Encyclopedia of POLITICAL THEORY



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Encyclopedia of POLITICAL THEORY

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Encyclopedia of POLITICAL THEORY

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SAGE reference
Los Angeles | London | New Delhi
Singapore | Washington DC

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E-mail: order@sagepub.com

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London EC1Y 1SP
United Kingdom

SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd.
B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044
India

SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd.
33 Pekin Street #02–01
Far East Square
Singapore 048763

Printed in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Encyclopedia of political theory / Mark Bevir, editor.
3 v. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4129-5865-3 (cloth)
1. Political science—Encyclopedias. I. Bevir, Mark.

JA61.E515 2010
320.01—dc22 2009037880

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

10 11 12 13 14 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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Preface

In discussing theoretical topics, professors and course textbooks often toss out the name of a theorist or make a sideways reference to a particular theory and move on. The students in their audience may want to learn more about the background to the reference in order to integrate it into their broader understanding. Librarians often have students approach them seeking a source to provide a quick overview of a particular theory or theorist with just the basics—the "who, what, where, how, and why." The *Encyclopedia of Political Theory* provides students with a quick, one-stop source.

While the encyclopedia will be a useful resource for students, political theory is something all humans engage in, and thus this reference book will also be relevant for a broader audience. Political theory refers to a particular academic discipline that includes the rigorous study of the history of our political ideas and the practices they have inspired and the rigorous study of future possibilities and the ideals that should guide our actions. Yet, all humans think about the world they live in, its history and future, and the ideals by which they want to live in relation to others. How we think today decisively influences the world of tomorrow. The encyclopedia might play a small part in bringing greater clarity and understanding to political debate.

The *Encyclopedia of Political Theory,* like all encyclopedias, can serve many purposes. Most obviously it provides summaries of the key topics in the field. Readers will find entries on the ideas of the major political theorists from before Plato to our own times, the main schools of political thought, the concepts and issues that have captured the imagination and attention of political theorists, and some of the main institutions and practices inspired by political thought. This preface describes the scope and organization of the entries and the aids by which readers can locate the information they need.

In addition, the *Encyclopedia of Political Theory* provides an organization of the current state of knowledge in the field. A particular view of political theory influenced both the structure of the encyclopedia and the selection criteria on the basis of which the entries were included. Current practices and trends in political theory appear in both the balance and the choice of entries. The short introduction that follows this preface describes the vision of political theory that guided the encyclopedia and its attempt to give a distinctive shape to current knowledge.

Scope and Organization

The *Encyclopedia of Political Theory* is a three-volume set containing 475 entries, totaling about a million words, and written by 369 international experts. The entries cover a range of theorists, schools, concepts, and topics. Most entries begin with a short definition or description of the topic before then giving more details. The entries on particular theorists often include some biographical details, but they generally emphasize the individuals' ideas, works, and contribution to political theory. Most entries include suggestions for further reading and cross-references to related entries elsewhere in the encyclopedia.

As well as individual entries, the encyclopedia contains additional sections that make it easier for readers to find what they are looking for, to explore adjacent issues, and to explore further afield. The Reader's Guide provides a thematic overview of entries, listing entries in at least 1 of 17 categories dealing with the history of political thought, theoretical perspectives in political

theory, central concepts in the field, and major political theories:

- Ancient Thought
- Applied Ethics
- Biographies
- Comparative Theory
- Constitutional Thought
- Critical Theory
- Democratic Thought
- Early Modern Thought
- Empirical Theory
- International Theory
- Justice
- Liberal Theory
- Medieval Thought
- Modern Theory
- Power and Authority
- Religious Thought
- Self and Community

Two appendixes contain additional resources for users. The Chronology of Political Theory helps readers to see how a given theorist, school, or issue fits into the bigger historical picture. The Web Resources might inspire readers to delve further into political ideas, the history behind them, and their implications for our world and what it might become.

User Aids

The right way to use the encyclopedia is, of course, that which you find most helpful and convenient. However, two of the main ways of accessing entries on a given topic are:

- Look up relevant words in the index.
- Browse the Reader's Guide.

And two of the main ways of pursuing further study on a given topic are:

- Follow the cross-references listed in the *See also* section at the end of each entry.
- Read the books and articles listed in the Further Readings section at the end of each entry.

Entries are arranged A through Z. They are cross-referenced when appropriate so as to guide readers to related material. Blind entries cover general topics that are dealt with in more specific entries as well as specific topics that have common, alternative headings. Enjoy!

Acknowledgments

An interdisciplinary and international cast of editors and contributors organized and wrote the encyclopedia. I thank them all. My special gratitude goes to Naomi Choi; she worked tirelessly to manage the project and ultimately bring it to fruition.

I also owe much to the editorial board members and the managing editors for their good humor and patience as Naomi and I bombarded them with requests. They helped to develop the list of entries, select contributors, chase missing bits and pieces, and then review entries. I would like to mention the specific topics on which they all worked. Entries on ancient political theory fell to Caroline Humfress, with the help of Toby Reiner. Jacob Levy was assisted by Ben Krupicka in dealing with entries relating to medieval thought and early modern thought. Colin Bird, aided by Asaf Kedar, organized modern political theory. Entries concerning comparative theory and empirical theory were arranged by Robert Adcock, supported by Yasmeen Daifallah. Paul Patton, helped by Tim Fisken, planned entries dealing with continental political theory. Simon Caney and Amanda Hollis-Brusky were responsible for contemporary political theory. Diana Axelsen, Jim Brace-Thompson, and Rolf Janke encouraged and assisted. Thank you to them and all those at Sage who helped to produce the encyclopedia.

Mark Bevir

Introduction

Politics refers to the actions and practices by which people conduct their public affairs and manage their collective lives together. Political theory is the more or less deliberate reflection on the nature of public affairs and collective decision making. It is both a science and an art—a science that aims at systematic knowledge, and an art that seeks to inspire practical activity to remake the world around us.

To define politics in relation to collective decision making is to emphasize that it extends beyond government to all forms of governance. The formal institutions of the state are part of politics, but so are policy-making processes, educational practices, trade negotiations, legal decisions, and many social relationships. Again, political theory may address constitutions and state formations, but it equally may address economic patterns, the distribution of power in society, the relations among cultures, or the logic of historical evolution.

It may be foolhardy to try to arrange human thought on all aspects of governance in a schema. Any such schema involves choices about what aspects of a complex pattern should be marked. Nonetheless, simplified diagrams may serve as useful maps, even as guides with which to begin to explore more unfamiliar terrain.

Political theory asks: How do we arrange our collective affairs? Why do we live together in the ways we do? How ought we to live together? These concerns helped to inspire the organization of this encyclopedia.

How do we arrange our collective affairs? Governments generally rest on distinct legal and political practices, religious and ethical ideas and values, and a distribution of power.

Many governments pay at least lip service to constitutional and democratic norms. The Reader's Guide includes specific lists of entries that deal with constitutional thought and democratic thought. There are entries on concepts that refer to distinctive norms and features of some governments, legal systems, and societies. Relevant concepts include federalism, kingship, representation, and oligarchy. One role of constitutional and democratic theories is to inform us about the distinctive features of certain political arrangements.

Generally laws and norms are supposed to embody moral values. These values often have religious roots. Equally, there have been many attempts to argue that religion and politics should be separate—render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's—and even to argue for ethical systems on grounds other than religious ones. The Reader's Guide covers religious thought as well as liberal theory and democratic thought.

Of course, laws and norms are not always the best guide to actual practices and behavior. Political theorists often examine the nature and distribution of power in all or some societies. The section in the Reader's Guide on power and authority lists entries such as domination, emancipation, and consent that refer to particular types of relations that can exist between people, whether rulers and ruled or distinct social groups.

It is worth emphasizing that our collective life is not confined to states. We are all part of a single world community with overlapping and interlocking concerns. For a while political theorists appeared preoccupied with arrangements within particular social and political units. Recently, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in global and transnational problems such as world poverty and climate change. The Reader's Guide embraces this development by including a list of entries that deal with international theory.

Why do we live together in the ways we do? Historically political theorists have recognized that people make their world in part by acting on their beliefs. The history of political ideas thus serves as a way of understanding the emergence of the

institutions and practices through which we govern and are governed. Political theory still contains much of this historicist conviction. Large parts of the encyclopedia are devoted to the history of ideas about government, ethics, and society. Thus, the Reader's Guide includes lists of entries on ancient thought, medieval thought, early modern thought, and modern thought. These sections offer a guide to the great thinkers from Plato to Marx, the broader traditions to which these thinkers contributed, and many of the ideas and topics that preoccupied them.

Recently political theorists have begun to emphasize the importance of extending their study of thinkers to other societies and cultures. Great political theory is clearly not something over which Europe enjoyed a monopoly. Multiculturalism and globalization have inspired a broader perspective that should always have been there. Political theory has a growing comparative dimension. Even more importantly, political theorists are slowly coming to realize that the exchange of ideas has never respected state or cultural boundaries, so political thinking has always been transnational, crossing the borders of nation-states and earlier still of empires and city-states. The Reader's Guide includes a list of entries that address comparative theory. Entries on comparative theorists, schools, concepts, and topics also appear under other headings in the guide. And many of the individual entries refer to appropriate transnational exchanges.

The historicism of so much political theory is no longer the dominant position it once was. Throughout the twentieth century, formal modes of explanation increasingly supplanted historical ones. Social science overwhelmingly rejected historical narratives in favor of appeals to structures, systems, models, correlations, and classifications. It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that today political theory remains the last refuge of historicists in departments of political science that are dominated by formal modes of thinking. The encyclopedia does not neglect the rise of formal and ahistorical modes of political thinking. The Reader's Guide includes a list of entries on empirical theory.

How ought we to live together? Throughout history, people have drawn on different ways of thinking to make arguments about how to govern collective affairs. Some arguments have appealed to historical or formal accounts of contemporary problems to point to particular solutions. Other arguments have derived more universal blueprints from religious theories, or apparently rational or neutral assumptions. Yet other arguments have focused primarily on the procedures by which we should decide how to respond to problems, whether through expert knowledge, votes among representatives, or more direct forms of democracy. The Reader's Guide covers these kinds of arguments under topics that have already been mentioned, including empirical theory, religious thought, liberal theory, and democratic theory.

Accounts of how we ought to live together characteristically address normative issues that appear under other headings in the Reader's Guide. Typically they offer or imply a view of the relationship between self and community; they point toward a vision of justice—a way of distributing rights, wealth, goods, and duties. In addition, they often draw on the view of self, community, and justice to take stances on a range of issues in applied ethics. Finally, critical theory sometimes challenges settled responses to such issues. Critical theorists often attempt to show the contingency and contestability—the ugly origins—of conventional morality. They hope thereby to open up novel spaces for transgression and transformation.

The question of how we should live together is intimately connected with those about how we live together and why we do so. Any division between these questions is somewhat artificial, as people's views on one are bound to influence their views on the others. Readers will thus find considerable overlap between the headings in the Reader's Guide. Democratic thought is as much about how we should conduct ourselves as about how we do. Modern political thought includes guides to what we should do as much as information about why we do things. Critical theory is at least as concerned to explain why we do what we do as it is to open the way for new alternatives.

Indeed political theorists are often asking yet another question. How do we get from here to there? How do we get from where we are to where we want to be? The question of "what is to be done" inspires much political thinking. To answer it, we need to discuss where we are and why we are there as well as where we want to go. I hope the encyclopedia will contribute to such discussions, for it seems to me that we badly need greater clarity and dialogue on our collective concerns.

Mark Bevir

A

Abortion

Abortion is a general term for several different medical procedures that terminate a woman's pregnancy. From a political theory perspective, abortion connotes a dimension of a woman's right to control her own body and to exercise her right to autonomy.

Historical Context

Women from many different cultures have been using folk methods for contraceptive and abortion purposes for centuries. By the turn of the twentieth century, laws in effect throughout the United States made abortion illegal. Significant numbers of women nevertheless continued to seek abortions; it is estimated that as many as one million abortions were performed each year during the 1950s and 1960s. Although the rise of sexual permissiveness is sometimes narrowly associated with the 1960s counterculture, women from all walks of life placed a new emphasis on controlling their reproduction at this time as they entered the workforce and higher education in unprecedented numbers and asserted their right to satisfying intimate relationships.

As long as abortion remained illegal, however, only wealthy women with ready access to medical specialists were able to obtain a safe abortion; thousands of other women, who were desperately determined to terminate their pregnancies, risked humiliating treatment and unsafe conditions as they resorted to dangerous folk methods and unlicensed practitioners. With the decriminalization of abortion—in the United States, the landmark decision, *Roe v. Wade,* was handed down in 1973—abortion-related injuries and deaths became quite rare.

Abortion opponents from the religious right wing have successfully turned back these reproductive rights gains in some key respects; for example, they have outlawed some medically necessary abortion procedures, prohibited the use of federal funds for abortion services, and banned foreign aid contributions to any organization that is deemed to be "promoting" or performing abortions.

Feminist Positions on Abortion

The "second wave" of feminist activists of the 1960s to the 1990s made free abortion on demand a central plank of its social justice agenda. Liberal feminists tend to regard abortion within the framework of the individual's right to privacy and the right to autonomous self-determination without arbitrary interference from the state. They understand these rights as flowing from the individual's ownership of his or her own body. Where religious conservatives seek to limit abortion access, liberal feminists insist on the containment of religious morality within the private realm of individual self-determination.

Radical feminists support the liberal feminist demand for the right to privacy. However, they also hold that men as a class strive to control women as a class. They believe that male-dominated

institutions, such as the patriarchal family, organized religions, the government, and the courts, seek to restrict women's autonomy to further larger efforts designed to relegate women to second-class citizenship. In this regard, radical feminists argue that abortion restrictions and violence against women (domestic violence, workplace sexual harassment, and rape) complement each other insofar as both impose gender-specific burdens. Both phenomena are so widespread and impose such severe obstacles that they constitute a systemic obstacle to gender justice. Consequently, radical feminists do not accept the liberal feminist idea that reproductive justice merely requires the removal of the legal barriers to abortion. They contend that genuine reproductive justice requires the dismantling of the entire gender privilege system and a complete revolution in men's attitudes toward women.

Socialist feminists, like radical feminists, consider abortion politics from both the individualist and structural perspectives. They, too, accept the liberal feminist premise that the individual woman should have the right to control her own reproduction and that abortion restrictions relegate women to second-class status. However, they pay close attention to the ways in which reproductive issues and the capitalist system intersect. Following the lead of Emma Goldman, they believe that birth control and abortion rights are key to the liberation of poor working women from the drudgery of numerous pregnancies and the economic burden of supporting large families.

Socialist feminists also point to the fact that when abortion was illegal, poor women suffered the most from lack of access and abortion-related injury. Since 1973, women who lack private medical insurance have been the most likely among all women to have unintended pregnancies; as a result, the abortion rate among low-income women remains much greater than the rate for their wealthier counterparts. With feminists who are women of color, socialist feminists are quite critical of the ways in which the hospitals serving poor minority women tend to offer substandard and culturally insensitive care.

From the perspective of these two groups of feminists, women's "double burden"—that of working for wages and performing most of the unpaid domestic labor in the home relating to child rearing—becomes all the more acute for the low-income women who cannot control their reproduction. In addition, these two groups of feminists also take a much broader view of abortion rights than their radical and liberal feminist counterparts. Attacking compulsory sterilization, unsafe working conditions, and poverty programs that make child rearing quite difficult, they call for a holistic form of reproductive justice that would allow even the most disempowered woman to make two complementary sets of choices freely, according to her own values: to control her body by preventing conception and terminating unwanted pregnancies and to bear and raise healthy children. From this perspective, reproductive justice necessitates, in addition to the availability of contraception and safe and legal abortions, a universal health care entitlement, culturally sensitive health care services, living-wage job opportunities, family-friendly workplaces, and adequate subsidized child care.

Anna Marie Smith

See also Autonomy; Feminism; Gender; Liberty

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Absolutism

Although it need not refer only to monarchical rule, absolutism usually refers to royal absolutism. The rise and peak of the age of royal absolutism is usually located in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, particularly in France and among

such men as Jean Bodin, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, and Louis XIV. The term *absolutism,* however, entered political discourse only in the eighteenth century, a century sometimes associated with enlightened absolutism. Absolutism is essentially a doctrine about the absence of limits to royal power. It is not, strictly speaking, a doctrine about the origins of royal power: Although absolutist claims were often tied to the doctrine of the divine right of kings, they were also compatible with some variants of contractarianism. Like arguments for constitutionalism or limited government, absolutist arguments have many of their roots in the discourse of canonists and Romanists regarding papal and imperial power.

At its simplest, absolutism claimed the completeness of royal power and the independence of royal power from human limits: The king was bound by God's laws and nature's laws but not by human laws. Subjects were bound to obey the king's commands and to not actively resist royal power exercised in conformity with divine law. Institutionally, the doctrine of absolutism aimed to free royal power from supervision by, or subjection to, other human powers, including royal subjects, estates, parliaments, the hereditary nobility, and the church. Conceptually, however, absolutists insisted on the distinction between absolute royal power and arbitrary, despotic, or tyrannical power. A proper monarch respected the property of his or her subjects and even the fundamental laws of the land (although these could be interpreted rather minimally and as strengthening royal power). In this conceptual aspect, Hobbes stands at the limits of absolutist thought.

While it is important to situate absolutism in contrast to constitutionalism, it is also important to grasp the emergence of absolutism, and absolutist discourse, within the broader context of the rise of the state in a European system of states. In the fifteenth century, and perhaps before, national kingdoms invoked Latin maxims such as *princeps legibus solutus est* (The prince is not bound by the laws) and *rex imperator in regno suo est* (The king is emperor in his own kingdom) as they sought to undermine the universalist claims of the empire and papacy. Indeed, the very idea of sovereignty, so central to the modern conception of the state, was not systematically addressed until Bodin. Consequently, it is also important to relate absolutism to the emergence of *raison d'état* and to such thinkers as Machiavelli.

Mark Antaki

See also Bodin, Jean; Divine Right of Kings; Hobbes, Thomas; Reason of State; Sovereignty; State

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ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability can be defined in the following manner: When people are meant to pursue the will and/or interests of others, they should give an account of their actions to those others so that those others are then able to decide whether to reward or to censure them for the actions. Accountability thus suggests that an agent (such as an elected politician or a civil servant) is responsible for acting on behalf of a principal (such as, respectively, a citizen or minister) to whom he or she should respond and report. The principal is thereby able to hold the agent accountable for his or her actions.

A Conceptual History

The word *accountability* derives from the Latin word *computare,* which literally meant "to count" and which referred mainly to bookkeeping and other types of financial record keeping. As we have seen, however, the word *accountability* now has a more general sense of "giving an account of oneself." As such, it overlaps considerably with concepts like responsibility and liability.

Prior to the twentieth century, indeed, accountability rarely appeared in dictionaries. The emphasis fell instead on responsible and representative

government. Political theorists generally conceived of representative democracy as a historical achievement, and, in their opinion, the civil society (or stage of civilization) that sustained representative democracy also would support the moral ideals and behavior that made for responsible government. Responsibility referred here to the character of politicians and officials at least as much as to their relationship to the public. Politicians and officials had a duty to respond to the demands, wishes, and needs of the people. To act responsibly was to act so as to promote the common good rather than to seek personal advantage. To act responsibly was to overcome petty factionalism so as to pursue the national interest.

The word accountability rose to prominence in the early twentieth century. At that time, World War I precipitated a loss of faith in the belief that nations progressed toward statehood, a liberal civil society, representative democracy, and also responsible government. Political scientists began to describe the nation as fragmented. They began to portray democracy less as a suitable means of realizing a common good and more as a contest among classes and factions. Equally, political scientists themselves appeared to be providing a neutral, scientific expertise. Social science could show us what policies would best produce whatever results and values democratic representatives decided they wished to pursue. Hence, a neutral bureaucracy appeared to be a possible check on political factionalism.

In this bureaucratic narrative, politics and administration appeared to be separate activities. The political process generated values and decisions. Public officials provided a politically neutral expertise to formulate and implement policies that were in accord with these values and decisions. The bureaucratic narrative thereby made responsibility seem less important than political and administrative accountability.

Political and Administrative Accountability

Political accountability involves politicians being held to account through the institutions of representative democracy. Legislators are accountable to the voters, who periodically decide whether or not to return them to office. The executive—especially presidents in political systems with a strong separation of powers—can also be directly accountable to the electorate. Alternatively, the executive—especially prime ministers in Westminster systems—can be held accountable by a legislature that is capable of revoking its authority. In practice, these forms of political accountability are fairly weak, for while politicians and governments can be voted out of office, they typically control knowledge, agendas, and resources in ways that make them more powerful than those who seek to hold them to account.

Administrative accountability is an ideal within bureaucratic hierarchies. Bureaucratic hierarchies are meant to clearly define a specialized, functional division of labor. They are meant to specify clear roles to individuals within the decision-making process, thereby making it possible to identify who is responsible for what. Typically, individual officials are thus directly answerable to their superiors (and ultimately their political masters) for their actions. Administrative accountability also occurs through ombudsmen and other judicial means for investigating maladministration and corruption.

If administrative accountability appears stronger than political accountability, it nonetheless remains a blunt tool. Administrative accountability provides a theoretical account of how to apportion blame and seek redress in cases of maladministration. Critics of the bureaucratic narrative complain, however, that it does not provide an adequate way of assessing different levels of performance. Moreover, administrative accountability has come to appear increasingly implausible as an account of that actual policy process. The involvement of diverse private, voluntary, and public sector actors in the formulation and delivery of policies and services makes it increasingly difficult to say who should be held accountable for what. Hence, recent discussions of accountability often shift the emphasis from the procedural accountability we have just discussed to new concepts of performance accountability.

Performance Accountability

Performance accountability identifies legitimacy primarily with satisfaction with outputs. In doing so, it sidesteps the problems associated with procedural accountability. For example, if the state is judged by its outputs, then there is less need to

cling to the illusion of a distinction between the administrative and political domains. Similarly, if we focus on performance, we can be less concerned that the actions of the agent are overseen and judged by the principal.

Although the shift from procedural to performance accountability solves some problems, it remains extremely controversial. Prominent debates concern how we should conceive of performance accountability and whether or not performance accountability adequately reflects our democratic values.

Let us look at the question of how to conceive of performance accountability. Sometimes, performance accountability is understood in quasi-market terms: Citizens act as customers, and they express their satisfaction by buying or selecting services delivered by one agency rather than another. In practice, however, public agencies often lack the kind of pricing mechanisms, profit levels, and hard budgets that are believed to make the market an indicator of customer satisfaction.

Hence, an alternative way of conceiving of performance accountability is in terms of measurements of outputs. Targets, benchmarks, and other standards and indicators provide a basis for monitoring and even auditing the performance of public agencies. Finally, performance accountability can be embedded in horizontal exchanges among a system of actors. Whereas procedural accountability privileged vertical relationships such as those of public officials and their political masters, performance accountability is equally at home within horizontal relationships in which various actors provide checks and balances on one another.

Consider also the fit between performance accountability and our democratic values. For many people, democracy is not just a matter of people being happy with the performance of their government. Democracy requires that citizens participate in making decisions and oversee their implementation. If we take these democratic values seriously, then, surely, proper accountability requires clear-cut arrangements such that particular officials and politicians should be answerable respectively to elected politicians and to citizens for their actions and decisions.

Historically, the concept of accountability has required fairly specific answers to questions such as: Who is accountable? To whom are they accountable? For what are they accountable? Yet, as policy making and policy implementation become increasingly shared among multiple actors, the answers to these questions are becoming less and less clear. Who is accountable? The more we accept that decisions are made by many actors, the harder it becomes to believe in the fiction of attributing causation and responsibility to one specific actor. To whom are they accountable? To say that policymakers ought to be accountable to the public is perhaps to assume the public has a more homogeneous voice than it actually does. For what are they accountable? If elected politicians promote a policy, should they be accountable for its implementation by other actors over whom they have little control? Conversely, if a government agency implements a law correctly, but the law undermines performance, then should the agency be accountable for that? If the concept of accountability once played an important part in democratic theory, it seems increasingly hard to apply to political practice, and yet, with the exception of the rather vapid idea of performance accountability, we do not appear to have found any substitute for it.

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See also Bureaucracy; Democracy; Governance; Representative Democracy

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Affirmative Action

Although there is no universally agreed upon definition of affirmative action, the phrase usually

refers to policies aimed at ensuring that members of historically disadvantaged groups are among those selected for competitively awarded benefits, such as college or university admission, employment, and government contracts. Affirmative action originated during the civil rights movement in the United States as a policy to end discrimination against African Americans. Since then, other groups have been targeted to benefit from affirmative action, such as women, Native Americans, Hispanics, and some other immigrant groups. Always controversial, affirmative action polices have been accompanied by philosophical, legal, and political battles that largely have developed into a stalemate.

History

In its original sense, affirmative action meant taking active steps to ensure nondiscrimination. The phrase *affirmative action* was first used in an executive order by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, directing federal contractors to employ applicants without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin. In this context, affirmative action simply meant that employers had not merely a "negative" duty not to discriminate but also a positive (affirmative) duty to take steps (action) to ensure that members of traditionally excluded groups—particularly African Americans—did not face discrimination in hiring or in the terms of their employment.

In subsequent years, as the federal government sought to enforce antidiscrimination policies, especially after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, affirmative action took the form of goals and timetables to achieve representation of certain groups in rough proportion to their presence in the labor market. Such numerical goals, it was argued, provided the only way to know whether employers were fulfilling their legal duty to employ qualified members of minority groups. At the same time, many colleges and universities voluntarily sought to increase the presence of minorities and women among their students. By the early 1970s, the contemporary meaning of affirmative action was in place: It referred to policies that sought to increase participation of minorities and women in higher education, employment, and government contracts.

These policies were immediately controversial. To its supporters, affirmative action represented the logical extension of the Civil Rights Movement, which, in their view, sought to end the second-class citizenship of African Americans (and, by extension, other traditionally disadvantaged groups). They saw affirmative action as necessary to achieve the full and equal participation of all citizens in the major institutions of society. To its critics, affirmative action policies betrayed American ideals and the ideals of the civil rights movement. In their view, the movement aimed at ending the use of race to discriminate and sought to establish a color-blind society in which people are judged by their individual characteristics, not their group membership. In subsequent decades, the debate over affirmative action has involved the elaboration of these two basic views.

Arguments in Favor

Arguments in support of affirmative action are often divided into two categories: those that are backward looking, in that they justify affirmative action by reference to the past; and those that are forward looking, in that they emphasize the desirable goals or ends that affirmative action policies achieve.

The main backward-looking argument sees affirmative action policies as a form of compensation for the history of injustice faced by African Americans and members of other minority groups. This discrimination and other forms of subordination and segregation constitute a violation of the rights of the individuals affected and therefore call for compensation. The history of unjust treatment makes it likely that individuals who are members of these groups are less well off than they would have been in the absence of unjust treatment, and affirmative action compensates them by ensuring that minorities and women are represented in the major institutions of society that confer money, status, and power. Furthermore, affirmative action has the advantage, advocates argue, of paying compensation with "goods" (jobs, contracts, and admission to college or university) to which no one has yet established a title. This should make the payment of compensation more palatable than payment with goods that people already possess, such as redistribution of money through taxes.

Over time the emphasis in arguments for affirmative action has shifted away from the compensatory rationale for three reasons. First, affirmative action policies have grown to encompass groups that cannot point to as clear a history of injustice as that of African Americans. Second, with the passage of time, the period during which racial injustice was most widely and publicly practiced recedes further into the past. Third, in its first major affirmative action decision (*Regents of the University of California v. Bakke*), the U.S. Supreme Court declared in 1978 that a general history of discrimination was insufficient to justify an affirmative action policy. As a result, any legal argument for affirmative action must find support on other grounds.

The forward-looking rationale, which the Supreme Court accepted and which many affirmative action advocates have embraced, is diversity. In higher education, the Court said, the educational benefits enjoyed by students as a result of a diverse student body may justify the use of race as a consideration in admissions. At the same time, the Court added, while considering race as one factor among many is permissible, specific quotas are not.

Other forward-looking considerations have been advanced by advocates of affirmative action: that it creates role models for other members of historically disadvantaged groups, encouraging them to see themselves as capable of achieving positions of power and status; that it is necessary to achieve social equality; that it is needed to overcome persistent and ongoing, if subtle or even unconscious, forms of discrimination; and that race, ethnicity, or gender can, under some circumstances, be considered a qualification for employment or admission to a college or university. In all of these cases, proponents argue that justice requires, or social utility is advanced by, taking race, ethnicity, and/or gender into account in awarding positions and contracts.

Arguments Against

Critics of affirmative action have responded to these arguments and have advanced some additional considerations. Against the compensatory argument, two responses have been prominent. First, it has been argued that it is impossible to know what any specific individual's condition would have been in the absence of the history of discrimination. If this is so, then it cannot be known whether any particular individual is entitled to compensation through affirmative action. Second, opponents argue that affirmative action is most likely to benefit the better-off members of the targeted groups. For example, in university admissions, middle- and upper-class African Americans are more likely to be in a position to win admission to a selective school under its affirmative action policy. Hence, it is argued, affirmative action tends to benefit those who have been least harmed by the history of discrimination, those in the targeted group least in need of compensation.

Regarding the forward-looking considerations, critics have argued that affirmative action policies often fail to achieve the benefits promised by their advocates. For example, with regard to diversity, critics charge that race itself is not a good proxy for distinctiveness of outlook or experience. If it is true that middle- and upper-class blacks are more likely to be the beneficiaries of affirmative action in higher education, for example, then their experiences and social background are likely to be similar to those of their white classmates.

Critics also claim that affirmative action has negative consequences that outweigh whatever benefits it might achieve. First, by taking account of race, ethnicity, and gender, affirmative action sacrifices merit, qualifications, and high standards. Second, it lowers the incentives for members of targeted groups to work hard because they receive preferential treatment. Third, affirmative action is divisive, pitting members of different racial and ethnic groups against each other in a competition for scarce desirable positions. It thereby creates resentment and the perception that members of targeted groups are receiving undeserved and unfair advantages.

Finally, critics argue that affirmative action harms two groups in particular: its intended beneficiaries and the most vulnerable members of nontargeted groups. Affirmative action is said to harm its intended beneficiaries in a number of ways: It reinforces stereotypes that some groups cannot succeed on their own efforts and merits; it undermines the self-confidence and self-respect of beneficiaries, who do not know whether they did or could succeed without preferential treatment; and

it places beneficiaries in settings, such as schools, for which they are not well prepared.

The other main harm, according to critics, is to the more disadvantaged members of the nontargeted groups under affirmative action. These will tend to be the people who, in the absence of affirmative action, might have received the admission or job in question but are denied these benefits under policies that prefer members of other groups. These individuals—poor whites, for example—are unlikely to have benefited from past discrimination against others, and yet, they are in essence asked to shoulder the burden of rectifying the society's historic injustice. At the same time, they are likely to have overcome obstacles and to contribute to diversity—perhaps more than relatively privileged members of targeted groups.

Mend It or End It?

In light of the controversial nature of this issue, it is unsurprising that both supporters and opponents have proposed modifications of, or alternatives to, affirmative action. In 1995, the administration of President Bill Clinton issued a review of the federal government's affirmative action policies and proposed changes to them, without eliminating them entirely. Clinton urged the government to mend these policies by, for example, revising minority set-asides for federal contracting to comply with Supreme Court rulings requiring that such policies be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

In 2003, the Supreme Court stepped in again. In a pair of cases involving the University of Michigan, the Court struck down the undergraduate admissions system, which added points to an applicant's score if he or she was a member of a group targeted by its affirmative action policy. The Court upheld, however, the law school's less rigid system of taking race into account as a "plus factor" without quantifying the degree to which this helped the applicant's odds of admission. At the same time, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority of the Court, stated that race-based affirmative action policies should be seen as temporary and that she expected they would no longer be needed in 25 years. Some observers saw O'Connor's statement as naively optimistic, but others interpreted it, not as a prediction about the society's likely progress toward racial equality, but as a statement that the court would not support affirmative action indefinitely.

In response to Supreme Court rulings narrowing the scope of affirmative action policies, as well as to the political climate, others have proposed alternatives. One proposal is to eliminate race-based affirmative action policies, which seem particularly unpopular and divisive, and replace them with class-based affirmative action. Advocates argue that this would allow the benefits of affirmative action to be directed to individuals who have truly been disadvantaged and have overcome adversity.

Some states have replaced race-based affirmative action in the admissions process of their public colleges and universities with policies that guarantee admission to one of the state's flagship campuses for high school students graduating near the top (usually the top 10%) of their class. This type of policy relies on residential segregation to ensure the admission of racial and ethnic minorities. Critics charge that such policies rob colleges and universities of their institutional autonomy and often result in the admission of students who are less well prepared than those who would have been admitted under race-based affirmative action.

Some have proposed that colleges and universities rely less heavily in their admissions process on standardized test scores. Proponents argue that tests such as the SAT and ACT are not the objective measures of merit that they are often assumed to be and that the opposition between merit and affirmative action is a false one. They advocate eliminating or reducing the role of test scores and engaging in a more holistic evaluation of each applicant. Critics argue that standardized tests are in fact a good predictor of academic performance and that, in any case, this proposal is not practicable in light of the large number of applications that many institutions receive.

Affirmative Action and Justice

Affirmative action policies bear on broader issues of justice because they help shape the distribution of benefits and burdens, opportunities and constraints, among members of society. The principle of justice most relevant to affirmative action is equality of opportunity, and it is noteworthy that both proponents and critics of affirmative action

appeal to (a version of) this principle. To proponents, equality of opportunity requires affirmative action in order to take account of disadvantages that members of some groups face. To its critics, equality of opportunity requires individuals to be formally treated equally and judged according to their merits.

If affirmative action is a compensatory policy, then it is related to the topics of historic injustice and transitional justice. To its supporters, affirmative action is needed as a response to the historic injustices of slavery and discrimination suffered by African Americans, as well as the disadvantages historically imposed on other groups. Hence, affirmative action raises questions of what a society may do in attempting to overcome the injustices of its past—to what extent should policy explicitly take account of that past, and how should the costs involved be distributed?

In yet a different light, affirmative action can be seen in its forward-looking guise as an attempt to pursue equality and diversity. In this respect, affirmative action is one instance of a more general issue, namely, to what extent should public policy and institutional practice take account of individuals' membership in groups defined by race, ethnicity, and gender? In this way, affirmative action intersects with issues in race theory, multiculturalism, the politics of difference, and feminism.

Andrew Valls

See also Civil Rights; Difference Theories; Equality of Opportunity; Feminism; Historic Injustice; Justice, Theories of; Multiculturalism; Politics of Recognition; Race Theory; Transitional Justice

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African Socialism

African socialism was a doctrine adopted by a range of African leaders at the close of French and British colonial rule, a period of great optimism about Africa's potential. As African countries gained independence, anticolonial nationalism could no longer play the unifying and mobilizing role that it had in the early 1950s. African socialism became a mobilizing slogan to unite Africans around the challenge of development in their postcolonial societies. The communal basis of most African precolonial societies and the absence of a private property tradition provided the material and ideological basis on which African leaders could point to an indigenous African path to socialism, one that seemingly offered a third way between Western capitalism and Soviet communism. This entry looks at both early theories and eventual implementation.

Early Expressions

Unlike Marxism, a materialist historical method based on a well-established body of theoretical literature, African socialism emerged rapidly as an eclectic and pragmatic approach to development. Its best-known proponents included Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia of Senegal, Sékou Touré of Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Tom Mboya of Kenya, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.

A Colloquium on Policies of Development and African Approaches to Socialism, held in Dakar in December 1962, failed to produce a clear definition

or a unified vision. The diverse participants interpreted African socialism to reflect the varied needs of their respective countries. They generally agreed, however, that precolonial Africa's communal values and the relative absence of classes and class struggle should form the basis for an African path of development. Three main themes were emphasized: African identity, economic development, and class formation and social control.

Senghor, probably the first to use the term, argued that Western and Soviet materialism should be replaced with values rooted in the continent's precolonial collective tradition. This African socialism should draw on *negritude,* the celebration of black culture and the African personality. Dia saw African socialism as a synthesis of individual and socialist values producing a humanist outlook that would harmonize with Christian and Muslim beliefs and allow Africa to follow its own trajectory, independent of the West or the Soviet bloc. For the pan-Africanist George Padmore, African socialism was part of a threefold revolutionary movement encompassing national self-determination, social revolution, and continental unity. African socialism should begin with communal land ownership and cooperative agriculture, along with joint state and private initiatives to build the economy. The party's task was to unite all sections of society behind these development goals.

Implementation and Outcomes

Despite the belief that African socialism was rooted in the continent's precolonial tradition, the approach was applied to societies that had been markedly transformed by the colonial experience in varied ways, making the application of a single doctrine problematic. On independence in 1957, Ghana became a beacon for pan-African unity and African socialism. Unlike most proponents of African socialism, who gave primacy to rural development, Nkrumah stressed the large-scale development of energy resources as a means of rapid industrialization. But Ghana quickly became heavily indebted, and Nkrumah became increasingly intolerant of criticism. In 1964, he declared himself to be president for life and banned opposition parties. He was overthrown in 1966.

Guinea became independent in far more difficult conditions. Once it accepted France's offer of independence in 1958, it faced the complete pullout of the French colonial apparatus and civil service. Guinea's African socialism was premised on the development of state-run mechanized farms and market controls. But Guinea lacked the educated personnel for state-led development; at independence, it had fewer than 50 university graduates, a legacy of colonial policy. Its state farms foundered, and price controls alienated peasants and traders, who smuggled produce into neighboring countries where they obtained higher prices for their goods. As social discontent mounted, Touré's rule became increasingly centralized and authoritarian, and he remained in power until his death in 1984.

In contrast to Nkrumah's emphasis on state-led development projects, Julius Nyerere, the doctrine's best-known East African advocate, stressed village-level development. But Nyerere shared Nkrumah's belief in a one-party state, arguing that class divisions were foreign to Africa, that their development should be suppressed, and that social differences could be reconciled within a single party. Capitalism was premised on exploitation and Marxism on class conflict, Nyerere contended. Socialist and democratic values were part of Africa's past, when all members of society contributed to production, and wealth was distributed horizontally rather than vertically.

As leader of Tanzania, the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed in April 1964, Nyerere promoted the idea of *ujamaa* or familyhood, in which the extended family was the building block of African development. The 1967 Arusha Declaration promoted *ujamaa,* self-reliance, and austerity as the key planks of African socialism. Nyerere launched a program of villagization, the forced relocation of rural people into collective and cooperative villages, as the basis for economic development. But this proved politically unpopular and economically nonviable. Once again, the peasants resisted the state's external interventions.

A. M. Babu, an influential critic, was imprisoned by Nyerere between 1972 and 1978. In prison, he wrote a significant appraisal of African socialism that was smuggled out of the country and later published as *African Socialism or Socialist Africa?* Babu contended that African socialists, like other African leaders, had pursued export-oriented strategies that perpetuated Africa's

dependency on foreign investment and foreign aid. He called for working-class organization and for the development of Africa's productive forces. Babu's critique signalled the intellectual demise of African socialism, but the doctrine's practical end was already seen in its failed economic projects and the repressive one-party regimes wielding power in its name. Once in authority, African socialists proved no more democratic than their conservative counterparts.

African socialism should be distinguished from a later wave of attempts to apply Marxist-Leninist principles to African development, known as Afrocommunism, which asserted the salience of class struggle and closer alignment with the Soviet bloc.

Allison Drew

See also Colonialism; Ideology; Marxism; Pan-Africanism; Socialism

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Agency

Agency is an important concept for political studies because it denotes the property or capacity of actors to make things happen. Political activities are carried out by agents, whose agency inheres in their power to produce effects. In politics, agency is generally reserved for human actors, and more controversially, it is sometimes attributed only to particular categories of person. Although they are often treated as synonymous, human agency and political agency are not necessarily identical: Niccolò Machiavelli and Max Weber, for example, contend that rulers require special political capacities in the art of statecraft.

Although the term *agency* is mainly used in quite a straightforward way, its presuppositions are widely contested. Who counts as an agent; what kinds of ability are deemed necessary for agency (are these, for example, biased in terms of gender or ethnicity?), and how effective agents are in determining political outcomes, all remain sources of disagreement. Because of the close association between agency and conceptions of what it means to be human, agency is implicated in some of the most contentious issues posed by contemporary political philosophers, and one's understanding of agency will have important implications for one's sense of the political.

Approaches to Agency

The most common approach to agency is one that sees agents as individuals and politics as a realm constituted by individual agents. Their agency is ascribed to certain characteristics, among which rationality is typically privileged. In rational choice approaches, agents are perceived as decision makers with the rational capacity to make strategic choices. From this perspective, all citizens might be regarded as political agents (for instance, as voters), although it is often more interesting to consider elite actors, whose decisions carry more weight.

Others, in particular those inspired by Kantian philosophy, focus on the moral agency that is involved in being held accountable for one's acts and being capable of assuming responsibilities and duties as well as bearing rights. Exercising moral agency requires autonomy, freedom, and logical or reflective capacities to guide normative decisions.

Sometimes, organizations are treated as rational agents, while in international relations, it is common to find states being treated as agents that

make decisions about national interests. Most exponents of individualist approaches would nonetheless maintain that individual decision makers within organizations or states are the ultimate source of agency.

Some Critiques

Despite their prevalence, these rather formal approaches to agency incite significant critical objections, among which three are especially salient. First, agency may be recognized as a historical and particularly modern phenomenon, which suggests that it may accordingly be lost as well as gained. Thinkers since Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill have worried about a decline of agentic capacity in modern democracies. Once one considers empirical individuals operating within concrete political conditions, moreover, it becomes evident that they do not all enjoy equal or identical capacities for agency. In the history of political thought, many categories of human—notably children, women, laborers, imbeciles, criminals, and members of particular racial or ethno-religious groups—have been deemed deficient in such abilities and therefore regarded as naturally passive or dependent members of society rightfully excluded from exercising political power.

But since the eighteenth century, agency has mainly been considered an acquisition fostered through education, socialization, and experience, thus provoking demands for their provision as a route to more inclusive models of citizenship. The means to acquire agency and the right to exercise it have therefore become significant political issues in their own right.

Second, some critics contest assumptions that political agency inheres primarily in individuals. Marxists argue that individual agency is both a specifically bourgeois ideal and limited by social structures, while historical agency is exercised by classes, among which the working class is privileged. A proletarian revolution would be the first time a class exercised full agency, inasmuch as its historical efficacy would be matched by its acting rationally and consciously (as a class in and for itself) to engender social change. Critics argue, on the one hand, that such an account relies on a teleological view of history and, on the other, that it is nonsensical to endow classes with agency because their mobilization depends on the individuals who comprise them.

Third, questions about agency are often encountered theoretically in the context of the structure-agency debate. Advocates of structuralist approaches to politics and society argue that history is not made by individuals (or by classes exhibiting agency) but is a consequence of structural imperatives. Individuals take up pre-existing roles and mainly reproduce structures they neither choose nor question. Whatever their intentions, furthermore, these have unforeseen consequences once their acts encounter other acts, resulting in a largely anonymous outcome. The resulting structures may nonetheless exhibit an underlying logic or direction of their own.

The danger here is that structures may themselves seem to evince agency insofar as they render individual practices congruent with their systemic requirements. More dialectical thinkers insist on reciprocity between agents and structures, with each constituting and circumscribing the other, although critical realists insist on their separation for analytical purposes. A more phenomenological approach might study the hazardous appearing of capacities for agency without guaranteeing their emergence or deciding in advance who will bear them. Some poststructuralists argue that from the perspective of this conception of the fragility of agency, traditional notions are little more than delusions of subjectivist potency. It is also important to distinguish between *capacities* for agency and *opportunities* for exercising it because closed political regimes may afford little scope for agents to act.

Diana Coole

See also Class; Durkheim, Émile; Marxism; Methodological Individualism; Rational Choice Theory; Structuralism; Structure

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Agonism

Agonism emphasizes the importance of conflict to politics. This can take a descriptive form, in which conflict is argued to be a necessary feature of all political systems, or a normative form, in which conflict is held to have some special value such that it is important to maintain conflicts within political systems. Frequently, the descriptive and normative forms are combined in the argument that, because conflict is a necessary feature of politics, attempts to eliminate conflict from politics will have negative consequences.

The descriptive form of agonism can be seen in William Connolly's criticism of pluralism in political science. Pluralist theorists of the 1950s and 1960s had described the American political system as one in which politics provided an arena in which diverse groups can each equally advocate for their preferred policies, eventually leading to consensus. Connolly criticized this theory for ignoring the differences of power between different groups within American society, which meant that politics was not simply a process for producing consensus, but rather a conflict that might result in some groups imposing their preferred policies on others. Connolly has since advocated what he calls "agonistic respect," which sees this conflict as something to be maintained, rather than something to be overcome through consensus.

Chantal Mouffe, on the other hand, arrives at agonism by taking issue with the normative presuppositions of contemporary liberalism, particularly John Rawls's idea that a "reasonable pluralism" is a *sine qua non* of a liberal democratic political order. According to Rawls, any liberal polity must respect the fact that citizens will differ as to their conceptions of the good; the pluralism that a society must tolerate, however, is limited, according to Rawls, by a requirement of reasonableness, that is, the requirement that citizens do not seek to impose their own conception of the good on others who do not share it. Mouffe finds this restriction unacceptable because it lays down, as an ethical principle that precedes politics, a restriction on conceptions of the good, which ought to be decided *within* politics. For Mouffe, politics must involve differences about which people are not content merely to agree to differ; a properly political pluralism must countenance different positions that are genuinely incompatible with one another, that is to say, positions that may come into conflict with one another. For Mouffe, when Rawls attempts to neutralize such conflict by declaring it "unreasonable," he thereby declares politics itself unreasonable.

Mouffe derives this understanding of the importance of conflict to politics from Carl Schmitt. According to Schmitt, the defining feature of the political is the identification of a friend and an enemy and the ensuing conflict between them. Mouffe goes along with Schmitt's argument that conflict is essential to the political but argues that conflict need not involve the identification of an enemy whom one wants to destroy. Instead, Mouffe sees the political as a conflict between adversaries, who may disagree but ultimately respect one another's right to exist. Mouffe calls this kind of respectful conflict agonistic pluralism in contrast to both the antagonism of Schmitt's struggle to destruction against an enemy and to the reasonable (and hence, with conflict ruled out, nonagonistic) pluralism of Rawls.

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See also Disagreement; Pluralism; Rawls, John; Schmitt, Carl

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Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr (c. 870–950 CE)

Abu Nasr Al-Farabi (c. 870–950 CE) hailed from central Asia but trained and worked in Baghdad. He was the most influential member of a group of

thinkers sometimes called the "Baghdad Peripatetics," who were mostly Christians. Al-Farabi was unusual in this group not only because he was a Muslim, but also for his emphasis on political philosophy. Yet his views on political authority are grounded in his metaphysics and epistemology. In his view, the human intellect can become perfectly actual when illuminated by a separate Active Intellect. The ideal ruler is a person with such an actualized intellect. Although al-Farabi's theory of intellect is broadly Aristotelian, he is also following Plato, who in the *The Republic* famously makes philosophers the rulers of the ideal city. Like Plato, al-Farabi is unclear about how perfect philosophical knowledge is to be deployed in the form of concrete political decisions. The difficulty is especially acute for al-Farabi, given his commitment to the Aristotelian doctrine that knowledge in the strict sense deals with universal intelligibles, and not the particular objects that would seem to be the concern of the political ruler.

Apart from intellectual perfection, al-Farabi puts an additional demand on the ideal ruler: Such leaders should be able to persuasively communicate their knowledge to the citizens of their cities. This gives rise to the need for religion. A virtuous religion is a rhetorically crafted version of demonstrative philosophical truths, which conveys the necessary beliefs to the citizens of a virtuous city. (These beliefs will often be of a practical nature but also include some "theoretical" beliefs such as the proposition that God exists.) Here al-Farabi deploys Aristotle's distinctions among rhetoric, dialectic, and demonstration. Whereas rhetoric and dialectic induce mere belief, demonstration gives rise to certain knowledge. Ideal rulers, then, are in possession not only of certain, demonstrative knowledge, but also of the means to persuade the citizens of their city to believe the propositions they know. Although it seems likely that al-Farabi thinks that Islam is a virtuous religion and that the Prophet Muhammad was an ideal ruler with certain knowledge, he does not make this claim explicit. He certainly leaves room for other virtuous religions, which would induce the same true beliefs via a different sort of rhetorical persuasion.

Al-Farabi devotes considerable attention to the question of what happens when there is no perfect ruler. In such cities, political rule must be entrusted to a group of people who collectively possess the qualities of the perfect ruler. Failing that, one should attempt to adhere as closely as possible to the laws and decisions passed down by the ideal ruler or rulers of the past. Again, al-Farabi would seem to have the case of Islam in mind, where the practice of jurisprudence serves to extrapolate and interpret the Qur'an and the traditions handed down about the Prophet. Al-Farabi further discusses the various types of failed city that result when rulership is directed at, for instance, wealth instead of being regulated by certain knowledge. Plato would seem to be an important influence on al-Farabi here.

Although al-Farabi has been credited with being the founder of political philosophy in the Islamic world, this is somewhat misleading. His main influence is in Andalusia, where Averroes adopted distinctly Farabian ideas in his *Decisive Treatise.* Also, al-Farabi was not a political philosopher in the sense of having given concrete political proposals for running a society: Rather, his aim was to describe the societal conditions that tend to produce virtue and vice.

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See also Aristotle; Averroism; Islamic Political Philosophy; Neo-Platonism; Philosopher King; Plato; Strauss, Leo

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Alienation

The concept of alienation is most often associated with the work of Karl Marx (1818–1883), or in writings related to his ideas. It starts from a conception of the human essence, which is said to be creative, loving, communal, and powerful. In particular forms of society, notably under capitalism, aspects of the human essence come to be located elsewhere, for example, in the commodities that human labor produces. From here, they dominate and oppress real human beings. Eventually, when alienation becomes sufficiently extreme, it leads to a revolution and the introduction of communism, a society in which the human essence has been reappropriated by men. This entry looks at some precursors of the Marxist concept of alienation, explores Marx's doctrine in detail, and describes its subsequent influence.

Hegel and Feuerbach

The concept is also found earlier in the writings of Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel (1770–1831). In writings around 1805, Hegel made some use of a conception of alienation very similar to that found in Marx which remained unpublished in Marx's lifetime. In Hegel's mature writings, notably *The Phenomenology of Mind* (alternatively, *Phenomenology of Spirit*) and his *Philosophy of History,* he sees the history of the world as the development of Spirit (*Geist*). In each age the Spirit is to be found in each level of society: civil society, (commerce), the state, art, religion, and philosophy. The Spirit is more explicit in the state than in civil society, in art than in the state, and in religion than in art; it is most explicit in philosophy. Thus, as Hegel was living in Prussia, which he argued was the most advanced state in history, Hegel's philosophy is the culmination of human history, at least up to the time at which he was writing.

For Hegel, history is the gradual reconciliation of Spirit with the world, its opposite, in a mediated fashion, and hence its return from self-alienation. The development of Spirit thus takes place in alienation from itself. Its development involves the development of Reason, which gradually comes to recognize itself in its opposite. For Hegel, human history is basically a process of intellectual labor.

Hegel's ideas came to dominate German philosophy in the 1830s. His followers divided between right Hegelians, who accepted Hegel's own view that the Prussian state was the culmination of human history, and left Hegelians, who thought that human history needed to pass through a further stage, which involved the incorporation of religion into the state. This would involve a recognition that religion does not involve a transcendent God but is a human product.

The immediate starting point of Marx's ideas about alienation is the thought of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872). Feuerbach was basically a left Hegelian but departed radically from other left Hegelians because he argued that there was no role for abstraction. Philosophy should be a direct copy of nature. He thought that Hegel's account of history and his philosophy were true, but they needed to be inverted, meaning that the subject and predicate would be reversed—or, more specifically, that men would be seen as developing religion and philosophy in parallel with their own style of life. Once these are inverted, men will worship collective humanity rather than transcendent gods. Feuerbach avowed himself a communist, meaning that he upheld the ideal of a community based on love.

The Marxist Concept of Alienation

Marx's doctrine of alienation is chiefly found in his early writings, most notably his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844. His immediate point of departure is his admiration for Feuerbach's philosophy, and his evaluation of Hegel at this stage follows the same lines as Feuerbach. He agrees with Feuerbach that religion is based on the alienated human essence, although in *The Jewish Question* (1843), he sees Christianity as reflecting the egoism of life in civil society, while in *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* (1843), Christianity is represented as a de-alienated ideal.

Marx also sees the state as the alienated essence of the citizens and offers democracy as the way of overcoming this. As his thought develops, he comes in his manuscript on *Estranged Labor* to see the proletariat as the most alienated class in society, possibly because the alienation of labor comes to be seen as the central form of human alienation.

Overcoming the alienation of the proletariat will also overcome the alienation of other classes.

Marx is best known for his account of the alienation of labor. He says that labor involves a fourfold alienation. Laborers are alienated from the act of labor, meaning that it is done under compulsion of necessity to make money to live, not to fulfill their creative potential or desire to please their friends. Laborers are alienated from the product of labor. The more effort they put into their labor, the more its product confronts them as something alienated from them and dominates them. Because sensuous nature is needed as a precondition of labor, laborers also render themselves more dominated by nature the more they labor. Labor is forced labor, forced by necessity to earn subsistence. Laborers feel at home only in the animal functions of eating and drinking and procreating.

Besides being alienated from the act and object of labor, laborers are also alienated from others, who are rivals for work. Laborers are also alienated from their species-being. This is a concept taken from Feuerbach. The central idea is that we are distinguished from animals because we are conscious of ourselves as a species. For Marx, the essential character of us as a species is that we engage in creative labor. Laborers are alienated from their species-being because this creative labor is only a means to subsistence. Their actual labor takes their inorganic body away from them. The young Marx also considers that capitalists are alienated but says that they are content in their alienated condition, whereas for laborers, alienation is a source of misery.

It is worth noting that, by this account, alienation is an objective condition. Indeed, there would be good grounds for saying that a worker who was happy to spend almost all of his or her waking hours sharpening pins would be more alienated than one who hated this way of life. The concept is thus rather different from the everyday notion of alienation in which "the voters have become alienated from the government" is just another way of saying that they have become dissatisfied with it.

From about 1847 onward, the concept of alienation plays a much less prominent part in Marx's writing. There was a major controversy in the 1970s as to exactly why this happened. An influential essay by Louis Althusser argued that there is a break in Marx's work and that scientific Marxism emerges only with the discarding of alienation as an organizing concept. The majority of Anglo-Saxon commentators rejected this claim. Most take the view that it is demonstrably false because the term alienation and ideas linked to it continue to appear in writings after 1847. Alienation is thus said to underlie Marx's later writings. It is held to reappear in his masterwork *Capital,* either as the motive for writing the book or alternatively in the specific discussion of reification, the way in which, under capitalism, relationships between people appear as relationships between commodities. These assertions are generally not very systematic.

The most extensive discussion is probably that by István Mészáros. The most systematic discussion, in which the main concepts of the older Marx are reinterpreted in terms of the theory of alienation, is that by Bertell Ollman. On the other hand, the alienation vocabulary is mainly found in unpublished writings of the older Marx, and it is possible to argue that much of it is susceptible of an interpretation that does not involve the youthful concept.

Impact of Marx's Theory

Marx's theory of alienation was used by reformers in the Soviet Union and China. The Marxist classics generally place very little emphasis on human rights, particularly the rights of individuals. Instead, there is a claim that after the revolution, the rights of the working class collectively will be much better respected than under capitalism. The alienation theory was used to advocate the cause of human rights as understood in the West. Marx's critique of alienated labor also raised the possibility of criticizing features of the economy under communism, as it could be argued that labor was still alienated in some respects.

The alienation theory has also been quite influential in the West. Western Marxism can generally be characterized as humanist Marxism, and the humanism is frequently introduced via a discussion of the alienation theory. A central feature of the thought of the Frankfurt School is the notion of negative dialectics, a critique of capitalism on the basis of a concept of human need and human nature, which was frequently related to Marx's

theory of alienation. In the writings of Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm, there is an attempt to unite the insights of the alienation theory with those of Sigmund Freud. Marcuse was the most explicitly political member of the Frankfurt School. Particularly in his *Eros and Civilization* and *One-Dimensional Man,* he uses the idea of alienation to argue that the apparently contented workers of the West lack authentic human fulfillment.

Marcuse argues that Western society may appear to be tolerant, but it is a repressive toleration stifling dissent. The groupings most likely to trigger off a revolution are not industrial workers but people at the margins of capitalist society, notably intellectuals and students but also ethnic minorities such as African Americans. These ideas became popular among the New Left and student radicals. Fromm was a member of the Frankfurt School but trained as a psychoanalyst. He used the concept of alienation as a way of criticizing both Western capitalism and Soviet Marxism. In his thought, the concept became the linchpin of his advocacy of democratic socialism.

The theory of alienation has also been taken up in more mainstream studies, for example, in Robert Blauner's surveys of workers in four different U.S. industries. Blauner treats alienation as more a subjective condition and broadly finds that workers with more control over their conditions of work experience greater satisfaction. This type of approach can be tied in with ideas developed by psychologists and applied by management theorists.

Marx's alienation theory was also influential in French communism, notably in the work of Roger Garaudy, where it became the basis both of a critique of the Stalinism of the French Communist Party and of a dialogue with Christians. It also influenced André Gorz, who argued for a generous basic income, which would allow people to reduce the amount of time they spent doing alienated labor and instead devote themselves to more fulfilling projects.

More recently, the concept of alienation has been taken up in the virtue ethics of figures such as Alasdair MacIntyre. Virtue ethics revives a central idea of Aristotle, namely that the central object of ethics should be the encouragement of qualities and character that lead to human flourishing, and these can be identified as the conception of human nature based on creative labor and loving community that is central to Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*.

Mark Cowling

See also Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Negative Dialectics; New Left; Repressive Tolerance

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American Founding

Among the politically active classes of late-eighteenth century America were well-educated men intimately familiar with the most important ancient pagan and modern European political theorists and leading thinkers in philosophy, British and international law, history, and theology (see, for example, the remarkably expansive

list of texts included in James Madison's original plan for the Library of Congress). Yet, it would be wrong to assume that any of these authors largely shaped the political thinking of those Americans most active in molding the new state and national political institutions.

Instructive in this matter is John Dickinson, a controversial but highly regarded author and mid-Atlantic political figure of the time. Near the end of the 1787 Convention in Philadelphia where the U.S. Constitution was, with difficulty, put together, Dickinson explained the intellectual process that had guided Americans in their move toward independence and the creation of a new state. According to notes made by Madison, Dickinson urged that "experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us. It was not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism of the English Constitution. . . . Accidents probably produced these discoveries, and experience has given a sanction to them. This is then our guide" (Farrand, Vol. II, p. 278). In light of such helpful guidance, a brief exploration of the political theory of the American founding can be best served by a short overview of the history of the two periods of the American founding and an exploration, not of European theorists of prominence, but of the actual historical terms of debate that shaped Americans' inherited political perspectives. Among the most useful terms to keep in focus are now antiquated ones like "court" and "country" politics, various but essential understandings of balanced government, and old-fashioned oppositions like authority and liberty.

The Two Periods of the American Founding

The American founding is most easily understood as describing two periods of 12 years, each culminating in a famous document of historical and continuing theoretical interest: the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the U.S. Constitution of 1787. Each period confronted similar but different structural problems, contributed differently to the important theoretical accomplishments of the American founding, and was pulled, at times, in somewhat contradictory directions.

During the first period, 1764 to 1776, most of the populous North American British colonies and the British homeland found it ever more difficult to resolve political differences within their heretofore accepted political and legal framework of constitutional monarchical institutions, hierarchical imperial relationships, and whiggish political theory, which had developed in the wake of the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England. This period of crisis was dominated by claims and counterclaims regarding the right understanding of British and English law and constitutionalism; what constituted a good or moral life and how such a life was best politically, economically, socially, and religiously achieved. There was no absolute divide on these subjects between politically active men in Britain and those in the colonies, with both sides airing their grievances in hundreds, if not thousands, of political pamphlets (see, for starters, T. R. Adams, *American Independence*). In the colonies, two essential forums for debate during this period were the intercolonial gatherings of the Stamp Act Congress of 1765 in New York and the First and Second Continental Congresses, which first met in Philadelphia in September 1774.

The second period, 1777 to 1789, was marked by the local and international legal, political, economic, social, and religious dislocations resulting from a war of colonial independence and another concurrent war among major powers of Europe. Of possibly greatest long-term importance, however, is the push by a transnational American elite, many of whom came to be associated with the Federalist political party, for a stronger central, truly national government. Strikingly, the dominant national figures in the first phase of the founding era were moved by the centralizing nationalist or "court" view of politics more than the earlier localist or "country" perspective (both terms are explained below). The localist perspective was relegated, at least initially, to opposition and backwater provincial politics. The short-lived period of ascending "court" politics, however, ended a decade or so after the hammering together of the U.S. Constitution.

During these two periods and well before, the court and country dispositions had formed two differing constellations of political, economic, and religious norms, which had formed relatively stable eighteenth-century schools of thought in Britain and its North American colonies. Those colonists who had, early on, urged separation, men like John

and Samuel Adams, James Otis, Thomas Jefferson, and Richard Henry Lee, predominantly viewed the imperial crisis from the country (and surprisingly culturally and economically reactionary) side, whereas colonial moderates and Loyalists, men like James Duane, John Jay, John Dickinson, the Morrises, Livingstons, and Rutledges, Thomas Hutchinson, and Joseph Galloway, along with the British Crown and the majority in the British Parliament, took the court (and often culturally and economically progressive) side of this frequently principled debate.

In the briefest of terms, advocates of country politics opposed increased political centralization, monetization of wealth, high-church Anglicanism, and the development of modern economic and political institutions that led to a diminished reliance on the personal moral qualities of those in office and in the populace. In the broadest of terms, these men opposed what has come to be called modernization and those who supported it. Indeed, they often viewed their court opponents in harsh terms as supporters of vice and corruption and as guilty of making public life dangerously independent of the inculcation of virtue. These two worldviews would be most famously debated in 1787 at the end of the founding era in: numerous newspaper editorials; various tracts that have come to be known as antifederalist; and, most deservedly, *The Federalist,* a series of 85 essays written principally by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison.

Articulate Americans' approach to the imperial crisis and their belief that the British Parliament could not legislate for them domestically, or directly tax them, however, rested on philosophical and constitutional claims that went well beyond the court/country debate and found mooring in varying interpretations of British legal norms and institutions and in the thinking of important European political theorists. In this era of contention, most colonial authors originally sought strategies of redress in authoritative British political and legal texts, polemical writings, and long-standing English and colonial legal and constitutional precedents. Only in the last years of increasingly deadly armed conflict, when it became clear that the Crown and Parliament would not accommodate multiple sovereign legislatures under a common crown, did those who had long opposed any language that smacked of independence, most important among them men in the mid-Atlantic commercial classes, begin to view separation as a necessary and preferable, even if undesired, alternative to what many viewed as the legislative tyranny of the British Parliament.

Accordingly, the preferred American language of resistance necessarily shifted from British constitutionalism, as embodied in 12 years of numerous but fruitless colonial petitions and memorials to both Houses of Parliament and the king, to the logical alternative, the language of international law, of natural law and rights, and the republicanism boldly asserted in Thomas Jefferson's 1776 Declaration of Independence. Thus, even if this shift in language was by many little intended and less desired, in moving from British monarchicalism to natural-law republicanism, much changed (how much, however, is anything but obvious).

Leaving aside the large number of people who were indifferent or chose to remain loyal to the Crown, within the separatist ranks, there remained powerful divisions among often largely overlapping categories of geographic region, socioeconomic class, and adherence to different forms of Protestantism. Accordingly, in ways too little noticed, it remains unclear whether all politically active authors in the breakaway colonies used political concepts exactly in the same way—that is, did they always mean the same thing when they used the same term? When rapid and demonstrable changes in meaning over short spans of time are added to this portrait, our ability to give precise and static meaning to key political concepts like *liberty* and *rights* becomes all the more difficult.

In spite of these limitations in our understanding, from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, we do know that important changes developed in how key political and moral concepts came to be understood: Most significant among them were shifting understandings of individual liberty, most prominently of religious liberty; a changing relationship in the heretofore correlative linkage between rights and duties; a merging of civil and natural liberty and rights; and a growing national insistence that constitutional limits be embodied in clearly written documents. And what we find, too, in a way that usefully illuminates the complicated

relationship between political history and theory, is that these epochal changes in the meaning of key political concepts didn't lead Americans into a war for independence but rather, in most instances, were an unforeseen, and for some an undesired, consequence of the war itself. In sum, the dominant political theory of the founding era enjoyed certain general continuities, for example, the persistent quest for balanced government and the rule of law, but, as well, important regional differences and rapid changes, often following the war, over the relatively short span of 24 years.

Political Theory at the American Founding: Dilemmas Confronted

In both periods, then, the dominant colonial and early American political theory embraced inherited British (and wholly traditional Western) norms that held that the essential features of legitimate forms of government, even if difficult to achieve and even more difficult to sustain, demanded a balance between different constituent social forces, between governmental authority and group and personal liberty and, under the rule of law, the prevention of the arbitrary exercise of power by any particular part of the population (including the majority) or the government. Few, if any, authors or political groups in the colonies or states would have disagreed with any of this. Disagreement would and did, however, arise over the best means to achieve these hallowed and uncontested political ends.

Each period, too, was marked by structural features in the politics of North America that invited disagreement and that made a direct application of inherited British constitutional norms and institutions and of European political theory difficult, if not impossible. In the earlier period of the imperial crisis, the central difficulty arose from the inability of British and colonial whig political theorists to make sense of a world in which there were distinct and multiple legislative assemblies under a unitary crown. A patchwork system of federalism, even if long-lived in colonial practice, was an accidental development of the seventeenth century which, when finally scrutinized by British ministers in the middle part of the eighteenth century, was found to lack an adequate explanatory theory that could make sense of the actual political practices of the colonies and their contested independence from the British Parliament. Still more important, a sufficient number of supporters in Parliament, among Crown ministers, and even among the colonists—with the important exception of two politically prominent men from Pennsylvania, Joseph Galloway and his more famous colleague, Benjamin Franklin—could not be found to embrace a set of political structures that would have led toward reconciliation and a series of institutions similar to what would, in the nineteenth century, come to be known as the British Commonwealth.

In the second period of the founding, the structural problem that for some necessitated innovative theorizing and institutional design was the wholly popular character of the country and government or, to put it more strikingly, the absence in 1780s America of inherited fixed social classes (i.e., an aristocracy) and a legitimate monarch. Prominent nationalists were forced, at least as much by necessity as by choice, to transform the inherited British imperial system of government, with its constituent monarchical and federal elements, into a wholly popular representative form of government. What they sought, however, was not in spirit new: to (re)create a balanced government in which appropriate levels of governmental authority, long associated with the monarchy, would exist with which to offset potentially dangerous levels of personal liberty, the stuff of democratic republics and governmental dissolution. But without a king or entrenched social classes, for many, fresh thinking seemed necessary.

To put it most succinctly, the central challenge confronting thoughtful Americans after the colonies' separation from Britain was how to prevent at the national level the rise of a government lacking in requisite balance. But not all sides understood the problem in the same way. For those with a more populist bent, such as Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Richard Henry Lee, and Patrick Henry and many others not often remembered in historical annals, the imminent danger Americans confronted was from a resurgent aristocracy or monarchy, the corrosive power of the few or the one, or what might also be described as excessive governmental authority. For those who, under the new republican circumstances of 1780s America, feared popular majorities—men whose names we remember well today, like Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, George Washington,

and John Adams—it was unbounded liberty that was to be controlled. Both sides, accordingly, agreed on the necessity of balancing political authority and individual liberty but disagreed on where the preeminent danger was likely to arise and, necessarily, how best to resolve it. Just such a disagreement divided many Americans of the 1780s into federalists and anti-federalists, pro-nationalist and pro-states forces.

Those who viewed the people and licentious liberty as the greater danger, given the unusual circumstances of 1780s America, had no fully adequate guidebook that described how to solve their dilemma, and thus, they were forced, both at the level of institutional design and post-hoc theorizing, to work with inherited institutions while envisioning novel ways of preventing a wholly popular government from becoming tyrannical and arbitrary. And to a significant degree, even if the results were often not always well understood or fully intended and, in actuality, often the result of parochial political forces pushing in opposing directions, these men successfully produced a system of representative federal republican government that worked. This system seemed to prove that, under proper institutional arrangements—ones remarkably close to those that had developed in America under British rule over most of 150 years—it was possible to produce balanced and stable republican government, a government of authority and liberty, but without the need for either a king or hereditary social classes. Still, it is doubtful that, except for a handful of unusually forward-looking men in Massachusetts and possibly Virginia, many Americans at the beginning of this voyage of change in 1764 would have thought this possible—the specter of the English Civil War and its dominant figure, Oliver Cromwell, loomed too large.

If any European political theorist understood their problems and could offer useful guidance, however, it was ironically a man little admired in the first period of the crisis, David Hume. (The only theorists to rival him in influence, if not in theoretical creativity, and far more so in both periods, were an eighteenth-century French political theorist, the baron de Montesquieu, and a British legal theorist of the period, William Blackstone.) What the world-famous Scottish philosopher provided was a theoretical justification for the clever solution offered by Robert Walpole, prime minister in Britain for most of 25 years early in the eighteenth century, to a similar problem faced earlier in Britain: How, after the Glorious Revolution, could a balanced government be sustained without adequate monarchical constitutional power to check that of the House of Commons? Hume boldly defended Walpole's solution, worked out through trial and error, not abstract reason. Walpole's solution was to use the king's impressive financial resources to corrupt members of Parliament by offering them paid positions in the Crown's service.

The irony in this, of course, is that such deviations from accepted "country" norms and the hope to avoid such corruption had moved, in part, many American separatists toward seeking independence from the corrupt British. Thus, the need for Americans in the second period of the founding to defend court-like and fully modern political theories that, in pursuit of balanced government, invited government officers to pursue self-centered ends, is in striking contrast with their earlier commitment to country-centered thinking and politics and what political theorists had and have continued to describe as the traditional and necessarily republican, that is, nonmonarchical, politics of personal self-denial and civic virtue in service of the common good.

The American theorist who followed Hume most closely (here one must be careful to distinguish actual political institutional practices and the theory that purports to explain them) was as active a politician as he was a creative political thinker, the fourth American president, James Madison. What Madison advanced was a republican theory of government that, without king or hereditary social classes, hoped to prevent popular government from becoming unbalanced, tyrannous (i.e., in a wholly popular government serving only the majority's interest), licentious, and arbitrary. His proposed solutions were to divide the country in such a way that the selfish interests, mostly economic, of groups of citizens (factions) would be offset by the similarly selfish wants and demands of wonderfully numerous others and, at the governmental level, the tying of the personal interests and passions of each governmental officeholder to the public functions of his office. Thereby, without depending on republican or civic virtue and its

demands for relatively selfless behavior that some following the war had come to little expect in either the people or the government (though rarely by the same author), Madison outlined in a number of letters, speeches, and several essays of *The Federalist* a vision of popular government, representative federalism, which he believed would prevent the growth of debilitating pathologies long associated with democratic governments.

Both periods of the American founding, thus, helped produce innovations in political structure and their defense in theory. In the first of the two periods, a number of important changes resulted: (1) there was a movement away from British unwritten natural-law constitutionalism toward written, positive, and entrenched constitutionalism; (2) initial efforts were made to collapse the distinction between natural and civil law and rights; (3) there was a renewed embrace of republicanism; and (4) there was a radical separation of church and state at the national level and a commitment to something close to equal religious liberty at all levels.

In the second period, the dominant problem for most moderates was how, without necessary hereditary social divisions, to control the people and those in government so that neither could exercise arbitrary power; that is, how liberty and authority could be joined without threatening either. America's situation rendered it incapable of exploiting either of the two sets of traditional governmental solutions: those most readily associated with and favored by republics (and associated with "country" thinking) and those most often found in constitutional monarchies (and associated with "court" politics). Yet, in ways that depended more on inherited British and colonial norms and practices than on novel political theories, American political leaders managed to find a way to combine the two traditions in a creative hybrid that borrowed from both and offered the world a vision of a representative federal form of wholly popular government that was at once balanced and free. And this, for a relatively new country, was a rather impressive result.

Barry Shain

See also American Revolution; Authority; Common Law; Constitutionalism; Democracy; Hume, David; Liberty; Publius; Republicanism; Rights; Separation of Powers

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American Pragmatism

Pragmatism is the American philosophy inaugurated by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) but

owing much of its popularity and influence to William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859–1952). The influence of pragmatism declined by the middle of the twentieth century but went on to enjoy a resurgence as a result of the work of Richard Rorty (1931–2007) and others. At the core of pragmatism is the idea that thinking does not aim to copy or represent the world but is itself a form of active engagement with the world. The political implications of this idea are controversial, but many have thought that pragmatist ideas provide a basis for a defense of democratic values. This entry reviews the history and central ideas of pragmatism and then describes its implications for political theory, especially as a justification for democracy.

History and Key Figures

Pragmatism originated in the discussions of the so-called metaphysical club at Harvard University around 1870, a group attended by Peirce, James, and others. Without using the term, Peirce developed some of pragmatism's core ideas in a series of essays published over the next few years, but it was James who popularized the term, notably in his book *Pragmatism* (1907). Dewey, who was younger, wrote directly and at length on politics and political theory and, with George Herbert Mead (1863–1931), attempted to build bridges to the burgeoning professional forms of social and political science. Dewey's longevity and wide cultural and intellectual reputation within and beyond the United States as a philosopher, political commentator, and educationalist helped to make pragmatism a prominent and influential philosophy in the United States.

Always a controversial set of ideas, pragmatism's influence waned within the discipline of philosophy after World War II. It had always been the subject of savage and influential criticism from important philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, but it was decisively diminished by the influx from Europe of logical empiricists, Frankfurt School theorists, and others such as Leo Strauss. These critics not only provided fresh, exciting, and different ways of pursuing philosophy and political theory at a time when pragmatism seemed fusty, but also fiercely opposed its ideas (whether or not they properly understood them).

Perhaps promisingly for its longer term prospects, one of the places where it retained a vestigial foothold was Harvard, in the work of philosophers such as C. I. Lewis, W. V. Quine, Nelson Goodman, and, in due course, Hilary Putnam. Its renaissance at the hands of Rorty and others came as part of, and was important for a wider contemporary onslaught on, foundationalist conceptions of knowledge.

Pragmatist Themes

The term *pragmatism* itself has been argued over since its birth. James, with characteristic generosity (and accuracy), attributed it to Peirce on its first public airing at a lecture in California in 1898. The notoriously awkward Peirce, in turn, was so appalled by what he considered its misuse at the hands of James and others that he adopted the term *pragmaticism* instead, which he thought was ugly enough to be safe from conceptual kidnappers. Pragmatism remains a contested term, and there are well-known difficulties in formulating a set of common characteristics that pick out all and only those figures conventionally regarded as pragmatists.

One place to start is with the title of James's lecture, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," which conveys much of the essence of pragmatism's message. The pragmatic maxim says that beliefs, concepts, and theories must be linked to experience and practice. In James's most notorious formulation, this was presented as the idea that the truth is just what works for us. He went on infamously to conclude that if religious beliefs prove to be valuable for our lives, then they will, for pragmatism, be true, a line of thought that brought the rage of Russell down on him. In more nuanced but also challenging versions of pragmatism, such as that of Peirce, the truth is what would stand up to experience, evidence, and argument in the long run. In its wider philosophical sense, pragmatism embodies a set of commitments in epistemology. Although not every figure conventionally regarded as a pragmatist thinks of these commitments in the same way, they capture the core of a pragmatist tradition.

The first is the idea that truth cannot consist in the correspondence of beliefs to external reality. In an essay on the fixation of belief, Peirce famously considers four methods of responding to what he

calls the irritation of doubt. If we adopt the method of tenacity, we stick with a belief irrespective of evidence against it. If we adopt the method of authority, the utterances of a particular public institution are taken as authoritative and supported by related institutions of education, censorship, and violence. If we adopt the a priori method, individuals reflect to arrive at beliefs that are agreeable to reason. Now, the problem Peirce identifies arises from the thought that there is nothing external to which our beliefs ought to correspond: In the absence of that, why not stick to whatever naturally swims into your head or the diktats of the church or state? Yet, each of these methods, he argues, fails to allow us to revise beliefs in the light of something beyond our current constellation of beliefs and to respond to dissident experiences and ideas. By contrast, the method of science seeks to answer doubts by confronting existing beliefs with a diverse range of potentially recalcitrant experiences, reasons, and arguments. Instead of truth as correspondence, we have the idea that truth is what emerges from properly applying a method of inquiry.

Second, although beliefs do not correspond to or copy an external reality, this is not because there is no reality outside our beliefs and thoughts. Pragmatists are not idealists. Rather, they possess a naturalistic view of inquiry as the activity of a needy organism attempting to grapple with a real and often problematic environment. (Pragmatists were very interested in, and influenced by, Charles Darwin.) Inquiry is the activity of arriving at settled beliefs to remedy the uncertainties of an inquiring agent. Agitated by some doubt, finding ourselves, in Dewey's phrase, in an "indeterminate situation," we respond with inquiry to arrive at beliefs and policies of action that can assuage these doubts. An inquirer is not a passive receiver of given experience but an experimental agent, intervening in his or her environment and learning from the experiences that result. Pragmatists such as Dewey went so far as to think of logic not as a fixed constraint on thinking but as an instrument or tool we use to shape the environment and solve problems.

Third, pragmatists reject skepticism about beliefs and embrace what is called fallibilism. It is not the case that there is *nothing* for our inquiries to latch on to, but that any belief we arrive at may be subject to critical revision. While any particular belief is vulnerable to revision, this is so only by reference to other beliefs that must be held to be stable or settled for the purposes of judging it. To put a belief that we have in doubt requires specific and convincing reasons, in the same way that we may ask for those reasons when we are asked to adopt a new belief. Critical inquiry cannot itself ground all our beliefs at once, so to speak. We can begin to reason and deliberate only on the basis of the beliefs and practices that we have—we cannot call everything into question all at once. Fallibilism is not meant to cast a pall of doubt over all beliefs or any particular belief. Rather, it insists that when we question a belief, we must do so for specific, justifiable reasons, stimulated by actual doubts—the real and irritating sort, not the purely notional sort that philosophers sometimes raise. In this way, the pragmatist views beliefs both as rooted in history and as subject to rational scrutiny.

Fourth, knowledge for pragmatists involves historical process. The criteria for what counts as success or failure in inquiry are not given and external to the process of inquiry but are hammered out through it. We accept some methods and practices of inquiry because they square with our theories, and we accept theories and standards of inquiry because they are developed in accordance with the methods and practices that we accept. This is circular but not viciously so because it allows for progress as we try to deal with recalcitrant experiences, arriving at new methods and new theories as we do so.

Fifth, pragmatists tend not to privilege any domain of inquiry. In particular, they do not separate a realm of facts from a realm of value and pronounce that only the former can be the subject of knowledge. This holism is grounded in a view that the practice of inquiry, rather than theory, is at the heart of all knowledge and that the distinctions to be drawn between different domains of inquiry can be drawn only in the light of practice. So pragmatists tend to reject the influential picture of values as just a matter of subjective taste as opposed to objective knowledge. Finally, pragmatists view inquiry and reasoning as collective and dialogic activities. Only by submitting claims to public discussion and scrutiny can we decide on their validity. This was a theme particularly emphasized by Dewey and Mead.

For opponents of these pragmatist ideas, there remains a yawning gap between a belief's meeting any posited standards of success in inquiry and its actually getting things right. Yet, among pragmatists themselves, as noted, there is plenty of disagreement. Peirce sees rational method and the community of inquirers as gradually arriving at a settled belief. James and Dewey paid less attention to the long run, suggesting (in their different ways) that success in inquiry is whatever satisfies the current interests of the community of inquirers.

This fault line is reproduced in recent conflicts between pragmatists. We can distinguish neopragmatists such as Rorty from new pragmatists such as Putnam. Rorty undoubtedly did the most to impose pragmatism on the current intellectual scene, but his own version of the doctrine has been at least as controversial as James's and attracted a similar uproar. In large part, Rorty's philosophy is negative, attacking foundationalist accounts of knowledge and rationality. Like other pragmatists, he believes that there is no single way of representing the world with absolute certainty, and we should view our beliefs as attempts not to mirror the world accurately but to forge tools to deal with it. Any set of tools may work for a particular group at a particular time, but it can make no claim to represent the way the world really is. In his starkest statements, Rorty claims that what gives a belief the power to justify other beliefs is purely sociological, a matter of what others will let us get away with saying. There is no truth or objectivity to be had, only solidarity or agreement within a community. Instead of seeking to line up our beliefs with the world, we should view ourselves as free to come up with new descriptions and "vocabularies" and to see how these help us achieve our ends and formulate new ends.

New pragmatists balk at this interpretation of the pragmatist tradition, seeing it as undermining reason and misreading the pragmatist tradition. For them, the historical development of standards in inquiry does not impugn their objectivity or make this objectivity simply a matter of "what we do around here." Rather, our standards and practices of inquiry can be both historical and objective.

Pragmatism and Politics

There is intense disagreement among pragmatists about the relationship of these themes to political theory. Peirce and James were both idiosyncratic in their politics. Peirce, the philosophical giant of the group, subscribed to the kind of reactionary conservatism for which reasoned inquiry was of little use in practical affairs. (This has not stopped later commentators finding in his work the raw materials for more political philosophies of democracy and community.) James combined an elitist liberalism with some sympathy for anarchism and, notably, a powerful opposition to imperialism.

In the early part of the twentieth century, pragmatism's rejection of fixed foundations for knowledge and reasoning was sometimes identified with an all-out assault on reason and morality: Without fixed standards, it was felt, the chaos of relativism, skepticism, and nihilism beckoned. The worry that pragmatism might unravel political values and practices has persisted but been overlaid by other interpretations.

Another early view of the politics of pragmatism appealed to the sense that pragmatism involves general dispositions toward flexibility, relativism about ultimate ends, ambivalence about theory, a practical orientation, and a belief in science. Pragmatism was seen as at base a complacent philosophy, which rested on an unquestioned acceptance of the liberal values of the United States. In this vein, pragmatism, and particularly Dewey, is sometimes cast as a founder of contemporary empirical political science, influencing such important figures as Charles Merriam and Harold Lasswell. There is some justice in this. An important component in Dewey's pragmatism is the thought that the logic of scientific inquiry needs to be extended to realms of social life that have been governed by tradition or prejudice.

Yet, dominant elements in pragmatism are squarely opposed both to a "revolt against reason" and to the idea that political goals are beyond rational criticism. For all pragmatists, the absence of fixed foundations does not imply a rejection of reason. And at least for Deweyan pragmatists, ethical inquiry is of a piece with empirical inquiry; in both, we should use our reflective intelligence to improve judgment. We test our value judgments by seeing their results and revising them in the light of those results. Unlike other defenders of the extension of empirical theory to the social and political sciences, pragmatists are opposed to a stark dichotomy between the factual subject matter of

science and the unscientific flotsam and jetsam of thinking about value. Their emphasis on the practical and consequential dimension of social inquiry, and against foundationalist views of knowledge, also mean that pragmatists share ground with constructivists about social and political science.

Pragmatism and Democracy

For both Deweyan pragmatists and more recent theorists, pragmatism provides the materials for a defense of democratic values. Dewey sees democracy as itself a form of social inquiry, in the pragmatist sense. Democratic societies try to arrive at acceptable decisions and to do so in ways that permit the criteria for an acceptable decision, as well as the decision itself, to be critically reviewed, scrutinized, and revisited. For Dewey, democracy is a form of experimental inquiry in the sense that it allows for a thoroughgoing questioning of the prejudices and assumptions on the basis of which decisions are made, even if, of course, much of ordinary democratic politics does not involve this kind of unsettling challenge. One reason why democracy improves social judgments about what to do is that it allows for the expression of beliefs and interests on the part of all, through both voting and less formal mechanisms of debate, discussion, and persuasion. Democracy involves the expression of interests on the part of voters; the vote helps to protect individuals from putative experts about where the interests of people lie. In the absence of this constraint, a class of experts will inevitably slide into a class whose interests diverge from those of the rest, and it becomes a committee of oligarchs, making poor and unresponsive judgments about what to do. Dewey stresses the importance of argument and persuasion in democratic decision making.

Furthermore, the epistemic virtues of inquiry are themselves partly constitutive of a wider conception of human flourishing or growth and collective autonomy. Dewey's point is not only that democracy allows us to arrive at a clearer view of social problems and of possible solutions by subjecting proposals to discussion and scrutiny, although he certainly believes this. Rather, his work also implies the stronger claim that people can properly express their potential for growth only within a democratic society; that is, where they make decisions with others in terms of equality. In this way, Dewey's pragmatism expresses an unconventional view of democracy as a mode of open and equal collective discussion and decision making. What he calls the ideal of democracy as social intelligence is different from the ordinary view of democracy as a specific set of political procedures where each citizen has a vote and the majority rules. (Dewey believes in this, as we have seen, but thinks it is insufficient to capture what is really valuable about democratic societies.) Skeptical commentators think that it expresses too much faith in individual and collective capacities for critical inquiry. However, proponents of Deweyan democracy—who find in his thought a fruitful source of recent deliberative conceptions of democracy—are attracted by the thought that democracy is more than merely a procedural minimum and that Dewey's thought provides a critical perspective on this minimalism.

Later pragmatists have tended not to take this Deweyan account at full strength. In keeping with the negative thrust of his epistemological writings, Rorty's pragmatism rejects the idea that political views, and specifically his own social democratic liberalism, require philosophical justification. Such accounts make the mistake of trying to justify liberal practices with reference to some universally authoritative standard. And his pragmatism rejects the very idea of such standards. A belief in freedom of speech should be viewed as a local practice, and there is no neutral standpoint outside the societies that endorse this practice from which to evaluate it. It does not follow that it is impossible to evaluate other worldviews, to Rorty's mind. Indeed, part of what it is to be a liberal is to appraise other worldviews in particular ways—to condemn governments that don't allow freedom of speech, for instance.

In one sense, Rorty gives *priority* to democracy over philosophy, arguing that the democratic conditions for solidarity matter more than any philosophical account of why democracy and liberalism are valuable. The task of the social thinker, Rorty asserts, is to sensitize us toward the suffering of others and widen the circle of those with whom we identify, not to elaborate theoretical justifications for this concern. What Rorty calls the "liberal ironist" combines an awareness of the historical contingency of evaluative categories with a commitment to promoting solidarity and freedom.

Projects of philosophical self-realization, Rorty suggests, should be confined to the private sphere.

By contrast, new pragmatists have been tempted to squeeze an epistemological justification of democracy out of the pragmatist concept of inquiry. We seek true beliefs, they argue, including (given the rejection of an a priori distinction between factual and evaluative discourse) true moral beliefs. In doing so, we try to arrive at beliefs that are responsive to, and fit with, all reasons, arguments, and experience. This search for a well-grounded belief involves testing claims against as wide a range of different experiences as possible, rendering our beliefs responsive to reasons and evidence. In particular, it requires us to search out and attend to different perspectives and arguments in order to test and, if necessary, revise our current conception. This search commits us to a form of democracy. Because we must be open to all possible sources of experience and argument, it would be a mistake to exclude anyone from the process of public discussion and decision making on *epistemic* grounds. For Rorty's pragmatism, this way of developing pragmatism makes the twin mistakes of thinking that a method constrains us, beyond what we happen to agree on, and that we must come up with a philosophical justification for democracy. In philosophy and political theory, new forms of pragmatism retain its quarrelsomeness and diversity.

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See also Anti-Foundationalism; Democracy; Dewey, John; Instrumentalism; Positivism

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American Revolution

The American Revolution occurred when 13 mainland North American colonies split off from Great Britain. In 1776, delegations from the 13 colonies each endorsed the Declaration of Independence, a document written primarily by Virginia's Thomas Jefferson, after a series of political disputes had produced military skirmishes between British armed forces and colonial militias. These political disputes had their roots in misunderstandings about the status of colonial charters and legislatures. Those wishing to become independent aggressively argued the plausibility of their positions, relying on a number of political theorists, such as John Locke and baron de Montesquieu. Their opponents did not concede intellectual ground, but after a bitter war, the British government recognized the independence of the United States. The Revolution produced new understandings of politics and political results, which sparked debates that lasted through the 1780s, ultimately informing the ratification process. This entry examines some of the political theories that were employed by the colonists in justifying their cause, some adaptations of existing theories, and the impact of those ideas on the early years of the democracy.

Justifications for Revolution

Most mainland colonies possessed charters allowing them to exercise a degree of self-government. By the eighteenth century, many Americans took these charters as a guarantee that they possessed the "rights of Englishmen," including a right to representative government. They thought of their colonial legislatures as local parliaments. The Crown and most in the British Parliament thought otherwise. In a series of disputes over taxation and other issues during the third quarter of the eighteenth century, Parliament and king insisted that the charters had no independent constitutional status. They could be changed by the British government at will.

The colonists felt that these claims violated their right to self-government. Subscribing to the views of English whig theorists like Locke and Algernon Sidney, by 1776, many colonists were arguing that the British government did not have the consent of its colonial citizenry and was therefore acting illegitimately and should be overthrown and replaced in the colonies. The Declaration of Independence clearly sounds familiar theoretical notes, borrowed most directly from Locke. It proclaims the existence of universal natural rights, suggests that the primary object of government is to safeguard these rights, and asserts that when a government does not do this, a new government may be formed. The bulk of its text is devoted to demonstrating the "long train of abuses" that Locke suggested were required to revolt.

The American Revolution is often described as having produced little notable political theory. Because many who wanted independence also hoped to preserve the "rights of Englishmen," they tended to draw heavily on theoretical views already familiar in England. Among these were the writings of Sidney and Locke, who in addition to justifying revolutionary action warned of the dangers of absolute monarchy. Locke in particular stressed the benefit of separating the legislative branch of government from the executive branch to maintain the rule of law. The American revolutionaries felt that this distinction needed to be reimposed, as the British executive, King George III, had frequently thwarted the will of the colonial legislatures.

The writings of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, who wrote under the pseudonym of Cato, were also frequently referenced. Trenchard and Gordon had aimed to curb the influence of the king's prime minister in the House of Commons during the first half of the eighteenth century. When Parliament and king tried to exert authority over the colonial legislatures, "Cato's Letters" were thought to be prescient by many Americans. Among their assertions was that political power almost inevitably centralizes through time, that the powerful use patronage to get their way against the will of the people, and that citizens have to be extremely vigilant to protect their liberties against those in power.

American complaints did not reference only English political theorists. The book most frequently cited by them was baron de Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws*. Montesquieu had added to Locke's idea about the separation of powers by suggesting that the judiciary should be a powerful and autonomous institution in republics. The law would be formulated by the legislature, then applied in the field by the executive, with criminal and civil disputes ultimately adjudicated by an independent judiciary. Americans became enamored of this idea as they saw their legal appeals repeatedly rejected by Crown-appointed judges. Montesquieu also envisioned republics succeeding in relatively small polities with citizens who shared cultural values. Revolutionaries eagerly adopted this view, as it allowed them to think of their newly independent small republics as far superior to the vast, autocratic empire commanded from Westminster.

More conservative Americans who wished to remain part of the British Empire were under less of a compulsion to offer intellectual justifications for their position. Nevertheless, they too referenced political theorists. The royal governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson quoted Locke back to the revolutionaries, suggesting that they had not exhausted legal remedies before engaging in illegal acts. If individuals were allowed to voluntarily choose which laws to follow, Hutchinson pointed out, there would be anarchy. Loyalists were typically steeped in the theoretical understanding that sovereignty was indivisible. Final decision-making power had to be lodged somewhere, and the only logical place for them was in the national government. If the colonies themselves were sovereign, then they were really independent nations, and the British Empire would cease to exist. They rejected formulations of a commonwealth or a federal state as unworkable. They argued that the colonies were represented in Parliament in the sense that its members carefully considered what was best for the empire as a whole.

Theoretical Innovations

Many who participated in the Revolution adapted existing theories. The dispute with Britain prompted Thomas Jefferson to consider political theory seriously for the first time in his early thirties. He ultimately integrated natural rights theory, existing ideas about the benefits of an agrarian political economy, and Scottish moral-sense philosophy to

form a distinctive democratic political theory. Jefferson suggested that citizens, and especially the owners of small farms, were capable of cooperative self-government. Very little political authority was actually required. When collective decisions were required, they would be made by the level of government most appropriate to the decision at hand, including the ward, a local grouping of citizens. In this way, few citizens would ever be severely imposed on by the state. For more than two centuries, these views have inspired libertarians and participatory democrats.

Another notable democrat who gained prominence during the Revolution was Thomas Paine. Paine was a recent émigré from Britain, who wrote the pamphlet *Common Sense* in early 1776. This widely circulated work helped convince many Americans to embrace independence. Its rhetoric is more notable than its theoretical depth, but it gave prominence to one who would go on to write several other notable works and find a career as a kind of global revolutionary, advocating the overthrow of tradition and aristocracy in favor of democracy. Paine's fervent radicalism was an embarrassment to the conservatives who had advocated a break from Britain, particularly as they constructed governments that looked little like the unicameral democracies that Paine favored.

The Americans invented written constitutions during the revolutionary period. If colonial charters had offered some guarantee against arbitrary rule, they felt that state constitutions could be written to provide even greater protections. The state constitutions written in the aftermath of the Declaration of Independence set explicit limits on government authority. Bills of rights were formulated in most states. These have been distinctive features of American constitutions ever since, and few democracies are now without them. Because the Americans believed that the centralization of power was a key problem, the confederation would need a written charter to define its limits. This came in the form of the Articles of Confederation, which defined the pan-state alliance or government employed by the United States for more than a decade.

Revolutionary activists reacted against British practices, leading them to adopt positions that did not necessarily correspond with familiar versions of the separation of powers. Because many concluded that the problem with Great Britain was the concentration of power in its monarchy, the most logical remedy was to write state constitutions with strong legislatures and weak executives, which almost every newly independent state proceeded to do. Pennsylvanians went a step further and adopted a unicameral legislature, reasoning that the legislature would then be both dominant and responsive to its citizens.

These choices were controversial. Many came to attribute the problems that the nation experienced during and immediately after the Revolutionary War to bad constitutional choices. Although possessing very different views, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton were at the forefront of a new generation of political thinkers who came of age during the Revolution. Many of these individuals possessed a sense of nationalism foreign to earlier generations. They felt that the American states were foundering because state legislatures were too powerful. Problems of administration prompted Hamilton to stress the need to reinvigorate executive power. He also adopted the Loyalist presumption that sovereignty could not be divided. If the constituent states of a federal republic were sovereign rather than the central government, Hamilton believed that the republic would fail. Madison perceived that homogeneity within states was allowing majorities within them to act tyrannically. The central government was too weak to guarantee citizens' rights when they were threatened by their state. It was also too weak to put down popular uprisings, such as the one that occurred in western Massachusetts in 1786 called Shays' Rebellion. The solution was an invigorated national government—an "extended republic" that split sovereignty with the states and encompassed many different interests and values.

Some notable individuals of the revolutionary generation believed that traditional political theory still had a great deal to teach the Americans, but their arrangement of these ideas was often original. Foremost among these thinkers was John Adams. Adams drew on so many political theorists in his *Novanglus Letters* that the Tory Daniel Leonard dismissed them in public as a useless "pile" of learning. Drawing on a number of sources, some of them obscure, Adams stoutly defended the legitimacy of the colonies' independent political power within the empire in the early

1770s. From his perspective, those in charge of the British government were either too stupid to realize that the colonies already possessed political authority or too power-hungry to admit it.

After an independence movement that he helped engineer, Adams's most consistent assertion was that each legislative chamber should represent a different economic class. The U.S. Constitution would require that these two chambers cooperate to make laws. A powerful executive would lend balance to the system. This argument had been a staple of British political thought for a century, and it seemed to describe the British system as it existed in 1776. With the caveat that there would be no hereditary aristocracy or royal family, Adams adapted this "mixed republic" ideal familiar from James Harrington (and stretching back through Niccolò Machiavelli to Aristotle and Polybius) to his own time and place. Adams framed Massachusetts' constitution and he also wrote an extensive *Defence of the Constitutions of the United States,* suggesting the superiority of this arrangement over more democratic alternatives.

In addition to these individuals, many others were writing from a variety of perspectives. In short, the Revolution not only prompted Americans to borrow ideas from political theorists that would help make their points, but also inspired as rich a context for theorizing about politics as has ever occurred in the United States. However, it produced consensus about very little. No one offered a definitive understanding of what politics should be like.

Continuing Controversies

Among the theoretical ambiguities not resolved by the Revolution was the relationship between the states. In theory the Articles of Confederation was just a treaty. However, it was used to formulate policies, which suggested a deeper relationship. Although many individuals clung tenaciously to the idea of state sovereignty, others embraced the idea of a federation, in which power is divided between constituent states and a national government. A few, like Hamilton, hoped for a fully sovereign national government. What to make of this relationship became the most important political issue of the 1780s, culminating in the controversy over and the ratification of the Constitution. This document set the terms of the debate, but how state and nation interrelate has been a live issue in the United States since the Revolution.

The place of revolution and protest in America was complicated by the events of the late 1770s and early 1780s. The United States owes its existence to revolution. Many American politicians and theorists acknowledge a right to revolution, but how this would work in practice is often unclear. Whether individual states can voluntarily leave the United States was left unspecified and only definitively answered by the force of arms during the Civil War. The revolutionists relied on extralegal political activity to point out British failings and publicize their own alternatives. Their success encouraged similar responses to perceived outrages perpetrated by the new domestic authorities.

The revolutionaries' emphasis on personal liberty and their objections to tyranny carried important implications in a society dominated by males of British descent. Hundreds of newspaper pieces called American citizens "slaves" of the British in the mid 1770s. In a society where chattel slavery was legal, the irony of this line of argument was palpable to many, especially because the conditions experienced by citizens and people of African descent were so different. Many reasoned that slavery could not be objected to in one context and not in the other. Seven states moved to curtail or outlaw slavery in the aftermath of the Revolution, beginning with Pennsylvania in 1780.

States also eased restrictions on voting during and immediately after the war. This was partly because property was more evenly distributed in the United States than in Britain but also because the Revolution spread a more egalitarian ethos. Those who had served as soldiers in the war expected to participate and share in the good that self-government might bring. Women contributed to the war effort by doing such things as providing supplies or money, maintaining homes and businesses while men were away at war, boycotting British goods, and spying. When women did these things, they were in an awkward position. The dominant ethic of the times countenanced only a private and domestic existence for them, not a political one. In the aftermath of war, certain restrictions on women were eased, most notably strictures on divorce. Several authors also described a new quasi-political role for women: They were to

teach civic virtues to the boys who would become the men of the republic.

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See also Constitutionalism; Enlightenment; Federalism; Locke, John; Montesquieu, Baron de; Natural Rights; Paine, Thomas; Revolution

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Analytical Marxism

Analytical Marxism is a movement within Marxist theory and in various branches of social science and philosophy that seeks to investigate and develop some standard Marxist substantive claims using the techniques and methods of conventional social science and philosophy. Specifically, analytical Marxism uses the techniques of conceptual analysis associated with analytical philosophy and methods associated with standard neoclassical economics. The movement had its origins in the publication by G. A. Cohen of *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence,* in 1977; in critiques of Cohen's work by Jon Elster and others; and in the publication by John E. Roemer of *Analytical Foundations of Marxian Economic Theory* in 1981. The movement has no institutional expression, as such, but for many years, a group known as the September Group, which included the leading analytical Marxists along with other philosophers and social scientists, met annually, and much of the work that is usually thought of as analytical Marxism emerged from that group.

Analytical Marxism represents a break with conventional Marxist theorizing precisely in its rejection of the view that there is a profound methodological divide between Marxism and bourgeois social science. Indeed, it represents the exact opposite tendency to that of the Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs, who famously argued in his book *History and Class Consciousness* that the distinctive feature of Marxism lies not in its substantive conclusions about class, history, economic dynamics, or revolution but, rather, in its methodological commitments. Analytical Marxists, by contrast, have been directly concerned with addressing the truth and falsity of Marx's *substantive* findings in social science and have attempted to reconstruct or salvage his arguments using the same tools that conventional social scientists or philosophers would use. They have placed great emphasis on the need to state arguments clearly and in a manner that optimizes the possibilities for rational discussion and critique, and they have often characterized the methodological stance of other Marxists as being obscurantist or directed toward evading falsification. Although the analytical Marxists were conscious and open about their rejection of a profound methodological discontinuity between Marxism and bourgeois social science, it is possible to point to other thinkers within the Marxian tradition who embraced similar positions, in particular the Austro-Marxists of fin-de-siècle Vienna and figures such as Michał Kalecki, Oskar Lange, and Piero Sraffa.

Early Findings

In his book, *Karl Marx's Theory of History,* G. A. Cohen developed and defended a traditional reading of Marxian historical materialism as outlined by Marx in the 1859 preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.* Until Cohen's

work, most analytical philosophers had thought that historical materialism was flawed by a fatal inconsistency. Specifically, it appeared that Marx had been committed both to the claim that the social and economic structure of a society was to be explained as a function of its scientific and technological development and to the claim that the very same structure caused (and therefore explained) that scientific and technical progress. A parallel difficulty was widely thought to afflict Marx's conception of the relationship between social structural and political and legal superstructure. Cohen argued that these supposed inconsistencies could be avoided if Marx's explanatory theses were taken to be instances of functional explanation. Just as evolutionary theory might show how the fact that birds have hollow bones is explicable by the role those bones play in the life and survival of the organism, so Marxian historical materialism could show that the selection of a particular structure of social relations for a society (and especially its system of property) was to be explained by the role that structure would play in developing its productive resources.

Cohen's work was subjected to critique on a variety of grounds. Some critics objected to it as an interpretation of Marx, whereas others thought that Cohen's reconstructed historical materialism was implausible as a reading of historical development or philosophically flawed. In this third camp was the Norwegian philosopher and political scientist Jon Elster, who argued in a series of papers and in his book, *Making Sense of Marx,* against Cohen's deployment of functional explanation. Elster did not oppose the use of functional explanation in principle but, rather, argued that, to be legitimate, it had to be underpinned by more conventional causal or intentional modes of explanation. Whereas the theory of evolution by natural selection provided such an explanatory underpinning for biological science, Cohen had provided no such supporting mechanism for historical materialism or for the social sciences more generally.

Roemer and Exploitation

Although Cohen disputed Elster's view that functional explanation was inadmissible in the absence of supporting microfoundations, other analytical Marxists were keen to supply them for other areas of Marxian theory. In particular, analytical Marxism became widely associated with methodological individualism in social theory, rational choice theory, and game theory. At the forefront of such developments was the economist John Roemer. In his first book, *Analytical Foundations of Marxian Economic Theory,* Roemer had sought to reconstruct Marxian economics using the tools of neoclassical economic theory. In his second, *A General Theory of Exploitation and Class,* he employed game theory to show how the emergence of coalitions of agents, closely resembling Marxian classes, could be explained by the differential endowment of such agents with productive resources such as labor power or ownership of capital. Roemer's work on class and exploitation inspired, in turn, a program of research by other analytical Marxists, including the sociologist Erik Olin Wright, who used Roemer's conceptual framework to analyze the class structure of modern capitalist societies in his book, *Classes*. Another important early contribution to analytical Marxism was made by the political scientist Adam Przeworski, who used rational choice theory in his *Capitalism and Social Democracy* to argue that social democratic parties are fatally driven to compromise in modern liberal democracies: The need to secure a sufficiently broad coalition to achieve electoral success necessitates the dilution of the socialist program.

Rational Choice Marxism

As a result of the contributions of Elster, Roemer, and Przeworski, analytical Marxism has often been identified with one particular substantive method (rational choice theory) and one specific philosophical view with respect to social explanation (methodological individualism). Rational choice theory seeks to explain social phenomena as a function of choices of rational utility maximizers. Methodological individualism is the reductionist claim that large-scale social phenomena and institutions should ultimately be explained in terms of the behavior of human individuals. A commitment to such positions is characteristic of modern microeconomics, game theory, and attempts to extend the microeconomic explanation of the social beyond the province of economics, which are the defining mark of public choice theory and the Chicago School.

There is a clear intellectual continuity between some analytical Marxist work and public choice theory. This can be seen, for example, in the similarity between Mancur Olson's writings in *The Logic of Collective Action* and analytical Marxist treatments of the problem of revolution. Whereas Olson focused on the problem of successful trade union mobilization, given that trade union success is a public-good provision that is vulnerable to the free-rider problem, analytical Marxists were drawn to ask whether proletarian revolution, in Marx's sense, was not also a public good. Work by Przeworski, Elster, and Cohen has addressed this issue, often drawing on an early statement of the problem by the philosopher Allen Buchanan. The sociologist Alan Carling has also drawn on rational choice methods to illuminate a whole series of questions involving history, class, gender, and race in his book *Social Division*.

The Turn to Political Philosophy

A further feature distinguishing analytical Marxism from orthodox Marxism has been an explicit focus on normative theorizing, especially surrounding justice. The orthodox Marxist position had been to eschew claims of justice as part of the condemnation of capitalism in favor of positive social explanation, historical relativism, and assertions of class interest. Analytical Marxists have often found the orthodox position implausible in the light of the collective action and free-rider problems and have also often sought to argue that Marx himself was self-deceived in his views about exploitation and justice. Work by Allen Wood, which sought to defend the orthodox view from a perspective similar to that of analytical Marxism, was later subject to critique by Cohen and others. In addition, the investigation and reconstruction of Marxian claims about capitalist exploitation led to a renewed interest in normative questions.

Central to Roemer's work on class had been the idea that the distribution of the means of consumption was a consequence of the pattern of ownership of productive resources. The exploitation characteristic of class relations was, therefore, a consequence of something causally more fundamental. Cohen, in work subsequent to his reconstruction of historical materialism, had come to notice that certain characteristic Marxist beliefs about exploitation seemed to presuppose normative commitments about self-ownership that were also at the core of the libertarian philosophy of Robert Nozick. The paradoxical and disturbing similarity between the foundations of socialist thinking and those of a right-wing individualist theory led both thinkers onto the ground of normative political philosophy. This focus was already characteristic of other, non-Marxist, members of the September Group, such as Philippe van Parijs.

This turn to normative theory has borne fruit in a number of writings. Cohen's works of this type include *Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality* and *If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're so Rich?* Roemer has contributed works including *Equality of Opportunity*. Negatively, Cohen has sought to attack the self-ownership principles that seemed to lie at the heart of Marxian claims about exploitation. Positively, he has sought to replace this with a commitment to some form of "luck egalitarianism." Whereas classical Marxism placed a great deal of emphasis on the play of impersonal social and historical forces and on the irrelevance of morality to social explanation, in his most recent work, Cohen has sought to place moral commitment at the center of the socialist project.

By the 1990s, analytical Marxism had ceased to be a live project. Elster and Przeworski had long since left the September Group, Cohen had refocused on egalitarian political philosophy, and Roemer combined an interest in normative work with an interest in working out the details of a feasible market socialism.

Christopher Bertram

See also Egalitarianism; Equality; Explanation; Exploitation; Functionalism; Game Theory; Historical Understanding; Ideology; Justice, Theories of; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Methodological Individualism; Rational Choice Theory; Revolution; Socialism

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ANARCHISM

Anarchism first emerged as a political movement in mid nineteenth-century Europe, within the socialist tradition. From this starting point, it has developed both geographically and ideologically. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, anarchism extended across the Americas and to Japan, China, and Australia, and as socialism came to be identified with Marxism and/or social democracy, the collectivist, communist, and liberal and individualist strands of thought from which anarchists drew their inspiration began to assume an increasingly distinctive quality, supporting the rise of a number of anarchist schools.

The significance of anarchism is often said to lie in the revolutionary movements it has inspired: most famously the Spanish Revolution of 1936 and May 1968. Today, anarchism is associated with the alter-globalization movement. In addition, anarchism has had an important influence in the arts and, in particular, on avant garde artists, modernist movements, and literary figures such as Oscar Wilde and Aldous Huxley.

Anarchism, like many ideologies, is an umbrella movement, and it describes both a set of ideas and an attitude. Yet, it is perhaps more slippery than other political positions not only because anarchists eschew party political structures and the ideological and tactical discipline that these tend to impose, but also because they contest the possibility of defining a proper relationship between ideas and attitudes and they disagree about the extent to which one might or should be balanced against the other. Analyses of anarchism in political theory tend to fall into one of two categories: Historians of ideas have traced the main currents of anarchist thought, looking at the work of selected thinkers; and political philosophers have examined anarchism through the analysis of key concepts. Similar approaches have also been adopted by writers working from within the anarchist tradition, but since the 1960s, new trends in anarchist theory have emerged, inspired by surrealist, situationist, postmodernist and poststructuralist ideas, on the one hand, and movement activism on the other. This entry begins with a review of the original anarchist thinkers, looks at the linkages between anarchism, the state, and utopianism, and discusses current expressions of this perspective.

Theoretical Traditions and Approaches

Although there is disagreement about the construction of the anarchist canon, there is general consensus that Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Michael Bakunin, and Peter Kropotkin played central roles in shaping the tradition by outlining an anarchist concept of the person (sociable, cooperative), an ideal of social organization (nonexploitative, self-regulating), and a theory of change (unpredictable, consciously willed, open-ended). Proudhon was the first to adopt the label anarchist with the intention of recommending this position and is best remembered for describing property as theft; much of his work was devoted to the sociological analysis of the state system.

Bakunin is usually celebrated as a titanic, whirlwind revolutionary, the embodiment of the anarchist spirit, who famously grounded creativity in destruction and made the abolition of God a condition for anarchist freedom. Kropotkin has emerged as the antidote to Bakunin: the measured theorist of mutual aid who successfully challenged the social Darwinian idea of the survival of the fittest to provide a scientific demonstration of the

possibility of anarchy; equally important, he outlined a strategy of constant incremental change, suggesting that revolution was only narrowly understood as a moment of civil strife and that its achievement lay in changing the behaviors of everyday life.

Both Proudhon and Bakunin were involved in well-publicized disputes with Karl Marx; in Bakunin's case, the argument led in 1871 to the collapse of the First International. The drama and bitterness of these arguments are sometimes taken as a marker of a clear and deep-seated philosophical division within socialism. However, the development of a specifically anti-Marxist anarchist position owed more to Kropotkin and his contemporaries than to either Proudhon or Bakunin; the factional divide developing in the course of the 1880s and 1890s was finally sealed with the Bolshevik seizure of power in the Russian Revolution.

In theorizing the anarchist position, analysts have often highlighted the commonalities with liberalism, particularly the priority attached to the individual and the capacity for rational agreement. For example, April Carter contextualizes anarchist thought through discussion of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and other canonical thinkers. Thematically, Rudolf Rocker once described anarchism as a hybrid emerging from the two great currents of post-French Revolution thought: liberalism and socialism. Unlike liberals, he explained, anarchists saw the state as an instrument of exploitation rather than a guardian of negative freedom, yet unlike other socialists, they also rejected any limitations on the liberal concept of freedom for the sake of equality or the common good, however this might be defined (Rocker dismissed republicanism, Hegelian ethical state theory, class analysis, nationalism, and fascism equally).

This thematic approach has encouraged the retrospective labeling of ideas as anarchist or the extension of the epithet to writers who did not explicitly self-identify with the doctrine. William Godwin is probably the best known nonanarchist to have been dubbed anarchist on account of the perceived incompatibility of his thought with classical liberal and nascent socialist traditions. The transcendentalist Henry David Thoreau is another example.

Conceptual approaches to anarchism have traditionally focused on particular clusters of ideas and their interrelationship. Thus, anarchism has been defined as the rejection of authority/law/government/property/violence/power or domination for the realization of freedom/equality/justice or community. Anarchists have undoubtedly encouraged this approach: Bakunin, for example, declared himself a fanatical lover of liberty, bracketing this declaration with an equally strong denial of the legitimacy of all formal claims to authority. Yet, with the exception of the work of philosophical anarchists like Robert Paul Wolff and, more recently, the activist-centered analysis of Uri Gordon, attempts to analyze anarchist thought through the lens of liberal political or legal philosophy have tended to fuel an impression of theoretical incoherence. One explanation for this is that anarchist concepts have been shaped as much (if not more) by engagement in revolutionary action or protest and political debate as they have by a concern with rigorous theory. Although it is possible, therefore, to translate anarchist ideas into terms familiar to political philosophers, reversing the process risks attributing to anarchists ideas that do not properly fit their initial, intuitive understandings.

Anarchism and the State

The distinctiveness of anarchism as an ideology is usually understood to be the rejection of the state. Some anarchists are wary of highlighting antistatism as the characteristic feature of anarchism because it raises difficult boundary problems, for example, blurring the lines between anarchism and the right-libertarianism of free-market capitalists like Murray Rothbard or the left-libertarianism of writers like Noam Chomsky. Others contest this description on the grounds that it is overly reductive and that it appears to emphasize the negative, destructive, and chaotic image of anarchy, exemplified in the violence of the 1890s.

Drawing on the work of writers like Gustav Landauer (a participant in the 1919 Bavarian Revolution, murdered by right-wing counterrevolutionaries), some modern anarchists (sometimes grouped as social anarchists) emphasize anarchism's constructive commitment to social experimentation, the development of alternative institutions (especially schools, self-help, or mutual aid groups), and the practice of consensual, deliberative

decision-making. However, as a starting point for analysis, the rejection of the state is usefully inclusive—accommodating Tolstoyan Christian anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists, individualists in the tradition of Max Stirner, and, in recent times, social ecologists—notably Murray Bookchin—the primitivists Fredy Perlman and John Zerzan and anti-anarchists like Bob Black and Hakim Bey under the same umbrella.

Moreover, the apparent negativity of the position has a historical significance linking anarchism, albeit mediated by Friedrich Nietzsche and violence, to early modernist art and to the profound cultural questioning that provided one dynamic for the kind of experiments that social anarchists encourage. Finally, the rejection of the state is underpinned by two core anarchist principles: the commitment to direct action and decentralized federalism. The defense of these principles was central to the debates in the First and Second Internationals, prompting the division of socialists into authoritarian and nonauthoritarian camps. As the latter came to be known as anarchists, they elaborated a critique of the state that challenged the class theory inspired by Marx.

Anarchists argued three points: that the state could not be defined solely in terms of class power; that its origins and existence could not be explained by the development of economic forces alone; and that the state's withering or smashing could not be achieved through the capture of existing governing institutions. Anarchists disagreed about how the state might be defined, explained, and overcome and about the conditions for anarchy, but they were identifiable by their subscription to these broad positions. And whether they chose to define the state in terms of authority or exploitation or domination or by a combination of terms, the anarchists' fundamental negativity pointed to the possibility of elevating political theory outside the constraints of sociological reality.

Direct Action and Utopianism

The principle of direct action implies a rejection of representation. This is often understood as a rejection of representative democracy, specifically, the refusal to participate in electoral politics (although some anarchists defend voting in local elections in special circumstances). On this understanding, direct action does not preclude organization. Indeed, direct action is consistent with the organization of alternative institutions as a means of bypassing or short-circuiting state bodies. And anarchists have been involved in all manner of organizational initiatives, from worker cooperatives to mutual aid societies and industrial syndicates.

Anarchists who accept organization are divided on the question of violence. One view is that anarchist direct action implies a commitment to nonviolence because violence is the means by which representative institutions ensure compliance, and its use by anarchists is therefore self-defeating. The competing view is that anarchists must be prepared to use violence in direct actions precisely because representative institutions will deploy repressive force to prevent revolutionary change.

Some anarchists associate direct action with the rejection of both organization and program. The thinking here, inspired by Max Stirner, is that any organization—even one without hierarchy—threatens to constrain the individual ego by forcing it into a straitjacket imposed by abstract categories of thought (anarchist, worker, peasant, rebel, etc.) not of its own making. Stirnerites and others—including the primitivist John Zerzan—also resist attempts to shepherd anarchists toward the adoption of particular revolutionary strategies. This, too, is a form of representation and one, moreover, that conflicts with the commitment to respect individual conscience: As direct activists, anarchists take responsibility for their actions, both in conception and in their realization and consequences.

A parallel set of arguments runs through anarchist discussions of anarchy. Some anarchists willingly outline organizational frameworks for anarchy, examining the possibilities for decentralized, nonhierarchical organization and for developing through federation nonexploitative, ecological patterns of production, consumption, and distribution. Others are fearful that organization necessarily involves constraint. A related fear is that anarchism might fall into the trap of utopianism: blueprint design, threatening the scope for individual creativity. The relationship between anarchism and utopianism is complex.

Anarchists who positively embrace utopianism as a form of revolutionary action argue the necessity of demonstrating both the potential and the superiority of decentralized forms of organization

but deny any intention to draw up blueprints for an anarchist society or to assert the desirability of developing fixed or unchanging ideals of anarchy. Yet, within the organizational anarchist tradition, the social-ecologist Murray Bookchin defended a thickly communitarian vision, based on a program of socialization that many anarchists find unpalatable. Moreover, as postanarchists like Saul Newman have argued, anarchist utopianism seems to imply the acceptance of a set of assumptions about the revolutionary subject and the nature of revolutionary change that are constraining. From this point of view, the attempt to outline the future implies an understanding of the present that misunderstands its fluidity and fails to appreciate the ways in which power is both constructed and inscribed in societies.

Twenty-First-Century Anarchism

The emergence of postanarchism, associated with Newman, Lewis Call, and Todd May, has been an important influence in twenty-first-century anarchist political theory and marks the attempt to revise nineteenth-century anarchism through the lens of a diverse set of influences including Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Lacan, and Jean Baudrillard. Although actually part of the older tradition, Stirner also assumes an important place in postanarchist thinking.

Critics of postanarchism—Benjamin Franks is one—argue that postanarchist theory tends to neglect the importance of economic exploitation and class-based cleavages and that it leads to a failure of real political engagement. Postanarchists deny this. Insofar as modern anarchist political theory is concerned, the rights and wrongs of the matter are perhaps less interesting than the light the argument sheds on the nature of anarchism in the twenty-first century.

The debate stirred by postanarchism has helped focus attention on what has become a primary division in anarchist studies: the distinction between the politics of so-called class-struggle anarchism and the unpolitical behaviors of rebellious libertarians. Notwithstanding the complex interchange of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century anarchist ideas, there is a growing tendency to read this division back into anarchist history, suggesting a fundamental division between collectivists (or communists) focused on the destruction of the capitalist state system by means of revolutionary struggle and individualists concerned with freeing themselves from the domination of all social actors and institutions through the construction of spaces for self-expression.

Yet, writing in 1943, Herbert Read defined anarchism as the politics of the unpolitical and argued that the programmatic aspects of anarchism were fully compatible with the attitudes of libertarians. Only as the creative and dynamic intersections of anarchist political thought and anarchistic practices give out to two increasingly polarized alternative anarchisms is this conception being challenged.

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See also Federalism; Ideology; Libertarianism; Marxism; Socialism; Utopianism

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Anarchy

Anarchy is a word of Greek origin denoting the absence of the rule of law or (more broadly) of settled government. The prevalence of anarchy is the first and primary assumption of realism, a term

given by scholars to a family of theoretical models of interstate behavior that is central to contemporary international systems theory. Realism is founded on several pessimistic assertions about interstate life, among them anarchy.

The argument is that, historically, the interstate world has most often consisted of a multiplicity of sovereign entities; these sovereign entities recognize little by way of international law and have almost no way of enforcing it. There really are no enforceable rules of conduct—especially for strong states. The term scholars employ to describe this situation is anarchy. The harsh interstate environment is both literally an anarchy in the strict sense of the absence of enforceable international law and an anarchy in the broader sense, which denotes violent chaos. The prevalence of this environment, in turn, dictates that the primary goals of individual governments are, simply, survival and security.

There are two possible exits from anarchy. One is the emergence of a universal empire. That is, one state achieves universal and unchallenged dominance and imposes a rough law and order everywhere, to suit its own purposes and as it sees fit. This, famously, was the Roman solution. But the emergence of universal states is rare and difficult to achieve (as the United States has recently found out). The second exit is through widespread acceptance of international law, especially by the strong states, administered—and enforced—by a neutral international institution such as a United Nations. But because the interstate world has traditionally been so dangerous, the voluntary acceptance of restraints on state conduct is unlikely. This is especially true for the powerful states, whose governments do not wish to give up their hard-won advantages of power and status. Historically, then, multipolar anarchy—an interstate world of multiple large powers, each pursuing its own interests in a fierce competition with few or no rules—has been the prevalent form of interstate life.

Realists argue that the prevalence of anarchy, rather than any internal cultural traits of individual states, is the primary determinant of interstate behavior. The generally harsh and competitive international environment and the current distribution of power across the interstate system are the vital factors. The anarchy of the state system, rather than any unique cultural attribute of any one unit in the system, is thus the primary factor in another fundamental realist principle: the ruthless self-seeking that occurs on the part of all states. This ruthless self-seeking occurs primarily because with no international law, states must provide for their own security. Thus, a structural anarchy is also inevitably a self-help regime: Governments are unable to depend on the help of others or on the rule of law, so every government reserves the right to be sole arbiter of what constitutes justice for itself and the right to take up arms to enforce it. Because the best way to provide security under anarchy is to be powerful, self-help leads naturally to power-maximizing behavior. In an anarchic state-system, power-maximizing behavior is, therefore, the normal behavior of all states.

This means that realists are more likely to see decision-making elites making their aggressive and power-maximizing decisions based primarily on (reasonable) fear, rather than on mere greed—although such analysts often see an intense desire for the accumulation of resources and power (i.e., greed) as a response to anarchy. That is, it is grounded in a general (reasonable) fear of weakness, in a desire for self-preservation in a fiercely competitive world. In such a world, one needs power to survive. As R. W. Sterling puts it: "States must meet the demands of the political eco-system or court annihilation." This is often called the *Primat der Aussenpolitik* (the primacy of external relations in determining state behavior), as opposed to the *Primat der Innenpolitik* (the primacy of internal political, social, and cultural structures in determining state behavior).

The combination of anarchy, ruthless self-help, and power-maximizing behavior by all states leads to a third realist assertion: In such an environment, "War is normal," to quote the leading realist theoretician, Kenneth Waltz. That is: War, or the threat of war, is a normative way by which states under anarchy resolve conflicts of interest. Those conflicts of interest are real; they are not a mere matter of miscommunication. And because every state in an anarchy must be ready to defend its interests through organized violence, this is the primary factor leading to the development of internal cultures of militarism and bellicosity (and an emphasis on maintaining honor, i.e., status, internationally). This is true of all states—under

anarchy they are all functionally similar. Cultures of militarism and bellicosity are simply a natural adaptation to the harsh international environment, although, in turn, they contribute as independent variables to the prevalence of war.

But political scientists also suggest that under anarchic conditions, there is a moment when the danger of large-scale war is most acute: when a sudden large shift in the distribution of power capabilities of states occurs within a state-system. Political scientists term this a power-transition crisis. The shift can be either a dramatic increase in the capabilities of one of the main actors or a dramatic decrease in the capabilities of another main unit. But when the existing distribution of privilege, influence, and goods in a system becomes mismatched to the changing realities of power, the result tends to be large-scale war, which in turn creates a new structure, a new configuration of privilege, influence, and goods—one better matched to the actual distribution of power.

Thus, major realignments of power, influence, and status within anarchic state systems have tended to be accompanied by great violence: what political scientists call hegemonic war. World War I is a good example. Realists hold that power-transition crises and hegemonic wars often result from the attempt by a main actor to preserve its deteriorating position within the system; it acts while its governing elite feels it still can. But this is only a *trend*—for realists also agree that individual moments of decision making by governments are too idiosyncratic to be predictable. Hence, the power-transition crisis caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union was handled without war, thanks to good diplomacy on both sides. But historically, a power-transition crisis tends to lead to hegemonic war to establish new leaders within anarchic systems.

Modern realist thinking rose to its current intellectual prominence as a pessimistic response, first, to the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of World War I, but even more strongly as a response to the terrible international events of the 1930s, which were followed by the cataclysm of World War II and then the onset and long persistence of the cold war, despite many diplomatic efforts at detente. These grim international developments seemed to demonstrate that the other major approaches to the study of international relations—Groatian legalism, Wilsonian liberal institutionalism and idealism, Marxist economism—were inadequate and even naive instruments of analysis. Conversely, the peaceful denouement of the cold war, and the relatively high level of interstate cooperation that accompanied it (1989–1991), led in the 1990s to a resurgence of liberal-institutionalist (neoliberal) criticism of anarchy theory as too pessimistic. Liberal institutionalists argued that realist paradigms of interstate behavior tend to underestimate the extent of consensual community and of communication, interdependence, and cooperation that can and does exist among states under modern conditions and to underestimate as well the human desire for peace.

Realists have responded by arguing that perceived national interest and little else—certainly not altruism—determined state actions at the end of the cold war and that the relative success and smooth working of international institutions in the 1990s merely reflected the fact that they were supported by (and were useful to) the overwhelming power and prestige of the United States. They have also pointed to the reemergence of a more internationally assertive Russia, as well as the rise in power of an increasingly nationalistic and militarized China, as demonstrating the persistence, pervasiveness, and ferocity of international competition.

Another major criticism of anarchy theory has recently emerged—a version of "the linguistic turn" that has affected so many scholarly fields. International relations constructivists now argue that anarchy theory, rather than being a sober comment on harsh real-world problems, constitutes instead an artificial and arbitrary discourse of competition and violence. This violent discourse has itself a detrimental effect on the international system because of its destructive impact on the expectations and perceptions of statesmen—and thus, eventually, on their actions. In other words, the harsh paradigms of realist discourse constitute a self-fulfilling prophecy. But the world of states is not an objective fact, a given that ineluctably forces itself on the individual units (states) within it; rather, it is a world socially constructed by human beings acting on specific ideas. The interstate system may be an anarchy without a guiding authority or effective means of enforcing international law, but anarchy is what you make

of it, and the pessimistic theorizing of realism can and should be combated, replaced by a new communitarian discourse of interstate relations. Once such a communitarian discourse of international relations replaces pessimistic and destructive anarchy discourse, this might, in turn, construct a new and more benign international environment—as, constructivists argue, similar communitarian discourses have accomplished in the past, especially in the Middle Ages.

Realists, while acknowledging the impact of discourse on state action, have answered that this line of thinking gives too much power to words. They argue that the prevailing medieval communitarian discourse actually had little practical impact on the rivalrous and warlike real-world actions of medieval states within their anarchic state-system. Moreover, the originators of constructivism were mostly American scholars writing in the 1990s, in a world that the United States dominated and a society that (extraordinarily in history) had little experience of what it felt like to be acted on violently and decisively by the outside, by others. Only intellectuals ensconced in the safety of the American world of the 1990s, of expected—or rather, unconsciously assumed—complete security before Sept. 11, 2001, could have doubted that a state's need to establish security against a rivalrous and hostile world without law and order was a real need, and not merely a matter of destructive discourse.

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See also Anarchism; Conflict Theory; Realism

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Ancestral Tradition (*Mos Maiorum*)

In ancient Rome, *mos maiorum* (ancestral tradition) was an unwritten behavioral code that defined and regulated all aspects of Roman conduct within and without the community. In itself, *mos* is strictly speaking a personal judgment or inner disposition; it may indicate a habit, which is neither good nor bad. Terence, a Roman comic playwright who lived in the second century BCE, encapsulates the neutral meaning of *mos* in a proverbial line: "'as many men, so many minds' everyone has his own *mos* " (*Phormio* 454). However, as ancient grammarians explain, the transformation of *mos* from an individual choice into custom (*consuetudo*) is generated by two main factors: social acceptance of the practice and its exercise and repetitions over time (Macrobius *Saturnalia* 3.8.9–12 citing Varro, Festus, and Vergil).

The *maiores,* the ancestors who gave rise to the greatness (*maiestas*) of Rome, constitute the community that accepts personal choices and transforms them into custom. Recent studies have identified them as those members of individual *gentes* (groups of families that shared the same name and ancestors) who had served as public magistrates. Because they belong to the past, they establish with those living a dual relationship of homogeneity and superiority. They act as the group that confers communal value to individual choices and grants authority to certain actions, establishing what deserves to become a custom. The *mos maiorum,* says Festus (a Roman grammarian of the second century CE), is "the practice of our fathers, that is the memory of the past especially with regards to religion and ancient cults" (Festus 1.46.3 Lindsay). Once the ancestors have accepted certain forms of behavior, its repetition over time conferred the status of custom on it.

The example of Julius Caesar is illuminating. During the celebration of his Gallic triumph, Caesar, passing along the Velabrum, accidentally fell off his chariot. From then on, each time he took his seat on a chariot, Caesar established the habit of thrice repeating a certain formula in the hope of securing a safe journey. This became "a practice that, to my knowledge"—says Pliny

the Elder, Roman author of the first century CE—"is done by many people at the present day." (Pliny *Naturalis Historia* 28.4.21).

Mos maiorum included a vast range of actions that were accepted and justified in its name. For example, custom prescribed that a legislative proposal could not be presented for voting to the popular assembly without having first received the Senate's approval. This *mos* became such an integral part of Roman political practice that the magistrate who did not comply was accused of subversive behavior. Custom also established the accepted behavior at theater, dictating the actors' dress code as well as the audience's behavior at the end of a show. Custom also prescribed many educational and military practices and exercised a considerable role in the spheres of religion and law. Despite being an unwritten code, the ancestral tradition at Rome could also function as source of law (Quint. *Institutio Oratoria* 12.3.6).

Although of a distinctive oral nature, the *mos maiorum* was transmitted to new generations through a diverse range of means, which, reaching the diverse echelons of society, gave it the possibility of playing a cohesive role within the community. Keeping record of yearly events, adoptions, wills, inheritances, and other matters, the accounts of the *pontifices,* the highest Roman religious officers, indirectly recorded ancestral customs, mainly, but not only, on religious matters. Both historiography and poetry also played an important role in the transmission of the *mos,* which was codified in examples, short stories, and memorable sayings embedded within historical narratives or poetic figures. To the uneducated audience that did not have access to these written forms, the *mos maiorum* was handed down via the topography of the city of Rome, funerary rituals, and deliberative as well as forensic oratory. In Rome, individual spots could remind the passer-by of memorable acts of the ancestors, while during funerary processions, the ancestors of the deceased, impersonated by actors wearing masks and dressed according to the magistracies once held, reenacted for those present the glory of the ancestors' deeds. In the open-air Forum, crowds gathered to hear judicial proceedings and to be informed on issues on which they might be called to deliberate. On these occasions, magistrates and those who received their approval to speak publicly evoked examples of the past to support their cause or to undermine that of their opponent.

The criterion that led to the establishment of a specific behavior as *mos* was its importance for the preservation of the commonwealth. In this sense, it is possible to say that the *mos maiorum* performed a selection among the stories of the past to create a collective Roman memory, which was functional to the commonwealth and corroborated its civic ideals. However, this idea of what was useful to the preservation of the commonwealth varied in time and depended on the sociopolitical context in which it was applied. These two factors, together with the variety of means of transmission, create the distinctive fluid character of the *mos maiorum*.

Despite this undefined nature, the *mos maiorum* functioned as a behavioral paradigm in Roman society: Actions that conformed and adhered to it were commended and justified, whereas those that departed from it were condemned and reprobated. In the historical work of Cato the Elder, statesman of the third through second century BCE, names of individual families were erased from the historical record, and a pantheon of nobles that belonged to the whole Roman people was thus constructed. The *mos maiorum* was adopted to identify the whole Roman community versus the non-Romans (e.g., the Gauls), while in the conflict between the *optimates* (members of the conservative elite) and the *populares* (members of the ruling group demanding change), each group claimed to be the true depositaries of the Roman ancestral tradition to the exclusion of their adversary. A past trend in scholarship underlined the role of the ancestral tradition as immutable and defined law, which functioned as precedent to legitimize actions and behaviors. Current studies, however, tend to emphasize its fluid nature and its openness to partisan interpretation.

The peculiar nature of the *mos maorium* is that it limited the permissible extent of change and what it saw as radical innovation, while being, by its own very nature, dynamic and open to modifications.

Valentina Arena

See also Assembly; Cicero; City-State; Common Good; Roman Commonwealth; Roman Law

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Ancien Régime

Ancien régime literally means the prior or former regime, but the most common English rendering is "old regime" or simply ancien régime. Over time, the phrase has acquired both a literal and a metaphorical significance. The original French term was coined to refer to the political and social order that existed before the French Revolution of 1789. Indeed, the first important uses of the term were by the revolutionaries themselves, such as the radical journalist Jean-Paul Marat and the Jacobin leader Maximilien Robespierre.

This circumstance itself helped lend a pejorative connotation to the term because its users aimed to legitimize their ongoing overthrow of the old order. Quickly, however, this literal usage came to be accepted as merely descriptive. Conservatives such as Joseph de Maistre (*Considerations on France,* 1796) and moderate liberals such as Benjamin Constant (*On the Strength of the Present Government of France, and on the Necessity of Rallying to It,* 1796) or Germaine de Staël (*On the Present Circumstances That Might End the Revolution, and on the Principles That Should Found the Republic in France,* 1797) were already using it in this fashion in the 1790s.

The richest definition of the ancien régime appeared in Alexis de Tocqueville's 1856 book, *L'ancien régime et la révolution* (The Old Regime and the Revolution). Tocqueville took the term as a description of the French political and social order before 1789 and served notice, even in the preface, that the formative influence of the ancien régime on the character and trajectory of the revolution itself would be a central question in his work. Since that time, theorists and comparativists have frequently analyzed the independent and discrete status of the old regime in something like Tocqueville's fashion.

In scope, the phrase has sometimes seemed to refer to a political and social order that included the Middle Ages and early modern period. More often, however, ancien régime means a regime that existed between the end of the Middle Ages and the revolution. Different authors have dated the beginning of this putatively distinct regime in different ways, some locating it in the fourteenth century, others from the end of the Hundred Years War (1453), still others from the establishment of the Renaissance monarchy (1498 or 1515) or even the absolute monarchy of the Bourbons (1598).

There is perhaps as much diversity of opinion about the attributes of the ancien régime as about its chronology. Some put the emphasis on the political, defining that period as one characterized by absolute monarchy buttressed by a religious, even divine-right form of legitimacy. Because most European governments were monarchical until World War I, this political definition must place

the emphasis on the social and religious underpinnings of the monarchy.

Others, however, use the term to refer more to the social hierarchy that existed before the revolution of 1789. Most societies in prerevolutionary Europe were structured around juridical distinctions between functionally defined classes, or orders (*états* in French): the first estate (clergy), the second estate (war-fighting nobility), and the third estate (commoners). The theory was that the clergy pray, the nobility fight, and the commoners work and that this arrangement was sanctioned by God. Broadly speaking, this functional definition of society disappeared as an explicit principle of legitimation in or shortly after 1789, even if landed nobilities continued to exist and to exercise considerable power in regimes as various as England, Germany, and Russia thereafter.

It is worth noting that the term ancien régime is rarely used to describe the old economic order. Economic historians use a number of different markers to distinguish between modern and premodern, most of which are at best indirectly related to the social and political attributes of the ancien régime, as that term is generally employed. Some emphasize the Industrial Revolution, which began before the French Revolution and was mostly independent of it. Others stress the commercial revolution of the post-Columbian Atlantic. Here, too, the concept of commercial society was a feature of eighteenth-century thought, and some critics of the ancien régime in fact advocated an expansion of the values and institutions of commercial society.

Although the term is French and was designed to make sense of French experience, it has been readily extended (as indicated in the foregoing) to other European countries that had similar institutions: monarchies, aristocracies, hierarchical social orders, established churches, elements of serfdom, and the like. Indeed, Arno Mayer argues for the essential continuity of such a broadly defined ancien régime right up to 1914, when the conflagration of World War I swept aside all the monarchies and empires—notably the Hohenzollern in Germany, the Romanov in Russia, the Habsburg in Central Europe, and the Ottoman in southeastern Europe and the Middle East—once and for all.

Henry C. Clark

See also Absolutism; Aristocracy; Conservatism; de Maistre, Joseph Marie; Divine Right of Kings; Enlightenment; Legitimacy; Tocqueville, Alexis de; Universal Monarchy

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Ancient Constitutionalism

Ancient constitutionalism is a related set of medieval and (especially) early modern doctrines, generally opposed to royal absolutism, state centralization, and the doctrine of reason of state, in the name of a traditional fundamental law. *Ancient* here means "previous, old," as in the French *ancien* of *ancien régime;* the law and constitution that are being appealed to, remembered, or invented were medieval, not ancient in the sense that refers to classical Greece or Rome. Indeed, the ancient constitution was also often referred to as the Gothic constitution, *Gothic* itself being a term often used during the (Greek- and Roman-oriented) Renaissance to refer to the nonclassical, feudal, Germanic centuries that preceded it, as in the Gothic art and architecture of the twelfth to fifteenth centuries. Gothic was often a derogatory term, the Visigoths and Ostrogoths, like the Vandals and other Germanic tribes, being remembered as barbaric destroyers of Roman civilization. But ancient constitutionalists would sometimes proudly appeal to an imagined history that included the Germanic tribes, who had a freedom in their primordial forests that the subjects of absolute Roman emperors lacked.

Ancient constitutions, as imagined or constructed by early modern ancient constitutionalists, were

not the unified written documents with clear status as fundamental law that we now associate with the word *constitution*. There were complex mixtures of written charters and codes of public law (Magna Carta, for example), customs, evolved institutions, feudal oaths, and political compromises newly described as fundamental law. The key intellectual move of an ancient constitutionalist argument was usually to identify some exercise of central or royal power as novel and innovative and disruptive of some long-established rule, custom, law, or practice and as therefore illegal or illegitimate. Appeals to ancient constitutions were, therefore, not always coherent or compatible with one another, to say nothing of the historical record; defenses of aristocratic privileges and defenses of urban liberties could sit uncomfortably with one another, for example, since during the Middle Ages, urban liberties were asserted against local feudal lords at least as much as against distant kings.

Ancient constitutionalism probably had its greatest influence as a set of doctrines in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England. The ideas that a Saxon (that is Germanic) common law had governed England since before the time of the absolutist Norman conquest, that Magna Carta had restated what were already old rules and rights at English law, and that Parliament as an institution had for centuries held the authority to grant or withhold consent to taxation and legislation provided a baseline against which the Stuart kings could be said to be illegally innovating. Ancient constitutionalism thus formed part of the foundation of Parliamentarian and Whig ideologies; the execution of Charles I and the chasing from the throne of James II were both characterized as restoring a good and old legal-political order. In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes was an important opponent of all parts of ancient constitutionalist thinking: He held that customs did not become law with age; that neither Parliament nor common-law judges could have any more authority than what a sovereign king granted them; and that the privileges of provinces, cities, and aristocrats alike were discretionary grants, not enforceable rights. In the late eighteenth century, David Hume, especially in his widely read multivolume *History of England,* subjected ancient constitutionalist history to devastating criticism. While Hume thought that the post-Glorious Revolution regime that we now think of as an emerging constitutional monarchy was a good one, he was also quite sure that it was a *new* one, not a restoration of what he took to be feudal barbarism. Nonetheless, ancient constitutionalist ideas retained a grip on the English historical imagination.

The ancient constitutionalist style of argument was nonetheless in evidence throughout early modern Western Europe. As central state authority grew, struggles between the center and traditional provinces or cities or regional aristocratic lords were common. So, too, were struggles between kings and parliaments or estates representing the aristocracy, the clergy, and the cities or common people. Political rhetoric, and sometimes developed political theory, often criticized absolutism in the name of the old order and institutions. These disputes were most famous in France: The sixteenth-century Calvinist monarchomachs theorized in an ancient constitutionalist style, and so did the eighteenth-century *parlementaires,* whose resistance to royal power, protection of aristocratic immunity from taxation, and insistence on summoning the long-defunct Estates General precipitated the French Revolution. Baron de Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws,* published in 1748, offered an ancient and Gothic constitutionalist reconstruction of French constitutional history and argued that a respect for the traditional rights and privileges of intermediate bodies protected the rule of law within a monarchy and differentiated it from despotism.

While ancient constitutionalism was in a sense logically tied to the customs of one particular place, there was considerable cross-fertilization. Monarchomach tracts were translated and published in English as bolstering Whig arguments. Montesquieu drew on English experience, and Edmund Burke wrote that England had preserved the ancient constitution of Europe and therefore that France could have rebuilt on its own constitutional foundations using English institutions as a model, as an alternative to revolution.

From the French Revolution through the early twentieth century, almost every European state broke with its legal and political past in a radical way. Moreover, the development of written, enacted constitutionalism, while it drew on Montesquieu and other ancient constitutionalist sources, apparently offered the possibility of

limiting the state and binding it to the rule of law in a more determinate and more democratic way, not dependent on either conflicting customs or on aristocratic privilege.

Jacob T. Levy

See also Absolutism; Common Law; Constitutionalism; Monarchomachs; Montesquieu, Baron de

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Ancient Democracy

Democracy began with the ancient Greeks. While a few prior kingdoms and city-states of the ancient Near East may have included a degree of communal or popular decision making in government, nowhere outside Greece did the process rise to the level of democracy. Greek democracy first appeared in a few city-states of the archaic period (c. 700–480 BCE), became more common during the succeeding classical period (c. 480–323 BCE), and continued in the Hellenistic era (323–31 BCE) before declining precipitously during the time of Rome's hegemony (from c. 196 BCE on). Greek democracy powerfully influenced political theory and practice in antiquity and has continued to do so to the present day.

What It Meant

The Greek word for democracy was *demokratia,* involving the root words *demos,* or people, and *kratos,* power. The Greeks conceived of *demokratia* as that form of city-state constitution in which the people—especially the masses of ordinary citizens (the *demos*) rather than the wealthy elite—controlled the deliberative process and held decisive political authority. Ancient writers usually contrasted *demokratia* with forms of government involving rule by a small class of privileged citizens (oligarchy, aristocracy) or rule by one man (monarchy, tyranny).

The *demos* expressed its control in the democratic city-state in various ways. Most directly, the *demos* ruled through meetings of a popular assembly, a body to which all citizens were invited. Most Greek city-states (or *poleis,* as the Greeks called them) regularly held assembly meetings of some kind. However, assemblies in democratic states

- required little or no property for attendance and in some city-states even offered payments to encourage poorer citizens to join in;
- allowed anyone to speak at the meetings, not just designated officials;
- had essentially unlimited purview and decisive authority, so that decrees of the assembly carried the full force of law.

The *demos* expressed further control in the city-state through the court system: Juries were manned by ordinary citizens and often ruled on political matters, not just narrow issues of civil or criminal law. In addition, democracies kept governing officials and councils on a short leash, with brief terms of office (typically a year or even less) and multiple mechanisms for oversight and discipline by the *demos*. Many officials were chosen by lot from citizen volunteers; others were elected in designated meetings of the assembly.

The concepts of freedom (*eleutheria*) and equality (various Greek terms typically with the prefix *iso-*) animated Greek democracy, and both appear prominently in discussions of *demokratia* by ancient authors. Freedom meant not only freedom from oppressive internal or external political control, but also freedom in the positive sense of the ability to live as one wishes. Equality expressed itself in the idea that people in a democracy should

rule themselves in turn because all citizens were capable of making contributions to the public welfare and all deserved a voice in public matters.

How It Worked

Ancient critics of *demokratia*—who far outnumbered its supporters in the surviving literature—judged that too much freedom and equality existed in democracy, leading to licentious behavior, social upset, and poorly considered decisions from a poorly educated collective citizenry. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all had serious doubts about the wisdom of democratic government (although Aristotle not as implacably as Plato), and they bequeathed their concerns to later theorists. Historical writers such as Thucydides and Xenophon also portrayed *demokratia* in largely negative terms. The historian Herodotus, however, wrote somewhat more favorably of the constitutional form and its ideals of freedom and equality, extolling the power it gave Athens and contrasting it with the ugly despotism of the Persian king.

Athens presents the most famous case of ancient democracy. Arising with the reforms of Cleisthenes (c. 507 BCE), Athens's democratic government became one of the hallmarks of the state and remained so even as the city grew into an imperial power in the course of the fifth century. Defeat in the Peloponnesian War in 404 BCE led to a brief episode of repressive oligarchy, but *demokratia* soon returned to Athens and continued through the rest of the classical era. Democracy also flourished elsewhere in the Greek world, although a paucity of historical sources leave other examples less well understood than the Athenian version. *Demokratia* probably began in the middle of the sixth century BCE in one or more city-states, including Chios, Megara, or Cyrene; by the fifth century, major regional powers such as Syracuse and Argos joined Athens in adopting the constitutional form and retained it for long periods of time.

Compared to the theory and practice of modern democracy, ancient *demokratia* seems radical in some ways and conservative in others. Given the widespread practice of slave holding in the ancient world and the routine exclusion of women from politics, ancient democracy naturally excluded both from participation, narrowing its ambit. On the other hand, for the free male citizens to whom it applied, *demokratia* enabled far more intense and direct political influence than citizens of modern representative systems can hope for. The smaller scale of the Greek city-state—usually ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand citizens—made possible something close to true citizen self-government, ruling and being ruled in turn.

Eric Robinson

See also Aristocracy; Cosmopolitan Democracy; Deliberative Democracy; Democracy; Participatory Democracy; People, The; Radical Democracy; Representative Democracy

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Animal Ethics

Does it matter morally whether animals suffer or live long happy lives? Do animals have moral rights? The moral status of animals has become an increasingly important topic, with the morality of hunting, scientific experimentation on animals, and eating meat particularly widely discussed. This entry first discusses the contractualist view that animals have moral status and then examines several approaches to the status of animals: utilitarian, rights-based, and virtue-based. It is assumed throughout that many animals are capable of feeling pain, pleasure, and suffering; this assumption is defended in detail and depth by David DeGrazia and in a collection of papers edited by Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson.

Contractualism and the Claim That Animals Have No Moral Status

According to some moral theories, animals lack moral status. Animal pain or suffering, as such, does not matter morally unless it has some impact

on creatures that do have moral status. A well-known and influential moral theory that has this implication is contractualism. According to contractualism, morality can be understood as a contract between rational creatures who can accept and abide by the terms of the contract. Because most (perhaps all) animals cannot make and choose to fulfill contracts, they neither possess moral responsibilities nor have moral status themselves. Eating animals, experimenting on them, even torturing them for fun is morally acceptable, considering the impact on the animals alone. Contractualism has been defended recently by T. M. Scanlon and, with specific reference to the moral status of animals, by Peter Carruthers.

Of course many contractualists do not believe that torturing animals for fun is morally acceptable, and they can offer a number of explanations why it is wrong, namely, that it has implications for the treatment of people, who do have moral status. First, some animals (such as farm animals and pets) are owned by people, and it is wrong to damage their property. Second, torturing animals for fun may be bad for your character. By doing so, you will become callous and cruel and more likely in the future to torture people, which would matter morally.

From the contractualist perspective, these are genuine reasons not to harm animals, but they are not very strong. Many animals do not belong to people, and it may be that harming animals has only a weak or even negative correlation with harming people (e.g., taking out your frustration on the cat may make you less likely to take it out on your child, in which case you would have reasons for harming the cat, according to contractualism).

Moreover, contractualists, who insist that rationality and the ability to make and to decide to fulfill contracts are essential to moral status, are faced with a dilemma. Some humans are not rational; some have mental capacities similar to or even lower than many animals. Either contractualists must accept that these humans have no moral status, or they must explain why these humans have moral status, but animals with the same or greater mental capacities do not. Contractualists have struggled to give a credible answer to this dilemma. This has led one prominent contractualist, Scanlon, to suggest that contractualism is not an account of the whole of morality. Scanlon suggests that an important part of morality, "what we owe to each other" is contractualist, but there is also "morality in the broad sense," which includes moral reasons not to harm animals or to cause them unnecessary suffering and which is not contractualist at its basis.

Utilitarianism

According to utilitarianism, it is morally right to maximize happiness and morally wrong to do otherwise. Utilitarianism implies that all creatures capable of happiness or suffering have moral status, in the sense that their happiness and suffering counts equally, whether they are human or animal. An action can be morally wrong, according to utilitarianism, simply because it causes suffering in animals, even if humans benefit from it; such actions are wrong if there is an alternative action that would result in more happiness overall (e.g., where the animals do not suffer and the humans still benefit).

Many utilitarians recognized that this moral theory had important implications for the treatment of animals, but the issue was raised particularly forcefully by Peter Singer in a number of works, but most notably in his book, *Animal Liberation.*

Animal Liberation was first published in 1975. It has sold more than 400,000 copies and is one of the most widely read and influential works of political philosophy of the twentieth century. Singer claims that we are guilty of *speciesism,* a prejudice toward humans comparable to the prejudice of sexists and racists. The book aims to question our treatment of animals and to encourage us to change our attitudes and practices toward them.

But it is important to note that in *Animal Liberation,* Singer does not appeal to utilitarianism, which he recognizes is a very controversial moral theory. Instead, he sets out a principle of equality, which he claims many people (not just utilitarians) will accept. According to this principle, regarding the pain (or pleasure) that animals feel as less important than the same amount of pain (or pleasure) felt by humans cannot be morally justified. Singer believes some pains are worse than other pains, but only if they are more intense or longer lasting. Your pain is not worse than mine because you are more clever or more self-aware or

because you happen to be a human rather than an animal. In other words, the badness of a pain is not affected by other features of the being that feels the pain.

Avoiding speciesism does not require us to believe that there are no differences between humans and animals that matter morally. According to Singer, the life of a normal human is worth more than the life of a normal animal. He thinks that the life of a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts of communication, and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being without those capacities. One reason for this is that a creature with those extra capacities will be able to form many preferences for the future and those preferences will be frustrated if the creature is killed, whereas a creature that has a less sophisticated mind, which cannot think about the future, can form fewer preferences that would be frustrated if it were killed.

Because humans typically have more complex and sophisticated minds than most animals, it follows that it is normally worse to kill a human or let one die than to do the same to an animal. But not all humans are "normal." There are humans who are no more self-aware, no more capable of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts of communication, and so on than many animals, and Singer believes that it is morally right to treat those humans as we would treat animals.

It is important to note that in *Animal Liberation,* Singer does not speak of animal rights, and he does not accord animals absolute rights not to be harmed. If there were significant benefits from an animal's suffering, it could be morally right to impose that suffering on it, and Singer is prepared to accept this consequence. This is compatible with utilitarianism (and with Singer's principle of equality).

For example, Singer strongly criticizes the thousands of experiments performed on animals every year that make it certain the animals will suffer and die, without any certainty, he claims, that any human lives will be saved or that humans will benefit at all. He does not, however, suggest that experimentation on animals should be outlawed completely. Rather, only those experiments serving a clear and urgent need should continue, and the remaining research should be replaced by research not involving animals. He supports (although he does not use these terms) what have become known as the three Rs: *replacement* (of experiments involving animals of high mental capacity with experiments involving animals of lower mental capacity), *refinement* (of experiments involving animals so that they cause as little suffering as possible), and *reduction* (of the number of experiments involving animals).

There are different versions of utilitarianism, and they have different practical implications for the treatment of animals. According to act utilitarianism, an act is morally wrong if an alternative act would produce more overall happiness. According to rule utilitarianism, an act is morally wrong if it is forbidden by a set of rules that, if generally accepted in society, would produce more overall happiness than any alternative. Consider now whether you should eat a chicken that has been raised in poor conditions on a factory farm. Suppose that you would gain pleasure from doing so, and your refraining from doing so would make no difference to the practice of factory farming. According to act utilitarianism, eating the meat is morally permissible, perhaps even morally required, because doing so produces more happiness than the alternative. But if, as is plausible, a rule banning factory-farmed meat would produce more overall happiness than one allowing this practice, then rule utilitarianism would require you not to eat the meat.

Utilitarianism is well-placed to defend the moral status of animals. But it does not follow from any version of that theory that harming animals is wrong, whatever the consequences. As a result, some philosophers have developed alternative approaches to animal ethics that protect the interests of animals more strongly. According to these theories, animals have rights.

Rights Theories

According to rights theorists, animals have rights, usually including a right to life. Whereas utilitarianism morally permits killing animals if the benefits are sufficiently great, if animals have a right to life, it is wrong to kill them whatever the consequences.

One of the best worked out theories of animal rights is Tom Regan's *The Case for Animal Rights.*

According to Regan, any creature that is a "subject of a life" has a distinctive kind of value that he calls inherent value. A subject of a life is a creature that has "beliefs and desires; perception, memory and a sense of the future, including their own future; preference and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them."

Because higher mammals (such as pigs, sheep, cattle) are subjects of a life, they have inherent value, and they have a right to life. Killing and eating these animals is always wrong. Scientific experimentation on these animals is always wrong, whether for cosmetics or medical research. Reduction and refinement of experiments are not appropriate responses, only elimination. Even if we could save more lives by medical research involving animals, it would be wrong to use them for this purpose. Regan is aware that not all animals are subjects of a life. Those that are not may not have inherent value, so it may not be wrong to use them in these ways.

Rights theorists like Regan typically argue that animals have rights in the same kind of way that utilitarians argue that animals have moral status. They point out that we accord rights to humans who have mental capacities similar to certain animals and argue that, to be consistent, we must allow that those animals have rights, too. It may, however, be more helpful to consider individual rights and their basis in order to consider whether animals have those rights. For example, a discussion of the basis of the right to life can be found in Alison Hills. But since the question of whether all humans have moral rights and, if they do, the basis of those rights is extremely controversial, and so it is not straightforward to draw conclusions about animal rights.

Virtue Theory

Utilitarianism and rights theories have been the most important approaches to animal ethics. But some moral philosophers have begun to develop alternative accounts. In particular, some have suggested that thinking about virtues can be a fruitful way of addressing animal issues. Vices such as cruelty and callousness and virtues such as beneficence and justice are clearly relevant to questions of the treatment of animals. In addition, Roger Scruton appeals to a virtue of piety in his discussion of how we should treat animals. And Rosalind Hursthouse, in a brief comment in her book on virtue ethics, suggests that eating meat may be an instance of the vice of greed. Although this approach is promising, it is not developed as fully as utilitarian and rights-based theories of the moral status of animals, and it is not yet clear exactly what practical implications virtue ethics has for the treatment of animals. Further work is needed to determine the similarities and differences between this approach and those already considered.

Conclusion

The treatment of animals is an important matter, both practically and philosophically. Animal farming is a very large practice, involving millions of animals; scientific experimentation on animals involves far fewer but still substantial numbers of animals. It is an urgent question how these practices should be regulated and, indeed, whether they should be legally permitted at all. In recent years, the United Kingdom has changed its laws regulating the uses of animals to protect animal welfare, but activists who campaign on behalf of animal welfare believe that the restrictions should be even stronger, whereas farmers and scientists who use animals in their research emphasize the benefits of these uses of animals to human beings.

Philosophical questions about the moral status of animals are important because they force us to reflect on the basis of moral status quite generally, including the moral status of humans. They have implications for the very heart of moral theory. It is very plausible, as even some contractualists admit, that the suffering of animals matters morally and that animals do have moral status. It is much harder to say whether they have rights, in part because it is controversial exactly which rights we humans have—if any—and why. It is likely that these difficult issues will not be settled soon, and so it may be worth exploring alternative approaches to animal ethics, including those suggested by virtue ethicists.

Alison Hills

See also Animality

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Animality

Animality denotes the characteristics of animals as opposed to plants or to humans. Although in the life sciences, humans are considered one type of animal, in philosophy and in everyday practice, animality continues to be defined against humanity. This entry first explores Aristotle's emphasis on rationality and self-government as the capacities that set human beings apart from animals. Medieval thought further elaborated this view, portraying human beings as superior to animals and as entitled to absolute dominion over them. René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, too, held that animals were inferior and lacked any rights. In the nineteenth century, however, a new perspective emerged, one that stressed similarities between humans and animals in terms of the capacity to suffer. In the twentieth century, some thinkers have focused on the relationship between humans and animals and the extension of rights to animals.

Aristotle on Animality

Until relatively recently, the meaning of the term *animality* within the history of Western political thought was constant. For centuries, Western philosophical conceptions of animality were dominated by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle's idea that humans are unique among the animals because of their ability to govern themselves, both as rational individuals and as political groups or nations. Whereas other animals are governed by natural instincts, humans are self-governing, he maintained. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) called humans *zoon politikon,* which means political animals. He argued that humans, as the only animals capable of politics and self-government, have the right of dominion over all other lower animals. He wrote that nature makes all animals for the use of man. Aristotle said that humans and other animals were distinct in that only humans have speech (even if animals have voices), rationality, and ethics. Therefore, he concluded, "man is the most excellent of all living beings."

Aquinas on Animality

Aristotle's theories of animality were given an even more radical form in the writings of medieval philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE). Aquinas argued that man is rational and animals are not; man has absolute dominion over animals, which were given to him by God, and therefore, man may kill or dispose of animals as he pleases. In other words, man has no direct ethical or moral obligations to animals whatsoever. Aquinas believed that there is no duty to animals and that God put animals on Earth for men to use.

Modern Philosophy

Modern philosophers René Descartes (1596–1650) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) continued to drive a wedge between animality and humanity. Descartes argued that animals are like machines that merely react to stimuli but do not have any true responses. He maintained that because animals are incapable of language and of knowledge, they are inferior to man. He said that animals do not have immortal souls; only humans do.

Kant also proposed that animals are inferior to man because they are incapable of reason. He concluded that we have no direct ethical duties to animals, although we may have indirect ethical duties

to them if by harming them we harm their owners. Kant also argued that people who harm animals may become callous and thereby become accustomed to harming living beings, including other people. In this regard, harming animals may indirectly lead to harming people, in which case it is ethically wrong. Kant argued that if we have a duty to animals, it is only because our behavior toward animals affects our actions toward other humans. We learn to be good to each other by being good to animals, and cruelty to animals can lead to cruelty to humans. But, Kant also says that if a man shoots another man's dog, it is a moral wrong done not to the dog but to the owner of the dog.

The view that humans have (or should) overcome their own animality and that they are radically different from animals because they are capable of reason, understanding, language, ethics, politics, sympathy, imagination, and various other characteristics associated with humanity (including having a soul) was the dominant view until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the beginning of what is called the animal rights movement. German philosopher Johann Herder (1744–1803) even claimed that man's upright or erect posture is what makes him unique and results in everything else associated with being human. Herder says that man has the most perfect organization of powers because of the perspective he gains through his upright posture.

Nineteenth-Century Views on Animality

Origins of the Doctrine of Animal Rights

In the nineteenth century, there are notable exceptions to Herder's view, particularly as articulated in the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). In addition, the nineteenth century saw the first organized attempts to protect animals with the emergence of animal protection associations in England and the United States. English philosopher Bentham argued that like humans, animals are also capable of suffering, even if they are not capable of language or rational thought. Because of this, people have obligations not to harm them. He suggested that someday animals may acquire rights withheld from them now; the day may come when the treatment of animals is viewed like the treatment of slaves, who were once subjugated but eventually liberated. Just as we now believe that it is wrong to enslave humans, someday we may believe that it is wrong to enslave or slaughter animals.

Nietzsche

Nietzsche actually proclaimed the virtues of animality over rationality; in various ways, he argued that the valuation of reason over the body has had deleterious effects on human culture, which is plagued by guilt and shame about its natural animality. He maintained that valuing the mind over the body or humanity over animality makes us both weak and sick. In his typical ironic and poetic fashion, he suggests that human evolution has made us awkward like sea animals when they had to become land animals or perish. Human animals were reduced to what he calls their most fallible organ, consciousness; where once they could rely on their animal instincts, now they had to think and therefore became weak. Nietzsche also suggests that the virtues that are considered the pinnacle of human culture are derived from animal virtues; all moral values can be traced to animals, including courage, goodness, and strength. Turning on its head the view that morality is distinctly human, Nietzsche claims that our greatest virtues come from our animal instincts and not the repression of those instincts, as his predecessors argued.

Nietzsche was one of the first philosophers to challenge the very man-animal or human-animal opposition that inaugurated Western philosophy. Traditionally, humans are conceived of as opposed to animals as the result of repressing animality; and humanity is valued as higher or superior to animality. Nietzsche reverses this valuation and puts animals and animality higher than humans and humanity. It could be argued that this extreme reversal of the traditional philosophical view of animals was intended to make us think about the arbitrariness of the absolute borders we draw between ourselves and other species. Nietzsche reminds us of our own animality and animal natures, which cannot—and should not—be eradicated. He challenges us to think about life as dynamic and fluid in ways that can only be reduced, and evacuated of their richness, by our tendency to categorize everything into neat columns or oppositions, including the human–animal binary.

Freud

Reminiscent of Nietzsche, the father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), proposed that humans have bodily drives that evolve out of our animal instincts. In other words, our animality does not disappear when we become civilized, social, political, or self-governing. Rather, aggressive instincts must be redirected into socially acceptable activities. Freud claims that we become human through the repression of animal instincts, which in humans are expressed in indirect and sublimated forms.

Darwin

Both Freud and Nietzsche were influenced by the theories of naturalist Charles Darwin (1809–1882), who proposed that humans evolved from lower animal forms, that humans share many characteristics in common with other animals, and that animals also possess forms of reasoning, intelligence, and emotion. Today, the basic principles of Darwin's theory of evolution are still accepted by the scientific community, although they are contested by various religious groups because of the presumption that being closer to animals is being further from God. This presumption is based on an oppositional hierarchy between humans and animals that does not allow a being to be both human and animal and holds humans to be superior to animals.

Twentieth-Century Views of Animality

Singer and Regan

The oppositional hierarchy between humans and animals that dominated the philosophical scene for centuries changed dramatically in the twentieth century with some philosophers' reactions to factory farming, mass animal slaughter for food production, and scientific experimentation on animals. Although there were many precursors in the nineteenth century, the beginning of what is now called the animal rights movement is associated with the publication of contemporary Australian philosopher Peter Singer's (1946–) book *Animal Liberation* (1975). Following the discourse of the civil rights movements, Singer argues that our treatment of animals is a kind of species-ism on par with racism or sexism. In the first paragraph of *Animal Liberation,* echoing Bentham, Singer claims that humans have enslaved and tyrannized animals, which he compares to the enslavement of black people. Like Bentham, he argues that someday we will see that the enslavement of animals is also morally wrong.

He argues that all animals are equal. In 1983, American philosopher Tom Regan (1938–) published another important book in the animal rights movement outlining a moral theory that demands that we extend rights to at least some animals. He argues that because both animals and humans have interests, animal welfare and human welfare do not differ in kind. He argues that all creatures are subjects of their own lives and therefore deserve respect. Since then, there have been many debates and ongoing discussions of issues around animal rights among philosophers working in the Anglo-American tradition.

Deleuze and Guattari

At the same time, however, philosophers working in the European tradition, particularly French philosophers, have taken a different approach toward our relations with and obligations toward animals. Most notably, Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992) (who co-authored several books) and Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) follow a more Nietzschean line of thought in rethinking the very boundary between human and animal. Rather than argue that animals are like humans and therefore should be given rights like humans—the type of argument made by proponents of animal rights—these philosophers try to articulate different conceptions of human, humanity, animal, and animality. They challenge us to question the meaning of these terms and our assumptions about such categories and to think about how these assumptions affect our actions. Whereas animal rights philosophers usually compare animals to humans, making humans the standard against which animals continue to be measured, these philosophers reject humanism or any philosophy that measures everything, including animals, in relation to humans.

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the boundaries separating humans, animals, and machines are becoming increasingly blurry and fluid as our

interdependence becomes more pronounced. They discuss multiplicities, packs, and assemblages to indicate how what we have taken to be individuals are really interconnected and can form shifting, changing groups that act in concert. Human life and history have become so intertwined with animals and machines that we misrepresent our experience when we insist on clear lines between them; we reduce the richness of our experience when we stake out territories of the animal or of the human. Deleuze and Guattari propose that humans are becoming animal and animals are becoming human; and the relationship between human and animal is reversible. They insist that a stable boundary cannot be drawn between human and animal.

Derrida

Like Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida argues that we cannot draw an absolute borderline between human and animal. Rather, he argues that there are multiple, shifting, unstable borders between different sorts of animals, including human animals. We use the term *animal* to refer to vast numbers of different species, from ants to zebras. In his first posthumously published book, Derrida maintains that the very word animal does violence to the multiplicity of nonhuman animals, some of which may have more in common with humans than they do with each other. He also says that humans may be the most beastly of animals. Unlike proponents of animal rights, Derrida is not arguing that animals are like humans, but rather there are more differences between species than the one between so-called humans and so-called animals. Derrida also suggests that the entire history of philosophy revolves around the wrong-headed oppositional hierarchy man-animal. Derrida's work is sparking what could be the latest trend in philosophers' thinking about animals and animality.

Kelly Oliver

See also Aquinas, Thomas; Aristotle; Becoming; Bentham, Jeremy; Kant, Immanuel; Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm

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Anti-Foundationalism

Anti-foundationalism is a doctrine in the philosophy of knowledge. In most versions, it asserts that none of our knowledge is absolutely certain. In some versions, it asserts more specifically and more controversially that we cannot provide knowledge with secure foundations in either pure experiences or pure reason. Anti-foundationalism appears to be compatible with a wide range of political sciences—from rational choice to ethnography—and an equally wide range of ideologies—from conservatism to socialism. Nonetheless, in practice, it has come to have a close relationship to critical approaches to the study of politics.

Philosophy

The term *anti-foundationalism* is of recent popularity. It is used to refer to any epistemology that rejects appeals to any basic ground or foundation of knowledge. Anti-foundational epistemologies thus include many that predate the recent spread of the term itself. Examples of anti-foundationalism surely include much postmodernism, poststructuralism, and pragmatism, as well as much of the analytic philosophy done in the wake of W. V. O. Quine or Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Anti-foundationalism commonly leads to various other philosophical positions. The most widespread are meaning holism, social constructivism, interpretivism, and historicism. Let us consider them in turn.

Given that we cannot have pure experiences, our concepts and propositions cannot refer to the world in splendid isolation. Concepts cannot directly represent objects in the world because our experiences of those objects must in part be constructed using our prior theories. Thus, anti-foundationalists

conclude that concepts, meanings, and beliefs do not have a one-to-one correspondence with objects in the world but rather cluster together in whole webs. While anti-foundationalists have defended many different epistemologies, from pragmatism to radical skepticism, many of them conclude that we cannot justify isolated propositions; rather, any justification of a knowledge claim must be one that applies to a web of beliefs or research program. These kinds of epistemological ideas inspire anti-foundational critiques of the positivism and naïve empiricism found in much political science.

The meaning holism associated with anti-foundationalism has implications for social ontology. Meaning holism implies that our concepts are not simply given to us by the world as it is; rather, we build them by drawing on our prior theories in an attempt to categorize, explain, and narrate our experiences. Thus, anti-foundationalists typically uphold social constructivism. They argue that we make the beliefs and concepts on which we act and thus the social world in which we live. This social constructivism asserts not only that we make the social world through our actions, but also that our actions reflect beliefs, concepts, languages, and discourses that themselves are social constructs. This constructivist ontology inspires anti-foundational critiques of the reified and essentialist concepts found in much political science.

Meaning holism feeds into anti-foundational analyses of social explanation. It undermines reductionist attempts to explain actions by reference to allegedly objective social facts without reference to the relevant beliefs or meanings. The crucial argument here is that because people's beliefs form holistic webs and because their experiences are laden with their prior beliefs, we cannot assume that people in any given social location will come to hold certain beliefs or assume certain interests. To the contrary, their beliefs, including their view of their interests, will depend on their prior theories. Thus, anti-foundationalists conclude that social explanation consists not of reducing actions to social facts but of the interpretations of meanings in the context of webs of belief, discourses, or cultural practices.

Social constructivism also feeds into anti-foundational analyses of social explanation. It undercuts a scientism in which social explanation appears as a quest for ahistorical causal links. The crucial argument here is that because beliefs and concepts, and so actions and practices, are historically contingent social constructs, we cannot adequately explain them in terms of a transhistorical correlation or mechanism. Human norms and practices are not natural or rational responses to given circumstances. Thus, many anti-foundationalists conclude that social explanation contains an inherently historicist moment. Even those concepts and practices that seem most natural to us need to be explained as products of a contingent history.

Political Science

To understand the implications of anti-foundationalism for political science, we should distinguish between philosophy, method, and topics. As we have just seen, anti-foundationalism supports a social philosophy characterized by holism, constructivism, interpretivism, and historicism. This social philosophy provides a stark contrast to the lukewarm positivism of much political science. It is clear, in that respect, that anti-foundationalism offers a major challenge to political scientists to clarify and defend the philosophical assumptions that inform their work. Yet, to challenge political scientists to rethink their philosophical assumptions is not necessarily to require them to reject their favored methods or topics. Anti-foundationalism cautions political scientists to reflect on the data they generate; it does not tell them that they must or must not use particular techniques to generate data on particular issues.

Anti-foundationalism itself should lead us to recognize that it does not require or preclude particular methods or topics in political science. Meaning holism implies that our beliefs or concepts form a web. Thus, it is possible that political scientists could reconcile anti-foundational philosophy with any given method by suitably modifying their other beliefs or concepts. Political scientists can make their favored techniques of data generation compatible with anti-foundationalism by modifying their other beliefs so as to suggest that the data they generate is saturated with their prior theories and involve holistic and constructed webs of meaning that are to be explained by interpretations that include a historical moment. Foundationalists may insist on particular techniques, arguing that these techniques generate pure facts

and others do not. Anti-foundationalists, in contrast, should allow that all kinds of techniques generate theory-laden data that we can accept or challenge in narratives.

Anti-foundationalists might choose to undertake critical studies that reveal the historical contingency and partiality of beliefs that present themselves as naturally given or inherently rational. Equally, one might imagine anti-foundationalists relying on large-scale surveys to generate data from which to postulate certain beliefs of which they then offer a historical explanation. Or one might imagine them using formal models to explore the outcomes that arise from actions based on particular beliefs and desires, and even then postulating particular beliefs and desires on the grounds that doing so best explains certain observed outcomes. No doubt any anti-foundationalists who used behavioral or rational choice approaches to political science would have to allow that the stories they told were provisional ones that related actions and practices to socially constructed webs of meaning. But there is no reason why their provisional stories should not rely heavily on surveys, statistical analysis, or formal models.

It is worth adding here that anti-foundationalism might even prove compatible with only slightly modified versions of the forms of explanation associated with behavioralism, institutionalism, and rational choice. Anti-foundationalism is, of course, incompatible with a naïve belief in the validity of explanations that treat data as pure facts to be explained in ways that reify practices so as to treat them as natural, fixed, or inherently rational. However, political scientists might accept an anti-foundational analysis of social explanation while offering ad hoc or pragmatic justifications for explanations couched in terms of reified concepts. Perhaps they might argue that such simplified explanations are more able to generate policy-relevant knowledge than are nuanced accounts of historical contingency and diversity: They might defend aggregate, formal correlations between poverty and race, gender, marital status, and education on the grounds that these help the state to develop policies that alleviate poverty. Equally, of course, anti-foundationalists might respond by arguing that the dangers of basing power and policy on essentialist concepts and formal explanations always outweigh the benefits of acting on simplified correlations or models, or they might argue that other approaches to policy formation are capable of generating similar or more substantial benefits. For now, however, the important point is that anti-foundationalism itself does not conclusively resolve such arguments in a way that rules out all possible uses of reified or essentialist concepts in formal correlations and models.

Critique

While anti-foundationalism in principle could be combined with all kinds of approaches to politics, in practice, it is associated more or less exclusively with those that are inspired by critical traditions of inquiry. The impact of different critical traditions on various strands of anti-foundationalism, including governmentality, post-Marxism, and social humanism, does much to explain their respective focus on particular concepts and topics.

In general, we may say that whatever their differences, anti-foundationalists have developed a broadly shared research program. That research program contains at least the following four themes:

1. A commitment to studying *meanings* (beliefs, discourses, and traditions) as constitutive of social and political practices
2. A belief in the *contingency* and contestability of meanings, and so an opposition to claims that a culture, web of beliefs, or practice is natural, inexorable, or inherently rational
3. A commitment to *historical* explanations of meanings, where historicity conveys contingency, thereby undercutting appeals to formal models, fixed institutions, or reified social patterns
4. A use of historical *critiques* to reveal the contingency of webs of belief, which understand themselves as natural, inexorable, or inherently rational.

As these themes suggest, anti-foundationalists portray government as a historically specific and contestable endeavor. They highlight the importance of exploring the changing meanings that constitute economic, political, social, and cultural practices in broader postimperial and transnational

settings. They encourage studies of changing patterns of governance and conceptions of politics, notably how practices of statecraft are conceived in relation to their objects of intervention. They encourage studies of how society and its discontents have been understood, especially in the context of traditions of social thought and protest and their role in framing patterns of sociality, inequality, and resistance. And they encourage studies of the role of the cultural domain in these transformations and the separation of culture as a discrete realm with its own institutions, forms, and conventions.

Mark Bevir

See also American Pragmatism; Critique; Foucault, Michel; Historicism; Postmodernism

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ANTIGONE

In ancient Greek legend, Antigone was the daughter—and the sister—of Oedipus, the mythical king of Thebes who tore out his eyes after discovering that he had unwittingly killed his father and married his own mother, Jocasta. The most famous account of Antigone's story is in Sophocles' Theban trilogy: *King Oedipus* (performed c. 427 BCE), *Oedipus at Colonus* (performed posthumously in 405 BCE), and *Antigone* (performed before its thematic prequels in 441 BCE). Aeschylus also touches on the Theban legend in *Seven Against Thebes*.

Aeschylus' tragedy tells the story of the mortal conflict between Antigone's brothers, Polyneices and Eteocles, which forms the prologue to the events detailed in *Antigone*. In Sophocles' play, Antigone comes into conflict with the new king of Thebes, Creon, the brother of Jocasta, when she insists on burying Polyneices against Creon's direct order. Antigone's significance has been seen as lying in her advocacy of the importance of family loyalties, in positing a conflict between human and divine law, in representing an early account of the demands of conscience against socially imposed obligations, and in raising the question of the role of women in public life.

Following the death of Jocasta and the expulsion of the now-blind Oedipus from Thebes, which occur at the end of *King Oedipus,* Antigone, despite being the younger of the sisters, accepts responsibility for the care of her father and accompanies him on his wanderings. By the time of *Oedipus at Colonus,* Oedipus is a very old man. During that play, Ismene seeks her father out in Athens to tell him of the impending battle between her brothers for control of Thebes. Unable to prevent this, Oedipus dies, and the play ends with Antigone resolving to return to Thebes to try to stop her brothers from destroying each other.

In *Antigone,* we learn that both brothers were killed in the battle and that Creon, while granting Eteocles full burial rights, has deemed Polyneices a traitor and demanded that his body be left where he died, as carrion meat. Antigone tries to persuade Ismene to help her bury Polyneices; Ismene refuses, claiming that as a woman she is not strong enough to oppose male decrees, and Antigone disowns her for failing to carry out her familial duties.

Once Antigone has buried Polyneices, she is brought before Creon, who orders her to be imprisoned, despite the pleading of Haemon, Creon's son and Antigone's lover, in a cave from which she cannot escape. Ismene now wishes to take the blame for the burial too, but Antigone refuses to allow her to share the credit for this act of sisterly devotion and explains that, as both her parents were dead, her brother was irreplaceable and her duty to him therefore exceeded even that owed to a husband or a child. Entombed in her cave, Antigone kills herself. When he discovers this, Haemon kills

himself too, as does his mother, Eurydice. Too late, Creon is left to despair of his stubbornness.

Toby Reiner

See also Community; Household; Myths; Theater, Antiquity and Middle Ages; Tyranny

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Apocalyptic Ideas

Basic to any understanding of apocalyptic ideas is a distinction between their use in the contexts of social and cosmic disruption and their use in contexts of disclosure and revelation. Both of these usages can claim some basis in the primary biblical apocalyptic text, whose opening is "The revelation (*apocalypse*) of Jesus Christ" (Revelation 1:1). On the one hand, on those occasions when we find words like *apocalyptic* or *apocalypse* used relating to cataclysmic events, we can see the influence here of the Book of Revelation as a whole, which is full of colorful descriptions of the disasters that overtake humanity before the coming of the millennium and the descent of the New Jerusalem from heaven to Earth. Such usage is based on the *content* of the Book of Revelation, which is largely (but by no means entirely) concerned with the upheavals that have to precede the new age, beliefs that were typical of much contemporary expectation about the future in both Christianity and ancient Judaism.

In the New Testament, we find ideas similar to those in the Book of Revelation in passages like Matthew 24–25, Mark 13, and Luke 21. On the other hand, we find *apocalyptic* used in something like its literal sense, where it means a disclosure of things that had hitherto been hidden. In such usage, it is the *form* of the Book of Revelation that determines the usage, as divine mysteries are unveiled, whether by vision or dream or some other extraordinary means, to a privileged seer. In the New Testament, we find ideas similar to these in Mark 1:10, Galatians 1:12 and 16, and Acts 10:11.

The apocalypse is a particular literary type found in the literature of ancient Judaism, characterized by claims to offer visions or other disclosures of divine mysteries concerning a variety of subjects. Usually, in Jewish and early Christian texts, such information is given to a biblical hero like Enoch, Abraham, Isaiah, or Ezra. There is an enormous variety of material contained in the ancient apocalypses. If we approach them as revelations of divine secrets, whose unveiling will enable readers to view their present situation from a completely different perspective, we shall best understand their distinctive character.

Origins of Apocalyptic Ideas

The origins of apocalyptic literature have been much debated. Some consider apocalyptic work to be the successor to the prophetic texts of the Old Testament and particularly to those about the future of hope of the prophets. The concern with human history and the vindication of Israel's hopes in Revelation all echo themes from the prophets, several of whom have contributed widely to Revelation's language, particularly Ezekiel, Daniel, and Zechariah.

Some see a subtle change in the form of that hope in the apocalyptic literature as compared with most of the prophetic texts in the Bible. It is suggested that the future hope has been placed on another plane, the supernatural and otherworldly (e.g., Isaiah 65–66 cf. Revelation 21 and 4 Ezra 7:50). But evidence for such a change from the earthly to the supramundane is in fact not widespread. More important is the subtle change of prophetic genre in the later chapters of Ezekiel, with its visions of a New Jerusalem, and the highly symbolic visions of early chapters of Zechariah and the cataclysmic upheavals of the last chapters of the same book and the probably late eschatological chapters of Isaiah 24–27 and Isaiah 55–66. Also important is the emergence of the apocalyptic heavenly ascent evident in passages like 1 Enoch 14. The glimpse into heaven, which is such a key part of John's vision from Chapter 4 onward, has

its antecedents in the call visions of Ezekiel 1 and 10 and Isaiah 6, as well as the parallel glimpses of the heavenly court in 1 Kings 22 and Job 1–2.

Antecedents of the apocalyptic literature have been found in the Wisdom books of the Hebrew Bible (such as Job or Proverbs, and, in the apocryphal literature, the Wisdom of Jesus ben Sirach), with their interest in understanding the cosmos and the ways of the world. We have some evidence of these concerns in apocalyptic texts as they are concerned with knowledge, both of the mysteries of the cosmos and of the secrets of the divine purposes (e.g., 1 Enoch 72ff). The interpretations of dreams, oracles, and astrology, as well as the ability to divine future events, were the activities of certain wise men and those loosely called *magi* in antiquity. But what distinguishes the wisdom discerned in a book like Daniel 2(2:44) is that this understanding comes through divine revelation.

Social Setting and Function

Often, apocalyptic ideas are linked with minority or marginal groups, and while this may be true at certain points in history, interest in apocalyptic ideas also attracted many in the theological and scientific mainstream. Thus, apocalypses were not the preserve of the religious mainstream, and several have turned up in the gnostic library discovered in Nag Hammadi in Egypt, where they are attributed to apostles like Paul, Peter, James, and John. A significant part of the Book of Daniel has to do with the royal court in Babylon, and Chapter 2 offers an interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar's dream. Here are men who have a good reputation in the land of their exile, although they are part of a minority that may be subject to persecution (Daniel 6:10) and there are limits on what the Jews described in these stories are prepared to compromise. There is often an antagonistic attitude to the state. We find this in Revelation 17–18, where the apocalyptic vision of Rome as a whore seated on the beast (cf. Revelation 13) unmasks the pretensions and seductions of power. In this situation, the only strategies are resistance and withdrawal (18.4).

Differing Types and Function

The variety of material found in apocalyptic texts is crucial for understanding their interpretation. Many books claim to be revelation of divine mysteries, but their form differs markedly. Even within the Bible, there is a significant contrast between Daniel in the Hebrew Bible and the Book of Revelation in the New Testament. While both contain the kind of imagery typical of visionary texts (beasts, heavenly scenes), Daniel, unlike Revelation, also contains extensive comment by an angel who accompanies Daniel, explaining the meaning of the visions. This is most clearly seen in Daniel 7, where Daniel's vision of terrible beasts and their judgment by God is linked with the destiny of a persecuted group of Jews. This kind of explanation is not as frequent in Revelation. It is to be found occasionally (e.g., 4 and 7), but most of the images are left unexplained. This leaves considerable room for later interpreters to make of these images what they will, uncontrolled by any directions in the text.

Both Daniel and Revelation are primarily visionary rather than auditory. What is written is what the apocalyptic seer sees in his dreams or visions. Other texts, however, also include much more auditory material, in which an angel or even the divinity communicates the contents of divine secrets. We find this particularly in 2 Esdras (one of the books in the Apocrypha). Whatever its meaning, in Revelation, the authority of the book was guaranteed (22:18). It is a vision that came from the heavenly Christ and has the same level of authority as earlier scripture. Communication whose authority is based on direct communication from heaven is of crucial importance for understanding the significance of such texts.

The Qur'an, which purports to be a revelation to the prophet by the angel Gabriel, is a communication of what Muhammad heard. The words themselves are of importance as they are angelic words whose authority is guaranteed by their source. Of course, they have to be interpreted and applied, but unlike the visions, there is less room for maneuver concerning their meaning.

Characteristics

Apocalypses manifest several characteristics. Dualism in the form of sharp contrast between different principles: truth and falsehood, light and darkness, and heaven and Earth. Spatial categories offer a good example. The contrast between

the world below and the world above is very typical. Indeed, the Book of Revelation concerns the seemingly stark contrast between heaven and earth in this age, which is to be overcome in the next when heaven comes to earth, and the New Jerusalem descends from heaven to earth. This kind of outlook means that the values of the surrounding culture and institutions are often suspect. Understanding the true nature of a culture requires an apocalyptic or revelatory dimension to discern the demands of eternity in history. Linked with this, hope for the future offered another world as the destiny for believers and as a contrast to the humdrum life of religious conformity and predictability.

"Acting Out" Apocalyptic Ideas

Apocalyptic speculation (When will the End come? What is the origin of the universe? Who are the enemies of God? and the like) has been a perennial feature of human culture. Alongside such speculations and the visionary sanctions that sometimes supported them, some apocalyptic ideas go beyond intellectual discussion and become the basis of a conviction that the apocalyptic image is to be acted out in history. We see this, for example, in the way in which the image of the woman clothed with the sun in Revelation 12 led several prophetic women, most famously Joanna Southcott in 1814, to believe that they had been called to fulfill this biblical prophecy. Southcott believed herself to be the incarnation of this biblical symbol and to be acting out the woman's predicted pregnancy. Such examples of the "acting out" of biblical texts are often found in the interpretation of apocalyptic texts and may have roots deep within the Bible itself, where Jesus in the gospels is reported to have linked himself with the apocalyptic image of "one like a son of man" who would come with the clouds of heaven (Mark 14:62, cf. Mark 13:26).

Apocalypse and Authority

The claim to visions or related ways of discerning the divine will for individuals, communities, or even the wider world has always been problematic for all religions, despite the fact that the three Abrahamic faiths all have visionary experiences as their basis. The problem is, however, that continued recourse to visions problematizes what seems to be the fundamental apocalyptic revelation. Thus, unique revelations in the past, either to Moses on Sinai, Mohammed from the Angel Gabriel, or the visions central to the lives of Jesus and Paul and, of course, to the apocalypse of John of Patmos have to be set apart and later claims to know God through apocalyptic revelations downgraded or even questioned.

As both Judaism and Christianity sought to define themselves, over against each other and heterodox movements within each religion, there was an appeal to an ancient deposit of tradition, whether the law of Moses and the tradition of interpretation it set in train, or the faith once manifested to the apostle and handed down via reliable teachers, which then acted as the criterion for any claim to subsequent revelation. In Judaism, claims to mystical experience were controlled through the rabbinic schools, and Catholic Christianity found ways of incorporating or excluding charisma. However, the incorporation of claims to visionary insight in religious traditions left open the possibility that future claims to apocalyptic revelations might be licensed by the very traditions that were meant to control charisma.

A Taxonomy of Apocalyptic Interpretations

It is possible to map the different forms of apocalyptic interpretation in a heuristic taxonomy, which takes the form of two intersecting axes. On the one hand, there is what one may describe as an allegorical form of interpretation, in which the images of the book are decoded as if they were ciphers that are encrypted and need to be rendered in a more transparent language. The interpreter presents the meaning of the text in another, less allusive form, showing what the text really means. Thus, the beast from the sea in Revelation 13 might be interpreted as the Roman imperial system (if relating to past events) or some future eschatological, Antichrist figure (if the book relates to an end-time scenario).

There is, in addition, a peculiar form of allegorical interpretation in which individuals act out details of the text, in effect decoding the text once and for all in their person and at a particular moment in history. This kind of actualizing interpretation has a long history. We find it in the New

Testament, where Jesus is reported as saying that John the Baptist is the Elijah who is to come (Matthew 11:14). Thus various women have thought of themselves as being the woman clothed with the sun (Revelation 12) and so chosen to be the eschatological messiah.

On the other hand, there is a form of analogical interpretation in which the interpreter uses the images as illustrative analogies, by juxtaposing situations with the apocalyptic images so that the latter may illuminate the former. It is a form of comparison, therefore, rather than an enigma that needs to be solved. In contrast with decoding, this kind of interpretation preserves the integrity of the apocalyptic image rather than translating it into another medium and thereby rendering it redundant by the link with a particular historical personage or circumstance. Thus, the image may potentially be used in different ways and in different circumstances over and over again. In this form of interpretation, the Book of Revelation is less a map of the end of the world and more a collection that, at least in principle, might be a resource for the religious life in every generation. Thus, Jerusalem and Babylon are less ciphers of some kind of end of the world scenario and become instead a means of challenging readers about the choices facing them.

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See also Biblical Prophets; Millenarianism

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AQUINAS, THOMAS (1225–1274 CE)

Thomas Aquinas considers all the major questions of philosophy and theology and makes some significant contributions to political thought. Although his concerns are always in the first place theological, he attends to questions of political philosophy in his Aristotelian commentaries, at appropriate points in his systematic works, and in occasional works composed in response to requests from political leaders. It can be argued that, with Aquinas, political philosophy emerges as a distinct discipline, a development stimulated by his application of Aristotle's criteria for properly scientific thought.

The Importance of Aristotle

In the 1240s, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* was first fully translated into Latin. Aquinas attended Albert the Great's lectures on the *Ethics* at Cologne between 1248 and 1252 and returned to his notes from these lectures when preparing his own full commentary on the *Ethics* between 1270 and 1272. Although known in part from the beginning of the twelfth century, the *Politics* also was first fully translated in the 1240s. Aquinas began a commentary on this work in 1268, but it was unfinished when he died in 1274.

Through his commentaries on the *Ethics* and the *Politics,* many key political ideas are either

reaffirmed or introduced into the discourse of Western political thought. The human being, says Aristotle, is by nature a political animal, *animal civile,* which Aquinas glosses as a social and political animal, *animal sociale et politicum* (*De regno* I, 1). Two of the most important ways in which this social and political nature is expressed are communication and friendship.

Communication

For Aquinas, *communicatio facit civitatem,* communication establishes the city (*In II Politicorum* c.1). Communication has, in the first place, its obvious meaning. The human being is the linguistic animal, Aquinas says, the one capable of speech and therefore of handling issues of justice and injustice. Communication also refers to the sharing of life and goods, a sharing found in the family (*domus*), which already entails diverse communications between people in the village (*vicinia domorum*), which involves a higher level of complexity in relationships, and supremely in the state (*civitas*). The state represents the highest level of communication and community toward which both individuals and other forms of community naturally tend.

Friendship

Friendship is treated at length in the later books of the *Ethics*. The common welfare with which communities and their leaders are concerned is not just the sum of the welfares of individual members. It is, says Aquinas, formally different, the welfare of a whole that is qualitatively and not just quantitatively greater than the sum of its parts. The function of government and law is to promote this common welfare, and yet, everyone is involved in it because human beings living together share virtue and not just material goods. This is why friendship is central to Aquinas's political philosophy, the best kind of friendship, founded on a shared desire for the good and not just on utilitarian or individualistic concerns.

The Aristotelian provenance of this politics of friendship is obvious. What is original with Aquinas is the use to which he puts it in his treatment of charity. Aelred of Rievaulx anticipated him, writing a treatise on Christian friendship inspired by Cicero's *De amicitia,* but Aquinas complements this with a "politics of charity" in which Greek political thought is combined with what the New Testament (John 15:15: "no longer servants but friends") and the fathers of the church (Augustine's *City of God*) say about a community established on friendship and love.

The Purposes of Politics

In his commentary on the *Politics,* Aquinas says that politics is the highest of the practical sciences. It concerns itself with all of human life because the state is ordered to the highest of goods (*In I Politicorum* c.2). It is just as clear, however, that politics has this perfection because it is at the service of an end beyond itself. In his commentary on the *Ethics,* Aquinas says that politics will inevitably become empty agitation if it does not aim at something that is not political: "The whole of political life seems to be ordered with a view to attaining the happiness of contemplation. For peace, which is established and preserved by virtue of political activity, places the human being in a position to devote himself to contemplation of the truth" (*In X Ethicorum* 11).

In *Summa theologiae,* Aquinas says that a person is not completely ordered to the political community (I.II 21,4ad3). The good human being and the good citizen are not simply identical—this excludes all totalitarianism—but if a state forms the good citizen it contributes to the formation of the good human person. Aquinas says there is nothing more perfect in nature than "person," a conviction that is of profound relevance for the treatment of individual human persons (*Summa theologiae* I 29,4).

Themes in Aquinas's Political Philosophy

Besides the commentaries on Aristotle, Aquinas presents his political thought in his systematic theological works and in a number of occasional writings. He wrote a short treatise for the duchess of Brabant and a longer one for the king of Cyprus (*De regno,* or *De regimine*). In these, he speaks about the practical responsibilities of governing, says that political authority is natural to human communities and accepts that political government may take a number of different forms. His

best-known work is *Summa theologiae,* which deals with political ideas, particularly in his treatments of law and of the cardinal virtues.

Law

Aquinas's definitive treatment of law is found in *Summa theologiae* (I.II 90ff.). Law is a rational and promulgated prescription for a common good made by one who has responsibility for the community whose good it is. The *eternal law* is God's Providence or plan for the world, and *natural law* is the way in which intelligent creatures are subject to it. Weaving together diverse strands of tradition about natural law, Aquinas regards it as a matter of reason as much as nature because the distinctive characteristic of human nature is its rationality. Intelligent creatures, therefore, take part in Providence by providing for themselves and others.

The first principle of natural law is "good is to be done, evil is to be avoided"; this is the first principle of practical reasoning, reasoning about action. Reason spontaneously apprehends as goods those things toward which the human being has a natural tendency. An order of secondary principles of natural law arises from human tendencies toward the goods of nature, of animal nature, and of rational animal nature.

Government

One who has responsibility for a community makes the law (*Summa theologiae* I.II 90, 3). Without such a one, the common welfare would not be served because each would be intent on personal interests. Responsible citizenship includes the duty of all to participate in appropriate ways. In speaking of the virtue of prudence, Aquinas says it is required by those who have responsibility for different kinds of community as well as by those whose task is to be subject to authority within communities (*Summa theologiae* II.II 50).

By his time, various forms of constitution and civil society had developed under the influence of feudal ideas and practices. Key principles of the rule of law as well as various forms of representative government were already in place. The idea of contractual obligations between governors and governed was part of the general understanding of political authority, and Aquinas thought those responsible for the common good have the task of promoting the education of good citizens (*Summa theologiae* I.II 105,3ad2).

For Aquinas, authority is legitimized not only by its institution but also by its exercise. Laws might be properly enacted by a legitimate authority but lose their character as law if they are unjust. Such would be the case where a government enacted laws whose purpose was to further its own selfish desires rather than the common welfare. Such laws are acts of violence, Aquinas says, rather than laws, and have no obligation in conscience. A government that acts in such a way is a tyranny and in certain circumstances should be resisted, provided the people do not suffer more from the disturbance than from the tyranny itself (*Summa theologiae* II.II 42,2ad3). He believed any form of constitution—monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic—could become tyrannical if it became partial and ceased to act for the common welfare.

Natural Law

Natural law, the human being's way of being subject to the eternal law, presupposes a creature that is intelligent, free, and creative, subject to that law in a way that is not simply passive, but rather critical and creative, as the history of political thought and practice itself illustrates. Things may be added to the natural law that were not realized before, and things may (rarely) be taken away where it is not possible to observe a secondary command of natural law absolutely (*Summa theologiae* I.II 94,4). The need for creative and critical engagement arises also because no law covers all cases, and something that is true most of the time (*ut in pluribus*) may not apply in a particular case (*Summa theologiae* I.II 94,4).

Some virtues are specifically concerned with the ability to recognize exceptional circumstances and to judge when the spirit of a law is best served by acting against its letter. Prudence itself is such a virtue, assisted by two lesser virtues of good judgment, what Aristotle calls *synesis* and *gnome* (*Summa theologiae* II.II 51,3–4). The virtue of justice is assisted by equity, *epiekeia* (*Summa theologiae* II.II 120), the ability to follow common sense in the observance of positive laws.

Private Property

The particular case of private ownership of material goods will illustrate Aquinas's natural law thinking. He believes that nature primarily intends the holding of things in common. Experience shows, however—and in this he agrees with Aristotle and Augustine—that the purposes of possession are best achieved through private ownership. He distinguishes ownership from use. If ownership may take the form of private property, property thus owned must still be regarded as common in the sense that one must be ready to share it with others in need.

Human beings have an absolute natural right to use material things to conserve their being; protect, nourish, and educate their children; and live in society with others. They owe this right to their creation by God, who has supreme dominion over all things as their creator and who shares this dominion with the creature made in God's image and likeness. That this should take the form of *private* ownership is a decision of human beings as they develop particular forms of society. Members of religious orders, for example, own things in common, and other forms of more or less corporative possession are conceivable.

Like coercive force, private property is a good thing in a fallen world. It is a quasi-natural right for Aquinas, established by the law of nations (*ius gentium*) and therefore something between natural law and positive law. Possession is not a matter of positive law only, purely conventional or contractual. But neither is it a primary precept of the natural law that ownership should be private. It is, therefore, a relative rather than an absolute right, the form of possession human reason has discovered to be most suitable for the management of material things (see *Summa theologiae* I.II 66,1–2).

Virtue and Community

The tradition of four cardinal virtues, central to Plato's *Republic,* is also found in the Bible (Wisdom 8:7). Ambrose of Milan and others placed these virtues at the center of Christian moral life in the world, and Aquinas follows this tradition.

In treating of justice (*Summa theologiae* II.II 57ff), Aquinas deals first with the notion of right, *ius*. To be just means willing to all people what is their right or due. This is in relation to property, first, and also to due process, the right to life, bodily integrity, one's good name, and truth. Aquinas accepts capital punishment as a society's way of defending itself. His contribution to just-war theory is found within his account of the virtue of charity (*Summa theologiae* II.II 40).

The ancient virtue of fortitude or courage (*Summa theologiae* II.II 123ff) is transformed so that, for Christendom, the martyr rather than the soldier represents the supremely courageous person. Courage is not just a private matter, as it includes virtues such as magnificence and magnanimity, forms of confidence in undertaking and sustaining large and long-term projects.

The virtue of prudence (*Summa theologiae* II.II 47ff) is required if we are to act well in view of the overall good of our lives. It is required in special ways by those who have responsibility for a community. Taking counsel is an essential part of prudence to be done also by those who govern.

The fourth cardinal virtue, temperateness (*Summa theologiae* II.II 141ff), likewise has social and political aspects, being concerned with self-indulgence and cruelty, for example, as well as gentleness and modesty.

Aquinas prefaces his treatment of these virtues with an account of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, the virtues required for life in "the city of God." The cardinal virtues may be taken as presenting a natural or secular morality, the kind of dispositions essential if human beings are to live together successfully in this world. In one place, Aquinas refers to the cardinal virtues as "political virtues," a phrase he finds in the Macrobius commentary on Cicero's *Republic*. It refers to the four cardinal virtues as they are found in the active and practical life (*Summa theologiae* I.II 61,5).

His Legacy

The contribution of Aquinas to political philosophy goes far beyond his treatments of natural law and just war, important as these are. His use of Aristotle's thought contributed significantly to establishing the notion of the citizen as an individual human person with inherent dignity and rights, naturally entitled to participate in the social and political order. His thought challenges

positivist and utilitarian understandings of law as well as totalitarian tendencies in government. Because ideas of human rights emerged from earlier understandings of natural right and natural law, it seems essential that Aquinas's political philosophy be kept in mind in any attempt to strengthen the intellectual basis for a theory of human rights.

Vivian Boland

See also Aristotelianism; Aristotle; Augustine; Augustinianism; Common Good; Friendship; Happiness; Natural Law; Natural Rights; State; Theology; Virtue

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Arendt, Hannah (1906–1975)

Hannah Arendt, daughter of secular Jewish parents, studied phenomenological and existentialist philosophy in Weimar Germany with Edmund Husserl, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger (with whom she had a brief affair). In 1933, she fled Germany for Paris. Arendt's disillusionment with philosophy was no doubt due in part to her dismay at Heidegger's support for the Nazi regime while rector of the University of Freiburg from 1933 to 1934. When war broke out between France and Germany, she was briefly interned as an enemy alien in France before emigrating to the United States in 1941.

Arendt made her name as a political theorist in the United States after the war through her writings on totalitarianism, violence, the public sphere, revolution, and civil disobedience. She coined the controversial phrase, "the banality of evil," to characterize the thoughtlessness of Nazi war criminal, Adolf Eichmann, whose trial in Jerusalem she reported on for *The New Yorker* in 1961.

Arendt's contribution to political theory can be encapsulated in terms of her conception of the *political*. By identifying politics with public freedom and the disclosure of a world or social reality, she makes *the political* an evaluative term according to which actions and modes of thought can be criticized as unpolitical, apolitical, or antipolitical. According to the contemporary liberal philosophy, political community has an instrumental value insofar as it secures for its members their rights to life, liberty, and property. Politics refers to the strategic interaction (within limits set by the state) that determines who gets what, where, when, and how. And political philosophy is properly concerned with specifying the principles of justice according to which the benefits and burdens of social cooperation should be distributed in a well-ordered society.

Hannah Arendt views this as an antipolitical view of politics. For her, politics does not properly concern strategic competition or cooperative interaction for private gain but rather enactment of public freedom by acting in concert. The purpose of political community is not to secure private freedoms. Rather it has an intrinsic value insofar as it establishes a space of appearances within which we can achieve public recognition and constitute a shared social reality. And the role of the political theorist is not to lay down the laws that are to provide a framework for political action but to judge the significance of political events for the world she or he shares with others. These themes can be traced in Arendt's discussion of the right to have rights, her political anthropology, and the theory of judgment she was working on in the final years of her life.

The Right to Have Rights

According to Arendt, the world became aware of a right to have rights when it was confronted in the interwar period by a new category of human

beings who had been deprived *en masse* of their citizenship and as such were forced to live outside all legal structures. The predicament of stateless people was not that their human rights had been violated. Rather, they found themselves in a situation of rightlessness. According to the natural law tradition, we are supposed to possess universal human rights by virtue of our common human nature and regardless of our membership in particular political communities. The legitimacy of the state rests on the extent to which it recognizes these universal human rights and secures their enjoyment within a determinate political community.

Yet, the predicament of stateless people seemed to show the opposite. It was only by virtue of their citizenship that individuals could be said to have any rights at all. In the modern world, to be forced out of political community was effectively to be expelled from humanity. Those deprived of their home and legal status in one state found themselves in concentration camps in the states to which they fled. As Arendt put it, the world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.

Arendt describes the experience of rightlessness in terms of the loss of a place in the world in which one's opinions might be significant and one's actions effective. This twofold deprivation corresponds to those two traits in terms of which human nature has traditionally been understood. For Aristotle, to be human was to be both a speaking animal (capable of distinguishing between right and wrong) and a political animal (that could realize its nature only by participating in political community). In describing the dehumanization of stateless people, Arendt radicalizes Burke's critique of human rights, insisting that we depend on political institutions not just for recognition of our rights but for recognition of our humanity.

Arendt's analysis of the perplexities of the rights of man is aporetic. On the one hand, Arendt invokes Burke to critique the very idea of human rights as grounded in an abstract conception of the human. For Arendt, there is no such thing as an unchanging human nature, a universal essence that commands the moral respect on which human rights are grounded. By nature, human beings are fundamentally different and unequal. We become equal only as members of a political community.

On the other hand, however, Arendt invokes the right to have rights as a primordial human right: the right never to be excluded from political community. But this leads to a puzzle. If human rights can be said to exist only insofar as they are the product of political association, what is the ground of the right to have rights? If to be deprived of citizenship is to be rightless, on what basis might a stateless person claim a right to have rights? Arendt's analysis rules out understanding the right to have rights as a prepolitical moral right to a set of legal rights. Rather, the right to have rights is best understood as protopolitical. It refers to a fundamental presupposition without which politics is not possible and the violation of which evinces an antipolitical politics. Indeed, Arendt defines the newly recognized crime against humanity as the violation of precisely this right.

The Space of Appearances

Arendt's analysis of the perplexities of the rights of man presupposes the Aristotelian distinction between mere life *(zoe)* and political life *(bios politicos)* that underpins her analysis of politics in *The Human Condition*. Here she argues that the dignity of politics depends on the constitution of a space of appearances in which individuals can realize their humanity through public action and speech. She writes approvingly of the Athenian view of politics as agonistic, involving a struggle to achieve excellence by participating in a public contest among equals. The Greeks provide an insight into a basic mode of being in the world whereby human beings are able to overcome the futility of mere biological existence and the meaninglessness of instrumental rationality through a struggle for public recognition. Through this struggle, individuals both distinguish themselves in their singularity and disclose a shared social reality. Moreover, individuals enact their freedom by initiating something new. The purpose of political community is to preserve a space of appearances in which human freedom can be realized.

Arendt's revival of an idealized vision of the Athenian *polis* can appear anachronistic and antimodern. Yet, Arendt does not hold up the classical view of political community as a model for modernity. Rather, she turns to the Greeks to provide a political anthropology, which plays a role in her

political theory analogous to that of the state of nature in social contract theory. Like other existentialists, such as Sartre, Arendt debunks the idea of human nature while nonetheless holding that certain universal conditions shape human experience.

In particular, she traces three modes of activity (labor, work, and action) that correspond to three basic conditions that define human existence (life, worldliness, and plurality). We labor out of necessity to sustain and reproduce life *(zoe)*. Beyond satisfying the needs of the body, labor remains futile, caught in the endless natural cycles of production and consumption. The activity that redeems labor from this futility is work. Work (*poiesis*) involves fabrication of material objects that provide a measure of permanence to human existence by constructing a world of things to house a culture. Because it is concerned with fashioning things from nature according to a given end, work entails an instrumental rationality. But this means that work cannot establish meaning because it determines the value of things only as means toward further ends. Action *(praxis)* redeems work from the predicament of meaninglessness because it is an end in itself. Through acting and speaking in public, human beings invest the material world fabricated through work with significance and establish a web of human relationships. Action presupposes plurality: It is only because the world appears differently according to the many perspectives that individuals bring to bear on it that politics is possible at all. The end of politics is the disclosure of an intersubjective world from the plurality of opinions that emerge when people gather to speak and act in concert.

Arendt turns to the Greeks to recover the primordial experience of action in order to critique the modern tendency to misconstrue politics in terms of work (liberalism) or labor (Marxism). Moreover, she describes the antipolitical politics of totalitarianism in terms of this same misidentification of politics with labor (biopolitics) and work (the attempt to remake society according to the logic of an idea). Such an antipolitical politics is driven by resentment of human plurality; it treats society in the same way as nature, to be improved and reshaped in the image of an ideal. Arendt's metaphor of political community as a space of appearance provides a countervision to the Nazi death camps, which she describes as holes of oblivion. The concept of the political, on this account, refers to the mode of acting in concert through which this space of appearances is brought into existence and the commonness of the social world is disclosed. Whereas the political depends on institutions for its preservation, the space of appearances is primordially dependent on political action: It is there wherever men and women come together to act and speak in public, but it begins to disappear with each individual's withdrawal from the public realm. If the right to have rights can be said to have a ground, then, it is in this space of appearances, which is, in an important sense, prior to institutions.

Reflective Judgment

Although Arendt was deeply concerned with what we often now describe as the grave human rights violations of the twentieth century, it is striking that she resists couching her own critique of modern politics in terms of rights. This reticence is best understood in terms of her desire to look on politics with eyes unclouded by philosophy. A political theory of human rights would adopt precisely the legislative perspective that she attributes to the tradition of philosophy. For Arendt, the philosophical tradition since Plato has been animated by a resentment of the political realm, in which the necessary truth *(episteme)* sought by the philosopher and arrived at through careful reasoning becomes one contingent opinion *(doxa)* among others.

This has led philosophers since Plato to understand their role using the model of the wise legislator, who would establish through reason the fundamental principles according to which the polity should be organized. Arendt rejects this legislative political philosophy as antipolitical because it views plurality as a problem to be managed rather than a condition of possibility for realizing our humanity. Rather than recognizing the dignity of politics, such a philosophy seeks to subordinate the freedom of action to the compulsion of reason.

In turning her attention to judgment in her later work, Arendt sought to develop a political theory that was not a philosophy of right. While Arendt identifies Kant's practical philosophy with the legislative mode with which she takes issue, she turns to his theory of aesthetic judgment to

recuperate what she takes to be Kant's unwritten political theory. For Arendt, aesthetic judgment and political judgment are closely related because they aim to derive the general concept from the particular rather than subsuming the particular under a pre-given rule. This is crucial if we are to understand the significance of events rather than assimilating them under our received categories of understanding.

Reflective judgment involves the mental operations of representation and reflection. Through representative thinking, we overcome the immediate subjectivity of direct perception by transforming what we want to judge into a thought object. The impartiality achieved through representative thinking differs from the universality sought by the philosopher because it is achieved by imagining the object from a manifold of partial perspectives of significantly situated others. In representing the thought object from a multiplicity of perspectives, we are liberated from the private conditions that constrain our own subjective response.

The impartiality that is achieved through representative thinking prepares the way for reflection, by which we combine the particular with the general. In Arendt's view, all of our political concepts originate in a particular historical incident, which then becomes exemplary so that we perceive in this particular what is valid for more than one case. Because political theory is properly concerned with judging the significance of unprecedented events, a particular is given for which a general needs to be found: The particular must be *brought to* rather than *subsumed under* a concept. This is possible by way of example, according to which an event or act can be taken to exemplify a general principle so that it discloses generality without surrendering its particularity. In saying, for instance, that "courage is like Achilles," we refer to a general aspect of human experience without abstracting this entirely from the particular circumstances in which it appeared. In judging in this way, we appeal to common sense (or *sensus communis*) which we share with others, which refers not simply to existing standards and prejudices but our shared sense of the world. As such, reflective judgment does not merely confirm common sense but reconstitutes it by reinventing existing categories or deriving new concepts for making sense of the world we share in common. This arguably is precisely what Arendt does in her discussion of the perplexities of the rights of man, in which she seeks to understand the unprecedented situation of stateless people and what it reveals about our modern political situation.

Andrew Schaap

See also Agonism; Phenomenology; Power; Public Sphere; Totalitarianism; Violence

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Aristocracy

The term *aristocracy* derives from the ancient Greek *aristokratia,* or "rule by the best." In modern usage, it normally designates a ruling elite whose political powers and wealth are invested with titles and privileges and transmitted through hereditary succession. Modern parlance reflects the term's original meaning insofar as it plays on a moral contrast between aristocratic powers, legitimated by the responsibility and self-restraint supposedly attendant on good breeding, and oligarchic powers, acquired through ambition, calculation, eager new money, and similar vices, which are thought to prevail in self-appointed or otherwise illegitimate regimes.

In ancient Greece, however, no actual group of people or government was known officially under the designation aristocracy. Exclusive gentile clans of the kind familiar from later European history, with hereditary status and landholdings that depended on royal grant or sanction, never existed, despite the longevity and pretence of some prominent families. The term *aristocracy* was coined no earlier than the fifth century BCE to denote a type of political system or constitution in which authority and moral excellence were inherently connected and attainable by few. Its usage probably was uncommon outside the sphere of theory, notably the debates on the relative merits of different constitutions, which had been triggered by the twin Athenian innovations of radical democracy at home and empire over Greek communities in the Aegean. Accordingly, although ancient aristocracy could not have had a real institutional legacy, the concept itself enjoyed a rich afterlife in both political analysis and polemic. This entry considers the three contrasting and complementary conceptions of aristocracy prevalent in different forms and periods from antiquity to the present—aristocracy as a constitution, a class, and a theory of elite leadership.

Aristocracy as a Constitution

The term aristocracy can be traced back in classical literature to the Peloponnesian War of 431 to 404 BCE, a prolonged conflict between two interstate leagues led by the two foremost powers of the Greek world, democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta. Our main source for the period, Thucydides, was surely not alone in trying to explain this conflict in terms of the political organization and interests of the two polities involved, although the flaws that the crisis revealed on either side were too numerous to permit praise and blame along ideological lines. As a result, it became necessary to supplement the existing quantitative classification of constitutions into monarchy (rule by one man), oligarchy (rule by few), and democracy (rule by the people) with a qualitative scale, either (as in Thucydides) through the use of adjectives or (in Plato) through the invention of new compound words, such as plutocracy (rule by the wealthy), timocracy (rule by the ambitious), and cheirocracy (rule by the worst).

The precise meaning of aristocracy could vary according to author or context: (1) In literary records of Socrates's dialogues (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4. 6. 12), the term denotes a positive variant of oligarchy, in which the "few" rich and powerful prioritize consistently the well-being of the whole community; (2) In Plato's work (e.g., *Republic* 4. 445d), aristocracy features as an ideal constitution alongside, and closely akin to, monarchy, or rule by a single "best" man; (3) According to Thucydides (2. 37. 2) and the fourth-century BCE orator, Isocrates (*Panathenaicus* 131–2), aristocracy was in fact a subspecies of democracy, in which the masses had voted the best men into office and willingly submitted to their rule, a state of affairs that was widely thought to have prevailed sometime in Athens's glorified past, under the "ancestral constitution," and to persist among more traditional societies, such as the Spartans and the Carthaginians.

In Aristotle's works, all three meanings occur: Aristocracy can be defined absolutely, as an ideal constitution on a par with monarchy, or in relation to oligarchy and democracy. In comparison to his predecessors, however, Aristotle elaborates more systematically the sociological factors that give rise to actual aristocratic governments (especially in *Politics* 1293b). As actual governments, these are necessarily of the relative rather than absolute kind: a mixed constitution in which the negative tendencies of oligarchy and democracy have been tempered by greater numbers of citizens and by wealth, or rather the good judgment and moderation resulting from good education and the leisured lifestyle of the landowning citizen. This combination of free birth, landed property, and moral excellence, subsumable under *eugeneia* (good birth), ensured according to Aristotle an altruistic interest in the common good that could be expected neither from the poor many nor from the newly rich, who having gained their wealth through commerce had no real stake in the community. The major difference in political procedure between aristocracy and democracy concerned the methods employed to allocate offices: Whereas selection by lot and pay for office were the key features of radical democracy (as practiced in classical Athens), election was by nature aristocratic, for it introduced an element of deliberate choice that was inevitably in favor of the "best" (*Politics* 1300b4–5).

Historians of the ancient world still use the term in its classical sense to describe political organizations in early Greece and republican Rome. Greek aristocracy is the conventional name for the regimes in early Greece that were dominated by a few prominent families, whose landed property and authority appear to go back to the relatively isolated and impoverished communities of the early Iron Age. Whether or to what degree political influence was guaranteed or institutionalized remains, however, open to question. While archaic poetry and the law codes known from inscriptions and later literary records may attest to conflicts between old lineages and new wealth, reconstructions of the preceding aristocratic period depend on problematic inferences from much later constitutional histories, which were prone to exaggerate the traditionalism of early societies (see, for instance, the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* 3, describing Athens's first constitution by Drako), and from terms of hereditary descent in the political organization of classical city-states, interpreted as relics of a past order controlled by great families.

Roman aristocracy refers to the *nobiles* (known men) from a restricted set of about 50 families, who ruled the republic practically among themselves through privileged access to the consulship. Although a relatively homogeneous group with status-defining lifestyles and forms of self-representation, the *nobiles* remained—despite their class-like character—primarily a political group: that is, a caste of "born leaders" who were compelled to serve the state by both high birth and social expectation.

The divergence of public authority and social standing, which aristocracy is now often taken to imply, manifested itself for the first time under the empire, as financial and military policy had become the preserve of the emperor, and executive posts in Rome and the provinces were allocated to members of a hereditary senatorial estate and a lower equestrian order, whose titles depended on imperial grant.

Outside classical scholarship, aristocracy retained its theoretical meaning until the Enlightenment. Thus, in Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* (1748), aristocracy still signified a republic in which privilege was the highest cause of liberty and the chief reason for entrusting legislative powers to the well-born. Later usage, however, focused by and large on social interpretation, as foreshadowed in Aristotle's concern with the economic sources of aristocratic virtue and the issue of rightful leadership in democracies.

Aristocracy as a Class

When modern historians and social scientists speak of aristocracy, they usually mean a class whose distinction from the rest of society is founded on a system of unequal distribution of privilege. This usage goes back to the Enlightenment and the political agitation of the run-up to the French Revolution, when *aristocrat* became a party designation balancing *democrat*. Used in an openly social and hostile sense, aristocracy implied undue accumulation of wealth and morally unjustifiable prerogatives—a closed establishment with hereditary titles and entitlements to landed property, goods, obligations and offices.

At the core of this perspective is the notion that aristocracy is a euphemism, forged by those who wished to obscure economic interests and give a favorable picture of oligarchy. The approach found its culmination in formalist economic analysis of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, notably orthodox Marxism, according to which any given aristocracy is identifiable as a class and its cultural expression reducible to a system of labor organization and asymmetrical distribution of wealth.

The outcome of such egalitarian rationalism is probably right and wrong at the same time. On the one hand, the power elites commonly known as aristocracies, whether Greek, Roman, or European, were inclined to seriously downplay the significance of wealth in their formation. Even in the blood aristocracies of the Roman Republic and Europe, hereditary principles hardly ever amounted to complete closure to newcomers: Some system of recruitment was necessary, if only to offset the difficulties of succession and demographic self-replacement. Furthermore, at first sight, European aristocracy seems to lend itself quite well to economic analysis due to its shared historical origins in medieval feudalism—a socioeconomic system based on an entrenched perception of hierarchies and reciprocal obligations whereby a king or other overlord granted land to his followers in return for loyalty and services.

However, the persistence of aristocratic power long after the feudal system and serfdom had been abolished shows that the link between economy and society was not as straightforward as envisioned by Marxism. Indeed, different European aristocracies showed themselves surprisingly adaptable to new sources of commercial and industrial wealth and new forms of bureaucracy and administration, which opened alternative routes to power, despite loss in overall economic standing. The greatest shortcoming of formalist analysis is, however, that it fails to capture the cultural significance of wealth, above all leisure, and the scope it offered in fostering new forms of conspicuous display to mark social pre-eminence.

Scholars from across the disciplines now prefer to consider aristocracies as dynamic elites rather than monolithic classes, a nonessentialist stance that provides greater opportunities in explaining the social energies and modes of distinction through which prestige was maintained. Ultimately, this view of aristocrats as masters of rarefied skills and symbolic capital is more accommodating to the fact that, throughout history, the majority of people readily accepted elite claims to special hereditary virtues as justifying the right to rule. Eugenicist views in the works by Plato and Aristotle (*Republic* 495d-e; *Politics* 1335b) indicate how easily experiences from animal breeding gave way to commonsensical explanations of noble birth and excellence.

Aristocracy as an Elite Theory

The idea developed by Socrates and Aristotle—that the voluntary adoption of aristocratic leadership could transform and enhance democracies—contained the seeds for an elite theory anticipating modern counterparts in some basic points. No doubt, this theory evolved from a conservative desire to explain how and why traditional wealth and privilege ought to translate into political pre-eminence, despite the rapidly changing circumstances under Athenian democracy. Our extant sources are fairly uninformative on how precisely this democratic challenge was formulated and dealt with, most likely because ancient democracy was never presented in a systematic theory.

Our only notable exception comes from Plato's literary record of a dialogue between his teacher Socrates and the Sophist Protagoras. Protagoras argued that every freeborn man possessed an inborn capacity for political judgment (*politike tekhne*), which was different and independent from the technical expertise normally concentrated among the wealthy and well-connected. From this distinction followed logically the democratic maxim that every citizen should have a say in political debates, and no one should possess special privileges in government.

In his later *Republic,* Plato seems to deal with this kind of challenge when he argues that democratic government was systemically defective because it expected ordinary citizens to make judgments about what was good for the whole community. Such decisions required expert knowledge, which, he maintained, ordinary citizens did not possess and were indeed in no position to acquire, as they were lacking the very capacity to apprehend the Truth. In essence, Plato countered the challenge of radicals like Protagoras by contending that opinion was worthless without authoritative knowledge of the kind found among educated elites.

This distinction between opinion and expert knowledge is implicit in the policy making of most representative governments and nongovernmental organizations of the modern West. In standard practice, decisions on policy are left to experts, who are periodically checked by an election or shareholder meeting, when broader sectors of the public are canvassed and given a choice between competing groups of experts. It seems perfectly sensible that the greater complexity of modern institutions and technologies should call for ever greater numbers of experts and areas of expertise. In general, modern elite theory approves of this development, arguing that the formation of elites, for instance, in political parties and bureaucracies, is both inevitable and necessary for the successful functioning of complex organizations.

Yet, recent history has offered more than enough examples to illustrate the extravagant failures in store when policy developed by financial, military, and other experts is allowed to go unchecked by the voice of a public that has been given a chance to form its own opinion. The ancient debate on aristocracy and democracy has lost little of its relevance: Indeed, in its modern rendering in terms of mass and elite, the classical

Athenian way of handling the relationship between knowledge and political authority has been seen as offering a possible model on which to reform modern practice. In this model, most forcefully presented by Josiah Ober, the key to Athens's success was the ability of her institutions to utilize the expertise of volunteer advisers, who were constantly competing for public recognition and approval for policy proposals put forward in open assemblies, rather than in the closed corridors of power in modern governments.

This model is attractively consistent with the evidence from epigraphy and prosopography attesting to the continued influence of elite networks and individuals from prominent families in, for instance, financial administration, diplomacy, and military policy. Other commentators are no less justified to identify this evidence with a *de facto* aristocracy, which dominated government through the defining upper-class skills of speech writing and delivery—a reminder that the classical taxonomy of institutions was developed to draw ideological distinctions between communities and provide orientation in a political landscape that was vastly more complicated than most ancient theorists wanted it to be.

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See also Ancient Democracy; Aristotle; City-State; Class; Elite Theory; Feudalism; Plato; Thucydides

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ARISTOTELIANISM

Aristotle is one of the greatest philosophers who ever lived and arguably the most influential. The Aristotelian tradition has had an enormous impact on the history of Western philosophy and political thought over the last two millennia. Moreover, Aristotelianism is a living tradition. There are political philosophers writing today who believe that Aristotelianism provides a vital resource for those seeking to address contemporary political problems in the age of globalization.

The Political Thought of Aristotle

The most significant of Aristotle's works for political theorists are his *Nicomachean Ethics* and his *Politics*. Of particular interest are Aristotle's view of human nature, his analysis of the concept of justice, and his commitment to the principle of constitutional government and "the rule of law."

Human Nature and Ethical Life

At the very beginning of his *Politics,* Aristotle asserts that man (*anthropos*) possesses an essential nature. According to Aristotle, man is by nature a "social and political animal" (*zoon politikon*). What Aristotle means by this is not simply that human beings are naturally gregarious. Rather, in his view, man is an ethical being—one that is destined to live an ethical life. In Aristotle's opinion, individual human beings undergo a process of development over time. They develop and become more mature. At the end of this process, they fully actualize the potential for ethical life that they possessed at the beginning. To live such a life is the *telos,* that is to say, the final purpose or ultimate goal in life, which Aristotle associates with the notion of what it is to be a human being. To say that individuals have achieved this end is but another way of saying that they have finally arrived at that state or condition Aristotle refers to as *eudaimonia.* This term is often translated as happiness but is perhaps better rendered by the term fulfillment or completion.

There are two dimensions to ethical life as Aristotle understands it. The first is that an ethical life is a virtuous life, one devoted to the cultivation of the virtues. The discussion of this lies at the heart of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.* Indeed, the emphasis that Aristotle places on these virtues has led many contemporary Aristotelians,

notably Alasdair MacIntyre, to characterize his views by the label "virtue ethics." The second, which is more directly relevant to political theory, is the emphasis that Aristotle places on the importance of just one of these virtues, justice. For Aristotle, an ethical life is above all else a life of justice.

Ethical Life and Justice

Aristotle's account of justice in his *Nicomachean Ethics* has never been bettered and is still in use today. Aristotle distinguishes between justice in general and justice in particular. He explains the meaning of the concept of justice in the latter sense by reference to the notion of equity. Broadly speaking, for Aristotle, justice in this sense is a matter of treating like cases alike and unlike cases differently. However, this provisional characterization needs qualifying in two ways. First, those whose circumstances are considered to be alike, or who are considered to be equals, must really be so. That is to say, they must be alike in some ethically relevant respect. Second, if it is true that treating unequals differently might in certain circumstances be justified because there is some relevant difference between them, nevertheless, the difference in the treatment must be one of due proportion.

Aristotle goes on to consider two areas in which this view of justice has an application, which he refers to as the spheres of rectificatory justice and of distributive justice, respectively. In the first of these, it is assumed that all those concerned are citizens of a particular city-state or *polis*. They are, therefore, equals in the eyes of the law. This presumed equality is something that each citizen ought to respect in his dealings with his fellow citizens. If he does not in fact respect his fellow citizens as his own equals, for example, by committing an act of murder or theft, then he commits an injustice. In these circumstances, the laws of the *polis* must rectify this injustice so that the initial balance of equality, which was presumed to exist between these two citizens, is restored.

So far as distributive justice is concerned, Aristotle assumes that all problems of this kind have three component elements. First there is some "good" that is to be distributed. Second, there is some target group of population among whom this good is to be distributed. Third, there is some criterion or standard of relevance that identifies a particular quality or characteristic the possession of which might be used to justify an unequal distribution of the good in question, provided this differential treatment is duly proportionate.

Explicitly or implicitly, Aristotle appeals to this theory of justice throughout his *Politics*. For example, he uses it to justify what he refers to as *natural slavery*. In his view, masters and slaves are not equals in the eyes of the law and are, of course, treated differently by it. Moreover, masters do not treat their slaves as their own equals, or as they themselves would wish to be treated by the slaves, should their positions be reversed. It seems evident that they would not themselves wish to be enslaved. The master-slave relationship, therefore, is far from being reciprocal. It is a one-sided and unequal relationship that, Aristotle appears willing to concede, would rightly be considered unjust if those associated with it were in fact equals. According to Aristotle, however, at least so far as natural slavery is concerned, there is no injustice involved here because, in this particular case, masters and slaves are not equals "by nature" but unequals. Aristotle acknowledges, however, that certain "anonymous opponents of slavery" in ancient Athens disagreed with him about this issue and condemned slavery because they considered it to be unjust.

Justice, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law

Aristotle and Constitutionalism

Aristotle employs this theory of justice in his *Politics* when discussing the problem of how different political constitutions ought to be classified. The starting point here is the problem of who should rule or who ought to rule in a just society. Aristotle considers this to be a problem of distributive justice, where the good to be distributed is political power and the target group or population is the citizen body as a whole. However, when it comes to the question of what the relevant standard of distribution ought to be, Aristotle observes that different societies answer this question in different ways, and it is for this reason that there is a variety of types of political constitution.

Aristotle goes on to identify six types of political constitution. We can, he argues, differentiate between those societies that are ruled by the one,

the few, or the many. Moreover, in each case, we can have rule that is either in the interest of the ruled or in that of the rulers. If we take those constitutions where rule is in the interest of the ruled, then we have kingship, aristocracy, and polity. If we consider those constitutions in which rule is in the interests of the rulers, then we have tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. In Aristotle's view, what is wrong with oligarchy and democracy, in particular, is that in such societies the wrong standard is used for the distribution of political power. In oligarchical societies, this standard is wealth, whereas in democratic societies it is citizenship. Both of these types of constitution overlook the fact that the appropriate standard is merit. The rulers ought to be those who are virtuous and wise and therefore "the best" at doing this particular job. In the case of democracy in particular, Aristotle associates this type of constitution with the idea of "the tyranny of the majority." In such societies, he asks, what is to prevent the mass of the citizen body, who are propertyless, from passing a law that would confiscate the property of the few citizens who are rich?

Of these six pure types of constitution, Aristotle appears to prefer that of aristocracy, or rule by the best (*aristoi*). He accepts that polity or rule by the many, not in their own interests but in the interests of all, is a theoretical possibility. However, it is unlikely to occur in practice and, if it did, would almost certainly deteriorate into democracy. So far as practicalities rather than pure theory are concerned, Aristotle suggests that a mixed constitution, or a polity in a second sense of that term, is to be preferred. Such a constitution would include input from the *demos* or the people, but this would be held in check somehow by the parallel influence of the minority of citizens who are assumed to be virtuous and wise.

The classification of constitutions developed in Aristotle's *Politics* had an enormous impact in the later history of political thought. In seventeenth-century England, Thomas Hobbes engaged seriously with it in his *Leviathan* (1651). So too did Montesquieu, in eighteenth-century France, in his *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748). Aristotle's ideas were also taken very seriously by the republican theorists who drew up the U.S. Constitution, who intended it to be a mixed constitution in the sense indicated above.

Aristotle and the Rule of Law

There are times when Aristotle connects the notion of justice with that of the rule of law. For example, when discussing the idea of justice "in general" in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* he associates it with the notion of obedience to law. Moreover, when he goes on to discuss the concept of justice in its particular sense, along the lines indicated earlier, Aristotle thinks of this in terms of "rule following." The idea of treating like cases alike is not simply a rudimentary account of what justice involves; it is also an account of what is involved in the idea of "following a rule." Indeed, Aristotle seems to have taken the view that the pattern of reasoning involved when someone is addressing a practical problem of ethics, specifically, a problem of justice, is the same as that involved when someone is developing a theoretical argument based on the principles of formal logic. In Aristotle's view, there is, therefore, a close connection between being just and being rational.

Aristotle, then, was a staunch defender of the idea of the rule of law, which he identified as being the basic principle of all constitutional government. In his view, even those types of constitution of which he disapproves in his *Politics* because they are not the best, such as oligarchy and democracy, are to be preferred to a situation in which there is no rule of law at all. Oligarchy and democracy might be said to participate, in their own limited way, in the idea of justice. This commitment to the principle of the rule of law is perhaps Aristotle's greatest legacy for the later history of political thought.

Some commentators, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, have suggested that Aristotle's "virtue ethics" attaches very little importance to moral rules or laws. It might be argued that this view does not take sufficient account of what Aristotle says about the virtue of justice in his *Nicomachean Ethics* and that this reading artificially separates what Aristotle insists must be treated together, namely questions of ethics, on the one hand, and questions of politics, on the other. In Aristotle's opinion, at least in the final analysis, the standard of justice that all citizens ought to follow is provided by the principles of political justice (*politikon dikaion*) or the laws of their own polis.

Aristotelianism and Medieval Political Thought: Thomas Aquinas

On several occasions, there has been a resurgence of interest in Aristotelianism. On each occasion, Aristotle's ideas have been taken up and adapted to a new set of circumstances, while also being modified. In this way, Aristotelianism as an intellectual tradition has developed over time. It has been transformed in and through the very same process of historical evolution that preserves its continuity.

The first of these periods of revival occurred at the high point of the medieval period, with the rediscovery and translation of a number of Aristotle's writings. It is associated especially with Western Europe and the Catholic Church. The most important figure here is Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), whose monumental *Summa Theologiae* (1265–1274) was intended to be an encyclopedic survey of knowledge of all things, including issues of ethics and politics, considered from the standpoint of medieval Christianity.

Aquinas has an important part to play in the history of Aristotelianism after Aristotle because it is largely through Thomism, or through Aquinas's attempted theoretical synthesis of the philosophy of Aristotle with Christianity (of reason and faith or revealed religion) that Aristotle's ideas were handed down to later thinkers. The extent to which Aquinas considered Aristotle to be an authoritative source on all matters is indicated by the fact that he refers to Aristotle, not by name, but as "the philosopher."

With regard to Aquinas's ethical thought and its relationship to that of Aristotle, the most significant point is that Aquinas's thinking is law based. For Aquinas, the starting point for deliberation when addressing ethical problems is the natural law, which he takes to be a framework of principles or moral rules that individual agents have an obligation or duty to follow. More than one commentator has suggested that the importance Aquinas attaches to the existence of such moral *laws* is not to be found in the writings of Aristotle himself but is a later addition, which comes either from the Christian religion or from Aquinas's engagement with Roman law.

This argument comes in two versions, the first usually associated with MacIntyre's virtue ethics and the second with Leo Strauss and his notion of natural right. Although his views on this subject are not entirely consistent, MacIntyre occasionally suggests that Aristotle's ethical thought is distinctive because it is *not* legalistic. It is an ethics that attaches little or no importance to the idea that being ethical is a matter of obedience to law or rule following. According to MacIntyre, Aristotle attaches more importance to character, and the cultivation of virtue than he does to moral rules or laws. Given this, it is not too surprising that MacIntyre takes the view that the concept of natural law has relatively little part to play in Aristotle's political thought, which is based on his ethics. In MacIntyre's opinion, there is, therefore, a significant difference between the views of Aristotle and those of Aquinas with respect to this particular issue.

In MacIntyre's account, it is with the later thinking of Aquinas, when Aristotelianism is revived and Aristotle's ideas are combined with the belief system of Christianity, that a *new* way of thinking emerges about the nature of ethical and political life. From then on, Aristotelianism became associated with the view that ethical conduct is indeed a matter of obedience to law, or of doing one's duty as this is defined by the natural law. Moreover, the Christian theologians of the Middle Ages associated this morality of rules or laws with the notion of the divine law or the commandments of God. At this time, it was commonly held that there could be no law without a lawgiver. These medieval theologians took the view that law must be the product of some act of will, and in the case of natural law, the lawgiver could only be the Christian God.

Like those of MacIntyre, the views of Strauss on this subject are also not entirely consistent with one another. Indeed, Strauss holds two quite different views at different times. Strauss's first understanding of the relationship between Aristotle and Aquinas, and therefore of the history of Aristotelianism, is similar to that of MacIntyre in certain respects but differs from it in others. According to Strauss, on this first reading, Aristotle is the direct source of inspiration for the Thomistic theory of natural law. He should not, therefore, be understood as someone who subscribes to a morality without laws, or an ethics without rules. Aristotle is not an advocate of virtue ethics in the

sense in which MacIntyre understands that notion, at least some of the time.

In Strauss's view, however, although both Aristotle and Aquinas attach importance to moral rules, there is nevertheless a fundamentally important difference between them. This is so because Aquinas considered the basic principles of ethics to be laws whereas Aristotle did not. In Strauss's account, Aquinas saw these moral rules as being the commands of a lawgiver (specifically the Christian God), whereas Aristotle (being a pre-Christian thinker) could not possibly have done so. According to Strauss, then, Aristotle was not an advocate of a doctrine of natural *law,* in the strict sense of the term. He was rather an advocate of a doctrine of natural *right,* more specifically, of the classic conception of natural right.

It is arguable that Strauss, at least on this first reading of his views, attaches more importance than MacIntyre does to the continuities between the ethical thought of Aristotle and that of Aquinas as opposed to the discontinuities. It should, however, be noted that although Strauss's understanding of the history of Aristotelianism emphasizes the importance of the notion of natural *right,* this is not the same thing as attaching importance to the notion of natural *rights* (in the plural). As Strauss understands it, a doctrine of natural right, understood in the classic sense of Aristotle, is a doctrine of *duties* rather than of *rights*. The principles of natural right indicate simply what ought or ought not to be done in a given situation. Aristotle's classic notion of natural right, therefore, is not to be associated with the notion of rights, understood as the property or possessions of isolated, atomic individuals. According to Strauss, it is with figures like John Locke in the modern era, from the seventeenth century onward, that the natural law tradition, or the doctrine of natural right, took a turn in this direction, at which point it parted company with Aristotle and with Aristotelianism.

Contemporary Aristotelianism

Broadly speaking, there are three types of contemporary Aristotelianism: liberal, conservative, and radical.

Liberal Aristotelianism

A number of Aristotelians who were writing in the second half of the twentieth century can be associated with the liberal political tradition. One group, associated especially with the name of Jacques Maritain, argues that Thomism was an important source of inspiration, not just for the development of natural law theory after Aristotle, but also, more specifically, for the emergence of the modern doctrine of natural rights. For those associated with this first group, then, Aquinas was an important precursor of the type of natural law theorizing that can be found in the writings of liberal thinkers such as Locke in the seventeenth century. Indeed, John Finnis has suggested that Aquinas himself can be considered a liberal thinker, his view of the relationship that ought to exist between the individual and the state being similar to that of John Stuart Mill in his essay *On Liberty*. It should, however, be noted that MacIntyre, who is perhaps the most widely known and influential Aristotelian thinker writing today, has rejected this view. Not only does MacIntyre reject the notion of natural or human rights, he also maintains that this notion is of little or no importance for anyone wishing to understand the political thought of either Aristotle or Aquinas.

A second category of liberal Aristotelians has argued that Aristotle's ideas, especially his defense of the principle of constitutionalism or constitutional government, again perhaps filtered through the writings of Thomas Aquinas, have had an important part to play in the history of political thought in the United States and that they are a prerequisite for understanding the republican principles that have underpinned the U.S. Constitution since the time of the founding fathers. This group includes Strauss and contemporary Straussians such as Harry V. Jaffa, at least on the first account of Strauss's understanding of Aristotelianism referred to earlier.

Most recently, a third group of liberal Aristotelians has emerged, associated especially with the name of Martha Nussbaum. Like that of Aristotle himself, Nussbaum's political philosophy rests on a commitment to the belief that there is such a thing as human nature, which might be associated with a definite end or *telos*. In Nussbaum's view, if individual human beings are to flourish, or to achieve that state of well-being or *eudaimonia* referred

to by Aristotle, then certain criteria need to be satisfied. Nussbaum identifies a list of 10 basic capabilities and associated entitlements, which, in her view, all human beings possess. A life that allows each individual to exercise all of these capabilities to the full, Nussbaum argues, is morally preferable to one that does not. Moreover, she rejects the idea that such a commitment might be justified using utilitarian or consequentialist arguments, suggesting that her own capabilities approach has a lot in common with that adopted by those who believe in natural or human rights. Nussbaum maintains that, suitably adapted, Aristotle's ideas help to provide the theoretical justification for a commitment to a program of welfare interventionism, which, if implemented in practice, would lead to a significant redistribution of wealth and other resources, not only within the territorial boundaries of individual nation-states, but also more widely within the global political community.

Nussbaum has a number of critics. For example, her views bring her into conflict with at least some of the ideas of John Rawls because she defends what Rawlsian political philosophers would refer to as a substantive or "thick" rather than a "thin" theory of the good. Nussbaum has also been criticized by contemporary poststructuralist or postmodern philosophers, who deny that there is such a thing as human nature and who reject her endorsement of the principles of moral universalism and essentialism. According to this second criticism, some of the beliefs Nussbaum builds into her view of life, which she claims are good for all human beings, are not universally applicable at all, but rather historically and culturally relative. They are, Nussbaum's critics allege, Western rather than human values.

Conservative Aristotelianism

There is also a conservative Aristotelianism today. Commentators such as Russell Hittinger have an understanding of Aristotle's ideas and their contemporary significance that is informed by the teaching of the Catholic Church. A primary focus of attention for these commentators is again the Thomistic notion of natural law, which they use to justify their view that certain actions or practices, such as those associated with abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, and reprogenics, are not a private matter for individuals to consider in the light of their own consciences, as liberal thinkers argue, but a public matter that ought to be legally regulated (that is to say, proscribed) by the state. When these Thomist Aristotelians appeal to the notion of natural law as an important tool of ethical deliberation, their emphasis is more on the *duties* they think this moral law places on individual moral agents rather than on any *rights* with which it might be associated. Unlike liberal Aristotelians, then, they reject the view that individual moral agents should be allowed to decide in conscience where their own duties lie when considering issues of this kind.

Other conservative Aristotelians have no connection with Catholicism and little interest in Thomism. Perhaps the most influential of these in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have, again, been Strauss and his followers, at least according to a second account of Strauss's understanding of Aristotle and of the Aristotelian doctrine of natural right. The reading of Aristotle advanced in Strauss's *Natural Right and History* is, at least according to this second account, closely associated with contemporary neoconservative political thought in the United States. This is so because, as Strauss understands him, Aristotle maintains that the principles of natural right are mutable or changeable. That is to say, they do not have a universal application. Whether or not they apply in any given situation depends on the circumstances, and in certain exceptional situations, the obligation to obey these moral imperatives can, for reasons of state, legitimately be set aside. Thus, far from defending the basic principles of constitutional government and of the rule of law, Aristotelian political thought on this reading of Strauss might be used to justify their suspension. On this second account, then, Strauss's understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of natural right lends intellectual support to the neoconservative claim that the political situation in the United States after the events of September 11, 2001, constitutes such a state of exception. It provides a possible justification for the domestic and foreign policies of the George W. Bush administration, especially in relation to its treatment of alleged terrorists in the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, which others have argued is an unjustified abuse of their human rights.

Radical Aristotelianism

Recently, we have seen the emergence of a radical form of Aristotelianism, one strand of which is associated with MacIntyre. Kelvin Knight refers to this as revolutionary Aristotelianism, and his understanding of it has been endorsed by MacIntyre himself, who rejects the view that the virtue ethics he develops in *After Virtue* (1981) has conservative political implications.

According to those associated with this group, Aristotle's ideas might be used to defend a radical critique of existing society and its institutions. Some of those who read Aristotle in this way have a tendency to connect his ideas to those of Karl Marx. As in the case of Marx, at the heart of this radical Aristotelianism lies a critique of capitalism. MacIntyre, for example, takes the view that the organizational principles on which any capitalist society is based make it extremely difficult for those living within it to practice the Aristotelian virtues. By bringing the ideas of Aristotle and Marx together in this way, MacIntyre might be seen as contributing to an ongoing project carried out by others, one that is devoted to an exploration of the intellectual relationship between Marx and Aristotle. Controversially, those associated with this project argue, first, that Marx and Marxism might be associated with a definite framework of ethical beliefs and, second, that this framework is an Aristotelian one. When MacIntyre first developed his Aristotelian virtue ethics in the 1980s, he would have had little sympathy with such a project. However, that is not the case today.

Tony Burns

See also Aquinas, Thomas; Aristotle; Equity; Marx, Karl; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Republicanism; Rule of Law

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Aristotle (384-322 BCE)

According to an ancient biographer, Aristotle (384–322 BCE) slept with a bronze ball in his hand poised over a pan; when the ball dropped, the rattling of the pan would wake him. What he did with all of that time awake was to make fundamental contributions to many fields of study and to do more than anyone since to set the agenda for Western philosophy. For readers 16 centuries later, there could be no doubt who was meant when Thomas Aquinas referred simply to "the Philosopher" or Dante to "the master of those who know."

Ancient booklists make clear that the majority of Aristotle's works, including most of his works on politics (including the books *On Justice, On the Statesman, On Kingship,* and a collection of 158 constitutions), have long been lost. Of the surviving works, the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* have been especially important for political theory. The theory to be found there is remarkable for being simultaneously sensible and systematic and for its emphasis on both the natural and ethical dimensions of politics.

At 17, Aristotle went to Athens and became a member of Plato's academy. He remained there for 20 years, until Plato's death in 347. A few years later, Aristotle joined the court of the king of Macedon, Philip II, probably as tutor to his son, known to history as Alexander the Great. Aristotle went back to Athens in 335 and set up his own school of philosophy, the Lyceum. Both his long apprenticeship with Plato and his foundation of a school to rival that of his teacher resonate in his extensive engagement with Plato's arguments.

When we turn from Plato's dialogues to Aristotle's texts, it is easy to overlook their dialectical character and to be impatient with their difficulty. "Learning is painful," Aristotle says in the *Politics* (VIII.5), and he sometimes writes as if to assure his students that they are learning. Ancient readers, however, were as exorbitant in their praise of Aristotle's style (Cicero refers to his "golden river of speech") as modern readers have been stinting (a nonetheless admiring Thomas Gray wrote in 1746 that "he has a dry conciseness, that makes one imagine one is perusing a table of contents rather than a book: It tastes for all the world like chopped hay"). This is because Aristotle was best known in antiquity for his polished public works, often dialogues, whereas the works now extant were akin to programmatic drafts or lecture notes and were subsequently edited by others. There is something compelling about the elliptical manner Aristotle reserved for his philosophical intimates, but it is an acquired taste and requires a complex stomach.

It will help, however, to recognize that the tensions and the doubling-back that we see in Aristotle's work often emerge as he first tries to discover what is worthwhile in one opinion that is held by the many or the wise, and then moves on to another on the same subject as a way of homing in on the truth. Together with a recognition that our text occasionally papers over a gap or preserves two attempts at the same topic, this helps to account for the "on the one hand . . . on the other hand" character of the work. Because "more or less everything has been discovered" (*Politics* II.5), he believes that we should proceed by considering the practices and positions that we have inherited. These, together with Aristotle's own reflections on them, refer to and relate to one another in complex ways, and the organization of his political theory is accordingly more like a fractal than a linear series of points.

The Nature of the City-State

At the outset of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle suggests that the science (*epistêmê,* a broader term than our science) proper to grasping the best good is political science. The other sciences are subordinate to the control of political science, and although the good of the individual and the good of the city-state (*polis*) are the same, that of the city-state is greater because it includes the good of individuals. Ethics itself, Aristotle says, is a kind of political science or political philosophy. Only mature students are suited to study political science because its premises are based on experience. Many of these premises hold good usually rather than universally, and in such cases, the political scientist will fulfill his role if he can indicate the approximate truth. The end of such study, however, is not truth or knowledge, but action. An activity like the systematic analysis of contemporary constitutions (*politeiai,* political systems or regimes) is meant to

have a role in bringing about not just knowledge, but betterment. When such knowledge is assimilated by a human being with characteristically human ends, that person's actions will then be different and more accurately inclined to the good. In this sense, the conclusions of political science are political actions.

Aristotle opens the *Politics* with the claim that every community, including every city-state, is established for the sake of some good (for we do everything for the sake of what we hold to be good). The city-state is the community with the greatest authority and so aims at the most authoritative and highest good. To demonstrate his claims about the specialness of politics and its orientation toward the good, Aristotle makes the surprising move of looking backward at how the city-state naturally develops from its component parts. Individuals are brought together by a natural urge, and those who cannot live without one another form a dyad; a conjugal pair arises, for example, from the urge to reproduce.

Aristotle argues that a similarly primitive and natural pairing is that of master and slave. This is natural not because it is a forceful domination but because the survival of the slave is furthered by the intelligent foresight of the master and that of the master is furthered by the physical labor of the slave. In contrast to Socrates' claim that all rule is for the benefit of the ruled, however, Aristotle argues that while a natural slave benefits from rule, masterly rule is essentially exercised for the master's own benefit. Aristotle maintains that mastery over natural slaves is just. It apparently follows from what he says that those who are slaves by law and not by nature are unjustly enslaved. It is worth remark that this means that if there are no slaves by nature (although Aristotle never doubts there are), then all slavery is unjust: Such domination is justified only if there are people who are by nature as different from others as body is from soul or beast from human and incapable of anything higher than physical labor.

These pairings for everyday needs are combined in the household. The grouping of relatives from a number of extended households is a village. When several villages find it expedient to come together in a wider community, that community, the city-state, proves to be self-sufficient, and there is no longer a natural spur to growth. Thus, the city-state is the end of the smaller communities: Their nature is fulfilled when they develop into the political community. In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle says that the political community both comes into being and endures for the sake of advantage, and he adds that legislators, too, aim at a common advantage, which is said to be just; in the *Politics,* he says that the city-state comes into being for the sake of living but endures for the sake of living well, understood in terms of virtue.

There is a considerable difference of emphasis here, but Aristotle saw no incompatibility between the advantage and the virtue of an individual, and he believed that the virtue of the legislator consisted in pursuing the common advantage. The city-state is akin to a human being: fulfillment of desire and the concerns of the body come first, but they nonetheless properly subserve reason and the concerns of the soul. The advantage that can be pursued in the political community is not for any particular advantages, but for advantage for the whole of life; it thus encompasses the range of ethical ends in addition to more material ends.

We may begin to see why Aristotle makes two of his most perplexing claims: that every city-state exists by nature and that the human being is by nature a political animal. Human beings have a natural impulse to form a political community, but this is not to say that political communities spring up necessarily and without being deliberately established. Despite the natural political impulse, a city-state is constructed rather than merely emerging. Art (*technē*) not only imitates nature, it can also complete what nature cannot; and the practitioner of the political art must complete the trajectory that nature of its own impulse cannot. Alternatively, it may be best to understand the politician as constructing the city-state not as the product of an art, but as the by-product of good activity (*eupraxis*) in accordance with practical wisdom or prudence. The end of this political wisdom is happiness (*eudaimonia*), or activity in accordance with virtue.

The nature of a thing can be understood by referring to the matter out of which it is made, and one sense in which the city-state exists by nature is that the communities out of which it is composed are natural. Aristotle insists that we will study the city-state in the best way by seeing how it develops,

and he identifies another sense of the nature of a thing with its process of development. But the nature of a thing should also be understood by referring to its form or essence and by its end or purpose, and the process whereby humans form communities has as its end point the city-state. Aristotle often opposes the natural not to the artificial but to the pathological or deviant. The city-state serves as a model because it is the natural result of proper development, just as a fully grown healthy plant is the natural result of a seed.

That the city-state is the end of human association is an observation of a natural process, but one that can go wrong. Aristotle thinks that the formation of the city-state requires conscious human intervention, but he sees this as consistent with the idea that it is the end of a natural process of growth, just as a seed that requires careful tending to grow nonetheless has the flourishing plant as its natural end.

Human beings are by nature political animals because they have within them a natural impulse to live with one another. The natural end of this impulse to associate is the city-state. Human beings by nature form couples and households, but there is a different sense in which they naturally form city-states. The last of these is understood in terms of the good life, which for a human being is a life in common with other human beings that is self-sufficient and enables pursuits that are not possible in other human groupings or on one's own. One who is naturally inclined to solitude rather than the common life of the city-state is a bellicose creature. Other animals, like the bee, may be called political, but human beings are *more* political, for they have speech (*logos,* which is not mere voice). Speech is essential for a community to be properly political, for the city-state is a community in which people share discussion of what is just and unjust, with the end of making them just.

This is distinctive of the city-state, according to Aristotle, who complains that in Plato's *Republic,* Socrates elides the essential differences between an individual, a household, and a city-state. Socrates there argues that the best city-state is one that most nearly approaches a unity, comparing the well-ordered constitution to that of an individual. A city-state is by its nature composed of a multitude of people of different kinds, Aristotle maintains, and is thus destroyed the more it becomes a unity. (It is unclear how Aristotle might respond to the objections that the best city-state in *The Republic* is composed of parts that are dissimilar and that Aristotle himself thinks that the parts of the human being and of the household are dissimilar from one another despite their greater unity.) Any community must have things in common, but Aristotle levels a few forceful criticisms at the constitution of *The Republic,* in which spouses, children, and property are had in common. His primary objection remains that this would "reduce harmony to a unison" (*Politics* II.5), whereas what should be held in common in a city-state are the habits, laws, and education that coordinate the differences without destroying them.

Constitutions

One way of understanding the composite whole that is the city-state is by considering the communities out of which it grows. But to analyze a city-state adequately, we must consider its two defining characteristics: its citizens and its constitution. These must be treated in tandem because neither can make up a city-state without the other and because the constitution determines who counts as a citizen in the first place. If a city-state receives a new constitution, it is thereby a different city-state even if its citizens remain the same, for the constitution is the form of the city-state (just as rearranging the same notes into a new form would make a different melody). A citizen is someone who is eligible for the deliberative or judicial roles in the city-state. Aristotle says that a city-state is a number of such people large enough to be self-sufficient. In the genetic account in Book I, we learned that the self-sufficient community of the city-state depends on women and slaves; the analytical approach of Book III reveals that slaves, at least, are nonetheless not of that community's essence. The criterion of citizenship is demanding: If only a few people in a city-state are entitled to participate in offices of judgment and deliberation, then (even if we do not count women and slaves) the vast majority in that city-state are noncitizens. The good citizen must be able to govern free people and to be governed by them.

A constitution is the organization of the citizen body into offices, and in particular the ruling office. The offices are organized according to the

end of each of the city-states, so the end is also constitutive of any constitution. The other offices are determined by whoever has overall authority, and the constitution is to be identified with that authority: When the people rule, for example, the constitution is a democratic one. All rule over free people is properly exercised for the benefit of the ruled; those constitutions that are instead designed for the benefit of the rulers are incorrect or deviant, as they treat free people as if they were slaves. The proper constitutions are kingship, aristocracy, and polity (rule by one, the few, or the many for the common benefit). The deviant constitutions are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy (rule by one for his own benefit, rule by and for the rich, and rule by and for the poor). In theory, there could be a democracy where the few ruled or an oligarchy where the many ruled, were the powerful few ever poor or the ruling many rich. Aristotle recognizes that his six-fold division is only a starting point and considers a number of different axes along which important distinctions may be made, leading to many subdivisions.

Constitutions that aim at the good of a faction demonstrate a partial grasp of justice. The oligarchs wrongly conclude from their superior wealth that they are simply superior; the democrats wrongly conclude from the fact that they are equally free-born that they are entitled to equality in every respect. A true city-state is just, so each receives his due therein, and this ought to be proportionate to a citizen's virtue, not to birth or wealth. Wealth and liberty should not be pursued as ultimate ends, but only insofar as they bring about the good life. Aristotle rejects a contractual model of political association according to which law functions as a kind of treaty requiring just behavior, for it should aim instead at making the citizens good and just. We maintain city-states in order to live well, and, as Aristotle explains in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* to live well is above all to live as the virtuous person would live. In a city-state, the citizens live in a common territory, agree not to wrong one another, and exchange goods with one another; but only when the bonds among fellow citizens are those of friendship is the community a political one.

If one person (or family) emerges who is manifestly superior in virtue, then that person should rule as king, although Aristotle seems to think that the days of kingship have passed. It may be even less likely that there will arise a number of people who are outstandingly virtuous, but if it should happen, then an aristocracy would be even better than a virtuous king because less corruptible (although ever vulnerable to degenerating into an oligarchy). Although Aristotle does not countenance the idea of a multitude of people who are outstandingly virtuous, he does take seriously arguments for why the many should be in authority rather than the few. Even if the many are inferior individually, collectively, they can be superior: When pooled, their virtue and practical wisdom can be greater than anyone else's. Taken together, the many are even superior on traditional grounds like wealth and strength. Aristotle does not decisively side with one, few, or many, making clear that the proper criterion for rule should be not number, but superiority in virtue.

Aristotle and his students gave careful accounts of 158 actual constitutions—one of which, *The Constitution of the Athenians,* was rediscovered in the late nineteenth century—so it is not surprising that he does not limit himself to a schema of three constitutions and the three deviant forms thereof (and criticizes Plato for doing so). His discussion of the constitution is simultaneously a normative theory of ideal types and an empirically informed account of comparative institutions. Aristotle delineates several different kinds of democracy and oligarchy, polity (a mixture of democracy and oligarchy), and tyranny; he also gives an account of how these different constitutions come into being. The theoretically best constitution, a virtuous kingship or an aristocracy of the virtuous, is often unattainable, and one reason that he enumerates the different kinds of other constitutions is to enable a judgment about which of these kinds is best given the circumstances.

Aristotle also provides his answer to what the best constitution is for most city-states, given what is within the reach of ordinary people. Rather than depending on the attainment of virtue by the citizens as individuals, the character of this constitution depends on applying the idea that virtue is a mean to the citizens as a body. (This runs into problems similar to those that undermine his attempt to transfer the idea of virtue as a mean—which works better when it is understood as the mean passion or action of an individual—to the

systemic justice of a constitution in the fifth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.) Aristotle accordingly maintains that the best constitution in most city-states is that in which the dominant political role is played by the middle class. The rich incline to arrogance and incapacity to be ruled, the poor to resentment and incapacity to rule. Those in the middle are between these extremes and are more equal and better prepared for friendship; they therefore keep the city-state from division into factions of rich and poor and from lapsing into extreme democracy or extreme oligarchy. As a constitution is mixed, it will lead to the predominance of the middle; that predominance will therefore produce greater stability. There is thus a close connection between this "practically best" regime, where the middle class dominates, and polity, the constitution that includes elements of both democratic and oligarchic mechanisms for public deliberation, the judiciary, and the selection and remit of officials.

Just as the constitution has an ethical end of enabling the good life, so what leads to faction is a misunderstanding of what justice requires. The ones who ought to participate more in the system are those of outstanding virtue, under whose leadership the good life would be most attainable; but the proponents of democracy insist instead on equal participation because of their equal liberty, and the proponents of oligarchy insist on their own greater participation as equal to their greater property. These respective understandings of equality will further the democratic or oligarchic lean of the city-state, but this partisanship will lead to political discord and instability. Indeed, a democracy is likely to destroy itself if it pursues overly democratic measures—the best democracy is the most limited one—and too many oligarchic features will ruin an oligarchy. Democracy is more stable than oligarchy, not least because it is closer to a constitution based on the middle class, but it is still prone to faction.

The constitution can be changed in a number of ways, but faction is the one that most concerns Aristotle. Faction may be caused by arrogance, profit, fear, honor, contempt, ethnic differences, disproportionate growth of one group, or a reaction to any of these. In the fifth book of the *Politics,* Aristotle systematically discusses how these and other factors affect each kind of constitution, drawing on historical instances of constitutional failure or overthrow. He thus provides a kind of catalogue of political pathologies for each system.

Knowledge of what destroys constitutions entails knowledge of what preserves them, Aristotle maintains, and so he goes on to analyze how best to maintain each kind. The assimilation of ethical and political outlooks here comes under some pressure, as Aristotle contemplates the utility of stirring up an exaggerated fear of danger to rally people behind the constitution, for example, or the preservation of a tyranny by murdering the outstanding citizens, abolishing schools, employing spies, impoverishing the people, and setting them against one another by slander. In part, Aristotle is confined by his own definitions: because tyranny is unaccountable rule over unwilling subjects, if the tyrant moderates his rule to the point that the subjects become willing, he will then have destroyed his tyranny rather than having preserved it. Aristotle nonetheless holds to the idea that the preservation or stability of a regime is best guaranteed by moderating that regime—which will mean that the least moderate regimes will require the greatest changes if they are to survive. He ends up arguing, therefore, that the only way for a tyranny to endure beyond its characteristically short span is for it to be essentially kingly (the tyrant still counting as a tyrant presumably because he is acting in this way for his own interests). As with preservation and the good life being the two ends for which people form and maintain a city-state, so the preservation of the city-state itself ultimately converges with its proper ethical role.

The Politics of Virtue

At the beginning of the seventh book of the *Politics,* Aristotle turns again to the question of the best and happiest life and determines that for both an individual and a city-state, this is a life of virtue together with the external goods needed to undertake virtuous actions. As in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* the two prime candidates are the political life and the philosophical life. The tutor of Alexander recognizes that some city-states are oriented to conquest, but he forcefully condemns the idea that the best city-state is the one that rules over others like a master or tyrant. Military activity is not noble in

itself but only if it is ultimately undertaken in pursuit of the highest end.

It is in light of the good life that the city-state is supposed to enable that we can determine the best constitution's characteristics. The population must be large enough for self-sufficiency but small enough that everyone knows one another sufficiently to judge them properly when it comes to elections and verdicts; and its territory should be of a size and situation so as to allow for ready defense and a life that is neither luxurious nor poor. But while the city-state needs territory, a city-state is defined not in terms of property but as a community of people aiming at *eudaimonia* or happiness. What is more, even the laborers, while necessary for the city-state, are not properly part of it. And Aristotle reveals how exclusive is his concern for the well-being of the ruling class when he says that even in the best city-state, the farmers should be spiritless slaves because they would then be more useful as workers and less likely to foment change. By contrast, all citizens participate in the constitution, which should be geared toward making them excellent and happy by focusing on their education. This education is Aristotle's focus until the *Politics* breaks off in Book VIII. Aristotle's account of the ideal city-state in the final books turns out to be beyond our grasp precisely because he aims to describe in some detail a political community that would be feasible for his contemporaries to establish. But it remains intriguing in no small part because what eludes us now are not the guiding values but the social and material conditions of such a political community's possibility.

While his account in the *Politics* is deeply ambivalent on the question, the final book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* clearly defends the superiority of the life of contemplation over the political life. Pursuit of the best life does not culminate with such a conclusion, for it only begins there. Aristotle insists that achieving knowledge about virtue is not enough and that it is not the ultimate aim of ethical enquiry. We must then endeavor to be virtuous and to bring others to act in accordance with virtue so far as they can. To do this, however, we need a proper system of education and a judicious code of laws, so that argument, aspirations, and compulsion all encourage people in the direction of an ethical life in common. The essential aim of political science is virtuous action, but this is why ethics proves but a preface to political science.

Kinch Hoekstra

See also Ancient Democracy; Aristocracy; Aristotelianism; City-State; Friendship; Happiness; Household; Naturalism; Plato; Scholasticism; Slavery in Greek and Early Christian Thought; Tyranny; Virtue

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Asian Values

Asian values is a controversial concept associated with prominent Asian politicians and establishment

intellectuals who claimed that the Asian postwar "economic miracle" was due to the shared culture of East Asian societies, especially those of Confucian heritage. They asserted that the "Asian values" that explained this success were discipline, hard work, frugality, educational achievement, balancing individual and societal needs, and deference to authority. Proponents argued that Western models of liberal human rights, democracy, and capitalism were unsuited to East Asia because they fostered excessive individualism and legalism. This had undermined social order and economic dynamism in the West. Critics pointed to the contradictions and weaknesses in these claims and argued they served the interests of Asia's authoritarian elites. These arguments connect with debates in political theory over universalist and particularist accounts of human rights, social justice, and social order, as well as social, economic, and political change. They are also related to wider conservative political and philosophical attacks on liberal democracy.

Claims about Asian values garnered particular attention in the early 1990s because they were articulated by prominent politicians such as former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at a time when the achievements of rapidly modernizing East Asian societies gave them a new global prominence and clout. These claims conflicted with liberal assertions that the collapse of European communism and China's market socialism marked the triumph of liberal democracy, human rights, and capitalism over competing forms of organizing societies. Asian values proponents challenged the trade and development aid conditionality promoted by the United States and other governments in the West.

The Asian values debate was also internal to Asian societies. At a time of rapid economic and social change in East Asia, growing individualism and democratization and human rights movements challenged established socioeconomic orders and authoritarian regimes. These debates were part of struggles over competing visions of modernity and who should legitimately decide how Asian societies should be organized.

Proponents of Asian values made several interconnected claims. They said human rights are culturally specific. Internationally dominant understandings of human rights are rooted in liberalism and the development of economic organization and state-society relations in the West, and so are not suited to East Asian societies. The distinct values of the latter have enabled rapid economic development and growth. Because of culture, but also because economic development must be prioritized in societies climbing out of poverty, civil and political rights should be subordinate to economic and social rights. The state is said to embody the collective identity and interests of its citizens; its rights should take priority over those of the individual. Asian values proponents defended state sovereignty, including the right to noninterference by outsiders promoting liberal human rights, democracy, and capitalism. Asian values proponents also argued that liberal universalist claims serve Western interests, much as European and American claims of moral superiority legitimated colonialism historically. These ideas were expressed in the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on human rights, which was signed by many Asian governments but criticized by many Asian human rights organizations.

Liberal critics have dismissed Asian values claims as attempts to shore up authoritarian and illiberal rule against domestic and external opponents and paper over the weaknesses of the Asian economic development model. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 appeared to vindicate some of their arguments. Those taking a constructivist approach to culture challenged the reverse Orientalist essentializing of Asia and the West that is part of the Asian values discourse. They noted that Asian values are similar to conservative values in Western societies. Critical political economists point to the contradiction between the antiliberalism espoused by prominent Asian values proponents and their promotion of the very market-oriented development that has challenged established social order. Feminist theorists saw the Asian values discourse as attempting to legitimate gender, class, ethnic, and racial hierarchies embedded in dominant understandings of Asian cultures, the Asian development model, and wider capitalist social relations.

The Asian values controversy intersects with theoretical debates over the evolution of human societies, including Max Weber's account of the role of Protestantism in European economic development. Illiberal democracy in Singapore and Malaysia and the Asian developmental model as it

emerged in Japan and later Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong appeared to some to offer viable alternatives to liberal modernization theory's contention that all roads led to liberal democracy.

The Asian values debate is relevant to arguments in political theory over whether commitments to global justice and equality can be grounded in human rights. It is also relevant to ongoing debate over whether the global realm is morally analogous to state, nation, local, and other forms of community. Taking issue with liberalism as the only moral starting point for advancing human well-being, communitarians such as Charles Taylor have reflected on Asian cultural experiences to examine the potential and challenges of establishing a more inclusive, unforced, but robust global consensus on human rights. A growing literature, including that associated with Confucian communitarianism and reformist Islam, has debated whether particular values and institutions in Asian societies are consistent with human rights, although not articulated in these terms. Daniel A. Bell has argued that many "values in Asia," as opposed to "Asian values," can both enrich global human rights theory and practice and be deployed to improve the dignity and well-being of contemporary Asians.

While rejecting many Asian values arguments, theorists of global justice have also criticized the emphasis on civil and political rights in liberal human rights discourse for protecting the interests of the wealthy and powerful in global capitalist order.

Susan J. Henders

See also Colonialism; Communitarianism; Democracy; Development; Human Rights; Liberalism; Modernization Theory; Orientalism; Social Constructivism

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ASSEMBLY

Ancient city-states, such as classical Athens (in the fifth century BCE) and republican Rome (especially between the third and first century BCE), were characterized, among other aspects, by the focal role the popular assembly played in political life, and therefore, they are often regarded as examples of direct democracy. The *ekklēsia* was the Athenian popular assembly, and the *comitia* was the assembly of the whole Roman people, as opposed to the *concilium,* whose membership was reserved to part of the population, the plebeians. Although there were fundamental differences in structure and functioning between them, both were open only to adult male citizens, and even the poorest were not formally excluded from the proceedings. The assemblies were called on to take decisions on a wide variety of issues, from declarations of peace and war to elections of magistrates, enactments of laws, and judicial verdicts. This entry describes the assembly as it existed in classical Athens and in republican Rome, highlighting the extent and existing limits of actual popular participation in the decision-making process in these two city-states.

The Athenian Assembly

The *ekklēsia* met on the Pnyx, a hill in the southwest end of Athens. The requirement of a quorum of 6,000 for some categories of business suggests that an attendance of that size could be easily reached but was not always the norm. In the fifth century BCE, there were 40 regular assembly meetings per year as well as exceptional gatherings called in case of extraordinary circumstances. These meetings did not take place on fixed days

and could be summoned only at the initiative of the *prytaneis* (presidents) with just four days' notice. The prytaneis were 50 men chosen by lot to serve as presidents of the *boulē* (council) for one tenth of the year. On duty every day, they made arrangements regarding the council and the assembly and attended to day-to-day business, including receiving envoys and correspondence that was addressed to the state.

In Athens, the citizens were paid one drachma per assembly to attend the ekklēsia, which facilitated the participation of the poorest citizens, whose livelihood was based on their daily work. During the proceedings of the assembly, both in the Pnyx and in the theatre of Dionysus (which was increasingly used in the fourth century as an additional meeting place for the ekklēsia), the citizens were seated as they pleased without being grouped by political associations or *phylae* (usually translated as tribes, they were territorial units that included a section from each of the three zones—city, inland, and shore—in which the Athenian landscape was divided). On particular occasions, the law prescribed specific items for the assembly's agenda, but the discussion always focused on issues that had been subject to a prior resolution by the boulē, which could, but did not necessarily, include a specific proposal. However, anyone in the assembly could speak out and propose a motion or an amendment. The final decision was taken by a show of hands. This was never precisely counted, but the result of the vote was adjudicated on the basis of a rough estimate. If a citizen lodged a sworn objection to the decision made, the show of hands was repeated.

The chairman of the meeting of the ekklēsia was one of the prytaneis, a foreman (the *epistatēs*) chosen by lot. For one day, once in his lifetime, he was in charge of the state seal and the keys of the treasuries and archives and had to maintain order during the meeting. This system of prytaneis and epistatēs, based on lot and rotation, guaranteed a high level of ordinary citizens' participation in public administration and fostered a culture of responsibility sharing in the decision-making process.

The Roman Assembly

At Rome, the *comitia* (plural noun) met principally in the *comitium* (singular noun), a consecrated area north of the Forum Romanum at the foot of the Capitoline hill. From some remarks made by Cicero, orator of the first century BCE, it appears that a quorum was generally not required. The comitia could be summoned only on certain specific days (*dies comitiales*) solely by a magistrate holding the formal right to convoke the people (*ius agenda cum populo*) and after favorable auspices, showing divine approval, had been taken. A *trinundium,* an interval of approximately 24 days between the announcement of an assembly meeting and its actual gathering, had to be observed to allow the people to acquire information on the issues at stake. In a judicial comitia, prior to the trinundium, an additional three days had to be computed for preliminary investigation before a *contio,* a gathering of the people without any decision-making powers.

In Rome, citizens who wished to attend the assembly had to do so at their own expense because they received no financial compensation for missing a day of work. No specific provisions were made for them to sit down during the proceedings, and, although these gatherings could take place in a number of settings not specifically designed for it, the comitium, the designated space, was clearly intended for standing rather than sitting.

Except in the case of the contio, where people gathered as they pleased to be informed on the issue at stake, the citizens in the comitia were summoned by groups, that is, voting units, which played an essential part in citizens' political identity. The majority of votes in each group constituted the vote of the units, and the comitia's final decision was determined by the majority of groups. Thus, the voice of the individual citizen was absorbed in wider units, the most important of which, in the mid-late republic, were the *centuriae* and the tribes.

In this period, the centuriae, originally the smallest infantry unit in the Roman army, had a membership of 193, divided among the five property classes in such a way that the highest census class, which included the smallest number of people, was assigned the largest number of centuriae. At the other end of the spectrum were the *proletarii,* those so poor that they did not possess anything other than their offspring (*proles*). Because they fell below the fifth census class, they were enrolled in a single *centuria* and effectively

disfranchised. The centuriate system was so designed that it was sufficient that the first two property classes voted in unison for a majority to be reached and for the rest of the Roman people to be automatically outvoted. In addition, in each class, the number of centuriae was equally divided between the young (men between 17 and 45) and old (men age 46 or over), and, because the young outnumbered the old, the system was biased not only toward the rich, but also against the old. Thus, in the Roman centuriate system, the individual citizen's political voice was dependent on his financial condition and age.

The other important voting group in the mid-late republic was the tribe (*tribus*). This was a territorial unit, which indicated the district into which people were distributed. Tribes were allocated in the census, and an adult who was enrolled for the first time was normally assigned to the tribe of his father, regardless of his personal movements, domicile, and property. By 241 BCE the number of Roman tribes had reached 35, of which 4 were called urban and 31 rural. The Roman plebs and freedmen were all enrolled in the four urban tribes. Thus, given the voting system by unit, the poor Roman plebs, more numerous than the rich landowners registered in the rural tribes, could never count more than four votes, even if they voted unanimously; they were, in practice, always outvoted. It should, however, be noted that this system, which provided the freedmen with a means, however imperfect, to express their political opinion, was still more open, at least in this respect, than its Athenian counterpart, where freedmen were deprived of any political right and regarded on an equal level with foreigners who resided in Athens (*metoikoi*). The tribal system, certainly more democratic than the centuriate organization, was unfavorable not only toward the Roman plebs but also toward the rural population, who lived far away from Rome and could not afford such a long journey and whose work cultivating their allotments would have suffered.

In the comitia, the people could only express their assent or dissent on a proposal that was put forward by the magistrate and could not amend it nor advance one of their own. Even in the contio, where a debate took place (at least theoretically), an ordinary citizen could speak out only after receiving the magistrate's permission to do so.

Before being presented to the comitia, new legislative proposals needed to receive the *patrum auctoritas* (literally, the authority of the Senate), the assent of the fathers. These were most likely patrician senators, who, at least originally, were called to confirm the lack of technical and religious flaws in the people's decision, and later, from the fourth century onward, had to approve the proposed law prior to the people's voting.

Until the late second century, voters were asked about their choice by the *rogatores,* distinguished men selected by the magistrate. Their verbal response was then translated into written marks over appropriate tablets. Written ballots were introduced with a series of laws, the so-called *leges tabellariae,* which derive their name from the tablet on which the vote was recorded. Because citizens were no longer required to reveal their vote to the *rogator,* the ruling elite interpreted the introduction of the written ballot, as attested by Cicero, as diminishing their influence on the people.

It may be helpful to present a brief outline of the Roman Republican assemblies and their functions. The *comitia curiata* was the most ancient of Roman assemblies, based on the voting unit curia, which were held to be 30 ancient divisions of the Roman people created by Romulus and named after Sabine women. In the late republic, the curiae had been replaced by 30 lectors (Roman functionaries), who symbolically represented them. Although its functions were progressively taken over by the *comitia centuriata,* the earlier group was still used to witness adoptions, wills, and priestly appointments and, most important, to confirm magistrates' election by the *lex curiata de imperio,* which seemed to confer power onto the magistrate.

The comitia centuriata, traditionally established by the king Servius Tullius, was a timocratic assembly based on five property classes, whose unit was the centuria. It was originally linked to the army, so that, even when this connection ceased to exist, the assembly met in military parade and on the Campus Martius, outside the sacred boundary of the city (*pomerium*). Ancient authors explain that the complex system of 193 centuriae divided among the five property classes described above was a way of exacting military duties from the citizens in proportion to their wealth, while conferring voting rights and political power in proportion to the services requested. In the third

century BCE, a reform of the system was implemented that unsuccessfully attempted to redress the unbalance of this structure, which, however, remained in the late republic deeply conservative in nature. Its function was to enact laws; to elect senior magistrates, such as consuls, praetors and censors; to declare peace and war; and to act as a jury in a trial where the death penalty could be inflicted and the citizen had exercised his right to appeal (*provocatio*).

The *comitia tributa* was modeled on the *concilium plebis tributum,* the assembly of plebeians. It was based on the voting unit of the territorial tribes but allowed the participation of the patricians. Summoned by consuls or praetors, it elected junior magistrates (quaestors, curule aediles, military tribunes), enacted laws, and functioned as jury in minor trials. From 287 BCE, the decisions of the concilium plebis tributum became binding on the whole Roman people, and its distinction from the comitia populi tributa became much hazier and harder to detect. This assembly elected the plebeian magistrates (tribunes and aediles); enacted laws, originally called plebiscites; and held trials for noncapital offenses.

The contio was the most informal Roman assembly, where people could gather together with almost no restriction on venue to listen to magistrate's edicts, news of victory or defeat, arguments in favor of, or against, a legislative proposal, or even to evidence about an alleged criminal. No decision was taken at this meeting, but a more or less fictitious debate took place between the ruling class (who informed its audience and paid them due homage as the sovereign political entity) and the people of Rome (who could actively manifest their voice mainly through public clamor, cheering, or booing).

In the first century CE, during the early empire, the election of magistrates was transferred to the Senate, and only the declaration of the result took place before the popular assembly. The judicial and legislative functions of the assembly also faded away during this time, and the comitia remained an empty shell, testimony of a long-gone republican past, until the third century CE.

Valentina Arena

See also Ancient Constitutionalism; Ancient Democracy; Cicero; City-State; Polybius; Roman Commonwealth; Roman Law.

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Augustine (354–430 CE)

Augustine (354–430 CE) was the first major political thinker within the Christian tradition. Politically astute and highly intellectual, Augustine was a North African bishop during a period that saw immense changes in the political landscape. Following the Emperor Constantine's conversion to Christianity in the mid-fourth century, Christianity was adapting to becoming a state religion. The process was complicated by two pressures: the external threat of invasion by barbarian forces and, internally, the legacy of persecution, which had left animosity between communities that had renounced their faith and those that had been steadfast despite the dangers. Augustinian political thought tackles the problem of living a Christian life amid these worldly pressures.

Augustine's major political work, *The City of God* (413–427 CE) describes two cities: one heavenly and one worldly. The earthly city is motivated by self-interest, whereas the heavenly city is a community of true believers. The cities represent a spectrum of the best and worst human behavior; the heavenly city, the City of God, provides a guiding symbol for Christians as to how they should live their private and public lives. *The City of God* also discusses the nature of the state, justice, and good kingship.

Augustine wrote no systematic political philosophy, and his political views need to be reconstructed from a body of work containing more than 1,000 works, sermons, and letters. Augustine's first works reflect his early affiliation with the Manicheans (a quasi-Christian sect) while he was working as a professor of rhetoric in Milan, as well as his subsequent arguments refuting Manichaeism following his conversion to Christianity. *The Confessions* (397) presents in autobiographical form an account of Augustine's conversion and decision to withdraw from the world and to form a small contemplative religious community with friends in North Africa. Writing continuously for the rest of his life, Augustine tackled particular questions of Christian faith both in the form of episcopal letters and scholarly works, such as *On Free Choice* (388–395), *The Nature of the Good* (399), *The Unity of the Church* (405), and *The Perfection of Human Justice* (415/16). *The City of God* (413–427) provides the fullest expression of his mature political philosophy, while the *Reconsiderations* (426–427) sets out Augustine's final review of his own writings.

The rise of a Christian empire raised three political questions for Christianity. First, if Christianity was no longer opposed to the earthly powers, how were the demands of the otherworldly to be balanced against the considerations of the world? Second, if Christianity represented a natural historical triumph of belief in the true God and God's historical plan, then why was a Christian empire being threatened by nonbelievers? Thirdly, who belonged to the true church, and how was belief to be regulated?

Augustine's major political text, *The City of God,* completed in the years following the Gothic sack of Rome, provides a perspective on all these questions. The City of God is a moral community of those predestined to go to heaven, whereas the earthly city is inhabited by those who love themselves more than they love God. However, neither city exists anywhere in reality, and the best way to understand them is allegorically as representations of the extremes of human dispositions. The human condition entails membership and loyalty to both cities, and the world is always a mixture of the two cities. History is a dramatic tension between the forces of the two cities. No official earthly institution, such as the church, represents the City of God, and churchmen are as likely as any others to belong to the earthly city. Thus, in the political context of the times, a perfect church composed only of those who had stuck firm to their faith was an impossibility. Politically, Christianity, the church, and individual Christians are striving to establish the City of God and must do so even amid the threat of invasion.

At the center of any political worldview is a judgment on human nature, and Augustine is similar to Hobbes in his understanding of man's fundamentally flawed nature. Human beings are fundamentally social and driven by a desire for peace. However, they also suffer from an inherently disordered nature and cannot achieve peace by the imposition of reason alone. Instead, people are reliant on the grace of God to master their own vices and achieve an internal order within themselves. Human nature affects external order as well because humankind's inability to master selfish desires leads to conflict between neighbors and, at a national level, provokes warfare between rival states.

A central difficulty for Augustine is defending the place of politics and government in a world waiting for redemption. The orthodox Christian view presents man as a pilgrim passing through a world that will come to an end, raising a question as to what place the church plays in the designs of God. Augustine was faced with one alternative religious and political model offered by another Christian thinker called Pelagius. The Pelagian theory, declared a heresy, argued that man himself could achieve his redemption through his actions. History itself could, therefore, be seen as mankind working toward the world's redemption. On this approach, the interconnection of the religious and the political is obvious because politics can provide the forum for acts designed to achieve redemption.

Augustine, however, takes an anti-Pelagian view that sees redemption as being part of God's predestination and unknowable to mortals. Although man must strive for goodness, he may achieve it only through God's grace. Augustine also believes that, other than the death of Christ, there are no decisive historical events. Nothing that happens, such as the Fall of Rome, is significant, nor does it influence the world's salvation. Predestination also complicates our sense of Augustine's politics in another way because our understanding of political action often requires a wider level of free will than seems possible within a predestined divine order. However, although Augustine insists on God's foreknowledge of all that happens, he also asserts that we have free will. God's foreknowledge of sin does not cause a man to sin; rather, the man himself chooses to sin.

Augustine's sense of God's love establishes his political order. God's love allows for a temporary mitigation of the disordered consequences of sin via the institutions of government. Although the citizens of God make good inhabitants of the earthly city, their focus is on the eternal peace they will enjoy in the City of God. The church and civil society accordingly cannot ensure our salvation or cause our fall; instead, their existence is a loving action by God to restore order to the world.

The City of God

In *The City of God,* Augustine provides a linear historical defense of the Christian faith. Augustine divides human history into six periods: (1) from Adam to Noah, (2) from Noah to Abraham, (3) from Abraham to David, (4) from David to the Babylonian Captivity, (5) from the Babylonian Captivity to the birth of Christ, and (6) from the birth of Christ to the Last Judgment. The first half of *The City of God* (Books 1–10) deals with the question of whether the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity led to the barbarian invasions. The second half (Books 11–22) looks at the origins, nature, and ends of the two cities: the heavenly city (Jerusalem) and the earthly city (Babylon).

The Augustinian State

Book 19 of *The City of God* is central to our understanding of Augustine's ideal state. Augustine underlines that the life of the wise man is social (19.5). The friendship of men can never be carefree, and human society will always be afflicted by misjudgments and anxieties. Even saints and faithful worshippers suffer from the temptations of demons. Yet, all men also wish for peace, which is a Supreme Good, and even in war, men are questing for peace (19.12). God teaches two precepts: love of God and love of neighbor, and this makes it right for a man to love God, himself, and his neighbor. The righteous man will achieve peace in observing two rules: first, to do no harm to anybody and, second, to help everyone where possible.

The logical consequence of this is that even those who give orders are the servants of those whom they appear to command (19.14). The first just men were set up as shepherds of flocks, rather than kings of men, although this pastoral role can be profoundly coercive. Augustine sees a legitimate role for punishment, even physical chastisement, provided that it springs from the right authority. Despite the commandment, Thou shalt not kill, Augustine is even prepared to sanction capital punishment, provided that it is either expressly ordered by divine communication or is required to maintain public order. Augustine's judge remains a "loving father" who should try to exercise mercy if appropriate, and capital punishment can prevent the judge's central aim of securing the criminal's repentance. Punishment is an act of love that aims to cure the criminal and restore public order. This coercive function of the Augustinian state even extends to legitimizing slavery because the first cause of slavery is sin, and it is allotted as a punishment to the slave according to God's judgment.

Members of the heavenly city are involved in an alienated but respectful relationship with the worldly authorities. The peace of the city derives from the domestic ordered harmony of those living together, so it is fitting for the father of the household to take his rules from the laws of the city and govern his household in such a way that it fits in with the peace of the city (19.16). The heavenly city leads a life of captivity within the earthly city, but its members should not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city because both the earthly and heavenly cities share a mortal condition, and so harmony must be preserved between them (19.17). (Book 5 adds that it does not matter under whose rule the Christian pilgrim of the City

of God actually lives, provided that he is not forced to perform impious and wicked acts [5.18]). Finally, it is irrelevant to the heavenly city what dress is worn or what manner of life is adopted by the faithful, provided they do not conflict with divine instructions.

In a life of action, what matters is not a place of honor or power in this life, but the task achieved by means of that power and honor in promoting the well-being of the common people (19.19). True wisdom directs its attention in all its dealings and decisions in this world toward the ultimate immortal state in which eternity and the perfection of peace will be assured (19.20).

Augustine rejects the Ciceronian idea of the state. Augustine argues that there never was a Roman commonwealth fitting Cicero's definition of the people as a multitude "united in association by a common sense of right and a community of interest" because justice can be found only where God rules an obedient city according to his grace, forbidding sacrifice to any being other than himself. An association of righteous men lives on the basis of active love, loving God as God ought to be loved, and loving his neighbor as himself. Where this justice does not exist, there is no people "united by a common sense of right and by a community of interest," but it would be wrong to follow the consequences of Cicero's definition and therefore deny the existence of a political Roman commonwealth in the absence of such justice (19.23). Instead, a better definition of a people is an "association of a multitude of rational beings united by a common agreement on the objects of their love." Thus, the Roman commonwealth was a commonwealth, even if devoid of true justice (19.24).

Augustine entirely rejected the realist idea that it is legitimate to exercise political power in the absence of justice, asking in "the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but organized brigandage?" (4.4). In this life, justice in each individual exists when God rules and man obeys, and reason governs the vices even when they rebel. This justice is related to the ultimate peace after the final judgment of God. In that ultimate peace, human nature will be healed, and there will be no perverted elements in conflict (19.27). Man and his rulers should strive to attain the final state of good and to escape the final state of evil, the everlasting wretchedness of those who do not belong to the City of God (19.28).

Christian Kingship

In Book 5 of *The City of God,* Augustine gives guidance as to the practical experience of governing. Augustine strongly rejects the Ciceronian position that a chief of state must be nourished by glory. Instead, the greed for glory should be overcome by the love of justice (5.14). Anyone who aims at power for domination is worse than the beasts in his cruelty. The righteous man loves even his enemies and wishes to reform them to be fellow citizens of the heavenly city. God alone has the power to grant kingdoms and to give power to individual men (5.21), and God decides in his just judgment how long wars will endure (5.22).

Christian rulers are happy if they: rule with justice; are not inflated with pride; put their power at the service of God; are slow to punish, but ready to pardon; punish wrongdoing to direct and protect the state rather than for personal animosity; grant pardon to encourage the wrongdoer's amendment; compensate for severe decisions with the gentleness of their mercy and the generosity of their benefits; restrain their self-indulgent appetites; act for the love of eternal blessedness and offer to God their humility, compassion, and prayers (5.24).

The Augustinian Legacy

Two key features of Augustine's political thought were crucial shaping factors in medieval political thought. The first was Augustine's insistence on the legitimacy of a just war. Second, Augustine provided guidance for the relationship between church and state and provided support for the development of a medieval political compromise that temporal rulers ruled with a divine authority that must be respected by ecclesiastical institutions and vice versa. More generally, Augustine provides a political philosophy that synthesizes biblical eschatological concerns with a classical preoccupation with the functioning of government. What is innovative is Augustine's ability to imagine a political world that is not dependent on unrealistic expectations of human reason or willpower.

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See also Augustinianism; Kingship

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AUGUSTINIANISM

A highly influential Christian writer of late antiquity, Augustine (354–430 CE) has been an inspirational figure for medieval, Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and conservative political thought. Political figures as diverse as Martin Luther in the fifteenth century and Hannah Arendt in the twentieth century have read Augustine closely and reused his conceptual vocabulary in their own work. Augustinian political theology has been particularly relevant to the discussion of: the role of human nature and sinfulness in political structures; the function of divine will and predestination in man's history; the relationship of church and state; the nature of justice and punishment; and the theory of just war. Different historical periods have emphasized different aspects of Augustine's thought. In medieval political thought, neo-Augustinian approaches developed, particularly in relation to the question of papal-secular authority. By contrast, Reformation and Counter-Reformation writers tended to look to Augustine for guidance on the role of divine grace in human affairs. In contemporary political philosophy, Augustine has had resonance for theorists who argue that a realist outlook on politics is desirable; for example, writers like Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau.

Identifying Augustinianism

The extent to which there has been a cohesive tradition of political Augustinianism has generated historical controversy. Some historians analyze the direct influence of Augustine's writings on other writers and their continuing use and development of Augustine's conceptual framework. Other commentators look at the extent to which independent forms of Augustinianism, sometimes based on misunderstandings of Augustine's actual thought, have developed.

Anselmist, Thomist, and Avicennist thought provided alternative theological models to Augustinianism and generated complex subvariants of medieval Augustinian thought. For example, the French historian Gilson identified two important variants of Augustinianism in the medieval period: Aristotelian Augustinianism represented by figures such as the Italian scholastic Bonaventure (1221–1274) and Avicennian Augustinianism represented by, among others, the English scholastic Grosseteste (1170–1253).

The Church Fathers

Augustine forms part of the patristic tradition of Christianity. Western Christianity gives special attention to the first eight centuries of Christian writings, which established the doctrine and practice of Christianity as a religion. Ambrose (c. 340–397 CE), Augustine, Jerome (c. 340/342–420), and Pope Gregory I (540–604) were all named as the great doctors of the Western church by a papal decree of 1298 in recognition of the benefit that the church had derived from their teachings. This status gave Augustine's writings special authority for later Christian writers.

Political Augustinianism

In the 1930s, the French writer H.-X. Arquillière connected political Augustinianism with the medieval erosion of the distinction between the state and the church in Christendom. Arquillière makes a clear distinction between Augustine and Augustinianism, arguing that later interpretations of Augustine do not necessarily coincide with the actual thought of Augustine, even where later writers have quoted directly from Augustine's major political work *The City of God* (413–427). Arquillière argued that medieval Augustinianism oversimplified Augustinian concepts, particularly with regard to the relations of church and state.

This form of political Augustinianism collapsed natural law into supernatural law and the law of the state into that of the church. Arquillière sees two Christian figures as being particularly implicated in this growth of medieval political Augustinianism: Gregory the Great (540–604) and Isidore of Seville (560–636).

Arquillière's argument that Augustinian thought provoked a movement toward papal theocratic government is strongly disputed by the modern theologian Henri de Lubac. De Lubac suggests that medieval thinkers, such as Giles of Rome (1247–1316), who ascribed absolute temporal power to the papacy in his work *On Ecclesiastical Power* (c. 1302), were influenced on this point by the Andalusian philosopher Averroes (1126–1198) rather than by Augustine. Instead, de Lubac suggests that Augustinians saw the church's power as merely spiritual and tutelary without direct authority over civil affairs. On either account, Augustinian thought was pertinent to the key issue of medieval political theory: the relationship between royal and priestly power.

Papal Theories of Government

Pope Gelasius I (492–496)

Pope Gelasius I ascribed distinctive functions to church and state, with the pope exercising a sacred priestly power while the emperor has temporal power. At the same time, the pope is under the temporal jurisdiction of the king, and the king's spiritual well-being is still the concern of the pope. Under this approach, neither party operates in an entirely autonomous sphere, establishing the potential for an ongoing battle over sovereignty and precedence.

Gregory the Great (c. 540–604)

In his *The Book of the Pastoral Rule* (c. 590), Gregory returns to the Augustinian theme of the contemplative life. Unlike Augustine's attempt to understand the general foundations of secular authority and the relationship between the active and contemplative life, Gregory aimed to guide specific ruling groups in their exercise of power. Crucially for the formation of a Christian empire, Gregory emphasized the tutelary role of the emperor in Constantinople as indispensable to Christendom's development. The emperor was charged with a supervisory role over the church, and Gregory aimed for an intimate union between the papal sovereign and the emperor. By encouraging the emperor to be more Christian, Gregory minimized the boundaries between the two forms of authority and suggested their possible alliance. Gregory promoted a culture of public wisdom, in which spiritual contemplation guides the exercise of all power and politics is a department of morality. In practice, Gregory used the threat of spiritual excommunication to control the exercise of political power by the emperor.

Isidore of Seville (c. 560–636)

Writing a century later in the context of a barbarian kingdom, Isidore of Seville continued to emphasize the harmonious operation of clerical and secular authority. Secular princes are subject to the religious discipline of the church, but in turn, they also have a pastoral obligation over the church. Allied with this is the same emphasis on ethical rulership and a belief that a culture of service should envelop the ruling elite. Princes should further peace, preach the faith, and legislate for righteous living.

Augustine's political framework provided Isidore with material for understanding the nature of power in a post-imperial context (476 CE had seen the deposition of the final Western Roman emperor). Isidore denied political universalism, arguing that the Roman Empire was not meant to outlive the coming of Christ and described the church operating instead with Christian kingdoms. Using an Augustinian and Roman law background, Isidore set out an influential theory of kingship. God predestined the king to serve as the head of a Christian body, which included the church. The king was God's minister, dispensing justice with complete authority over the health of the kingdom, including the supervision of clerical matters. Where priestly preaching failed to control heresy, the secular authorities had to reimpose orthodoxy via the terror of discipline.

Charlemagne (742–814)

Despite a limited availability of patristic texts, Augustine was much used during the Carolingian

Renaissance by theological writers such as Eriugena (c. 800–c. 877), Theodulf of Orléans (c. 750/60–821), and Alcuin (734–805). Via Alcuin's writings on princely virtues, *The City of God* was a possible influence on Charlemagne, and Augustinian thought may have structured his religious-political thinking about empire and the rebuilding of Christendom in the eighth century. Particular Augustinian beliefs that may have influenced Charlemagne were the idea that conquests are evil unless they can be justified by an improvement in the condition of the conquered and Augustine's description of a perfect emperor as one who used his power to advance God's glory.

Pope Gregory VII (c. 1020/1025–1085)

Hildebrand, who became pope in 1073 as Pope Gregory VII, reiterated Isidore of Seville's view of the pope as God's viceroy. The dispute between the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV (1050–1106) and Gregory VII centered over the relative authority of church and state. Gregory VII viewed Henry IV as failing in his reforms of ecclesiastical institutions. Henry IV maintained, in contrast, his right to choose his own bishops and to depose the papal choices for those bishoprics. The pope argued for ultimate authority over the emperor, arguing that he could both make and depose kings. In contrast, the emperor argued that the papacy's temporal authority derived from secular rulers. In his disputes with Emperor Henry IV, Gregory VII developed Augustine's metaphor of the two cities to explain the difference in origin and purpose of ecclesiastical institutions as opposed to secular ones. Because secular government is ordained by God as a remedy for man's inherent sinfulness, secular princes cannot be allowed to be the final judges in their own cases. The papacy is thus a divine provision to ensure that justice is truly universal. Even the Holy Roman Emperor is subject to justice and not to recognize this is sinful pride.

Gregory VII can also be credited with the juristic development of Augustinian political theology. Justice needed to be codified into detailed ecclesiastical law that would be recognized by all secular authorities. The *Papal Dictates* (1075 CE) issued by Gregory VII provided an axiomatic basis for papal supremacy and the authority of canon law.

Otto, Bishop of Freising (c. 1114–1158)

Otto, Bishop of Freising, in his *The Two Cities: A Chronicle of the Universal History to the Year 1146* (1143–1147), updates Augustine's account of the City of God and the earthly city to explain how they have been melded into medieval Christendom in the epoch after Augustine was writing. Otto argues that although Augustine strictly separated the two cities, they had now been joined into one city as the church. Although Otto presents his history as Augustinian, he is directly contradicting Augustine's theoretical principle that the two cities will continue separately in human history. Otto is overly literal in his understanding of the City of God—a hidden mystical city of believers that Augustine would never identify with an actual political entity. In Otto's description, the church is a manifestation of divine power, transcendent over any secular authority and an earthly form of the kingdom of God. Accordingly, the church had political sovereignty in both its sacerdotal and royal roles; by divine will, it would emerge triumphant in any battle with secular forces. Although, the church declines to exercise most of its social and political sovereignty because it is more appropriate for such functions to be exercised by royalty, Otto clearly moves beyond a merely pastoral role for the church in relation to the state.

Augustine and Medieval Legal Thought

Medieval Just-War Theory

Augustine defined a just war as one waged when a city or a people failed to punish the wrongs done by its members or to restore unjustly seized goods. This definition provided the basis for medieval just-war theory. Medieval theorists argued that war must be conducted by rulers or soldiers, not by private Christian individuals; it relied on Augustine's sense that the consequences of sin morally obliged the Christian ruler to take coercive measures. The basic Augustinian position on the just war resurfaces in Gratian's canon law and was later refined by the Thomistic doctrine of the just war.

With Charlemagne's idea of the holy war and Gregory VII's denial of penance to knights who failed to give up their arms, the medieval period sees a Christianization of warfare and a denial of

the legitimacy of warfare for purely secular aims. Saint Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) expressed this crusading theology in terms of a sword of coercion possessed by the pope but exercised on the pope's behalf by secular rulers.

The Development of a Crusading Ideology

The glory of warfare waged for God and the defense of the church legitimized the amalgamation of the warrior and the monk into the knight-monk. A further corruption of the Augustinian position on warfare helped to crystallize crusading political thought. Whereas Augustine had insisted on the unpredictability of God's Providence, Gregory VII insisted that a just war would ensure divine favor for the just party and therefore a guaranteed victory.

Gratian (Early to Mid-Twelfth Century)

Gratian's *Decretum* (1140) provided a definitive compilation of canon law and a foundation for the further development of canon law. Gratian takes a firmly Augustinian approach to warfare and thereby transferred Augustinian thought directly into medieval military jurisprudence. Like Augustine, Gratian emphasizes that wars waged to punish sin do not offend against the basic Christian precepts of pacifism and patience. Gratian relegates the obligation of patience to a Christian's internal disposition and declares military service not sinful. The commandment to love one's enemy is fulfilled in military action because chastisement of sin is a loving action. The aim of war is to reestablish peace and then to exercise mercy, all the while exercising military virtues. More specifically, a just war was waged either to repel an enemy attack or to recover lost goods and must meet the Augustinian requirement that there is an injury to avenge. Just war can be waged only following the edict of a legitimate authority—the defining of which was to exercise Gratian's canon law successors.

Augustine's influence on the subject matter of canon law is widespread. The legal historian J. Werckmeister has estimated that some 44% of the patristic texts used in the *Decretum* are attributable to Augustine. As well as his just-war theory, Augustine's view of property as a response to sinfulness influenced canon and civilian lawyers, as did his views on the nature of marriage.

William of Ockham

William of Ockham (1285–1347) developed a neo-Augustinian position on property rights. As a Franciscan, Ockham held to the ideal of poverty. In theoretical terms, Ockham viewed property as a consequence of man's fall: In the Garden of Eden, all shared in a natural right to property, whereas after the fall, God consented to the creation of positive legal rights over property.

Augustine and Ideas of Peace and Tolerance

Although often overshadowed by his theories of a just war, Augustine's contribution to medieval accounts of social peace and the *pax catholica* (catholic peace) is also significant. Augustine argues that earthly peace is a valuable, but incomplete precursor to the peace of the heavenly city. Christians live as pilgrims within secular society, but they still have an obligation to try to reflect the peace of the heavenly city in those societies. This neo-Platonic belief in cosmic and secular peace is then translated into the imperial and church institutional machinery, with medieval thinkers from Charlemagne to Gregory attempting to create an Augustinian *concordia* (state of harmony).

Thirteenth-Century Augustinianism

Medieval Schoolmen: The Basis for Scholastic Augustinianism

Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (1155) provided a comprehensive synthesis of Christian doctrine, which was to turn into a standard medieval educational book for theological students. Augustine's central place within that codification ensured his influence on medieval theological training even outside of the Augustinian Order. However, it is noteworthy that Lombard (c. 1100–1160) had no direct knowledge of *The City of God* and many of Augustine's sociopolitical positions were conveyed to medieval thinkers not by his central political work, but by Florus of Lyon's assembling of his commentary on the Pauline Epistles (c. 816–855).

Anti-Thomist Thought

Another historical model places Augustine as a rallying point for anti-Thomist thought in the thirteenth century. Theologians disquieted by the growing use of classical, non-Christian Aristotelian thought preferred to use Augustine as an alternative basis for Christian philosophizing.

Voluntarism

Augustinianism also had a role to play in the development of voluntarism in the thirteenth century, namely the idea that the will is the prominent cause of action. The leading scholastic, John Duns Scotus (c. 1226–1308), echoed Augustine's position on man's moral psychology, by arguing that the will does not necessarily choose the highest good, even where it has been identified by the intellect.

Fourteenth-Century Anti-Pelagian Thought

Historians of medieval and Reformation religious thought have identified the fourteenth century as a watershed in Augustinian thought and have contended over two questions in particular: first, the extent to which a distinctive Augustinian school developed within the Augustinian Order in the late medieval period and, second, the extent to which this *schola Augustiniana moderna* (modern Augustinian School) influenced later Reformation figures such as Luther and Calvin.

Concerned primarily with Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings, the fourteenth-century *schola Augustiniana moderna* aggressively asserted the place of grace in salvation and reasserted Catholic tradition. The neo-Augustinian Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1300–1349), author of *The Case of God Against Pelagius* (c. 1344) and a future archbishop of Canterbury, contended with the Pelagian position held by various Oxford scholars contemporary to him that the gift of grace could be earned through God's generosity. Although Bradwardine accepted that grace was a habit gifted by God and united to the will, he did not believe that grace and the will were cooperative causes of good acts. Nor was the created habit of grace particularly powerful; instead, an individual was reliant on God's own will in rising above temptation. The controversy had strong political ramifications, ones that would be crucial in the Reformation, because the Pelagian position emphasized the possibility of human action and achievement. Bradwardine's assertion that works could not achieve grace removed the underpinnings of a pragmatic Christian political theology. Wyclif (c. 1324–1384) developed Bradwardine's ideas and transmitted them to the English Reformation movement.

Bradwardine's Oxford position is echoed by the Paris-based Gregory of Rimini (c. 1300–1358). Using contemporary philosophical innovations such as nominalism (the belief that abstract universal terms have no independent existence but are merely names), Gregory took an anti-Pelagian position that emphasized man's fall and inherent sinfulness and the divine nature of justification. Like Bradwardine, Gregory emphasized the immediate influence of God to supplement the will.

Augustine and the Renaissance

Superficially, Augustinianism appears discordant with the central humanist preoccupations of the Renaissance and the later scientific methodology of the Enlightenment. Humanists emphasize man's creation in God's image, as opposed to Augustine, who views man's fall as the central determinative historical event. The search for scientific and individualistic modes of government may be impossible within an Augustinian worldview, which sees law and government as necessarily punitive and coercive. Nonetheless, Augustinian schools of thought continued to be influential into the early modern period. Within the context of the European religious wars of the sixteenth century, Augustinian views on salvation and predestination again became highly debated. The English historian Wright goes so far as to identify an "Augustinian obsession" spanning the mid-fifteenth to eighteenth centuries.

Editions of Augustine's Works

Resulting from an increase in the circulation of and interest in copied Augustinian texts in the fourteenth century, a dramatic revival of interest in the writings of the church fathers in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries enabled Augustinian thought to be foundational to both the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic

Counter-Reformation. Important new editions of Augustine's work helped to continue the influence of Augustinianism because a considerable number of confusing pseudo-Augustinian works had been in circulation during the medieval period. The printer Amerbach issued a comprehensive edition in 1506, followed by an edition from the great humanist thinker Erasmus in 1528. The circulation of such editions also transformed the nature of Augustinianism because it moved theologians and philosophers away from loose citations of Augustine's name to precise commentary on his actual works.

The Reformation and Augustinian Thought on Grace

Luther (1483–1546) and Calvin (1509–1564)

Augustine was accorded a preeminent position within the patristic tradition by the Reformation reformers Martin Luther and Andreas Karlstadt (1486–1541). Luther viewed the contemporary church as practicing Pelagianism and wished to return to the Augustinian message of God's salvation, thus echoing the themes of the *schola Augustiniana moderna*. Theories of justification (the act of God making a sinner righteous before himself) became intensely controversial at the Council of Trent (which attempted between 1545 and 1563 to address the concerns of reformers and prevent the splitting of the Western church). Key reformers wished to press the argument for salvation by grace alone, as opposed to the orthodox position of grace and works (a doctrinal position that also permitted the lucrative sale of indulgences for forgiveness of sins by the church). However, although he was motivated by a desire to return to the Augustinian model of Christian faith, Luther also developed his own versions of key doctrinal positions.

In this respect, Luther epitomizes the postscholastic approach to Augustine, which views the church fathers not as authoritative in their own right but as helpful guides to the interpretation of scripture. First, Luther described a political model of two kingdoms, which renders unnecessary the Augustinian church, and insisted, unlike Augustine, that because God values and forgives the sinner, his idea of righteousness does not coincide with human conceptions of righteousness. Second, although Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone fits well within an Augustinian framework, Luther developed his position to include the idea of forensic justification. Unlike Augustine, Luther did not accept that the process of divine justification became a part of the individual concerned. Thus, an individual would be *made* righteous in Augustine's eyes, whereas Luther would merely accept him as *pronounced* righteous.

Heiko Oberman argues that there is a specific link between the education of Luther and the Augustinian thought of Gregory of Rimini and that Luther stands as the culmination of the medieval Augustinian tradition. McGrath takes a contrary position, alluding to Luther's general interest in Augustinianism, but denying a specific intellectual influence on the development of his thought. McGrath takes the same approach to Calvin, denying a specific link between neo-Augustinianism and Calvin, but accepting the Augustinian features of Calvin's thought. As an example of neo-Augustinian traits in Calvin, McGrath points to Calvin's voluntarism. Christ does not achieve salvation for mankind by choosing to sacrifice himself; rather, it is God's choosing to accept that sacrifice that secures man's redemption.

The Catholic Counter-Reformation and Augustinianism

The Catholic Counter-Reformation shares a common motivation with the Protestant Reformation in its desire to return to a more contemplative, patristic faith. Augustine was thus as appealing to Counter-Reformation thinkers as he had been to Luther and Calvin. Augustine's personal history as an African bishop fighting heresy also made him appear especially pertinent to the reassertion of Catholic orthodoxy. Counter-Reformation writers fought the Protestant appropriation of Augustine by arguing that Protestantism had both misunderstood Augustine's own words and isolated him from the rest of the patristic tradition. Counter-Reformation writers such as Catharinus (1484–1554) used Augustine to reassert the primacy of the papacy.

Enlightenment Augustinianism

Augustine enjoyed a general reputation in the seventeenth century as an alternative to the pagan

philosophy of Aristotle. Augustine also had a surprising role in the development of Enlightenment skeptical thought. At the base of Cartesianism, there is arguably a redeployment of Augustinian metaphysics, and contemporary readers saw a clear affinity between the Augustinian principle of *Si fallor, sum* (If I am mistaken, I exist) and Descartes' principle of *Cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I exist).

Malebranche (1638–1715)

Nicolas Malebranche offered a synthesis of Augustinianism and Cartesian thought in which God remained the only causal agent, but, paradoxically, in which God is not responsible for the evil of individual agents. Following Augustine's position, Malebranche emphasized the role of grace and the internal freedom of man in moral decision making. God is responsible for inclining man to the Good; however, man's inner sensations may cause him to withdraw his consent to that inclination. In his *Traité de morale* (1684), Malebranche expresses an Augustinian moral theory involving the proper ordering of our love, which should be directed by the relations of perfection to be found in God's wisdom.

Augustinianism in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Conservative Thought

The Catholic reactionary use of Augustine continued into nineteenth-century Catholic conservative thought and American and European conservative thought more generally. Augustine's identification of a tension in man's psychology between a tendency to vice and a natural tendency to sociability accords with the core psychological tenets of traditionalist and conservative thought. Rather than the close use of Augustinian texts in the early modern period, generalized references to Augustine's pessimistic view of human nature became standard in the modern period.

Augustine is identified by conservatives as a helpful precursor to other explanations of social psychology and order as provided by Hobbes (1588–1679) and Freud (1856–1939). Augustinianism is seen to explain the extreme difficulty of maintaining order in light of a fundamental human potential for evil and to provide an alternative explanation for human sociability other than the Enlightenment belief in the development of spontaneous political order. Augustine's emphasis on the will rather than the intellect explains the irrational drives within a society and the need for coercive measures to maintain order.

Augustine's anti-Pelagianism is also employed once again in anti-utopian, anti-perfectionist and anti-utilitarian thought. Writing after the French Revolution, for example, de Maistre (1753–1821) uses Augustine as a justification for support of social hierarchy and political authority. In the *St Petersburg Dialogues* (1821), de Maistre alludes to Augustine's understanding of man's double nature and the split between passion and reason to bolster his emphasis on punishment and sacrifice. Augustinian thought underlines de Maistre's anti-utopian approach to politics because the attempt to create revolutionary "kingdoms of justice" ignores the consequences of man's inherently sinful nature.

Twentieth-Century Political Augustinianism

Niebuhr (1892–1971)

In twentieth-century political thought and international relations theory, Augustine has been an important influence on certain realist positions. The American theologian Niebuhr identified Augustine as the first great realist in Western history. Pointing to Augustine's placing of evil within human selfhood, Niebuhr praises Augustine for understanding the power and persistence of individual and collective egotism, and he values Augustine as a political thinker who does not rely on idealistic or naturalistic conceptions of human nature and reason. According to Niebuhr, Augustinian politics are an improvement both on the classical belief that the ideal state can be established with ease, once reason has conquered irrational desires, and on modern sentimental perfectionism that views love as a solution to political disorder. Instead, an Augustinian approach allows us to seek the establishment of peace and justice under the conditions set by inherent human sinfulness. For Niebuhr, Augustine perfectly explains the tensions and competitions of interest that beset the international community.

For Niebuhr, Augustinian realism is not nihilistic. In *Augustine's Political Realism* (1953, 1983), Niebuhr reminds his readership that no

formulas for justice will prevent conflict if the collective interest of each nation remains unmodified by loyalty to a higher value. A tentative Augustinian peace is achieved by the recognition of mutual responsibilities. Thus, Augustinian political realism does not engender a narrow and willful assertion of interests. Niebuhr instead argues that a nation that recognizes the value of international cooperation will in fact also protect its broader and long-term interests.

Morgenthau (1904–1980)

The connection between Christian realism and Augustine is continued in the international relations theory of Morgenthau. In *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics* (1946), Morgenthau underlines the need to base international relations on an understanding of human nature, which turns out to be Augustinian in character. As with Niebuhr, Morgenthau takes the Augustinian view that the human intellect is unable to completely control its desires and action.

Oakeshott (1901–1990)

Augustine also has a role to play in the political thought of those who write outside the constraints of modern political science and who want to critique aspects of modernity. For the British traditionalist political thinker Michael Oakeshott, Augustine provides an understanding of the meaningfulness of political conduct beyond the pursuit of particular ends and demonstrates the need for self-understanding at the base of political endeavor.

Arendt (1906–1975)

The German American political theorist Hannah Arendt, best known for her writings on totalitarianism and the nature of evil, wrote her doctoral dissertation on the concept of love in Augustine's work, and recent academic scholarship has identified the repeated use of Augustinian concepts in her later political writings. Arendt presents a non-theological Augustine. On Arendt's presentation, the Augustinian individual is forever involved in a searching questioning of personal identity in relation to God—a feature that propels people into an active search for new beginnings and thus allows political optimism. For Arendt, the Augustinian concept of *caritas* (love) results in an active engagement with one's neighbor that follows from the understanding gained by self-reflection.

Kristeva (1941–)

Another twentieth-century approach to Augustine applauds his understanding of aspects of political psychology, which are expressed in the concept of love. Postmodernist approaches highlight Augustinian themes of alienation and otherness. The Bulgarian-French structuralist philosopher Julia Kristeva, in her book *Strangers to Ourselves* (1994), argues that Augustine's two cities offer a psychological adventurous pilgrimage focused on estrangement and reunion. The political effect is to transform the problematic foreigner into a pilgrim supported by a community of mutual assistance. The neighbor that a pilgrim encounters is any Christian, regardless of political jurisdictions, and Augustinianism is thus likely to provoke conflict with centralized statehood.

Helen Banner

See also Augustine; Marsilius of Padua; William of Ockham; Wyclif, John

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AUTHORITY

Authority is a way of orienting people's behavior without persuasion or coercion. Instead, authority relies on the trust or recognition of others to obtain reliable obedience. While persuasive and coercive measures may be at the disposal of the authority figure, the need to resort to those measures indicates a lack of trust in the authority figure. An authority figure is someone whose status, expertise, or office should ensure obedience without having to explain or coerce.

While the Greek language and history lacked both the concept and practice of authority, nonetheless, it is with the Greeks that the concept first emerges. In *The Republic,* Plato sought to create a type of rule distinct from tyranny (which relied on coercion) and popular rule (which relied on persuasion). Popular rule's reliance on persuasion often slowed down the process of government. In addition, most of the populace could not distinguish philosophical truth from rhetoric, and people were thus easily and frequently duped into making poor decisions. On the other hand, the tyrant dominated the entire polis. He ruled arbitrarily and by violence, often more concerned with his own affairs than the public interest. This type of rule prevented men from taking part in the political affairs of their day, which was a key element of the Greek concept of freedom.

Thus, for Plato, authority was a type of rule in which men obeyed while retaining their freedom. Plato looked to the prepolitical sphere for inspiration and drew largely from the models of the expert and craftsman. These figures commanded confidence and obedience as a result of their expertise. Two insights relevant to authority were to be gained from these models: first, that expertise compelled people. The qualifications of experts often precluded both coercion and persuasion from those under their command. Second, such expertise created and justified a pronounced inequality between the expert and the layperson. An important characteristic is that the inequality existed prior to the issuance of commands and was internal to the relationship itself. Thus, it was by virtue of the expertise, and not the particular individual, that the expert deserved recognition and obedience.

Plato used the model of the expert to justify political rule by the philosopher-king. The philosopher-king derives his privileged status from his ability to contemplate the forms. Note here that it is the ideas that have authority—the philosopher is singled out because the rest of the population is unable to contemplate the ideas. For Plato, philosophic truth—transcendent, absolute, and separate from the everyday realities of human action—is the source of political authority. Able to contemplate the forms, the philosopher-king is then responsible for transforming these truths into laws.

While the concept of authority had its beginnings with Plato, ancient Rome was where the word and practice of authority emerged. The Latin word *auctoritas* derives from the verb *augere,* or to augment. For the Romans, the founding of Rome was considered sacred: Future generations were bound by it, and the end of Roman politics was to preserve it. Thus, the original founding was the source of authority. In their politics, the Romans sought constantly to augment their foundation, and those who were closest in time to the foundation, that is, the Senate elders, were vested with authority. For the Romans, *auctoritas* was in contrast to *potestas*. *Potestas,* or power, was vested in the people—who reached and executed decisions. *Auctoritas* was vested in the Senate, whose precepts were somewhere between advice and command. Significantly, those in authority in Rome did not possess power.

With the decline of the Roman Empire and the lack of a secular power equipped to assume its role, the Catholic Church filled the vacuum. Following the authority/power distinction, the church claimed authority over people, leaving power to princes and other worldly leaders. Nonetheless, the church gradually assumed vast

temporal and political power as well—mainly through its teachings on the afterlife. By promising eternal rewards and punishments, the church obtained vast political and moral influence over people, attaining a large degree of secular control. While the Christian notion of an afterlife did not overtly use coercion, it introduced the elements of fear and threat, and thus power, into the concept of authority.

The history of the concept of authority helps to explain why the modern form of the word contains within it several tensions and ambiguities. One tension is between epistemic authority, based on knowledge and expertise, and political authority. Max Weber articulates the most widely accepted definition of political authority, which equates authority with legitimate power. A tension emerges because the standards for epistemic authorities often conflict with the standards for political authorities. Thinkers disagree whether and to what extent political authorities require mastery or expertise over some form of knowledge—be it statecraft, morality, or the public interest. Some thinkers are unconcerned with the epistemic aspect of political authority and view political authority as exercising the duties of one's office in accordance with established rules.

This formulation of authority as legitimate power draws out another current tension within authority—namely, between facts and norms. This tension hinges on what constitutes legitimate power—namely, whether legitimate power requires a transcendent concept of the good or of public interest, or whether it can be based on people's approval of a political ruler. This tension generated two broad traditions of scholarship on authority. The first is more empirical, in which social scientists study authority as a capacity or faculty of gaining consent—namely, they research the conditions and reasons under which people obey. The second tradition, often called social contract theory, is more normative and researches the conditions necessary for political obligation—namely, when or why people are obligated to obey.

The contrast of authority to power and coercion highlights yet another tension, whether the source of authority comes from those who have it or from those subjected to it. In other words, to what extent does authority depend on the recognition of those subject to it? An asymmetry exists between those who have attained authority and those who have not, such that the authority figure is more deserving of trust and obedience than the layperson. Yet, authority also depends on the recognition of those below, as expressed in their obedience. Consequently, resorting to coercion and persuasion often denotes a failure of authority. The inability to secure obedience thus undermines one's status as an authority figure.

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See also Ancient Democracy; Plato; Power; Roman Commonwealth; Social Contract Theory; Tyranny

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Autonomy

The English word *autonomy* is a compound of the Greek word *autos* meaning "self" or "own," and *nomos,* meaning "law." Thus, in the original Greek, *autonomy* has the sense of (to give to) oneself one's laws, or perhaps, to make one's laws knowing that one is doing so. Contemporary usage of the word *autonomy* emerged in the eighteenth century, retaining a relation to the original Greek meaning but diverging in significant ways. Autonomy in contemporary usage is used synonymously with concepts such as freedom, liberty, and independence and is contrasted with concepts such as unfreedom, dependence, and heteronomy.

In contemporary moral philosophy, autonomy is important in at least three distinct ways. First, autonomy is often thought to be the basis of human dignity, the property or capacity of human beings that makes humans worthy of our concern and potential bearers of rights. Similarly, autonomy is thought to be the basis for assigning responsibility, duties, and obligations to persons as moral agents. Because individuals are autonomous, they are subjects bearing rights worthy of respect and subjects to whom duties and obligations may

be assigned. The moral subject in contemporary moral philosophy is nearly synonymous with the autonomous subjects. Finally, autonomy is considered a fundamental value, to be protected and cultivated by society.

Autonomy is also a central concept within contemporary political philosophy and is sometimes used more or less interchangeably with the concept of freedom. As such, autonomy is a basic value, sometimes the fundamental value, to be considered when organizing society. The various traditions within contemporary political theory can be understood, in part, as having different understandings of what autonomy consists in and how society might best be organized to protect and promote autonomy. Although autonomy is a central concept in both contemporary moral philosophy and political philosophy, the concept is the focus of ongoing debate and generates persistent criticism.

Greek Conception of Autonomy

There emerged in classical Greece (fifth century BCE), with the brief flourishing of democratic politics and the creation of philosophy, what has been called a project of collective and individual autonomy. An entire people, recognizing that society is governed and reproduced by historically contingent, ever changing, man-made laws *(nomos)* rather than extrasocial laws given by nature or god *(physis),* explicitly put into question existing institutions. What resulted was a self-conscious project of autonomy, the giving of one's own laws in light of an ongoing collective debate about the nature of the good and justice.

For the Greeks, this project of autonomy was essentially communal. A polis was said to be autonomous if it was governed by its own laws (nomos) arrived at by collective deliberation and participation, free from the imposition of external laws. It would not have occurred to the Greeks to think of isolated individuals as autonomous, as acting from self-given laws, as laws unto themselves. Man was seen as fundamentally political or social, standing in relation to other men from birth to death, incapable of fulfillment or significant freedom outside the polis. Individuals participated in autonomy as citizens of an autonomous community. This project of collective autonomy, however, entailed cultivation of individual autonomy. Collective autonomy required the socialization of citizens into the requisite capacities for deliberating on and making the laws (*nomos*) of the community. To a large extent, Greek politics, and theoretical reflection on politics, concerned itself with the education *(paidea)* and reproduction of citizens capable of participating in collective autonomy. Thus, the Greeks understood autonomy as historically contingent, as essentially communal, and as an ongoing project requiring the communal socialization of free men into the requisite capacities for participating in autonomy as citizens.

Modern/Contemporary Conception of Autonomy

The contemporary meaning of autonomy can be traced to historical developments and intellectual traditions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which culminated in the work of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Kant's work has remained the locus for contemporary discussions of autonomy. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, external events, including wars of exhaustion and pervasive strife, led to a questioning of traditional religious and hierarchical forms of social ordering and authority. As traditional forms of authority failed to contain conflict and maintain order, there emerged an identifiable morality of self-governance. This morality of self-governance was explicitly developed in opposition to moralities of obedience to external authority (both religious and secular). What gradually emerged was a twofold demand for wider participation in politics and religion, as well as a recognition of the competency of a broader range of individuals to take part in governing. This emergent morality of self-governance, developed by figures such as Thomas Reid, Jeremy Bentham, and Immanuel Kant, posited the equal capacity of men for self-governance and founded the dignity of man in that same capacity.

Kant's thought represents, in at least four senses, the culmination and radicalization of this emergent tradition of self-governance. First, Kant conceptualized autonomy as an innate capacity universally shared by all rational beings. This capacity was a fact of reason available to everyone on introspection. Second, Kant conceived of autonomy as acting from a self-given law conforming to

the law of practical reason (freedom). Third, Kant contrasted autonomous action with heteronomous action, or action determined by causes outside the individual will. Thus, autonomous or free action for Kant was radically contra-causal. Man as a biological being, subject to the laws of nature, or man as social being subject to social conventions, is heteronomously determined and thus unfree. Only by acting on the self-caused spontaneous laws of freedom, in accordance with reason, is man autonomous or free. Finally, Kant thought of autonomy as an innate capacity of individuals, which could ultimately be exercised irrespective of prevailing social, economic, or political conditions. Kant's conception still functions as the locus for most contemporary discussions of autonomy in both moral and political philosophy.

Autonomy and Contemporary Political Theory

The differences between the Greek and modern conceptions of autonomy should be apparent. Whereas the Greeks understood autonomy as a historically contingent achievement of particular communities giving themselves laws and socializing individuals capable of participating in communal autonomy as citizens, post-Kantian conceptions of autonomy emphasize the universal innate capacity of individuals to act freely, independent of social influences, by acting on self-given reasons or laws. Much of contemporary political theory can be understood in light of this shift from the classical Greek to modern conceptions of autonomy.

Once autonomy is thought of as a prepolitical innate capacity of individuals, a series of persistent dilemmas emerge. How can this innate prepolitical individual autonomy be reconciled with social organization and the social situatedness of individuals? Individuals find themselves related to others, enmeshed in modern political, legal, and economic relations that threaten to undermine individual autonomy. There appears to be an inherent antagonism between individual autonomy and social relations as such. It was Jean Jacques Rousseau who most clearly formulated this dilemma, and much of political theory since then has consisted of various attempts to resolve it.

Rival traditions in contemporary political theory can be understood in relation to this difference between Greek and modern conceptions of autonomy. Anarchist, libertarian, and liberal traditions of political thought accept the modern conception of autonomy as an innate prepolitical capacity of individuals and attempt to reconcile this autonomy with modern forms of social organization. The most common strategy, shared by all these traditions, is to resolve the dilemma by conceptualizing politics, law, economy, and society as the product of the autonomous choices of individuals. Thus, socially situated individuals retain their autonomy by being subject to social relations they themselves have willed in some sense. Within politics, individuals are subject to authorities they have elected. Likewise, laws that constrain individuals are thought of as positive law issuing from the will of elected representatives. Finally, economic relations and distributions are conceived of as the result of free choices made by individual consumers, suppliers, and workers. Thus, individual autonomy is reconciled with society by conceiving of all social relations as subject to, and emerging from, the autonomous choices of individuals. These traditions differ among, and often within, themselves as to whether existing forms of social order are compatible with individual autonomy and with respect to what an ideal form of social order compatible with individual autonomy would look like.

By contrast, other contemporary traditions, including republicanism, communitarianism, and Marxism reject the modern conception of presocial innate individual autonomy and retain a conception of autonomy much closer to the classical Greek view. For these traditions, autonomy is thought of primarily as a communal achievement. Whatever autonomy individuals have comes as a result of communal processes of socialization and is exercised within relations of social dependency. For these traditions, the idea of an antagonism between individual autonomy and community in need of reconciliation is nonsensical.

For those traditions that accept the modern conception of autonomy, political philosophy becomes an exercise in reconciling individual autonomy with social life. For those traditions that retain the Greek conception of autonomy, the central task of political theory becomes that of understanding the means of generating, maintaining, and reproducing historically contingent communal autonomy and

socializing individuals capable of participating in communal autonomy as engaged citizens.

Critics of Modern Autonomy

The concept of autonomy, especially the modern conception, has remained the focus of much debate and criticism in contemporary political theory. Critics have suggested that the modern conception of autonomy is incoherent or even ideological. Some have gone so far as to claim the "death" of the autonomous subject. While proponents of modern individual autonomy have addressed the hard philosophical dilemma of reconciling individual autonomy with forms of modern social organization, the counterfactual nature of their presuppositions remains a constant source of criticism. The presupposition of a prepolitical, innate, universal capacity of individuals to act autonomously strikes critics as a falsification of basic facts of the human condition. A cursory glance at empirical reality suggests individuals are born radically dependent and socially situated, attaining autonomy only later, if at all. Furthermore, the capacity of individuals to become autonomous seems radically dependent on the contingent historical circumstance and societies into which they are born. As an empirical matter, if individual autonomy is even possible, it would seem to be a precarious achievement or project of a limited number of individuals in a limited number of historical societies.

Critics of modern conceptions of individual autonomy argue that the counterfactual presupposition of innate autonomy occludes or covers over essential questions and areas of inquiry that political theory ought to address. A political theory that assumes the innate autonomy of individuals is unlikely to inquire into the social and historical conditions under which radically dependent and socially situated beings might come to be autonomous. A theory that assumes the innate autonomy of individuals will likely overlook processes of subject formation, and the subtle forms of domination and functioning of power that are part of such processes. In short, if we begin with a counterfactual assumption of individual autonomy, theoretical reflection on the project and processes of generating, maintaining, and reproducing autonomy is neglected.

We can, however, imagine an empirically informed political theory which, like its classical Greek predecessor, rejects the counterfactual presupposition of innate individual autonomy. We might retain a notion of socially situated, historically contingent, achieved *agency,* either communal or individual, all the while rejecting counterfactual presuppositions of innate autonomy. Political theory could then take up the task of thinking through the conditions of possibility, maintenance, and reproduction of such agency. Such a political theory need not reject entirely insights generated by adherents to modern conceptions of individual autonomy. We can rather combine the ancient Greek focus on processes and projects of autonomy creation with modern philosophical insights as to how such achieved autonomy might be reconciled with conditions of modern political, economic, and legal forms of organization. The Greek conception of autonomy shifts our focus to the project(s) of creating autonomy while the modern conception provides philosophical resources for viewing that achieved autonomy as compatible with modern forms of social organization.

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See also Agency; Anarchism; Ancient Democracy; Communitarianism; Democracy; General Will; Kant, Immanuel; Libertarianism; Liberty; Marxism; Neo-Kantianism; Participatory Democracy; Radical Democracy; Representative Democracy; Republicanism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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Averroism

Historiographically speaking, the notion of Averroism is notoriously elusive. By Averroism one can mean at least three different things: a current of radical Aristotelianism that exercised a considerable influence over the scholastic philosophy of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance, especially in Paris and at some universities in northern Italy (Padua, Pavia, and Bologna); a hermeneutical approach meant to reconcile theological views and religious beliefs with the kind of rational investigation carried on by philosophers (an approach that, not without some straining, came to be known in the Latin West as the "doctrine of double truth"); and, finally, in the period spanning from the late Middle Ages to the Enlightenment, a general skeptical attitude toward revelation and established religion that could range from a dissembled expression of unorthodox beliefs to plain atheism.

Abū al-Walīd Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd, latinized into Averroes, was born in Córdoba in 1126 CE to a family of jurists. Among other disciplines, he studied law and jurisprudence. In 1182, after having served as a judge in Seville (1169) and Córdoba (1171), he was appointed chief physician of Caliph Abū Ya'qūb of the Almohad dynasty (reigned, 1163–1184 CE). Starting from 1169, on request of his patron, Averroes embarked on the project of producing a systematic commentary on Aristotle's works. In 1195, during the caliphate of Abū Yūsuf, son of Abū Ya'qūb, due to an outbreak of intolerance toward philosophy instigated by the religious orthodoxy, Averroes lost the caliph's favor and was exiled to Lucena, outside Córdoba. He was rehabilitated two years later, shortly before dying in Marrakesh in 1198.

Averroes' theorizations in political philosophy can be better understood when they are set against the cultural and political context of the Almohad rulers, who tried to reconcile their enlightened patronage of philosophy and science with a respectful consideration of religion, in both its theological and popular forms. Averroes can be seen as a typical representative of this intellectual milieu, in that he went to great lengths both to vindicate the precarious but irreplaceable role of human reason and to mediate between religious and political laws.

In *The Decisive Treatise,* he defended the role of philosophical analysis as a legitimate tool to interpret the Qur'an. This point was also stressed in *The Incoherence of the Incoherence* (known as *Destructio destructionum* in Latin), which Averroes wrote to refute the arguments leveled against philosophy by the theologian and jurist al-Ghazāli (1058–1111). In *The Incoherence of the Incoherence,* Averroes argued that the sacred texts could be understood on two levels, one accessible to the uneducated masses, the other suitable to scholars and philosophers.

The thesis that in the western Latin world came to be known as the doctrine of double truth was in fact a sophisticated hermeneutical technique to settle conflicts between philosophical truths and religious beliefs. Far from dismissing pious readings of the sacred texts and religious ceremonies as naive and superstitious, Averroes held the view that figurative interpretations and knowledge through imagination were integral components of human experience. Thus, he managed to maintain a unitary view of truth while acknowledging the existence of different ways of accessing the one truth.

Distancing himself from the most radical theological positions, Averroes regarded man as a natural being placed in a universe characterized by varying levels of causal determinism. Within such a network of influences created by multiple kinds of efficient causes, Averroes thought that it was nonetheless possible for man to rely on a certain degree of free will. In his *Commentary on Plato's Republic,* he reinterpreted Plato's political views so that they can be adapted to the reality of the Almohad caliphs. As in Plato's ideal state, Averroes recommended that the rulers should become virtuous philosophers aiming at good government. He enumerated five principal qualities required for this end: wisdom, legal expertise, rhetorical skills, imagination, and physical strength to wage wars against enemies. He rejected democracy and tyranny as types of unjust governments, both forms being based on a distorted relationship between the ruling class and the ruled masses.

In line with an overall Aristotelian framework, Averroes assigned political theory to the domain of practical philosophy. Like medicine, on which he

also wrote important works, the science of political affairs was based on a body of theoretical knowledge (which for Averroes was to be found in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*) meant to discipline human conduct. From Plato, Averroes adopted the analogy between a well-administered state and a healthy and sound soul. From Aristotle, he took the notion of human beings as political animals, naturally inclined to form societies to fulfill their basic needs and create the best conditions for the attainment of happiness.

After Averroes' death, his philosophy, or at least certain components in his variegated intellectual production, exercised a remarkable influence on the Latin West. Jewish philosophers began to translate Averroes' work into Hebrew early in the thirteenth century. From the point of view of political philosophy, one of the most important results of Jewish Averroism was the translation of Averroes' commentary on Plato's *Republic* into Hebrew by Samuel ben Judah in the early fourteenth century, which was then translated into Latin by Elia del Medigo in 1491 and by Jacob Mantinus in 1539. Around 1220, Michael Scotus translated some of Averroes' works and the influence of his philosophical views is manifest in a number of works by Albert the Great and Roger Bacon.

In thirteenth-century Paris and fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Padua, the form of radical Aristotelianism that came to be known as Latin Averroism was associated with three particular theses: the already mentioned theory of double truth (meant as an argumentative device to legitimize philosophical investigations in situations of theological supremacy), the doctrine of the one intellect (according to which the intellect transcends man's cognitive power and is one and eternal for all human beings), and the view of man's happiness as a condition of mental perfection (i.e., the thesis that human happiness can be based only on the attainment of higher degrees of knowledge).

Averroism was perceived as one of the most formidable forms of rationalism during the Middle Ages and the early modern period, based as it was on the view that only humankind as a whole (the intellect is the same for all human beings) could reach ontological and ethical perfection (i.e., happiness of the mind) in a domain guarded from the excesses of theological fundamentalism (the truth of rational investigation being opposed to the truth of religious dogmatism, and yet rhetorically reconcilable with it).

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See also Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr; Aristotelianism; Islamic Political Philosophy; Plato; Renan, Ernest; Scholasticism

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B

Barbarians

In ethnic groups, perception of their own identity is often accompanied by delimiting themselves from an external world that is perceived as totally different. This may imply the suggestion that this external world is uniform just due to its otherness. In the ancient Greek case, all those foreigners were called *barbarians*. The term was first applied in a neutral sense; it was only later that it displayed a sense of cultural superiority from the speakers' point of view and could be used to denounce the alleged enemies of the civilized world. Especially with this connotation, the category has survived in later epochs.

The colonization movement from the eighth to the sixth century BCE, which led to the foundation of Greek settlements along the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Black seas, fostered a sense of cultural unity among Greeks. The experience of encounters with a non-Greek world led to a consciousness of community with respect to descent, language, religion, and customs. Language, however, was the only decisive criterion to differentiate Greeks from non-Greeks. All who did not speak Greek were considered barbarians, but that label did not originally entail a pejorative sense.

The fifth century BCE Persian-Greek confrontation changed decisively the Greek perception of other cultures. On the one hand, (allegedly) empirical knowledge about various Asian peoples was vastly increased; on the other hand, their final victory induced the Greeks to develop a sense of superiority.

This can especially be seen in the work of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, which was completed during the last third of the fifth century BCE. Large parts of Herodotus' work consist of ethnographical digressions on those people with whom the Persians came into conflict and contact in the course of their expansion, from Egypt to Scythia and India. Herodotus concentrates on religious and cultural customs and on the material conditions of life. At the outskirts of the known world, tribes are reported as practicing unrestricted promiscuity, incest, cannibalism, and human sacrifice, eating grass and roots or only raw meat and fish. (Since the fourth century BCE, such "data" have been used to construct stages of a progressive "process of civilization" by which the brutish state of primitive man would be overcome.)

Herodotus' ethnographic discourses were part of a work on the Greco-Persian wars. This work should, as Herodotus says in his preface, preserve the memory of the great deeds of both Greeks and barbarians. But it also reflected the lessons the Greeks drew from their great victories over the Persians in 490 and 480/79 BCE. With growing distance, Herodotus' discourses were more and more understood as proving the superiority of a free society over a despotic system. Herodotus had no doubt that lack of personal freedom had made the Persian warriors unfit for military success. Later authors embellished this to produce a picture of an effeminate society characterized by harem intrigues, luxury, promiscuity, and incest. (Thus, in

some aspects, decadent Persians and most primitive peoples were understood to be all alike.)

Attic tragedy of the later fifth century contributed to emphasizing the dichotomy of Greek freedom and Persian despotism. A generalized image of the barbarian replaced differentiated perceptions of Persians, Thracians, Scythians, Egyptians, and so on. The political implications of the Greek–barbarian dichotomy were developed into an idea, first aired by Euripides, that barbarians who behaved like slaves should rightly be dominated by the Greeks. Aristotle later attributed a slavish character to the Asian peoples, drawing on the climate theory of Hippocrates' medicine: Thus, in the first book of his *Politics,* he identified the barbarians with "slaves by nature."

In the fourth century BCE, the Greek–barbarian contrast continued to be used by those who urged a campaign of vengeance and conquest against the Persian Empire. The Macedonians (until then regarded by most Greeks as semi-barbarians) became champions of the Panhellenic case. When Alexander the Great had conquered the Persian Empire, he tried to consolidate his rule by drawing traditions and (to a certain degree) indigenous élites; the demand that the Greeks should enslave the Asian barbarians became obsolete.

However, the conquests of Alexander and later those of the Romans could also be understood as a sort of civilization mission with respect to peoples living on the fringes of the known world: Nomadic tribes were forced to settle down; barbarian practices like cannibalism and human sacrifice were suppressed.

Relations between Romans and Greeks were at first marked by the fact that the Greeks considered the Romans barbarians. After Rome had taken control of the Greek world, during the second century BCE, the Roman elite undertook astonishing efforts to acquaint themselves with Greek culture. This acculturation generated an awareness of a new cultural unity in the time of the Roman Empire. Because the Empire was under pressure from Germanic tribes, from the Parthians and later the Sassanids in Iran, and from the Huns, the world outside the empire came to be understood as a place of barbarians to which the ensemble of stereotypes was applied. Barbarians, per se cruel and untrustworthy, were considered enemies of civilization—they could be fought legitimately without restraint concerning the conduct of war. Barbarous practices would also be ascribed to the enemy within, from political conspirators to the early Christians.

The asymmetrical structure of the concept of barbarians made it possible to apply it to so-called primitives, pagans, and Muslims in later times. Motifs from antiquity survived in European ethnographic literature on the New World in the Americas and on Asia alike and could be used to legitimize European colonialism as a civilizing mission. In addition, from the early modern period until the nineteenth century at least, Asia (be it the Ottoman Empire, Persia, India, or China) became associated with despotism, where the subjects enjoyed neither personal liberty nor private property. By declaring the climatic and ecological conditions decisive, the presumed stagnation of Asia over the centuries also seemed to be accounted for.

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See also Community; Slavery in Greek and Early Christian Thought

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Basic Structure

In political theory, basic structure consists of those social, economic, and political institutions that fundamentally affect a person's opportunities over a lifetime. The concept plays an important role in John Rawls's theory of justice, and consequently in the work of his critics and defenders, but it can also be used more broadly to define and demarcate the political and to distinguish the public from the private.

The success of a person's life depends on a number of factors, such as the social class into which the person is born, natural ability, and

good or bad fortune. How society is organized has a direct impact on social class because the state can redistribute wealth and other goods, but political structures can also affect the extent to which the exploitation of natural ability has distributive consequences. For Rawls, the basic structure is the main concern—or *primary subject*—of justice. As examples of institutions within the basic structure, he gives the legal protection of freedom of thought and conscience, competitive markets, private property, and the monogamous family.

Rawls distinguishes between the justice *of* the basic structure and justice *within* the basic structure. Take as an example the family. Such things as the number of books in the family home, the quality of conversation between parents and children, the range of leisure activities, and even diet will affect the intellectual development of children. In choosing principles of justice, society can allow these factors to determine the distribution of educational achievement, and, by extension, income and other goods, or attempt to nullify them through distributing extra educational resources to children disadvantaged by their upbringing. It is assumed that educational opportunity is an appropriate good for distribution, and to this extent, the family is an institution within the basic structure of society.

The justice *of* the family must, however, be distinguished from justice *within* the family. Household labor and child-rearing responsibilities, as well as income, are distributed within families as well as between families. Furthermore, the dynamics of family relations are different from wider social relations, for although families can be dysfunctional, at their best, they are held together by ties of affection rather than mutual advantage or civic duty. This difference is significant in at least two ways: It may not be possible to redistribute affection in the same manner as income or freedom is redistributed, and even if it were possible, it would not be desirable to attempt a redistribution. The basic-structure argument works to limit the scope of state intervention for the purposes of redistributing resources. A theory of just distribution is a moral theory, but morality extends beyond politics.

The concept of the basic structure can be criticized as drawing the scope of politics too narrowly or too widely. For a classical liberal thinker such as Friedrich Hayek, the economy is a spontaneous order brought into existence and maintained by the unintentional actions of agents, whereas justice is an individual virtue, such that only intentional actions can be deemed just or unjust. Furthermore, justice consists in the maintenance of a system of rules, chief among which are private property rights. The basic-structure argument makes society rather than the individual the primary moral agent.

For some egalitarian thinkers, the basic-structure argument works against addressing gender and global inequalities. The basic structure determines what is politically valuable—for Rawls, these are the socially primary goods—things like rights, income, and self-respect. Excluded from the list is equality as a substantive value. Although Rawls argues that justice consists in giving priority to the worst-off, meaning the worst-off must be as well-off as possible in terms of their primary goods, the worst-off class may have a very gendered character, especially if the household rather than the individual is taken to be the primary recipient of income.

One way to address this is to include gender equality as a primary good; instead of income going to households, it should go to (adult) individuals in the form of a "citizen's income," which all adults receive regardless of whether or not they are employed. To avoid the citizen's income acting as a disincentive to work, individuals might receive it only if they are carrying out socially useful labor, such as child-rearing. But perhaps the most significant consequence of such a scheme would be to erode the boundary between the public and the private, with the state determining intrafamilial income distributions. This brings out an important function of the basic structure—its role in fulfilling the traditional liberal desire to protect the private sphere from politics, but at the same time acknowledging the post-Marxian concern with the role that economic structures play in determining a person's life chances.

Besides extending the basic structure downward to the household, egalitarians also seek to extend it outward to the global sphere. Rawls restricts cross-national obligations to the establishment and maintenance of the conditions for a well-ordered

society. His global principles of justice are much less egalitarian than his domestic principles. The basic structure is significant in that one argument for an asymmetrical treatment of the domestic and global spheres is that society is a scheme of social cooperation. Individuals have obligations to fellow citizens because within a *national* economy, contra Hayek, a person's actions do affect others. Although there may be other—and better—arguments for an egalitarian theory of global justice, the basic-structure concept may be employed to show that the economy is not national but global, and so generates significant moral obligations across national boundaries.

Paul Graham

See also Class; Feminism; Gender; Global Justice; Hayek, Friedrich von; Justice, Theories of; Liberalism; Marx, Karl; Property; Rawls, John

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Beccaria, Cesare (1738–1794)

The Milanese aristocrat Cesare Beccaria wrote one of the most celebrated works of Enlightenment-era political and legal theory, *On Crimes and Punishments*. While this pamphlet-sized book stands as his only lasting intellectual contribution, it was both an especially clear distillation of many important eighteenth-century ideas and an important influence on other philosophers and legal reformers. It is in many ways a quintessentially Enlightenment work: devoted to freedom and education, oriented toward social reform and improvement, and concerned with the welfare and rights of equal persons rather than with custom or religion.

Published in Italian in 1764 and rapidly translated into French and English, *On Crimes and Punishments* was praised by Voltaire, widely relied on by the American founders, and later came to be seen as a founding text of utilitarianism. It evaluated systems of criminal law according to whether they succeeded or failed in providing "the greatest happiness shared among the greatest number," an idea and phrase Jeremy Bentham would later adapt into a master principle of social theory. Enlightened reforming absolute monarchs including Catherine the Great of Russia and Frederick II of Prussia were likewise attracted to Beccaria's rationalistic and modernizing approach.

As for the existing systems of criminal law, he found them sorely wanting. In criminal law, the book advocates equality rather than the contemporary aristocratic privilege, legal transparency and consistency, procedural protections for defendants, and the abolition of torture and capital punishment. Beccaria maintained that the only justification for punishment was the deterrence and prevention of harm to others (as against, for example, theories emphasizing either moral improvement through suffering or the deserved retribution for wrongdoing). If punishment is worthless in its own right, undesirable suffering that is engaged in only to prevent suffering on the part of others, then it follows that punishments should be the least that is compatible with deterrence and proportional to the crime's injury to others. Beccaria further insisted that mild punishments reliably inflicted would provide surer deterrence than the sporadic and gruesome punishments characteristic of the era.

Although the criminal law was Beccaria's primary object of attention, he maintained that it could not be viewed in isolation. It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them, he thought, as it is better for no one to suffer than for both victim and offender to suffer. And the prevention of crimes requires social melioration of various sorts: enlightenment and education, but also the alleviation of poverty.

Beccaria's greatest enduring fame in philosophy has perhaps come from Bentham's references to him and from his anticipation of many utilitarian ideas, but the differences between them are important. Beccaria remained committed to doctrines of social contract and natural rights as the foundations for human equality and liberty; he was a consequentialist about institutions and policies,

but not a consequentialist all the way down in Bentham's fashion.

Jacob T. Levy

See also Bentham, Jeremy; Enlightenment; Voltaire

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Becoming

The attention to becoming in contemporary political theory owes much to Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche's efforts to displace the traditional philosophical concept of being and replace it with a world in constant flux, in which all forms of identity are more or less temporary fixations within an ongoing process of change. Nietzsche's theories of the will to power, of eternal recurrence, and of humanity as a bridge toward an *overhuman* may all be understood in this light. Gilles Deleuze provides one of the most explicit affirmations of an ontology of becoming when he writes in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* that "there is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity." Other influential thinkers affected by Nietzsche's philosophy of becoming include Foucault, Derrida, William E. Connolly and Judith Butler.

In a reading of Kant's *What Is Enlightenment?* Foucault presented his genealogical studies as embodying a critical *ethos* toward the limits of the present. The aim was to identify limits to present ways of thinking, acting, and speaking to find ways of going beyond them. Underlying this critical attitude toward the present is a social ontology similar to the one Nietzsche proposed in the *Genealogy of Morals,* when he suggested that social identities and institutions are like texts in that they are subjected to constant interpretation and reinterpretation as they are overtaken and transformed by different powers.

Derrida's concepts of différance, iterability, and "the trace" also express a conception of a social, political, and moral world in perpetual becoming. Iterability implies the repetition of something already established and the possibility of variation of what is repeated. The repetition of a mark or trace in a new context implies new possibilities for interpretation and therefore the possibility of transformation, proliferation, and dissemination alongside that of conservation. This dimension of iterability enables Judith Butler, in *Bodies that Matter,* to see the performativity of gender as a condition of possible transformation as well as conservation. Derrida often describes the political task of deconstruction as little more than destabilizing fixed identities to open up the present to becoming. For example, in *Psyche: Invention of the Other,* he suggests that to allow for the coming of the other, "one does not make the other come, one lets it come by preparing for its arrival."

In *What Is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Felix Guattari define becoming in a way that closely resembles Derrida's concept of iteration, namely as "the action by which something or someone continues to become other (while continuing to be what it is)." In their view, individuals or groups succeed in becoming other in this lateral sense only to the extent that they accede to a realm or dimension of things in which movement is possible. This implies the need for another, vertical movement of becoming, which they define as the movement by which things and events escape what they are and attain a dimension of pure eventness or absolute deterritorialization. In *A Thousand Plateaus,* they describe a series of quite specific ways in which individuals or groups are able to become other. These are minoritarian becomings or forms of "becoming minor," where minority refers not to subsystems within a given majority but to processes of becoming minor or minoritarian in relation to a norm that defines the majority. In these terms, to become minor is to embark on a process of deterritorialization or divergence from a given norm that defines a certain kind of person or institutional identity. Insofar as the subject of rights, duties, and moral obligations within modern

European forms of society and political community is human, adult, masculine, and white, then becoming animal, becoming child, becoming woman, and becoming colored are potential paths of deterritorialization of the majority. For example, anthropology, myth, and folktales provide many examples of the human propensity for becoming animal. These are not a matter of literally becoming the animal in question (becoming wolf, horse, rat, or whatever) but rather of enhancing the powers one has or acquiring new powers by entering into a proximity to the animal. They are ways of forming a transindividual assemblage with the real or imagined powers of the animal in question.

The important political questions concern the conditions under which minoritarian becoming can occur and the effect on majoritarian identities. What kinds of minoritarian becoming are capable of breaking with the ways in which human becoming is fixed and codified in a given society? How might particular instances of becoming animal, becoming woman, or becoming native contribute to the reterritorialization of individual capacities and the social field in which these are recognized and protected by law?

William Connolly defines the "politics of becoming" as the paradoxical politics by means of which new cultural identities are formed as a result of reaction or resistance to the perception of injury on the part of particular social groups. This occurs when those marked as negative in an existing social arrangement strive to reconfigure their identity and their position. The process is paradoxical because the outcome and even the final characterization of the injuries are rarely understood at the outset. These become clearly defined only in retrospect, once a new configuration of socially recognized identities is in place. In this sense, he suggests that "Indians, slaves, feminists, Jews, laborers, homosexuals, and secularists, among others, have participated in the politics of becoming in the past few centuries in Euro-American societies."

Connolly argues that procedural theories of justice are ill equipped to deal with the politics of becoming because this involves struggle over the nature and content of injustices and, as such, is prior to the distribution of fair shares of social primary goods, which might ameliorate injustice. While procedural principles and associated virtues such as reasonableness and a sense of justice are important, the politics of becoming requires something further, namely, an ethos of responsiveness and critical engagement with the new forms of resistance that inevitably arise. For Connolly as for the philosophies of becoming mentioned above, the underlying assumption is that there is no final social and political vocabulary because the social field remains in flux and "there is always another round in the politics of becoming."

Paul Patton

See also Difference Theories; Foucault, Michel; Immanence; Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm; Radical Democracy

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Behavioralism

Behavioralism was an intellectual movement that sought to make American political science more systematic and scientific. It began in the early 1950s as the movement of an insurgent minority wielding its vision of a transformed discipline as a manifesto for change. By the mid-1960s, the movement had won wide recognition and influence, as shown in the election of behavioralists David Truman, Gabriel Almond, Robert Dahl,

and David Easton as presidents of the American Political Science Association. The movement's success helped, in turn, to crystallize critics, largely centered in the subfield of political theory, who turned the vision of a transformed discipline against behavioralism, depicting themselves as an embattled resistance holding out against a purportedly hegemonic wave of scientism.

In surveying behavioralism, it helps to distinguish: (a) the topics the movement focused on, (b) the kind of theory it advocated, and (c) the techniques it promoted. With regard to topics, many behavioralists researched pressure groups, public opinion, or other phenomena reaching outside of formal government. In doing so, they furthered an intellectual trend as old as the American political science discipline, and which, by the 1940s, was already discussed in terms of the study of "political behavior." There was, as such, nothing revolutionary in the continuing extension of the scope and prestige of research on political behavior topics during the 1950s and 1960s.

What made behavioralism transformative was, instead, the new departures in theory and techniques that its participants promoted. They believed that systematic sciences are driven by a cumulative interplay between theory and empirical research. By transforming both the kind of theory found in political science and the techniques used in gathering and analyzing empirical data, behavioralism aspired to establish a dynamic interplay between innovations in theory and empirical research, which would, they hoped, advance political science along a self-directed path of scientific progress.

Behavioralism's theoretical agenda reimagined what theory should be. It conceived of theory instrumentally as a scientific tool to integrate empirical findings and to direct attention to empirical questions that needed to be addressed to allow, in turn, further theoretical refinement. While behavioralists provided sketchy accounts of criteria by which to judge the instrumental payoff of their empirical theories, they were clearer about what they did not consider relevant. They had little sympathy for such once important criteria as a theory's relation to past ideas or to everyday concepts and practices, and they hence embraced novelty and abstraction in theoretical vocabularies. Behavioralists also broke with the reformist pragmatism formerly widespread in political science by excluding the relationship of a theory to normatively favored beliefs and outcomes from assessments of its scientific merit.

Behavioralism was very effective in spreading its instrumental conception of theory and the vision of scientific progress with which that conception was interwoven. In broad outline, this conception and vision prevail across much of American political science to the current day. The impact of behavioralism in this regard has, however, been obscured by the fact that, at the level of specific theoretical frameworks, its high initial hopes gave way to disappointment and even disintegration. While the movement successfully propagated a conception of what theory should be, the actual candidates it offered to play that role—such as functionalism and systems theory—had only a fleeting window of popularity in the discipline.

Behavioral Techniques

If behavioralism's theoretical agenda had a mixed legacy, its push to change techniques for collecting and analyzing empirical information was, by contrast, a resounding success. In the domain of techniques, behavioralism looked admiringly to other social sciences. While most political scientists had previously favored a low-key empiricism with no preference for, or even outright hostility to, quantification and statistics, interwar psychology and sociology had housed vibrant neopositivist currents that pioneered and applied new techniques. In light of this contrast, behavioralism exhorted political scientists to critically examine and improve their own methods, with improvement meaning, whenever possible, taking up techniques that produce quantitative data and analyze it statistically.

The new techniques promoted by behavioralists were of two main types: survey research based on samples of individuals and secondary analyses of aggregate data culled from census, election, and other records created by governments and other organizations. First developed by sociologists and psychologists, survey research was brought into the mainstream of the study of American politics during the 1950s, and in the 1960s, it was extended into the study of comparative politics. Survey research made up, however, only about half of the behavioral era's surge of work using quantitative and statistical techniques. Analyses of aggregate

data accompanied surveys as the second major strand of behavioralism's technical thrust, and these were especially significant in the study of comparative politics and international relations. Multiple projects—including the polity and the correlates of war data sets (founded by Ted Gurr, University of Maryland, and J. David Singer, University of Michigan, respectively)—were begun in the early 1960s to make aggregate data of wide cross-national, temporal, and topical range easily available in a standard format. Ever since, the steadily expanding variety and reach of aggregate-level data sets, together with the individual-level data sets created by surveys and advances in statistical tools and computer technology, have provided political scientists with ever increasing opportunities to conduct quantitative analyses with an ease, speed, and complexity that would have astounded their predecessors.

In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing two points about behavioralism's transformation of techniques. First, the surge of quantitative work gave way to stabilization during the 1970s. Subsequent decades have seen a ratcheting up in the technical complexity of quantitative work, but the proportion of the American discipline doing such work has not increased. Second, the tide of quantitative work stabilized at different levels in different subfields. Although the behavioral revolution pushed qualitative work to the periphery in studies of American politics, it retains major roles in studies of comparative politics and international relations, and nary a number ever appears among scholars devoted to historical and normative, as opposed to empirical or positive, political theory.

Robert Adcock

See also Dahl, Robert; Empirical Theory; Functionalism; Systems Theory

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Bentham, Jeremy (1748–1832)

In an autobiographical letter, written toward the end of his long life, Jeremy Bentham describes a dream in which he sees himself as the founder and leader of a sect named the utilitarians. This dream was indeed prophetic, for while he was not the first to use the concept of utility—indeed, he acknowledged David Hume, Cesare Beccaria, Claude-Adrien Helvétius, and Joseph Priestley as sources of his own utilitarian ideas—he can, with no distortion, be seen as the first of a distinctive tradition in moral and political theory that continues to have advocates and apostles to this day. Many scholars deny that Hume was a utilitarian, but no serious scholar would deny that Bentham was the first in a tradition of thinkers that includes John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick, as well as contemporary philosophers such as J. J. C. Smart, R. M. Hare, R. B. Brandt, and Peter Singer. Utilitarianism has an important prehistory, but the subsequent development of utilitarianism as a distinct moral theory is the history of Bentham's legacy. Yet, Bentham was not only what contemporary moral philosophers would call a utilitarian, he was also a founder of legal positivism and analytical jurisprudence, or the idea that an account of the source and nature of law can be given independently of moral values and judgments. Utilitarianism does not entail legal positivism; indeed, most contemporary legal positivists are not utilitarians, and many are moral skeptics. Nevertheless, Bentham thought that both theories were intimately, although not necessarily, connected. Bentham's positivism is the source of another legacy that has transformed jurisprudence (or the philosophy of law) in the twentieth century.

To found one sect would be sufficient for most philosophers, but to found two is a rare achievement, indeed. This was no small achievement for the shy child prodigy and subsequently reclusive scholar, who in later years cultivated the persona

of the "hermit of Queen's Square Place," named after his address in central London.

Early Life and Education

Bentham was born on February 15, 1748, the son of Jeremiah Bentham, an attorney and small property owner. Soon realizing that young Jeremy was something of a prodigy, his father began to harbor ambitions for his son. Hoping that he would enter the legal profession and rise to wealth and power as lord chancellor of England, the father began an early educational regime for Jeremy that rivals that imposed on the young John Stuart Mill a generation later. At the age of three, young Jeremy began the study of Latin; consequently, he never really enjoyed a normal childhood and grew up in the absence of the company of other children. Instead, he was inducted into the company of adults and sought solace in books. What little childhood he had was brought to an end when in 1755, at the age of seven, he was sent up to Westminster School. This was as much a potential career move as an educational decision, as Jeremiah hoped that young Jeremy would make connections that would be profitable in later life. He did not make any profitable connections, but he did manage to shine intellectually, as well as, through no real effort, achieve the dubious distinction of being the smallest boy in the school. At the age of 12, he went up to Queen's College at Oxford University. The Oxford of Bentham's day was as much devoted to the high living of undergraduates and the preparation of some for ministry in the Church of England as it was to the pursuit of knowledge. Given Bentham's young age, he was cut off from the social round. Instead, he devoted himself to an existence of attending lectures, studying, and taking solitary country walks. Perhaps the most significant incident of his time at Oxford was the requirement to submit to the Thirty Nine Articles of the Church of England to qualify for a degree. Bentham took the oath seriously, but he was deeply troubled by what he was being required to assent to. He made the required submission, but it was an act that haunted him for the rest of his life and colored his attitude toward both religion in general and the Church of England in particular.

In 1763, Bentham was admitted to Lincoln's Inn to begin study for a legal career at the Bar. He was called to the Bar in 1769 but by that time had already begun to immerse himself in the writers of the European Enlightenment, such as Voltaire, Beccaria, and most especially Helvétius, as well as study of the natural sciences. Much to his father's disappointment, Bentham showed no inclination to accept cases as a practicing barrister. Instead, he chose to pursue a less well-remunerated career as a student of legislation, regarding the scientific study of legislation as his peculiar genius. Throughout the 1770s, he was engaged in the systematic analysis and critique of existing theories of legislation, including a critique of the massive four-volume *Commentaries on the Laws of England* by Sir William Blackstone, the dominant jurist of his day. Bentham continued his studies of Enlightenment thinkers such as Helvétius and Beccaria. This combination of English legal theory and European philosophy was to provide the context from which Bentham developed his own system of ideas. These were first set out systematically in three works that remained central to Bentham's philosophy of law and morality: *A Fragment on Government (A Fragment), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (An Introduction),* and *Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence (Of the Limits)*. The first of these works, published anonymously, brought Bentham some public notice (at least until his authorship was revealed—the author's identity was revealed by Bentham's father, who hoped that Jeremy might capitalize on its success; instead, his action had the opposite effect of diminishing interest in the book). The latter works were either a delayed publication or else, as in the case of *Of the Limits* (previously published as *Of Laws in General*), not properly published until the twentieth century. The text of *An Introduction* was separated from the larger manuscript and published in 1789 at the urging of Bentham's friends, following the publication and success of William Paley's theological utilitarian work, *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*.

One positive consequence of the circumstances surrounding the publication of *A Fragment* was that Bentham was drawn to the attention of the Earl of Shelburne, who had been secretary of state in the 1760s and was to become prime minister for a brief period in the 1780s. His real value to Bentham was that he introduced him to the political, social, and intellectual world that gathered

under his patronage, either at Bowood House in Wiltshire or at Lansdowne House in London. Bentham continued his studies under Shelburne's patronage but in the end failed to gain a hoped-for seat in Parliament, which would have allowed Bentham to advocate some of his ideas in the principal legislative forum of England.

The Foundations of Bentham's System

Bentham wrote about many subjects, as evidenced by his massive corpus of unpublished works and papers, now housed in University College, London. His ideas also developed significantly, if subtly, through his long and productive life. That said, three basic elements to his system remain constant and underpin his many practical plans and reform projects: psychological hedonism, utilitarianism, and legal positivism.

Psychological Hedonism

An Introduction contains both an account of human psychology and motivation and a theory of value and moral obligation. Bentham analyzes human motivation in terms of two natural sensations: pleasure and pain. All actions are ultimately explainable in terms of the pleasure they give rise to or the pains they avoid. Pleasure is a single psychological sensation, as indeed is pain, but we tend to speak of pleasures and of pains as if they are of different kinds. Although J. S. Mill, a philosopher living after Bentham, distinguishes between qualitatively distinct pleasures, Bentham denies this. Insofar as we can speak of different pleasure and pains, as Bentham does, the distinctions are in terms of the sources of pleasure rather than in distinct sensations. This idea led Bentham to say, in so many words, that a "pushpin is as good as poetry." The important point is that Bentham denies that there is anything significant about the activities themselves that makes one more or less superior to the other. A claim that people prefer Beethoven to folk tunes is merely an empirical claim about what gives more or less pleasure.

Given that pleasure is a single sensation, we can make quantitative judgments about it, according to Bentham. An important part of the opening section of *An Introduction* is concerned with the dimensions of pleasure for purposes of comparison. Bentham identifies intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, and propinquity or remoteness as dimensions that can be given a numerical value and then be incorporated into a "felicific calculus." The ability to quantify pleasures for purposes of comparison was, according to Bentham, an important tool for the rational legislator and formed part of his aspiration to reform the existing English legal system and transform the haphazard practice of legislation into a modern social science.

This reductionist naturalism was one of the primary grounds of criticism of Bentham's hedonistic psychology among nineteenth-century critics such as Thomas Carlyle or John Ruskin. The charge that Bentham's reductionist analysis makes all men no better than pigs, of course, misses the point. As Bentham was aware from his own experience, which was hardly devoted to slavish sensuality, many people find considerable pleasure in mental cultivation, music, philosophy and public service. Nevertheless, Bentham came to realize that his initial vision of a calculus of pleasures was problematic. Many later thinkers have pointed out the impossibility of making interpersonal comparisons of sensations or psychological states. Bentham was certainly troubled by this problem and sought alternative metrics for his hedonist psychology. In this way, his psychological theory resembles the attempts of economists to use ideas such as "willingness to pay" to provide precise measures of subjective valuations.

Bentham's felicific calculus is often meant as little more than metaphor, as his actual concern was less with making interpersonal comparisons of pleasures than with measuring the appropriate quantity of pain necessary to deter actions. This latter task was, for Bentham, central to the rational science of legislation and to the theory of punishment and sanctions that was central to his account of law and morality. The task of the legislator was to use the appropriate measure of punishment sufficient to deter actions of the proscribed kind and no more. This task was much less problematic than the task of comparing pleasures because in regard to pain, human nature was much more constant and predictable. Aversions and responses to pain were also considered far more visible and therefore had an educative effect on the wider community. This was crucially important for Bentham as the point of punishment could only be deterrence of

further reoffending or additional crime by third parties. There was no point in punishment for any other reason: One cannot intervene in and alter the motivations of past agents. Traditional theories of punishment would also claim that punishment involved just sanctioning of morally bad acts. However, this raised the question of what is the basis of morality and whether moral goods should be promoted or merely honored and respected as in retributive theories of punishment.

Utilitarianism

Bentham's answer to the question of the source of value and our attitude to the good was developed in his second appeal to the concepts of pleasure and pain as the ultimate sources of our judgments about right and wrong. Bentham does not make the simple elision of rightness with what we are most attracted to on psychological grounds; the relationship between his psychological and moral hedonism is more complex. He uses the concept of pleasure and pain as the ultimate bases of our moral judgments on the grounds that these must derive from some publicly accessible natural property; otherwise, all of our moral judgments would become groundless and hopelessly subjective. Bentham claimed that all judgments of good or bad were reducible to statements about quantities of pleasure or pain. The greater the quantity of pleasure an action elicited in observers, agents, and beneficiaries, the more we tend to judge the action good. The reverse is the case with quantities of pain. Hence, we judge pleasure good and pain bad. That said, Bentham's utilitarianism was not simply a theory of judgment but was also an account of obligation or duty. (The term *utilitarianism* was adopted only later in Bentham's career and drew on the idea of utility, which he identified with pleasure rather than usefulness or eudaimonistic happiness). Just as his account of motivation is monistic, so is his account of obligation in the sense that he claims that we should always do that which promotes the most good and avoid that which causes the most harm. Actions are right (and therefore should be done) insofar as they bring about the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" and wrong insofar as they do the reverse. This is the basis for the greatest happiness principle, which is the most widely accepted statement of Bentham's basic moral norm and the classic statement of utilitarianism as an ethical doctrine.

Subsequent utilitarian theorists have identified problems with this unqualified direct approach to utility maximization and have replaced it with rule utilitarianism or indirect utilitarianism whereby the right action is that which is conformable to the rule or system of rules, adherence to which is maximally beneficial. Only in this way can utilitarians make sense of crucial moral notions such as justice and rights. Bentham was a famous "rights skeptic" in morals, claiming that the language of rights was "terrorist language" and "nonsense upon stilts." His rejection of fundamental rights was partly based on his fear of the legacy of the French Revolution. However, he places great emphasis on the role of rights within municipal legal systems, and given the centrality of legislation to his utilitarianism, he prefigures many of the concerns of subsequent rule and indirect utilitarians in the twentieth century.

One of the central problems of act utilitarianism, which he does address, is the liberation of individual utility calculations as being the basis of action. Most individuals are rarely in a position to make complex and nuanced utility calculations; therefore, Bentham claims that they should tend toward obedience to existing laws and rules. In case this might seem to entail a conservative conformism more appropriate to the likes of Edmund Burke, Bentham argues in his *A Fragment* that individuals should "obey punctually; censure freely." This motto of the good citizen also underlies his distinction between legal obligations and the dictates of utility, which is at the heart of Bentham's legal positivism.

Legal Positivism

Although Bentham's reputation is largely based on his utilitarian ethical theory, he considered his work on law of greatest importance. He began the study of law as a young man and continued to devote himself to issues of fundamental jurisprudence to the very end of his life. The range of his jurisprudential writings and law reform projects is considerable, but in all of these, there remains one constant, represented by the figure of Sir William Blackstone, Vinerian professor of English law at Oxford. Blackstone was the author of a

comprehensive study of the English common law, which Bentham considered a haphazard combination of common law judgments and precedents, moral and political prejudices, and loosely interpreted concepts such as social contract derived from the English tradition of political philosophy. Subsequent lawyers have tended to marvel at Blackstone's scope and ambition, but Bentham found almost every sentence worth extended critical commentary. Many of his early writings, such as *A Comment on the Commentaries,* do indeed take this form.

The crucial point of objection was the conflation of moral and political judgment and social prejudice that made up the common law and was exemplified in its adjudicative practice of legislation through precedent or *stare decisis*. Precedents are always *ex post facto* judgments of what the law is and what our rights and obligations are. As such, it cannot form a stable basis of expectations, Bentham thought. Instead, he saw the primary task of the scientific student of law as one of providing an analysis of the notion of a law to distinguish it from other kinds of rules or other social exercises of power. This analytical task was both prior to, and logically distinct from, the moral or critical task of deciding what laws there ought to be. Thus, Bentham distinguishes two fundamental tasks in jurisprudence and legal reform: that of the expositor, who determines the nature and identity of a law, and that of the censor, who decides on the maximally beneficial system of law. A utilitarian science of legislation requires both but needs to keep both tasks distinct at the level of analysis and of political practice, for a law does not cease to be obligatory simply because it is not maximally beneficial.

The analysis of law proceeded by identifying a law as an imperative deriving from a sovereign will backed by sanctions or punishments. Consequently, the nature of sovereignty is an essential part of Bentham's theory of law and is developed in his short work, *A Fragment on Government* (1776). Yet, any apparent similarities with Hobbes are misleading; Bentham saw sovereignty residing in a habit of obedience among a people to recognize a source of law. He is thus an early defender of a "social fact" theory of law. He also recognized that whether sovereignty needed to be unitary and deposited in one person was an empirical question and not a logical one. A further important point about Bentham's work is that although he retains an imperatival view of law as a sovereign act of will commanding obedience, he included within his account of will not just commands and duties but also permissions, liberties, and powers. Subsequent positivist theorists such as H. L. A. Hart have found his attempt to reconcile these ideas within his theory problematic, but they acknowledge that Bentham's unpublished philosophical jurisprudence remained by far the most sophisticated positivist theory until the twentieth century and much superior to Bentham's well known nineteenth-century follower John Austin. Using this positivist analysis of law and his utilitarian criterion of reform, Bentham set about the critical reform of all the informal sources of social and political coercion in the British state, from the legal system and government to the Church of England.

Political Economy and Panopticism

With the basic ideas of his ethics and jurisprudence worked out, and following his failure to secure a political office that would allow him to put them into practice, Bentham spent the next two decades of his life taking his work in a new direction. Bentham's brother, Samuel, nine years his junior, had, on Jeremy's advice, been apprenticed to a shipwright and had subsequently cultivated a career as a naval architect and administrator. After failing to secure employment in the naval dockyards, he had gone to Russia to manage the factories on the estate of Prince Potemkin, a favorite of Catherine II. Samuel invited his brother to Russia with the prospect of interesting Catherine in legislative reform. In 1785, the shy and retiring scholar made the six-month journey across Europe. In the end, this journey proved to be the limit of Bentham's adventurousness, for when he had the opportunity to meet and present his ideas to Catherine, he declined and retreated to his study. The opportunity would not arise again.

Bentham's ultimate failure of nerve was not to render his three-year adventure worthless. During this period Bentham worked on political economy and wrote and published *Defense of Usury* (1787), in which he applies ideas of laissez-faire derived from Adam Smith to the deregulation of lending at interest. Bentham's interest in political

economy was always focused more on the application of economic ideas to public policy and legislation—what he considered the art of political economy—than on the science of political economy, that is, grand theory; in the latter, he appears to have deferred to Smith on most essentials. That said, Bentham's commitment to the art of political economy in policy making made his economic thought much less doctrinaire than the emerging classical political economy of David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus, and John Ramsay McCullough. It did, however, mean that he had much less direct impact on the development of mainstream economics in the nineteenth century, despite the impact that he was to have on the development of public-choice economic approaches to politics in the twentieth century.

While in Krichev with his brother, Sam, Bentham also developed the inspection principle, which was to be central to a host of social and political reform projects over the next 20 years of his life and which was to transform his approach to politics and democracy. The most famous application of the inspection principle was to be found on Bentham's plan for a Panopticon Prison.

The Panopticon Prison was the application of the inspection principle to the architecture, organization, and administration of prison reform. In place of the haphazard and barbaric treatment of criminals common in Bentham's day, he offered the idea of a model prison that would reform and rehabilitate the inmates while being self-financing. Central to this project was the architectural structure of the prison, which was designed around a central inspection house from which the warden could observe all the inmates without himself being observed. The point of this strategy was to assist in the reform and rehabilitation of the prisoner by discouraging the cultivation of criminality while in the company of the other inmates, but it also meant that the effects of observation could be achieved without the inmate actually being observed at any particular moment.

The architectural principle of inspection was almost infinitely adaptable as it could be used not only in penitentiaries but also in factories (for which it was originally developed) and poorhouses (The National Charity Company), which became an important arena for Bentham's ideas of social and political reform. He also applied the idea to the design of a henhouse, a fact that is often used to discredit the inspection principle as inhumane. Among these later commentators was Michel Foucault, who uses the panopticon to represent the darker manipulative side of the Enlightenment. Yet, the architectural principle was not the only aspect of Bentham's inspection principle. The ideas of inspection, accountability, and economy, which were all part of the rationale of his plans for prison reform, were to inspire a revolution in thinking about public administration and bureaucracy, even if his thinking is not quite responsible for a revolution in government in the nineteenth century.

Although the development of the panopticon and related projects was to occupy nearly 20 years of Bentham's life, the biggest part of that commitment was taken up with his efforts to see a panopticon built. After an initial show of support from William Pitt and the passage of an act of Parliament in 1794 with the express purpose of purchasing land for the building of a panopticon, Bentham began to run up against more powerful interests, who wished to frustrate the public interest in favor of their own private interest and property. Significant land-owning families such as the Grosvenors and Spencers did not wish to see their own plans for the development of property in London compromised by the building of a prison. They were ultimately successful in frustrating Bentham (and Parliament), and after much struggle, he conceded defeat in 1803. His frustration and subsequent return to the study of the reform of legal procedure, evidence, and codification of law show a change of direction back to more familiar territory, but Bentham had learned one important lesson that was to shape his attitude to government and political power for the rest of his life.

Radicalism, Reform, and Representative Democracy

Throughout his early writings, Bentham regarded government as a vehicle for reform, without paying close attention to the role of government and the political interests that shape its actions as potential obstacles to achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The interests of office-holders, competitors for political power, and landed and money interests, as well as the interests of professions such as lawyers, however, were

potential obstacles to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In the writings of the last few decades of Bentham's life, he became increasingly occupied with both the theoretical justification and the practical politics of holding government to account. The theoretical concerns with governmental accountability are manifested most strongly in the *Constitutional Code* and other related writings of the 1820s. Here Bentham is concerned with the analysis, organization, separation, and accountability of government functions and functionaries. He also develops a defense of representative democracy as a way of holding government accountable and bringing about a convergence between the interest of the governors and the interest of the governed. His plans for parliamentary reform and his defense of representative democracy were among the most radical of all the radical views. His primary interest in democracy was as a mechanism for holding power to account and for checking the elites or "sinister interests" that exercised power over the "subject many." To achieve this, he wished to extend the franchise as widely as possible, with only a minimal educational qualification. He saw no good reason for denying women the franchise (unlike James Mill), but was persuaded that the public advocacy of female suffrage would undermine any chance of reform. Alongside this defense of representative democracy, Bentham also elevated the idea of enlightened public opinion as the only ultimate guarantee of good government, and in this, he indicates a sympathy for a more democratic and perhaps even republican social ethos than his institutional reforms suggest at first glance.

Political and legal theory was always Bentham's primary vehicle for engagement with practical politics. However, from 1809 when he formed a close working relationship with James Mill, Bentham became a confirmed public advocate of parliamentary reform and the intellectual figurehead of a group known as the Philosophic Radicals.

The Legislator of the World

Bentham's reputation grew through his advocacy of parliamentary reform and representative democracy, and as a result, he became one of the exemplars of the "spirit of the age," who inspired a rising generation of reform-minded intellectuals such as John Stuart Mill, James Mill's son. Yet, Bentham's reputation had also been growing internationally throughout the early part of the nineteenth century following the publication of versions of Bentham's ideas by his Genevan disciple and editor, Etienne Dumont. It was largely through these redactions of Bentham's ideas that he was known to the wider world; indeed, John Stuart Mill was converted to Bentham's utilitarian philosophy through Dumont's *Traité de Législation.* Throughout the early nineteenth century, Bentham was seen as an advocate and supporter of constitutional and political reform in the Iberian peninsula, in Spanish America, and in the struggle for Greek independence. Bentham conducted an extensive correspondence with most of the major political figures in these struggles as he offered his proposed constitutional and legislative expertise, should it be required. He was largely unsuccessful in obtaining commissions, but his advocacy and ideas remained important and inspiring to progressive causes throughout the world. The Guatemalan José del Valle's description of Bentham as the "Legislator of the World" is only partly an exaggeration of his importance.

Bentham was paid for his Panopticon Prison scheme, even though it was never built, leaving him financially secure. This fact enabled Bentham to settle into the stable and secure lifestyle that made him "the hermit of Queen's Square Place." It would be a mistake to take that description too literally, given Bentham's extensive correspondence and participation in the movement for radical political reform. Bentham cultivated the friendship of many important intellectual and political figures, such as David Ricardo and Lord Brougham, and hosted numerous foreign visitors; nevertheless, his daily round continued to be dominated by his writings until the end of his life. Bentham was served by a series of secretaries and assistants, the last of whom, John Bowring, was responsible for a posthumous edition of Bentham's works. Bowring's influence was not always benign, and Bentham's friendships often suffered. Yet, Bentham was not wholly free from blame either. In many respects, he remained a child, and while often incredibly generous, he could often be obsessively self-centered and insensitive. His childish nature is no better illustrated than in his love of domestic ritual and his habit of naming walking

sticks, teapots, and other household artifacts, as well as his beloved cats.

It is also illustrated in a more macabre way by his plan for the auto-icon, which was eventually carried out. His body was dissected for science, and his mummified head was mounted on his skeleton, dressed in his normal outfit of clothes; this was to be exhibited, both to inspire future generations and, more important, to break the religious and social taboos surrounding the posthumous use of the human body. Bentham had glass eyes made for insertion in his mummified skull and carried these around in his pocket to show to guests. Bentham's auto-icon can still be seen in the South Cloister of University College, London.

Bentham died at the age of 84 in 1832 on the eve of the Great Reform Act. This was far less radical than Bentham would have preferred, but the intellectual and political climate that made even this modest reform possible was in no small part due to Bentham's influence.

Paul Kelly

See also Empiricism; Enlightenment; Positivism; Science of Politics

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Berlin, Isaiah (1909–1997)

Isaiah Berlin is best known for his defense of negative liberty and critique of positive liberty. His analysis of nationalism has also been influential, and his concept of *value pluralism* is increasingly discussed by contemporary theorists. In addition, he made significant contributions in the history of ideas—especially to the study of nineteenth-century Russian thinkers, of Counter-Enlightenment writers such as Giambattista Vico and Johann Gottfried Herder, and of the nature of historical explanation.

Berlin was born in Riga, in what is now Latvia. His family were middle-class Russian Jews, his father a successful timber merchant. After moving to Petrograd, the Berlins experienced at first hand the revolutions of 1917, eventually leaving Russia and settling in England in 1921. Berlin studied philosophy at Oxford, where he remained for most of his life, apart from service during World War II as a British official in New York and Washington, DC. A brief posting to the Soviet Union in 1945 brought him into contact with dissident writers and sharpened his sense of the harm done by Soviet totalitarianism.

In the 1950s, he gained a reputation as a leading liberal commentator on the intellectual roots of the developing Cold War. In 1957, he was knighted and appointed Chichele professor of social and political theory at Oxford, a post he held until 1967. His inaugural lecture in 1958, "Two Concepts of Liberty," remains his most influential piece and is one of the most frequently cited works of twentieth-century political theory.

Berlin's approach to political theory is highly distinctive: not the conventional analytical technique of constructing arguments and counterarguments, but a historical and personalized style that traces ideas to the work of key thinkers whose character is shown to be as important as their logic. Berlin likes to step into the mental world of the thinker he is examining and to reconstruct that world for readers to make their own judgment.

Using this method, Berlin takes as his dominant concern the intellectual origins of twentieth-century totalitarianism. He finds those origins at a series of levels in the history of Western ideas. The first is what he calls "the betrayal of freedom," the idea not of a simple rejection of liberty but of a systematic distortion of what freedom truly is. According to Berlin, the fundamental sense of liberty is negative: the absence of coercive interference. He contrasts this with positive liberty, the freedom of self-mastery, where a person is ruled not by arbitrary desires but by the true or authentic

self. Both negative and positive ideas represent genuine and important aspects of liberty, but the positive idea leaves open the possibility that a person's authentic wishes may be identified with the commands of some external authority—for example, the state or a political party. Freedom can then be defined as obedience and in effect twisted into its opposite. Berlin associates this kind of thinking with writers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Karl Marx, whom he regards as inaugurating modern totalitarian thought. Contrary to widespread misunderstanding, he does not reject the positive idea outright, but he does regard negative liberty as the safer option politically.

At another level, Berlin traces totalitarianism to the battle between the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, each of which he portrays as leaving an ambiguous legacy. He defends the liberal Enlightenment values of reason, personal liberty, and toleration. But he also sees certain strains of Enlightenment thought as taking the claims of reason and science to utopian extremes, playing a significant part in the genesis of the totalitarianism of the left, which is Berlin's principal target. Soviet communism can be traced back through Marx, he believes, to the hyperoptimistic scientism of well-meaning eighteenth-century philosophers like Claude Adrien Helvétius, Paul Henry d'Holbach, and the marquis de Condorcet.

The heritage of the Counter-Enlightenment is no less complex. On the one hand, it clearly contributed to the genesis of right-wing totalitarianism, especially through its romantic strain. Romanticism, opposing Enlightenment universality and reason with a stress on uniqueness (both individual and collective) and emotion, helped to engender modern nationalism and the irrationalism with which it combined in twentieth-century fascism. On the other hand, romanticism and nationalism express the desire for cultural belonging that is, Berlin insists, an essential component of human nature—in this respect, he draws on his own background in the Jewish diaspora. Moreover, he sees Counter-Enlightenment thinkers like Vico, Herder, and J. G. Hamann as rightly emphasizing the cultural and historical aspects of social explanation against the impersonal scientism he associates with the Enlightenment and as anticipating the idea of value pluralism.

At its deepest level, Berlin's thought addresses the opposition between monist and pluralist conceptions of morality. The scientistic, utopian side of the Enlightenment is really a modern instance of the "perennial philosophy" of the Western mind: moral monism, according to which all moral questions must have a single correct answer that can be expressed in a single formula. The political implication of monism is utopian. The true moral formula, once known, will make possible a perfect society in which there will be universal agreement on a single way of life. For Berlin, such a view is dangerous. To suppose that moral and political perfection is possible is to invite attempts to realize it at any cost to real people and their actual wishes.

Furthermore, Berlin argues, moral monism belies human experience. We are frequently faced with choices among competing goods, choices to which no clear answers are forthcoming from simple formulas. The truer and safer view of the deep nature of morality is value pluralism (not Berlin's own term but one now widely used). There are many human values; we can know objectively what these are, and some of them are universal—such as liberty and equality. But values are sometimes incommensurable with one another: They are so distinct that each has its own character and force, untranslatable into the terms of any other. When values come into conflict, the choices between them will be difficult—in the sense that in choosing one good, we necessarily forgo another and also in the sense that we will not be able to resolve the problem by applying a simple rule that reduces the rival goods to units of a common denominator (e.g., utility) or that makes them serve a single super-good (e.g. Marx's liberation of the proletariat).

The key political lesson Berlin draws from pluralism is that utopian forms of politics are not merely hard to implement but conceptually incoherent because gains in one respect must always bring costs in another, and not harmless dreams but dangerous delusions. The political system that fits best with pluralism, according to Berlin, is liberalism. The inescapability of choice in human experience, he maintains, implies an argument for freedom of choice. Also, the anti-utopian aspect of pluralism suggests a case for liberalism as a realistic, humane form of politics that seeks

to contain and manage conflict rather than to transcend it.

Berlin has many critics. Much ink has been spilled, for example, attacking his analysis of freedom, including objections that his two concepts are really one (either positive or negative or something else), that his negative conception is too narrow (e.g., disregarding poverty as a constraint on freedom), and that he is too dismissive of positive liberty. On the whole, his account has stood up well to these assaults, which often rest on misunderstandings of his position, and it remains a widely accepted starting point for talk about freedom.

The deeper problem in Berlin's thought is the relation between its liberal and pluralist components. Berlin believed that the two are at least compatible and perhaps that liberalism can be grounded in pluralism, but his arguments are sketchy and have come under sustained criticism over the last decade or so. John Gray, for example, argues that if pluralism is true, then liberalism itself is no more than one political option among others, with no valid claim to universal superiority. But Berlin's link between pluralism and liberal universalism also has its defenders, and they have restated, revised, and added to his arguments.

George Crowder

See also Counter-Enlightenment; Enlightenment; Liberalism; Liberty; Nationalism; Pluralism

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Biblical Prophets

Biblical prophets are figures in the Hebrew Bible who address the Israelite community and its kings on behalf of God. Their primary functions are to criticize the people for breaking God's commandments and to deliver warnings about the consequences of continued disobedience. As a spokesperson for God, a prophet can draw on any number of rhetorical, theological, political, and predictive techniques to fulfill his commission. The prophets consistently challenge the spiritual and political corruption under the monarchy through their dire conditional judgments. If the Israelites do not repent, God will deliver them to their enemies and destroy their kingdom.

Although early figures in the Bible such as Abraham and Moses are sometimes called prophets, the term more commonly refers to two later groups, which can be distinguished from each other by their period of activity and the type of text in which they appear. The books of the Former Prophets (Joshua, Judges, 1 and 2 Samuel, 1 and 2 Kings) contain narrative accounts of the prophets during the formative years of the monarchy in Israel, including the substantial Elijah and Elisha cycles in 1 and 2 Kings. These narratives both situate the speeches of the various prophets in specific political settings and provide details about their other activities such as healing and performing miracles.

The books of the Latter Prophets, sometimes called the classical prophets, are anthologies of prophetic speeches attributed to the individuals who lend their names to the books. There are

three major books (Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel) and twelve minor ones (Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi). The terms major and minor describe the length of the books, not their relative significance. With the exception of Jonah, these books have little or no narrative framing, and an account of the specific historical events to which they respond is further complicated by the long process of editing and expansion that produced them. Through various internal and external clues, many sections of the anthologies can be connected to particular periods in the monarchy beginning in the eighth century and continuing beyond the Babylonian exile in 586 BCE.

The prophets come from diverse backgrounds (farmers, shepherds, scribes, priests) and address their messages to individual kings, cities, or, in the later books, the whole nation. They regularly depict themselves as political outsiders, and they are especially concerned with the unjust oppression of the poor and weak by the king and other wealthy elites. They attack any infidelity to God and his laws in the harshest terms, but their negative predictions are often accompanied by promises of restoration. The prophets represent the moral conscience of Israel.

Edan Dekel

See also Civil Religion; Divine Right of Kings; Kingship; Narrative

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BIOPOLITICS

The term *biopolitics* is about a hundred years old. Its literal meaning is a politics that deals with life (Greek: *bíos*), but how exactly life and politics are articulated with each other has been the object of a long and controversial debate. It is possible to distinguish three major lines of interpretation: those originating in the naturalistic tradition; politicist concepts, which address the ecological crisis and issues raised by biotechnology; and historical and relational concepts that build on the work of Michel Foucault.

Naturalistic Concepts of Biopolitics

The naturalistic tradition starts with the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, who was probably one of the first to use the notion of biopolitics. At the beginning of the twentieth century, he proposed an organicist concept of the state and argued that there was an analogy between politics and biological processes, regarding the state as a collective organism and a form of life.

Some years later, the National Socialists in Germany gave biopolitics an explicitly racist meaning. The term figured in texts on the regulation and policing of race, legitimizing eugenic practices and the murder of individuals and collectives declared to be "unworthy of living," "defective," or "degenerate."

At the end of the 1960s, a new variant of the naturalist conception of biopolitics made its appearance. Under the heading of biopolitics, a new field of research was established in political science (principally in the Anglo-American context) endorsing biologistic explanations of political processes and structures. This theoretical approach is grounded in the belief that the analysis of politics needs to take up empirical findings from biology and the behavioral sciences and also explanatory models from sociobiology and evolutionary theory. From this perspective, political behavior could be understood only by taking into account biological factors and evolutionary constraints.

Politicist Concepts of Biopolitics

Since the 1970s, the naturalistic tradition has been complemented by a politicist concept of biopolitics. The latter does not focus on the alleged biological foundations of politics but discovers life processes as a new object of political theory and practice. Here biopolitics denotes a new policy field designed to address the ecological crisis, encompassing

endeavors to solve global environmental problems and to ensure the survival of mankind. More recently, the term has also been used to characterize those procedures and practices striving to govern biotechnological innovations and biomedical research. In this context, biopolitics refers to the need for administrative and legal regulations to determine the conditions and the limits of the use of controversial technologies that modify or transform (human) nature.

Historical and Relational Concepts of Biopolitics

The third line of interpretation originates in the work of the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. Foucault advances a historical and relational concept of biopolitics, which does not accept the idea of prepolitical foundations that supposedly guide politics or focus on extrapolitical objects of political action. Foucault's notion of biopolitics points to a historical shift at the threshold of modernity. According to Foucault, biopolitics marks a discontinuity in political practice because it places life at the center of political order. He distinguishes historically and analytically between two dimensions of biopolitics, the disciplining of the individual body and the social regulation of the population. Furthermore, Foucault's concept signals a theoretical critique of the sovereign paradigm of power. According to this model, power is exercised as interdiction and repression in a framework of law and legality. In contrast, Foucault stresses the productive capacity of power, which cannot be reduced to the ancient sovereign "right of death." Whereas sovereignty seized hold of life to suppress it, the new life-administering power is dedicated to inciting, reinforcing, monitoring, and optimizing the forces under its control.

The Foucauldian notion of biopolitics has had quite a remarkable reception in recent years. The two extremes of this discussion are also the most prominent contributions to this debate: the work of Giorgio Agamben, on the one hand, and that of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, on the other. Agamben's point of departure is a conceptual distinction that, he argues, has characterized the Western political tradition since Greek antiquity. He states that the main line of separation is not the difference between friend and enemy, but the distinction between bare life (*zoé*) and political existence (*bíos*), between the natural existence and the legal status of a human being. Agamben claims that the very constitution of sovereign power requires the production of a biopolitical body in the form of "bare life." In this light, inclusion in a political community seems possible only by means of the simultaneous exclusion of some human beings, who are not allowed to become full legal subjects.

Hardt and Negri put forward an entirely different account of biopolitics, trying to give it a positive meaning. By synthesizing ideas from Italian autonomist Marxism with poststructuralist theories, they claim that the borderline between economics and politics, reproduction and production, is dissolving. Biopolitics signals a new era of capitalist production where life is no longer limited to the domain of reproduction or subordinated to the working process. In Hardt and Negri's account, the constitution of political relations now encompasses the entire life of the individual, which prepares the ground for a new revolutionary subject: the multitude. The biopolitical order as conceptualized by Hardt and Negri also includes the material conditions for forms of associative cooperation, which will finally transcend the structural constraints of capitalist production.

Thomas Lemke

See also Foucault, Michel; Life; Naturalism; Power

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Bodin, Jean (1529–1596)

Jean Bodin was a sixteenth-century French jurist, philosopher, and scholar known primarily for his influential account of sovereignty, which he defined as the "absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth." In addition, he was recognized for his contributions to the philosophy of history, political economy, and religion. He was one of the most influential legal philosophers of the Renaissance, and his theories were heatedly debated both by his contemporaries and by succeeding generations of philosophers.

Life of Bodin

Bodin was born in 1529 in Angers, in the northern French duchy of Anjou. Little is known of his family or of his early life, except that his father was a modestly successful burgher, probably a tailor; rumors of his mother being a Jewish refugee from Spain are now generally dismissed. In 1545, he entered the Carmelite order and was sent to Paris, where he received a formidable humanistic education at the Collège de Quatre Langues (later to become the Collège de France). Four years later, however, he obtained a release from his vows and went to Toulouse to study civil law. He returned to Paris around 1561 intending to practice at the Bar but was by all accounts not very successful, and he turned instead to legal, historical, and philosophical scholarship, which led to his first major work, the *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (Method for the Easy Comprehension of History). Two years later, he published the *Réponse aux paradoxes de M. de Malestroit* (Response to the paradoxes of M. de Malestroit), an important contribution to political economy.

In the meantime, Bodin had caught the attention of the French court and had left his career as a barrister to enter the public service as a king's advocate. Over the next decade, he undertook numerous missions on the crown's behalf, and in 1571, he became counselor to François, duke of Alençon and younger brother of King Charles IX. Bodin continued to hold various governmental posts and remained involved in public affairs for most of his life. In 1576, Bodin produced his most important work, the *Six Livres de la République* (Six Books on the Commonwealth), which was well received and won instant acclaim for its author. It was the cornerstone of his fame for centuries to come.

That same year, however, saw his fortune wane. King Henry III, brother and successor of Charles IX, had convened the Estates General at Blois, and Bodin was appointed representative of the Third Estate for Vermandois. The king urged the Estates to agree to new taxes in order to redouble his efforts to impose religious uniformity by pressing against the Protestant resistance. Bodin led a successful opposition to the king's proposals. He was distraught at the prospect of continuing a ruinous civil war, both because of a pragmatic commitment to religious tolerance and because he thought the Third Estate was already taxed beyond its means. Later during the Estates, when the frustrated king attempted to raise revenue through the alienation of the royal domain, Bodin again protested, on the premise that the royal domain was not the king's to alienate but was given to him by the people for his use and enjoyment only. Because of his success in opposition to Henry's designs, Bodin was denied further advancement in the king's court.

Bodin eventually settled in Laon, where he served as a *procureur du roi* (royal prosecutor) from 1587 until his death. During this time, which saw the final phase of the French wars of religion, Bodin was at times torn between collaboration with the Catholic League—which opposed the accession of Henry of Navarre to the throne on the grounds that he was a Protestant—and the royal party. His sympathies, by all accounts, lay with Henry, but he had come under suspicion of heresy and was pressed to pledge the Catholic cause. Only when Henry captured Laon in 1594 was Bodin free to declare his true allegiance. Throughout this period, he wrote extensively on religion and ethics. The *Colloquium heptalomeres de rerum sublimium arcane subditis* (Colloquium of the Seven about the Secrets of the Sublime), which was completed in 1593, was so controversial that it could be published only posthumously. Near the end of his life, Bodin may have converted to Judaism. Nonetheless, when he died in 1596, he was buried as a Catholic.

Bodin's Work

Bodin's reputation rests mainly on his contributions to the legal theory of sovereignty but nearly

as important to the development of political and legal theory were his innovations on the method of jurisprudence. He is credited as one of the precursors of comparative law and of empirical political science.

Innovations in the Method of Jurisprudence

Bodin's exposition of the legal attributes necessary for the independent and effective exercise of power by the sovereign proceeded from a critical analysis of the laws of historical and contemporary states, which he took to be manifestations of universal historical principles. This critical turn contrasted sharply with what had been the dominant attitude of jurists since the *Corpus Juris Civilis*—a compilation of laws, edicts, and commentary from the later Roman Empire—was rediscovered in the twelfth century. For 400 years before Bodin, the work of jurists had been mostly exegetical because the *Corpus Juris* was assumed to be internally coherent and, despite its age, perfectly applicable to medieval societies. But in the sixteenth century, the authority and coherence of Roman law began to come under attack by humanist scholars informed by the methods of classical philology and by a renewed faith in universal reason.

Bodin stood at the cusp of this critical turn in jurisprudence. He cited Roman sources extensively, but not with the unreflective deference shown by previous generations of jurists; rather, he used them as an example (albeit an important one) of historical practice. To these sources, he juxtaposed ancient and contemporary laws and customs not only from France and Western Europe, but from the fringes of the world known to him: Turkey, Muscovy, Africa, and America. The result was a critical assessment of general principles and patterns of legal order, an unusual accomplishment for his time.

Theory of Sovereignty

As important as his methodological innovations were to the field of jurisprudence, Bodin's most memorable achievement was his account of sovereignty, developed in his most important work, the *Six Books on the Commonwealth*. The aim of the work was ambitious: to provide a methodical account of the ends, structure, and policies of the state and to defend a conception of sovereignty as the absolute and indivisible power to enact laws binding on each and every subject of a realm, without such power being subject to any prior legal or institutional constraint. This thesis, while not completely unprecedented in its time, was nonetheless never as forcefully or systematically presented before Bodin.

Bodin begins with a general assessment of the ends, origin, and concept of political authority. Contrary to later writers (such as Thomas Hobbes), who took the individual as the basic unit of inquiry, Bodin considers the family to be the irreducible, prepolitical entity. Political activity is first undertaken by heads of families, who, although they enjoy lordly power over their household, associate with other heads of families on the basis of equality. Yet "force, violence, ambition, avarice, and the passion for vengeance armed men against one another," and from the ensuing violence, some emerged victors and the rest were reduced to servitude. Bodin thus refuses to draw many lessons of legitimacy from the origin of commonwealths and throughout the work reiterates that tyrants, although they have acquired power illegitimately, are nevertheless sovereigns in the relevant functional sense.

The cornerstone of the work is Bodin's celebrated formula that "[s]overeignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth." The formula requires some explanation. By *perpetual,* Bodin meant that power, to be sovereign, must be conferred for the life of the holder, not subject to expiration or revocation. Otherwise, the holder of such power was a mere deputy or lieutenant because he presumably had to give account of his actions to another. By *absolute,* Bodin may have meant a number of different things, and most of the controversy over his theory of sovereignty turns on the precise bounds of Bodin's absolutism.

Bodin contrasted the idea of absolute sovereign power with the ancient and medieval idea of a mixed constitution, one in which the attributes of sovereignty were not all possessed by a single individual or determinate body, but rather allocated to different parts of the state. In a mixed constitution, the ruler could not enact law or formulate public policy without at some point requiring the consent of some other magistrate; a king, for instance, could propose a bill, but it could become law only

through the assent of a parliament. This arrangement, Bodin stated, meant that such a king was not sovereign and, moreover, that such a state had no proper sovereign at all. Sovereignty was either indivisible or it did not exist.

The same principle that denied coherence to the concept of a mixed constitution, Bodin thought, also made federal arrangements impossible in principle, as well as any legal system in which some magistrates held their authority of their own right, on terms irrevocable by any higher authority. With one hand, Bodin dismissed the authority of medieval Estates, guilds, and chartered cities, rendering them mere consultative bodies; with the other, he also removed the authority of independent nobles, who had often held important public offices by hereditary right. The issue lay at the essence of the attributes of sovereignty: The sovereign was first and foremost the fountain of law, and thus, no legal claim could stand but by his acquiescence or approval. The first prerogative of a sovereign prince was to lay down the law, both in general statutes applicable to all subjects and as specific orders applicable to individuals. But it was of the essence of sovereignty that a prince, if truly sovereign, did not require anyone's permission to exercise this prerogative—not that of his subjects, his peers, or even his putative superiors.

Bodin's attribution of unchecked legislative power to the sovereign effectively inverted the medieval relationship between the ruler and the law. Medieval political theory made the king a creature of the law. He was ostensibly bound by the custom of the realm, by privileges and charters granted by him or his predecessors, and by the general principles of equity contained in the natural law. The image of the king was that of a judge administering justice to his subjects. But Bodin relegates the judicial function of the king to a secondary attribute, the exercise of which could be (and often was) delegated to lower magistrates. The image of the king became that of the legislator, the fountain of law and origin of all honors and privileges.

Here, however, Bodin's image of absolute sovereignty begins to blur. A simple formula would have made the sovereign exempt from all legal requirements in the exercise of his discretion, or at least from all the requirements of human law. Neither Bodin nor most of his contemporaries doubted that sovereigns were subject to the demands of morality or of the laws of God and of nature. But Bodin curiously limited the king in important ways that did not seem at first consistent with the claim of absolute power. For one, a king was not free to violate the contracts that he himself had made, which included contracts with his subjects and with foreign princes. Such contracts were binding on the prince, at least as long as the interest of the other party in the contract subsisted. Bodin resolves the apparent contradiction by arguing that contracts and promises obligate not by the sanction of the civil law but by the operation of the law of nature.

A more notorious case of apparent inconsistency is Bodin's curious claim—which he famously advanced as a delegate at the Estates at Blois, on the same year as the publication of the *Commonwealth*—that the sovereign could not tax his subjects without their consent. He also traced this argument to the natural law, as he equated taxation with the taking of private property, which could not be done without the consent of the owner. This was a curious stance, given that Bodin generally derived the marks or attributes of sovereignty from the powers necessary to the effective imposition of law, and there was already in his time a tradition that considered some level of taxation, voluntary or not, as essential to effective governance. The inconsistency is magnified when one considers that later writers (like Hobbes), who followed Bodin in ascribing to the sovereign all prerogatives necessary to rule, included among them the power to tax without consent.

Moreover, Bodin's additional claim at the Estates at Blois—that the king was not free to alienate the royal domain—could be traced back to the same proprietary principle: that the king's alienation of that which did not belong to him would go against the natural law. However, two other reasons for this apparent exception to the wide discretion given to sovereigns seem plausible. The first is an appeal to custom: Similar restrictions on the disposition of royal land were the norm across European monarchies, a fact that would not have escaped Bodin's encyclopedic mind; such general acceptance of this norm would strongly recommend it to one attuned to the perspective of "universal history." A second reason is an appeal to prudent public policy: Bodin strongly

felt that, in ordinary circumstances, the sovereign should live by his own means. The prohibition on the alienation of the royal domain, together with the requirement that all taxation require the subject's consent, may be read against the backdrop of the French wars of religion; it served both as a fiscal limit to overzealous ambition and as respite to a Third Estate already overburdened with taxes.

The matter of consent to taxation and prohibition on the alienation of the royal domain is magnified when the institutional context of these restrictions is considered. Bodin had successfully defended these theses as a representative of the Third Estate, but in the *Commonwealth,* he steadfastly denied that the Estates or parliaments had any power to impose or veto the sovereign's legislation. Their authority was exclusively consultative. It is unclear whether Bodin's seeming failure to reconcile his theoretical propositions with his political activity should be attributed to a simple mistake on his part, an intractable difficulty in the subject matter, or a legacy of the medieval constitutional structure, which Bodin had done so much to dispel but had only begun to overcome.

Bodin's Legacy

Bodin was not an entirely consistent thinker, and some of his most famous theses about sovereignty were seen, even by his contemporaries and early critics, to rest on misconceptions about the form and exercise of political power. His more famous argument—that sovereignty was indivisible and absolute in principle—has not survived the historical achievements of the constitutional separation of powers and the inherently pluralist order of federalist states. Yet, for centuries after Bodin, these phenomena were observed with some puzzlement, and no pluralist theory of sovereignty could dispel the presumption that sovereignty was in its essence an absolute and undivided authority and that any deviations from this norm, however successful in practice, could not be justified in principle.

Some of Bodin's mistakes have an ideological source: They reflect his desire for an elegant theory that secured order and promoted good government to overcome the factional strife that was tearing France apart. Other inconsistencies speak more to Bodin's intellectual formation. He had been educated in the best of medieval and Renaissance traditions and still structured his social world around the categories of premodern France, a world of corporations, guilds, estates, and chartered cities. Bodin is standing at the threshold of early modernity; it is only with Hobbes that the threshold is crossed.

Víctor M. Muñiz-Fraticelli

See also Absolutism; Ancient Constitutionalism; Authority; Civil Law; Divine Right of Kings; Hobbes, Thomas; Jurisprudence; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Pluralism; Roman Law; Sovereignty; State; Toleration; Tyranny

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Body

"The body," in this entry, refers to the human body and relates to the concept of the person or human subject. In political theory, human subjects have always been assumed to be embodied and therefore subject to birth and death, to physical

requirements of survival, and to further bodily needs and pleasures over and above subsistence. The body has thus been a locus of more or less explicit assumptions in relation to politics, which then necessarily take place in a realm of minds and ideas, albeit in interaction with the material world, including human bodies. By contrast, sociobiological approaches to politics take the opposite view by locating behavior in bodily mechanisms of human genetic inheritance and then purportedly explaining on that basis why politics is necessary and how it should proceed. However, through the work of Michel Foucault, the body has become a focus of study in a different way, resulting in a reconceptualization of the person as a mind/body duo produced through powerful practices of normalization. Moreover, feminist theorists have focused on the female body, questioning the status of the body as generically conceived in relation to sex. Along with Foucauldians, feminists have also cast doubt on the male/female dichotomy as a necessary and exclusive way that bodies exist biologically or normally. As a political category of identity and struggle, race can be located retrospectively within this new political theory of the body. Political theorists are now confronting further issues of "the body" with respect to children, disabilities, and animals, conceptualized in critique of the political subject properly so-called.

Man as a Political Animal

The traditional way of looking at the human animal in political theory was made explicit in Aristotle's characterization of "man" as a political animal. Living in a city, as man does, is a process, achieved—well or badly—through the communication of specific concepts, rather than through instinctual behavior, understood as located in the body. Conceptual communication is perforce an aspect of the mind, and political theory is a contested register of relevant concepts and definitions. Considering politics is thus a philosophical activity, in and of the mind, albeit one from which practical recommendations should flow, and these of course would involve the body as a concept and actual bodies in practice.

In this way of understanding political theory, it is notable that the body is a presupposition but not a central concern, other than in basic presumptions about physical survival and some aspects of pleasure. Knowledge of further bodily things is then left to other studies (e.g., nutrition, medicine) or simply sidelined as generally nonpolitical (e.g., sexual relations, sporting activities). Political theory has thus traditionally operated with a hierarchy in which the body occupies a lower and less significant realm than the mind. People, and therefore the human subject, are treated most directly and extensively as minds, albeit encumbered with bodies, which are of secondary significance. Indeed, in some religious conceptions through which the human subject has been understood politically, particularly Christian ones, the body has been treated as a source of mental disturbance and social disorder. It has thus figured negatively in relation to politics, although again, it is not studied or conceptualized in much detail precisely for this reason.

Sociobiology

Sociobiology of the 1970s and 1980s adopted an opposite approach to the mind/body dichotomy by theorizing politics in relation to the supposed inheritance, through bodily mechanisms, of instincts and behaviors. This ancestral inheritance was derived from suppositions concerning primate evolution, or sometimes from analogies with the behavior of other animals, particularly if the males were territorial and aggressive. This approach made human bodies into carriers of genetic materials, which then, independent of culture and will, were said to produce the problem of disorder in society and to dictate the structures of order, through which politics should proceed. This effectively privileged body over mind, reversing the traditional hierarchy within the dichotomy.

Foucault and Power

The social theorist Michel Foucault has radically altered these conventional conceptions in political theory by reconceptualizing the nature of power and in particular the role of the body—not just the mind—in these social processes. In his work, he focused on prisons and punishment, social disciplinary practices that impinge on individuals,

sexuality in highly varied forms, the conceptualization of mental illness and normality, and numerous other institutions and practices that had hitherto been of marginal interest, if any at all, in political theory. His studies were historically based and extensively detailed, thus inductively illustrating change and malleability in human practice, rather than proceeding deductively from nearly timeless generalizations about "man" and society, as political theorists had often done. His work was thus made to intervene in political theory in alignment with historicizing methods and intellectual commitments to cultural diversities. However, most important, he offered a new conceptualization of power and thus of what counts as political and how politics actually operates.

Foucault conceived of power as everywhere in human relations, rather than as something paradigmatically central to the problem of order that politics poses and to the conventional solution in the state as sovereign enforcer. Moreover, he conceived of it as micro-power relations, proceeding through nearly invisible or little regarded capillary motions between people. In that way, he reconceptualized it as the prime mechanism through which people themselves are constructed in *both* body *and* mind. There is thus in Foucault's work a certain refusal of the mind/body dichotomy and perforce a conception of the body/mind duo as co-constitutive.

For Foucault, the body/mind duo is thus an outcome of political processes that require theorization, rather than a mere set of assumptions that can be formulated with relative ease. His work self-consciously focused on the body, revealing the ways that people are formed, and re-formed, through power relations that produce the body itself in certain ways (and not others) and thus produce different subjectivities in relation to it. As a result, formerly devalued or ignored topics, such as etiquette, hygiene, discipline, anatomical sex, sexual activity, health, and the like have become an important part of the way that the human subject is conceived in political theory. This is because, through Foucault, political theorists have been alerted to these and similar ways by which normality itself is produced and regulated through normalizing practices. It is from those historically and culturally diverse normalities that politics as we know it proceeds.

Feminist Analysis

Feminists have focused on the female body as a defining concern and have thus mounted a direct critique of traditional conceptualizations of the person. Prior to their intervention, political theory was understood to consist, in the first instance, of a loosely bounded canon of writers, all of whom were male. When "man" was considered in relation to embodiment—if this issue was considered at all in "malestream" canonical writings—it was theorized in a minimal way. In malestream writings, reproduction within the human community was dealt with by introducing woman as different in a bodily sense from the supposedly generic conception of the person as "man." Child care and other household activities were then centered in a domestic sphere, whereas the political realm was located in a public sphere by contrast.

The female body was, thus, with few and tentative exceptions, conventionally theorized in relation to children and so conceptualized as weak and similarly unsuited to political activity. For that activity, male bodies were theorized as more appropriate, not simply because they were conceived in relation to a nondomestic realm, but because the political realm was one where ultimately force and violence would be required. This theorization of the political realm, and of the political subject properly so-called, is thus a reflection of a preexisting conceptualization of labor as divided between warriors and domestics and a division of space between the political or public and the nonpolitical or household. In this double dichotomy, sex, taken to be an observable and strictly binary feature of the body, was paramount.

In making this analysis, feminists added gender, as well as sex, to the vocabulary of crucial—rather than merely presuppositional—concepts in political theory. Gender relates—with some current confusion—both to the known or presumed bodily sex of the person and to known or presumed behavioral characteristics that proceed in strong correlation to this bodily factor, albeit with cultural and individual variations.

Feminists have then used the concept of gender to criticize the canonical construction of woman as both unsuited to politics *and* peculiarly suited to child rearing and domesticity. In that way, they have drawn attention to the highly gendered way in which institutions and practices in society—whether

commonly conceptualized as political or not—are operating so as to devalue and exclude a person who has a female body, in favor of a person who has a male one. This has also necessarily revealed the ways that conventional political theories have been complicit with, or in some cases—such as patriarchalism—openly supportive of, the subordination of women. This has occurred in and through the malestream ways by which the body has been conceptualized.

Destabilizing the Body

Foucauldians and feminists have thus drawn attention to the political character of the normalizing processes that produce commonplace understandings of the human body. However, they have also raised certain doubts about the existence of the male/female binary as a secure bodily phenomenon (citing so-called hermaphrodite or intersex people) and have thus launched a critique of the body as necessarily and definitionally—at all stages of development from conception onward—importantly distinguished as sexed. This critique of the body has exposed the assumption—derived from a crude biological framing—that sexual activity is essentially reproductive and normally heterosexual. Feminist critiques have focused on validating non-reproductive aspects of sexual activity as an appropriate use of the body and similarly with validating female-female sexual pairings. Foucauldian, liberationist, and gay male critiques have covered similar ground in decoupling bodily sexual activities from heteronormative and reproductive presumptions.

Race and the Body

As a bodily phenomenon, race had been marginalized by political theory, although it was generally present at the level of covert or occasionally overt presumptions. Like sex, it functioned as a way of categorizing humans into hierarchies with respect to the properly political subject, who was not only presumptively male but also in racial terms "white." "Racial science," as a way of doing this, has been thoroughly criticized and effectively marginalized since the anti-Nazi and postwar eras, a process that antedated the Foucauldian and feminist interventions in political theory described above. This latter conjunction of interests has almost made the body a signifier for anatomical sex and perhaps certain other disciplinary practices in contemporary industrialized societies, such as incarceration. However, from a contemporary perspective in political theory, there is no reason why race could not be taken on board when the body is made conceptually central, albeit with a critical understanding of race as a failed scientific construction and of racism and anti-racism in current theorizations of culture, ethnicity, and identity.

Current and Future Theoretical Approaches

The body has thus become more a signifier of debate than a descriptive term with a clear referent. It signals a significant reconceptualization of the traditional mind/body dichotomy and of the recurrent tendency to create a hierarchy of one term over the other within the dichotomy itself. Theorists are now more alert to the co-constitutive practices through which mind and body are themselves understood as objects about which our intellectual technologies generate knowledge. The focus in political theory is not so much on individual bodies within which individual minds are located—or conversely on individual minds encumbered by individual bodies—as on the ways that politics operates through a myriad of social institutions and normalizing practices to create mind-body conjunctions that are interpreted as human subjects or people. Political theorists are now engaging not so much with the body as a thing or even a concept, but rather with the person, or human subject, conceived as bodily in a way that transcends previous dichotomizing assumptions. The body is thus no longer easily marginalized, nor devalued in relation to mind, nor reducible to some assumed social or genetic normalities.

However, this complexity with respect to the human person is proceeding in relation to increasing skepticism about generic and universalizing claims concerning the political subject properly so-called. Further bodily phenomena, such as age and disability, thus come into play. With disability, mind is often reduced to an effect of bodily imperfection or impairment—the inverse of the traditional view of the generic human as gifted with a mind that occupies a realm where the body matters little (or the sociobiological view that bodies within the species are necessarily normal because of natural

selection). With children, there are increasing concerns that the age criterion by which the political subject is established is arbitrary and often too high, particularly with respect to political rights of voting and officeholding, as against political obligations within taxation and military systems.

The mind/body duo has also been applied in relation to animals as a constitutive outside or "other" to the human, to understand what precisely the human person is. Traditionally conceived, animals appeared in political theory as foodstuffs, tools, or metaphors and as all body, with little if any mind, and certainly not capable of—by human standards—intelligence, communication, culture, or politics. However, in current conceptualizations, the borderline between the human species and all other animal species cannot be drawn so sharply because zoological research and experimental psychology are now suggesting that some species show evidence of communication and culture, and some individuals show evidence of learning and onward social transmission of knowledge. On this basis, some theorizations of the human person as political subject argue for the incorporation of duties to all animals, or at least to particular species, that arise from their body/mind conjunctions as observed in behavior and through experimentation. Animals are thus sometimes theorized in alignment with children as not political subjects properly so-called but rather as members of the human political community to whom duties of care and protection are owed. In some theorizations, they are—like children—endowed with rights.

There is thus no obvious limit to the fundamental issues that a focus on the body in political theory will continue to raise. This is because the human subject or person, necessarily embodied, is itself a highly contested area in numerous ways, none of which can be neatly parsed through easily assumed conceptualizations of mind and body, whether dichotomous or hierarchical or not, or limited by stereotypical conceptions of the human body, whether sexed or raced, or not.

Terrell Carver

See also Animality; Culture; Essentialism; Foucault, Michel; Feminism; Gender; Household; Identity; Manners; Naturalism; Performativity; Pleasure; Race Theory

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Body Politic

The metaphor of the body politic is part of many English speakers' daily language. The analogy is employed to conceptualize and attribute an organic or biological nature to political institutions. Comparing a state to a body facilitates the rationalization, analysis, and comprehension of its various functions. For example, presidents or premiers are called heads of state, and press secretaries are their voices; or sometimes civil strife is described as wounding a state. The body metaphor brings to mind an orderly hierarchy where a head leader directs and controls the action of the rest of the body as it recognizes the necessity of harmonious cooperation between all of its "members" for sustenance.

Imagining a state or a political institution as a body politic has a long history that spans the centuries of Western civilization. Generally, the analogy has a strong autocratic or monarchial connotation that implies subordination. This entry reviews the history of the usage of the body metaphor when applied to abstract institutions like states, emphasizing its Greek birth, medieval development and perfecting, and early modern decline.

History of the Body Metaphor

The first recorded instance of the metaphor resides in the *Rig-Veda* (c. 2000 BCE), where the Indian caste system was explained by comparing the priesthood to the mouth, fighters to the arms, shepherds to the thighs, and peasants to the feet of mankind. The usage found its anchor in the ancient Greek concept of hylozoism, that is, the belief that matter and material objects have a life.

One of the better known examples of a bodily metaphor appears in *The Belly and the Members,* a fable of Aesop (c. mid-sixth century BCE). As told, the members of the body revolted against their belly, which they thought was getting the lion's share of their work without doing much in return; hands, mouth, and teeth initiated a strike and after a few days realized that they were ailing. They learned then and there that cooperation between all members, including the invisible belly, was vital for the healthy maintenance of the body. The story's not so hidden subtext intimated that society, like a body, functions better when all do their assigned tasks and work together. The social metaphor translated easily into the political world

Later, in the fourth and fifth centuries BCE, Plato (c. 424–348 BCE) articulated and refined the political usage in *The Republic* and *Laws*. His organic connection between human body and state emphasized fitness and well-being over illness. In *The Republic,* he stated preference for a healthy state constitution over a fevered one. Furthermore, in his *Laws,* he discussed statesmanship's choice for peace over the constant state of readiness for war that was his contemporary Greece. From that premise, he underscored the need for legislators to keep the peace at home in order to better face external enemies. For Plato, the ultimate interest of the state (the greatest good) is harmony and compassion because well-being is preferable to disease. Herewith, the state had gained its organic quality. It was a body to be maintained in good physical condition.

The Greeks' fondness for the organic welfare of their state continued in the voice of their poets. Aristophanes (456–386 BCE), especially in *The Wasps,* claimed that poets needed to cure the diseases of the state. Shortly after, Demosthenes' (384–322 BCE) orations encouraging the Athenians to fight against Philip of Macedon—particularly, his *Philippic III*—compared Philip to the attack of a fever or an illness.

The Greeks influenced Rome, and Livy (59 BCE–17 CE) was as familiar with the analogy as were his predecessors, Cicero and Seneca. Livy's book II of the *History of Rome* used Aesop's fable of the other body parts revolting against the belly in his tale of the secession of the plebs (commoners). During the early Roman republic, the plebs seceded from the senators, isolating themselves on the Sacred Mount, or the Aventine. Menenius Agrippa was sent to end the crisis, and he used his version of the fable to convince the plebs to return to the state. In Livy's words, the Senate-belly agreed that it received food from the plebs-body, but it did not go to waste. The Senate digested it and sent it back to blood and veins of the republic; hence, cooperation between all gave vitality to the republican body. This fable lived on in Plutarch, the poetry of Marie de France, and William Shakespeare's *Coriolianus*.

Christianization of the Metaphor

The Romans' appropriation of the analogy leads us to the Christianization of the metaphor. Interestingly, its meaning changed little and still implied subordination. Saint Paul used the bodily metaphor amply. He molded Christ and the church into a single body and further depicted the church as the bride of Christ in I Corinthians 12: 12–27, which clearly demonstrates the continuity with the ancient authors:

> For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ . . . If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; it is not therefore not of the body. And if the ear shall say, Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; it is not therefore not of the body . . . And the eye cannot say to the hand, I have no need of thee: or again the head to the feet, I have no need of you . . . That there should be no schism in the body; but that the members should have the same care one for another . . . Now ye are the body of Christ, and severally members thereof.

Colossians 1:18, adds "And he is the head of the body, the church," and Ephesians 5:23–30

continues the metaphor with: "For the husband is the head of the wife, and Christ also is the head of the church . . . because we are members of his body.

Early theologians continued the use of bodily metaphors. Their notion of the body politic was a mystical Christian body united in the sharing of Christ, the Eucharist or transubstantiation (the substantial change of the bread and the wine of the mass into the body and blood of Christ). The metaphor took theocratic connotation. Leadership was divine. For example, Chapter 12 of Augustine's *The City of God* discusses the following: "Concerning the Opinion of Those Who Have Thought that God is the Soul of the World, and the World is the Body of God."

Augustine's notions are representative of the medieval infatuation with the metaphor. The Middle Ages defined what the eminent French medievalist Jacques Le Goff has proposed to be medieval society's organicist conception of the political world. The model started in the clerical world and spread to secular politics. Originally, the church presented itself as a mystical body politic whose original head was the pope; kings and princes were its members. But eventually lay authorities vied for leadership, and theorists argued for a divinely inspired monarchy-head until, to a large extent, the eighteenth-century revolutions dismembered the medieval Christian body.

The church was first conceptualized in terms of a body and, often, that of a bride; Christ was either the body's head or the bride's groom. Later, kings and popes associated themselves with the Christian body, integrating its ambivalent dual nature. Like Christ, kings and popes lived and died, but the institutions of monarchy and papacy continued. The renowned medieval historian Ernst Kantorowicz was the first to highlight the double nature of the monarchy in *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*. He suggests the dual construction of a king's body, which dies because of its physical/biological nature, and of a monarchial (everlasting) institution that endures. This construction was captured in the traditional rallying cry that followed the death of a king: *The king is dead, long live the king*. Later, Ralph E. Giesey offered some of the best-known visual evidence of the monarchial dual nature in his discussion of the royal effigies that were posed on top of kings' coffins. As the corpse decomposed, the effigy-institution symbolized the continuity of the body. The symbol eased political transition. Effigies remained visible during the funerary processions and the mourning periods and sometimes took on a life of their own during the royal interregnum.

Reflecting on Kantorowicz's analysis, Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, in *The Pope's Body,* considered how the church formulated its own institutional continuity based again on the bodily metaphor. The pope died of human death, but the ecclesiastical institution, like Christ, continued. For Paravicini Bagliani, the ecclesiastical rituals that surrounded the death of a pope cemented this inherent internal contradiction between the pope's physical transience and the church's institutional continuity and survival.

Perhaps the most sweeping medieval elaboration of the concept was left to John of Salisbury (1120–1180) and his *Policratus,* an essential medieval work of political theory. Like his ancient Greek model, his political society mirrored a healthy human body. Chapter Two of Book Five, grounded in Plutarch's theories, discusses the body of a republic (a complete anachronism in his twelfth-century context) that was ultimately dominated by its Christian soul symbolized in the spiritual leadership of the priesthood. For John, the head of his republic was a leader who was subject to the rule of God as, in a body, the head is subjected to the rule of its soul. He then proceeded down the physical body, attributing the heart to the Senate; ears, eyes, and mouth to judges and provincial governors; hands to officials and soldiers; stomach and intestines to treasurers and record keepers; and the feet to the peasantry.

In the thirteenth century, the Florentine Brunetto Latini's *Book of Treasure* continued the political usage of the analogy, as did the theological writings of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). Aquinas, influenced by *Policratus,* discussed the necessity of a human's natural deference to the leadership of a king, arguing that this form of governance was as natural an occurrence as a soul was in a body. Similarly, John of Paris's (1250–1306) *On Royal and Papal Powers,* defending the subordination of the pope to a king, used the metaphor to

argue for the commonsensical leadership of one single common force. The argument of single leadership is repeated in Marsiglio of Padua's (1275–1343) *Defender of the Peace.*

It should be noted that the medieval tendency to fuse church and state was bound to create a necessity to identify a single leadership, especially when using bodily metaphors. Marsiglio of Padua, for example, using Aristotle's *On the Movement of Animals,* understood quite well that, in a body, multiple leaderships created an unviable position of contrary directions. In his *On the Duty of the King,* the Christian reformer John Wycliff continued the defense of a divinely inspired kinship, arguing from the bodily metaphor. In his case, leadership moved organically. The king was the kingdom's head or heart. The medieval apogee of the metaphor's history rested with the political writing of a woman, Christine de Pizan (c. 1365–1430) and her *Book of the Body Politic.* As the first female professional writer of France, she organized her treatise into three parts (ruler, nobles, and commoners) that cooperated, like a well-functioning body, for the benefit of the whole.

Henry VIII (1491–1547) of England initiated the quartering of the medieval body politic metaphor by bringing some of the earliest radical theorists' views to fruition. He placed himself in the role of the Roman pope as head of the church. Slightly before his time, Sir John Fortescue's (c. 1394–1476) *De Laudibus Legum Angliae: A Treatise in Commendation of the Laws of England* had argued that nerves-laws bound the British body politic, advocating a limited monarchy and parliamentary rule. In 1606, Barnabe Barnes's *Foure Bookes of Offices* continued the dismemberment of the traditional body politic by granting the head to the king and, this time, the lungs to the laws. The Reformation dismantled the issue of body's leadership even more, challenging most often those who headed it: the king or the pope. The Christian partition allowed rulers to refer to the old metaphor to gain some sense of control over a population that could disavow the leader's choice of allegiance (Catholicism or Reform). Hence, the usage of the metaphor advertised unity as the Christian body splintered and the long association between Christianity and politic decayed.

Rejection of the Organic Concept of the State

John Milton's 1641 *Of Reformation Touching Church-discipline in England* refashioned *The Belly and the Members*' fable into *The Fable of the Wen and the Members.* The wen (or boil)—a metaphor for a Catholic bishop—having grown close in size to a head, argued for his prime position over the rest of the members. A philosopher brought to the council exposed him for his real nature, a foul excrescence. If the latter philosopher debated the positioning and precedence in leadership, he still adhered to the traditional understanding of the metaphor.

Shakespeare also instilled doubt in its validity, questioning in *Coriolanus* the organicist conception of the cooperation between the members of the body. He stripped the metaphor of its foundation. Just as John Milton suggested that a body could grow unhealthy and diseased, Shakespeare wrote that it could also transform into an abomination when members of society did not play their assigned organic function. Hence, in *Coriolanus,* plebeians are compared to the Hydra monster or diseases like the measles or scabs. Pushing the usage of the metaphor to its extreme, Milton and Shakespeare pointed to the truism that a body, like society, does not always function well.

In 1651, Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury struck the death blow by proposing the artificiality of the body-state. In his *Leviathan,* he discussed the natural selfishness of humankind and the impossibility for the species to survive without external intervention for some form of balance and preservation. The *right of nature* (survival instinct) and the rationality found in the *law of nature* led the species to abide a *Leviathan* (the state), an artificial creation. Without a *Leviathan,* a system that all agree to follow, chaos would rule. Hobbes clearly constructed the state as a social institution and demoted it from a biological-natural view.

Later Use of the Metaphor

Past the seventeenth century, the metaphoric usage of the body declined, even more so after the Industrial Revolution, when issues of social contract overtook the field of analysis. Institutions were then compared to machines rather than nature. In more modern times, social Darwinism

and the identification of biological competition fed a certain degree of life to the ailing metaphor. But instead of maintaining status quo and political immobility, it emphasized changes, as did sociologist, philosopher, and political theorist Herbert Spencer's (1820–1903) "survival of the fittest" theory. Most recently, A. D. Harvey has argued for the renewed used of the metaphor by the military, which he describes as *fists* of the nations.

It should be noted that the metaphor has been revived in the late twentieth century as an academic buzzword. This revival has robbed the analogy of most of its analytical content. Today's body politic is less of a conceptual tool than one of Orwell's dying metaphors. In its contemporary usage, body politic usually denotes oppression in gender or colonialism, for example, but hardly ever refers to its old-regime analytical connotation of cooperation.

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See also Absolutism; Body; Canon Law; de Pizan, Christine

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British Idealism

British idealism took its inspiration from the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, but unlike him, the British turned the underlying ideas into a practical crusading philosophy, taking the high moral ground against the injustices of the age. For British idealists the philosopher is a public intellectual with a social responsibility. The rapid industrialization of the nineteenth century produced such squalid social conditions, appalling sanitation, rampant drunkenness, and dangerous working practices that the idealists, with their emphasis on the spiritual growth of the self, were determined to campaign to remove the obstacles to self-realization. This entry highlights some of idealism's fundamental principles and shows how they resulted in a highly politicized philosophy generating clear principles of state intervention. It concludes with an application of these principles to a specific social issue.

The British idealists dominated philosophy in the Anglophone world during the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They had a corrosive effect on the prevailing utilitarianism and individualism of the day and developed instead an organic theory of society in which the good of the whole was dependent on the good of each individual. Theirs was a spiritual philosophy that viewed material well-being as a precondition for moral flourishing. We are now so accustomed to the ideas of social welfare and state intervention in relation to such a wide sphere of life that it is difficult to appreciate the extent to which the radical politics of the British idealists constituted a considerable departure from Victorian orthodoxy. Education, sanitation, regulation of the externalities of production, social welfare, and health and safety were regarded by many as outside of the sphere of government. The social reformer had to combat not only a deep-seated fear of the arbitrary power of the state, but also modern evolutionary thought, which was initially commandeered into the service of the reactionary right. Proponents of state intervention, or *interference* if you were an opponent, had to counter the arguments of those, such as Herbert Spencer, who believed that it was not only impractical but also immoral to interfere with the natural and social processes of evolution. Wherever the state interfered, as in trying to improve the condition of the poor through the Metropolitan Housing Act, the consequences were the opposite of those intended.

Fundamental Principles

The philosophy that underpinned the social consciousness of British idealists has often being caricatured and misrepresented. The principle to which they adhered and from which the whole philosophical worldview emanated was the unity of experience, which predisposed them to take all dualisms as false abstractions, including those between nature and spirit, the mind and its objects, and individualism and socialism. To give credibility to their social policies, British idealists had to counter some ideas about evolution and heredity that caught the public imagination. Naturalistic forms of evolution, such as those put forward by Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, degraded humanity by explaining what came later in terms of what came before. Furthermore, British idealists could not go along with T. H. Huxley and Alfred Russel Wallace in believing that there were two processes of evolution discontinuous with each other; cosmic, in which nature is red in tooth and claw; and ethical, in which sociability and morals evolve despite nature. The idealists contended that nature and spirit are continuous, but instead of spirit being explained by nature, they simply substituted Hegel's notion of emanation, in which the first is explained in terms of the latter. By this, they did not mean that nature was intelligent, merely that it is intelligible to mind and has no separate existence apart from it. This is different from suggesting that the mind creates the world. Mind and nature are mutually dependent and inseparable.

The idea of evolution, far from being a denial of religious experience, for the British idealists assists us in understanding it much more adequately. While there were differences of view, in general, evolution bridges the gap between the present and the past, laying bare the unity in the diversity of humanity by discerning in man's life one spiritual principle that continuously works its way through the changing forms manifest in the course of human history. In evolution, British idealism found a solution to the ultimate dualism of mind and its objects because it contained the promise of undiminishing support to religious faith.

Because they held to the principle of unity, British idealists responded to claims that idealism had no epistemology; they made a virtue out of the fact. Descartes had tried to connect the mind to an external world by claiming that the mind must conform to the reality it perceives, but he failed to overcome the dualism between the mind and its objects. Kant's Copernican revolution was to contend that reality must conform to the mind by positing a priori categories in terms of which it could be understood, such as time, space, and volition. He too, however, failed to overcome the mind/object dichotomy by positing things in themselves and things as they are known to mind. It was Hegel who rejected the starting point—trying to connect the mind to reality—and posited instead an undifferentiated unity. The problem, then, became not one of how to attach mind to the world, but instead how to understand the process by which the unity became differentiated into the multiplicity of things that confront us. In other words, it was ontology and not epistemology that was the basis of British idealist philosophy.

This ontological understanding and the assumption of unity are called absolute idealism, the predominant form that pervaded the English-speaking world from about 1870 until after World War I. Such ideas led many critics, including some who were sympathetic to idealism and who called themselves personal idealists, to charge such luminaries as T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, F. H. Bradley, Edward Caird, and Henry Jones with dissolving individual personality into the absolute, that is, into the one undifferentiated unity of experience as a whole and of subordinating the individual to the state.

A Fighting Philosophy

The British idealists placed themselves at the heart of the most contentious political debates of the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Education was to be the great social leveler, and everyone, not just the privileged, was to be given access to it. They believed that manipulation of the social environment through regulation and education would ensure that every citizen had the opportunity to achieve his or her potential. Like their Victorian and Edwardian contemporaries, the idealists made the improvement of moral character a fundamental preoccupation. They rejected the two principal theories of heredity: social determinism and the idea of inherited character, associated with Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and Herbert Spencer, and also the genetic determinism that was

powerfully advocated by August Wiesmann in his germ plasm theory. Typically taking the best from each of the antithetical theories and synthesizing them into a positive alternative, the British idealists maintained that we inherit certain capacities. These capacities certainly limit the extent of our potential, but to flourish, they require the right social environment.

According to British idealism, the individual is nothing without society, and society is merely the individual writ large. Individuals could not be conceived as the bearers of rights outside of a social context. Rights were to be regarded as an achievement and resulted as a consequence of social recognition. For any valid claim to become a right, it had to be socially recognized, and the justification for having such a right is that it contributes to the common good. While all rights are social, there are some without which society would be unrecognizable, and these rights, while not natural, are nevertheless fundamental.

Rights require a moral community, but there is no reason why that community could not extend beyond national boundaries. In this respect, the British idealists differed from Hegel. They agreed that a worldwide moral community was both possible and desirable but nevertheless differed among themselves over the extent to which it had already been achieved. For the likes of Green, Caird, Haldane, Jones, and Muirhead, considerable advances had already been made, whereas Bradley and Bosanquet were far more skeptical.

The Principles of State Intervention

Insofar as nations were still the identifiable moral community capable of sustaining a system of rights, and solidarist enough to support the reciprocity of rights and duties, the role of the state was to ensure that the social environment did not place obstacles in the way of individuals fulfilling their potential. Because moral development requires individual responsibility, each extension of the activity of the state had to be weighed against the potential inimical consequences of diminishing that responsibility and making the individual dependent on society. In that right intention is one of the features that defines a moral act, to compel action takes it outside of the moral sphere. The state, therefore, faces a serious moral dilemma when it compels its citizens to act or desist from acting in certain ways. To justify state action, three conditions have to be met. In the first place, some impediment must inhibit or frustrate the individual's capacity for potential action. Second, the benefits of being able to harness the resources of character and intelligence must outweigh the negative consequences of any restrictions imposed. Third, it must be better to act, even if the action is compelled through fear of legal reprisal, than not to act at all. Experience and judgment have to be employed in weighing the costs against the benefits of state intervention. There is no formula that can be magically applied to impose a priori limits on state activity.

This placed British idealists squarely in the middle of the debate between individualists and socialists over the role of the state. Both individualists and socialists presupposed that any increase in the activity of the state limits the opportunities for individual enterprise. They agreed that the extension of the state encroaches on individual will but differed over whether it is desirable. The idealists contended that individualists and socialists were mistaken. The controversy, for them, was absurd because the individual is not an isolated entity independent of society. Socialism, on the other hand, far from diminishing individualism could with equal credibility be viewed as enhancing it. When assessed in relation to the criterion of what the state can do for the individual and what the individual can do for himself or herself and society, it is obvious that individual freedom (not arbitrary choice) and the extension of state activity have grown hand in hand. The right kind of socialism provides the individual with opportunities that deepen his or her personality and facilitates the possibility of conceiving and pursuing higher purposes. The "true" socialism, then, empowers individuals and generally makes them stronger and better citizens.

This is an enabling conception of the state, which makes it responsible for doing only what is needed to assist individuals to act. The state should not diminish individual responsibility by attempting to achieve substantive ends on behalf of its citizens, according to the British idealists. The issue is one, not of minimal state activity, but of the right sort of state activity, which does not undermine individual responsibility. At a time when we expect

the state to do more and more, Bosanquet provided a reminder of the importance of individual responsibility and of the need to promote participatory citizenship and the revitalization of democracy.

Idealism in Action

To take a practical example, how could the enforcement of temperance or restrictions on the sale of alcohol increase the capacity of the individual for moral growth? The opportunity for such growth is taken away by removing temptation. For those such as Green, Caird, and Jones, to be a slave to drink or to one's passions is already to have diminished one's capacity for free choice. Drink drives the individual into degeneracy and renders him or her incapable of providing and sustaining a loving family environment in which children may be nurtured and flourish. Drink arouses passions in men that make them a danger to women. Green, for example, believed that diminishing drunkenness would reduce the incidence of child neglect, poverty, and the sexual abuse of women.

Crime and pauperism are the burden that intemperance imposes on society; so government has every right to intervene to lessen the burden. Green was not averse to the use of legislation to diminish temptation, especially in relation to the sale of alcohol. Education and example were not likely to halt the advance of the vice among the degenerate and hopeless. Legislation abolishing or restricting the sale of alcohol would remove one of the obstacles to the improvement of character. Education alone would not be enough and needed the assistance of legislation before it could transform social values.

Bosanquet is seen quite rightly as more of an opponent of state socialism than his fellow idealists, and much more in favor of private property and laissez-faire capitalism. He was, nevertheless, committed to the same principles by which to judge whether a social ill was best left to individual enterprise or state legislation. Bosanquet's support for allowing free-market forces to prevail or for advocating social or state intervention was consistently based on the capacity of existing institutions to facilitate or impede individuals in the realization of their natures. On balance, he thought that private property and laissez-faire capitalism performed the task adequately. If they did not, Bosanquet was prepared to concede a considerable degree of collectivism as long as it was guided by increasing human happiness and improving character.

The legacy of British idealism has been to give emphasis to a communitarian conception of society in which rights are fundamentally social and in which social justice is driven by a principle of reciprocal obligations and responsibilities.

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See also Communitarianism; Hegelians; Historicism

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Buddhist Political Thought

Buddhist political theory is a work in progress. Political theory in the Buddhist world is primarily a response to the encounter and confrontation with the modern and the Western, which created the need to think about theoretical and institutional content and change in innovative ways. Traditional society throughout the Buddhist world never ceased changing, but this did not require the

reconceptualization of society and the polity as profoundly, and as theoretically, as has the impact of the West that grew most intensely in and after the nineteenth century.

Postulates

A limited number of presuppositions form the foundation of Buddhism and provide the conceptual framework within which Buddhist political theory is developing: The world consists of sentient beings. It is the nature of all sentient beings to want to be happy and not dissatisfied. All sentient beings are interrelated because of *dependent origination:* that is, everything that exists is related causally to everything that has or will exist. Harming other sentient beings generates unhappiness and therefore should be avoided. The ultimate objective of all sentient beings is enlightenment.

There are many paths and practices to achieve enlightenment, and the Buddha taught that the individual should find the tools that worked for him- or herself. The world of sentient beings is constantly changing. Nothing is permanent, and nothing exists in and of itself but only in relation to, and as a consequence of, everything else that exists. Therefore, there can be no objective truths valid for all times, all places, and all sentient beings. Time in the Western sense does not exist, nor do ultimate beginnings and ends within the perceivable universe.

These postulates raise certain conceptual problems for Buddhist political theory: Of what does society consist? *Sentient beings* usually implies all beings, from the gods to earthworms, for example. Does society include the vegetable kingdom, which we know is sentient? If nothing exists in and of itself, can there be inherent rights? Is dignity a characteristic of human beings only or of all sentient beings? What social structures, political institutions, and political processes may inhibit, or encourage, the achievement of enlightenment? Do the capitalist society, economy, and culture harm sentient beings? Buddhist political theorists are seeking to resolve these and many other issues today.

Historical Sources

The historical textual sources for Buddhist political theory are very limited and almost never dedicated primarily to political theory. Philosophers and scholars, therefore, have to extrapolate from them. Three are most important: The *sutras,* considered the records of the Buddha's oral teachings, provide expositions of fundamental postulates and indications of lines for extrapolation. The *vinaya,* the teachings of the Buddha in response to specific questions and issues raised by the monks of his time, constitute the framework for the daily social and spiritual life of the *sangha,* the monk body, and provide material for thought about social theory and problems. The Indian Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (c. 150–250 CE.) is often a source of ethical principles to be applied in developing political philosophy, particularly two of his works: *To a Good Friend* and *Precious Garland.*

The acts and policies of the South Asian emperor, Ashoka (c. 304–232 BCE), are considered exemplary of Buddhist kingship and social policy. After years of warfare, Ashoka suddenly, according to legend, converted to Buddhism and proceeded to create compassionate social policies and institutions and to teach the *dharma,* the Buddhist conception of the nature of the universe, to the people. He is the model of the Buddhist universal king, embodying the social and political values of a Buddhist state.

Contemporary Schools

Four schools of Buddhist political theory may be singled out as typifying different approaches. In late nineteenth-century Sri Lanka and Burma, Buddhism became a basis for nationalist opposition to Western ideas and values. Concepts of history and popular education developed from this, as did the engagement of the monks in social reform. In the twentieth century in both countries, socialism provided a discourse for Buddhist political and social engagement.

The Kyoto School of thought in Japan, which flourished in the 1930s and is most closely associated with the name of Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945), sought to use Buddhism in both understanding and defining politico-historical processes in Japan before World War II. It was very abstruse. Although it was tarnished by its ambiguous response to World War II, both scholars and philosophers began late in the twentieth century to reevaluate its contributions.

In Thailand, the writings of the monks Buddhadasa (1908–1993) and Prayudh Payutto have led to speculation in the realm of political thought and in experimentation in social action. The secular social activist Sulak Sivaraksa has paid considerable attention to the concept of justice in the Buddhist context.

The last remaining officially Buddhist state in the world, the kingdom of Bhutan, has for 20 years or more been developing a theory of Gross National Happiness. Deeply rooted in Buddhist values, the state seeks to develop both theory and practice that will modernize and develop the country's culture and institutions without betraying its Buddhist worldview. It rests on the "four pillars" of equitable and sustainable socioeconomic development, the preservation and promotion of the culture, environmental conservation, and good governance.

Mention must also be made of the primarily Western, more specifically North American, "engaged Buddhism," which seeks to apply Buddhist principles to sociopolitical action but has not contributed significantly to theory itself.

Theoretical and Practical Issues

As a work in progress, there is no theoretical issue that Buddhist political theory does not have to confront. For example, is there a place for something like the Western concept of the individual to develop in Buddhist theory? Can Western concepts such as rights, equality, law, justice, and democracy be adapted within Buddhist political thought? And should they be? How do these concepts apply to all sentient beings, most particularly to animals? Women and ethnic minorities pose particular problems for Buddhists because traditionally gender has constituted different orders of beings, and ethnicity was never a Buddhist concept.

Equally important: How should Buddhist political theory respond to globalization? Industrialization? Capitalism? What are the implications of the imposition of Western law, legal processes, and judgment in place of traditional mediation practices? Do they inflict harm in the form of dissatisfaction on the part of losers and unbalanced gratification on the part of winners?

Buddhist political theory has played, and continues to play, a large role in demarcating Western from non-Western thought in Asia and in negotiating the interaction between Buddhism and the West. Its future path will depend largely on its relationship to institutional, economic, and social development and on communication among various schools of Buddhist thought.

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See also Asian Values; Colonialism; Culture; Development; Imperialism; Modernization Theory; Universal Monarchy; Virtue

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Bureaucracy

A bureaucracy is an organization characterized by hierarchy, fixed rules, impersonal relationships, strict adherence to impartial procedures, and specialization based on function. Bureaucratic organizations can be found in the private sector as well as the public sector. This definition of bureaucracy as a type of organization overlaps with other ways in which the word is used. Bureaucracy can be used as a synonym for a hierarchic mode of coordination—a usage based on the hierarchical nature of such coordination. It can be used as a synonym for the public administration—a usage that suggests the public sector is the archetype of a hierarchic organization. It can refer to the bureaucrats who work in the public sector or other large, hierarchic organizations. And it can describe bureaucratic conduct that rigidly applies general rules to

particular cases—a type of conduct associated with officials in hierarchic organizations.

Historical Contexts

Etymologically bureaucracy combines *bureau,* which referred to a place of work for officials, with *-cracy,* which was the Greek term for a pattern of rule. Vincent de Gournay, an eighteenth-century economist, introduced the word *bureaucracy* as an addition to the classic typology of government systems: It was a form of government in which officials dominated.

Although the word bureaucracy first arose in the eighteenth century, social scientists have been quick to apply it to earlier times. They have argued that the Egyptian monarchy created a bureaucratic system to build waterworks projects throughout its empire; that the Romans used bureaucratic systems to govern their vast territories; or that the monarchs of medieval and early modern Europe used bureaucrats for tax collection, trade regulation, and early forms of policing. Generally, however, bureaucracy retains a clear association with the rise of modern industrial societies. Political scientists often argue that industrialization led to a shift away from small-scale craft production to a system of mass production, and the greater concentration of capital and the rise of factories then led to the rise of the modern bureaucratic corporation. They also often argue that industrialization created a myriad of new and increasingly complex social problems and that from the nineteenth century onward, the state began to establish departments and bureaus to govern and mitigate these problems. Hence, the argument goes, large-scale hierarchic organizations came to dominate both the private and public sectors.

Government bureaucracies expanded for much of the twentieth century. To some observers, bureaucracy appeared to be the ideal organizational type for the performance of complex repetitive tasks: It allowed separate parts of the state to specialize in particular tasks, while providing the center with effective control over each of the parts. Yet, by the late twentieth century, a growing number of critics argued that government bureaucracies had become too big and complex, leading to a lack of responsiveness and to inefficiency. Some critics argued that bureaucracies were inherently unresponsive and inefficient because they were shielded from the disciplines of the market. The backlash against bureaucracy led to attempts to reform government through privatization, internal markets, contracting out, private-sector management practices, and networks.

Theories of Bureaucracy

Max Weber, a German sociologist, has been far and away the most influential theorist of bureaucracy. Weber believed that societies evolved from the primitive and mystical to the complex and rational. He paid particular attention to changing forms of political authority in this process of evolution. In his view, political authorities secured obedience by acquiring various kinds of legitimacy. He identified three types of authority, each of which had a different source of legitimacy. Tribal societies, and also absolute monarchs, rely on traditional authority legitimized by the sanctity of tradition. Military, religious, and other leaders often rely on charismatic authority legitimized by the personal standing of the leader. Finally, rational-legal societies rely on legal authority legitimized by reason. Law defines the obligations and rights of rulers and ruled. Reason leads the ruled to obey the rulers. Weber argued that there was a general pattern of social evolution toward the kind of rational-legal authority found in modern states.

Weber described bureaucracy as the institutional form of rational-legal authority. Bureaucracy does not involve public officials dominating government. It requires only that full-time, professional officials are responsible for the everyday affairs of the state. Elected politicians might formulate policy, but officials implement it. Many aspects of bureaucracy derive, in Weber's analysis, from its rational-legal setting. The dominance of legal authority entails an impersonal rule in which abstract rules are applied to particular cases. Similarly, the dominance of rationality appears in the division of an organization into specialized functions carried out by experts.

Most social scientists endorse something akin to Weber's characterization of bureaucracy. Although Weber thought modern rationality was a mixed blessing, he is often read as claiming bureaucracy as the ideal and most efficient type of

organization, and many critics disagree strongly with such claims.

Critics of bureaucracy often argue that the features of Weber's ideal type have self-defeating consequences. Rational-choice theorists argue that hierarchic organizations encourage bureaucrats to respond to their superiors at the expense of citizens. Neoliberals argue that the emphasis on general rules and stability leads to inertia and to an inability to respond to a rapidly changing environment. Institutionalists argue that the specialization of functions leads to fragmentation; it results in a plethora of subunits, each of which goes its own way, leaving the center facing problems of coordination and control. Yet other critics argue that bureaucracy threatens democracy: Whereas Weber suggested that bureaucracy offered a neutral and technical structure for implementing policies formed by elected politicians, these critics emphasize the impossibility of distinguishing policy implementation from policy formation and so bureaucratic administration from democratic decision making.

Today, Weber's concept of bureaucracy might seem an outdated relic. Certainly, the rational-choice, neoliberal, and institutionalist criticisms of bureaucracy helped to inspire various attempts to replace hierarchies with markets or networks. Still, we should not overemphasize the extent to which the reforms genuinely succeeded in supplanting elder bureaucratic structures. For a start, large parts of the public sector remain heavily bureaucratic. In addition, even when we do find a proliferation of markets and networks, these new organizations still operate within a realm constituted in part by the lingering presence of the bureaucratic state. Finally, bureaucracy appears to be as relevant as ever for organizations that have to impartially process vast numbers of similar, routine cases. We would not want immigration issues, welfare payments, airport security, and the like to depend on the whim of the particular official someone encountered. Hence, even if the state contracts out some of these tasks, the organizations that take them over are likely to appear rather bureaucratic. And there are tasks that we would rather the state did not contract out.

Bureaucracy remains with us. It is likely to do so for considerable time. Critics might say that its persistence reflects institutional inertia and the ability of bureaucrats to defend their fiefdoms. Others might say that bureaucracy persists because of its utility and desirability.

Mark Bevir

See also Accountability; Governance; Organization Theory; State; Weber, Max

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Burke, Edmund (c. 1729–1797)

Edmund Burke was an Irish-born British statesman and writer. He earned some early recognition as a philosophical thinker but spent the bulk of his professional life as a member of Parliament, where he gained prominence for his outspokenness and leadership on controversial issues as well as for the quality of his rhetoric. Today, he is primarily known for the philosophical depth and practical value of his political thought.

Life and Works

Burke was born in Dublin, where his father was an attorney; his mother was descended from old Irish gentry, but her family was of very modest means. Burke's religious background—which may have helped shape his political and philosophical views—has been a subject of some controversy among scholars. His mother and sister were Catholic, whereas Burke, his brothers, and his father were officially members of the (Anglican) Church of Ireland. Given that Burke and his father would have been barred from their careers if they were

Catholic, speculation has existed—in Burke's time and in ours—that the Anglican Church may not have had their full allegiance. As a youth, Burke was educated at a Quaker school.

Burke attended Trinity College in Dublin, where he helped start *The Reformer,* a citywide weekly devoted to the Dublin theater and matters of "taste." He studied law in London but dropped out after his first year and eventually focused on writing. Among his works were two philosophically oriented books: *A Vindication of Natural Society* (1756) and *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757; revised, with an Introduction on Taste, 1759). During this period, he married and had two sons, one of whom died; he also became the editor and principal writer of Dodsley's *Annual Register*.

The *Vindication,* a satire on the works of Henry Saint John, First Viscount Bolingbroke, seeks in part to ridicule the idea of "natural religion" by applying similar arguments to society as a whole. The *Enquiry* has enjoyed more lasting fame; it was widely read throughout much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and was influential in the English Romantic movement. It made a mark on the continent as well, including with Immanuel Kant. In the *Enquiry,* Burke rejects classical or intellectualistic approaches to aesthetics and argues for the immediacy of aesthetic experience. He begins with a discussion of the passions or emotions. An experience of the sublime, linked to the passion of pain, is sharply distinguished from the beautiful; the sublime involves that which is beyond one's control or understanding and is associated with mystery, infinity, power, danger, and so on. Burke also argues that taste is not a form of instinct, even though it usually involves little or no conscious rational deliberation. It is a form of judgment that is shaped through learning and practice.

With a family to support, Burke became a private secretary to a government official; he soon came to the attention of the marquis of Rockingham, leader of the whigs. The whigs, one half of Britain's two-party system, could be characterized as both liberal and conservative. On the one hand, they tended to be associated with the emerging commercial order and free markets, with individual rights, and, especially, with belief in the preeminence of parliamentary power over that of the king. On the other hand, at that time, most whigs, including Rockingham and Burke, saw value in monarchy and in a significant role for the landed gentry and were more interested in preserving than in changing British society. In 1765, Rockingham placed Burke in a "pocket borough" parliamentary seat. In 1774, Burke was put up for one of Bristol's competitive seats in Parliament, which he won. His *Speech to the Electors of Bristol* (1774) is considered a classic articulation of what is sometimes called the trustee approach to political representation. At the time, it was common for MPs to be asked to follow specific instructions given by their electors. Burke argued that Parliament was not a "congress of ambassadors" and that it was his duty to exercise his own judgment and to participate in deliberations to develop good public policy for his electors and for the entire nation. (The idea that MPs should consider the interests of nonconstituents would support a theory of *virtual representation* advanced by Burke in 1782.) Although his speech is still widely read Burke was punished with defeat when he stood for reelection. Rockingham returned him to a pocket borough, where he remained until he retired from Parliament in 1794. Burke was often a key strategist and policy articulator for the whigs; he is given some credit for helping develop party government theory.

Once Burke entered Parliament, his more scholarly or nonpolemical writing stopped. However, his parliamentary speeches and writings fill many volumes, much of his correspondence has been preserved, and he published several important political pamphlets and his famous *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). Ironically, although Burke is best known today as a political philosopher or theorist, he did not write a single work of political theory per se. His reputation is largely derived from the fact that many of his practical political writings and speeches are rich with political-philosophical content. Because he does not explicitly lay out a systematic philosophy, Burke can be a challenge to political theorists. However, consistent themes and sophisticated ideas can be drawn out of his works, especially when they are taken as a whole. It is impossible to treat Burke's copious writings comprehensively here, but some highlights can be briefly addressed.

Early in his parliamentary career, Burke became a leader on issues involving the American colonies, giving several speeches on the subject, including his *Speech on Conciliation with America* (1775). In his American works, Burke argues that, for historical reasons, the political cultures of America and Great Britain have become different, and that Parliament should accommodate those differences. In addition he faults Parliament for upsetting the status quo through its impositions of taxes on people already subject to Britain's mercantilist trade restrictions. Notably, he maintains that by telling the Americans that their policy objections constitute "treason" and "rebellion," Parliament is helping to transform them into rebels. Burke also argues that it is foolish for Parliament and the Crown to fixate on their right to impose direct taxes on the Americans; they should abandon such metaphysical questions and instead focus on pursuing good public policy.

In the *Speech on Conciliation,* Burke employs an interesting rhetorical device: He associates past policies with the particular individuals who pursued them, linking their personality traits to the merits of the policies. This reflects his belief that people evaluate and respond to the character of individuals much more readily than to technical matters.

Colonialism or imperialism emerged as an important area of concern and action throughout Burke's career. He was a leader in efforts (as in the American case, largely unsuccessful) to reform British rule in Ireland and India, and his writings and speeches on both of these British holdings are extensive. In the case of Ireland, Burke argued that Britain's extensive network of laws and policies oppressing Catholics appeared to be perfectly designed to transform a healthy society into an ignorant, desperate, and, in today's terminology, atomized mob ripe for revolution. Ireland's "Protestant ascendancy" was bitterly attacked as a narrowly self-interested "plebian oligarchy," which was not a viable substitute for the old Catholic Irish gentry. In the case of India, Burke displayed similar concern regarding the impact of colonial policies on local society and the ultimate consequences for Britain. Burke pursued Indian reform through several mechanisms, including teaming up on legislation with the more radical whig, Charles Fox, and leading a long, ultimately unsuccessful crusade to impeach and remove the Governor-General of Bengal, Warren Hastings.

Several notable themes emerge in Burke's treatment of Indian policy. He contrasts Britain's relative youth with the venerable culture of India, deserving of respect. He maintains that any system of law imposed on a people from the outside, no matter how sound, would strike that people as tyrannical. Although Burke argues that Britain must adjust its laws to reflect cultural differences, he also denounces "geographical morality," the idea that British moral and ethical standards need not apply in India. To bolster his position, he refutes the belief that Asian governments are necessarily characterized by tyrannical or arbitrary rule. Traditional and religiously based societies such as those typically found in Asia actually constrain rulers and provide a measure of stability and protection to subjects, he says. Although Asian regimes are imperfect, it is under the British that India is being governed almost lawlessly, primarily by young men who spend just a few years there seeking their fortunes and who establish no ties to the people. In contrast, previous conquerors became rooted in the place; they also sought to provide for their posterity and do right by their ancestors and therefore tempered their behavior. The young men of the East India Company pose a danger to Britain as well as India, Burke said, because they are likely to maintain their arrogant and disrespectful habits once they return home with wealth.

Burke's sympathies for Britain's colonial subjects helped earn him a reputation as a reformer and as a fighter against abuses of power. It is, however, important to recognize that a conservative streak runs through the reformist efforts described above. Burke's conservatism is more obvious in his opposition to efforts to reform parliamentary representation in 1782 and, most notably, in his response to the French Revolution and to the phenomenon of Jacobinism. When Burke came out against the revolution, it was still popular in Britain, especially among the whigs; the issue would divide his party. Burke's strident denunciation of the revolution dismayed many, including Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft, who would publish (respectively) *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792) and *A Vindication of the Rights of Men* (1790) partly in response to the *Reflections*. However, as violence escalated and

reports of various crises in France grew, Burke's early critique appeared prescient.

Political-Philosophical Significance

The fact that Burke never wrote any political-philosophical treatises has contributed to a diverse variety of interpretations of his political theory and its significance. Elements of Burke's thought that are universally recognized are his attention to history and his emphasis on the particular situation, rather than on abstract maxims, when formulating policy. Burke's tendency to focus on particulars has led some commentators to find that he has no meaningful political theory at all; this is somewhat ironic, given that in his own day, some claimed that he was too much a philosopher to be a practical politician. In the early twentieth century, some commentators praised what was pragmatic and utilitarian and modern about him—employing such terms more in their conventional than philosophical senses. By the mid-twentieth century, such praise had turned to criticism. Leo Strauss argued that Burke's thought is characterized by historicism and a denigration of reason, which is ultimately nihilistic; hence he represents a part of modernity's problem. Such views helped trigger the emergence of an opposing "natural law school" of Burke interpretation, which holds that his thought is in fact morally centered and is, like much traditional Western thought, based on such ideas as God, reason, and truth. Although this understanding has been subject to some criticism, it has enjoyed broader support than nihilistic interpretations.

The mid-century resurgence of interest in Burke coincided with the emergence of a self-consciously conservative intellectual movement in the United States. Some saw in Burke's thought a philosophical grounding for Anglo American conservatism. Conservatives intensified the focus on Burke's counterrevolutionary writings; a passage in his public *Letter to a Noble Lord* (1796) is especially noteworthy. There he discusses "metaphysicians," by which he means ideological, abstractly oriented, revolutionary political thinkers who are willing to inflict tremendous suffering in the name of some hypothetical, distant future good. The experience of the twentieth century's totalitarian horrors, and Marxist movements and regimes especially, made Burke once again seem prescient. Some critics have derided the conservatives' Burke as the "Cold War Burke," but conservative interest in Burke goes far beyond anticommunism. Notably, Burke's thought has been much more closely associated with traditional conservatism than with neoconservatism.

Not surprisingly, much conservative interest in Burke is derived from his emphasis on tradition and his frequent preference for the old over the new. To Burke, established practices and structures are the product of the wisdom of generations, and we change them at our peril. Human nature and society are not easily understood; consequently, it is difficult to anticipate the impact of changes, so we are better off sticking with the tried and true and attempting small, gradual improvements only. This argument emphasizes the limits of human reason in addressing social and political problems. While this line of reasoning is explicitly articulated by Burke, it should not be taken as the essence of his thought. It is problematic, both as a political theory and as an explanation of Burke's policy positions. Burke's political thought is actually more subtle and sophisticated than this; relationships to such philosophers as George Berkeley, David Hume, and Adam Smith are evident, although so much of Burke's thought is unique that he should not be closely associated with any other particular thinker.

One may argue that the idea of Burkean conservatism is best understood as a desire to conserve a sense of order and meaning; this sense helps to moderate behavior and hence helps make possible a stable and healthy—and perhaps liberal—polity. Burke's key political test, therefore, becomes not whether a policy or social structure is old or new, or whether the proposed change is dramatic or incremental, but whether the change is likely to weaken or strengthen the framework of meaning that underpins society and the state.

Burke's thought represents a partial rejection of the rationalism that was coming to dominate much Western thought. He tends to shun abstractions because, by themselves, such concepts as liberty or rights have little meaning. Meaning arises in historical contexts. Therefore, it is necessary for a statesman both to take particular contexts into account and to take care to preserve cultural frameworks. Without such frameworks,

shared meanings are lost, and a polity is placed at risk of disintegration or tyranny. Those who attempt to reason ahistorically, such as the metaphysicians or ideologues, are not moving to some higher plane but are merely casting aside traditional moral anchors and historical sources of wisdom in favor of an inferior, ad hoc moral-epistemological framework that allows one's will free rein. If society as a whole loses such anchors, the door is opened to "caprice."

Using contemporary language, one may say that, for Burke, judgment often occurs on an intuitive level. Reason, narrowly understood as conscious rational deliberation, is not a privileged way of getting at truth and is in fact usually employed to justify judgments that have already been arrived at intuitively. Burke places great value on feelings; these can be seen as reflecting intuitive judgments. Similarly, he mounts a defense of prejudice as a valuable source of knowledge, norms, and inclinations. Burke believes that we learn largely though imitation and experience (real and virtual), and he places great value on the arts as shapers of moral and political behavior. Burke's aesthetics help shape his politics: If political matters assume a sublime quality—such as by invoking the venerable—a barrier is erected against caprice. He defends church establishment partly on the grounds that it casts a sublime aura over the state, helping to impress upon decision makers the idea that they have a sacred trust that must override their own selfish interests.

An emphasis on subjectivity highlights the more postmodern dimensions of Burke's thought. However, Burke does not reject the idea of the true or the good but appreciates the complexity of the problem of moving toward them. Similarly, he does not reject theorizing or rational deliberation but pays more attention than most thinkers to the contexts (both external and internal) within which these occur. His emphasis on feelings should not be mistaken as an endorsement of the instinctive or primitive; for Burke, culture is of great importance, and civilization represents the flowering of humanity. Although he shares with Jean-Jacques Rousseau a connection to Romanticism, he deplored many of Rousseau's views. He rejects social contract theory and its atomized view of human beings; contracts are for business ventures and not for societies, which stretch over many generations, rely heavily on sentiment, and are all-encompassing, helping make their members who they are. Similarly, he is often (but not consistently) hostile to the idea of prepolitical natural rights to which politics must conform. Burke does not employ these positions in defense of authoritarianism or blind subservience to the past, but in an effort to build and maintain a humane state.

Burke's political thought combines ethical, epistemological, aesthetic, psychological, and sociological elements in a complex manner that blurs the usual lines between the natural and the conventional and between the universal and the particular. His writings and speeches continue to offer a rich blend of philosophical insight and political wisdom.

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See also American Revolution; Conservatism; Culture; Historicism; Imperialism; Jacobinism; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Neoconservatism; Paine, Thomas

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Byzantine Political Thought

We call Byzantines people who thought of their civilization as the seamless continuation of the Roman Empire. They called themselves Romans (*Rhomaioi*) and their monarch the emperor of the Romans (*basileus tōn Rhomaiōn,* with variations). Their history is conventionally dated from the foundation of Constantinople (modern Istanbul)

on the site of the old Greek city of Byzantium by the first Christian emperor, Constantine I in the fourth century CE. It ended definitively more than a millennium later with the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks, which claimed the life of the emperor, Constantine XI Palaiologos (1449–1453). This entry briefly sketches certain key themes and broad outlines under the headings of Byzantine exceptionalism, the Roman imperial legacy, the imperial office, and relationships between emperors and subjects.

Byzantine Exceptionalism

Byzantines characteristically sought to demonstrate continuity with the past and to seek precedents and exempla that were adaptable to present circumstances. Theirs was an exceptionalism founded on the concept of *taxis,* an encompassing social, ecclesiastical, and political ideal denoting hierarchical order, stability, and harmony—qualities that, by their lights, distinguished their society from others and signaled their proximity to the divine. Hence, Byzantines stigmatized those outside their empire, including fellow Christians, as barbarians (*barbaroi*) even as they asserted their emperor's presumptive sovereignty over the entire inhabited world (*oikoumenē*). Although it is tempting to impute timelessness and stasis to Byzantine civilization in general and to the political thought of the Byzantines in particular, this runs the risk of reproducing rather than critically examining their ideology. What instead should be emphasized is the facility with which particular thinkers, representing official, ecclesiastical, and independent perspectives, engage with the totality of their tradition to marshal responses to recurrent issues and to address novel challenges.

A key constitutive element of Byzantine political consciousness can be found in the idea of a universal monarch enthroned amid his subjects within a world capital. This consciousness was cemented in the successive Avar-Persian and Arab sieges withstood by Constantinople in the seventh and eighth centuries; it was resilient enough to survive the city's capture by the Fourth Crusade in 1204 and was vindicated in its restoration in 1261. Two additional aspects of Byzantine identity, Orthodox Christianity and Hellenic language and culture, outlasted the empire itself.

The Roman Imperial Legacy

Constantine I ruled over a Mediterranean-wide empire in which Latin predominated as the language of administration and culture in the west and Greek in the east. By the eighth century, however, Byzantium's geopolitical reach was effectively limited to Asia Minor, the Balkans, and, until the early eleventh century, southern Italy and Sicily. The imperial court cultivated an elaborate and classicizing Greek. Byzantium's claim to the Roman imperial legacy did not go uncontested: Charlemagne was crowned emperor of the Romans by the pope in 800 CE and recognized as emperor of the Franks by the Byzantines in 812; later the imperial title was claimed by Symeon of Bulgaria (893–927), by the German emperors beginning with Otto I (962–973), and by the Serbs under Stefan Uroš IV Dušan (1345–1355). Periods of prosperity, notably under the emperors Basil II (976–1025) and Manuel I Komnenos (1143–1180), alternated with periods of misrule and military setbacks, culminating in the disaster of 1204. Of three successor states established in the aftermath, one, the empire of Nicaea in western Asia Minor, succeeded in recovering Constantinople from the Latins; the second, later known as the despotate of Epirus in northwestern Greece, maintained a separate existence under Greek rulers with the subimperial title of *despotai* down to 1318; the third, the empire of Trebizond on the southeast coast of the Black Sea, held out against the Ottomans until 1461. By the middle of the fourteenth century, the empire itself scarcely extended beyond the hinterlands of Constantinople and outposts at Thessalonica and in the Peloponnesus.

Even as the Byzantines' military and economic power fluctuated, a comparatively high level of prestige and sophistication coupled with effective diplomacy long enabled Constantinople to exercise soft power over its western and eastern rivals and a Byzantine commonwealth of independent central European and Eurasian powers linked by common cultural and religious ideals. In the Byzantine reckoning, the emperor of the Romans stood at the head of a hierarchy of states organized on the analogy of a family. Degrees of affinity were carefully delineated; Constantinople dealt with the Sasanian Persians, and subsequently with the Arabs, on a fraternal basis,

whereas relationships with the Franks and the pope were at a distinctly more collateral remove.

The Imperial Office

Byzantium produced little in the way of systematic constitutional theory or political philosophy. With rare exceptions, the authors of the relevant literary and documentary sources, drawn for the most part from the milieu of the civil service and the upper echelons of the clergy, were unconcerned with conceptualizing alternatives to monarchy or interrogating the ideological underpinnings of their political and social order. They focused instead on distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power and reflecting on the purposes and responsibilities of government. Rhetorical training modeled on specimens of classical and late antique oratory provided the foundation for the discourse of these elites. Accordingly, the media through which politics and policy were articulated included the ornate prefaces that adorned official documents, whether acts of general legislation or individual charters and privileges; panegyrics or encomia; works of historiography; ecclesiastical writings and sermons; letters and treatises; and the hortatory and didactic works known as "mirrors of princes."

Formal ceremonies, of which literary descriptions and pictorial representations are extant, were another critical vehicle for the enactment and reaffirmation of political relationships and ideas. Solemn processions marked the progression of the calendar and expressed thanksgiving or penitence as circumstances might dictate. A symbolic topography linked the palace and the hippodrome, sites of interaction between the emperor and his subjects and of displays of imperial preeminence before foreign delegations, with the great church of Hagia Sophia and the city's many other holy places, at which the emperor's status as a layman required him to acknowledge the prerogatives of the clergy. Itineraries marking, for example, a triumphant emperor's entry into his capital not only deployed the city's public spaces and its monuments to contextualize the moment but also signaled, by means of a sequence of pauses and changes of vestments and of modes of conveyance, the transition from war to peace and the reintegration of the monarch with his people.

The imperial office was in principle elective and distinguishable from both the individual who occupied it and the state over which it ruled, in spite of a dynastic impulse usually shared by emperors and subjects alike. Emperors frequently nominated family members (generally, sons) as imperial colleagues and otherwise marked them as successors. Imperial women played a crucial role in assuring dynastic continuity and legitimacy and often in exercising effective power behind the scenes, but they were also capable of wielding the emblems of authority and in some cases—notably, those of Irene (797–802) and the sisters Zoe (1042) and Theodora (1042, 1055–1056)—of ruling in their own names. An imperial child "born in the purple" (*porphyrogennētos*—i.e., within the reign) could be regarded as having been Providentially marked for greatness. Yet, the chronic instability of the throne—by the count of Louis Bréhier, 65 emperors were unseated forcibly, while 39 concluded their reigns peacefully, in the period 395–1453 CE—attracted the notice of foreign observers. Barely a handful of dynasties outlasted a century; the most successful, the Macedonian (867–1056), included five generations of direct male and female descendants from its founder, Basil I (867–886).

The armed forces, the imperial household, the large and centralized bureaucracy, and the clergy were all capable of emerging as centers of influence and resistance. Emperors contended with powerful aristocratic factions whose power was generally based in the land and whose precedence at court was largely determined, in the period prior to the Komnenian dynasty (1081–1185), by the hierarchy of civil and military offices and institutions and subsequently by lineage. The extent to which these and subsequent changes, particularly with respect to the granting of territories and other exemptions and privileges that become especially apparent in the fourteenth century and thereafter, are indicative of the feudalization of later Byzantium is much disputed. Usurpations were a danger in every period. The successful usurper, after all, could also claim the mandate of Providence. The absence of a regular plan of succession and the inability to remove an unsuitable monarch short of outright rebellion ensured that the orderly transmission of power could not be taken for granted.

Ceremonies and the acclamations that were an integral part of them were calculated to demonstrate and continually to reaffirm the universal consensus on which legitimacy and authority depended. Recent scholarship has emphasized as real the possibility that such a legitimizing affirmation might be subverted or withheld, although a tendency toward formalization and orchestration is apparent with the passage of time. Accounts of imperial accessions stress the cooperation of the constitutive elements of society—the people, as represented by the assembled masses in the hippodrome, as well as the army, palatine officials, and the patriarch—in making manifest the operation of Providence in providing a ruler of the Romans for the world. From the seventh century onward, coronation typically occurred in Hagia Sophia and was performed by the senior emperor or, in the absence of an emperor, the patriarch; anointing, a critical element in Western accessions, is securely attested only from the thirteenth. Loyalty oaths asserted a commonality of interests between emperors and subjects.

Emperors and Subjects

The making of an emperor represented the confluence of the divine will and the unanimous choice of the governed. It effected the ratification and conferral of absolute power on the recipient, who was expected to govern in the interest of his or her subjects. Well before Constantine's conversion to Christianity, Roman emperors had displayed their power in a manner that increasingly emphasized their majesty and controlled access to the imperial presence. They permitted themselves to be addressed as "master" (*despotēs*) and claimed sacredness as an imperial attribute. This style of governing was familiar and undoubtedly welcome to a populace for whom strong central authority was less often to be deplored than either the more narrowly self-serving interests of local potentates or the potential for outright disorder. The emperor was supreme military commander, legislator, and judge, steward of both public finances and a vast private patrimony. He played a supervisory and administrative role in the church, including the appointment and investiture—and in many instances the deposition—of the patriarch of Constantinople, which is now generally considered to fall short of the "caesaropapism" that was once a preoccupation of modern scholarship.

When Christians depicted the kingdom of heaven, they found ready to hand an analogue in the splendor and pageantry of the imperial court. In a similar fashion, monotheistic universalism and the process by which it came to be dogmatically defined in orthodox Christianity reinforced and enhanced Roman and Byzantine ideas about monarchy. The terrestrial monarchy (*basileia*) ought to strive to be an approximation or imitation (*mimēsis*) of the celestial. The emperor was God's elect and therefore uniquely the focus of divine favor and the agent of victory, stability, and prosperity. Yet, emperors were also accountable for the powers jointly delegated to them by God and the Roman people. They participated in human fallibility and were necessarily sinners and penitents. The Old Testament supplied parallels: David, above all; also Moses; Saul; Solomon; and the priest-king Melchizidek. As a son of the church, the emperor had a duty to support its clergy and to respect their role in the economy of salvation. He must be Orthodox himself and a defender of Orthodoxy. The few emperors who attempted to intrude on matters of doctrine, as in the disputes over the divine and human natures of Christ or the veneration of religious images or the union of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches, or who tried to claim for themselves a quasi-episcopal or sacerdotal role, did so with scant long-term success.

Discourse on imperial virtues provided a shared framework for justifying and evaluating the manner in which emperors exercised power. Emperors were congratulated for possessing not only the traditional cardinal virtues of courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom but also specifically kingly virtues such as philanthropy, generosity, and clemency. They should be vigilant in responding to the needs of their subjects, yet their demeanor should suggest serenity and the contemplation of eternity.

Imperial initiative was capable of evoking a range of responses. As the inheritor of the Roman legal tradition, which was concerned primarily with the sphere of civil or private law as preserved by the *Corpus iuris civilis* of Justinian I (527–565 CE) and subsequently translated into Greek and

adapted in successive collections, Byzantium upheld an ideal of civil society organized around the observance of legal rules and procedures. Legislation was an imperial prerogative, and the emperor's jurisdiction was in principle unlimited. As the source of law and supreme judge, emperors acknowledged no terrestrial authority superior to their own. They were, therefore, capable of being identified with the Hellenistic epithet "living law" (*nomos empsykhos*), to whom the laws were subordinated. Yet, emperors were also reminded that, inasmuch as their power was unconstrained, the onus was on them to exercise self-restraint: Imitation of divinity entailed observance of legal and moral norms; failure to adhere to customs and expectations risked the charge of innovation, with its connotations of disorder and revolution and intimations of tyranny.

Yet, there was also concern lest strict legalism and moral rigor, an overscrupulous investment in *taxis,* impair the efficacy of the imperial office in responding to circumstances warranting a relaxation of the letter of the law. Such a concession (*oikonomia*) could be justified as an imitation of divine mercy to mitigate unmerited severity or hardship. This kind of flexibility, validated through rhetorical subtlety, enabled Byzantines to maintain their claims to world dominion even as they dealt pragmatically with the challenges confronting them throughout their long history.

At the same time, the diminution of the empire and the attenuation of its multiethnic character from the thirteenth century onward as a result of conflict with Westerners and the Turks contributed to the development of a national consciousness on the part of Greek speakers, who increasingly identified themselves as Hellenes, and to an intensification of interest in classical Greek civilization on the part of Byzantine intellectuals, many of whom would spur the renascence of Greek letters in the West.

Charles F. Pazdernik

See also Barbarians; Empire; Feudalism; Kingship; Legitimacy; Mirror of Princes' Genre; Oaths; Roman Commonwealth; Roman Law; Tyranny; Universal Monarchy

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CALHOUN, JOHN CALDWELL (1782–1850)

In *A Disquisition on Government* John C. Calhoun argued that majority rule inevitably led to majority tyranny and proposed instead a consensual model of government whereby each significant interest enjoys veto rights over collective decisions. He did not believe this would produce anarchy or deadlock but held instead that it would force all groups and interests genuinely to deliberate together and legislate for the common good. Calhoun is significant first for his critique of majority rule and, second, for taking the consensus principle more seriously and exploring its presuppositions more thoroughly than any other theorist before or since.

Calhoun's theory emerged from his experience representing a state (South Carolina) and region (the slaveholding South) increasingly outvoted by a growing Northern majority. In a career spanning four decades, Calhoun served as U.S. representative, secretary of war, secretary of state, vice president, and U.S. senator. He insisted that states had a constitutional right to nullify federal law; this would guarantee policies upon which all states and regions could agree. He claimed states had a constitutional right to secede from the Union but believed a consensus rule would make secession unnecessary. He was strongly committed to slavery, which highlights a general problem with his consensus theory: deciding who counts as an "interest." For Calhoun slaveholders were a legitimate interest entitled to veto rights; slaves were not.

Calhoun's diagnosis of majority tyranny differs from James Madison's treatment in Federalist 10. Madison claimed that in a large republic no single interest would be permanently in the majority. Calhoun argued that over time the dynamics of party competition would create entrenched, regionally based majorities and minorities unlikely to alternate in power. The majority would then monopolize public benefits and impose excessive costs and burdens on the minority; this could be prevented only by arming the minority with veto rights.

The question remains whether Calhoun's proposed cure is worse than the disease. Deadlock was not his goal; he assumed, on the contrary, that collective action was urgently necessary. In his view a minority invoking its veto rights would create a crisis and thereby force enlightened leaders from each interest and section to deliberate together and break the deadlock. In Federalist 10 Madison warned that "enlightened leaders will not always be at the helm." Calhoun's consensus model makes the opposite assumption.

Mutual-veto systems resembling what Calhoun recommended have existed and continue to exist today. Examples include the United States under the Articles of Confederation (1781–1788), the 1998 peace agreement for Northern Ireland, and the 1974 constitution of the ill-fated former Yugoslavia. Calhoun's theory sheds light on their workings, and their effective or ineffective operation, in turn, illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of Calhoun's theory.

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See also Democracy; Federalism; Publius; Slavery in the United States

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Caliphate

The term *caliphate* was used classically in the West to indicate the "successor" to the Prophet Muhammad, while the Arabic term *khalifa* signifies the office or institution of a single ruler and symbolic leader of the entire Muslim community (*umma*). Rival claims to this office were the source of three early civil wars (*fitna*s) in the first century of Islam, resulting in the creation of sects within Islam based first on loyalty to rival claimants and ultimately on diverging conceptions of the meaning and authority of the office itself. (There are multiple transliterations of Arabic words, but this entry uses some of the most common.)

Khalifa: In the Qur'an

The word *khalifa* or its plural appears in the Qur'an either in relation to prophets (Adam, David, Noah; see Q. 2:30, 38:26, 7:69) or in relation to humanity as a whole, as in Q. 6:165: "For, He it is who has made you *khalifas* on the earth, and has raised some of you by degrees above others, so that He might try you by means of what He has bestowed upon you." (See also Q. 10:14, 10:73, 35:39, and 27:62.) In all of these usages the word can suggest vicegerent or inheritor. Thus, that the "sons of Adam" at large are seen as God's vicegerent or inheritor implies their mastery over the Earth and entitlement to its bounty.

Classical Views on the Caliphate

Doctrines of Rightful Claims to the Caliphate

The early consensus views held the Caliph (or, Imam) as crucial to salvation because he gave the community legal status and guided it. The Muslim community was thus regarded as a vehicle of salvation. The assassination of the third Caliph ('Uthman) in 656 raised for the first time the question of who is the Imam of guidance and who the Imam of error. If 'Uthman had been an Imam of guidance, then his successor 'Ali (r. 656–661) would be a usurper and the community following him unbelievers. Yet if he been an Imam of error, then he had forfeited the Caliphate, rendering 'Ali a legitimate Imam. These questions were never resolved to the satisfaction of all Muslims.

In the long run, the basic divide was between those who held doctrines of *inheritance/legitimism* and those who held doctrines of *merit*. Hybrid doctrines involved restricting the election of the most meritorious to a particular family or tribe, whether the Prophet's tribe (the Quraysh) at large, or his own house (*ahl al-bayt*).

1. *Umayyads* (r. 661–750) grounded their right to rule in the legitimacy of 'Uthman and their right to avenge their kin's death. Their rule represented a restoration of the practice of selection through tribal council (*shura*) of the best man from among the Quraysh. They gave two justifications for their return to dynastic succession: (1) Each ruler was asserted to be in fact a man of unsurpassed merit, indeed, the best man of his age. (2) Their successful acquisition and retention of power was said to suggest both this merit and God's will, a politicization of the prevailing deterministic theology.

2. *Shi'ites ('Alids)* grounded right government in right lineage, specifically the house of the Prophet Muhammad through 'Ali and his wife Fatima. The 'Alids became *the* Shi'ites and *the* party of opposition and protest only after the 'Abbasids emerged as a dynasty from a different branch of the Prophet's Hashimite clan. Under the Umayyads, Hashimite Shi'ism refers to the general opposition based on the popularity of the Prophet's wider clan. Emerging after the 'Abbasid revolution, followers of 'Alid Shi'ism asserted that 'Ali was

designated Caliph already by the Prophet. This doctrine is called *rafd,* or "rejection" (i.e., of even the first two Caliphs Abu Bakr and 'Umar as usurpers of 'Ali's right). Their line ended at 12 Imams after the 'Abbasids had successfully excluded them politically.

3. *'Abbasids* (r. 750–1258) grounded right government in right lineage, specifically the house of the Prophet through his uncle 'Abbas. Early on in their reign they circulated stories of a designation from 'Ali to the 'Abbasids or alternatively of the bequeathal of the imamate from the Prophet to his uncle 'Abbas. This, incidentally, also implies a doctrine of *rafd* (rejection of the first three Caliphs). They gradually reformulated a doctrine that recognized Abu Bakr and Umar and, later, 'Uthman and 'Ali, resulting in the commonly known "Four Rightly Guided Caliph" thesis. The one and only stable position from beginning to end was that they were members of the Prophet's family (*ahl al-bayt*) who had rendered themselves deserving of the imamate over all other kinsmen of the Prophet by deposing the Ummayads.

4. *Kharijites* were a group of 'Ali's supporters in the war against 'Uthman's kin, who assassinated him for being willing to submit the quarrel to arbitration. Their doctrine of legitimate rule was a radically meritocratic one. Anyone (famously "even an Ethiopian [freed] slave") can be the Imam with no descent criterion whatsoever. They imposed strict election conditions, and some even held that the Imam must be elected unanimously by all Muslims. However, the Caliph must rule Islamically; otherwise, he can be deposed and killed by the community. Some (the same group that insisted on unanimous election) claimed not only that the Caliphate was not necessary but also that it had never existed.

5. *Sunni scholars*. From the beginning of the civil wars there were those who stuck to communal unity and refused to form separatist communities under present or future Imams even though they might regard the present Caliph as sinful. They became much later the Sunnis. They declared the Caliphate elective within the Quraysh to legitimate both the Umayyads and the Abbasids, while distinguishing themselves from Shi'ite hereditary succession. However, communal unity was more important than right government, and the community was formed by acceptance of the guidance left by the Prophet (through the *hadith*), not by any Imam here and now. Sinful Imams were to be endured and passively resisted, not openly rebelled against.

Doctrines of the Role, Status, and Functions of the Caliph(ate)

1. *Initial view*. The Caliph was held to be an "Imam of guidance" crucial to the community's salvation. He is to guide it in both political and religious matters. To be a Muslim is to recognize and follow a true Imam.

2. *Umayyad*. The Umayyads alone in the history of Islam claimed the title of God's deputy (*khalifat allah*) and held that the Caliph gave the community its legal existence, guided it in both religious and political matters, defended it against enemies, sought to expand its domain, maintained internal order, and formulated and exemplified God's law. There were some messianic claims advanced at the time on behalf of certain Umayyad Caliphs, but for the most part, an Umayyad Caliph remained, by and large, an ordinary human being.

3. *Shi'ite ('Alid)*. The Imam was the Messiah in addition to filling all the normal political and religious roles. However, the Shi'ite (Imami) tradition does not require any actual political success for a true Imam to claim the title. Rather, they followed a direct line, from 'Ali (via Husayn), of scholar-Imams in exile.

4. *Kharijite*. A true Imam is both a political and a religious leader (i.e., an Imam of guidance) bound to rule by what God has proclaimed without innovation. Thus, right government is more about how the Imam rules than who he is. This view is similar to the Umayyad and Sunni view, but it gives much more power to the community, to the point of downgrading the Imam.

5. *Sunni scholars*. Around the ninth century the Caliphs ceased representing the transmission of right guidance and became mere guardians of the community. This was retrospectively fixed at the

end of the first four Rightly Guided Caliphs. The scholars took on the role of right guidance, and people no longer needed to model themselves on the Caliph or assure themselves of salvation by paying allegiance to him. Nevertheless, the Caliph preserved a range of important religious roles, including protecting the community, waging jihad, appointing judges, upholding law, carrying out the mandatory punishments, leading prayer, and collecting charitable taxes.

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See also Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr; Averroism; Islamic Modernism; Islamic Political Philosophy; Islamism; Philosopher King

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Canon Law

Anthropological evidence shows that every community develops law of some kind to ensure the well-being and continuance of the group and often to balance the actions and aspirations of the individual with the common good as a whole. What is known as *canon law,* a set of regulations adhered to in different Christian communities, has evolved from the attempts of the earliest Christian communities to do this. The word *canon* comes from the Greek word *kanon,* meaning "rule, standard, or measure," and *law* may be understood as divine or human, discovered through revelation, the use of reason, or both. What makes this aspect of law and governance interesting from a theoretical point of view is the fact that it is voluntary: that individuals and communities make a choice to bind themselves to it.

Early Evolution

The Greco-Roman *domus* was used as a model for the organization of early Christian churches. However, even with this local organization, Christians were aware of the universal nature of the church and its mission. The conversion of the Roman emperor Constantine in 312 CE, with the church gradually assuming a dominant position in society, meant that the church had to adapt or evolve institutions. To some extent there was a parallelism between church institutions and the structure of the Roman state. A structure of authority, with the emergence of a "monarchical" episcopate, aided by presbyters and deacons, was commonplace by the fifth century.

In the first three centuries Christians drew their rules and norms from the Gospels and sacred scripture. Some communities produced handbooks to provide guidance on various aspects of the Christian life, the Didache (the Teaching) being one of the earliest of these. Though these texts were not a compilation of legal enactments, they drew upon the oral tradition, scripture, and practice (and problems arising) for their norms. As Christian communities grew and evolved into more complicated structures, ecclesiastical assemblies emerged, which provided a forum for making doctrinal and disciplinary decisions and establishing norms for local communities. Before the first ecumenical council of Nicaea in 325 CE, there were a number of local councils, which dealt with the alienation of ecclesiastical property; the practice of magic, adultery, and murder; and questions relating to baptism, reconciliation, marriage, Sabbath observance, and rules governing those in positions of ministry. Ecumenical (or general) councils produced credal formulations, established

structures for governance, and agreed on norms for ecclesiastical discipline. The letters of the bishops of Rome and the writings of the Fathers (Athanasius, Cyril, Basil the Great, and Gregory of Nyssa) emerged during the fourth century as other authoritative sources of canons.

By the time Gelasius I became pope (492–496), sources of canonical norms in the West were widely scattered. A Greek, Dionysius Exiguus, who was fluent in both Latin and Greek, arrived in Rome at the end of the century. He compiled three collections of conciliar canons that included those from the councils of Nicaea and Constantinople (381 CE), placing Latin and Greek versions side by side for comparison. He further compiled a collection of papal decretals from Siricius to Anastasius II and combined these four collections into what has become known as the *Collectio Dionysiana*. The work of Dionysius is recognized as having major importance for the later development of canon law in the Latin Church.

A further source of canonical writings was the emperors. Though the earliest period in the church was characterized by persecution from the Roman emperors who feared that the new faith of Christianity would threaten the state religion and undermine their own political power, Constantine the Great's conversion in 312 was a turning point for the Christian Church, with an end to persecution. In 313 a new freedom to openly profess faith and to celebrate liturgy was established by the Edict of Milan, which granted freedom of religion and recognized the church as a corporate body. In the years to 450, the church communities became more formally institutionalized, with church provinces identical with the imperial ones, the emergence of episcopal collegiality in provincial churches, and more specific guidelines for the nomination and appointment of bishops. As well as convening the earliest church councils, emperors from Constantine onward produced a number of documents that addressed questions of internal governance of the community, liturgical issues, issues that might interfere with the unity of the church (heretical assemblies, penalties for heretical groups), and many other varied subjects such as the burial of heretics, decorum in church, episcopal interest in military payment, donations for pious purposes, and segregation of monks and nuns.

Sources

There are a number of sources for canon law. As discussed, *church councils, papal letters, writings of the Fathers of the church,* and *imperial edicts* were some of the earliest sources. Others included the *sacred scriptures* in which Old and New Testament authors were cited as the highest authorities in matters of church discipline; *natural law,* whereby humankind discovers through the use of reason those structures or values that are considered to be of the very essence of things, for example, monogamy in marriage and truth in speech, which were and are often still called upon as bases for rules; *custom,* where long-standing practices within the earliest church communities (e.g., Sunday observance and the celebration of Easter), were taken to be normative; *rules of Religious Orders* such as the Benedictines, Franciscans, and Dominicans, whose constitutions evolved to influence other religious groups and, eventually, the general rules of the church; *civil law,* where it is judged that some harmony needs to exist in canon law because of developments in civil society; and *concordats,* formal international agreements which have historically been negotiated between the Apostolic See in Rome and national governments.

Codification

In the codification of canon law, there were two major figures in the first six centuries. Dionysius was a Scythian monk who came to Rome around 497 and is the first great canonist of the Western Church known by name. His collection and translation of canons and his collection of papal decretals were the first of their kind to gain widespread influence in the Latin Church; all subsequent collections were to be affected by them. His contribution can be summarized thus: (1) He provided for the church in Rome an accurate Latin translation of the Greek conciliar canons and of the canons from Sardica and Africa; (2) he provided a well-ordered collection that was far superior to all that had preceded it in the West; (3) he provided the first canonical collection worthy of the name, because he included only juridical material and omitted other material; and (4) he laid the foundations for the serious study of canon law. Justinian was Roman emperor from 527 to 565. Early in his

reign Justinian promoted a wide-ranging legislative reform that would be important for the development of both civil and canon law. In 529 he promulgated a codex of constitutions. He then commissioned a collection of excerpts from the writings of famous classical Roman jurists, and he ordered the publication of a manual for students of law (the *Institutiones*). These three books became known as the *Corpus Iuris Civilis,* intended to be a unified body of already existing Roman law. His code enabled Roman law to become more available in the East and the West and became one of the sources for the development of canon law.

In the twelfth century two key figures emerged: Gratian and Theodore Balsamon. Though little is known about Gratian, it is agreed that he lived around the mid-twelfth century and died before the Third Lateran Council was held in 1179. It is generally accepted that he was the first to teach canon law as an autonomous science. Having inherited an array of law sources, he compiled the canonical collection that he called the *Concordia discordantium canonum* (Concord of Discordant Canons), a work usually known as the *Decretum*. Though never formally promulgated by the church, the *Decretum* was accepted as the basic canon law textbook in the law schools of Europe and was a valid law book in the Catholic Church until 1917. The importance of Gratian's text is reflected in the title given to him as "the father of the science of canon law." Historians of canon law are unanimous in viewing his work as a foundation for successive generations in studying and practicing canon law. He created a collection that was organized differently than any earlier collection. His systematic and logical ordering of documents ensured that the *Decretum* provided a basis for future collections, and it was the first synthesis of canon law that was universally applicable. Theodore Balsamon (d. 1195) was a canonist of the Greek church, in which he was a deacon *nomophylax* (guardian of the laws). From 1178 to 1183 under the Patriarch Theodosius, he had charge of all ecclesiastical trials or cases. His best work is considered to be his commentary on the *Nomocanon of Photius,* which gave him a reputation and a position in Greek Orthodox canon law similar to Gratian in Western canon law. Balsamon's significance was central in the Byzantine canonical tradition, and his commentary was cited and used even in the post-Byzantine period. His work also influenced Slavic canonical literature.

Further work on codification took place under the auspices of Pope Gregory IX (1227–1241), who, on becoming pope, decided to tackle the problem of multiple canonical texts, some overlapping, others contradictory, which led to uncertainty about the law in force and complicated the teaching and application of canon law. He decided to have a new compilation that would contain only the laws in force, and he appointed Raymond of Penafort to the task. Raymond (c. 1180–1275) had joined the Dominicans in 1223 and was a professor of canon law in Bologna. He was summoned to Rome in 1230 by Gregory and worked on the *Liber Extra* for 4 years (*Decretales Gregorii IX* or *Liber Extra* for short) was promulgated in 1234.

After Gregory IX, his successors (Innocent IV, Gregory X, and Nicholas III) promulgated new constitutions, and inevitably repetitions and contradictions again occurred. Boniface decided to group these decretals into a new collection, together with his own decretals and the canons of the councils of Lyon (1245 and 1274). It also contained the 88 *regulae juris* of Roman law of Dinus Mugellanus, a jurist from Bologna, which were thought to be useful for the interpretation and application of canonical norms. Boniface called this collection the *Liber Sextus*. In the Roman Catholic Church in the twentieth century, two further codifications took place. The Pio-Benedictine Code promulgated in 1917 served the church for more than 60 years. The second was inspired by the insights of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), though not promulgated until 18 years after the end of the council by Pope John Paul II. This new code reflected the rediscovery of the ecclesiology of *communio,* the concept of the church as the people of God, the idea of authority as service, and the participation of all members of the church in the threefold office of Christ.

Canon Law Today

The Roman Catholic Church is by no means the only Catholic Christian tradition to have a Code of Canon Law. The Eastern Catholic Church—comprising 21 Catholic (not *Roman* Catholic) churches, though still in communion with the See of Rome—has its own code, which was promulgated

in 1990. The majority of its canons correspond closely to the Roman code, but there are certain differences in terms of sacraments, hierarchy, and governance. The Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition has its own canons, though it treats many of these as guidelines rather than as absolute laws, as it has a less legislative and juridical model of canon law than does the West. The Anglican Communion as a whole does not have a centralized law, but autonomous member churches have a canonical system dealing with issues such as sacraments, governance, marriage, alteration or alienation of church property, and clergy discipline. The Church of England has a highly developed system of law, while the Episcopal Church in the United States and the Anglican Church in Canada have their own systems. Other denominations have different names for canon law; the United Methodist Church refers to the Book of Discipline, while Presbyterian polity is a system of church governance that is typified by the rule of assemblies of presbyters or elders. Though all have different emphases and structures, their aim is much the same, in that the codes seek to ensure that there is a measure of discipline and order within each ecclesial community.

The Role of Law

The question is sometimes asked as to what is the point of law in a church community, which is a voluntary society founded on love. This point was argued by Rudolf Sohm (1841–1917), an eminent historian and outstanding scholar in civil and canon law. His position was that canon law had no place in a church of charity, law and charity being mutually exclusive, as there was a contradiction between the essence of the church and the concept of law. He argued that the church must be free of laws, this being in continuity with earliest Christianity. His opinions were well received by Protestant theologians, though they found less favor among Catholics. The latter argued that, as well as being a spiritual communion, the church was at the same time an ordered society that required structures and rules necessary to maintain discipline.

However, law should not just be seen as something that prevents or inhibits. Recent popes have proclaimed that law can create a just order, serving communion, and can teach and educate individuals in what they ought to do in order to best fulfill the upbuilding of the community and to communicate God's message to the wider world. It can prevent ethical subjectivity and juridic relativity, and eliminate arbitrariness from ecclesiastical administration, so protecting both superior and subject. Sohm's views, however, are a reminder of the danger of law overshadowing charity, and that all law must be linked to authentic values, with its foundation in Christ, and expressing the life of the Holy Spirit. Anything less renders canon law the equivalent of civil law, without regard to its distinct nature within the church. In essence, canon law, rooted in theological values, should provide the ecclesial community with a measure of order, stability, coherence, and a safeguarding of the common good and the rights of each individual.

Helen Costigane

See also Aquinas, Thomas; Biblical Prophets; Byzantine Political Thought; Civil Law; Common Good; Conciliarism; Divine Right of Kings; Hierocratic Arguments; Rights; Scholasticism

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CHANGE

One cannot think about change in politics without engaging in the debate between Marxism and liberalism. This entry concentrates on the French philosopher Alain Badiou's Marxist contributions to the discussion.

Reform versus *revolution*: Broadly speaking, these are the conceptions of change found in the

two camps. Liberal philosophers counsel the gradual improvement of democratic institutions, whereas the Marxists claim the problems of capitalist society lie at a deep structural level and can be resolved only through the construction of a more equitable economy. The poststructuralist contribution to this debate, at least in France in the mid-1960s, seems to come down to outbidding the Marxists and claiming that the only genuine political change is one that would affect structures even deeper than those of private property and the social organization of production. Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze invoke Friedrich Nietzsche in gestures toward the emergence of a new order of knowledge and thought and attempt to situate their own experiments in writing as auguries of this event. The challenge for Badiou, working in the wake of Marxism, poststructuralism, and the events of May 1968, was to theorize radical political change beyond economic determinism while insisting that such change be both concrete and independent of any philosophical gestures.

Badiou's initial attempt to theorize change occurs in his 1967 article "Recommencing Dialectical Materialism," a review of Louis Althusser's work. Althusser attempts to analyze political change according to the model of an epistemological break where the latter designates transformations of knowledge such as that ensuing from Isaac Newton's discovery of gravity. The immediate implication is that politics is thought of, primarily, as an order of knowledge—knowledge of society and its components, of institutions, and of governmental practices. In Badiou's review of Althusser's project he identifies two difficulties, namely, the lack of a concept of the whole within which the change occurs and the limitation of change to being a reshuffling of elements within a given structure. Rather than ditching Althusser's project Badiou enlists mathematics in order to develop a more complex model of change in knowledge, whether that knowledge is scientific or political. In his most significant early publication, *The Concept of Model,* Badiou explains how change in mathematics occurs through the use of models, where certain theories or "syntaxes" are transposed and tested within various semantic fields to give rise to models of the theory. However, the relation between such gradual production of new mathematical knowledge and the widescale transformations of society that remain the horizon of Badiou's thinking is tenuous at best.

Badiou enlisted psychoanalysis alongside mathematics and Althusser in his treatment of change. He seized on two major ideas in Jacques Lacan's thinking, both found in *Seminar 11:* (1) The real—or the blockages an analysand must encounter in order to effectuate change during analysis—is a moment of impossibility within a symbolic order; and (2) a subject is not given but emerges in praxis, where a praxis, such as psychoanalysis, is the treatment of the real. In his article "Infinitesimal Subversion" Badiou argues that widescale transformations in mathematical knowledge occur when a point of symbolic impossibility is named. That is, a mark that is impossible in one symbolic order, such as the square root of minus one, is given a name (*i* for an imaginary number), thus opening up another possible series of numbers—a new symbolic order. If one transposes this operation to the current French political situation it is the act of naming of migrant workers *as* political subjects who *rightfully* belong to the symbolic order of the French Republic that begins to open up a new political space. Badiou developed this concern with nomination in the late 1960s, and it can be traced through to the present day in the concepts of "evental site" and "intervention" in *Being and Event,* and "event" and "inexistent" in *Logics of Worlds.*

In short, the starting point of change is a structural flaw in a situation, a weak point. This is the first of six fundamental properties of change that can be found in Badiou's mature philosophy. The second property is that the kind of change Badiou concentrates on is maximal; it effectuates a wholescale transformation of its milieu or space. For instance, in *Being and Event* a process of change extends the initial situation by supplementing it with one of its previously indiscernible submultiples. The third property of change for Badiou is that, being neither finite nor measurable, it does not possess a clear end point. In his first major work, *Theory of the Subject,* the dialectical process of division within a political movement is permanent—this, by the way, being Badiou's solution to the Marxist dilemma of the withering away of the state. In *Being and Event,* a generic truth procedure is said to be an infinite multiple. The fourth major property of change in Badiou's sense is that

it is unpredictable; it does not conform to a set program. However, this does not mean that its possible direction cannot be thought. Badiou identifies the various pitfalls and dead ends into which a process of change can fall: In *Theory of the Subject* he condemns leftist and rightist deviations of the Maoist dialectic, and in *Being and Event* he warns of dogmatism or spontaneism overtaking truth procedures. The local unpredictability of a procedure of change does not entail its being completely random at a global level. According to Badiou there are objective constraints upon the process of change that originate in the nature of the situation in which that change unfolds (e.g., see his theory of decision in *Logics of Worlds*). This forms the fifth property of change in his philosophy. The sixth property of change is that it takes place, at a local level, through slow methodical work on the part of militants involving trial and error and the patient examination of elements of the initial situation with regard to the consequences of the initial event or naming that opened up the procedure of change. For example, part of the transformation of French society initiated during the French Revolution concerns the promulgation of universal secondary education, and part of the continuing work of change in the field of education concerns simple questions like "How can collective discipline be ensured or encouraged among students after May 1968?" In Badiou's eyes, it is solely the successful treatment of such eminently practical questions, one after the other, which allows a procedure of political change to take place.

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See also Event; Maoism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Revolution; Structuralism

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Chinese Legalism

"Legalism" is the conventional translation of the Chinese *fajia* (school of law), referring to a tradition of thought and practice that regards law as the principal instrument of governance. Although traces of this school can be found in writings dating to the seventh century BCE, it emerged as an influential body of thought in the fourth and third centuries BCE and came to be associated with the rise of the Chinese imperial state during the Qin and Han dynasties. Representative thinkers are Shang Yang (d. 338 BCE), Shen Buhai (d. 337 BCE), and Han Fei (d. 233 BCE).

Legalism's conception of law, in the standard view, is that law is amoral and an instrument of power, used to strengthen and preserve the state. This emphasis arose from preoccupation with the conditions of social order and the aim, as Han Fei puts it, to rescue all living beings from chaos. For the Legalists, order was not an abstract problem but grew out of their experience during the Warring States period, when many states contended for domination and the threat of war was constant. They wrote, in particular, about the resources needed to strengthen a state against its rivals and thus anticipated the formative period of nation building that began with the Qin dynasty. In the standard view, the ruler is the source of all law and stands above the law, so there are no limits or effective checks on the ruler's power. Law is what pleases the ruler. This conception is most starkly expressed in the writings of Shang Yang, whose regard for human subjects was limited primarily to their value in fighting wars of conquest and expanding the state's territorial control.

This is rule by law, in contrast to rule of law. The latter regards law as constraining the exercise of power, so that it is truly laws that govern legal subjects, not the desires of specific individuals or groups. Rule by law, in contrast, appears within a relationship of domination, where a superior (in power) issues commands to an inferior (in power) and compels the inferior to act by threatening sanctions in the event of noncompliance, or

sometimes rewards in the event of compliance. Thus, law is imperative, taking the form of commands; coercive, in relying on irresistible incentives manipulated by the ruler; preemptory, in taking priority over all other obligations; and morally arbitrary, as no limits exist on what the ruler can demand.

The most sophisticated elaboration of Legalist ideas was by the aristocrat Han Fei, a member of the ruling family in the small state of Han. His essays, collected in what has come to be known as the *Hanfeizi,* address advice not to the ruler per se but to the good, enlightened, benevolent, or sage ruler. This does not mean Han Fei expected the ruler to possess exceptional qualities, either of virtue or intellect. It suggests, rather, that he was elaborating an ideal of legal order, establishing criteria for success or failure in the enterprise. The mediocre ruler, especially, needs the guidance that comes from the correct ideal. Criteria for success or failure are not necessarily moral criteria, but Han Fei is clear that the general welfare is the proper guiding goal: not only peace and harmony but a productive labor force and general prosperity. As a result, the *Hanfeizi* stands somewhat apart from other Legalist writings, with deeper insight into the nature and need of a political morality of governance.

The moral dimension of the *Hanfeizi* has critical as well as constructive components. On the critical side, Han Fei opposes Confucianism and offers an extended critique of the forms of social order based on it. The Confucian view is that right relationships are achieved through respect for authority, not the threat of force. Society is transformed by the virtuous example of an educated elite. Accordingly, Confucians object to rule by law because it depends on punishments and rewards, which reinforce self-interested calculation. These methods circumvent the sense of shame and fail to encourage habits of self-control, thereby undermining moral development. The proper method is rule by virtue rather than by law, to inculcate a sense of appropriate conduct (*yi*) and the rules of propriety (*li*), through education and imitation of exemplary persons.

To this, the *Hanfeizi* objects that Confucian rules of propriety constitute an esoteric body of knowledge requiring extensive study and training. Because only small, select groups are capable of such training, Confucians have a monopoly on interpreting the rules and exemplifying virtue—and then expect deference from everyone else, including the ruler. Indeed, many Confucians measured their status in society by the laws they were exempted from, such as military service, taxes, and corvee labor. Whose interests are actually served by the activities of this educated elite? Han Fei's answer is that they serve private interests, not the public good. In striking language, anticipating the rule of law ideal, he says: "The most enlightened method of governing a state is to trust measures [i.e., laws] and not men [i.e., Confucian ministers]" (Liao, trans. 1959, vol. 2, p. 332). Thus, Han Fei advocates equality before the law. This idea of equality can be understood as a cynical effort to eliminate centers of power that might rival the ruler. In place of the five Confucian relationships, each with its own form of deference, is the singular relationship of ruler and ruled. However, it can also be understood as an attack on the unjust privileges of a social class, for whom family pedigree or social rank was a basis for exemptions from general rules. Where the cynical interpretation requires reading between the lines, Han Fei's moral critique is explicit; he often warns that the Mandarin elite will act to increase its power and wealth, at other people's expense, if the ruler fails to rein them in. The deep inequalities of Confucian society are a continuing source of conflict and injustice.

If Confucianism were all of morality, the *Hanfeizi* would be seen correctly as insisting on the separation of law and morality. But the commitment to equality before the law makes it evident that the ruler's use of law to govern is a fateful, moral choice. The self-restraint of subjects in doing what a rule requires is matched by the lawmaker's self-restraint in adhering to the declared rule. Rule by law requires official faithfulness, to provide the guidance and predictability needed for effective governance. To discard the law one has issued and instead follow one's personal whim would produce disorder; the ruler establishes the standard and then abides by it. Thus, it is not the case that the ruler can change or revoke any law at his pleasure. To the contrary, the enlightened (benevolent, sage) ruler does not inflict punishment upon innocent people or fail to inflict punishment on the guilty. In this and other ways, Han Fei gives

expression to basic principles of legality, such as *nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege* (no crime, no punishment without law).

The Hanfeizi also recognizes that effective legal order depends on the moral agency of subjects. Because laws use general language, they abstract from particulars and take the form of conditional assertions: If someone acts in a specified way, certain consequences will follow. Thus, subjects are not coerced by law unless they act so as to place themselves in violation of it. They do not obtain permission from the ruler before they act; they act by their own lights, considering what official response may occur. In this way, the effective use of law turns on the capacity of subjects to engage in practical deliberation, to make choices, and to take responsibility for what they do.

The excesses of the Qin dynasty—much closer to the model of Shang Yang than to that of Han Fei—produced a permanent reaction in China against a purely Legalist approach to political order. Future dynasties attempted to achieve centralized legal control while using law to protect a moral order constituted by Confucian practices. But the *Hanfeizi*'s emphasis on equality before the law and the moral agency of subjects offers an indigenous resource for elaborating a principled mode of rule by law that addresses the legal situation in contemporary China.

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See also Confucianism

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Chinese Liberalism

China's experience with liberalism (in Chinese, *zi you zhu yi*), understood broadly as a doctrine valuing individual autonomy, personal freedom, and limited government, began over a century ago when Chinese intellectuals identified these values as central to securing the "wealth and power" that enabled Western nations to dominate China militarily and intellectually. Often in tension with ruling ideology—first with the Confucian-dominated values of the imperial state and then with Maoist Communism—liberalism on the Chinese mainland remains primarily an intellectual preoccupation rather than an organizational principle for mainstream politics. Liberal principles continue, however, to inform political ideology in democratized Taiwan and in the former British colony of Hong Kong, and increasingly many contemporary Chinese intellectuals emphasize the similarities rather than tensions of liberalism with "traditional" worldviews like Confucianism.

As a foreign ideology self-consciously imported into China by elites in the late nineteenth century, the term *liberalism* in China identifies a cluster of related views that draw in various ways on classical and late imperial Chinese political thought, including Chinese Legalism and the Confucian "statecraft" (*jingshi* school); contemporary Japanese scholarship that inaugurated the reception of much Western ideology in East Asia; and Anglo-American, French, and German traditions of liberalism. The term *liberalism* itself is a reverse loanword, created by Japanese translators from classical Chinese roots and reimported into China by returning students. The word for "liberty" in Chinese, *zi you,* literally translates as "do-as-you-will," evoking strong overtones of Daoist beliefs as well as a degree of heterodox libertinism.

The Chinese political and intellectual movements identified by participants or observers as "liberal" can be classified along four strands, whose historical and ideological overlaps are marked but not exhaustive. In rough chronological order of their emergence, these strands are (1) the importation and application of European classical liberal political ideologies by court intellectuals and treaty-port compradors in the late nineteenth century, and the subsequent

development of this liberal trend in the early years of the Chinese republic (1911–1919) and into the 1930s; (2) the rise of liberal individualism during the May Fourth student movement of the 1920s, largely informed by the pragmatic philosophy of the influential social critic Hu Shi; (3) the revival of interest in both of these prior liberal schools, intersected with new interests in market liberalism and social democracy after the Cultural Revolution and during the "reform and opening up" under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s; and (4) the retrospective recognition by Western sinologists of a protoliberal tradition in imperial China, which draws attention to the indigenous discourses of individual autonomy and limited government championed by late Imperial scholar-officials like Huang Zongxi.

Qing- and Republican-Era Liberalism: Constitutionalism, Individual Rights, and Local Self-Government

The first self-conscious advocacy of a liberal political program in China did not appear until the late nineteenth century, when monarchical advisors, including Tan Sitong, Kang Youwei, and Liang Qichao, formulated a constitutional reform program to shore up the flagging monarchy. Inspired by Chinese thinkers of the late Imperial "realist" and "statecraft" schools, their policy prescriptions were given concrete shape by German and British liberal doctrines. Urging regime change along the lines of Britain's constitutional monarchy, these reformers endorsed dramatic revision or abolishment of the imperial civil exam system, a federal political organization, and various other measures designed to check the centralized power of the Qing court and secure some measure of civil liberties to the Chinese people. When their plans met with tragic defeat in 1898 at the hands of the Qing court, the survivors fled abroad and continued to develop their reformist agendas in exile. While in Japan, Liang Qichao and other sympathetic intellectuals exploited the emerging capacities of Chinese-language print media to argue that freedom of speech, a multiparty government system, and promotion of local self-government would strengthen the Chinese nation-building project, not weaken it in the face of foreign incursion as some contemporaries feared. Their theoretical work was aided by Yan Fu's influential translations of key works of British and French liberalism, including John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty,* Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws,* and Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*.

When the Revolution of 1911 ended China's dynastic system, liberal constitutionalism rose to political ascendency for the first and what was to be the last time on the Chinese mainland. Struggling to sustain the new republican government, intellectual activists like Zhang Shizhao and Song Jiaoren developed the constitutional program of prerevolutionary intellectuals in both practical and theoretical ways. Recognizing the growing influence of radicalism on Chinese politics, Zhang and his followers advocated broad toleration for opposing opinions and a multiparty parliamentary system. Anticipating the individualist thought that would dominate the 1920s, these thinkers argued more explicitly for individual rights against the state than did earlier Chinese liberals, who had urged a more group-centered ethic attentive to social obligations and public commitments.

Liang, Yan, Zhang, and their colleagues exercised seminal influence on what became, in ensuing decades, a formative discussion in China over the extent to which Western values could inform or supplant indigenous Chinese political culture. Although soon eclipsed by more radical movements that urged total Westernization and destruction of China's Confucian heritage, the liberal program these thinkers promoted was taken up later by Zhang Dongsun and Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang). Throughout the mid-twentieth century, these two thinkers and their followers promoted constitutional democracy as a viable alternative to party tutelage under the Nationalists or authoritarian control under the Communists. Their focus on incremental, consensus-based, and politics-centered reform distinguished their liberalism from more radical versions, whose transformative goals implied dramatic interventions not only in politics but also in popular culture and social organization.

Radical Liberalism: The "New Culture" and May Fourth Movements

On May 4, 1919, a student protest against the ceding of Chinese territory to Japan by the Versailles

Treaty initiated a reassessment of China's attitude to its past in the face of Western modernity and domination. The May Fourth Movement, as this reassessment came to be called, rejected the earlier liberal emphasis on piecemeal reform and constitutionally limited, elite-led government, but its own brand of liberalism remained indebted to the categories and concerns of late Imperial and early Republican liberal debates.

Convinced that the individual rights and political progress urged by early liberals could not advance on the basis of China's "traditional" political culture, May Fourth activists urged young people to "destroy the Confucian shop" that, in their view, shored up social hierarchies, inhibited individual growth and personal expression, discouraged scientific inquiry, and crippled necessary social transformation in the name of adhering to ancient sagely models. Among the most radical yet enduringly influential May Fourth reforms was language vernacularization, which reflected the deeply populist ideals of this brand of liberalism. The vernacularization movement demanded that classical Chinese—the dense and highly allusive written language that dominated Chinese political and literary discourse for nearly two millennia—be replaced by the "plain speech" (*bai hua*) spoken by most ordinary Chinese. It was believed that this change would not only enable non-elites to better access politically relevant written materials, and thus facilitate their entry into politics, but also change the system of values in Chinese thought and literature, bringing them into closer alignment with the lived experiences of China's masses rather than those of educated elites.

This anti-Confucian, populist, and pro-science rhetoric was greatly influenced by a faith in Western Enlightenment principles, as well as by the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey, who, during an extended trip to China in 1919–1921, urged the Chinese to adopt a more critical and socially engaged stance toward their history and culture. His most prominent Chinese student, Hu Shi, was instrumental in translating this progressive liberal thought for a Chinese audience, including an elaboration of how China's history and culture could support a pragmatic, liberal project. Rather than engage in the directly political action that usually occupied Chinese intellectuals, however, Hu suggested that China's elites should work on reforming Chinese culture and social organization from the ground up, and focus on the truth yielded by rational inquiry and practical experimentation.

May Fourth liberalism remained influential throughout the 1930s and 1940s, but its capacity as a practical reform program was truncated by the communist victory in 1949, when many of its adherents fled to Taiwan. In 1958 Hu was elected president of Academia Sinica, the Chinese Academy of Sciences reestablished by the Nationalist government on the island. He and other liberal intellectuals in Taiwan—including Yin Haiguang, Lin Yusheng, and Fu Sinian—continued their revisionist research into traditional Chinese popular culture and thought as well as Western liberalism. The extent of their legacy, along with that of the earlier Republican-era liberals, was to become clear only decades later, when academic discussions became less subject to the strictures of the Communist state ideology.

Liberalism After the Cultural Revolution

After the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution (1967–1976), in which intellectuals were labeled "bourgeois" elements and subjected to torture and imprisonment as part of a power struggle within the Communist leadership, liberalism once again emerged as a viable alternative to reigning ideology. Rule of law was given special emphasis in the new liberal program, as legal and political theorists urged an end to the arbitrary "rule of man" policies that, in their view, resulted in the lawless chaos of the previous decade. These liberals drew increasingly from Qing- and Republican-era constitutional thought, sketching out policies for incremental, consensus-based change as well as legal protection for civil liberties.

Another major liberal trend that emerged in the 1980s was an unprecedented support for laissez-faire economic policy. Never before a central tenet in Chinese liberalism, due perhaps to a long-standing Chinese tendency to view commercialism as promoting greed, free markets and consumerism emblematized China's growing economic power. The liberal principles of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman entered Chinese discourse both through translations and through the work of Chinese scholars, such as Li Qiang,

whose liberalism was informed by study at U.S. and European universities. May Fourth liberalism also enjoyed a small resurgence, as the social democracies of northern Europe provided inspiration and counterexamples to liberals less sanguine about economic expansion in the wake of the Asian economic downturn.

In the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, liberalism in China met new challenges in the form of postmodernism, globalization, and "crony capitalism"—all of which undermined the promised stability of a liberal economic and political transition. The return of the former British colony of Hong Kong to Chinese Communist control provoked further reflection as to the possibility of constitutionally limited government on the Chinese mainland. For all camps of liberals, however, fostering civil society and promoting a critical, engaged populace continue to be major goals, as China's Communist leadership retains its control of news and academic media. New translations of the work of John Rawls, Isaiah Berlin, and other prominent twentieth-century liberal thinkers fuel ongoing debates in China's increasingly cosmopolitan intellectual circles, even as scholars continue to argue for the relevance of traditional Chinese thought to this modern liberal project.

Liberalism in China's Past

Many scholars of Chinese liberalism have come to pay increasing attention to indigenous elements in China's long history of political thought and experience. Chinese liberalism, in its various forms, exhibits marked similarity to its imperial forebears in terms of orientation and practice as well as substantive ideas. Despite their attempts to ground political legitimacy in popular consent and participation, liberalism from the Qing and May Fourth eras replicated the top-down forms of political action that characterized literati reform efforts under the empire. Pointing to the traditional Confucian belief that the people were the "root" of government, not its masters, many scholars have suggested that these early Chinese liberal programs failed precisely on the basis of this paternalistic tendency.

Other characteristics of indigenous Chinese "liberal" thought may, however, provide more substantive bases for liberal reform. In terms of institution building, the early liberalism of Liang Qichao and Yan Fu was self-consciously informed by previous Qing reformist thinkers such as Gu Yanwu and Wang Fuzhi, whose doctrines of "public" and "private" critiqued imperial privilege in the name of the common good, and in the process articulated a powerful argument for limited government and a proto–civil society. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s in Hong Kong and Taiwan, many Confucian revivalists such as Xu Fuguan and Mou Zongsan insisted on the compatibility between China's traditional value system—including Buddhism and Daoism as well as Confucianism—and liberal democracy. The work of these "New Confucians," as they came to be called, broached old tensions that first emerged in May Fourth liberalism—between Western Enlightenment thought and science, on the one hand, and humanism and traditional Chinese culture, on the other.

Among foreign scholars, William Theodore de Bary has been among the most prominent to identify a tradition of rule of law, limited democracy, and individualism in pre–nineteenth-century Chinese thought, especially in the work of realist scholars such as Huang Zongxi who wrote during the Ming-Qing transition, and in radical neo-Confucians of the Taizhou school, including Li Zhi. De Bary argues that enduring liberal tendencies in Chinese thought encouraged both critical stances to absolutism as well as an individualistic voluntarism akin to what is found in most strands of Western classical liberalism. His work, although arguably promoting a Eurocentric analysis of China's past, has nevertheless helped to break down research paradigms in both China and the West that tend to see limited government and individual autonomy as the unique heritage of European thought.

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See also Chinese Legalism; Chinese Revolutionary Thought; Confucianism; Liberalism

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Chinese Revolutionary Thought

Chinese revolutionary thought is best understood in the context of the events surrounding the revolutions of 1911 and 1949. The modern Chinese term for revolution, *geming,* existed in classical Chinese and indicated a change in dynasties. However, political actors and theorists used this term in a radically different sense in the twentieth century. Chinese revolutionary thought is important because the concept of "revolution" influenced the way in which Chinese understood politics during the twentieth century. To explain the historical significance of the twentieth-century Chinese concept of revolution, this entry briefly explains the premodern conception of *geming* and then examines Chinese revolutionary thought during the 1911 and 1949 revolutions.

From the Character Couplet: *geming* to "Revolution"

The modern Chinese term for revolution is the character couplet *geming* 革命, which is made up of two characters, *ge* (革) "to change" and *ming* (命) "life."

One of the most famous classical instances of this couplet is in the *Book of Changes,* which states that the kings Tang and Wu changed the course of things (*geming*). In the *Book of Changes* (*Yijing*), the term *geming* implies that heaven and earth cause political transformations. Kings Tang and Wu followed heaven and overthrew the old dynasty and established a new one. In this context, *geming* is related to another concept in premodern China, namely, *tianming* or the "mandate of heaven." The mandate of heaven legitimated the rule of a particular dynasty, and when a dynasty was overthrown and replaced by another, it was retrospectively confirmed that the old dynasty had lost this mandate. The concept of the mandate of heaven was a double-edged sword: It could legitimate a given regime, but it could also encourage the overthrow (*geming*) of a dynasty.

Examples of the duplicity of the idea of the mandate of heaven are found in classical Confucianism. Confucianism is usually considered to be a conservative philosophy, but one of the most famous justifications for the overthrow of a dynasty comes from Confucius's disciple Mencius (372–289 BCE). Mencius suggests that the people would be justified in overthrowing a malevolent ruler. Mencius describes the same event as the *Book of Changes,* namely, King Tang and King Wu removing King Zhou from office; however, he notes that this overthrow of rulers was legitimate because they had already lost the mandate of heaven. In his view, rulers lose the mandate of heaven if they do not rule according to the Confucian principles of benevolence (*ren*) and righteousness (*yi*).

Mencius seems to anticipate later Chinese revolutionaries in that he condones overthrowing bad governments; however, such parallels should not be taken too far. In Mencius's view it is precisely because the ruler is a great person in relation to the petty multitude of people that he has an obligation to help the people. If the ruler does not live up to this task, he will be removed by the people, just as natural disasters, such as floods and droughts,

occur. Moreover, Mencius does not envision a radical change in political structure; rather he aims at restoration. The mandate of heaven is lost by one emperor or dynasty and then regained by another. Thus we can say that *geming* in premodern China is fundamentally different from that of modern revolution, because for Confucians who had a populist tendency, such as Mencius, the goal of overthrowing the unjust king is to bring back the rituals, which had been keeping peace and order since ancient times. Although twentieth-century revolutionaries would invoke Mencius, they would reinterpret *geming* in a new framework based on progress and evolution.

Early-Twentieth-Century Chinese Theories of Revolution

Japanese radicals in the late Meiji period (1868–1912) used the Chinese character couplet for *geming,* transliterated as *kakumei* in Japanese, to mean "revolution," and Chinese intellectuals followed the Japanese in using this term. To understand the function of this idiom we need to place it in the context of late Qing political culture and especially the last years of the dynasty. The Qing dynasty (1644–1911) stands out in Chinese history because (1) during this dynasty a Manchu minority of about 5 million ruled over a Han majority of 400 million, and (2) this dynasty faced the threat of modern Western imperialism. Early Chinese revolutionary theories were intimately connected to the racial tensions between the Han and the Manchus and the conflict between China and Western imperialism.

When China first felt the need for radical political reform, after China lost the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), most Chinese intellectuals were not favorably disposed toward revolution. At this time, most reform-minded Chinese intellectuals combined assumptions from Western political theory with elements of classical Confucianism to create a vision of nationalism, which made Chinese revolutionary theory possible. Chinese intellectuals associated nationalism with ideas such as citizenship and equality, which were diametrically opposed to the traditional political philosophy of imperial China. Chinese reformers devised plans for the Manchu dynastic empire to transform itself into a nation-state with constitutional checks on the ruler.

In 1898, a number of reform-minded intellectuals, including Kang Youwei (1858–1927), attempted to implement their ideas by appealing to an enlightened Qing emperor in what was called the Hundred Days' Reform. This movement ended in a catastrophe when conservatives in the government staged a coup d'état, and the reformers involved either fled to Japan or were executed. The failure of the 100 Days Reform caused intellectuals to become more critical of the Qing government, and in 1900, with the added failure of the Boxer Uprising, Chinese intellectuals began to advocate the revolutionary overthrow of the Manchu government. These were China's first modern revolutionaries, who brought together ideas of China as a nation based on race, social transformation, and evolutionary history.

The reformers were already China's first nationalists, but they developed a narrative of Chinese identity that included the Manchus as Chinese and placed Chinese culture, rather than the Han race, at the center. In other words, Manchus could become Chinese as long as they performed Confucian rituals. After China's loss in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Chinese intellectuals contended that the Manchu government could restore its legitimacy by successfully modernizing. They also stressed that overthrowing the Manchu government would result in chaos, which would lead to China's being carved up like a melon by foreign imperialists. After 1900, a revolutionary narrative that placed the Han race at the center of Chinese identity became increasingly popular and proponents of this theory, including Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and Zou Rong (1885–1905), directly criticized Kang Youwei and those who proposed reform under the Qing dynasty. But early twentieth-century Chinese revolutionaries reinterpreted this anti-Manchu discourse to entail much more than merely overturning the Qing dynasty. Revolutionaries did not just attack a specific dynastic system; they hoped to replace such a system with a modern nation-state in the form of a republic.

Revolutionaries considered the modern republic to be a more advanced stage in history and in 1903, Zou Rong famously connected revolution to "a universal principle of evolution" and contended that revolution implied an advance from barbarism to civilization and would turn slaves into

masters. By linking revolution with evolution, Zou stressed that the political system of the future would be better than those of the past. Early twentieth-century Chinese revolutionaries told a story of progress, invoking worldviews informed by the ideas of science, social justice, and freedom. In Zou's view, revolution liberated slaves from bondage. The liberation of slaves from masters involved a concept of freedom that again departed from imperial Chinese conceptions of politics and dynastic transition. Zou not only aimed at replacing one dynasty with another but rather hinted at a social revolution, which implied overcoming inequalities.

Zou's tract reveals that Chinese revolutionaries' aims were not limited to the national; rather, the revolutionaries conceived of the revolution as global. Zou's use of the term *universal principle* implied that although the revolution might begin in the nation-state, its scope was global; the revolutionaries' goal was eventually to change the world. Thus many of the thinkers who supported the anti-Manchu revolution were people with global visions of social change, and this transnational dimension pervades Chinese revolutionary thought in the twentieth century.

To some extent, early Chinese visions of politics and universal evolution continued the legacy of the French Revolution. However, given China's position on the periphery of the capitalist world system and general intellectual trends toward the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese revolutionaries tended to be ambivalent toward the modern world. After 1900, many Chinese intellectuals saw the capitalist world not only as a world of freedom and equality, but as one of imperialism and exploitation. Moreover, by the end of the nineteenth century, European philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Stirner began to show the dark side of modernity and the Enlightenment. So when early twentieth-century intellectuals embarked on projects related to modernization and enlightenment, they were exposed to radical critiques of the Enlightenment and capitalist culture. This larger intellectual trend partially explains why many revolutionaries who supported the 1911 revolution, including Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936) and Liu Shipei (1884–1919), developed not only theories of Chinese nationalism and modernization, but ideals of socialism that would overcome the injustices of capitalist modernity. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the 1911 revolution to overthrow the Manchus, associated revolution with three principles: democracy, nationalism, and an emphasis on the people's livelihood. The last tenet of Sun's theory stresses economic equality and gestures in the direction of socialism.

Chinese anarchist revolutionaries often supported Sun's principles of democracy and socialism. As Arif Dirlik has pointed out, anarchists are particularly important in Chinese history because their influence began with the early twentieth century revolutionaries and continued through the communist revolution of 1949. Chinese anarchists constantly stressed education and the importance of culture, which would become a central theme in post-Republican Chinese political thought. The Chinese anarchists who were based in Tokyo, such as the couple He Zhen and Liu Shipei, anticipated Mao Zedong by stressing the complexities of agricultural life. On the one hand, they analyzed class-based inequalities in the countryside, but on the other hand, they suggested that aspects of agrarian communities could be used to envision a future that transcended the injustices of urban oppression. Wu Zhihui (1865–1953) and the anarchists based in Paris, on the other hand, stressed a more clearly evolutionary model of revolution based on the Enlightenment. This opposition between a vision of progress that attempted to incorporate the virtues of peasant life and one that associated progress with Westernization would continue in the Chinese Marxists' theories of revolution.

Chinese Marxists and Revolution

In 1911, the Qing dynasty was overthrown by a revolution led by Sun Yat-sen. However, this revolution was far from successful in establishing a republic and Sun lost power only one year after the revolution. Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), a former Qing official, gained power and attempted to reinstitute the imperial system. These events caused young supporters of the revolution to be extremely disappointed, and consequently they concluded that political revolution was insufficient. Instead, they came to the conclusion that a deeper "cultural" revolution was necessary. These intellectuals, including Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), began the

New Culture movement, which lasted from 1915 to 1920 and which aimed to overcome the lingering traditional influences on Chinese society. Following in the footsteps of their late Qing counterparts, these intellectuals introduced the works of Western authors, including the writings of Karl Marx, which formed the basis for the Chinese Communist Party.

Chen Duxiu founded the Chinese Communist Party along with Li Dazhao (1888–1927) in 1921, and the two of them reproduced the antinomy between an agricultural vision of socialism that stressed Chinese conditions and an urban ideal that emphasized the West as a model. However, by 1921, the ideal of revolution was influenced by the October Revolution in Russia, and Chinese Marxists would express their views in the language of Marxism and Leninism rather than anarchism. They conceived of an evolutionary scheme in which socialism developed out of the contradictions of capitalism. Consequently, like Lenin, they dealt with the problem of how a revolution with socialism as an eventual goal would be possible in a country in which the contradictions of capitalism were not mature.

Mao Zedong (1893–1976) constantly dealt with this question. Scholars have generally interpreted Mao's thought in relation to orthodox Marxism. Until recently, many scholars argued that although orthodox Marxism implied a theory of economic determinism, Mao countered this by emphasizing human agency, which enabled him to argue that a socialist revolution in China was possible. In response to this position, Paul Healy and Nick Knight have analyzed Mao's texts and notes and argued that Mao's understanding of Marxism was in line with Lenin and other Russian orthodox Marxists. These two positions shed light on a larger problem in Mao's theory of revolution, namely that he had to reconcile an orthodox Marxist point (namely, that socialism emerges only after the contradictions of capitalism have developed) with a China where production relations were not as advanced as in the core of the capitalist world-system. Mao accepted that China had to compete with other countries in the global capitalist system. But he nonetheless aimed to develop a society that had resolved the contradictions of capitalist society. We have seen how this resistance to capitalism in late Qing and Chinese revolutionary thought was characterized by this hope for an alternative to capitalism.

After Mao's death and Deng Xiaoping's reforms, Chinese scholars began to reject the legacy of the communist revolution as the country followed further on the path of market capitalism. In this context, since the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals have heatedly debated whether the Maoist ideal has anything to offer the present. Responses to this question are inextricably woven with how one thinks about the possibility of socialism.

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See also Chinese Liberalism; Maoism; May Fourth Movement

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Chivalry

Medieval chivalry (from the French, *chevalier,* knight; Latin, *caballus,* horse) was an ambivalent force in European history for more than 500 years. According to historian Maurice Keen (1984), *chivalry* may be defined as "an ethos in which martial, aristocratic and Christian elements were fused together" (p. 16); it functioned as "a secular upper-class ethic which laid special emphasis on martial prowess . . ." (p. 199). It was also, as Matthew Strickland maintains, a set of guidelines governing behavior toward other chivalric

figures in war. It operated in the belief that its knightly practitioners possessed a special right to maintain and increase their honor through violence and that such activity, whether in the service of their "rights," the state, the church, or women of nobility, was part of society's natural order. Central to the chivalric ethos was the conviction that the knight's sufferings while performing martial feats ("deeds of arms") earned him divine favor, and this, together with the chivalric order's function as society's protector, allowed the people to justify the existence of chivalry on grounds parallel with, but semi-autonomous of, spiritual and political ideologies.

Origins

Medieval chivalry arose in the aftermath of the collapse of royal power in the ninth century and is best seen as an ideological and cultural response to political, military, and social necessities. Its roots were varied, but the Teutonic warrior ethos, Christian teachings on licit and illicit violence, and the gradual social ascendancy of the armored horseman, whose service to his lord was supported by land, family, and patronage, were all important elements. Historians see these elements converging somewhere between the early Carolingian empire (c. 800 CE) and the preaching of the First Crusade in 1095. Georges Duby connected the emergence of the martial group with the decline of central royal authority in France. As royal and baronial power declined in the wake of the Carolingian Empire's collapse (c. 843–1000), the power and autonomy of individual castle commanders ("castellans") grew, until this "revolt of the castellans" caused a radical revision of French political structure.

These social changes led to an ideological relocation of the political community's defense, as armored horsemen slowly climbed into the lower ranks of nobility. Jean Flori points to a gradual change in ceremonies for the bestowal of arms (weapons) in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Against the backdrop of Viking raids, fractured kingdoms, and the decline of royal authority, the church increasingly emphasized the mounted warrior as the armed defender of the body politic in his own right. In locating the rights, privilege, and duty of arms in a particular part of the political order, the "bestowal of arms" transformed over the next 150 years from a public trust (originally pertaining to kings and their nobles) to a private right of passage (reserved for a particular social group—in this case, knights). The "dubbing ceremony" developed haphazardly throughout medieval Europe, partially reflecting the uneven rise of knights to minor noble status. Thus chivalry can be seen, in some sense, as originating in societal needs of defense and military service and from the adaptation of the community to adverse circumstances.

Crusade, Statebuilding, and the High Middle Ages

Between roughly 1066 and 1300, chivalry emerged as a fully fledged ethos throughout Western Europe (coinciding with the reemergence of strong monarchies). The political consequences of locating a kingdom's armed force within an increasingly privileged and cohesive social group meant that by 1066 (Battle of Hastings) and 1095 (preaching of the First Crusade), the Catholic Church and royal governments relied increasingly on warriors whose penchant for feuding tended to destroy any noncombatants in their paths. According to some accounts, in preaching the First Crusade at Clermont in 1095, Pope Urban II condemned the knights (*milites*) for their constant fighting, feuding, and warfare and urged them to turn their activities to a more worthwhile activity (in this case, church-sponsored violence against non-Christians). Given chivalry's origins, the crusades seem as much a logical extension of the church's efforts for a peaceful society as an expression of the milites' simplistic piety. The Council of Clermont's main business was with the Peace of God movement, an ongoing (and largely unsuccessful) attempt to limit the effects of knightly violence by protecting various (especially ecclesiastical) noncombatants and institutions.

Crusading came to occupy an important place in the fully fledged chivalric ethos of the thirteenth century, but it did not change knights' behavior to any great degree. Its importance, as Flori has suggested, lay as much in the church's validation of knightly violence as in the knights' ostensible service to the church. Knightly independence of church teaching was one of the central and most abiding characteristics of chivalry, as Richard Kaeuper's work on chivalric violence makes clear.

Crusade, sacraments, and genuine piety often did not prevent the destruction and looting of religious houses throughout the many small wars of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, nor did it keep noncombatants safe, as one of the most popular twelfth-century chivalric tales, *Raoul de Cambrai,* illustrates. Even Matthew Strickland, who sees in chivalric conventions the origins of the "laws of war" of the later Middle Ages, finds that they were of use mostly within the chivalric order itself. Politically speaking, the emerging chivalric ethos of ransom, treatment of captives, and service did not amount to a general standard of conduct toward the larger community.

Chivalry's "coming of age" in the late twelfth century was marked by an increasing number of decrees, charters, and regulations delineating the armored horseman's military and social role in the political order. King (later Emperor) Frederick Barbarossa's (1152–1190) decree of 1152, forbidding commoners the possession of swords and attempting to regulate judicial duels in the Holy (later Holy Roman) Empire, is a good example of this trend, which was also to be found in France and Spain. Regarding England, Jean Scammell has advanced the thesis that the emergence of the chivalric class was closely tied to Henry II's *Cartae Baronum* (barons' certificates) decree of 1166 and the Assize of Arms of 1181, which were driven by the king's need for reliable armored horsemen for his wars. His demand for inventories of knights' fees (which effectively meant the number of knights a lord had at his disposal) and the maintenance of expensive equipment led to a substantial shift within the landowning class and a final change in the meaning of *milites* from the general (soldier) to the specific (knight). In Spain, *Las Siete Partidas,* the law code of Alfonso X "The Wise" of Castile (1252–1284), clearly established the relationship of the chivalric order to the crown and the body politic. In short, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries convey the impression of kings everywhere attempting to codify the relationship of their knights to monarchical society.

Both the tournament and chivalric literature, exemplified in the tales of King Arthur and his knights, provide a mixed verdict on such efforts. It is easy to forget that the ultimate expression of the chivalric order was warfare and that when knights were not fighting by obligation to their lords, they enjoyed war-like tournaments. Although the church condemned tournaments as sinful events until the fourteenth century, and kings often prohibited them as breeding grounds of revolt and social disorder (because they were large gatherings of armed men), they never lost their popularity. William Marshal (1147–1219), "greatest knight of his age" and regent of England, made his fortune on the tournament circuit.

Chivalric literature was produced occasionally by, and mostly for, the chivalric order, and provides a special window into both the chivalric mentality and its place in political society. Many tales praise knightly violence while urging knights to be responsible members of society and offering their author's particular vision of a reformed knighthood. Chrétien de Troyes' tale *Yvain, or the Knight with the Lion* is an excellent example of this trend. On the other hand, *Parzival,* by Wolfram von Eschenbach, asserts that chivalry was beloved of God and that one could win salvation by the sword.

"Royal" Chivalry and the Later Middle Ages

From roughly 1300, rulers began to move from regulating to actively co-opting the chivalric ethos, as can be seen in the increasing number of chivalric orders and officially sanctioned chivalric events. Edward III of England (1327–1377) is perhaps the outstanding example of this trend of chivalric political influence. Edward, following in the footsteps of his grandfather Edward I (1272–1307), actively identified himself with the Arthurian legends and held several "round table" tournaments throughout his reign, most notably the Windsor Festival of 1344. It is safe to say that his cautiously tolerant attitude toward tournament stemmed from a desire to secure the loyalty of his nobles for his foreign wars, and even on campaign in France he found time to hold tournaments. Perhaps his most famous chivalric gesture was the creation of the Order of the Garter in 1348. The Order, partly inspired by the English victory over the French at Crécy in 1346, focused the attention of the chivalric class on the king by means of its prestige and demonstrated the chivalric character of the polity, with the king as head of his bellicose company.

Other realms throughout Europe followed England's lead and began to actively embrace

chivalry as a means of promoting national unity, vitality, and order. After Crécy, John II of France (1350–1364) founded the Company of the Star, with the express purpose of reinvigorating French knighthood. The order was short-lived; most of its members, including its commander Sir Geoffroi de Charny, were killed in action at Poitiers in 1356. Spain, Hungary, and the Holy Roman Empire also had notable chivalric orders, but perhaps the most famous in the fifteenth century was the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece. Founded in 1431 by Duke Philip the Good (1419–1467) and modeled closely on the Order of the Garter, the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece was a focal point for chivalric feasts, pageants, and crusading activity.

Monarchies' harnessing of the chivalric drive for war and "deeds of arms" did not come without cost. By and large, practitioners of chivalry were committed, in one form or another, to serving their respective rulers in war or at court. Yet this culture of war promoted behaviors inimical to public order, especially in England and France. As Nicholas Wright has shown in his study of the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453), the limitations of state finance and communications actually promoted chivalric disorder, because governments often lacked both the money and means to pay or control their soldiers. The demands of garrison duty often forced knights and soldiers to oppress the very folk they were supposed to defend, thereby calling into question their status as "just warriors." How far the behavior of war abroad carried into knights' domestic behavior is still highly debated, but knights were often unruly, even when serving the crown in nonmilitary capacities. Surviving English records show some knights being criminally charged with riding through the English countryside "with banner displayed" (a sign of war), killing and robbing at will.

The Decline of Chivalry

Historians have never reached a consensus over why chivalry "declined"—though the fact itself is not disputed. In the broadest sense, social, economic, military, cultural, and religious changes all contributed to making chivalry less and less politically relevant. These changes, however, came slowly. Chivalry could be described as flourishing at the start of the sixteenth century, when powerful monarchs such as Maximilian I of Germany and Henry VIII of England portrayed themselves as the first knights of their respective realms. Malcolm Vale has argued that late fifteenth-century chivalry remained an important arena for testing weapons, armor, and tactics. Yet he has also pointed to the changing nature of warfare during the same period, in which "chivalry" lost ground to bureaucratization and "the officer." The Protestant Reformation (from c. 1520) also contributed to chivalry's waning political influence, as it attacked the efficacy of "works" for salvation. The rise of artillery, mass Swiss pike formations, and the general shift of chivalric "honor" from the public sphere of tournament and warfare to the private sphere of the duel—all took part in the "decline" of chivalry. The chivalric ethos was replaced by a "cult of honor," whose most famous manifestation was the private duel. Like tournaments in the twelfth century, the duel was sternly opposed by state power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

What chivalry lost, kings gained. As Richard Kaeuper argues in *Holy Warriors,* the state, as the locus of loyalty and legitimacy, ensured the final collapse of the chivalric ethic, as chivalry's independence of state and church endorsement had allowed its survival. As the knightly class shrank, religion became an increasingly personal affair (albeit one requiring princely support), and state bureaucracy grew, knights and gentlemen found their motives for performing "deeds of arms" subsumed into the service of the state, the source of martial honor. The chivalric revival in Elizabethan England, for instance, can best be understood in this context. The continued success of royal chivalric orders also demonstrated the state's success, while literature showed a parallel tendency: from *Amadis de Gaul,* a "superhero" chivalric tale (c. 1550) to Miguel de Cervantes Saavredra's *Don Quixote* (1605), which mercilessly satirizes chivalric deeds of arms. Cervantes' hero had read too many chivalric tales, and his misadventures demonstrated to avid readers why chivalry for its own sake was fundamentally incompatible with the emerging state-centered political order of modern Europe.

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See also Aristocracy; Hierocratic Arguments; Kingship; Oaths

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Cicero, Marcus Tullius (106–43 BCE)

Measured by influence upon the thinking, writing, and speaking of subsequent centuries, Marcus Tullius Cicero was clearly the most influential figure of the late Roman Republic. Sometimes simply called "Tully" in the later literature of the West, he was among the most powerful and learned men in his own time. His range of achievements was truly remarkable, encompassing his much revered oratorical ability and writings on rhetoric, his legal and political career marked by holding key offices reaching to the highest office of consul in 63 BCE, his extensive correspondence (more than 900 extant letters), and his rich and varied philosophical writings at the center of which is his work as a political theorist. Decisions he made in the politically tumultuous circumstances of his life—notably his handling of the Catilinarian conspiracy and his opposition to Julius Caesar, Mark Antony, and forms of agrarian legislation—made him a highly controversial figure. The ire of his political opponents then and down through the years, along with the very personal revelations of his correspondence, have at times created obstacles to a fair-minded study of his writings on moral philosophy and political theory.

Philosophy and the New Academy

Cicero saw himself as a Socratic, appreciating Socrates as the "first philosopher," not in the sense of the first to wonder about the nature of things but in that of the first to turn philosophy from inquiry into heavens, namely, philosophy of nature, and to focus it on the questions of good and evil as they arise in the homes and cities of humankind. Cicero embraced this "Socratic turn," taking its emphasis on practical philosophy one step further and elevating the active political life over the life of philosophy for those suitably talented. Whereas Plato reports that Socrates explicitly turned away from seeking political office as a threat to a life of effective teaching, Cicero, from the earliest years, prepared himself to seek office and regarded political leadership in the founding and maintaining of just political communities as the highest duty for a human being.

However, Cicero's love of philosophy and interest in learning it from the proponents of its various schools in his time also was in evidence from his earliest years. He thought that philosophy, which bore fruit for the direction of life, was the greatest of the divine gifts to humankind. Among the major schools of philosophy in his time, the Stoics, Epicureans, Peripatetic followers of Aristotle, and various strains of the Academy founded by Plato, Cicero explicitly and repeatedly identified with the school known as the New Academy, the school that he saw as the most authentic continuation of the tradition of Socrates.

The New Academy embraced a form of moderate skepticism that led its adherents to hold back from affirming with certainty all judgments about the truth and to content themselves with

embracing, after examination of contending positions, what seemed likely or probably true. Accordingly, the New Academy's position was more procedural than a set of philosophic answers, and it allowed Cicero, even while sometimes putting the substantive teachings of the other schools in contention with one another in his writings, to draw from them an ethics and political theory that usually represented his own distinctive appropriation of his sources. Thus Cicero can appear a Stoic, seem to embrace Peripatetic positions and profess his agreement with the political principles he regards Plato as teaching in *The Republic*—all of this being consistent with his stance as a New Academician. One school he could not embrace in any way was that of the Epicureans, whose core teaching was that pleasure, or the avoidance of pain, is the highest human good. Despite his maintaining a much noted lifelong friendship with Atticus, an Epicurean, Cicero thought this school's teachings, though not the sometimes decent practices of Epicureans, undermined any conception of moral duty, the common good, and the related ethic of public service that Cicero sought to foster.

Writings on Political Theory

Cicero's most direct writings on the traditional topics of political theory were his own *Republic* (*De Re Publica*) and *Laws* (*De Legibus*), consciously following with two so-named works the example of his revered Plato. Important also to his very conception of politics, as it was to that of his Greek predecessors and especially Aristotle, was his consideration of the foundational question of the highest human good (*De Finibus*) and the specific virtues and moral duties that might be reasonably based on one or another answer to this question (*De Officiis)*. Cicero wrote his *Republic* in the 50s, beginning it in 54 BCE, which would also mark the beginning of a decade of intense writing in which he completed all 12 of his major philosophical works. Though begun shortly after writing his *Republic, Laws* was not circulated in completed form in his lifetime, and there is uncertainty about how far it extended beyond the largely intact three books that exist.

The Republic and *The Laws,* like most of his philosophical writings, employ the dialogue form that he knew not only from Plato but also from his access to Aristotle's dialogues, which are not available today. Discussions in Cicero's letters of the construction and variety of types of dialogues seem to indicate that his prefaces to some books of *The Republic* in his own direct voice and his actually writing himself into a major role in the dialogue of *The Laws* are features characteristic of Aristotelian dialogues. Though often utilizing long speeches with their considerable rhetorical potency within his dialogues, Cicero did so consciously and indicated at one point his full awareness that the short and pressing question-and-answer technique of Socratic dialectic served best overall to get at the seeming truth of whatever was under inquiry.

Through a long period of the history of the West, Cicero's most political work, his *Republic,* was lost, disappearing sometime late in the fifth century BCE only to be found under a writing of Augustine in the Vatican Library in 1820. Even then, what was recovered amounts to no more than half of what appeared to be contained in the original, and the recovered portion is heavily fractured with missing sections, including almost the entirety of three of *The Republic's* six books. What was recovered, however, has allowed a reasonably reliable reconstruction of the argument of the whole dialogue; this process has been assisted by the availability of quotations and paraphrases from the text as well as summaries of it in the extant writings of Augustine, Lactantius, and others who had read and engaged Cicero's thinking in *The Republic* before the text's disappearance. The most notable such segment is known as "The Dream of Scipio," with which the dialogue ends and which was preserved continuously intact down through the years in Macrobius's famous commentary on it. "The Dream" appears to have been intended to function much like the myth of Er does in closing Plato's *Republic,* namely, as an expression of the hope and reasonable expectation that a life of justice will be rewarded after death. However, like all of Cicero's appropriations of Plato, it has a specific Roman and practical twist in emphasizing ancestral ties and the importance of a life of public leadership and service.

Cicero's Impact as a Political Theorist

Only since 1820 has Cicero's stature as a political theorist been seen in the light of his *Republic,* his

major work in this field. Political theorists in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and modernity (through the American Founding and the French Revolution) developed concepts like natural rights, popular sovereignty, various types of social contract, and the proper education of the citizen and statesman without Cicero's *Republic,* which would have been able to bear directly on such thinking. This is not to say that Cicero was not influential upon moral and political thinking through these periods. His impact was considerable, perhaps, taken on the whole nearly as great as that of Aristotle and significant even when he was opposed, as both he and Aristotle were by Hobbes, for their unsettling republican thinking. Without *The Republic,* except for portions preserved as noted earlier, other works of Cicero, especially his treatise *On Duties* (*De Officiis*) and *Laws,* were the carriers of his ideas about morals, the foundations of law, and politics.

The Republic reveals clearly what a critical and pivotal thinker Cicero was on politics, looking back and learning from his formidable Greek predecessors while shaping his thinking in important ways in the light of Roman experience and developments in the schools of philosophy like the Stoic teachings on human dignity, equality, and natural law. Cicero's political theory, now more fully understood, is an important resource for thinking through the differences and tensions between classical and modern political theory and thinking about the moral foundations of liberal democracy, concerns much on the mind of political theorists since the end of World War II.

Features of Cicero's *Republic*

Cicero's *Republic* is a respectful encounter with Plato's work. Beyond his direct voice in prefaces to some of the books, Cicero's voice is heard, though perhaps not exclusively so, through the major speaker in the dialogue, Scipio Africanus Minor, an esteemed Roman political leader who lived in the century before Cicero. Scipio welcomed Greek teachers into the highest Roman circles and loved philosophy to the point of being tempted to pull away from political responsibilities. The setting for the dialogue is a holiday discussion among Roman political leaders and their friends, and Scipio is asked to indicate his opinion of what is the best constitution for a republic or political community (*res publica*). Cicero thus raised, even more directly than did Plato, the question that Leo Strauss has called the orienting or central question for classical political philosophy. In Cicero's hands the consideration of the question requires a definition of what is meant by a political community, and what is stipulated is that such a community is literally a thing or property of the people created by a gathering of persons joined by agreement about what is mutually useful and what is right. The true republic then requires both consent and agreement in what is truly just or lawful. So it is that a tyranny, even a tyranny constituted by a large consenting majority, is not to be taken as a genuine republic. Augustine thought Cicero set too high a standard and noted that by his measure Rome was never a genuine republic for it was never wholly just.

Two matters related to this foundational moment in Cicero's political theory should be noted. When in Book II of *The Republic* Cicero gives a selective review of Roman political development, he highlights the custom during the period of kings that a newly ascended monarch goes to the people for approval of his kingship, a practice then already suggesting a normative requisite of consent under a republic. Cicero also stresses in his *Republic* and other works that the mutual benefits that the political community endows upon its members must go beyond satisfying the human need for security and survival. Cicero contends that with all ordinary needs satisfied, the human being seeks human interaction, through speech and reason. The human being, for Cicero, is born for political community and to serve others through sustaining and developing such communities.

When Cicero's Scipio comes to respond to the question about the best constitution, he speaks first of the simple forms of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy and regards all of them as acceptable as long as they are just. Among such just simple forms, monarchy is said to be the best for reasons of the distinctive care and efficiency one can expect from a single ruler. Even better and thus the truly best is a constitution that combines the strengths of the three simple forms. This concept of the mixed regime or constitution that Cicero famously describes is much indebted to the Greek historian Polybius, who wrote on Roman history and actually conversed with Scipio and his

circle. By incorporating both greater freedom and virtue through extending participation to the many and few respectively, the mixed constitution can be seen as an attempt to minimize political divisiveness and instability and thus the likely slide into injustice that goes with the exclusion of these parts of any society.

Rome was the best actual instantiation of the best regime for Cicero and the best teaching example for his immediate Roman audience. He did not regard it as the best constitution in all respects and thus entirely equivalent to the imaginary city that Plato created in his *Republic*. While tracing the development of Rome from its founding to its seeming republican peak in the century of Scipio, Cicero not only cautiously alludes to the shortcomings and injustices in that history but also stresses the gradual, trial and error improvement of the Roman regime over a long time. In this process prudent political leaders take on a critical role, learning from past experience and even at times from Greek practices and thought, and moving Rome toward the type of city that might deserve the empire it came to administer.

The Model Statesman

It appears that missing portions of Cicero's *Republic* treated in detail the proper education of the political leader or statesman. This lacuna can be filled in large part by attention to Cicero's treatment of education in his dialogue on the model orator (*De Oratore*), for the model statesman must also be the model orator. Yet even in what we have of his consideration of this model statesman, it is clear that the model statesman must be nourished for his public role by a philosophical understanding both through learning and a reflective solitude marked by self-examination. The ground or measure of a realized self and the duties of leadership is "the way of nature," in the phrasing of the Stoic tradition. It is from that tradition that Cicero takes and elaborates the language of natural law. Only in the light of the natural and universal standard available to human reason can there be a sufficiently grounded justice to allow a ranking of different constitutions and a choice of a best one; otherwise, all is simply custom and thus relative to context. Cicero's teaching on natural law, sketched in his *Republic* but elaborated in the first two books of his *Laws*, provides the framework for his observations on conscience, the seeds of that law within human beings, for a consideration of private property that is respectful of customary and legal claims while noting that nature gives its goods and lands to all for common use, and for a moral basis for his defense of tyrannicide. With the idea of natural law that Cicero appropriates and develops, he comes to have a critical role in the passage of the concept of nature as a standard to its elaborations in the Middle Ages and into modernity's emphatic embrace of natural and human rights.

Walter Nicgorski

See also Augustine; Consent; Natural Law; Plato; Polybius; Republicanism; Roman Commonwealth

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CICERONIANISM

In the broadest sense of this somewhat elusive concept, Ciceronianism is an attraction to Cicero giving rise to a desire to imitate him in one or more features of his manifold achievement. The initial use of the term, as well as the most frequent usage, seems to pertain to Cicero's quite universally acknowledged stylistic mastery reflected above all in his orations but also in evidence in his writings on rhetoric and philosophy as well as in his letters. Cicero's excellence in this respect

comes to give the name *Ciceronian* to a period of Latin literary excellence that is co-extensive with the second half of his life. Ciceronianism becomes directly relevant to political theory as, over time, it takes on a meaning that goes beyond stylistic achievement and by means of the example of Cicero himself comes to refer to a commitment to a life of public leadership informed by philosophical and humanistic learning and marked by rhetorical and moral excellence. In this form of the model or perfect statesman-orator, the Ciceronian ideal has its most notable impact on Renaissance thinking and maintains a significant influence through the Enlightenment to the founding generation of the American Republic. It thus comes to refer to an ideal of republicanism in which the moral excellence and learning of leaders and leading citizens are coupled with persuasive power.

Cicero as Model

In his own life, Cicero struggled to find the stylistic balance that ultimately made him the very standard of classic Latin speech and prose. That balance was defined in terms of extremes of Asianism and Atticism, which were drawn from Greek rhetorical and literary history. Asianism, to which Cicero inclined, especially in his first years as a public speaker, was an abundant, emotionally charged, and ornate style. Those who found it tasteless and were inclined to the plain, lucid, and terse Atticism were apt to describe it as grandiloquent, turgid, and repetitive. Julius Caesar, Cicero's political nemesis in the last phase of his life, inclined to Attic qualities, but as Cicero attained his balance and peak as a master of Latin prose, even Caesar and other representatives of Atticism tended to recognize that Cicero had attained a model classic style. So it was that Quintilian, Cicero's learned first-century admirer, came to say that Cicero was not so much the name of a man as the very name of eloquence.

Still, with respect to his rhetorical achievement, Cicero had his critics in his own lifetime and immediately thereafter. Criticism of his style often was closely bound up with opposition to his politics and a closely related critique of his character. This tradition of criticism has persisted, along with the attraction to Cicero, through Western history. It was given its most influential modern expression in Theodor Mommsen's mid-nineteenth-century *History of Rome*.

Mommsen revealed a passionate dislike of Cicero along with a welcome embrace of the historical actions and aspirations of Julius Caesar. Mommsen's ire for Cicero seemed to spread from his opposition to Cicero's political role to judgments on Cicero's character, thinking, and writings, including his orations. He alleged that Cicero was "a statesman without insight, idea, or purpose," who as a writer "had no conviction" or "passion," being "nothing but an advocate, and not a good one." Cicero was seen as lacking in sound as well as original ideas, "a dabbler" and a bad "journalist" at best. Confronting the long-standing acclaim for Cicero the orator and prose stylist, Mommsen remarked that this "Ciceronianism is a problem . . . that can only be resolved into that greater mystery of human nature—language and the effect of language on the mind." Mommsen revealed his taste, shaped so clearly by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's elevation of the Greeks and their cultural experience, when while acknowledging the historic regard for Cicero's orations, he noted "the unpoetic, dogmatical, rhetoricizing temperament of the Romans" and concluded that "the Romans possessed no great Latin prose writer." Yet for Mommsen, if there was a master of Latin prose in Cicero's time, it was Caesar, the model man and the greatest statesman of the last years of the decaying Roman Republic. Caesar's chaste and simple style was in accord with the simplicity of the "democratic monarchy" that, according to Mommsen, he rightly saw as the remedy to the republic's corruption in politics, morals, language, and literature. In Mommsen's view, what Julius Caesar sought was realized in what Caesar Augustus ushered in, an age of Caesar and Caesarism. Mommsen's usage of Ciceronianism indicated that it remained anchored in matters of style while Caesarism pointed directly to a form of political rule, to which Ciceronianism posed an obstacle.

A richer conception of Ciceronianism was nonetheless what Mommsen attacked with his charges about Cicero's character and political leadership. Like many of the criticisms of Cicero made through the years, this richer conception of Ciceronianism was rooted in Cicero's own actions and aspirations and even more so in his writings about a model orator-statesman who was a good and learned

man. To aspire to be Ciceronian is to seek to be that model orator or writer who is a good man and a philosophically informed statesman, or to be the model statesman, like Cicero and like his own model, Scipio Africanus Minor, who is devoted to the common good, is deeply engaged in philosophy, and excels in rhetorical ability. Rhetoric makes philosophy efficacious, and philosophy grounds rhetoric in the truth and thus ultimately makes it more effective. Cicero's most explicit discussion of the desired unity of rhetorical excellence with wisdom and public service is found in his dialogue *On the Orator* (*De Oratore*). Here Cicero the Socratic protested that even Plato's Socrates had portrayed rhetoric too negatively and thus contributed to a separation between the mind and the tongue.

The Ciceronian Tradition

Quintilian became a highly influential formulator of the richer sense of Ciceronianism, and with the rediscovery of a complete text of his most important writing (*Institutio Oratoria*) in the fifteenth century, the ideal of Cicero came to captivate important figures in the Renaissance. Whatever his personal faults, Quintilian held, Cicero aspired to a noble ideal. Independent of Quintilian and from Cicero's own writings and orations, Cicero's eloquence and moral teaching came to be a dominant influence on intellectual leaders of early Christianity. Among the most notable were Lactantius, "the Christian Cicero"; Jerome, who feared he would be judged more a Ciceronian than a follower of Christ; and Ambrose, who preached with Ciceronian eloquence and drew direct inspiration and direction for pastors from Cicero's moral teaching. Directly moved by Ambrose's eloquence, Augustine regularly engaged Cicero's writings throughout his life. Initially, however, as a young teacher of rhetoric, his reading of Cicero's now lost dialogue, *Hortensius,* turned him from professional success based on simple rhetorical mastery to philosophy and a search for a life-directing wisdom. In the passage in his *Confessions* where he reports the impact of the *Hortensius,* he speaks of Cicero as one whose tongue, but not his heart, is admired by most, thus providing a reminder of the difficulty, even for the legacy of Cicero, of forging a unity of moral and rhetorical excellence.

Earlier in the first century, as Quintilian extolled Cicero and drew out the rich sense of Ciceronianism, Plutarch in his *Life of Cicero* displayed sensitivity to the tensions and shortcomings in Cicero's effort to realize the ideal in his own life. Never, it seems, was Ciceronianism, at least as exemplified in Cicero, without its skeptics and critics. Modern scholarship reports that it survived through the Middle Ages and the ascendancy of the contemplative ideal closely associated with Christianity. Then, and especially in the late medieval period and into the Renaissance as Ciceronianism was reborn with vigor, it contended with an Aristotelianism that gave priority to philosophy and theology above all, usually held rhetoric in contempt, and tended to find Cicero's edifying moral teaching wanting in philosophical support. In this time of its ascendancy, perhaps the greatest champion of Cicero, and in fact of Ciceronianism, was Petrarch. Even this devotion of Petrarch then suffered an important setback when he recovered an important part of Cicero's correspondence and found himself disillusioned with what his discovery brought to light, namely, that his eloquent and noble political leader and moral teacher had been involved in the pursuit of power and all the attendant calculations and maneuvers in the "dregs" of Roman politics.

The Ciceronian ideal and often the attendant reputation of Cicero continued to be embraced or contested in different ways by Erasmus, Thomas More, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. It appears to have been especially renewed in the eighteenth century when it engaged Montesquieu and impacted notably David Hume, Edmund Burke, and statesmen-thinkers such as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Wilson, who assumed leadership in the founding of the American Republic. The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed the finding of substantial portions of Cicero's long lost *Republic* (*De Re Publica*) with their decisive elevation of the life of public leadership and the necessary preparation for it, as well as of the Roman Republic as a political model realized by the cumulative efforts of outstanding leaders. At much the same time, the influential lectures of Hegel on the philosophy of history worked to diminish Roman achievement overall and set the stage for Mommsen's severe critique of Cicero and Ciceronianism.

Mommsen's attack was never lacking in critics though it shaped the view of Cicero and Ciceronianism that largely prevailed into the second half of the twentieth century. Through advances in scholarship on the Roman Republic and on the texts of Cicero, a more balanced view of Cicero and Ciceronianism took hold. Aspects of that ideal appear to be especially welcome in the postmodern period where there is a tendency to privilege attention to the practical and hence to practices, customs, and traditions over theoretical and speculative inquiry and where there is also found a renewed appreciation for responsible rhetoric, moral development, and dedication to the common good. Often closely linked to, but sometimes independent of, how Cicero's personal achievement was being assessed, Ciceronianism has been a resilient ideal in the experience of the West.

Walter Nicgorski

See also Ancestral Tradition (*Mos Maiorum*); Anti-Foundationalism; Aristotelianism; Cicero; Humanism; Mirror of Princes' Genre; Philosopher King

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Citizenship

Citizenship is the condition of membership within a political community. While citizenship refers broadly to a shared political status, theories of citizenship vary widely in their interpretations of the scope, shape, and depth of that status. Citizenship may refer to a formal legal category, the condition of sharing an ascribed characteristic such as ancestry or ethnicity, a set of shared cultural or civic practices, or an aspirational ideal. Debates over the boundaries and content of citizenship—who is included within the citizenry and what entitlements and obligations accompany the status of citizenship—are at the heart of contemporary political debates on topics ranging from immigration policy to the welfare state.

Citizenship may assume both *thin* forms, characterized by relatively weak levels of association between citizens, and *thick* forms, where the definition of citizenship assumes a more robust character. In a thin view, citizenship may refer simply to the legal rights and obligations of citizens living under a common law. Citizens defined this way may share little more than a passport. Conversely, citizenship may also be viewed as a thicker association, one defined by common origins, language, religion, customs, or a shared conception of *the good*. From this perspective, citizenship is defined more substantively as a collective way of life. Modern citizenship has typically been defined by the boundaries of the sovereign nation-state. However, confronted with the effects of globalization, political theorists have argued for an expansion of the definition of the citizen to include multicultural, postnational, and cosmopolitan forms of citizenship.

Classical Citizenship

According to J. G. A. Pocock, Western conceptions of citizenship can be traced to two distinct lineages: the Ancient Greek model of citizenship and the Roman model of citizenship. The Greek, or "classical," model of citizenship is associated with the Athenian *polis* (city-state) in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. Aristotle's *Politics* offers the canonical articulation of this model, an ideal conception in which the practice of citizenship is itself the definition of the good life. For Aristotle, citizenship is the condition of *self-rule* among equals—the practice of *ruling* and *being ruled*.

To share in virtue of civic life, the classical citizen must be free from material needs and the demands of labor. The citizen must therefore leave behind the realm of necessity in the household, the *oikos,* where the women and slaves attend to them, as per their natural roles. (The

question of whether or not the institution of slavery and the exclusion of women are accidental or inherent features of Aristotelian conceptions of citizenship remains an active topic of debate.) In the Aristotelian view, the public exercise of citizenship was the highest form of human activity and constitutive of the good life.

Liberal Citizenship

In contrast to the Greek model, the Roman or *juridical* model of citizenship, originating with the Roman jurist Gaius, focuses upon the *rights* of citizens as subjects to a common law. The contemporary heir to the Roman tradition is liberal citizenship, founded on a contractualist understanding of civic law. Modern liberalism, originating in the seventeenth-century philosophy of John Locke, prioritizes *consent* as the basis of citizenship. According to Locke, men in a state of nature are always vulnerable to threats from other men against their liberty and property. Therefore, men join together in civil government through a social contract by voluntarily renouncing some of their natural freedom for the purposes of collectively securing their liberty and property. Liberal citizenship is thus conceived in *contractual* terms as an agreement premised upon the mutual consent of free individuals for the sake of their property and liberty. Consequently, liberal theories of citizenship have tended to focus upon the legal *rights* of citizens, employing a juridical model of the citizen. The law, legitimated by the fact that citizens consent to it, is the contract that binds citizens together and defines their rights as citizens.

Individuals, instead of political communities, are the primary actors for liberals. Liberals approach citizenship *instrumentally,* as a means of protecting the liberty of individuals. Because individual liberty is the goal of liberal citizenship, liberals tend to have relatively *thin* conceptions of citizenship. The liberal priority of individual freedom implies that individuals should be as free as possible to determine the courses of their own lives. This form of freedom is defined negatively as freedom from external intervention.

Because their priority is *individual* autonomy, liberal citizens do not need to share values or culture. Indeed, liberal citizens need only share a contractual agreement. Whereas Aristotle defined a shared pursuit of the good as the defining feature of citizenship, liberal theories usually defend the rights of individuals to define and pursue their own diverse visions of the good life. Such a definition accommodates pluralistic visions of the good. Liberal citizenship is therefore not an end in and of itself, but a *means* to protecting the autonomy of individuals.

Feminist and Marxist theorists have criticized the liberal priority of autonomy as a founding principle of liberal citizenship. Feminists such as Susan Moller Okin and Anne Phillips have argued that the apparent autonomy of the liberal citizen (presumed to be a man) depends upon the fact that women tend to basic necessities in the domestic realm. Liberal men are only able to be free because women are confined to the home. Likewise, Marxists criticize liberalism's driving motivation of securing private property. If, as in the Marxist view, the world is divided into the propertied and the propertyless, then citizenship may function as a mechanism to protect the interests of the owners of property from the threat of the propertyless.

Defending liberal citizenship against these concerns, T. H. Marshall has contended that liberal citizenship in the postwar era has evolved beyond a strictly *civic* notion of citizenship to include *political* and *social* dimensions of citizenship. For Marshall, the liberal welfare state can ensure the universal enjoyment of citizenship by providing basic social entitlements, such as public education and subsistence provisions, that facilitate equal access to citizenship.

Republican and Communitarian Citizenship

Meanwhile, contemporary *communitarian* and *republican* models of citizenship reject both liberalism's individualistic approach and its retreat from the public sphere. Republicanism and communitarianism emerged at the end of the twentieth century as critical movements that sought to recover citizenship's classical roots and to restore the public, participatory dimension to citizenship.

Republicans are critical of the liberal turn away from civic virtue and its corresponding duties. Republicans such as Quentin Skinner, Adrian Oldfield, and J. G. A. Pocock seek to bring civic duties back to the center of the notion of citizenship, which has focused almost exclusively on

rights in the liberal model. Contemporary republicans, often referred to as civic republicans or neo-republicans, trace their philosophical lineage back to Machiavelli and Rousseau. While republicans share the liberal commitment to the priority of freedom, they argue that methodological individualism is the wrong approach to the preservation of liberty. Republicans contend that the active exercise of civic duty is the best defense against the threats to liberty. In this view, participation may function as an instrumental form of resistance to domination.

Communitarian models of citizenship, associated with the work of theorists such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, and Michael Walzer, are critical of liberalism's universalist standpoint and methodological individualism. For communitarians, liberals fail to recognize the basic fact that individuals form their views about freedom and justice in the context of the shared meanings of their political communities. Because individual ideas about justice, liberty, and the *good* are developed within political communities, these values cannot be treated as strictly individual preferences. Instead of viewing liberty in terms of the self-determination of the unencumbered individual, communitarians view freedom as the ability of a political community to act in order to pursue its collective goals. Further, communitarians often contend that we have particular ethical obligations to members of our political communities that may supersede our duties to nonmembers, with whom we do not share affective and communal ties.

Some communitarians, such as Walzer, emphasize the crucial role of voluntary civil society associations in contributing to the development of good citizens. This emphasis on the role of civil society echoes the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, who argued that civil society functions as a "schoolhouse" for democratic citizenship. Rather than defining freedom as a private good that must be protected from the public, participation in public life itself becomes the architect of freedom.

Accordingly, both republicans and communitarians defend a form of citizenship that requires the active participation of citizens in the public sphere. Advocates of communitarian and republican citizenship emphasize the priority of the political community and urge active participation as a requirement of citizenship. Whereas the liberal model tends to treat citizenship as nothing more than a common set of laws to protect private liberties, these thicker models of citizenship contend that freedom itself is derived from active engagement in civic life.

Nationalism and Citizenship

Offering another critique of liberalism, proponents of a *nationalist* definition of citizenship contend that liberal citizenship is incapable of instilling a sense of shared purpose and commitment to a political community. For nationalists, the thin, legalistic conception of liberal citizenship is insufficient to unite individuals in a common political project. Nationalists argue that citizenship requires the cultivation of an emotional attachment to one's fellow citizens as members of a single nation. Further, nationalists often argue that members of a nation have particular ethical claims and duties that cannot be overridden by purely legal civic demands.

Although definitions of nation and nationality vary, national identity tends to be understood as an *ascriptive* characteristic. In other words, membership in a nation is usually defined in terms of a shared history, culture, language, civic life, ethnicity, or religion that one does not voluntarily choose. The ascriptive element of nationalism has fueled accusations that nationalism is inherently racist or illiberal. Critics of nationalism point to the rise of xenophobic, expansive, and authoritarian forms of nationalism in the second half of the twentieth century as evidence of the dangers of nationality as a means of defining citizenship.

Nationalism may be defined in terms of *ethnic* or *racial nationalism,* determined by shared genetic ancestry, or *civic-territorial nationalism,* based on a shared territory and civic life. In an effort to preserve the ethnic character of citizenship, most continental European states have implemented the policy of *jus sanguinis,* citizenship determined by blood lineage. Other nations, such as France and the United States, follow the doctrine of *jus soli,* birthright citizenship, which confers citizenship upon those born within the state's sovereign territory. Regardless of how nationalism is defined, the strongest articulations of nationalism demand that the nation be coextensive with a sovereign state. Contemporary

work by David Miller, however, contends that the principle of nationality may, in some cases, be protected without recourse to state sovereignty.

Globalization and the Future of Citizenship

In recent years, the concept of citizenship has been under growing pressure in the face of the transformations understood collectively as *globalization:* the consolidation of Western European states in the European Union, increasing rates of migration, rising refugee populations, the integration of world markets, technological innovations that have facilitated rapid transfer of information across boundaries, the emergence of transnational political institutions and a global human rights regime, and the challenges posed by increasingly multicultural polities. Confronted with these changes, cosmopolitan, postnational, and multiculturalist theorists have argued that the state is increasingly incapable of clearly delimiting the status of citizenship and that citizenship needs to be redefined to accommodate the fact of cultural pluralism.

Multicultural Citizenship

Will Kymlicka argues that in response to rising ethnocultural conflicts stemming from increasing diversity and pluralism, liberal democracies need to rethink their definition of citizenship. According to Kymlicka, human rights and majoritarian democracy are insufficient mechanisms to protect cultural and ethnic minorities from majority tyranny. As such, Kymlicka argues that liberals should adopt a notion of *multicultural citizenship*. According to the *multicultural* model of citizenship, liberal states should accommodate cultural and ethnic particularism through measures such as the special language rights and guarantees of group representation in political institutions.

Likewise, Iris Marion Young advocates a notion of *differentiated citizenship*. For Young, the notion of a universal form of citizenship masks the fact that the citizenry is differentiated along lines such as class, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and sexuality. While a universal approach to citizenship may appear to be the best approach to ensuring equality, treating unequal citizens equally may in fact reinforce existing inequalities. Young argues that citizenship should therefore accommodate differences that exist in pluralistic societies by allowing for special rights for oppressed groups, such as group representation and affirmative action policies.

Cosmopolitan Citizenship

Meanwhile, proponents of cosmopolitan citizenship question whether the state is the appropriate location for citizenship in the first place. *Cosmopolitanism,* a term derived from the Greek *kosmos* (universe) and *politês* (citizen), refers to the status of membership in a world polity. Liberal cosmopolitanism traces its modern roots back to the work of Immanuel Kant, who envisioned a moral universe that extended beyond the boundaries of the state. Following Kant's universal morality, cosmopolitans such as Martha Nussbaum and Kwame Anthony Appiah reject the notion that a person's future should be determined by the accident of where one happens to have been born. In this view, the rights and duties of state membership should not override our moral obligations as human beings *simplicter*.

Postnational Citizenship

Likewise, pointing to the emergence of a global human rights regime, Yasemin Soysal argues for the emergence of a new form of "postnational" citizenship, where civic rights and duties can transcend state borders. Other theorists argue about the viability of multiple citizenships as a means of reflecting the mobility of the resident of a globalized world. Critics of cosmopolitan, multiple, and postnational citizenship question the ability of divided citizenship to enforce rights and duties and worry about the democratic legitimacy of fractured polities. These critics contend that transnational political institutions such as the United Nations have proven relatively ineffectual in protecting the rights of human beings in general and argue that states remain the proper site for the expression and protection of citizenship.

In the coming years, globalization will continue to redraw the world map, and definitions of citizenship will need to accommodate this changing topography. As the borders of nation-states are transformed, residents of this shifting

terrain will most certainly redefine the boundaries of citizenship.

Jackie Vimo

See also Communitarianism; Cosmopolitanism; Immigration; Multiculturalism; Nationalism; Republicanism

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City-State

The compound word *city-state* was coined in nineteenth-century political science to describe a type of state concurrently in terms of its characteristics as a settlement and as a social and political organization. As a settlement, the city-state consists of a comparatively large and densely populated urban nucleus with a sufficient degree of internal complexity to foster division of labor, specialized skills and crafts, trade, and market exchange and thus to act as a social, economic, and religious center of an agricultural hinterland. As a political organization, the city-state exhibits the capacity and level of institutionalization to exercise legal authority over a particular population and territory.

Although initially conceived with reference to classical antiquity, in the twentieth century the city-state model has been identified with a cultural-evolutionary stage of global significance, found in Mesopotamian, Mesoamerican, African, Asian, and European civilizations. In this comparative perspective, city-states occurred commonly in clusters, forming extensive culture areas whose inhabitants shared a common language, religion, and other traditions and which transcended the political subdivisions into separate polities. According to the most comprehensive investigation of ancient and modern city-states, conducted under the aegis of Mogens Herman Hansen at the Copenhagen Polis Centre, the role of city-states in world history entailed four major developments and unifying features:

1. A degree of urbanization unprecedented before the Industrial Revolution
2. The rise of a market economy based on trade
3. Political decision-making processes dominated by assemblies and majority votes rather than monarchs
4. Interaction between individual city-states, which led to the rise of federal states of a type first transferred into a territorial state with the foundation of the United States of America in 1787–1789.

For political theorists, the classical Greek city-state, the *polis* (plural *poleis*), has remained the city-state par excellence—the birthplace of philosophical and political inquiry, including the attendant repertoire of terms and concepts current to this day, above all, politics (*ta politika,* literally the affairs of the polis). The polis is commonly defined as a community of equals (*politai*) who controlled the major source of wealth (agricultural land in a catchment area called *chora*) and decided on policy through open debate and voting. Thus, the polis

was, in principle, self-governing and economically self-sufficient, and autonomy and autarchy were indeed avowed ideals, even though some classical cities had clearly outstripped their domestic agricultural resources, and the creation of leagues and federations in the unceasing struggles for freedom or domination spelled the loss of political independence for many communities. The terms of participation in the polis community (*politeia,* also translated as citizenship or constitution) determined the nature of political debate and shaped social relations within the polis. The citizen body consisted of a subgroup of the adult males defined by a set of criteria such as birth, property, military service, and education. Regardless of local differences in citizenship definition, the membership of countrymen as well as city dwellers promoted greater economic and political integration than in most other ancient (Near Eastern, Phoenician, Etruscan) and modern city-states, whereas the exclusion of women, foreign residents, slaves, and children from active involvement in decision making encouraged hierarchical segregation into gender, age, and ethnic groups. Most of the 1,500 or so attested poleis were small, often smaller than 1,000 square kilometers and numbering less than 10,000 inhabitants. But in large centers, such as Athens, Cyrene, Syracuse, and others, the population exceeded 100,000 inhabitants and thus clearly surpassed the scale and complexity of a face-to-face society.

The aim of this entry is to consider the broader setting for the works of ancient Greek political theory covered elsewhere in the encyclopedia. It places the invention of Greek politics in its historical and social contexts and concludes with observations on the survival of Greek political concepts beyond their original framework of creation. The account focuses inevitably on the fully developed political society of fifth- and fourth-century BCE Athens, which has produced most of the relevant literary sources. However, archaeological and epigraphic evidence suggests that the basic social relationships and practices of other Greek poleis were broadly similar to those of Athens and had their roots in a set of cultural and ideological transformations in the eighth century BCE—at the end of the period of relative material poverty that followed the collapse of the Bronze Age Mycenaean palace culture.

From Thought to Theory: The Historical Context of Greek Politics

The extant corpus of Greek political theory consists chiefly in the works of Plato and Aristotle. However, the discovery of political theory occurred in Greece at least a century before Aristotle had begun his career. It is first unequivocally attested in Herodotus's "Persian Debate" (3. 80–82), a fictional episode of Persian court history in which the seven conspirators around the future king Darius engage in comparative constitutional analysis according to the conventions of Greek political discourse. Each speaker offers different views on the most desirable political organization, arguing in turn for rule by the majority (*plethos*), a group of the "best" (*aristoi*), and a superior individual as monarch, as the form of government most conducive to stability and imperial continuity. Although avoiding overtly Greek political terminology, Herodotus's account subscribes to the idea that all political formations must be identifiable with one of only three classificatory types: democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy. This taxonomy, central to all subsequent constitutional theory, is remarkable for its heuristic grasp, surpassing the level of abstraction of earlier political thought witnessed by the Greek sources, such as the poetry of Homer and the archaic lawgiver Solon, and undoubtedly paralleled in neighboring Mediterranean city-state cultures.

If open debate of one or the other form determined communal policy in most Greek poleis, it should not be surprising that the conditions under which such debate was conducted became themselves the issue of discussion and disagreement. To some extent, the theoretical turn of Greek politics may be considered simply a natural consequence of debate on relatively equal terms reaching a new level of intensity, yielding analyses of the community from the outside—from a standpoint ostensibly unencumbered by sectional interests, suggesting objectivity and dispassionate interest while employing a conceptual apparatus that had arisen within polis politics. It received its fullest expression in the attempts in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE (notably Plato's *Republic* and *Laws,* and Aristotle's *Politics*) to envisage ideal poleis with institutions directed toward a specific goal: happiness by some definition. However, given that the experience of living in a Mediterranean city-state is not

sufficient to explain the transformation of political thought into theory, we need to consider the social and historical factors specific to Greece that encouraged political analysis beyond the bounds of specific issues.

The appearance of such theoretical analysis was inherently bound up with Athens and the two turning points of fifth-century BCE Athenian history—the Persian War of 480–479, in which a coalition of Greek states under Spartan and Athenian leadership warded off the far greater forces of the invading Persians under Xerxes, and the Peloponnesian War of 431 to 404, a long and vicious struggle of attrition in which Athens, ultimately defeated by a Spartan-led alliance, sought to consolidate an empire of tribute-paying subjects among the Greek poleis originally united in a defense league against Persia. The two wars, recounted by the historians Herodotus and Thucydides, respectively, provided both the subject and social conditions for political theory.

On the one hand, both conflicts were conceived crucially as conflicts of the polis. In Herodotus's Persian War, the superior resolve and fighting spirit exemplified by the Athenians is linked to the political organization of the Greeks into small and autonomous communities of equal citizens and contrasted with its inverted (and heavily structured) mirror image—a vast dynastic conglomerate under the autocratic and increasingly despotic rule of a monarch, the Great King of Persia. Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian War, while making a passionate plea for the democratic virtues of freedom and individual enterprise (most famously so in the Funeral Oration, 2. 34–46, delivered by Pericles for the war dead of 431–430 BCE), deals squarely with the ambiguity and dangers of democracy which the crisis had exposed: namely, its reliance on the personal leadership of outstanding individuals who, driven by the same democratic virtues that Thucydides identified as the source of Athenian greatness, turned into "flatterers of the people" (*demagogoi* in the more recent, negative sense) and brought Athens to ruin through personal ambition.

On the other hand, the concurrent and connected revolutions of mid-fifth-century BCE Athenian history, the introduction of radical democracy in Athens, and the imposition of empire over Greek communities in the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea resulted in a massive redistribution of wealth and political opportunity. Radical democracy meant literally direct rule by the people (*demos*): Attendance in the assembly (*ekklesia*) was open to all citizens, and each of them enjoyed the right to speak (*isegoria*). Nearly all public offices, including the 500 members of the council (*boule*), were chosen by lot and rotated, thus opening them to people who were otherwise virtually debarred from active participation and ensuring that an unprecedented proportion of the citizen body gained firsthand experience in the running of civic affairs. Participation was further promoted through the introduction of daily allowances for men serving in administrative and judicial bodies. No doubt the actual proposal and formulation of policies remained the preserve of a small political class who had the education required for persuasive speech making and the leisure and personal connections to keep abreast of political affairs elsewhere in the Mediterranean world. Nevertheless, conservative critics, such as the "Old Oligarch," the anonymous author of the *Constitution of the Athenians,* came to consider democracy and imperialism as elements of a self-sustaining power structure controlled by the interests of the *thetes* (mob), who manned the warships of the Athenian navy, extracted tribute from their subject-allies, settled their lands with armed agricultural colonies (*cleruchies*), and imposed like-minded democratic regimes throughout the Aegean.

The Old Oligarch's dissatisfaction with contemporary politics must have been widely shared among well-educated aristocrats who saw their wealth and traditional privileges undermined. It created the conditions for the rise of a class of intellectuals who perceived and consciously styled themselves as outsiders—removed from the politics of their own community despite their superior disposition and ability. Exclusive upper-class drinking parties (*symposia*) came to provide alternative and potentially subversive forums for political discussion and theorizing. In Athens, the notorious clubs (*hetaireiai*) were twice involved in oligarchic coups, introducing, temporarily, a limited franchise of 400 oligarchs (411 BCE) and 30 "tyrants" (404 BCE). It was from the charged atmosphere of the elite symposion that the classification of constitutions into democracy and oligarchy derived its meaning: as a means to draw clear ideological lines

between political systems that were (apart from minor variations in the distribution of powers and eligibility for office) continuous.

The Classical City-State as a Political Community

In the opinion of a growing number of scholars, the classical polis, traditionally viewed as the city-state par excellence, was neither a city nor a state in the strict sense. The conventional rendering of polis as city-state is considered inadequate for two reasons: (1) Archaeology has shown that urbanization and the development of poleis were commonly though not intrinsically connected, and (2) the polis is thought, in important respects, to fall short of modern definitions of the state. Among the alternative characterizations of the polis proposed in recent years, citizen-state (Garry Runciman) has gained some currency. As in any debate on categorization, the position adopted depends mostly on how the categories are defined, and in the case of such complex social phenomena as cities and states, these vary considerably among the disciplines. Regardless of differences in opinion, however, it would seem undeniable that analyses that stress dissimilarities between the polis and its modern equivalents provide greater explanatory insight into the social context of Greek political theory than those that stress similarities.

Such particularizing definitions stress the relatively undifferentiated nature of government institutions in the polis, including the division of powers (basic to modern doctrines of the state) into legislative, executive, and judicial. The emergence of such powers, organized and perceived as an agency beyond everyday life, was effectively prevented through the laymanship that prevailed in the classical polis. In Athens, the political institutions, the assembly, the council, and the law courts were conceptually identical with the citizen body and, with the exception of the generals (*strategoi*), all magistrates were appointed annually by lot. As a result, the same individuals, either the rich few (*oligoi*) or the demos, took turns at ruling and being ruled through the political institutions. In the absence of a bureaucracy, separate government buildings were not necessary. Only the largest cities acquired purpose-built structures, such as the Athenian Bouleuterion (council hall) and law courts. Elsewhere, political meetings were conducted in functionally compatible mess halls and open-air theaters, and even in Athens the city's political buildings shared the central Agora throughout its history with market stalls and shrines.

Moreover, the widespread reliance on citizen militias precluded the formation of a centralized state monopoly of violence with its corresponding organs of army and police. The dominant mode of warfare in ancient Greece involved massed infantry ranks of citizen-soldiers (*hoplitai*) equipped with thrusting-spears and circular shields, which were fixed to the left forearm. The use of such shields was only effective in a closely packed line (*phalanx*), in which each soldier relied on his right neighbor's shield to protect his right side. Swift and brutal, hoplite battle required little specialized skill, reflecting its social basis in a "middling" class of landowners who paid for their own equipment and shared a strong egalitarian ethos. Only Sparta and Athens established permanent units comparable to standing armies, an anomaly resulting from the unusual status that the two communities had acquired as suzerains of extensive empires. Yet, even with these partial exceptions, the general rule applies that enforced conscription was unknown, and probably impracticable, in the ancient Greek polis.

Similarly, law enforcement agencies or police systems in the proper sense of the word are unheard of in the Greek world. In the absence of a public prosecution system, arrests and court orders were carried out on the initiative of family members or other interested parties, usually through the intervention of appointed magistrates, such as the Athenian Eleven (*hoi hendeka*), who were also in charge of the prison and executions. The significant exception to the rule is the tyrants of the sixth and seventh centuries BCE who temporarily assumed power in some Greek cities with the help of "bodyguards," later retained for internal policing. The most successful among them pursued a conscious policy of centralization, reorganizing the relationship between public and private space and creating state institutions that were amenable to political control. Peisistratos of Athens (c. 546–527 BCE), for instance, cleared the Agora of private buildings to make room for some of the city's first public facilities and permanent symbols of state,

including a notional territorial midpoint, the Altar of the Twelve Gods, in relation to which all distances in Attica were measured.

In the absence of strong state coercive powers, the polis community was maintained by a mixture of consensus and legal routine. This is well illustrated by the Athenian system of public funding, through contributions called liturgies (works for the people), which depended to a large extent on the willingness of wealthy citizens to accept financial responsibility for specific tasks in return for public recognition. Direct taxation (*eisphora,* or paying in) was exceptional and had to be levied collectively through a vote, for a specific purpose and from a specific group, often from wealthy foreigners—still a far cry from the impersonal dues collected by modern governments. Moreover, the administration of justice was clearly a communal affair. No citizen could be executed without being tried by a court appointed by the polis, and no one was permitted to take the law into his own hands without a public warrant (*psephisma*), save for such specific cases as burglars or adulterers caught red-handed, and traitors or exiled offenders found in the country of jurisdiction. Correspondingly, by the fifth century BCE the carrying of arms in public was associated with the lawless conditions that supposedly prevailed among contemporary barbarians and the Greeks of the past (Thucydides 1. 6), and the introduction of law codes was imagined as a departure from primitive custom, requiring innovation and conscious imposition by archaic lawgivers, such as Draco and Solon of Athens, and Lycurgus of Sparta.

However, the polis differed from nonstate societies, notably tribes, as much as it differed from modern states. Communal cohesion and collective responsibility in the polis transcended kinship ties; this is borne out by the fact that in times of internal crisis or conflict (*stasis*), divisions were primarily political and coincided only incidentally with lineage. Although some polis institutions had names that may have reflected a tribal past, such as *phyle* (tribe), *phratria* (brotherhood) and *genos* (family or lineage), by the classical period the function of these associations was wholly determined by the political organization of the polis. In fact, Athens provides abundant evidence to suggest that the polis community perceived kinship or family allegiance as a potential threat to its integrity. Cleisthenes's reforms of 507 BCE, for instance, which later Athenians deemed a critical event in the formation of their constitution, involved as a key feature the reorganization of the citizen body into ten tribes in place of the old four and the division of Attica into three regions: the city, the coast, and the plain. The new tribes were composed of newly established "thirds" (*trittyes*), one from each of the three regions. Furthermore, each of the tribes was assigned a mythical eponymous hero with a statue monument in the Agora, perpetuating a fiction of common ancestry and autochthony. The main purpose of this mixing was undoubtedly to minimize the divisive impact of local or familial allegiances by ensuring even regional participation in each of the political and military units of the Athenian polis.

In the classical period the conflict between kin and communal interests was a regular subject of tragedies, such as Sophocles's *Antigone,* and the creation and maintenance of the polis community were thought to demand selfless prioritizing of the common good over that of the family—a central theme of both Pericles's Funeral Oration and the sculptural decoration of the Parthenon frieze, recently identified as the mythical sacrifice of King Erechtheus's daughters by their mother to ensure Athenian military success. Likewise, the extension of family ties beyond the polis was actively curtailed by Pericles's citizenship law of 451 BCE, which made birth from two Athenian parents a requirement for legitimate citizen status. Archaeological evidence confirms that the extended oikos became a feature of the past, as classical housing was commonly structured around the core family and burial plots of big clans were superseded in the fifth century BCE by relatively short-lived family tombs of standardized form on the one hand and public burial grounds for the war dead and other prominent individuals on the other.

As far as modern theories of the state are concerned, the polis is a remarkable phenomenon. The salient feature of modern states—a formal government machinery exercising legal control over a territory through elected party representatives and salaried public-sector employees—was only rudimentarily developed in functionally equivalent institutions. Lacking a coercive monopoly separated from the citizen body, its structure is not

easily accommodated within modern definitions of the state, as formulated from Thomas Hobbes to Max Weber. Nevertheless, life in the polis produced integrated, self-governing communities whose sense of belonging and respect for law depended neither on kinship ties nor substantially on regular face-to-face contact, thus recalling in some respects the "imagined communities" of modern nation-states. The thriving of such complex societies without much statehood in the narrow sense defies the evolutionist notion, implicit in many social science disciplines, that civilization is synonymous with state formation.

Ancient writers in fact have always described the polis in terms of its members and the relationships among them, not as a group of political offices or a territory. In his *Politics,* Aristotle provides two complementary definitions of the polis: His developmental account in Book 1 is centered on the members of the household (*oikos*)—men, women, children, and slaves—as the primeval unit of social and economic reproduction, whereas his systematic account in Book 3 focuses on the citizens and the constitution as the two essential aspects. Throughout the work, he considers the polis as a species of *koinonia,* a key term meaning association or, literally, sharing in. An abstract idea of the state associated with a territory was also unknown in everyday language. Athens was always referred to as "the Athenians," and they fought wars against the Spartans, not Sparta. In art, the Athenians could be personified through the Demos (a bearded man with staff, borrowing the standard citizen iconography), but proper allegories of state are not attested prior to the figures of Macedonia and Asia in a wall painting from Boscoreale, Pompeii, copying a Macedonian original (now in Naples, in the Museo Nationale).

Individual Choice and the Maintenance of the Political Community

For such decentralized societies to endure, a strong consensus was crucial—a sense of communal purpose and a readiness among its individual members to accept majority decisions and the rule of law. The question of how Greek poleis sustained social cohesion will not reveal its full historical significance unless we stress the radical differences between ancient and modern notions of political community, however much the latter might depend on the concepts and prestige of the former. Moshe Berent has forcefully argued that much of what is distinctive about Greek political theory may be explained by its function in society, as an aspect of cultural practice responding to the problem of civic cohesion in the "stateless" polis. Without an idea of state or tribe acting as a dominant referent for group identity and loyalty, social crises were likely to have been perceived individually in terms of competing moral claims and approached through political deliberation and discussion. Accordingly, whereas modern political theorists tend to focus on the difference between legitimate (i.e., state) and illegitimate (private) violence, ancient politicians (where all violence was private) focused on the roots of internal strife, trying to determine, first, what sort of person should be allowed to participate and try to resolve civic discord, and, second, what sort of social system would prevent such crises from emerging in the first place.

This socially conditioned focus on the individual and the individual's moral choices might explain some of the ancient responses to conflict that strike the modern observer as incompatible with modern conventions. For instance, Athens had a law against neutrality, traditionally attributed to Solon, which compelled Athenian citizens under the threat of disenfranchisement (*atimia*) to participate in civic conflict. Thus, although most ancient authors abhorred stasis, Greek ideology accepted it as a constant and necessary fact of life that required the involvement of able citizens willing to form counterfactions in order to preserve a balance of interests and power in the community. Furthermore, throughout their careers, whether in court or upon entering citizen status or office, politically active members of the polis had to expect periodic moral scrutiny by their fellow citizens. In contrast to modern legal practice, many Greek law court proceedings were about potential rather than past offenses, judging the defendant morally with regard to his conduct and associations, which might jeopardize his ability to perform his duties as a citizen. The peculiar practice of ostracism, in which the citizen body voted anonymously for the banishment of individuals by inscribing their names on pottery fragments, was likewise a moral assessment of comportment and character.

Most importantly, however, the social context of Greek political debate holds out a convincing explanation of the ethical character of Greek political theory often stressed by modern observers. After all, much of the preserved corpus of Greek political thought consists of reasoned but prescriptive opinions on the value system and civic virtues most likely to unify the polis. In the absence of an external repressive apparatus, ancient theorists from the Sophists to Plato deliberated by default on the right system of education that conditioned moral inhibitions and self-restraint in both personal and communal affairs. The central significance of Greek education, understood as upbringing and cultural training in the broadest sense, was impressively demonstrated by Werner Jaeger, whose multivolume *Paideia,* approaching the sources through a unifying thematic standpoint rather than formal literary categories and genres, remains the most holistic modern synthesis of classical Greek literature.

Conclusion: Politics Beyond the City-State

The Copenhagen Polis Centre concluded its comparative examination of city-states with the observation that, although the last true city-state cultures (as opposed to isolated city-states surrounded by territorial states) had ceased to exist around 1900, the political organization of most modern territorial states has come to resemble that of city-states in important respects. Whereas all territorial states prior to the eighteenth century appear to have been monarchies, in most of their modern successors the political decision-making process involves some form of discussion and voting, practices that have their origins in ancient city-state cultures. The transferral of city-state politics into modern nation-states goes back to the French Revolution, in particular Jean-Jacques Rousseau's blueprint for democracy modeled on the ancient constitutions of Rome and Rousseau's native Geneva. Similarly, the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution invoked ancient precedents, such as the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues (both founded in Greece in 180–179 BCE), for the federal constitution they created.

Whether this transferral of Greek politics into modern contexts extended to more than concepts remains a moot point. Other scholars, notably Moses Finley, hold that without the organism of the classical polis, which had come to a terminal end with the conquests of Alexander the Great, Greek politics could not have a genuine legacy. After the death of Alexander in 323 BCE, all Greek poleis fell more or less directly under the sway of monarchs, and autonomy in politics, though vigorously contended for in civic discourse, was increasingly restricted to internal affairs. The highest offices became honorary, requiring financial clout and administrative skill, rather than proficiency in political debate and warfare. Elsewhere, the conditions for the emergence of a political community in the classical sense failed to materialize too, due to either the persistence of segmentary tribal structures (e.g., some African city-states) or the economic and political differentiation between city and countryside (e.g., early modern and Renaissance Europe), which prevented the formation of integrated communities with a comparably high participation ratio in central decision making. Finally, in larger territorial states the decision-making process, if it is to be based on consent and majority decision, has to involve some form of representation, which inevitably presupposes institutions and relationships between citizens and politicians different from those encountered in the classical polis. The disparity between ancient and modern politics would seem to be unbridgeable, and any modern claims to constitutional precedents deriving as a living tradition from ancient Greece must be treated with due caution.

Caspar Meyer

See also American Revolution; Ancient Democracy; Aristocracy; Aristotle; Citizenship; Happiness; Herodotus; Lawgivers; Oligarchy; Plato; Radical Democracy; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Rule of Law; Sophists; State; Thucydides; Tyranny; Virtue

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Civic Humanism

Civic humanism is rooted in the theory that a branch of republican political philosophy developed in Florence and spread throughout the Italian city-states toward the end of the fourteenth century. It emphasized a return to a Roman ideal of the citizens' reciprocal relationship to the state, which had lain dormant since the end of the fourth century CE. To the extent that it remains viable today, it is seen as a precursor to the republican ideals developed in France, America, and England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that led to the formation of the modern secular democratic state. The cornerstone of the republic for the civic humanist was the citizen or *cittadino* and his relationship to his fatherland or *patria*. Citizenship conferred rights of community and livelihood in exchange for accepting a series of obligations, such as undying fealty to the patria and its needs during times of both war and peace. In peacetime the fortunate *cittadino* would, for a limited term, be entrusted with the rule of the republic. He worked to extend and protect the peace and prosperity of his city by setting aside his private interests and devoting himself to the common good; in times of war he was expected to give up his worldly goods, the lives of his sons, and perhaps even forfeit his own life in the service of the state in order to secure that most precious of goods: the liberty of the patria in the face of inevitable tyranny should the republic fail.

Hans Baron is widely considered to have coined the term *civic humanism* in 1955 in *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance* in response to what he considered was Jacob Burkhardt's undue emphasis on the individualism of the Renaissance. In point of fact Eugenio Garin slightly preceded Baron's claim in 1952 with *L'umanesimo italian,* although Baron made the greater impact by emphasizing the elevated social standing accorded the literary humanists and coining the evocative term *bürger humanismus,* or civic humanism, to announce the paradigm shift he had just described.

Baron lauded the auctorial power of Guarino Veronese, Pier Paolo Vergerio, Gasparino Barzizza, and Niccolò Niccoli and especially that of the new breed of Florentine literary entrepreneurs Leonardo Bruni and Poggio Bracciolini. He grounded his thesis on their republican eulogizing of citizen-driven political engagement after Florence's war against Milan in 1402. They were well rewarded with both money and communal honor by their politically ascendant mercantile readers; this suggested to him that a new politically committed and patriotic form of humanism had emerged in Florence by the early fifteenth century. Civic humanism as an analytically coherent concept was then taken up most prominently by members of the Cambridge School, led by John Pocock and Quentin Skinner. Also referred to as the contextualist school, the Cambridge School worked hard to correct the hitherto dominant Lockean-liberal paradigm of the positive unintended consequences of acquisitive individualism. Skinner agreed with Baron's analysis of the impact of the call to civic republicanism but saw it less as a Renaissance recovery of a lost Hellenistic stance than as an amplification of an already extant, if relatively dormant, tradition of rhetorical and scholastic study. It is now generally accepted that Baron made too clear a divide between the Renaissance and the Middle Ages and hence ignored the long-standing tradition of civic liberty that developed its voice throughout the high Middle Ages in both oral and textual traditions. Skinner's contemporary, Pocock, was less concerned with traceable literary antecedents than he was with thematic coherence, contending that political discourse in general and republican discourse in particular

developed from its classical roots through a series of epiphanic paradigm shifts, or "moments," finally calcifying into what would become known as the "Atlantic republican tradition."

The Cambridge scholars emphasized the contemporaneous reception of historically situated political utterances and consequently made much use of literary evidence left by humanists. This emphasis led to the claim that Western liberal democratic values could be directly traced to the spread of civic humanism in the Italian Renaissance. Nevertheless, it is Locke's liberalism rather than Machiavelli's republicanism that is still regarded as the primary influence on the formation of contemporary American values. However, the ahistorical foundation of excessive individualism has left the door open for a historically grounded, theoretically rich counter-theory to gain ground. It is in this context that civic humanism has once again become a powerful rhetorical tool against the dominance of individual property rights.

Critical Responses to Civic Humanism

Given the centrality of Baron's *Crisis,* those wishing to call civic humanism into question inevitably begin by confronting the work itself, on the assumption that if the axiom can be shown to be flawed then all derivations from that axiom can be disregarded as unsound. Alison Brown critiques Baron's monological presumption of social development, citing examples such as "now that chivalry had ceased to be the determining factor in Italian medieval life" or the ideal of Franciscan poverty, which "began a victorious procession through all ranks of society."

William Bouwsma takes a more analytical position in arguing that the fact such ideals needed to be lauded at all suggests that de facto civic humanism was not present and that Baron's version of civic humanism represented an ideal representation rather than the reality of fifteenth-century communal history. Bouwsma notes that after 1434 the Medici family held such a tight grip on the city's nominally republican government that opportunities for the active life of a citizen quickly began to fade. However, Brown's critique of Baron's overly stark intellectual transitions applies equally well to Bouwsma when he suggests that the neo-Platonic mysticism of Pico's *Oration on the Dignity of Man* forced the demise of civic humanism in the early to late fifteenth century. The truth is that despite the rise of such esoteric philosophies, the Petrarchian tradition of civic pride remained alive in Florence well into the sixteenth century at the same time as it was being critiqued by Savonarola, Machiavelli, and Guicciardini.

Unlike earlier critics, James Hankins is unremittingly forthright in his rejection of Baron's thesis: With respect to political theory, Hankins declares that Baron was simply wrong about the significance of the Milanese wars, and that Baron failed to see the true significance of Bruni's "civic humanism," which was in fact a subtle reinterpretation of Florence's traditional republican language in oligarchic terms. Along with Philip Jones, Peter Herde, and Nicolai Rubinstein, Hankins takes Baron to task for his naive view of republican politics. A richer interpretation of Renaissance societies suggests that they were not as devoted to individual liberty as their traditions of political folklore would suggest; within the patria full freedom was enjoyed only by a few long-standing property-owning residents.

Critical attention has also been paid to Baron's followers; Pocock extended Baron's thesis by claiming that Florence's civic humanists considered the concept of the patriotic citizen to be antithetical to *homo economicus*. This obvious anachronism in the most commercially successful city in Europe stood unchallenged until 2001 when Mark Jurdjevic demonstrated how, far from being antithetical to the mercantile mind-set, the language of Florentine civic humanism celebrated the merchant as the economic wellspring of the republic and the guarantor of communal liberty.

John Najemy has further argued that the tensions created by economic expansion in peacetime and patriotic defense in times of war were required to promote civic freedom. Najemy proposed that civic humanism was a new ideology developed under the aegis of Florence's elite mercantile families to deflect attention away from their de facto control of the state. The platitudes of civic humanism were, for the politically disenfranchised middle-rank Florentines, the echo of a political voice that had effectively been stripped of all practical power to criticize the regime.

The consensus seems to have developed that late Renaissance republics were invariably oligarchic in

structure and had weaker claims to legitimacy than many tyrannies. It is worth noting that since the late fourteenth century, Florence had relied heavily on slaves who were imported from a variety of foreign locales to fill the labor shortage after the plague of 1348. A decree of 1363 allowed slaves to be imported without limit as long as they were not Christians, and by the mid-fifteenth century slavery was institutionalized to the extent that there were commonplaces about the slaves' national characteristics: Tartars were hard workers, Circassians were good looking with sweet temperaments, and so forth. In the mid-1450s, just as Bruni and Poggio were composing their paeans to the republican liberties enjoyed by Florence's citizens, Guglielmo Rucellai was busy trying to recover 30 florins he had spent on a young female slave he had hoped to debauch. After discovering that she was pregnant he immediately returned her and recovered his money plus costs from the slave dealer. Baron's thesis ignores this lacuna in his account of Renaissance Florence's humanist ideals and the reality of a slave-owning noble remains a fatal flaw for subsequent claims that Renaissance civic humanism was ever anything other than a romantic ideal at best or oligarchic propaganda at worst.

In many practical respects civic humanism has established itself as a corrective ideal to free-market capitalism as well as the illiberal educational axioms promoted by the religious right in the United States. The corrective effect is assumed to lie in its inherent communitarian values matched to its call for mandatory civics lessons promoted by the secular arm of the state's educational institutions. The historical controversies may eventually prove to be a red herring as, even in its debased state, the fact that a notion unknown until 1955 has become an academic commonplace suggests that our own century's need for a unifying term of civic engagement is much stronger than it ever was in the past. Its critics notwithstanding, in the twenty-first century, civic humanism and the classical republican ideal it evokes remains a central feature in the debate surrounding the political validity of communitarianism, representative democracy, and civic engagement in the political process.

Edward King

See also Civic Republicanism; Machiavelli, Niccolò

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Civic Republicanism

Civic republicanism addresses political concerns that have been extant since at least the Hellenistic period. The tradition favors approaches to social and political life that focus on the importance of civic virtue and the political participation that such virtue entails. It necessarily highlights the dangers of political corruption, the primacy of the

rule of law, and the inestimable benefits of a constitution dedicated to a "thick" view of personal liberty expressed as freedom from arbitrary power. In the most potent manifestation of civic republicanism in Western Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, civic republicans drew heavily on classical examples to make their political points. They were especially fond of citing Cicero and his fellow Roman historians, which led to their movement being referred to as the "classical republican" or "neo-Roman" tradition of political thought. The neo-republican interpretation of the Roman tradition, developed in large part in the second half of the twentieth century, is not without its critics, and because so much in the civic republican tradition relies on its interpretation of classical political writings, these criticisms have traction in the debate as to the approach's overall viability.

The Civic Republican Model

The end of World War II stimulated a reformulation of the social conditions of the west, which led to an increased interest in the classical republican tradition. As might be expected after the cataclysmic destruction caused by the previous sociopolitical models of Europe and the West, classical republicans initially held to what we might describe as a perfectionist political philosophy. This assumed that there was a specific and achievable definition of the good life, the perceivable benefits of which would create a politically engaged, incorruptible citizenry to bring it to fruition. Aristotle's conception of the properly constituted *polis* was their axiomatic model and they seemed to assume that political engagement would, of itself, naturally lead to the *eudaimonia* they sought. This view is now commonly referred to as the civic humanist interpretation of the classical republican tradition. It was most vigorously promoted until the mid-1970s by authors such as Hans Baron, Hannah Arendt, and John Pocock and, to a certain extent, it still exists.

Despite its relative lack of appeal to contemporary scholars in the field, civic humanism remains the dominant paradigm for lay readers who wish to oppose the stark utilitarianism of classical liberalism, and as such it might be useful to disentangle it from later incarnations of civic republicanism. The most singular difference is the primacy given by civic republicans to the notion of political freedom or liberty. For civic republicans this freedom is the *condicio sine qua non* of the good life, and nothing good can exist for long without it. Whereas this positive interpretation of freedom is present in some Hellenistic texts, it is not present for most readers of the classical Roman authors, in whose works the emphasis is more on freedom as noninterference than on freedom as a positive good in itself. This is a problem for authors seeking their political justification in the republican successes of ancient Rome, and thus some civic republicans assert that freedom for the republican citizens of Rome involved their active participation in the political process of self-determination. Their favored exemplars are Brutus, Cincinnatus, and Scipio who were lauded, even in their own day, for their extraordinary commitment to the republican cause. It is an even greater problem for neo-republicans who seek historical confirmation of their tenets in Niccolò Machiavelli's Florence, as that city's social structure in the fifteenth century relied heavily on slavery to fill the labor shortage suffered by the city in the wake of the plagues that occurred after 1348. A decree of 1363 allowed slaves to be imported without limit as long as they were not Christians. In the mid-1450s, exactly contemporaneous with Leonardo Bruni's republican panegyrics, Guglielmo Rucellai was reimbursed 30 florins plus costs for a young female slave he discovered to be inconveniently pregnant. It is hard to imagine a circumstance more antithetical to the neo-republican ideal than a slave-owning nobleman returning a human being bought for sexual pleasure on such grounds. Since its high watermark in Pocock's *Machiavellian Moment,* the paradigm for Renaissance scholars such as Quentin Skinner, Gisela Bock, and Maurizio Viroli has shifted away from the impact of the perfectible qualities of civic humanism and has moved toward an instrumental interpretation of civic republicanism as the concept with most traction for modern readers. The problem with this approach, for those intent on developing a distinct civic republican model, is that its largely instrumentalist interpretation of the historical roots of republicanism too easily collapses into liberalism for it to long remain apart from its tenets.

Republican Concepts of Liberty

Skinner introduced his reading of civic virtue as an *instrumentally* valuable aspect of political liberty in *The Idea of Negative Liberty* (1984). The impact of this piece has meant that in contemporary political philosophy, the "republican" part of civic republicanism more often than not refers to Skinner's rather singular interpretation of the development of the classical tradition. Skinner understands the overwhelming republican criterion of value to be political liberty, which he describes in Isaiah Berlin's terms as a "freedom from" oppression and arbitrary rule, rather than a "freedom to" assert one's individual will in the face of the communal good. Such an approach has been further developed, most prominently by Philip Pettit, into a persuasive theory of contemporary political action, and scholars in his mold are often referred to collectively as "civic republicans" or "neo-republicans."

Civic republicans seek to understand the limits of freedom in a socially and politically interdependent world. They suggest that the best opportunity for personal freedom consists in membership in a political community. A collective response to the shared human condition of vulnerability and fear offers a more formidable defense from myriad natural and man-made terrors than could ever prove possible for a solitary individual, no matter how accomplished or wealthy. Such a response articulates the concept of negative liberty, insofar as the community's members are not prevented from following their desires, a freedom that is limited only to the extent that their decisions do not in turn prevent other members of the community from following theirs. This basic conception of negative liberty was ultimately derived from Hobbes although it was most persuasively articulated by Jeremy Bentham and by his godson John Stuart Mill, who declared in Chapter 1 of his essay "On Liberty" that "the only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs" (Mill, 1991, p. 17). This pragmatically prophylactic understanding of personal freedom, which places liberty and responsibility in constant tension, is now entrenched as the dominant conception of liberty among contemporary English writers.

The continental European tradition, promoted by the likes of Baruch Spinoza, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, involves a more "positive" conception of liberty that allows citizens to fulfill their own potential, especially with respect to proactive engagement in government. The major difficulty, as Berlin noted, is that positive arguments can easily be applied on behalf of a citizen incapable of recognizing his or her own best interests, such as is commonly done on behalf of children or the chronically addicted. To what extent, for example, should an alcoholic be permitted to claim a positive freedom to drink when any reasonably impartial spectator would declare him or her to be acting against his or her own best interests and possibly against the best interests of society? The point seems to rest on when and to what extent citizens are free to exercise negative liberty to prevent being coerced for their own good. Despite the broad Anglo-American liberal consensus that positive freedoms have the potential to enervate the citizens' freedom of choice, civic republicans continue to argue that negative freedoms alone are an insufficient axiom upon which to develop a truly free society.

Civic republicans see political liberty in terms of the quality of relationships that exist between persons or groups, rather than the contingent outcomes of any such structures. Whether a strict patriarch decides to show a kindness to his eldest daughter is an outcome contingent on many factors that lie outside of the daughter's control. A legally sanctioned system of patriarchy is part of a series of entrenched social laws and conventions that effectively deny free agency to female citizens, irrespective of whether any particular daughter has a good or bad relationship with her particular father, and as such they are the legitimate target of committed civic republicans. They therefore begin by defining freedom as conditional upon not being subject to the arbitrary whim of a superior power. This stance, which Machiavelli had originally defined as one of the dichotomous positions of the human political condition, is foundational to republican theorists: "The end of the people is more decent than that of the great, since the great want to oppress and the people want not to be oppressed." It is important to recognize that this negative conception of political liberty remains a necessary but not sufficient condition of civic republicanism. Short of regular but infrequent voting, there is no imperative to do anything in particular to enjoy political liberty in this minimal

sense of republicanism. There is no requirement to perfect one's life or society, exercise or restrain one's will, or achieve any goal beyond accepting Rousseau's advice that contentment was to be found by vegetating perpetually on the hillside of the upper Valais.

Practical Limitations of Civic Republicanism

A more developed view of republican freedom, such as might be held by a contemporary civic republican, demands recognition—and eventually elimination—of the broader frame of oppression that exists in the example of patriarchy cited earlier. The fact that the patriarch's daughter enjoys the privilege of not being impeded in her choices does not mean that she has the right to insist upon such freedoms should her father choose to place limits upon her. This argument would hold irrespective of whether the father is under the sincere belief that he is acting in the best interests of his daughter and even if it could be irrefutably demonstrated that his daughter's decisions would lead to a worse outcome than those of his own. It is important to recognize the counter-intuitive fact that theorists of republican liberty value the opportunity to fail on one's own terms over any degree of success wrought on one's behalf by others acting without one's express permission. This difference between a privilege extended—albeit benevolent in intent—and a right—irrespective of its efficacious application—forms the axiomatic basis of a civic republican theorist's opposition to the intrusion of the state into the affairs of its citizens. The goal of a civic republican would not be to seek a "golden mean" between the value of the father's experience and the daughter's desire to maximize her utility. The daughter can have no measure of mature liberty without the abolition of patriarchy as both a legal institution and a cultural phenomenon. The goal of a civic republican then is to design and establish laws and institutions that will eliminate the systemic barriers to free agency—especially those barriers based on arbitrary ascription, such as race, gender or sexuality, that invisibly determine the relationship between the individual and the state. As Pettit notes, the point is to eliminate the negative influence of *dominium* and *imperium* by limiting relationships that permit private persons to oppress each other (*dominium*) while at the same time limiting the state's power to do the same thing in the public realm (*imperium*).

This entirely normative desire has an attractive lucidity in its theoretical formulation. However, once these ideals are mapped onto the political realities of actual communities, the rigors of ideal conceptions of liberty begin to exhibit their pragmatic limitations. To what extent is a republic willing to bear the cost of the sum of all the poor decisions that will inevitably be made by individuals who have little regard for, or intellectual capacity to compute, the social impact of their decisions? Societies operating according to the strictures of sufficiency over idealized optimality regularly restrict their citizens' access to drugs, weapons, prostitutes, child laborers, or slaves. The argument that the repeal of some of these restrictions would have little appreciable effect on the orderly maintenance of society is undeniable, but the decision as to which ones could reasonably be relaxed is one that resists the universal demands of neo-republican theory in favor of negotiations involving parochial norms, laws, and conventions. The fact that all democratic societies live in a constant state of negotiated tension over these communal and individual liberties speaks to the demonstrable lack of interest free peoples have in absolute collective freedoms. To the extent that republican theorists such as Pettit acknowledge the normative quality of their claims, such a dearth of practical exemplars does not trouble them much. Unfortunately, the equally valid normative claims of conservative citizens concerned about the moral decay of their communities have received short shrift from them. There is an elitist tendency in the republican tradition that sees political wisdom as rooted in the mature and enlightened members of the community who then educate the less insightful as to how to develop in a similar fashion. The fact that emotional appeals to fear and loathing are most frequently the rhetorical devices chosen by those who oppose the extension of absolute liberty to all who desire it should not obscure the fact that absolute freedoms may well not have the best interests of the community at heart. As with the individual level examined earlier, neo-republican theorists are not primarily concerned with contingent outcomes; they tend to value the extension of liberty as a singular criterion of value that overrides any and all outcomes that may derive

from the exercise of those freedoms. This should alert us to the potential value in a conservative or gradualist approach to the extension of liberties for liberty's sake.

Civic Virtue

One of the most important themes of the classical republican tradition is the role of civic virtue in preventing the spread of civic corruption. Republicans such as Pettit deviate from their liberal colleagues in that they do not generally assume, for example, that public officials are institutionally or collectively corrupt but rather choose to view officials as individuals and, as such, only potentially corruptible. By evading the question of power relations that Robert Michels's iron law of oligarchy suggests is inherent in all organized institutions, this approach leaves republicans free to believe that the organization of the social and political realm involves nothing more than the correct algorithm for the relationship of institutional laws and practices. Republicans believe that not trusting people will inevitably lead to the very practices one intends to prevent. This is, of course, a reasonable assumption when one is dealing with individuals, but less persuasive when people are institutionally embedded. Civic republicans improve individuals through a program of civic education that rewards virtue with public esteem. However, no modern republican theorist has yet offered a pedagogical approach to civics that differs significantly from that employed in Hellenistic Athens, the Roman Republic, or Renaissance Florence. These examples of short-lived republics only serve to emphasize the fact that such an approach has no long-term successes to boast of in any culture outside of the militaristic and profoundly illiberal case of ancient Sparta. Until the shift in the instrumental approach to virtue inspired by Skinner, critics of republicanism were able to legitimately complain that the profound degree of self-sacrifice, matched to the stoic frugality of the classical exemplars, made such a political ideal unattainable for any but either a militaristic society or an elite number of secular saints. Once this assumed perfectionism was replaced by the acceptance of civic virtue as a strictly instrumental good—useful for maintaining republican liberty but not the sole criterion of value—citizens were able to pursue their goals for private rather than strictly public benefits, reserving their group interests to issues of collective security.

Another significant lacuna in this classically rooted approach is its almost complete failure to address the disproportionate power of corporations, the media, and informational technology to shape and direct the lives of modern citizens. Its theorists seem to slip all too easily into the axioms that functioned perfectly well in its earliest Roman formulation but were already becoming untenable in Machiavelli's economically developing Florence. The fact that Hans Baron was able to locate a republican strain in the polemical writings of Leonardo Bruni was less of an indication of its de facto existence than it was a rhetorical device to deflect attention away from the oligarchic dominance of the public realm instigated by the Medici. Despite reigniting interest in civic republicanism in the 1990s, this relative disinterest in fitting the theory to contemporary realities was at the root of much criticism leveled at Pettit's *Republicanism* (1997). This suggests that beyond the theoretical elegance that undoubtedly exists in its formulations, a practical revival of civic republicanism is effectively impossible until the progress gap between conditions that existed 2,000 years ago and those that exist today is addressed.

Civic Republicans and Freedom

A further problem lies in the fact that civic republicans generally insist upon a much "thicker" conception of freedom than even their historical progenitors would ever have claimed as necessary. To the extent that Machiavelli was engaged in a civic republican revival—as opposed to the more hybrid form of a republic for the citizens with extra-legal responsibilities for the apotheosized elite and the debased *consigliore* recently proposed by Edward King (2008)—we can see the origin of Florentines' concern with freedom placed in opposition to an oligarchical preference for noninterference. However, Machiavelli believed that people would support any governmental system as long as it constrained the nongoverning nobility from their desire to dominate. Their freedom from oppression was guaranteed by the suppression of those who would oppress them if given the opportunity.

Clearly the government could not be seen to rule arbitrarily either; neither could it openly flout the traditional conventions of the *patria,* especially when it pertained to patrimony or the security of women; otherwise, there is almost no discussion whatsoever with respect to positively defining the freedom of the citizenry, meaning that Machiavelli advocated noninterference of a much lower order than would prove acceptable to a neo-republican. For example, Machiavelli never presumed that a republic could ever do away with its overwhelmingly powerful ruling families. Pettit decries precisely this acceptance of a privilege extended in that no matter how extensive the education of such a ruling family might be through "mirror to princes" literature or shared responsibilities with a Machiavellian counselor, there is no guarantee that such a ruler would continue to respect the mutual benefits that such a relationship ought to confer. Indeed the historical record would tend to support his demand that the citizens' acceptance of the prince's arbitrary power must end before any meaningful discussion of their freedoms could be entered into. The presumption that underlies such an aversion to arbitrary power is that it is by definition a bad thing.

For a dogmatic civic republican, one enjoys freedom only to the extent that one is independent from arbitrary power. For a less analytically constrained thinker such as Skinner, there is little pragmatic value in a distinction between noninterference and the more profound level of freedom required of civic republicanism. They both carry de facto value to the citizen and in some instances interference can be deemed a positive good. In cases exemplified by the parent–child, doctor–patient, or pilot–passenger relationship, there is an explicit value in surrendering some of one's rights to perfect freedom in exchange for the expert guidance of a trained professional. There are clearly limits that need to be monitored to ensure that the long-term balance of benefits remains with the immature, sick, or temporarily powerless party, but on balance we regularly and willingly agree to temporarily surrender our absolute freedoms to persons of professional repute. Indeed a world in which such transactions were constrained could prove at best inconvenient and at worst fatal.

This contradiction could be accommodated by considering the human experience holistically, rather than decontextualizing the moments when we surrender our freedoms from the complete arc of our lives. It seems intuitively reasonable to accept constraints on the diminished human experience—such as when we are in our minority, when we are sick, or when we need protection from invasive exogenous forces such as terrorists or foreign armies—for the benefits they confer once we are restored to the sovereignty of our person. Pettit appears to promote such a position when he distinguishes between factors that *compromise* and factors that *condition* a citizen's liberty. A citizen's freedom is potentially compromised when someone seeks lasting arbitrary power over him or her, but it is only conditioned when he or she fails to exert her freedom to its maximum potential due to the exigencies of exogenous factors. Although Pettit only considers exogenous conditioning factors, with some adjustment this framework could accommodate decisions to temporarily condition one's freedom for the greater good of one's holistic well-being. The issue for Pettit, as with other civic republicans, seems to rest on the slippery slope of where we draw the line at willfully permitting our freedoms to be held in abeyance. Pettit illustrates how the cost to the individual of a conditional quality of freedom can be much more damaging that it at first appears by citing Hobbes's description of a state without freedom from interference as being a state of war of all against all. The citizen's liberty is conditioned by his or her having to be safe from imminent death 24 hours a day in the state of nature. Given that Hobbes advocates for absolute rule as an acceptable cost for personal security, poorly reasoned conditioning might easily lead to a complete compromise of one's liberties resulting in death, rendering the degree of distinction somewhat moot.

Civic Republicans and Arbitrariness

Just as the term *freedom* appears as a false friend to a civic republican once it is examined closely, a similar problem arises with the notion of *arbitrariness*. It cannot simply be unpredictability, as under a pseudo-republican Machiavellian regime, rationalizing the prince's actions to allow one to better

predict his behavior does nothing to remove the systemic roots of princely oppression. In this Machiavellian formulation arbitrariness is defined by a failure to be constrained by the generally accepted standard of the parochial modes, laws, and ordinances in effect in any given patria. This does little to raise the standard of arbitrariness above that covered by the rule of law, and it fails even that standard if the outcome can be judged to have benefited the patria more than it has harmed a significant number of its citizens. Pettit again tries to thicken the value of the term by defining arbitrariness as a failure to track the "welfare and world-view" of those affected, although he remains open to the charge that this requires an a priori definition of the common good available to a state that is acceptable to all. It is possible to deflect this unappealing scenario by submitting the account of the welfare of citizens to the democratic process. However, it is difficult to know how this last move achieves any substantive deviation from the practicalities of contemporary liberalism.

In addition to being concerned with government assuming arbitrary powers over its subjects, civic republicans are also concerned that individuals or groups within society do not assume arbitrary power over each other. A system of laws to govern the citizens' mutual relations is as important as the rules that protect the citizens from the awesome power of the state. All of this is available in the classical republican literature; where neo-republicans extend the concept is in recognizing that the least advantaged members of society are vulnerable to the vagaries of the economy, and not having their basic needs met renders moot any concern for their political liberty. An initial reaction might be to ensure that government provide subsidies to low-income families to protect them from the arbitrary power of exploitative employers, but we should recognize that they are also in danger of losing their freedom from long-term dependence on the very subsidies designed to protect them in the first place. This constant battle with the entrenched inequalities inherent in a competitive capitalist society leads contemporary republicans to consider no less trenchant inequalities in public policy directed toward gender, race, education, or disability provisions in public and family law. There is no doubt that considerable work remains for civic republicans engaged in determining appropriate policies that can answer the philosophical demands of republican freedom while at the same time satisfying the practical needs of the most disadvantaged of citizens.

Conclusion

Despite making significant contributions to a series of ongoing debates in contemporary social and political theory, neo-republicans seem unnecessarily constrained by the need to maintain a distance between themselves and the mainstream liberal tradition. To claim, as Viroli does, that liberalism is "an impoverished or incoherent republicanism" is to prize the dry coherence of an abstract and rigidly monological thesis over the essentially human advantages inherent in a rich communitarian existence. Both approaches share political commitments to, for example, equality, political liberty, and the rule of law. And many axiomatic authors such as Machiavelli and Montesquieu represent both approaches, so the move to an instrumental interpretation of liberty spearheaded by Skinner might have opened the door to a symbiotic relationship. Even as signally perfectionist a liberal as John Rawls declared that his theory had no fundamental opposition to a nonperfectionist, instrumental interpretation of republicanism. The alarm for such a failure to seek a theoretical compromise in favor of a historically anachronistic purity was sounded by David Hume at the height of the republican movement in 1778:

> A civilized nation, like the English, who have happily established the most perfect and most accurate system of liberty that was ever found compatible with government, ought to be cautious in appealing to the practice of their ancestors, or regarding the maxims of uncultivated ages as certain rules for their present conduct. (Hume, p. 525)

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See also Arendt, Hannah; Civic Humanism; Liberty; Mill, John Stuart; Neo-Republicanism

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Civil Disobedience

Arguments as to the meaning and acceptability of civil disobedience became central to political theory in the late 1950s and remained so into the 1970s. The topic had been much discussed before the 1950s, especially in debates initiated by the writings of Henry David Thoreau and Leo Tolstoy in the nineteenth century and by the actions of Mahatma Gandhi in the early twentieth, but it was the American civil rights movement and the antiwar protests of the student New Left which propelled civil disobedience to center stage in political theory. Then it captured the attention of leading political philosophers, including Hannah Arendt and John Rawls, who wrote extensively on the theme, and generated a broad public debate about the limits of acceptable political action in a democracy.

The Concept of Civil Disobedience

In this mid- to late-twentieth century variant, the term *civil disobedience* was almost always taken to refer to a refusal by a group of individuals to obey a specific law, particularly when such refusal was accompanied by nonviolent protest, including so-called direct action protest whereby civil disobedients confronted legal authorities directly and drew immediate attention to their refusal to obey. These tactics were pioneered in campaigns against racial segregation in the northern United States by James Farmer's Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in the 1940s, and they spread more dramatically to the southern states of the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, led by Martin Luther King Jr.'s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The widespread publicity that these movements garnered, combined with their apparent success in overcoming racially exclusive legislation, led to the tactic being widely copied, most notably by the student New Left in the United States in their campaigns against American involvement in the Vietnam War in the later 1960s and early 1970s.

Despite the popular association of civil disobedience with dramatic and direct forms of political action, political philosophers of civil disobedience generally insisted that it was an approach to politics characterized as much by a precise and demanding set of restrictions and constraints on citizen behavior as it was by support for radical action. The major philosophical defenders of civil disobedience, including Arendt, Marshall Cohen, Rawls, and Michael Walzer, thus placed great emphasis on the ways in which civil disobedience differed from insurrection, rebellion, or revolution, arguing as they did so that it might be possible for the practice of civil disobedience to be compatible with the maintenance of the prevailing liberal democratic political order over time. This account was dependent on four characteristics of civil disobedience on which these philosophers put much store.

The first of those characteristics emphasized that civil disobedience must always involve claims of "justice" rather than straightforward claims of "interest." An action only counted as civil disobedience, on this account, when those involved in disobeying the law did so not simply because the law did not serve their own self-interest but because there was something fundamentally unjust about it: an injustice, moreover, which could potentially be accepted not only by the disobedients, or by those directly affected by the specific law being disobeyed, but by any reasonable, impartial observer. In this way, civil disobedience was said to differ from many of the campaigns conducted by other movements, such as radical trade unionists or tax refusers, in which the targets of disobedience were particular laws that directly disadvantaged certain groups in ways widely considered to be fair, just, and appropriate. These other campaigns did not deserve the title "civil disobedience," it was charged, because they were intended to serve the interests of some specific group rather than the general cause of justice or fairness.

The second characteristic of civil disobedience followed directly from the first characteristic. This involved a claim that it was not just any concept of justice that civil disobedience must serve but rather justice as already generally understood by the majority of reasonable citizens living in the particular nation whose laws were being disobeyed. Just as it was not acceptable for disobedients to appeal solely to their self-interest, it was also not acceptable for them to appeal to standards of justice that could not be shared by fellow citizens. In this classic version of civil disobedience, therefore, actions could not be classified as civil disobedience if they were defended by deeply controversial interpretations of the demands of justice, such as those derived from comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines, but only if they were justified with reference to norms and values that were already widely shared in the broader public culture. The American civil rights movement was once again presented as the paradigmatic example of civil disobedience in this vein by many philosophers, because although many members of CORE, SCLC, and SNCC possessed controversial visions of the ideal society, they tended to justify their resistance to the law in terms of widely shared "American values," especially in terms of those rights, freedoms, and equalities promised in the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. Martin Luther King Jr., in particular, was renowned for his insistence that the civil rights campaign was an effort to make American society live up to its own standards rather than an attempt to impose new moral standards upon it.

The third characteristic of civil disobedience required that this justificatory story must be clear and apparent to all and not only to the disobedients themselves. To be properly described as civil disobedients, protesters would have to conduct their campaigns openly in public, explicitly drawing their opponents' attention to the specific injustice that they were opposing and their reasons for doing so. In this way, civil disobedients would make it clear that they were not trying to serve their own interest but rather trying to serve the general good, and were not seeking to do so coercively through threat or force but by persuading the broader community of the necessity of rectifying the particular injustice. If actions were secret or their justifications hidden from view, after all, disobedients would always be open to the charge that they lacked real confidence in the relationship of their cause and broader social attitudes toward justice and injustice.

Finally, the fourth characteristic of true civil disobedience was said to rest in what John Rawls called the ideal of "fidelity to the law." On this

condition, campaigners could only turn to direct action and to disobedience of the law once they had fully exhausted other avenues of political change, including elections, pressure group actions, and appeals to judicial bodies such as supreme or constitutional courts. Prospective disobedients had to be certain, therefore, that the injustice that they were protesting could not be met in any other way than through an active campaign of refusal to obey the law. Moreover, this fidelity to the law also demanded that disobedients willingly accept any legal punishments that followed from their disobedience, including appropriate imprisonment or the payment of fines. Philosophers of civil disobedience argued that the acceptance of such punishment, even if it were rightfully considered unjust, was the best guarantee possible that the disobedients were sincere in their cause and truly believed that their actions were required to bring the injustice they protested to the attention of the nation at large. Disobedients would not, after all, commit to such self-sacrifice merely in the pursuit of self-interest, but they would do so if they believed that the duty to the justice of their cause demanded it.

These four conditions were intended to be extraordinarily demanding on civil disobedients. They were designed to ensure that civil disobedience was never taken lightly and always taken in good faith. They also placed great expectations on the personal characteristics of those involved in civil disobedience. It was unsurprising, therefore, that organizations such as CORE, SCLC, and SNCC made considerable efforts to ensure that their members were capable of engaging in campaigns that were consistent with these conditions, often drawing on the spiritual and psychological writings of Tolstoy, Gandhi, and French existentialist Albert Camus, in order to explain how it was possible for human beings to live up to such high standards in their political lives, even in the face of great stress and constant opposition. Civic virtue and personal restraint thus became the key characteristics of the practitioners of civil disobedience in the mid-twentieth century.

Criticism of Traditional Philosophies of Civil Disobedience

Partly in response to these demands on practitioners, critical voices emerged in the later 1950s through and the 1970s when a wide and diverse range of activists and thinkers, including Stokely Carmichael, Frantz Fanon, and Tom Hayden, insisted that the rules for civil disobedience laid down by liberal philosophers were unrealistic. These critics insisted most of all that traditional philosophies of civil disobedience failed to acknowledge how far removed most—if not all—existing nation-states were from the political, social, and economic conditions that justice required. When seen in this way, the publics of existing nations were unlikely to be led to abandon unjust practices even when those injustices were pointed out to them through nonviolent direct action and by the breaking of specific laws. This was partly because ideals of justice were not, in fact, widely shared across the citizen body and partly because actual injustices were far too deeply entrenched in the politics and culture of the nation to be fully remedied without considerable difficulty. Racial segregation, for example, might be ameliorated through the kind of action recommended by the philosophers of civil disobedience, but it would require significantly stronger, and potentially more coercive, campaigns to eradicate racial injustice entirely in the United States.

Such critics thus disputed both the practical efficacy of civil disobedience as previously described and the normative force of the restrictions that the philosophers of civil disobedience had sought to place on activists. If, after all, the majority of citizens to whom disobedients were appealing had historically proven themselves immune to the demands of justice, then it seemed inappropriate to restrict disobedients to public actions that were explicit in their justifications and to insist that they accept any punishments to which this majority deemed it fit to submit them.

These debates as to the efficacy and appropriateness of civil disobedience continued vociferously in political theory in the early 1970s. They dropped away from the center of academic argument, however, as actual social movements of civil disobedience declined across the developed world later in that decade. As the movement for civil rights moved into mainstream party politics and the student New Left disintegrated in the face of the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam, no new movements of civil disobedience replaced them in North America, and much the same was true for Europe and the developing world too.

For a while, therefore, it seemed as if the debate about civil disobedience was relatively sterile, playing a relatively minor supporting role to arguments about philosophical anarchism and the problem of political obligation more generally. The theoretical arguments resurfaced in a slightly new form, though, in the final years of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century, as a result both of the emergence of environmental and antiglobalization activism and as a response to developments in democratic political theory itself, and especially the rise of the theory of "deliberative democracy." Many activists and deliberative democrats in these new movements were initially very sympathetic to the original description of civil disobedience and were especially enthusiastic about its insistence on campaigns for justice rather than self-interest and on the need for constant public justifications of actions taken. Recent years, however, have also witnessed a reemergence of more skeptical voices, with a group known as democratic realists insisting that significant, far-reaching political change is unlikely ever to be brought about through such relatively mild forms of disruption. The debate between these two movements now occupies center stage in democratic political theory. It appears, then, that both the moral and the practical arguments about civil disobedience and its limits might well become a major theme of theoretical argument again in the decades to come.

Marc Stears

See also Arendt, Hannah; Civil Rights; Disagreement; Dissent; Gandhi, Mohandas; Liberty; New Left

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Civil Law

"Civil law" is a translation of the Latin term *ius civile,* a body of law exclusively available to Roman citizens. In modern scholarship, the adjective *civilian* is used to identify those legal systems historically influenced by Roman law through the process of "reception." Before the stages in this process can be explored, some remarks on the Roman law that was "received" are required.

During the sixth century CE a compilation of law was collected by order of the Emperor Justinian. This collection, later named the *Corpus Iuris Civilis,* consisted of the *Institutes* (a textbook of first principles based on one written by the jurist Gaius during the second century CE), the *Digest* (an anthology of juristic writing compiled from nearly 2,000 books by 38 renowned jurists of the first to the third centuries CE), the *Code* (an updated collection of Imperial law covering the second to sixth centuries CE), and latterly the *Novels* (further Imperial laws collected after Justinian's death). The first stage in the reception process was initiated by the partial rediscovery of the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* during the twelfth century in a library in Florence. The discovery is conventionally linked to the investiture contest between the Hohenstaufen emperors and the popes. Because this collection of Roman law contained many references to the power of the emperor and his relationship with the law, it proved a powerful tool in this debate. The rediscovery of Roman law was further aided by the founding of the first universities in Europe. When the University of Bologna was established in the mid-twelfth century, one of the first subjects taught was Roman law. Throughout the twelfth century, as other universities were founded in Northern Italy, a group of legal scholars (the Glossators) emerged. The Glossators, so called because of their method, were interested in uncovering the true meaning of the text, but by linking texts using glosses they succeeded in forming general principles (*regulae*). The culmination of this method is visible in a work, the *Glossa Ordinaria,* produced toward the end of the twelfth century by Accursius. With the advent of the thirteenth century, southern France became an important center for the study of Roman law. The subject continued to flourish at Italian universities, but a

different methodology began to emerge at French universities such as Orleans under the influence of scholars, known as the *Ultramontani* (or "school" of Orleans). Whereas the Glossators treated the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* as a finished text that could not be questioned, French scholars, chief among these Jacques de Revigny and Pierre de Belleperche, adopted a skeptical approach to the order of the texts (which had been transmitted in different formats) and to their content. By the start of the fourteenth century, Italian jurists again began to dominate the study of Roman law. Unlike their French counterparts, these scholars, known as the Commentators, adopted yet another method of examining Roman legal texts. While continuing to engage in textual exegesis, these scholars, most prominent of whom were Bartolus de Saxoferrato and his pupil Baldus de Ubaldis, also specialized in writing freestanding commentaries on specific areas of law in which they demonstrated how the rules and principles of law could be applied to the circumstances of their day.

By the end of the fourteenth century, Roman law had contributed significantly to the creation of a European "common law" (*ius commune*). This common law did not replace existing local law. Rather, legal practice shows that local statutes continue to be drafted and many of the Italian city-states had their own customary law. Rather, the concepts, intellectual structures, and terminology of Roman law were learned by students from across Europe studying at these universities and transfused into the court system or bureaucracy of their native jurisdictions upon their return. The *ius commune,* which came into existence by the end of the fourteenth century, was not solely made up of Roman law but was also shaped by canonic, customary, and feudal laws.

The transformation of the *ius commune* into the legal systems of Western Europe (and elsewhere) from the fifteenth century onward is inextricably linked to the rise of the nation-state and the impact of the Protestant Reformation. The fifteenth century witnessed an intellectual break with the medieval past and over the next two centuries legal scholarship came under the influence of humanism. For the study of Roman law, this manifested itself in an attempt to produce authoritative editions of Roman legal materials. During the course of the sixteenth century, two further important developments occurred. First, a group of Spanish theologians, the Scholastics, came under the influence of Thomas Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* and his notions of distributive and commutative justice, which led them to reinterpret Roman legal principles and taxonomies. Second, the work of the Scholastics had a profound influence on the sixteenth-century Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, widely regarded as the father of seventeenth-century natural law thought.

The seventeenth century, a turbulent period in Western Europe characterized by bloody wars and the recognition of the boundaries of many modern European states, was dominated in the field of legal scholarship by (secularized) natural-law thought. According to supporters of this theory, the inspiration for law could be derived from inductive reasoning and intellect rather than a higher power (as was the prevailing medieval view). It was also during this period that new taxonomies and methods of legal classification were explored. Natural-law thinking continued to dominate legal scholarship for much of the eighteenth century, fueled by values of the Enlightenment and the legal developments in the rights of man following the French Revolution. Encouraged by the rational approach of natural-law scholarship, the end of the eighteenth century also witnessed the first attempts at redacting the law into a code aimed at replacing the organic legal development that had occurred since the advent of the twelfth century. A good example of this development is the Prussian Civil Code of 1794, commonly regarded as the first of the legal codes in early modern Europe. Much of nineteenth-century legal scholarship in Western Europe focused on the development of codes of law. In France, the Civil Code of 1804, a product of Napoleon's grand vision, is squarely rooted in Enlightenment thought. Similarly, the German Civil Code of 1900, borrowing in many instances from the Prussian Code of 1794, is a textbook example of structuring of legal thought during this period. In the creation of these codes, the terminology, structure, and concepts of Roman law featured heavily—hence the modern classification of these systems as civilian.

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See also Ancestral Tradition (*Mos Maiorum*); Ancient Constitutionalism; Canon Law; Common Law; Consent; Corporation Theory; Hierocratic Arguments; Jurisprudence; Lawgivers; Roman Commonwealth; Roman Law

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Civil Religion

The idea of civil religion received its first sustained theoretical treatment in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *The Social Contract* (1762). Rousseau dedicates a penultimate and relatively lengthy chapter of that work to a discussion of civil religion, laying out its central conceptual elements and emphasizing its normative importance for a healthy body politic.

Civil religion is a public profession of faith, one that aims to inculcate political values and that prescribes dogma, rites, and rituals for citizens of a particular country. These are the central and defining elements of civil religion, as Rousseau describes it. The object of civil religion is to foster sentiments of sociability and a love of public duties among citizens, extending these bonds throughout a citizenry and its membership. Civil religion identifies gods and tutelary benefactors to assist with this great aim, and its successful inculcation is supposed to help maintain stability, order, and prosperity for the country.

Rousseau proposes that the dogmas of civil religion ought to be simple: They should affirm the afterlife, a God with divine perfections, the notion that the just will be happy and the wicked punished, and the sanctity of the social contract and the polity's laws. Civil religion should also condemn intolerance as a creedal matter, Rousseau contends, given that there can never again be an exclusive national religion. A civil profession of faith ought to tolerate all and only those religions that tolerate others, he suggests, at least insofar as the respective religious groups do not uphold beliefs that run contrary to citizens' duties. More extremely, Rousseau avers that penalties may rightly be applied against those who do not observe the civil religion. Although government cannot obligate a person to believe its dogmas, one who fails to adopt them can rightly be banished from the state on grounds of unsociability. Additionally, a citizen who publicly acknowledges civil dogmas may be punished with death if subsequently that citizen behaves as if he does not believe them.

Civil religion is not identical to religious establishment. While established religions receive symbolic endorsement or financial aid from government, they may not reciprocate by supporting state institutions or citizens' duties. An established religion might advocate meekness or withdrawal from public life, or promote other values that run contrary to the purposes of citizenship. Established religions can prioritize otherworldly ends over life on earth, too, or identify a church leadership independent of political authorities. Rousseau sees the latter problem as both common and pernicious: "Wherever the clergy constitutes a body," he writes, "it is master and legislator in its domain." Rousseau claims that Thomas Hobbes was the only Christian writer brave enough to propose that Christianity and state be reunified but that Hobbes apparently misunderstood that Christianity is terrible for founding republics. Rousseau charges that Christianity teaches people to be excessively servile and dependent, leaving adherents unsuitable for military service and ready for slavery. Interestingly, Rousseau contrasts contemporary, institutionalized Christianity with the "religion of man," distinguishing the latter as the religion of the gospel. He lauds the religion of man as "saintly, sublime, [and] true," but adds that its weakness lies in the fact that it lacks a proper relation to the political whole, and as such gives no external force to the fraternal unity that it envisions.

Rousseau maintains that civil religion has decided benefits: It unites divine love with the laws of one's country, prompts people to pray for their homeland, and vivifies the body politic. But civil religion has distinct weaknesses: Because its dogmatic elements of sociability are constructed, and will vary across countries, it stands to reason that they could be devised poorly or incoherently. Furthermore, the theological postulates of the civil religion presumably may be false, a point that Rousseau seems to recognize. Civil religion also runs the risk of fostering credulity, superstition, intolerance, and bloodthirstiness in the body politic; in addition, moral or prudential problems may accompany efforts to foster or perpetuate civil religion in a pluralistic country.

Although Rousseau may have given civil religion its first elaboration in political theory, the phenomenon predates him by many centuries. Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges identified forms of civil religion in the foundations of the ancient city-states of Greece and Rome. And the Greek historian Polybius, writing in the second century BC, observed elements of civil religion in his study of the Roman constitution. Polybius remarked that superstition bound the Roman state together, adding—with admiration—that this made Rome decisively superior in the sphere of religion. The Romans' public form of religion stimulates magistrates to be scrupulous and dutiful, Polybius proposes, while the fickle, lawless masses remain restrained by their fear of gods and punishment in the afterlife.

Sociologist Robert N. Bellah has proposed that civil religion exists in America: The United States is suffused with various rituals that unite its citizens, employing symbols that are drawn from specific religions but which operate independently of those origins. He reckons that America has its own series of saints and martyrs (such as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln) and that an examination of founding documents and important inaugural addresses shows how America operates on the idea that it is a nation chosen by God. However, while unifying symbols, founding myths, and public rituals may be found across countries, it is unclear whether civil religion is necessary for a country's foundation or ultimate success.

Lucas Swaine

See also Common Good; Community; General Will; Sociability

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Civil Rights

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966) includes the following:

- The right to life
- The right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
- The right not to be held in slavery or servitude
- The right to liberty and security from arbitrary arrest
- The right for accused persons to be kept separately from convicted criminals
- The right not to be imprisoned solely for inability to fulfill a contract
- The right to freedom of movement and residence
- The right to due process when accused of a crime, including the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
- The right against retrospective legislation
- The right to privacy
- The right of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion

- The right to hold opinions and express them freely
- The right of peaceful assembly
- The right of freedom of association, including the right to form and join trade unions
- The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry
- The right to a nationality
- The right to take part in public affairs, including to vote in a secret election, and to have access, on terms of equality, to public service
- The right of members of minority groups to enjoy their own culture, religion, and language
- Provisions that require that these rights be respected for all people independently of their race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status

It is not clear that there is a determinate answer to the question which of these are "civil" and which "political" rights. The concept of civil rights is typically understood as encompassing those rights that guarantee a person the standing of a full and equal member of a political community. According to this view, some of the rights, in the previous list, that seem clearly "political" might still qualify as civil rights. For example, we might ask whether for a person to be a full and equal member of a political community, it is necessary that the person holds the right to take part in public affairs. Nondemocratic theorists might deny this, but supporters of democracy are likely to think that the right to political participation is a central component of any person's standing as a full member of his or her political community. Furthermore, some will think that this list of rights omits some important civil rights, such as the right to own property.

Which rights should be included in a list of civil rights will turn on what the theorist deems necessary for a person to have the status of a full and equal member of a political community. Any plausible list is likely to include some of the following: rights against arbitrary or excessive interference from the state and other people; rights to appropriately respectful treatment within the legal system; rights to participation in the law-making process; rights to equal standing under the law and rights against unjustified discrimination. Among the policies for implementing these rights, we can distinguish between those aimed at generally ensuring the rights are fulfilled (e.g., policies aimed at protecting people's privacy or at preventing torture) and policies that aim to prevent unequal or discriminatory respect for these rights (e.g., policies aimed at preventing racial or gender-based discrimination in educational practices or in access to public office). It is notable that policies aimed at preventing unjustified discrimination in all areas of life—including access to employment and consumer opportunities, rather than simply to directly "political" activities—have fallen under the heading of "civil rights."

Civil Rights and Other Categories of Rights

Natural Rights

The list given by the International Covenant can be taken as operationalizing the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property endorsed by John Locke, and in various forms by other natural law theorists—although the International Covenant's list is notable for the omission of property. The conception of civil rights as natural rights is also evident in the American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789). Understood as natural rights, civil rights would exist independently of their social or legal recognition through instruments such as the International Covenant. Whether further rights—such as socioeconomic rights and group rights—also qualify as natural rights is a matter of debate, but most natural rights theorists have included the fundamental civil rights among their lists of natural rights. However, one can be committed to the importance of civil rights without regarding them as natural rights. For example, although Jeremy Bentham famously dismissed inalienable natural rights, he nonetheless argued that the social and legal creation of, and subsequent respect for, civil rights is of the utmost moral importance. Contemporary utilitarian defenders of civil rights take a similar view.

Human Rights

There are many ways of conceiving human rights: as the rights listed on the international and regional lists like the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, or the European Convention, or African Charter on Human Rights; as secularized forms of natural right; as the rights that each person has simply in virtue of being human; or as among the most morally important rights we hold. On any one of these understandings, human rights will include most civil rights. If human rights are those we have by virtue of being human, then whether human rights include *all* civil rights will depend on whether simply by being human, one is entitled to the standing of full and equal membership within a political community. Political conceptions of human nature (as evident in Aristotle) will support the view that all civil rights are human rights, but others argue that some of our civil rights, such as the right to compensation for a miscarriage of justice, are not human rights because they are not essential to the possession of a distinctively human life. As with natural rights, whether further rights—beyond civil rights—qualify as human rights is a matter of debate.

Negative and Positive Rights

Negative rights entitle their holders to noninterference and can typically be fulfilled through refraining from doing things to the right-holder; examples include the rights not to be killed or tortured. By contrast, positive rights entitle their holders to assistance, and their fulfilment typically requires actions to be performed for the right-holder; examples include the rights to education and medical care. Civil rights have standardly been conceived as negative: At first glance, it seems that respecting people's lives, refraining from torturing or enslaving people, and respecting people's freedom of worship and expression all require mere noninterference rather than assistance. But on second glance we might question this: Some of the components of full and equal political membership, such as the right to political participation or the right to a nationality, seem necessarily to require positive actions for their fulfilment (e.g., actions of setting up a democratic system and providing passports), and even those civil rights that seem to demand no more than noninterference (such as the right not to be tortured or enslaved) still require positive action for their enforcement, such as funding a police force and establishing law courts. More radically, Henry Shue and Jeremy Waldron have also argued that none of the civil rights is genuinely secured for a person who lacks the means for subsistence, education, and housing: On this account, fulfilment of a range of clearly "positive" welfare rights would be a necessary precondition for fulfilment of civil rights.

Social, Economic, and Welfare Rights

Civil rights are often contrasted with social, economic, and welfare rights such as the right to work, the right to health care, and the right to education. This contrast is evident in the United Nations' provision of a distinct International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and in the frequently made claim that social, economic, and welfare rights constitute a second generation of rights, in contrast with first generation civil rights and third generation cultural and group rights. Some theorists charge some of the second and third generation rights with not being genuine rights, or at least not genuine "natural" or "human" rights, sometimes on the ground that they are too demanding or too liable to conflict, sometimes on the ground that they lack determinate content, are unenforceable, or do not entail determinately allocated duties. Others, as noted earlier, argue that fulfilment of certain social and economic welfare rights is a necessary precondition for the fulfilment of civil rights.

Who Holds Civil Rights?

If civil rights secure one's status as a full member of a political community, then in some sense it must be possible for them to be held by anyone who has the capacities necessary to be a full member of a political community. It is interesting to consider what this implies for those who lack these capacities. Some have argued that babies and young children, adults with severe mental health difficulties, and animals cannot qualify as bearers of any rights whatsoever, or at least of any human rights, because these beings lack the necessary rational capacities. Such exclusionary arguments seem surprising in light of the prominence given to nondiscrimination within civil rights discourse. Nonetheless, it is notable that for some rights on the International Covenant's list, many societies seem willing to make exclusions (e.g., by disallowing

adults with severe mental health difficulties full freedom of movement and residence and by excluding political participation rights from children and animals). Furthermore, those rights on our initial list that seem to apply universally to all people—such as the rights against torture and slavery and rights of due process—are arguably not only civil rights. Such universal rights seem to constitute broader rights of humane treatment justifiable independently of their role in securing rights-holders full membership of a political community. They are *also* civil rights because they are also necessary for full and equal membership, but they are valuable in ways that go beyond this role.

Against Whom Are Civil Rights Held?

It is important to consider whether a person's civil rights entail duties for a citizen, government, or both. Furthermore, one might wonder whether a person's civil rights can also entail duties for foreign governments and transnational bodies (such as the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and corporations). Theorists, particularly those working primarily on *human* rights, are divided on these issues. At the least, a citizen's civil rights must surely entail binding duties for the citizen's government, and many are willing to go further and argue that human rights in general entail duties for any individual acting in an official capacity within the society. Whether civil rights, or human rights more generally, also directly entail duties for all citizens is debated, but the civil rights against nondiscrimination, torture, and slavery seem clearly violable by individual citizens. Some would argue that whereas an intrusive neighbor can violate one's *civil right* to privacy, this will only qualify as a *human rights* violation if the neighbor is acting in an official capacity, or if the neighbor's intrusions are condoned by the state.

What Justifies Civil Rights?

One's positions on the issues outlined earlier will vary depending on one's theory of the justification of civil rights. There are several rival accounts of why we hold rights in general, with implications for civil rights. Among these accounts, we should distinguish between individualistic theories, which maintain that a given person holds civil rights because of the great importance *to that person* of what civil rights secure, and more collectivist theories, which maintain that a given person holds civil rights because of the wider importance *to everyone* of a system of civil rights. Both types of accounts should be distinguished from those which justify civil rights independently of the importance of what they secure—perhaps on the ground that the principle of respect for civil rights is universalizable or not reasonably rejectable. Whichever account is chosen, it is likely that its grounding for civil rights will appeal in some way to the value of playing one's part in a political community, the importance of political communities in general, and the role of equal status in the moral community.

Civil Rights in History

The U.S. Civil Rights Movement

The campaigning movement to liberate African American U.S. citizens from legal and institutional oppression is often called the civil rights movement. The rights for which the movement fought included direct rights to political and legal participation (e.g., removal of restrictions on voter registration and discrimination in law courts) but also rights to full and equal participation in public activities that are not, at first glance, overtly political (such as desegregated shopping, employment, and public transport). The range of activities over which the civil rights movement fought reflects the wide range of aspects of life that are central to one's full and equal participation in society: education, economic activities, and family life, including marriage. In Martin Luther King Jr.'s 1963 "Letter From Birmingham Jail," he describes the urgent need for reform, cataloguing a series of injustices that includes lynchings, police brutalities, and poverty among African Americans, and ending with his own personal dilemma when trying to explain to his young daughter why a television advertisement for an amusement park is not aimed at her and why the park will exclude her. Elimination of discrimination in all areas was, and remains, one of the core goals of the movement. This has led to debates over policies of affirmative action. And the African American campaign should be understood as generating and working alongside related civil rights campaigns to end discrimination on the

basis of gender, sexual orientation, disability, and species membership. These various civil rights movements, with their overriding aim to secure for all citizens a full and equal status as members of the community, should be distinguished from anti-colonial and indigenous groups' campaigns against imperial domination, which aim for political self-determination, and from campaigns for wider respect for welfare rights in general.

Civil Rights as "Western"

Two years after the U.S. Civil Rights Bill was passed in 1964, the two International Covenants—on (1) Civil and Political Rights and (2) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—were adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, open for ratification by member states. The division into two covenants partly reflected the cold war division between the North American and Western European focus on civil and political rights, and the Eastern European and USSR's focus on economic and social rights. Although neither bloc was exemplary in respecting either sort of right (witness the continued civil rights struggles in the United States and the economic deprivations in parts of the former USSR) the assumption that some types of rights are more suited to, culturally embedded in, or normatively relevant to certain types of society reappears on various occasions, such as Lee Kuan Yew's claim in 1991 that Asian values prioritize the community over the individual in a manner not congruent with traditional civil rights.

Rowan Cruft

See also Affirmative Action; Feminism; Human Rights; Race Theory; Rights

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Civil Society

The term *civil society* refers to a variety of uncoerced voluntary associations that publically promote a broad range of shared interests, purposes, and values. Although these necessarily include some self-interested goals, the trope of civil society presupposes that the citizens form such associations out of a collective desire to improve the communities to which they belong. Such associations vary in terms of the formality of institutional structure, the influence they can command in the public sphere, and the degree to which they are fully autonomous from more integrated civic institutions, such as the government or the corporate world.

The term *civil society* is a false friend to the social sciences in that it has come to mean all good things to all people, even when competing claims become mutually exclusive to the point of absurdity. Michael Edwards illustrates this problem by contrasting the Cato Institute's understanding that civil society is "fundamentally reducing the role of politics in society by expanding free markets and individual liberty" with the World Social Forum's claim that it is "the single most viable alternative to the authoritarian state and the tyrannical market" (Edwards, 2007, p. 13). Part of the reason for the term's malleability comes from the fact that citizens seeking the common good through a variety of voluntary public activities often find it impossible to agree on their competing interests, goals, and values. Engaged citizens participate in a variety of nongovernmental organizations, including those led by women, labor unions, faith-based organizations, community leaders, professional associations, charities, and local and international justice, peace, and poverty coalitions, the goals of which are often at odds with each other. With *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962), Jürgen Habermas initiated a movement to "tidy up" the disordered face of civil society by distinguishing these activities from the more parochial demands of family, friends, state-sponsored institutions, or the stock market, although in practice, such divisions often render the political impact of voluntary associations meaningless. Robert

Putnam emphasized the historical dimensions of this dislocation when he showed that citizens in a modern society have become progressively less likely to sign a petition, participate in a political rally, socialize with their neighbors, or even spend time with family. The title of his work, *Bowling Alone,* which became his metaphor for the diminishing status of civil society, was derived from the observation that despite the fact that more people bowl than ever before, fewer than ever are bowling in leagues. However, neither author makes it clear that the level of civic engagement in the traditionally unstructured realm or in other, less demonstrative arenas has reduced the overall political impact of contemporary citizens on their representatives.

Ferguson and the Scottish Enlightenment

Despite civil society being a subject of interest since antiquity, the modern understanding of the term was first developed during the Scottish Enlightenment by Adam Ferguson, who was David Hume's successor as librarian to the Faculty of Advocates. Despite contrary advice from Hume, who thought the essay "superficial," Adam Ferguson published his *Essay on the History of Civil Society* in 1767, and it was well enough received to be translated into several European languages in his lifetime. In opposition to many of his contemporaries, such as Francis Hutcheson and the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Ferguson never found the theory that human society was enjoying a peaceful development toward a teleologically satisfying (and benevolent) dénouement analytically satisfying. In his essay he declared that

> every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design. (Ferguson, p. 205)

He also rejected Hume's hedonic calculus, which saw human behavior as driven principally by the peaceful pursuit of pleasure:

> To overawe, or intimidate, or, when we cannot persuade with reason, to resist with fortitude, are the occupations which give its most animating exercise, and its greatest triumphs, to a vigorous mind; and he who has never struggled with his fellow-creatures, is a stranger to half the sentiments of mankind. (Ferguson, p. 39)

In this way his historically informed analysis of civil society was allowed to unfold agonistically, motivated by principles of self-interested utility but lacking any overarching plan, and as such, much of it remains persuasive today. Nevertheless, Fergusson remains out of step with current definitions of the civic imperative of the public sphere to the extent that, for him, the development of a civil society is intimately linked to the emergence of a market economy. In common with de Tocqueville, Ferguson believed that only a developed commercial environment had the power to subject the government to the rule of law, which occurs once merchants have ousted aristocrats from political power. Commercial practices are also important in the sense that public spiritedness cannot develop until production moves out of the farm or household and into factories. Only in such circumstances do strangers recognize their dependence on each other and allow rational self-interest to lead them to stable social and political relations. Unfortunately, it is in the commercial strength of civil society that the seeds for its eventual corruption lie. Trade does not enrich citizens equally and the desire of the wealthy to maintain their condition in spite of the advantages of an agonistically developed sense of the common good leads to the dissolution of the institutions necessary to the development of a civil society:

> Defects of government, and of law, may be in some cases considered as a symptom of innocence and of virtue. But where power is already established, where the strong are unwilling to suffer restraint, or the weak unable to find a protection, the defects of law are marks of the most perfect corruption. (Ferguson, p. 406)

Challenges to the Institutions That Foster Civil Society

The fact that the term *civil society* faded from view in Europe shortly after World War II, and in the United States significantly earlier, is probably due to the increased tendency of the social sciences to see the world as divided between the twin poles of

the state on the one hand and the economy on the other. This suggests that the increased importance given to the interplay between the state and the market comes at the expense of the engaged society each is supposed to serve. Antonio Gramsci, for example, divided society into two organic entities known as the private or "civil society" and the political organism known as the "state." However, his concern to isolate intellectuals from the world of production by the use of these terms is indicative of the isolation nonintellectuals have felt from elite demands for communal activity that have little relevance to the conditions ordinary workers find themselves facing in the modern world. In many ways the variety of meanings given to the term is a reflection of competing state and business interests' more comforting claims that *they* now provide the social cohesion that was once provided by the voluntary sector of society. John Ralston Saul sees this co-option of social infrastructure by the unimaginative managers of the state and the market as one of the great crises of the twenty-first century. He blames the ideological credence given to experts by the progenitors of the Enlightenment for devaluing amateur social activism and warns interested citizens that civil society will vanish without their engaged participation in opposing the tyranny of the managerial class.

Another explanation for the enervation of the engaged citizen is that a classically civil society, such as that espoused by Ferguson, can only function when the number of citizens is small. In our large modern societies, representative government has become an essential component in mediating between the state and the citizenry, permitting only a limited and ever decreasing level of institutionally unmediated input. Although citizen involvement with a political party or an interest group *can* extend beyond voting to such things as influencing agenda setting, research, or community activism, the informational demands (and the technological competence necessary to retrieve this information) on a modern citizen can be overwhelming. Political parties can filter out much of the competing background noise to allow an individual to focus attention more profitably on civic issues; however, this filter function is offered at significant cost to the citizen's independence of thought and action, as the agenda is set by professional politicians with a vested interest in maintaining their own power within the status quo. Also, while providing some citizen input, such experiences within a two- or three-party system generally fail the test of developing the degree of civic cohesion necessary for a truly civil society. The associations that develop this social cohesion exist at too parochial a level to be a major influence on national politics, leaving national parties more or less permanently disconnected from the societies they claim to represent. In short, the larger the society, the less influence civic-minded members have on political, legal, or economic aspects of their lives. This problem is most acute in the international realm, where a level of free riding and noncompliance exists that would not be tolerated within a self-regulating civil society. The European Union's relatively weak sense of civil cohesion is a telling concern for one of the largest and most developed international decision-making institutions in the world. That the European Union has no internationally recognized political parties, unions, or other institutions—beyond the *Eurovision Song Contest*—to promote civic union outside of the sports and business worlds is a worry for analysts concerned with the EU's deepening democratic deficit.

Contemporary interest in civil society has focused on how it might be developed in historically illiberal parts of the world, such as the newly liberated ex-client or colonial states of central and eastern Europe, South America, Asia, and Africa. More pressing for the international community is the open question of whether one can build a civil society through foreign aid and varying degrees of military and economic intervention. When a foreign society can claim none of the social and political bulwarks that encourage Western citizens to participate in civic activities, what needs to be encouraged for such institutions to take root becomes a leading question. Indeed, if the citizens of a state are voting for increased public surveillance or are freely participating in activities that promote militant Islam, militaristic Judaism, or the formation of Christian militias, can such societies truly be considered civil, even if their citizens meet the test of being publically engaged and committed to activities they perceive as essential to their society's most prudent development? Questions such as these suggest that the key to individual freedom through a guaranteed framework of voluntary associations is a necessary but insufficient condition of civil society

and some additional element, such as political equality under the law, a separation of church and state, or a guarantee of human rights for minorities needs to be articulated before civil society can properly be said to exist.

Despite the temptation offered by the authority of theorists from the ancient world to the Enlightenment, the answer cannot lie in a re-creation of the type of civil society envisioned by Plato, Hobbes, or Rousseau. These authors believed that by isolating certain key variables—be they philosophical clarity, security, or equality—that would withstand any historical or philosophical scrutiny, and promoting them to citizens as singular criteria of virtue, a state could direct its citizens to a unified search for a civil society free of the untidiness of individuated desires contested in a marketplace of ideas. Even the fashionable interest in Habermas's "public sphere" approach to civic engagement—wherein individuals and groups meet in a "discursive space" free of individual markers of difference and distinction to discuss matters of mutual public interest—has this abhorrence of freely contested civil society at its core. Debate is assumed to occur in the public sphere, which exists between the "private sphere" and the "sphere of public authority." This sphere is intended to shield the discussants from the emotive and irrational push of the market as well as the coercive pull of the state, allowing them to reach a common judgment on the social good for all. The problem with such a division is that it cannot be delineated in practice, because a civil society is less a broad coalition of discursively sensitive intellectuals seeking perfectible harmony than it is a fluctuating agglomeration of groups seeking the compromised sufficiency that is obtained by contesting the limits of society's tolerance for fresh ideas in a civic space dedicated to social and political improvement. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted as far back as 1835, the discursive element is only the first in a sequence of necessary events:

> Thus, in the first instance a society is formed between individuals professing the same opinion, and the tie which keeps it together is of a purely intellectual nature. In the second case, small assemblies are formed which represent only a fraction of the party. Lastly, in the third case, they constitute a separate nation in the midst of the nation, a government within the government. . . . It is true that they have not the right of making the laws; but they have the power of attacking those which are in being and of drawing up beforehand those which they may afterward cause to be adopted." (Tocqueville, p. 156)

The full effect of civil society is felt when it embraces the totality of life as lived by the citizen. "In the United States associations are established to promote public order, commerce, industry, morality, and religion; for there is no end which the human will, seconded by the collective exertions of individuals, despairs of attaining" (Tocqueville, p. 155).

Edward King

See also Ferguson, Adam; Gramsci, Antonio; Habermas, Jürgen; Public Sphere; Scottish Enlightenment; Tocqueville, Alexis de

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Class

Class refers to various forms of social stratification, primarily along broadly economic lines. As

such, class became particularly salient to political theory in the nineteenth century, after the decline of feudalism had rendered more directly political forms of stratification, such as ranks of nobility, largely irrelevant. For some political theorists, notably Marxists, sharp differences between classes provide the fundamental framework through which politics is to be understood, whereas for other theorists class forms one among a number of significant differences within society (alongside, e.g., gender and ethnic diversity). For still others, more fluid economic gradations are more important than distinct classes.

The Marxist Concept of Class Conflict

The importance of class to Marxist political theory is summed up in the claim of *The Communist Manifesto* that "the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggle." As this statement suggests, class, and in particular class conflict, is the central category through which Marxists understand the political sphere. This follows from the Marxist focus on the economy as the "base" that underlies and constrains the "superstructure" of culture, law, and politics. Class divisions are, on the Marxist view, the fundamental structure of the economy and consequently, class explains and makes comprehensible political activity.

Class is fundamental to the Marxist view of the economy because it expresses the central relationship around which the economy is organized—the relationship, broadly speaking, between those who control the resources of the economy (raw materials, factories, transportation, and so on) and those who do not. The fundamental economic distinction in Marxism is not simply a quantitative distinction between the rich and the poor, those who have less and those who have more wealth, but a qualitative distinction between those who own economic resources—the bourgeoisie—and those who don't—the proletariat, or working class. This way of defining class, first of all, makes class objective; in this sense, class is purely a matter of actual economic relationships, independent of individuals' perceptions of their social status or shared interests. Second, the Marxist definition of class allows for a sharp conceptual distinction between classes. Whereas a definition of class based around gradations of wealth or income would require drawing more-or-less arbitrary dividing lines (deciding, e.g., that those with an annual income of $99,999 were in one class, while those with an income of $100,001 were in another), class in the Marxist sense is based on a simple binary choice: If someone owns an economic resource, he is a member of the bourgeoisie; if he does not, he is a member of the proletariat. This ability to draw a sharp line between classes leads to the third distinctive feature of the Marxist definition of class: the claim that classes are not merely distinct, but necessarily have divergent interests that bring them into conflict. This follows from the economic relations that give rise to class, which manifest themselves in a conflict over control of productive resources.

It is this inescapable class conflict that makes class *politically* important for Marxists. Political activity is, for Marxists, the way in which the more fundamental economic conflicts between classes are played out. The question of precisely *how* class appears in political forms, however, has led to the development of a number of complexities in Marxist theory, both by Marx himself and in the subsequent Marxist tradition, because the tight connection of the Marxist definition of class to economics makes the connection to politics less clear. Because Marxists define class objectively, there seems to be no necessary connection to the subjective aspect of politics; one can be a member of a class without being aware of it, and so one could be a member of a class without consciously basing one's political activity on this class identity. Marx proposes, however, that objective class position (which he calls "class-in-itself") will tend to produce an identification with that class (which Marx calls "class-for-itself") and thus a conscious engagement in struggle on behalf of that class.

This gap between objective class position and subjective class identification produces much of the complexity in Marxist class analyses. This can be seen in Marx's historical works, which describe an apparent reality that is more complex than the model of a binary class division in his more theoretical works. Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,* for instance, as well as recognizing the existence of the old feudal orders of aristocracy and peasantry alongside the bourgeoisie and proletariat, discusses divisions within these classes

on both economic (finance capital, industrial capital) and ideological (republican, monarchist) grounds, as well as groupings that seem not to be clearly part of either class (the small business owners of the "petite bourgeoisie" and the nonindustrious working class, the "lumpenproletariat"). Marx's own analysis, that is to say, recognizes a gap between classes that appear to exist and those classes that really exist according to some kind of more fundamental (i.e., economic) analysis. Marx believes that there is a tendency for this fundamental underlying class division to become increasingly more apparent. This tendency should explain the transition from objective class position to subjective class identification: As capitalism develops, its class structure becomes closer and closer to its theoretical ideal, and so its class structure becomes ever simpler, and the relationship between individual interests and class interests becomes ever more obvious. This purported relationship between objective economic processes and subjective political identities has been a matter of significant debate among Marxists and a point of criticism for those who reject the Marxist account of class.

Non-Marxist Concepts of Class

Non-Marxist theories of class do not share Marx's emphasis on class conflict. Whereas the Marxist definition of class presupposes a specific understanding of the economy, non-Marxist accounts of class typically concern themselves with a posteriori correlations between class groupings and other features of (political or economic) interest. This occurs, first of all, in the way class is defined. Sociologists and political scientists have proposed a wide range of systems for delineating class, based on attempts to find empirical support for the salience of particular groupings. The purpose of these definitions of class is to identify forms of classification that reflect actually existing groupings of citizens. Once these aggregations have been identified, further correlations can be discovered between class identity and various forms of behavior, particularly political behavior such as correlations between class membership and party affiliation.

These kinds of affiliations are always, in at least some sense, empirical, in that class groupings are derived from observed similarities rather than from a more abstract theoretical framework, but it is worth distinguishing a more quantitative approach to class from a more interpretive one. The former would attempt to delineate class on the basis of features subject to external measurement, such as occupational type or industrial sector, or perhaps certain features of an individual's background (e.g., whether they or their parents attended university). The latter approach, on the other hand, is more interested in how individuals understand their own class position, with the various narratives and practices that produce a sense of identification with one group or another.

Neither approach, however (and this is where they differ strongly from the Marxist position), proposes that class has a central role in understanding the *nature* of politics, and so their interest to political theory (as opposed to more empirically oriented political science) is not as likely to concern conceptual questions, but rather normative ones. Because class groupings concern patterns of economic stratification which, moreover, frequently have wider social and political effects, they are relevant to some political theorists interested in conceptions of justice. An illustrative example here is Michael Walzer's idea of "spheres of justice." For Walzer, one of the most troubling injustices is the way in which inequalities in one "sphere" of society (e.g., the economy) perpetuate matching inequalities in other spheres (e.g., political power or access to education). Walzer's account of economic justice is not concerned so much with whether the distribution of wealth is equal or deserved (questions that occupy those who base their accounts of justice on a continuum of wealth), but with the effects of this distribution outside the economic sphere. Class is one potential concept that allows theorists to connect economic questions to questions of power and opportunity outside of the economic. When approached in this light, class appears alongside a number of other stratifications that also appear to produce differences of power and opportunity (such as race and gender). Such an approach to class, then, would provide an alternative to Marxism's focus on class as the most fundamental dividing line within society.

The Decline of Class?

Marx developed his account of class as a description of the industrial capitalism he saw coming

into being during his lifetime. Since the late 1960s, there have been significant changes in the economy that have led some to question the relevance of class today. If contemporary society is a postindustrial society, the divisions that arose from an industrial organization of society may no longer be significant. A number of considerations may make the working class, or proletariat, an irrelevant category for postindustrial society. First, if increasing automation and use of technology have reduced the amount of work necessary, then we would expect to see less work available, and we might expect to see an increase in unemployment or underemployment. (This argument appeared particularly plausible in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period of high unemployment.) The predominant grouping within society would then not be waged workers but nonworkers, and the primary struggles would not be between capitalists and workers over the organization of work, but rather about how to deal with this effective abolition of work.

A second feature of the contemporary economy that may make class less relevant is the relative decline in industrial, as opposed to other, forms of work. In industrial production there was a sharp distinction between those who performed most of the work (i.e., blue-collar and largely unskilled workers) and those who directed the work (i.e., various forms of managerial and technical workers). This led to a visible distinction between those who had little control over their work (the working class) and those who had control over both their own work and the work of others (the capitalist class); the terms *blue collar* and *white collar* demonstrate the way in which this distinction was made visible in dress, and the distinction was also visible in cultural norms as well as the location in which the work was done (the working class inhabiting the factory floor, while the capitalists occupied the offices). Postindustrial work makes this distinction less clear. Many low-skilled jobs now take place in offices, where white-color norms may be enforced (such as work in call centers), and work in the service sector may involve a high lever of individual responsibility and training without involving control of capital (e.g., nursing and various auxiliary health care roles).These postindustrial occupations are often understood in terms of "human capital," and the ownership of human capital is less sharply defined than the ownership of physical capital was in factory-based industry. This makes the class position of any individual worker less clear. Although class is always an abstraction, if this abstraction no longer has any clear mapping on to concrete circumstances, its value is highly questionable.

A third reason for rejecting class analysis, which might be seen as a material consequence of the two preceding reasons, is the decline of class-based practices and organizations. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the creation of a number of explicitly working-class organizations, whether political (primarily labor unions and social-democratic parties) or cultural (workingmen's clubs and working-class self-help and educational organizations). Many of these institutions became less important in the closing years of the twentieth century. For instance, although there may still be some correlation between certain social groupings and particular cultural activities or the consumption of particular media, there is rarely any explicit, self-conscious connection of this common activity to class. Likewise, traditionally working-class political organizations no longer direct themselves explicitly to the working class.

This account of the declining importance of class is by no means universally accepted. Because Marxists have traditionally defined class as an objective, economic abstraction, they may argue that the lack of visible and self-conscious class distinctions does not mean that the fundamental abstractions are no longer useful, but that those who are (objectively) members of a given class may simply be lacking in "class consciousness," that is, awareness of these class distinctions. Meanwhile, those who question the contemporary relevance of class frequently also question whether class was in fact as important a category in the past as it was believed to be. Analyses that focus on class are often criticized for having concentrated on one particular form of stratification while ignoring other, equally important, categories, especially identity categories built around race, gender, and sexuality. This criticism of class-based analyses often also involves a criticism of the way in which class analysis has implicitly identified the working class with white, male, industrial workers and thus has served to exclude women (who are more likely to engage in unwaged work in the home) and

people of color (who have frequently been excluded from industrial work and the organizations such as labor unions that represented industrial workers). On this analysis, the apparent decline in the importance of class is in fact a testament that class was never an adequate frame for social theory.

The 1970s saw the rise of a number of non–class-based political organizations, collectively referred to as new social movements. Some of these groups were based on various collective identities: feminist groups based on the specificities of women's experience, national liberation movements based on ethnic or racial identities, and queer liberation movements based on sexual identities that did not conform to heterosexual norms. Other new social movements were based on particular issues, such as the environment. Some have enthusiastically embraced these movements as demonstrating the limitations of class-based politics and providing an alternative. More recently, a more nuanced approach to these varied movements has emphasized intersectionality, that is, the way in which different forms of oppression and exclusion reinforce one another. Intersectional accounts do not pose race, gender, or sexuality analyses as alternatives to class analysis, but rather reincorporate class analysis by exploring the ways in which class is experienced differently by members of different gender and ethnic groups and by considering the ways in which racial or gender oppression can be imposed in economic (and so class-based) forms.

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See also Environmentalism; Feminism; Marxism; Race Theory; Socialism

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Classical Political Economy

Classical political economy is characterized by the systemic study of economic forces. Primarily concerned with the dynamics of economic growth, the classical economists sought to explain how and why wealth is created and destroyed. Their study found the role of institutions central in answering this question and as a result, stressed the importance of laissez-faire, free trade, and free competition. This entry reviews the history and basic elements of classical political economy, some of the criticisms that have been raised, and the impact of classical political economy on economic policy.

The Emergence of Classical Political Economy

The discipline of political economy was born in the eighteenth century as a branch of moral philosophy. Prior to that time, various thinkers from Aristotle to Aquinas, from the Spanish Scholastics to the French Physiocrats, had offered observations on the organization of production, the nature of commerce, the impact of the inflow of foreign currency on domestic prices, and the moral status of economic activity. Although observations of political and economic life abounded, the systemic study of political economy emerged out of the Scottish Enlightenment and in particular in the work of David Hume and, most notably, Adam Smith.

The classical political economists made contributions both to our understanding of the systematic regularities of the price system and the patterns of exchange and production, and to a political and legal environment that encouraged individual initiative, mutual gains through commerce, and social cooperation under the division of labor. In the first instance, the eighteenth-century thinkers provided the groundwork for the development of the technical discipline of economics. In the second instance, the eighteenth-century thinkers provided the foundation for the social philosophy of classical liberalism. The relationship between scientific economics

and the political ideal of classical liberalism has been the subject of debate almost since it was first stated, but the classical economists saw the two as inseparable for creating wealth.

In looking for an answer to the question of what makes some countries rich and others poor, Smith needed not only an understanding of economic forces, but also an understanding of the political and legal environments. The two cannot be separated. To the classical political economists, the relationship between economics and liberal philosophy was derived through positive analysis—looking at what is, using the tools of both economics and sociology—and not by making value judgments about what should be. Essentially, liberalism provided an institutional system in which bad men can do the least harm. Smith and his contemporaries demonstrated that the private property order had in fact provided the institutional framework by which men are induced by their ordinary motivations to benefit themselves to engage in production and exchange activities that benefit others. In short, the institutional regime of private property and freedom of contract (or what Hume stated as a system of stability of possession, transference by consent, and the keeping of promises) served as the framework for the robust political structure of constitutional government and the *invisible hand* proposition which became the hallmark of the classical school of political economy.

The enthusiasm of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political economists toward the free market economy was thus perfectly understandable. The scientific discoveries made by the classical political economists not only created a new discipline (economics) but also showed that the values of liberty, prosperity, and peace could be achieved together. The classical political economist's teachings led them to appreciate that when the government established and maintained the appropriate structural constraints, individuals could be free, as economic agents, to privately pursue their own purposes in order to enrich themselves while at the same time benefiting and enriching others peacefully.

Thus for the classical economists from Smith to John Stuart Mill, the discussion of political economy in the English-speaking world began with the presumption in favor of the laissez-faire principle. Laisser-faire was even the general practice for Mill, as he viewed any departure from it to be a great evil, unless required by some great good. The logic of the classical political economy argument from the starting point of individual pursuit of self-interest was that within the institutional configuration of private property, freedom of contract, and freedom of entry, the *forces* of the market would cajole and discipline economic behavior so that private and public interest would be aligned.

Anarchy Plus the Constable?

The classical political economists were, as Thomas Carlyle disparagingly put it, advocates of laissez-faire with a constable. Their argument for laissez-faire, however, was never inflexible, but instead an empirical generalization. The basic role of the state included defense, justice, and public goods that constituted the basic infrastructure in society such as roads, canals, lighthouses, and so forth. This list could also include coinage and stamps, as well as usury laws, financial regulations, restrictions on child labor, education, and relief for the poor, depending on which classical economist one was talking about. These were special circumstances when the alignment of private and public interest would not occur in the market, and that is where the laissez-faire presumption gives way to government action. In other words, government would move from providing the framework of law and order (security of person and property), to actively intervening in the market economy to curb the social distortions and market dysfunctions. The main distortions and dysfunctions identified in the classical theory were (a) monopoly, (b) inability to provide public works, and (c) injustice. This, for the classical economists, leaves an important, albeit relatively limited, role for government.

Thus, the classical political economists argued that government served three essential roles: (1) to ensure against foreign invasion, (2) to provide for domestic tranquility, and (3) to provide public works that the profit motive would not provide if left to its own. This is the classic night watchman state and is often referred to as limited government. But a close reading of the classical political economists would reveal that the binding limits are not as strictly defined and, in fact, are much softer constraints than many might want to believe. In other words, the night watchman state still has a

very large and positive role for government to play in the economic life of a society. Roads, bridges, canals, as well as education, are listed as necessary public works. A standing army, police force, courts, as well as poverty relief, are essential to ensure security and justice. But the laissez-faire presumption was evident in the classical political economists from Smith to Jean-Baptiste Say to Mill, even though many of the classical economists disagreed about these and many other issues.

Critiques of Classical Political Economy

Critical to this development in economics was the analysis of the relationship between savings and investment. But first, an examination of the exact claim on the classical political economists on Say's Law is in order. A critical insight of classical political economy was that money is not wealth. Money is a facilitator of exchange, and trade is the source of wealth. But poverty cannot be addressed by the printing of more money. As Hume noted, money is a veil because the amount of money in the economy, whether large or small, makes no difference. This idea is known as the quantity theory of money, which in its crudest form states that the price level, not relative prices, is affected by the quantity of money, all else being constant. So, to increase real income, the classical school argued, individuals must increase real productivity. Smith contended that the greatest advances in human productivity were a consequence of refinements in the division of labor. Specialization and exchange were the sources of increasing productivity and increasing wealth. Money merely facilitated this process of wealth creation, but by itself it did not have any wealth-creating capacity. In other words, the nominal variables in an economy can have only nominal impact, while the real variables can have real effects.

Thus poverty alleviation is accomplished through productivity increases. Say's law of the market explained how the increases in real productivity would be translated through exchange into increases in wealth and thus enhanced consumption patterns. Production brings forth demand is one translation; aggregate demand equals aggregate supply is another. In the first interpretation, Say's law is another way to discuss Smith's proposition about the division of labor and the complex interdependency found in a market economy. The productive activities of some will be coordinated with the consumption demands of others through the price system. In the second interpretation, Say's law is a precursor to Leon Walras and the establishment of conditions of general competitive equilibrium in the neoclassical system. Aggregate supply and aggregate demand are always in balance. If one takes the classical political economists on their own terms, the first interpretation is the more accurate one to work with.

The supply of one good is, at heart, the demand for alternative goods, and the coordination of supply and demand through time takes place through freely adjusting prices. So, the classical political economists argued that gluts and shortages are eradicated on the market through changes in the relative price of the goods and services in question. The theories of overproduction/underconsumption to which Say and David Ricardo were responding often committed the error of talking about this phenomenon absent any discussion of price. The classical model did not postulate that periodic gluts and shortages could never occur on the market, just that as long as prices are free to adjust to changing market conditions gluts and shortages will not persist.

There were economic thinkers who, from the beginning, challenged the social philosophy of the classical political economists. Thomas Malthus argued that not only was there a problem with the natural path of population growth, but also the economic system was prone to general gluts due to underconsumption. Both Say and Ricardo challenged Malthus's explanation for the stagnation of commerce both in letters and in published works. One could say that the art of economic controversy developed in these exchanges. Mill would later side with Ricardo and Say and challenge underconsumption theories. Karl Marx, on the other hand, would challenge a strict reading of underconsumption as the cause of stagnation and, instead, develop his own theory of the contradictions of capitalism that would result in economic crisis. This was not the only debate the classical economists found themselves in, either with others or among themselves.

John Maynard Keynes used the term *classical economics* as a debate foil and contrasted the tenets of the classical school embodied in Say's

Law with the rogues' gallery of economists who challenged the classical idea of a self-regulating market economy such as Malthus, Marx, and of course Keynes himself. Underconsumption theories become aggregate demand failure theories as economic thought evolves from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. But the big picture implication is the same—the end of the social philosophy of laissez-faire and the development of economic analysis as a tool for policy makers to mitigate economic distress through activist intervention on the part of government.

The classical school of political economy was born in controversy with the older ideas of mercantilism, and policy disputes are evident throughout its history from Smith to Mill. There were purely technical debates, as well, in the area of value and distribution theory—about the focus on use and exchange value, labor theory of value, and the payment of profit, interest, rent, and wages to the factors of production. Despite the fine points in debate among the different economists, they all agreed that the market economy exhibited a strong tendency toward a long-run equilibrium and that prices and payments to the factors of production fluctuated around the long-run equilibrium, with the deviations from long-run equilibrium being erased by entry and exit by firms to realize profit opportunity and escape from losses. Relative price adjustment, in other words, was the mechanism by which markets tended to the long-run equilibrium. This was a systemic tendency observable in reality by the trained eye of the classical economist. Despite this agreement, much incongruity still existed.

Money, for example, was also a subject of debate among the classical economists. Hume is generally recognized for demonstrating the systemic relationship between the supply of money and the price level in an economy. As was discussed already, the classical school challenged the idea that increasing the supply of money in a society would address the problem of poverty. Increasing the supply of money would not do the trick because that increase would translate into higher prices; inflation, not poverty alleviation, would result. Poverty alleviation only occurs from increases in real income, which in turn only result from increases in real productivity. Those increases in real productivity are best realized through expansion in the division of labor—through specialization and exchange. Monetary policy, thus, is to be directed by the goal of facilitating exchange. This, however, was not universally agreed.

In the early nineteenth century, the debates over monetary policy among the classical economists culminated in the Bullionist Controversy surrounding the question of convertibility and the relationship between the money supply and inflation; the currency and banking debate, which included the development of the real bills doctrine; and the passage of Peel's Bank Acts of 1844 and 1845, which solidified the centralization of the Bank of England.

Another area the classical economists argued feverishly in the public arena was over the benefits of free trade, and developed the principle of comparative advantage to make the argument; and the core principles of public finance, including the burden of taxation and who should bear it, and the moral, political, and economic bankruptcy of public debt. The classical economists were free traders and fiscal conservatives, and these debates helped to define the classical political economy positions.

The Legacy of Classical Political Economy

Perhaps, however, the most enduring legacy of the classical political economists resides not in their policy prescriptions per se, nor in their broader social philosophy, but in the mechanics of economic development that they identified. One should never forget that Smith entitled his book *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* to find answers to the questions as to why some nations are rich and others poor and precisely how it is that some nations that were poor became rich and why others that were rich fell back. Smith's great contribution was to see that the source of growth was to be found in the institutional framework and how that framework affected the mechanics of the division of labor, the realization of mutual benefit through exchange, and allocation of labor and capital to where it would realize its greatest return. Peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice, Smith argued, would be sufficient to set in motion a process of development that would lift a country from poverty to opulence.

It is here that the mechanics of development link with the social philosophy of the Scottish

Enlightenment and the laissez-faire principle and, finally, with the specific policy proposals of a constitutionally limited government. Unpack the idea of tolerable administration of justice and you are led down an intellectual path that begins with Hume's property, contract, and consent and ends with Friedrich von Hayek's emphasis on the rule of law and James Buchanan's plea for freedom in constitutional contract. The continuing relevance of the classical school of political economy has been demonstrated by the stagflation of the United States and United Kingdom in the 1970s, the collapse of state socialism in the 1980s, the fiscal crises of the Scandinavian countries in the 1990s, and the frustration of the failure of foreign aid in the less-developed world in the 2000s. This continuing relevance is also demonstrated by the current debates over the fiscal crisis of 2008–2009. The debates over Say's Law have resurfaced, as have the debates over fiscal policy and the proper role of government in an economy.

The main teachings of classical political economy are not tailored for political popularity. The role of the economist is to dispel popular fallacies regarding the operation of the economy and economic policy. In fact, the teachings of the classical school more often than not put severe limits on the authority and scope of politicians to intervene in the economy. Instead of relying on the benevolence of government, the classical school through constitutional craftsmanship enlisted the power of self-interest to produce public good. From the perspective of the classical school, the public is often made better off not by promoting the public good but by promoting one's own self-interest—as Smith argued, with the proper institutional setting, one can benefit society simply by regarding one's own self-interest.

Peter J. Boettke and Nicholas A. Snow

See also Hume, David; Justice, Theories of; Liberalism; Market; Mill, John Stuart; Scottish Enlightenment; Smith, Adam

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Clausewitz, Carl von (1780–1831)

Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian officer and a prolific military theorist who is most famous for writing *On War,* an eight-volume work that attempted to capture what he called objective or universally valid knowledge of war. While Clausewitz's contemporaries sought to address the uncertainty of war by establishing general guidelines or principles, he endeavored to enhance a military commander's judgment by developing a corpus of verifiable knowledge of war that could be used as a foundation or reference. His thinking was influenced by the events of the French Revolution, by his participation in the wars against Napoleon, and by the intellectual undercurrents of Europe's Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment. He entered military service in 1792, and the pivotal battles of Jena-Auerstädt (1806), Moscow (1812), and Waterloo (1815), all of which he studied in some detail, helped refine his military theories. Clausewitz's legacy is a contested one: Advocates point to the enduring relevance of his theories, while detractors claim that his concepts are essentially outmoded. Whichever position one takes, it cannot be disputed that Clausewitz's *On War,* which is essentially a coherent corpus or theory of war based on violence as

a unifying principle, has contributed immeasurably to the general body of knowledge concerning war.

Principal Theories

Defining War

Clausewitz defined war as an "act of violence to force an opponent to fulfill our will." This definition establishes violence as the root means of war, while also affirming that its purpose is to impose one's will on an adversary. Thus, for Clausewitz, all the underlying cause-and-effect relationships of war were based on the use of violence, or the threat of it.

War's Nature

Clausewitz defined war's nature according to three essential forces—hostility, chance, and purpose—that can be found in every war. The first force, hostility, can take two forms: hostile feelings and hostile intentions. Hostile feelings need not exist for war to occur; however, hostile intentions—one party advancing its interests at the expense of another—are present in every war. Chance, which can be expressed as a function of probability, not only affects the conduct of war at the highest levels, distinguishing it from war on paper, it also influences the activities of units and individual soldiers; it is the exploration of chance and related intangibles, such as friction, that make Clausewitz's theory much more realistic than those of his contemporaries. Purpose is probably the decisive factor in shaping war's nature because it defines (or should define) the military goal. War's purpose can vary in kind from total conquest to a negotiated settlement.

Clausewitz combined these three forces into a single, enduring conception of war's nature, which he referred to as a wondrous trinity (*wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit*). War's nature is, in short, dynamic and changeable due to the kinds of forces that come into play.

War and Politics

Clausewitz also determined that war is not a separate thing but rather indissoluble from political activity. He defined political activity or politics as the "interaction of governments and peoples"—what today might be referred to as internal and external political relations. War did not interrupt this interaction but continued it, though by violent means. But, Clausewitz's formulation has created some confusion because some of his interpreters have taken policy and politics as the same thing. Although war may sometimes get away from its original policy aims, it can never escape political activity, which for Clausewitz remains the context in which all armed conflict occurs.

Defense and Attack

Contrary to the accepted wisdom at the time, Clausewitz maintained that defense was stronger than attack. Clausewitz reasoned that if attack was truly the stronger posture, no one would opt to defend; and yet they do. When a party chooses to defend, it generally does so because it lacks sufficient strength to attack. Thus, defense must provide some advantage (e.g., time, shorter lines of supply, choice of terrain, public opinion) capable of at least partially compensating for a lack of strength. Defense also offered an important advantage by enabling the defender to achieve success by simply avoiding the aim of the attacker. If an attacker's aim is to conquer the defender, for instance, the defender succeeds simply by eluding conquest, by surviving. Clausewitz's argument that defense was stronger than offense was, thus, a statement of fact, not a statement of preference. He did not favor one over the other, but merely sought to correct an error in understanding.

Center of Gravity

Clausewitz also developed the concept of center of gravity as a tool for military planning. He defined it as the "focal point of force and movement, upon which the larger whole depends." It is the thing that, if struck, would lead to the total collapse of the foe. The concept was evidently inspired by the center of gravity as it is represented in elementary physics. Accordingly, it is best thought of as a focal point, rather than as a source of strength or a specific strength or weakness. Similarly, centers of gravity only exist where separate parts are connected enough to form a single entity. Moreover, centers of gravity tend to come into play—and are only truly evident—in wars in which a decisive

victory is sought because such conflicts unleash powerful forces, which in turn require focus and direction. In wars where such a victory is not sought, destroying an opponent's entire system might not serve our political purposes and might indeed run counter to them; hence, striking a center of gravity might not be desirable.

In sum, it is precisely because Clausewitz endeavored to establish verifiable knowledge of war and its underlying cause-and-effect relationships that we would do well to consider his theories. His contribution need not be wholly objective, or universally valid, to have enduring value. It need merely add to our knowledge in a substantive way.

Antulio Joseph Echevarria II

See also Just War Theory

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Climate Change

It is now widely accepted by scientists that the world's climate is changing. The most authoritative source of information is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC regularly issues assessment reports, providing analyses of the science of climate change, the projected effects that this will have, and possible ways of responding to climate change. In its assessment reports (the most recent of which is the Fourth Assessment Report, published in 2007) the IPCC records that temperatures and sea levels have already risen and are projected to rise over the next century and beyond. It also projects increased exposure to severe weather events. It further reports that climate change is anthropogenic—that is, it is caused by human activities.

The prospect of dangerous climate change raises a number of different ethical questions. These include: What normative criteria should one employ to evaluate the impacts of climate change? How should one respond to risks and uncertainties? What obligations do people have to future generations? Who should bear the burden of combating climate change? And how should access to emit greenhouse gases be distributed? These issues are discussed in this entry.

Evaluating the Impacts of Climate Change

One fundamental issue concerns how humanity should evaluate the impacts of climate change. Utilitarians will appeal to the effects on welfare. Rights theorists will appeal to the effects that it has on the realization of human rights. Others take a non-anthropocentric approach and would also include the effects on nonhuman animals, and some would also include the effect on biodiversity and ecosystems. In their view, humans are not the only sources of intrinsic value—animals and the natural world may have intrinsic value too.

The question as to how one evaluates climatic impacts has considerable practical relevance. For example, it affects the case for adaptation (where this is defined as those measures that enable persons, or any other moral subjects, to cope with any climate change that occurs). It is only when one knows what specific effects count as harmful that one can then decide what kind of adaptation is needed. In addition to this, it is important to have a set of criteria by which one judges climate change in order to assess the case for mitigation (where mitigation is defined as reducing the emission of greenhouse gases, maintaining greenhouse gas sinks, or both). For example, if one adopts both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric values, then one may think that the case for mitigation is even stronger than it would be if one employed only anthropocentric criteria.

In addition to this, some would argue that having criteria for assessing the impacts of climate change is necessary to determine whether resources are best spent on combating climate change as

opposed to development. For many, there is no necessary conflict between mitigation and development. The view that there is no deep conflict between the two is defended on the grounds that dangerous climate change is seriously harmful for development and that eradicating poverty is also needed to enable people to adapt to any climate change to which we are already committed. It is also, in part, grounded on a certain view of who bears the responsibility for combating climate change. Some believe developing countries should bear only a very light burden and the duty to combat climate change should fall most heavily on the most advantaged. If this is true it means that the global poor can develop without causing dangerous climate change and therefore that development and mitigation can be jointly realized.

Addressing Risks and Uncertainties

A second pressing ethical issue posed by climate change arises because scientific projections of the nature of the climate changes and social scientific assessments of the social and economic effects of these climatic changes necessarily involve probabilistic statements. We thus face a situation where there is risk and uncertainty rather than certainty.

One common way of thinking about these issues is to compute the expected utility and disutility of events. Thus one multiplies the probability of an event happening with its utility/disutility and thereby arrives at its expected utility/disutility. If one adopts this method, then catastrophes might have a very small expected disutility if the probability is small enough.

Some, though, object to the expected utility approach, arguing that it would be wrong simply to aggregate expected utility across persons. This aggregative approach would, as many critics of utilitarianism have pointed out, allow the benefits to some to outweigh the rights of others. In the case of climate change, it might be that the benefit to those who emit high levels of greenhouse gases could override the expected disutility to the potential victims.

In light of this, some propose a precautionary approach, arguing that in certain circumstances it is wrong to undertake a course of action that risks serious harm to others when one can eschew this course of action without too much cost. This approach too is not, however, without its difficulties. At what level of probability is it appropriate not to engage in risky actions? How bad must the potential outcomes be in relation to the loss involved in avoiding the risky activity?

Intergenerational Equity

Climate change also raises questions of intergenerational equity. There are a number of issues here. First, are there duties of justice (or of morality) to future generations? And if so, what are these based on? Do future people have rights? Or do current generations owe them duties based on a concern for their well-being? A number of different positions are canvassed here. Some adopt a rights-centered approach and argue that current generations owe duties to future generations in virtue of the latters' rights. Some, however, advocate a purely duty-centered account. A third group would adopt a welfarist approach and ground obligations to future people by appealing to the welfare effects of current policies.

Second, once we have ascertained whether there are duties to future generations the question arises of how much weight one should ascribe to their interests as opposed to those of current generations. Some argue, for example, that it is permissible to discount the interests of future generations and subject them to a positive social discount rate. It is common, for example, within economics to employ a positive pure time discount rate. This is sometimes defended on the grounds that this is in fact how humans behave—though it appears to move straightforwardly from a factual claim to a normative conclusion. Others reject a zero pure time discount rate on the grounds that it would be far too demanding and would require too much of the current generation.

Others, however, including some prominent economists, object to basing public policy on a positive pure time preference. They argue that public policy should treat persons as equals and that it is not fair for some to allocate a lower moral value to the interests of others; to do so discriminates against people for morally arbitrary reasons. The upshot for climate change, then, is that the more we discount people's interests the weaker the case is for mitigating climate change. If we accord less weight to the interests of future people, our

current resources might be better spent on helping people now rather than preventing climate change that will affect many people in the future.

Assigning Responsibility for Costs

A further normative issue raised by anthropogenic climate change concerns who should be responsible for preventing dangerous climate change. One commonly accepted principle holds that the polluters should pay. Many argue, on this basis, that members of industrialized countries should bear the burden of combating climate change.

Although the principle this argument appeals to has some intuitive force, the argument is vulnerable to a number of objections. First, some object that the emission of greenhouse gases has been taking place since the mid-nineteenth century. Hence, they say, although it might be fair for current generations to pay for their emissions, they should not have to pay for the emissions of earlier generations. They conclude that the Polluter Pays Principle cannot apply to past generations.

Second, some object that persons should not be held liable for some of their greenhouse gas emissions because they could not have reasonably been expected to know that emitting greenhouse gases was harmful. Some polluters, they contend, should be exempted from paying because they were excusably ignorant.

A third response to the application of the Polluter Pays Principle to climate change objects that sometimes it is unfair to make the polluter pay. Consider the case of the desperately disadvantaged: Making them pay in proportion to their emissions would be to further push them beneath a decent minimum standard of living. This has considerable relevance for any analysis of whether it is fair to make some contemporary Chinese or Indians, for example, pay.

Some propose a second principle, arguing that the burden should be distributed to actors in accordance with their ability to pay. This may, in practice, identify the same group of people as the polluter pays approach but does so for quite different reasons.

Proponents of an ability to pay approach can argue that their approach is not vulnerable to any of the objections leveled against the Polluter Pays Principle. They can also argue, more positively, that by making the wealthy pay, all people can enjoy autonomy and have the space to pursue their own personal projects.

Against this, however, proponents of the historical approach will respond that it is counterintuitive to ascribe obligations to parties without some reference to the historical process and without making any reference to who brought about the problem.

Mitigation, Adaptation, and Compensation

At this point it is worth unpacking the notion of the burdens of combating climate change. These can involve both mitigation and adaptation. One might also include compensation (i.e., compensating people when there has been insufficient mitigation and inadequate adaptation) as well as possibly geo-engineering the climate.

Mitigation deserves special attention because any program of lowering greenhouse gas emissions will require a principle specifying how emissions are to be distributed. How then should greenhouse gas permits be distributed? One of the most common principles proposed is that greenhouse gas emissions should be distributed on an equal, per capita basis.

One worry about this approach is that it is insensitive to people's needs. Some, for example, need more fuel because they live in colder climates. Others have greater health needs. In such circumstances, it is not clear why emissions should be equalized.

In addition to this, one might query why emissions should be equalized when some have much greater access to clean energy sources (such as wind, solar, or hydroelectric power). They cannot be said to need the ability to burn fossil fuels as much as others, so is it fair to give them equal emission rights?

These are some of the normative issues raised by climate change. A corollary of the above is that climate change poses a particularly difficult set of ethical challenges, for it requires the development of a theory of justice that is global and intergenerational, that judges whether only human interests have moral significance, that addresses risks and uncertainties, and that factors in both material needs as well as the harmful effects of climate change.

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See also Global Justice; Historic Injustice; Intergenerational Justice; Justice, Theories of

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Collective Responsibility

There are two related but nevertheless distinct types of problems typically referred to under the heading *collective responsibility*. One is the set of issues that arise when we try to hold a nation, corporation, association, or other collective morally responsible for the wrongdoing of one or more of its members. In this case, the issues raised are metaphysical—what we need to explain is how an entity that is not a single, conscious, self-aware, decision-making human being can be morally responsible for anything. Some theorists claim that only individuals have the attributes necessary for moral responsibility to attach and that it makes no sense to assign moral responsibility to collectives of any kind. Others think that collectives can be morally responsible if they have established decision-making procedures and members with oversight responsibilities, like nations and corporations, but deny that moral responsibility can attach to more loosely organized associations. Still others claim that even mobs and other collectives with no organizational structures can be morally responsible if they have come together for some shared reason or objective.

The other sense in which the term *collective responsibility* is used is to refer to the issues that arise when we try to hold one individual morally responsible for the acts of another merely because they are members of the same collective. In this case, the issues raised are normative—what we need to explain is what the individual has done wrong when the wrongful acts in question were actually committed by some other member of the collective. Note that these issues can arise regardless of whether the collective itself can be held morally responsible. For example, we may or may not hold Germany collectively responsible as a nation for the acts of the Nazi regime, but whether Germans who did not participate in such acts nevertheless bear some responsibility for these wrongs merely because they are members of the same collective is a separate question. Most liberal theorists deny that merely being members of the same collective is sufficient to create moral responsibility, but perfectionists who adopt a communitarian view of moral responsibility (e.g., Joseph de Maistre) argue that responsibility can be based on group membership alone. Liberal theorists, however, are typically willing to attribute moral responsibility to group members only when some additional factor connecting the individual to the wrong is present. For example, some argue that individual group members may be held responsible only if they have causally contributed to the wrongdoing in some way, such as by providing financial, political, emotional, or material support,

or by failing to prevent the wrongdoing when it was possible to do so without substantial risk to themselves. Others argue that group members may also be held responsible if they have benefited from the wrongdoing, or if they share the wrongdoer's morally repugnant attitudes and dispositions, or if they have somehow consented to the wrongdoer acting on their behalf.

Mark R. Reiff

See also Communitarianism; Liberalism; de Maistre, Joseph Marie; Political Perfectionism

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Collingwood, Robin George (1889–1943)

Robin George Collingwood is best known for his philosophy of history and for his claim that there are no perennial problems in philosophy. The Cambridge School, particularly Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, profess to follow a "Collingwoodian approach" to the history of political thought. He produced a normative political theory at a time when logical positivists denied the authenticity of knowledge that was not either analytic or empirical. He was vehemently antifascist and anti-Nazi, and he espoused a form of social liberalism in what was one of the first revivals of social contract theory in the twentieth century.

His father, W. G. Collingwood, was a professor of fine arts at Reading University, a writer of Norse sagas, and John Ruskin's secretary and biographer. R. G. Collingwood obtained his degree at University College, Oxford, and was elected to a fellowship at Pembroke College in 1912. He served as an unpaid intelligence officer in the Admiralty during World War I. In 1927, he became a university lecturer in philosophy and Roman history; in 1934, a fellow of the British Academy; and in 1935, Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy.

He was a latter-day exponent of philosophical idealism and an arch enemy of the philosophical realism of G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, John Cook Wilson, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. He wished to refute the proposition that knowing something makes no difference to what is known. This was, in his view, a logical error entailing knowledge of what was known both with and without knowing it, which is impossible. A more serious error was the tendency of philosophy to deviate from all positive doctrines by a process of relentless critical disintegration. In relation to moral philosophy, this entailed rejecting over 2,000 years of believing that the purpose of philosophy was to think out more clearly the issues involved in conduct in order to act better. He rejected Harold Arthur Prichard's contention that moral philosophy was purely theoretical, focusing upon the workings of the moral consciousness, without interfering with its practice. Collingwood also criticized Russell's banishment of ethics, altogether, from the body of philosophy. In contrast, the generation of students brought up on the idealism of T. H. Green had been taught that clear philosophical thinking is essential to informing and improving conduct. Those exposed to realism, on the other hand, were told that philosophical thinking is a disinterested activity with no contribution to make to practical conduct.

It was, then, the separation between theory and practice to which Collingwood objected, and not least of which because it denied the role of the committed intellectual and absolved philosophy of social responsibility. Realists violated all of Collingwood's golden rules; they did not satisfy themselves as to the relevance of their criticisms by reading texts historically, and they did not take pains to determine what question the author of a text was asking, but instead assumed that the questions were perennial. Their greatest crime, according to Collingwood, was completely to ignore history as an example of knowledge and formulate their own theory of knowledge on the methodology of the natural sciences.

Collingwood's own political philosophy was based upon a theory of mind in which practical reason, that is, the reasons we have for acting, overlap with theoretical reason, that is, the explanations we give for action. In answer to the question "Why

should I do such and such?" Collingwood offered three answers, all of which were related to each other on a hierarchical scale. The first reason is because it is useful (utility); the second, because it is the right thing to do (rule governed, or regularian action); and, third, because given the kind of person I am and the circumstances in which I find myself, it is the only thing that I can do (duty). Their theoretical counterpart was Greco-Roman science, in which Nature had her ends and devised means to attain them. Modern science emerged when people began to think of the world around them in the same terms as they saw themselves, namely, as rule governed. Duty has history as its theoretical counterpart. A historical explanation shows that what happened, given all the circumstances, had to happen. Collingwood never adequately elaborated the relationship between the two overlapping types of reason.

His unique take on the social contract tradition was in believing that in any body politic, there is a nonsocial and a social community and there is a continuous process of the one being converted into the other. As the complexity of society grows, the age and capacity deemed necessary to shoulder the responsibilities of sociality may vary. The process within a body politic is called socialization, which entails the gradual elimination of force from our relations with each other. Collingwood gives a historicist, but not relativist, account of this process. Given the development of rational consciousness and the degree attained at any one time, the ruling class may be justified in practicing slavery or in inflicting capital punishment. The attainment of higher levels of consciousness and the diminishing of force in our relations would render such practices unjustifiable.

Socialization entails a move from eristic politics, the politics of confrontation, to dialectic politics, the politics of agreement, in which conservative and radical elements are necessary. One is to preserve and caution; the other is to press for change. At the global level, socialization is what he calls the civilizing process, which first entails treating fellow citizens equally and then exploiting nature intelligently, what would be called these days, sustainable development. Finally, instead of treating members of other bodies politic as if they are part of nature, and not fully human, and therefore to be subdued, we come to think of them as part of our own broader moral community, and we afford them the equality and respect we extend to fellow citizens. Fascism and Nazism constituted a form of barbarism that was not a stage on the way to civilization but instead a reaction against it. Collingwood died before the end of World War II, but he had confidently predicted the defeat of both on the grounds of their irrationality.

David Boucher

See also British Idealism; Historical Understanding; Historicism; Interpretive Theory

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Colonialism

For political theorists, colonialism involves the subjugation or domination of one group by another, usually through conquest, settlement, or both, of a territory. It has generally negative associations—with the denial of self-determination, with economic and cultural domination, and even with genocide. The etymology of the term is useful to keep in mind. Its various political senses derive from Roman sources, including *colonia,* or colony, meaning the settlement or plantation of a human community on foreign soil. But *colonus,* meaning colonist or farmer, also reminds us of the territorial dimension of colonial settlement. Colonialism is closely related to agricultural and economic development.

Colonialism is often assimilated with imperialism, but the two are not synonymous, however often entwined. Once again, Roman sources are important. The root of imperialism is *imperium,* which refers to order or command, and is a precursor to modern conceptions of sovereignty and thus to modern conceptions of the state. But it also referred to the geographic extent of the Roman people's authority, which was conceived as a unity created out of the binding together—through force—of previously independent societies. The nature of this authority was subject to debate; for example, was it legislative or monarchical? This raised further questions about the relationship between republics and empires. Could liberty at home be combined with empire abroad?

An empire may exercise its authority over an extended domain either directly or indirectly; as discussed in this entry, many empires did so through colonial settlement. But it is also possible to exercise imperial power without engaging in colonialism per se, as some scholars argue the United States has done in various contexts.

If colonialism is a system of subjugation and domination, then this raises questions about legitimacy and authority. How could colonialism ever be justified? Many prominent figures in Western political thought seemed to have been not only indifferent to, but also supportive of, colonialism. How could this be? What is the legacy of colonialism for contemporary political theory?

Justifying Colonialism

Although colonialism is not a modern phenomenon—aside from the Romans, the ancient Greeks, Ottomans, and many others practiced it—there were some particularly important developments in early modern Europe. Technological progress, especially improvements in maritime navigation and exploration, meant that many of the geographical limits of previous eras were being overcome. But in the process, new philosophical and social questions arose about the nature of colonial settlement. Who owned the seas? Under what circumstances was it justified to appropriate vacant land or land already occupied by other peoples? Under what circumstances was it justified for one state to rule over another? What were the moral consequences of radical cultural difference? The arguments and theories proposed during this period have continued to shape the history and practice of colonization (and decolonization) until today.

An important background to the justification of European colonialism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the language and conceptual apparatus of Renaissance humanism, a set of beliefs and practices deeply informed by Greek and Roman ideas. Renaissance writers were willing to consider a range of not only direct but also indirect injuries as justifications for armed intervention in other peoples' affairs, on the grounds of securing and pursuing "glory" for their country. Recent scholarship has also pointed out, however, that if the pursuit of glory was a central humanist concern informing early modern colonialism, so was a concern with corruption and thus a deep anxiety about the consequences of colonization. This was particularly true of some of the earliest English colonial ventures in the Americas. Such anxiety was often short-lived, but it signaled an element of ambiguity about the justification of settlement in general. As we shall see, for every justification, there was a counter-justification, and for every incursion or settlement, resistance and insurgency.

Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries there were, at least, four general arguments for justifying colonialism: These arguments were about conquest, grace, *res nullius,* and civilization.

The Argument From Conquest

In essence, the argument from conquest tied the extension of sovereignty to the propagation of the Christian faith and hence the legitimacy of waging war against those who were perceived to reject Christianity and thus natural law. The Spanish empire, for example, was supposed to be engaged in just such a project. The early claims the Spanish made in the Americas rested, in part, upon the rather dubious authority of a papal grant made by Pope Alexander VI in 1493. The basic idea, in its strongest form, was that the pope, as true heir of the Roman emperors, not only enjoyed sovereignty over the whole world but rights of ownership as well. The argument did not go very far, however, because it presumed the pope had the appropriate jurisdiction in the first place, which was not obviously true. How could his authority be said to

exist over both Christians and non-Christians and believers and nonbelievers—including the Amerindians, for example, who had never even heard of the pope? Authority over the Amerindians had to be grounded in something less ambiguous; hence the attempt to justify it according to natural law. If the arguments linked to papal bulls went nowhere, then sovereignty over the Indians and rights to their lands lay with claims about their apparent lack of reason and "barbarity." A preemptive strike against them was justified if their practices were contrary to human nature; these practices constituted an injury against properly civil men, even if only indirectly. The basic claim was that injury against the innocent justified aggressive intervention, even if those who were apparently harmed did not actually ask for help. "Crimes against nature," in this sense, justified depriving Amerindians of their natural rights. But the Spanish Dominicans, often referred to as the School of Salamanca, challenged this argument. Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1492–1546), for example, acknowledged that the Indians had properly organized cities, magistrates, rulers, laws, industry, commerce, all of which was evidence of their capacity for reason. (This did not, however, prevent Vitoria from finding other grounds for justifying Spanish colonialism.) Bartolomé de las Casas (1484–1566), the closest we have to a defender of Amerindian property rights in these debates (albeit again, always within the political limits of a legitimate Spanish occupation and evangelization of the Americas), argued that the kind of sovereignty and ownership presupposed by the Spanish crown could only be claimed if the Amerindians consented to the arrangements.

The Argument From Grace

Another justification of empire that rested on the dispensation of a higher authority was the argument from grace. This Lutheran account of authority maintained that the authority of the prince depended not on God's laws but upon his grace, and thus if one fell from grace then he might be legitimately deposed by his subjects and replaced with a more godly prince. Thus no non-Christian—which obviously included Amerindians—could hold legitimate sovereignty or ownership over their lands. Not surprisingly, both the Spanish Dominicans and, later, English Protestants, resisted these arguments. For one thing, *dominium* derives from the fact that man is a rational being, and tying it to grace suggests he can lose this status (and the natural rights that go with it) simply by sinning. Although some acts are so bad that whoever commits them can be legitimately considered as subhuman, this was not obviously true of the practices and beliefs of the Amerindians (as Vitoria had pointed out). The main problem, however, was that the argument was too broad. The potential for political instability and tyranny was obvious. This was something John Locke made very clear in his *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689), which argued against the claim that civil power had authority in matters of conscience: "No man whatsoever ought therefore to be deprived of his Terrestial Enjoyments upon account of his Religion. Not even Americans, subjected unto a Christian Prince, are to be punished either in Body or in goods for not imbracing our Faith and Worship" (1689/1983, p. 43).

The Argument From res nullius

The argument from *res nullius* has its roots in Roman law, wherein all "empty things," including unoccupied lands (*terra nullius*), were said to remain the common property of mankind until put to proper use—that is, cultivated. Locke, for example, in chapter 5 of his *Second Treatise of Government* (c. 1679–1682) argued that only labor delivered title, because it was only when someone mixed his labor with previously unowned objects that he acquired title to it. This idea, and the "agriculturalist" arguments that were pressed along with it, became one of the most frequently cited justifications of European colonialism in the Americas, Australasia, and Africa. Discovery and effective occupation of any part of America not already occupied by a Christian ruler gave secure title to those lands against other nations. But the doctrine applied only where the lands were genuinely uninhabited, or at least where they were *practically* unoccupied—that is, where the existing inhabitants were considered so primitive as to be without effective laws or political institutions. It followed, therefore, that in order to gain sovereignty and *dominium* (ownership) over those lands, a number of things would have to happen.

First, the Indian nations would have to be persuaded to submit themselves to the authority of the European sovereign and then to sell their lands or parts thereof to it. But that required mutual consent and recognition of some kind (e.g., treaties), which, by definition, invalidated the application of *terra nullius*. Failing that, the physical presence of the indigenous peoples would have to be rendered legally irrelevant; hence the application of the enlarged doctrine of discovery that denied indigenous peoples effective ownership and jurisdiction over their lands.

The Civilizing Mission

The argument that colonialism was justified in helping to "civilize" barbarous populations has its roots in some of the claims examined earlier in this entry (especially the desire to bring Christianity to new lands), but it became particularly prominent in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The idea of "civilization" has complex roots in Western political thought and came to be applied in specific ways during this period to the classification of societies and peoples, as well as in international affairs. Already in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, a powerful "four stages thesis" of historical development was being propounded in which societal development was said to move through various phases: from hunting, to herding, to farming, to commerce—in other words, from savagery to civilization. Thus, along with growing societal complexity came a narrative about the refinement of morals and manners and the development of the capacities required for proper reasoning and self-government. European civilization was thus positioned at the apex of historical development (a claim ruthlessly parodied by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his *Discourse on Inequality*), and non-European societies were at various stages of lesser or underdevelopment.

The civilizing mission was perhaps the most prominent argument used to justify colonialism in nineteenth-century social and political theory, most notoriously—although not without ambiguity—in the work of John Stuart Mill. Despite his powerful defense of liberty and critique of paternalism in *On Liberty* (1859), Mill claimed that some "backward states of society" lacked the capacity for self-government and thus lacked a legitimate claim to collective self-determination. Given the nature of these societies, Mill claimed, large swathes of the population lacked the capacity to reason properly about their ends. Thus "civilized" countries, like Great Britain, through the right kind of "civil" imperial rule, could help to create the conditions in which "barbarous" states could move to a higher stage of development. It was almost a duty that civilized nations had to bear in order to help bring about human progress. Mill criticized British imperial authorities for often failing miserably to do so—through cultural misunderstanding, political ineptness, and corruption—but never questioned the ultimate value of the imperial and colonial project.

Alexis de Tocqueville defended another kind of imperial project that involved colonization but inverted this emphasis on civilization. The great observer of American democracy, who wrote critically of America's treatment of the Amerindians in his *Democracy in America* (1835–1840), also defended European colonialism in Algeria and India. For him, the benefits of colonialism and imperial expansion were almost exclusively to be justified in terms of what they did for the colonizer, not the colonized. Even if France's rule in Algeria had made things worse for the Algerians, the political benefits to France—in terms of promoting national solidarity and its status vis-à-vis other European nations (especially Great Britain)—justified colonialism.

Conclusion

Along with these justifications, however, came challenges. First of all, local indigenous populations, who were faced with the brutal imposition of force, challenged colonialism. Critics within European societies, who were concerned about the consequences of colonialism for liberty at home, as well as the moral consequences of imperialism more generally, also challenged various aspects of the arguments examined in this entry. Denis Diderot (1713–1784), for example, criticized European pretentions about "civilizing" non-Europeans through their actions, and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) criticized the "agriculturalist" justification of colonial settlement. Adam Smith (1723–1790) and Edmund Burke (1729–1797) offered more subtle historical and cultural analyses of societal development, along with sharp criticisms of the seemingly

inherent injustices of colonial and imperial rule. None were categorical anti-imperialists, and some sought merely to tame its excesses, but the criticisms pointed to some fundamental questions that subsequent theorists and activists would focus on. Among these were challenges to assumptions about the nature of societal and human development that placed European societies above all others; assumptions about the nature of cultural and political agency, and the recognition of a diversity of ways of living worthy of mutual respect; and finally, assumptions about the necessary conditions for individuals to develop the capacities for reasoning and the exercise of moral autonomy. It would be in the wake of the great decolonization movements of the mid- to late twentieth century that these questions would be pressed with even greater urgency. Frantz Fanon's (1925–1961) searing analysis of the effects of colonialism on the mind-set of the colonized, and his bleak assessment of what was required to overcome it, remains one of the most powerful anticolonial statements produced in this period. The ongoing discussion of these questions, along with the rise of the discourses of multiculturalism and postcolonialism and renewed concern about the emergence of new forms of imperialism in global politics, means that colonialism will remain an important topic in political theory for some time to come.

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Commerce

Commerce did not become an explicit part of political theorizing until the early modern period. This entry describes notions of commerce in the ancient and medieval worlds, its growing importance as part of global trade and colonization, the evolution of free-market theory, and the further elaboration of the concept of commerce during the nineteenth century.

Early Views of Commerce

Ancient thinkers did not emphasize commerce. Plato saw commerce as a source of conflict rather than harmony (*Laws*), and his ideal polity had little place for it (see *The Republic*). Aristotle, though his emphasis upon prudence may have granted a certain leeway to economic life, distinguished clearly between mere household management (*economia*) and accumulation (chrematistics; see *Politics,* I.9–11), preferring the former. Sparta shunned commerce with other societies, and the durability of its constitution lent credibility to its anticommercial posture. The most successful commercial polity of the ancient world was Carthage. Its devastating defeat by Rome simultaneously effaced the memory of whatever laws and institutions might have contributed to its rise and validated the Roman alternative, an agrarian regime dedicated to virtue and conquest.

Medieval Christianity was even more hostile to trade. To Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE), the Carthaginian ships were symbols of pride, and the winds that drove them were metaphors for the vanity and instability of earthly life. Jesus' remark that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye

of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of Heaven (Matt. 19:24) was often applied to merchants in this period, and usury (i.e., the charging of interest for loans) was regarded as sinful in the Catholic Church into the eighteenth century.

Even Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), often seen as the founder of modern political theory, treated commerce in passing as an undoubted source of corruption in a people's morals. In the *Discourses* (chap. 55), he attributed the goodness of the modern Germans to their lack of commerce with other nations. Virtue was the true source of political success, and commerce ran contrary to it.

The Advance of Commerce

The discovery of America and the spread of colonial conquest and trade helped make commerce politically important in the sixteenth century and afterward. The establishment in Spain, Holland, France, and England of state-chartered companies, vested with privileged monopolies of import or export, also brought trade into the public domain. The Frenchman Jean Bodin's discovery (in 1568) that the level of prices reflects the quantity of money in circulation made overseas trade and the import of bullion a public issue in an unprecedented way. In Spain, the so-called School of Salamanca arose, whose market-savvy theorists addressed a variety of novel topics brought to the fore by this colonial experience.

The seventeenth century saw a significant advance in the consideration of the political place of commerce, especially in England and Holland. Much of the theoretical work grew out of topical tracts and pamphlets, concerning Machiavellian themes such as the power and interests of individual states. For example, some of the Dutch republicans of mid-century saw commerce as uniquely important to Dutch identity. Authors like Pieter de la Court (*Political Maxims of the State of Holland,* 1662) argued that freedom of trade and industry strengthened the Dutch state in various ways: by combining with freedom of religion to attract skilled foreigners into their poorly endowed and lightly populated country, by providing economic resources usable for self-defense, by creating a more cohesive and interdependent community with a shared interest in the common good, and by advancing a model of peaceful exchange contrary to the warlike proclivities of contemporary monarchs. In short, commerce was to republicanism as conquest was to monarchy in the eyes of some Dutch writers.

English pamphleteers likewise depicted trade as essential to their own emerging political order. The East India merchant Josiah Child (*A New Discourse of Trade,* 1668) cited the Dutch example in support of a raft of proposals to help England catch up, including everything from bringing merchants into state councils to expanding the education of women; lowering the statutory rate of interest was his key to unleashing English prosperity. The doctor and real estate developer Nicholas Barbon (*A Discourse of Trade,* 1690) argued that trade was more necessary to state prosperity in modernity than in antiquity because the equipment necessary for modern war could only be acquired through trade. John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, authors of the popular series *Cato's Letters* (1720–1721), claimed that trade was the natural "offspring of civil liberty" and that by making England a naval rather than a land-based power, trade had enabled the English to avoid the dangers to domestic liberty caused on the Continent by the current rise of standing armies.

More famous philosophers also wrote on the question of trade. In the *Leviathan* (1651), Thomas Hobbes argued that the royally chartered companies in England and elsewhere were examples of "double monopoly"—on import and export. These bodies of merchants, he claimed, were disadvantageous both to domestic consumers and to foreign sellers. In his *Second Treatise of Government* (chap. 5, para. 48–50), John Locke depicts commerce implicitly as a natural human activity made easier by the invention of money, an invention accepted by later generations through tacit consent. Money has made unlimited accumulation of property possible.

Bernard Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* (1705, 1714, 1723) marked an important moment. The subtitle of his work, "Private Vices, Publick Benefits," announced his novel argument not only that state power rested upon wealth—a fairly common claim throughout the seventeenth century—but also that wealth depended upon a policy of giving vent to the selfish passions. A regime based on justice and virtue, he claimed, would be impoverished and weak, easy prey to less scrupulous

neighbors. Just as Machiavelli had seen Christianity as harmful to the military virtues of medieval Europe, Mandeville unleashed an attack against the Christian "charity schools" movement of his own day, replacing its ethos of service with an unsparing ethos of reciprocal exchange of interests. Specifically, Mandeville argued that luxury should be encouraged by states, that trade should be free, and that the vices of envy and vanity, among others, should be accepted as natural and steered to positive advantage by prudent government.

After Mandeville, it became conventional for political thinkers to incorporate commerce fully into their fields of vision. Thus, luxury—its causes and effects, and the policies of governments toward it—became one of the leading topics of public discussion throughout the eighteenth century. Baron de Montesquieu, in his *Spirit of the Laws* (1748), offered a nuanced and wide-ranging endorsement of modern commerce. Morally, he noted that commerce both cured destructive prejudices and corrupted local mores (20.1). Internationally, the Frenchman made the influential claim that commerce leads to peace. Paradoxically, however, commerce divides individuals even while uniting nations, as it tends to reduce moral and social activities to matters of monetary calculation (20.2). Montesquieu also distinguished between what he called a commerce of economy, which is based on necessities that benefited polities (especially republics), and a commerce of luxury, which he saw as characteristic of despotisms and those monarchies perhaps tending toward despotism (such as his native France). Jean-Jacques Rousseau offered the most far-reaching critique of commerce in the period. Rousseau lamented how commerce and the arts could "enrich and ruin nations" in the modern world. He attacked the way in which commerce and material self-interest had replaced virtue, honor, and love of country as the central preoccupations of modern statesmen. Where many eighteenth-century commentators viewed commerce as a way of replacing ancient prejudices and hierarchies with a more utilitarian spirit, Rousseau saw commerce as a validation of the corruption that the modern arts and sciences had wrought in modern peoples.

The leading figures of the Scottish Enlightenment were well aware of Rousseau's critique and were not unsympathetic toward some of it. But generally, their evaluation of the political role of commerce was considerably closer to that of Montesquieu than of Rousseau. David Hume, in a series of essays on commerce and luxury in the 1750s, amplified the argument for trade by historicizing it. He argued that state interest and private interest coincided in commerce. The happiness and prosperity of the individual subjects was a precondition of the power of the regime. Against the Spartan model of public virtue and private self-denial, Hume argued that governments must take human nature as they find it. Commerce, he wrote, is part of a broader, long-term progress in the arts in Europe, progress he saw as conducive to individual liberty and free government. Even the military virtues of self-defense, Hume claimed, benefited from commerce and luxury through a combination of technological improvement, the sense of honor arising out of property ownership, and the discipline of regular labor in a free workforce.

Evolution of Free-Market Theory

Adam Smith went further. As early as his university classes on law and moral philosophy in Glasgow in the early 1750s, Smith had developed a scheme of human history divided into four stages: the hunter and gatherer stage, the nomadic or shepherd stage, the agricultural stage, and finally the commercial stage. According to this historical scheme, every aspect of the life of a society—from its morals to its technology to its legal and political systems—is powerfully shaped by these characteristic subsistence activities of the age. It was Smith who definitively put economic activity in general, and commerce in particular, at the center of political reflection with the publication of his classic work *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776. In it, he argued that everyone in a modern society becomes a sort of merchant, making the whole a kind of "commercial society" (*WN*, I.4.i, 37). Though Smith saw agricultural improvement as a more "natural" path to economic growth than commercial expansion, he saw Europe as having developed economically with the rise of medieval trade. Regardless of the specific circumstances, all economic activities were to be judged by the standards of Smith's system of "natural liberty," in which the function of law and government were to provide a general framework for productive activity rather than attempt to manage it, though Smith never

related his economic theory with a specific theory of political or constitutional order.

Smith was greatly influenced by a French school of free-market theorists in the 1750s and 1760s called the Physiocrats and contemplated dedicating his book to their leader, François Quesnay (1694–1774). The Physiocrats developed a theory that free agricultural trade was the natural method by which to fulfill the broader purposes of civil society. But there were at least two important differences between Smith and the Physiocrats. First, the Physiocrats believed that commerce was a "sterile" profession and that only agriculture added real value to any society. And second, in their emphasis upon the naturalness of their theory, the Physiocrats argued for what they called a "legal despotism" to enforce the laws and concepts that they developed. These and other elements of their doctrine gave the Physiocrats a reputation for dogmatism and abstractness, which limited the nonetheless broad influence they had in the late eighteenth century.

Nineteenth-Century Developments

During the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, the cosmopolitan hope of a modern continent held together by trade was at least temporarily replaced by national conflicts and prejudices; Maximilien Robespierre saw the Enlightenment embrace of trade in Rousseauian terms as a betrayal of public spirit for private gain, and Napoleon dismissed the commercially minded English as a "nation of shopkeepers." But Benjamin Constant (*The Spirit of Conquest,* 1813) developed a theory distinguishing between ancients and moderns. Modernity as a whole, he asserted, was ill-suited to the spirit of conquest normally associated with an Alexander or a Napoleon. The modern polity rested inescapably upon the private interests of private individuals; long experience had taught the lesson that commerce is a less dangerous way of acquiring possession of any wanted item than force, so that the spread of commerce was a natural consequence of a process of gradual enlightenment. The political effects of commerce, Constant believed, were primarily to impose important obstacles to the perennial efforts of government to control property; to render government dependent upon credit, and thus to strengthen the bargaining position of individuals in their relations with government. More broadly, commerce was a means of fulfilling the modern project of fostering the pursuit of individual happiness, as enshrined in the American Declaration of Independence and in the Enlightenment tradition summarized by Constant.

Reflecting on both the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) saw commerce less as a source of modern democratic equality than as one of its signal results. In Tocqueville's view, the spirit of equality that gives rise to democracy is one of the factors that leads to an embrace of worldly and material values, which in turn makes people passionate about pursuing commerce and industry. Moreover, while agriculture, slow to yield its benefits, appeals either to the already wealthy or to those concerned merely about survival, commerce (and industry) is attractive to those individuals—whose numbers increase greatly in democracies—seeking a more efficient and expeditious method of accumulating their fortunes. Politically, the absence of aristocratic outlets for the rich in democracies leads even them to take up commerce with zeal. Finally, the turbulence endemic to democratic polities leads to a positive appreciation of chance that is well gratified by a life of commerce (*Democracy in America,* II.2.19).

Tocqueville had already begun to elide commerce with industry, and with the increasing centrality of the Industrial Revolution in public discourse after the 1830s, commerce receded from the central place it had occupied in the long eighteenth century (1660–1830). Commerce arguably makes its comeback in political thought only with the onset of the concepts of the knowledge economy, the information economy, and the service economy from the 1970s onward.

Henry C. Clark

See also Classical Political Economy; Colonialism; Commercial Society; Constant, Benjamin; Grotius, Hugo; Hume, David; Mandeville, Bernard de; Manners; Mercantilism; Montesquieu, Baron de; Perpetual Peace; Physiocracy; Scottish Enlightenment; Smith, Adam; Sociability; State of Nature; Virtue; World-Systems Theory

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Commercial Society

The idea of a commercial society was central to eighteenth-century political economy and thought. Although it shares some features with contemporary liberal capitalist orders, it is best understood as a protocapitalist form of economic and social organization. Of the eighteenth-century thinkers who dedicated their intellectual energies to elaborating the features and policies of a well-functioning commercial society, Adam Smith is perhaps the most preeminent. His *Wealth of Nations,* published in 1776, remains the most thorough and nuanced defense of a commercial society against other forms of political economic organization.

Commercial societies began to take shape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, primarily in Europe and North America. The two earliest examples of flourishing commercial societies were probably Britain and the Netherlands, two predominant trading nation-states. Early in his *Wealth of Nations,* Smith draws out the defining features of a commercial society. First, commercial societies have a well-established division of labor in which people are specialized producers and thus satisfy their material wants and needs largely through exchange with other producers. Commercial societies thus comprise a highly interdependent network of producers, consumers, and employers held together by mutual exchange and trade. Their commercial interactions are, Smith argues throughout the *Wealth of Nations,* ably supported by a robust system of property rights and equal protection under the law. The hallmark of commercial society is, on Smith's read, a high degree of mobility for its members; although individuals are dependent on a commercial society's vast network of exchange for survival, they should be able to move within this network as social and economic actors and be free to choose their occupations and personal projects.

In *Wealth of Nations,* Smith offers a conjectural history of the development of commerce, culminating in the commercial society as the most advanced form of political, economic, and social organization. It stands as a marked improvement on other social forms that he mentions, many of which were also supported by some form of commerce, such as European feudal society or agrarian or hunter-gatherer societies. What sets commercial society apart, according to Smith, is that it is less constrained by old forms of hierarchy and is better able to provide greater degrees of freedom, security, and prosperity for all of its members.

Smith's elaboration and defense of the promise of a commercial society came on the heels of a series of powerful critiques served by other eighteenth-century social theorists who were less sanguine about its merits. The two best-known critics, Bernard Mandeville and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, admittedly offer quite different evaluations of the promise of a commercial society, although their accounts converge at points. Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* (1714) offers an early reading of commercial society as tinged with vice. In Mandeville's satire he comments on the commonplace assumption that a commercial society's prosperity is directly linked to the moral virtue and civilized character of its inhabitants. In contrast, Mandeville argues that vices like greed and envy are what truly animate commercial relations and render them prosperous and that learned

manners and hypocrisy, rather than true virtue, constitute the appealing moral veneer of commercial societies. Mandeville does not suggest that commercial society ought to be abandoned as a socioeconomic project but rather points out to his readers the price of the prosperity he encourages them to embrace.

In his "Discourse on the Origins of Inequality," Rousseau offers more penetrating critiques of commercial societies. In keeping with some of Mandeville's claims, Rousseau argues that societies built on commercial exchange nurture vice, increase the human drive for luxury and gain, and make people more dependent on technology and material goods. In other words, life in a commercial society renders human beings weaker, less virtuous, and less satisfied with their lives. Furthermore, the division of labor that characterizes a commercial society's system of exchange does much, Rousseau argues, to exacerbate and sustain inequality. He suggests that in a commercial society, the lines between the wealthy and the poor are sharply drawn, with little hope for mobility or unity. Part of this critique includes a critical reflection on property rights and the rule of law, which serves, he thinks, to protect the interests of the very wealthy against those of the poor.

In *Wealth of Nations,* Smith addresses many of these critiques and expresses sympathy for the plight of those who find themselves in the poorer strata of a commercial society. Most certainly, he does not deny the problem of inequality. Rather, his argument in favor of commercial societies as the preferred form of socioeconomic organization rests largely on his belief that commercial societies are better able to ameliorate living standards for most people, create more opportunities for the exercise of economic or social freedom, and provide a more satisfying quality of life for individuals than do other forms of organization. While commercial societies ought not to be equated with modern forms of liberal capitalist order, the debates that persisted in the eighteenth century regarding the promise of commercial society appear in our own considerations of the merits and drawbacks of capitalism. Questions about the existence and pernicious effects of inequality, the potential for workers' mobility and development, and the connections between the drive for luxury and material gain and human happiness persist in our reflections on contemporary capitalist culture. Like Smith, defenders of capitalism often argue that it is the best form of economic organization on offer, even as they reflect on the ways in which it falls short of the ideal.

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See also Classical Political Economy; Commerce; Mandeville, Bernard de; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Scottish Enlightenment; Smith, Adam

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Common Good

A common good, broadly construed, refers to anything of genuine worth or value that is sharable by many and conduces to the happiness, flourishing, or welfare of many. Politically, "the" common good has traditionally been defined as a just and true aim of political society and its government, laws, and policies. The common good was for centuries a central concept in political theory, especially from Aristotle's time and writings through the medieval period, and becoming especially pivotal and well developed in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Beginning with Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes and the advent of political theory's modern period, the common good became progressively eclipsed by notions of individual rights, personal or group power and its maintenance or balance, and utilitarian notions of pleasure or welfare maximization expressed as the greatest good for the greatest number. This

utilitarian thrust was most evident in, but far from exclusive to, modern totalitarian forms of politics and their communist or fascist ideologies and regimes. In the contemporary period and current liberal democratic world, the common good has reemerged in neo-Aristotelian, neo-Thomist, civic republican, and communitarian theories as an important complement to the notion of rights in modern political theory and public life. In some important instances contemporary common good theory has been limited or specified by a "personalist" emphasis intended to ward off any drift toward forms of political totalism or contempt for individual human beings on the part of (purportedly) common good–seeking political authorities and their policies. The early and mid-twentieth century's ideological-political disasters seemed, to many social and political theorists, such as French neo-Thomist Jacques Maritain (1882–1973), to make a personalist variant of common good theory and political practice essential in the context of the modern nation-state and current international community.

Aristotle and the Common Good

The common good first achieves theoretical prominence in Aristotle's *Politics*. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) famously argues at the beginning of *The Politics* that as all human action is for the sake of what is or seems to be good, so the action involved in forming, living in, and governing the *polis* (the city as a complete political association) is for the sake of some good. The political good is called by Aristotle the most comprehensive or all-embracing and the most authoritative among human goods. It implies the happiness of a community that aims to be self-sufficient and so involves the rest of the goods that humans seek as part of a fine or noble existence and endeavors to order them according to the city's form of government or regime and the end or goal of human life generally.

In developing both his political theory and his ethics, Aristotle is in constant dialogue with his philosophic predecessor and teacher Plato. Aristotle's political theory of the common good is no exception. In Plato's dialogue *The Republic,* written decades before Aristotle's *Politics,* a sophist named Thrasymachus tells Socrates that justice is another name for what is advantageous for the "stronger." In other words, Thrasymachus argues that there is no common good in political life; there is only the benefit or interest of one part of the polis, whether this is a tyrant or an oligarchy (rulers who are few and wealthy) or the people (in Greek *demos*) in a democracy, where the weak individually band together by a social contract of sorts to become collectively powerful and advance their interests to the detriment of the rich or wise or virtuous. In all cities, from time immemorial, the ruling person or groups ennoble with the name "justice" whatever conduces to their particular interest or whatever they consider good for themselves, and this they try to legitimize and convince, or they even force the rest of the community to work toward their rulers' benefit as well. Socrates tells Thrasymachus that he is wrong, that a true ruler is one who rules for the benefit and welfare of the weaker, just as a true doctor makes decisions and prescribes treatments for the sake of weak bodies, and indeed normally for others rather than for himself. In an analogous way, political authority and rule should be for the sake of the ruled rather than of the ruler or rulers in the polis. Socrates never says in his exchange with Thrasymachus that justice is the common good, the good of all persons and parties weak or strong. Later in the dialogue Socrates argues that what is just, and hence the goal of politics, is or conduces to the happiness of the whole city rather than of any of its members, individually or in social groups or classes; but it is far from clear that all its people, as individuals, will be happy.

In Book II of *The Politics* Aristotle explicitly criticizes the Socratic concept of the happy city without all or at least most of the citizens in it being happy and having their rightful needs and wants met. This form of justice or common good would be something of a farce, a purported good of the "whole" when the actual people making up the polis may not be content, when their individual or familial goods may not be procured or defended. Then, in Book III of *The Politics* Aristotle argues (as Wayne Ambler has noted, directly it would seem against Thrasymachus, but in part also against Socrates) that although the proper good of political life is justice, this is nothing other than the common good or the common advantage. People unite in political partnerships to achieve goods that are especially excellent because they can be shared by many, but they do not do so to

alienate their own good in the name of a "common" benefit that, on closer inspection, turns out to be the advantage of someone else, or of some other faction or social group.

According to Aristotle, as to Plato before him, each city is governed by a ruling body that rules on account of some claim to excellence as its justification. This governing body may be made up of one, few, or many persons, and these may rule on account of their claim to possess the freedom, wealth, or virtue which the city needs. And then, and this is significant, these may rule for their own benefit (personal in the case of a tyrant; collective in an oligarchy or democracy), or for the sake of the common good of the citizens, the true benefit of the whole polis and all its members, as in the case of the regimes called kingship, aristocracy, or polity. Thus Aristotle, in Book III, chapter 6 of *The Politics,* develops his classification or typology of regimes on the basis of their particular form and presuppositions and compares them normatively, especially on the grounds of whether they seek the common good or the private advantage of the rulers. Those regimes that seek the common good are right or just in the strict or "absolute" sense, whereas those that seek the benefit of the rulers only or principally are deviant, incorrect according to what is politically right or just. By definition Aristotle's kingship, aristocracy, and polity seek the common good, whereas their deviant variants tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy seek the advantage of the ruler or ruling faction. After all, notes Aristotle, what are these deviations but forms of domineering mastery (Aristotle refers literally to the rule of a master over slaves), masquerading as civic leadership and public service? Aristotle's *Politics* involves throughout a critique of mastery, of domination over others and using them primarily for one's own benefit, even if secondarily this conduces to some advantage for those so used. Such mastery is in no way intrinsically excellent or noble. It should not be sought after for its own sake. Aristotle likewise seeks to motivate those with civic rights of participation and those actively involved in ruling or office holding to care for and promote true goods and to make them as widely shared as possible in the polis, an association of people who are free. As such, their common good should not be considered alienable or of secondary or instrumental concern; rather it must be their goal in common and is the special responsibility and mission of those who govern the polis.

Thomas Aquinas and the Common Good

Aquinas (c. 1225–1274) writes in the thirteenth century CE, at a time when many of Aristotle's books were being rediscovered and translated into Latin. Aquinas was the author one of the first two medieval commentaries on Aristotle's *Politics* (the other was written by Aquinas's former teacher Albert the Great and was likely completed before Aquinas's), although Aquinas treated just the foundational Book I to Book III.8 of *The Politics* and left the rest uncommented. It is significant, as Ernest L. Fortin has noted, that although most of the great medieval political philosophers of the Islamic world (including those noted as Aristotelians and virtually all of whom preceded Aquinas in time) almost certainly had or could have had access to Aristotle's *Politics,* they chose to comment rather on Plato's *Republic* in their reappropriation of ancient political wisdom and passed over Aristotle's *Politics* with its clearer articulation of a political theory of the common good. (They often commented on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics,* however, and through that work have knowledge of some politically salient aspects of Aristotle's thought on the common good.) In Christian centers of learning in Aquinas's era, the reverse was the case and *The Republic,* with its more clearly problematic account of the relation between the personal good and the good of the city or polis, was passed over in favor of Aristotle's political thought. Platonic perspectives came down to Christian medievalists most often through patristic texts such as Augustine's *City of God.*

In developing his own theory of political life, government, law, and the common good, Aquinas thus learned much from Aristotle, his *Nicomachean Ethics* (which Aquinas also commented on, extensively and in full), and perhaps especially his *Politics,* but he also drew extensively on works by and theories of the Stoics, Cicero, and Augustine. Augustine had written that, as Cicero had also stated, true civic justice had to be a *res publica,* a public good embodying a shared notion of what is right and benefiting the entire community in a sharing of advantage. All actual political societies known to humankind had fallen short of this

demanding but noble ideal, even the Roman Republic at its most austerely public spirited and heroically virtuous. Augustine, as Plato and Aristotle had arguably done before him, considered wisdom or truth as the highest and most intrinsically sharable of common goods in this present life. It could be known and enjoyed by many minds at once without being diminished or divided in the slightest way. Knowledge of God, even the small measure attainable by unassisted reason and magnified in the light of faith, was considered the pinnacle or perfection of truth as a common good. Unlike the classical philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who seemed to consider only the rarest and best philosophers as able to participate in and so to share knowledge about God and thereby forge the highest friendship among themselves, the Christian Aquinas saw the highest wisdom about God as sharable by all through revelation and grace, and he followed Augustine in rejecting political-philosophic pride and elitism. This led him to accentuate the common dimension of the common good of Aristotelian political theory and ethics and to reject most of Aristotle's realist backtracking in later books of *The Politics* where the common benefit seems unattainable and even unsought in any real polis, including the aristocratic best regime that "one would pray for" but which has not yet existed, and which Aristotle theorizes in the final two books of his *Politics*. Aquinas almost never references any aspect of this "best regime" depicted by Aristotle (which includes slavery and some eugenic practices), and he refrains from commenting on it in his work on *The Politics*.

Because of the distinction between believers and nonbelievers, however, as understood by and incorporated into Aquinas's thought on politics, there was limited but nonetheless open space for repression of heresy and protection of the religious community's highest common good of divine truth by politically enforced punishments and even death for those who once professed but now stubbornly and publicly renounced the Catholic faith. In this regard Aquinas undervalued the sense in which politics and its common good were, as he stressed in works like *Summa Theologiae,* properly human and rational goods, and he overestimated what political authority and political rule could prudently and justly contribute to protecting a transpolitical faith shared as a common good. Aquinas saw heavenly and earthly common goods as distinct from one another, as also political authority and ecclesial authority; but in practice in his world and also in his thought, these intermingled in some harmful ways.

Still there is much in Aquinas's thought that is still considered wise today, not least of all his reflections on the ethical dimensions of politics and its end or goal of the common good. Much of this Aquinas learned from reflection on Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics,* but in the process and in many respects Aquinas reconsidered, revised, broadened, and universalized Aristotelian common good theory under the influence of Stoicism, Ciceronian thought, Augustinianism, and the Judeo-Christian tradition generally. Aquinas argued that in practice the best regime for attaining or approximating the political common good was a "mixed regime," one that combined elements of kingship, aristocracy, and polity or democracy (Aquinas did not use this last term in the somewhat pejorative sense it had in some of Aristotle's writing and in much of ancient Greek thought, even from democratic Athens), and in opposition to oligarchy and tyranny. A virtuous (unmixed) kingship was in some sense best for the common good, Aquinas argued in his *Summa* (and also in the book he probably began as a courtesy to some royalty seeking advice, called *On Kingship*), as it best eliminated faction and it is easier to find one highly virtuous and wise governor than scores of them; but because the power of monarchy brought with it powerful incentives to corruption and rule for the private benefit, a *mixed regime* in which the chief ruler and subordinate officials were chosen from and by the people on account of their virtue and qualification for office was deemed much better in practice.

In the realm of legal theory Aquinas premised his thought on the role of law in fostering the common good of societies and political communities. By definition, argues Aquinas, law is a rational ordinance for the sake of the common good. Human beings are social and in seeking their good they necessarily and rightly make rules or laws with a view to the common good. Aquinas did much to develop and move beyond Aristotelian thought on law and the common good, beginning from some central passages written by Augustine on law that come from a dialogue called *On Free*

Choice of the Will. According to Augustine, law is either temporal or eternal; it is either framed by human authorities for the welfare of their communities and people here and now, and justly altered in the course of time if it ceases to serve the common good, or it is divinely legislated from and for eternity and for the common good of the whole universe and of all times and places. Eternal law is the rule of divine reason, and as such it contains general norms that are never alienable or alterable, such as that what is just must always be done or that it is always right that the good be rewarded. Only human or temporal laws that do not directly contradict or ignore eternal law are just and truly for the temporal common good of the people it is framed to govern in this world.

Aquinas stresses that because of our capacity to reason, our human way of participating in or knowing aspects of the eternal law, we know a natural law (a concept Augustine and other earlier Christian writers had inherited from Cicero and the Stoics and then developed in their own right). Natural law is an imprint of the Creator's providential wisdom, a rule of reason written in the hearts and minds of human beings that directs them to aim for true goods which in turn are parts of, or somehow related to, *moral* and sometimes also *political* common goods. The moral order among human beings, or the order of justice and other virtues (generosity, mercy, practical wisdom, courage on behalf of the just claims of other persons or of the communities to which one belongs), is itself a primordial common good for human beings who are social by nature at least chronologically before, as Aristotle had famously argued back in *The Politics* Book I, they are properly political. Sin and generation of evil, both personal and communal, obscure the natural law and its moral common good from our hearts and minds but never entirely obliterate them from our consciences. And our consciences, when guided by natural law and virtue, will direct us to act for the benefit of others and of ourselves as in community with others; our consciences will guide or urge us to seek the common good.

Seeking the common good then is not just the job of those holding political authority who make (or should make) laws for that purpose; it is also the responsibility of each human being who, in some significant way, can always further or support the common good of his or her community. At times, if a human or political law is intrinsically or circumstantially unjust, if it militates against the community, or it is meant to serve but undercuts the common good, then individuals, even private individuals, for the sake of the common good, may have to disobey it. It is no accident that the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. appealed to Aquinas's notion of natural law and its priority to civil law, in his *Letter From a Birmingham Jail,* arguing that a loving, prudent civil disobedience was at times a requirement of the public good it seems to violate on the surface of things. While public officials and lawgivers have primary responsibility for the common good on a political level, ordinary citizens are also responsible and have important contributions to make to the public welfare in their daily, even mundane actions. Only with the aid of private virtue and personal initiative in doing and promoting justice and peace, in ordinary life and sometimes also in acts of heroism and self-sacrifice, in addition to good government, laws, institutions, and policies, can the political and moral common goods among human beings persist and flourish to a significant degree.

Thus on Aquinas's account, perhaps even more powerfully than Aristotle's but also on this point greatly in Aristotle's debt, true concern for the public welfare, for the common good, motivates persons to turn their attention to their own souls and character, to their virtuous good, and to examine the worth of their motives, their conscience, and their actions. And the converse also holds: The concern for becoming and acting as good human beings necessarily involves growing concern for the moral, political, and ultimately divine or religious common good. This is so because, as Plato's Socrates put it in *The Republic,* we are naturally needy creatures, and no human being is sufficient unto himself for the preservation of his life, much less a good life. Aristotle argues essentially the same point in *The Politics:* We naturally tend to live together and associate with others in forms of shared life or *koinonia* (community) beginning from the family, the *oikos* or household, and moving up through the political association. "By nature," Aristotle argues in *The Politics,* and not solely or chiefly because of social compact or convenience, human beings are "political animals" inclined to debate about and promote justice in

political society, to seek the common good and not just their private advantage. In *The Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle notes that man and woman are attracted to each other and form couples and family units even more naturally than they are united in political society. Yet in *The Politics* he argues that the goods natural human associations of couples and households seek cannot normally be attained or protected without their participation in the advantages of political life and its broader and richer, if also more problematic, common good.

Through his notion of natural law Aquinas argues that people naturally seek, and indeed ought to seek, more universal common goods, including those of the moral order and of knowing the truth about God and the universe under him. Some theorists in the contemporary period have further drawn on Aquinas's notion of natural law and its moral common good to theorize about international community and the possibility or validity of international legal norms in the service of the human common good. It is not certain that Aquinas's thought supports a broadened quasi-political common good of this kind, but it is not implausible that it could; this idea has been debated in recent decades, along with the truth or falsity and the best possible understandings and meanings of the concepts themselves.

Modern and Contemporary Political Theories and the Common Good

Possibly in late medieval thought, as M. S. Kempshall has argued, and certainly in early modern political theory beginning with Machiavelli, the concept of the common good shifted from its ethics-, virtue-, prudence-, and law-based center toward a more individual and material, acquisition-based notion of public welfare. Thomas Hobbes "subjectified" the good to the point that a good was defined as anything a person might desire, any object of the passions. And as these are variable, fleeting, malleable, and contentious, no secure political order could be premised on them. In short, there was no substantive, and certainly no natural, ethically based common good in politics. Justice's focus, as Hobbes laid it out in *Leviathan,* was theorized to be a rational rule ordering and a means to the preservation of each individual's life. Politics could at best preserve the peace and assist individuals in prolonging their lives and material welfare so that they could pursue what goods they personally found most desirable and compelling, within legal limits decided at the sovereign's unchecked will. Politics was now understood to be in no sense natural to humans but rather to comprise a conventional (artificial) collective body that could try to keep itself, and so many of its parts, alive and moving as long as possible. John Locke ameliorated, checked, and democratized Hobbes's sovereign, but the focus of the political society and its law and government was kept on the level of the material: The common welfare consisted in the collective protection of the individual's right to property, broadly defined as life, liberty, and possessions. Authors of *The Federalist* papers (especially number 10) at the time of the American founding would famously write in a Lockean vein that the only rightful aim or purpose of government (and so the sole nature of a properly political good or common good) is the preservation of individuals' separate and unequal abilities to acquire property. Despite its liberal-democratic form, this understanding of government is open to an Aristotelian common good–based objection that it could deteriorate into a de facto oligarchy. Locke would argue back, and with him most of the U.S. founders, that this new, large-scale and individual rights and freedoms–based approach to republican government enshrined what Aristotle notes as the premise of democracy, namely, love of and respect for freedom, and also that its limited notion of government did more to ensure a robust civil society with a rich and diverse public welfare than the small-city–scale and common good–based civic model of Aristotle.

Historicist, dogmatic materialist, and other ideologically founded notions of the people's or public welfare came to dominate the political stage of the twentieth century and revealed an underlying, marked utilitarian basis as well as (pseudo-)scientific-rationalist justifications. Marxist-Leninist and other forms of communist collectivism demeaned the individual human's worth, while some Nazi slogans seductively encouraged citizens to seek the general good before the private welfare. In recovering from the horrors that these antihumanist humanisms supported, supporters of broadly Aristotelian or Thomistic notions of common good theory have sought ways to emphasize that true

common goods can only exist as the good of all the people in the society. The baseline of this is affirming the goodness of the unique existence of each human being or human person; hence, for instance, the "personalist" anthropology and political theory of Jacques Maritain, who played an active role in drafting of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Maritain and others, among them new natural law theorist John Finnis (b. 1940), have endeavored to incorporate key insights of modern liberalism into their frameworks of theorizing law, politics, and the common good. Finnis argues that the political common good, as also the authority and law made in function of it, is "limited and instrumental." Other contemporary theorists of the common good, such as Alasdair MacIntyre (b. 1929), have argued that true common goods require much smaller communities of shared inquiry, traditions, and practice than the liberal and indeed the modern nation-state can allow. They recognize the legitimacy or at least the inescapability of modern political forms but at the same time encourage forming smaller, insular communities, from universities to farming or fishing villages, where the virtues undergirding efforts at instantiating true but not uncontested or unproblematic common goods can be practiced and shared.

Within liberalism there have been thinkers of communitarian or civic republican influences who have laid greater stress than some of their peers on common goods (Aristotelian but also more modern forms such as Hegelian syntheses of epistemological and moral particularism and universalism) and their significance in political life and justification as well as in our personal identities and self-understandings. These theorists include Michael Sandel (b. 1953) and Charles Taylor (b. 1931). Taylor's most recent work deals with the problem of modern secularism, and he raises the central question of the relation between reason and revelation, or among social science, philosophy, and religion, in identifying and understanding the meaning of and means to the common goods of our contemporary political societies and forms of common and civic life.

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See also Aquinas, Thomas; Aristotelianism; Aristotle; Citizenship; City-State; Civic Humanism; Civic Republicanism; Civil Disobedience; Civil Law; Civil Society; Communitarianism; Community; Friendship; Happiness; Justice, Theories of; Justice in Medieval Thought; Lawgivers; Legitimacy; Natural Law; Natural Rights; People, The; Public Goods; Republicanism; Sociability; Thomism; Universality; Virtue

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Common Law

Common law refers to the English and Anglo-American legal tradition featuring independent courts of law and a legal profession, trial by jury of citizens to balance a judge, and liberty under rule of law—with law defined both as customs or principles affirmed by a court and statutes or codes made by a legislature. Further characteristics of common law include the selection of judges from the experienced lawyers (the bench from the bar), reliance upon precedent and traditional principles in adjudicating new cases, and a jurisprudential complexity that balances continuity and adaptability. These elements distinguish common law from the civil law, which stems from Roman law and casts judges as magistrates with administrative powers.

Many citizens, lawyers, and political scientists in liberal democracies are unfamiliar with the influence of common law upon conceptions of constitutional government, individual rights, and the status of the judicial power beside the legislative and executive powers. The American Constitution springs from the spirit of the common law, and not only in entrenching the right of *habeas corpus* (Article I), or jury trials (Article III and Amendments 5, 6, and 7) and "suits at common law" (Amendment 7), or in other clauses using common-law terms. The concept of a written constitution with distinctly enumerated powers rather than broad grants owes much to the common law insistence upon defining government to serve liberty, apart from the addition of a Bill of Rights, which literally draws from common law.

That said, a great debate arose in the past two centuries between classical common law and the advocates of modern common law. The predominant conception of common law today as judge-made law—devised case-by-case and guided partly by precedent but largely by a rapidly evolving or dynamic consensus of bench and bar—reflects the modern common law view developed in the late nineteenth century. The view led to significant growth of judicial power, starting in America and spreading to most liberal democracies, which in turn has sparked debate about the scope and character of judicial review and the proper approaches to statutory and constitutional interpretation. This entry reviews the history of common law and its impact on contemporary legal and political theory.

Classic Common Law

The common law originally meant, most basically, the immemorial customary law of England. It claimed roots in the ancient constitution predating the Norman Conquest (1066), and some scholars emphasize this historical dimension. Other scholars argue that common law jurists balanced this element with concern for legal reason, for consent of the community, and for adherence to jurisprudential principles of the Aristotelian and natural law schools of medieval Christianity. Common law was practiced in distinct courts, especially Common Pleas and the King's Bench, while other courts employed ecclesiastical, equity, or admiralty law; standing apart from all of these was statute law of Parliament. Nonetheless, the common law influenced the general principles of English law, in part, as the law common to all regions and classes—as ubiquitously affirmed by its characteristic institution, the jury of one's local peers. The epitome of classic common law is the jurist Sir Edward Coke (d. 1632), whose legal treatises and court rulings were still studied in the late eighteenth century by such American lawyers as John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and John Marshall, and which contain seeds for the idea of judicial review.

Coke argued that reason can refine immemorial custom and that judgments at law can reconcile positive (man-made) law with natural law or right reason. An important predecessor, the jurist Fortescue (d. 1476), cites in his treatise *In Praise of the Laws of England* (c. 1471) mainly Aristotle as well as Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). Aristotle argued in his *Politics* and *Ethics* (fourth century BCE) that justice requires both law and equitable judgment to interpret and apply law, and that laws based upon custom are more authoritative than newly written laws. Another of Coke's predecessors, Saint Germain (d. 1540), cites the natural

law jurisprudence of Aquinas in his *The Doctor and Student, or Dialogues Between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student in the Laws of England* (1528). Coke's treatises and rulings also blend Aristotelian and scholastic principles with historical particularity. The common law judge works from precedent cases and maxims to exercise an Aristotelian legal prudence informed by both particulars and principles. Coke defined this judgment as an "artificial perfection of reason" that lawyers and judges gain through long years of study and experience, with subsequent jurists refining this by applying precedent and classic treatises to new cases.

One of Coke's boldest arguments for common law reason as a pillar of liberty is *Dr. Bonham's Case* (1610) in which he ruled that a statute of Parliament had violated common right and reason, in part because it allowed a college of physicians to be judge in a case to which it was a in fact a party. Coke's legacy also includes his four volumes of *Institutes of the Laws of England,* the first of which treats the common law of property. The second volume includes commentary upon Magna Carta, the concession by the English king John in 1215—reaffirmed by his successors—that he ruled under law and recognized the rights of his subjects, including *habeas corpus* (the right not to be detained by government without trial). Coke argued that these rights applied to all subjects, regardless of class; both the charter and Coke's commentary were significant developments of constitutional government and the rule of law.

A paradox of common law is that its advocacy of liberty and a learned legal profession fostered independent-minded jurists and philosophers who criticized it. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) wrote *A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England* (1681) to recall but repudiate Saint Germain's classical view. Only a more rational, and less Christian and customary, conception of law and sovereignty—one more scientific than the vague, customary concepts of legal judgment or prudence—could achieve a more enlightened politics. The effort to either directly attack the common law or bend it toward Enlightenment philosophy continued more quietly with the English liberal philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) and then very openly with the English jurists Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Austin (1790–1859). These legal positivists all sought to replace the blending of natural law, customary law, and judicial prudence in classic common law. Their emphasis on law as the command of one clear sovereign claimed to produce more legitimate, rational, and progressive government, and this required clear subordination of courts (and juries) to parliamentary supremacy.

Common Law and Liberalism

Bentham developed his legal positivism by criticizing his law professor, William Blackstone (1723–1780), who is the common law jurist best known to later Anglo-American thinkers. Blackstone, however, cites the French judge and philosopher baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755) for discerning that the constitution and common law of England compose the only regime in the world devoted to liberty. Montesquieu is a liberal philosopher, and he does not cite the common law or its great jurists in his major work, *The Spirit of Laws* (1748); nonetheless, he praises the liberty in England's constitution, especially its independent judicial power. Montesquieu's advocacy thus marks the first moment in which liberal philosophy prescribes the tripartite separation of powers familiar to later liberal democratic thinkers. Moreover, he seemingly echoes classical common law when praising juridical independence, with its complexity of precedent and reasoning, for checking popular, monarchical, or despotic power and thus protecting rights. The political moderation and constitutional balance that Montesquieu advocates blends the common law's customary emphasis on traditional rights with the enlightened rationalism of a liberal science of law that will openly refine custom.

Montesquieu's jurisprudence prepares the way for Blackstone's blending of common law tradition and the rational spirit of liberalism in his *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1765–1769). *The Spirit of Laws* and the *Commentaries* became the two most fundamental sources for American constitutionalism and jurisprudence in its founding era. The *Commentaries* analyzed the constitution and laws of England from public offices, to civil law (property and commercial), to criminal law. Most scholars argue that some one element of Blackstone's synthesis in fact

predominates, and many claim that he uses Hobbesian legal positivism to support a Lockean constitutionalism of property rights, individual liberty, and parliamentary sovereignty, all by injecting positivism into common law. Some argue that he followed Montesquieu in more carefully balancing classic common law reasoning and institutions with a liberal, positivist view of rights, so that common law judges learn to temper parliamentary power and the broader political class learns to undertake incremental reform—mainly by lawyers and judges—toward a moderate liberalism. For this view, it is his focus on a moderate liberal constitutionalism and liberty that explains his blending of natural law, common law, and liberal positive law.

Common Law in the American Founding Era

In eighteenth-century America, Blackstone's *Commentaries* quickly rivaled Coke's work as an authority on English law for the American colonists; for the American revolutionaries it was a leading guide about the rights of men and Englishmen; finally, alongside *The Spirit of Laws,* it guided the American framers about principles of moderate constitutionalism. *The Federalist* (1788) cites Montesquieu and Blackstone but never Hobbes or Locke. Marshall cites Blackstone in some of his most important rulings, including *Marbury v. Madison* (1803), which entrenched a power of judicial review. The leading American jurists of the first half of the nineteenth century, Justice Joseph Story (1779–1845) and Chancellor Kent (1763–1847), each modeled their treatises on American public and private law upon Blackstone. However, the American principles of a declaration of natural rights, a written constitution, and judicial review do not reflect Blackstone's effort to blend common law with parliamentary sovereignty. For some scholars this suggests that America's leading constitutional framers, most of whom trained in the common law, developed a distinctive blend of Coke's classic common law with the already blended views of Montesquieu and Blackstone. Thus in "Federalist 78" Hamilton (1755–1804) propounds, well before *Marbury,* a rationale for judicial review rooted in Montesquieu's conception of separate powers and a Cokean view of the distinctive mind of common law judges. Indeed, Hamilton had cited Coke's *Dr. Bonham's Case* in 1784 when urging a state court to void a law for violating fundamental principles of American and common law. The French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) confirms and endorses the common law character of American law, judicial power, and judicial review in his *Democracy in America* (1835, 1840). He praises Americans for grasping fundamental natural rights and liberty through their respect for courts and juries, which in turn were guided by traditional common law judges and the bar quite independently of the Enlightenment abstractions of liberal philosophy and utilitarianism.

Modern Common Law

Tocqueville approvingly cited *The Federalist,* Marshall, Story, and Kent in portraying the legal mind of mid-nineteenth century America, but when Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841–1935) edited Kent's *Commentaries on American Law* toward century's end, his notes argue that traditional common law jurisprudence possesses neither a clear self-understanding nor a grasp of newer, more rational conceptions of law. Holmes led the movement of legal realism, which eschewed natural law and classic common law as intellectually flawed about law and self-deceptive about the power judges long had wielded. Holmes's modern common law argued that common law always was defined by historical change and flexibility in its forms and rules; that judges long had made law and policy, albeit incrementally rather than through sweeping legislative declarations; and that lawyers and judges must recognize their policy goals and use their legal discretion to nudge society in more rational, progressive directions. Holmes supplemented earlier legal positivism with the post-Enlightenment views about the historical character of all thinking and, related to this, the new science of evolution. Legal realism repudiated a legal formalism that portrayed judges as machines using maxims and precedents to discern objective rulings on new cases. Rather, they must rationally shape the law by admitting the political biases behind legal judgments, then refining these through tests of utility, recourse to recent precedents in accord with current social needs and developments, and the new sciences of economics and sociology. However,

unlike Bentham's advocacy of a legislative code to enforce rational utility, Holmesean realism places courts and judges at the center of political-legal reform. This challenges or transforms the Montesquieuan separation of powers and views the common law as a legal-judicial process without enduring jurisprudential substance apart from a current consensus or dissensus.

One consequence of modern common law in America was a reduced judicial rationale for independence from statutes, which invited greater reliance upon legislative codes in commercial, criminal, and administrative law—producing a mixed common law and civil law system. Alternately, judicial review of constitutional issues in American law grew exponentially bolder over the past century, and the spread of judicial review to civil law countries produced a hybrid common law and civil law system of another sort. The rise of modern judicial review has produced charges from across the jurisprudential and political spectrum that judicial activism, or the imposition of political views under the guise of constitutional adjudication, now threatens the political branches, representative government, and the rule of law in liberal democracies. Holmes anticipated this when referring to the U.S. Supreme Court, where he served for decades, as a "storm center" of politics. Advocates of a more recent blend of common law adjudication and liberal theorizing eschew the moral skepticism of legal realism while embracing robust judicial review in interpreting constitutional guarantees of rights, to achieve an evolving liberal consensus on equal dignity and material equality for all citizens. However, in the latter half of the twentieth century, several scholars resuscitated Blackstone's *Commentaries* and even Coke's classic common law as part of a search for enduring principles and guidance about law amid the uncertainty and skepticism produced by modern common law, legal realism, and the ensuing contentious debates about judicial activism—which most recently has engulfed judicial appointments for any appellate courts with constitutional caseloads. An understanding of the classic common law and the rise of modern common law is necessary for grappling with these and other controversies about law and politics in the twenty-first century.

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See also Ancient Constitutionalism; Bentham, Jeremy; Constitutionalism; Dicey, Albert Venn; Judicial Review; Jurisprudence; Liberty; Montesquieu, Baron de; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Separation of Powers; Tocqueville, Alexis de

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COMMONWEALTHMEN

The Commonwealthmen were late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British political writers

who championed the cause of limited government and individual freedom following the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689. Sometimes referred to as "real whigs" or "old whigs," Commonwealthmen urged constant vigilance against those in power. They drew primarily upon the political ideas of republican writers such as James Harrington, John Milton, Henry Neville, and Algernon Sidney in developing an ideology of protest against concentrations of power in government and the economy. As a result, they promoted institutional reforms to limit ministerial influence over Parliament, the modification of mercantilist policies, and the protection of individual rights to freedom of speech, thought, and religion, including increased toleration for dissenters. Even though they failed to get many of their reforms adopted because they never formed an organized party, their ideas had a significant impact on the political thought of the American Revolution beginning with the Stamp Act Crisis of 1765.

Prominent Commonwealthmen in the early eighteenth century included critics such as Walter Moyle, Robert Molesworth, John Toland, and especially John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, who coauthored *Cato's Letters,* a widely reprinted set of essays named after the Roman hero who opposed Julius Caesar's rule. The most notable Commonwealthmen later in the century included radical philosophers like Richard Price and Joseph Priestley, the political reformer James Burgh, and the historian Catharine Macaulay. Despite important political, religious, and ideological differences, Commonwealthmen were typically anticlerical writers who warned against the corrupting influence of power and favored strict adherence to the rule of law and balance in government to safeguard liberty. In many respects, their ideas corresponded to the seventeenth-century "country" tradition of opposition to the excessive power associated with a corrupt "court" that aims to keep legislative representatives subservient to the king or his ministers.

The seventeenth-century English republican James Harrington's fictionalized *Commonwealth of Oceana* was a touchstone for many Commonwealthmen. The single most important lessons they took away from Harrington concerned the link between the independence and the liberty of citizens. A strong proponent of the idea that property relations form the basis of political power, Harrington argued that the independence of citizens ultimately depends on their ownership of sufficient land and use of their own arms. In order to prevent tyranny arising from abuses of power or concentrations of wealth, Harrington recommended a balanced, or mixed, government of law, not of men. Inspired by these and other ideas found in Harrington's work, Commonwealthmen generally opposed the establishment of a standing army; favored the use of the secret ballot; supported the exclusion of "placemen," or office-holders, from membership in Parliament; and advocated rotation in office, preferably through annual elections.

Commonwealthmen in the early decades of the eighteenth century advocated many of these reforms in direct response to practices of the newly emerging Cabinet government led by England's first prime minister, Sir Robert Walpole. Much like their republican forebears, they were deeply suspicious of executive power and looked to the legislature as the guardian of the people's liberties. Commonwealthmen in this period decried Walpole's attempts to extend his influence over Parliament through control over elections, the awarding of government pensions, and the use of patronage as corrupt and unconstitutional intrusions on the independence of the legislature. In their view, liberty was endangered whenever the property or position of an individual depended on the favor of government. Their conception of corruption was not limited to outright attempts at bribery. It included any form of interference with the political and economic independence of citizens or their representatives. They urged the people to be ever-vigilant against the first signs of corruption and looked to civic virtue as a remedy against the social and political ills afflicting the political system. Writers like Trenchard and Gordon also stressed the importance of definite legal and constitutional rules to limit the powers of government.

The Commonwealthmen's views on economic and financial matters paralleled their views of politics. They were especially critical of concentrations of wealth and monopolistic enterprises. Some Commonwealthmen favored agrarian laws to moderate wealth—not necessarily to redistribute property out of egalitarian concerns, but to maintain balance out of a concern for independence. There was a fear that excessive luxury would breed

indolence in the people and undermine their capacity for virtuous participation in politics.

Commonwealthmen were not necessarily opposed to the development of a modern commercial society, but some expressed reservations about the emergence of new financial instruments associated with the development of the stock market. Most objected to the links that emerged between government and a new class of "stockjobbers" who speculated in public funds and contributed to the growth of the public debt. Implacably opposed to the development of parties, Commonwealthmen warned that these arrangements divided the country into creditors and debtors with divergent interests that undermined the common good. To prevent the further deterioration of virtue associated with these developments, they generally called for cuts in government spending, reduced salaries for public employees, and the end of government pensions.

The legacy of the Commonwealthmen was felt most profoundly in America during the revolution. Men and women like Thomas Jefferson John Adams, and Mercy Otis Warren invoked the ideas of the Commonwealthmen in defense of the rule of law, civic virtue, a citizen militia, frugal government, and the right of resistance against all forms of absolutism. Their influence also helps explain the hostility to party politics characteristic of the early republic.

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See also Civic Republicanism; Corruption; Liberty; Mercantilism; Republicanism

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COMMUNITARIANISM

As its name suggests, communitarianism is a broad tradition of political thought that emphasizes the moral and political value of community. Although the label is of twentieth-century vintage, contemporary communitarians often claim thinkers like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as their intellectual forebears. In the modern era, the communitarian project has included both a critique of liberal political theory as well as a critique of the practices of liberal society. Thus, for example, one aim of Hegel's communitarian philosophy was to critically respond to Kantian moral and political philosophy, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's communitarian theory of politics in *The Social Contract* was motivated by his repulsion at eighteenth-century Europe civilization, which was becoming increasingly liberal and capitalist. More recently, in the 1980s, a new round of the liberal communitarian debate took center stage in Anglo-American political theory. In this debate, communitarian thinkers were primarily reacting against the neo-Kantian liberal political theories of philosophers like John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Ronald Dworkin. Four theorists, in particular, are associated with this recent communitarian critique of liberalism: Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer, and Charles Taylor. Curiously, none of these four habitually identifies himself as "communitarian" and, moreover, their respective philosophical projects differ greatly from one another. Nevertheless, commentators have identified a similar theme in their respective works that criticizes contemporary liberal theory for neglecting the value of community.

The Communitarian Critique of Liberal Theory

Contemporary communitarians critique what they see as a politically and ethically noxious mixture of

abstract rights, impartial decision procedures, and narrowly self-interested rationality that are prominent in neo-Kantian liberal theory. In their view, these features render liberal theory theoretically and morally deficient, because it is excessively, even incoherently, individualistic (or "atomistic") and neglects the essential roles that virtue, tradition, and communal belonging play in our lives. Analyzing this critique more closely, we can identify several related criticisms.

The myth of "neutral" liberal justice. Neo-Kantian liberalism conceives of social justice as morally neutral between the diverse views of what a good human life entails which are held by the citizens of modern liberal democracies. As it is commonly put, liberalism prioritizes the "right" over the "good": It attempts to construct a neutral or impartial framework of rights while abstaining from taking a position on the nature of the ethically good life. Liberals argue that such a framework is necessary because it ensures peaceful and fair terms of social interaction between persons who have deep disagreements about the nature of the good. The liberal state is thus an impartial umpire, enforcing individual rights but refraining from favoring one conception of the good over another. This is what makes liberal society freer and more just than nonliberal societies, in which the state bolsters one way of life at the expense of equal toleration for other ways of life.

Communitarians, however, counter that the very idea that there exists a neutral standpoint from which the right can be derived is an illusion; the right can never be prior to the good, because the function of rights is to protect certain interests (e.g., freedom of religion), which cannot be identified without an understanding of what is good for human beings (e.g., it is good for individuals to be able to choose whether and how they worship). Any scheme of rights thus always advances some conceptions of the good at the expense of others, because some conceptions will be more compatible with the scheme. For example, the liberal right to free speech supports conceptions of the good that relish the clash of ideas, but makes pursuit of the good difficult for those who believe that the censorship of certain ideas or images is morally required. As MacIntyre observes, the allegedly "neutral" starting points of neo-Kantian liberal theorizing are always *liberal* starting points.

Ahistoricism and myopic, rationalistic abstraction. Communitarians chide contemporary liberal theorists for formulating rationalistic, abstract schemes of rights and justice that are detached from the ways that real people experience moral and political life. We learn how to value and act ethically because we are embedded in social practices. Our experience of moral and political life is thus conditioned by, and rooted in, the historically developed normative traditions of our political community. Walzer, in particular, maintains that arguments about justice must start not from abstract theorizing but rather from the shared understandings of communal practices. Failure to be attentive to these shared understandings results in less meaningful, less effective social criticism, and attempts to foist ahistorical, abstract conceptions of justice on real communities inevitably results in morally perverse unintended consequences.

This critique of liberal theory has an apparent Burkean cast, despite the fact that the thrust of much contemporary communitarian writing points toward what is generally considered to be leftist social policy. Indeed, leftist communitarians often agree with left-liberal policy goals, for example, a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and universal health care. They disagree, however, that abstract theories of justice and rights are the appropriate or most effective way to argue for and achieve these policy goals. Rather, these communitarians argue that the best way to achieve leftist policy goals is to increase affective (as opposed to rationalistic) communal attachment. Only the latter properly makes sense of and indeed spurs our motivations to help the more vulnerable members of society, which is a primary concern of leftist politics.

Asocial hyperindividualism or "atomism." Liberalism arguably has a history of theorizing individual interests and rights as given prior to communal or political life. For communitarians, this presocial theoretical starting point is misguided because we so obviously begin our lives and gain our self-conceptions as members of communities with given attachments and relationships to other people. Liberal theory seems oblivious to the fact

that we are members of families and communities before we identify ourselves as individuals with distinct interests and rights. Communitarians argue that the liberal emphasis on schemes of rights is problematic because it reduces persons to self-interested, rights-bearing atoms who demand only negative freedom in order to pursue individualistic goals. Pursuit of the good, they argue, is not a radically individualistic endeavor but is only meaningful in the context of a community with historically developed ethical traditions. It is because we are socialized into these inherited ethical traditions that we can begin to formulate our conception of the good. Persons are not metaphysical, "unencumbered selves" who can stand back from all of their inherited values and communal attachments and "freely" choose their ends as liberals suppose ("choose on the basis of what?" communitarians ask). The beliefs, desires, and relationships that make up the self are irreducibly social and historical: Who we are and what goals we pursue are a function of the historically conditioned relationships we have with those we live among. It is only in light of these relationships that the pursuit of the good can be properly and realistically understood.

In this vein, Sandel makes one of the more famous criticisms of Rawls's seminal work of liberal political philosophy, *A Theory of Justice*. Rawls argues that in order to choose the principles of justice that will regulate society, we must place ourselves in an "original position" of choice that is behind a "veil of ignorance," which strips from us all knowledge of who we are and what status each of us has in society. All we know is that we bargain behind the veil to "rationally" maximize our number of social goods and opportunities. The point of this, of course, is to ensure that the principles of justice are chosen impartially: Because we do not know our particular place in society, we cannot choose principles that will be slanted to our particular advantage and, as a consequence, we all choose the same principles. The result of this procedure, Rawls argues, is an egalitarian liberal regime, as each of the bargainers, ignorant of the socioeconomic status he or she will have, will want to make sure that everyone in society has equal rights and a fair share of material wealth.

Sandel, however, criticizes Rawls's procedure because it assumes that it is appropriate and unproblematic for people to drop their particular identities and ends in the "original position" when they consider the just structure of their community. Sandel argues that this procedure posits an untenable, metaphysical understanding of the self as an entity that somehow exists prior to its values and ends. What Rawls misunderstands is that the self is constituted by the very communal attachments and narrative identities that he wants us to bracket in the original position. For example, if I am a devout Catholic, why would I want to choose principles of justice from a position that requires me to "forget" this essential, constitutive identity? Thus, Rawls assumes a conception of the self that is "unencumbered": It is narrowly self-interested in securing goods and opportunities for itself in the original positions so that it may "freely" choose its "life plan" in the egalitarian liberal society. But this conception of the self is impoverished, because it has no substantive values to guide its choices, only the formal, selfish motive to maximize its own goods and opportunities. Sandel thus suggests that the way that Rawls asks us to conceive of ourselves in his theory is, in a real sense, inhuman; it will be ineffective in organizing the humane liberal society that Rawls imagines to be his goal, and it endangers a proper understanding of political community that actually will be humane, an understanding that takes our social nature and commitments to one another as fellow citizens as primary. For Sandel, a good politics is one that explores communal identity and recognizes that the achievement of communal, public goods is essential to creating a context that enables individuals to flourish.

Taylor joins this criticism that contemporary theorists of liberalism misunderstand the social nature of the self. We become individuals only because we learn a common, socially created vocabulary and set of practices that enable us to conceive of ourselves and act as individuals. In other words, a communal context is a precondition of individuality. Recent liberal theorists, Taylor argues, are so preoccupied with delineating the rights that individuals can assert against the demands of the community that they fail to attend to this crucial precondition. Liberal theorists' one-sided focus on the negative liberty of individuals "to lead their *own* lives" comes at the expense of recognizing the duties and obligations upon which community rests. The result is ethical and political

"atomism": a robust, self-centered and self-absorbed individualism that threatens to undermine the very communal context that is a precondition for individual freedom.

Neglect of virtue. Because of their aspiration to neutrality on the issue of the good, neo-Kantian liberals are irremediably spare in their discussions of ethical character, or virtue, which communitarians argue is necessary to make sense of the ethically good life. Rather, as we have seen, liberals tend to emphasize a conception of the person as essentially a rights-bearing agent. In the view of communitarians, this is a very thin conception of a person, too thin on which to base meaningful and healthy communal life. Taylor fears that liberal theorists' abstract, ahistorical conception of a self, whose main concern is negative liberty protected by liberal rights, is likely to lead to atomism: a situation in which people see their community as merely an instrument to the pursuit of their own selfish ends. Such a conception of the self inevitably leads to the neglect of the maintenance of communal goods that sustain the community. Agreeing with this problematic picture of liberalism, MacIntyre suggests that crucially missing from liberal theory is a communal understanding of the good life that includes an account of the associated virtues required to lead such a life. Indeed, one finds in liberal societies, MacIntyre argues, a lack of a coherent moral vocabulary, which renders moral and political discussion little more than a stark clash of wills. Only communities that identify themselves with a rich moral tradition, in which character virtues necessarily play a key role, have the conceptual wherewithal to have meaningful and fruitful discussions about the moral and political good. Denizens of liberal society, in contrast, are fated to suffer anomie as they increasingly and more vociferously assert their clashing emotive preferences against one another, typically couched in the language of liberal rights, while their society devolves into barbarism.

Universalism. Another complaint that some communitarians aim at liberals concerns their universalistic aspirations; that is, liberal theorists assert that the liberal rights and conception of justice they conceive are morally required for every human society. This criticism, of course, stands to reason if communitarians criticize liberals for failing to take into account the particular, historically developed moral and political vocabularies that form the identities of communities and their members. Walzer, in particular, warns against the alleged one-size-fits-all approach of liberal morality. The tendency of contemporary liberal theorists to focus on constructing rationalized, abstract procedures for securing justice (i.e., the right) causes them to miss the complicated, affective, lived qualities of real human life in historical context. Liberal theorists too blithely assume that their account of "rationality" and of various human interests (e.g., its preferred conceptions of "equality" and "freedom") are obviously correct and universally applicable, regardless of cultural differences that have developed out of the diverse historical experiences of different communities. In other words, liberalism fails to deal adequately with the ethical pluralism that exists in our moral world.

The Liberal Response

As the smoke cleared from this barrage of communitarian criticisms, some commentators observed that communitarians were actually making two types of claims against liberalism that were not always consistent with each other. The first type of critique, which perhaps predominates in the work of the four communitarian thinkers mentioned earlier, is aimed at liberal theory, whereas the second type is aimed primarily at liberal practice. The critique aimed at liberal theory seems less damning for liberalism because it merely suggests that liberal theorists do a bad job of describing the moral and political identities that real liberal citizens have. We are not the unencumbered, rights-bearing atoms that these theories make us out to be; rather, we are of course the communally embedded creatures that the communitarians take us to be. As Bernard Yack argues, liberal practice does not "live down" to liberal theory: Communal life in real liberal societies is much more robust and plays a much more important role than liberal theorists recognize. But as long as our practices are healthy, what does it matter that liberal theory is deficient? The problem is that theorists may encourage liberal citizens to actually become the problematically individualistic agents that are

described by the theory. Theory is an effort to help us understand and reform our practices. If it inaccurately describes our practices and argues for misguided reforms, it can come to have a negative effect on practice.

Thus, the communitarian critique of liberal theory provoked a robust response from liberal political philosophers, who mostly agreed with communitarians that liberal theorists had wrongly neglected issues of community, virtue, and pluralism. They argued, however, that communitarians were wrong to suggest that liberalism was unsalvageable because of these theoretical flaws. To the contrary, they endeavored to theorize liberalism to address communitarian concerns. The communitarian critique of liberal theory has therefore arguably had the beneficial consequence of eliciting liberal theories that are more self-aware, sociologically accurate, and theoretically deeper than the previous neo-Kantian theories.

For example, although Rawls does not explicitly engage the work of his communitarian critics, most commentators take Rawls to be reacting to communitarian concerns in his later writings, which develop the influential theory of "political liberalism." The reason for this is his new emphasis on addressing the challenge of ethical pluralism and his admission that liberal conceptions of justice must be culled from the political tradition of a community, which means that that liberal justice may not apply to communities that lack such requisite sort of political tradition. Indeed, the challenge of pluralism, which can be linked to the communitarian critique of liberalism, has come to dominate the attention of contemporary liberal theory in the past two decades.

Other liberal thinkers have responded to communitarian charges that liberalism necessarily neglects the values of virtue and community. William A. Galston and Stephen Macedo, for example, have both argued that there are distinct "liberal virtues" that liberal citizens must possess in order for liberal political community to be viable and healthy. They point to virtues like toleration of difference, respect for the rights of others, concern for the common institutions of liberal society, and possession of political courage to identify and condemn injustice, among others. Liberalism thus promotes a thin conception of the good life, which is compatible with a wide range of ways of life, but a range that is nevertheless limited by the requirements of liberal morality. Moreover, this means that the liberal state and liberal society are not completely neutral; individuals following certain ways of life, like religious traditionalist ways, will find it more difficult than others to maintain themselves in liberal society. These "virtue liberal" theorists argue that liberalism is not merely about individual rights but is rather about constructing a certain sort of political community in which rights, to be sure, play an important role, but not to the necessary detriment of our relationships and attachments or ethical characters.

Liberal theorists are also able to respond to communitarian accusations of ahistoricism and myopic abstraction by arguing that liberalism itself is a historical moral and political tradition and that discussions of schemes of individual rights is a central part of this tradition. They can argue, for example, that Rawls is not positing a metaphysical theory of the self that is unencumbered and unnaturally abstract. Rather, he is arguing in *A Theory of Justice* that, in order for people whose identities are constituted by different communal attachments to live together in a political community in which they are treated fairly regardless of their understandings of the good, they must adopt the supplementary identity of the "just liberal citizen" that is committed to the sort of politics Rawls theorizes. If they refuse to accept this identity alongside their other inherited and chosen identities, then the liberal hope for a just society based on fair terms of interaction among diverse, free, and equal citizens will be a nonstarter. If, however, they seek fair terms of interaction based on the equality of their fellow citizens, then Rawls's construction of the choice procedure with its "veil of ignorance" becomes plausible. Rawls's procedure does not, however, necessarily denigrate the inherited communal identities and attachments that citizens inevitably possess when they endeavor to formulate liberal principles of justice.

The second type of communitarian critique is aimed at the practices of liberal society. Whereas the first type of critique argued that liberal theory mischaracterizes its subjects—liberal citizens, institutions, and society—the second critique claims that the neglect of community is indeed a disease of modern liberal practice. According to

this critique, citizens of liberal society really are individualistic, calculating maximizers who are primarily interested in exercising negative liberty and who seek terms of justice out of naked self-interest. This renders liberalism morally problematic in practice for two reasons: (1) Liberal individuals are ethically deformed and thus miserable and contemptible, and (2) liberal society is subject to what Stephen Macedo calls the "disintegration thesis," which holds that without a shared morality grounded in a view of the common good, liberal society risks deterioration into a Hobbesian "war of all against all." This sort of critique of liberal society and its citizens has the distinguished pedigree of the Romantic, anti-bourgeois tradition of writing that can be traced back to Rousseau and that has proponents on both the left (e.g., Marxists, feminists, critical race theorists) and the right (e.g., Burkean conservatives, Christian conservatives). Elaborating this critique, Ronald Beiner lists some of the damning features that communitarians commonly identify in modern liberal society: anemic citizenship, mindless consumerism and greed, the resort to hyperindividualistic fantasy and escapism, the increasing brittleness of basic social institutions such as the family, the attenuation (by market-based individualism) of that degree of civic solidarity needed to sustain even a minimally decent welfare state, and so forth.

The liberal reply to these charges typically consists of two responses: (1) The pessimistic portrayal of liberal man and society is inaccurate, and (2) the critics fail to propose a concrete or plausible alternative. Virtue liberals, like Stephen Macedo, Richard Dagger, and Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. argue that although there may be some truth to this critique—liberal societies are far from perfect—liberalism has the theoretical and practical resources to address these shortcomings and therefore still offers the best political context for human flourishing. What is needed to address these problems is a renewed and more nuanced commitment to liberal morality and politics, which includes a more active sense of liberal citizenship and dedication to the liberal public good.

Other liberal theorists dismiss the communitarians' political and moral critique of liberal practice as merely nostalgia for a "golden age of community" that never existed. They find it hard to take the critique too seriously because the communitarian critics are vague when it comes to offering solutions to the social problems that these critics lay at the feet of liberalism. They suspect that these critics, who are mostly Western academics, are tactically vague because they are not really serious about curtailing liberal individual rights in the name of traditional notions of community, which entail an unpalatable social conservatism. (On this view, perhaps the only serious communitarians in Western liberal democracies are conservative Christians.) More sympathetic liberal theorists are comfortable issuing a Churchillian response to this communitarian critique: Liberalism may be indeed the worst way to organize a society, except for all the other ways that have been tried.

The Communitarian Critique of Social Policies

The moral and political critique of liberal practices gained greater substance and salience in Anglo-American political philosophy in the 1990s with the inauguration of the flagship communitarian periodical, *The Responsive Community,* edited by the influential communitarian thinker, Amitai Etzioni. Communitarian criticism began to more specifically target social polices (rather than theories) associated with both the right and left ends of the liberal spectrum. For instance, some communitarians criticize the left-liberal trend of promoting ever-larger social programs directed by the bureaucracies of the central governments of the advanced liberal democracies. They argue that various programs are alienating and impersonal and are thus ill-suited to help those who the programs are supposed to help. Moreover, such programs crowd out smaller-scale, local, community-based efforts to solve these social problems, which would be more effective and humane (and are thus supported by communitarians). Communitarians have also been particularly wary of the rapid globalization of market forces in recent decades. Against the free-market ideology of the right-liberal libertarians, these communitarians argue that communities should be, to some degree, sheltered from the uncontrollable vicissitudes of the global market, which rapidly devastate communities by forcing people to perpetually relocate to where the market finds them the most productive.

The Good Life and the Good Society

At the root of these criticisms is a basic point about what sort of communal context is most conducive to living a good human life (and except for those who espouse hermitism, all social thinkers agree that some sort of communal context is necessary for a good life). Communitarians are perhaps ultimately opposed to the dynamism of modern liberal society, which is a function of its individualism and emphasis on individual rights. Denizens of liberal societies are afforded the freedom and are even encouraged to experiment with their identities and attachments. Liberal theory and practice make it clear to them that there are no relationships in their society that are necessarily sacred or essential to well-being; as long as we respect the rights of others, we are free to associate with whom we choose, and thus we are free to construct any identity that strikes our fancy.

Communitarians worry that this self-understanding, and the social milieu that is based upon it, is inevitably superficial and will lead to anomie, unhappiness, and moral and political nihilism. If our moral and political identities are simply a matter of choice, then there is no overriding reason to make our choices based on anything other than transitory, self-absorbed preference. This creates a society full of ethically unstable people and in which our moral obligations to one another have dissipated. What we need is a communal context that cultivates a more stable and solid ethical identity, one that is not confronted with and deformed by a constant, nihilistic rush of mercurial cultural and ideological fashions. For many communitarians, such a communal context must begin at the local, face-to-face level, as we are psychologically constructed to be attached to those who are immediately around us. From this stable, core web of relationships, we can extend our firmly anchored ethical identities, with our conception of the duties we owe to others, out to the rest of the larger political community, the nation, and even the globe.

This sort of argument echoes the "Asian values" argument of thinkers like Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore. Lee argues that the Confucian cultures of East Asia emphasize filial piety and social harmony over and against the individualism of Western liberal societies. He suggests that Western individualism is the cause of many of the societal problems that plague the West, like high rates of crime, drug use, and divorce. He argues that the "soft authoritarian" governments of East Asian countries like Singapore, which curtail the extensive individual liberties enjoyed in Western liberal democracies, better fits with Asian cultural heritage. The allegiance to traditional Asian values enables these countries to modernize and be economically successful without falling prey to the social maladies of the West.

Liberals, however, tend to cherish the cultural and ethical dynamism that liberalism makes possible. Moreover, they arguably have history on their side: The advanced liberal democracies are the most peaceful, humane, and materially prosperous political communities that have ever existed. Xenophobia, tribalism, perpetual violent conflict, slavery, religious warfare, starvation, and pestilence have been the way of the world for most of human history, and yet the liberal democratic world has made once inconceivable strides in eliminating these sources of human misery. While the communitarians certainly identify some of the drawbacks that come with liberal culture, liberals argue that cures they tend to offer are much worse than the disease. It is the dynamism of liberal society, which emerges from the liberal cultivation of diverse and free individuals, which enables it to better solve the social and political problems that perpetually confront humanity.

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See also Alienation; Aristotle; Asian Values; Autonomy; Civic Republicanism; Community; Justice, Theories of; Liberalism; Libertarianism; Liberty; Market; Methodological Individualism; Neo-Kantianism; Pluralism; Public Goods; Rawls, John; Social Capital; Universality; Virtue

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Community

In modern English, "community" reflects a quality of being held in common. In particular, it often connotes a group of people of more or less similar social and political status sharing a sense of collective political, social, or religious identity and acting together in the common interest. In medieval Europe, the Latin word *communitas* could likewise refer to a body of people sharing something in common, be it residence, property, a way of life, status, interests, or goals. Medieval sources also, however, use other words to describe what we would call a sense of community. Modern scholarship on medieval communities, therefore, is concerned both with how medieval people understood *communitas* and with groups, however described, that acted as collectives or shared common imperatives or values, whether expressed or implicit. This entry reviews the evolution of the medieval concept of community from a general notion of fellowship to that of a political collective. It then describes the development of urban communities and their association with political power during the later Middle Ages.

Community as Fellowship

In the Roman period, *communitas* embraced what would be described in modern English as society or fellowship. The word did not necessarily denote a political collective; for this the Romans generally used the word *civitas* (translated now as "city," though it referred to the inhabitants of a city as a political community rather than the physical city or *urbs*). In Christian late antiquity, *communitas* remained a general word that expressed a sense of common condition, as when Ambrose of Milan (c. 340–397, bishop of Milan from 374) wrote that had Christ been born in time, he would begin to share the human condition (*communitatem; De Incarn.* 3, 18). When Ambrose's younger contemporary Augustine (354–430, bishop of Hippo from 396) wanted to describe the ideal Christian society, however, he wrote *On the City of God* (*De Civitate Dei*).

In the centuries that followed, the word *communitas* appears frequently in the context of Christianity and Christian institutions. In its largest sense, the Christian *communitas* embraced the entire body of the faithful, whether in a particular region or in Christendom as a whole. On a more immediate scale, *communitas* could refer to the body of Christian clergy or to a specific body of clergy attached to a particular religious institution. This latter use of the word was particularly pronounced in monasticism. The rule for what became the dominant form of monasticism in

early medieval Europe, the Rule of Saint Benedict, repeatedly refers to being in communion with the group under absolute obedience to the abbot and to being excommunicated from the group for infractions of its requirements. C*ommunitas* came also to refer not simply to a religious community but also to the collective rights of its members, such as over its property.

Communities as Collectives

As Susan Reynolds in particular has pointed out, however, traditions of collective thinking and collective activity in the early Middle Ages were not limited to churches and monasteries. Lay people, too, thought in terms of communities, even if they did not use the word *communitas*. Community was in fact essential to early medieval political, social, and economic life, in ways that allow few clear distinctions between laity and clergy. For example, mythologies that developed in Europe in the wake of Rome's decline described the new barbarian kingdoms as political communities with ethnic names and common histories (*gentes*, or "peoples"). These *gentes* were organized into realms (*regna*) under the leadership of kings, who were responsible for providing peace, order, justice, and protection from foreign enemies to the people God had entrusted to their care.

At a lower level of political and social activity, groups of kin acting as collectives leap from the pages of the sources. They appear in kinship networks built around property holdings or formed around proprietary churches or monasteries. Such kinship communities could blend with monastic communities, as, for example, in the lay kin-groups visible in monastic prayer confraternity lists. Local communities are also particularly prominent in accounts of disputes. In a world in which a perceived wrong or injury could trigger a violent response, one's support group (i.e., one's kin, friends, and followers) was essential for survival. Support groups were constantly negotiated and renegotiated; nevertheless, they appear repeatedly, in the form of those rendering aid, those who would mediate, or those who would stand witness or swear a mutual oath. Local communities were likewise manifested in judicial assemblies, headed by a judge but staffed by the "good men" from the neighborhood and attended by all the men of the area; everyone present helped to mediate between disputing parties, arrange compromises, or give voice to a judgment.

Early medieval government needed such local communities to function. Kings depended on counts to head local assemblies and courts and to mobilize and maintain support for royal actions through their networks of kin and followers. They depended on the bishops and the clergy of their dioceses, and on abbots and their monks, to receive and transmit both religious instructions and other kinds of legislation. This symbiosis between local community and central authority could become institutionalized, as was the case with the Anglo-Saxon "frankpledge," that is, a group of households made legally responsible for each other's conduct.

Early medieval communities were by no means egalitarian or strictly horizontal, in the way that we might think of modern communities. On the contrary, they incorporated hierarchy. Hierarchy is visible, for example, in the Benedictine ideal of monks united in a community under the leadership of their abbot. It also appears in Frankish judicial assemblies. Justice was a matter for an assembly, but the assembly was led and spoken for by the leading men of the area, under the direction of a local or regional official (such as, in the Carolingian period, a count or a *centenarius*) and sometimes with the help of men who knew the applicable law and custom (*scabini*). The same applied to the kingdom. Early medieval kings ruled, but they were responsible (at least in theory) not only to God but also to the community of their subjects, who were represented by the upper aristocracy. This political ideal is visible in the repeatedly expressed expectation that rulers would consult with their leading followers and gain their consent for a given course of action; these leading men are usually described collectively in ethnic terms that render them stand-ins for an entire people (e.g., "the Franks" or "the Saxons").

Particularly constitutive of early medieval communities were oaths, by which the members of a group committed to mutual support and a common course of action. Such sworn collectives could undermine royal authority (witness, e.g., Charlemagne's repeatedly expressed concern in the early ninth century about *conjurationes* (lit. "sworn groups"). They could also attempt to replace it;

when a ruler was perceived to be oppressive, rebellions could take shape in the form of sworn groups taking up arms against the king under the leadership of their most prominent members. Under some circumstances, oath communities could try to act in place of the king. In later tenth- and eleventh-century France, oaths taken at the so-called Peace of God councils bound aristocrats, both secular and ecclesiastical, to uphold the peace and respect the rights of the church in their areas; parties to the oaths were also to adjudicate and punish violations.

The Town as a Community

All of the collective phenomena discussed in the previous sections illustrate particular kinds of group consciousness formed or assembled in particular contexts for particular purposes. From the eleventh century onward, the set of possible contexts in which collective identity and action could emerge changed in ways that affected medieval senses of community and the language used to describe particular kinds of communities. The change had to do with towns. Towns had been present in Europe throughout the early Middle Ages, but economic growth starting in the eleventh century, and the wider range of commercial and manufacturing activities that accompanied it, meant that towns became more numerous, larger, and more wealthy. By the twelfth century, wealthier inhabitants of some towns were uniting themselves into sworn associations for the purpose of advancing their collective interests vis-à-vis their lords as well as their economic competitors. Some particularly wealthy and influential towns were able to negotiate formal grants of privileges or liberties from lords eager to encourage and profit from their economic activities. The word used to describe these sworn associations was "commune" (Lat. *commune, communia*). But whether or not townspeople had taken a formal oath or received a charter of privileges, they could also express collective consciousness (or had it expressed for them) with the word *communitas*. In 1182, for example, the French king Philip Augustus "created a commune (*communitatem*) at Chaumont" (Chaumont-en-Vixin; Actes. Phil. Aug. no. 59 [a. 1182], I p. 80); a decree of the Emperor Frederick II issued in 1232 railed against the "communes (*communitates*), conspiracies (*conjurationes*) and similar things, which were rashly attempted in the cities of Alemannia" (D. Frid. II. Imp. a. 1232). Such feelings of urban community only strengthened, as towns and cities became rich enough to build walls and to field their own armies, thus acting as political powers in their own right.

The appearance of urban communes did not change the fundamentally hierarchical nature of medieval communities. Towns were spoken for by their leaders, especially when dealing militarily or diplomatically with lords or kings. The hierarchical nature of communes was expressed symbolically in cases where townspeople, forced after a lengthy siege to surrender, expressed their capitulation by having the leading men of the town exit a city gate with nooses around their neck and prostrate themselves before their captor. This aspect of urban communities did not change even as subcommunities formed within towns, such as guilds or craft associations; wealth, age, or standing within the group brought with it the right to represent and to govern the community.

The University and New Concepts of Community

High medieval cities became hosts for new institutions that, by virtue of their place within a political community, took on a communitarian cast. Chief among these were the universities, whose origins can be found in Italy at the end of the eleventh century and which spread to Paris, Oxford, and beyond in the centuries that followed. As the new centers of learning grew, clashes of collective interests produced communities: the *universitas* or "collectivity" of the student body or of the teachers, as well as the university as a whole as opposed to the people of the town in which they lived.

The universities, in particular, produced a wave of new thinking about communities, and along with it new written theoretical discussions. This theoretical work dealt both with the moral responsibilities of communities and with the need, in an increasingly legalized and bureaucratized society, to legally define them. In the process, the word *commune* came to be formally distinct from *communitas*. The latter embraced a wide range of collective activities, including communes, whereas the former came to refer specifically to towns that had

been granted proper juridical rights. Theory percolated outward to practice; for example, the handbook of French legal custom called the *Coutumes de Beauvaisis,* compiled at the end of the thirteenth century by Philippe de Beaumanoir, draws a clear juridical distinction between communities based on communes and other towns.

New thinking about political communities was sparked by the reintroduction of Aristotle into the Western philosophical tradition. A prominent genre for discussions of community was the commentary on Aristotle's *Politics.* Theorists such as Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274) wrestled with the relationship between community in general and the city (*civitas*) as the ancients had understood it. Aquinas and his successors argued that the *civitas* as a political community was the most perfect form of community in that it permitted the individual to develop his talents and ambition not only for his own fulfillment but also for the common good.

Communities and Political Power

In the high and later Middle Ages, assertive kings continued to rely on local communities in order to make their power felt in areas traditionally controlled by local aristocracies. In pursuit of this aim, kings could create new communities or strengthen existing ones. In France, the kings worked with communes to help them expand their authority out beyond the Capetian heartlands. In England, the Angevin kings, in an effort to insert themselves into local judicial processes, created juries of presentment (the ancestor of modern grand juries) to identify wrongdoers without the necessity of a victim making an appeal; they thus both relied on and institutionalized collective judicial identities. The requirement visible throughout Europe in the thirteenth and following centuries for local communities to participate in the "hue-and-cry" (i.e., the collective pursuit of a wrongdoer) likewise reflected authority crystallizing and institutionalizing local communities for its own governmental purposes. A sense of political community could also, of course, be forged in opposition to assertive royal authority. One of the most visible examples is the baron's revolt against King John of England that led to the issuing of the Magna Carta in 1215. The barons opposed to John's expansive understanding of royal prerogatives came to call themselves the *universitas* or *communitas regni,* claiming thus to speak for everyone in the realm.

As royal governments in the fourteenth century, especially in France and England, tried to legitimate their claims to jurisdiction and to regular taxation, their advocates began to argue for the community of the realm as an overarching political community headed by the king. In the thirteenth century already, Aquinas had written of the legislator as having the care of society (*communitatis curam*). Some scholars point to this idea, which emerged particularly sharply in the early fourteenth century in conflicts between the French kings and the Roman papacy over taxation of the clergy, as both reflecting and promoting the first stirrings of national feelings or political consciousness in Europe.

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See also Aquinas, Thomas; Aristotelianism; Aristotle; Assembly; Augustinianism; Barbarians; Body Politic; Canon Law; City-State; Civil Law; Civil Society; Collective Responsibility; Common Good; Common Law; Communitarianism; Consent; Corporation Theory; Corporatism; Counsel; Friendship; Governance; Kingship; Oaths; Rebellion (Medieval); Roman Law; State; Thomism; Universality

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Comparative Political Theory

Political theory has been defined in a variety of ways, as an academic field, a canon of books, a set of interrogatives, a timeless tradition, and a practice of inquiry. The definition that prevails not only determines what qualifies as "real" political theory but who can be recognized as participants in its ongoing "great conversations" about the foundations of collective life. Currently, political theory tends to be organized around thinkers from Plato to Rawls, and thus it is implicitly understood as a discipline both produced by and coterminous with what is identified as the Western intellectual tradition. Outside its purview are the numerous thinkers from China to Africa, informed by traditions such as Islam and Confucianism, whose adherents have long been engaged in rich and complex debates about how humans do and ought to live together. Comparative political theory, by contrast, is both an approach to and argument for a more capacious understanding of political theory, one defined less in terms of a parochial mapping of Western answers to fixed questions posed by a pantheon of European American philosophers than a free-ranging inquiry into the conditions of coexistence.

This approach presumes that political theory is not the domain of any particular culture or historical epoch and that, moreover, its wisdom and intellectual value do not reside exclusively within a canon of classic texts. Instead, it is a distinct way of interrogating and reflecting on the premises of political life. More specifically, political theory is best understood as a field animated by certain kinds of questions concerning, for example, the nature of legitimate sovereignty, the content of justice, the purposes of politics, the duties human beings owe to one another, and the obligations we have to worldly authority. In very general terms, such questions are similar to those of political theory conventionally understood; yet inasmuch as they are always asked within specific cultural and historical contexts, the scope, focus, and terms of such questions are elastic rather than fixed, transforming and adapting to reflect diverse languages, conditions, and concerns.

Understood as a *domain* of inquiry, then, political theory is not coextensive with "the West" but encompasses all those so-called non-Western debates and literatures about the foundations of political life, the importance of which does not depend upon the extent to which they ratify or reject Western paradigms and preoccupations. Understood as a *mode* of inquiry, political theory is capable of illuminating concrete political practices often considered beyond its jurisdiction. These include practices and phenomena—from religiopolitical fundamentalism to specific expressions of popular culture—that are typically located within the precincts of fields such as comparative politics, religion, anthropology, and area studies. Comparative political theory thus traverses conventional boundaries among academic disciplines and blurs the borders said to distinguish the West from the non-West. Indeed, while comparative political theorists often invoke "the West" and "non-West" as heuristic devices, comparative scholarship tends to call into question the very accuracy and usefulness of such binaries by drawing attention not only to critical points of engagement and commonality *between* them, but also to the complex of differences subsumed *within* each term.

In this way, comparative political theory simultaneously resists the assumption that cultural traditions are morally and cognitively incommensurable on the one hand and, on the other, that they are internally homogeneous or unified. This leaves open the possibility that cultures intersect and speak to one another despite significant moral, historical, political, and linguistic differences. Such a possibility is not predicated on the existence either of universal psychological motivations or perennial questions that arise everywhere by virtue of being human. On the contrary, investigations of

the extent to which people across culture and history do or do not share certain dilemmas of coexistence are central to the very project of comparative political theory and must remain so if theorists are to avoid universalizing their own preoccupations without warrant. Careful attention to the continuous flows of people, information, and ideas across communal borders that have characterized much of human history frequently reveals sufficient cultural overlap to make comparisons possible without either fixing the terms of contrast or presupposing a particular outcome. Such cross-pollination has only accelerated in an increasingly globalized world characterized by extensive mobility and instant communication; questions about the nature and purpose of collective life are now global in every sense of the word.

Some argue that the designation of "comparative political theory" is redundant, as political theory properly understood is and has always been inherently comparative. After all, the ancient Greek practice of *theôria,* etymological precursor to the English word *theory,* explicitly links theorizing to observation of different lands, cultures, and institutions, and there are a host of cultural practices and intellectual traditions past and present in which knowledge about others' as well as one's own community is presumed to depend upon contrasts with what is unfamiliar. This suggests that comparative political theory ultimately needs to be understood bifocally. It is a radical departure from many contemporary understandings of political theory, but it is also a recuperation and enactment of a long-standing if subterranean premise of many traditions of political thought, namely, that literal and imaginative comparisons with other ways of living, being, and constructing political collectivities enable human beings to question the coherence and naturalness of their own. Such questioning makes possible a critical distance toward one's own cultural practices and commitments. This distance is crucial to recognizing the larger patterns and connections that inform one's own world, as well as to engaging culturally unfamiliar perspectives without making them speak to and for "us."

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See also Buddhist Political Thought; Confucianism; Hindu Political Thought; Islamic Political Philosophy; Japanese Political Thought; Neo-Confucianism

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Compound Democracy

Compound democracy is both a model of organization and functioning of a political system and a political theory. As a model, it is characteristic of those political systems that aggregate previously independent and asymmetrical states or territorial units. As a political theory, it justifies the need to prevent the formation of permanent political majorities, which might jeopardize the relations between the asymmetrical states. This is why compound democracies are organized along the lines of multiple separations of powers and function through the reciprocal control of the (horizontal and vertical) separated institutions. These democracies cannot be assimilated to the nation-states democracies, which are generally organized around fusion of power at the horizontal (governmental) level, even though some of them have separation of powers at the vertical (states) level. In compound democracies, separation of powers is at both vertical and horizontal levels. Within established democracies, there are only three cases of multiple separation of powers systems (the United States, Switzerland, and the European Union), and all of them are the outcome of the aggregation of previously independent and asymmetrical states. Scholars of comparative politics, recognizing the

difficulty of fitting the three cases into the predominant models of democracy, have ended up considering them "exceptional." Comparative politics has thus stopped at the nation-state's edge, confirming its analytical uneasiness in dealing with supra-states experiments, such as the three cases in question.

Models of Democracy

In the past, scholars of comparative politics focused on specific institutions of democratic systems. They compared legislatures, executives, parties, administrations, and courts of the various national democracies. Those who tried to advance more general comparisons identified the format of the party system as the independent variable for distinguishing between Anglo-American democracies (characterized by two parties) and continental European democracies (characterized by more than two parties). It was only in the late 1960s and 1970s that, thanks to the fundamental contributions of the Dutch American political scientist Arendt Lijphart, a more holistic approach to the comparison of democratic models emerged. This approach joined measures of cleavage patterns and party politics to those of institutional structures in order to develop a typology of democratic models. Initially used for analyzing the small democracies of the European continent (such as the Netherlands and Belgium), with the gradual expansion of the number of democracies, this approach came to compare all the established democracies. Indeed, in her 1999 book Lijphart considers the 36 democratic countries which, at the end of the twentieth century, have had at least 20 years of uninterrupted democratic stability.

On the basis of 10 institutional variables regrouped in two separate dimensions (the party-executive and the federal-unitary dimensions), Lijphart has developed a basic twofold typology: the majoritarian or Westminster type, and the consensual type of democracy. However useful this typology may be, it is based on a too static view of institutional variables. Taking a dynamic perspective, Lijphart's typology may be re-elaborated in terms of the operational logic of democracies. Following Robert A. Dahl, the term *model of democracy* should refer to the way in which decisions are made in a given political system. From this perspective, it is possible to distinguish between competitive democracies, where decisions are made by means of the alternation in government of alternative political groupings (parties or coalitions), and consensual democracies, where decision-making proceeds by the accommodation or consociation in government of the main political groupings. However, this typological distinction cannot include those democratic systems where a government as such does not exist, as is the case for those democracies that *compound* previously separated and asymmetrical states. Thus, a third type of democracy should be considered.

Competitive Versus Consensual Democracies

The twofold typology of competitive and consensual democracies derives from the interaction of two variables: the system of institutional incentives and the nature of the social system. Jointly, they favor a political logic over another. The institutional system refers to the interaction of the various political actors within a given structure of institutional incentives and disincentives. In competitive democracies (such as the United Kingdom, France, Spain, or Germany) the electoral and party systems combine to promote a bipolar logic of political competition, and the governmental system allows a centralization of decision-making power in the executive, controlled exclusively by the winning party or coalition. However, whereas political competition is not supported by a strictly majoritarian electoral system (as in Germany), the formation of a government by a large coalition cannot be excluded. In consensual democracies (such as Belgium, Austria, Israel, and, for a long period, the Netherlands and Italy), on the contrary, the electoral and party systems combine to support a multipolar logic of political competition, and the governmental system creates incentives for the sharing of the decision-making power by an oversized coalition of parties.

The *social system* refers to the nature of the *social cleavages* that divide the citizens and groups. Of course, the cleavages that matter are those that endure over time, as they are expressed by the political culture shared by elites and citizens alike. A democracy is always linked to the society whose

political system it organizes. All societies are marked by internal cleavages. Yet, the nature and the number of these cleavages may vary considerably. In competitive countries, the social divisions have evolved into a homogenous configuration, in the sense that the divisions, or social cleavages, have grouped around a central, socioeconomic axis of political conflict. In consensual countries, the social divisions have come to display a nonhomogenous configuration, in the sense that the divisions or social cleavages have given rise to several axes of political conflict of a sociocultural type, in addition to a socioeconomic axis. It is interesting to note that the competitive model has taken root in large countries and the consensual model in small-to-medium sized countries.

Of course, between the system of institutional and social incentives and the political outcomes (the functioning of a democracy), the decisions of political actors intervene, which generally are informed by various factors, including their way of interpreting those incentives (Table 1).

The Compound Democracy Model

The previous typology presupposes the existence of a government as the ultimate locus of decision-making power. The government as a single institution is characteristic of democracies based on fusion of power systems. Fusion of powers is not incompatible with directly elected presidents, if the parliament (or legislature) remains the exclusive site of popular sovereignty (as is the case in France, Austria, Portugal, Iceland, Ireland, and Finland). As in the traditional parliamentary systems, also in the latter countries the government should have the (direct or indirect) support of the legislature in order to function. For this basic reason, that typology cannot include the United States, Switzerland, or the European Union. Indeed, these are the cases that belong to the model of compound democracy.

What do these cases have in common with respect to the two variables employed to construct the typology of democratic models? First of all, in all three cases there can be neither alternation in government nor consociation or accommodation of the various political parties, because these are political systems *without a government,* that is, without an ultimate decision-making center. The government is made up of separated institutions sharing power, whose members are elected separately and whose decisions are the outcome of the interaction among these separated institutions. In fact, all three political systems are organized according to the criteria of the separation of powers, both vertically (between the institutions of the center and those of the member states, or cantons in the Swiss case) as well as horizontally (between the various institutions of the federal or community center). Vertically, these political systems are comparable to other cases of decentralized organization of territorial authority, and in particular to federal systems (such as Canada, Germany, Austria or Australia). Horizontally, however, they constitute a case of separation of powers that deviates completely from those federal countries.

Table 1 Competitive Versus Consensus Democracies

		Institutional System	
		Alternation in Government	*Accommodation (Consociational Government)*
Social System or System of Social Cleavages	*Socioeconomic Cleavages*	Competitive democracies	
	Sociocultural Cleavages		Consensus democracies

Source: Author.

Whereas in the competitive and consensus democracies the purpose of the electoral and political process is to form a government, directly or indirectly, in the three cases considered here, the purpose of the electoral process simply is to elect or select the members of the various separated institutions. In the United States these institutions are the presidency (monocephalic executive power) and the bicameral Congress (legislative power), consisting of the Senate (representing the states) and the House of Representatives (representing the state electors). In Switzerland, they are the Federal Council (collegial executive power) and the legislature, consisting of the Council of State (representing the cantons) and the National Council (representing the voters of the canton). Finally, in the European Union, the corresponding institutions are the Commission (collegial executive power) and the legislature, consisting of the Council of Ministers (representing the governments of the member states) and the European Parliament (representing the voters of the member states). These institutions, in some way, are guided by the European Council, made up of the heads of government and the heads of state of the member states, which, however, plays no role whatsoever in the day-to-day policy making of the European Union.

Compound Democracies as Peace Pacts

In the United States, Switzerland, and the European Union there can thus be neither alternation in government nor accommodation/consociation, simply because there is no institution (the government) within which either logic could take hold. At most, the logic of competition or accommodation operates within each of the separated institutions of government. Thus, the United States witnesses alternation between Republican and Democratic presidents and between Republican and Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress. In Switzerland, on the contrary, all three separated institutions operate according to a consensual logic. Thus, ever since the end of World War II, the Federal Council is composed of a coalition of the FDP (Democratic Party), the CVP (Christian Democrats), the SVP (People's Party), and the SPS (Social Democrats). The European Union is located halfway between these two different logics. Of course, in view of the preeminent role the president has come to play since World War II, one might argue that the United States should be considered a competitive democracy of the presidential type. However, alternation in the office of the presidency is not identical to alternation in government. Moreover, although the president has become preeminent with respect to the legislature in the fields of foreign policy and defense, the same does not hold true for domestic policies.

Also concerning the other variable, these three democracies differ significantly from both the competitive and the consensual democracies. In fact, the main cleavage regards neither the opposition between socioeconomic interests nor the opposition between sociocultural identities (even if both exist). Rather this cleavage concerns mainly the divisions between states, that is, between specific and autonomously organized territorial units or regions. It is this inter-state cleavage that drives the political process in these democracies, although this cleavage may take the form of a partisan divide (as the one between the "red states" and the "blue states" in the United States), a religious divide (as the one between the Catholic and the Protestant cantons in Switzerland), or a cultural divide (as the one between the western and eastern member states in the European Union). After all, these democracies emerged from a process of aggregation of independent states that had resolved to pool a part of their sovereignty.

The aggregation of those independent states was due to different reasons, but paramount was the need of defense against possible threats from both without and within. These three democracies may be considered veritable *Peace Pacts* between previously sovereign states. They are unconventional Peace Pacts, as they do not rely on mere diplomatic relations between neighbors, knowing full-well that the states' system cannot guarantee the desired outcome of peace. This is why they have inserted the inter-states relations within a supra-states structure. Although significant differences exist between them, they do not fit into the typology of competitive or consensus democracies. Indeed, they have to be subsumed under a new category, namely, the genus of *compound democracy* (Table 2).

Table 2 Models of Democracy

		Institutional System		
		Alternation in Government	*Accommodation in Government*	*Neither Alternation nor Accommodation*
Social System (Social Cleavages)	*Socioeconomic Cleavages*	Competitive democracies		
	Sociocultural Cleavages		Consensus democracies	
	Interstate Cleavages			Compound democracies

Source: Author.

The Political Theory of a Compound Democracy

The United States was the first compound democracy by design. The 1787 Constitution was an attempt to go beyond a purely inter-states agreement through the institutionalization of a supra-states structure. James Madison, the architect of the U.S. Constitution, was probably the first to use the concept of compoundness for thinking of a "republic of many republics." However, theoretical interpretations of a "Madisonian democracy" or "compound republic" or "international union" came to be elaborated only in the second half of the twentieth century. With different accents, scholars interpret the American experiment as the attempt to prevent the formation of permanent majorities, either of states or citizens, through the dispersion of decision-making power. The system of separation of powers creates incentives for a competition between the concurrent majorities of the separated institutions, thus activating the mechanism of checks and balances. Thus, compound democracy tends to promote an anti-hegemonic political order through both an anti-hierarchical institutional structure and an anti-unilateralist decision-making system. However, the tyranny of the majority has been prevented at the costs of allowing the tyranny of those minorities able to control specific institutions (as was the case of the Southern states in the Senate). Whereas Switzerland consciously followed the U.S. experiment in the mid-nineteenth century (1848), the European Union came to institutionalize such a model of democracy by necessity (through several inter-states treaties interpreted by the European Court of Justice, the peak judicial institution, as quasi-constitutional documents; an interpretation subsequently accepted by the member states' courts, governments, and citizens).

Whereas consensus democracies accommodate the various political parties within the government, in compound democracies there is no specific arena in which such an accommodation can take place. Whereas competitive democracies give rise to majorities and minorities, in compound democracies it is not possible to introduce such a distinction because it might jeopardize the equilibrium between the states (or better between the separated institutions). Indeed, when a militant across-the-board partisan majority emerges, as happened in the United States in the period 2003–2006, the basic mechanism of checks and balances between institutions is called into question. Democracies of this kind cannot function on an exclusively partisan level like other democracies. Trans-states party coalitions may emerge within the institutions that represent the voters giving rise to a left–right logic on some issues. However, these divisions are bound to be constrained by recurrent divisions between the states or territorial regions which are represented in the other, separated, institutions. This is why in compound democracies, the basic political relations are between institutions more so than between parties.

Conclusion

Examining consolidated democracies, it is thus possible to draw a threefold typological distinction

between competitive, consensual, and compound democracies. Recognizing the specificity of supra-states polities, the comparison of democratic systems will become richer.

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See also Democracy; Separation of Powers

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Conciliarism

The Conciliar movement of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the Roman Catholic Church was an attempt to establish that the final authority in spiritual matters resided in general (or ecumenical) councils rather than the pope. Emerging in response to a particular crisis when the Roman papacy was forced to move to Avignon in 1305 (where it remained until 1377), the movement also gained impetus with the need to reform abuse and reconcile the claims of contending popes. The idea is by no means confined to the fourteenth century, as recent advances in medicine have made it a real possibility that a reigning pope could be kept alive in a coma or vegetative state, with no provision currently in canon law for that possibility. The question is whether "conciliarism"—the power of a church council to remove a pope or intervene in a particular situation—would once again come to the fore in rescuing the church from a hiatus in papal governance.

Church Councils

Church councils have been important from the earliest years of the church. Beginning at the local level, there emerged a number of councils involving the whole world ("ecumenical"), which discussed issues of church discipline and governance. Among these was the idea—and recognition—that the pope held a unique position within the church. The Council of Sardica (342) mentions this position in terms of the primacy of judgment of difficult cases, and the Council of Constantinople in 381 discussed the issue in terms of precedence, which was reiterated at the Fourth Council of the Lateran in 1215. The idea that the apostle Peter speaks through the present-day pope was first mooted at Chalcedon in 451, and this idea was developed at the Council of Florence (1438–1445), which decreed in 1439 that the Roman pontiff held the primacy over the whole world, was successor to Peter, the prince of the apostles, and which to him is committed "the full power of tending, ruling, and governing the whole Church, as is contained also in the acts of ecumenical councils and in the sacred canons." What is spelled out is a primacy of teaching, ruling, and sanctifying.

The content of this primacy in terms of these three tasks was developed further (not without controversy) at the First Vatican Council. This council was conducted in an atmosphere of social and political instability in Italy and Europe. It was abruptly terminated in September 1870 on the occupation of Rome by Italian troops during the Franco-Prussian War, but not before making a definition on papal primacy that would be the source of much discussion (and some dismay) for years to come. The First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ (session 4, July 18, 1870) affirms the appointment of Peter by Christ as

"prince of the apostles and visible head of the whole Church militant." It emphasized that this was not just a primacy of honor but one of "true and proper jurisdiction" received directly from Christ. It affirmed the permanence of the primacy of Peter in the Roman pontiffs. The Roman pontiff does not merely have an office of supervision and guidance but "full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the whole Church." Further, it proclaimed papal infallibility in "matters of faith and morals." Papal primacy was reaffirmed at the Second Vatican Council, but this time with what might be seen as a corrective in the affirmation of the order of bishops and the idea of collegiality.

In summary, church councils and the popes have recognized the idea of papal primacy, but what that might mean in practice has evolved. From a role of supervision and arbitration, there has been an intertwining of spiritual and secular power and, as the years progressed, an increased emphasis on the pope himself as teacher and leader.

Self-Perception

Many popes described themselves over the centuries as the "Vicar of Peter," and it might be said that this has become the core of papal self-understanding. More than simply an honorific title, it was made the content of the pope's claim to leadership over the whole church. This is evidenced from the early years of the church in decretal letters issued during the fourth and fifth centuries in the Latin West, often in response to requests for answers on issues such as doctrine, discipline, and governance. Though there is evidence of decretals since the time of Pope Liberius (352–366), the oldest completely preserved papal decretal is that of Pope Siricius (384–399) in response to a letter from Bishop Himerius of Tarragona. In this, Himerius had asked questions on 15 different points concerning baptism, penance, church discipline, and the celibacy of the clergy. In responding to these questions, the pope asked Himerius to forward the decretal letter to all his fellow bishops on the Iberian peninsula. Clearly, the pope envisaged that his authority to establish norms ran to regions far outside Rome, and that authority was based on the prestige and primacy of the bishopric of Rome and the support of the Roman Christian community. Subsequent popes issued decretals, many of these concerning questions of discipline and governance. The practice of this has continued up to the present day with the popes issuing apostolic exhortations, letters, and encyclicals and also through the work of the Roman dicasteries, which regulate all areas of life in the Church.

Two popes give interesting insights into what they understand as "primacy." The first of these, Gregory VII (1073–1085), set out his view of the papacy in the *Dictatus Papae* (1075). In it, he claims that bishops are the assistants and servants, not the partners and equals, of the pope. The pope alone has the power to depose or translate bishops, to call councils, to reform canon law, to absolve subjects from allegiance to wicked rulers, and to depose emperors. Gregory's pontificate might be said to represent the highest point of papal aspiration to dominion over the secular world, but one of his successors, Innocent III (1198–1216), displayed a similar mind-set. In his letter to the Prefect Acerbius and the nobles of Tuscany of 1198, he suggested that papal authority might intervene in cases where the secular power was acting contrary to the good of souls.

1917 Code of Canon Law

The 1917 Code of Canon Law states that the Roman pontiff, "the Successor in primacy to Peter," has more than a "primacy of honour" (which seems to repudiate the statement of the Council of Constantinople in 381). The pope has "supreme and full power of jurisdiction over the universal Church," a statement that is clearly against the conciliarist notion of earlier centuries. Jurisdiction is over "faith and morals" but also "in those things that affect the discipline and government of the Church spread throughout the world." Though there is no sign here of claiming any kind of temporal power or right to interfere in the operations of government, there is still an idea that some response will be given to governments that interfere unduly with the rights of the church.

The pope's power is "truly Episcopal, ordinary and immediate" over every church, pastor, and individual and is "independent from any human authority." This statement is an assertion of a "divine mandate," that is, that the pope in his office is accountable to no one and does not rely on a consensus (of bishops, cardinals, or clergy) to

act. This definition was refined further, in light of the Second Vatican Council, in the revised Code of Canon Law promulgated in 1983, which identified Peter with the apostles but at the same time gave him a unique office that is transmitted to his successors. This commission and transmission is seen as of divine ordinance. The pope is described as having "full power," which he exercises freely (canon 331), whereas the College of Bishops exercise it only together with the pope (and never apart from him). The pope, with "immediate" power, means that he can intervene directly on all levels of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and there is no recourse beyond him.

The Conciliar Movement

The Council of Constance (1415) is particularly important in the history of the church because it suggests that if the pope is a danger to the faith and unity of the church, then action can be taken by the bishops. The council achieved unity in the face of schism at a time when there were three separate individuals claiming papal power, and it raised the possibility of the principle of a council having emergency power over the pope. The fruit of the council was the decree, *Haec sancta,* which declared that the council

> legitimately assembled in the Holy Spirit, constituting a general council and representing the catholic church militant, . . . has power immediately from Christ; and that everyone of whatever state or dignity, even papal, is bound to obey it in those matters which pertain to faith, the eradication of the said schism and the general reform of the said church of God in head and members.

Standing firm on the basis of their own rights, rather than admitting that the pope could dissolve the council, the synod declared that it had its own authority stemming immediately from Christ and that everyone was bound to obey it in serious matters such as faith and unity. This suggests that should a pope err on matters of the faith or provoke schism, then the bishops could claim the power, based on this council, to convene in order to remedy the situation. However, the following years did not resolve the question of whether the pope was above the council or vice versa.

Certain movements in the following centuries demonstrate some of the tension between the pope and bishops, and also with temporal powers. The strands of both of these issues are somewhat intertwined in the ecclesiopolitical realities of the time. One of these movements was called "Gallicanism" and used to designate a certain group of religious opinions peculiar to the church in France and its theological schools. The quarrel between Louis XIV and Pope Innocent XI, where the king sought to extend his powers over the church's temporal goods, led to the king making a show of force by requiring the French clergy to reaffirm his powers in the so-called Gallican Articles of 1682. This Declaration of the Clergy of France asserted that the pope had spiritual power only, and not temporal or civil power. Secondly, papal primacy within the church was limited in that "although the pope has the chief part in questions of faith, and his decrees apply to all the Churches, and to each Church in particular, yet his judgement is not irreformable, at least pending the consent of the Church." In other words, the pope's decrees lacked infallible authority in themselves; it was the bishops who, by giving their consent, gave his decrees that authority.

In 1763, Johann Nikolaus von Hontheim, Auxiliary Bishop of Trier, wrote a work under the pseudonym Justinus Febronius. Based on Gallican principles, it advanced to a radicalism far outstripping traditional Gallicanism. According to Febronius, and denying the monarchical constitution of the church, the power of the keys was entrusted by Christ to the whole body of the church, which was exercised through the bishops. The pope comes first among these, but he is subordinate to the church as a whole. "Febronianism" was translated into ecclesiopolitical reality at the Congress of Ems in 1786, which was the last great uprising of German prince-bishops of Rome. The congress protested against Roman centralism and demanded a return to the situation that existed before Pseudo-Isidore (a minor set of decretals claimed to be forgeries), which asserted that although the pope remains the primate of the whole church, the power of the bishops ought to be restored. Clearly, there was a wish to return to the days of Sardica and Constantinople. Febronius believed that the final court of appeal was the ecumenical council to which the pope was subordinate. The delegates to the congress demanded more authority for the bishops, the removal or

restriction of nuncios, and the restoration of the rights of metropolitans as they existed in the ancient church. However, while it was foreseen that all this would be accomplished with the assistance of the emperor, the reality was that the Holy Roman Empire was dying and Joseph II of Austria was more concerned with his own territorial problems, and the fragile unified front of the archbishops collapsed.

Present-Day Issues

Though many members of the church believe that the pope, as the successor of Peter, retains the power of jurisdiction given by Christ to a single person rather than to a particular group or community, a conciliarist strain of thought remains in certain particular (local) churches. This is particularly the case where it is recognized that there would be significant problems in the ongoing life of the church were the pope to become severely incapacitated (e.g., if he were to become comatose or fall into a persistent vegetative state). Given that medical advances mean that he could be maintained in this condition for a number of years, there would be a question of how the church could respond to this. Though there are provisions made for what should happen when a pope dies, there is no similar provision that he can retire, or that he can be made to retire or to be deposed. As popes are not always elected when they are in the first flush of youth, live longer than average life expectancy, receive better medical care in their latter years, but are not immune to the onset of acute illness, this is a problem yet to be tested in the ecclesial community.

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See also Canon Law; Divine Right of Kings; Hierocratic Arguments; Scholasticism

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Condorcet, Marquis de (1743–1794)

Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet was a mathematician and political scientist of the French Enlightenment. He took an active part in the French Revolution. Today he is considered a pioneer in social choice theory and the application of probability to social science—two fields of inquiry that flourished only some 200 years after his death.

He rejected the religious and military parts of his aristocratic upbringing. His talents were recognized by mathematical greats, Joseph-Louis Lagrange and Jean le Rond d'Alembert, who secured his admission to the Royal Academy of Sciences in 1769. This became the center of his life, and he became its perpetual secretary (chief executive) in 1773. He was one of the leading mathematicians to work on the *Encyclopédie méthodique,* which deepened the mathematical and scientific coverage of the original *Encyclopédie.* His position also brought him into contact with foreign scientists and social scientists, including Benjamin Franklin (whose scientific obituary Condorcet wrote) and Thomas Jefferson but not Adam Smith, although Condorcet and Smith held similar economic views. He entered politics as adviser to the reforming economist Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot in 1774, but when Louis XVI sacked Turgot 2 years later for offending vested interests, Condorcet concluded that the "beautiful dream" of enlightenment in politics was over. However, the start of the French Revolution brought him back to politics, with endless schemes for rational institutions based on his social science. He became an ardent republican; never a partisan, he was however most closely associated with the Girondin faction, which fell in 1793. Condorcet was declared an outlaw and he hid away with a courageous Paris landlady. He had to divorce his beloved wife to save her from the guillotine. In March 1794 he escaped in disguise (to save his landlady's life) but was arrested at a village inn. He was found dead in prison 2 days later.

Condorcet saw his principal contribution as the application of probability to social science. His *Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions* (1785) addresses the problem "Given that a majority of imperfectly

informed jurors has returned a verdict, what is the probability that the verdict is correct?" This probability is an increasing function of the size of the majority and the degree of enlightenment of each juror. After two centuries of neglect, the jury theorem is recognized as a division of social choice theory.

The same theory underpinned his unfinished *Tableau Historique* (Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind). An introductory *Esquisse* (Sketch) was published in 1795 but the full *Tableau* only in 2004. In Condorcet's view, mankind has progressed from nomadism to agriculture to science, and from religion and superstition to enlightenment. In the 10th and final epoch of the human mind, with disease and superstition banished, there will be no bound to human progress. Many commentators, beginning with Thomas Malthus and continuing to postmodernists, have seen this view as foolishly optimistic. Most contemporaries did not understand Condorcet's underlying theory of probability, but a group of his followers who called themselves the *idéologues* tried to put his ideas into practice under Napoleon.

Ironically, he is now best known for a failure in his probability theory. When there are at least three voters and at least three options, it is always possible that by successive majority votes $a >$ [read "beats" or "is preferred to"] $b > c > \ldots a$. This is known as a cycle, and it lies at the root of social choice theory. In 1951 Kenneth Arrow generalized it to his impossibility theorem. Some have suggested that this destroys Jean-Jacques Rousseau's idea that politics should follow the general will, because the general will may not exist. Social choice should, but does not always, profoundly affect the choice of electoral systems.

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See also Enlightenment; Public Choice Theory; Robespierre, Maximilien; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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Confucianism

The term *Confucianism* refers to a complex set of philosophical, cultural, ethicoreligious, and political teachings and practices that form a *bonum commune* of the East Asian civilization that encompasses the Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese. Though Confucianism literally denotes a set of ideas advanced by Master Kongzi (Kongfuzi, Latinized by Jesuits as *Confucius;* 551–479 BCE), it encompasses not only various, often mutually competing, or even conflicting, philosophical and political ideas advanced by later Confucians (*rujia*) but also the political, social, and cultural practices predicated on and inspired by such ideas. The early sinologists' patriarchal and patrimonial (and hence authoritarian) illustration of Confucian politics notwithstanding, it is indeed difficult to definitively label Confucianism as either authoritarian or liberal, due to the multiple and locally divergent developments within the Confucian tradition. For this reason, students of Confucianism tend to distinguish "philosophical Confucianism," represented by Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, the three giants of classical Confucianism in the pre-imperial era, from "political Confucianism," the Confucianism adapted to or twisted by imperial China. Strictly speaking, the latter is an outcome of the historic compromise between classical Confucianism and Legalism (*fajia*), the founding ideology of imperial China. Not surprisingly, contemporary Confucianists are much more interested in unearthing humanist values in classical philosophical Confucianism uncontaminated with Legalist and imperial elements than advocating Confucianism as it has actually been practiced over the imperial period since the Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE). This entry first briefly surveys the historical context in which Confucianism originated. It then discusses philosophical

Confucianism in its formative period, focusing on Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi.

Historical Context

In comparison to Western political tradition, the defining characteristic of Confucianism as a distinctive political and cultural tradition lies in its enormous ethicopolitical emphasis on the family (*jia*) and filial piety (*xiao*). One telling example is, when asked why he was not engaged in governing, Confucius replied, "It is all in filial conduct! Just being filial to your parents and befriending your brothers is carrying out the work of government." This Confucian assumption of *familial as political* or what can be called *Confucian familism,* however, cannot be fully made sense of without considering China's pre-Confucian Zhou civilization (c. 1100–249 BCE), which was predicated on kin feudalism (*fengjian*) and the Clan Law (*zongfa*), the civilization (*wen*) that Confucius aspired to creatively revivify.

Apart from the legendary Yao-Shun periods and the Xia dynasty (c. 2205–c.1600 BCE), which is currently under archeological investigation, pre-Confucian ancient China had two, relatively unified, dynasties of Shang (c. 1600–c. 1100 BCE) and Zhou (c. 1100–249 BCE). The two dynasties, however, developed their own unique civilizations: The Shang civilization, worshiping the supreme ancestor-god *Shang-di* (Lord-on-High), was essentially a bellicose shamanistic theocracy where the shaman warrior-king ruled the people by means of augury and oracle; whereas the Zhou civilization was much more rational and humanistic, the Zhou people worshiping a universal deity called *Tian* (Heaven), which prevented the Shang practice of human sacrifice. While conquering the Shang dynasty, a well-centralized dynasty according to recent archeological findings, the Zhou rulers developed a kin-based feudalism (*fengjian*) by distributing the newly acquired lands first to the Zhou clan members and then to the non-Zhou clans by making them Zhou's extended family members, which is in marked contrast to the medieval West's contract-based feudalism. The Clan Law was both a political and ethicoreligious mechanism that regulated this kin-based moral-political entity. Governing the empire by means of the ritualism of the Clan Law rather than sheer force, and thus calling their statecraft a rule by virtue (*de-zhi*), the Zhou rulers justified their ruling in terms of the Mandate of Heaven (*tian-ming*).

By eighth century BCE, however, the Zhou court's imperial authority was only nominally maintained as it was challenged by the rising feudal lords within and constantly infiltrated by the northern barbarians without, and by late fifth century BCE even Zhou's nominal authority was no longer upheld. Chinese call this time the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE), distinguishing it from the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) that followed it, when, unconstrained by any higher authority, seven to ten (finally seven) hegemonic feudal states struggled violently for supremacy until the reunification of the Middle Kingdom by the state of Qin in 221 BCE, which employed Legalism (*fajia*) as its statecraft.

What worried classical Confucians most—Confucius having witnessed the helpless collapse of the Zhou civilization in the last Spring and Autumn period, and Mencius and Xunzi active from the heydays of the Warring State period—was the rise of *realpolitik* among the competing states, the tendency to separate statecraft from morality, replacing the political ritualism of the Zhou civilization. Apart from advocating the traditional fusion of politics and morals, however, the three Confucian giants diverged on how and to what degree politics and morals should be connected, each creating his own version of Confucianism.

Confucius

In *Lunyu* (*The Analects of Confucius;* Note: All Confucius quotes in this entry are from this work), Confucius, humbly yet somewhat puzzlingly, says that he was not attempting to innovate but only to transmit what had been there in antiquity, particularly the *wen* civilization of the Zhou dynasty (and some elements from the Xia and Shang dynasties). Though he wrestled with revivifying the bygone Zhou civilization of the Clan Law and social and political rituals (*li*), Confucius was neither a blind political conservative nor an anachronistic Romanist. In a profound sense, as the famous Legalist Li Si later complained about the Confucians, Confucius used the past to reform the present, while reinventing the past itself. In other words, Confucius was committed to "reviewing the old as

a means of realizing the new." The gist of Confucius's social and political ideas lies in his creative reclaim of tradition.

Shame Ethics and Moral Leadership

In the face of the disintegration of the Zhou civilization in the late Spring and Autumn period, Confucius unswervingly defended the traditional ritualistic social and political order predicated on and/or originated in the Clan Law of the Zhou dynasty. His overarching interest, however, was not so much to reintroduce the past as it is, but to counterbalance the politics of power and punishment vigorously pursued by the rulers of his time by inculcating in every man and woman a proper sense of shame. Put differently, Confucius reinvented Zhou ritualism, originally patriarchal and hierarchical, into a universal ethics for *all* members of society. "Lead the people with administrative injunctions (*zheng*) and keep them orderly with penal law (*xing*), and they will avoid punishments but will be without a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence (*de*) and keep them orderly through observing ritual propriety (*li*) and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves."

Traditionally, Chinese statecraft was twofold—that is, when dealing with aristocrats the rulers used ritualistic junctions instead of penal codes but employed physical punishment for ordinary people. The rulers of Confucius's time, however, due to their political ambition and personal vainglory to enlarge their states, were increasingly drawing solely from the penal code for their statecraft. What Confucius tried to do was to make rituals available to all members of society and thus rationalize their use as the only legitimate statecraft. Confucius believed penal code and punishment should be allowed, but only when necessary, and even then, minimally. This universalization of rituals may be understood as the uniquely Confucian way of self-empowerment.

The fact that Confucius respected individuality in terms of rituals is important in understanding the nature of the Confucian self and its relations to noncoercive moral politics. First, Confucius never thought of the self in terms of a clearly demarked psychological substance—be it soul, mind, or ego—even though he still believed the Confucian relational self has coherent moral agency capable of virtuous actions. If punishment were to hold any *moral* implications, it must be able to restore the original, morally pure, state of the self. For example, in Western political thought, punishment is commonly thought of the restoration of the right, freedom, or the soul (hence it is morally significant). In contrast, for Confucius, there is no individual as a repository of inalienable moral desert or unalloyed identity. As Tu Wei-ming argues, in Confucianism, man is always "man-in-society" (*renjian*) radically situated in the complex web of human relationships, fulfilling various social roles and obligations. That is, there is no pure self entertaining the concept of "right" or "freedom" that is antecedently given prior to the particular social context in which one finds him- or herself. One is always a particular person in the particular social situation where he or she makes a moral decision that is, in his or her judgment, most appropriate.

For Confucius, punishment was not only morally hollow but also politically ineffective, as his ideal society was not a just society. A just society might be founded on the just soul or on the individual right. What Confucius had in mind, however, was a harmonious society where people are mutually cooperative and trustworthy by the spontaneous yet reflective practice of rituals. Shame is felt when one fails to be faithful to his or her social roles and responsibilities. A shameless behavior transgressing the ritualistic boundaries threatens the viability of such a harmonious or "fiduciary" society. An ideal Confucian society is where "the ruler rules, the minister ministers, the father fathers, the son sons."

Secondly and accordingly, Confucius did not believe the ruler could be above the ritualistic order, the very resource of his statecraft. When Ji Kangzi, the usurper of Confucius's home country Lu, asked Confucius about governing (*zheng*), Confucius replied, "To govern is to correct (*zheng* 正). If you set an example by being correct, who would dare to remain incorrect?" "To correct" means to return things to where they properly belong; and for Confucius, rituals were the proven repository of what is proper. Of greater importance in this idea of correction through rituals is the ruler's own self-rectification by aligning himself properly within the ritual boundaries. The ruler's political leadership, Confucius believed, is

the natural outgrowth of his moral power—his willingness to subject himself to the higher authority of rituals, thereby constraining his personal ambition and interest. Again, when Ji Kangzi, troubled by the number of thieves, asked Confucius for advice, Confucius replied to him, "If you yourself were not so greedy, the people could not be paid to steal," and added, "If you (the ruler) desire the good yourself, the people will be good. The virtue of the morally superior man (*junzi*) is like the wind while the virtue of the small man is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend." Ultimately, Confucius was convinced that the ruler could attain supreme moral virtue (*ren*) only if he "return[s] to ritual propriety by overcoming himself." Thus understood, it does not seem far-fetched to say that Confucius advanced a kind of "constitutionalism"—not of law but of rituals—namely, the ritualistic constraint of the ruler's otherwise personal and arbitrary power.

Ren, Li, and Junzi

Before Confucius and even during his time, the term *junzi*—literally the son (*zi*) of the ruler (*jun*)—widely referred to the ruling aristocratic caste. Even though *ren,* the Confucian virtue *par excellence* is understood in terms of humanity, human-heartedness, benevolence, love—or, more accurately, all of them—*ren* originally meant a virtue of "manliness" that exclusively belonged to the warrior-aristocratic caste of *shi* or *junzi.* Confucius, however, was critical of the warrior culture of his time, which in his view had replaced or misrepresented the brilliant, and essentially moral, culture of antiquity. His discontentment with the present, thus, drove him to transvaluate the meaning of *ren* with that of *junzi.* Though throughout *Lunyu,* Confucius offers multiple definitions of the concept of *ren* (hence multiple English translations), he fundamentally rendered *ren* to be the inner moral power that can be attained through the continuous practice of moral virtues, including filial piety, fraternal responsibility, deference, humility, reciprocity, and respectfulness. In Confucius's new conceptualization, *ren* was at once a wellspring of all specific moral virtues (*ren* as potentiality) plus what was attained by the self through the virtues (*ren* as achievement [*de*]).

There is a compelling similarity between the Confucian transformation of *ren* as manliness into *ren* as moral virtue and the Platonic transvaluation of *arête* as physical excellence into inner moral virtue in terms of rational self-control (*sophrosune*). What distinguishes Confucius from Plato is that Confucius, while transforming *ren,* transformed the *li* (ritual propriety) from the rigorous precepts of the Clan Law into ethical practices and, more importantly, made them an outer expression of the inner moral quality of *ren.* Likening *ren* to one's inner disposition (*zhi*) and *li* to expressed refinement (*wen*), Confucius explained the inextricable relation between *ren* and *li* by saying, "When one's basic disposition (*zhi*) overwhelms refinement (*wen*), the person is boorish; when refinement overwhelms one's basic disposition, the person is an officious scribe. It is only when one's basic disposition and refinement are in appropriate balance that you have the exemplary person (*junzi*)."

From a political standpoint, *li* is of special significance because it is through the reflective practice of the *li* that the Confucian harmonious society can be achieved. Confucius abhorred extremity and cherished the middle course (*zhong*) as the defining characteristic of harmony (*he*): "Deference unmediated by observing ritual propriety (*li*) is lethargy; caution unmediated by observing ritual propriety is timidity; boldness unmediated by observing ritual propriety is rowdiness; candor unmediated by observing ritual propriety is rudeness." For Confucius, the combination of *ren* and *li* not only contributes to a harmonious society but is the very essence of self-cultivation. He said, "Through self-discipline and observing ritual propriety (*li*) one becomes *ren* in one's conduct. If for the space of a day one were able to accomplish this, the whole empire would defer to the virtue of *ren.* Becoming *ren* in one's conduct is self-originating—how could it originate with others?" In other words, one's authentic individuality is achieved only through one's relentless yet voluntary practice of the *li* with others. Confucius criticizes the one who blindly follows the *li* without the heart of *ren,* merely for the sake of good reputation, as nothing but "a village worthy"—destructive to *ren* indeed.

Confucianism as Vocation

Confucius, however, did not naïvely believe that becoming a morally superior man (*junzi*), not to mention a sage, a moral paragon whose life is in

perfect unison with the Heaven (*tian*), would be simple or easy. In fact, he often lamented that he had rarely seen a *junzi*. Confucius envisioned that if any should exist, they would have to be masters of self-discipline because their voices would easily be brushed away. And this was exactly the case with Confucius himself, as his political ideas were hardly embraced by the political leaders. However, Confucius was never let down. Even when he was surrounded by his enemies in Kuang, he was able to say, "With King Wen long dead, does not our cultural heritage (*wen*) reside here in us? If *tian* were going to destroy this legacy, we latecomers would not have had access to it. If *tian* is not going to destroy this culture, what can the people of Kuang do to me!" Contemporary scholars differ on what exactly Confucius meant by *tian* (a transcendental divine force or a moral repository?). What is significant, however, is that Confucius was unflagging in his pursuit of the moral and political reform of the present. As a mysterious yet perspicuous observer said, Confucius was a sort of the "wooden-bell clapper," a prophetic voice of wilderness for the morally corrupt world. Even though Confucius saw this very secular world as sacred, it cannot be dismissed that he held a special sense of moral and cultural mission—a mission that he thought had been given by *tian*—to transform the world by means of the past. And for him this mission was the way (*dao*) a *junzi* must follow unflaggingly, regardless of any foreseeable hardships.

Mencius

Mencius (c. 371–289 BCE) is the most forthright pacifist during the Warring States period, and he is often credited to be the second greatest Confucian next to Confucius. Although there is a 100-year gap between him and Confucius, he highly esteemed Confucius, by calling him the "sage of timeliness," and upheld Confucianism as the only legitimate school of thought among the Hundred Schools vying for supremacy. Unlike Confucius, Mencius appears to have enjoyed notable popularity among the warring lords of his time partly because of his eloquence, but, like Confucius, his moral and political ideas were never taken seriously by them due to his unapologetic defense of morality against the brute political power and the untrammeled pursuit of material profits.

Good Human Nature and Human Perfectibility

Despite his adamant claim to be a true champion of Confucianism, Mencius indeed created his own version of Confucianism, quite distinct from Confucius's own thought. Most notably, Mencius advanced a very sophisticated set of arguments on human nature, a topic that Confucius rarely mentioned, according to *Lunyu*. Mencius did so by embracing *Zhongyong*'s (*The Doctrine of the Mean,* allegedly authored by Zi Si, Confucius's grandson) core message that the Mandate of Heaven (*tian-ming*) created human nature (*xing*), and fully realizing the original human nature is the way (*dao*) a human being must follow. That is to say, Mencius fully extended the moral significance of *tian,* of which theoretical meaning was not yet quite clear in Confucius's thought, by positing it as the metaphysical ground of human nature.

Mencius attempted to resolve the intrinsic tension in Confucius's conceptualization of *ren* as both potentiality and achievement and its relation not only to *li* (ritual propriety) but also to other key Confucian virtues, particularly *yi* (righteousness) and *zhi* (wisdom). Unlike Confucius, who made *ren* and *li* dialectically intertwined as inner and outer dimensions of morality and deemed other virtues as subsets of *ren,* Mencius believed (or theorized) all four cardinal moral virtues as *tian*-endowed, and thus innate in every human being's heart-and-mind (*xin*). According to Mencius, these four virtues (*si de*), being metaphysical potentiality, are actualized in various manifestations of *xin*—*xin* of commiseration as the sprout of *ren, xin* of shame and dislike as that of *yi, xin* of declining and yielding as that of *li,* and *xin* of distinction of right and wrong as that of *zhi*. Mencius thought the four virtues (metaphysical potentiality) and the four sprouts (phenomenological manifestation) are good, and therefore he concluded that human beings are originally and inherently good. For Mencius, the reason that man fails to be good or becomes wicked is due to his lack of willpower, rendering him under the sway of the external environment. What is needed, therefore, is a full development of one's moral potential. A *junzi* is simply a person who has succeeded in this. Whereas Confucius was somewhat equivocal about the universal possibility of *junzi,* Mencius was strongly convinced that everyone is capable of becoming a *junzi* because all are endowed with *xin* and thus potentially morally

perfect. When it came to moral perfectibility, Mencius saw no difference between sage-kings and ordinary people. Mencius thus transformed the idea of sagehood. Previously sagehood was associated only with the legendary sage-kings, not even with Confucius. Now Mencius implied that everyone had the potential for sagehood.

Inventing Daotong and Confucian Moralpolitik

Living in the last days of the Warring State period, the most tumultuous period in China's history, Mencius was confronted with two challenges. The first came from the intensification of *realpolitik:* As the Zhou court's cultural and political authority completely collapsed, however nominal it had become, nothing was able to constrain the warring kings' glaring ambitions to enrich and strengthen their own states and ultimately to reunite the Middle Kingdom with might. In this political milieu, the maximization of profit singularly dominated their political agenda, and military expansion was opted as the best way to achieve such vulgar utilitarian goals. Not surprisingly, warfare became the natural course of the people's daily life and their welfare was rarely attended to. The second challenge posed to Mencius was the mushrooming of the competing schools of thought, particularly Mo Zi's doctrine of universal love (*jian ai*) and Yang Zhu's doctrine of self-love (*wei wo*). What is interesting is that not only did Mencius see the two challenges as inherently intertwined culturally and politically, but, more importantly, he pinpointed the moral-cultural confusion as the root cause of the political turmoil. For Mencius, the best and only way to resolve this moral-cultural and political challenge was to firmly establish the orthodox status of Confucianism among all Hundred Schools and transform the warring ruler into a *junzi,* and further, into a Confucian sage-king.

First, Mencius strove to establish the orthodoxy of Confucianism by claiming that (a) Mo Zi's undifferentiated universal love is flawed in that it directly goes against man's differentiated sense of affection according to relational distance, thereby absolving equally differentiated moral responsibilities; and (b) Yang Zhu's individualism completely dismisses the obvious truth that human beings are essentially social beings situated in the concentric web of relationship—first in the family, next in the state, and finally in the world. Mencius was thus firmly persuaded that Confucianism alone holds a good balance between particular love (filial love) and universal love (*ren*). In addition, like Confucius, Mencius thought the family should be the key ground for ethical self-cultivation and self-extension toward a broader social world.

Mencius's commitment to Confucianism indeed has ethicoreligious and also political quality, as he saw himself as the only heir to the authentic Dao after a hundred years following the demise of Confucius, the Dao that Confucius had rediscovered long after the golden ages of the sage-kings such as Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu—all dynastic founders. Therefore, despite his repeated political failures, Mencius was never frustrated and never questioned his Heaven-mandated mission to rescue the world from moral and cultural-political destitution: "The time seems ripe. It must be that Heaven does not as yet wish to bring peace to the empire. If it did, who is there in the present time other than myself? Why should I be unhappy?"

This somewhat narcissistic statement is of tremendous significance in the creation and the later development of what can be called "Confucian *moralpolitik*"—a unique form of politics in which politics and morals are fused. It is here Mencius tacitly endorses the view that the Dao does not necessarily have to be tied with the kingship—though Confucius thought the inscrutable meaning of the Dao is transmitted only among sage-kings, and it is partly for this reason he (Confucius), not being a king, never claimed himself to be a sage. Mencius came to this radical conclusion by investigating his theory of human nature. What is important is its political implications. Though Mencius never spelled them out, Zhu Xi (1130–1200), great compiler of neo-Confucianism, later recapitulated Mencius's claim that (1) Confucius is indeed a sage (if not a sage-king) by praising him as "greatest man ever"; (2) hence, there is no intrinsic link between sagehood and kingship; (3) therefore, the original two powers in the Confucian "sage-king paradigm"—the Sagely Line (*daotong*) and the Princely Line (*wangtong*)—can be dissociated; and (4) finally, whoever has been able to repossess the Dao in himself is entitled to exert great *moral* authority over the political ruler who is without the Dao. Mencius called such a

morally exalted man a "Great Man" (*da-zhang-fu* 大丈夫) who, practicing the Dao alone, "cannot be led into excess when wealthy and honored or deflected from his purpose when poor and obscure, nor can he be made to bow before superior force." It is on this ground that Mencius was able to uphold the Confucian scholar's (such as Zi Si's) moral authority vis-à-vis the king's power. The following exchange is presented in the *Works of Mencius:* "Duke Mu frequently went to see Zi Si. 'How did kings of states with a thousand chariots in antiquity make friends with virtuous Confucian scholars?' he asked. Zi Si was displeased. 'What the ancients talked about,' said he, 'was serving them, not making friends with them.' The reason for Zi Si's displeasure [says Mencius] was surely this. 'In point of position, you are the prince and I am your subject. How dare I be a friend with you? In point of virtue, it is you who ought to serve me. How can you presume to be friends with me?'"

Mencius's empowerment of the Confucian scholar, however, was not merely to pit the Confucian scholar against the political life saturated with the habits of *realpolitik*. Its primary purpose was rather to extend Confucius's teaching on *ren* government dedicated to the welfare of the people. Put differently, Mencius's supreme concern was to exalt the Confucian scholar's moral authority to rectify the political ruler, thus making him a *junzi*-king or ideally a sage-king. Only such a king, Mencius thought, would be able to entertain the Mandate of Heaven to rule the people, whose welfare, in his view, should be the sole indicator of the Heaven's contentment with his government. Otherwise, even regicide (and possibly revolution) could be justified, as he would then no longer be a mandated, hence legitimate, king. Thus, Mencius regarded compassion as the most essential emotional quality for a people-based government (*min ben zheng zhi*).

Certainly, Mencius was not a democrat. But it is important to note that due to some radically anti-autocratic elements in his thought, the *Works of Mencius* (*Mengzi*) had never been welcomed in the royal court, and it was banned even by the first emperor of the Ming Dynasty despite its canonization as one of Four Books by Zhu Xi and thus widely popular among later Confucian scholars. In fact, since the rise of neo-Confucianism in the Song period, which was essentially the revivification of Mencian-Confucianism, Mencius's political ideas have laid the theoretical foundation of the uniquely Confucian rivalry between kingship and ministership over the government of *ren*.

Xunzi

Xunzi (c. 313–238 BCE) is casually juxtaposed with Mencius as one of the two greatest Confucians after Confucius, well known for his remarkable breadth of knowledge and sophisticated argumentations encompassing virtually all branches of human science. Moreover, unlike *Lunyu* and *Mengzi,* which were the anthologies compiled later, the majority of *Xunzi* (*The Work of Xunzi*) was written by Xunzi himself and, compared to Confucius and Mencius, Xunzi allegedly had great success as a scholar, as he seems to have been appointed more than once as president of the Academy of the Western Gate (the Ji-Xia School) in the state of Qi, the wellspring of the Hundred Schools of thought in the late Warring States period. Due to wide exposure to and active interaction with other schools of thought, Xunzi's theories were highly eclectic and pragmatic, which made him popular through the beginning of the Han dynasty. But ironically, because of his heavy theoretical eclecticism, Xunzi was never considered an orthodox Confucian—after all, among his most prominent students were Li Si and Han Fezi, two of the most famous Legalists—and his credit as a Confucian was significantly undermined with the rise of neo-Confucianism, which self-consciously aligned itself with his rival Mencius.

The Reconceptualization of Heaven and Evil Human Nature

Xunzi professed to be a Confucian and he indeed had no doubt about the Confucian Dao that he thought was invented by the sage-kings and transmitted by Confucius. However, he was not content with the way Mencius reinvented Confucianism—especially his understandings of *tian* and correspondingly of human nature—and thus advanced his own, more realistic, version of Confucianism that in his view would better represent the reality of the human condition without relying on the metaphysics of *tian*.

First, Xunzi radically parted company with Mencius on the concept of *tian*. For Mencius, *tian* was conceived as a repository of moral norms and there is (and ought to be) a cosmic correlation between the Way of Heaven (*tian-dao*) and the Way of Man (*ren-dao*). In this scheme, the Way (*dao*) is something mythical, hence something to be discovered and transmitted by those who have somehow grasped the mystery of *tian-dao*. In Xunzi's view, Mencius's reasoning that seamlessly interweaves Heaven, human nature, and Dao was absurd. For Xunzi, *tian* was simply natural patterns; hence *tian-dao* is not and cannot be correlated with man's (especially the ruler's) moral behavior. *Tian* is nothing but nature, and Mencius's mistake was to confound what is natural and what is moral (or what is political). The defining characteristic of *tian* as nature is its constancy: It does not respond to human action by punishing the wicked and rewarding the good. Accordingly, the Confucian Dao cannot be an object of sudden (re-)discovery, esoteric transmission, or both. Because it has nothing to do with *tian-dao,* it is purely of human creation, and thus its entire course is subject to human effort: "The Way is not the way of Heaven, and it is not the way of Earth; it is the way for guiding people, it is what a *junzi* uses as his way."

Second, the natural corollary of the reconceptualization (or naturalization) of *tian* was Xunzi's realistic view of human nature. Xunzi countered Mencius's idealistic view of human nature by arguing that human nature is evil. However, contemporary students of Confucianism generally agree that Xunzi's critique of Mencius is based on a misunderstanding because Mencius only made a metaphysical claim on human nature—that is, on man's inherent potential or capability to *become* good. On human perfectibility, Xunzi agrees completely with Mencius, but they disagree on how to *attain* human perfectibility. Trusting man's inherent moral capacity, Mencius proposed a so-called developmental model of self-cultivation. Xunzi, holding a different (empirical) view of human nature, supported a reformation model of self-cultivation—that is, the spontaneous human nature (*xing*) that is prone to be evil can be rectified by means of man's various artificial efforts, such as education, ritual junctions, and punishment. In contrast to *xing,* Xunzi called such self-transforming human artifice *wei*.

A Political Theory of Rituals

Xunzi's political theory entails his realistic view of human nature and logically extends from his idea of *wei*. According to Xunzi:

> Humans are born with feelings of envy and hatred. Indulging in these feelings causes violence and crime to develop and loyalty and trustworthiness to perish . . . Indulging in these desires causes dissolute and wanton behavior to result and ritual and moral principles, precepts of good forms, and the natural order of reason to perish. This being the case, when each person follows his inborn nature and indulges in his natural inclinations, aggressiveness and greed are certain to develop. This is accomplished by violation of social class distinctions and throws the natural order into anarchy, resulting in a cruel tyranny. Thus, it is necessary that man's nature undergo the transforming influence of a teacher and the model and that he be guided by ritual and moral principles.

Central to Xunzi's argument is that social disorder results from man's indulgence in his natural desires, which outruns naturally available resources and can only be cured by the fundamental transformation of the self by means of the social and political institutions of *li*. What is important is that unlike Confucius, who thinks returning to ritual propriety (*fu-li*) is possible by overcoming the natural desires (*ke-ji*), Xunzi argues that rituals (*li*) indeed nourish, rather than constrain, man's desires so that they can be properly satisfied without disrupting social harmony. Put differently, rituals are the social mechanism through which self-interest can be rechanneled and further merged into the common good. And such Confucian-utilitarianism is possible because through rituals, not only is social class equitably differentiated but each class is given its proper place in a hierarchically ordered society.

Xunzi is often mistaken as the first Legalist because of his occasional use of the term *fa* ("forms" or "models"), but for him the *fa* refers to the proven system of the Confucian rituals, which he believes was invented by the ancient sage-kings. Thus, despite apparent similarity between Xunzi and Thomas Hobbes in terms of their depictions of the presocial state, Xunzi's *fa* is a far cry from the Hobbesian social contract. After all, the *fa* is something to be embodied as the habits of the heart, not something

to be voluntarily consented to. Unlike Confucius and Mencius, however, Xunzi thinks punishment of the wicked is indispensable to the moral-political reformation of the self and therefore should be an integral part of his system of rituals (*fa*).

By redefining sagehood (*sheng;* a fundamental moral quality for both Confucius and Mencius) in terms of a purposeful action of establishing human institutions (*zou wei*), Xunzi ultimately shifted the traditional Confucian institutional focus from the family to the state. Certainly, both Confucius and Mencius advocated the rule by virtuous ruler (*de-zhi*), but they never doubted that the core domain where the lifelong process of moral self-transformation begins must be the family. They even defined (if not always) the political in terms of the familial, regarding filial piety as the quintessential moral quality of the ancient sage-kings (most famously, Shun). What is unique about Xunzi is that although he sees the state as a family-state and the king as a father, he never singles out filiality as a defining moral-political characteristic of the sage-king, as a quality that the contemporary political ruler must actively seek to possess. For Xunzi, a political ruler is (and ought to be) a teacher-ruler, and ultimately it is the state that is to transform human beings, thus bringing about social order. After all, Xunzi's advocacy of rule by virtue is tantamount to the rule by the rituals (*li-zhi*) administered by the ruler.

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See also Chinese Legalism; Neo-Confucianism

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Consent

Consent (of the governed) is a political theory whereby the legitimacy of a state and its ability to exercise its powers are said to be derived from the permission of its citizens. This entry examines the development of the theory of consent, beginning with its Greco-Roman origins, then discussing medieval interpretations of consent, and concluding with an examination of consent in modern political theory.

Greek and Roman Origins of the Theory of Consent

The philosophical origins of this theory may be found in the works of Plato (c. 428–c. 348 BCE) and his pupil Aristotle (c. 384–322 BCE) who, while discussing the modes of classification of constitutions, observed that some states are governed

through the consent of the people. These comments, while philosophical in nature, reflected the political circumstances familiar to the authors. Ancient Greece consisted of a loose confederation of city-states, each with their own laws and political organization. Some of these cities, such as Athens (of which both Plato and Aristotle were citizens), were democracies based on the consent of the majority of voting-eligible (male) citizens, while others like Sparta were ruled by a despot whose authority derived from physical might rather than democratic consent.

Plato and Aristotle's observations about consent were also interpreted by the Greek historian Polybius (c. 200–118 BCE) who, in *The Histories/ The Rise of the Roman Empire,* classified constitutions along similar lines but also linked the concept of consent to be governed to the notion of good governance and the intelligence of the ruler. It has been observed that Polybius' account of consent as the basis of state legitimacy differs from that of Plato and Aristotle in that he drew his information from local examples of Hellenistic democracy, whereby formal popular sovereignty resided with a ruler but executive power resided with magistrates. Greek philosophy thus laid the foundations for this political theory and would in time prove to be very influential in its historical development.

Roman civilization also made a significant contribution to the historical development of the theory of consent. Unlike ancient Greece, the Roman Empire was a unitary state that underwent three significant constitutional changes during the course of its history.

The earliest phase, the monarchy (c. 753–510 BCE), consisted of a king and council of elders who governed the fledgling city-state of Rome. The extent to which the king's rule was based on the consent of the people is unclear, owing to the paucity of sources, but the creation myth of Rome suggests that the earliest Roman kings derived their initial authority not from the consent of the people but from their divine connections to Jupiter and the Trojan civilization, even though kingship seems to have been, to some extent, elective.

With the advent of the republic (509–27 BCE), the authority of the Roman king was divided between two annually elected consuls, both of whom were given the right to veto the decisions of the other. Although the elective nature of the consulship was an important constitutional shift in favor of the people, it remains unclear to what extent the governance of the republic may be said to have been based on the consent of the people. The early years of the republic, if Livy's account is taken as being at least in part historically accurate, was dominated by civil strife between the social orders. Even after the threatened secessions of the plebeians brought about important constitutional changes, the election of all major public offices in the republic remained weighted in favor of the aristocracy. Be that as it may, the Roman Republic produced two influential thinkers who verbalized their ideas about the notion of consent to be governed. The first, the poet Lucretius (c. 97–c. 53 BCE), influenced by the writings of Plato, proposed in his didactic poem *De Rerum Natura* that civil government comes into existence when people, wary of being in constant warfare, submit to be ruled. Lucretius's view was admired by Cicero (106–43 BCE) and seemingly formed the basis of his discussion in *De Re Publica* (written c. 54–51 BCE) in which he argued that the state was similar to a partnership in Roman private law and that the consent of the partners was required for government. It should of course be stressed that Lucretius's and Cicero's views on the consent of the governed were merely political views, and the reality, especially in relation to the collapse of the republic, was quite different.

The effect of the third major constitutional change in Roman history, the advent of the principate under Octavian, on the notion of consent to be governed is unclear. It is well known that Octavian (later Augustus) took great care to preserve the semblance of a republic, for example, by calling himself *primus inter pares* and preserving many of the republican constitutional conventions, but the successors of Augustus were not as circumspect about the foundations of their authority. With the advent of the dominate, the notion of consent to be governed must have been downplayed in favor of the will of the emperor. Although some statements may be found in Roman law (especially in the sixth-century compilation ordered by Justinian) about the constitutional basis of the emperor's power, no philosophical discussions similar to those of Cicero seem to have been produced during this period. These legal texts about the emperor's power were to prove influential in the medieval development of this political theory.

Medieval Interpretations

Medieval interpretations of classical ideas about the consent to government provided the next significant step in history of this theory. In the early medieval period (c. 300–750 CE), the constitutional role of the Roman Emperor was gradually replaced by that of the medieval king in the West. Medieval kingship was founded on the Roman concept but gradually drew its authority directly from God. This left little room for consent by the people or the Roman concept of citizenship. Sources the period generally describe the inhabitants of medieval kingdoms in a passive sense as being the subjects of a king's rule. A shift in emphasis is visible in Europe in the period circa 750–1050 CE when Carolingian notions of kingship introduced the sworn oath (based to some extent on the reciprocal, contractual nature of the feudal bond between lord and vassal), which underpinned the relationship between ruler and subjects. The concept of the divine right of kings is commonly said to have originated in this period under Pippin of Heristal. From circa 1050 CE until the end of the medieval period (c. 1450 CE) a number of important changes, which had a significant impact on the theory of consent to be governed, occurred in Western Europe. First, a renewed interest in the works of Cicero and Aristotle gave prominence to the theory of consent to be governed. In particular, Cicero's treatise on the state provided a renewed interest in this theory as it introduced the vocabulary of partnership into discussions of the state and the consent of the governed. Second, the church became an important and powerful organization in Western Europe. The growth of the church led to the creation of its own legal rules, known as canon law, and also gave rise to conflict with the secular rulers of Western Europe about the authority over bishops. The investiture contest is said to have been one of the driving forces behind the rediscovery of Justinianic Roman law in the libraries of northern Italy.

The late medieval concept of consent to be governed was founded primarily on legal theory rather than on Greek philosophy. Three strands of medieval legal doctrine influenced the formation of the medieval concept of consent. First, the notion of corporation theory (*universitas*) derived from Roman law was explored and developed further by medieval civilians and canonists in relation to the state. More specifically, the exploration of the rights and duties of the head of the corporation and his responsibilities to the members gave rise to a notion of control over the ruler of a state. Juristic discussions about consent also played an important role in justifying the legal self-sufficiency of Italian cities during the thirteenth century by using the argument of tacit consent granted by the ruler. In second place, the rule *quod omnes tangit,* which originally applied to a case involving the joint property rights of several guardians, was extended by medieval jurists to form a general principle which in turn provided the foundation for the view that the head of a corporate body (such as the state) had to obtain the consent of its members in all matters which affected them. This justification seems to have been used by Bernard of Pavia as early as the thirteenth century. It was later incorporated into the *Liber Sextus* and was regularly used as justification for consulting the laity about proposed canonic legislation throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Finally, a statement in Gratian's *Decretum* (4.3) that laws are only confirmed when they are approved by the custom of those using them further reinforced the notion of consent. It is of course important to remember that these academic discussions would have been at the fringes of the dominant medieval theory of the divine right of kings whereby God awarded power to a secular ruler. With that said, though, elements of the Carolingian notions of an oath between ruler and subjects as well as the reciprocal rights and duties inherent in the feudal relationship were also incorporated into discussions about the divine right of kings and provided important limitations for the exercise of the ruler's (arbitrary) will. Thus, for example, the civilian Guido de Suzaria described due process of law as a natural right, a statement repeated by Baldus de Ubaldis toward the end of the fourteenth century.

The Fifteenth Century: Nicolaus of Cusa

The fifteenth-century canonist Nicolaus of Cusa, who in 1433 wrote an influential treatise on the "body" of the church, made an important contribution to the history of this concept. It is conventionally agreed that he was the first scholar (apart from references in passing by Duns Scotus) to give

prominence to the notion of consent to be governed. In formulating his views, Nicolaus of Cusa drew upon canonic doctrine (especially Gratian's *Decretum*) as well as on the observations of Plato, but his theory about consent to be governed surpassed both these formative influences to the extent that it was based on an early form of natural law (possibly derived from his reading of Stoic philosophy) in terms of which all men are free and rulers have to obtain the consent of their subjects.

Political Theory in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a politically turbulent time in Europe, saw great development in the theory of consent to be governed. While the divine right of kings reached its pinnacle during these two centuries in the form of absolutism, legal-philosophical treatises contributed to the development of this political theory. The first legal scholars to make a contribution were the Spanish scholastics who, during the course of the sixteenth century, produced a number of treatises in which Roman law combined with Aristotelian ideas as interpreted by Thomas Aquinas are expounded. Both Luis de Molina (1535–1600) and Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1483/93–1546), well-known representatives of this group, discuss the issue whether a king rules by his own will or on the basis of a transfer of political power to him by the people. (A similar theme may be found in the works of the famous sixteenth-century French jurist, Charles Dumoulin [1500–1566].) Francisco de Suárez (1548–1617), another influential member of this group, was one of the first jurists to reinforce the notion of the citizen body as a *universitas,* which transferred its power to the ruler. The works of the Spanish scholastics, popular with jurists supporting the secularized natural law doctrine emerging during the course of the seventeenth century on account of the authority of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), were to have a great impact on the development of this political theory.

The Evolution of Modern Political Theory

Modern political theory on the consent to be governed was largely shaped by two English jurists, both supporters of the secularized natural law doctrine, who flourished during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The first, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in a work written in 1651 titled *Leviathan,* argued that although the natural state of man is free, this state brought about constant strife. In an attempt to curb this conflict, man agreed to form a commonwealth, thereby surrendering individual freedom to the authority of the sovereign. In Hobbes's view, such an arrangement was essentially founded on an irrevocable social contract between a ruler and his people. The consequence of this irrevocable contract was that the citizens had to endure the possibility of the arbitrary exercise of power by the sovereign as it prevented society from reverting to its original strife-torn state (a view supported by the German jurist Samuel von Pufendorf [1632–1694]). In contrast to Hobbes's view, John Locke (1632–1704) in the second of his two treatises on civil government (1690), although supporting the notion of a social contract between ruler and his people, argued that social order in a state depended on the formation and the maintaining of the express consent of the governed. The logical consequence of this is that a government can only exist through the will of the majority. Locke regarded the social contract between ruler and people as a revocable contract which could be canceled through revolution.

Locke's exposition of the theory of consent to be governed proved very influential in modern political thought. It is known to have inspired both Voltaire and Rousseau and seems to have had a profound impact upon those calling for an end to British rule in North America. In fact, Locke's legacy remains a frequently debated topic in modern American constitutional thought.

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See also Corporation Theory; Democracy; Reason of State; Roman Law; Sovereignty

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Conservatism

Few political concepts cause more confusion than conservatism. Whereas most academic commentators agree that it is an ideology, many self-styled "conservatives" hotly deny this. Even among academic commentators, conservatism tends to be treated differently from other ideologies, and most of the varying accounts are open to contestation. This entry first reviews the ways in which conservatism has been defined by Edmund Burke and by later thinkers. It then considers the influence of the conservative perspective on political life in Britain, the United States, and in Western political thought more generally.

The first of many hurdles encountered by writers on conservatism is the claim that it is not an ideology like liberalism or socialism; instead, conservatives are said to be *pragmatic,* making political decisions on the basis of their knowledge of specific circumstances, rather than trying to implement policies on the basis of abstract theorizing. An empirical approach to politics is indeed an essential ingredient of conservatism. But this is not to say that all pragmatists are conservative. Even Vladimir Lenin was capable of being pragmatic in certain circumstances, but obviously he was not a conservative. For students of ideology, the important point is to analyze the arguments of those who attach a high priority to pragmatism *regardless of circumstances.* Equally, in familiar usage "conservatism" is taken to denote an opposition to change. But opponents of change can be found within all political systems, whatever their nature, and it would be odd to use the same word in relation to people who have nothing in common beyond their support for existing governments. Again, the key point here is to study the *reasons* why certain people oppose political change.

One way to overcome the problem of definition is to identify conservatism with the view that political decisions should *always* be taken on the basis of existing facts and that change is *always* regrettable. But even that would be insufficient to disclose the nature of conservatism as a distinctive ideology. To make progress in this task we need to examine the writings of individuals who have provided a rationale for these distinctive approaches to politics.

Burkean Conservatism

The case for pragmatism as a habitual approach, rather than an occasional enforced practice, found its classic exposition in the writings of the Irish-born author and politician Edmund Burke (1729–1797). In his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790) and in other works, Burke had tried to explain why *radical* change based on abstract reasoning is always dangerous. In so doing, he furnished opponents of the French Revolution with an ideology.

The key conservative idea is that human beings are imperfectible. This viewpoint has a long ancestry; the French essayist Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) expresses it as well as anyone, though ideological genealogists could carry their search back to Plato and beyond. However, Burke, can be seen as the first modern thinker to embed the idea within a framework that is self-consciously ideological, in the sense that his writings provide an explanation of contemporary circumstances and a basis for political action. The following propositions, all affirmed in Burke's *Reflections,* provide a good picture of the core values of conservatism:

> Individual human beings are creatures of passion and prejudice as well as reason.
>
> Despite unavoidable inequalities of wealth and status, they are interdependent.

Society is thus an "organic" reality, not an abstraction.

The state is the repository of human wisdom, accumulated over many generations, and as such it is worthy of considerable respect.

Change is at best a regrettable necessity, but at times it is clearly unavoidable if greater evils are to be avoided.

Proposals for change should be based on a careful examination of existing circumstances.

If change is deemed to be necessary, it should be based on previous practice rather than an abstract plan because, although individual reason is weak, the collective wisdom of many generations is likely to be a reliable guide.

Radical change is always dangerous, but when it is carried through in accordance with an abstract plan it is sure to precipitate unforeseen difficulties, leading to the destabilization of the most orderly societies.

This prospectus explains why some conservatives have denied that they are ideological. In their eyes, ideology is synonymous with rigid ideas about human nature, which commonly inspire visions of ideal societies. Conservatives, by contrast, eschew utopia and thinks that human beings will always vary widely in their personal attributes. But they do so for reasons that are themselves ideological. Although conservatives deny that individual people can be forced into the same mold, their pessimistic assessment of human behavior in a collective sense (i.e., that they are not to be trusted) provides a guide to political action, even if its practical implications are usually negative.

In opposing the ideas of the leading French revolutionaries, Burke was addressing himself to ideas that can be characterized as distinctively liberal. Burkean conservatives reject liberalism on two levels—the micro and the macro. On the first level, liberals are much too optimistic about the human capacity for rational thought and conduct. On the second level, liberals provide a false understanding of society, seeing it as a fragmented forum for competition between rational individuals instead of an organic whole in which every person plays a valued part.

Conservatism Since Burke

Burke was a whig rather than a supporter of the British Tory Party, which adopted the Conservative label in the 1830s to denote its opposition to the liberal case for radical reform. (The word *conservative* was first used in an ideological sense after Burke's death by the French writer and politician, the Vicomte de Chateaubriand [1768–1848].) In itself, Burke's partisan allegiance should be enough to undermine any attempt to equate "conservatism" with the beliefs of the British Conservative Party at any given time.

Another French writer associated with the conservative tradition is Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821). However, de Maistre's thought was heavily influenced by religious considerations, and he was strongly attached to monarchical rule. By contrast, although Burke was a devout Christian his writings can be equally persuasive to people of a secular outlook, and although he was an eloquent supporter of monarchy, his fundamental arguments are equally applicable to republican regimes.

There are, then, good reasons for tracing the origins of conservatism to Burke and Britain rather than to de Maistre and postrevolutionary France (or, as we shall see, to America). However, although Britain did not undergo a political revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, its society was being transformed in a way that Burke could not have foreseen. Burke held liberal views on economics and admired the works of Adam Smith. But the most potent enemy of Burkean conservatism was the operation of the free market during the Industrial Revolution, which dissolved social ties and made radical innovation a regular occurrence. In turn, this led to major political change and challenged the aristocratic dominance, which had formed a central assumption of Burke's writings.

The Burkean view of society and politics was expounded to defend a largely rural society, where the hereditary aristocracy provided a pool of talent from which political leaders should be recruited. Whereas Burke could not have foreseen the way in which free-market economics would transform British society in unwelcome ways, the next generation of British conservative writers, like Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834), devoted much of their energy to attacks on the social impact of the

Industrial Revolution. This was an early indication that modernity would prove deeply uncongenial to those who were chiefly concerned with limiting the social impact of change.

Despite the urgings of Coleridge and other conservatives, nineteenth-century Britain proved to be deeply uncongenial to Burkean supporters of aristocratic government and social stability. By 1918, if not before, Burkean conservatism was no longer able to inform a political platform with a realistic chance of winning power in Britain. Essentially, the creed was antipathetic toward democracy, denying that every male (let alone female) inhabitant over the age of 21 was entitled to an equal say in the political process.

The British Conservative Party After Conservatism

The continued success of the British Conservative Party has lured many observers into the assumption that "conservatism" is a flexible creed. The real implication is that members of the British Conservative Party were flexible, proving themselves capable of changing their presuppositions as the price of continued political relevance. Liberal ideas of various kinds filled the ideological vacuum left within the Conservative Party after the Burkean approach had become obsolete.

However, further impetus was provided by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. In opposing Bolshevism, members of the Conservative Party could persuade themselves that they were resuming the battle that Burke had fought against the French revolutionaries. After all, like the ideologues of the French Revolution, the Bolsheviks espoused a view of human nature that could be attacked by conservatives for its utopian character. But the ideas in question were very different. The French revolutionaries had prioritized human rights over economic equality. The need to oppose the Bolsheviks entailed a shift in ideological targeting, which the transformed Conservative Party could easily accommodate. The most effective attacks on Bolshevism were derived from laissez-faire liberalism, which asserted that state intervention of any kind could be characterized as the first step on "the road to serfdom." As we have seen, Burke believed that the state should be an object of respect, even "veneration." Such views had no place within the anti-totalitarian narrative that now gave the Conservative Party its chief raison d'être. The only surprise, in retrospect, is that the party leadership remained in the hands of moderate liberals (the so-called One Nation faction, who idolized the enigmatic Benjamin Disraeli [1804–1881] rather than Burke) for so long.

When the economic liberal Margaret Thatcher became leader of the Conservative Party in 1975, she was merely bringing to a logical end a process that had begun with the Industrial Revolution. In some respects, Thatcher can be seen as the rationalist liberal of Burkean nightmares, with limited respect for established institutions or for history, an emphasis on the individual rather than the collective, and a feeling that most aristocrats were as undeserving as the "idle poor."

The American Perspective

If this analysis is accepted, the final eclipse of Burkean conservatism as a political project in Britain coincides almost exactly with the emergence of the United States as the world's most potent power. Burke had spoken out in favor of the American cause during the War of Independence. But in doing so, he had taken a pragmatic line, deploring the likely results of the British policy of imposing taxes on the Americans without explicit consent. Burke understood that the drive for American independence arose from a liberal individualism that was already enmeshed within the customary practices of that fledgling nation, whereas French political culture had been forged in an era of absolute monarchy. Thus, he had felt that independence for America would involve limited social change, whereas if France abolished the monarchical system, its existing social order would collapse. These views were confirmed by subsequent events—the U.S. Constitution embodied but also restrained preexisting American liberalism, whereas the French revolutionaries combined utopian thinking with mass murder.

From this perspective, it seems odd that millions of Americans should continue to regard themselves as "conservative," more than two centuries after their *liberal* revolution. Some American academics (notably Russell Kirk [1918–1994]) have been unflinching admirers of Burke. They are, however, often described as "paleo-conservatives," in

recognition of their attachment to political ideas that belong to the predemocratic era. Most other notable political figures who have identified themselves with "conservative" ideology are best understood as liberals who are reluctant to accept the logical consequences of their creed. In contemporary America (as in Britain) there are many people who extol the virtues of the free market while deploring the decline of traditional moral standards. This position is vulnerable to the objection that the free market has been the principal agent of moral change in America and other capitalist states. Modern conservatives have thus been forced to choose between economic liberalism and support for traditional morality, often favoring the former over the latter.

One thinker who has enjoyed recognition on both sides of the Atlantic and who is often seen as an exponent of a conservative approach is the British philosopher Michael Oakeshott (1901–1990). However, Oakeshott's most celebrated essay relating to this subject, "On Being Conservative" (1956), eschews policy prescriptions and instead portrays conservatism as a "disposition," which, while agreeable, has no necessary connection with any of the established ideological traditions.

Why do some individualists in both Britain and America continue to see themselves as "conservatives," when the adoption of this ideological label makes so little sense in the contemporary context? The answer, at least in part, reflects a mistaken equation: Burke = conservatism = opposition to revolution = opposition to Soviet communism = antagonism toward the state. In political parlance words are often used in a loose fashion. It is the task of academics, however, to clear a path through the resulting confusion. In reality, too often academics have accepted the self-ascription of political actors at face value, and have drawn the conclusion that "conservatism" must be a diverse ideology, which embraces economic liberals as well as people who strongly dislike the radical social impact of economic liberalism. This trend has been sustained through the coinage of question-begging neologisms such as "liberal-conservative," "conservative-liberal," or "neo-conservative." The latter of these labels is associated with individuals who believe that Western values can be exported around the globe without regard to local context—the antithesis of Burkean ideas. It is even stated with confidence that the Australian Liberal Party is "conservative," although in this case political labels are misleading and the ideas of the Australian Liberal Party can only be understood within the liberal tradition.

Conservatism in the Twenty-First Century

It has been argued here that Burkean conservatism is a distinctive ideology, which, in spite of the accidental survival of parties which call themselves "Conservative," has borne marginal relevance to partisan disputes within mature liberal democracies in the past 100 years. Superficially, though, in many countries twentieth-century politics was heavily influenced by parties that either described themselves as Conservatives (as in the United Kingdom) or were associated with "conservatism." For example, the highly successful Christian Democratic parties in post-war West Germany and Italy were supposed to be conservative, and in France, Gaullism is often seen as a conservative movement. To varying extents, such organizations tried to cushion the social impact of free-market policies, in contrast to the British Conservative Party, which, under Margaret Thatcher (leader, 1975–1990, prime minister, 1979–1990), sought to promote a program of radical ideological reform when "pragmatic" considerations would have dictated a far more cautious approach.

But in the face of globalization European parties that saw themselves as "conservative" presided over societies in which change was a constant companion, rather than an occasional and unwanted intruder. In the United States, "conservatism" was purportedly represented by politicians like Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) and Newt Gingrich (b. 1943), who were able to assemble election-winning coalitions without reflecting on any tension between rhetorical support for "traditional" moral values and practical assistance to the free-market forces that undermined key social institutions like the family.

The Burkean approach to political questions was still common among the voters of liberal democracies at the dawn of the twenty-first century; there is, after all, little cause for confidence in the human capacity for reason, and the experience of the past 100 years may be seen as illustrating the dangers of radical political change based on

abstract blueprints. But few major Western political parties accommodate conservative views. Even growing concern about the environmental effects of industrialization, which might have sparked renewed interest in conservatism as a political project, tends to be addressed within an ideological framework that remains distinctively liberal—seeking for ways in which liberal society can be sustained, rather than examining different views of the world. In the absence of a realistic alternative, in some countries those ideological conservatives who retain an interest in partisan politics feel increasingly attracted by organizations of the populist, reactionary right, which Edmund Burke would have abhorred.

Mark Garnett

See also American Founding; Ancien Régime; Burke, Edmund; Liberalism

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Constant, Benjamin (1767–1830)

Benjamin Constant was a Swiss-born French political theorist, novelist, intellectual, and politician from the later stages of the French Revolution through the Napoleonic era and the Restoration. He made major contributions to the coalescence of liberal theory and indeed is sometimes thought of as the first liberal theorist; after Alexis de Tocqueville he is the probably the most important French liberal thinker. Best known in political theory today for his contrast between the liberty of the ancients (the right to participate in public life) and that of the moderns (individual freedom in the private sphere), he was a longtime defender of freedom of speech, critic of slavery, and supporter of responsible parliamentary-ministerial government.

Constant entered French political life in the mid-1790s, after university educations in Germany and Scotland and service in minor diplomatic posts. He joined a circle of moderate republicans centered around Germaine de Staël, a fellow Protestant from Switzerland and the daughter of the former French finance minister Jacques Necker; Constant and de Staël had a long and stormy romantic relationship for more than a decade. He wrote some minor political pamphlets and rose to office; he and de Staël provided support to Napoleon Bonaparte as a moderate force but broke with him as he revealed his absolutist plans. They went into exile, sometimes traveling through Europe and sometimes living at her estate in Switzerland.

During those years of exile, both before and after he broke with de Staël in 1808, Constant began serious intellectual writing on politics and religion. Many of his later published writings derive from two large texts written circa 1806–1810, one on "the possibility of a republican government in a large country," which is about political institution and procedures, and one on "principles of politics," which lays out substantive arguments for individual liberty. In 1814–1815 he published the first important adaptation of these works, the anti-Napoleonic "On the Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation." After Napoleon's fall he returned to France and French politics. During Napoleon's return during the Hundred Days, Constant collaborated with him on the drafting of a constitutional-monarchical constitution, at a serious cost to his reputation.

Constant's political career resumed in 1819; he spent the rest of his life as a member of the Chamber of Deputies, as a member of the liberal independent opposition.

His most famous contribution to political theory was a lecture titled "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared With That of the Moderns" (1819). Constant maintained that in the ancient world, freedom meant the freedom to take part in civic life, whereas the material, intellectual, and moral conditions of modernity demanded an individual liberty of private life and private pursuits. As a result, the republican liberty of collective civic life associated with the Jacobin stages of the French Revolution and with Rousseau's *Social Contract* was anachronistic.

The crucial changes between the ancient and modern world included the growth in state size that diminished the effectiveness of any individual's vote or political participation; the abolition of slavery, which had previously allowed free citizens to devote their time to public business; economic growth, which had resulted in a greater worth of private life and a greater opportunity cost to the devotion to public affairs; and profound religious transformations. To the ancients, worship *was* civic, as the gods were gods of the city. Christianity introduced a noncivic emphasis on individual salvation, an emphasis that Protestantism increased; the moderns could not trust their salvation to the happenstances of politics.

Constant worried that these trends could leave public life so unattractive, and private life so attractive, as to discourage necessary democratic participation and pave the way for public despotism. He thought that the French middle classes had accepted or even welcomed Napoleon's rule, so as to spare themselves the disruptions of revolutionary politics. Notwithstanding these worries, the lecture as a whole is a strong defense of the moral worth of individual liberty and an argument that participation in democratic politics cannot be central to modern life.

Constant's education and travel had exposed him to both the social theory of the Scottish Enlightenment and the early development of romanticism in Germany, both of which he brought into French intellectual life. Both influenced him: He was a supporter of laissez-faire in economics but devoted more intellectual energy to questions of freedom of religion and speech, which he took to be tied to individual personality and personhood.

Constant is sometimes thought of as the first liberal political theorist. This has two, partly independent meanings. One is terminological: Constant's intellectual and political career spanned the years in which "liberal" became the label of a tendency in political thought or a party in political action, and he was associated with the movements in Spain and France that went by those names.

The second is substantive; there is a good case to be made that Constant was the first major political thinker to combine commitments to constitutional government (whether monarchical or democratic), the rule of law, civil liberty, religious freedom, electoral representation, the free market, the abolition of slavery, and antimilitaristic promotion of peace. His political thought is decisively post–civic republican and friendly to commerce and trade, in a way that is not so clearly true for, for example, the American founders. At the very least, Constant was the first major thinker to draw fully on the economic and social theories of Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment, the constitutionalism of Montesquieu and the English tradition, the democratic ideas of the American and French revolutions, and the romantic idea of the authentic individual self.

Jacob T. Levy

See also Liberalism; Montesquieu, Baron de; Romanticism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Scottish Enlightenment; Smith, Adam; Tocqueville, Alexis de

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CONSTITUTIONALISM

Constitutionalism is both a philosophical and legal concept as well as a practical manifestation in different political contexts. In both respects it represents one of the main features in the development of the modern state. Constitutionalism presupposes the existence of a constitution, which is typically, but not necessarily, contained in a constitutional document. The essence of constitutionalism contains three structural and substantive limitations on legislative and executive power. First, constitutions not only constitute but also limit government power, for instance, by separating the organs of state. Second, constitutions expressly protect individual rights against the state. Third, constitutions claim to be higher-order law in the sense that the constitutional norms enshrined in the written document take precedence over ordinary laws in the case of conflict.

Alternative contemporary theories (political, republican, social-democratic constitutionalism) exist. In essence, they do not provide for the entrenchment of rights in the constitution due to a lack of consensus of what a Bill of Rights should contain; they regard the process of judicial review as democratically unsatisfactory, and they reject the passing of responsibility for problem solving from the legislature (accountable) to the judiciary (unaccountable).

However, most scholars understand constitutionalism as a subset of classic and modern liberalism that focuses on institutional design and fundamental rights—this is as true for the concepts of *Konstitutionalismus* (which is specific to nineteenth-century German history) and *Rechtsstaatprinzip* (which is closer to liberal constitutionalism). This meaning of constitutionalism and the content of individual rights have evolved, from stressing "natural rights" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to emphasizing "human rights" in the twentieth century. Constitutionalism is so adaptable that its meaning threatens to become indistinct as it is extended to new fields such as public international law, global constitutionalism, European constitutionalism, postnational constitutionalism, and transnational constitutionalism. But even when constitutionalism is applied to new areas, the post-Hobbesian model of the constitutional state (*Rechtsstaat*) often remains the conceptual blueprint and the normative yardstick for all comparisons.

Origins

Early forms of constitutionalism can be identified in Greek and Roman political philosophy. Plato's central concern in *The Republic* is the proper relationship between the *polis* (the city-state) and *nomos* (customs, conventions, and beliefs, which include law). *Nomos* comes in various guises as social convention and public enactment (even as divine law) and gives force to certain fundamental norms, like *aidôs* (conscience) and *dikê* (a sense of justice), which are innate to human beings and vital to society. The ideal form of political relations is a government of philosopher rulers who are not formally bound by prescribed rules; Plato suggests, however, that this type is only an ideal and that actual states can only approximate the ideal. In Plato's last work, *The Laws,* he reasserts that good political orders (*politeiai*) are always orders according to *nomos* (as opposed to the arbitrary command of a tyrant).

Like Plato, Aristotle rejects the choice between the (unattainable) ideal and the (imperfect) actual relationship. In *The Politics* he distinguishes *politeia* from *nomoi* (the latter are informed by the former, not vice versa). The translation of *politeia* as "constitution"—customary only since the eighteenth century—is problematic, as *politeia* is a broad concept relating to the nature, the composition, and the life of the *polis*. In *The Nichomachean Ethics* Artistotle develops the first clear expression of the principle of the rule of law (as opposed to government by personal rule)—a notion captured by John Adams in the eighteenth century as a government of laws and not of men.

The Roman jurists made a basic distinction between public law (*jus publicum*) and private law (*jus privatum*). Cicero in *De Re Publica* recognized that all legitimate public power in a state stems from the people (*rem publicam constituere*), not the ruler. Whereas *constituere* refers to the making of laws, Cicero understood *constitutio* as a body of

customary rules and traditions of the political order in Rome that was of higher authority than ordinary laws. Although the Roman state did not have a written constitution, it was bound by antecedent law, that is, a canon of rules formed and recognized by tradition. Crucially, Cicero adds that no state can ever pass binding law in derogation of this law of nature.

Common Law Reception

The term *constitutionalism* was of no consequence in the political thought of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Medieval scholars like Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Theologica*) and John of Salisbury (*Policratius*) regarded the origin of natural law as divine and the power of the king as limited by natural law and the church. But they did not provide a way to respond to violations of the law except through the threat or execution of revolutionary violence. Although the study of the classic texts influenced constitutional culture in England, the distinctions between *politeia* and *nomos,* state and society, and law and policy were not appreciated by those who viewed the business of governing as a form of practical knowledge. In the political discourses of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, usage of the term *constitution* was still rare. In *Republica Anglorum* (1584) Sir Thomas Smith understood Aristotle's *politeia* as "policy" or "government" rather than "constitution." In 1602 William Fulbecke granted the state (the "body politic") a constitution by analogy with the human body, and in 1606 Edward Forset systematically analyzed the relationship between nature and state, medicine and politics, and doctor and statesman.

The use of the term *constitution* increased during the course of the seventeenth century, meaning both "form of government" and "fundamental law." Most commonly constitution was understood in a descriptive sense. In 1642, the publication of *His Majesties Answer to the XIX Propositions of . . . Parliament* understood the term *constitution* as a form of government and addressed the description of state power (monarchic, aristocratic, democratic). The descriptive constitution was not particular to the United Kingdom, but reflected the contemporary understanding of constitution in Europe. In his 1758 treatise *The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law,* Emmerich de Vattel tried to capture the *Constitution de l'État,* namely, the organization and the exercise of state power, which was understood as "government" in the English context. Government was a broader term than the concept of the executive, to which it was reduced once the powers of the state were separated. This is evidenced by Cromwell's *Instrument of Government* of December 16, 1653, which was a constitutional document—rather than a constitution—that settled the supreme authority of the Commonwealth. It ended in 1660 with the restoration of the monarchy. In contrast to later developments on the European continent and the United States, *constitution* thus remained a purely descriptive term in England.

That said, seventeenth-century England was also the heyday of fundamental law, when political theory consciously and deliberately became infused with practical politics. The first reference to the term *constitution* in the political context was in 1610 when Sir James Whitelocke argued in Parliament that taxation without parliamentary sanction subverted the fundamental law of the realm and the constitution of the kingdom. Here the constitution is regarded as consisting of, and being formed by, a body of fundamental law.

Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634) made the most significant and most lasting contribution to the modernization of the ancient form of constitutionalism. He sought inspiration from Bracton, whose work *On the Laws and Customs of England* was first printed in 1569 and again in 1640, and accentuated the supremacy and authority of law. Coke regarded the common law as immemorial custom and as the absolute perfection of reason, which was not without practical consequences. Speaking as a justice of the Court of Common Pleas, Coke in Dr. Bonham's case (1610) appeared to assert the primacy of the common law when he declared that under certain circumstances the judges could refuse to enforce even an Act of Parliament. Also, the significance of the constitution gained ground in the conflict between Parliament and the Crown. When Charles I was tried for high treason in 1649 he was accused of having violated the "fundamental constitutions" of the kingdom.

Coke's early statement on what is today known as "judicial review," namely, that judges have a

power of refusal over statutes that are deemed to be contrary to the supreme common law, did not prevail in subsequent English practice. On the other hand, his view that the Magna Carta was a binding compact between governors and governed became part of legal legend. Coke, who wrote in English (at a time when French or Latin would have been the norm), gave people a historical myth of the English constitution. It is through Coke's interpretation that the Magna Carta became part of the national consciousness.

Contrary to a common misreading of J. G. A. Pocock's discussion of the common law as the *ancient constitution,* the common law was not seen as fundamental law in the modern sense of being capable of overriding Acts of Parliament. Fundamental, superior, law status was always denied to the common law precisely because of the principle of sovereignty, which does not allow a body of superior norms to impose constraints upon the legislative authority of Parliament. Common lawyers did not question the ultimate authority of Parliament to override the common law; they merely questioned the wisdom of exercising that power. They expected Parliament to respect principles and powers (of review) developed by the common law as a matter of comity and convenience. Underlying the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was a principled structure that made the same distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law that was reflected in the ancient dualism of Aristotle and Cicero and in the normative (post-1789) concept of the constitution.

Revolutionary Traditions

According to Jean Bodin and later Thomas Hobbes, the sovereign prince is (nominally) limited by the laws of God and nature and bound by his own contracts and civil covenants. However, due to the absolute power of the sovereign, the limits are not policed. Nor do these limits provide for effective enforcement mechanisms or for civil disobedience. The Bodin-Hobbes understanding of sovereignty thus invokes the specter of the authoritarian and absolutist *Machtstaat,* which uses law in the interest of power and is often viewed as conflicting with the *Rechtsstaat* principle and constitutionalism.

The great natural law philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth century (Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, Hobbes, Algernon Sydney) revolutionized natural law by making it the basis of the modern secular state, by taking God out of the equation, and by shifting it onto the foundation of subjective natural right. Whereas in Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651) the social contract implied ceding all individual rights to the sovereign (i.e., the monarch), John Locke insists in *Two Treatises of Government* (1690) that certain "natural rights" (to life, property, and personal security) were inalienable and continued to reside with the community or people. Locke replaces the absolute sovereignty of the state with the sovereignty of the community. Laws exist not to empower a despot monarch but to protect natural rights and to regulate political or civil society. By recognizing substantive limits on the powers of the king in Parliament, Locke tapped into the ancient common law tradition that had suggested that judges were within their rights to ignore a law of the Parliament if it was manifestly contrary to natural justice or attempted to subvert the fundamentals of the Constitution by purporting, say, for example, to abolish the monarchy or the House of Commons. Whereas Hobbes denied any right of rebellion in relation to the social contract, Locke argues that if a sovereign power exists, it must ultimately belong to the people who also decide when a breach of trust has occurred. Locke recognized that the people can oust the legislative power as a right. But this right, in the final resort, is not a right of positive law; it is an original right of revolution that precedes positive law.

Constitutionalism in France and the United States meant not merely a fundamental reorganization of the state order, but a reorganization in a liberal sense based on the three important claims mentioned at the outset. The first tenet of constitutionalism is the separation of powers. Locke distinguished legislative from executive power (which is distinct from, but often fused with, federative power), and baron de Montesquieu divided the state into branches, thus creating separate and independent powers and areas of responsibility. In *The Spirit of the Laws* (1750), Montesquieu isolates adjudicative power (judicial) from lawmaking power (legislative) and from the power of enforcement (executive). Later this system becomes known as *separation of powers,* but the term itself does not appear in Montesquieu's work. To

Montesquieu the functional division of state powers was a necessary if not a sufficient condition of liberty. Banned by the Roman Catholic Church in 1751, Montesquieu's publications were more influential on the Constitution of the United States of America (1787) and the French Constitution of 1791. Today the doctrine of the separation of powers is often used synonymously with constitutionalism and is a central principle of all liberal-democratic states.

The second feature of constitutionalism was anticipated by George Lawson in the 1660s and finally established in 1789 with the publication of a pamphlet by Abbé Sieyès called *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?* in which he introduced the concepts *pouvoir constitué* and *pouvoir constituant*. The period of the Enlightenment produced the doctrine of popular sovereignty (*populus est rex*), according to which all public power derives from the people. According to this principle of democratic legitimacy, sovereignty is vested in the people who are the constituent power (*pouvoir constituant*) and who have ownership of the constitution. According to Article XVI of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of August 26, 1789, "a society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all."

In the tradition of the American and French revolutions, the constitution is the "founding" document that comprehensively organizes the public power in the state. It not only establishes limits to public institutions but also realizes self-government by defining the extent and procedural rules for the exercise of (delegated) governmental powers. Outside that framework, public power can no longer be legitimately exercised; all such power has to be traceable to the original *pouvoir constituant* via the constitution.

The constitution thus both constitutes and limits public power (*pouvoir constitué*) according to the rule of law, fundamental rights, and the separation of powers (legislative, executive, and judicial). This is known as the paradox of constitutionalism: All public power is constituted and legitimated, but it is also limited by the constituent power. The *pouvoir constituant* forms the basis of validity and, therefore, cannot be empowered, let alone restricted, by the *pouvoir constitué*. Today the conflict is seen in the relationship between supreme political authority and constitutional limitations.

The intellectual origins of American constitutionalism are derived from the English common law as well as from natural law and social contract philosophy. As the Americans moved from protest to revolution, the exponents of revolutionary doctrine, like John Adams, expressly based the political theory of the revolutionary movement on the principles of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Sydney, and Locke. But the implementation of the separation of powers doctrine presented practical challenges for the revolutionaries. The different powers of government do not automatically imply different functions. Some powers are necessarily closely intertwined, which the doctrine of checks and balances highlights. In the end, the Constitution of Virginia of 1776 provided that

> the legislative, executive, and judiciary department shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them, at the same time.

Article XXX of Part First, Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, stated:

> In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.

The third element of constitutionalism (and the keystone of American constitutionalism) is the removal of the constitution from the ordinary process of national legislation. The 1787 U.S. Constitution was drafted by a convention of delegates and ratified by special conventions in the states, and it requires a different and more complicated method of amendment (two-thirds vote of Congress plus approval by three fourths of the states)—all of which affirms the distinction between (superior) constitutional law and statute law.

The idea of the constitution as "higher law" is given practical significance through judicial review. Although it is not expressly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, judicial review is now an undisputed

element of U.S. constitutional practice. It stems from the idea that the legislator must respect the norms of the U.S. Constitution and that judges (and ultimately the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court) have the power to set aside legislative and executive acts that violate the Constitution. Judicial review entered U.S. legal history in 1803 with the judgment given by Chief Justice John Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court in the celebrated case of *Marbury v. Madison*—the first decision in which the Supreme Court declared "unconstitutional" an Act of Congress (Judiciary Act 1789) on the ground that it was contrary to the Constitution. Marshall saw the choice before the Court as follows: Either the Constitution is superior law and controls any legislative act found to be contrary to it, or the legislature may change the Constitution by ordinary legislation (which would, he acknowledged, make a mockery of the attempt by written constitutions to limit public power). Although the Supreme Court had to wait until 1857 to review the next case, the path of constitutional review of legislative acts had already been paved.

Nineteenth-century Europe did not have a system of review of legislative acts before the courts. Although elements of constitutional review can be traced back to the Holy Roman Empire in 1180, and preliminary forms of review existed in France (thirteenth century) and Portugal (seventeenth century), the only serious projects of constitutional or judicial review appeared in the nineteenth-century constitutions of Norway, Denmark, and Greece. After World War I, the legal philosopher Hans Kelsen was inspired by these "specialist organs" as he drafted a new constitution for Austria that was enacted in 1920 and established the world's first separate constitutional court. The U.S. example and Kelsen's solution led to the creation of constitutional courts after World War II, especially in Germany, Italy, later in Spain, and, after 1989, in the East European states. The de Gaulle Constitution of France (1958) created a constitutional council (*conseil constitutionnel*) with the power to declare parliamentary bills unconstitutional (i.e., prior to enactment). But it is a council, not a court of law, and it does not form part of the judicial system. Litigants have no access to it directly or indirectly via appeals from lower courts. The other notable exception is the United Kingdom, where the sovereignty of Parliament is still a near-sacred doctrine.

The UK Exception

The contemporary significance of constitutionalism can be traced to the common law tradition that was revitalized in seventeenth-century England and to its reception in North America and France. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* the word *constitutionalism* appeared for the first time in the English language in 1832, and the oldest book in the British Library with the word *constitutionalism* in the title is James Lorimer's *Constitutionalism of the Future; Or, Parliament the Mirror of the Nation* (1865). It has been claimed that English, American, and European constitutionalism have always had an identical purpose in that they address the specific content of guarantees, that is, a set of fundamental principles and an institutional arrangement that target the conditions of legitimate power by restricting arbitrary power and ensuring "limited government."

But if the emphasis on separation of powers, individual rights, and a higher-order law is correct, then arguably the United Kingdom does not have a strong sense of constitutionalism due to four main obstacles. First, the UK constitution is not "written." Second, the organs of state are not clearly separated. Third, no Act of Parliament can have special constitutional status. Third, judicial review is "supervisory" only and does not ensure constitutional compliance of ordinary statutes with higher constitutional law.

The first observation, although oft-repeated, is not accurate. The constituent parts of the UK constitution are written and are, therefore, discoverable and definable. There are hundreds of constitutional documents (dating back to Magna Carta in 1215) that regulate the relationship between the citizen and the state. The UK constitution is thus better described as "unassembled" or "uncodified."

Second, it is true that the United Kingdom is better known for fusing executive and legislative power, which Walter Bagehot understood as the efficient secret of the constitution. However, the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, the curtailing of the powers of the lords chancellor, and the creation of a Supreme Court (due to start work in October 2009) were all designed to demarcate existing powers.

Third, Acts of Parliament cannot be earmarked as "constitutional," entrenched against implied

repeal or future amendment by a later statute, and all Acts remain subject to revision according to the ordinary processes of Parliamentary law making. However, some clearly are of constitutional significance, for example, the devolution legislation of 1998, the Human Rights Act of 1998, and the European Communities Act of 1972.

Fourth, the role of the courts is to give effect to the will of Parliament by interpreting the statutory text and by declaring the law. The courts are to interpret legislation literally and they have only limited review powers over delegated authority by Parliament to subordinate bodies. Put differently, the sovereignty doctrine prevents judges from imposing their own view upon a public body and only allows them to consider whether that body has acted in accordance with the law.

The reason for all four obstacles, and the main difference between the UK and the U.S. constitutions, is the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. According to A. V. Dicey's lasting interpretation, the doctrine includes the "positive" side of legislative supremacy (Parliament has the right to make and unmake any law) and the "negative" side of legislative monopoly (no other lawmaker has the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament). The uncompromising nature of this central principle faces continuous challenges in the contexts of administrative law, the United Kingdom's membership in the European Union, and the Human Rights Act of 1998.

Since the 1980s, the courts have reviewed cases of administrative action not authorized by Parliament. A growing body of opinion argues that the courts' power of review does not derive from Parliament but from the rule of law and from values protected by the common law. The development of the common law coupled with the recent trend to subject the political process to explicit legal regulation (such as ensuring the conformity of national law with the European Communities Act of 1972 and the Human Rights Act of 1998) has been variously described as the "judicialization" or the "constitutionalization" of politics and public law, or simply as "constitutionalism." Some judges have recently questioned (on record) whether, in the continuing absence of a single constitutional document, the judges might of their own initiative begin to review legislation by Parliament, based on the need to respect fundamental human rights. In the decision of *Jackson* (2005) UKHL 56, the law lords (the most senior judges) did not accept that the UK Parliament acting today could, with impunity, violate the fundamental precepts of the rule of law.

Membership in the European Union is not easily reconciled with parliamentary sovereignty. The orthodox view is that the European Community legal order is inconsistent with the sovereignty of Parliament: The twin pillars of community law (the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy) simply cannot be reconciled with the tenets of parliamentary sovereignty. However, a modern alternative viewpoint claims that Parliament is still the highest law-making authority *within* the national legal order and that it legislates in areas in which it is competent to legislate. This view also stresses that there is an additional European legal order that produces legal effects in the United Kingdom as well. In other words, an area exists where the United Kingdom, as a matter of law and policy, has delegated law-making powers to the European Union institutions. As a result, so long as the United Kingdom is a member of the European Union, there will be instances (which are controlled by judges) where community law will have the final legal say in those areas in which powers were conferred to the European Union.

The Human Rights Act of 1998 came into force in 2000 with the express intention to "give further effect" to the rights enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). There is a rebuttable presumption in favor of interpreting national law consistent with ECHR rights. In the event of incompatibility, the courts must either interpret primary and subordinate legislation "insofar as it is possible" in conformity with ECHR rights (s. 3(1) HRA), or they have the option of making a declaration of incompatibility if they are unable to construe a statute (s.4(2) HRA). This is a formal restraint on politics and further evidence that the Human Rights Act is different in kind from ordinary legislation (where incompatibilities are resolved through the doctrine of implied repeal).

Community law and the ECHR impose new interpretative obligations upon the courts. The question is not only (a) what meaning are the words capable of yielding but also (b) can the words be made to yield a sense consistent with

community law and ECHR rights? In other words, the courts are not subordinate to Parliament but have a constitutional duty to do justice according to law, which requires decisions to be supplied with good justificatory argument. This paradigmatic shift lies at the heart of the recent evolution of the U.K. constitution for which the shorthand term *constitutionalism* is frequently employed.

Conclusion

Constitutionalism, which regulates the set-up and legalizes the exercise of state power, as well as entrenching the relationship between state and society, matured in the context of liberal democracies that place emphasis on civil and political rights and clearly separate the public and the private sphere. There are two senses in which constitutionalism has traditionally sought to limit state power through fundamental rights (1) in relation to the legislature's ability to enact laws (*Rechtsstaat* or "constitutional democracy") and (2) in relation to the exercise of executive power ("limited government") in accordance with the rule of law, the separation of powers, democracy, procedure, and judicial review. To be sure, civil society does not require the express protection of fundamental rights (see only the European Union or the United Kingdom before the Human Rights Act came into force). But fundamental rights, once enacted, cannot underwrite themselves. The protection of liberty and the assertion of individual commitments require the monopoly of force, which the state, or the "public" domain of government, possesses. The "private" domain of civil society cannot protect itself against threats to liberty that emanate not from the executive but from the legislature, and it is for this reason that constitutionalism fights on two fronts: against the executive and against the legislative branches of government. The state is the social organization that decides on the legitimate use of the sanction. Through its control of the police and the military, the state has a monopoly of coercive power that it can use to enforce private (ordinary) law against private individuals should all else fail. The purpose of constitutionalism is to prevent even the legislature from arbitrary coercion, and fundamental rights are an additional guarantee that the state is itself bound by fundamental rights and that the private realm should be protected from arbitrary interference by civil rights.

The raison d'être of constitutionalism is the legalization of political rule, which it achieves by tying law making and law enforcement to positive law. Constitutions not only constitute, but also regulate, the highest power. In so doing constitutionalism promotes a normative understanding of law by focusing on attributes and qualities that law should possess. At one level, constitutionalism is an ideal for government: It stipulates that government should be limited by the law-based exercise of power and the predictable determination of the rights of individuals, as opposed to an arbitrary or other mode of government. In other words, the government can *only* act on the basis of, and is therefore limited by, law.

At another level, constitutionalism is also an ideal for law. The government can respect the constitution merely by ensuring that it and its officials always act within the law. But the law itself must also live up to certain standards, such as certainty, clarity, stability, predictability, generality, and, especially, nonretroactivity. Constitutional statutes are different from ordinary ones for three reasons. First, they define objectives and limit the exercise of political power. Second, they tend to be skeleton legislation; in other words, they are fragmentary in nature (the result of compromise) and in need of further concretization. And finally, constitutional statutes are not enforced in the same way as are ordinary statutes. Here the state itself is the body that is bound by the constitutional norms that it has enacted and which are unalterable by ordinary legal process. Importantly, the decision of the state to operate subject to constitutional laws is a voluntary one. Constitutional law justifies its status as higher-order law because it is accepted as controlling in cases of conflict with ordinary law.

Constitutionalism is thus shorthand for the creation, implementation, and control of public power, as well as a philosophical concept in its own right. Whereas the constitution sets up public power, constitutionalism identifies its purpose. Whereas the rule of law concerns the law-based exercise of governmental power, constitutionalism creates a normative benchmark for the evaluation of government action. Whereas in jurisdictions with a supreme or constitutional court, constitutionalism is understood as the mechanism by

which the ordinary political processes are disturbed or overridden, in the United Kingdom, constitutionalism could only ever govern the legitimacy of government action.

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See also Absolutism; Accountability; Authority; Constitutional Patriotism; Federalism; Liberalism; Representation; Republicanism; Rule of Law; Separation of Powers

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Constitutional Patriotism

Constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus) is a term developed by the contemporary German philosopher and social theorist Jürgen Habermas (1929–). The component parts of the term, *constitution* and *patriotism,* have their own meanings and were in widespread use long before Habermas combined the two. *Constitution* generally refers to the system or body of fundamental principles according to which a nation, state, or body politic is constituted and governed. *Patriotism* generally refers to a devotion or love for one's country. Constitutional patriotism would then be a sort of love or devotion to the constitution of a community. The term *constitutional patriotism* is a sort of conceptual innovation that should be grasped in relation to other historical forms of patriotism (ethnic, cultural, national, etc.). Habermas developed the concept of constitutional patriotism to address various dilemmas in contemporary political theory; as such, it is best understood and assessed in the context of those specific dilemmas. Habermas has mostly deployed the term to explain a possible means for social integration in modern, pluralistic, multicultural, functionally differentiated, highly secular societies. He has also used the concept critically to understand the conditions of possibility of postnational forms of social integration such as the European Union, cosmopolitan citizenship, and world government. As a conceptual innovation meant to resolve multiple dilemmas, the concept has remained a focus of ongoing discussion and persistent criticism within political theory.

Social Integration

Constitutional patriotism can be understood as a conceptual innovation by Jürgen Habermas meant to address problems of social integration and coordination under the (historical) conditions of modernity. Much of Habermas's work, especially his earlier sociological work on communicative rationality, has taken up this same dilemma. Thus constitutional patriotism can be situated as a conceptual innovation within the development of Habermas's thinking about social integration.

On Habermas's view, social integration in any society happens through a process of communicative rationality whereby speakers coordinate their action and pursuit of goals on the basis of shared understandings. Social integration and coordination are never mechanically guaranteed but rather are produced through the communicative agency of the members of a society. In relatively small,

homogenous, undifferentiated, premodern societies, this process of integration is facilitated by an all-encompassing social ethos or "lifeworld" in which meta-social religious and legal authority secures widely shared understandings.

Under modern conditions, in which societies are increasingly complex, secular, functionally differentiated, and pluralistic, the traditional means of social integration are inadequate. For modern societies the following problem emerges: How can social integration be secured on the basis of communicative action of individuals who lack widely shared background beliefs secured by meta-social religious and legal authority? For Habermas, social integration and coordination can be achieved under conditions of modernity through a combination of positive law, deliberative democratic politics, republican citizenship, the constitutional state, and ultimately, constitutional patriotism.

The medium of law in its modern form of positive law (i.e., man-made law) presents itself as one means for integrating society under complex conditions of modernity. Legal norms make possible highly artificial communities of free and equal persons. The integrative force of positive law, however, relies simultaneously on the threat of external sanction and the supposition that legal norms are legitimate. Absent meta-social sources of legal legitimacy, positive law must ground its legitimacy in the legislative and judicial processes of law making. Coercive laws must prove themselves to be laws of freedom, capable of generating rationally motivated agreement. What sort of processes could ground the legitimacy of positive law and motivate rational agreement and compliance?

Positive law can be legitimated by *democratic* processes of law making. The democratic procedures generating law must, however, be truly deliberative, issuing in action based on mutual understanding, rather than a mere strategic process of bargaining and interest representation by rational egoistic individuals. Deliberative democratic procedure must be further supplemented by republican conceptions of autonomy and citizenship. Participants in deliberative democratic procedures are to exercise their citizenship rights in an engaged way aiming at the *common good* and *autonomy* of their community. To the extent that laws emerge from an inclusive deliberative procedure aiming at the common good of society, those laws can be accepted as legitimate, and the legitimacy gap in the integrative function of positive law is partially filled.

Deliberative democratic procedures and republican conceptions of citizenship and autonomy must also be combined with the constitutional organization of political power. The constitutional organization of political power entails a commitment to various principles (including popular sovereignty), comprehensive legal protection for each individual, legality of administration secured by separation and balance of powers, binding the judiciary to existing law, a prohibition against arbitrariness in domestic affairs, and separation of state and society. The constitutional state is the means of organizing political power such that the administrative application of democratically generated positive law remains subject to the collective process of deliberation—serving the politically autonomous self-organization of a community—rather than to arbitrary particular interests within that community.

Positive law, deliberative democracy, republican conceptions of autonomy and citizenship, and the constitutional state are all essential means of social integration under conditions of modernity, but none of them functions automatically. Each requires the active and voluntary participation of individuals; thus each must be embedded in a *political culture* that links the affective commitment of individuals to the mechanisms of integration. Positive law relies on willful compliance, deliberative democracy relies on active participation, republican autonomy relies on identification with community, and the constitutional state relies on habits and norms of self-restraint and self-governance. Historically, these mechanisms of modern social integration emerged and were housed in the nation-state and were sustained by national political cultures and patriotic attachments to the ethnic or cultural nation. Thus civic solidarity, in the form of nation-based patriotism, seems to be a historical condition of the possibility of social integration in modern constitutional democracies.

Habermas's concept of constitutional patriotism can be situated at this juncture. Whereas Habermas insists that social integration requires a common political culture and affective attachments to community, he argues that these attachments needn't take the exclusionary form of patriotic commitment

to an ethnically or culturally homogenous nation. The democratic order needn't be rooted in the "nation" as a prepolitical community of shared destiny. Rather, affective attachments and solidarity of citizens can be shifted onto the more "abstract" foundation of constitutional patriotism. Habermas argues by analogy from the U.S. and Swiss examples to show how a political culture capable of sustaining constitutional democracies can take root in multicultural societies absent shared ethnic or cultural homogeneity. A liberal political culture that socializes citizens into an affective commitment to a tradition of constitutional democracy is the only common denominator needed for social integration in modern societies.

Shifting the basis of solidarity from the ethnic or cultural nation to the constitutional processes of democratic law making addresses two concrete dilemmas. First, it neutralizes the historically disastrous effects of ethnic nationalism, detaching republican self-rule from the homogeneous nation, all the while acknowledging the place and need for affective civic attachments. Second, it provides a basis for civic solidarity and democratic political culture in societies that are increasingly pluralistic and multicultural. The concept of constitutional patriotism is Habermas's response to the dilemmas of social integration in light of the need for affective civic attachments, the historical horrors of ethnic nationalism, and the emerging reality of multicultural societies.

Further Applications of Constitutional Patriotism

Habermas has critically deployed the concept of constitutional patriotism in at least two additional contexts. As processes of globalization have undermined the capacity of nation-states to secure social integration, some nation-states have turned their attention instead to postnational forms of social integration. The project of European unification is one such project. In debates on European unification, Habermas has deployed the concept of constitutional patriotism to remind proponents of the European Union that processes of democratic will formation that can cross national borders require the simultaneous development of corresponding cross-national political cultures, public spheres, and affective attachments. Transnational democratic and legal institutions without corresponding political cultures and affective attachments will suffer legitimacy deficits that undermine social integration and coordination. Against critics of the European Union, Habermas has argued that just as constitutional patriotism can serve as an abstract basis of civic solidarity for integrating multicultural domestic societies, it could serve the same integrating function among national cultures. Likewise, in debates on cosmopolitan citizenship as a source of postnational civic solidarity and world government as a possible means of postnational social integration, Habermas has deployed the concept of constitutional patriotism to remind proponents and critics alike of the need for supplementing formal democratic and legal institutions with concrete affective sources of civic solidarity.

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See also Citizenship; Communitarianism; Constitutionalism; Cosmopolitanism; Deliberative Democracy; Democracy; Deterritorialization; Global Civil Society; Globalization; Habermas, Jürgen; Multiculturalism; Republicanism; Sovereignty

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Constructivism

Constructivism is an important theory about the normative justification of principles of justice that has a comparatively short history. It has been developed explicitly only in the last decades of the twentieth century, primarily as a response to the perception that traditional foundational accounts of justification were being discredited only to be replaced with pluralist or relativist accounts that may endanger the very notion of objective justification. Although not necessarily agreeing that foundational justification is impossible, constructivists maintain that it is not at all necessary if

what we are concerned with is the possibility of objectively justifying principles. Constructivism is an important new way of continuing this normative project. Rather than "discovering" foundational principles, constructivists argue that objectively justified principles can be thought of as "constructed" by humans in their exercise of practical reasoning without having to make any necessarily controversial or partial foundational assumptions. What is constructed is generally understood to be principles of justice that identify the political principles, and perhaps institutions, that should regulate our social cooperation, although some attempts have been made to outline a broader constructivist account of interpersonal morality more generally.

Constructivism is associated primarily with contemporary liberal theory, with the liberal stress on impartiality and the necessity of justifying principles of justice to each and every citizen, reflecting the constructivist understanding of what justification requires more generally. It is identified most closely with the work of important theorists such as John Rawls and Onora O'Neill and with the related contractualism of Thomas Scanlon, but because of its relative youth, there is no settled consensus on exactly what constructivism is.

What Constructivism Is Not

In the first instance, it is important to be clear that constructivism is not a variety of social constructivism, although in international relations theory, where the term is often used, this is what it usually refers to. Social constructivism is an explanatory theory suggesting that social reality is constructed out of human knowledge and concepts and is therefore defined in opposition to realist accounts. Constructivism, on the other hand, is a normative theory of justification that opposes alternative accounts of justification. When we are asked questions like "Why did you do that?" explanatory theories will typically offer a causal account of our actions. Theorists of justification will answer such questions by reference to our good reasons for acting in the way we did and are concerned with our critical judgments about the right or justifiable thing to do, sort of person to be, or political and legal institutions to create or reform. Constructivism is one way to think about justification and the objectivity and authority of our reasons. So, where social constructivism is concerned with explaining the social construction of reality, normative constructivism is concerned with the possibility of objective judgments of justice or morality.

Constructivism and Justification

Justification has usually been regarded as having a foundationalist character. Foundationalist accounts of justification "discover" some fact(s) or reason(s) that have special foundational status in that we should check our everyday reasons against them in order to reassure ourselves that our actions and principles are justifiable. It is argued that foundations constitute an "independent moral order" that grounds legitimate normative reasoning, and any claims for the universal authority of our reasons must be built on them. Different accounts propose alternative foundations, including, for example, the word and authority of God or fundamental accounts of human nature. Skeptics usually agree that successful justification would be foundational but then dispute whether any such foundations are available to us and therefore deny that objective reasons of justification to all can be identified. Perhaps, they suggest, good reasons for people depend on nothing more than their particular tastes or perspective or, as social constructivists might argue, the ways of life of different communities and cultures, and so there are no reasons or principles that are justified for everyone. Instead, there are many communities and cultures, and what might be right for one need not be right for the others. Foundational justification is often regarded as effectively no more than the attempt to universalize the values of one community and use them to judge all communities. In contemporary political theory, such worries about foundationalist justification have become commonplace, finding expression in some forms of communitarianism, postmodernism, and pluralism.

Constructivism is a response to exactly these concerns. It does not deny that we live in a plural or multicultural world. As many critics of foundationalism have urged, constructivists accept the "fact of pluralism," but they regard this recognition of pluralism as the starting point for reflection rather than the end of discussion. It is not enough to simply point to diversity and assume that there

is little more that can be said about justification. It is clear, for example, that many people do not think that the existence of different ways of life should relegate their general concern with human rights or with human poverty and suffering to the status of a local reason, perhaps justifiable to "people like us" but inapplicable more broadly. Should an increased sensitivity to claims of diversity imply that we can rule nothing out categorically, or are there justifiable limits to tolerable principles of political morality? Although constructivists recognize pluralism, they retain a "thin universalist" commitment to the idea of objective reasons that are generally justifiable and apply to everyone. Rather than simply to note pluralism as such, constructivists respond to it and aim to outline a notion of a "principled pluralism," ensuring that worries about foundational justifications do not prevent us from continuing to take the notion of justification seriously.

Constructivist Justification

Instead of discovering foundational principles, constructivism conceives of justified principles as constructed. They are justified because they are the object of an agreement by all. Understanding what this notion of general agreement means is tied up with differing accounts of practical reasoning.

One prominent understanding of practical reasoning is broadly Humean or Hobbesian and considers it to have a wholly instrumental function. Instrumental, or means-ends, reasoning involves identifying the most efficient means to the satisfaction of already given ends, themselves thought of as the desires we just happen to have. The argument is that just principles are those that each of us can agree to as a compromise that enables us to consistently satisfy as many of our intense desires as possible. This agreement is a compromise not only between our interests and the competing and often conflicting interests of others, but also between our hopes about what we can get away with and our fears concerning the threats made by others if we don't make concessions. Those people with a considerable threat advantage, whether they are particularly strong, wealthy, or prone to violence if frustrated, may do well out of this agreement. There is no conception of the reasonableness of agreement, though our ends motivate and guide our reasoning, because they are not themselves subject to rational assessment. In this way, these ends function as a foundation for our reasons, an independent order of values against which our reasons and principles are checked. Thus the contractarian theories that incorporate this account of practical reasoning, and which are sometimes referred to as constructivist, are more obviously understood as a variety of foundationalism.

In contrast, constructivists argue that practical reason has an important critical function in addition to its instrumental role. Rather than ask what principles of justice best meet our given ends, a critical and constructivist approach requires us to consider what the right principles are, whatever our ends happen to be. Principles are justified only by reasonable agreement and must then be regarded as limitations on what anyone can do in pursuit of their ends.

Both critics and proponents of constructivism have argued that our critical reasoning either is, or should be, oriented by assumptions about a conception of the person and usually also a conception of society. Rawls, for example, takes persons to be free and equal and holding very different conceptions of the good life and takes society to be a fair system of social cooperation. In contrast, O'Neill suggests an apparently more minimal account in which persons are regarded as vulnerable and capable of varying degrees of interdependence and rationality, and society is viewed simply as a plurality of persons whose ends and needs are not necessarily in harmony. Constructivist reasoning about justifiable principles can then be structured by a form of hypothetical choice situation that embodies these assumptions about persons and society. This situation is intended to make clear what fair and reasonable agreement would require; justified principles are those that would, or perhaps could, be unanimously chosen from this hypothetical position. The archetypal example of such a choice situation is Rawls's "original position," but other broadly constructivist theories such as O'Neill's and Scanlon's can be understood to function in more or less similar ways.

This has struck many people as a strange way of identifying and justifying principles of justice. However, constructivists are keen to point out that we typically use hypothetical reasoning in moral and political argument whenever we ask questions

such as "What would it be like to be in that person's situation?" and "What would society be like if everybody behaved that way?" Each of these hypothetical questions asks us to set aside the particulars of our current situation and to adopt an alternative point of view in order to consider the justifiability of our actions or principles. Constructivist positions can be understood as attempts to model the appropriate point of view from which to judge principles of justice. Rawls's original position, he argues, models the idea that principles of justice should be judged, not from our personal and partial standpoint but solely on the basis of the general features of persons and therefore from a standpoint available to everybody. In this way the principles agreed to can be regarded as exhibiting generality or impartiality as their justification does not depend on the particular features of anybody's talents, character, or beliefs. Whereas other constructivist theories characterize the specifics of their project differently, this basic commitment to the identification of impartial principles is central to all of them, and there are clear similarities in the principles particular constructivists advance as justifiable. They are all broadly liberal in character, regarding each person as of equal status and owed equal consideration. This is regarded as a straightforward consequence of requiring principles to be justified from an impartial point of view and is often expressed as a commitment to equal citizenship. Some constructivists go on to draw explicit links with democratic politics and the democratic ideal of public reason, which requires important political discussion to be conducted in terms accessible to all reasonable citizens, whatever their specific beliefs happen to be.

This raises the key remaining question of the scope of constructivist justification. Does constructivism justify principles universally, or is its scope more limited? The broadly liberal democratic character of constructivist principles of justice has suggested to many commentators that constructivism is a theory that is peculiarly suited to historically liberal regimes. This suggestion is given credence by Rawls's account of "political constructivism," where he explicitly identifies the source of his conceptions of society and person as the public political culture of democratic regimes. Orienting practical reason with such conceptions is widely taken to limit the scope of justification to societies already in possession of a democratic political culture. However, many constructivists, including Rawls at times, adopt an alternative understanding of constructivism that stresses the potential universality of limited conceptions of society and person and therefore of principles constructed by reference to them. This claim to universality is based on an understanding of the objectivity of our practical reasoning that highlights the requirement to maintain its generality and impartiality, often drawing on Rawls's account of "reflective equilibrium." If we are faced by challenges to the general justifiability of our principles, which suggest that our assumptions about persons and society, for example, are partial or subjective, we are obliged to reassess our assumptions. We do so in order to reassure ourselves of their impartiality or to modify them in order to remove any partiality. Revising our conceptions of society and the person may mean revising our principles of justice. Constructivists argue that our best current understanding of the principles that survive this reflective process are broadly liberal. This suggests that the liberal character of constructivist principles is a consequence of the commitment to general and objective justification rather than a sign of partiality.

Critics of Constructivism

The constructivist attempt to maintain the integrity of a notion of objective (and perhaps universal) justification that does not rely on discredited foundational claims is disputed from two broad directions. First, it is argued that despite constructivist claims to the contrary, reasons and justification are necessarily partial because our reasoning is unavoidably constrained or constituted by our upbringing in particular communities or cultures. Our reasoning, and therefore justified principles, is relative to a way of life constituted by particular social structures and so justifications are irreducibly plural. This critique is, in large part, a restatement of the social constructivist thesis and is best exemplified in contemporary political theory by communitarianism.

A second critique argues that where constructivists manage to objectively justify principles, they do so only by implicitly making foundational assumptions that undermine their constructivism. These critics argue that constructivism relies on what are

essentially factual claims about, for example, human vulnerability but that these factors can only be identified as relevant by appeal to prior normative claims. In essence constructivism is necessarily grounded on foundational normative principles. Many critics have identified a certain conception of the person, or of basic human equality, as the foundation on which constructivism builds. If either of these critiques is successful, then the constructivist project is dealt a significant blow.

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See also Contractualism; Justice, Theories of; Liberalism, Contemporary; Rawls, John; Universality

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Contractualism

Contractualism is a moral theory that attempts to give an account of the content of our moral duties (including political obligations) and what ultimately grounds or justifies these duties. According to traditional forms of contractualism, the content and justification of morality are based on some kind of contract or agreement among those in the moral domain. Different theories of contractualism have been defended in the past by a long line of philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes, Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. Contemporary philosophers who have defended some versions of contractualism include John Rawls, David Gauthier, Brian Barry, T. M. Scanlon, and others.

Models of Contractualism

There are two dominant models of contractualism. On the first, Hobbesian model (often called contractarianism) moral requirements are grounded in a contract between self-interested individuals, without which each person would be worse off. David Gauthier is the best-known contemporary exponent of contractarianism. On the second model, which has its roots in Rousseau, morality can be understood in terms of an agreement among individuals who regard each other as free and equal persons deserving of moral respect.

Within the second model, one can distinguish two further strands of contractualism. The first is what might be called Kantian contractualism, according to which we are required to follow principles that all rational individuals could accept under certain ideal circumstances. Rawls is the most influential contemporary advocate of Kantian contractualism. Like contractarians, Rawls understands the individuals in the original agreement as people who try to get the best deal for themselves. However, Rawls denies that our actual reasons to follow the considered hypothetical agreement are determined by our self-interests. Instead, according to Rawls, these reasons are derived from our inherent sense of justice.

A version of the second strand is defended by Scanlon. On Scanlonian contractualism, an act is wrong if it could not be justified to everyone else. More specifically, one cannot justify an action if it is forbidden by a set of principles that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement. In other words, our reasons not to do wrong actions are based on our reasons to be able to justify our actions to others.

As Scanlon explains, we should care about being able to justify our actions to others because this is a way of recognizing and respecting other people's rational abilities to assess justifications for actions. If we do this, we create an inherently valuable relationship with others, which in turn provides us

with reasons to be moral. Scanlon opts for principles that no one could reasonably reject rather than principles that everyone could reasonably accept. This is because a self-sacrificing person could reasonably accept principles that are burdensome for him or her. However, it would not follow that it would be right to treat him or her in that way.

To specify the principles that no one could reasonably reject, Scanlon argues that we should think about what kind of lives and standpoints would be created for different individuals if different sets of principles were adopted. An individual can reasonably reject a set of principles if there is an alternative set of principles under which no one would need to bear equally serious burdens. Consequently, because principles such as the one that forbids harming others for fun do not have such alternatives (in all its possible alternatives, some people would be harmed), these principles cannot be reasonably rejected.

Contractualism Versus Consequentialism

To see why contractualism might be an attractive moral theory, it is helpful to compare it with its main rival, consequentialism. The standard form of consequentialism requires that we aim at bringing about the best possible state of affairs as the consequence of our actions. Whether a given state of affairs counts as the best one is determined by whether it contains the largest amount of well-being of individuals interpersonally aggregated. Consequentialism thus implies that if the best available option involves producing a large number of small benefits that outweigh a smaller number of large harms, then this option is the one we should choose.

In contrast, contractualism tries to avoid interpersonal aggregation of the well-being of individuals. Rawls famously argued that utilitarianism, a form of consequentialism, ignores what he called "the separateness of persons"; that is, it ignores the fact that people are distinct. More specifically, whereas utilitarianism aims to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number, according to Rawls, it is indifferent regarding the question of whose happiness is maximized. Indeed, utilitarianism seems to allow for one person's loss to be offset by another person's greater gain, as long as the net sum total of happiness is maximized. In contrast, rather than allowing that everyone's well-being gets lumped together, contractualism purportedly can put a constraint on interpersonal trade-offs and rule out aggregation. This is because the rightness of actions depends only on the rejectability of principles from various individual standpoints. Rejectability in this sense is grounded in the pairwise comparisons of the objections that individuals have regarding the alternative moral principles. As a result, contractualism does not require us to accept that a large number of small benefits to people would justify creating a smaller number of large harms.

The Redundancy Objection

A common objection to contractualism is that it might be empty or redundant. After all, one might think that all plausible moral theories accept that we should be able to justify our actions on grounds that others could not reasonably reject. Indeed, as Scanlon notes, utilitarians would like to think that no reasonable person could reject the principle that requires one to bring about the maximal amount of general well-being. However, Scanlon argues that his contractualism is in fact substantive, because it holds the process of justifying to others to be "basic." That is, Scanlon believes that simply by thinking about what could be justified to others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject, we can determine the shape of more specific moral notions such as murder or betrayal. This helps with the redundancy objection in two ways. First, it could be argued that the notion of giving justification *to another individual* is a substantial notion that rules out some (often interpersonally aggregated) considerations as reasons that could be used to reject principles. Second, as Scanlon explains, even though utilitarians could also accept that an act is right if and only if it can be justified to others, what makes an action right for utilitarians is that the action has the best consequences; justifiability is merely a consequence of this, whereas for Scanlon's contractualism, justifiability would be what makes an action right or wrong.

But there still is a threat that, instead of giving an account of the central moral notions, Scanlon just assumes them when he applies his view. He considers a situation in which we must choose between saving two people versus saving one

person from the same loss. According to Scanlon, we would conclude that we should save the greater number if we considered whether it would be permissible to be indifferent between saving two versus saving one. Scanlon argues that the second person in the larger group could complain that this principle did not take account of the value of saving his life, because it permits the agent to decide what to do in the very same way that it would have permitted had he not been present at all. It follows, according to Scanlon, that saving the greater number is required because it is not unfair to the person who is not saved, because the importance of saving him has been fully taken into account.

Here it might seem as if Scanlon has illustrated how justifiability can be taken as the basic moral notion, because the reason why one should save two is that doing so seems to be required by a principle no reasonable person can reject. However, it might be argued that what is really doing the work here is not justifiability but the notion of fairness. Recall that Scanlon's explanation of why the individual in the one-person group could not protest to not being saved is that it is not "unfair" to him or her. Without this unfairness, it is difficult to see why the person in the one-person group could not reasonably object to a principle that requires one to save the greater group. Of course, once fairness is taken into account, then it could override the single person's claim that he or she should be saved. But, in such a case, it seems that it is fairness that determines why one should save the greater number; justifiability seems only to be a consequence of the fairness of the other option. If so, one might question whether Scanlon has succeeded in showing that justifiability is the basic moral notion.

Interpersonal Aggregation

We can also question whether contractualism really rules out interpersonal aggregation and whether it would be problematic if it did not. Consider again the previous situation in which we must choose between saving two people versus saving one person. Some nonconsequentialists, such as John Taurek, have argued that in such a situation, there is no reason to save the greater number, because no individual in the greater group can claim that it is any worse for him or her to die than it is for the one in the smaller group. Scanlon argues that contractualism can require one to save the greater number without aggregating the claims of the greater group. Employing an argument developed by Frances Kamm, he argues in the following way: Suppose that we could save either A or B and C. In this case, one should begin by balancing off equal and opposing individual claims or needs, for example, A versus B. Once this is done, C's claim then serves as a tiebreaker. The result is that we should save the greater number, B and C, instead of A. As Scanlon explains, this argument does not require aggregating the claims of the greater group, because each person's claim is taken seriously and is not dismissed just because an individual happens to be a member of a comparatively smaller group. B and C are saved because C's claim is unbalanced rather than because there is a greater number on the side of B and C. It is because of this fact that the approach is claimed not to require aggregation.

A number of writers have argued that the Kamm-Scanlon argument covertly involves combining claims. For example, Michael Otsuka has argued that in order for C's claim to count in favor of B and C against A, B must be present. Using a balancing scale metaphor, Otsuka notes that the Kamm-Scanlon argument requires that one first places A on one of the scales and B on the other scale, at which point the scales balance evenly. One then tips the scales to B's side by placing C on B's scale. This suggests that the Kamm-Scanlon argument still involves covertly combining the claims of B and C. As Otsuka explains, if B were not present, then A and C would balance each other out, and C would not be unbalanced.

Kamm and others have responded that the Kamm-Scanlon argument need not involve combining claims in the manner Otsuka has suggested. Rather than pursuing that line of inquiry here, it is worth asking whether contractualism needs to rule out aggregation at all. Intuitively, it seems that what distinguishes a nonconsequentialist theory such as contractualism from consequentialism (of the simpler sort at least) is not that the value of the created states of affairs in terms of well-being does not matter at all, but that there are other considerations that also matter. Indeed, as Rawls says, "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness." For example, consider the transplant case, in which to

save five people from various organ failures, we must intentionally kill a healthy individual and extract his organs. That there are five lives versus one is one consideration in this matter. But for a nonconsequentialist, the number of lives saved will not be the only consideration; that an innocent individual would be killed may provide a further consideration in the deliberative process regarding what we ought to do. In such a case, a nonconsequentialist may conclude that intentionally killing an innocent individual is something one should not do, even if this means letting five people die. This is because the individual who would be killed would have a more serious complaint than the others who would be merely allowed to die, even when the complaints of those who would be allowed to die were aggregated.

As S. Matthew Liao has argued, such a picture of nonconsequentialism need not violate the separateness of persons, because on this picture, what is distinctive about persons is that they are moral agents capable of deliberating and being persuaded by moral reasons. This means that even if aggregation presupposes a notion of an overall good (because individual moral agents remain the sources of normativity), on this picture of nonconsequentialism, the employment of aggregation must ultimately be justifiable to each moral agent from his or her point of view. For example, in the transplant case, although five people would die if we did not kill the innocent individual and take that person's organs, this picture of nonconsequentialism holds that moral agents—even the ones who might die as a result of our not killing the innocent individual—could recognize that the fact that the healthy individual is innocent may provide a legitimate moral reason not to kill the innocent individual intentionally.

Moreover, this picture of nonconsequentialism can also address the issue that aggregation could lead to a large number of small benefits adding up to outweigh a smaller number of large harms. In particular, nonconsequentialists could employ something like the principle of triviality to constrain aggregation without rejecting it. According to this principle, if the small benefits are too trivial when compared with the large harms, then no amount of the small benefits can add up to outweigh a smaller number of large harms, thereby constraining aggregation. The principle of triviality does not require rejecting aggregation, because if the harms were not trivial, then aggregation would still be permitted. The upshot is that contractualists can accept aggregation without becoming consequentialists.

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See also Constructivism; Rawls, John; Social Contract Theory

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Corporation Theory

Legal personality, derived from the Roman legal term *persona,* refers to the ability (assigned by the legal order) to hold assets, rights, and duties. It is a central foundational component of modern private law. The modern legal order recognizes two categories of *persona* which have the ability to hold legal rights and duties, namely, natural persons (human beings) and juristic persons (legal entities that exist distinct from their members or office bearers and that hold assets in their own name). Examples of juristic persons are companies or clubs (collectively called corporations), which are said to have legal personality (usually by virtue of statute) and which are treated as such by the legal order.

The origins of the concept of a company or club as a juristic person lie in Greco-Roman antiquity, but Greek and Roman cultures contributed in different ways to its creation. Although clubs and associations (*hetaireia*) existed in Athens as early as the sixth century BCE, Greek influence on the creation of the concept seems to have been largely indirect, through philosophical influences on the writings of the Roman jurists. Given the importance of Roman law in the foundation of modern law in Western Europe, it is not surprising that Roman legal thought, influenced by Greek philosophy, provided the foundations for modern corporation theory.

Several kinds of associations, clubs, and corporations existed in the Roman Empire. The term *collegium* (association) was the official title given to the four priestly colleges. Although the word retained its religious connotations, it also came to be associated in time with (secular) groups of trades and professions (compare the archaeological evidence of the *Piazzale delle Corporazioni* in Ostia) as well as with funeral clubs and other societies. The terms *universitas* and, later, *corpus* were used mostly when referring collectively to these clubs, but Roman law never developed a specific (technical) vocabulary to discuss corporations. Despite the de facto existence of these clubs and societies, the extent to which these were given legal recognition as juristic persons is unclear. The law of corporations, which operated in the realm of public law to a greater extent, was only of passing interest to the Roman jurists, who focused predominantly on private law. Furthermore, the concept legal personality was not central to the Roman jurists' discussion of private law (*persona* being a nontechnical term used in the Roman law of persons mostly when referring to certain human beings, not slaves).

In the sphere of Roman public law, the state (*populus romanus*), the treasury (*aerarium*), crown property (*fiscus*), and municipalities (*municipia*) resemble corporations, but, as Max Kaser has argued, they were never regarded in law as juristic persons. The one seeming exception is the issue of the legal status of Roman municipalities, which attracted some juristic discussion (see, e.g., D.3.4.7pr–1, Inst.Gai.2.11, D.4.3.15.1, D.41.2.1.22), especially in relation to representation by its office bearers. It has been argued that the Roman jurists' discussion of the legal status of municipalities was an important step in the conceptual development of Roman juristic thinking on the topic (see Christopher Rowe, Malcolm Schofield, Simon Harrison, and Melissa Lane). Another important public "corporation" that had a significant impact on the development of the Roman Empire is the church. There are no texts from the postclassical period of Roman law to suggest that the church (*ecclesia*) was ever treated as a juristic person that had legal personality. As far as private corporations (e.g., funeral clubs) are concerned, Kaser maintains that the Roman jurists did not develop the law of associations to any great extent. It is, however, clear, according to Kaser, that some clubs were recognized under Praetorian law as holding private rights and could be litigated against (like a natural person) using civil procedure.

Although the Roman jurists developed most of the legal requirements necessary for the acknowledgment of the legal personality of corporations (i.e., a separate [immortal] legal entity with assets that can perform legal acts and that can be

represented by its members), a theoretical underpinning of this concept clearly did not arise in Roman law. It was only through the subsequent interpretation of Roman legal texts during the afterlife of Roman law in the Middle Ages that such a theory emerged.

The development of a theory of corporations was a product of medieval scholarship on Roman legal texts. The glossators, the first group of Italian jurists to examine Roman law texts in the century or so after the rediscovery of the Digest at the end of the eleventh century, seem to have taken a literal view of the nature of a corporation, namely, that it was merely a group of people who happened to be present as evidenced by Accursius's Gloss on D.3.4.7. It is clear that such an interpretation, while not uncommon in the works of the Glossators, did not contribute to the genesis of corporation theory. The impetus for the development of a theory seems to have arisen in the works of the Italian successors of the Glossators during the thirteenth century. The concept of legal personality, derived from the Roman legal notion of the *persona,* is explored in the works of various Italian jurists of the thirteenth century, especially in relation to fictitious *personae* (juristic persons). This provided solid conceptual footing on which to base a theory of the legal personality of corporations (a matter that, according to Kaser, was reexamined in detail and greatly developed in the works of the nineteenth-century Pandectists). The work of Sinibaldus Fliscus (later Pope Innocent IV) who studied civil law under Azo and Accursius was particularly influential in this regard, according to Joseph Canning.

The final phase in the development of a theory of corporations occurred in the works of the fourteenth-century Italian Commentators, a group of jurists who applied the rules of the emerging *ius commune* to legal practice of fourteenth-century Italy. Bartolus de Saxoferrato and his pupil Baldus de Ubaldis, two of the most celebrated jurists of the period, discussed juristic personality in the context of a city and a kingdom, thereby extending the theory of corporations to the realm of political thought and ushering in a new assessment of the nature of the state. This had a significant impact on the conceptual development of corporation theory until the early modern period.

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See also Commerce; Democracy; Reason of State; Roman Law; Sovereignty; State

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Corporatism

Today corporatism generally refers to a pattern of rule in which the state has strong ties with business and labor organizations. Business and labor organizations are treated as having a legitimate right to represent their groups' interests in policy networks formed with the central state. In exchange for this privileged position, these organizations take on considerable responsibility for the implementation of the collective agreements that arise out of such policy networks. The state thereby gains some control over the demands, and perhaps even the leadership, of business and labor organizations. Although corporatist bargaining typically acts to limit competition within individual industrial sectors, it is generally compatible with a high level of competition between various sectors, such as that between agrarian and manufacturing interests.

A Brief History

Corporatism has a long and diverse history. Before the rise of modern states, corporate organizations, such as guilds and churches, had considerable autonomy in pronouncing and enforcing rules for their members. The guilds regulated entry to particular trades and also cooperation

and competition among those who practiced the relevant trades. Yet over time these corporate bodies lost much of their autonomy, for the modern state increasingly claimed the sole right to make laws while free-market ideas led to a liberalization of the professions.

The Catholic Church was the first major institution to attempt to integrate corporatist governance into a modern state and a free-market economy. Pope Leo XIII took note of the surge of trade unions that swept through Europe in the late nineteenth century. He disagreed with those economists who argued for the inevitability of class conflict or the superiority of market-based competition. In 1891, he published *Rerum Novarum,* advocating associations to link employers and workers so that the two would understand one another better. The Catholic Church began to promote, in particular, the idea that social conflict could be managed through representative institutions based on occupations and professions. Later, in the twentieth century, Fascist regimes in Southern Europe adopted representation along professional lines as an alternative to parliamentary democracy. Spain under Franco, Portugal under Salazar, and Italy under Mussolini tried to control the population using occupational groupings derived from civil society.

Other modern forms of corporatism have been far less coercive than those found in Fascist Europe. In particular, neo-corporatism refers to increasing attempts by the state to intervene in industrial relations so as to foster economic growth and social justice. This neo-corporatism arose as an alternative to both Soviet Marxism and liberal capitalism in Europe in the aftermath of World War II. At the end of war, many states guaranteed jobs to returning soldiers; this resulted in a sudden rise in employment rates but also raised the specter of inflation. Some states used corporatist relationships with business and labor organizations to build a consensus on effective anti-inflationary economic policies and then to implement them.

Neo-corporatism relies heavily on collective bargaining agreements on economic issues and especially income policy. These agreements involve multiple actors in contexts where no one actor is able to ensure implementation of the agreement on their own. Explanations of neo-corporatism often imply that of the three principal actors, the state prefers an authoritative solution, labor prefers a redistribution of wealth, and business prefers a market solution. In contexts where none of these actors can secure its own preference, all can agree on a system that combines state authority, the organized representation of labor and business, and the commitment of labor and business to the implementation of state policies.

Many political theorists argue that neo-corporatism declined after the economic crises of the 1970s, and even that it was virtually abandoned in macro-economics during the 1980s. The most popular explanation for the decline of neo-corporatism is the rising interdependence of national economies. In this view, globalization has undermined the ability of states to manage their own economies whether or not they try to do so with the cooperation of organized labor and business: Attempts to manage wage levels and rates of employment are now doomed to fail. Hence, the argument continues, neo-corporatism has yielded to more competitive approaches to global markets. States, as well as labor and business, now have to adopt strategies that will prove competitively viable within the global market.

Some political theorists argue, however, that the changes in some states since the 1970s are best understood as a shift from macro-level forms of corporatism to alternative forms of meso-corporatism and micro-corporatism. Meso-corporatism involves state agencies interacting more with smaller, specialized interest associations and less with the big organized expressions of capital and labor. Likewise, micro-corporatism involves state agencies developing bilateral arrangements with particular private firms and labor groups.

Political theorists often argue that corporatism is most successful in smaller nations and most likely to arise in states that have comparatively little autonomy: Small nations are more likely to be able to sustain collective agreements among actors from civil society such as labor and business, whereas states that are unable to impose policies are likely to seek the cooperation of actors from civil society. However, a significant number of states deliberately cultivate neo-corporatism because of the close connections that it creates between the state, labor, and capital. In their view, the integration of state, labor, and capital promotes economic flexibility and so competitiveness in the global market. Neo-corporatism has thus

become as much a competitive strategy for states as a means of promoting social justice and harmony.

Corporatism and Pluralism

There has been some debate about the relationship of neo-corporatism to other forms of interest intermediation, especially neo-pluralism. The neo-pluralists portrayed liberal democracy as a political market analogous to a market economy. In this view, there are limited amounts of power, influence, money, and cooperation in politics, and groups compete to accrue as much influence as possible so as to gain access to policymakers and affect outcomes. Some pluralist theorists added that the state, far from being on an equal footing with other groups, was an adjudicator that weighed competing interests, actively chose the final policy, and then implemented it.

Neo-corporatism is clearly a type of interest mediation between capital, labor, and the state, and, as such, it resembles neo-pluralism. Yet there are significant differences between neo-corporatism and neo-pluralism:

- Whereas pluralism focuses on interest groups competing for scarce resources, corporatism emphasizes their limited cooperation. Indeed, corporatist divisions are brought together through effective hierarchical management.
- Corporatism privileges producer interests. It gives producers (labor and business) an institutionalized voice in policy making in a way it does not consumers.
- A corporatist state thus often reinforces status quo power relationships and discourages the creation of new groups.
- Whereas pluralism places the state in charge of policy administration, corporatism has capital and labor involved in the implementation of collective agreements.

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See also Civil Society; Elite Theory; Guild Socialism; Pluralism; Schumpeter, Joseph

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Corruption

Corruption implies the disregard of or inability to meet an established norm, whether moral, economic, linguistic, sexual, or political. In contemporary political discourse, corruption most often refers to the exploitation of public office or trust for private benefit, such as bribe-taking by politicians in exchange for the promotion of policies antithetical to the common good. In the history of political thought, however, corruption has a broader range of meanings. Corruption refers, on the one hand, to the institutional process of constitutional decay and transformation, and hence it is a key term in the classical vocabulary of virtue for understanding and explaining the long-term historical development of regimes. On the other hand, corruption refers more specifically to the actions and values that collectively constitute the catalyst for constitutional decay. At the specific level, *corruption* has been defined and interpreted in many ways, depending on the interpretation of the virtue it is seen to threaten. In principle, there are as many meanings of corruption as there are meanings of virtue, but the key discussions of the term from antiquity, Renaissance, and Enlightenment have tended to focus on corruption in terms of wealth or related by-products, such as glory, philosophy, or luxury.

The Nature of Corruption

The classical Greek world tended to classify and order the myriad city-states of the Aegean world in constitutional terms: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, or rule by the many, the few, or the one. Each of these three legitimate forms, however, had a corresponding corrupt counterpart: anarchy, oligarchy, and tyranny. Most observers believed that the corruption of political forms was an inescapable fact of political life and hence that all just

constitutions sooner or later inevitably broke down into their deviant forms. If corruption could not be prevented, however, its destructive force could be minimized and delayed. Plato's *Laws* and Aristotle's *Politics,* the former episodically and the latter formally, argued that a "mixed constitution," one combining the best features of each legitimate form, was the best protection against corruption and decline. The classical theory of the mixed constitution and its related understanding of corruption left a powerful imprint on subsequent political thought. In the Roman world, it was championed by Cicero and Polybius, in the Italian Renaissance by Niccolò Machiavelli and Gasparo Contarini, during the English civil war by John Milton and James Harrington, and in the Enlightenment by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Abbé de Mably, and baron de Montesquieu.

All these writers also shared the notion of corruption as an individual, rather than institutional, failing, an inability or unwillingness to place the common good ahead of self-interest. Polybius believed that human nature had contrasting qualities: an instinctual animal nature that prioritized the self and a reasoning faculty. Actions driven by rationality tended to lead to cooperation and social order and hence were virtuous, whereas nonrational actions led to competition for power and wealth and hence were corrupt. Machiavelli's *Istorie fiorentine* applied a similar conception of virtue and corruption, applied to factions rather than individuals. He dismissed most Florentine political conflict as corrupt because no victorious party ever attempted to enact laws for the benefit of all, but rather always pursued sectarian advantage. He deployed the same notion of corruption in his analysis of Rome's agrarian laws, which he believed had been promoted at the expense of common liberty to expand the power of the elite. In northern Europe and England, Desiderius Erasmus and Thomas More condemned European political culture as corrupt because princes and their courtiers formulated policy according to their vanities rather than to any notion of public welfare. John Locke's defense of political resistance deployed a similar conception of corruption. Echoing Aristotelian categories, he argued in the *Two Treatises* that kings devolve into tyrants when they ceased to protect the collective interests and property of their subjects, privileging instead the satisfaction of their own passions. Rousseau articulated a similar sentiment in different terms: Virtue itself was simply the adaptation of one's desires in accordance with the general will, whereas corruption was the prioritization of one's desires in spite of the general will. Baron d'Holbach both critiqued and extended the notion of corruption as self-interest at the expense of the common good. Substituting humanity in place of fellow citizens, he argued that the patriotism of antiquity was a corrupting force because it prevented citizens from identifying with those outside their city's walls.

The Causes of Corruption

Just as these thinkers shared a similar definition of corruption, they also shared a similar understanding of its causes. The Western tradition generally identified wealth, and the related problem of extremes of wealth and poverty, as the principal cause of corruption. Aristotle argued in *The Politics* that those with extreme wealth were inherently unwilling to submit to the rule of others. Medieval Italian writers such as Dino Compagni, Albertino Mussato, and Brunetto Latini all expressed variations on the theme that the principal cause of factionalism was the lust for wealth of Italy's elites. Machiavelli blamed Florence's merchant middle class for the Florentine corruption. Mistrustful of both the aristocrats and the masses, a merchant regime disarmed both groups and turned instead to mercenaries for security, transforming Florence into an effeminate, unarmed republic led by businessmen who disdained war. Both he and Francesco Guicciardini asserted that well-ordered republics ought to keep their treasuries rich and their citizens poor. More pointed to England's enclosure laws as an example of the corrupting effect of wealth on the English aristocracy's morals. In the eighteenth century, the Abbé de Mably and Montesquieu argued that excessive wealth was socially blinding and hence inherently corrupting of both character and wisdom. In the following century, Alexis de Tocqueville condemned aristocracies as regimes in which wealthy aristocrats purchased the consent that legitimated their rule and hence could be classified as rule by auction.

Beginning in the Renaissance and culminating in the Scottish Enlightenment, however, there was a powerful dissenting strain that rejected the

association of wealth with corruption. Humanists such as Leonardo Bruni, Poggio Bracciolini, and Leon Battista Alberti, writing for an audience made rich by textile industries and international banking, sought to reintegrate excessive wealth with an otherwise traditional republicanism. They all stressed the myriad ways in which independent republics crucially relied on the wealth of their elites: Their taxes paid for armies to defend the city, their building projects provided employment, their patronage fostered the arts, and their charity helped to sustain the marginalized and indigent. In England, Bernard Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* elaborated on similar themes, suggesting that the narrow and self-interested pursuit of wealth had indirect beneficial by-products for society such as comfort and liberty. Scottish intellectuals such as David Hume and Andrew Fletcher offered the most sustained critiques of republicanism's suspicion of wealth and commerce. Hume in particular argued that civil liberty, far from being undermined by wealth, was crucially dependent on commerce and the refinement of manners and intellectual expansion that he believed it inevitably promoted.

The dim view of wealth that much political culture nevertheless continued to insist upon led to the identification of several related issues as corrupt. For some, the absence of property regulations that made extreme wealth possible was a powerful force for corruption. Plato was convinced that the unregulated and limitless exchange of property would invariably create corrupting extremes of wealth and poverty: Those enjoying plentiful wealth would invariably become indolent and arrogant, whereas those suffering excessive poverty would cease to be active civic participants in public life. He offered two sustained solutions to the problem. In *The Republic* he argued for the wholesale abolition of private property, and in *The Laws* he argued for aggressive restraints on individual ownership. Guicciardini in the Renaissance and the Abbé de Mably in the Enlightenment praised Lycurgus's equitable distribution of property in Sparta and prohibitions on the use of money and traditional displays of luxury, although Guicciardini found such solutions unworkable for sixteenth-century states. Early modern utopian writers such as Tommaso Campanella in *City of the Sun,* More in *Utopia,* and Harrington in *Oceana* all made similar arguments about the relationship between corruption and property distribution.

A different but equally influential interpretation of the relationship between property and corruption circulated widely in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain and the U.S. colonies. In this view, wealth derived from property was seen as an essential safeguard against the politically corrupting effects of commercial wealth. Country whigs, whose local standing and wealth were rooted in property, took a dim view of the commercial profits that they saw as principal driving forces of court politics in London. They argued that commercial exchanges by nature involved unstable relationships of patronage and dependence, whereas landed wealth, they insisted, ensured not only that landowners had a demonstrable interest in the general prosperity of the nation but also crucially provided stable economic independence. Those without such independence were always vulnerable to bribes, the promises of status and profit, and other corrupting forces. The crown and court's opponents regularly denounced "old corruption," which invariably implied that Parliament had been corrupted by the crown's wealth, either by purchasing votes outright via bribes and pensions or by promising lucrative and prestigious offices to those in financial need. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft in *A Vindication of the Rights of Men* routinely accused the crown of having virtually purchased outright the House of Commons. Edmund Burke expanded on this theme when he denounced the systematic and insidiously covert financial corruption of Parliament by a crown whose powers of patronage had been vastly expanded by the immoral profits of imperialism. Burke was a vocal critic of what he saw as the fundamentally corrupt East India Company, its relatively unchecked authority in India, and its tendency to use its immense wealth to transform Parliament from an institution of public representation into an instrument of the company's influence.

Periodically overlapping with the discourse on wealth was another tradition that identified the arts—poetry, philosophy, and science—as vehicles for corruption. In *The Republic,* Plato famously banished poets from his ideal state. Although he did not connect poetry explicitly with the term *corruption,* he believed that it inspired and excited the passions and hence constituted an obstacle to the

primacy of reason essential to a just state. Machiavelli argued that philosophy corrupted the martial outlook and culture necessary for the preservation of civic liberty, praising Cato's decision to expel the Athenian philosophers Diogenes and Carneades. Machiavelli's rejection of philosophy was essentially a subset of his conviction about the corrupting effects of wealth, because philosophy followed in the wake of leisure, which was in turn critically dependent on wealth. Machiavelli's contemporary Girolamo Savonarola shared Machiavelli's reservations about philosophy, and in particular pagan philosophy, though for Savonarola it corrupted civic liberty by undermining Christian morality rather than martial values. Rousseau's *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* essentially expanded Machiavelli's earlier position, offering an historical survey of ancient cultures that fell into moral and political decline in periods immediately following the flourishing of the arts. Rousseau's position, too, was connected to a priori assumptions about the relationship between wealth, virtue, and corruption, as one of his principal objections to the sciences was the way in which its technical accomplishments made possible greater luxury and ease of living and hence distanced society even further from the ideal of Spartan virtue.

Another contentious issue indirectly connected to the problem of wealth was the pursuit and idealization of glory. Roman culture generally praised the pursuit of glory as a central virtue necessary for the preservation of the republic's liberty and strength. Machiavelli agreed, contrasting the political utility of glory with what he saw as Christianity's corrupting emphasis on humility and transcendence. But there was a robust tradition identifying glory as a corrupting force. Plato, and to a lesser extent Aristotle, condemned the quest for glory as a distraction from and obstacle to civic harmony. Plato's view was connected to his conviction that in a truly just state, philosophers must rule. Regimes dominated by those who had yet to emerge from the darkness of the cave were doomed to suffer the corrupting effects of discord and injustice. Cicero saw the problem in practical rather than philosophical terms. He acknowledged that glory was useful, that it fortified the convictions of statesmen in the face of danger and adversity. But Cicero had seen firsthand the threat to civil life posted by glory-hungry individuals supported by loyal troops and personal armies. Implicit in Cicero's argument in *On Duties* is the connection between Roman corruption and the influence of self-seeking men hungry for glory. Enlightenment philosophes tended to condemn the glory pursued by European monarchs in similar terms. Montesquieu in particular argued that a prince's glory consisted only of arrogance, rooted in self-serving passion rather than in public-oriented reason.

Finally, there was an ideological tradition identifying monarchy in general with corruption. Apologists for monarchy, however, did not deploy corruption as part of their critique of democracies and republics. They tended to associate the freedoms associated with popular regimes with anarchy, discord, and factionalism, conditions of social chaos rather than—as their opponents claimed prevailed under a monarchy—conditions that corrupted individual character and morals. In one of the earliest articulations of this view, Herodotus's *Histories* had the Persian Otanes deliver an oration on the psychologically corrupting effects of one-man rule. The sheer magnitude of power it offered to an individual gave rise to insatiable passions and desires, corrupting former virtues first into pride, then envy, and inevitably to violent and savage actions. Polybius argued that all monarchies inevitably degenerate into tyrannies. In his view of the foundation of monarchies, individuals of exceptional virtue are made kings by the people, who thereby benefit from the monarch's use of rationality and sense of justice to settle disputes and impose order. But the source of that initial virtue derives exclusively from direct experience of the social discord that preceded the emergence of government; without the experience of vulnerability, virtue cannot be acquired, nor can it be taught or inherited. Hence, with each passing generation, monarchs become increasingly removed from the conditions that temper their rule and make it just. They increasingly pursue their passions and desires, become rapacious, and lead lives of luxury that invariably and inevitably corrupt them. Variations on these classical arguments were advanced by civic humanists in the Italian Renaissance and by northern humanists such as More. In *Utopia,* however, More expanded the corrupting qualities of monarchy from the king to the larger court culture

that surrounded monarchies. As a condition of survival as a royal counselor, the character Raphael argues, a courtier necessarily had to approve corrupt proposals and applaud vicious policies. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Dutch republicans such as Pieter de la Court and Lieven de Beaufort and Enlightenment philosophes such as Montesquieu elaborated similar themes on the inherently corrupting moral effects of monarchy.

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See also Civic Republicanism; Commerce; Commercial Society; Virtue

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Cosmopolitan Democracy

Cosmopolitan democracy is a project of normative political theory that attempts to apply some of the principles, values, and procedures of democracy to global politics. Well-known academic advocates of cosmopolitan democracy include David Held, Mary Kaldor, Richard Falk, and Daniele Archibugi. Many civil society activists and peace movements have also supported the idea of cosmopolitan democracy.

The basic aim of cosmopolitan democracy is to expand some of the principles, values, and procedures of democracy at the global level. This implies devolving more powers and functions to the existing international organizations and generating new ones. Cosmopolitan democracy does not aim to substitute existing states with a world political power. Rather than attempting to concentrate force in a single source, it aims to subjugate coercive powers by developing more advanced constitutional rules.

Cosmopolitan democracy can be seen as a modern revival of some peace theories. In particular, it is an attempt to refine and apply in the current political landscape some of the insights of institutional pacifism. Peace can be achieved through a variety of methods; one of them is strengthening international norms, covenants, and organizations. Several peace projects of the past, including those of Émeric Crucé, William Penn, the Abbé of Saint-Pierre, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, and Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon, already designed international organizations with the function of sorting out conflicts through peaceful means rather than through war. This body of thought had a crucial role in the creation of modern international organizations, including the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the European Union.

But the contemporary historical conditions should allow a more decisive role for international organizations. Democracy has become the inspiring political system all over the world. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, democratic regimes have spread across the East and the South. For the first time in history, elected governments administer the majority of the world's population. Although not all of these regimes are equally respectful of basic

human rights, there is significant pressure to achieve representative, accountable, and lawful administration. Democracy has become, both in theory and in practice, the principal source of legitimate authority and power.

However, global politics continues to be dominated by *raison d'état*. Issues concerning war and security are still in the hands of national governments that, as in the past, can make decisions autonomously. Could globalization affect industry, finance, media, and fashion but not the institutions of the international political system? Confronting this paradox, cosmopolitan democracy is an attempt to combine the globalization of democracy with the democratization of globalization. This democratization of globalization means not only to constrain undesired effects of globalization through the traditional instruments of territorial states (such as controls on capital flows or labor standards) but also to create forms of democratic control at new levels of decision making (such as negotiations and agreements on transnational flows of capital and labor), with the active involvement not only of governments but also of nongovernmental organizations.

Cosmopolitan democracy is based on two assumptions. The first is the empirical observation that, whereas states are sovereign according to legal principle, they are in practice nonautonomous. Environmental threats, contagious diseases, trade, terrorism, and migration make it more and more difficult for states to be truly independent. Each political community has to cope with phenomena that take place outside its territorial jurisdiction and for which it has no direct accountability and control. In these circumstances it is becoming increasingly difficult to preserve meaningful democratic decision making within states. If the democratic principle of involvement and equality of all members affected by decision making is to be preserved, the boundaries of political community need to be rethought.

This, in turn, requires reconsideration of some of the basic principles of democratic practice and organization. Until now, democracy has been developed in relation to territorially delimited communities. In this situation the individual belongs to community A or to community B, but not to both, and therefore can participate in the democratic process of either A or B, but not both. Cosmopolitan democracy is therefore an attempt to reimagine the boundaries of political communities in order to make them inclusive toward the "other." Who are these others? They may be aliens, migrants, or refugees living or seeking to live in an established political community, or they may be citizens living in community B who are directly affected by facts or decisions made in community A.

The second assumption underlying ideas of cosmopolitan democracy is that the foreign policy of democratic states is not necessarily more virtuous than that of nondemocratic states. Even the most democratic states can be aggressive, selfish, and prepared to defend their vital interests by all means. History provides large abundance of aggression wars perpetuated by democratic regimes as well as by despotic ones. The hypothesis according to which "democracies do not fight each other" (the so-called democratic peace) is widely debated in international relations. According to this hypothesis, even if democracies are often war-prone, there have never been wars among consolidated democracies. Not everybody agrees with this statement, but those who agree also claim that if all states of the world were democratic, war might disappear. The normative implication is that to achieve the goal of peace, it is necessary to develop internal democratization. Some policymakers of democratic nations misunderstood the implications of this hypothesis and went so far as to wage war against despotic regimes with the aim of forcing a regime change and inducing these countries to become democratic. The war in Iraq, started in 2003, is the most recent example.

Cosmopolitan democracy has a rather different view: Although it shares the desire to increase both the quantity of democratic states and the quality of their democratic procedures, it does not assume that the goal of peace can be achieved acting on the internal constitution of individual states only. Moreover, it argues that "exporting" democracy through war is contradicting the very nature of the democratic process, which requires democracy to be built from below and not from above. For these reasons, cosmopolitan democracy suggests that an international system based on cooperation and dialogue is a fundamental condition for fostering democratic progress inside individual countries and also to allow peoples living under dictatorship

to change endogenously their own regime. While the "peace among democracies" hypothesis tends to stress the causal link from [internal democracy] → to [international peace], cosmopolitan democracy points out at an equally important link: from [international peace and cooperation] → to [internal democracy].

Unfortunately, democratic states are not prepared to deal with the preferences and needs of individuals of other political communities as they deal with those of their own citizens. Encouraging the adoption of a more just and fair foreign policy (as advocated by the political theorist John Rawls and a growing literature on global justice) and increasing the number of democratic states are important activities. But something more is needed to safeguard the basic democratic principles of equality and participation, namely, the willingness of states to undertake agreements that enshrine procedures of democracy among and across states. These agreements sometimes involve states, as in the case of international organizations, but in other circumstances they could and should also involve individuals, who would then concurrently be citizens of a state *and* citizens of the world.

Globalization provides the material conditions that could allow the expansion of the principles and procedures of democracy at the global level. For the first time it has become possible to generate virtual communities that share similar problems across the world. New information and communication technologies are opening the gates to a genuine global public sphere, and it has become technically feasible for communities living in remote parts of the world to take part in the same deliberative process. Such deliberations are already happening in elite circles such as professional associations. But they can also involve the global demos as a whole, especially when issues that affect the destiny of all humanity (such as environmental and security issues) are at stake. Recent literature has introduced other terms similar to cosmopolitan democracy. For example, the sociologist Jürgen Habermas has spoken of "post-national" democracy in relation to forms of political organization different from traditional state-centered ones. Others have invoked notions of "transnational democracy" with reference to connections across nongovernmental organizations and substate political units. Still others have talked of "global democracy" to denote the need to democratize the institutions of global governance.

To imagine that conflicts can be solved on a global level by constitutional and juridical procedures, rather than by force, is visionary. But it rests on the assumption that norms can be respected even in the absence of a coercive power of last resort. The project of cosmopolitan democracy is thus identified with a much broader ambition: that of turning international politics from the realm of *antagonism* into the realm of *agonism,* that is, acknowledging the presence of conflicts but also addressing them through nonviolent dialogue. Achieving these goals in global politics would mean taking a decisive step toward a superior level of civilization.

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See also Cosmopolitanism; Global Civil Society; Global Justice; Human Rights

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Cosmopolitanism

On one common account of cosmopolitanism, the key idea is that every person has global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal respect and consideration no matter what his or her citizenship status or other affiliations happen to be. This entry surveys the central varieties of cosmopolitanism, the diverse accounts of cosmopolitan justice, distinctions typically drawn among kinds of cosmopolitanisms, some concepts commonly associated with cosmopolitanism, some common fears concerning cosmopolitanism and how they can be addressed, and the prominent and influential debate between cosmopolitans and defenders of statist accounts of global justice. It then considers whether cosmopolitan commitments are necessarily in tension with other affiliations people typically have.

Early proponents of cosmopolitanism included the cynic Diogenes and Stoics such as Cicero. These cosmopolitans rejected the idea that one should be importantly defined by one's city of origin, as was typical of Greek males of the time. Rather, they insisted that they were "citizens of the world." The Stoics' idea of being a citizen of the world neatly captures the two main aspects of cosmopolitanism, especially as it is frequently understood today. These aspects are a thesis about identity and one about responsibility. As a thesis about identity, being a cosmopolitan indicates that one is a person who is influenced by various cultures. Depending on attitudes to the various influences, the word *cosmopolitanism* could have negative or positive connotations. It has had positive connotations when, for instance, it has been thought to mean that a person is worldly and well-traveled rather than narrow-minded or provincial. It has had more negative connotations and, on some occasions, it has been used to stigmatize some, including Jews for example, on the grounds that they were thought to be a threat to the community. Cosmopolitanism as a thesis about identity also denies that membership in a particular cultural community is necessary for an individual to flourish in the world. Belonging to a particular culture is not an essential ingredient in personal identity formation or maintenance: One can pick and choose from the full smorgasbord on offer or reject all in favor of other noncultural options, as Jeremy Waldron maintains.

Cosmopolitanism as a thesis about responsibility generates much debate. Roughly, the idea is that as a cosmopolitan, one should appreciate that one is a member of a global community of human beings. As such, one has responsibilities to other members of the global community. As Martha Nussbaum (1996) elaborates, one owes allegiance "to the worldwide community of human beings" and this affiliation should constitute a primary allegiance (p. 4). As a thesis about responsibility, cosmopolitanism guides the individual outward from local obligations and prohibits those obligations from crowding out responsibilities to distant others. Cosmopolitanism highlights the responsibilities we have to those whom we do not know and with whom we are not intimate, but whose lives should be of concern to us. The borders of states, and other boundaries considered to restrict the scope of justice, are irrelevant roadblocks in appreciating our responsibilities to all in the global community.

Cosmopolitan Justice

Cosmopolitan justice can be argued for from a number of theoretical perspectives. The different conceptions of how to treat people equally, especially with respect to issues of distributive justice, are often reflected in these different accounts. Cosmopolitan justice could be argued for along various lines, including utilitarian (prominently, Peter Singer); rights-based accounts (Henry Shue, Charles Jones, Thomas Pogge, and Simon Caney); along Kantian lines (Onora O'Neill); Aristotelian

or capability-based accounts (Nussbaum); contractarian (Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, and Darrel Moellendorf); and multiple approaches (e.g., Pogge).

Another common divide in accounts of cosmopolitan justice exists between those who argue for "humanist" and "associativist" approaches. Humanists believe that our duties of justice track our shared humanity. (This approach is often well captured by embracing human rights for all people.) Associativists, by contrast, believe duties of justice track co-membership in some association, such as political or economic association. Unless we are members of some important association, we have no duties toward persons. On such accounts, if we happen to come across persons one day existing on some distant planet, with whom we have no prior interactions, we could not have any duties of justice toward such people (though there might be some, more minimal humanitarian obligations that we have toward them). Associativists, such as Moellendorf, tend to emphasize that all people who currently exist on earth are part of at least one relevant association made especially salient by economic globalization.

Cosmopolitan approaches to justice are often distinguished from "statist" accounts. The central contrast here is that in the latter case the primary focus of our duties of justice are states rather than individuals. Cosmopolitans tend to place individuals front and center of their theorizing about justice, though there might well be derivative implications concerning duties for states that flow from their analyses. There is a prominent debate between John Rawls and his critics that nicely follows these tracks and will provide a good illustration of the differences between the two approaches. Because of its enormous dominance in current debates on cosmopolitan justice, this debate is discussed in more detail in the section on Rawls's position in *The Law of Peoples*.

Varieties of Cosmopolitanism

Several distinctions are in use in the literature and it may be useful to review these distinctions.

Moral and Institutional Cosmopolitanism

The crux of the idea of moral cosmopolitanism is that every person has global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal consideration no matter what his or her citizenship or nationality status is. Pogge (1992) gives a widely cited synopsis of what are thought to be the key ideas:

> Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons—rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally—not merely to some sub-set, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone—not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like. (p. 89)

Cosmopolitanism's force is best appreciated by considering what it rules out. For instance, it rules out positions that attach no moral value to some people, or weights the moral value some people have differentially according to their race, ethnicity, or nationality. Furthermore, assigning ultimate rather than derivative value to collective entities such as nations or states is prohibited. If such groups matter, they matter because of their importance to individual human persons rather than because they have some independent, ultimate (say, ontological) value.

A common misconception is that cosmopolitanism requires a world state or government. A distinction is sometimes drawn in the literature between moral and institutional cosmopolitanism (also referred to in the literature variously as "legal" or "political" cosmopolitanism). Institutional cosmopolitans maintain that fairly deep institutional changes to the global system are needed in order to realize the cosmopolitan vision adequately. Moral cosmopolitans need not endorse that view; in fact many are against radical institutional transformations. Cosmopolitan justice requires that our global obligations (such as protecting everyone's basic human rights or ensuring everyone's capabilities are met to the required threshold) are effectively discharged. However, a number of suitable arrangements might do this

effectively. There are various possibilities for global governance that would not amount to a world state. These include mixtures of delegating responsibilities for particular domains to various institutions, with multiple agencies able to hold each other accountable, and other ways of reconfiguring the structure of governance bodies at the global level (such as the United Nations) so they are brought into line better with cosmopolitan goals.

Extreme Versus Moderate Cosmopolitanism

This terminology was initially introduced by Samuel Scheffler. Using this terminology, Scheffler actually distinguishes at least two forms of cosmopolitanisms, giving rise to two distinctions. One concerns the *justificatory basis* of cosmopolitanism, and the other concerns the content of what cosmopolitan justice consists in. An extreme cosmopolitan with respect to *justification* considers the underlying source of value to be cosmopolitan, and it is with respect to cosmopolitan principles, goals, or values that all other principles of morality must be justified. A moderate cosmopolitan can take a more pluralistic line on the source of value, admitting that some noncosmopolitan principles, goals, or values may have ultimate value as well. In particular, moderate cosmopolitans need not reduce our special obligations to principles of cosmopolitan value, which might be construed as devaluing and distorting the meaning of the special attachments that people have.

We can best appreciate the force of the second kind of cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitanism about the *content of justice,* by considering the following question: Are there any norms of justice that apply within an individual society and not to the global population at large? The extreme cosmopolitan denies that there are *at the level of fundamental principle,* whereas the moderate cosmopolitan believes that this is possible—there might be some things we owe members of our own society that are not owed as matters of justice also to nonmembers.

Weak Versus Strong Cosmopolitanism

The way in which this distinction is typically drawn (by, say, David Miller) is that weak cosmopolitanism underwrites, as requirements of justice, only the conditions that are universally necessary for human beings to lead minimally decent lives, whereas strong cosmopolitans are committed to a more demanding form of global distributive equality that will aim to eliminate inequalities between persons beyond some account of what is sufficient to live a minimally decent life. So, what is weak or strong on this account is the extent of one's commitments to redistribution.

Globalization, Global Justice, and Some Common Fears About Cosmopolitanism

Talk about cosmopolitanism is often closely aligned with discourse about globalization and global justice. These are, in general, different topics entirely, but they often have strong points of intersection.

What is the subject matter of global justice? What is the field of global justice concerned with, or what should it be about? If we examine actual global justice movements in the world, as represented by (say) the World Social Forum, we notice that there are a number of quite different groups that can be identified as concerned with issues of global justice. To pick out just a few, these include trade unionists, farmers, indigenous peoples, and environmentalists. They often have common grievances and points of resistance, such as opposition to the way globalization is unfolding in the world today, the dominance of multinational corporations or economic interests throughout the globe with a feared withering away of local cultures, devastation for local economies, intensified destruction of the environment, deepening exploitation, or the apparent unconcern with the most vulnerable and marginalized. Though members of the so-called global justice movement have common points of struggle, they often resist congealing into an overarching political program, despite occasional victories (such as those achieved at, or represented by, the World Social Forum). A central claim made by some of these marginalized groups is that they want to be left alone. Perhaps despairing of ever getting any meaningful chance to be given a real voice and input in decisions that crucially affect them, perhaps also skeptical—given bad histories of interference, domination, or oppression and given their current and expected future marginalization—they (apparently) frequently ask now simply to be left alone to live their lives as they see fit. Others, perhaps more hopeful

about what their activism can accomplish, demand changes to our global governance arrangements (such as the rules governing the World Trade Organization). Chief among these would be changes that take more seriously fairness for the world's worst off and most vulnerable, by distributing the costs and benefits of globalization more evenly.

Academic theorizing about global justice has, in some important ways, been more narrowly focused. Theorizing about global justice has been dominated by issues of global distributive justice over the past two decades or so, though other issues have not been entirely neglected. Various theorists advocate different models of global justice, which might consist of several components such as advocating that every person be well positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life; a more equal distribution of resources globally or that every person have enough to meet his or her basic needs; more global equality of opportunity; universal promotion of human rights; promotion of the autonomy of peoples who stand in relations of equality with one another; or criteria governing intervention, especially military intervention, in the affairs of states. There is also much debate about how best to realize the desired elements, what principles should govern our interactions at the global level, and how to improve the management of our global affairs, including how best to govern globalization. Contemporary theorizing on global justice has been enormously influenced by Rawls's work, especially *The Law of Peoples,* as well as the work of cosmopolitans. These views are discussed in the following section of this entry.

For the antiglobalization movement, cosmopolitanism is sometimes feared because it is construed as another way to justify the relentless spread of capitalism throughout the globe and the liberal discourse associated with cosmopolitan values is nothing more than global capitalism's useful handmaiden. This view involves a misconception about the diversity of positions that are rightly construed as cosmopolitan. One could see oneself as a member of a global community of human persons for all sorts of reasons, such as religious commitments—Christianity is often thought of in this connection—and there is also a strong Marxist justification for holding this position as well. There is no need to suspect at the outset that talk of cosmopolitanism necessarily entails commitment to neoliberal, capitalist views about economic justice. The question of what cosmopolitan justice entails is very much a current topic of debate, with people defending a full spectrum of views. Indeed, the critical mass of scholars actively working on the topic today endorses forms of egalitarianism that would be quite antithetical to the neoliberal agenda.

There are economic forms of cosmopolitanism, some proponents of which advocate free trade (these include Adam Smith and Milton Friedman). However, there are also as many communist and socialist versions of economic cosmopolitanism as well (as advocated by, say, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin), which encourage proletarians of the world to unite and to recognize their common interests in promoting a global economic order more aligned with workers' interests rather than those of capital. What is cosmopolitan about both of these familiar economic views is simply the idea that the preferred economic model transcends the boundaries of a nation-state. Current debates about what cosmopolitan justice consists in typically bypass the debate about modes of production.

Rawls's *Law of Peoples* and Some of His Prominent Cosmopolitan Critics

In *A Theory of Justice,* John Rawls sets out to derive the principles of justice that should govern liberal societies and, by employing the apparatus attached to the original position, the hypothetical choosing situation, he famously endorsed two principles; namely, one protecting equal basic liberties and a second permitting social and economic inequalities when (and only when) they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the difference principle) and attached to positions that are open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (the fair equality of opportunity principle). In *A Theory of Justice,* Rawls's focus is on the principles that should govern closed communities—paradigmatically, nation-states. Cosmopolitans such as Beitz and then Pogge argued that these two principles should apply globally. After all, if the point of the veil of ignorance is to exclude us from knowledge of factors that are morally arbitrary, surely where one happens to have been born (or one's citizenship)

qualifies as one of those quintessentially arbitrary factors from the moral point of view.

Rawls argues against the global extension of his two core principles. Rather, in the international arena, Rawls thinks different principles would be chosen (in a second original position occupied by representatives of different, well-ordered peoples); these would include principles acknowledging peoples' independence, equality, right to self-defense, and duty of nonintervention, as well as the duties to observe treaties, honor a limited set of rights, conduct themselves appropriately in war, and assist other peoples living in unfavorable conditions. This entry focuses on just a few commonly identified points of tension between Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics.

In *The Law of Peoples,* Rawls engages directly with central claims made by some cosmopolitans, namely, those who argue that the difference principle should apply globally. He takes up Beitz's claim that, because a global system of cooperation already exists between states, a global difference principle should apply across states as well. Rawls argues against this, for a couple of reasons, but notably because he believes that wealth owes its origin and maintenance to the political culture of the society rather than (say) to its stock of resources. Furthermore, any global principle of distributive justice we endorse must have a target and a cut-off point. Rawls (1999) believes we do have a duty "to assist burdened societies to become full members of the Society of Peoples and to be able to determine the path of their own future for themselves" (p. 118). Unlike his understanding of cosmopolitan commitments to a global difference principle, Rawls believes his principles have a target, which is to ensure the essentials of political autonomy and self-determination.

Rawls's *Law of Peoples* has generated much criticism. One of the most frequently raised objections is that the background picture Rawls invokes incorporates outmoded views of relations between states, peoples, and individuals of the world. Rawls presupposes that states are (sufficiently) independent of one another, so that each society can be held largely responsible for the well-being of its citizens. Furthermore, according to Rawls, differences in levels of wealth and prosperity are largely attributable to differences in political culture and the virtuous nature of its citizens. Critics point out, however, that Rawls ignores both the extent to which unfavorable conditions may result from factors external to the society and that there are all sorts of morally relevant connections between states, notably that they are situated in a global economic order that perpetuates the interests of wealthy developed states with little regard for the interests of poor, developing ones. We who live in the affluent, developed world cannot thus defensibly insulate ourselves from the misery of the worst off in the world, because we are complicit in keeping them in a state of poverty.

Pogge is a prominent advocate of such views. According to Pogge, two international institutions are particularly worrisome: the international borrowing privilege and the international resource privilege. Any group that exercises effective power in a state is recognized internationally as the legitimate government of that territory, and the international community is not much concerned with how the group came to power or what it does with that power. Oppressive governments may borrow freely on behalf of the country (the international borrowing privilege) or dispose of its natural resources (the international resource privilege), and these actions are legally recognized internationally. These two privileges have enormous implications for the prosperity of poor countries (for instance) because these privileges provide incentives for coup attempts, they often influence what sorts of people are motivated to seek power, they facilitate oppressive governments being able to stay in power, and, should more democratic governments get to be in power, they are saddled with the debts incurred by their oppressive predecessors, thus significantly draining the country of resources needed to firm up fledgling democracies. All of these things are disastrous for poor countries. Because foreigners benefit so greatly from the international resource privilege, they have an incentive to refrain from challenging the situation (or worse, they have an incentive to support or finance oppressive governments). For these sorts of reasons, the current world order largely reflects the interests of wealthy and powerful states. Local governments have little incentive to attend to the needs of the poor, because their being able to continue in power depends more on the local elite, foreign governments, and corporations. Affluent developed countries have a responsibility to stop

imposing this unjust global order and to mitigate the harms already inflicted on the world's most vulnerable people. As an initial proposal for us to begin to make some progress in the right direction, Pogge suggests that we impose a global resources tax of roughly 1% to fund improvements to the lives of the worst off in developing societies.

We see then that critics frequently maintain that Rawls ignores the extent to which societies suffering unfavorable conditions are a result of factors external to that society. They also argue that the boundedness and separateness of political communities is difficult to sustain in our world today, due to phenomena such as globalization and integration. Rawls assumes we can talk coherently of bounded political communities that can constitute self-sufficient schemes of political cooperation. However, critics argue this is an untenable assumption. Some authors concentrate on showing that we actually have a system of global cooperation among societies and how this would give rise to obligations to the worst off. Others believe that it is insulting to characterize the relations between states of the world as cooperative, as in reality the relationship is rather one of domination and coercion.

Several critics argue that the basic global structure is a scheme of coercive institutions that importantly affects individuals' life prospects. It should be transformed so that it becomes a fair scheme of cooperation among all citizens of the world. For many of these critics, this is best modeled by considering a global original position in which decision makers have no knowledge of any morally arbitrary features, including country of citizenship. Using this kind of strategy, popular claims are that we should endorse a global difference principle (permitting economic inequalities just in case they work to improve the situation of the worst-off in the world) or global equality of opportunity.

Several other kinds of criticisms are also voiced, including that the notion of a people is not sufficiently clear or important to do the work Rawls thinks it can do. Furthermore, because Rawls often takes the boundaries of states to mark off distinct peoples, his view runs into difficulties. If we take a people to be constituted by commonalities such as shared language, culture, history, or ethnicity, then the official state borders and peoples do not coincide well. National territories are not typically comprised of a single people, nor is it clear that individuals belong to one and only one people.

Another common observation is that Rawls's arguments for his abridged list of human rights is defective. For one thing, critics charge that Rawls's failure to include democratic rights is mistaken. Amartya Sen, for instance, provides extensive evidence to support the claim that nondemocratic regimes have severely adverse consequences for the well-being and human rights of those over whom they rule. Sen also argues that respect for human rights and ideas of democracy are not simply Western values but rather that substantial elements of these ideas can be found in all major cultures, religions, and traditions.

Rawls argues for a respectful relationship between states (as representatives of peoples). Indeed, he argues that liberal democratic regimes have an obligation to deal with illiberal decent regimes as equals and not impose their values on them. Some might think that Rawls's views appropriately acknowledge the importance of our cultural or national affiliations. Andrew Kuper argues that Rawls may take cultural pluralism seriously, but he does so at the expense of taking seriously the reasonable pluralism of *individual persons*. Well-ordered hierarchical societies may well contain individuals who hold liberal ideas. Rawls's account incorporates the wrong kind of toleration for such societies at the expense of liberal values. Rawls's view is not sufficiently sensitive to the individuals within states. Indeed, it would seem that Rawls, in defending nonliberal states as he has, would be forced to defend the rights of states to impose inegalitarian policies on its citizens, even if a majority of the citizens were vigorously against such policies.

Rawls aims at a realistic utopia, but critics charge that the result is neither sufficiently realistic nor utopian. It is not sufficiently realistic because, critics claim, he has not taken account of all the relevant realities, for instance, of interdependence or domination in the global arena. To the extent that he has not captured all the salient realities, his "law of peoples" is not as "workable" and likely to sustain ongoing cooperative political arrangements and relations between peoples. Furthermore, the view is not utopian in that the political (moral) ideals used are too tame to constitute much of an

advance over the status quo. In his bow to realism, Rawls has tried to ensure that the law of peoples results in stability, yet the law of peoples that he endorses is potentially unstable because, arguably, stability is only really achieved when just arrangements are in place, and Rawls has offered nothing more than a modus vivendi with oppressor states.

Reconciling Cosmopolitanism With Other Commitments

Can cosmopolitans take account of the special attachments and commitments that fill ordinary human beings' lives with value and meaning?

A common misconception about cosmopolitanism concerns how cosmopolitans must view their relations to those in local or particular communities, namely, that they must eschew such attachments in favor of some notion of impartial justice that the individual must apply directly to all, no matter where they are situated on the globe. But this is by no means entailed by several of the sophisticated accounts of cosmopolitanism on offer today. Indeed, most contemporary cosmopolitans recognize that for many people, some of their most meaningful attachments in life derive from their allegiances to particular communities, be they national, ethnic, religious, or cultural. Their accounts often seek to define the legitimate scope for such partiality, by situating these in a context that clarifies our obligations to one another. Cosmopolitan justice provides the basic framework or structure, and thereby the constraints, within which legitimate patriotism may operate (see, e.g., Kok-Chor Tan, 2004). Cosmopolitan principles should govern the global institutions, such that these treat people as equals in terms of their entitlements (regardless of nationality and power, say). However, once the background global institutional structure is just, persons may defensibly favor the interests of their compatriots (or co-nationals, or other, more particular groups), so long as such partiality does not conflict with their other obligations, for instance, to support global institutions. So cosmopolitan principles should govern the global institutions but need not directly regulate what choices people make within the rules of the institutions. One of the strengths of Tan's view is that even though cosmopolitan justice provides the justification for the limits of partiality toward group members, the value of those attachments is not reduced to cosmopolitan considerations, which is arguably a flaw with other attempts.

A simple way to show how there is a gap between the cosmopolitan's position and what anti-cosmopolitans fear is this: Cosmopolitanism is essentially committed to these two central ideas: first, the equal moral worth of all individuals, no matter where they happen to be situated on the planet and what borders separate them from one another; and second, obligations that are binding on all of us, no matter where we are situated. But acknowledging these two ideas still leaves plenty of room to endorse additional obligations, which derive from more particular commitments, and the preference some may have to spend discretionary resources and time on particular communities or attachments important to one's life plans and projects. In order to know just what constitutes our discretionary resources and what our basic obligations to one another are, we need the input of cosmopolitan justice. So long as we act in ways consistent with those commitments, there are no residual ethical concerns. Whether or not there is still room for conflict depends on how much is packed into cosmopolitan justice. Very strong forms of egalitarian duties might leave little room; weaker ones might leave more. And yet we can appreciate that conceptually, at least, there is no tension here as feared.

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See also Cosmopolitan Democracy; Globalization; Global Justice; Human Rights; Nationalism; Rawls, John

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Cosmopolitics

Cosmopolitics is the study of politics at the world level. It has grown out of the debate on globalization and the economic, political, and cultural processes that cross national borders. Most political theorists who study cosmopolitics separate it from cosmopolitanism. If cosmopolitanism usually refers to the moral attitude of being "a citizen of the world," cosmopolitics concerns itself with the politics of this idea. It asks whether it is possible to conceive of politics beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and if so, how. What is characteristic for the field is that it focuses on the significance of the nation-state. In so doing, it questions many core assumptions of political theory. In political theory one often assumes a sovereign and territorial state and then asks of the proper relationship between the citizen and the state. Or, one assumes a nation and then asks what this form of solidarity implies for issues of redistribution and migration. By contrast, political theorists concerned with cosmopolitics take these assumptions as their primary object of study. Typically they discuss the significance of sovereignty, territoriality, law, statehood, and nationhood for the conception or understanding of global politics.

In addition to being dedicated to politics at the world level, cosmopolitics calls into question the standpoint or position from which we study it. The nation-state has not only marked the boundary between particular countries, such as that between France and Germany; it has also served as an implicit boundary between different subdisciplines in political science—between political theory, on the one hand, and international relations, on the other. If political theorists normally deal with relationships within the nation-state, scholars of international relations deal with relationships between nation-states. This is how many students of political science get to know politics. By opening up the

nation-state itself to critical scrutiny—and thereby also its distinction between domestic and foreign, inner and outer, friend and foe—cosmopolitics prompts a rethinking of the ontological and epistemological categories that we have become accustomed to within the nation-state. It opens up new questions regarding the way we seek to grasp and understand the world around us. As a result, cosmopolitics is an interdisciplinary field of research. It attracts both political theorists and scholars of international relations, as well as sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers. There is also a range of methodological and theoretical approaches to be found within the field, from more applied studies on global institutional reform to more philosophical ones, such as what it means to be human or what characterizes the relationship between self and other.

Cosmopolitics covers many themes, including intervention, environment, future generations, governance, private public partnerships, and media. Perhaps the most controversial issue is democracy. Although most political theorists admit that politics already exist at the world level—seen, for example, in the actions of the World Trade Organization, the UN Security Council, and the global civil society—they strongly disagree on whether the global political order can be rethought in democratic terms. Worthy of note is that the disagreement has no clear parallel with classical ideological standpoints. Familiar antagonists such as liberal and radical democratic theorists often find themselves allied when it comes to cosmopolitics, a fact which may reflect that the controversy has moved from politics to its presuppositions. Generally speaking, the controversy hinges on the significance of the nation-state, whether it should be seen as a necessary or contingent condition for democratic rule. Still, most political theorists concerned with cosmopolitics are reluctant to think in terms of either/or—either national or global politics. On the contrary, they often insist that cosmopolitics is an open question in need of further investigation. The intention is rarely to formulate programs, but to problematize and explore. They stress that the unpacking of the various concepts built into the idea of the nation-state has opened up new theoretical possibilities, regarding what it means to rule in the absence of a state and who should do the ruling in the absence of a nation.

The Main Controversy

Modern democracy developed in tandem with the nation-state. What this means for cosmopolitics is subject to debate, and it divides scholars into two broad camps. On the one hand there are those who consider the nation-state an important premise for democracy. They stress that as long as the conditions that have been decisive in shaping democracy at the national level do not exist at the global level—such as a sovereign state, rule of law, or an equivalent to national sentiment—the prospects for cosmopolitan democracy look bleak, or at least highly unrealistic for the foreseeable future. This does not mean that they reject global institutional reform or that they deny that institutions like the United Nations are justified in their work toward a more stable and peaceful world. These theorists are often as keen as anyone else to find a solution to the inequality that exists around the world. What they reject is the idea that global politics can be subject to democratic rule. They worry that the eagerness among political scholars to establish reforms at the world level makes them use the term *democracy* in the wrong way. They confuse what is justified with what is legitimate. The risk is that they thereby dress global institutions in democratic garb, although they lack anything that resembles democracy as we know it. In the end, they argue, this misuse of the term *democracy* may deprive people of the opportunity to demand real democratic reform when the time is apt for it.

On the other hand there are those who think of the nation-state not as a premise but as a problem for democracy. They argue that it fails to capture the essence of a new political landscape, which is far more pluralistic, divided, unpredictable, and apt to change than before. On this view, the expectation that citizens should be divided into sovereign and separate nation-states will only deprive them of the opportunity to govern themselves. Because political decisions, influences, and decrees cross national borders, people are affected by rules that are not of their own making, something which needs to be compensated for by various cosmopolitical means. Apart from the fact that cosmopolitics already exists at the world level and so calls for democratic reform, these theorists often insist that the skeptical attitude suffers from analogous thinking. In their view, one cannot draw an analogy

between the national and the global level. The global level is an entirely different animal that must be analyzed on its own premises. Rather than assuming that we know what democracy is and then comparing it with the conditions that exist at the world level, they think we need to do the opposite. We need to turn our worries into a positive research question and ask what democracy could mean under these new political conditions. They often use words such as *rethink* or *re-read* to signal the difference vis-à-vis traditional approaches.

Arguments

There are many arguments in favor of either side in the controversy. Political theorists who conceive of the nation-state as a premise for politics can be divided into two subgroups, depending on whether they emphasize substantial or procedural arguments. The substantial argument often stresses the role of nationhood, culture, and common history for politics. Majority rule, for example, requires not only that the composition of the minority change over time, but that the minority be prepared to conform to the will of the majority. If it were to ask for secession every time the vote goes against its will, this would undermine the stability of the political order. To many political theorists, a common national identity is thus what offers the source of solidarity needed in order for the political system to work. It makes citizens agree to disagree, to feel like one common unit and so to abide by common rules. The main problem, they argue, is that this form of solidarity does not exist at the world level. Because the world is culturally divided, the conditions for political rule are missing.

The procedural argument emphasizes the importance of statehood, rule of law, and constitution building for politics. Rule of law is generally seen as that which upholds freedom and equality in society. What many political theorists point out, however, is that in order for it to have effective force, it must be able to sanction violations of law. It must have a monopoly on violence. Otherwise, the most powerful forces in society may withdraw from their obligations or tailor the constitution to fit their own vested interests. The general worry is that this is what happens in the move from the national to the global level. The world consists of a plurality of legal subjects—nation-states, organizations, companies, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals—of which some are far more powerful than others. Rather than setting up a constitution based on equality, there is a risk that the most dominant parties negotiate and put forward a constitution that mirrors their own balance of power, something which would undermine its legitimacy in the rest of the world. To many political theorists, this implies that while a constitution may indeed be established at the world level, it is not likely to be either stable or legitimate. Calling it democratic, they add, will not change this fact.

However, there are also those who think that the skeptical argument is trapped in an old conceptual framework. The idea that the nation-state constitutes a problem for cosmopolitics usually takes two forms, a normative and a descriptive. The normative argument stresses that although "ought" certainly implies "can"—it is useless to go around wishing for humans to unite in a world community if this is impossible to fulfill—the logic does not run in one direction only. "Ought" also influences "can" insofar as our capacities often get shaped by what we wish for. It makes us act and think in new ways. Theorists who emphasize the normative dimension of politics are therefore more optimistic about the prospects for global political reform. They think it possible to turn cosmopolitanism into cosmopolitics; moral human rights into institutionally guaranteed political rights. They often divide on the normative source of cosmopolitics. Some turn to the Enlightenment and its ideas of universalism and individualism. Others turn to ancient and more teleological forms of normative thinking. Yet another group locates the source of normativity in our everyday communicative practices. What they share, however, is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political, economic, or cultural affiliations, have the potential to join into a world community. Presuming that cosmopolitics is both desirable and feasible, these theorists sometimes concentrate more on institutional and technical questions, such as the institutional design of a reformed United Nations, the right balance of power between global legal subjects or the proper mechanisms for voting and deliberation in a future global parliament.

The descriptive argument emphasizes the contingency of the nation-state. Rather than holding on to ideas of sovereignty, territoriality, or nationhood, they highlight the importance of history, context, and change. Typically, they study existing political, economic, and cultural practices, only then to ask what politics could mean on the basis of these altered conditions. Or they turn to history to disclose the contingency of our current political practices. In this way, they seek to open up alternative pathways to the future. They are often critical of timeless definitions of concepts. Take the idea of representation, for example. When it was introduced in politics in the eighteenth century, it was often held to be an alternative to democracy. It was good and desirable precisely because it prevented ordinary people from ruling. Today a country that has general and regular elections typically counts as democratic, all of which implies that the definition of democracy has changed over time. To many political theorists, this suggests that we cannot convert historical solutions into timeless truths. What counts as desirable today may not do so tomorrow. At issue for these theorists is the self-understanding of human beings, that is, the way they interpret and make sense of their own world. Taking an interest in interpretation, these theorists often look at how media and discourse enable and constrain thinking on cosmopolitics, as well as how they influence and challenge our allegiances, affiliations, discords, and enmities.

Characteristics

Cosmopolitics is a field of research orientated toward the future. As such it has given rise to new ways of conceptualizing the global political order. Central to the discussion is whether cosmopolitics should be characterized as unitary or plural, organized according to territoriality or function, subject to norms of sovereignty or human rights.

To some theorists, cosmopolitics involves commitment to a world state or federalism. They argue that the logic of modernity eventually will bring this development forth. Others prefer to use the term *governance* as opposed to *government* to signal that the global political order lacks the usual characteristics of sovereign statehood. Although most theorists in this latter group deem national governments strong actors in world politics, they insist that they must be compensated for in areas such as environment or economy where power eludes their grasp. These compensations can take different forms: overlapping legal structures determined by the scope of the political issues or functions at hand, a system of cross-border representation between nation-states, or a three-tier system where decision making at the national level is supplemented by supranational and transnational organizations. There are also those who characterize cosmopolitics as a system, of nondomination, as a capitalist world-system as well as those who insist that it must be understood in more decentralized and plural terms, as an empire or a network society.

The suggestions for how to characterize cosmopolitics also concern the subject of politics. Some theorists argue that cosmopolitics requires a world citizenry to hold global political actors to account. Others prefer to think of the political subject in more plural terms. The global civil society is here a common point of reference. Consisting of a number of different organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and business companies, it is thought of as a powerful "bottom up" force in world politics. There are also those who replace the unitary concept of the people with publics, arguing that what matters in politics is not people per se but their ideas, arguments, and opinions. Yet another group of theorists speak of cosmopolitics as formed by the multitude. The multitude is modeled on the Internet insofar as it is characterized as a decentralized and open network of relations. Differences aside, what these theorists have in common is that they question unitary, territorial, and national ways of thinking about political activity and solidarity.

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See also Cosmopolitan Democracy; Cosmopolitanism; Global Civil Society; Globalization; Global Justice

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Counsel

Counsel is one of the activities closely associated with the thought, action, and the institutions of politics. Most cultures and political systems consider counsel in one form or another to be an intrinsic part of the decision-making process. The term encompasses knowledge technologies and intellectual cultures as well as the procedures and processes of communication that enable governments to make informed and advantageous decisions. Counselors (i.e., political advisors or consultants) are those with the experience, expertise, and the authority required to advise on policy development and implementation. They provide advice orally or in written form, with a view to instructing or correcting the governing body or individual. This entry highlights main aspects of the theory and practice of political counsel during the classical, medieval, and early modern periods.

Counsel and Council

The classical and Christian traditions are united in their emphasis on counsel as one of the seminal conditions of good government. Characteristically, the Latin tradition merges the notions of a summoning or assembly (*conclavum*) and counsel (*consilium/concilium*) early on. This blending of deliberative and normative action is reflected terminologically in a number of European languages (e.g., English: *council/counselor;* Spanish: *consejo/consejero)* as well as institutions like the diocesan and ecumenical councils of the early Christian and medieval Catholic Church. The nature of the surviving evidence can make it difficult to establish the degree to which "conciliar events" invited and allowed vigorous debate or were stage-managed to corroborate predetermined outcomes. Certainly, many ecclesiastical and secular assemblies display a clear sense of gathering for the purpose of discussion and genuine exchange of ideas as an integral part of making decisions. Equally, there are varying degrees of openness in the "secret councils" (the gathering of aristocrats and functionaries) that advised the rulers of the nascent early modern states. Certainly, the idea that a prince has to seek out and listen to "good counsel" in order to act legitimately and in the best interest of dynasty and people remains fundamental, modified but not diminished by the rise of reason of state.

Characteristics of Counsel

There is no predominant theory, rhetoric, or discourse of counsel. The notion of counsel is pertinent to all fields of political activity. It comprises a wide range of terminologies and media, ranging from the written *consilia* of medieval canon lawyers to Martin Luther's *Letters of Spiritual Counsel* and Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan,* from advice rendered during discussions in the assemblies of feudal lords to Girolamo Savonarola's public sermons. Invariably, it also raises a set of specific questions with regard to the individual counselor, group, or political body dispensing counsel as well as those receiving it.

One common point of debate and concern is that of the qualification of the counselor and nature of expertise brought to the task, for instance, the assumed relationship between age, experience, and authority. The rules of Benedictine monasteries, for instance, insist that if the monastic community gathers to receive and give counsel, the younger brethren have to be given a voice. The presumed lack of experience and insight on the part of the majority of young people is weighed against monastic ideals of shared responsibility and collective action. The gender of the counselor can also affect the authority and mode of delivery of counselor and counsel. The biblical queens Esther and Jezebel permeate medieval and early modern discourse on counsel, exemplifying the gendered nature of notions of what constitutes good and bad counsel and counselors.

The issue of gender is related to the problem of biased or partisan advice. The fawning and corrupt courtier and the scheming aristocrat as perilous sources of advice are staple characters in the mirror-of-princes genre from ancient Greece to

Renaissance Europe. Ideally, counsel had to be rendered solely with the best interest of prince and dynasty in mind. Yet it was equally acknowledged that the courts and counsels of princes were the place to negotiate the agendas and settle the conflicts between the ruling dynasty and the powerful families of the realm. Counselors were among those who had to represent and channel interests from one or more lobby groups. The writings and activities of individuals and groups as diverse as Hincmar (806–886), who was archbishop of Reims and political advisor to the Carolingian ruler Charles the Bald, and the boyars of Renaissance Muscovy testify to the necessity and the predicaments inherent to the task of arbitration and crisis management within political elites largely built on kinship networks.

During the medieval and early modern periods, advisors recruited from the clergy or religious orders frequently appeared or were claimed to be closer to the ideal of the disinterested counselor. Yet the relationship between ecclesiastical "expert" and secular "layman" was also problematic. A prime example is the institution of the Catholic confessor. The latter was recommended as the expert in exploring the relationship between the will of the king and divine law. Thus Cardinal Bellarmine saw the confessor as "judge" and "doctor of the soul." Mediator between the private and the public sphere, the confessor was distinguished among counselors in that he was particularly sworn to secrecy. The fortunes of confessors at early modern courts, however—as well as manuals for confessors like the Jesuit *De Confessariis Principum* (On the Confessors of Princes) issued by the Jesuit superior general Acquaviva in 1602—illustrate that the boundary between spiritual and political advice, and thus the precise remit of the confessor, remained significantly and perilously blurred, always likely to attract fierce criticism. Equally problematic and often at odds with the confessor in terms of interest and influence was the counselor whose position depended upon the "friendship" of the king: the controversial figure of the favorite. Like the confessor, the favorite combined privileged access to the monarch with a relationship built on trust. Alvaro de Luna in medieval Castile and Cardinal Richelieu in seventeenth-century France exemplify the problematic nature of counsel and influence emanating from a position of emotional and intellectual dependency on the part of the counseled.

Already during the medieval and early modern periods, there is a trend toward the professionalization of expertise and personnel, counselors, and counsel. Notably, law graduates from the European universities increasingly compete with baronial and ecclesiastical post-holders, reflecting the profound social, cultural, intellectual, and institutional changes from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, such as the rise of universities and academics as sources of expert advice. This trend goes along with the establishment of "politics" and "politician" as independent spheres of human inquiry and action, exemplified in the work and career of individuals as different as the Flemish scholar and political theorist Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) and Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683), minister of finance under Louis XIV of France. Today, specialists in law, economics, and other fields of expertise either join the executive or represent individuals, corporate clients, and public bodies as lobbyists. Political counselors or advisors appointed as civil servants thus continue to walk the narrow tightrope between public service and partisan interest, a dilemma reflected in the controversial figure of the "spin-doctor" and the problematic issue of private-sector employment of former civil servants.

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See also Civic Humanism; Consent; Critique; Deliberative Democracy; Disagreement; Governance; Hierocratic Arguments; Institutionalism; Kingship; Legitimacy; Mirror of Princes' Genre; Parliament; Reason of State; Scholasticism

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Counter-Enlightenment

The term *Counter-Enlightenment* is intended to capture self-conscious critics of the Enlightenment and its legacy. The term achieved widespread scholarly usage following the 1981 republication of Isaiah Berlin's essay "The Counter-Enlightenment." Berlin's essay examined a late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century intellectual reaction against the Enlightenment ideals of the French philosophes, expressed by thinkers such as Giambattista Vico, J. G. Hamann, Johann Gottfried Herder, Friedrich Schelling, Edmund Burke, and Joseph de Maistre. Berlin identifies a common enemy for these otherwise diverse thinkers: the doctrine that there is a universal human nature, everywhere and always the same, defined by natural laws accessible by human reason, knowledge of which can provide the basis for a more just, humane, and rationally organized human society. Against the rationalism, universalism, and progressive optimism of this doctrine, Berlin's Counter-Enlightenment thinkers represent the positions of skepticism and relativism. These positions can be enlisted in a wide variety of political projects, from the extreme left to the extreme right, so Berlin does not identify the Counter-Enlightenment with any particular political position.

More recent scholarship has vastly expanded the scope of the Counter-Enlightenment, both temporally and substantively. Darrin McMahon has traced a "low" Counter-Enlightenment, primarily identified with Catholic writers, emerging in eighteenth-century France. Graeme Garrard has identified multiple Counter-Enlightenments, from the eighteenth century to the present, covering a vast ideological territory ranging from monarchist Catholicism to Western Marxism. Because Isaiah Berlin's essay on the Counter-Enlightenment provided the jumping-off point for so many recent engagements with the Enlightenment and its critics, this article will begin by elaborating upon his original conception of Counter-Enlightenment, before examining in subsequent sections how McMahon and Garrard have built upon Berlin's foundation to offer a broader view. Insofar as Enlightenment political thought is often identified as the foundation of modern liberalism, this exploration of Enlightenment's critics also surveys a wide variety of possible critiques of liberalism.

Isaiah Berlin's Counter-Enlightenment

According to Berlin, Counter-Enlightenment thinkers responded to the French Enlightenment thinkers' search for universal laws and values with historicism and relativism. In Vico and Herder, for example, Berlin underscores a sensitivity to irreducible cultural difference, in which norms and values spring from a communal source bounded in space and time. No overarching standard of comparison between cultures was possible, thus undermining any vision of clear historical progress from barbarism to enlightened civilization. The search for universal laws deserved condemnation for erasing particularity and individuality and for subsuming unique cultures under sterile, empty abstractions. For Herder, this cultural relativism provided the basis for an unrelenting critique of imperialism. Indeed, contemporary critics of colonialism often recapitulate Herder's critique of Enlightenment universalism as implicitly imperialist.

For Hamann, skepticism and relativism carry well beyond respect for cultural differences. For Hamann, all truth was particular. To understand an object is a mystical and irrational process through which the object communicates its unique being to a receptive audience. Through the construction of abstract categories that correspond to nothing concretely existing, reason builds an illusory house of cards, an intricate system of laws and interconnections with no basis in reality. Thus Hamann brings together skepticism and relativism to underscore the impotence of Enlightenment reason itself and the necessary turn to faith. Hamann warned against the consequences of remaking society in accordance with imagined universal laws: Such an endeavor would inevitably enshrine a crushing totalitarianism, bending irreducible difference and particularity to fit its mechanical system. Despite his personal conservatism, we find echoes of Hamann's condemnation of Enlightenment totalitarianism not only in conservative critique of the Enlightenment, but also in twentieth-century critique from the political left, such as in Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.

After a brief foray through Romantics influenced by Herder and Hamann, Berlin concludes

his essay with the most extreme of French Catholic counter-revolutionaries: Joseph de Maistre. Berlin's de Maistre paints a fearsome picture of man in opposition to the bland optimism of Enlightenment thinkers who disavowed original sin. De Maistre's man is violent, sadistic, and self-destructive, an irrational and bloodthirsty beast. Such a debased nature requires the iron fist of absolute authority to prevent incessant slaughter. Criticism and doubt must be immediately expunged lest they threaten this solitary bulwark against a terrifying chaos. For de Maistre, the Revolutionary Terror was the inevitable outcome of Enlightenment doctrine: When fallible and sinful human beings attempt to construct a society based on abstract principles of reason rather than the unquestioned authority of church, crown, and executioner, this society will necessarily be bathed in bloodshed. Though de Maistre was considerably more misanthropic and reactionary than Burke, to whom he is often compared, both shared a vision of the French Revolution as a frightful but predictable consequence of Enlightenment hubris, carelessly detaching human reason from history and tradition.

It is difficult to find much intellectual kinship between de Maistre's bleak pessimism and Herder's celebration of cultural difference. De Maistre may strike an especially discordant note at the end of Berlin's essay because he defies Berlin's general focus on the German response to the French Enlightenment. For a better picture of de Maistre's own intellectual context, we must turn to the Counter-Enlightenment in France, traced in McMahon's *Enemies of the Enlightenment*.

The French Counter-Enlightenment

McMahon's French Counter-Enlightenment was predominantly Catholic, an alarmed reaction to the fashionable *philosophie* of the century, perceived as a mortal threat to religion, morality, and political authority. Moreover, McMahon expands his focus beyond the predictable "great names" of philosophy to include countless forgotten pamphleteers, scribblers, and hacks. From this shadowy milieu, McMahon argues, the modern European Right emerged. He traces the trajectory of Counter-Enlightenment thought from the eighteenth century through the Revolution and the Restoration. Common right-wing positions, such as the valorization of the family, the defense of tradition and prejudice, and the critique of divided sovereignty, found initial expression among the countless French voices who warned of impending social catastrophe if the aspirations of the philosophes should come to pass.

The names in McMahon's account are relatively unfamiliar: Charles-Louis Richard and Augustin Barruel replace more recognizable names like de Maistre and Louis Bonald. Across the voluminous anti-philosophe writings of the eighteenth century, McMahon finds a pattern of repeated allegations. The philosophes are charged with embracing a radical individualism of hedonistic self-interest, a purportedly inevitable consequence of materialist doctrines, which undermines all social bonds. The anti-philosophes suggested that philosophical hedonism led to an embrace of the most debauched and sordid human impulses, such as avarice and lust, thus directly contravening the Christian counsel of self-denial. Moreover, materialism simultaneously was expected to undermine religious faith, and the philosophes, despite their wide variety of religious views, were charged with a militant atheism bent on the destruction of church and throne alike. As these pillars of traditional society were under attack, Counter-Enlightenment writers predicted horrific scenes of anarchy, chaos, perversion, and bloodshed.

When the French Revolution culminated in regicide and the Reign of Terror, the bloody warnings of the anti-philosophes suddenly appeared prophetic. Burke's and in some instances also prefiguring, Echoing, well-known critique of abstraction, French counter-revolutionaries charged that liberal principles such as rights and popular sovereignty were metaphysical abstractions, dangerously disconnected from history and tradition. Against liberal thinkers who argued that the Reign of Terror was a horrific departure from the noble principles of the early revolution, the Enlightenment's critics in this era claimed that the Terror was in fact the inevitable outcome of the revolution's attempt to enshrine Enlightenment principles in law. In this reading of the revolution and the Terror, they clearly stood with the most famous Counter-Enlightenment thinkers, de Maistre and Burke. Blaming the excesses of the revolution on the Enlightenment became a common literary trope.

McMahon's account of the French Counter-Enlightenment is also significant insofar as it demonstrates the extent to which Counter-Enlightenment thinkers have influenced common perceptions of the Enlightenment itself. Early critics of the Enlightenment treated it as a self-conscious, conspiratorial project, intending to undermine, if not to destroy, religious and political authority. Although more cautious historians would avoid such a polemical construction, the concept of an overarching "Enlightenment project" still colors our common perceptions of the eighteenth century today. However, in order to grasp fully the contemporary stakes of Enlightenment criticism, we must finally turn to Garrard's sweeping account of multiple Counter-Enlightenments from the eighteenth century to the present.

Counter-Enlightenments

In *Counter-Enlightenments,* Garrard offers a comprehensive chronicle of Counter-Enlightenment voices, ranging from the familiar names of Berlin's account to contemporary postmodern critics of the Enlightenment. Because of his vast time frame, he finds critics of the Enlightenment coming from such diverse and sometimes explicitly contradictory political and philosophical backgrounds that he rejects the notion of any single, coherent object of study called the Counter-Enlightenment. Instead, he suggests we must pluralize Counter-Enlightenment, to examine the numerous different Counter-Enlightenments from the eighteenth century to the present. Despite this pluralization, Garrard finds that all Counter-Enlightenments have in common the allegation that the Enlightenment offered an untenable and ultimately dangerous conception of reason. Following Garrard's example, this entry concludes by exploring some of the major movements and names in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Enlightenment criticism.

Nineteenth-century Romanticism can be understood as a reaction against the Enlightenment. Romantics such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the Vicomte de Chateaubriand viewed Enlightenment reason as cold, dry, and mechanical, sapping the world of beauty, mystery, passion, and romance. A desacralized world was an uninspiring world. Thus the Romantics valorized beauty and passion above scientific and instrumental reason. Many turned to Christianity to provide the kind of meaning and mystery that the Enlightenment nearly destroyed, thus repeating the familiar battle lines of religion versus Enlightenment from the eighteenth century. The concept of desacralization has been taken up in various forms by numerous subsequent thinkers; Max Weber, for example, famously associated modernity with the disenchantment of the world.

Perhaps the most famous nineteenth-century critic of the Enlightenment, according to Garrard, was Friedrich Nietzsche, although his account of the Enlightenment was ultimately complex and ambivalent. In his middle period, Nietzsche explicitly embraced many aspects of the Enlightenment, presenting Voltaire as an intellectual hero. However, in his later writings, the eighteenth century became increasingly associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whom Nietzsche disdained for his sentimental moralism and his egalitarian political sympathies. He compared the eighteenth century unfavorably to the bold and aristocratic seventeenth century. In unmasking the more sadistic and bestial impulses in human nature, Nietzsche also rebuked the placidly optimistic depictions of a rational and benign human nature associated with many Enlightenment thinkers. To whatever extent we might identify an egalitarian and democratic strand within Enlightenment thought, Nietzsche certainly was a vehement critic of such ideas.

Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* remains the touchstone of Enlightenment criticism in the twentieth century, although it can also plausibly be read as an attempt to save the Enlightenment from its own excesses. At the centerpiece of Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis is the concept of instrumental reason, a technical and utilitarian species of reason that can identify the proper means for pursuing an end but cannot designate appropriate ends themselves. When instrumental reason becomes the last form of reason still standing, it authorizes relationships of domination between men and nature, and between men and other men, ultimately serving totalitarianism itself. Yet Horkheimer and Adorno's critique is unique in that they examine "enlightenment" not as a historically specific period term, but as a generic term identifying a particular impulse in Western thought, already identifiable in Odysseus,

the protagonist of Homer's *Odyssey*. When they turn to the eighteenth century, they find that the Marquis de Sade's sadistic but calculating heroine Juliette represents the culmination of enlightenment's dark underside.

After Horkheimer and Adorno, Enlightenment criticism in the twentieth century has splintered in so many directions that it would be impossible to offer an exhaustive account. Feminists have criticized Enlightenment masculinism and phallogocentrism; postmodernists have criticized Enlightenment universalism, progressive history, and naturalism; conservatives in the tradition of Burke have criticized Enlightenment rationalism; postcolonial theorists have criticized Enlightenment imperialism and ethnocentrism. Even some liberals, including Berlin, have taken up the battle against the Enlightenment. Inspired by the Counter-Enlightenment thinkers he examines, Berlin essentially endorses their view of the Enlightenment as shaped by an untenable assumption of a universal human nature and suggests that this assumption undermines such liberal principles as tolerance of diversity and a commitment to pluralism.

Garrard's vast historical survey of Counter-Enlightenments underscores the intensity with which partisans of the Enlightenment and their foes often square off in contemporary academic circles. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century critics of the Enlightenment, by tracing alleged crises of modernity to sources in the Enlightenment, have contributed to the widespread thesis that the Enlightenment represents the intellectual birth of modernity itself. If we accept that modernity is an age in grave crisis, threatened by everything from philosophical nihilism to political totalitarianism and nuclear obliteration, and we also accept the Enlightenment as the intellectual foundation of modernity, then it is tempting to hold the Enlightenment accountable for these modern scourges—hence the extraordinarily high stakes of so much Enlightenment criticism. Hence also the urgency with which twentieth-century partisans of the Enlightenment, such as Peter Gay and Robert Wokler, have risen to its defense. Ultimately, regardless of whether we find the critics of the Enlightenment persuasive, we must acknowledge that they have contributed as much to our common constructions of the Enlightenment itself as its original theorists and their heirs.

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See also Berlin, Isaiah; Burke, Edmund; de Maistre, Joseph Marie; Enlightenment; Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm; Romanticism

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Counter-Reformation

The Counter-Reformation refers to the revitalized Catholic and specifically Thomist thought in the generations after the Council of Trent, which was concentrated at the University of Salamanca and in the educational institutions recently established by the Society of Jesus (Jesuits). This surge in intellectual activity was motivated by the need to address the criticisms leveled against the Catholic Church by the thinkers of the Protestant Reformation, while at the same time defending its traditions against the Reformation's more revolutionary tendencies. The Reformation thinkers were rooted in the late scholastic thinkers under whom they had studied. The political ideas of the Reformation period—Lutheran, Calvinist, Catholic—engaged the ideas of the Renaissance, in particular, the new idea of the centrality of political power or the state.

At the Council of Trent (1545–1547, 1551–1552, 1562–1563), the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, hoped to resolve the religious disputes initiated by Martin Luther (1483–1546) through a church council, which he hoped would find common interpretations of disputed issues. The council comprised expert theologians from traditional religious orders as well as Jesuits.

At the center of the debates at the Council of Trent were competing understandings of human nature, the differences between which would remain central to political philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Since the twelfth century, Aristotle's view of human nature and human flourishing had led many Catholic theologians, most prominently Thomas Aquinas, to see human nature as diminished, rather than corrupted, by original sin. This came to include the thought that human beings could cooperate in their salvation though good works.

Reformation thinkers, by contrast, looked back to the much earlier writings of Augustine. Augustinianism tended to have a pessimistic view of human nature. In association with the temptation and fall of Adam and Eve, mankind inherited original sin, which corrupted human nature. They held that it is impossible for corrupt and fallen humanity to achieve salvation except by the absolute involvement of God's grace. Moreover, Augustine was a Platonist, not an Aristotelian, and the revival of Platonism in the Renaissance played an important role in the development of Reformation thought.

Partly due to the intellectual leadership of the Jesuits, the Council of Trent endorsed the philosophy of human nature of Aquinas and the Aristotelians. This confirmed the rupture with Protestantism, but it also set Catholic theology and social philosophy on a new and firmer footing. Some of the abuses of the medieval church that the Reformation had condemned, including the sale of indulgences, were limited or prohibited.

The Jesuits emerged as perhaps the leading force in Catholic philosophy and education and founded some 700 colleges and universities over the next two centuries. They soon issued the Ratio Studiorum (1599) as the standard of curriculum rooted in the classics, mathematics, Aquinas, and Aristotle.

As Quentin Skinner explains, the constitutionalism of the Counter-Reformation originates in the revival of Thomism in Paris at the beginning of the sixteenth century. This revival was prompted by the teaching of Pierre Crockaert (1450–1514) to the Dominicans at the University of Paris, and it would provide a challenge to the ideology that would eventually produce the Calvinist and Lutheran doctrines. He published a commentary on Aquinas with his student, Francisco de Vitoria (1485–1546), perhaps the most important Counter-Reformation political thinker. His legacy derives primarily from his teachings on international law and on the rights of American Indians against Spanish conquest. Vitoria described four different aspects of law: eternal, natural, positive, and "international" or *jus gentium*. Vitoria developed even further some views hinted in the writings of Aquinas and stressed that the authority to exercise power comes from the community, usually through the operations of its legislative power. Vitoria's views on the origin of rights led to the conclusion that sin did not diminish one's right to private property. This famous conclusion, that Indians were rightful holders of their lands and of governing authority even though they were nonbelievers and therefore sinners, was directed in part against the revolutionary Protestant doctrine that heretical (i.e., in Protestant eyes, Catholic) monarchs could legitimately be overthrown. Vitoria remained 18 years as a Dominican in Paris, returning to Salamanca in 1523. His pupils occupied the chairs at other Spanish universities, and it was from those universities, and later the Roman College, that their views were disseminated throughout the world.

Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) was a Dominican studying with Vitoria in Paris and returned with Vitoria to teach at Salamanca. In December 1545 he attended the reform Council of Trent as Emperor Charles V's theologian. De Soto published *On Justice and Law,* a 10-volume best seller. Vitoria is viewed as a founder of international law, and his arguments were important in rebutting the claims of Juan Ginés de Sepulveda (1490–1573) that Aristotle's concept of "slaves by nature" applied to the Native Americans and justified their conquest and enslavement by the Spanish. Vitoria, Soto, and his entire "school" stated very clearly that all rights were natural and the consequence of God's law. In predominant non-Roman traditions (including John Wyclif, John Huss, and

Luther), rights are seen as merely consequences of God's grace—divine gifts, not a part of a necessary moral order.

The Dominicans and the new Jesuit order entrenched Thomism in the articles of the Council of Trent and thence in Catholicism more broadly. Among the many Jesuit scholars in Spain were Luis de Molina (1535–1600) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621) was one of the rectors of the Roman College and was well read among the Protestants. As an academic and spiritual leader he was an actor during a critical time in the development of the principles of limited power, and he joined other theologians and jurists in helping refine and further disseminate the scholarly work conducted at the University of Salamanca. By 1584, Salamanca had between 6,000 and 7,000 students, and its intellectual influence was immense throughout Europe.

Like the political theories associated with sixteenth-century Protestantism, such as that of the Calvinist monarchomachs, the political theory of Counter-Reformation Catholicism confronted the relatively new institution of the modern sovereign state and the relatively new doctrine of reason of state. The Counter-Reformation reaffirmed Thomist natural law against both, denying that the state was the source of all law and also that political officials could act for purely political reasons without regard for morality or religion. It was friendly to established political orders and not to revolutionary violence, but it remained a potent source of criticism of the turn to absolutism.

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See also Absolutism; Ancient Constitutionalism; Aquinas, Thomas; Monarchomachs; Natural Law; Reason of State; Reformation

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Crimes Against Humanity

Crime against humanity is an offense in international criminal law, adopted in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which tried surviving Nazi leaders in 1945, and is now incorporated in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (the "Rome Statute"). As now defined, the offense consists of various acts—murder, extermination, enslavement, torture, forcible transfers of populations, imprisonment, rape, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid—when these are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on civilian populations. The term also has a broader use in condemning other acts that, in a traditional phrase, "shock the conscience of mankind." World poverty, human-made environmental disasters, and terrorist attacks (such as 9/11) have been described as crimes against humanity. This broader use of the term may be intended simply to register the highest possible level of outrage, or the intention may be to suggest that further legal offenses be added to the list.

Considered either as a legal offense or as a moral category, crime against humanity embodies the important idea that individuals who either make or follow state policy can be held accountable by the international community. It thus modifies traditional ideas of sovereignty, according to which state leaders and those who obeyed them enjoyed immunity. Political and legal theorists have justified this challenge to the idea of sovereignty in several ways. For some, crime against humanity is simply an *inhumanity* of an especially gross type. For others, major atrocities have the potential to damage international peace (for they are either a prelude to external aggression or have effects that spill over state borders). For others, the core notion is genocide—the term *crime against humanity* was first officially used in condemning the Turkish massacres of Armenians in 1915 and first adopted in law as a response to the Nazi Holocaust. Genocidal attacks on people on the basis of group membership implicitly deny the victims' human status, thus affronting all human beings. Yet others reject those views and focus, rather, on the basic nature of state authority: States are justified only by their capacity to protect their citizens, and when their powers turn

atrociously against a state's own citizens, they lose all warrant, and those who direct and obey them become subject to judgment and sanction by the entire human community. How to distribute blame between those who direct and those who follow is, however, a contested issue in both morality and law.

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See also Arendt, Hannah; Collective Responsibility; Cosmopolitanism; Global Justice; Law of Nations; Sovereignty

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Critical Theory

Many theoretical programs, in a variety of fields and disciplines, have a critical component and can therefore be described, and indeed defined as "critical theory." Among those various programs, however, the term also designates more specifically the tradition of critical social inquiry that was initiated at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in the 1920s. This first generation of critical theorists came to be represented by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin, the most famous of the philosophers associated with the institute. After World War II, the critical theory program was continued through the influential oeuvre of Jürgen Habermas, and more recently in the writings of Axel Honneth. These later developments are commonly labeled "second" and "third" generations of critical theory. Because of the initial location of the institute (which is also its current one), this program of critical social inquiry is also referred to as the Frankfurt School.

The name *critical theory* first appeared in an article titled "Traditional and Critical Theory," published in 1937 by Horkheimer, the institute's director at the time. This article was both a retrospective synthesis and a manifesto for future research. In it, Horkheimer identified the distinctive parameters characterizing the collaborative research program conducted at the institute. Even from its early days, however, important shifts—indeed, significant ruptures—affected this intellectual movement. Today the number of authors that can be attached to this tradition and the range of issues they discuss are extremely varied. This heterogeneity is the product of the internal evolution of critical theory itself and of its successful introduction and expansion in countries outside Germany, notably the United States. At the heart of all these developments lies the immense influence played by Habermas, whose theory of communicative action continues to operate within the parameters of the original program as set out by Horkheimer. But a significant aspect of Habermas's impact on critical theory after the war has been to open critical theory to new traditions, especially American pragmatism, analytical theories of language, and political liberalism. This, combined with the quasi-encyclopedic scope of his interventions (hardly any area of theoretical and practical philosophy has not been addressed by him), means that research in critical theory today touches on a vast array of topics, references, and methodologies.

For all these reasons, it seems at first impossible to provide a concise overview of "the political theory of critical theory." One might suspect that it does not designate a unified object but refers only loosely to a set of authors with germane interests and references. However, if we return to Horkheimer's original characterization, which continues to capture the unity and distinctiveness of the critical theory program, and if we focus on the development from the first to the second and third generations, we might well find a useful thread. Accordingly, it seems possible to distinguish between three categories of contemporary critical theorists: authors who address contemporary issues from the perspective of first generation writers; authors for whom critical theory mainly means a critical engagement with Habermas's work; and a third category of writers who attempt to develop a new model of critical theory to implement its traditional program in new ways. If we want to inquire into the "political theory" of critical theory in a contemporary sense, we do not need to focus on the first category of writers. Outstanding

work has been produced in recent decades in studies specifically dedicated to the authors of the first generation, Adorno and Benjamin in particular. But the second and third groups are the decisive ones for an account of the political theory of contemporary critical theory. Before we deal with them, though, it is crucial to outline briefly the main characteristics of the critical theory program as they were first articulated by Horkheimer.

The Critical Theory Program

The distinctiveness of the critical theory program stems directly from its Marxist inspiration, even if that is now often overlooked. In his seminal article, Horkheimer, recasting classical arguments of materialist epistemology, castigated "traditional," that is, positivistic and idealistic, conceptions of theoretical inquiry that treat the latter as if it were radically independent from the social and historical time in which it is conducted.

Horkheimer viewed this as a mistake that produces errors and abstractions not just in the application of theory to practice but within theory itself, specifically in the theory of society. Positivistic and idealistic conceptions of theory lead to the tendency to naturalize the objects studied (facts and laws) and thus to interpret them as though they were not strongly influenced by the general social life in which they are found. By contrast, theory must be "critical," not initially in the sense of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* as a critique of reason's powers by reason alone but in the sense of Marx's critique of political economy, where "critical" therefore is closely related to "dialectical." It is no wonder then that Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is the second fundamental reference, next to Marx, for critical theory. Accordingly, theorists of society must indeed follow the examples of great sociologists like Émile Durkheim and Max Weber and study social facts and laws, but they must do so in dialectical fashion. First, they must highlight in what way these social facts and laws combine to form an unjust and inhuman social world, in what way social life is, as it were, contradicting itself. Then conversely, they must pinpoint the forces present in the social world that carry the promise of a more humane and just future.

Two fundamental implications derive from this vision of the dialectical nature of a "critical theory of society." These two implications are the two features, which, taken together, demarcate critical theory from other forms of social and political theory. Indeed, they form the litmus test in deciding whether a contemporary social or political theory can be called critical theory in a narrow sense.

First, critical theory's methodology is dialectical in the sense that it envisages a substantial link between theory (philosophy) and the empirical social and human sciences (especially sociology and psychology). Theory provides the general conceptual grammar that can unite the diverse descriptions borrowed from the social sciences of the different components of social reality. For the first generation of critical theorists, this general theoretical role was devolved to Marx's historical materialism. Since Habermas, new philosophical and social-theoretical models have replaced the Marxist canon. However, some form of strong relation remains between conceptual inquiry and empirical science. Throughout the generations of critical theory, that relationship between philosophy and empirical science remains one of mutual correction and enrichment. The conceptual framework is not constructed a priori but is informed by the most relevant human and social sciences. Reciprocally, the empirical information receives a new systematic meaning by being integrated and unified in a framework that it cannot independently establish.

The second implication concerns the unity of theory and practice. The historical self-awareness of critical theorists means that they are conscious of participating in the very historical time they study. The relation between social theory and social reality is therefore again a relationship of reciprocal dependence. On the one hand, theorists receive their fundamental impetus from extra-theoretical interests. This means that theorists find leading clues about the reality they study in the experiences of individual and collective dissatisfaction with the existing social order, as well as in the aspirations expressed notably by proponents of social movements for a more just and a more humane social order. On the other hand, theorists also aim for their theories to have practical relevance; they do this by clarifying the core concepts, norms, and values with which to describe social experience, in both its negative and positive aspects.

Post-Habermasian Political Theory

Today the greatest proportion of political research conducted from a critical theory angle relies on the Habermasian framework as an explicit, undisputed presupposition, one that predetermines the objects of study, the core conceptual language, and the fundamental philosophical hypotheses. In order to give an account of critical theory's contribution to political theory, it is therefore necessary to briefly highlight those aspects of Habermasian political theory that constitute its background conditions.

Habermas's most fundamental assumption is the intersubjective nature of the human individual. According to this premise, one becomes a self through interactions with others. The individual internalizes external behavioral patterns and expectations, which gradually give rise to an inner space in which the capacity for reflective self-consciousness can be exercised and developed, leading, at the end of the socialization process, to a concrete personal identity and, ideally, the capacity for autonomous action. Accordingly, to be a subject is structurally to include the perspective of others in one's own perspective. This conception of an "individuation through socialization" is famously buttressed by Habermas's other fundamental assumption, namely, his insistence on the central role played by language in human interaction. This involves his analysis of linguistic communication as operating precisely on the logic of perspective sharing already analyzed in the account of subjective formation. In the end, all dimensions of intersubjective experience, whether in the special case of socialization or in the case of the relations that make up society (what Habermas calls the "lifeworld") depend on the power of language to "decenter" subjects' perspectives and thus ensure that they view the world from the perspective of others. Beyond the potential for deceit and manipulation, communication requires that the agents commit to a number of restricting conditions that basically amount to recognizing the other agents as full partners of communication, individuals to whom they owe truth, respect, and sincerity, and who can, at any moment, reject their claims or demand that they justify them.

This fundamental intuition—that beyond power, violence, and manipulation, human interaction is premised on intersubjective recognition, the recognition of each other by the partners of interaction—was developed at first not for the purpose of a contribution to political theory per se, but rather as a new paradigm to fulfill the original program of critical theory. It was a new entry point into critical social theory. In particular, it allowed Habermas to propound a new critique of contemporary capitalistic society by showing how the institutions characteristic of that society, the market and the bureaucratic state, gradually impinge on the processes of genuine communication that underpin social life. Habermas's first aim was thus to propound a new theory of reification, one however that shed the old Marxist clothes, abandoned the outdated theory of surplus value, and instead fully embraced the linguistic turn. This led him to reformulate the classical ideal of social emancipation in the terms of a communication free of domination. Later on, in the 1980s, the communicative model was brought to bear on moral philosophy, as Habermas took an active part in the debates that were occurring at the time regarding the nature of moral norms and the structure of moral reasoning. It is only at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, in particular as a result of the impact of John Rawls's work, that Habermas used his communicative model to address questions of political theory more specifically. This culminated in the publication in 1992 (first German edition) of *Between Facts and Norms,* one of his most important books. Subsequently, Habermas published a number of seminal essays on political questions, gathered in particular in *The Inclusion of the Other* (1996) and *The Postnational Constellation* (2001). Most of the political thinking developed by contemporary critical theorists lies in the shadow of that magnum opus and the articles that followed.

Of course, earlier critical theorists did not wait for Habermas's interventions in the political philosophy debates of the 1990s and had developed their critical diagnoses of contemporary society into their own critical reflections on politics. In the most general sense, since the critical theory project consisted in the diagnosis of "social pathologies" and aimed to indicate the directions of a more emancipated social life, it always contained a significant political dimension. Already the demand for a unity of theory and practice inherited from Marx and which forms, as we have seen, a characteristic feature of the critical theory project, pointed to its inherent political aims. Furthermore,

the "left Hegelian" grounding of critical theory has a direct, critical implication in its relation to political philosophy. It entails a fundamental methodological suspicion toward all approaches to political theory that aim to conduct it as a separate discipline, severed from social theory and social criticism. This suspicion has remained alive from the first generation of the Frankfurt School, through Habermas's entire work and continuing to the most recent writings, notably the work of Honneth.

The political theory developed by Habermas after his 1992 magnum opus combines a largely sympathetic reception of Rawls's political liberalism with methodological premises stemming from his critical theory background, notably the left Hegelian suspicions just mentioned. In fact Habermas's turn toward political theory was not simply dictated externally by the resurgence of the discipline as a result of Rawls's seminal intervention. It was also a logical, internal development of his social theory premised on the model of communicative action. The ideal of a communication free of domination provides a normative model for practical interactions between human individuals, in other words, a model for moral or social philosophy. But it is also, very simply, a way of defining democratic practices. Habermas's "communicative" correction of critical theory, that is, the strong emphasis he puts on the equality and freedom of the partners involved in social interaction, thus implied making explicit and articulating fully the internal link that already existed between critical theory and democratic theory. At the same time though, the left Hegelian origins of Habermas's project, which insist on the social preconditions of politics, continued to exert a strong influence on his arguments. As a result, his model of deliberative democracy coincides with none of the other competing models, liberal, communitarian, republican, or other.

Today, a great deal of the research conducted by critical theorists consists in extending the dialogue between the communicative approach and other approaches to political theory, in particular by working out the differences and overlaps between various models of democracy. This has implications in terms of substantive, political questions, for example, in terms of the link between democratic life and the critique of contemporary social and economic phenomena. More often than not, though, the debates are of a more conceptual and methodological nature, relating to the analysis of political norms, the definition of justice, and the method used in normative justification (e.g., in the criticism of Rawls's constructivist approach). Rainer Forst in Germany and James Bohman in the United States are the most prominent representatives of this line of inquiry.

Another internal line of development was already present in Habermas's theory of communicative action, this time in relation to the issues that arise with the tensions between, on the one hand, the definition of normativity as universalizability, following the pressure of sharing perspectives, and on the other, the boundaries of the community concerned by the application of norms. Following the communicative hypothesis, the normative value of an action is defined in terms of the procedure by which it is ensured that the action actually takes into consideration the interests of others affected by it. It then becomes arbitrary to limit the range of normative application to specific groups, for example to the nation-state, in the case of democratic action, or to a majority culture in a multicultural society. The logic of Habermas's communicative approach to ethics and politics, which constantly decenters the perspective and enlarges the boundaries of the community of value, chimes in substantially with real trends occurring in the contemporary world, notably as a result of globalization. By embracing Habermas's approach, contemporary critical theory has been particularly well-placed to make significant contributions to a number of pressing debates in political theory. These include challenges to democratic ideals and practices arising from the questioning of the nation-state as the ultimate *locus* of popular sovereignty; the new "claims of culture," following the emergence of multicultural societies and the problem of the legal, cultural, and social treatment of nonnationals, migrants, and refugees; the shape of global democratic politics—in particular the question of the institutional structure and evolution of the European Union as the first transnational democratic space; the difficulties involved in creating a new, valid framework for international law; and the problem of cosmopolitan solidarity. On all these issues, the work of Seyla Benhabib, James Bohman, Hauke Brunkhorst, David Held and Max

Pensky, to cite only some of the most important contributors, has been decisive.

Despite its deep democratic features, however, Habermas's quasi-transcendental approach, which defines the ideal presuppositions under which communication is possible, has been consistently suspected of not dealing sufficiently with the problem of its relation to empirical application and of overlooking too easily the issue of power and social domination. A third major area of activity in contemporary critical theory has therefore consisted in a series of internal criticisms targeted at the Habermasian framework from the perspective of those groups who have been historically excluded from the circle of the participants in communicative action. In particular, a great deal of significant work has developed Habermasian themes and arguments in confrontation with feminist concerns. Of particular note in this respect is the work of Nancy Fraser, who initially based her immanent critique of Habermas in a feminist perspective, borrowing elements from other traditions such as Weberian sociology and poststructuralism. She has extended her critical reappropriation of Habermas's politics to develop an exhaustive analytical model of the forms of contemporary injustice and the implication of the multifaceted aspect of contemporary injustice for radical democratic politics. By defining the norm of justice as capacity to "participate" in social life, Fraser has been able to correct and complement Habermas's theory of democracy by integrating concerns about economic exclusion and cultural misrecognition, thus making room within the analytical framework for these significant forms of contemporary injustice.

Honneth's Theory of Recognition

As said, most of the work in critical theory today is conducted either within the frameworks of first generation writers, or by taking Habermas's writings as the fundamental departure point. By contrast, the work of Honneth stands out as a profound innovation in the field, offering a truly new paradigm, one that also manages to remain deeply faithful to the initial program. Honneth is the current director of the Frankfurt Institute and continues to foster an interdisciplinary research program as advocated by his illustrious predecessors.

Honneth's theory of recognition arises from a deep dissatisfaction with some of the central features of Habermas's communicative theory. At the most basic level, Honneth agrees with Habermas in describing social life as a web of intersubjective relations. Honneth departs from Habermas in the immediate identification of intersubjective interaction with discursive communication. The emphasis on linguistic exchange as the sole medium, indeed as the paradigm, of normative interactions brings with it serious drawbacks for a critical theory of society, especially in its political implications. For example, it leads to an interpretation of social pathologies as distortions of communication, which does not correspond to the participants' actual experiences of domination and injustice. The suffering caused by poverty, racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression does not just involve exclusion from public discourse but consists also of attacks on the conditions of subjective identity and well-being.

At the political level, the emphasis on open and rational structures of public discourse leads to a proceduralist approach, which reduces problems of democratic theory to issues of proper process in public will formation. This latter dimension is certainly an important one for politics, but it underestimates its key precondition, namely, the social conditions of political participation and the reciprocal links between social and political exclusion. In particular, the emphasis on rational justification as the touchstone of political normativity runs the risk of entrenching the exclusion of forms of social experience from the circle of the politically relevant. Put more simply, the fact that some forms of social experience might not be expressed in the proper normative language should not necessarily rule them out, and conversely, there is a suspicion, well supported by critical sociology, that the language games of normative justification are, to a large extent, socially acquired, if not socially defined.

As a result of his discontent with Habermas's communicative approach to politics, Honneth has proposed a new paradigm in critical theory to fulfill its initial program. Habermas's key intervention consisted of replacing the old Marxist paradigm of production with that of communication. With that shift, he made it possible for critical theory to reconnect with the phenomenology of social experience, a crucial move for social and

political theory. Honneth proposes to radicalize the communicative turn by interpreting intersubjective interaction not as communication but as recognition.

As in Habermas, the subject, society, and politics are internally related through their sharing of an identical normative core. At first, recognition indicates the fundamental forms of interaction that enable a subject to develop "positive relationships to himself," that is, those basic dimensions of self-worth without which it is impossible for a subject to articulate, let alone attempt to accomplish, his or her own conceptions of the good life. In short, they are the conditions of practical identity and autonomy. Because of the intersubjective dependence of the subject, "positive self-relations" depend structurally on the quality of the interactions with socially encountered others. Recognition names the different ways in which society can positively affirm, or in the case of social pathologies, disregard or misrepresent, subjective capacities and identity features. The dependence of the subject on social recognition for his or her fulfillment means that the norms of subjective well-being are at the same time norms of social life. Affirmative forms of interaction create the conditions for practical identity and subjective autonomy defined not just as self-determination but also as self-realization. On the other hand, social pathologies can be redefined as forms of social interaction that prevent the creation of strong enough subjective identities, because they look upon in negative ways—or simply fail to look at and register at the societal level—subjective traits and capacities. Social psychology and social theory thus combined translate into an alternative approach to political theory as Honneth turns to the issue of the rise of social movements. In the right cultural and social circumstances, subjects who suffer from systematic denials of recognition have the means to realize that their subjective suffering is due to social causes, that their subjective plight is in fact that of a whole group. Consequently, if circumstances are favorable, they can form a collective identity around a specific wrong and turn toward society to demand that the denial of recognition or the misrecognition they suffer be corrected and that they be granted true recognition of who they are (identity conflicts) or of what they do (notably in conflicts about work and redistribution).

Like all the authors in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, Honneth refuses to devise the normative core of his theory ahistorically. Indeed it is in the real "struggles for recognition" that the theorist finds historical instantiations of the fundamental types of recognition that are at stake for modern subjects. The first type of recognition is provided by the limited interaction that occurs in the intimate sphere, a sphere that has separated itself from other social spheres in modernity. In this sphere, capacities are developed that are necessary for subjects to develop the self-confidence required to engage in the social world. Beyond the family, by far the largest area in which social struggles have been waged in the past concerns the denial of, and demand for, rights. Mostly, the demand for legal recognition concerns the claim of individuals to be considered as equals to all others. This claim, underpinned by the norm of universal equality, can be couched in strict universalistic terms, notably when groups demand to be given rights that have been granted to other groups. But the egalitarian claim can also lead to claims for special treatment when the exercise of universally accepted social functions cannot be performed without special consideration. Finally, struggles for recognition have also historically challenged systems of value in which certain types of contribution to the social division of labor have not received their due acknowledgment. This corresponds to the demand of an individual not only to be respected like any other human being but also to have his or her specific contribution to social life recognized as such.

Like his predecessors, Honneth was initially interested in social criticism rather than political theory strictly speaking. Thus, his contribution to political theory has been limited to a number of issues. Questions about the history, nature, and value of different constitutional arrangements and questions about the relations between the different arms of government, or even the normative origin of the law—all issues in which Habermas has made significant contributions in recent years—remain uncharted territory for the theory of recognition. On other issues, however, the approach in terms of recognition brings substantive new insights. To begin with, the political theory that results from the turn to recognition is more clearly demarcated from political liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism than most of its post-Habermasian

counterparts. Honneth's concerns are always about the social foundations of political life. This defines a substantial critical vantage point toward theories of justice whose main concern is normative consistency, as well as theories that emphasize only the social embeddedness of the individual (communitarianism) or his or her political dependency (republicanism), without making sufficient room for the structures of domination. The old Marxist critique of the abstraction and bad idealism of political thinking that does not relate its definition of political norms to the reality of society finds a most striking reincarnation, in a new vocabulary, in the theory of recognition.

But the insistence on social life as the ground of politics also leads to a positive new direction in contemporary political theory. Honneth thus propounds a threefold theory of justice, revolving on three equally important normative principles that can guide particular political movements. The conflict that arises between the principles of justice, rather than representing an embarrassment for the theory of recognition, is in fact one of its strengths. For, rather than attempting to subordinate one principle to another, it articulates one of the main normative problems of modern societies, namely, the conflicts between principles that seem equally justified.

The insistence on the social conditions of politics also enables Honneth to reintegrate questions that had disappeared from political theory after its normative turn. His emphasis on struggles for recognition not only highlights the historical role of social movements in modern history; it also connects political theory with studies in political sociology that analyze the mechanisms by which individuals and groups overcome psychological, institutional, and social obstacles to organize collective action. Similarly, work and the division of labor take center stage once again, not only as major areas of contemporary political confrontation but also, on a conceptual level, as the central social institutions in which democratic participation is rooted. Not only is the recognition of one's contribution to socially defined labor one of the key demands of modern social movements (especially feminism), but following Dewey's conception of democratic social life, Honneth sees the division of labor as the most important area of social life in which citizens develop the motivations and capacities to engage in politics. The political theory of recognition thus reformulates, in a new version, the old idea that is at the heart of critical theory. Democracy is more than just a set of political procedures. It is in fact a social ideal, a vision of what just and humane relations between beings associated through their shared social life should be like.

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See also Critique; Habermas, Jürgen; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Politics of Recognition; Public Sphere; Rawls, John

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Critique

Critique is the reflective assessment by human beings of their own capabilities and limits, and of the principles informing their thoughts, creations, and actions. It was introduced as a technical term in philosophy by Immanuel Kant. The activity of critique was given a political bearing in the work of the left Hegelians, principally Karl Marx. In the twentieth century, the task of "critiquing" social and political formations was taken up by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School of Social Research. Since World War II, *critique* has taken on a more diffuse meaning. Today it is often used to describe the work of structuralists, poststructuralists, and hermeneuticians. This entry traces the genealogy and changing meanings of critique since Kant. Emphasis is placed on its intersections with political theory, in the work of Marx and the critical theorists.

The Kantian Model of Critique

The English word *critique* is a translation of the German *Kritik*. It has its roots in the Greek notion of *Krisis*. *Krisis* connotes a decision, choice, or judgment, and dissent or controversy. The Kantian notion of critique adapts the earlier modern understanding of the criticism of works of culture. Its central form of argument, the "transcendental deduction," is adapted from later Roman jurisprudence. Kant wrote three ground-breaking critiques: of "pure" (or theoretical) reason, of "practical" (or moral) reasoning, and of aesthetic and teleological judgment.

To critique a human capacity, on the Kantian model, is to show both its limits and its "conditions of possibility." In *Critique of Pure Reason,* for instance, Kant argues that humans cannot know things as they are "in themselves" (independently of our perception of them) or the truth of the whole of nature. Nor can we attain knowledge of the objects of our reason's highest hopes or of previous metaphysics: God, the soul, the highest good, or life after death. The reason is that one necessary precondition of our theoretically knowing things is that they can be experienced empirically by us. Our understanding applies rules (the famous "categories") to the manifold sense data: and if we try to apply these categories to supersensuous objects like God, Kant argues, we are necessarily led into confusions.

Critique as Kant initiated it is a distinctly modern form of philosophical thought. It is an exercise in self-reflection: registering the scope and finitude of human reason and our other capabilities "within the bounds of reason alone," rather than against inherited metaphysical or religious beliefs. At the same time, Kant balances his critique of our ability to achieve theoretical knowledge of supersensible things like God, the soul, and the highest good against the assertion that our moral experiences nevertheless give us good reasons to postulate the existence of these things. With Kant, critique thus issues in a "primacy of practical reason" different from Bacon's and Descartes' earlier gearing of scientific knowledge to the human interest in mastering, rather than contemplating, external nature.

Marx and Hegel

Kant assured the political authorities of his day that critique did not aim to undermine religion. Its aim was to make room for faith by showing that reason cannot authoritatively judge on matters of religious concern and indeed that reason can provide good justifications for religious hope. The left Hegelians, and principally Marx, radicalized the meaning of critique they inherited from Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and gave it a more directly political object and significance. According to Marx, all critique should begin with the critique of religion, and religious hope should be redirected to the secular political project of actively creating a better world.

Hegel had accepted Kant's argument that the way we experience the world is structured by the

categories of our understanding. However, unlike Kant, Hegel "historicized" these categories, arguing that the concepts that structure people's experiences in the world change historically. In *The Phenomenology of Geist,* Hegel also importantly argued that people's shared religious beliefs, social customs, and political institutions—the concerns reserved for traditional political philosophy—have epistemological relevance. Hegel's claim is that these sociopolitical conditions reflect and actively shape peoples' theoretical and practical understandings of the world. For instance, the great conceptual oppositions in modern philosophers like Kant or Johann Gottlieb Fichte's systems—between appearance and reality, theory and practice, sense experience and reason—are read by the young Hegel as reflecting the great modern social divisions between economy and state, private and public, bourgeois and citizen. Hegel thus in effect inaugurates a different, specifically social-theoretical take on the primacy of practical reason from Kantian critique.

The word *critique* does not appear in the titles of any of Hegel's works. Yet Hegel's method of dialectical reasoning, taken up by Marx, also clearly reflects a Kantian heritage. Hegel's method is to show how, in all previous human self-understandings, the way people have interpreted the world was contradicted by that position's own deeper presuppositions. The dialectical philosopher hence conducts an immanent critique of all such divided perspectives. His task is to reflectively posit these intellectual and sociopolitical presuppositions, just as Kantian critique had uncovered the categories at work structuring our experience of the world.

The left Hegelians adapted and radicalized these Hegelian developments of critique—the historicizing and socializing of the Kantian categories, and the method of immanent critique. Karl Marx was the decisive figure in bringing critique to political philosophy. Nearly every work Marx wrote has the word *critique* in its title or subtitle. Several models of critique are discernible in his writings.

Like Hegel, Marx argued against any approach—like Kant's or (as Marx alleged) Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach's—which analyzed human capabilities and beliefs as if individuals could or did exist outside of evolving, historical political communities. But Marx also adapted an important, romantic idea present in Hegel's work. This is the idea that man is an expressive being, who externalizes his essence in the products of his labor, so as to make himself at home in the world—by recognizing the stamp of his own creativity in the products and institutions he creates. For Marx, however, this idea licensed turning Hegel's idealistic philosophy on its head and defending a specifically materialist understanding of human history. The history of human industry, Marx claimed, is the history of humans' "species-being" and capacities writ large. Before humans construct ways of understanding the world, they must, in political societies, transform the material world to meet their needs as finite, embodied beings. In all of Marx's work, then, the goal of critiquing people's beliefs and practices is to remind people of the determining primacy of their social and political experience. Philosophers should no longer seek merely to interpret the world. Kant's primacy of practical reason becomes in Marx the famous injunction for philosophy to change it, supporting the revolutionary transformation of the material, sociopolitical causes of people's sufferings and illusions.

The young Marx's *1844 Philosophical Manuscripts* undertakes the famous critique of alienated labor. For Marx, labor is a social activity wherein the laborer, in conjunction with others, transforms the material world in accordance with their shared ideas and capacities. The understanding of man as a laboring animal thus posits a normative ideal. This is a society wherein the products of people's labor would express and reflect their human species-being. However, in a capitalist economy, the people who produce the wealth of society (workers) do not own what they produce. Work becomes increasingly mechanized and specialized, so people's capabilities are less and less reflected in their work, and they have less and less need to relate to one another. Workers come to live for their spare time and begrudge labor rather than seeing it as what is most distinctly human and worthy in our lives. Indeed, in market societies, our capacity to work is objectified as a quantifiable commodity, like any other thing, to be bought and sold on "labor markets."

Although this is disputed by Althusserian Marxists, Marx's expressivist conception of labor is related to Marx's famous critique of "commodity fetishism" in the first chapter of *Capital.* Rather

than producing and exchanging things to serve our needs, says Marx, we produce them solely for their exchange value, embodied in money (this is the technical meaning of *commodity*). Marx's claim is that in capitalist societies we thus come to attribute the same type of quasi-human characteristics to commodities that older societies attributed to the gods, totems, and other idols they fetishized: Your capital can, for instance, work for you by acquiring interest, it can open doors for you in society, it can confer power and prestige, and so on. What we forget in our fetishizing of commodities are the social relations at play beneath economic exchanges, including the origin of exchange value in human labor (an idea Marx takes from Locke and David Ricardo).

The critiques of alienation and commodity fetishism aim to show "the human bottom to nonhuman things," as Horkheimer would later describe the goal of Marxian critique. Like Feuerbach's earlier critique of religious beliefs, the aim is to make people aware of how what they believe to be alien to them (the modern economic system and money) is actually a human, social creation. The critique of alienation thus also anticipates Marx's notion of the critique of ideology, introduced in *The German Ideology* of 1847. Marx's deepest idea in this text is that the ideologies of political systems are recognizable because of the false consciousness they produce in subjects. The idea here is that, for an unjust political system to motivate subjects to continue supporting the regime, the system must produce ideas that misrepresent the way society works, conceal its less palatable aspects, or—as with religions—simply distract from political concerns. When subjects look at the world through ideologies, says the Marx of 1847, it is as if they look through a *camera obscura* and can only see the truth in a distorted, illusory form.

The final model of critique in Marx is the critique of bourgeois political economy. It has three registers. First, Marx argues that one way of thinking about economics that can treat labor as a commodity, and economic laws as just as binding as natural laws, expresses people's alienation from their species-being as active, laboring beings who can change the world. Second, Marx adopts the idea of immanent critique from Hegel to contend that the capitalist system harbors its own, contradictory "crisis tendencies": principally, the tendency of rates of profit to fall. Third, Marx claims that the semblance of equal contractual exchange in market societies conceals the actuality of unequal exchange in the exploitation of labor. Marx's critique of exploitation argues that the way profit is initially generated is, for example, by business owners employing people for 10 hours a day but paying them a wage equivalent to the value of what they produced in 7 hours. The laborer's alternative is the poverty and uncertainties associated with unemployment. In exploiting the weak bargaining position of laborers, the final 3 hours of labor represent a pure profit for the business owner. Like the critique of commodity fetishism, the critique of exploitation aims at revealing the social relations concealed behind the Edenic realm of exchange, apparently ruled only by "freedom, equality and Bentham" (Marx, *Capital*).

The Frankfurt School

Critique in the lineage of Marx became central in twentieth-century political theory through the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School of Social Research: principally, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. In Horkheimer's famous 1937 essay "Traditional and Critical Theory," critical theory is positioned in terms of long-standing German epistemological debates. For Horkheimer, traditional theory refers to both the natural sciences and those social sciences, including economics, that analyze society with the same "objectivity" as the experimental natural sciences. Horkheimer agrees with contemporary philosophical schools like existentialism and *Lebensphilosophie* that to look at human beings and societies in this way is implicitly dehumanizing. However, critical theory also targets such philosophies, whose emphasis on individual authenticity or a vitalistic, irrational metaphysics are read as distorted ideological reflections of a socioeconomic system that is experienced by subjects as out of their personal control. Critical theory is theory that recognizes, after Marx, that political societies and beliefs are products of human creativity—and also that the activity of the theorist is one part of the society he or she critiques. It conducts an immanent critique of modern society, measuring its actualities against the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity in the great revolutionary declarations of the eighteenth

century. Critical theory is hence distinguished from other philosophical positions, Horkheimer contends, because it adapts the ancient ideal of a good and happy life, replacing it with the normative ideal of a free, nonalienated society. Its principal addressee is the working classes, still seen in the prewar years as the harbingers of revolutionary change to a socialist society.

Following the rise of Nazism in Europe, Stalinism in Russia, and World War II, the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School became increasingly preoccupied with trying to understand the preconditions for political authoritarianism. In the context of repeated political disappointments, the nature of their critiques also changed. Reflecting the influence of Weber and Georg Lukács, the critique of instrumental reason came to replace Horkheimer's Hegelian Marxism by the early 1940s. Principally in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* by Adorno and Horkheimer, the idea of immanent critique is also supplanted by a critique of Western rationalization, beginning with Homer. Reason's critical capacity disappears in this model behind a conception of reason as "mythic fear turned radical"—a means whereby humans set out to master external nature but end by subduing their own inner nature and objectifying their fellow human beings. Such a critique notably embraces all modern political regimes, whether liberal or communist.

At this terminus, as later Frankfurt School thinkers (principally Habermas) have argued, the normative and political pivot of critique becomes unclear, as well as the status of the critical theorists' own reasoning. However, the shift from an immanent critique of liberalism to a total critique of Western civilization brings the Frankfurt School's work into close proximity with the French poststructuralists of the late 1960s. Thinkers like Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, or Jacques Derrida—whose works are today widely described as involving critique—were influenced heavily by Martin Heidegger's deconstruction of Western philosophy as leading to the domination of technological rationality. Like the later writings of Adorno and Horkheimer, critique in a poststructuralist mold aims to uncover the hidden violence, contradictions, and what is excluded (the "Other") in predominant philosophical and political ideas. As in the later Frankfurt School writings, however, the political implications of these critiques and their link with real political movements (like the labor movement) are unclear.

Matthew Sharpe

See also Critical Theory; Habermas, Jürgen; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Ideology; Kant, Immanuel; Marx, Karl; Marxism

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Culture

In contemporary political theory, *culture* appears most—or rather *cultures* appear most—in discussions about whether liberalism can or should accommodate, or even foster, multiculturalism. When understood as an overarching way of life that gives sense and significance to those who live it, culture may unsettle liberalism, the dominant political doctrine of our times, and its contemporary expression as the separation of the right and the good. However, both these discussions and this understanding of culture emerged only recently and after several centuries of rich engagement with the idea of culture. Although contemporary discussions are doubtlessly better situated and critiqued against this historical backdrop, this history is important in its own right. This history also points to other important themes of, or approaches to, political theory.

Culture and Nature

Before Europeans began to use it in the plural in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the word *culture* was used more or less interchangeably with *civilizatio*n. Both of these terms were opposed to

the term *nature*. The discovery of the New World led to the articulation of a contrast between the newly discovered "natural humans" and the more cultivated or civilized Europeans who had supplemented nature with art or artifice. Indeed, the doctrine of discovery was bound up with both beliefs in the cultural superiority of Europeans and the "naturalization" of native Americans. The perceived egalitarianism of natural native Americans went along with assertions of the equality of men in a "state of nature"—assertions that figured prominently in most social contract theory. Accounts of humanity in terms of stages of development accompanied the nature–culture opposition. As illustrated by the expression "noble savage"—most often associated with Michel de Montaigne and Jean-Jacques Rousseau—the movement of human beings from nature to culture could be construed as fall or corruption and not simply as unproblematic progress.

Culture and Human Plurality

While "noble savage" thinking made possible criticism of European civilization, the belief that all human beings are necessarily cultural (i.e., that art or artifice belongs to them from the beginning) supported the most genuine and careful concern for native peoples, such as Denis Diderot's anti-imperialism. In addition, the denial that some peoples lack culture called into question universal histories that placed all peoples on the same developmental road and led to assertions of the superiority of some peoples over others. For instance, although the eighteenth-century Johann Gottfried Herder did not use *Kultur* in the plural, his thought led to the emergence of culture as a designation for different national ways of life, not necessarily fixed or homogenous, tied to different languages. Culture, now pluralized, emerged as a word that affirmed the valorization of a deep human plurality.

Culture and Civilization

Whereas the terms *culture* and *civilization* tended to be used interchangeably in the eighteenth century, they parted ways in the nineteenth century, particularly in German thought where they became opposites. *Kultur* tended to be associated with community (*Gemeinschaft*) and with art and literature, that is, spiritual or cultivation. *Zivilization* tended to be associated with (industrial) society (*Gesellschaft*) and with science and commerce, that is, technical advancement. This opposition emerged as well in the writings of British thinkers, many of whom were influenced by German Romantic thought. Culture, by way of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Thomas Carlyle, led to John Stuart Mill's reaction against, and refinement of, Benthamite utilitarianism. And by way of such thinkers as William Morris, culture led to radical, though not yet Marxist, critiques of capitalism. Culture pointed to the goods that were threatened by the advent of industrialism and modernity, whereas civilization sometimes pointed to the very evils of industrialism and modernity, particularly those later tied to instrumental reason by members of the Frankfurt School and others.

Leaving Culture Behind

The use of culture in the plural in the latter half of the nineteenth century to designate different ways of life led to a curious reversal in the twentieth century. As opposed to its prior use, culture was now used to designate the objects of anthropological study. "Culturalization" rather than "naturalization" became the plight of aboriginal peoples and of minority groups. For instance, the "right to culture" in international law, aside from questions of language, concerns primarily aboriginal rights to land. This "culturalization" of others also made its way into mainstream political discourse. Majority groups came to be construed, often implicitly, as without culture in opposition to the various "cultural communities" that required toleration or inclusion. The leaving behind of one's particular culture or culture of origin was now a mark of superiority or advancement.

Cultural Studies

The twentieth century also saw a proliferation of culture. Although in the nineteenth century, culture had emerged to designate different ways of life, these (mostly national) ways of life tended to be associated with high culture. On the other hand, the twentieth century saw the rise of mass culture, of the culture industry—and of a new discipline or approach, rooted in Marxism, that

turned to the study of popular culture: cultural studies. Usually associated with such names as Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, cultural studies is more a set of concerns and approaches than a homogenous school of thought. Cultural studies has impacted or complemented political theory by shifting the focus away from canonical texts to questions of mediation and representation in everyday practices and objects, such as hip hop music or Hollywood movies. For better or worse, cultural studies has contributed to the introduction of "subjectivity" into political-theoretical discourse. Many political theorists now concern themselves with questions of identity or subject formation—and with the relation of culture to power—in addition to, or instead of, engaging in normative theorizing.

Mark Antaki

See also Colonialism; Community; Essentialism; Identity; Liberalism; Multiculturalism; Multiplicity; Orientalism; Other; Politics of Recognition; Postmaterialism; Romanticism

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Cynics

The term *cynic* originates from the Greek word for dog (*kyôn*), the most shameless animal according to Greek proverbs; it was originally attributed derisively to candid and shameless behavior. Diogenes of Sinope (412/403–324/321 BCE), however, adopted it as a positive description of the type of living he was advocating, which was characterized by the devaluation of every aspect of human convention and political structure. Diminishing contemporary philosophical schools for their intellectualism and systematization, Diogenes was preaching for a way of life, and his example became the source for a variety of attitudes and degrees of adoption. Cynics were critical of social and political arrangements, professing instead a cosmopolitan utopia and communal anarchism.

"Eudemonistic" self-sufficiency (individual "human flourishing") and primitive asceticism are the twin pillars of Cynicism. Ancient doxography stressed a philosophical lineage that Socrates had founded, presenting Diogenes as the nexus from Socrates to the Stoics. Antisthenes (445–365 BCE), one of Socrates' followers, whose famous eulogy of self-sufficiency is reported by Xenophon (*Symposium,* 4.34–4.44), was presented as a proto-Cynic and the fictitious teacher of Diogenes. Zeno of Citium (334–262 BCE), the founder of Stoicism, was portrayed as having been taught by Diogenes' student, Crates of Thebes (365–285 BCE). Alternatively, Diogenes' extreme asceticism, an ardently antipolitical stance, has been interpreted as a radical deprecation of conventional morality and intellectualism. Soft eudemonistic and hard ascetic coexisted in Cynicism almost harmoniously, and although Diogenes' ascetic life presented itself as the exemplar par excellence, it did not necessarily have to be adopted in its extreme form by other confirmed Cynics.

Diogenes' family had been exiled from Sinope for adulterating the *nomisma* (Greek for "coinage" but etymologically close to the term *nomos,* which means law and convention). This accusation evolved into the driven motto of Cynicism and was fully exemplified in Diogenes' falsification and reversal of every conventional value—intellectual, social, political, legal, economic, and aesthetic. By rendering all external goods, social as well as material, as unnecessary and active obstacles for self-sufficiency, he opted for a life according to nature that was alien to all forms of convention. Still, his personal salvation could not satisfy him; driven by a strong "philanthropic" conviction, he also demanded the liberation of his fellow-beings from their conventional illusions and spared no expense on this goal, even abusing and harassing his contemporaries. Although equality was an entailment of his primitive utopia, he denied equality to the

polloi of his time, whom he compared unfavorably to barbarians and animals, due to their corruption by convention.

The central points of Diogenes' political theory survive in a brief report (*Lives of Eminent Philosophers,* VI.72) of his lost utopian work, *Republic:* (a) abolishment of property, (b) deprecation of social and legal conventions, (c) ludicrousness of social values, (d) primitive cosmopolitanism, and (e) dismissal of family relations. His cosmopolitan proposal—(d)—was supported by a plea for a form of austere communism—(a) and—(e)—and by the abolition of conventional social values and their justification—(b) and (c).

On the social level, Cynicism ascribes to a communal ideal, which is instrumental in the rejection of the emotional and economic hierarchy intrinsically associated with the Greek household. Those aspiring to conventionalism embraced indifference to material possessions, whereas membership to the Cynic fellowship entailed free access to, but not ownership of, material goods, as well as approval of stealing and begging, practices that Diogenes carried out regularly. Crates and some Cynics of the Roman era opted for milder ways of expressing their indifference to material goods, namely, by endorsing redistribution of wealth or generous donations of personal property to the needy. Diogenes would have probably condemned those attitudes for setting store upon material goods. Analogously, Diogenes' radical repudiation of conventional family was twofold: aversion to natural equality, as family relations were always hierarchical, and compromise of its members' self-sufficiency by intensive and distractive desires. Still, the union between Crates and Hipparchia—their doglike marriage, as both friends and enemies characterized it—was presented as an alternative form of association free from the previously mentioned risks.

On the political level, Diogenes was a radical anarchist: The destruction of the state—which, owing to its hierarchical nature, was the cause of a plethora of misfortunes—was presented as the only salvation for the human species, the members of which were naturally disposed to be foreigners in every single state. Democracy and freedom were equally problematic: They should be rejected for compromising self-sufficiency because of the duties they entail, whereas the rights they come with are unnecessary and indifferent to a Cynic.

It comes as a surprise that Diogenes was the founder of cosmopolitanism and the person who coined the term *kosmopolitês* (*Lives of Eminent Philosophers,* VI.63). Still, his conception is different from our modern understanding, which takes its origin from Stoicism: Instead of the cosmopolitan's positive easiness with, and acceptance of, every conventional culture and state, the Cynic *kosmopolitês* endorses a negative, apolitical ethos that admits allegiance only to the natural order of the cosmos. Although Diogenes again defaced the conventional—this time by attacking the state—and introduced the politics of nature, he influenced a number of radically different positive conceptions: Zeno's Stoic *Republic* introduced the type of cosmopolitanism we are familiar with, while several Cynics discovered the cosmopolitan ideal in Hellenistic kingdoms, in which they often served as court philosophers.

Charilaos Platanakis

See also Anarchism; City-State; Cosmopolitanism; Property; State of Nature; Utopianism

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D

Dahl, Robert (1915–)

Robert Dahl is one of the most renowned American political scientists of the twentieth century, with a long and distinguished career at Yale University. From his association in the 1950s and 1960s with the behavioral movement in political science to his recent work, Dahl's corpus forms a relentless and strikingly consistent analysis of the nature and workings of contemporary—predominantly American—democracy. Most notably, this preoccupation has involved the construction, revising, and restating of the theory of polyarchy.

An early statement of this theory was in *Preface to Democratic Theory*. This short book laid out the theory of polyarchy in contrast to a Madisonian theory of democracy, which Dahl thought exaggerated the importance of constitutional checks and balances for a well-functioning polity, while it underestimated the importance of "social checks and balances" in a pluralistic society. The theory of polyarchy was also contrasted with a "populistic" theory of democracy that sought to maximize the ideals of political equality and popular sovereignty. Instead, an empirically adequate theory of democracy for a pluralistic society should seek to establish "a set of limiting conditions to be approached" as to the control exercised by citizens over the process of political decision making.

Among the conditions Dahl identified were participation in political decisions, political equality, control over alternatives scheduled for decision, and information about the alternatives scheduled, conditions never maximized by existing democracies, but on the basis of which different countries and organizations could be ordered according to their relative ranking. Dahl defined *polyarchy* loosely as a political system in which such conditions are present "to a relatively high degree." Underpinning this definition was a pluralist vision of American democracy as a decision-making process involving a plurality of groups, all seeking to advance their goals, typically at the expense of other groups. Dahl also explained that democratic politics was "merely the chaff," a "surface manifestation, representing superficial conflicts," beneath which was a more fundamental consensus on "the rules of the game" in the political process, as well as on matters of policy. Such consensus, Dahl claimed, "usually exists in the society among a predominant portion of the politically active members."

In the early 1960s, the *Preface* was met with critique. Dahl had little to say about, and showed little interest in, what went on outside the stratum of the politically active members of society, and elsewhere; he explained that a well-functioning polyarchy did not require extensive citizen participation, but rather the reverse: institutionalized bargaining among the politically active members of society, within the context of an apathetic majority. Extensive political participation might even threaten the consensus necessary for polyarchy, Dahl suggested in the *Preface* by reference to research linking "authoritarian predispositions" to socioeconomic class, so that with an increase in political participation, one might expect a

decline in "consensus on the basic norms among the politically active."

Often advocating participatory democracy, critics argued that what Dahl construed as apathy was the result of an elite bias in polyarchal democracy, a bias sustained and justified by the theory of polyarchy. This critique was further fueled by Dahl's engagement with sociological studies of community power, works by Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills. In *Who Governs?,* Dahl critiqued what he perceived as methodological deficiencies in these works, using a study of power and decision making in New Haven, Connecticut. Polemical in intent, this work subjected Hunter's and Mills's notions of power structures and elites to what was described as rigorous empirical testing. The result of the study was that no power structures or elites could be identified in New Haven, which was instead seen to confirm the pluralist vision of American politics.

What kept the critique of the bias of pluralism going throughout the 1960s was partly the debate about the concept of power that emerged from the exchange between Dahl and his critics, from his own influential essay on the concept from 1957, to the no less influential works of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz and Steven Lukes. Also, the critique gained new urgency from the social and political upheaval of the day and from the perceived need for political scientists to address current affairs in ways that went beyond accepting electoral apathy as a fundamental, and fundamentally sound, feature of the American political system.

Dahl responded to this critique not by abandoning the pluralist vision of politics or the theory of polyarchy, but by moderating the less than generous view of political participation in his early work. Dahl's revaluation of the merits of political participation is clear in books such as *After the Revolution,* and *A Preface to Economic Theory,* as well as in *Democracy and Its Critics,* a probing and wide-ranging summary of his work on the theory of polyarchy. In the latter book, the criteria for polyarchy were again refined and restated, following a 1979 essay. To those criteria Dahl now added a set of institutions necessary for polyarchy, such as recurrent fair and free elections and freedom of expression, information, and association, thus outlining a conception of democracy wholly predicated on the modern nation-state. At present, a crucial question concerning Dahl's theory of polyarchy is precisely its relevance and leverage in a globalizing world, in a situation in which bounded territory can no longer be presupposed in the definition and identification of units for democratic decision making.

Henrik Enroth

See also Elite Theory; Empirical Theory; Participatory Democracy; Pluralism; Power

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Dante Alighieri (1265–1321)

Dante Alighieri is best known as the author of the *Divine Comedy,* the epic poem that places him in the first rank of literary figures in Western history. By offering an account of how individuals can achieve salvation, the *Divine Comedy* may be considered of importance to the history of ethics; however, Dante's most significant contribution to political theory is *Monarchy,* a treatise on the form of government that best accords with human nature and a contribution to the debate about whether the papacy should have authority over temporal powers such as the Holy Roman Empire. In *Monarchy,* Dante draws on his training in Aristotelian philosophy and his knowledge of biblical scripture to advance the claim that only by ceding power to a world ruler who is separate from the church will humanity be able to achieve

peace. Peace is itself taken to be essential for us to achieve our potential by combining the capacities of body and mind. *Monarchy* seeks to argue from first principles and to establish universal truths about politics, but it is also an exhortation to the Italian city-states of the early fourteenth century to end the strife that had seen Dante live as an exile for the last two decades of his life. This entry, therefore, starts by providing an account of the context in which Dante wrote *Monarchy* before summarizing the arguments of that treatise itself.

Dante's Life

A Florentine by birth, Dante enrolled in a guild to make himself eligible for public office and then became one of the six priors who governed the city in terms of two months duration. When the Guelf Party, which controlled the city, split into two, he joined the Whites rather than the Blacks. As a result, when the Black Guelfs seized power in late 1301 while Dante was in Rome attempting to sign a treaty between his city and the pope, Dante was banished from the city on a corruption charge and condemned to death should he return to the city. Although he left the White Guelf Party in 1304, Dante never returned to Florence, but for the remainder of his life traveled in Italy, spending his final years in the royal court at Verona, before dying in Ravenna in 1321. In his wanderings, Dante witnessed at first hand the public disorder that beset the Italy of his day and that is familiar to most contemporary students of political theory from the account of the similar situation detailed by Machiavelli 200 years later. Dante is believed to have written *Monarchy* some time after 1314, although the uncertainty about its dating leaves unclear whether he still believed that the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry VII, could provide the sort of unified, strong leadership that he advocated in the treatise.

Monarchy's argument against papal dominion over secular affairs was so controversial that the book was ritually burned by the Vatican shortly after Dante's death and placed on its list of banned books from 1554 until 1881.

Dante's Political Theory

Monarchy consists of three books, each of which argues from a first principle to a conclusion that is supposed to follow by syllogistic reasoning from that principle. As a result, the influence of Aristotle is paramount throughout the text. In Book I, Dante argues that humanity has a unique position in the cosmos in having reason, which separates it from the animals, and in being encumbered by a body, which sets humans below the angels. If we are to make full use of our reason, Dante argues, we must have an individual leader to act as both lawgiver and enforcer of the peace; it was a commonplace of Aristotelian philosophy that social groupings most thrive under the leadership of a single person.

In Book II, Dante uses the principle that whatever God wills is right to assert that the dominance of the Roman Empire was both just and necessary, a key part of God's plan for humanity. Examples drawn from Roman history, and in particular from Virgil and from Livy, are adduced to demonstrate that the nobility and unselfishness of the Roman people, as well as the repeated miracles that were said to have helped ensure the survival of the empire, show that Rome ruled with God's will.

Book III of *Monarchy* is the most controversial. In it, Dante uses the arguments of the first two books and the premise that whatever goes against the intention of nature is against God's will to argue that the papacy should not have dominion over the Holy Roman Empire. Dante's most important argument is that it would be against the nature of the church for it to dominate outside the spiritual realm because Christ himself renounced the earthly kingdom. Dante claims that it is against nature both for power to be divided and for the church to exercise temporal power; therefore, the Holy Roman Emperor should control all of Italy. However, Dante suggests that the pope can help the emperor to rule wisely, further demonstrating his commitment to a more harmonious life for the Italian city-states than they had previously experienced.

It is worth noting that Dante's insistence that the church should return to its ancient position of apostolic poverty so as to avoid greed and corruption shows the continuity of thought between *Monarchy* and the *Divine Comedy*. In the latter work, avarice, or greed, is taken to be the fifth of the seven deadly sins for which human souls suffer while in purgatory on the way from hell to paradise, and hence the third most damning. Removing the church from its role in political life

would, therefore, have the effect not merely of enhancing the prospects of peace, but of helping senior members of the clergy on their way from darkness to light.

Toby Reiner

See also Aquinas, Thomas; Aristotelianism; Aristotle; Hierocratic Arguments; Machiavelli, Niccolò

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Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy places communication rather than voting or aggregation of preferences at the center of democracy, although it remains a matter of some contention what sorts of communications count as deliberative, who should deliberate, where deliberation should occur, and what relationship deliberation should have to voting and aggregation of citizen preferences. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this approach dominates democratic theory, and it is very influential in political practice.

Origins

The term *deliberative democracy* was first used by Joseph Bessette in 1980 in an interpretation of the U.S. constitution that emphasizes its specification and protection of deliberative spaces, in Congress or a broader public. However, the concept's roots reach back to the *polis* of ancient Athens and associated Aristotelian notions of government by active citizens arguing in terms of the public good.

In the eighteenth century, radicals such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and conservatives such as Edmund Burke could endorse something like deliberation. For Rousseau, citizen participation in consequential political talk was necessary for human freedom. Burke used the term *deliberation* to characterize mature reflection grounded in the wisdom of experience, for the statesman in parliament rather than any mass of citizens. Immanuel Kant's later moral universalism was not itself necessarily deliberative, but it did influence the kind of reasoning that contemporary theorists such as Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls thought should characterize public deliberation.

In the nineteenth century, J. S. Mill emphasized the benefits for liberal individual development of participation in political dialogue. In the early twentieth century John Dewey sketched an ideal public that would be communicative, educative in Mill's sense, and committed to joint solving of collective problems. In mid-century, Hannah Arendt revived Aristotelian republican citizen political action. But the rise of deliberative democracy by that name began only in the late 1980s, initially as an account of political legitimacy.

Legitimacy

For deliberative democrats, the essence of legitimacy is located in the right, capacity, and opportunity of those affected by a collective decision to participate in consequential deliberation about its content. Participants must be able to understand the reasons for the outcome adopted, even if unconvinced by those reasons. Reason giving and reflection are central. Legitimacy, then, is seen mainly as a matter of fair procedure. Habermas specifies procedural ideals for open public communication in terms of the equal capacity of competent individuals to raise and question arguments. Habermas also believed that an ideal procedure would produce consensus on decisions and the reasons for them, such that consensus could be the hallmark of legitimacy. Sorting out the problematic legacy of aspirations for consensus not easily achieved in reality has kept deliberative theorists busy.

For some deliberative democrats, procedural legitimacy is to be found in connection with electoral process. For others, substantive legitimacy comes in the resonance of collective decisions with the outcome of the engagement of discourses in broader public interaction. Legitimacy may also benefit from a well-designed deliberative system, to which legislative debate, citizen forums, election campaigns, interest group advocacy, and administrative hearings can all contribute.

Schools of Thought

It is common to highlight differences between Rawlsian and Habermasian influences in deliberative democracy, although not all deliberative democrats can be classified in this manner. Other dimensions may be useful, notably, the degree to which a theorist adopts a critical or accommodating orientation to established institutions. In a classic 1989 statement, Joshua Cohen draws on Rawls, but Rawls is controversially a deliberative democrat because deliberation for him is mainly a matter of the individual working out in his or her mind what could be accepted by all others—including others who subscribe to different "comprehensive doctrines" rooted in religious and metaphysical differences. Guided by this idea of public reason, each rational citizen should come to the same conclusion, so there is no need for them to talk. However, Rawlsian public reason can be applied in interpersonal interaction—especially necessary when individuals disagree about what public reason demands.

Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson follow Rawls in considering what sorts of reasons should be allowed in public discussion, without adopting the substance of Rawlsian public reason. Instead, they call for principles of publicity, accountability, and especially reciprocity to guide debate. Reciprocity means arguing in terms others who do not share one's framework can accept. So, for example, those motivated by religious belief will have to argue in a way that makes sense to those who do not share their religion, especially on controversial issues like abortion. Gutmann and Thompson also believe good deliberation requires background social conditions of basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity for all.

Habermasians emphasize the process rather than the content of public reasoning. While hoping that "generalizable interests" that overcome self-regarding perspectives will come to the fore, they impose fewer restrictions on the sorts of arguments that can be made. Habermasians believe the process of deliberation itself should foster other-regarding perspectives, so there is no need to prespecify what arguments pass the test of public reason. For Habermas himself, rational argument is central, but some of those he influenced allow a wider variety of forms of communication, such as rhetoric and testimony or storytelling.

Habermasian notions of discourse and communication that create the conditions for political legitimacy are prominent in the work of deliberative democrats such as Seyla Benhabib, Simone Chambers, James Bohman, and John Dryzek. Habermas's influence on deliberative democracy has resulted in exploration of the role of discourse and of flows of communication in creating legitimate forms of democratic politics. Habermas believes that deliberative ideals can be sought not just in small face-to-face assemblies (be they parliaments, committees, or public meetings) but also in macro-level flows of what he calls "subjectless communication" in the political system. This idea is reflected in Benhabib's anonymous conversations, in Bohman's decontextualized forms of communication, and in Dryzek's "discursive democracy" featuring contestation of discourses in the public sphere. Some of these authors depart from Habermas in various ways, especially in taking pluralism more seriously than does Habermas himself, and consequently seeking to move away from Habermas's view that rational consensus is the gold standard of political legitimacy.

The Sites of Deliberation

Some of the early work on deliberation focused on the properties of deliberation rather than where it might be sought. Different theorists have very different ideas about the proper location. For some, the legislature is central, with communication between legislators and their constituents also important. Rawls believes the U.S. Supreme Court is an exemplary deliberative institution because individual judges are experts in public reason. For Robert Goodin, deliberation is first and foremost something that goes on inside the head of the reflective individual—preferably one in a position of political power.

Other scholars emphasize the importance of participatory deliberative institutions built with the purpose of giving citizens a say in decisions that affect their lives. Forums involving randomly selected lay citizens have been especially popular. These include citizens' juries, created by Ned Crosby in the United States (but applied most extensively in the United Kingdom), planning cells invented by Peter Dienel in Germany, consensus conferences developed by the Danish Board of

Technology and widely copied elsewhere, and citizens' assemblies as pioneered in British Columbia. With the exception of James Fishkin's deliberative polls, none of these was created by a deliberative theorist. The same might be said for designs involving self-selected citizen participants, such as participatory budgeting as used in Porto Alegre in Brazil or the 21st Century Town Meetings sponsored by the AmericaSpeaks Foundation. Discursive designs composed of advocates for different interests interacting under the auspices of a neutral third party also have some deliberative appeal. All of these sorts of exercises have been endorsed by particular deliberative theorists and analyzed for their deliberative qualities—but none should be mistaken for the essence of deliberative democracy.

Habermas and those influenced by him stress the importance of an unstructured and informal public sphere, where citizens argue and communicate, sometimes to achieve reciprocal understanding and enlightenment and generate public opinion. The public sphere is the politicized aspect of civil society, home to activists, social movements, and media communications—but also agents of distortion such as advertising, spin, and propaganda that need to be uncovered and counteracted.

The different sites can be linked. Habermas connects public sphere and legislature in his two-track model of democracy, with election campaigns acting in very conventional terms as the central means through which public opinion is converted into communicative power felt in legislative deliberation. Jane Mansbridge speaks of a deliberative system reaching from everyday talk to legislative debate.

Applications

Deliberative democratic theory has been applied to an ever-growing range of questions. Legal theorists investigate the deliberative legitimacy of constitutions and transnational legal coordination. Legal rights can be interpreted in terms of their ability to facilitate and protect political discourse in society.

Deliberative democracy meshes nicely with what Frank Fischer and John Forester call the argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning. This synthesis comes to fruition in what Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar call deliberative policy analysis, an antidote to technocracy in both policy analysis and policy practice. Complex and divisive policy issues concerning, for example, medical ethics, policing, health care, city planning, environmental pollution, and budgeting ought to be amenable to deliberative treatment, and all these areas have seen deliberative forums used to develop policy recommendations. A combination with mediation and consensus building approaches to dispute resolution is also possible.

Deliberative democracy can be joined to social choice theory, showing how problems of instability and arbitrariness, which preoccupy critics of democracy such as William Riker, can be solved through deliberation. In economics, deliberative valuation is now widely advocated as an alternative to contingent valuation in cost-benefit analysis. In environmental philosophy, possibilities for joining deliberative communication with the sorts of communication that pervade the nonhuman world have also been explored.

Deliberative democracy travels much more easily to international relations and global politics than do more traditional aggregative democratic ideas because transnational elections are generally implausible. Even in the European Union, when elections are held the dominant approach to postnational democracy is deliberative. Deliberative theorists point to the democratic potentials of transnational civil society and the global public sphere.

Conflicts across cultures and competing identity claims are also amenable to deliberative treatment. Benhabib points out that the internal polyvocality of cultures means that deliberation can take place across their boundaries. Deliberation may also help resolve conflicts across ethnic or religious segments in deeply divided societies.

The study of democratization in comparative politics has proceeded without reference to deliberation, but the building of deliberative institutions and practices ought to be central to state democratization, and so the gap between political theory and comparative politics needs to be bridged.

The Empirical Turn

Deliberative democracy has taken an empirical turn, to the extent that it offers the most promising place to overcome the long-standing alienation of political theory from empirical social science. Scholars have investigated real-world deliberative

settings such as international negotiations, legislatures, mediation processes, citizen forums, elections and referenda, social movements, and everyday talk.

Some microlevel work uses experimental methods in social psychology in deliberative context; more often, it draws lessons from small-group research in other contexts. Often, this work challenges the feasibility of the normative deliberative project, particularly when read from a Habermasian perspective. One problem that needs to be overcome is the conceptual stretching that occurs when survey researchers, social psychologists, and rational choice theorists come to deliberation. Often, what they describe as deliberation would not be recognized as such by deliberative theorists.

Efforts more true to deliberative theory include the application of a *discourse quality index* developed by Jürg Steiner and his colleagues, grounded in Habermasian standards of inclusiveness, respect, and reason giving to the evaluation of parliamentary debates. Other authors here construct measures that can be applied before and after deliberation to investigate how and why preferences, judgments, and values have been changed by the process of deliberation.

Macrolevel studies of real-world deliberative systems such as the European Union can also be found. Empirical work of many kinds now informs deliberative theory.

Critics

One indicator of the success of deliberative democracy is the number of its critics. Defenders of aggregative democracy dismiss its idealism in a world where politics is mostly about interest, strategy, and power. Or they can point to deliberation's lack of any effective alternative to voting and hence aggregation. Those unwilling to let go of microeconomic rational-choice assumptions about individual motivation see in deliberative forums only opportunities to lie and deceive. If private preferences are most fundamental, then deliberative public reasoning can only distort the proper task of democracy in preference aggregation.

Critics from the multicultural left accuse deliberative democracy of advancing a kind of moderating communication that effectively excludes dissident voices and perpetuates an oppressive status quo. Iris Young made this kind of criticism before developing ideas about a communicative democracy that is in essence an expansive kind of deliberative democracy. Nancy Fraser sees any unitary public sphere as a bourgeois construct, against which she positions *subaltern counterpublics,* enclaves of oppressed minorities. Chantal Mouffe argues for agonism over deliberation; agonism is more passionate, seeking recognition across difference and not resolution of joint problems, only continued struggle.

Deliberative democrats respond to all these criticisms, and the theory changes as a result. It now addresses the very practical questions of collective choice raised by liberal critics. And it is much more pluralistic and inclusive in response to multicultural critics, although deliberative democrats remain divided on the degree to which their project should be pursued within or against the dominant institutions of the liberal capitalist political economy. Habermas has been criticized for eventually embracing a liberal constitutionalist political position, thus blunting the critical edge of his earlier work on communicative action and the forces that distort it in liberal capitalist society.

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See also Discourse; Habermas, Jürgen; Participatory Democracy; Public Reason; Public Sphere; Republicanism

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de Maistre, Joseph Marie (1753–1821)

Joseph de Maistre was a Savoyard political thinker usually remembered as an early exponent of Francophone conservatism. His diverse work also provided founding texts of sociology, historicism, and political ultramontanism and inspired early socialist philosophies of history. Although Maistre has often been portrayed as a reactionary and theocratic reviver of classical and medieval worldviews, recent research has revealed the primarily modern sources and character of his political thought.

Maistre first articulated his conservative outlook in the *Considerations on France* (1797), a counterrevolutionary pamphlet that offered a Providentialist critique of the French Revolution. Like Edmund Burke, Maistre understood that the revolution was historically unprecedented because it had convulsed society's very foundations. Unlike Burke, however, Maistre drew on Jean-Jacques Rousseau's philosophy to theorize society as a moral being whose cohesion is ensured by the divine principles sustaining political and civic institutions. To be healthy, to last, and to ensure a people's happiness, these institutions must develop organically through time and cannot be suddenly devised by a priori reason. At the same time, however, reason-induced crises like the revolution help execute Providence's plan of progress by ending tranquil periods of social development and inaugurating new historical ages.

Maistre was a monarchist. Elaborating on baron de Montesquieu's description of monarchy as a beautiful machine, he argued that monarchy is the most durable of governments, the only one suited to all peoples, all times, and all places, because it is the most flawlessly mechanical and demands the least of human virtue. Indeed, in requiring only mediocrity, monarchy brings lasting contentment to most individuals. These opinions, derived from the belief that people are too evil to be free completely, reveal Maistre's strong Augustinianism. Concomitantly, Maistre sees republics as brilliant but ultimately ephemeral governments, destined to die young, which often purchase glory at the price of their citizens' unhappiness.

Yet Maistre does not think that monarchy is invariably preferable. Like Montesquieu, he rejects the idea that the political theorist's task is to find an abstractly ideal government. Politics, instead, must identify the type of government best suited to a nation's character. Nor does Maistre think that monarchy precludes all liberty. In every case except despotism, suitable government preserves civic liberty by fostering civic institutions that act as intermediaries between the state and the people.

Maistre's theory of government found its most extensive and innovative expression in *The Pope* (1821), his great work and the original text of political ultramontanism. *The Pope* argues that the Catholic Church is the longest-lived government in history because it is a universal monarchy that encourages the development of personal freedom. Maistre explored this freedom in *The St. Petersburg Dialogues* (1821), his unfinished Pelagian mystique. *The Dialogues*' neo-Platonic psychology and theory of nature counterbalance his Augustinianism, lending an exceptionally broad and deeply spiritual context to his political theory.

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See also Augustinianism; Burke, Edmund; Conservatism; Montesquieu, Baron de; Neo-Platonism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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Democracy

Democracy is a form of collective decision making that presupposes some form of equality among the participants. The term is used empirically and normatively, often simultaneously. It is often used to describe or distinguish one kind of political regime from another. A democratic system, for example, is one in which there are procedures and institutions for capturing the views of citizens and translating them into binding decisions. At the same time, however, these empirical descriptions often contain within them normative claims about the way institutions *ought* to be structured or behave. Thus, it can be said that one society (whether now or in the past) is more (or less) democratic than another. The ideal of equality is particularly important to the normative evaluation of democracy. A democratic political system, on this view, is one that manifests in its institutions and procedures a conception of its members as free and equal and thus owed equal respect.

If we look to the Greek roots of democracy (*demokratia*), *demos* refers to the people and *kratos* to power, capacity, or rule. Democracy, therefore, refers to the power or the capacity of the people to do certain things in the public realm.

These simple definitions, however, betray deep complexities. Who are "the people"? What kind of power do they exercise, and what is it, exactly, that they are supposed to do? It is particularly difficult to establish just who *the* people ought to be. Are they simply the mass of the adult population sharing the territory in question? Or should we define them as all those whose most important interests are affected by the law or policy under consideration? How and where do we draw the distinction between who is in and who is out?

Even if the people can be so identified, what is it that they do when they exercise their power? In general, we can distinguish between direct and indirect forms of democratic rule. Direct democracy implies that the people exercise some kind of direct control, or authority, over their society. Indirect democracy, on the other hand, implies that the people are represented by others who make decisions on their behalf (but who remain accountable to them in various ways). According to the former, exercising authority or control might entail not only participating in deliberations about the best course of action but having control over and responsibility for implementation. According to the latter, being able to validate the decision-making processes of others—without necessarily having participated in the deliberations themselves—is enough.

Winston Churchill once quipped that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the other forms that had been tried. Recent work in political science has investigated the conditions in which democratic government can emerge, produce coherent outcomes, and remain stable over time. The results of this research often seem to confirm Churchill's suspicion; democracy is the least bad of a range of possible systems, but it remains deeply imperfect. Political theorists, on the other hand, have generally focused on the normative evaluation of democracy. How can democracy be justified? Which kinds of democracy are morally desirable and why? What is the relation between democracy and other important values, such as liberty, equality, and social justice? What is the scope of democracy?

Justifying Democracy

Democracy can be justified in two general ways. First, we might consider democracy valuable in terms of the outcomes it tends to produce and thus offer instrumental arguments for its value. Second, we might think of democracy as intrinsically valuable. Political theorists almost always believe that political institutions have to be evaluated in some way in relation to the outcomes they produce. However, as we'll see, some think democracy needs to be defended in terms independent of the evaluation of its consequences.

Instrumental Arguments

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) and John Dewey (1859–1952) thought that democratic decision making was valuable (in part) because it forced decision makers to take into account the interests of the many as opposed to the few. This meant that the interests of the many were better protected against the biases and indulgences of a self-serving elite. Widespread suffrage, open elections, and a free press forced elites and politicians to pay attention to more than simply narrow sectional interests. Both Mill and Dewey also thought that democratic decision-making had positive epistemic benefits for society as a whole. Mill, for example, thought that the greater the variety of opinions canvassed and expressed, the more robust and meaningful the values of a liberal society would become for its members. He also thought people would become more tolerant and accommodating the greater the range of views they encountered. Dewey thought that given the nature of social and political problems, the greater the range and diversity of input into decision-making processes, the more likely decision makers would be able to arrive at the right answer. Dewey had a particularly rich conception of this aspect of democracy, which he sometimes referred to as a form of organized intelligence. For him, democracy was as much a mode of inquiry or activity as it was a mode of decision making. Democracy not only channels the diverse interests of the people but also helps them discover what their real (public) interests are.

Contemporary political theorists, drawing on formal political science and theories of institutional design, have argued in a similar vein. This research has attempted to show that democracies are best at organizing and mobilizing the dispersed knowledge of their societies in such a way that it enables them to remain dynamic, innovative, and self-correcting. Democracies, therefore, have a distinct advantage over authoritarian political systems: According to these arguments, they tend to be more stable and prosperous over the long term.

Another influential instrumental argument in favor of democracy is that it has positive benefits on the character of individuals. The opportunities a democratic system opens up for political participation call for—and at the same time help to cultivate—valuable capacities and skills. The cultivation of these virtues, in turn, ensures that the interests of the participants are protected in the course of democratic deliberation and decision making.

One problem with a purely instrumental approach to democracy, however, is that it might turn out that other (less democratic) political arrangements are much better at producing the outcomes we value. If what matters, for example, is the quality of decision making, then it might be that sealing off that discussion from nonexperts promotes better deliberation overall. Indeed, critics of democratic rule from Plato onward have exploited this line of argument. This has led some political theorists to think there is more to the value of democracy than the outcomes it tends to produce.

Intrinsic Arguments

Democracy can be defended on intrinsic grounds. Recall the overlap between empirical and normative accounts of democracy. Democratic political arrangements are those that manifest, in their institutions and processes, a conception of the members as equals owed equal respect. The claim here is that *only* democratic political arrangements can deliver equal respect, and thus nondemocratic systems—hierarchical or authoritarian regimes, even if relatively benign—are inherently unjust.

The connection between democracy and equality was strongly emphasized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). For Rousseau, when the people assemble as a sovereign body, they do so as equals. If each of us is fundamentally free and equal, then any political association in which one is subject to authority must be consistent with these premises. The only form of political association that meets this standard, thinks Rousseau, is one in which each individual remains self-governing and is subject only to those laws of which he or she is the author. Interestingly, Rousseau was doubtful the conditions for genuine self-government could ever be met in the modern world, but his normative ideal has remained influential ever since (as well as a target for extensive criticism).

Robert Dahl referred to the relationship between a society of equals and democratic political arrangements as the logic of equality. A similar argument is made in relation to the ideal of public justification. If the laws and policies of a political

community are legitimate only if they can be justified to each and every citizen, assuming a plurality of worldviews, then this too entails a commitment to democratic political arrangements. Democracy is valuable according to these arguments, not because of the outcomes it produces, but because of the way it manifests a commitment to the basic freedom and equality of each citizen.

There are, however, a number of challenges to this line of argument. First, there is the issue of interpreting and specifying the relevant ideals of freedom and equality. What kind of equality are we talking about when we say that democracy advances or protects the interests of all equally? Another related problem is the persistence of disagreement. If we interpret the Rousseauian standard strictly, it is hard to imagine how anything other than consensus or unanimity could count as the appropriate standard for legitimacy because otherwise some people are being coerced against their will. However, disagreement is a permanent feature of politics. We need political decision-making procedures precisely because disagreement is so prevalent. One solution is to weaken the requirement for consensus and aim for only reasonable consensus or minimal consensus. The challenge then, however, is to distinguish between the reasonable and unreasonable and to show that even minimal consensus is possible against a background of deep disagreement. Majority rule, for example, might be one way to proceed in the face of disagreement because it holds out the promise of being part of a future majority if on the losing side today. However, we then face the problem of "persistent minorities" (the same group losing every time) and the "tyranny of the majority," problems that cut against the logic of equality at the heart of this conception of democracy.

Minimalist Democracy

Given the difficulty of identifying what exactly the general will of the people might be, and given the nature of large-scale, complex, and deeply diverse modern political societies, many theorists have suggested abandoning Rousseau's ideal. Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950) provided a robust defense of a more minimalist or elite democracy. In *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,* Schumpeter defined the democratic method as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 269). Applying a mode of analysis borrowed from neo-classical economics, Schumpeter denied there was any coherent "general will" to be discovered in the first place, and thus the idea that a society could be self-governing in Rousseau's sense was literally nonsense. Because individuals were driven by a jumble of ever-changing preferences and desires easily manipulated by elites and demagogues, what was required was responsible political leadership. Citizens still had an important role to play in electing and holding political leaders to account. But the development of policy was to be driven by elites, not citizens. Electoral competition between political parties, not participation by individuals, was the mechanism for ensuring that proper decision making occurred.

For Schumpeter then, the value of democracy lay in the institutionalization of the competition for power. When working properly, democratic competition converts stones into paper ballots and ensures a peaceful transition of power between different groups. To ask for anything more of democracy is to ask for trouble.

Subsequent work in political science and social choice theory seemed to confirm many of Schumpeter's suspicions. Kenneth Arrow's famous "impossibility theorem" seemed to show that there was no universally workable way of aggregating individual preferences and values into coherent and stable collective decisions. Others questioned the rationality of voting, let alone greater participation, given the likelihood of your vote having any substantial impact on the actual outcome of an election. In short, democracy was chaotic, irrational, and strictly speaking, impossible.

Deliberative Democracy

Despite these challenges, and partly inspired by them, there has been a remarkable resurgence in the idea of deliberative democracy in recent years. Deliberative democrats accept that in large, complex societies, democracy will have to be organized in some way as a system of competitive representation. But they reject that this is all we can expect of democracy. For deliberative democrats,

democracy provides the best means through which laws and policies can be justified to citizens considered as free and equal. Deliberative democracy represents an idea of political association in which the legitimacy of its terms and conditions proceed through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens.

The ideal is a demanding one. Deliberative democrats presuppose that members of such an association recognize each other as possessing the appropriate deliberative capacities and as capable of participating in the exchange of public reasoning and acting on the basis of that reasoning. They assume that there is a plurality of interests and preferences—accepting the challenge to Rousseau by minimalist conceptions of democracy—but suggest that deliberative institutions can be designed in such a way that preferences can be shaped and transformed through deliberative processes prior to voting. And they insist that deliberation can be genuinely free only when the parties are formally *and* substantially equal. Citizens seek to advance their own interests and also to discover reasons that others can share when justifying the exercise of public political power. Thus, legitimacy is a product of common deliberation. But note that this does not necessarily mean *direct* participation. Indirect or mediated deliberation in the wider public sphere can be linked to the competitive process (exactly how is an important question).

One major objection to deliberative democracy, however, is that it is simply unrealizable in modern conditions and repeats the delusional vision of Rousseau. In response, there have been interesting attempts at designing real-world applications of deliberative principles, often with striking results. Nevertheless, it's not clear that these highly controlled experiments—such as citizens' juries, or "deliberation days"—really vindicate the applicability of the ideal to large-scale political processes. The relationship between these small-scale exercises in deliberation and the larger, competitive representation system (assuming it can't be abandoned entirely) remains unclear.

Agonistic Democracy

Another major concern is that deliberative democracy isn't democratic enough. First, because if citizens are expected to be reasonable in order to participate in common deliberation, then who decides what is reasonable? There is a tension between rule by deliberative reasons and rule by *democratic* deliberative reasons. For more radical critics of deliberative democracy, the demand for consensus lying behind the deliberative ideal—no matter how thin or indirect—is not only unrealistic but misconstrues a fundamental paradox at the heart of democracy: namely, the clash between freedom and equality. For these critics, we need to relinquish the ideal of consensus and embrace a more agonistic approach. According to this account, dissensus is a constitutive feature of democratic politics that can never be overcome. Persistent disagreement and contestation should, instead, be seen as markers of democratization itself and harnessed in such a way that antagonism is converted into agonistic respect for pluralism. Democracy is uncertain and contingent, given the inherent tensions between freedom and equality, self-government and the rule of law, human rights and popular sovereignty. However, unlike the minimalists, pluralist and agonistic democrats take the unavoidability of these tensions not as a reason to downplay the promise of democracy, but as a constant invitation to renew its possibility.

Duncan Ivison

See also Cosmopolitan Democracy; Dewey, John; Mill, John Stuart; Participatory Democracy; Rawls, John; Representation; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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Democratic Peace

The term *democratic peace* denotes the proposition that democracies never (or almost never) wage war on one another. It must be distinguished from the claim that democracies are *in general* more peaceful than nondemocratic countries. Whereas the latter claim is controversial, the claim that democracies do not fight each other is widely regarded as true by current American scholars and practitioners of international relations. Proponents of the democratic peace hark back to President Woodrow Wilson—who famously declared in his 1917 war message to Congress that the United States aimed to make the world "safe for democracy"—and especially to Immanuel Kant.

In a treatise titled *Perpetual Peace,* written in 1795, Kant envisioned the establishment of a zone of peace among states constituted as republics. Although he explicitly equated democracy with despotism, contemporary scholars claim that Kant's definition of republicanism, which emphasized the representative nature of republican government, corresponds to our current understanding of liberal democracy. Thus, in the contemporary literature, the terms democratic peace (or *liberal peace*) and *Kantian peace* are often used interchangeably.

It is not, however, as if a continuous line of intellectual development can be traced from Kant to present-day scholarship. For decades, *Perpetual Peace* received little notice from students of international relations until, in a series of influential articles published in the mid-1980s, Michael Doyle called attention to Kant's work and argued that the zone of peace envisioned by Kant in 1795 has gradually become reality. Subsequently, and especially since the end of the cold war, the democratic peace has become one of the hottest subjects of research in international relations. Scores of studies have been devoted to it, many of which have employed quantitative methods to demonstrate that the democratic peace was a solid historical fact, that is, democracies have rarely if ever waged war on one another. The point is not that wars between nondemocracies, or between democracies and nondemocracies, have been frequent; it is rather that, although interstate war is a rare event in general, wars between democracies have been even rarer.

Although a number of critics have questioned the veracity of the proposition, the claim that democracies do not fight each other continues to be widely, if not universally, accepted in the international relations discipline. Less agreement exists with regard to how to explain this historical fact. Two major competing (if not mutually exclusive) explanations have been elaborated—cultural (or normative) and structural (or institutional). Proponents of the first argue that the political culture of democratic societies is pervaded by the norm that disputes are to be settled by peaceful means. Democratic citizenries, the argument goes, apply this norm to their relations with other democratic societies; hence, when two democracies are locked in a dispute, their leaders expect each other to shun violent means of resolving the dispute.

Proponents of the structural explanation argue that the reason democracies do not go to war with each other has to do with the design of their political institutions more than the norms harbored by their citizens. The division of powers and the checks and balances characteristic of democratic political systems constrain the ability of elected leaders to move their nations rashly toward war. Thus, when a conflict arises between two democratic nations, their leaders need not fear a surprise attack; the inherently slow process of national-security decision making on both sides allows ample time for diplomats to resolve the conflict peacefully.

In the debate over international relations theory, the democratic peace is identified with the liberal perspective, and it is closely associated with two other liberal claims about world politics: that international peace is promoted by (a) economic interdependence among nations and (b) international institutions. The major rival of international liberal theory is realism, which contends that the

foreign policy behavior of states is shaped primarily by the anarchic structure of the international system, that is, by the absence of a supranational authority capable of effectively providing for the security of individual states. For realists, so long as the international system is anarchic, violence will remain latent, if not always overt, in world politics regardless of the internal characteristics of individual states (e.g., their regime type). Thus, to the extent that a perpetual state of peace indeed prevails among liberal democracies, its emergence contradicts realist expectations and undermines the position of realism as the leading theory of international relations.

The popularity of the democratic-peace idea has not been confined to the academy. The foreign policy rhetoric of the Clinton administration featured many appeals to this thesis. Spreading democracy throughout the globe was a principal aim of President Bill Clinton's foreign policy, and administration officials used the democratic-peace idea to justify this policy—if the formerly autocratic nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union democratized successfully, the argument went, the United States and its West European allies would no longer need to contain these nations militarily because democracies do not fight each other.

The democratic peace has also been embraced by the neoconservative thinkers and officials who critically shaped the George W. Bush administration's foreign policy in the Middle East in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks. The belief that a zone of democracy equaled a zone of peace and security buttressed the neoconservatives' desire to use force to topple Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and their expectation that the democratization of Iraq would result in the spread of democracy throughout the Middle East.

Ido Oren

See also Democracy; Democratization; Kant, Immanuel; Liberalism; Perpetual Peace

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DEMOCRATIZATION

Democratization is the process through which a political regime becomes democratic. The explosive spread of democracy around the world over the last 35 years radically transformed the international political landscape from one in which democracies were the exception to one in which they are the rule. Interest in democratization is high among academics, policy makers, and activists alike, in large part due to the strengthening of international norms that associate democracy with many positive attributes, from human rights to economic prosperity to security. After briefly describing historical trends in democratization, this entry first explores definitional issues and then examines alternative explanations of democratization.

Waves of Democratization

Transitions to and from democracy tend to occur globally in waves, meaning they are clustered in both space and time rather than distributed randomly. Samuel Huntington identified three main waves of democratization. The first wave (1826–1926) accompanied the expansion of suffrage, principally in Europe and the United States. The collapse of many European democracies after World War I marked the first reverse wave (1922–1942).

The second wave (1943–1962) occurred through the postwar occupation of Axis powers, attempts at democratization in former British colonies, and the spread of democracy in Latin America. The second reverse wave (1958–1975) came with the reversion to military rule in much of Latin America

and the collapse of young democracies in Asia and Africa.

The third wave began with the overthrow of the military regime in Portugal in 1974. Over the following 25 years, there was a dramatic expansion of democracy worldwide. Democracy first spread through southern Europe and Latin America, then to eastern Europe and Asia, and finally to Africa. During this period the number of electoral democracies grew from roughly one quarter to nearly two-thirds of all countries. Most analysts agree that the third wave has crested if not reversed. Rather than reverting to authoritarianism, however, many third wave democracies have become mired in hybrid or mixed regimes that combine elements of both democracy and authoritarianism.

Defining Democratization

Democratization is difficult to define in practice, in large part due to disagreements over how to define democracy. For example, there is no consensus on where to mark the beginning and end points of the democratization process. One approach defines democratization as the period between the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and the conclusion of the first democratic national elections. Others mark earlier beginning points, such as the initiation of liberal reforms by authoritarian regimes or structural changes that weaken authoritarian regimes enough for opposition groups to push for democratic reforms. Some democratic theorists similarly assert that democratization continues long after the first elections because, by themselves, elections do not ensure a functioning democracy. The problem with this approach is that it is not clear when the democratization process stops. If measured against the ideal of a perfect liberal democracy, all countries may be viewed as perpetually being in a process of democratization. This limits the utility of democratization as an analytical tool.

Disagreement over definitions of democracy also makes it difficult to measure where a country is in its democratization process. One common measure is the Freedom House score, which measures political rights and civil liberties and reflects a liberal definition of democracy. Another indicator is the Polity score, which measures the authority characteristics of governing institutions and is more consistent with procedural definitions of democracy.

Transition Versus Consolidation

One common approach to specifying the democratization process is to differentiate between two phases: (a) the initial transition from an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime to an electoral democracy and (b) the subsequent consolidation of the democracy. The transition to and consolidation of democracy are often viewed as distinct processes driven by different actors and facilitated by different conditions. The transition process is oriented around the undermining of an authoritarian regime and the emergence of nascent democratic institutions and procedures. The consolidation process entails a much broader and more complex process of institutionalization of the new democratic rules for political life. As the reverse waves of democratization suggest, a transition does not always lead to consolidation.

Modes of Transition

Democratization theorists have identified different patterns of interaction among social groups that shape the way democratization unfolds in a particular environment. Numerous such modes of transition have been identified, reflecting variations in the role of elites and masses in confronting the authoritarian regime, the degree to which the transition is managed by elites from the old regime, the speed with which the transition occurs, and the degree to which the new democratic regime breaks dramatically with the old regime. In all cases, transitions occur when a democratic opposition becomes strong and united enough to confront the authoritarian regime, and the authoritarian regime is too weak and divided to control the situation, either by co-opting the democratic opposition or cracking down through force.

Three very general modes of transition include pacted transitions, bottom-up transitions, and top-down transitions. In pacted transitions, moderate members of a weakened authoritarian regime negotiate the conditions of a transition with moderate leaders of a prodemocracy movement. These transitions tend to occur relatively rapidly and result in power-sharing arrangements that preserve

elements of the old authoritarian regime. Examples include the democratic transitions in Spain and Chile.

In bottom-up transitions, social groups develop a broad-based, grassroots movement for change that weakens the authoritarian regime through mass protests and ultimately forces the regime to relinquish power. These transitions often result in a radical break with the old regime. Examples include the democratic transitions in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

In top-down transitions, leaders of an authoritarian regime implement democratic reforms because they become convinced they are necessary for regime survival. Sometimes, these reforms produce protracted transitions in which the new democratic regime does not break dramatically from the old regime, as in the case of Mexico. In other cases, the reforms may produce more rapid and dramatic transitions, sometimes unintentionally, as in the case of the Soviet Union.

There is debate over whether certain modes of transition have a differential effect on the prospects for consolidation. Scholars who favor a strategic choice approach argue that there is little effect. They see actors as forward looking and only marginally affected by historical legacies. Others argue that the prospects for consolidation are enhanced when the balance of power between authoritarian and democratic forces is roughly equal because it provides pressure for compromise and moderation on all sides. A third argument is that there is no one best mode of transition. Rather, the conditions and strategies that facilitate a successful democratization process tend to vary by region due to a number of historical and contextual factors that shape perceptions of power relations and levels of uncertainty during the transition period. These factors include previous experience with democracy, traditions of civilian control over the military, levels of mass mobilization, and learning effects from previous successful cases of democratization.

Definitions of Consolidation

Consolidation may be defined either in terms of democracy's sustainability or the deepening of its quality over time. These different understandings of consolidation reflect different definitions of democracy. For minimalist definitions, which understand democracy as a dichotomous variable, consolidation is merely the survival of an electoral democracy. For broader definitions, which view democracy as a continuous variable, consolidation means going beyond an electoral democracy to include characteristics of a liberal democracy. In either case, it is difficult to know how consolidated a democracy is.

Conceptually, a country's democracy is consolidated when there is no longer a chance that it will revert to authoritarianism. This is difficult to know because only failures can be measured directly, and these only in hindsight. One common indicator is two consecutive turnovers of power. Another is when one political group agrees to give up power to the former opposition because this indicates a willingness by incumbents to settle disputes through the democratic process and to spend periods of time out of office. However, these measures are tautological because the processes that define a democracy are used to measure its persistence.

An alternative strategy is to measure the legitimacy of the democratic regime among citizens under the theory that a democracy is consolidated when all political actors recognize democracy as the best system for their society. Consolidation represents a shift in political culture as democratic behaviors become routine and taken for granted. This happens over time through the institutionalization of democratic procedures and the ability of the system to perform effectively.

Hybrid Regimes and Consolidation

Sustainability and quality of democracy were long thought to go hand in hand—the higher the quality of democracy, the more resistant it will be to reversal. Although this may be true, the assumption that the longer a democracy survives, the more likely it is to improve its quality over time is increasingly criticized as overly deterministic and teleological. This assumption is undermined by the prevalence of hybrid or mixed regimes produced during the third wave of democratization. Rather than leading to the consolidation of liberal democracies, the third wave resulted in the rise of regimes that share elements of both democracy and dictatorship. This reality contradicts the assumption that countries will inevitably take one of two

paths, either toward a consolidated liberal democracy or back into authoritarianism. The fact that many of these mixed regimes appear to be stable has led some scholars to question the utility of analyzing countries in terms of movement along a continuum between authoritarianism and liberal democracy.

Explaining Democratization

Not surprisingly, arguments regarding the sources of democratization responded to developments in the real world as the third wave evolved. There are two main approaches to explaining democratization: one that emphasizes favorable structural conditions and another that stresses elite choice. Each has benefits that compensate for the drawbacks of the other. The favorable-conditions approach allows a detailed explanation of the democratization process in particular countries, but it tends to produce a long list of factors that matter, making it difficult to produce a general model of democratization. By contrast, the elite-choice approach is theoretically concise and useful for making generalizations, but it lacks the richness of structural explanations. The rest of this section presents each approach, devoting more space to the favorable-conditions approach because it is theoretically less concise. Due to space limitations, this entry focuses on domestic explanations rather than international factors while recognizing that their importance is demonstrated by the fact that democratization occurs in waves.

Regardless of which approach one adopts, there are two areas of general agreement. First, there appear to be many paths to democracy. In some countries, democracy evolved gradually over centuries (e.g., Great Britain) whereas in others it emerged much more rapidly (e.g., the Baltic states). Some countries inherited democratic institutions from Britain as a result of colonialism (e.g., Canada and Australia), whereas others finally became democratic through foreign intervention following war (e.g., Germany and Japan). Second, democratization does not occur in a linear process. Rather, it is a long, slow, and conflictual process, often with frequent reversals. Viewed historically, the democratization process in a given country is shaped by the accumulation of experience with democracy over time. Each successive democratic experience builds on the institutions and expectations of the previous experience while also shaping those of the future.

Elite-Choice Explanations

During the early 1980s, many scholars were intrigued by the rapid expansion of democratic transitions in southern Europe and Latin America, which challenged the conventional wisdom that authoritarian regimes were robust. Democratization theorists of the period understandably focused on explaining these transitions. The third wave brought democracy to places where it was least expected, suggesting that there were no preconditions for democracy and that democratization could occur anywhere.

The wide variety of conditions surrounding democratic transitions suggested that the specific causes of democratization in a particular country might vary over time and space, making efforts at generalization difficult, if not impossible. Because the timing of transitions was highly contingent on contextual factors, many early democratization theorists framed general explanations in terms of the strategic interaction among elites, which produces a decision to adopt democratic procedures and institutions once the opportunity arises.

According to this approach, democratization is ultimately explained by elites' decision to establish institutions that generate incentives for them to voluntarily comply with the democratic process. Transitions are successful to the extent that elites perceive themselves as better off in the long run under the new system, either by ensuring the possibility of future access to power or by providing material gains through greater stability. The only necessary conditions are that elites view themselves as members of the same nation and agree on the borders of the state. These conditions induce elites to resolve their conflicts through bargaining rather than breaking off into separate political groupings. This is not to say that ethnic homogeneity guarantees democracy or that heterogeneity prohibits it; there is little evidence to support either proposition. Rather, elites must simply accept that they belong to the same nation-state and therefore seek to resolve political conflicts within that context.

The advantage of the elite-choice approach is that it is theoretically concise and overcomes the

problem of multiple causality inherent in structural explanations. However, it does not account for the origins of elite preferences or the conditions that shape negotiations. A related criticism is that it understates the importance of the masses, particularly labor and civil society organizations, in pressuring authoritarian elites to liberalize and providing credibility to demands by the democratic opposition. In addition, the fact that democratization occurs in waves suggests that transitions are not entirely contingent but are shaped by international structural forces.

Structural Conditions

Over time, the third wave of democratization provided many more cases to study and to test various theories. Two trends revitalized explanations emphasizing conditions that facilitate democratization. First, the democratic transitions that occurred in Latin American and East Asia in the wake of rapid industrialization renewed interest in modernization theory. Second, as the third wave wore on, the focus of research switched from transitions to the problems of consolidation faced by many young democracies. Proponents of structural explanations point to the difficulty of democracy promotion efforts in places like Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as the failure of many third wave democracies to consolidate, as evidence that democratization requires more than elite consent. There is no consensus on which conditions are most important or exactly how they function to promote democratization. There is, however, broad agreement that the following conditions should not be viewed as deterministic but rather probabilistic in the sense of making democracy more likely to flourish.

Economic Development

The correlation between democracy and economic development is one of the strongest in political science. However, there is much debate over the nature of the relationship as well as the causal mechanisms behind it. Early modernization theorists noted that the most successful and enduring democracies at the time were also the richest, whereas most poor countries had difficulty developing democracy. Many interpreted this correlation as evidence that economic development, usually measured as per capita GDP, lays the foundation for democratic transitions. Some even saw democratization as the final stage of the modernization process. The basic argument is that economic development produces an educated and entrepreneurial middle class with an interest in demanding greater influence over governance issues and the capacity to do so. Eventually, even the most repressive governments must bow to this pressure.

A large middle class is widely viewed as a stabilizing and moderating force that guards against authoritarian tendencies. The assumption is that large inequalities in society exacerbate class conflicts. In extreme cases, both the rich and poor are willing to use authoritarian measures to impose their will on the other. The middle class balances these extremist positions due to their interest in economic security and stability. As property owners, they seek to protect their economic, political, and social rights through the rule of law and accountable government. Middle-class pressures for democratic reforms were crucial to the democratization processes in places as diverse as Britain, the United States, Latin America, South Korea, and the Philippines. However, it is also true that members of the middle class do not always support democracy. Examples from Germany in the 1930s, Chile in the 1970s, and China today suggest that the middle class will back authoritarian regimes when they see it as suiting their economic interests.

A similar argument is that experience with capitalism promotes democratization as economic freedom creates pressures for political freedom. Private enterprise generates a business class with interests separate from the state and the resources to make demands on the state. The business class inevitably organizes and begins to demand a say on issues that affect them, such as taxes, regulations, and the protection of property rights. It pushes for responsive and accountable government to protect its interests. In contrast, the absence of economic freedom reduces the incentives and ability for citizens to organize independent of the state or hold the state accountable, making authoritarianism more likely.

For supporters of this argument, the emergence of a strong business class can explain the difference between countries like Britain and the United States, where industrialization coincided with democratization, and countries like Germany,

Japan, and Russia, where industrialization coincided with authoritarianism. However, in cases like Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the business class supported authoritarian regimes that respected private enterprise. The Chinese government has become quite skilled at permitting economic freedoms and private enterprise while maintaining strict limits on political freedoms, contradicting the conventional wisdom that economic liberalization will necessarily lead to political liberalization.

Education appears to be particularly important. Although education levels tend to rise with economic development, many scholars credit education as a key reason why democratization is viable in poorer countries. Educated citizens are better equipped to understand political issues and are more likely to be active in the political process. They are more attentive to public affairs and demand both inclusion and accountability. In addition, better educated people are more likely to hold values in line with democracy. Of course, whether education promotes democracy depends in large part on the content of what is taught and discussed in the education system. Citizens must be given the skills, resources, and freedom to analyze and evaluate different political ideas if education is to facilitate democratization.

A major criticism of explanations emphasizing economic development is that it is not clear whether the relationship between economic growth and democracy is positive or negative. The modernization process produces political instability and frequently leads to authoritarian regimes, such as the fascist regimes in Europe during the 1930s or the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in South America in the 1970s. Therefore, conditions other than economic growth must explain variation in the success of democratization. Other scholars acknowledge the relationship between economic growth and democratization but argue that it is not causal. They point to the wave of democratic transitions in poor countries around the world during the 1980s and 1990s as well as the persistence of wealthy authoritarian regimes in countries like China and Saudi Arabia as evidence that wealth is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratization to occur.

There is broad agreement that while a country's level of economic development may not explain the timing of a democratic transition, it does determine the prospects for consolidation once democracy is established. Democratic transitions occur in poor and rich countries alike, but the probability of consolidation is considerably higher in rich countries. High levels of per capita GDP virtually guarantee that democracy will endure. However, there is no agreement on why this is the case.

One common argument is that to function well, democracies require the consent of citizens, which is based on the legitimacy of the system. This legitimacy rests on effective performance, which is usually defined in terms of economic development. A criticism of this argument comes from studies of Eastern Europe and Latin America, which suggest that economic decline does not necessarily reduce popular support for democratic governance. In addition, the loss of popular support is not a necessary or sufficient condition for democratic breakdown; democracies tend to be overthrown by elite conspiracies rather than popular revolt.

Political Culture

Some democratic theorists believe a democratic political culture is necessary for democratization to succeed. There is no consensus on exactly which attitudes and values comprise a democratic political culture, but most scholars acknowledge the importance of a tolerance of diversity, the belief that other citizens are basically trustworthy, a belief in reciprocity, a willingness to cooperate and compromise, a respect for freedom and equality, and a belief that all members of society have both the right to be included in the political system and the capacity to participate effectively. This collection of values and attitudes is often referred to as a civic culture. There is less agreement over whether other values, such as individualism, security, or a commitment to economic welfare, are also essential.

The above values contribute to democracy in a variety of ways. They encourage a willingness among competing groups to resolve their differences peacefully through the political process even when they do not achieve all of their goals. Average citizens are more willing to abide by state decisions even when they do not agree with them. At the same time, these values promote citizen participation in the democratic process by fostering an interest in public issues and a willingness to work

to solve collective problems. They also help citizens organize in independent associations that can check state power and make it more responsive and accountable. In short, a civic culture maintains the delicate balance required by a democratic system in which citizens recognize and obey the authority of governing elites while also pressuring them to be responsive and accountable.

There is considerable debate over whether a democratic culture explains democratic transitions. One argument is that countries with high levels of the values and attitudes listed above are more likely to adopt democracy than countries that lack these values, regardless of the level of economic development. Interpersonal trust is crucial to elites accepting the rules of democracy. Losers of elections must trust that the winners will not use their advantage to keep the opposition permanently out of power. Citizens must trust that their elected leaders will generally represent their interests or that they will at least have the opportunity to shape leaders' decisions on issues that matter most to them.

Supporters of this argument point to statistical studies based on survey data that show a strong correlation between the attitudes and values of a democratic culture and the number of years a country has experienced democracy. Other scholars criticize these studies for assuming the causal arrow moves in one direction, from culture to democratic institutions. In contrast, they argue that a democratic culture is the product of prolonged experience with democracy. Transitions occur for a wide variety of reasons specific to each case rather than the attitudes of the general public. The success of democracy over time increases levels of democratic attitudes and values as a rational, learned response to the experience of living under a stable democratic regime.

Regardless of whether a democratic political culture comes before or after the transition to democracy, it is widely recognized as essential to the consolidation process. How nondemocratic countries overcome the chicken-and-egg problem and develop a democratic political culture is not well understood. A number of factors are frequently mentioned, including education, changes in the social structure that accompany the modernization process, and particularly the density of social ties constructed through civic associations.

Civil Society

The idea that an active and engaged civil society is conducive to democratization is widely held. However, there are different explanations for why this is the case, some of which are contradictory. One argument is that civil society fosters democratic habits and values. Dense networks of voluntary associations through which citizens organize independent of the state are a primary source of the civic culture essential to the functioning of a democratic society. Particularly when these associations are not political in nature, citizens develop ties that cut across political, economic, and social cleavages. These social ties promote a level of moderation in society that encourages tolerance of diversity and prevents political conflicts from escalating into violence. Citizens also learn habits of organization and develop a sense of community. As society becomes linked together at the grassroots level through a dense network of associations, citizens increase their level of social trust and develop norms of reciprocity that allow them to cooperate to solve many community problems on their own. In this way, an organized citizenry is able both to ease the burden on the state, allowing it to be more effective, and to limit the state's power by keeping it accountable.

A different argument links civil society much more explicitly to democratic transitions. Rather than a source of moderation and apolitical cooperation, civil society is viewed as a site of active resistance against the state. In authoritarian regimes, it is difficult to contest state power through the state, so the values of resistance are developed within civil society. The active resistance of civil society groups weakens the authoritarian regime enough for a democratic transition to occur. Supporters of this view cite as evidence the role of civil society in challenging communist regimes in Eastern Europe and military regimes in Latin America during the 1980s.

These different arguments have prompted a great deal of debate over the type of associations that should be considered part of civil society and the mechanisms by which they facilitate democratization. To best serve democratization, should civil society be characterized by moderation, cooperation, and apolitical associations of equal actors linked through horizontal relationships? Or do highly political and confrontational groups of

people mobilized through hierarchical structures better promote democratization? These contradictory views of civil society show that the link between civil society and democratization is not well understood. Furthermore, critics of the civil society approach note that not all civil society organizations are rooted in democratic values. The purpose of associations and the norms they promote matter; not all civic associations inculcate norms of tolerance and equality. Organizations like the Ku Klux Klan demonstrate that citizen associations do not always involve people in harmless efforts and that group involvement does not always cut across existing social cleavages. A second criticism is that an active civil society can just as easily destabilize democratic regimes as authoritarian regimes. Hitler came to power in part through the mobilization of civil society that characterized Germany in the 1920s. This civil society was highly politicized and contributed to the polarization of politics, drawing people apart and fueling hatred of different social groups, undermining democratic values.

Institutions

Institutional arrangements play an important role in shaping the prospects for both democratic transitions and consolidation. Institutional arrangements matter because they shape elite incentives and their ability to overcome collective action and coordination dilemmas. This can affect the prospects for democratic transitions by determining the durability of authoritarian regimes. For example, highly institutionalized political parties allow authoritarian leaders to maintain a cohesive coalition able to suppress advocates of democratic governance by managing elite conflicts through party mechanisms. In the same way, the institutional design of democracies affects the prospects for consolidation.

There is general consensus that parliamentary systems are more conducive to democratic consolidation than presidential systems. However, there is disagreement on why this tends to be the case. One common argument is that parliamentary systems are better able to manage political conflict by allowing representatives of a broader spectrum of society to participate in government institutions as well as reducing the incentives and capacity for chief executives to circumvent or suspend democratic procedures. Another argument is that leaders who design new democratic institutions during the transition often see themselves as leaders of the nation and seek strong control to build the new state. They often choose presidential systems for instrumental reasons to enhance their control, which increases the likelihood of undemocratic tendencies. Of course, the prospects for democratic consolidation are affected by a number of other institutional features, including the electoral and party systems, independence of the judiciary, and legislative powers vis-à-vis the chief executive.

Structured Contingency

One way to reconcile the influence of both strategic choice and structural conditions is to adopt a path-dependent approach. A number of structural factors, domestic and international, shape the strength of both an authoritarian regime and a democratic opposition and thus the strategic interaction of elites. However, the transition to a basic democratic framework is ultimately contingent on the decision of elites. This process of elite interaction, in turn, determines the institutions and structures that shape competition among social groups in the future and thus the prospects for a well-functioning democracy.

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See also Civil Society; Culture; Democracy; Democratic Peace; Elite Theory; Modernization Theory

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Dependency Theory

Dependency theory is a body of ideas about the role of developing countries within the global economic system, about the nature of development, and about patterns of unequal power. It dominated much Latin American social science (including the analysis of the region's international role) in the 1960s and 1970s. Its popularity was increased by the vociferous criticism in both North and South America of U.S. interventionist policies, especially the Vietnam War and the U.S. role in deposing the Salvador Allende government in Chile.

Dependency theory formed one part of the broad critique of liberal and Western ideas of economic development (modernization theory), which argued that the less developed parts of the world could and would follow essentially the same growth path as the industrialized world and that participation in the global economy was fundamentally positive. More precisely, the emergence of dependency theory from the mid-1960s reflected both growing dissatisfaction with the ideas of national-developmentalism associated with the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, CEPAL in Spanish) and ongoing debates within Marxism as to the nature of capitalist development in peripheral societies. Leading theorists at ECLA such as Raul Prebisch had stressed the need for a conscious and planned strategy of national development built around a major role for the state, import substitution, and a cross-class coalition led by a modernizing national bourgeoisie.

By the mid-1960s, the limits of such policies were becoming clearer: limited growth, a failure to reduce social inequalities, recurrent balance of payments crises, and the support of industrialists and the middle classes for the wave of military coups that were sweeping the region. Dependency theorists argued that the bourgeoisie was in fact not national but deeply connected with both the economic interests and anticommunist objectives of the core capitalist countries.

Dependency theory is best seen as a broad approach or perspective encompassing a variety of writers from different backgrounds and with different concerns. Some theorists (such as André Gunder Frank) tended to view dependency theory in terms of a rigid law of underdevelopment and argued that participation in the international economy served only to perpetuate inequality and underdevelopment. Others (such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Peter Evans) developed a more case-specific historical structural approach, which accepted the fact of economic development but nonetheless argued that the character of that development remained indelibly marked (and distorted) by the dependent status of the region. By the early 1970s, the focus had shifted from the notion of the "development of underdevelopment" to the analysis of "dependent development."

Dependency theory is concerned with the dynamics of the world capitalist system. Many of the external structures of dependency—the high levels of dependence of developing countries on the United States and its allies for trade, investment, aid, and technology—can be readily incorporated into other theories of international relations that stress the importance of power inequalities. However, what is distinctive about dependency theory is the emphasis on the links between internal and external forces and the coincidence of interests between dominant classes within Latin American and other third world societies and those in the core capitalist economies. Dependency theorists accepted that development was taking place and that some Latin American countries in the 1970s were adopting more assertive foreign policies. However, they insisted on the need to recognize (a) the degree to which this development and this apparent foreign policy assertion was constrained within an overall triple alliance between state technocrats, multinational companies, and local capital; (b) the continuing powerful external constraints on the region and the degree to which effective control lay with the industrialized states;

and (c) the need to examine the distribution of winners and losers within and not just between states—in other words, analyzing which classes and groups were gaining from the development that was taking place.

Dependency theory arose principally as an attempt by Latin American scholars to understand the nature of the region's political and economic underdevelopment. It became of increasing interest to international relations because the approach implied a structured (but evolving) pattern of dominance and dependence between core industrialized states and the underdeveloped periphery.

Criticisms of Dependency Theory

As a theory of underdevelopment, dependency theory was subjected to a barrage of criticisms: that it had underestimated the growth potential of peripheral capitalism (as evidenced by the emergence of East Asian economies); that it exaggerated the role of external factors in determining the internal pattern of class relations and capital accumulation; that it downplayed the extent to which many of the most powerful obstacles to development lay in the domestic system and in the histories of individual states and societies; that it placed too much emphasis on the role of foreign direct investment, downplaying the importance of the international trading and financial system; and that there was no necessary link (or even "elective affinity") between dependence in the international economy and nondemocratic or authoritarian political systems.

As a theory of international relations, two criticisms stand out. First, the economistic bias of dependency theorists blinded them to the importance of interstate power-political competition—in other words, that the international political system could be just as important as global capitalism in shaping the economic fortunes and foreign policies of developing societies. Second, viewing the preferences of Latin American elites solely in terms of transnational class solidarity underplayed the role played by nationalism and the continuity of the search for national independence and autonomy, including, for example, on the part of Latin American military governments.

By the mid-1980s, many of these criticisms had gained ground in the face of the growing influence of neoliberalism. Even supporters of the dependency approach argued that although its heuristic value had been demonstrated by the growing number of studies analyzing the interaction of the classes and the state within an increasingly internationalized global economy, the label carried too much theoretical baggage to be useful and should be discarded. Radical and critical thinking on what was by now becoming called the Global South moved in other directions: Critical political economists, often influenced by Antonio Gramsci, analyzed the nature of the new era of neoliberal hegemony; postcolonial theorists focused not on the universalizing tendencies of global capitalism but on questions of identity and difference of the representation of different communities and subjectivities; and antiglobalization theorists shifted attention away from developing states and toward global social movements and transnational civil society. More recently, figures such as Fernando Enrique Cardoso have analyzed the relationship between dependency and globalization, while the failures of neoliberalism in Latin America have prompted a renewed interest in the impact of global capitalism on social and political change in the region.

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See also Development; Globalization

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de Pizan, Christine (1364–c. 1430)

Christine de Pizan (sometimes written *Pisan* because of confusion of her family name with the city of Pisa) was one of the most prolific political writers of the late medieval period. Her works on a variety of political issues, such as good government, the role of women, just war, the evils of civil war, and the like, were widely circulated and respected. Although she was born in Pizzano, Italy, near the city of Venice, her father, Tommaso di Pizzano, brought the family to Paris when he became an adviser to King Charles V of France. Her life was conventionally happy; she was well educated in French, Latin, and Italian, and she was married at 15 to Etienne du Castel, a court notary; they had three children. However, the unexpected death of her husband in 1390 left her a young widow with the family's finances tied up in legal proceedings. The turmoil of her own life echoed the deteriorating political situation around her. France was locked in war with England, stressed by civil disorder, and faced with the worsening mental illness of King Charles VI. The royal family was divided over control of the kingdom,.

De Pizan began to write for solace in her grief but by 1399 had come to the attention of royal patrons, first for her defense of women against the common stereotypes in literature and then for a stream of political works, written for the royal families on topics ranging from the characteristics of good rule to the proper conduct of war and the nature of chivalry. Over the next 15 years, she produced multiple books intended to educate future leaders about the nature of good government. These mirrors for princes, as they are called, were part of a tradition of political writing that included Augustine, John of Salisbury, Giles of Rome, and many others; the tradition is considered to have concluded with *The Prince* by Niccolò Machiavelli.

De Pizan's life and career contradict many stereotypes about premodern women. Her ideas about the just conduct of war persisted to become part of the development of international law. Her insistence on including female rulers in her works in the mirror of princes' genre enriched political literature. Born into a time of terrible social and political upheaval, she wrote to remind the ruling class of its responsibilities to the people. Her opinions were respected, and multiple copies of manuscripts and early translations of her works still exist, attesting to their usefulness as well as their popularity.

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See also Body Politic; Just War Theory; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Mirror of Princes' Genre

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Desire

Desire has always been a fundamental concern for political thought. Plato links desire to the appetitive part of the soul, which the rational and spiritual parts control to constitute the just man and city. Augustine associates it with the flesh, which is responsible for sin and corruption and which justifies even tyrannical political order on Earth. Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli

counsel rulers to know men's passions, both what they desire and what they detest. Sigmund Freud maintains that civilization must repress desires and sublimate their corresponding instinctual energies into activities such as labor, which results in civilization's many discontents.

Although all these thinkers treat desire as a dangerous excess that poses a political problem of containment, others value it positively. Utilitarianism, for example, holds a normative commitment to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, linking these to the fulfillment of desire. John Stuart Mill's utilitarian ethical theory asserts that the subjective motivation for justice and morality requires habituation so that individuals feel pleasure or pain when acting or not acting in accordance with duty. This entry reviews historical and contemporary analyses of this concept and its relationship to political theory.

A common but certainly not universal characterization of desire defines it in terms of lack or absence: A subject desires what it does not have, so that the fulfillment of desire implies completion. The classical statements of this position are found in Plato's *Symposium,* where Aristophanes holds love to be the yearning for one's other half and Socrates declares it to be directed at a quality or thing that one lacks. Socrates, however, adds that his teacher, Diotima, scoffs at these views, holding instead that genuine love seeks only the transcendent Good, all other desires being merely derivative. This negative and teleological movement of desire is challenged by Baruch Spinoza, who, holding that nothing can be destroyed except by an external cause, attributes to the essence of all things a *conatus,* affirmative force that strives to enhance the thing's power and sustain its existence; and later by Friedrich Nietzsche, who maintains that desires and strivings express a will to power that seeks only to discharge its strength against resistances. Teleological or not, however, these conceptions share the idea that desire is an impulse that compels a living thing beyond itself.

Involving a relationship to an object or other, desire is central to many political theories and ontologies that see the self as a product of constitutive relations and exclusions, particularly those associated with contemporary theories of radical democracy. Many of these approaches are related, both affirmatively and critically, to Freudian psychoanalysis and Hegelian dialectics. Freud treats desire as a complex set of polyvalent and negative relationships to an object: An individual desires at once to possess the object, to destroy or consume it, to be given over to and possessed by it, and so on. Desire is insatiable, and the self's unity, for Freud, demands the unconscious repression of the major part of desire's various facets, leaving the conscious individual, as far as possible, with a single and unambiguous relationship of desire or aversion to an object. However, Freud maintains, repressed desires continue within the unconscious, subject to various processes of condensation, displacement, transference, and projection, and occasionally erupt into consciousness in a "return of the repressed."

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel holds self-consciousness to be the "native realm of truth" because it comprises a dialectical movement that both separates self and other into distinct entities and establishes a unity in which their differences vanish; he then declares that, by this reflexive movement, "self-consciousness is *Desire* in general." Hegelian desire is, therefore, a striving that compels the subject outside itself to ultimately find and return to itself, and in this way, Hegel links it to a development that culminates in Absolute Knowing.

Many contemporary theories of desire contest this dialectical movement toward unity, often adapt and rework Freud's concept of repression, and sometimes criticize the negativity and lack at the heart of both Hegel's and Freud's thought. While many affirm the importance of desire in understanding and reworking contemporary politics and political theory, some see this focus as something of a modern political trap, holding desire to be a fulcrum for contemporary relations of discipline and normalization. Contemporary theorists such as Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, who rework the Hegelian conception of desire to remove the tendency toward unity but who retain desire's fundamental negativity, often follow the work of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. Theorists who criticize this negativity and reconfigure desire as a positive force include Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and William Connolly. The thinker most closely associated with contesting desire in modern politics is Michel Foucault.

Hegelian and Post-Hegelian Desire

In his seminal analysis of Hegel's *Phenomenology,* Alexandre Kojève identifies two types or levels of desires. Natural desire aims to negate the otherness of an external thing by possessing, consuming, or destroying it. Human desire, however, is a dialectical negation and sublation of natural desire that unites desire's subject and object while also sustaining their difference. This reversal involves negating the subject rather than the object, the subject aiming not to attain an object it values but to become an object of value for another. Human desire is, therefore, the desire to be desired by another—that is, to be *recognized*. The desire for recognition drives Hegel's master–slave dialectic, in which two individuals enter a death struggle, each seeking the other's recognition; one eventually submits out of fear of death; but the result is that the slave moves toward self-consciousness by discovering his own value through work. The master–slave dialectic presents only the first steps in a larger historical process, which, Kojève explains, is driven by the desire for recognition and culminates in Hegel's idea of a modern state, in which members reciprocally recognize each other's self-conscious moral agency and thereby form a unity of differences. For Hegel, modern life provides a space for both natural and human desire to be satisfied. While the market allows individuals to pursue their material desires, the family and the rational state ensure love, respect, and equal recognition. In the modern state, therefore, human subjectivity is fulfilled.

In contrast, Lacan links desire to a negation that exceeds these two Hegelian forms and their reconciliation and that is closely related to the constitution of the subject in language. Lacan contends that because needs must be articulated to another through language, they are bestowed with universality. Language compels us to articulate more than our particular material wants and to make a universal demand for recognition and love, so that when our needs are met by another, this satisfaction also confirms being loved and valued. However, Lacan continues, no satisfaction of need can ever demonstrate love completely and unconditionally, so that even if the subject articulates all its wants and receives everything it demands, a feeling remains that something is withheld. For Lacan, desire is precisely desire for this residual something. It seeks a lost object that seemingly beckons toward an ultimate Good and that becomes mystical and transcendent because, being neither particular nor universal, material nor conceptual, it cannot be articulated in language. Through this excess of desire over demand, the relationship between subject and other is reversed: Whereas the subject first made demands on the other, it now finds itself prohibited from something the other seems to possess and seems to desire more than it desires the subject, resulting in the subject's subjectivity, its identity and sense of self, being subverted by a lack of recognition. Lacan links this to Freud's Oedipus complex, where the father intervenes to prohibit the child's demand for its mother's love. For Lacan, the subject aims to become what it believes the other desires it to be (the father) or seeks substitutes to give it the fulfillment it lacks (other women in place of the mother), but these moves are always inadequate and, as such, desire's search for fullness remains interminable. To be a subject, according to Lacan, is always to be a failed subject, seeking to fill a void that cannot be filled. The subject achieves some sort of stability and identity only insofar as this lack within it and the inadequacies of the objects meant to complete it are forgotten or repressed.

Theorists who adopt this Lacanian idea of failed subjectivity analyze individual and collective subjectivity in terms of desire for an impossible fullness. A desire for identity permeates subjectivity and calls for something that can fill the subject's lack. As no such thing exists, what is instead needed is for a particular object or idea to be given a transcendent status, so that it signifies fullness and Goodness and consolidates an identity by separating it from what it is not. By assuming this role, the idea's particular meaning is evacuated; yet, because it also must retain some particularity, it fails in its role as transcendent marker. A contemporary political example could be democracy, which, in Western politics at least, is a term to which diverse groups can claim allegiance precisely because its specific meaning remains vague. Democracy arguably now represents what is unequivocally good, so that the proclamation, "we are democrats," can at once establish a collective identity and distinguish it from those deemed democracy's enemies. Yet, because democracy can mean so many things to so many people—and the same can be said of what is antidemocratic—if the

question of what "we" mean by democracy was seriously entertained, this collective subjectivity would risk dissolution. The exclusionary opposition between democrat and antidemocrat thus depends on a repression of the way the collective subject's lack remains indefinite, and the filler meant to secure the group's identity cannot achieve its task. Theories that understand subjectivity and identity on these terms often conceive politics as a struggle over the construction of collective subjectivity through the hegemonization of markers that assume this filling function. They also contend, however, that genuine democratic politics must negotiate the way attempts to secure identity are ephemeral and must always fail because the fullness that identity requires is ultimately impossible.

Desiring-Machines

Whereas Hegelian desire negates the subject but ultimately allows it to return to itself, Lacanian desire is a lack that prevents the dialectic from restoring identity. Nevertheless, Lacan retains the idea that desire drives the subject to seek identity, completion, and fullness, and he retains what is in many respects a dialectical relationship between subject and object, even if it is an always failing dialectic. Against this, Deleuze and Guattari argue that lack and the aspiration to completeness often associated with desire are secondary or derivative. Fundamentally, they maintain, desire establishes nondialectical connections across differences—that is, connections that do not allow differences to form a higher identity. Deleuze and Guattari refer to these as *rhizomatic* relations, a rhizome being a plant, such as ginger, that grows horizontally underground, sending roots below and shoots above, and thus having no center or definable limit. Rhizomatic connections constitute "desiring-machines," desire being "machinic" insofar as it is a working assemblage of heterogeneous components, and they function through a "body without organs" formed within them. Like Lacan's lost object, this "body without organs" exceeds the grasp of language. However, it is not a transcendent object that desire seeks, but an immanent conduit that relates the desiring-machine's heterogeneous components so that they are riddled with strife and friction. Creating these heterogeneous connections, desire, for Deleuze and Guattari, is an immanent force of becoming that is not governed by anything transcendent or external to it. While certain formations of rhizomatic desire may generate an appearance or illusion of transcendence and a corresponding sense of lack, which "capture" desire and submit it to the strictures and "stratifications" of identity, on a more fundamental level, desiring-machines "deterritorialize" formations of identity by exposing them to constitutive relations that cannot be dialectically unified. In doing so, these machines suggest alternative possibilities of being that need not be organized in terms of identity.

Many theories inspired by Deleuze and Guattari's thought reject the idea that politics concerns first and foremost the construction of collective identities, with the problematic friend/enemy binaries that this inevitably implies. Instead, they use the idea of the rhizome as a way to consider alternative forms of political and ethical pluralism, often exploring what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a realm of micropolitics, where new forms of ethical and social being can emerge. In his introduction to Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus,* Foucault expresses something of the nature of this micropolitics when he declares one lesson of their work to be: "The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization" (p. xiv). The collective, in other words, must become the instigator of a rhizomatic and deterritorializing desiring-machine.

Desire and Truth

Despite his endorsement of Deleuze and Guattari's work, Foucault nonetheless expresses reservations about their affirmation of desire as a means to challenge structures of identity, holding instead that desire has become central to modern disciplinary and normalizing society. Foucault contends that although premodern forms of power that deploy restriction and punishment still operate today, modern society is defined primarily by subtle power relations that differentiate various social types and identities and deploy mechanisms of observation, testing, classification, and confession to hold individuals to account for the degree to which they conform to or deviate from identities deemed to be normal, healthy, and good. As this regime of power/knowledge classifies individuals not by their actions but in terms of the character

types thought to be predisposed toward committing certain acts, it depends on an examination of the motivations and desires behind action, especially those that might be unconscious and hidden. As a result, Foucault argues, modern society has come to see desire as the mysterious source that explains actions, so that, by uncovering the deepest and most hidden desires, the truth of the individual can be revealed. Modern mechanisms of modern power function on the basis of this problematic connection between desire and truth.

Foucault, therefore, concludes that resistance to modern forms of power and the identities they construct requires that the link between desire and truth is challenged. He suggests that this might be done by emphasizing bodies and pleasures, which have been forgotten by modernity's obsession with desire. Although this position puts Foucault at odds with the post-Hegelian theorists of desire who have been discussed, he nevertheless shares their more general project of challenging the centrality of identity in contemporary political theory and practice.

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See also Foucault, Michel; Freud, Sigmund; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hegemony; Identity; Immanence; Micropolitics; Ontology; Other; Radical Democracy; Subject

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DETERRITORIALIZATION

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have given the term *deterritorialization* the significant political-philosophical importance it has today. They used it to indicate the fracturing of and freeing from repressive fixations and despotic arrangements of a certain milieu, be it conceptual, social, affective or linguistic. The Nietzschean-based concept of freeing oneself, escape, or in their words, *lines of flight,* should not be understood, however, as a movement toward an a-territorial situation. The stress is on the movement itself, the process, hence the prefix *de-* and the use of the active form *ing,* as in *deterritorializing*. In this respect, the word deterritorialization does not form the opposite of the other word that is often used in combination with it: reterritorialization. In their view, the two words are in and of each other. Together, the words express the transformative and creative potential of making new connections, linkages, becomings, and assemblages.

Deleuze and Guattari used the term deterritorialization in many different contexts, as have the various people who followed them. In political theory, Deleuze and Guattari used the term deterritorialization to explain the workings of capitalism. Capitalism is then understood as a system that frees (deterritorializes) materiality and human interaction from a hierarchical overcoding, but then also despotically recodes, reterritorializes, into the generic axiomatic of capital.

In political theory, deterritorialization has become widely applied, especially in relationship to globalization, to describe the debordering of human spatial interaction processes, as a movement away from territorial or spatial containers and borders. In the early 1990s, some scholars even used the term to proclaim the end of the nation-state or geography and the emergence of a borderless or a-territorial world. The identification of deterritorialization with the rise of a border-free world is,

however, very different from Deleuze and Guattari's earlier concept. As argued above, their concept of deterritorialization is not necessarily spatial and, what is more, it emphasizes rather the free*ing* of a certain fixation and order and nomadically mov*ing toward* different (territorial) reconfigurations and assemblages, new reterritorializations, provoking or inducing new deterritorializing desires. What the term as well as its applications and debates have made clear is that any organized milieu should not be assumed as given and fixed container, but subject to constant change and transformation, thereby opening it up for a debate as to what extent the order can and, more important, should be fixed. In short, deterritorialization poses a question rather than an answer.

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See also Desire; Globalization; Marx, Karl

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Development

Development is generally taken to refer to processes of economic and social change that improve the living conditions and choices of people in the Global South. It would be wrong, however, to assume that development is something that occurs only in poor countries or that is directed only at poor people. Development happens everywhere, all the time, and it makes sense to distinguish between three linked but significantly different concepts of development: immanent development, intentional development, and an ideology of developmentalism.

Immanent Development

Prior to 1800, most of the world's population lived in conditions of extreme income poverty. Leading political economists in Western Europe maintained that working families were trapped in poverty by enduring constraints on agricultural progress. Thomas Malthus, for example, argued that increases in the real wage rates of laborers were quickly reduced by biological pressures to breed. Population growth, he said, took the form of a geometric progression (2, 4, 8, 16), whereas the growth of the food supply took the form of an arithmetic progression (2, 4, 6, 8). The tendency of population growth to run ahead of food production inevitably called forth negative checks on the living standards of ordinary families: those of famine, pestilence, and war. David Ricardo, meanwhile, argued that daily life in England mainly took the form of a steady state. Men and women were condemned to repeat the lives of their ancestors, save for a few minor improvements. Time was largely cyclical and ideas of rapid economic progress or secular change—the precursors, we might say, of modern ideas of development—were mainly absent from people's lives.

All this changed dramatically in nineteenth century Europe and in some of its (white) settler offshoots—Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels caught the flavor of the new era better than anyone. *The Communist Manifesto* of 1848 described a new bourgeois epoch in which "all that is solid melts into air." Competition between capitalists now gave rise to continuous technological change. New products emerged every year and with them new production technologies. Men and women were forced from the land to work in new urban factories. Agriculture began to be industrialized, and the very nature of food started to change. Ordinary people began to understand that continuous change is the order of the day. The future was

no longer knowable in the sense that it has been in centuries past. Development was now *immanent* to the economic machine itself, to capitalism.

Intentional Development

Significantly, however, what was mainly spoken of in the nineteenth-century heartlands of industrial capitalism was progress or improvement. Mike Cowen and Rob Shenton suggest that the word *development* was most often used to refer to an idea of stewardship. As such, it designated a set of interventions that had become necessary to temper the contradictions of unregulated capitalism. Processes of immanent development were widely and rightly understood to be dangerous. The production of stark inequalities between the urban rich and poor raised the specter of dissent and revolution. So, too, did capitalism's tendency to boom and bust. Old social networks were eroding, and new forms of social insurance began to be proposed in their place. This was *intentional* development: forms of social intervention that saw an expanding state apparatus attempt to mediate the contradictions of what Karl Polanyi would later call *The Great Transformation*. Polanyi famously argued in 1944 that capitalism's attempts to disembed the "free" market from society were bound to end in failure. Capitalism could be sustained only by embedding itself in forms of social protection that guarded people against the material and existential costs imposed by continuous technological change. In Polanyi's view, the history of capitalism—of the great transformation—could be written in terms of a repetitive "double movement" between more or less regulated market exchanges.

The slow and contested movement to tame capitalism in the West was mirrored elsewhere by very different models of immanent and intentional development. Marx argued in the 1850s that the rich world was showing an image of the future to its colonies. Marx subscribed to a diffusionist view of capitalism based on the export of capital and the power of empire to disrupt customary forms of rule and production—what he called accumulation by dispossession. As Lenin and others pointed out 50 years later, however, and as many nationalist leaders from the colonial or ex-colonial (Latin America) worlds were already pointing out, industrial capitalism in the global periphery was more often constrained than delivered by colonialism. The islands of capitalism that took shape in India, South Africa, or Brazil were dependent on circuits of capitalism controlled by the metropolitan powers. Many were geared to natural resource extraction and plantation crops. In India, too, the British after 1860 prioritized a conservative ideology of political control over a liberal ideology of capitalist growth. (They had been shocked by the First War of Indian Independence in 1857–1858, the so-called Mutiny). Railroads were built across the subcontinent, and canal colonies were carved out of the Punjab by "native" labor. But for the most part, India's small class of occupying Britons were minded more to preserve order in South Asia than to foster rapid economic and social change.

This tendency to conservatism, and the allied tendency to produce the nonmetropolitan world as a source of raw materials and primary commodities for the industrial North, was bolstered either side of 1900 by new efforts to imagine the world in terms of what Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have called "the global color line." Buoyed by a crude misreading of *The Origin of Species,* social Darwinists and racists of various stripes came in this period to define development as an endeavor appropriate only to "white men's countries." The possibility of development in most of Africa and in large parts of Asia was largely disallowed on the basis of both internal nature (genetics and race) and external nature (tropicality). Black Africa was considered to be especially unsuited to autonomous capitalist development and self-governance. The cranial capacities of black Africans were thought to be smaller and less evolved than those of Caucasians (something the pseudosciences of phrenology and craniometry tried to prove by means of various indices of skull shape and gradient: notably the cephalic index), while supposedly brutal climate and soil regimes (too hot, too rainy/dry, too much laterite) militated against high levels of agricultural productivity or a disposition to innovation. Africa's fate instead was to be ruled by white colonialists, who would shoulder the burden for their (slow) improvement.

The Ideology of Developmentalism

To be sure, there were exceptions to this attempt to impose a global color line: in Latin America,

most obviously, and in parts of Asia following Japan's defeat of Russia in 1904, but also in parts of black Africa in the 1940s, by which time the British were setting up colonial development corporations. It is important nonetheless to recognize that the idea that "they" can become like "us"—the idea that is at the very heart of post-1945 ideas and practices of global developmentalism—is a recent one. It can reasonably be argued that an *ideology of developmentalism* did not take hold until the middle part of the twentieth century, in the wake of (a) decolonization and nationalist struggles, (b) the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (c) the Pax Americana, and (d) the onset of the cold war.

The creation of postcolonial nation-states like India and Pakistan set the scene for new ideologies of nation-building and development. Indeed, development quickly became the raison d'être of most postcolonial states and the chief source of their (il)legitimacy. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, meanwhile, and continuing challenges to overtly racialized forms of rule, as for example in South Africa into the 1990s, advertised the possibility and indeed the necessity of growth and empowerment in non-white and non-Western countries. By the same token, the advent of American hegemony in the post-1945 era was widely taken to mean the end of territorialized empire. America's ambition was to make the world safe for commodity circulation. Its mainspring was diffusionism, or the drive to create new global opportunities for capitalist production and consumption. This drive, moreover, became more pressing in the 1950s as the cold war heated up. The third world so-called—consisting of those countries that were not yet full members either of the advanced industrial first world or of a socialist second world dominated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—was now both courted and dominated by two hegemonic powers. In the 1950s, the aspirations of the Tiers Monde to be a third estate, or to be nonaligned (neither capitalist nor socialist, as Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser fondly imagined) was slowly but surely eroded. The third world came instead to define a crudely homogenized world of poverty stretching from Peru to Indonesia. The main purpose of development was to erase this third world, and this remains the principal way that development is imagined today. Development is a set of processes that deliver people from extreme poverty and that expand the capabilities of ordinary people to make choices for themselves (drawing here on Amartya Sen).

The modern enterprise of developmentalism is surrounded by a large and expanding body of academic and practical knowledge: roughly, development studies and development policy. Development studies combines work on growth economics with broader studies of structural transformation and modernization in the Global South. In the 1950s and 1960s, many of the leading growth theories were rooted in Keynesian economics. The third world was thought to be characterized by pervasive market failures. These failures, in turn, made the case for placing the state at the heart of many development strategies. India was not alone in seeking to catch up with first-world countries by building up local import-substituting industries—in its case, heavy industries like steel and chemicals—behind protectionist barriers. Standard thinking at this time held that countries could not hope to develop by specializing in the production of nonindustrial goods or services. Static comparative advantages had to be shifted by activist states, or by what later came to be called developmental states. Planning was a handmaiden of this enterprise.

By the 1970s, however, it was apparent that many states in the third world were far from developmental. Neoliberal scholars like Deepak Lal and Anne Krueger, both important figures at various times in the World Bank, began to argue that third-world countries were being held back by *dirigiste* concepts of economic development. These downplayed the role of incentives and of the private sector. Third-world states, they argued, were more likely to be characterized by pervasive rent-seeking and corruption than by Weberian bureaucracies bent on rational improvement. Significantly (in this view), the debt crises of the 1980s led to structural adjustment programs in many countries across the Global South. Economies and government ministries were now reorganized to better suit the needs of a fast globalizing capitalism. In some cases, these adjustments were enforced very rapidly, leading to the charge that some transitional economies were being forced to develop by shock therapy—something that plainly didn't succeed in parts of

the ex-Soviet Union. In some other countries, as for example in India or China since 1980, adjustments have been slower, more gradual, and also more sustained—more in keeping, perhaps, with the Polanyian/Keynesian view that successful capitalist development has to be grounded in supportive social arrangements. Certainly, these experiments in development have been at odds with the "limited state/free market" model proposed by Krueger, Lal, and the leading Washington-based development institutions.

Whether the map of the world economy in 2010 looks very different from that of the world economy in 1950 (or 1900) is sharply debated. The richest countries in the world in 1950 are still largely the richest countries today. There have, nonetheless, been some striking and largely unexpected success stories: Taiwan and South Korea, of course, and Singapore, but also Botswana and post-Maoist China. All these countries have fared better than most commentators in 1950 would have expected, just as some Southern Cone countries have failed to maintain their positions near the top of a global table of economic performance. To argue that development has failed since 1950, however, which is an argument floated by various anti- or postdevelopmentalists, is too crude. Life expectancies in most parts of the Global South—with the important exception of some countries in sub-Saharan Africa—are now far higher than they were in 1950. In India, for example, men and women who could expect to live to just 32 in 1950 can now expect to live to over 60. Furthermore, according to the most recent World Bank figures, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty in 2005—beneath a rather brutal international poverty line of $1.25 per day, defined in terms of 2005 purchasing power parities—is roughly half what it was in 1981 (25.7% versus 52.0%). Of course, in absolute terms, this still leaves about 1.5 billion people in extreme poverty and more than 2.5 billion people getting by on just $2 a day.

The economist Paul Collier maintains that today's world is no longer a 1 + 5 world, with 1 billion people doing very well while 5 billion are mired in third-world poverty. Rather, it is a 1 + 4 + 1 world, where roughly 4 billion people are slowly and unevenly being pulled out of extreme poverty by economic growth. In this view, too, which is not uncontroversial, the major intellectual and political tasks of our time are to understand why some countries have failed to develop (the countries of the bottom billion) and what can be done about it. Are the poorest countries of the world being held back mainly by bad geography (by climate and location, as Jeffrey Sachs maintains) or by bad institutions (roughly, the economic and political rules of the game)? If geography is to blame, we can usefully think of future development policies in terms of a big push, largely replaying ideas from the 1950s. Poor people can be helped out of linked poverty traps by foreign aid programs that deliver better roads and ports and that tackle debilitating tropical diseases. If bad institutions are to blame, development is about better governance regimes and politics. As such, it is correspondingly more difficult for nonresidents to effect, short of regime change or some forms of structural adjustment.

One of the key questions in contemporary development studies is this: If we know that countries prosper most where property rights are stable and guaranteed, where there are checks on the executive, and where there is the basic rule of law, why don't all ruling elites in poor countries pursue this policy mix? And the deeper question, of course, which recognizes that development is fundamentally about politics, is this: To the extent that countries today have the institutions and elites bequeathed them by colonialism (including weak states and porous boundaries in many parts of Africa), how might political coalitions be built to support institutional change? Put another way, we need to know how far patterns of development today are the prisoners of development processes, both in the recent and in the not too recent past, and how far and by which means these path dependencies can be undone.

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See also Dependency Theory; Globalization; Modernization Theory; World-Systems Theory

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Dewey, John (1859–1952)

John Dewey, a philosopher, educational theorist, and public intellectual, was the major representative of American pragmatism in the twentieth century. In the context of political theory, Dewey is perhaps best known for his invocation that democracy constitutes "a way of life." This statement encapsulates Dewey's contention that face-to-face communication, local association, and experimental problem solving constitute the basic citizen experience necessary for the sustenance of an autonomously self-governing state. This understanding is rooted in his pragmatism and its emphasis that experience can act as a powerful source of useful concepts to solve problems without the aid of concepts or practices originating outside of history or human endeavor.

Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont. Although his mother came from a well-connected family, his father ran a modest grocery store. Their son, John, attended the University of Vermont, and after a short stint as a public school teacher in Oil City, Pennsylvania, he was admitted to the Philosophy Department of the Johns Hopkins University. There he studied under the experimental psychologist G. Stanley Hall and the Hegelian George Sylvester Morris, whose shared influence would impart a combination of empiricism and speculation that would manifest itself throughout his entire intellectual life.

He graduated in 1884 and gained a position as an instructor in philosophy at the University of Michigan, were he met his first wife, Alice Chapman, with whom he would have three children. After a brief stay at the University of Minnesota and a return to Michigan, in 1894, he was recruited to head the Philosophy Department at the University of Chicago, where he would eventually also lead the Department of Education. At Chicago, he founded his Laboratory School where he tested his progressive pedagogic theories in actual teaching environments, an institution considered to be one of the first schools of its kind in the United States. Dewey stayed at Chicago until 1904, then moved to New York City to take a position at Columbia University. Although officially retiring in 1939, he remained active in both the academic and public worlds until the end of his life. His wife, Alice, died in 1927, and in 1946, he married Roberta Lowitz with whom, in an expression of his enduring interest and affection toward children, he adopted two Belgian war orphans.

Theory of the Public

Although many claim that Dewey's conception of democracy merely mirrored the participatory town meetings he experienced during his youth in Vermont, he explicitly rejected the claim that democracy requires that the polity either craft or agree to every political decision taken by the state. Instead, his political writings focus on the difficulties that individuals face in perceiving

the connections between themselves and the larger public and how communication in local associations can assist citizens to find the sometimes elusive relationship between themselves and the social origins of their personal problems.

Dewey's best-known writing concerning this subject was provoked by Walter Lippmann's skeptical stance toward democracy. Lippmann claimed that the average citizen does not possess the time or capacity to understand the complex global issues that face modern nation states. Instead of democratic participation, Lippmann urged the increasing professionalization of policy formulation, with only periodic opportunities for scrutiny by the public.

Dewey agrees that most individuals do not exhibit the expertise to craft complex social policy, but he rejects Lippmann's claim that this requires rule by technocrats. Instead, Dewey believes that citizens can, through the revivification of local communities disrupted by rapid technological change and economic dislocation, rediscover the "public," or the larger connections between themselves and their larger social world. Local communities can play this role through fostering communication about matters of public concern. Dewey asserts that through such mutual engagement, citizens will adopt an experimental attitude toward politics characterized by tolerance of otherness, openness toward creative problem solving, and desire for participation.

Dewey's notion of a "Great Community" gives some shape to these ideas. As individuals participate in vibrant local associations, he asserts, they increasingly search out larger and novel meanings for the events that affect their lives. They begin to regard seemingly distant events, ideas, and cultures as resources for their own reflection about how to address their problems and, in fact, cultivate a potential openness and affiliation toward otherness. Thus, through communication of information, meanings, and desire, they come to see humanity as united in a "Great Community" based not on similarity of ideas or interest but on a common need for creative problem solving.

Public Intellectual Activity

Dewey's public and political activities mirror these large themes. He began to engage in public life in earnest during his time in Chicago, building relationships with progressive reformers such as Jane Addams and continuing such work after he left for Columbia. He was involved in the formation of many liberal advocacy groups, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the American Association of University Professors. He was strongly supportive of both Woodrow Wilson and World War I, going so far as to marginalize his former student, Randolph Bourne, for his antiwar views—in essence ending his career. His support for the war was grounded in his belief that military mobilization would lead to further nationalization of local issues and the strengthening of the federal government to solve these issues. The political repression of the red scare of 1919 dampened, but did not destroy, his optimism in the reformist potential of democratic institutions.

After the war, Dewey continued to write and advocate, but with more skepticism concerning the power of government. For example, he was instrumental in the formation of the New School for Social Research in 1919, an institution of higher learning bringing together scholars and community members without either administrative controls or traditional academic requirements. This was, in part, a reaction to Columbia's decision to terminate several faculty members who had opposed the war. Furthermore, he played an important role in the foundation of the American Civil Liberties Union in 1920. In terms of electoral politics, he criticized the New Deal for what he saw as its caution (voting for Socialist candidate Norman Thomas against Franklin Roosevelt) and increasingly began to associate himself with the labor movement, helping to found the League for Industrial Democracy and vigorously defending the Brockwood Labor College from attacks by conservative critics.

Although he strongly advocated the adoption of left-liberal policies, Dewey maintained a contentious relationship with communism. Critical of what he saw as the Soviet Union's lack of political democracy, he admired its education system. In 1928, he published a series of articles in the *New Republic* that noted improvements in lives of the average Soviet citizen. Furthermore, in his most notorious intervention in public discourse, he presided over a committee of inquiry

concerning the charges leveled against Leon Trotsky by the Stalin regime. Traveling to Mexico in 1937 at age 78 to personally hear testimony from the exiled Trotsky, Dewey and the rest of the commission found that the charges of counterrevolutionary activity by Trotsky were without merit. He became increasingly critical of the Soviet Union and Communist Party of the United States in his later life, but did not go so far as advocating for the exclusion of party members from either teaching or public life.

Dewey and Philosophy

Dewey's understanding of the promise of modern democracy embodies the general pragmatist assertion that daily experience can provide truth and meaning without having to be anchored in a metaphysical framework. His claim that judgments of fact and value need not conform to absolute concepts to yield fruitful paths for human action led many to label him a nihilist and a relativist. In response, Dewey asserted that experience constituted a dynamic transaction between organism and environment where individuals both passively perceive empirical facts and actively interpret situations. Early in his career, Dewey challenged behaviorist understandings of human motivation. Rather than artificially segregating value judgment from apprehension of the facts, Dewey preferred to understand human action as a continuous circuit in which desires intertwine with rationality, memory affects perception, and aesthetic appreciation informs quantitative calculations. To express these simultaneous characteristics, Dewey variously refers to experience as "double barreled" or as "mediated and immediate."

To take advantage of the potentialities within experience, Dewey recommends individuals practice a process of open inquiry toward their problems. This procedure does not entail individuals creating facts or values *ex nihilo,* but instead requires that individuals carefully test the expectations for their own actions and desires against the changes that their realization produces on their environments. Dewey goes so far as to define logic in terms of inquiry as opposed to a package of static rationalistic tests and procedures, transforming logic into a flexible process reflecting the complexity of experience itself. In fact, Dewey strongly criticized traditional philosophy as representing a stale "quest for certainty" that acted more as an emotional support in the face of life's contingencies than as a tool that could solve problems or provide enlightenment. He preferred to call his process of logical inquiry *reconstruction.* For Dewey, philosophy requires a constant process of examination of the world and oneself in light of new circumstances.

Education, Art, and Democracy

Dewey's emphasis on the promise of empirical, experimental inquiry heavily informs his theory of education. His understanding of effective education grounded teaching in the concrete experiences of the individual child and claimed the best teaching came through encouraging children to inquire autonomously into the concrete problems that constitute their daily lives. Through exploring the connection of mundane activities such as cooking and gardening with larger disciplines such as mathematics, chemistry, and geography, students would become engaged in learning, gaining habits of inquiry that encourage them to constantly seek the larger forces that affect their lives. Furthermore, Dewey encouraged students to engage in collective projects of their choice as opposed to passively learning facts presented by a teacher. For example, to learn mathematics, students might track the stock market, or to learn geography students might plot maps of their neighborhoods. Dewey recommends projects such as these in hopes that students would become accustomed to learning both facts and the relationships facts have to each other within concrete situations.

Whereas some believe that widespread adoption of such a scientific attitude and progressive, value-free education leads to a culture of sterile instrumentalism, Dewey insists that widespread practice of experimental inquiry would result in the liberation of meaning, value, and creativity. He stresses that effective thinking, a process he defines interchangeably with inquiry, possesses a phenomenological form characterized by the accumulation of tension, questioning, and uncertainty that becomes released when previously disconnected facts come into focused harmony. When inquirers have forged

reliable connections of meaning between themselves and the disparate aspects of their environment, they undergo a "consummatory experience" that bestows a sense of fulfillment akin to intense aesthetic experience.

Dewey went on to assert that all effective acts of thinking possess this aesthetic form. This led him to conclude that to think well, we must cultivate habits that regulate the spatial and temporal flow of thought. If done well, thinking can yield as many aesthetic benefits as admiring a work of art and surpasses "art for art's sake" in terms of its ability to provide daily life a sense of fulfillment and beauty. Dewey's assertion that consummatory experience can imbue daily life with such meaning finds its apex in his definition of God as the "uniting of the ideal and actual," a characterization notably bereft of any higher power or mysticism. Through this domestication of the religious, Dewey thought that the "disenchantment" many see as the inexorable result of modernity need not result in the alienation that causes so many to return to traditional, metaphysical conceptions of the right and the good.

Although seemingly possessing few social implications, the concept of consummatory experience fully links his philosophy with his political theory of everyday democracy. In Dewey's view, individuals would look toward the Great Community for interpretations of their local situations, suggestions concerning methods to solve their individual problems, and meaningful experiences that would compose a fulfilling democratic existence. After interpreting their individual problems in light of the public meanings provided by the Great Community, people's political life would become enriched with greater meaning. Undergoing consummatory public experiences would require the "mediating function of liberalism," Dewey says, where by linking their individual problems to social causes, citizens gain both greater knowledge and increased feelings of connectedness and solidarity with others. Thus, in Dewey's view, democracy, when functioning as a "way of life," acts as both the foundation of collective autonomy and a source of creativity, fulfillment, and even beauty.

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See also American Pragmatism

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Dicey, Albert Venn (1835–1922)

Albert Venn Dicey was a British jurist whose constitutional theory proved remarkably influential among scholars, politicians, civil servants, and lawyers. For much of the twentieth century, the dominant view of the constitution revolved around Dicey's work, especially his emphasis on parliamentary sovereignty. It is even arguable that the influence of Dicey on politicians, civil servants, and judges was such that they actively fashioned the constitution to bring it closer to his view. Dicey's major work, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (1885), focused on three basic constitutional principles: parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law, and the role of constitutional conventions.

Parliamentary Sovereignty

Dicey argues that the sovereignty of Parliament is the dominant characteristic of the British constitution. Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament (composed of the king, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons) can make or unmake any law that it chooses, and no other person or institution can overrule its laws. Parliament is the only body with the authority to make laws. Hence, parliamentary sovereignty implies the subordination of the judiciary. The judiciary cannot challenge an act of Parliament.

This attempt to subordinate the judiciary might appear to fall before the common law. The common law appears to allow judges to make laws by establishing precedents, which are then binding on their successors. Dicey argues, however, that the practice of the common law does not contradict the supremacy of Parliament, for judicial legislation is subordinate to acts of Parliament. Crucially, for Dicey, there is nothing in the British constitution akin to the judicial review provided by the Supreme Court in the United States. To the contrary, Parliament ultimately has supreme authority in every jurisdiction, including the rights of the individual.

It might seem now that parliamentary sovereignty has a curious resemblance to the kind of despotism that so enraged many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century radicals. Parliament appears to be a leviathan against which individuals have no appeal and from which they can expect no redress. Dicey counters this objection by arguing that two limitations circumscribe the actions of even the most despotic ruler. First, no prudent government would knowingly pursue a morally repugnant law that might incite people to revolt. Second, even tyrants who may possess the power to make unilateral decisions are unlikely to take certain actions given the cultural context in which they govern.

Rule of Law

If parliamentary sovereignty appears as a counter to popular participation, the rule of law is, for Dicey, a counter to parliamentary despotism. The rule of law describes the relationship of the government to the courts. Dicey defines it more narrowly than do most commentators. He identifies it with known rules, equality, and respect for precedent. For a start, Dicey argues that government operates in accord with known rules not based on arbitrary caprice or discretion. In addition, Dicey suggests that Britain, unlike its counterparts, has long boasted a notion of equality before the law, according to which all individuals are treated similarly irrespective of rank or class. Finally, Dicey associates the rule of law with the way the decisions of judges have led over time to the entrenchment of principles that protect individual liberties. In his view, whereas some other states rely on enumerated powers and formalized rights, Britain's use of precedent is actually a more effective way of ensuring individual liberties.

It is difficult to see how Dicey can reconcile his account of the rule of law with his principle of parliamentary sovereignty. To mention just one difficulty: If Parliament is bound to follow known rules rather than make and unmake laws on its whim, how can it be free to do as it pleases? Dicey himself argued that, far from being in conflict, the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty reinforce one another. But his argument here is vague, controversial, and arguably simply implausible. To say that parliamentary sovereignty favors supremacy of the law is not to say it favors a rule of law based on formal equality and respect for precedent. And, likewise, it is far from clear why Parliament requires a strong legal system rather than, say, a strong executive branch of government.

Constitutional Conventions

The final section of *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* is in part an attempt to explain how the rule of law combines with parliamentary sovereignty. Dicey's explanation consists of an appeal to the importance of constitutional conventions. He argues that the legal system consists not only of the procedural enforcement of rules and precedents but also of informal customs, practices, maxims, or precepts that, although not enforced by the courts, constitute a constitutional ethics. The unwritten constitution of Britain is one in which these conventions and implicit rules are vital to the operation of democracy. Dicey elevates these conventions into a constitutional morality to which he then appeals to limit the powers of a popularly elected Parliament. A sovereign Parliament that adheres to these

constitutional precepts will oppose neither the supremacy of law nor, therefore, the individual liberties secured by precedent.

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See also Common Law; Constitutionalism; Parliament; Rule of Law; Sovereignty

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Difference Theories

There is undoubtedly a certain irony in trying to bring together under a single encyclopedia entry a range of theorists whose sole commonality may well be that they define themselves *against* the tendency of philosophy to think in terms of sameness, to categorize, or to demand that people live as readily identifiable subjects. At the same time, it is reasonable to gather under this general rubric a constellation of arguments, from the structuralism of 1960s France to present-day queer theory and postcolonial theory in the United States. In addition to forming a certain intellectual lineage (which partly accounts for the family resemblance), these theories share two things: a philosophical concern with the role of difference in social relations and a more political commitment to affirming difference(s) where others privilege sameness or identity.

From Difference to *Différance*

For present purposes, the story of difference theories can be said to begin with the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). Although his work may not have been as influential as some might argue, his name has come to signify for many the structuralist position on difference—a position against which many subsequent theorists would define themselves. Saussure's main contention is that language is a system of signification in which the basic unit of meaning is not the word but the *sign*. The sign, in turn, is composed of a signifier and signified, which are related in an arbitrary fashion, and the meaning of a sign results from its *difference* from all the other signs in the system.

Although Saussure's approach to language has been mostly abandoned by academic linguists, its importance for our story is twofold: first, the suggestion that language is a system of signification (and, later, Claude Lévi-Strauss's [1908–2009] application of this model to structural anthropology) shifts attention away from things in themselves to *relations* among things and suggests that what appears as identity depends in fact on relations of difference. Moreover, it implies that these relations of difference that condition or constitute identity are in fact relations in *language* and should be studied as such.

Among those who have both borrowed from Saussure and criticized his conception of difference, the French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) stands out as among the most original and influential. While giving credit to structuralism for conceiving of meaning in terms of difference rather than identity, Derrida argues that in reducing difference to a mere opposition between two terms (as if the meaning of a term were entirely contained in its opposition to another—e.g., white v. black), the structuralist position is ultimately no less problematic than the tradition of Western philosophy it seeks to supersede. As Derrida points out, even those binary oppositions that appear neutral (e.g., good v. evil, day v. night) are in fact structured hierarchically, with one term being consistently privileged over the other. Thus, for instance, the meaning of the word *day* is not reducible to its opposition to the word *night*. It may be the case that day depends on an opposition to night, but this relation is neither self-contained nor symmetrical: Day is consistently privileged over night by virtue of other relations, whereby day is associated with light, life, and reason, for example, whereas night is on the side of darkness, death, and ignorance. Because these associations are potentially endless, the opposition between night and day is in fact unstable; and as one slides from one term to the next, one finds eventually that the

lesser term of a given opposition has attributes that were presumably defining only of the first.

The task of deconstruction, therefore—if one can speak in such terms (which, strictly speaking, one cannot)—is to identify the hierarchical oppositions at work in a given text and overturn them by affirming the secondary term. Or more precisely, deconstruction does not simply identify and overturn these hierarchies (these are necessary but insufficient steps because they would only put new hierarchies in their place) but serves ultimately to disrupt these hierarchies through the introduction of a third term.

This is evident, for instance, in Derrida's reading of Saussure and the opposition of speech and writing that courses through his work. Saussure, who inherits Western philosophy's prejudice against writing, insists that the proper object of a science of language is speech, not writing, which he considers to be secondary or derivative. And yet, Derrida points out, when Saussure tries to explain how language actually functions, he does so by way of an analogy with writing. On close inspection, then, the secondary term in Saussure's hierarchy—writing—turns out to be primary, or at any rate, Derrida can point to what he calls writing-in-general (*arche-écriture*) as prior to the speech-writing hierarchy.

As Derrida's work suggests, any attempt to reduce a concept to its essence (and, by extension, any attempt to organize social relations around such a concept) necessarily founders, for the oppositions on which it depends invariably return to haunt the project. The meaning or identity of a term or concept is never present to itself, argues Derrida, but rather depends at the same time on both difference and deferral, something which Derrida famously tries to render with the notion of "*différance*."

What is *différance?* The word is Derrida's *bon mot:* It did not exist before Derrida coined it, and yet it is also understandable, which attests to the productive dimension of difference (a productivity that the structuralist position could not easily account for). If *différance* means anything, it is, of course, because of its difference from other terms in the French language: It is phonetically identical to the French noun *différence,* but its difference from *différence* becomes apparent in writing, such that the term silently undermines the phonocentrism of the Western philosophical tradition. Granted, to claim that the difference is apparent is misleading because difference "itself" is never manifest; at most, what appears is the presence of the letter *a* where one might have expected an *e*. This *a* in turn evokes both the absent '*e*' of *différence* and, at the same time (or rather, not quite at the same time), calls forth another meaning implicit in *différance,* by virtue of its resemblance to the French word *différant* (deferring). To put it simply, the meaning of *différance* is hard to grasp, and that is very much the point: It comes into view only gradually, as one recognizes its difference from and relation to other (absent) terms, in a process that takes time and reminds us that meaning is never simply present but depends rather on a process of both difference and deferral.

While Derrida's ostensible concerns are not obviously political, the influence of his approach has been far-reaching and is evident in the work of Anglophone political theorists like Bonnie Honig and Chantal Mouffe. Moreover, in his later works, Derrida himself does address questions of central importance to political theory, as when he discusses the possibility of justice, evokes a democracy to come (*démocratie à venir*), and engages what he calls the specters of Karl Marx. Nonetheless, Derrida has been less influential in political theory than has his contemporary, Michel Foucault (1926–1984). Again, Foucault is less obviously a philosopher of difference, but he more consistently addressed more overtly political topics, notably the nature of power and its relation to knowledge and discourse.

For Foucault, discourse is not simply language, but rather a way of talking about and representing knowledge at a particular time. Discourse concerns the production of knowledge through language. It overlaps considerably with the concept of a social practice, for both embody the meanings that shape conduct. Any given discourse thus constitutes a truth about subjects while—at the same time—constituting them *as subjects* in a regime of truth.

Such a broad conception of discourse allows Foucault to focus on the complex relation of knowledge and power. Even a seemingly "objective" science, which seeks only to gauge what constitutes normal behavior in a given society, is limited to asking the questions of the age and serves ultimately to *determine,* in part, what will

count as normal or abnormal in that society. Knowledge is not produced in a vacuum, and it is not without effects. We need only think of the encyclopedist, tasked by his or her peers with producing a survey of a given field of knowledge. Which topics deserve an entry, which topics do not? Merely deciding what theories count as "difference theories," after all, presumes that the phrase is meaningful and simultaneously contributes to shaping its meaning for the readers. The point is not that the works of Derrida, Foucault, and others do not exist outside the discourse of political theory, or that there is a straightforwardly political story behind their appropriation or deployment in the American academy. Simply, the point is that their existence *as* "difference theories" is the result of contingent struggles and conflicts in which these texts have been variously appropriated, truncated, and interpreted for particular ends, in ways that are shaped by power and have their own power effects.

If Foucault reminds us that discourse imposes one particular order where there could have been another, he also offers the hope that the knowledges that have been excluded or ignored may be recovered or given a voice. Thus, who knows, a history of political theory may one day be written to account for the emergence of "difference theories" as a discursive unit—one that owes its existence less to the coherence of their ostensible object than to the relations of power that gave them birth. This history, perhaps, would give voice to those "subjugated knowledges" that did not make the cut and would make it clear why certain theories were deemed "too different" (after all, where in this entry is Gloria Anzaldúa's [1942–2004] *mestiza* consciousness?) or not quite "theoretical" enough (what about the "Black is beautiful" movement?).

Among those difference theorists who have been clearly recognized as such, even if they are perhaps less influential among Anglo-Saxon political theorists (at least until recently) than either Derrida or Foucault, the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998) deserve special mention. Deleuze, like Derrida and Foucault, is a critic of the Hegelianism dominant in twentieth-century French philosophy, and like many of his contemporaries, he insists on the need to develop a concept of difference that is not secondary to identity. More than others, however, Deleuze remains sympathetic to the project of systematic philosophy, so long as systems are understood as open rather than closed and the task of philosophy is construed as the creation of new concepts (rather than the pursuit of Truth).

Deleuze's own philosophy of difference emerges from his engagement with a number of other thinkers, each of whom affirms a version of what Deleuze calls multiplicity. From Heraclitus, Deleuze takes the notion of flux as the basis of reality. From Henri Bergson, Deleuze takes the notion of duration (and the corollary distinction between space and time) as an alternative to the traditional opposition between the one and the many (which, according to Deleuze, leads invariably to a privileging of unity). From Friedrich Nietzsche, Deleuze adapts the concept of an eternal return, arguing that "it is not being that returns but rather returning itself that constitutes being" (Deleuze, 1962/1983, 48). More generally, where metaphysics has traditionally concerned itself with being (and understands being as being *the same*), Deleuze views the world as *becoming*. In *Difference and Repetition* (1968), difference is granted ontological primacy, and repetition is understood not as repetition of the same, but as the expression of difference in itself—the difference of the thing with itself.

Although the political implications of granting priority to difference are not obvious, Deleuze's own concern with politics is readily apparent in the works he coauthored with the psychoanalyst Félix Guattari—specifically, in their theory of assemblages and related concepts (in particular, the concept of minority or becoming-minor). And whereas Deleuze's influence outside of France was for a long time limited to film and literary theory, a number of political theorists have done much in recent years to bring Deleuze's distinctive brand of philosophizing to Anglo-Saxon political theory.

Jean-François Lyotard, finally, although best known for having declared the end of metanarratives in *The Postmodern Condition* (1979), ranks also as an important theorist of difference in his own right as the author of *The Differend* (1984), which Lyotard himself described as his book of philosophy. In this work, written in the context of the so-called linguistic turn in European philosophy, Lyotard takes on what he identifies as an old

prejudice of philosophy and the human sciences, whereby language is a mere instrument of communication that is used by already constituted subjects. Writing against this view of language, Lyotard claims that what there is are phrases, constituted according to groups of rules or regimens (e.g., reasoning, knowing, describing)—phrases which "happen" and demand a form of linkage. These may obey regimens that are heterogeneous, and the genres of discourse may be incommensurable, but linkage must nonetheless occur. As Lyotard puts it, "to link is necessary; how to link is not." No phrase regimen or genre of discourse has a universal authority to decide how to link. Lyotard thus suggests that actualizing any particular link wrongs the possible regimens or genres that then remain unactualized. Such is the nature of the *différend,* which Lyotard describes as "a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments" (1984, p. xi). Lyotard's concern, then, is to show that politics is the problematic linking of one phrase to another, and more generally, through philosophy, to bear witness to the *différend.*

From Feminism to Queer Theory

Difference, needless to say, had been a concern of feminism long before structuralism or poststructuralism ever took up the question. Indeed, for much of the twentieth century, feminists assumed—whether for philosophical or political reasons—the existence of such a thing as "sexual difference," a difference that forms the basis for women's oppression in society. Within these broad parameters, feminist debates have often been cast in terms of the following choice: Should one demand equality for women on the basis of a presumed sameness between men and women, or should one advocate instead for the recognition of those differences that specifically characterize women's condition?

While this distinction makes some sense, especially in a context where equality and liberty are both prized, the development of poststructuralism has done much to trouble this basic dichotomy. On the one hand, simply affirming the qualities of women risks naturalizing "feminine" traits that are in fact either the result or the basis of women's continued oppression. On the other hand, if one merely declares that men and women are fundamentally the same, one risks overlooking the realities—be they naturally or socially determined—that differentially shape the lives of men and women in society.

So, Joan Scott argues that feminists cannot resolve the differences between the sexes by embracing or ignoring them as they are normally conceived. Instead, feminists have to criticize the differences and the way they give rise to exclusions and inclusions and so the hierarchies; they have to refuse the truth of the differences. Yet, feminists have to aim here not at an equality based on identity, but rather an equality based on differences; they do not seek to define women and men the same but rather to disrupt all such binary oppositions.

How successful such a project can be (or, indeed, just what would constitute "success") remains an open question, but it is one way of understanding the influence of poststructuralism on the theorizing of sexual difference. Luce Irigaray (b. 1930), a French philosopher and psychoanalyst, is one of the best-known feminist theorists (along with Julia Kristeva and Hélène Cixous, among others) to have brought poststructuralism's insights to bear on the question of sexual difference. Sexual difference, for Irigaray, is perhaps the main philosophical issue of the age. But where others attribute sexism chiefly to social, political, or economic practices, Irigaray contends that its roots extend deep into our language. She argues that our language has made Man the subject of theoretical and moral discussion, and a male God the guardian of this subject. According to Irigaray and others writing in a deconstructive vein, the notion of the subject in the West is indeed based on a series of binary oppositions (e.g., active v. inert, culture v. nature, reason v. affect) which are both hierarchical and distinctly *gendered,* with the secondary term being consistently coded as feminine. As a result, the argument goes, it is impossible for woman in Western culture to truly achieve a subject position because the subject position is always already masculine. Irigaray's challenge, then, is not only to underscore this lack of a female subjectivity but to remedy it, which she attempts by way of critique of both philosophy and psychoanalysis—discourses she thinks contribute to the devaluation and exclusion of women from the rank of subject,

even as they attempt (at least in the case of psychoanalysis) to describe this exclusion.

There have been many disagreements (and, no doubt, misunderstandings) surrounding Irigaray's attempt at theorizing difference differently (many of her detractors in the United States, in particular, have faulted her for a kind of essentialism), but perhaps the most influential critique of her work—and more generally, one of the most influential interventions in feminist debates in the last two decades—has been Judith Butler's (b. 1956) *Gender Trouble,* a work that draws inspiration from Foucault and Derrida, among others, and marks an important turn in both the theorizing of identity/difference and the development of queer theory.

An American scholar trained in continental philosophy, Butler offers in *Gender Trouble* an avowedly feminist critique of a certain kind of feminism. Specifically, her target is what she calls "the heterosexism at the core of sexual difference fundamentalism." The argument of the book is notoriously difficult, but much of it turns on a critique of the distinction commonly made between the notion of sex (which is considered to be natural) and that of gender (which is considered to be culturally determined). Taking as a point of departure Simone de Beauvoir's famous observation—one is not born a woman, one becomes a woman—Butler wonders what is at stake in positing a subject that *becomes* a woman, culturally, on the sole basis of her body being identified as female. Butler recognizes that the sex/gender distinction is meant to show that gender roles are culturally constructed (and therefore contestable). She worries that by casting sex as existing outside of and prior to discourse, this distinction fails to recognize the male/female distinction *as a distinction* (a culturally determined distinction that is productive of effects). Moreover, she warns against a feminism that makes sex the basis of one's identity (instead of viewing it as an effect of power) and demands of desire that it be heterosexual (because man and woman are necessarily defined in relation to each other). In the end, Butler suggests, gender should be understood not as the cultural forces acting on the natural distinction of sex, but rather as the discourses through which sex is produced as if it were natural.

Like Foucault, Butler focuses on power and discourse and understands the (sexed and sexual) subject as an effect of power. But Butler's debt to Derrida is also significant: In addition to overturning and displacing the sex/gender distinction, Butler makes creative use of his notion of performative (which Derrida himself borrows from John Austin). She suggests that gender is performative in that it constitutes the very identity that it implies is natural. Gender is thus not something that one *is* or *has* but rather something that one *does,* through the repetition of acts that invoke and inscribe in the body a certain sexed identity. This understanding of gender as resulting from repetition also carries the promise of possible resistance, or at least of a subversive embrace of gender's constructed character.

For all its influence on feminist debates and beyond, Butler's argument has had more than its share of critics, even among those who militate against discrimination on the basis of gender or sexual orientation. Some worry that her account of gender misjudges the real nature or extent of women's oppression, while others worry that it simply removes the ground for any feminist solidarity. Even among gay and lesbian activists, who might share Butler's concern with the tacit heteronormativity of feminism, there is some ambivalence: After all, in Butler's view, any political demand that is based on one's sexual orientation (be it on behalf of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, transgendered individuals, etc.) runs the risk of producing sexuality as the basis of one's identity, concealing its nature as an effect of power and contributing to setting expectations of what constitutes normal sexuality.

Race and Postcolonial Theory

It goes almost without saying that theorizing about sexual difference has taken place alongside (and often intersected with) a number of debates about difference in other areas of politics and culture. In the United States, for instance, where W. E. B. Du Bois had anticipated that the "problem of the color line" would be the problem of the twentieth century, the civil rights movement and the rise of identity politics did much to invite (and, at times, frustrate) theoretical engagement with the role of difference in the construction of race and identity. Likewise, around the world, the wars of independence that brought about the end of colonialism also did much to spur a new wave of theorizing on

the importance of difference for the colonial project and for its legacy, often building on poststructuralist insights. In particular, the discussion of race has benefited considerably from the notion that race functions as a semiotic system, in which it is certain markers of racial identity—or more precisely, markers of racial *difference* (like a person's skin color or the shape of the eyes)—that allow one to recognize a person as being *of* a certain race. On this account, racial markers are but signifiers associated with particular signifieds (e.g., low intelligence or high athletic ability) in relations that are, of course, arbitrary but appear otherwise in a given cultural context.

While such an account of race as a system of signification invites the kind of deconstructive reading that overturns and displaces racial hierarchies, it also begs the question of how such associations are *made* historically (and how, by extension, they might be unmade or refashioned). This is where Foucault's attention to discourse and to the body as a site of power has proven a useful complement to the semiotician's focus on relations of meaning. In particular, Foucault's attention to power/knowledge has inspired considerable research in recent years into the ways that certain disciplines (e.g., anthropology, criminology, or genetics), in seeking to establish whether apparent differences between groups are the result of biological factors or of social discrimination, find themselves both drawing on categories that are themselves effects of discourse and, inevitably, contributing to *fixing* the meaning of these differences and shaping the relations of power built around them.

Finally, among those who have most developed Foucault's insights in the context of cultural and racial difference, Edward Said (1935–2003) stands out as the most influential figure in the development of postcolonial theory. Said, a professor of comparative literature, achieved notoriety outside of his discipline with the 1978 publication of *Orientalism,* which offers an account not of the Orient per se (if one can even speak of such a thing) but of the Orient as imagined, invented, and to a large extent *produced* by the West. By Said's account, *Orientalism* is about the *discourse* by which Europe constructed the Orient during the post-Enlightenment age. The European imagination then ascribed particular political, sociological, military, ideological, and scientific characteristics to the Orient. Insisting, like Foucault before him, on the inseparability of power and knowledge, Said argues that the (Western) science of the Orient can be understood only in the context of the colonial project: Indeed, such a science is predicated on Europe's domination of the East (a field such as Egyptology is unthinkable outside of Napoleon's conquest of Egypt); it also serves to legitimate Western domination. More precisely, it gives a particular shape to the colonial administration and—perversely—contributes to the rise of an Oriental *subject* who in turn serves as the vehicle of Western domination. And yet, as Said is careful to point out, what is at issue in Western representations of "the Orient" is really the identity of the "West" itself. The Orient acted as a strange other in contrast to which Europe defined its own familiarity

Ivan Ascher

See also Feminism; Foucault, Michel; Identity; Orientalism; Other; Postcolonialism; Postmodernism; Queer; Race Theory; Subaltern

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Disagreement

Disagreement, the translation of the French term *mésentente,* is the central concept in the political thinking of French philosopher Jacques Rancière, whose writings on democratic politics have increasingly become a major point of reference, especially since the publication in 1999 of his most important work, the eponymous *La Mésentente*. The fact that disagreement is the central notion in Rancière's theory of democracy indicates that the latter ranks among those theories that emphasize the moment of conflict rather than consensus in their definitions of politics. More recently, Rancière has also used the term *dissensus,* the opposite of consensus, as a synonym of mésentente. The term mésentente, however, has connotations that disappear in translation yet are essential to grasping the originality of Rancière's approach.

The disagreement Rancière sees at the heart of politics is not simply the irreducible lack of accord among citizens about their respective values, interests, and so on. It is for him literally based on the absence of understanding of others, or indeed, as the word *entente* also denotes, on the inability of the groups dominating society to "hear" the dominated, to acknowledge them as belonging to the circle of those who deserve to take part in the symbolic reproduction of society (notably in politics).

The basis of a political disagreement is a situation in which a group is not heard; its voices and its claims are ignored because from the perspective of the elites, the social situation of the individuals renders them incapable of accessing the plane of meaningful participation. The voices of these excluded groups are not recognized as *logos* but remain in the state of *phone,* to use Aristotle's famous criterion of the human polity. A disagreement, and with it politics, arises when excluded groups challenge the logic of exclusion that identifies social positions and occupations with symbolic capacities, in particular the capacity to be a full citizen.

For Rancière, such logic of exclusion is operative in all societies. The challenge to political exclusion based on social hierarchy can take specific objects as its explicit themes, for example, issues related to work or the private sphere. However, because the real issue is the threshold of visibility between the socially significant and the insignificant, Rancière insists that the true political moment in all political struggles is not exhausted by the object of the struggle but resides in the challenging of the boundaries that underpin the representation of the social order. Politics is always waged in the name of equality, as a challenge to the inequality that structurally pervades social orders. In this very specific sense, Rancière equates politics with democracy. When politics is only the effective management of existing social interests, it reproduces an order that is implicitly an order of exclusion and should rather be called *police,* in the old sense of the term. As a result, Rancière's politics of disagreement is critical of theories that approach politics mainly through the question of deliberation. Such theories presuppose

as given an equality that is in fact the main object in contention in politics.

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See also Agonism; Aristotle; Democracy

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Discourse

The last few years have brought a growing interest in the concept of discourse in political theory, as well as new forms of discourse analysis. As the term *discourse* suggests, discourse theory highlights the role of language—and more broadly the question of meaning—in politics. Yet, there are different ways to interpret and use the resources yielded by the so-called linguistic turn to understand and explain political processes. Some focus more narrowly on talk and text in context, whereas others deepen and extend the concept of discourse to include a wide range of social practices and political phenomena.

Different approaches to discourse theory in contemporary political theory largely reflect the different starting points of the various theorists, coupled with the theoretical resources on which they draw. Three types of discourse analysis can thus be distinguished. A first set of political theorists draws on the work of J. L. Austin's speech act theory and the later Ludwig Wittgenstein to inquire into the history of ideas or to develop ethical and normative theory. The work of Michel Foucault and those inspired by his different methods of discourse analysis constitute a second approach. A third group of theorists find inspiration in Ferdinand de Saussure's theory of the sign and in those who have deconstructed the structuralist tradition of thought he bequeathed, which has resulted in a distinctively poststructuralist theory of discourse. This entry discusses each in turn.

Speech Act Theory

A first branch of discourse theory has its roots in the theory of speech acts developed by the English philosopher J. L. Austin. Austin directed attention in philosophy away from assertoric utterances—statements that assert something about the world—to performative utterances, in which to *say* something is to *do* something. For someone to say "I do" in a properly constituted wedding ceremony is to act in the here and now while committing the agent to future actions. Equally, the assessment of such utterances does not inquire into their truth or falsity but focuses on whether they are carried out felicitously or infelicitously. Speech act theory thus brings out the performative character of language, which has been used to analyze rhetoric—the art of persuasive speaking and writing—and controversial political discourses and speeches. For example, Quentin Skinner and those in the Cambridge school focus on what political philosophers are *doing* when they address particular problems in specific historical conditions, whereas Judith Butler draws on Austin's distinction between the meaning, import, and effect of linguistic utterances to reexamine practices like hate speech.

Jürgen Habermas also draws on Austin's theory to rethink important elements of moral and political philosophy. He elaborates a notion of discourse ethics that arises from his overall social theory, especially his account of language. In this conception, linguistic meaning depends on the presence of other language users—a state of intersubjectivity—while the truth of statements depends on the potential agreement of those with whom one discusses. In so doing, Habermas proposes an "ideal speech situation" in order to determine the validity, and thus acceptability, of our utterances and proposals. The procedure requires participants to be sincere in reasoning toward the best argument, while including all those affected by the decision. If this is approximated, then an agreement or rational consensus on "the force of the better argument" can be expected. In this context, discourse ethics is a form of normative reasoning, the argumentative rules that social actors must accept if they are to

argue reasonably for the claims they propose to validate. So conceived, discourse becomes central in resolving conflicts and disagreements that emerge between asymmetrically positioned actors in the modern social world.

For Habermas, conflicts arise because different systems of instrumental action, such as the market and the bureaucratic capitalist state, clash with—or colonize—the social lifeworld, where agents interact and relate to each other on the basis of communicative, rather than instrumental action. Discourse ethics enables a legitimate and democratic resolution of such contestation. Habermas's political theory is closely connected to this account of ethics, for the latter involves a commitment to the ideals of inclusiveness, equality, and universal solidarity, which are implicit in discourse and language use. In this vein, Habermas's approach has been used to develop deliberative models of democracy and discursive accounts of public policy making and representation.

The Foucauldian Turn

Foucault's voluminous writings, and those inspired by his work, constitute a second type of discourse theory. His earlier archaeological method also draws on Austin's idea of speech acts. But whereas Austin is concerned with everyday linguistic performances, Foucault is interested in what might be termed *serious* speech acts—or statements—that are held to be true or false according to a particular set of rules, which come into play in a particular historical context. Foucault examines those linguistic performances in which subjects are empowered to make serious truth claims because of their training, institutional location, and mode of discourse. For example, assertions about the prospects of global warming only become statements when they are uttered by suitably qualified scientists and climate experts, who present plausible theories and evidence to justify their arguments. In sum, Foucault's archaeological project is concerned with sets of statements that are taken to be serious claims to truth by particular societies and communities at different points in time. His aim is then to describe their appearance, the different kinds of statements, and the regularities between statements in particular systems of discourse—or *discursive formations*—and their regulated historical transformation.

Foucault's early program is thus concerned to describe the historically specific set of rules that enable the production of discourse, which thereby account for the rarity of scientific discourse and for the way science is demarcated from nonscience. However, this endeavor to elaborate a quasi-structuralist theory of discourse, which is understood as a relatively autonomous domain of statements, ran aground on a series of methodological contradictions, not least because Foucault's purely descriptive intent pushed against the critical potential of the enterprise.

By contrast, his Nietzschean-inspired genealogical approach seeks to redress these difficulties by broadening the notion of discourse to include a much wider set of social phenomena (such that it is not altogether clear how to distinguish between the discursive and nondiscursive dimensions) and by stressing the constitutive function of power in the formation and operation of scientific knowledge. Foucault thus stresses the interweaving of various systems of power-knowledge, such as criminology or psychiatry, and their role in producing and disciplining social subjects like "the criminal," "the delinquent" or "the insane." Contra Habermas, his genealogical investigations explore the contingent and ignoble origins of such systems while stressing the role of power and conflict in forging identities, rules, and social forms.

Finally, Foucault's later writings on governmentality have spawned a school of thinking in which government is an art of doing politics—an activity of governing issues and subjectivities—which concerns the how and what of public interventions; what Foucault famously termed the *conduct of conduct*. Government thus concerns the whole range of practices and activities that are undertaken by various agencies to shape the conduct of citizens and subjects. In this perspective, it is best viewed as a plethora of ambiguous and decentered authorities, with diverse technologies, rationalities, discourses, and modes of intervention. Indeed, its very unity as a system of institutions—such that exists—is itself a political and ideological construction.

Poststructuralist Discourse Theory

Poststructuralist discourse theory (PDT), which is a third strand of discourse theory, is best represented

by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and those in the Essex school of discourse analysis. Proponents of this approach accept the interweaving of saying and doing and build on the way Foucault connects discourse to a wider set of social practices and institutions. But they go further to stress the discursive character of *all* objects and social practices and provide an explicitly political theory of discourse that critically explains their formation and transformation. Poststructuralists thus extend the idea of discourse as a shared way of apprehending the world, which is based on certain presuppositions and viewpoints that furnish the rules for analysis, discussion, and decision making, to the idea that discourses are systems of meaningful practices that are produced by exercises of power, which involve the creation of political divisions between differently positioned actors and their demands.

To grasp the basic idea at work here, finding inspiration in the opening remarks of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations,* imagine a Builder A and an Assistant B building a wall with assorted stones. A calls out the words *block, slab, beam,* and *pillar,* and B passes the stones to A, who inserts them into the wall. As Wittgenstein notes, we can call this entire operation, consisting of objects, language, and the actions into which they are woven, a *language game*. The concept of a language game more or less corresponds to what poststructuralist discourse theorists name discourse or discursive structures.

Three features are of importance in this conception of discourse. First, discourses are *relational configurations* of elements that include agents (or subjects), words, and actions. Moreover, these different elements make sense only within the context of a particular activity; for example, the practice of constructing a wall. Put more formally, drawing on Saussurean linguistics, a discourse consists of a system of signs without positive terms, in which the identity of each element depends on its difference from others. Thus, the meaning of the term *block* depends on its difference from related signifiers like *slab, beam,* and *pillar*. Or, in a more political language game like Marxism, the meaning of *socialism* makes sense by its contrast with terms like *feudalism, capitalism, primitive communism,* and so on.

Second, once this model of language has been formalized, the purely relational and differential character of language holds for *all* signifying structures. This includes practices like playing chess or regulating banks in a particular country, as well as the norms, rules, and procedures that enable the monitoring and enforcement of human rights in international politics. This does not mean that everything *is* language narrowly construed—that is, speech or writing—but rather that the relational and differential properties of language hold for all meaningful structures, including social formations in Marxist theory, as well as international regimes in the fields of political economy or human rights.

Third, as the name implies, poststructuralists stress the *structural incompletion* or *radical contingency* of any formal signifying structure. This is because all systems of meaning are marked by an outside that prevents their full constitution. Every identity must differ from others, and the entire set of differences must be distinguished from others. This reliance on something external means that the outside partly constitutes the identity of the inside, while rendering the inside precarious and vulnerable. In political terms, it is the construction of antagonisms—in which an "other" blocks my identity and prevents me from realizing my identity—that discloses the limits of any existing set of social relations. When foreigners or immigrants are said to prevent domestic workers from getting access to jobs, resulting in a set of demands that cannot be satisfied by management or government, we see the construction of antagonistic relations and divisions within society. The experience of antagonism, coupled with the linking together of demands and antagonisms, creates political frontiers that divide society into opposed camps. This enables proponents of PDT to discern the limits of discourse and then to delimit and individuate a discourse or discourses.

In general, then, three aspects of PDT can be specified: the discursive, discourses, and discourse analysis. The discursive is an ontological category that captures the idea that every object or order is meaningful because it is situated in a field of significant differences. Yet, such entities are always incomplete and thus radically contingent.

Discourses are particular systems of meaningful practice. Ideologies like Thatcherism in the United Kingdom or the apartheid system in South Africa are all discourses in this sense of the term. They are finite and contingent constructions that are

constituted politically by the construction of social antagonisms and the creation of political frontiers. They are stabilized and challenged by multiple hegemonic operations, which involve the linking together of different demands into discourse coalitions, and/or the disaggregation of such demands by their negation or incorporation into an existing hegemonic order.

What might be termed discourse analysis involves the empirical investigation of specific discourses in particular times and places, although it is always informed by the ontological presuppositions of discourse theory. Discourse analysis captures the strategies and techniques of analyzing practices and regimes as discourses by focusing on the way in which these objects can be translated into discursive sequences and texts and then investigated with a range of commensurate techniques, such as rhetorical analysis, theories of argumentation, different forms of textual analysis, and so on.

Questions about discourse analysis also concern the epistemological status of the substantive outcomes of such research. It is important to stress in this regard that PDT is a problem-driven approach to political analysis, which involves the construction of particular problems in specific historical contexts. Yet, its advocates and practitioners also ask some general questions. What are the origins of particular discourses? How can they be characterized? How and why are they sustained? How can discourses be evaluated and criticized? The last question emphasizes the fact that PDT is usually construed as a species of critical theory.

Jason Glynos and David Howarth have responded to these questions by developing the idea of *logics of critical explanation*. Logics in this perspective are not causal laws or causal mechanisms independent of an actor's meaning. And while their discernment must take actors' own meanings into account, logics do not simply reflect an actor's self-interpretations. Instead, the logic of a discourse captures the rules that govern a meaningful practice, as well as the conditions that make the operation of such rules possible (and at the same time render them vulnerable to change). They also speak to the kinds of entities presupposed by the existence of such rules. In short, logics provide answers to questions about the nature and function of various social practices, as well as their overall purposes, meanings, and effects.

Three types of logic are stressed in PDT. *Social logics* enable the characterization of social practices in different contexts. They are thus multiple and contextual, as there are as many logics as the various situations that an investigator explores. They may capture economic and social processes: a particular logic of competition or commodification, for example, or a specific logic of bureaucratization in a particular social context. "Enforced ethnic and racial separation for political domination and economic exploitation" is a stylized way of characterizing the logic of apartheid discourse in South Africa.

Political logics enable the discourse theorist to explain and criticize the emergence and formation of a social practice or regime. Of particular importance in this regard are the logics of equivalence and difference. Equivalential logics enable the researcher to grasp the way in which identities and political frontiers are constructed via the linking together of social demands by the construction of antagonisms, whereas the logics of difference capture the way in which demands are negated, disarticulated, mediated, and negotiated by various institutions. Politics is thus understood as the contestation and institution of social relations and practices, which in turn disclose their contingent character by showing the role of power and exclusion in their formation. The revealing of contingency makes possible a space for thinking and acting differently.

Logics of ideology provide the means to explain and criticize the way subjects are gripped by discourses. The concept of ideology is understood as that dimension of social relations that conceals the contingency of social practices and naturalizes the relations of domination in any discourse or practice. Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis, an important focus here is the role of phantasmagoric narratives, which structure the way social subjects become and remain attached to certain signifiers, as well as the different types of enjoyment (*jouissance*) they procure in identifying with discourses and believing the things they do. In short, fantasy operates by covering over the radical contingency of social relations, either through a fantastic narrative that promises a fullness-to-come once a named obstacle is overcome—the beatific dimension of fantasy—or which foretells disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable, which is the horrific dimension of fantasy. The task of discourse theory is to detect and critique these narratives, to disclose their

character as fantasies, and to propose alternative forms and modes of identification.

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See also Constructivism; Foucault, Michel; Interpretive Theory

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Disenchantment

The term *disenchantment* can be used in a colloquial sense to denote a particular affective or emotional dimension of politics—for example, one may say that one is disenchanted with politicians, or with the political process in general, meaning that one has doubts about their efficacy or integrity, or that one's emotional investments in them have been betrayed. However, the word has a more specific meaning in the history of political and social thought. In this more specific sense, disenchantment is used to refer to the supposed condition of the world, once science and the Enlightenment have eroded the sway of religion and superstition. At stake in this latter use of the word disenchantment are the opposed roles of science and religion in modern society.

The sociologist Max Weber is credited with popularizing the term in a lecture given in 1918. The German word he used was *Entzauberung*, translated into English as disenchantment, but literally meaning "de-magic-ation" (more generally, the word connotes the breaking of a magic spell). For Weber, the advent of scientific methods and the use of enlightened reason meant that the world was rendered transparent and demystified. Theological and supernatural accounts of the world involving gods and spirits, for example, ceased to be plausible. Instead, one put one's faith in the ability of science to eventually explain everything in rational terms. But, for Weber, the effect of this demystification was that the world was leached of mystery and richness. It becomes disenchanted and disenchanting, predictable and intellectualized. In this sense, the disenchantment of the world is the alienating and undesirable flip side of scientific progress.

Indeed, Weber did not have many good things to say about the process of disenchantment. For example, in a disenchanted world, public life is on the wane because transcendent values are no longer to be found in community or polity; rather, people seek emotional fulfillment in private relations. According to Weber, such undesirable consequences of disenchantment can be attributed above all to the fact that science inadequately fills the vacuum left by the diminishment of religion—science may be able to clarify questions of values and morals, but it is ultimately incapable of answering them. However, a return to old-style religion is also an inferior solution, for this would represent a withdrawal into the obsolete and unfounded beliefs of the past. This inadequacy of both science and religion produces a fundamental impasse in the modern world, Weber thought.

During World War II, the philosophers Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno drew on Weber to point out that science's attempts to disenchant the world resulted only in a kind of return of the repressed—the irrationality that had been squelched by enlightened reason returned in the form of violence and barbarism. More recently, political theorists and philosophers such as Jane Bennett and Charles Taylor have sought to question the very premises of Weber's thesis that science serves only to disenchant the world and dispel spiritual feeling.

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See also Alienation; Civil Religion; Critical Theory; Enlightenment; Weber, Max

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Dissent

Dissent is an unwillingness to cooperate with an established source of authority, which can be social, cultural, or governmental. Political theorists have focused mainly on government as an object for dissent, thinking through how and to what extent dissent should be promoted, tolerated, and controlled by a state. Dissent is often related to two other concepts, critical thinking and toleration. Both play into the problem of legitimation.

Dissent has primarily been associated with the activity of critical thinking, or thinking for oneself and questioning accepted notions of authority, truth, and meaning. Critical thinking has itself frequently been seen as activity that, in some sense, must necessarily involve dissent. To think for oneself, to be what Immanuel Kant would call mature, or to pursue an "examined life" often involves developing positions that contrast with the conventions of a thinker's age and society. This puts critical thinking individuals at odds with other members of their society and frequently with the state itself. Dissent, then, is a powerful source for developing effective public reasoning, itself necessary for determining the legitimacy of the actions and institutions of a given state as well as the customs and practices of a given society.

The question that arises is what role dissent that flows from critical thinking should play in a functioning political association. For Plato and Immanuel Kant dissent is important for promoting either individuals' capacity to examine their life in relation to others or a collective capacity for public reasoning. However, dissent can go only so far. They can practice the examined life as much as they want, they can promote enlightened public reasoning as much as possible, but at the end of the day, critical thinkers must obey the laws or sovereign power within their polity.

For more recent thinkers, be they liberals like John Stuart Mill or twentieth-century voices like Michel Foucault, members of the Frankfurt School, and numerous others, dissent is seen as a vital good, one whose relative absence in nineteenth- and twentieth-century democracies goes to the heart of the malaise affecting these states. Modern democracies are seen as fostering forms of self-censorship, pernicious ideals of normality, or intellectually asphyxiating forms of culture. Each of these inhibits critical thinking, thus minimizing dissent and limiting the development of effective forms of public deliberation.

Dissent's relationship to toleration involves the role of minority groups in larger collectivities, whose practices are often seen by other members of the larger collective as dissenting from the norms of that collective. To what degrees should the practices of these minorities be tolerated and accommodated? In the name of what set of values should these determinations be made?

Frequently, the issue of dissent and toleration has involved religious minorities. In his famous piece, "A Letter Concerning Toleration," John Locke argues that tolerance is indeed a Christian virtue and that the state as a civic association should be concerned only with civic interests, not spiritual ones. Locke's separation of church and state stood at the beginning of a debate about the limits of religious dissent from civic authority in the name of not unduly hampering an individual or a group's spiritual practices. Among the questions pursued here are: How neutral or independent of theistic/metaphysical concerns can debates about the laws or policies of a state be? When is a dissenting religious practice, such as sanctioned drug use, such an egregious violation of civil law that a state can legitimately move to deny it? To what degree should dissenting religious practices that apparently violate individual rights like the rights of children or women be tolerated?

The toleration of dissenting religious practices can often be a vital force for expanding the scope of inclusion and consent within a state, thereby increasing the legitimacy of the laws and policies of a given state. Yet, it can also be a destabilizing force that undermines the legitimacy of the state by compelling the state to sanction practices that

contravene what others see as basic and universal norms. Finally, through simply tolerating but not critically scrutinizing such dissenting practices, the state might be involved in implicitly sanctioning, without directly legitimating, one set of metaphysical/theistic biases while marginalizing and in some sense implicitly discrediting the beliefs of those it seeks to accommodate.

In the late twentieth century, numerous scholars focused on ethnic or cultural minorities. Here the claims often involve appeals for recognition of different identities. Individuals who belong to minority ethnic or cultural collectives, which often engage in dissenting practices, ask to have their differences accommodated so that they have an equal opportunity, vis-à-vis members of a majority culture, to pursue their ideal of the good life. Many see the struggles for recognition of dissenting identities as integral to healthy democratic politics, as they promote more reflexive understandings of identity and with that a more inclusive pluralist political culture. Others worry about the specter of fragmentation. To what degree does the accommodation of dissenting identities undermine common bonds or sources of solidarity necessary for effective democratic governance?

Mark Redhead

See also Deliberative Democracy; Legitimacy; Toleration

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Divine Right of Kings

The divine right of kings was the central doctrine used to justify monarchy in early modern Europe. It claimed that kings received their earthly power by divine mandate and, as a result, could not be subject to any temporal or secular authority. Divine right theory is, therefore, a version of political absolutism. It draws heavily on the analogy between the rule of a father over his children and that of a king over his subjects. In some ways, divine right theory may be seen as a descendant of the late medieval doctrine of the two swords.

The theory was most prominent in Tudor and Stuart England and received its most powerful intellectual justification in the writings of King James I (James VI of Scotland) and in Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha*. King Louis XIV of France was also a significant representative of the tradition. Following the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688 and the French Revolution of 1789, monarchs in those countries were no longer able to base their claims to sovereign power on a divine mandate. In the contemporary world, few if any sovereigns base their legitimacy on a claim of divine right.

Divine right theory emerged out of various ideas that were central to medieval European political thought, notably the claim that God granted power to both secular and religious authorities on Earth, the notion of the Great Chain of Being, and the metaphor of the body politic. The claim that the king was the head of the body politic is powerfully illustrated in the frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan,* in which the king's body is literally made up of the bodies of myriad subjects. (It should be noted, however, that Hobbes, although an absolutist, was not a divine right theorist but one of the founders of the social contract tradition.) Given that the human body has but one head and that a two-headed being would be seen as either a monster or an ungovernable being, divine right theorists argued that the king's authority

must not be challenged or divided. In their view, multiple sources of authority would inevitably lead to political strife or even to civil war. Any attempt to oppose the king could thus be construed as treason. For this reason, King Charles I of England refused at his trial to accept that the British Parliament had any right to hold him accountable for his actions as the country's monarch.

The Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made prominent the idea that human beings were created equal and thus called into question the notion of a divinely ordained sovereign. Furthermore, many of the traditions associated with medieval monarchy, such as the idea that kings could cure scrofula—then known as "the King's Evil"—simply by touching sufferers, could no longer be maintained. Divine right theory slowly fell out of fashion and was replaced by natural law theory as the preeminent justification of political power. John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* was fundamental in the replacement of divine right theory. The first of the two treatises is dedicated to a thorough critique of Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha.*

Toby Reiner

See also Absolutism; Body Politic; Enlightenment; Hobbes, Thomas; Kingship; Locke, John; Natural Law; Paine, Thomas; Sovereignty

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Domination

The term *domination* comes from the Latin *dominus,* the master or lord of the household who rules over his household with absolute power. *Dominium,* a related word, designates ownership as well as rule over others. Accordingly, slavery appears as an instance, perhaps the key instance, of domination. More generally, political theorists tend to grasp domination as a particularly intense or extreme form of power or rule involving the systematic subordination of some human beings to others such that the subordinated are vulnerable to the arbitrary will, and violence, of those who dominate.

Domination is frequently tied to exploitation, for example, exploitation of labor in Marxism and of sexual labor in some strands of feminism. While those who are dominated often seek liberation, as in women's liberation or liberation from colonial rule, the evil of domination appears as the opposite of both liberty and equality. Indeed, domination is almost always tied to some radical difference in status. Accordingly, some political theorists grasp domination not simply as an instance of a great disparity in power, but as a set of relatively entrenched practices in which subordination is discursively and symbolically inscribed in the political order. These practices can be understood as performances in which both those who dominate and those who are subordinated have their own parts to play, their own scripts to follow.

Herrschaft and Domination

Discussions of power and domination often begin with Max Weber. Weber distinguishes *Macht,* usually translated as power, from *Herrschaft,* variously translated as rule, domination, lordship. The *Herr* in *Herrschaft* points to the Latin *dominus* or the English master or lord. According to Weber, one has *Macht* to the extent that one can carry out one's will in the face of resistance. To achieve greater precision, Weber ties *Herrschaft,* a subset of power, to command. The counterpart of Herrschaft appears as discipline, that is, habituation to obedience. The state, with its hierarchical administrative apparatus and monopoly over legitimate physical force, appears as the most important instance of Herrschaft in the modern era.

Because Weber uses *Herrschaft* to refer to all situations of political rule, his account of Herrschaft captures situations where there may be little domination as most political theorists understand the term. Conversely, Weber's understanding of Herrschaft is, in one respect, narrower than some understandings of domination because Weber ties Herrschaft specifically to the possibility of

achieving obedience to explicit commands, thereby excluding other modes of domination. Most important, perhaps, the translation difficulties occasioned by *Herrschaft* raise the question of whether all political rule, broadly understood, necessarily contains the germ of, or is even identical to, domination. Whereas anarchists might answer the question in the affirmative, many political theorists conceive of democracy, the rule of law, and constitutionalism (or variants or combinations thereof) as ways in which political rule, no longer understood simply as the rule of some human beings over others, can be more or less successfully purified of mastery, lordship, and domination.

Freedom and Domination

Building on the work of Quentin Skinner, Philipp Pettit traces the "political ideal" of nondomination to a republican tradition working its way from Cicero to Niccolò Machiavelli, James Harrington, and several eighteenth-century thinkers. In this tradition, Pettit argues, domination appears as the power to interfere arbitrarily, whether by coercion or manipulation, in the lives of others. And freedom appears as nondomination, that is, living without a master. Freedom as nondomination is put forth as an alternative to both of Isaiah Berlin's concepts of liberty: positive liberty (self-mastery) and negative liberty (freedom from actual interference by others).

If Pettit presents nondomination as a worthy political ideal for our times, it is no surprise that other theorists have turned to the language of domination in their attempt to articulate the evils of modern times. For instance, in Hannah Arendt's account of totalitarianism, concentration camps appear not simply as instruments of organized mass murder but as part of a larger experiment in "total domination" that sought to eliminate human freedom and spontaneity.

The Political Psychology of Domination

Political theorists studying domination (and power more generally) have concerned themselves with the experience of domination and subordination and hence with what we may call the political psychology of domination. For instance, in his *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude,* Étienne de la Boétie, a contemporary and friend of Michel de Montaigne, inquires into why people voluntarily submit to arbitrary tyrannical rule, why they habituate themselves to their own subjection. German thought about Herrschaft and domination has been even more influential in bringing psychological concerns into contemporary political theory. From Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's account of lord (*der Herr*) and bondsman (*der Knecht*) in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has emerged an immense literature dealing with the politics of recognition. Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of Hegel has led, on a much lesser scale, to a literature dealing with the politics of *ressentiment,* a politics tied to a slave morality, to reaction rather than action, and to an identity, in Wendy Brown's words, "invested in its own subjection." The Marxist concern with ideology has led to explorations of the false consciousness of the subordinated and of structures of hegemony. James C. Scott, however, has called false consciousness and hegemony into question by pointing to the differences between the public performance of those subordinated and their "offstage" actions.

Mark Antaki

See also Anarchism; Equality; Exploitation; Hegemony; Liberty; Power; Slavery in Greek and Early Christian Thought; Slavery in the United States; Totalitarianism; Tyranny; Violence

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Douglass, Frederick (1818–1895)

Frederick Douglass was a slave turned statesman whose speeches and writings played a significant role in the fight against slavery in the United States. Although Douglass was not a student of philosophy in the scholarly sense, his considerable influence on American political thought is evident in the writings of W. E. B. Du Bois and other later thinkers on race. Douglass was also a major proponent of women's equality and female suffrage, writing on behalf of, and forming political alliances with, leading nineteenth-century American feminists such as Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton. As an author and activist, Douglass belonged to a tradition of prophetic thinkers who used the written and spoken word to rework, and to give meaning to, the tenets of the American founding as a means to achieving social and political equality for those originally disadvantaged by and excluded from the U.S. Constitution.

Douglass used narrative as a theoretical tool and a political weapon, and his work is closely intertwined with the details of his biography. Born into slavery and separated from his mother at an early age, Douglass was taught basic reading skills by Sophia Auld, the wife of his second owner. In 1833, Douglass was placed under the supervision of Edward Covey, a noted "slave breaker." After several terrible beatings at Covey's hands, Douglass eventually fought back physically, and the beatings stopped. Described in some detail in all three of his later autobiographies, this moment marked his transformation from slave to man, Douglas said. He eventually escaped from slavery in 1838, moving first to New York City, where he married Anna Murray, a free black, and then to New Bedford, Massachusetts, where he met the white abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison in 1841. Recognizing Douglass's talents, Garrison encouraged Douglass to become an antislavery speaker, and Douglass began his public political activity.

Initially heavily influenced by Garrison's view of the U.S. Constitution as a proslavery document, Douglass published his first autobiography, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave,* in 1845; it is widely regarded as the finest example of its genre. Douglass articulately expounded on the horrors of slavery in the United States. Fearful that publicity generated by the success of the book might lead to his being recaptured and returned to slavery, Douglass made an 18-month speaking tour of Britain and Ireland. During this period, Douglass began to separate himself from Garrison. His freedom having been purchased by British admirers, Douglass returned in 1847 to the United States, where despite opposition from Garrison and his original benefactors, he started his own newspaper *The Northern Star*. The break with Garrison produced a more sophisticated political perspective and strategy that manifested itself in a series of newspaper articles, letters, speeches, and two further autobiographies. Douglass turned the promise of equality embedded in the Declaration of Independence against the inequalities of the Constitution in a sustained attempt at social and political transformation.

A historically precocious thinker who recognized the difference between the sign and the signified, Douglass sought social and political equality—for both African Americans and for women—through a performative reinterpretation of the nation's founding texts. Among his most famous speeches was "The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro," delivered in Rochester, New York, on July 5, 1852. Douglass used the opportunity of the traditional Independence Day address to demonstrate the disparity between black and white experiences of America, a distinction that would later be employed by Du Bois in his concept of "the veil." Employing rhetoric, argument, and scorching irony, Douglass offered a retelling of the nation's history that demonstrated America's failure to live up to its founding promise. Arguing that the U.S. Constitution was an *anti*slavery document, Douglass employed the tropes of the American jeremiadic tradition to shame his white audience into recognizing their own culpability for slavery and to inspire them to work to overcome it. Typically, however, Douglass situated his stinging criticism within a stirring narrative of hope for America's future.

Douglass's importance to the struggle for emancipation cannot be overstated. Abraham Lincoln—with whom Douglass had an ambivalent personal and political relationship—acknowledged Douglass's considerable influence on his thought and actions. Recognizing that establishing what Lincoln meant in the postwar period was central to establishing the meaning of the Civil War in American memory, Douglass later sought to shape that memory in series of eulogies and Memorial Day speeches that culminated most famously in his 1876 speech at the unveiling of the Freedmen's Memorial in Washington, D.C. In the face of a nation thirsting for reconciliation at the expense of any discussion of the causes of the war or its enduring legacies, Douglass offered a complex and occasionally excoriating critique of the sixteenth president to an audience that included President Ulysses Grant, the Supreme Court, and members of Congress. In seeking to avoid a simple hagiography of the fallen, Douglass noted the ways in which Lincoln had disappointed African Americans and taken actions that benefited whites at their expense.

Despite these repeated attempts to shape American memory, Douglass was unable to establish this account of Lincoln and the war in the mainstream of American politics, and the election of Rutherford B. Hayes in November 1876 effectively put an end to radical Reconstruction. Douglass nevertheless continued his quest for social and political equality. On the evening of February 20, 1895, Douglass died at his home, having that morning attended sessions of the National Council of Women in Washington, D.C.

Simon Stow

See also American Founding; Lincoln, Abraham; Race Theory; Slavery in America; Women's Suffrage

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Durkheim, Émile (1858–1917)

Émile Durkheim is regarded as one of the founders of sociology, which he sought to establish as a distinct scientific discipline capable of explaining the structural and normative characteristics of modern industrial societies, identifying the sources of stress and conflict in such societies, and suggesting rational responses to these problems. He never published a major work specifically devoted to political theory, but he dealt with such politically relevant topics as justice, individual rights, the role of the state, moral education, socialism, and the nature of modern democracy. Although controversial, Durkheim's contributions to these areas have been of continual interest to political sociologists and political theorists. An appreciation of his political thought will be assisted by a brief consideration of his background, the historical context in which he wrote, and the sociological theory in which his political thought is grounded.

Background and Context

Born in Lorraine, in France, of Jewish parentage, Durkheim graduated from the elite École Normale Supérieure in 1882. After a period as a secondary school teacher, he was appointed in 1887 to teach a course in social science and pedagogy at the University of Bordeaux, becoming professor of social science in 1896, the first such post in France. In 1902, he was appointed to teach pedagogy at the Sorbonne in Paris, becoming a professor in the Science of Education in 1906; in 1913, the post was renamed the Chair in the Science of Education and Pedagogy, which he held until his death.

Durkheim lived during a traumatic period of French history, which included the defeat of France in the war against Prussia (1870–1871) and the loss of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine; the insurrection in Paris culminating in the repression of the Paris Commune; and finally

the First World War, in which Durkheim lost his son, André. He also witnessed the difficult process of establishing the Third Republic between 1870 and 1879 in the face of determined opposition from conservative and reactionary forces. Even when the republic was consolidated, it faced periodic threats from opponents and experienced class, ethnic, and religious divisions that occasionally erupted into violent conflicts. In this context, Durkheim, a committed republican, sought to establish sociology as a science. Lecturing to trainee teachers who were charged with the task of educating future citizens of the republic, Durkheim engaged with the problem of identifying a secular morality appropriate to the diversity and complexity of modern societies. This required a sociological investigation of moral facts.

Durkheim's Sociology

For Durkheim, morality referred to forms of acting and thinking that originated outside of the individual in laws and customs; they were constraining in that their infringement invited punishment or moral censure. In his first major publication, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893), Durkheim studied the moral foundations of social cohesion. He argued that modern industrialized and market societies had evolved from less complex social structures characterized by a limited division of labor. The members of such societies were bound together by adherence to shared sentiments and values, which he termed the *conscience collective,* a term difficult to render in English as it can mean both "collective consciousness" and "collective conscience." The authority of the conscience collective was maintained by punitive laws and moral regulations that repressed nonconformity. However, population growth generated increased levels of interaction among the members of society and stimulated the division of labor. Functional specialization produced a high degree of internal differentiation, and as a result, the conscience collective became progressively weaker and less repressive, thereby widening the scope of individual freedom and independence. Social solidarity was achieved through the coordination of separate but complementary social functions. The ethical foundations for this type of society were provided by the cult of the individual, which respected the moral worth and dignity of the person.

Durkheim argued that due to the rapidity of the evolutionary process, this type of solidarity had not yet been fully achieved, generating a series of pathologies. Industrial relations were inadequately regulated, generating conflict, forced contracts, and inadequate remuneration, while social inequalities meant that occupations were often not freely chosen, nor related to the talents and capabilities of the individuals concerned. This situation could be remedied only by ensuring greater congruence between social practices and the moral precepts of the cult of the individual. This required the regulation of industrial relations, the promotion of greater equality of opportunity, and the elimination of inherited wealth and privilege.

In a later study, *Suicide* (1897), Durkheim developed his analysis of the pathologies endemic to modernity. Increased specialization and differentiation resulted in individuals becoming detached from group identities and traditional beliefs and practices: Lacking moral guidelines, they became susceptible to depression and suicide. Moreover, for people to be reasonably content, their desires must be limited by moral forces because, unlike physical wants, socially induced wants (e.g., for wealth, fame, and power) have no natural boundaries. In modern societies, individuals were emancipated from group controls and left with no constraints on their desires, rendering them discontented and unfulfilled.

Although Durkheim believed that a certain level of suicide was a normal feature of social life, he regarded the contemporary rapid increase in suicide rates as pathological, the result of the erosion of old modes of social solidarity. His proposed solution was not to attempt to resurrect tradition and religion but to establish occupational groups that would integrate and regulate individuals. This proposal was taken up in more detail in subsequent publications and lectures and will be examined below.

From the middle of the 1890s, Durkheim became increasingly preoccupied with religion, culminating in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912). All societies, from the most primitive to the most advanced, embraced a set of

values that were sacred, he thought, invested with moral authority and maintained through collective activities such as rites and ceremonies, thus reinforcing group identity and cohesion. The idea that a set of sacred beliefs was fundamental to social solidarity played an important part in Durkheim's political thought.

The State and Democracy

As a sociologist, Durkheim insisted that political phenomena must be explained by social structures and processes. Consequently, he often redefined the concepts employed in conventional political theory. This is evident in the analysis of political society, the state, and democracy found in his posthumously published lecture course, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. Rejecting traditional definitions of political society in terms of territory or the division between rulers and ruled, Durkheim defined it as one where a number of social groups (e.g., castes, families, classes, or corporations) are subject to a state, which is a sovereign body in that it is not subordinate to any higher authority.

The state must not be confused with the administrative organs that execute its commands. The role of the state is analogous to the function of the brain in advanced biological organisms, that is, to reflect, deliberate, and make decisions on behalf of the rest of the society. It is an embodiment of conscious and rational deliberation, refining the spontaneous but diffuse and obscure currents of opinion in society. Durkhheim opposed theorists like Herbert Spencer who saw an inherent antagonism between the state and individual liberty and wished to restrict the former in favor of the latter. In contrast, Durkheim argued that a strong state was essential to guarantee freedom and protect the individual from the potential despotism of secondary associations. This is evident from the historical role that the state had played in emancipating individuals from the authoritarian control formerly exerted by the family, castes, and guilds.

In classifying different types of state, Durkheim rejected the conventional categories of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy based on the number of rulers. Instead, he proposed two classificatory criteria: the degree of communication between the state and the rest of society and the range of government action. They are closely connected in that if the action of the state is restricted, then the interactions between state and society will also be limited. Hence, the difference between states is one of degree because no state, however despotic, is devoid of all contacts with its subjects. But these differences are crucial, for at one end of the continuum there are states in which the scope of government action and the degree of communication are very limited, whereas at the other end, both are very extensive. The latter are democracies, and democracy has been slowly developing throughout history: The state in modern France is more democratic than the absolute monarchy, which was more democratic than the feudal state.

Nevertheless, Durkheim was critical of the modern French state. A state is an organ of critical and reflective consciousness that requires a measure of autonomy with regard to mass opinion. The function of the state is to refine this opinion, not simply to reflect it. However, the system of directly electing representatives to parliament ensured that the appropriate degree of separation between constituents and deputies was absent, with the consequence that the latter echoed the unreflective opinions and prejudices of the former. The state ceased to be a distinct organ and became absorbed by society, rendering it incapable of rational deliberation because the alleged incompetence of the deputies mirrored that of their constituents. This was a pathological situation in which the state had become incapable of dealing effectively with social problems while still possessing the ability to oppress individuals.

To remedy this defect, Durkheim advocated the creation of occupational corporations representing both employers and workers. Each occupation would be headed by an elected council, which elected delegates to a national assembly. In this way, citizens would be voting on issues and for representatives about which they were knowledgeable, and parliament would be liberated from its excessive dependence on unrefined public opinion. Consequently, although Durkheim regarded voting in national elections as an important duty, it was a temporary one made necessary by the abnormal conditions of modernity and would be unnecessary once the pathologies had been addressed.

The occupational bodies played an important role in Durkheim's thinking and fulfilled a number of functions. They would pacify industrial relations by bringing employers and employees into permanent relations, while also providing an institutional milieu that would integrate individuals with a moral community and insulate them from the destructive consequences of modernization. These groups, in which membership would be compulsory, would make citizenship meaningful for individuals by providing them with an electoral arena in which voting would be relevant; they would replace territorial units (communes and departments) as electoral units. Finally, membership in these bodies would furnish people with a measure of protection against the state. State and corporations would thus interact to form a dynamic cooperative system while at the same time acting as mutual counterweights to protect individual autonomy.

The idea that secondary associations were integral to both democracy and individual liberty was common to a number of liberal and democratic political theorists (e.g., Alexis de Tocqueville and the British Guild socialists). But for these thinkers, membership in such associations was voluntary and intended to complement rather than supplant nationally elected parliaments to extend participation and representation in complex and plural societies. Durkheim's compulsory corporations, in contrast, would reduce the scope of representation, maintain the disenfranchisement of women, and deny citizenship to the unemployed, retired, and those unfit for work through disability. These are controversial aspects of Durkheim's political thought, and they need to be assessed in the context of his commitment to individual rights.

The Sacred Individual

Durkheim supported the idea of individual rights as expressed in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789. But he was dissatisfied with the philosophical rationale for these rights as natural, inherent in human nature. On the contrary, he believed that individual rights were created by society during a slow evolution of functional diversity and specialization, which encouraged the development of a moral code that promoted respect for the individual.

Durkheim was to clarify his position on individual rights during the Dreyfus affair. Dreyfus, a Jewish army captain, was falsely accused of treason and imprisoned. The campaign for his exoneration divided France between those who championed individual rights and those who believed that the security and honor of the nation took precedence over the freedom of individuals. Durkheim was active in his support of Dreyfus and published an essay in 1898—"Individualism and the Intellectuals"—in defense of individual rights. He distinguished individualism from egoism. The latter was simply self-interested behavior, and as an individual's interests were likely to fluctuate over time, they could never constitute a moral bond capable of sustaining solidarity. Individualism, in contrast, was an ethical perspective that had been developing in the West for centuries, marked by the emergence of Christianity, the Reformation, and the French Revolution.

Durkheim argued that in the fragmented and diversified conditions of modernity, the belief in the rights of the individual constituted a modern conscience collective that was the only basis on which people could identify with one another. Modern individuals were differentiated by occupation, wealth, and ethnic and religious identities, but they shared a common humanity; the belief in human rights denied that this humanity could be sacrificed in the interests of the nation, state, or any other institution or creed. In these circumstances, the real threat to social stability in France came not from the proponents of individual rights, but from those who wished to undermine this crucial principle of solidarity in the name of national security.

Although Durkheim championed individual rights and moderate political reform throughout his life, he never became attached to any political party, remaining aloof from partisan engagements. While he was sympathetic to socialism and a friend of the socialist leader Jean Jaurès, he rejected class conflict and revolution as vehicles for social change. He believed that vibrant occupational corporations, complemented by a strong democratic state responsive to but not slavishly following public opinion, would provide the matrix in which individuals could experience solidarity with their fellows while also enjoying liberty. Durkheim's political thinking resists being subsumed under any ideological label, but his attempt to rethink the

political implications of modernity, marked by increasing individualization and social complexity, remains as pertinent to the twenty-first century as it was in his own time.

Mike Hawkins

See also Democracy; Liberalism; Republicanism; Socialism; Spencer, Herbert; Tocqueville, Alexis de

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E

Ecological Debt

The idea of ecological debt refers to how human societies have come to live, so to speak, beyond their ecological means. Ecological debt accrues whenever resources are removed from their natural state faster than they can naturally be renewed, or when pollutants are emitted faster than they can naturally be assimilated. The magnitude of the problem is indicated by estimates that sustaining the world's population at the current consumption levels of the affluent would require the resources of three additional planet Earths. Even current global consumption, with at least one billion people existing in absolute poverty, is not sustainable. In these circumstances, it can be argued, the affluent are ecological debtors who have drawn more than their share of the Earth's aggregate resources, or ecological space, and at the expense of poorer populations.

The term *ecological debt* was initially coined as part of a campaign for debt relief spearheaded by Ecuador-based Acción Ecológica. While industrialized countries pursue highly indebted developing countries for their financial debts, the counterclaim is that the former owe a much greater accumulated debt toward poorer countries on account of resource plundering, environmental damage, and uncompensated occupation of environmental space to deposit wastes, including the emissions responsible for climate change. Thus, the accumulated debt has historical origins in colonial expropriation of natural resources. For the most part, the countries responsible for accumulated ecological debt are also those most responsible for the recurrent global ecological overshoot, which is symbolically marked by the annual Ecological Debt Day, on which humanity is estimated to have used all the resources regenerated naturally for that year.

Nevertheless, although scientific research develops increasingly robust methodologies for calculating the ecological overshoot, such data do not suffice as evidence of debt. Debt carries the normative implication of a liability to act in some way to discharge certain obligations, and attributing it involves taking a stance on controversial issues in political philosophy. For instance: Should normative responsibility track historical causal responsibility, in light of practical and ethical difficulties in effectively applying principles retrospectively? Or should we look at who currently benefits or has greatest economic capacity to shoulder practical responsibilities? Another question is whether nations should consider the ecological space provided by their territories as their entitlement, or whether the global aggregate should be divided among humanity on a per capita basis. A further issue is whether resources are in effect created through technological innovation, and thus to that extent belong to their creators rather than humankind.

There are, thus, contested questions about exactly who owes what to whom, and why. The quantitative measures used by natural scientists cannot straightforwardly be translated into precisely quantified debts in either monetary or moral terms. Yet, this is not necessarily the point. The

concept of indebtedness can apply to priceless benefits received or incalculable harms done. The main role of the concept of ecological debt may be to shift perceptions about which benefits and harms should count when assessing where obligations lie in the sphere of global justice.

Tim Hayward

See also Environmentalism; Global Justice; Green Political Theory

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EGALITARIANISM

The concept of equality is an internally complex idea. We should speak instead of conceptions because many of the varied conceptual strands that fall under this category bear family resemblances but sit together uncomfortably or downright contend with one another. This is because equality is an intrinsically comparative idea. The proposition that two things are equal may be descriptive, that is, factual, or it may be normative. Such a proposition is incomplete, however, without further specification of the respects in which the objects compared are thought to be equal. Because no two objects outside the realm of pure mathematics or logic can be equal in all respects—only in all relevant respects—the question of which respects are relevant in social theory yields a spectrum of debates.

Equality and Social Justice

The assertion of the equal standing of individuals has made equality a central but controversial ideal in social and political theory. The declaration "all men are created equal" is not rebutted by pointing to the obvious fact that some are smarter or stronger or better looking than others. The ideal of equality is a prescriptive claim about social justice. It says there is some respect in which no difference should be made in the consideration of individuals, whatever their actual differences. Greater equality in principle, however, leaves open the question of what exactly should be equalized: opportunities, resources, welfare, capabilities, or another aspect of human life. There are sound arguments for taking any one of these as the basis of public policy; ranging from extreme egalitarian approaches, in which virtually nothing forfeits equal treatment, to elitist ones, in which many things do. Four related but distinguishable forms of equality can be discerned: moral, social, legal, and political.

Moral equality is the idea that people should be regarded as being equal in value or worth, at least insofar as they are the subjects of moral reasoning. The equal worth of people entitles them to equal consideration in the treatment of their interests in a scheme of moral decision making, as in the utilitarian concern that each one counts as one in aggregation procedures. Social equality demands that all members of society enjoy equal access to basic goods that enable them to lead good lives, such as income, wealth, education, and medical care. Legal equality, or equality before the law, holds that all those to whom the laws of a particular political association apply should be subject to a standard impartial body of laws. No one should enjoy privileges that are not extended to all, nor should anyone in particular be exempt from legal sanctions. Political equality demands that all members of a polity have an equal say with all others in the selection of leaders and making of laws. This idea is most obviously violated when some members are disenfranchised.

Outcomes or Opportunities

Provided that the relative levels of equality across individuals can be measured in the first place, the question of opportunities versus outcomes yields further debates within each of these conceptions. For instance, some people advocate equalizing opportunities for high incomes even if it leads to exceedingly unequal incomes in the end. On this view, as long as competition for advantages is open to all, the ideal of social equality does not require that everyone end up with equal or similar advantages. To the contrary, those who promote equality

of outcomes view equal opportunity as irrelevant or secondary at best if some people end up substantially rich and others poor. Similarly, there are debates over whether and how much political equality concerns eligibility or actual participation. Equal suffrage, for instance, will not offset or correct for an imbalance in the political voices on offer and will only contingently lead to legislative outcomes that conform to some standard of equality.

Challenges to Equality

Tensions also exist between each of the general conceptions of equality. Legal and social equality are widely believed to stand in an uneasy relation to one another. Legal equality as it is usually understood requires that the law be blind to a great range of differences between those who are subject to it. To apply the law impartially means to apply it without regard to those differences. Yet, to promote social equality, it may be necessary to apply the law in ways that are sensitive to disabilities; differences of gender, class, and race; or effects of past discrimination, as some proponents of affirmative action have argued. Moreover, moral and legal equality may be concerned primarily with conceptions of agent or agents so as to run up against the constraints or bounds posed by any particular polity or sovereign nation. Thus, any adequate balancing of multiple equalities will surely impinge on other values deemed socially important, such as merit or desert, individual freedom, pluralism, or communal ties. Radically egalitarian measures can infringe on some for the sake of others, lead to an unraveling of other aspects of social life for all, or undermine too many of the economic and cultural conditions for stable society.

Grounds for Equality

No social or political theory aims at equality categorically, only specific conceptions deemed socially important when they are embedded within a broader theory of politics and society. Thus, the concept evoked by the term *equality* is actually a range of "equalities," each of which answers whether and what kinds of equalities of social situation are desirable. Egalitarianism as a social and political thought covers a wide range of philosophical explanations of the value of equality and justifications for specific practices so aimed. Because human beings differ remarkably in endowments and capabilities, egalitarianism rarely means treating everyone exactly alike or making people's conditions the same in any respect. To speak of egalitarianism without historical, social, or philosophical qualification, therefore, is to speak elliptically. An egalitarian usually finds some existing social arrangement indefensible—an inequality based on allegedly irrelevant or inappropriate grounds for differential treatment—and calls for replacing that system of distinctions. Historically, the focus of egalitarian ideals has shifted continuously to attack the differential treatment of barbarian and Greek, freeman and slave, noble and commoner, black and white, male and female.

Brief History of Egalitarian Ideas

With respect to Western European and Anglo American thought, modern egalitarian ideas have a long and diverse history. In the English civil war of the 1640s, the Levellers claimed that legitimate authority of superiors to command inferiors derives from the voluntary agreement of natural equals. Taking for granted individuals' rough equality of strength and guile, Thomas Hobbes proposed that an absolute sovereign is necessary to ensure lasting peace. John Locke—whose ideas came to be regarded more as a rejection of egalitarianism than a version of it—nonetheless held that men are by nature equally free, subject only to natural law, and possess the same natural rights. In the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that social inequalities are artificial, arising from the pressures of a sophisticated way of life; thus the key problem, to which the sovereignty of the general will gave answer, was reconciling man's natural equality and autonomy with political authority and the social condition. Similarly, Immanuel Kant's statement of human beings as morally self-governing agents declared all to be equal legislating members of the kingdom of ends and said they ought to be treated as ends and not merely as means. At the end of the eighteenth century, egalitarian ideas found voice in the great revolutionary movements in Europe and America and were made explicit in the declaration of rights. Mid–nineteenth-century Europe saw, in addition to revolutionary movements for political power, the evolution of socialist and communist

thinking, which targeted economic inequalities as well. In America, egalitarian claims have been heaved on the status quo in the struggle to end slavery and later fueled the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and support for universal human rights.

Equality and Freedom

In modern democratic societies with market economies, egalitarianism usually refers to a position that favors a greater degree of equality of income and wealth across individuals than already exists. The focus on equality is that of results, according to which people should be made more nearly equal in actual circumstances. This contrasts with equality of opportunity or equality before the law—ideas more commonly associated with modern libertarianism and classical liberalism—where the freedom and rights of the individual are paramount and of utmost concern in matters of political affairs. Many egalitarians have been suspicious of equal formal rights, pointing to the substantive inequalities they may disguise or exacerbate. The insistence on redistribution toward equalities of income, wealth, capabilities, or life chances shares common ground with socialism. Critics have maintained, however, that egalitarianism necessarily diminishes aspects of freedom in unacceptable ways. For instance, libertarian arguments claim that redistributive measures to equalize property involve a constant and extensive infringement of some individuals' Lockean rights, constraining their liberty to enjoy the fruits of their own labor and to gain more property than others by trade, inheritance, or assiduousness. Egalitarian rejoinders argue that goods such as money give one the positive freedom to engage in a wide variety of activities and experiences; thus, little justification can be made for why people should not be able to enjoy this effective freedom to the same extent. Moreover, the injustice lies not in economic inequality alone, but in an unequal distribution of economic goods as also the source of unequal power, status, and prestige.

Specifying Egalitarianism

Considerable debate surrounds what is required for egalitarian positions sensitive to arguments about markets, individual freedom, fair treatment, just distribution, the nature of society, communal ties, and the meaning of citizenship. Disagreement characterizes attempts to identify inequalities that are arbitrary from a moral point of view. Controversies also embattle attempts to specify the class of human beings to whom egalitarian norms apply. Some might count an unborn fetus or a very severely demented person as a human being, while others would not. Furthermore, one should not take for granted that the adjustment sought by egalitarianism is strictly for people or individualized agents. A minority linguistic community in a particular society might seek government action, on egalitarian grounds, to promote its flourishing or survival alongside the dominant group. Egalitarian claims have been raised against difference of privilege thought to be irrelevantly grounded and against qualifications for assuming a role considered unduly restrictive to some. The focus and scope of egalitarian ideals, therefore, has and will continue to change with the social and political context.

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See also Affirmative Action; Democracy; Equality; Equality of Opportunity; Equity; Justice, Theories of; Marxism; Radical Democracy

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Elite Theory

Dividing human communities into classes is one of the oldest tools of the political theorist's trade, and prominent among such conceptualizations is that of an elite—a potent minority. Elite theory's significance for the study of politics revolves around two propositions, one normative and the other empirical: that a community's affairs are best handled by a small subset of its members and that, in modern societies, such an arrangement is in fact inevitable. These two tenets are ideologically allied but logically separable.

The basic normative question is whether a group's relative power ought to exceed its relative size. The affirmative answer goes back to ancient Greece, where the disproportionate influence of distinguished minorities was defended by reference to their superior wisdom or virtue, as in Plato's "guardian" class of rulers. The Greek precursor to the English aristocracy (*aristokratia*) referred to rule by "the best men" (the *aristoi*). The empirical assumption behind the defense of elite rule at the time was the unequal distribution of the finest human traits.

The inevitability of elite rule could not be taken for granted, however, as attested by the fact that ancient, medieval, and early modern political writers undertook a constant struggle against rule by ordinary people, or democracy, which was often equated with the absence of order, or anarchy. This explicitly antidemocratic posture was characteristic of Christian writers like Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century theologian. The French word *élite*, from which the modern English is taken, means simply "the elect" or "the chosen," and thus accommodates the notion that people of outstanding ability hold their power and privileges by divine sanction.

It is sometimes forgotten that later revolutionary ideologies held fast to the classic form of normative elitism, even borrowing the Platonic language of guardianship. Among the varieties of Calvinist resistance theory in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, most justified the powers of aristocratic bodies by reference to the superior personal characteristics of their members; for instance, John Milton's defense of the regicide in England in 1649 and subsequent rule by puritan "saints." Milton was admired by John Adams, the American revolutionary, and in the 1780s, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton defended the new institutions of the U.S. Congress and Supreme Court precisely as good guardians: privileged agencies more capable of serving the people's interests than the people themselves. These defenses of elite rule are the more notable because, in some cases, their authors ostensibly rejected the ancient assumption of unequally distributed capacities in favor of some notion of natural equality.

By the late nineteenth century, attention to the empirical aspects of elite power complemented normative elitism without fundamentally altering it. Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto were among the first to stipulate that elite rule is inevitable and to explore the ramifications of this axiom, mainly by analyzing the reproduction and transformation of elite groups. Robert Michels's famous "iron law of oligarchy" was more systematic: Instead of merely positing the inevitability of elite domination, he tried to explain it by reference to the peculiar organizational features of modern politics, undoubtedly influenced on this point by Max Weber. Michels's account was unusually compelling because of his own egalitarian sympathies and his case studies of German socialist organizations. In the face of his "iron law," Michels concluded, in evident despair, that "democracy is the end but not the means."

The proto-Leninist undertones of Michels's conclusion underscored the complex relation of elite theory to Marxian political thought. Mosca,

Pareto, and Michels accepted that governing elites are usually (albeit not necessarily) friendly to leading economic interests, but they rejected Marx's analysis of historical change as the result of class conflict. They also spurned what they took to be his democratic faith in the ultimately decisive influence of the most numerous, the laboring class. Yet, empirical elitism also appealed to Marxian figures like Vladimir Lenin and Antonio Gramsci. In the years following World War II, however, the classic elitists' writings were much in vogue among American social scientists committed to a kind of liberal constitutionalism. James Burnham depicted Mosca, Pareto, and Michels as Machiavellians whose realistic analysis of elite actors and rejection of utopian egalitarianism represented the best hope of democracy—as defined in terms of the law-governed liberty that emerges from inter-elite checks and balances. Joseph Schumpeter used the elitists less conspicuously but also redefined democracy in terms congenial to the elite legacy, as nothing more than electoral competition among elites vying for popular authorization to rule.

Schumpeter's empirical elitism and his economic models of politics influenced the behavioral and rational choice schools of American political science, but he was the last great political writer to explicitly marry empirical elitism to normative elitism. The behavioralists upheld the pluralist vision of multiple, mutually interfering minorities as a purely empirical theory of politics in the United States. The rational choice approach, which arose in the 1980s and 1990s to effectively displace previous debates between behavioralism and its critics, is based on a methodological individualism that disdains group analysis and on abstract models that disdain the social and personal characteristics of real actors. It, too, is meant to be a value-neutral theory, but unlike behavioralism, it acknowledges no connection to the classic elitists—although it maintains one indirectly via Schumpeter. In fact, rational choice strengthened empirical elitism by offering new arguments for the inevitability of elite rule. For example, Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem showed that ordinary voting procedures could not in principle express a stable collective will, implying that agenda setting and other procedural maneuvers by a few strategically placed actors are indispensable to public choices. A similar conclusion follows, more generally, from Mancur Olson's analysis of the logic of collective action.

The historical and empirical evidence for unequally distributed human capacities and for small groups' disproportionate power may explain the inconspicuously entrenched elitism of political theory today. Although a few self-consciously elitist social scientists attempt to use the two assumptions to promote benevolent rather than tyrannical government, most political theorists accept them tacitly while conducting their democratic theories on the terrain of identity, representation, and deliberation rather than popular control.

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See also Behavioralism; Class; Gramsci, Antonio; Pareto, Vilfredo; Public Choice Theory; Rational Choice Theory; Schumpeter, Joseph

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EMANCIPATION

Like many concepts—including revolution, progress, citizenship, and others—the idea of emancipation is a modern construct. It originated among social thinkers who thought that their epoch was not only qualitatively distinct but also with a great potential for further improvement. Although the moderns did not coin the term, they gave emancipation a new twist. Where the concept originally refers to a course of action in which an individual assumes autonomy after parental control, the modern sense of emancipation entails a societal process in which a social-political break

in continuity ensues. The new order is supposed to correct the ills of current dystopia and unleash the potential undercurrent in the present.

Accordingly, emancipation has come to mean a process in which groups or society at large is extricated from a state of unfreedom, with conditions both objective and subjective. Objectively, modernity is perceived to have the material conditions for an advanced social order. Subjectively, modernity is understood as a historical era in which standards are used to evaluate social conditions relentlessly. The immanent critique, in turn, occasions a dynamic relationship between diverse social groups in which even those who are defending the status quo ante are forced to respond both materially and intellectually to those who are critical of the social order.

Among the moderns, perhaps the most important movement intellectual of emancipation was Karl Marx. Where previous political philosophers spoke of emancipation by way of consciousness alteration, Marx was clear that emancipation can be possible only when objective conditions are modified. Social problems are not merely errors of perception. Marx insisted that the will to emancipation must have a scientific basis. Accordingly, he made an analysis of capitalist society without providing a blueprint for the forthcoming well-ordered society. In capitalism, Marx saw a dynamic social system that cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing itself. Nonetheless, capitalism was for him an inherently inconsistent social system that cannot resolve the contradiction between social production and private appropriation, a conflict that primarily manifests in alienation, a distorted form of existence in which humans are estranged from their products, their fellow men and women, from themselves, and from their true human self. Consistent with his optimistic view, Marx notes that the very existence of these problems implies that the conditions for their resolution exist. Yet, in the establishment of a postcapitalist society, Marx believed in active intervention. He accordingly considered the proletariat class as the universal class, which can take the historic mission of emancipating itself and society at large; its ascendancy to power marks the end of prehistory and the beginning of real history.

Marx's notion of emancipation was later taken up by critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. Although these theorists took Marx's critical approach as their point of departure, they incorporated ideas from social thinkers such as Max Weber and Sigmund Freud and considered the latest social developments. The most important outcome of this approach was a critique of society centered on modernity and instrumental reason, a particular form of rationalization that permeates Western societies. Here, capitalism is abandoned as a unit of analysis, and the Enlightenment premise that the disenchantment of the social world will lead to emancipation is contested. Critical theorists noted that modern societies have created administered societies, which enfeeble individual autonomy and result in a lack of creativity and the mass-ification of culture, which encourages surrender to false needs. Ultimately, all these have created a condition in which efforts for emancipation are effectively undermined. For this reason, in the later part of their career, most critical theorists abandoned the focus on the political economy of emancipation and instead invested their intellectual energy in a philosophical analysis of consciousness.

Jürgen Habermas took the arguments of critical theorists in earnest but refused to accept their pessimistic conclusions. Habermas insisted that modernity still contains room for the unfinished project of Enlightenment to come to fruition. Yet, Habermas contends that Marx's theory cannot be embraced uncritically because in late capitalism, new forms of social fissures have emerged. He accordingly envisions emancipation differently. For him, emancipation is an act of transcending "colonization of the lifeworld," a process that, as a result of the growing expansion of political and economic institutions, causes the realm of symbolic reproduction to diminish in significance. Politically, the state, as a result of its active intervention in the economy to neutralize crisis, attains more weight than civil society. Economically, more and more aspects of everyday life fall prey to commodification, an economic phenomenon in which virtually all social things acquire exchange value. Eventually, important aspects of the lifeworld that make everyday life meaningful are undermined, and the conditions for an "ideal speech situation" are foiled; that is, public spheres that serve as social spaces in which ideas are expressed relatively freely are eroded.

However, Habermas does not believe that the way out of the unbalanced relationship between

system and lifeworld falls in the hands of just one universal class. Emancipation comes through the collective efforts of multiple groups with diverse interests. Accordingly, in the creative collective reactions of adherents of new social movements, Habermas sees the possibilities for a postcapitalist society. New social movements are the new agents of social transformation that are located at the seams of lifeworld and system. These movements, such as ecology movements and feminist movements, are truly distinct because they are hardly susceptible to co-optation. Unlike old movements, such as the labor movement, which have gradually lost their avant-garde potential, new social movements magnify societal legitimation crises by posing a formidable challenge to the existing social order through their constant reaction against system intrusion in the lifeworld.

Alem Kebede

See also Critical Theory; Habermas, Jürgen; Hegemony; Marxism; Repressive Tolerance

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Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1803–1882)

Ralph Waldo Emerson—philosopher, essayist, and poet—was the leading figure in American transcendentalism. He set the intellectual tone of New England letters in his own time and represents the beginning of an authentically American voice in literature and thought. Born in Boston and educated at Harvard (graduated 1821), Emerson was pastor of the Unitarian Second Church in Boston for a few years before moving to Concord, Massachusetts and launching a public career of publishing and lecturing. His friends and acquaintances included Margaret Fuller, Henry David Thoreau, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Walt Whitman, and Thomas Carlyle. The influence of his original expression of American philosophical pragmatism is evident in such thinkers as William James and John Dewey. Across the Atlantic, Friedrich Nietzsche carried a well-marked copy of Emerson's essays with him for years. Emerson died in Concord and is buried there near Thoreau.

Emerson was in many ways a typical nineteenth-century liberal; he favored universal public education, decried the Fugitive Slave Law, spoke for abolition, and penned the "Concord Hymn" celebrating "the shot heard round the world." However, his conception of America as the spiritual home of both political and cultural democracy is the key to his political thought. Through the advances made in the revolutionary era, individuals began to become free from the laws that limited social roles, individual expression, and political participation; these were but the first steps toward democracy. Emerson championed the cause of democracy against the idea that only great men or an aristocracy may make history and culture.

The application of the political values of liberty and equality offers the opportunity for individuals to free themselves from the doctrines, traditions, and customs that limited aspirations in the arts, religion, and morality. Emerson's address, "The American Scholar" (1837), provoked the younger generation with this revolutionary maxim: "The one thing in the world of value is the active soul." Subsequently, "The Divinity School Address" (1838) angered and confused the older generations with its proclamation that "historical Christianity destroys the power of preaching." By virtue of his essay, "Self-Reliance" (1841), Emerson has been associated with the rugged individualism born of the wilderness and frontier experience. He tempered that individualism, however, with the acknowledgment that individual genius is but the expression of the common mind. Emerson's conviction that "all men are at last of a size" generated his optimistic view that when culture and the realms of intellectual creativity are one day democratized, the genius thus expressed would surpass all that has come before.

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See also American Pragmatism; Thoreau, Henry David

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Empire

The English word *empire* and its cognates are derived from the Latin word *imperium,* whose literal meaning is supreme power or command. Historically, the term has been closely allied with sovereignty, particularly the power of the state to apply its laws by force. From very early on, however, empire also came to connote military, legal, and economic control over large swaths of territory encompassing different political and cultural communities. A number of empires have fit this twofold definition, including those of Persia and the ancient Near East, Asia (particularly Chinese and Mongol), India, and Africa, as well as the various Muslim empires and those of the early Americas. Nevertheless, when political theorists discuss the topic of empire, they are almost always referring to Western empires, and that will be the approach taken in this entry. Despite its obvious limitations, a focus on the West is appropriate if we want to sketch the relationship between theory, empire, and the shape of political modernity, which is the goal here. The globalization of Western ideas, institutions, and social practices, often spread by the vehicle of empire, defines many of the most important debates of our time. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the various theoretical critiques of empire without focusing on the West, which is their principal target. Thus, the world-historical impact of Western empires on political modernity in some sense justifies focusing on their internal logics and principles of justification, and that is what is done, chronologically, below.

Ancient Western Empires: Greece and Rome

If we go back to the dawn of Western political thought in the ancient Greek world, we see that political theory and empire have been entwined from the very beginning. The origins of the word *theory* are Greek. A *theorist* was one who visited other lands specifically for the purpose of witnessing different spectacles, rituals, and social practices and reporting back home. But, the Greeks did not merely travel to other places, like contemplative tourists; they also colonized those places, coming to dominate much of the Mediterranean world. Moreover, the democratic city-state of Athens, in particular, did not believe that the experience of difference was analogous to the experience of equality. The Athenians drew a sharp in-group and out-group distinction between themselves and those they encountered; they referred to all non-Greeks as barbarians. This was a derogatory linguistic distinction—those incapable of speaking Greek all sounded like they were incessantly blubbering *bar bar*—and it had momentous political ramifications that echoed through history. The Athenians believed that the capacity for *logos,* or rational thought expressed in intelligible speech, was the preeminent, distinctively human ability. To speak inarticulate nonsense was, therefore, to signify oneself as something less than fully human, thereby providing a basis for enslavement. And this is precisely what the Greeks did to many barbarians, with the full support of such canonical political philosophers as Aristotle (who was, interestingly, not an Athenian citizen himself), whereas Greek speakers were allowed to join freely in political and economic league with Athens.

However, Rome, not Greece, remains the most famous ancient empire, not least because of its profound influence on successive imperialist endeavors. Ancient Rome's history is conventionally divided into two roughly equal periods, the Roman republic (509 BCE–44 BCE) and the Roman Empire (43 BCE–410 CE). Nevertheless, this is a somewhat misleading distinction, insofar as it suggests that republics and empires are mutually exclusive forms of political association. Clearly, they are not, either conceptually or historically, as Rome amply illustrates, just as surely as Athens gives the lie to the notion that democracies cannot be empires. Despite the existence of a single all-powerful emperor, the Roman republic sought to

extend its *imperium* as far as it could territorially, by conquering those external to it and integrating them within a web of uniform political, social, and legal institutions.

As with the Greeks, for the Romans there was a tight connection between imperial expansion on the ground and a particular set of normative theoretical precepts used to justify it. A republic, or *res publica,* literally meant "thing of public"; it referred to the public interest or ultimate well-being of the community. A person who pursued the communal good acted with *virtus,* a value that later come to be known as civic virtue. For the Romans, extraordinary displays of civic virtue enabled one to win glory, the supreme value in the Roman political world, demonstrated most clearly by success on the battlefield. When the clearest route to achieving the highest value in a society is the display of martial prowess, it should come as little wonder that the society is frequently involved in making war and seeking conquest. This was the case for the Roman republic, whose imperial adventures led it to conquer not only the Italian peninsula but modern-day Greece, Spain, France, and North Africa.

But Roman republicanism also denoted a particular institutional configuration that would come to play a key role in the history of Western political thought, the balancing of rule by the one (monarchy), few (aristocracy), and many (people). When scholars talk about the transformation of Rome from a republic to an empire, they are usually referring to the destruction of this balance, a framework shattered by the republic's descent into civil war and, finally, its replacement by the principate and the long series of single emperors that followed. From the standpoint of the conquered, there was little difference between the imperialism of the republic and the imperialism of the empire. But, of course, for the Romans themselves, the transformation from a government of divided powers with checks and balances to one of absolute rule by one man was enormous, as eloquently lamented by the greatest theorist of Roman republicanism, Cicero.

Of course, Roman imperialism had to offer something perceived as valuable to those it conquered, or Rome could not have lasted as long as it did. What Rome provided was peace and protection (the *pax romana)* and, more important, Roman citizenship and inclusion within one community, or *civitas,* whose purpose was to civilize or develop to the fullest extent the human potential of those within it. Unlike the Greeks, the Romans believed that as their *imperium* extended, so too did their *civitas,* which was consequently seen as theoretically limitless. Rome was an empire with truly universal ambitions, predicated on the assumption that its acts of conquest and assimilation ultimately facilitated the civilization of the barbarians it defeated within a single, ever expanding, united community.

But Rome's ambitions would ultimately prove its undoing (a phenomenon often called "imperial overstretch"), and successive waves of barbarian counterattacks weakened and finally destroyed it. Augustine famously meditated on the sack of Rome by Alaric the Goth in 410 CE and used that event to drive a sharp theoretical wedge between the ephemeral, material Roman City of Man and the eternal, spiritual City of God. But such a stark dichotomy between the material and the spiritual was chimerical. Even before Augustine wrote, Constantine the Great had converted to Christianity in 324 CE, thereby making it the official religion of the empire and guaranteeing that Rome's legacy would endure in the West long after Rome fell. However, its heir would await, until the leader of Rome's official religion effectively conferred God's blessings and Rome's legacy on the imperial ambitions of a European power capable of projecting them on a global scale, Spain. When this occurred, in the sixteenth century, the era of modern Western empire truly began.

Modern Western Empires: Spain, Britain, and France

As the head of the Catholic Church, the pope retained the ability to confer the title of Holy Roman Emperor on kings. One such emperor, Charles V of Spain (1500–1558), took full advantage of Spain's power and the voyages of discovery made by Christopher Columbus and others to the Americas and Africa to link the Spanish quest for wealth with the spiritual duty of disseminating Christianity to the newfound "savages" and "barbarians" who had been denied it. Shortly after the pope drew the so-called Tordesillas Line, in 1494, dividing the entire world outside Europe into lands that were the property of either Spain or Portugal,

Charles V and his *conquistadores* turned a Christianized version of Roman *imperium* westward. Eventually, they transformed Rome's mission into a religious one of "saving" eternal souls through evangelical conversion. But this proved far less important at first, when the Spanish discovered the massive amounts of gold and other treasure that could be expropriated from the Amerindians and their lands.

Although Spain was the first great empire of political modernity, it operated according to an internal theoretical logic whose roots were deeply premodern. The story of relations between the Spanish Empire and Amerindian societies from the late fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries is that of a confrontation between the preeminent Western religious worldview and those "others" whose cultures profoundly differed from it. This collision of worlds, which resulted in the destruction, enslavement, and cultural transformation of millions of Mesoamericans, was shaped by the imperialists' most important question: What justifies the conquest of one people by another?

As the most insightful contemporary historian of empire, Anthony Pagden, has shown, the Spanish answered this in three ways. First, following Aristotle and the Greeks as filtered through a reading of Thomas Aquinas, some Catholic theorists argued that the Amerindians were not fully human due to their lack of reason, or *logos,* but stood somewhere between wild animals and human beings (hence, savages) and as such were born to be natural slaves. This was the idea behind the infamous *Requerimiento* (or requirement), in which the Spanish conquerors read a statement to the Indians, telling them that through his emissary the pope, God had transmitted all their lands to Spain. The Indians' failure to understand and agree to these terms, communicated to them in a foreign language that none had ever heard, was taken as a sign of their complete ignorance and fitness for natural slavery. If they resisted, this was taken as a sign of their hostility to God's will and authorized a "just war" on them. The second justification for Spanish conquest was as a different kind of just war, one that relied on arguments made by Augustine, in the name of protecting some members of Amerindian society from certain social practices that destroyed the innocent (e.g., human sacrifice). The Spanish killed very large numbers of Indians to ensure that the Indians would not kill one another.

The third justification of Spanish imperialism in the New World was not conquest but conversion, and it developed only after more than a half century of massacre and enslavement. It came most famously from one of the harshest critics of violence against native peoples, the Dominican priest Bartolomé de Las Casas, known as the "defender of the Indians." Las Casas rejected the various arguments for just war and natural slavery in favor of understanding the Indians as fundamentally equal but underdeveloped human beings, or children. As such, every peaceful effort should be made to aid in the voluntary conversion of these children to Christianity. But despite his eloquent and impassioned critique of imperial violence, Las Casas never doubted the theoretical legitimacy of the imperial enterprise or the spiritual duty of the Spanish to efface cultural difference across the globe by transforming all the natives under their tutelage into good Christians, lest they burn for eternity.

In North America, the British Empire, which would ultimately come to supplant Spain, established and extended its power according to a very different logic. This was partly just the result of chance: Unlike the Spaniards with the Maya, Aztec, and Inca, the British found no large cities or population centers to conquer. There was more to it than that, however. Unlike those of Catholic Spain, the British imperialists worshipped a very Protestant God and also undertook their expansion when one of the great political theories of the West, liberalism, was emerging. The latter trend posed something of a theoretical problem that the Spanish did not face, especially in the early part of their empire. Whether relying on Augustine's deep-rooted Platonism or Aquinas's Aristotelianism, most of the Spanish, like their classical and medieval guides, were firm believers in the existence of a wide range of natural inequalities that made the subjugation of others easier. In the wake of both the Protestant Reformation and the transformation of traditional theories of natural law, however, the idea developed that the primordial human relationship was one of fundamental equality and that hierarchy and subordination were deeply unnatural phenomena, which, at the very least, had to be voluntarily acquiesced in by individuals.

For the British, especially, this conundrum required a solution.

They found their answer in the doctrine of *res nullius,* or *terra nullius,* "empty things" or "empty lands." According to this theory, which formed the intellectual backbone of British imperialism until the end of the eighteenth century, the British were really not conquerors at all. There were two dimensions to this claim. The first was straightforward: Many of the lands in North America seemed literally empty, or devoid of people, and therefore available to be made someone else's private property without the necessity of conquest. However, this argument could extend only so far because the British quickly encountered Native Americans, both in small settlements and, especially, wandering nomadically through large territories that they had previously assumed were uninhabited. This is where the second dimension of the *res nullius* claim proved essential. According to perhaps the greatest theorist of liberalism, John Locke, the lands of the New World remained empty, notwithstanding the existence of large numbers of Native Americans on them, precisely because most of those Indians did not to do what God told them they should do, which was to enclose common lands, till and farm them, and plant themselves as well as their crops in residence on them. In the *Second Treatise of Government,* Locke insisted that although God gave the Earth to men in common, he did not want it to stay that way. Rather, he commanded them to mix their labor with it, subdue it, cultivate and enrich it, and thereby divide it up into discrete individual tracts of private property. The Indians' failure to do this could mean only either that they were irrational, incapable of understanding God's law, and therefore less than fully equal human beings; or, alternatively, that they were willfully disobeying God's commands. Either way, Europeans were justified in settling on lands where Indians lived—or in killing them for resisting the settlers' attempts to do God's bidding—because they did not really own them anyway. The British would later use a version of these same arguments to claim the entire continent of Australia from its aboriginal inhabitants.

In one sense, the doctrine of *res nullius* proved tragically true, with devastating results for another continent, Africa. Unlike the Spanish, the first phase of the British Empire (and to some lesser extent, the French) relied on intensive colonization, or the movement of large-scale settler populations to the New World. Private property in North America needed to be worked, as it did in the West Indies, and the settlers were too few to do it to the extent required for producing sugar, cotton, and tobacco, while the Indians either fled, were killed resisting, or died off in massive numbers due to the introduction of European diseases against which they had no resistance. The shortage of labor in the colonies led to the transportation of millions of black Africans across the horrifying Atlantic middle passage, into colonial slavery.

Notwithstanding Locke's talk of equality and voluntarism, he was deeply inconsistent in applying those principles to Africans. Indeed, Locke himself was one of the prime movers in the founding of the colony of South Carolina, which relied heavily on slave labor, and he was a stockholder in the Royal African Trade Company, one of the major forces in the European slave trade. Similarly, Thomas Jefferson, who relied heavily on Lockean arguments in crafting America's Declaration of Independence from Britain, was a slave owner until the day he died, as were many of the founding fathers. And, of course, the French, while they maintained better relations with the Native Americans, trading with them, settling among them, and even intermarrying with them to some degree, nevertheless were heavily engaged in the slave trade in the Caribbean until the end of the eighteenth century.

Contradictions between theories of universal equality and such practices as slavery and the destruction of the Native Americans have led scholars to ask fundamental questions about the relation between the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century movement known as the Enlightenment and the path of European imperialism. Were Enlightenment principles such as the belief in natural freedom, equality, self-government, and the universality of human rationality and moral sentiments intentionally exclusionary, really nothing more than the intellectual handmaidens of empire? Conversely, did Enlightenment principles actually provide eighteenth-century thinkers, in particular, with the tools for critiquing and combating empire, tools that they used eloquently? In short, was Enlightenment universalism purposefully built on the construction of exceptions to its

core ideas so that imperialism could flourish, or did those principles provide the very antidote to imperial domination?

Scholars differ over these questions. At the heart of their disagreements lies the question of commerce and its relation to empire, especially with the emergence of capitalism in the eighteenth century. For example, it has been pointed out that thinkers such as Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and Denis Diderot were explicitly opposed to both colonialism and the slave trade and based these arguments on normative principles derived from the Enlightenment. At the same time, however, these thinkers also believed that owning colonies and owning slaves were a financial waste; that is, they were not just immoral, but the new Enlightenment social science of economics demonstrated that they were unprofitable enterprises as well. What these thinkers thought should replace population-intensive settler colonies was what one of them, baron de Montesquieu, called *doux commerce,* or "sweet commerce," which it was hoped would create something like a worldwide federation of producing and trading peoples engaged in the mutual peaceful exchange of goods. Furthermore, it has been argued that these Enlightenment thinkers held a much broader understanding of the word *commerce,* which included the exchange of values, customs, ideas, and culture. Some see notions of egalitarian, reciprocal cultural influence marking Enlightenment thinkers' criticisms of European exploration of the South Pacific and elsewhere in the eighteenth century, as exemplified by Diderot's writings on Tahiti.

Other scholars argue that the Enlightenment's relation to empire is far more pernicious. They contend, for example, that Kant was one of the earliest proponents of scientific racism and created subclasses of human beings that enabled the Europeans to use force against them; he effectively excluded them from his cosmopolitan commercial ideal. So, too, scholars maintain that Kant's writings show him quite willing to countenance force to create the initial conditions necessary for the "perpetual peace" promised by his commercial federation. And some have suggested that while it is clear that Diderot clearly used Tahitian social practices to criticize Western customs, he actually did so in ways that exoticized the other, especially when it came to the sexual availability of Tahitian women, and thus paradoxically reinforced the imperial impulse. Perhaps most important, some have argued that while Adam Smith clearly opposed both colonialism and slavery, he was nevertheless central to the articulation of a deeply normative theory of history, the Scottish Enlightenment's four-stages thesis, which conceived of all societies as naturally progressing from hunting to herding to farming to commercial modes of production. As societies traced this arc, on Smith and the Scots' account, they also went from savagery to barbarism to civilization, so that only commercial societies were truly "civilized."

In any case, in the nineteenth century, the hope that commerce would prove the antidote to empire proves demonstrably false. The legacy of the four-stages thesis and other historical theories like it in the hands of the great nineteenth-century liberals was to make commerce the linchpin of imperialism's greatest global expansion. Nineteenth-century British imperialists relied heavily on a version of the Scots' narrative, understood as a linear theory of progress that facilitated a new kind of commercial exchange: The British would extract the raw materials, resources, and wealth from India and their other colonies while forcing open their markets and, in return, would take on the difficult task of guiding them from savagery and barbarism to civilization, much as parents guide their children to adult maturity. As the poet Rudyard Kipling famously put it, it was in fact the duty of the superior British to take up this "White Man's Burden." Such a phrase also conveys the very great extent to which scientific racism, whether or not it began with Kant, would become one of the great imperial legacies. The hold of the nineteenth-century metanarrative of history as a civilizing process was so strong that even a thinker as brilliant as John Stuart Mill accepted large parts of it, despite deep ambivalence, which led to extraordinary contradictions in his thinking. Mill was deeply opposed to slavery, an ardent defender of individual liberty in Western civilized societies, a very important early feminist and, like his father, also a lifelong employee of the East India Company, the central tool of British imperialism on the subcontinent. Thus, in the very text of his most famous work, *On Liberty,* Mill could simultaneously argue that all of India should be governed "despotically" because there the entire "race" was

like a large group of children in need of strict parental guidance.

In nineteenth-century France, the liberals who followed Napoleon Bonaparte would take the notion of commerce in a very similar direction. One branch of French imperialism relied on a linear and progressive notion of history, set forth by the marquis de Condorcet, to develop their own racially charged version of the white man's burden, which they called the *mission civilisatrice,* or "civilizing mission," and applied to their colonies in Africa and Indochina. The other branch of French imperialism, represented most clearly by Alexis de Tocqueville, defended empire more as an antidote to bourgeois effeminacy and languor and in the name of national grandeur. From the perspective of the colonized, however, the logic of the colonizer was often equally brutal, as Tocqueville's defense of extraordinarily harsh imperial policies in Algeria demonstrates.

What the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries saw was the fusion of nationalism with various versions of a civilizing mission under the aegis of an increasingly globalized capitalist system of production and exchange. This system was sharply criticized by both Karl Marx and Vladimir I. Lenin. Their critique is perhaps best captured by the title of Lenin's famous pamphlet, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). For Marx and Lenin, competition between capitalist states compelled their bourgeois leaders ineluctably to empire, in search of raw materials and new markets; hence, the various "scrambles" for colonies in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere by the European powers. These arguments have led many to see Marxism-Leninism as one of the great anti-imperial theories of modernity, but that is overly simplistic. In fact, Marx's writings demonstrate a tortured relationship to empire. Imperialism was, of course, the natural extension of an economic system he found deeply exploitative and abhorrent. Yet, based on his own linear, progressive, normatively freighted view of history, imperialism for Marx was also a necessary step on the inevitable worldwide path from feudalism to capitalism to communism. To the extent that it swept away much he saw as backward and benighted, like particularistic cultural and religious beliefs, and ultimately paved the way for the coming of communism, Marx regarded imperialism as a positive as well as a necessary historical step.

Decolonization, Postcolonialism, and the Question of American Empire

World Wars I and II would mortally wound the European empires of France and Britain, while preventing Germany and Japan from usurping their place and allowing the Soviet Union, which emerged from Lenin's Russia, to develop as a massive empire in its own right. What followed after 1945 was the spread of nationalism and the great decolonization movements associated with it in Africa, Asia, India, and the Middle East. And, in many instances, the tale of Western imperialism's retreat, and the hasty map-drawing related to it, created a number of the world's most troubled regions, including Kashmir, Palestine, and Iraq.

Decolonization and its aftermath also produced a rich body of critically oriented anti-imperial literature. During the decolonization period, much of this work was Marxist in orientation, as in the case of Frantz Fanon's landmark work on French decolonization in Africa, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961). Later Marxist work, like Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory and dependency theory, contend that Western imperialism is still alive and well, despite the literal nonexistence of colonies, because the core neo-imperial powers control the periphery of impoverished countries through a variety of mechanisms, such as international economic and political institutions, the media, and others. Today, Marxist-influenced critiques of imperialism can also be seen in the work of such writers as Noam Chomsky, Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, whose recent book, *Empire* (2000), created much academic debate.

A good deal of postcolonial theorizing, however, is more indebted to postmodernism, as seen in the work of writers such as the late Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Homi K. Bhabha. Following the lead of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, postcolonial theory is basically interested in the question of the relationship between power and knowledge in creating relationships of domination and subordination between the West and the planet's subalterns. In *Orientalism,* the most famous work of postcolonial theory, Said contends that the West's attempts to *know* "the Orient" through various texts actually constitute a discourse that *produces* it in a

distinctly subordinate fashion and is therefore not an exercise in the objective, disinterested pursuit of knowledge but, rather, itself a method of Western domination. Given the asymmetries in power between the Western world and its others, Said's work opens up the possibility that imperial relationships will obtain long after the formal markers of the West's empires vanish.

But will the West's empires vanish? One profoundly important recent question concerns the U.S. relationship to empire. In general, Americans do not regard their country as an empire, either today or at any point in its history. This is connected with many Americans' belief that their nation is qualitatively different, and normatively better, than those of Europe, a view known as American exceptionalism. But theorists critical of this idea maintain that, in its history, the United States relied on the legacy of British *terra nullius* arguments, as well as claims about the manifest destiny of God's will, similar to Spanish arguments, to destroy the Native American populations or shunt them off into reservations. Similarly, they point out that the United States engaged in the imperial slave trade, waged war to take territory from Mexico, annexed Hawaii and Puerto Rico, invaded and controlled the Philippines, controlled Cuba according to the Platt Amendment and other legislation, and exercised the Monroe Doctrine in its "backyard" of Central America and the Caribbean, often by the use of military force. So, too, critics insist that, in the aftermath of World War II, the United States established a network of military bases throughout the world to pursue and protect its various interests and spearheaded the creation of an international economic system that it still leads and benefits from enormously, while forcing other states, especially those in the Global South or third world, to comply with its specific conditions. Today, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the War on Terror, many critics are asking increasingly pointed questions about America's role in the world. Interestingly, not all of these questions come from the political left. A number of contemporary defenders of empire have emerged on the right, like Niall Ferguson, who argues that the United States needs to shed its historical amnesia and misguided anti-imperial self-understanding, accept itself as an empire, learn from empires past, and get on with the important business of extending its *imperium* and spreading its particular *civitas* to the benighted.

Daniel I. O'Neill

See also Colonialism; Enlightenment; Imperialism; Orientalism; Postcolonialism; Slavery in America; Subaltern; World-Systems Theory

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Empirical Theory

The pursuit of empirical theory was a key component of the post-World War II behavioral revolution in American political science, and it continues to occupy an important place in the discipline to this day. It is framed by two core beliefs. The first belief assigns theory a pivotal role in social science: Theory is needed to focus the choice of empirical research topics and to integrate the results of such research. The second belief prescribes features that theory should display if it is to successfully play this role. It must logically distinguish between *is* and *ought* statements and articulate an analytical framework of concepts and relationships characterizing what is. Empirical theorists hold various views regarding the role, if any, of questions about what ought to be in social science. But they agree that their own theoretical endeavors can and should proceed at some remove from such questions of normative theory. Their proposed division of labor—which sets up empirical theory as a separate province of theoretical work—receives different receptions in different parts of American political science. It is widely accepted in most subfields of the discipline, but many scholars in the subfield of political theory find it problematic.

A variety of empirical theories flourished during the decades after World War II. Some theories were pitched at the macro-societal or even global level; others were more micro-oriented, taking individuals or groups as their key units of analysis. Some were general theories meant to apply universally at all times and places; others were framed as theories of the mid-range, limited in their range of applicability. Prominent examples within American political science during the 1950s and 1960s included David Easton's systems theory, Robert Dahl's pluralism, and Gabriel Almond's structural-functionalism. While these specific theories were criticized and lost favor during the 1970s, the beliefs motivating the pursuit of empirical theory outlasted the early examples of this pursuit. These beliefs continue to underlie what most American political scientists today have in mind when they extol the importance of building and testing theory.

An ambiguity with regard to empirical theory concerns its relationship to positive theory. Sometimes, these phrases appear synonymous, but sometimes they are contrasted. The ambiguity here can be clarified if we consider criteria that theories might strive to meet. Empirical and positive theorists share a modernist view that the progress of social science is served by theories that avoid appealing to moral criteria, and they are willing (or eager) to supplant ordinary language with more technical vocabularies. They agree, moreover, that theories should be internally consistent and give rise to empirically testable claims. But where empirical theorists tend to stress the latter criterion, positive theorists combine a greater stress on consistency with a more stringent view of what it demands; they see a formal axiomatic system, making possible the use of deductive logic, as a prerequisite of meeting the consistency criterion.

Robert Adcock

See also Behavioralism; Dahl, Robert; Functionalism; Pluralism; Positive Theory, Systems Theory; Value-Free Social Science

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Empiricism

Empiricism is an epistemological doctrine that regards sensory information as the exclusive basis of all knowledge. Nothing in the mind was not first in the senses. For purposes of tracking the influence of empiricism on social theory, empiricism receives its canonical formulation at the hands of David Hume. With Hume, empiricism becomes the fundamental criterion for arbitrating the possible meaningfulness of statements. This leads directly, in the fullness of time, to the view that the only evidence that bears on the truth or falsity of claims

made by social theories can be observable (empirical) evidence. Thus, empiricism comes to exert a determinative influence early in the twentieth century on what counts as necessary for evaluating any social theory. Yet, the twentieth century also witnesses both the apotheosis and philosophical transformation of Humean empiricism.

Hume (in)famously advises that any subject that did not provide statements that were, to speak anachronistically, definitional entailments or provable by or reducible to sensory data should be consigned to the flames. All candidates for human knowledge, on this view, can establish their credibility, that is, their ability to be rationally evaluated, in exactly one of two mutually exclusive ways. The first would be to establish their truth as a consequence of "relations of ideas"—for example, logical or mathematical truths and (more dubiously) analytic truths. This tradition views the truth of, for example, 7 + 5 = 12 or the statement, all bachelors are unmarried, as being ascertained without any recourse to empirical test and solely by virtue of the meaning of the components of the assertion.

The second alternative requires that all truth claims must be verified by experience. Logical form in these cases reveals just what aspects of the statement must be true for the whole statement to be true. Nothing else besides reducibility to or testability by experience could count for demonstrating that a statement asserts something other than what Hume derides as "sophistry and illusion."

The Apotheosis of Empiricism: The Positivist Empiricist Criterion of Meaning

The significance of Humean empiricism for the social sciences comes filtered through key doctrines of logical positivism. The positivists sought to accomplish in detail what Hume insisted on only in principle: to demonstrate how all human knowledge was built from initial sensory elements. The logical positivists expected to develop a method that would ultimately account for all human knowledge of the world on a sensory basis, from the ordinary to the most abstruse, such as physics. The verifiability criterion of meaning (VCM) captures the core of the positivist program in this regard. The VCM maintained that any meaningful statement could be sorted, by virtue of its logical form alone, into one of three logical types: contingent (possibly true or false); tautologous (always true by virtue of its logical form alone); contradictory (always false by virtue of its logical form alone).

The VCM implies that if a statement is not determinably true or false by virtue of its logical form, then it has a meaning if and only if analysis of its logical structure reveals the empirical (experiential) conditions that would determine its truth or falsity. Verification by means of sensory experience is what empiricism is with regard to the meaning of theoretical statements in any science, natural or social. Empiricism requires that any statement about the world must in the end bear fruit by revealing what in experience would show it to be true or false.

Statements taken to fail this standard of meaningfulness include, for example, the absolute is manifest, murder is wrong, and the Taj Mahal is beautiful. What they purport to assert cannot be determined to be objectively true or false (i.e., true of that thing and not just of one's reaction to it) by any possible experience. Hence, the sentences are literally meaningless. If a statement has no meaning in terms of how things stand in the world, it has no meaning, full stop.

As applied to the social sciences, logical positivism was most congenial to approaches such as behaviorism, which proposed to simply "black box" all concerns about or inquiries into cognitive processes or meanings. Consigned to the flames from this perspective were, for example, almost all interpretative approaches to the study of social phenomena. If "thick description" connotes detailed understanding of the "native's point of view," an empiricist approach favors what might be termed "thin descriptions." For example, modeling people's behavior using the axioms of decision theory requires no assumption about what this or that means to any individual. If people are rational, on this view, the model will capture the gross behavior. The rest is extraneous.

History and anthropology looked particularly anemic in terms of their scientific or empirical credentials from this perspective. Insofar as historians sought to reconstruct the past *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*—"as it actually was"—historians trafficked in unverifiable claims. There was no traveling back to verify that any historian now

described matters correctly. Likewise, to speculate on the meaning of this or that custom or ritual was to venture into what actually went on in the black box and so, too, to drift off into a realm where empirical evidence did not exist. More generally, ethnographic and historicist approaches failed to generalize, and this made it difficult to test imputed meanings. But lack of testability simply added to the ways in which such approaches sinned against empiricism.

Empiricism, in the form given it by the logical positivists, set a very stringent standard for meaning. Indeed, it was unclear that any of the social sciences met the bar set by positivism for producing scientific knowledge. Worse, it was quite unclear that some disciplines could clear this bar. The VCM, for all of its intuitive plausibility, excluded not only certain areas of inquiry long thought meaningful—aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics—but also what appeared to be empirical research.

The Revenge of History

Empiricism as a philosophical doctrine was ultimately undone by its advocates. This constitutes one of the great philosophical ironies of all time, and it remains as a lasting tribute to the philosophical insight and intellectual integrity of empiricism's greatest exponents—the logical positivists. Consider the following example (from Carl Hempel). Tubercular sputum is observed under a microscope. What tells the observer that these rod-shaped objects are the agents of tuberculosis? If a person walks into a room and sees a certain arrangement of instruments, what in perception tells them that this arrangement constitutes an experimental apparatus? Even the most empiricist-minded philosopher of science came to realize that "seeing" was influenced by theory. A person's training—the background knowledge brought to a specific situation—determined what would or could be seen.

With regard to the understanding of individual sentences, this relationship of the views (theory) held by a perceiver and the objects encountered in experience implied that the understanding of any one sentence already presupposed a knowledge of "the meaning" of other sentences. Perceivers could not learn the meaning of statements in isolation from learning the meaning of related statements as well. Even the seeming prototype of an individually identified statement meaning, for example, this is red (said while pointing at a red object), implies that the perceiver knows how to discriminate red from other colors, knows under what conditions it makes sense to agree that something is perceived as being a particular color, understands the act of ostension, and so on. A dogma of empiricism—an unexamined article of empiricist faith—held that the empirical meaning of statements could be determined by evaluating statements taken one-by-one. This turns out not to be a correct picture of how statements can be said to have a meaning. To know the meaning of any one statement seems to require knowledge of how this statement relates to others. The interanimation of statements, in turn, mediates what counts as experience.

A further and related blow to the statement-centered empiricist account of meaning arose from studies in the history of science. Empiricists held science to be the paradigm of rational inquiry. On this model, both individual beliefs (e.g., scientific hypotheses) and whole theories were accepted or rejected by comparing statements implied by a theory against what experience reveals. However, the history of science manifests a rather different picture of this relationship between experience and belief. Indeed, the historical picture reverses the order of knowing assumed by empiricism. Belief determines what in perception is correct and not vice versa. As a consequence of the interdependence of statements discussed above, theories shaped the very perception of what might count as evidence. One could not observe microbes by looking through a microscope if one had no way of integrating what one observes into a more informed understanding of these observations as those things. Nothing in the mere act of looking determines foreground and background, items of significance from mere "noise."

Moreover, it was noted, when theories changed, what was observed changed as well. A frequently discussed case here concerns the shift from Ptolemaic astronomy to Copernican theory. What moved and what did not was altered, not because new observations were made but because the account of existing observations altered. What heavenly bodies existed, what was a star, and what was a planet underwent similar alterations at the behest of changes in theory. The observed furniture

of the universe now was deemed to shift with changing theoretical fashions. The reasons for accepting or rejecting a scientific theory were likened to *gestalt* shifts, changes of perception that occur not because anything in the field of vision changes but because of a shift that occurs in the perceiver. The primacy of the empirical gave way, under this assault, to the primacy of theory. It was no longer to be unproblematically assumed that truth was wrested from unwilling nature by experimental probing. Rather, theories inform what one sees and so what one comes to expect. Perception of what there is follows suit. Evidence ceased to be a test of theories and instead became artifacts of theories held for other reasons.

In the context of this assault on the empirical as a guide to truth, the sociology of science arose. If philosophical models of theory testing and evaluation that stressed the role of the empirical did not determine to which theories scientists allied themselves, what did? "Social interests!" answered the sociologists of science. The claim was that nothing in experience could logically compel the scientific community to renounce one particular theory and accept another. Sociological studies of various areas ranging from high-energy physics to biological laboratories yielded a rich and controversial picture of laboratory life. Ethnographic approaches to how scientists negotiated differences in practice provided a very different picture of how the scientific picture of the world comes to be crafted and scientific theories come to be accepted. The *empirical* itself becomes a theorized notion, and so one incapable of offering a neutral arbiter of the correctness of a theory or a belief. "Evidence" devolves into being an afterthought of theoretical positions.

At the same time that the sociologists of science were proclaiming that the empirical is too weak a reed on which to construct any account of scientific theory acceptance or change, a parallel revolution was taking place in the philosophy of science. This approach focused on laboratory practice instead of the formalization of theories in the manner of the positivists. But the philosophical accounts of laboratory work departed markedly from those crafted by the sociologists of science anxious to discount the voice of experience in the conversation of inquiry. Rather, emphasis fell on how agreement was fashioned in laboratory contexts through convergence of various scientific practices. No one factor, including the evidence, might determine which theoretical approach to favor. But a number of factors could and did have a cumulative effect in one direction rather than another. Closer examination of laboratory work allowed accounts to move away from a view of scientists as caught up in a "mob psychology" and toward a more complex yet empirically grounded account of enquiry. In the process, the notion of the empirical expanded to include the practices—for example, instrumentation, training—involved in how scientists produce the results that bear on the theories they endorse.

Within philosophy of science, empiricism has evolved from its Humean status as the foundation of all knowledge to that of a hypothesis that explains why science works as well as it does. Logical positivists emphasized and debated about "observation sentences," but doubt existed even then regarding exactly how to characterize the notion of observation. Empiricism has now become a theory of the sort of evidence to be favored by scientists, and not an independently determined basis of evidence for belief. Social scientists, in turn, should draw certain lessons from the debates that raged, first among the positivists themselves regarding the status of the empirical and later between sociologists and philosophers of science. What comes to be counted as evidence and why cannot be treated as some neutral, unproblematic view of what there is. The lesson in all of this is that the tie between theory and evidence—belief and the world—runs both wide and deep.

Paul A. Roth

See also Empirical Theory; Explanation; Historical Understanding; Methodological Individualism

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ENCYCLOPÉDIE

In its completed version, the *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* comprised 17 volumes of articles and 11 volumes of illustrations, published in Paris between 1751 and 1765. The work was intended to represent the most advanced state of contemporary knowledge in every discipline conceivable, ranging from natural history and mathematics to religion and philosophy to the mechanical arts. Authors with special expertise across the range of subjects were recruited to write articles. Moreover, it was hoped that the careful organization of the project would reveal to its readers the connections and interrelations among the various branches of knowledge. The *Encyclopédie* was initially coedited by two well-known philosophes, Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, until d'Alembert resigned from the project in 1758, leaving Diderot the sole editor. It is often regarded as the first modern encyclopedia and one of the signal works of the Enlightenment, representing its loftiest ideals and aspirations, including its political philosophy.

That the *Encyclopédie* was a work of scholarly collaboration expressed the solidarity and power of so-called men of letters in eighteenth-century France. In addition to Diderot and d'Alembert, many of the best-known thinkers of the century, including baron de Montesquieu, Voltaire, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the leader of the Physiocratic school, François Quesnay, contributed articles. The most frequent contributions came from a core group of relatively radical philosophes. Against the solitary man of genius working alone in his attic, the philosophes believed that scholarship was a social and collaborative enterprise, and they often regarded themselves as a coherent intellectual movement, a republic of letters, working together to improve society through the use of critical reason. They regarded themselves as educators and popularizers, diffusing throughout society not only specific articles of knowledge but also techniques of thinking critically. Thus, although the overtly political articles in the *Encyclopédie* did not explicitly undermine political absolutism, the very technique of its writing expressed increasingly democratic principles of cooperation, collaboration, and mutuality.

The plans for the *Encyclopédie* were initially far more modest. André-François Le Breton, a French publisher, originally conceived the project as a French translation of Ephraim Chambers's *Cyclopedia* of 1728. Chambers's *Cyclopedia,* although the most comprehensive and ambitious such work when it was published, was more akin to a modern dictionary than a modern encyclopedia. Le Breton quarreled repeatedly with his British partner, John Mills, who was originally contracted to perform the translation. Shortly after Mills was dropped from the project in 1745, Diderot and d'Alembert joined in his stead, initially as subordinates but eventually as chief editors. Under their stewardship, the scope of the project was expanded enormously, until it became an independent venture distinct from the translation of Chambers's *Cyclopedia.*

The publication history of the *Encyclopédie* was long and tortuous. The project was constantly beset by troubles, even prior to the publication of its first volume. In 1750, Diderot's *Prospectus* already attracted negative attention from the *Journal of Trévoux,* a Jesuit periodical. This initial confrontation may be seen as emblematic of the difficulties faced by the *Encyclopédie* throughout its 14-year publication history. However, the circle of enemies and critics expanded well beyond

the Jesuits to encompass a broad swath of religious and political figures. In 1759, following a succession of mishaps, the king issued a decree condemning the *Encyclopédie* as subversive and suppressing it. The remainder of the project was completed underground, under the constant shadow of potential criminal sanctions.

Understanding why the *Encyclopédie* was so controversial illuminates its political and philosophical significance, as well as its status as a flagship work of the Enlightenment. Most frequently, the *Encyclopédie* was condemned as a threat to religious faith. The editors and authors of the *Encyclopédie* were aware that they lived under a regime of censorship, so exceedingly subversive antireligious doctrines could not be explicitly promulgated. Nonetheless, numerous *Encyclopédie* articles advocated critical skepticism by dismantling popular superstitions and old wives' tales, a technique that could just as easily be turned on opaque scholastic doctrines, while articles on religious subjects frequently called for toleration of dissenting religious beliefs, one of the core principles of Enlightenment political doctrine. Meanwhile, the *Encyclopédie*'s system of cross-referencing allowed its editors to undermine popular beliefs in a more subtle manner, by linking an otherwise respectful discussion of religious orthodoxy, for example, to a principle of critical thinking that might cast the entire discussion into doubt.

The *Encyclopédie* has also been interpreted as an ideological arsenal for a nascent capitalist class. Such a reading is extreme, but the *Encyclopédie* did communicate a disdain for aristocratic values. Diderot's numerous articles on specific crafts and technologies, often accompanied by detailed plates and diagrams, expressed not only the dignity of labor but also the basic worldliness and utilitarianism of the Enlightenment. Placed alongside the many articles praising thrift and denouncing luxury and idleness, the *Encyclopédie* repeatedly praised anti-aristocratic, middle-class values—arguably the values of an emerging bourgeoisie.

Above all, the *Encyclopédie* represented the basic article of faith of the Enlightenment at its most optimistic: that knowledge contributes to scientific and moral progress and, ultimately, to the improvement of human societies and the expansion of human freedom. D'Alembert's *Preliminary Discourse* clearly establishes this belief in laying out the aspirations of the project. Yet, this progressive doctrine implicitly threatened the authority of the church and the power of the Crown, by suggesting, first, that useful knowledge about the world could be derived from empirical investigation rather than revelation and, second, that human beings guided by accumulated wisdom could successfully regulate their own affairs. Not only the substance of specific articles but also the organization and conception of the *Encyclopédie* as a whole testified to the philosophes' basic faith in progress driven by knowledge derived from empirical investigation.

Sharon Stanley

See also Enlightenment; Philosophes; Radical Enlightenment

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End of Ideology

The concept of the end of ideology is closely linked to the idea of the end of utopianism. Whereas Karl Mannheim, in *Ideology and Utopia* (*Ideologie und Utopie,* 1929), anticipated the end of utopia, Daniel Bell, in *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (1960), raised the idea of the inevitable end of the era of ideology.

Mannheim described utopian ideas as altogether incongruent with reality, that is, if translated into action, the ideas would inevitably overthrow the existing social order. By contrast, he described ideology as a totality of ideas, also incongruent with reality, which nevertheless tends to justify and maintain the status quo. It is conceivable, then, on Mannheim's view, that utopian ideas could be regarded as ideological, but only after they have been realized in the social sphere. According to Mannheim, this has happened in a

number of contexts, from liberal to Marxist. Mannheim regretted what he understood to be the absence of the utopian mentality in modern society, particularly in liberal democracy.

Bell insisted on the end of major ideologies, more or less humanistic in their content and intent, arguing that they were exhausted and that new parochial ideologies would replace them soon. Ironically, Bell's *The End of Ideology* appeared on the eve of the explosive proliferation of new ideologies and social movements, such as the new-left radical intellectuals, the student revolution, the so-called counterculture of the 1960s, and the like. Similarly, many prophecies of the end of utopianism have been rendered false by the appearance of recent ecological and feminist fictional utopias such as Ernest Callenbach's *Ecotopia* (1975), Ursula K. Le Guin's *The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia* (1974), and Marge Piercy's *Woman on the Edge of Time* (1976).

Hence, we have much evidence that ideology and utopia are still alive and well. They are likely to have always been the necessary complementary forms of the historical and cultural imaginations, if we are to endorse Paul Ricoeur's insightful suggestion. The end of ideology thesis revived for some time after the end of the cold war and the fall of the Berlin Wall, as exemplified with Francis Fukuyama's concept of the end of history (*The End of History and the Last Man,* 1992); later, it was challenged by the new theoretical anticipations in political theory and political sociology, such as the clash of civilizations (Samuel P. Huntington) or the encounter of the opposing forms of modernity (S. N. Eisenstadt).

Leonidas Donskis

See also Ideology; Utopianism

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English School

The English School (hereafter ES) refers to a group of scholars whose work has been influenced by the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, established in the 1950s. Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Herbert Butterfield, Adam Watson, John Vincent, Tim Dunne, Nicholas Wheeler, Robert Jackson, and Barry Buzan are among these scholars. According to ES, one can see international relations as an interplay of three philosophical traditions—realism (Machiavellianism), rationalism (Grotianism), and revolutionism (Kantianism). These also correspond to three distinct modes of organization of the international realm, namely the international system, international society, and world society, respectively. ES is known for its concept of international society: That states sharing common rules, norms, and institutions form a society of states that has an impact on their international conduct. ES scholars often argue that their position as rationalists can act as a *via media* between realism, which focuses on power politics, and revolutionism, which advocates a universalist morality regarding states' conduct in the international arena. The international order versus international justice debate animated most of ES scholarship. As a result, two distinct positions emerged, solidarist and pluralist.

At the core of ES lie two interrelated sets of triads. The first set is what Wight called the three traditions of international thought: realism, rationalism, and revolutionism. These traditions represent ways of looking at the international realm. Realism highlights anarchy and struggle for survival in the international realm. The main focus of realists is power politics. Revolutionism focuses on universal moral values and the unity of humanity. The main actors here are individuals rather than states. This position is closely related with utopianism or idealism, which calls for the advancement of universal values rather than national interest in international relations. In contrast to both realism and revolutionism, rationalism argues that the

international realm resembles neither the state of nature nor humanity as a single society. Rationalists agree with realists that states are primary actors in the international realm and that the international system is anarchic. However, they argue that the international realm is best described as an anarchical society, to use the title of Bull's famous book. The states share and recognize common values and norms. They are constrained by these norms, rules, and values while acting in the international realm. Therefore, rationalists argue they represent a middle way between realism's hard-core power politics and revolutionism's cosmopolitanism.

The second triad represents ways of seeing the dominant features of the organization of the international realm. It includes international system, international society, and world society. International system emerges when there is a continuing interaction between states to the extent that they need to calculate each others' behavior in deciding their actions. It is the realm of power politics and anarchy. This level is closely related with the realist tradition. An international society, on the other hand, can exist only when the states that are part of the system recognize shared interests, values, and identity. In an international society, states recognize that they are bound by common rules, such as international law, and work within common institutions, such as diplomacy. This acceptance and recognition of shared norms, values, and identity is the primary feature that separates international society from international system. It is closely related with rationalism. ES is best known for this level of analysis. World society is composed of individuals and nonstate actors across the globe. It refers to humanity in general, individual human beings, and transnational identities. This level is closely related with revolutionism. This category is the most underdeveloped among the triad in ES.

Despite the fact that most ES scholars identify with rationalism and by extension prefer international society as their level of analysis, it is important to note that all three levels and all three traditions of international thought are believed to explain certain aspects of international relations. The three traditions are seen as an eternal conversation, simultaneously present in the discourses of statesmen and scholars. The same is true for the three levels (international system, international society, and world society). They are assumed to be simultaneously present and interacting with each other.

Scholars working within ES tradition generally favor international society as their level of analysis. Debates within the school about international society have, however, led to the emergence of two positions, pluralist and solidarist. This debate concentrates on the issues of international law, human rights, and humanitarian intervention. Pluralists argue that international society is limited because states do not have much in common, apart from a shared understanding about mutual respect for sovereignty, the principle of nonintervention, and diplomatic norms. They argue that international law is and should be based on positive law and that state sovereignty has political and legal primacy. Therefore, they advocate the principle of nonintervention regarding human rights issues. Pluralists argue that this is the best way to preserve the international order. They value difference in international relations.

Solidarists rely on the natural law tradition as well as cosmopolitan ideas. They advocate that humanity is actually one and has to work toward realizing this goal via international law and diplomacy. Solidarists have a universalist conception of norms and values *contra* pluralists, who have a particularistic understanding. Solidarists value individual rights over state rights and call sovereignty and nonintervention principles into question. They argue that international order cannot be sustained without realizing international justice, and this inevitably requires a more encompassing international society that shares values, norms, rules, and institutions. This would mean more interventionist policies regarding human rights violations.

The solidarist versus pluralist debate continues to animate theoretical and empirical works within ES. However, there is also an emerging schism between the normative wing of ES exemplified by the works of Wheeler, Dunne, and Jackson on humanitarian interventions and the structural wing, advocated most prominently by Buzan, who tries to reconceptualize ES as a structural grand theory.

Balkan Devlen

See also Cosmopolitanism; Grotius, Hugo; Human Rights; Kant, Immanuel; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Realism; Social Constructivism; Utopianism

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ENLIGHTENMENT

The Enlightenment can be most conveniently defined as the principal intellectual event of eighteenth-century Europe, at once the cause and effect of a dramatic and sweeping rethinking of the nature and aims of philosophy, politics, and religion. Predominately Western European in its scope (from Scandinavia on the north to the Mediterranean on the south, and from the British Isles on the west to Russia on the east) and eighteenth century in its period (from the 1680s of the English Glorious Revolution to the 1790s and the French Revolution), the Enlightenment has been largely defined in scholarly and popular imaginations as an "age of reason," its many strains unified by a core commitment to the use of reason for the promotion of happiness via the amelioration and improvement of the practical conditions of human life.

For political theorists, the Enlightenment has come to represent a project to promote values characteristic of liberal modernity: freedom, progress, opulence, and humanitarianism. More specifically, political theorists have found in the Enlightenment the origins of several institutions that define our political landscape today, from liberal individualism and global capitalism to constitutional democracy, value pluralism, human rights recognition, and religious toleration. On each front, the Enlightenment has been regarded as a self-conscious attempt to break from classical and medieval orders and, in keeping with the metaphor from which it derives its name, to bring new light to the theory and practice of politics.

Or so, at least, many have thought. The advantage of this definition is that it provides us with a place to begin as we attempt to understand what the Enlightenment was (and is) and why it matters. Yet, recent years have also seen many attempts to reassess the nature and aims of the Enlightenment and its legacy. Many such efforts are inextricable from methodological questions of how the Enlightenment is best studied. For brevity's sake, we might divide the debate into two camps: the monolithic and the pluralistic. In the former are those who tend to adhere to the view of Enlightenment set out in our introduction. This camp takes its cue from the most influential contemporary definition of the Enlightenment. In 1784, Immanuel Kant published a newspaper piece as a contribution to a debate on the Enlightenment's meaning. Pithily summarizing its creed as *Sapere aude!*—"Dare to be wise!"—and defining the task of enlightened intellect as liberation from its self-imposed immaturity, Kant's definition achieved iconographic status as a result of its brevity and clarity, its rhetorical appeal, and its author's credentials.

This view has been further reinforced by the leading intellectual and cultural contribution of the age, the *Encyclopédie* of Jean Le Rond d'Alembert and Denis Diderot. In structure and composition, the *Encyclopédie* was everything that Kant's article was not: Published in 35 volumes including more than 70,000 articles, the *Encyclopédie* announced itself as an attempt to present the unity of all knowledge. Yet, this massive project, which has come to be seen as indistinguishable from the Enlightenment itself, was born of the same spirit lionized in Kant's little piece: faith in reason, progressivist optimism, and dedication to the improvement of the human condition.

In time, these same values were to become constitutive of several of the most influential conceptualizations of the Enlightenment set forth in the twentieth century. Interestingly, these views ranged considerably in their assessments of the value of the Enlightenment: Where some celebrated it, others vilified it. But on both sides of the spectrum, one could find evidence of the monolithic view of the Enlightenment as a unified project oriented around the core values of reason and humanitarianism. The most celebratory expression of this

view was likely that set forth by the historian Peter Gay. Writing in the 1960s, Gay delivered one of the first and most influential historical studies of the Enlightenment. His focus was a "little flock of *philosophes,*" mostly French, which he elsewhere described as a "party of humanity," who self-consciously sought to bring light to the world by promoting science and supplanting the traditional authority of revealed religion. Other students of the Enlightenment were considerably less optimistic than Gay about the long-term effects of such a project but agreed that it is principally defined by its efforts to liberate reason. Perhaps the most influential account of this pessimistic view was set forth by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. As German refugees writing in the immediate aftermath of World War II, Horkheimer and Adorno notoriously denounced the Enlightenment as a naïve celebration of instrumental rationality that paradoxically subverted the very freedom and humanitarianism it ostensibly championed by laying foundations of a technocratic rationality that came of age two centuries later in fascism and totalitarianism.

Similar critiques would be further developed by later postmodern thinkers. For Michel Foucault, too, the main category of Enlightenment was reason, but far from promoting emancipation from the repressive norms of the past, reason, he argued, provided merely a more efficient and thus more insidious technique of domination and subjection—theses he developed in his historical studies of the origins of the modern prison and the insane asylum in Enlightenment humanitarianism. In political theory, the monolithic view would receive expression in the work of such diverse thinkers as Isaiah Berlin, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Leo Strauss, who all broadly agreed that the *Enlightenment project* (MacIntyre's term) promoted a scientific worldview that furthered a destruction of traditional forms of belief and social order that had provided meaning for generations.

The unified or monistic view of an Enlightenment project thus took both optimistic and pessimistic forms. Yet, in time, debate shifted from the question of optimism versus pessimism to the question of the sufficiency of the monistic definition itself. On this front, a second diverse group of scholars challenged what came to be seen as a reductive definition of Enlightenment, which in fact was neither quite as unified nor quite as reason-obsessed as the monistic view suggested. Rightly reminding us that the English language lacked even the word *enlightenment* until it was invented in the nineteenth century as an equivalent for terms in other European languages, skeptics to the monistic view have encouraged us to take a much broader perspective. This call was driven in part by new methodological approaches to the history of ideas. Whereas the old vision of the small flock or party conceived of the Enlightenment as the exclusive province of a few select philosophers, a new group of historians, who practiced what came to be known as the "social history of ideas," encouraged awareness of how Enlightenment was disseminated across social and geographic boundaries, thus offering an account grounded in low rather than high intellectual history. A second group questioned limiting the Enlightenment not only to a select circle of thinkers, but to a select circle of French thinkers. Noting that Enlightenment took many different forms outside France, these scholars brought to light the differences in the way its questions were asked and answered in various national contexts. J. G. A. Pocock and others have thus cautioned against speaking, as monistic conceptions do, of "the Enlightenment" as a singular phenomenon introduced by the definite article. In light of differences in national contexts, it is better to speak of multiple "enlightenments," pluralizing the noun and dropping its capitalization. Labors in this vein have done much to reveal fault lines across the intellectual landscape of eighteenth-century Europe, and today, we routinely discriminate between a Scottish Enlightenment (led by Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith and dedicated to the study of history, commerce, and social progress), an English Enlightenment (pioneered by Lord Shaftesbury, Joseph Addison, William Blackstone, and Edward Gibbon and distinguished by the study of manners and polite morals), an American Enlightenment (with Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison contributing insights on constitutionalism and rights), and a German Enlightenment (represented most famously by Immanuel Kant and its advances in metaphysics and law)—not to mention Dutch, Italian, and Ibero-American enlightenments, as well as Catholic, Jewish, and Arminian enlightenments (among others). Such pluralism of course

presents challenges of its own. How, we might wonder, can we define Enlightenment in a way that avoids the reductive anachronism of the monistic view and yet retains its irreducible, substantive core—a core likely to be lost if the pluralistic view is taken to its full conclusion? What universal values underlie the various local responses to local problems that emerged across eighteenth-century Europe and which make it possible to still speak of Enlightenment?

Transformations

Our goal in what follows is to answer this question from the perspective of the political theorist. But appreciation of the Enlightenment's contributions to political theory requires that we begin with some acknowledgment of the transformations in political and philosophical life that formed the context of its innovations in political philosophy. For political theorists, the most familiar introduction to these transformations is provided by Jürgen Habermas. In an influential study, Habermas traced to the eighteenth century the emergence of a public sphere that provided new forms of public deliberation. Underlying this was a striking transformation of traditional institutions that marked a wholesale reordering of modern social and cultural life. Brief mention needs to be made of a few of the most important transformations. First, marketplaces and stock exchanges grew dramatically and provided the imagination of the age with striking images of the interdependence of sociability and progress. Public coffeehouses and taverns provided not only consumption opportunities but also informal spaces for discussion and debate. The birth of the public library and the growth of museums afforded new conduits for exposing audiences to vast amounts of new information about classical antiquity, natural history, and precivilized societies, information that flowed into Europe from all over the globe via trade, missionary, and colonial expeditions. Theaters and opera houses shaped aesthetic and moral norms and created new classes of producers and consumers for the performing arts. Changes were similarly afoot in literature, as new media and methods of communication emerged to accommodate and disseminate wholly new ideas. Newspapers provided opportunities to reach broad popular audiences. Specialized literary and scientific periodicals facilitated rapid transmission of new discoveries across an international republic of letters. The emerging class of female readers was served by a boom in the production of historical narratives and polite essays, as well as the birth of the modern novel. All the while, clandestine international networks enabled dissemination of heterodox philosophy (and pornography), and the international Masonic brotherhood disseminated its own creeds. The transmission of ideas within cities was likewise transformed, evident in the emergence of both salon cultures in France and philosophical clubs in Scotland—each of which, in its different way, allowed for circulation of information and prestige as well as practical theories of reform. Printing and bookselling were themselves transformed by a flourishing international book trade, making it possible for authors to live by their pen, independent of patronage. Intellectuals were further aided by transformations in universities, and especially in Dutch and Scottish universities, which promoted innovative scholarship and spread Enlightenment to new generations.

We mention these transformations not only because they dispel any simplistic dichotomy between high and low within the Enlightenment but because they reinforce the complex and sophisticated interconnectedness that defined the relationship of Enlightenment philosophy to the public and practical world. The commitment to such interconnectedness is itself constitutive of the most significant feature of Enlightenment philosophy. This commitment is as much evident in what the Enlightenment rejected as in what it embraced. For many of its principal minds, the image of the solitary monk, dedicated to contemplation, was considered anathema. The monastic life exercised them not only because it seemed to clash with the natural sociability they so prized but also because it seemed indifferent to the duties philosophy owed to practical life. Nowhere was this commitment more evident than in the Enlightenment's dedication to natural philosophy, or science. In discussing the role of science in the Enlightenment, one can easily degenerate into clichés, yet it would be hard to overestimate its significance. In the pantheon of Enlightenment heroes, few were greater than Francis Bacon or Isaac Newton, whose codifications of scientific methodologies captivated the Enlightenment mind. As celebrated by Voltaire,

David Hume and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, Bacon and Newton made it possible to break the metaphysical and cosmological shackles of medieval scholasticism (the Christian worldview embracing Aristotelianism and Thomism) and thereby inaugurated the modern ambitions for experimental science dedicated to empirical observation, rigorous analysis and synthesis of data, and hypothesis testing. These new methods came to reap great harvests in the life sciences with the classificatory schemes of Carl Linnaeus and the conte de Buffon among its greatest achievements. And the decisive move in the development of Enlightenment political theory was the application of the methods of natural science to the study of humanity itself. In a much-celebrated phrase, among the greatest ambitions of the moral and political theorists of the Enlightenment was to create a true "science of man," which would replicate in the study of human phenomena the same rigor of analysis characteristic of empirical natural science. The subtitle to Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature—Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects*—captures the heart of their hopes. So, too, the call of the English poet Alexander Pope, who exhorted his readers, "Know then thyself, presume not God to scan / The proper study of Mankind is Man"—a call that found a ready audience in an age more friendly to humanism than to theology. As the century progressed, the science of man developed precise vocabularies and methods, which did much to lay the foundations for the modern social sciences; today, historians and practitioners of these sciences commonly speak of various Enlightenment thinkers as founders of their disciplines, with economics claiming Adam Smith, sociology claiming Adam Ferguson and baron de Montesquieu, and history claiming Edward Gibbon and Hume.

The central ambition of the Enlightenment science of man was—perhaps unlike modern social science—to define human nature itself. What, then, did its practitioners claim to discover? Answers, in fact, varied. Some argued that the human being was itself little more than matter in motion—a deeply materialist worldview that comported quite conveniently with the scientific techniques of its adherents. This view was hardly new, as it had been well developed by Thomas Hobbes in the century prior (and by Greek atomists before him), yet, it received noteworthy expression in the materialist Epicureanism of Enlightenment philosophers such as Claude-Adrien Helvétius and Julien la Mettrie, who understood the human being to be little more than a sophisticated calculating machine. Other students of human nature, however, reached very difficult conclusions. Departing from their materialist contemporaries—and challenging later theorists who insist on reason as the preeminent category of Enlightenment—they held that the central aspect of our psychology was not reason, but passion, emotion, affect, or feeling. Sentiment, in short, was considered the constitutive aspect of the human psyche, a view that clashed not only with contemporary materialism but also with classical and Christian conceptions of human nature, which also celebrated reason as man's highest faculty. Important eighteenth-century statements of this position include the "moral sense" theories of the earl of Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, the sentimental ethics of Hume and Smith, and the less easily classified system of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

This debate between rationalism and sentimentalism was principally a debate between two different positions in what we would today call meta-ethics. Yet, the birth of sentimental ethics itself prompted a debate within normative ethics. This debate focused on the question of which sentiments are most central to human nature and to virtuous action, and broadly, answers tended to fall into two camps. On one side stood those who argued for the primacy of self-love and self-interest and, on the other, those who defended other-directed sentiments of benevolence, compassion, pity, and humanity. The egocentric camp was memorably described by Hume as the defenders of a "selfish system of morals." Hume named Hobbes and John Locke explicitly, and in the eighteenth century they were joined by Bernard Mandeville and others who emphasized the primacy and benefits of enlightened self-interest in individual and social affairs.

Countering them was a diverse set of thinkers—from Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to Rousseau and Smith—who argued that individual virtue and social bonds were best founded on the cultivation of our natural concern for others. Defenders of this position often emphasized the role of the imagination, claiming that it enabled us to sympathize

with others and thereby achieve the deeper appreciation of sentiments and opinions needed for social cohesion. Sentiment and imagination alike were thus central to the Enlightenment science of man—a fact too often forgotten by later Romantic critics prone to excoriate its attenuated vision of human nature.

Innovations

The Enlightenment's reconsideration of human nature suggested new solutions to certain traditional problems in political theory and also pointed to new problems for political theory to address. Indeed, many of the most significant contributions of Enlightenment political theorists began as attempts to manage the passions and interests that its new science of human nature had uncovered. These innovations are most clearly seen in their teachings on four fronts: trade and commerce, freedom and revolution, constitutionalism and social order, and religion.

On the first front, the Enlightenment is today often alternately celebrated and vilified for having given birth to modern capitalism. Such claims can be easily exaggerated; yet, it remains true that the eighteenth century was a key stage in the transition from medieval Europe's social and economic orders to the modern industrialization of the nineteenth century. Enlightenment political theory both mirrored and furthered this transformation, as many prominent minds came to celebrate the benefits of luxury consumption and free trade. These commitments were themselves the product of the reconsideration of human nature examined above. In earlier ethical and political systems, a dedication to the pursuit of gain on which commercial society is founded had been thought beneath the dignity of a genuinely virtuous person—a view set forth by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, among others, and richly developed in the philosophical traditions they inspired. But for many of the thinkers of the Enlightenment, the passions that prompted the love of material gain—as well as esteem and recognition—were too entrenched in human nature to be renounced or transcended. Thus, rather than seek to extirpate such passions, they thought it better to harness or channel them to the most productive and beneficial ends possible. It is on this hope that many of the Enlightenment's key defenses of free markets rest—and particularly those of Montesquieu, Hume, and Smith—each of which is founded on the belief that if a polity of disinterested virtue should prove impossible, given human nature's limits, commercial society offers a second-best solution that maximizes the benefits of these limits.

The Enlightenment's pro-commerce arguments are thus best understood as responses to their understanding of human nature rather than as celebrations of either bourgeois values or simple greed, as many later critics would insist. Markets were first to be welcomed as tools of managing man's natural self-interest.

But as we saw above, self-interest represents only half of the Enlightenment vision of human nature. How, then, could those who understood men to be moved principally by benevolence, sympathy, and compassion come to champion markets? The answer lies in the fact that many defended markets because they understood them to promote beneficent social ends and, indeed, to do so more effectively and efficiently than private charity. Nowhere is this perspective more evident than in the writings of Smith, who, so far from defending commerce because it made possible the pursuit of greed, did so on the grounds that it alone could create a "universal opulence" that would particularly benefit the lowest and poorest members of society. Thus, while the Enlightenment is often remembered for its contributions to the creation of modern economic thinking and practice—indeed, to it we owe such key modern conceptions as the increased efficiency of specialized labor, the role of spontaneously emerging orders, and the dangers of the unintended consequences of economic intervention, as well as the growth of modern financial institutions from joint stock companies to national banks—largely forgotten in today's debates over markets and economic intervention is the fact that the original defense of markets in the Enlightenment was founded on a beneficent and humanitarian concern for promoting the well-being of all, and especially the poorest and weakest. The defense of commerce was thus a key stage in the Enlightenment project to explain and promote the progress of humane civilization and to explain, through both historical and social analysis, how civilized societies had emerged from savagery and barbarity and how this progress might be preserved and sustained.

Enlightenment arguments for economic liberty thus sought to promote human dignity by allowing individuals maximum possible freedom to pursue their well-being in the way they saw fit. This same perspective also informed Enlightenment arguments for political liberty. Indeed, many of the most significant participants in the two key political events of the Enlightenment—the American and the French revolutions—understood their projects to be efforts at promoting freedom. This commitment is especially evident in the key documents to emerge from these events, the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. These remain the quintessential distillations of the Enlightenment's dedication to liberty and have proved deeply influential in the course of 200 years of efforts to define and guarantee universal human rights. But one might wonder why it was these efforts—and not the many previous efforts to define justice, freedom, and human dignity, which were themselves central to two millennia of Western political theory—that set the ground for discussions of human rights in the modern era.

The answer lies in the Enlightenment's innovation on this front. Classical and Christian theories located the source of human dignity and nobility in the status and place of the individual within larger cosmological, teleological, and theological orders. It would be wrong to say that the Enlightenment sought merely to secularize these traditional views; however far they may be from traditional conceptions of divinity, both the Creator of Jefferson's declaration and the Supreme Being of the French National Assembly's declaration are central to the arguments there set forth. Yet, it remains true that these efforts made possible an argument for rights that could achieve universality without being tied to any specific commitments in revealed religion—a fact that accounts for both the appeal of the Enlightenment for some and its limitations for others.

Another fact regarding the Enlightenment's commitment to freedom also bears mention. It is often noted today that the actual practices of many of the Enlightenment's most recognizable figures sharply conflicted with the high-minded ideals espoused in their writings—Jefferson's slaveholding being a particularly notorious example. So, too, it is often noted that the tremendous forces unleashed by the Enlightenment in the name of freedom, discovery, and civilization—and particularly exploration, trade, and missionary evangelization—too often degenerated into naked exploitation, manipulation, and imperialism. Certainly, the critics are to some degree right, as the most egregious of these abusive practices are indefensible on any terms. Yet, we would be wrong to tar with too broad a brush, for however much such actions may seem to vitiate the ideals of the Enlightenment, it remains true that these arguments and ideals made possible, in the following century, the eradication of legalized slavery, the guarantee of women's suffrage, and the establishment of systems of universal education, among other major reforms.

The Enlightenment's reconsideration of power thus ushered in a new age of democratic revolutions. But these revolutions themselves now compelled Enlightenment political theory to address new questions about how to construct and maintain legitimate governments capable of both preserving freedom and managing the forces of democratic sentiment in light of the fall of the traditional social hierarchies and political orders characteristic of the old aristocratic regimes. As one might expect, different circumstances in different places gave rise to different responses. In the large monarchies of central and eastern Europe, there emerged what came to be known as "enlightened despotism" or "enlightened absolutism." As practiced by such powerful figures as Frederick II of Prussia, Catherine II of Russia, and the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II, this new strain of administrative science encouraged a progressive modernization, albeit one guided by a strong hand. Different approaches emerged in the republican states of western Europe and the Atlantic world. Drawing on the innovations of Hobbes and Locke, the architects of these newly emerging states insisted that legitimate political power finds its origin in the people rather than governors. This doctrine of popular sovereignty informed both the Enlightenment's revolutions and its subsequent efforts at state building.

The fundamental claim of the doctrine of popular sovereignty is that the people, in their collective capacity, are both the source of and a check on the power of those officials whom they have designated to govern in their name. This innovation was

understood to be a great advance in the theory and practice of freedom, as it compelled leaders to wield their power in the name of and for the good of those ruled—or face rebellion and revolution. Underlying this innovation we again find the Enlightenment's conception of human nature and the need to manage the passions that drive it. Here the problem concerned how to manage human beings driven not simply by the love of gain, but by a host of other, seemingly intractable passions—from vanity to avarice to the ambitious love of glory or fame. Indeed, this problem served as the departure point for almost all of the most creative constitutional thinking of the Enlightenment and especially that of Hume and Montesquieu and the American founders. Common to all of their projects was a belief that while a government managed by virtuous and disinterested statesmen would be the best of all possible governments, such a government was unlikely to emerge in practice, given the passions that tended to drive human beings. Better, they insisted, to assume the worst—to expect virtue to be rare and self-interest omnipresent—and on this basis erect constitutional structures capable of minimizing the threats that unchecked private interest might otherwise pose to public order. To this recognition of the relationship of human nature and constitutional structure we owe many of the characteristic features of the U.S. Constitution, and particularly its emphasis on the separation of powers and checks and balances, each designed to preserve stability in a world in which traditional classical and Christian virtues were thought unavailable or unreliable. It would be wrong to suggest that the concern for virtue was lost altogether; as many studies have shown, in Enlightenment political thought, a classical republican dedication to virtue could and often did coexist with the recognition of the import of self-interest. But by and large, the philosophers of the Enlightenment dedicated themselves to minimizing the abuse of power through the reform of laws and institutional structures rather than through the cultivation of virtuous characters.

The question of how to manage power also lay at the fore of the best-known contribution of the Enlightenment to social and political thought: its reconsideration of religion. This concern has been so often and repeatedly noted that many now see the Enlightenment as indistinguishable from antireligious polemic. But here again an appreciation of the context of these discussions is necessary. Clearly, the principal Enlightenment thinkers were deeply troubled by the instability that the wars of religion and the sectarianism of previous centuries had brought to Europe. So, too, were they troubled by the persistence in their own day of religious enthusiasm, zealotry, and factionalism. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to allow the most extreme forms of antireligious polemic to stand in for the whole. Voltaire certainly spoke for many when his anticlericalism culminated in his indignant call, *Écrasez l'infâme!* ("Crush the infamous thing!"—that is, the church). But he hardly spoke for all. Full atheism, even among the *philosophes,* was quite rare, and even their most hard-line efforts had modest effect on the actual religious practices of many until fairly late in the eighteenth century. More important, the wedge that Voltaire and other French thinkers sought to drive between philosophy and Christianity was hardly typical of the Enlightenment elsewhere. Outside of France—and especially in Scotland—many of the key philosophers of the age found themselves associating with moderate divines, understanding them to be fellow contributors to a common project.

But what then is this common project? Stated most simply, it was not to eradicate or undermine religious belief but to moderate it; to mitigate the potentially politically destabilizing aspects of organized religion while yet preserving a space for the Providentialism characteristic of what came to be called natural religion. These schemes to mitigate revealed religion took many diverse forms. Occasionally, they were polemical, like Voltaire's famed writings on toleration in response to the tragic affair of Jean Calas. Others took different approaches. Hume, for example, argued for the state establishment of a religion—on the grounds that an established religion was more likely to atrophy and wither! His friend Smith took a diametrically opposed approach to reach the same end, arguing that religious zealotry and factionalism would be best mitigated by multiplying the number of sects, ensuring that they would have to remain moderate in their competition for new adherents and preventing any one sect from becoming so dominant (arguments embraced by Madison in number ten in *The Federalist,* which

proposes a similar scheme for managing political faction). What all of these proposals shared was the hope that the most destabilizing political effects of religion could be contained, an argument that underlay the many significant steps taken in the Enlightenment for separation of church and state and guarantee of freedom of conscience.

Finally, in at least one sphere, the Enlightenment, contrary to its popular reputation, was decidedly friendly to religion. For all of the skepticism that it voiced toward what is known as revealed religion—that is, religion founded on the direct revelation of divine teachings to men—many of its leading practitioners were amenable to if not adherents of natural religion—that is, a faith founded on conviction of the existence of God as inferred from the study of nature. In our age, which regularly presumes the incompatibility of faith and science, this perspective can be difficult to grasp. But yet, amid all their many critiques of the Christian mysteries—Christ's atonement, transubstantiation and the real presence, the trinity, the biblical history of creation—many of the leading natural philosophers of the Enlightenment believed their work to be nothing less than an effort to reveal and thereby prove the existence of an intelligent designer, knowledge of whom was available to all through the use of reason. In this sense, the same scientific fervor that questioned revealed religion did much to promote belief in natural religion. Herein lies one of the Enlightenment's own mysteries—one that reveals it to be much more complex, more interesting, and indeed more relevant to us today than any simple caricature might suggest.

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See also American Founding; *Encyclopédie;* Hume, David; Kant, Immanuel; Philosophes; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Scottish Enlightenment; Smith, Adam; Toleration; Voltaire

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ENTHUSIASM

Enthusiasm entered the English political vocabulary in the seventeenth century, a period of intense religious and political turmoil marked by the English Civil War (1642–1651), the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell (1653–1658), and, finally, the achievement of political stability following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. In left-wing Protestant or Puritan theology, enthusiasm was a second manifestation of conversion through baptism in the Holy Spirit by the infusion of revelatory grace. Religious communities of the converted, ranging from Muggletonians, Diggers, and Levellers to Congregationalists and Quakers, separated themselves from the Church of England. Church and royal opposition to their demands for ecclesiastical reform, coupled with suppression, set the stage for revolution. By the end of the century, reaction against religious antinomianism, regicide, and the

imposition of strict codes of morality turned enthusiasm into a term of reproach, denoting fancied inspiration, vain confidence of divine favor, and extravagant forms of speculation.

While respecting the psychological and social power generated by religious enthusiasm, Thomas Hobbes, in *Leviathan* (1651), characterized it as an intellectual defect, a kind of madness, justified only by true prophetic revelation attested in the Old Testament by God's miracles, but having no place in the secular political orders mandated by posta-postolic Christianity. Whatever individuals may claim regarding their own experience of supernatural inspiration, this knowledge can have no public or ecclesial standing. All public interpretation of biblical prophecy must repose in the authority of the political sovereign. John Locke continued this critique in a chapter on enthusiasm appended to *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1693). He condemned the pretensions of enthusiasm by clearly distinguishing it from reason-sanctioned biblical revelation but provided collective space for shared prophetic belief by urging toleration for all Protestant churches based on differing interpretations of written revelation for church organization, formal articles of belief, and, within the civil law, personal conduct.

David Hume set the pattern for a deeper theoretical understanding of the relationship of enthusiasm to politics. His essay, "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm" (1741), was part of a larger project to moderate and compose the political, religious, and cultural divides that tore apart England in the previous century and, in the form of ideological political parties, threatened political stability in his own day. Associating enthusiasm with extreme republican principles and superstition with extreme monarchical beliefs, Hume outlined ways in which both tendencies have been mitigated by the rise of commercial society and material progress. Here, however, the analysis takes a more interesting turn. Superstition supports priest-craft, persecution, and slavish dependence; it is the cultural-religious power behind political and economic interests that represses moral and material progress. Enthusiasm, in contrast, empowers leaders and followers with political courage and social recklessness in its assault on prevailing practices. By "clearing the field" of previous institutional and intellectual impediments, it paves the way for the reconstitution of society on a more rational basis. The necessary vices of hot enthusiasm become the cooled virtues of modern society: personal sobriety, moral self-discipline, economic reliability, and political obedience. Speaking more broadly, Hume suggested that politico-religious enthusiasm is both anarchic and proto-totalitarian, demanding religious freedom and the extirpation of God's enemies. For Hume, Cromwell was a charismatic leader of the first order, one who embodied all sides of enthusiasm's political and institutional possibilities—and, in the process, laid the foundations for modern constitutionalism. Hume's analysis anticipates what Max Weber termed the *routinization of charisma*.

In the two centuries that followed, the political face of enthusiasm emerged in evangelical Protestantism. Intense missionary activity and movements for moral and social reform swept England and America. Revivalists and postmillennial religious perfectionists powered the temperance, antislavery, and woman's suffrage movements. God's kingdom was on the horizon. Even Pentecostal ideas, including divine healing and speaking in tongues, filtered into social gospel enthusiasms in mainstream American Protestantism. From the late nineteenth century onward, separate Pentecostal religious bodies founded by charismatic leaders proliferated in America, penetrating deep into African American and poor white communities. While this downward movement tended to marginalize Pentecostal theologies, under the influence of historicism and the democratic dreams of the new social sciences, liberal Protestant thinkers saw in movements for social justice and welfare the progress of God's kingdom on Earth; each advance in the material world was a further infusion of spirit in human history; every victory for social reform was a victory over sin. Avowedly secular thinkers (e.g., John Stuart Mill, John Dewey) were not immune from some of these same enthusiasms.

By the early twentieth century, distinctly religious enthusiasm was no longer of interest to political theorists but was replaced by a close analogue: secular ideologies and utopian dreams, with their power to mobilize revolutionary and totalitarian movements. Here the focus was on the psychological stresses and irrational responses occasioned by modernity, almost a repeat of Hobbes's arguments but with the academic support of sociology,

social psychology, and psychoanalysis. Of growing interest in contemporary scholarship has been the rapid rise of Pentecostal Christianity in Latin America, Africa, and Asia and among immigrants from those areas in Europe and America. Many scholars tended to dismiss this growth as the artificial effects of American missionary activity and resources and, when this seemed inadequate, to the ineffective and privatizing responses of poor rural populations streaming into the vast conurbations in developing countries. Now, however, social theorists are exploring the ways in which Pentecostal beliefs and communities are a form of "walkout" from prevailing but dysfunctional practices that mark their present condition and the acquisition of new forms of personal and collective action, leading both to economic advance and social agency. Political theorists term this a form of micropolitics leading to new forms of personal and social empowerment that soon become expressed on the larger political stage—a process not unknown to students of religious enthusiasm in seventeenth-century England and Northern Europe.

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See also Hume, David; Ideology; Levellers; Locke, John; Millenarianism; Weber, Max

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Environmentalism

In the literature on environmental political thought, *environmentalism* is generally held to be distinct from *ecologism* on the basis of the degree of social, economic, and political change that is held to be necessary. Ecologism, in its various forms, seeks a comprehensive restructuring of society and economy and a fundamental change in the way the relationship between the human and nonhuman worlds is perceived. In this view, the solution to the perceived environmental crisis can be brought about only through a radical change in ideology, economy, and society. Environmentalism, in contrast, while sharing with ecologism the view that the world is experiencing serious environmental problems, seeks to ameliorate the problems within, rather than by replacing our current economic and political systems. Andrew Dobson, thus, denies it a place as a distinct political ideology. Environmentalism (or what Arne Naess called "shallow ecology") thus tends to seek such things as better regulation, more appropriate economic incentives, or additional government investment in certain technologies, rather than the wholesale overthrow of the existing liberal-capitalist order.

Historical Context

Concern for environmental goods such as clean air, potable water, and attractive natural environments is of course nothing new, and local or national political campaigns for environmental ends have a long history. John Evelyn, for example, complained in *Fumifugium* (1661) of the smoke to be found in London, which rendered the inhabitants "obnoxious to a thousand inconveniences, corrupting the lungs and disordering the entire habit of their bodies." The work of the American transcendentalist environmentalists, such as John Muir and Henry Thoreau, and the former's campaigns for the establishment of national parks and founding of the Sierra Club are justly famous, and the National Socialist government in Germany (1933–1945) was the first in Europe to instigate nature reserves, one act among others that has led to a controversial literature on whether or not that regime can be seen to have genuine environmental credentials.

If there is any element that distinguishes contemporary environmentalism from these historical forebears it is its emergence as a phenomenon that is global in terms of both its reach and its concerns. The 1960s and 1970s saw the development of a transnational environmental movement on the

back of concerns raised in publications such as Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* and the *Limits to Growth* report for the Club of Rome. Environmentalists began to see that the problems raising their concern were not only local and specific (although they were still this, as well) but also global and systemic. In particular, worries about pollution, resource depletion, and human overpopulation were taken to be generic to the developed world (and the developing world as well in the case of overpopulation). The responses to this new conception of global environmental problems varied from calls for the suspension of democracy and rigid state control in the neo-Hobbesian eco-authoritarian literature to anarchistic calls for the dissolution of the state and the deep ecological call for *metaphysical reconstruction*—a fundamental change in how "we" (human beings in the industrialized world) view the nonhuman natural world and, indeed, all matter. At this point, the environmentalism–ecologism divide begins to take shape, as some thinkers seek to render the existing system environmentally sustainable, and others seek the radical overthrow of industrial society.

Sustainable Development

Following the former track here, the 1980s saw an increasing concern with sustainability as a key concept. This became entwined with questions of continued economic growth and resulted in the emergence of a key environmentalist discourse articulated around sustainable development. There is a large literature on sustainable development and many suggested definitions, but the one perhaps most employed and widely known is that from Gro Harlem Brundtland's World Commission on Environment and Development report of 1987, *Our Common Future,* which described sustainable development as that which "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." At this level of generality, sustainable development is an idea that can gather much apparent support. It is much more difficult to determine exactly what kinds of development can actually meet the needs of the present without compromising the position of future generations—much depends on, for example, whether human-made capital is taken to be substitutable for natural capital and what the long-term costs and benefits of existing or alternative patterns of development are taken to be. Nonetheless, for all the difficulties involved at the level of specifics, sustainable development remains one of the central themes of environmental political thought.

Ecological Modernization Theory

Deep ecologists and eco-authoritarians might both be described as technological pessimists, in that either they see current industrial technologies as fundamentally misguided or they do not believe that there is sufficient time to apply a technological fix before environmental catastrophe hits. This view is not shared by all environmental political theorists, and a strand of thought known as ecological modernization theory has emerged in recent years, which holds that technological improvements can take us a considerable way toward resolving the environmental crisis. Ecological modernization theory draws on some of the insights of economists such as Julian L. Simon and suggests that the appropriate use of economic incentives can change human behavior in an ecological direction and move society toward the internalization of environmental externalities, such that the price we pay for goods and services will reflect their true social and environmental cost. Early ecological modernization theory tended to be techno-corporatist or "weak"; it emphasized the role of science and technology in both causing an environmental crisis and resolving it, and it stressed the potential of the market to send signals about relative scarcities and to change incentives via price signals, which in turn would change behavior. Here, there is clearly a regulatory role for government, although governance would not necessarily take place at the level of the nation-state; there may be good reasons to regionalize some decision-making levels and to globalize others. Later reflexive or "strong" ecological modernization theory retained these features, but in response to critics of early versions of the theory, it has been more amenable to the critique of markets and capitalism emanating from other corners of the green world. The role of social movements is more strongly emphasized, and ecological modernization theory calls for more open and inclusive forms of democratic decision making in which those social movements that are not antisystemic are given a prominent role. More emphasis is also placed on

questions of environmental justice, and intergenerational solidarity is taken as a core principle of strong ecological modernization.

Environmental Justice

Another recent development in environmental thought is the rise of the environmental justice movement, which originated in America as a grassroots campaign for a more equitable distribution of environmental benefits and burdens among different socioeconomic groups, in particular for people of color. Theories of distributive justice (e.g., John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice)* have been concerned with the questions of what goods (and bads) are to be distributed, who the agents and recipients of justice should be, and what principles should govern the distribution of the appropriate goods and bads. Campaigners for environmental justice have something to say on all of these points. Most important, of course, they want explicit recognition of environmental benefits and burdens as one of the primary goods to be distributed. For too long, in this view, elements such as polluted air and groundwater or contaminated land have been ignored by the relevant authorities, and for theorists of environmental justice, environmental goods have also been underplayed in mainstream justice theory. Scandals such as the building of houses on contaminated land at Love Canal in New York and Carver Terrace, Texas, and the clearly skewed distribution of environmental burdens on different communities indicate that the claims of environmental justice campaigners have some merit. Note, however, that this discourse remains firmly within the anthropocentric domain, relating environmental benefits and burdens to questions such as human health and poverty. It would be far more controversial to try to bring in goods such as species preservation or the protection of wilderness under the environmental justice rubric; this seems instead to take us toward the domain of ecological justice. The latter raises the prospect that demands for justice can cross the species divide, entailing that nonhuman species may have rights to ecological space grounded in claims of justice against humanity. In another strand of cross-species justice literature, the Great Ape Project, championed by Peter Singer among others, suggests that the members of the great ape species should have rights grounded in their capacities for communication, rationality, and self-consciousness. In contrast, for environmental justice theorists, both the agents and the recipients of justice are human beings, and various principles have been proposed to regulate the distribution of environmental resources, most revolving around some notion of the (at least prima facie) equalization of benefits and burdens.

It is worth noting that for environmental justice theorists, distribution alone does not exhaust the field of concern with regard to environmental justice. Theorists such as David Schlosberg and Kristin Shrader-Frechette also see a denial of recognition and a lack of opportunities to participate as central underlying causes of environmental injustice. These three elements link in that lack of recognition (of, for example, the claims of communities of color) is viewed as leading to the lack of opportunities to participate, and without participation, such communities have no influence over the ultimate distribution of environmental goods and bads.

Skeptical Environmentalism

A recent development in the field of environmental political thought has been the rise to prominence of so-called skeptical environmentalism associated with the Danish statistician Bjørn Lomborg. Lomborg's work looks back to the reaction that followed the first wave of global environmental concern, particularly that of economist Julian Simon in his books *The Resourceful Earth* and *The Ultimate Resource*. Simon had dismissed the doom-laden predictions of the eco-authoritarians and the systems analysts behind the Club of Rome report, arguing instead that economic growth, human ingenuity, and growing technological sophistication would leave human societies well-placed to deal with emerging environmental problems. Lomborg takes a similar view; on most indicators, the environmental quality of developed nations is getting better rather than worse, and developing nations can expect similar improvements to accompany their economic growth. Where there are genuine environmental problems, such as climate change, it would be foolish to give up more than marginal amounts of economic growth to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Lomborg sets a stark contrast between the requirements of future generations and the needs of the existing global poor.

We can expect people living, say, 100 years in the future to be significantly richer than their compatriots today, such that a Bangladeshi living in 2100 may (if existing trends continue) expect to be as wealthy as a Dutchman living today. We may help the future Bangladeshi by a small amount (but so small as to be very ineffectual) by seeking to limit climate change emissions quite radically today. This might be a good thing if nothing else were at stake for present people, but much is. We could do very much more for the present global poor by spending our resources on HIV/AIDS treatment, malaria treatment, or clean drinking water than we could do for future people by Kyoto-type treaties to limit emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse-related gases. What we have to do is look at the possible welfare payoffs from any dollar spent, and on a cost-benefit analysis of that sort, spending resources on the alleviation of climate change looks like a very poor use of scarce goods.

Lomborg's thesis is not, of course, uncontroversial, and he has been roundly criticized for neglecting the possibility of catastrophic tipping points and for his assumption that standard cost-benefit analysis techniques can be applied to climate change despite the great uncertainties involved. He has even, somewhat bizarrely, been compared to Hitler by Dr. R. K. Pachauri, the chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for his views on global warming.

Environmental Activism

An integral part of environmental politics has been the phenomenon of environmental direct action. This raises questions about how environmentalists conceive the domain of politics and, in particular, how they understand the relationship between their own political ends and the liberal democratic order as it is constituted in most developed nations. The globalization of environmental concern referred to above was also accompanied by the development of (in addition to many local and specific groups and campaigns) transnational environmental campaigning organizations such as Friends of the Earth (founded in 1969 when David Brower split from the Sierra Club), Greenpeace (1972), and Sea Shepherd (1981, from a parting of the ways between Paul Watson and Greenpeace). Such campaigning organizations can be seen as environmental rather than ecological, on the distinction given at the start of this entry, on the grounds that they seek to deal with a series of specific environmental problems rather than radical systemic change. By contrast, the direct action group, The Earth Liberation Front, articulates an anarcho-primitivist ideology that seeks the complete overthrow of civilization, including the state, capitalism, and organized religion.

These direct action groups set their own values focused on environmental preservation against the priorities of development and economic growth embodied in industrial societies. This campaign form can be seen as undemocratic, as it often seeks to increase the costs of engaging in legal business transactions for government, business, and individuals and claims a "trumping" justificatory status for a set of environmental values over and above other values reflected in public policy. In defense of what they do, activists will point to the flaws in the existing policy-making process, such as planning laws, which in their eyes disproportionately favor one set of interests (usually business/economic) over others, bringing into question the democratic nature of the political system. They also point to the irreversible nature of many environmental changes, such that they cannot expect effective policy reversal in the future, thus making their case all the more urgent. They may also point to a higher moral or natural law in justification of their direct action campaigning, which is taken to provide a more fundamental justification than the positive laws inscribed in statute. Existing treaties and laws may also, however, be cited in defense of environmental action: Sea Shepherd claims to be enforcing international maritime law against whalers, and the recent successful defense, in the United Kingdom, of climate change protesters accused of criminal damage rested on an existing law permitting the infliction of damage to property in the cause of preventing greater damage at some point in the future.

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See also Climate Change; Global Justice; Green Political Theory; Intergenerational Justice

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EQUALITY

The demand for equality is central to modern politics, but it is a complex and highly contestable demand. Recent work in political philosophy has exposed it to rigorous scrutiny. Drawing on this work, we will consider the nature and plausibility of the demand in four stages:

1. Equality of opportunity and John Rawls's critique
2. Four criticisms of Rawls's theory of distributive justice
3. The leveling-down objection
4. Relational egalitarianism

Equality of Opportunity and John Rawls's Critique

In contemporary politics, the demand for equality is often understood as the demand for equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is closely related to the ideal of *meritocracy* (Miller, 1996). In a meritocratic society, valuable jobs and positions are to be allocated to individuals strictly according to the talents they have that are relevant to good performance in the jobs and positions in question. This constitutes distribution according to merit. However, in practice, distribution according to merit might be blocked by other factors, for example, a preference for one job candidate over another on the basis of race, gender, or class background, where these features are not relevant to the individual's capacity to perform in the relevant job or position. Where such features obstruct distribution according to merit, we often say that there is a failure of equality of opportunity. Some candidates for jobs or positions are advantaged, and others disadvantaged, in an arbitrary way by virtue of these features. The demand for equality of opportunity is, in the first instance, a demand for a purely merit-based distribution of these goods; or, in other words, a demand for a nondiscriminatory distribution of the goods, where *discrimination* in this context is a particular kind of injustice occurring when a job or position is allocated according to criteria other than merit. The ideal of *weak meritocracy,* as we might call it, is the ideal of a society in which there is an absence of discrimination in this sense.

However, although the absence of discrimination is crucially important, critics argue that it is not sufficient for equality of opportunity. For example, even if individuals have access to jobs and positions on a nondiscriminatory basis, they might still have unequal access to jobs and positions on the basis of merit for other reasons, for example, unequal endowments of wealth, which influence their opportunities to set up businesses. And even if they have equal opportunity to compete for jobs and positions on the basis of merit, they might have very unequal opportunities to develop the talents that are the criterion of merit, for example, because

of inequalities in educational opportunity in childhood. The ideal of *strong meritocracy* is the ideal of a society in which there is equality of opportunity in the deeper sense indicated by these comments. The underlying ambition is akin to that which John Rawls (1999) describes under the heading of "fair equality of opportunity," which prescribes that any two individuals with similar natural ability and motivation should have the same opportunity to gain jobs and offices, regardless of their parental class background (p. 73). Concretely, the ideal draws attention to the impact of inequalities in financial inheritances, educational opportunity, and the cultural and social capital of different families and neighborhoods.

However, one major school of thought in contemporary political philosophy questions whether strong meritocracy would result in distributive justice. Strong meritocracy envisages a world in which individuals have equal opportunity to develop their job-relevant talents and to compete for jobs and offices solely on the basis of these talents, but in which there might well remain substantial inequalities of reward, and thus of income and wealth, between differentially talented workers in high- and low-paid jobs. But job-relevant talent is a function of our underlying endowments of natural ability. Is it just to allow the distribution of income and wealth to be shaped by differences in ability endowments, as strong meritocracy permits? The strong meritocrat accepts that it is wrong for our prospects to be shaped by accidents of birth such as the social class of our birth parents. But our natural ability is also an accident of birth. Surely, it is no less improper for our prospects to be determined by the one accident of birth as the other. As Rawls (1999) puts it: "There is no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social fortune" (p. 64).

In Rawls's theory, as set out in *A Theory of Justice,* inequalities attributable to differential talents are handled in the following way: goods such as income and wealth are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution would make those worst-off under the ensuing inequality better off. Indeed, according to *the difference principle,* inequalities are justified when they work to the maximum benefit of the worst-off group (Rawls, 1999, pp. 65–73; 2001, pp. 61–64). The talented cannot claim a right to (say) a higher income on grounds of desert, given the moral arbitrariness of the distribution of natural ability. The only justifiable grounds for allowing inequality is that it somehow works to make prospects better for the least advantaged. It might do this, for example, because higher incomes for talented workers give them *incentives* to produce more, and this higher output can, in part, be used to raise the income of less talented workers.

Four Criticisms of Rawls's Theory of Distributive Justice

Rawls's proposal has, in turn, generated a huge critical literature. Here we will focus on three lines of criticism: (1) the choice-sensitivity criticism, (2) the metric of equality criticism, and (3) the incentives criticism. We will also note a fourth line of criticism: (4) the global justice criticism.

The Choice-Sensitivity Criticism

In *A Theory of Justice,* Rawls (1999) argues that differences in productive contribution do not warrant unequal reward when they reflect differences in natural ability *and* when they reflect the different choices people make about how far to deploy their talents productively (pp. 89, 274). Rawls faced criticism early on that this implied an arguably unfair subsidy to those with productive ability who, instead of using it, choose instead to "surf all day off Malibu" (Musgrave, 1974). Rawls amended his theory in light of the criticism (see especially Rawls, 2001, p. 179), but other theorists have sought to give a much more prominent place to the role of choice in developing a theory of egalitarian justice (as an alternative to meritocracy).

A key contribution here is that of Ronald Dworkin (2000, Chapter 2). In developing a sophisticated theory of equality of resources, Dworkin introduces a distinction between "brute luck" on the one hand and choice and "option luck" on the other. If Smith has lower earnings capacity than Jones due to forces beyond her control, such as natural endowments, then this is a matter of bad brute luck and is properly a matter for concern. If she has lower earnings than Jones because she chooses to work fewer hours, or because she elected not to take a risk or gamble that Jones did

(option luck), then, on Dworkin's view, this is to be respected.

In an influential paper, G. A. Cohen (1989) argues that the brute luck/choice distinction captures something of fundamental importance to egalitarian theory. In the case of inequalities in advantage due to differential brute luck, there is a justice-based reason to remove or compensate for them; in the case of inequalities due to choice (including option luck), by contrast, there is a justice-based reason to tolerate them. This expresses the basic idea of what has come to be known as *luck egalitarianism* (Anderson, 1999). Some philosophers who endorse the idea seem to think that there is little else to the question of distributive justice (or to the issue of what degree of equality is desirable) other than luck egalitarianism. Others, such as Cohen, regard it as describing one important normative concern for a theory of distributive justice, without claiming that it is necessarily the whole story. Clearly, one challenge to luck egalitarianism is that of how to conceptualize exactly, and operationalize the pivotal distinction between disadvantage due to brute luck and that due to choice. For example, choices reflect preferences, but preferences are often shaped by circumstances that are largely a matter of brute luck (e.g., attitudes to smoking are strongly affected by one's social context, which is to some extent a matter of brute luck). Philosophers sympathetic to luck egalitarianism have sought to elucidate these complexities (Roemer, 1993, 1998; Stemplowska, 2009). As we will see below, luck egalitarianism has also been subject to fierce criticism in recent years.

The Metric of Equality Criticism

We spoke above of Rawls's views on inequality of reward. This is inexact. More exactly, Rawls argues that in approaching the topic of equality, we need to focus on individuals' shares of *social primary goods*. These include certain basic liberties, occupational opportunity, "powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility," income and wealth, the "social bases of self-respect," and leisure time (Rawls, 1999, pp. 78–81; 2001, pp. 58–59, 179). The difference principle applies not only to an index of social primary goods that includes income and wealth, but also to the powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility, the social bases of self-respect, and leisure time (Pogge, 1989, pp. 162–164; Rawls, 2002, p. 179).

However, is this the right metric for thinking about (in)equality in distributive shares? Rawls sets out his primary goods metric as an alternative to what has come to be called *welfarism:* that we should assess relative positions in terms (and only in terms) of welfare levels, where welfare is understood either as pleasure or as preference satisfaction. Many recent philosophers have agreed with Rawls in rejecting welfarism, so defined. Dworkin (2000, Chapter 1) argues, for example, that a welfarist account of equality has two implausible implications: (1) that we should give extra resources to people who cultivate tastes that are expensive to satisfy and (2) that we should deny extra resources to people who suffer severe handicaps, for example, very limited mobility, if they are nevertheless capable of enjoying as much welfare as others.

As an alternative, Dworkin (2000, Chapter 2) proposes a *resourcist* conception of equality: What we should be seeking to equalize, fundamentally, is not welfare but resources. Rawls's metric of social primary goods is one kind of resourcist metric. Dworkin proposes a similar metric, which takes in both external resources (the resources of the external world, e.g., land) and internal resources such as talent. What Dworkin refers to as handicaps represents a kind of resource deficit. Dworkin develops a complex theory of *hypothetical insurance markets* to help us determine how deficits in internal resources (low earnings potential, handicaps) should be compensated or otherwise addressed.

But is resourcism the most credible alternative to welfarism? G. A. Cohen (1989) argues that while Dworkin is right to reject welfarism, on the grounds indicated above, he is nevertheless wrong to deny welfare any place at all in a theory of the underlying metric of equality (pp. 916–921; see also Arneson, 1990). Imagine, for example, someone who is able to move his arms, but who, for reasons beyond his control, suffers severe pain some time after doing so. An egalitarian will rightly see this vulnerability to pain as something that matters. But, Cohen argues, this must surely reflect a judgment that a person's welfare is one thing that matters in a fundamental way for egalitarians. According to Cohen (1989), the fundamental "currency of egalitarian justice" is neither

welfarist nor resourcist but pluralist. What matters is equality in access to advantage, where *advantage* is a complex notion incorporating resourcist and welfarist concerns (pp. 916–917). This position is similar (although not identical) to Amartya Sen's (1992) proposal that we should treat individuals' *capabilities* as what matter in a fundamental way for an egalitarian theory. A capability, in Sen's terms, is a person's ability to achieve various significant beings and doings (or functionings). These significant functionings should not be reduced to a simple concern for a person's welfare, but they might include welfare, or specific kinds of welfare (such as security against involuntary pain).

Dworkin argues that the points raised by these *pluralist* theories of the metric of equality can, in fact, be handled adequately within his resourcist framework. Returning to Cohen's example of the man who suffers involuntary pain after moving his arms, Dworkin (2000) argues that this "pain-producing infirmity" is "a canonical example of a lack of personal resources" (p. 297). It is the kind of internal resource deficit that people would, on average, choose to insure themselves against in a hypothetical insurance market and, as such, should receive compensation or some other appropriate form of redress. Critics like Cohen (1989) argue, however, that this is really to concede the relevance of welfare while expressing (and perhaps thereby obscuring) the concession in the language of resources (p. 919).

The pluralist approach seems, therefore, to have some intuitive strength. But its pluralism also generates potential problems. Consider, in particular, Sen's capabilities theory. In saying that we ought fundamentally to care about equality in the space of capabilities, we raise the obvious question: *Which* capabilities, out of the huge number we could identify, matter? A worry here is that in answering this question, we might be guided by overly specific, controversial theories of human flourishing, making our theory of equality *sectarian* in an objectionable way. The desire to avoid this sectarian danger is, of course, one motivation for the resourcist approach. Rawls chose to focus on social primary goods as the metric of equality because he sought a way of thinking about citizens' basic interests that is not tied closely to a particular "conception of the good life" but which would be a common ground for citizens with diverse conceptions of the good life (Rawls, 1993, pp. 187–190; 2001, pp. 57–61). The challenge to the pluralist, therefore, is to develop the pluralist theory in a way that retains the nonsectarian or ecumenical ambition of resourcism (see, for example, Nussbaum, 1990).

The Incentives Criticism

Rawls's theory allows for incentive-based inequalities. Starting from a position of equality in (for simplicity's sake, let us say) income and wealth, we should allow inequality if the effect is to somehow motivate some workers to greater efforts, which, at the end of the day, also benefit the group that is worst-off under this inequality. This seems like common sense. How could one object to an inequality if those worst-off under it are better off than they would be under greater equality?

However, in an important sequence of writings, G. A. Cohen (1995; 2000, Chapters 8–9; 2008) has challenged the fundamental justice of incentives-based inequality. Cohen points out that if higher pay for (say) talented workers leads them to work harder, thus raising output from which even the poor benefit, in general, this is because the talented would *choose* to work less hard under equal pay. But then we can ask: Do the talented workers act justly when they choose to work less hard under the policy of equal pay? If, for example, these talented workers themselves accept as a principle of justice that the worst-off be as well off as possible under any distributive regime, then do they not violate this principle of justice by choosing to work less hard under equal pay? They *could* choose to work just as hard under the equal-pay regime as they do under inequality, and, if they did, more of their output could be shared with the worst-off.

Cohen's challenge identifies a major issue for egalitarian theory. All can agree that principles of (egalitarian) justice apply to the design of institutions, for example, tax laws. But to what extent ought they also to apply to the decisions that individuals make within the formal rules and institutions of their society? On the one hand, we can imagine a pure institutionalist approach, which would call on government to design laws and policies to work to the maximum benefit of the worst-off (or to promote whatever other egalitarian objective is seen as appropriate) while leaving

individuals free to be as selfish in their economic decision-making as they like, so long as they comply with their legal obligations. On the other hand, we can imagine a maximal egalitarian approach, which would require all citizens to make considerations of egalitarian justice always the overriding consideration in making personal economic decisions. Cohen argues that what I have called the maximal egalitarian approach gives too little weight to legitimate self-regarding concerns. Nevertheless, he argues, a just society will feature an egalitarian ethos that shapes individuals' economic decision-making. Critics variously argue that the proposal remains too oppressive of personal freedom; or that the proposal violates an important requirement of publicity (that we be able to see that others are doing their justice-based duties); or that the proposal is otiose because other features of a (Rawlsian) just society would anyway eliminate the kinds of selfish productive motivations that are truly objectionable (see J. Cohen, 2001; Daniels, 2003; pp. 263–270; Estlund, 1998; Williams, 1998).

The Global Justice Criticism

Rawls advances his theory for an independent, self-contained society. It is intended to apply to the internal arrangements of a liberal nation-state. In *The Law of Peoples,* Rawls (1999) argues that some duties of justice apply across nation-states (or peoples), but these are not the egalitarian duties that he argues apply within liberal peoples. However, many of those sympathetic to Rawls's theory have rejected this limitation of the scope of egalitarian distributive justice, arguing that there are compelling grounds for applying egalitarian justice at the transnational or global level (Beitz, 1999; Caney, 2005; Pogge, 1989, pp. 240–280).

The Leveling-Down Objection

Recall Rawls's claim that inequality is to be preferred to equality if inequality works to the benefit not only of those who are well-off under inequality but also of those who are worst-off. If we think further about this aspect of Rawls's theory, are we perhaps led to question whether *equality,* as such, is really of value?

Imagine two possible societies, X and Y. In X, social class A has 20 units of opportunity, whereas class B has 10 units. In Y, both classes have 9 units of opportunity. Which should we prefer? Surely, we should prefer X to Y. Y is more equal than X. But to insist on Y, for the sake of equality, simply makes everybody, including the worst-off, worse off than they need be. That doesn't seem very sensible. Or imagine a variant of X, X*, under which class A has 20 units of opportunity and class B has 9 units. If X is unavailable, and we had to choose between Y and X*, which would we prefer? Even though the worst-off are no better off under X* compared to Y, they are not worse off, and those in class A are much better off. So again, although Y is more equal, it seems implausible to prefer it to X*. To insist on Y over X* on grounds of equality allegedly makes no moral sense, given that the option of equality makes nobody better off and makes some people worse off.

Proponents of the leveling-down objection use cases such as these to challenge the thought that equality, as such, is of intrinsic moral significance (Parfit, 2000, pp. 97–99; see also Raz, 1986, pp. 227, 234–235; Clayton & Williams, 2000). In its simplest form, the objection says: If equality matters, we'd be willing to level down; reflection on the above cases shows that we aren't willing to level down; so equality, as such, can't be what we are concerned with. Proponents of the objection then proceed to argue that what we are really concerned with is not equality as such, but something that is being confused with a concern for equality. Thus, our real concern is not equality, but priority to the worst-off (choosing that distributive regime which makes the worst-off as well off as possible). Or perhaps our real concern is sufficiency (ensuring that everyone has a decent standard of living rather than equalizing standards of living; see Frankfurt, 1987; Waldron, 1993; for criticism of this view, see Casal, 2007).

However, the leveling-down cases suggest only that equality is not our *only* value, not that it is not itself a value. Go back to the choice between Y and X*. Say we do prefer X* to Y. Does this reveal that, in fact, we place no value on equality as such? Not necessarily. I might think that all things considered, taking into account all the values in play, X* is preferable to Y. But, as Larry Temkin (2000) argues, this is entirely consistent with thinking that Y is superior to X* in one respect—namely, that it is more equal. The leveling-down objection, as

summarized above, too readily assumes that if we think equality is valuable for its own sake, we must always want to place this value first when it competes with other values (such as efficiency or aggregate utility). The leveling-down cases certainly suggest that equality does not plausibly have this status, but that need not mean that equality as such is not a value.

Relational Egalitarianism

As we have seen, Rawls's theory of distributive justice generated a critical literature that sought to refine egalitarianism. The emergence of luck egalitarianism is especially important here, with its pivotal distinction between inequality in advantage due to choice and that due to bad brute luck. However, this development has, in turn, generated a second wave of critical literature, pointing to alleged deficiencies in the luck egalitarian perspective. This criticism has proposed an alternative perspective that may be termed *relational egalitarianism* (see especially Anderson, 1999, and, for related perspectives, see Fraser, 1995; Scheffler, 2003; Wolff, 1998).

Elizabeth Anderson (1999) provides a particularly forceful statement of the relational egalitarian perspective. In essence, her argument identifies two concerns as properly fundamental to egalitarianism: status and power. An egalitarian society is, first, one in which there is an absence of status hierarchy. An egalitarian society is one in which people do not look down on others (or up to them) because of differences in features such as race, gender, class background, or disability. It is also, second, a society in which no person is dominated by another. It is, therefore, a society with meaningful equality in the formal political sphere and one in which personal relations, in the family and the workplace, are characterized by an absence of oppression. The underlying thought is that a society is egalitarian not (fundamentally) in virtue of the way it distributes goods, but in virtue of the quality of social relationships. If one wanted a slogan to summarize the quality that social relationships ought to have, then perhaps that slogan would be: No masters, no slaves.

Of course, the way in which society organizes the distribution of income and wealth can have an impact on status and power. The relational egalitarian calls for distributive arrangements that will underpin the achievement of status equality, political equality, and the prevention of personal domination. The exact degree of equality of income and wealth necessary in this respect is a matter for empirical research. However, Anderson argues, we can be sure that the sort of equality demanded by the luck egalitarian will not meet these needs. On the one hand, the luck egalitarian's willingness to leave people to suffer the consequences of their lifestyle choices could easily result in social relationships in which weaker parties are degraded or dominated. On the other hand, the luck egalitarian's insistence that brute luck disadvantages such as disability be met with financial compensation is itself degrading to those who receive such compensation. In the case of the disabled, for example, Anderson argues that the appropriate approach will focus on integration of the disabled as equals into mainstream society, not on financial compensation expressing an attitude of condescending pity.

Luck egalitarians have argued that Anderson's (and related) criticisms are at least overstated. For example, luck egalitarians are not committed to saying that the only, or best, policy response to disability is necessarily merely to pay the disabled financial compensation. A given brute luck disadvantage has a justice-based claim to redress on the luck egalitarian view, but this does not mean that redress always ought to take the form of financial compensation.

More fundamentally, Anderson's critique arguably overlooks different ways in which the luck egalitarian idea might enter into an overall, action-guiding political theory. To think that the choice/luck distinction is relevant to distributive justice, and, thereby, relevant to policy, is not necessarily to think that it is all that matters from the standpoint of distributive justice or policy. One can quite intelligibly be a pluralist who thinks that the luck egalitarian concern points to one thing of relevance to distributive justice and, therefore, policy design, without thinking it exhausts distributive justice or that (even if it did) it ought to override all other moral considerations in policy design (G.A. Cohen, 1989, pp. 908–909). Anderson's critique is forceful, understood as a critique of the views that only luck egalitarian concerns are relevant to distributive justice or that only luck egalitarian

concerns should govern policy. But it is not clear that (all) luck egalitarians hold these views (for example, G. A. Cohen, 1989, certainly does not), rather than the more moderate views that the choice/luck distinction is justice- and policy-relevant.

Intuitively, there seems much to be said for a pluralist approach that would seek to combine the insights of the luck egalitarian and relational egalitarian perspectives. However, the pluralist position raises a tough question: How are the respective concerns of luck and relational egalitarianism to be integrated? And lurking behind this question is the more fundamental question of whether the demand for what we call equality is an internally harmonious ideal or one that refers to a plurality of legitimate moral concerns that can conflict and that are not, ultimately, reducible to some single, underlying principle (Berlin, 1969). As Bernard Williams (1973) noted in a related context, this might be "an uncomfortable situation, but the discomfort is just that of genuine political thought. It is not greater with equality than it is with liberty, or any other noble and substantial political ideal" (pp. 248–249).

Stuart White

See also Equality of Opportunity; Global Justice; Justice, Theories of; Liberalism; Libertarianism; Rawls, John; Sen, Amartya; Socialism

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Equality of Opportunity

There is widespread agreement that equality of opportunity is a good thing, even a constituent of a just society, but very little consensus on what it requires. Defenders of equality of opportunity suppose that it requires people to be able to compete on equal terms, on a "level playing field," but they disagree over what it means to do so. They believe that equality of opportunity is compatible with, and indeed justifies, inequalities of outcome of some sort, but there is considerable disagreement over precisely what degree and kind of inequalities it justifies and how it does so. This entry examines the approaches to equality of opportunity taken by advocates of fair equality of opportunity, luck egalitarianism, and libertarianism.

Fair Equality of Opportunity

Many believe that equality of opportunity requires advantaged social positions to be subject to open competition. (This view is sometimes captured by the slogan, "careers open to talents.") The idea here is that jobs and limited educational places should be open to all and that the selection procedures for them should be designed to identify the best-qualified candidates. This appears to be an efficient way in practice of allocating jobs so as to maximize productivity and of distributing prized educational places to those who are likely to gain the most from them. But even if it is a necessary condition of equal opportunity, it cannot be a sufficient condition. For if it were, equality of opportunity would permit differences in people's social circumstances, such as the economic class, family, or culture into which they were born, to have too deep an impact on their prospects. (This is why it is sometimes described as merely formal equality of opportunity.) The ideal would be compatible, for example, with a society in which those born to a lower economic class have radically different prospects from those born to a higher economic class as a result of the way that the different resources at their disposal influence their access to the qualifications required for success. The solution, it might be thought, is to suppose that equality of opportunity requires not only open competition for advantaged social positions but also fair access to qualifications. The resulting position is often called *fair equality of opportunity*. (Some also refer to it as substantive equality of opportunity, in contrast to the formal equality of opportunity provided by open competition on its own.)

John Rawls defends a version of fair equality of opportunity. He argues that advantaged social positions should be open to all, not only formally, but also in such a way that each has a fair chance of attaining them, which he treats as equivalent to the idea that those with the same level of talent and ability, and the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success, regardless of factors such as class, race, and sex. Although Rawls does not explicitly say so, he presumably also means to allow that those with a higher level of talent and ability and a greater willingness to use them may legitimately enjoy greater prospects of success than those with lower levels of talent and ability and less willingness to use them. Implementing fair equality of opportunity would require counteracting the effects of differences in class, race, sex, and the like, and it would have

substantial implications for the design of a system of public education, including the tax regime required to fund it. Some have worried that even the provision of high-quality public education would be insufficient to guarantee fair equality of opportunity, on the grounds that differences between families, such as the different values they attach to education and the different resources they have available to them, could continue to prevent those with the same level of talent and ability (and the same willingness to use them) from having the same prospects of success. This raises the question of whether fair equality of opportunity, if it were implemented in an uncompromising way and without regard to other values, would require abolishing the traditional family.

Some have thought that fair equality of opportunity is highly unstable, however. It appears to be motivated by the desire to prevent differences in people's social circumstances from significantly affecting their prospects in life relative to each other. Yet, if the reason for doing so is that an individual's social circumstances are beyond his control (they are simply a matter of, say, being born into a particular family, class, or culture, or being a particular sex or member of a particular race), then the same can be said of people's "natural circumstances," such as the genetic potential with which they happen to have been born or what we might call their natural endowment. Consistency would seem to require preventing differences in people's natural endowments, not just their social circumstances, from significantly affecting their relative life prospects. This has led to worries that the ideal of equality of opportunity ultimately collapses into the different one of equality of outcome or condition. Indeed, it might seem that we are confronted by a stark choice between retreating to an unacceptably thin conception of equality of opportunity, which holds that it consists in open competition for advantaged social positions and nothing more, and a much more expansive notion, which maintains that it requires us to counteract the differential effects of anything that is beyond a person's control.

But there are potential lines of argument open to those who endorse fair equality of opportunity but do not want to extend it to counteracting the effects of differences in people's natural endowment as well. The most prominent among these is the argument that when the effects of different social circumstances have been redressed, people *deserve* the benefits they receive: In other words, when there is fair access to qualifications and the best-qualified candidates are appointed to advantaged social positions, they deserve those positions and the rewards the market attaches to them, despite the existence of differences in natural endowment. This line of argument, however, is vulnerable to the reply that people cannot truly deserve the extra benefits they receive unless the effects of differences in natural endowments have been neutralized and differences in effort alone are being rewarded.

Luck Egalitarianism

Even if the ideal of equality of opportunity, strictly thought out, did require us to counteract the effects of different natural endowments as well as the effects of differences in social circumstances, we would not be led inexorably to the conclusion that this requires equality of outcome. That aim is consistent with allowing people's life prospects to be influenced by their values and choices. Indeed, it is consistent with the idea that those who are ambitious and want material success may legitimately end up with a greater share of resources than those who value leisure or time with their families. Some have wanted to claim that a deeper conception of equality of opportunity emerges from these reflections, with a more radical vision of what is required to level the playing field. From this standpoint, the underlying motivation of the ideal of equality of opportunity, properly understood, is to counteract the effects of people's different natural and social circumstances while permitting inequalities of condition that emerge as a result of their choices. When inequalities arise from differences in choice, they are just; indeed, if we do not allow inequalities to arise in this way, we fail to give personal responsibility its due. This view is sometimes described as luck egalitarianism.

Luck egalitarianism provides us with a particular account of what it is to level the playing field in the way that justice requires. It maintains that inequalities are unjust if they derive from differences in people's circumstances because these are a matter of brute luck, but inequalities are just if they are the product of people's voluntary choices.

It is, in effect, a combination of two different claims: first, that justice requires us to neutralize the effects of differences in people's circumstances; second, that it is just to require people to bear the costs, or allow them to enjoy the benefits, of their voluntary choices. In making these claims, luck egalitarianism invokes a distinction between choice and circumstance, or brute luck and option luck, which it assigns direct normative significance. Such an approach might be thought to offer the best way of understanding the ideal of equality of opportunity. Indeed, luck egalitarianism is attractive because it gives an account of what it means to level the playing field that goes further than other theories of equality of opportunity, but which at the same time aims to hold people accountable for how well their lives are going.

Luck egalitarianism has its critics, however. Given the social forces to which each of us is subject, the distinction between choice and circumstance, or between brute luck and option luck, is not always easy to draw in a plausible way. Even if we can find a satisfactory way of drawing these distinctions, there is the worry that luck egalitarianism is too harsh in the way that it holds people responsible for their foolish or reckless behavior. It seems to imply that those who end up needy as a result of their own imprudence can justly be forced to bear the costs of their choices. So a person who chooses to smoke in full knowledge of the risks involved and develops lung cancer may have no entitlement of justice to the health care that he or she needs but cannot afford. Uncompromising luck egalitarians may insist that they have no objection to voluntary schemes to help those with self-inflicted needs but that they regard the forcible extraction of taxes to help those who are responsible for their plight as sanctioning the exploitation of the prudent. Others, however, may concede that luck egalitarianism requires supplementing with a further principle of justice, for example, a principle holding that the needy—that is, those whose condition falls below some threshold—are entitled to support regardless of how their needs arose.

Some regard luck egalitarianism as radically misconceived, however. Elizabeth Anderson rejects it in favor of what she calls democratic equality. Democratic equality has a positive and negative dimension. Its negative dimension consists in a rejection of oppression, that is, forms of relationship by which some are dominated, exploited, marginalized, or demeaned; its positive dimension consists in a commitment to a social order in which people stand in relations of equality, which requires democratic self-government involving open discussion among equals in accordance with mutually acceptable rules. Anderson regards democratic equality as a relational theory, whereas she claims that luck egalitarianism is a distributive theory because it conceives equality as a pattern of distribution. This contrast is perhaps somewhat overdrawn: Luck egalitarianism itself may be part of an account of what it is to treat people as equals, with equal concern and respect, while democratic equality has distributive implications even if it is not itself a theory of distribution. But the two accounts of equality do have a different character: Luck egalitarianism is troubled by inequalities of access as such, whereas democratic equality is moved by them only insofar as they play a role in oppression or exploitation or undermine democratic self-government. In laying out its vision of a society without domination, oppression, or exploitation, democratic equality has room for a more specific conception of equality of opportunity that stands opposed to discrimination in spheres such as employment, education, and the provision of public services and requires fair access to qualifications. This might in some respects resemble the idea of fair equality of opportunity but without the grander ambition of neutralizing the effects of differences in people's social circumstances, which has often animated that idea.

The Libertarian Perspective

This entry began by suggesting that there is widespread agreement that equality of opportunity is a good thing, and indeed a requirement of justice. But there are some dissenters. Some on the left argue that equality of opportunity is simply a way to legitimate inequalities of wealth and income that are inherently unjust. No doubt the idea of equality of opportunity does sometimes play this role, but both fair equality of opportunity and luck egalitarianism can provide the basis for a critique of real world inequalities of wealth and income and justify extensive redistributive schemes. A more fundamental challenge to the idea that equality of opportunity is a component of justice comes

from a libertarian perspective. Libertarians argue that employers are entitled to fill vacant positions within their workforce with whomever they want, for whatever reason they want.

According to this libertarian position, the entitlement of employers to decide who should work for them on whatever basis they choose is grounded in their property rights. (Managers acting on behalf of their employer might be regarded as having a similar entitlement that derives from the employer's property rights.) But any reasonable account of property rights must recognize that they are limited by the rights or entitlements of others: A person may own a car but is not in general entitled to use that car to run others over. Even if a person may in some cases have a right to do wrong, he does not have a right to violate the rights of others or to act unjustly. So the most obvious strategy for defending the idea that equality of opportunity is a component of justice will involve trying to show that applicants for jobs have rights or entitlements that restrict the reasons for which selectors can legitimately reject them. (This would not by itself show that the decisions of employers should be subject to legislative constraints. Such constraints might be regarded as ineffective or counterproductive.) Influenced by a libertarian perspective, however, some will argue that the rights or entitlements of applicants for jobs are not such as to impose a duty on employers to select the best-qualified candidates. Matt Cavanagh, for example, maintains that candidates have a right not to be treated with unwarranted contempt but argues that this does not entail that the best-qualified candidates have a right to be selected, for employers may have a variety of reasons for rejecting them that do not express unwarranted contempt.

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See also Egalitarianism; Equality; Rawls, John

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EQUITY

Equity is a term used in jurisprudence and ethics to distinguish judgments that exceed, circumvent, or contradict the letter of the law in order to uphold principles of humanity, natural law, or moral conscience. It is closely related to notions of equality, fairness, clemency, and justice. In the English and American legal systems, equity also refers to a set of principles used to provide relief in cases where the rules of common law are deemed unfair or inadequate. The principle of equity recognizes that the law is sometimes at odds with natural justice and that the strict application of legal justice may not fulfill the moral or rational demands of each specific situation. Equity demands that unusual cases be treated unusually, a concept that has its roots in the ethical and legal philosophies of the ancient world.

Equity in Ancient Greece

Greek philosophy was particularly sensitive to the tensions between legal and natural justice. In the *Statesman,* Plato argues that the rule of law is inferior to the rule of a wise king because the law cannot determine what is most just for each individual. The complexity of human action makes it impossible for any law to apply universally; only a perfectly wise ruler can determine the appropriate application of justice in each circumstance. However, because a ruler possessing such perfect wisdom cannot be found, it is necessary to adhere

to established laws in all cases. Laws can be changed, but until that is done wisely, it would be worse to violate them than to follow them strictly.

In distinguishing between the ideal and actual state of affairs, Plato highlights the problem without endorsing specific measures to ensure equity. In a subsequent work, the *Laws,* he proposes supplying the law code and many individual laws with preambles to facilitate a deeper interpretation of their true meaning. He also suggests that, while a judge is bound by the rule of law, he must rely on his own discretion in determining matters of fact. If used wisely, this allows for individual cases to be distinguished from each other under the same written law. Finally, Plato states that there are unwritten laws, the ancient customs and traditions of the society, which cannot be easily rejected.

Aristotle provides a more explicit definition of equity and further bridges the theoretical and practical concerns. In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* he defines *epieikeia* (equity) as a kind of justice that corrects and completes legal justice in cases where the law is defective because it is too general or absolute. This corrective is necessary because the law must be universal, which leads to gaps in some cases and outright errors in others. This is not the lawmaker's fault; the sheer variety of possible situations cannot be anticipated. The correction of the law in a particular case is an attempt to recover what the lawmakers would have included if they had known the facts. In this regard, equity is not entirely opposed to legal justice, but it is superior to the absolute interpretation of the law.

In the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle describes how equitable judgments should be made, highlighting the importance of adopting a forgiving attitude toward human behavior. An equitable person should attempt to see things from the wrongdoer's perspective to understand the particular errors and misfortunes that led to the act. In this way, the strictures of the law can be tempered by examining the full moral context of the crime and showing mercy. Aristotle then discusses applications of these concepts in forensic speeches. In cases where the written law is clearly against the accused, he recommends an appeal to the more natural and constant principle of equity, which is a part of true justice. This is consistent with surviving evidence from Greek oratory, where litigants regularly demand special consideration for their cases. Aristotle's theories thus reflected actual legal practice regarding equity.

Equity in Ancient Rome

The concept of equity in Roman jurisprudence combined Greek theories with independent judicial innovations. In his ethical and political writings, Cicero describes justice as essentially equivalent to equity, which he calls *aequitas*. He quotes a Latin proverb, *summum jus summa injuria* ("extreme law is the greatest injustice") to demonstrate the error of adhering too strictly to human laws. Justice is a natural and rational principle that transcends the customs and rules of states. Like Plato, Cicero emphasizes the distinction between written and unwritten law, but he also connects equity to the Roman legal principle of good faith. Legal rights cannot be enforced in bad faith, and equity promotes more thorough investigation of both the facts of the case and the spirit of the law.

In practice, equity occupied a place of ever-increasing importance in the Roman legal system through the establishment of praetorian law alongside the traditional law code. The praetors were magistrates with supreme judicial power, and they gradually introduced principles of equity to allow for flexible interpretation of the established law. As judicial rulings rather than legislation, the praetors' edicts were not binding on future magistrates, but the most useful ones eventually cohered into a parallel body of law. The edicts were especially shaped by the notion of natural law as a means of determining the proper interpretation of old laws in new situations that were not anticipated by the lawmakers. This is consistent with Cicero's views and earlier Greek theories of equity, with which the Roman jurists were familiar.

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See also Aristotle; Cicero; Equality; Justice, Theories of; Natural Law; Plato; Roman Law

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Essentialism

In general terms, essentialism is the doctrine that (some) objects have essential, rather than merely accidental or contingent properties. In philosophical discourse, essentialism is a complex term that picks out different positions. Stretching back to Plato's doctrine of Forms, it can refer to abstract entities that exist only in a "heavenly place," so that the concrete physical objects we experience in the world are no more than imperfect copies. In more analytical terms, essentialism is the view that something can have an essential property by virtue of its definition or description: For example, a man can be necessarily defined as two-legged insofar as he is a cyclist. Essentialism can also be thought of as a metaphysical doctrine in which objects or kinds of objects have certain properties without which they could not be the things they are. By contrast, an accidental or contingent property is something an entity or object may or may not have. For example, Aristotle maintained that the property of rationality is essential to human beings, whereas the property of having a long nose is not.

In contemporary social and political theory, debate has raged between those who claim that objects (such as human beings) have essential properties, and those who argue that all objects (including humans) are radically contingent and historical entities that are unstable and open to change. Essentialism is here understood as a belief in the real and true essence of things—the unchanging and immutable properties that define what something is—and it is often contrasted with various forms of constructivism, postmodernism, or poststructuralism, whose proponents insist that there are various ways of constructing entities, depending on the actions and interactions of social agents. The anti-essentialist perspective of the latter does, however, admit of variation, with some stressing the role of intentional actors situated in historical traditions or knowledge systems, whereas others emphasize the constitutive operation of discourses in shaping social agents and their identities.

Despite these differences, anti-essentialists are agreed that essentialism is a pejorative term that precludes an investigation of change and multiplicity in the name of natural and fixed characteristics. However, other political theorists find it normatively and descriptively attractive to invoke ideas of essential properties, such as an intrinsic human nature, to capture those distinctive attributes and features of entities like human beings. In their view, such an account can provide a way of better understanding human beings while also furnishing the means to articulate and justify the defense of their basic needs and interests.

Another group of critical political theorists have questioned the sharp distinction between essentialism and constructivism. Some argue for a *strategic essentialism,* in which oppositional movements acknowledge differences within groups but choose to essentialize their demands and identities in the name of more pressing political goals. On the other hand, various discourse theorists in the poststructuralist tradition stress the mutual interweaving of essence and contingency. In the latter perspective, all objects are socially constructed in different ways by competing actors and their respective discourses, but no discourse or identity can ever fully exhaust the meaning of an object. Each and every object is penetrated by contingency and is thus open-textured, although there are constant efforts to partially fix the meanings of entities. Instead, an important part of social and political life consists of various struggles to impose particular meanings onto essentially contingent objects and practices.

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See also Constructivism; Discourse; Foucault, Michel; Interpretive Theory; Postmodernism

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EUERGETISM

Euergetism—the word derives from the ancient Greek word for a benefactor (εὐεργέτης)—is a term used by ancient historians to refer to the phenomenon of elite benefaction to towns and communities through voluntary gifts, such as public buildings or endowments for various forms of festival or distribution. The process has been seen as critical to understanding how city-states functioned in the Hellenistic Greek east and throughout the wider Mediterranean world in the Roman republican and imperial eras.

Gift-giving was a well-established aristocratic prerogative from very ancient times in the Greek world (the Greek mainland, as well as Greek-speaking communities across the eastern Mediterranean). It was ill-suited to Athenian democracy but became well established from the late fourth century BCE under the Hellenistic kingdoms of the successors to Alexander the Great and continued to form an important element of civic life as the influence and then the imperial presence of Rome came to dominate the area. As Rome also colonized the less-urbanized west, a very similar system of rule by gift-giving local elites was developed there.

Euergetism contributed to the physical development and sociopolitical stability of ancient cities. It bound local elites into a system of reciprocity with their communities and also allowed them to model their conduct on that of hegemonic powers—at first, the Hellenistic kings honored as liberators and benefactors and later, Roman emperors, frequent recipients of divine cult in the east.

Euergetism, therefore, acted as a system that mediated wealth and status differences, enabling the spread of urbanism and enriching the lives of citizens. However, it was not conspicuously motivated by what would now be regarded as conventional charitable or philanthropic motives; seldom, for instance, do we hear of gifts being aimed specifically at the relief of poverty. Indeed, euergetism tended to perpetuate inequalities of wealth and power by entrenching a strongly hierarchical social system with a limited political class. In this, it can be compared to other systems of power brokerage in the ancient world, such as slavery and patronage, which also tended to reinforce a strongly hierarchical status quo. By fostering a spirit of competition in gift-giving within and between towns and by helping to negotiate the subordination of previously autonomous city-states to successive larger kingdoms and empires, euergetism also had a wider political dimension.

Benefactors and Recipients

It has been suggested that a crucial feature of civic euergetism in the classical world was that its benefits and obligations were distributed equally to all those who wanted them. Such benefits were not aimed at favored factions but were received by the city as a single entity, preventing the practice of euergetism from descending into mere bribery or partisan patronage. The concept of collective benefits has been criticized; it can be shown that some benefactions were aimed at specific recipient groups, including (for instance) cash benefactions and alimentary grants. However, for the most part, it seems that euergetism did not collapse along factional lines but remained a quasi-institutional process negotiated between benefactors and recipient cities as something distinct from the world of private patronage.

Euergetistic benefactions, in fact, were not simply imposed from above on supine civic populations; rather, there is some evidence that both the *boule* or *ordo* (town council) and *demos* or *populus* (popular assembly) of the recipient communities could exercise a degree of scrutiny and even control over proposed gifts, acting as the legal authorities for ratifying and receiving benefactions and, for example, administering projects donated through legacies. The honors offered to benefactors were also usually granted in the name of these organs of local government. Such scrutiny and administrative oversight, being the prerogative largely of social and political peers of the potential euergetes, tended to reinforce rather than challenge euergetism as a system, but it did allow recipient communities to retain a role in the process and reminded all parties of their engagement with a wider population of fellow citizens.

Towns, which possessed revenues and executive powers of their own, could even act in concert with benefactors. We know of several joint enterprises from the Roman world, such as the library at Timgad, Algeria (begun by a private benefactor and then completed by the town); the theater Pliny mentions at Nicaea in Bithynia appears to have been a joint undertaking by the town and various private benefactors who have provided adjoining halls and a gallery. Towns could also levy an entrance fee (*summae honoriae*) for high civic officeholders, formalizing the intersection of city finances with private resources.

However, euergetism remained for the most part the prerogative of individual benefactors, who were usually, although not exclusively, male: The rich benefactions of women like Plancia Magna at Perge and Eumachia at Pompeii reflect the importance of the dynastic element of local benefaction.

Forms of Benefaction

Particular categories of benefaction were especially appealing to the exponents of such a system. Monumental public building, in particular, was a frequent choice, offering certain important benefits to donors. It was suitably spectacular and appealingly permanent. It could bring obvious benefits such as flowing water to a town or act as the backdrop for crowd-pleasing events such as theatrical performances, religious sacrifices, or bathing. Buildings could also effectively act as dynastic monuments; the famous façade of the Celsus library in Ephesus acts as a large stone billboard that advertised the career of the donor (in bilingual inscriptions) and the precise terms of his benefaction. It framed multiple statues of himself, his family, and his personified intellectual virtues—a neat epitome of the *quid pro quo* a wealthy benefactor hoped to achieve.

Large-scale civic building projects were also suitable for euergetistic benefactors in that they usually required resources of land, labor, and materials that were more readily met by large one-off capital outlays from the very wealthy than by the steady revenues available to most city treasuries. Indeed, one study suggests that it would have taken 90 to 140 years for public revenues to pay for the public buildings of a typical town in Roman North Africa, the buildings in question being four temples of average size, a set of baths (many towns had more than one), a forum, a marketplace, a theater, at least one porticoed square, paved roads, and essential infrastructural features such as drains and walls. In fact, many towns show concentrated bursts of development over much shorter periods, suggesting—even if we did not have thousands of dedicatory inscriptions recording private benefactions—that euergetism must have provided a significant proportion of funding for public building.

Besides buildings, benefactors could endow distributions of cash or foodstuffs (typically grain or oil), or festivals of various sorts. Such events could coexist with buildings, raising their profile and reminding the townspeople of the identity of the donor; in Ephesus, statues of the donor of the library, Tiberius Julius Celsus Polemaeanus, and of his heirs were to be garlanded annually on his birthday.

Endowed festivals and processions could also stand alone as separate benefactions for which the whole city served as a setting. Among the better known examples of this sort of euergetism are the Artemis procession of Vibius Salutaris at Ephesus and the near-contemporary Demostheneia endowed by Demosthenes of Oenoanda, a festival involving artistic competitions, sacrifices, processions of 26 officials, the provision of at least 28 bulls from surrounding villages, the dedication of a golden ceremonial crown with relief portraits of Apollo and the emperor Hadrian, and a distribution of free grain.

This famous festival shows that in the Roman east, euergetism can be studied in particular connection with the second sophistic movement, which saw a reformulation of Greek civic and cultural identity under the Roman Empire through spending by local notables and aristocrats. Acts of euergetistic benefaction were made by local patrons acting autonomously and in conscious awareness of local religious and civic traditions, but also incorporating elements of the Roman present. The procession at Ephesus, for example, taught the town's citizens about the town's history and institutions through its choice of participants, route, and activities and combined this with acknowledgement of Roman imperial government and cult, perhaps as a response to the growing dominance of Rome. Euergetism was not part of a top-down imposition of Roman uniformity on the province

but something in which influential natives wanted to play a part. Through euergetism, towns asserted their individual identities and vigor while gaining the typical suites of public buildings—baths, forums, theatres, paved and colonnaded streets lined with statues—that still act as hallmarks of the Roman presence.

Indeed, Rome's emperors provided a pattern of philanthropic expenditure that others could follow. Imperial spending of this sort became an expected function of the emperor, as it had been of ambitious politicians under the republic; spending freely on "bread and circuses," in Juvenal's famous phrase (*panem et circenses; Sat.* 10.81), was necessary to legitimize the emperor's position at Rome and maintain his base of popular support. Moreover, generous spending on architectural and other acts of benefaction was one criterion of imperial success for writers such as the imperial biographer Suetonius.

The emperor's largesse stimulated similar spending by Roman senators and provincial elites. Trajan, for instance, hailed in his own lifetime as "best of emperors," spent on alimentary schemes (in which the interest on loans to farmers was paid toward the upkeep of children in towns); so did his senatorial subordinate and exegete Pliny. Trajan spent on baths and libraries, and so did Pliny and a host of other provincial donors; and the monumental adornments of imperial Rome—arches, stadiums and theaters, aqueducts, forums—sparked imitations across the empire.

Benefactors might find friends and supporters among their peers with whom they could discuss their schemes. However, the role of euergetism in enhancing the prestige of leading local families and thereby helping their members to office naturally made it also a source of tension or dispute. The rival ambitions of the urban elites who engaged in euergetism led on occasion to conflict and dispute both within and between towns. The disputes within towns could be mediated by the town in question or, under the Roman Empire, referred to Roman officials such as the governor Pliny.

The disputes between towns, less easy to check in the absence of any really developed infrastructure of government at a tier above the level of the individual town, and in light of the fact that euergetisic projects were conceived individually rather than in response to any coherent plan of urban development, could lead to disastrous emulous spending on impractical "white elephant" projects. Pliny's letters from his province of Bithynia to the emperor Trajan refer to the emperor several abortive or ill-managed projects by cities whose ambitions exceeded their abilities to see the projects through, such as an aqueduct at Nicomedia, which consumed more than 3 million sesterces but was not completed, and the joint-funded theater at Nicaea, built on sinking ground and apparently subject to a dispute between architects (Pliny *Ep.* X.39). At Prusa, meanwhile, rivals of the orator-statesman Dio tried to derail his own euergetistic library project by denouncing it to the governor (Pliny *Ep.* X.81). These failed or contested projects are an important addition to the record because archaeological and epigraphic evidence has a natural tendency to reveal successful benefactions rather than those that failed.

Motivations of Benefactors

In light of the expense and potential for rivalry that attended euergetistic projects, what motivated benefactors? Various factors have been suggested, such as the desire of the local elites to show their participation in metropolitan fashions at the court of Hellenistic kings or later of Rome, as well as their desire to emulate the cultural activities that went with them; the balancing of these tastes with local identities has already been mentioned. Civic pride and fellow feeling are not to be underestimated, nor are religious or genuine philanthropic sentiment, although their expression was rather different from modern equivalents. Self-commemoration went hand in hand with giving large sums to the public purse, so that gifts given for altruistic motives served the donor's interests as well: A citizen from Ebusus (Ibiza), for example, left 90,000 sesterces to help the citizens pay their taxes in difficult times—and to provide a display of lights on his birthday.

The desire for power, for posthumous prestige or memory, and the Greek *philotimia* and its Latin variant *honor*—the competitive pursuit of public esteem—were also powerful motivating factors. No doubt a lavish gift would do a donor no harm as he sought election for himself or his relatives to positions of power within a town, but as we have seen, the role of the town in receiving gifts and

rewarding them with honors meant that euergetism was not simply bribery or purchase of office.

This crucial function of the communities receiving euergetistic gifts can be understood as a partnership between the town and the wealthy individual donor: A system of reciprocity through euergetism developed, ensuring that the social position of local elites was dependent on following its established practices. In this partnership, the benefactor offered money and organizing initiative; the town in return offered civic prestige, expressed through titles and honorific statues as a sort of currency.

The formulaic nature of honorific inscriptions, often carved on the bases of statues erected by recipient communities, suggest that this pattern—whereby civic titles such as benefactor or patron or civic honors such as a public funeral were offered in return for euergetistic gifts—was very well understood. Such titles could then be advertised by the benefactor to present and future urban audiences, one factor behind the epigraphic habit that littered the ancient world with tens of thousands of public inscriptions.

Such rewards made the donor and his peers more willing to give further gifts and resulted in a system that remained essentially stable for several hundred years. The financial, political, and military crises of late antiquity led to higher tax burdens on the rich, and the importance of voluntary obligation began to decline; eventually the long-established system of euergetism gave way to new forms of patronage as part of a wider pattern of social and political change.

Matthew Charles Nicholls

See also Ancient Democracy; Aristocracy; City-State; Empire; Tacitus

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EUGENICS

Eugenics is a term coined by the nineteenth-century British biologist Francis Galton to refer to a program of breeding better people. In an era, nation, and class that tended to see civilization as progress and itself as the most civilized, Galton saw the attributes of civilization as the expression of innate endowments, rather than as the product of historical contingencies and opportunities. Thus, eugenics afforded a biological—a scientific—means of advancing society.

There was an immediacy to eugenics as well, however. Insofar as the lower classes were having more children than the wealthier classes, and the lower classes were assumed to be genetically inferior, it followed that the present demographic trends would retard civilization. To this "scientific" problem, a "scientific" solution had to be sought. In the United States, before income taxes and a large federal budget, when equal rights and opportunities were not taken for granted (women could not vote until 1920), when the perceived good of the state or the race could take precedence over individual civil liberties, and where sprawling urban slums were being fed daily by large numbers of new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, the eugenic platform made a good deal of sense. As articulated by Madison Grant (1916) in *The Passing of the Great Race,* America's existing and impending social problems could be dealt with scientifically, indeed, surgically.

> A rigid system of selection through the elimination of those who are weak or unfit—in other

> words, social failures—would . . . enable us to get rid of the undesirables who crowd our jails, hospitals, and insane asylums. . . . [Sterilization] can be applied to an ever widening circle of social discards, beginning always with the criminal, the diseased, and the insane, and extending gradually to types which may be called weaklings rather than defectives, and perhaps ultimately to worthless race types. (p. 46)

This was coupled to a program to stem the immigration of "inferior strains"—those very "huddled masses, yearning to breathe free" about whom Emma Lazarus's poem "The New Colossus," at the base of the Statue of Liberty, spoke. Science was again invoked, ostensibly demonstrating (with IQ tests) the innate intellectual inferiority of the new immigrants.

Grant's work was endorsed by both the leading human geneticist in America, Charles Davenport, and the leading evolutionary biologist, Henry Fairfield Osborn. Grant himself was head of the New York Zoological Society. When the American Eugenics Society was formally incorporated in January of 1926 (having been preceded by less formal associations), Grant was one of its founders and officers. Serving beneath him, on its advisory board, were nearly all of America's most prominent geneticists and biologists.

Also on its advisory board was Congressman Albert Johnson (R-WA), who sponsored the bill enacted in 1924 to restrict immigration, targeted specifically at eastern and southern Europeans (which was a euphemism for Italians and Jews). Eugenicist Harry Laughlin testified to a gradient of criminality stretching from northwestern Europe to southeastern Europe, as evidence for the genetic undesirability of these immigrants. The Johns Hopkins University geneticist Herbert Spencer Jennings examined the evidence and concluded that the data showed only that newer immigrants were poorer than previous waves of immigrants had been. Jennings quietly dissociated himself from the eugenics movement.

Eugenicists were particularly successful in appropriating the scientific voices of Charles Darwin and Gregor Mendel in their work. To oppose eugenics was to risk being labeled antiscience or even creationist. Consequently, the initial opponents of the movement came from areas other than biology: journalists like Walter Lippmann and H. L. Mencken (who queried the judgments of scientists about the innateness of intelligence); civil libertarians, like the lawyer Clarence Darrow (who objected to political intrusion into private life); anthropologists, like Franz Boas (who found the assumptions about the past and future of civilization to be specious); and Catholics, like the English novelist G. K. Chesterton (who objected to human interference in reproductive matters).

Nevertheless, the eugenicists had managed to convince the educated world that they spoke for science and could solve the problems of the modern world cheaply and scientifically. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the state of Virginia's right to sterilize a poor white woman involuntarily in the notorious case of *Buck v. Bell* (1927). Tens of thousands of Americans were subsequently sterilized under new state laws.

The first American biologist to criticize the eugenics movement publicly was the Johns Hopkins University geneticist Raymond Pearl. After the stock market crash and the onset of the Great Depression, other geneticists, such as Hermann Muller, also wrote strong critiques. Muller's paper, called "The Dominance of Economics Over Eugenics," tried to come to grips with what everyone except the biologists had already grasped—that wealth and power and social prominence are historically very ephemeral and have little to do with inherited endowments, but have rather a lot to do with circumstance, opportunity, hard work, and luck.

In Germany in the 1930s, eugenicists found a national ideology with which they could work well. By 1933, German universities were introducing courses in "race-hygiene," explicitly based on Grant's work. American eugenicists were generally envious of their German counterparts, and Laughlin considered it an honor to be awarded an honorary degree in 1936 by the Nazis, who were basing their sterilization laws on the ones he had drafted in America. By this time, however, American sentiment was turning against eugenics, both as a result of its obvious fallacies laid bare by the Depression and also as a result of its large-scale implementation by the Nazis.

In the aftermath of World War II, the field of human genetics had to be largely reinvented. Shifting the focus from the race to the family, from coercive to voluntary measures, and from

imaginary social diseases to real medical conditions, human genetics in America managed to discard the basic trappings of the eugenics movement.

Unfortunately, some geneticists resurrected the word *eugenics* to refer to the newer areas of genetic counseling and prenatal screening, leading to needless confusion. The word is best left to the era and the ideologies that spawned it.

Jonathan Marks

See also Social Darwinism

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EVANGELICALISM

Evangelicalism, a transdenominational movement of Christians devoted to the biblical doctrine of salvation by faith alone, has exerted considerable influence on a global level and in America. Since its inception in the eighteenth century, evangelicalism has played a formative role in the character of American life and thought and has exerted considerable influence in the political realm. This entry reviews its history as well as its status in the United States today.

Evangelicalism emerged from what is commonly called the Christendom model common to European countries in the Renaissance era. In this model, religious identity mingled with nationalistic sentiment as the state shaped the spirituality of its residents. When a young monk named Martin Luther (1483–1546) began to advocate the doctrine of justification by faith, Christendom took its first major blow. Luther's change of mind helped create the "protesting" church and aided in the development of the doctrines of justification and *sola scriptura* (Scripture's absolute authority). Other efforts of similar emphasis occurred in various European settings in this era, including England (led by John Owen), Switzerland (led by Ulrich Zwingli, 1484–1531), France (Jean Calvin, 1509–1564), and Scotland (John Knox, 1510–1572).

In the new world, the New England colonies soon fell into spiritual malaise despite sharing a strong Christendom base. Spiritual renewal came in the mid-eighteenth century in the form of two passionate evangelists from Britain, George Whitefield (1714–1770) and John Wesley (1703–1791); with the titanic Massachusetts pastor-theologian, Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758), they preached the "new birth" to great effect.

This revolution of religion continued in the nineteenth century as figures like Charles Finney (1792–1875), Jonathan Edwards, Jr. (1745–1801), and Francis Asbury (1745–1816) preached all over the young country in what is known as the Second Great Awakening. These efforts combined with religious disestablishment to create what some have called a market-based spiritual economy that drew thousands of people to evangelical groups like the Methodists and Baptists. The nineteenth century also witnessed the birth and rapid expansion of the modern missions movement, jumpstarted in different places and times by four students from Williams College, a brilliant linguist named William Carey (1761–1834) and a single woman named Lottie Moon (1840–1912.

A diverse group of leaders, including the evangelist D. L. Moody (1837–1899) and the Princeton theologian B. B. Warfield (1851–1921), publicly defended their brand of historic Christianity against late nineteenth-century Protestant liberalism and

its social gospel. They published a series of volumes called *The Fundamentals* (1910–1915) to stake their position. In this same period, Pentecostalism began in a small Los Angeles church. It soon dwarfed many traditional denominations and profoundly influenced the evangelical movement.

The conflict reached a head in the Scopes trial of 1925, where a fundamentalist politician named William Jennings Bryan (1860–1925) and a modernist lawyer named Clarence Darrow (1857–1938) fought in a Tennessee courtroom over the right of a public school teacher, John T. Scopes, to teach evolution. Bryan won the trial but lost the public relations war. Coupled with the defeat of Prohibition a few years later, the fundamentalists fell on hard times. Some withdrew from the culture, while others remained engaged in evangelism, missions work, and care for the poor.

Another phase of the evangelical movement was brewing, one led by a dynamic young pastor named Harold Ockenga (1905–1985). Preaching from Park Street Church on Boston Common, Ockenga began to outline his vision for a "new evangelicalism," one that would not retreat from society but would transform it through a reinvigorated evangelical effort that spanned denominational lines. Ockenga partnered with radio personality Charles Fuller (1887–1968), with whom he founded the influential Fuller Seminary (1947) in California; evangelist Billy Graham (1918–), with whom he formed *Christianity Today* (1956), an evangelical periodical that was an alternative to the mainline *Christian Century* (1884); and theologian Carl F. H. Henry (1913–2003), the first editor of the periodical, who published the hugely influential text, *The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism* (1947). Ockenga also served as the first president of the National Association of Evangelicals (1942), a clearinghouse formed in response to the World Council of Churches (1937). In Great Britain, John Stott (1921–), J. I. Packer (1926–), and D. Martyn Lloyd-Jones (1899–1981) led various corners of the evangelical movement while traditional denominations wilted all over Europe.

Led by the neo-evangelicals, Christians reentered all sectors of American society, reentering the political realm forcefully in the 1970s. Billy Graham became widely known as the "pastor to the nation" and personally counseled numerous presidents. Jimmy Carter (1924–), a professed "born again" Christian, became president in 1976, the same year *Newsweek* labeled "the year of the evangelical." The moral majority, driven by men like Jerry Falwell (1933–2007), Pat Robertson (1930–), Oral Roberts (1918–2009), and others, helped to usher in a conservative president, Ronald Reagan (1911–2004), and many Republican political leaders on the local, state, and national levels. In 2000, George W. Bush (1946–) famously cited Jesus as his "favorite philosopher." Evangelicals now formed a significant voting bloc and were regularly courted by politicians of varying ideologies.

In the current day, evangelicalism pulses with life even as it seeks stability. Prominent evangelicals like Mike Huckabee (1955–) and John Thune (1961–) run for office, academic specialists like Alvin Plantinga (1932–) and Mark Noll (1946–) teach in elite universities, musicians like Jon Foreman (1976–) and artists like Makoto Fujimara (1960–) create renowned art, and pastors like Rick Warren (1954–) and Mark Driscoll (1970–) oversee "mega-churches." Simultaneously, financial and marital scandals and compromise on matters like inerrancy, the nature of the gospel, and gender roles have weakened many institutions and churches. Critics have noted the perpetuation of racial segregation in evangelical circles. Lamin Sanneh and Philip Jenkins (1952–), among others, have argued that explosive evangelical growth in Africa, Asia, and other areas has shifted the center of evangelical influence from the decadent West to the non-Western world. China in particular booms with evangelical activity, much of it under the radar.

The evangelical movement, begun in the strictures of Christendom but now remarkably destabilized, faces an uncertain future. Although its prospects vary, it is clear from its history that evangelicalism often proves most successful when it is most challenged.

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See also Fundamentalism; Globalization; Market; Neoconservatism; Reformation

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Event

The event is arguably the core concept in contemporary European philosophy. Although there is no shortage of references to the event in the Anglo-American tradition, from Alfred North Whitehead to Donald Davidson, the concept serves above all to define the principal stake of so-called continental thought, from Martin Heidegger to Jacques Derrida to Catherine Malabou and from Michel Foucault to Gilles Deleuze to Alain Badiou. Genealogically, the event emerges with particular force toward the late sixties, marking a possible crossover point between structuralist and subject-centered approaches. Among the features that are relatively invariant in the use of its concept, we can mention the event's contingent, unpredictable, singular, and radically transformative nature. Beyond these basic invariant traits, however, each individual thinker also gives the event a specific inflection. Major polemics thus concern the unicity or plurality of events, their ontological or nonontological inscription, their immanence or transcendence to the world as is, and their susceptibility to a hermeneutical or a dialectical understanding. Finally, the primacy attributed to the event in contemporary philosophy is not immune to criticisms and attacks from a political point of view, insofar as eventfulness, contingency, and difference in the context of late capitalism can be seen as descriptive of the current functioning of the global market, instead of promising its revolutionary transformation.

Genealogically speaking, we might say that the event becomes the central topic of theoretical and philosophical reflection precisely in the wake of the worldwide events of 1968. To think this revolutionary sequence, then, entails investigating what happened and asking the underlying question of how to think the happening of that which happens. In French, this is often called the *événementialité* of the event, awkwardly translated as the "eventality" of the event, with the task of thinking, whether in history, in political theory, or in philosophy, being described as *événementialisation,* "eventalization." Of course, we can also enumerate many conceptual precursors for this notion, such as Aristotle's *tuchè* or chance as opposed to automatism or *automaton;* the role of *clinamen,* deviation or swerve, for ancient atomists after Lucretius; Niccolò Machiavelli's *fortuna,* fortune or chance in relation to *virtù* as capacity or power for intervention; Stéphane Mallarmé's *coup de dés* or dice throw as the attempt to abolish chance; Friedrich Nietzsche's destiny of breaking in two the history of humanity; or Martin Heidegger's *Ereignis* as enowning. These concepts have been variously retrieved among contemporary thinkers of the event, but they appear as precursors only in retrospect and as a result of such retrievals, which do not begin to give shape to a common doctrine until the late sixties in what is then frequently called postmetaphysical or antifoundational thinking.

More specifically, the concept of the event bridges two traditions that otherwise are at loggerheads: a humanist, subject-centered approach and an antihumanist focus on the action of the structure. An event is neither the expression of free human action nor the causal effect of structural determinisms. Instead, an event occurs precisely when and where a certain dysfunction or systematic deadlock becomes visible through the intervention of a subject who, by gaining a foothold in this gap in the structure, at the same time profoundly reshuffles the coordinates that otherwise continue to be determining in the last instance. The event, in other words, transversally cuts across the traditional oppositions of freedom and necessity, action and system, spontaneity and organization, movement and the state.

Among the event's defining features we should list its contingency, its unpredictability, its singularity, and its transformative capacity. Beyond this basic consensus, however, we find a wide range of divergent and often polemical orientations. In the Heideggerian tradition, for example, there is good reason to speak of the event only in the singular,

as the event of being itself—being which "is" not but "happens" or "occurs." This then raises the difficult question, which thinkers as diverse as Derrida and Deleuze grapple with in much of their work, of defining the relation between the unique event of being qua being and the occurrence of plural events in the everyday sense of the term. For Badiou, on the contrary, the event is that which is *not* being qua being. In this orientation, therefore, ontology, as the science of being, can literally say nothing of the event, which rather calls for an intervening doctrine of the subject as operative in various fields or conditions, such as art, politics, or science.

A related polemic concerns the immanent or transcendent nature of the event with regard to the situation at hand. Here a Deleuzian orientation, which involves a reevaluation of virtuality outside the traditional binary of the real and the possible, will insist on the presence of the unique event of being as if folded into particular accidents. To this image of the event as fold, by contrast, we can oppose the notion of a radical break, which Badiou, for example, finds at work in Nietzsche and Mallarmé. Neither immanent nor transcendent, in fact, the event crosses out this very opposition for Badiou.

The method for thinking the event also changes depending on which of these basic orientations we adopt. Thus, if in everything that happens the virtuality of the one and only event of being is always already present, then our approach will ultimately take the form of a hermeneutic interpretation in which each item or entity (this or that occurrence) can also simultaneously be read as the expression of the immanence of being (the happening of all that occurs). Conversely, if an event is inscribed in a specific situation by way of this situation's deadlock and yet depends on a break with (existing representations of) being, then our approach will most likely take the guise of a dialectical articulation (not in the orthodox terms of negation and the negation of negation but as a logic of scission and of the exception).

The proliferation of theories of the random, multiple, contingent, and radically transformative event, however, can also be seen as the product of late capitalism, rather than as a counteracting force. Karl Marx was, after all, quite enthusiastic about the power of capitalism to break down old feudal, patriarchal, or idyllic bonds and hierarchies. But, if it is indeed capitalism itself that reveals all presence to be a mere semblance covering over random multiplicity, then the event as the core concern of postmetaphysical thought might turn out to be little more than descriptive of, if not complicitous with, the status quo. Difference, multiplicity, or the primacy of events and becomings over subjects and objects, far from giving us critical leverage, thus would define our given state of affairs under late capitalism and its attendant cultural logic.

Bruno Bosteels

See also Anti-Foundationalism; Becoming; Change; Difference Theories; Exception; Hermeneutics; Immanence; Multiplicity; Ontology; Singularity; Virtual

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Evolution

Philosophers since Greek antiquity have distinguished between *nature* and *nurture,* and political theorists have typically based their ideas on the parallel distinction between *human nature* and *custom*. Today, however, this dichotomy—which spawned a rigid division between natural sciences and social sciences—has been bridged by developments in the life sciences. Since Charles Darwin, traditional accounts of human origins have been challenged by evidence of human evolution from earlier primate species. These findings, reinforced by behavioral studies of nonhuman primates, reveal similarities as well as differences between our species and nonhuman primates like chimpanzees or gorillas. More important, recent developments in genetics, neuroscience, and toxicology directly contradict the attribution of all human traits to cultural practices and individual learning.

For example, John Locke's theories rest on the concept that humans are born with a *tabula rasa* (i.e., the brain is a "blank slate" on which experience and learning shape behavior). Similarly, Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau had theories of the "state of nature," which purported to describe human life before the formation of political societies based on a "social contract." These views are contradicted by a variety of findings. As Frans de Waal revealed in *Chimpanzee Politics* and ethologists confirmed in observations of other monkey and ape species, nonhuman primates are often social animals with patterns of leadership and alliance formation within the group. Anthropologists have found complex social and political activity even in stateless societies among tribal peoples often described as primitive, who often live in tribes organized around clans and other kinship groups. Paleontologists' discoveries of fossils from earlier stages of hominid evolution show signs of tool making, and human art as well as artifacts have been observed in prehistoric caves like Lascaux.

Developments in genetics are rapidly uncovering genes associated with specific behavioral profiles (such as attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder ([ADHD]), autism, alcoholism, and many other health outcomes). Already, for $1,000, Americans can buy a list decoding the nucleotide bases for all sites in their genome now identified as having effects on human health or behavior. Specialists predict that within a decade, it will have become routine (at least in developed societies) to record the entire sequence of each individual's genome in infancy. Increasingly, innate propensities of behavior are not merely inferred but can be traced to genetic predispositions.

Cognitive neuroscience has also transformed our understanding of the brain and behavior. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and other techniques, the brain structures and neurotransmitters (and sometimes genes) linked to specific behavior can be identified. Such research is far from the genetic determinism once feared so widely. Frequently, genes and environmental influences interact in complex ways that could sometimes increase (rather than decrease) individual responsibility. For instance, a recent research study found that if individuals with a particular gene (D2, D3 dopamine receptor mutation) use cocaine as teenagers, they have a significant likelihood to develop schizophrenia by age 35 or 50. Similar interactions between environmental factors and a specific gene creating vulnerability can probably help explain autism, ADHD, substance abuse, and some forms of Alzheimer's disease.

In short, the understanding of human nature of modern thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau is inconsistent with a wide range of recent observations and theories. To be sure, Hobbes's concept of the state of nature as a "war of all against all" may seem to describe the breakdown of a civilized society (not the original condition of all humans), but Hobbes's view of human motivations is not always observed, even in circumstances when settled societies degenerate into chaos and violence. One reason is that experimental studies using fMRI sometimes show cooperative or altruistic responses unlike those attributed to human nature by these thinkers. Another factor is that kinship plays a far greater role in human social behavior than these early modern thinkers imagined.

The findings just sketched are being rapidly extended, modified, and transformed by researchers in many fields. By the time this text is put in print, it will already be obsolete in some details. Because new scientific studies increasingly challenge traditional barriers between natural and social sciences, although it is impossible to say

exactly how the results will be integrated, some traditional explanations of human political and social behavior now appear increasingly questionable. For instance, sociologists who speak of the "social construction of reality," based on Skinnerian conditioning of an organism without innate propensities, will have difficulty maintaining their views. Instead, there is growing interest in new fields like biopolitics, which explore how research in the life sciences relates to the study of politics. Given practical applications of findings in neuroscience, genetics, ethology, and toxicology, the need for more coherent criteria of regulating biological techniques that change human behavior will be greatly increased. And in our universities, students destined for responsible positions in the private as well as public sectors will need to have an opportunity to take courses in human biology as well as biopolitics.

The American controversy in 2007 and 2008 over embryonic stem cell research provides a useful illustration of the need for more extensive knowledge of the details linking evolutionary biology, human life, and public policy. President George W. Bush limited the development of new lines of stem cells, claiming that it was unethical to take lives (by taking stem cells for research from embryos) to save lives. However, in this research, what were called embryonic stem cells are taken from *blastocysts* (not embryos). When a female's eggs (ova) are fertilized with male sperm, the resulting cell complex is technically called a blastocyst until it attaches to the wall of the womb. Only then, when the fertilized egg is capable of receiving nutrients and developing into a fetus, is it called an embryo in the precise sense. Although the word *embryo* is often used to describe a blastocyst, technically, they are different insofar as a blastocyst that is not yet successfully implanted in the womb is—like sperm from masturbation—only potentially a source of pregnancy.

The blastocysts from which stem cells have been harvested are usually associated with in vitro fertilization (IVF), which is now widely used to assist infertile couples. Because blastocysts do not always successfully bond to the womb to become an embryo capable of development into a viable birth, IVF couples usually provide eggs and sperm for up to a dozen blastocysts. In this treatment, these fertilized eggs are often used three at a time to attempt to produce a pregnancy. Typically, successful implantation and formation of an embryo occur before all blastocyts are used, so that to date the excess fertilized blastocysts have been discarded. These discarded cells were being used to produce what were called embryonic stem cells (even though in precise terminology, embryonic stem cells form only after a pregnancy has begun in a fertilized egg attached to the womb).

As a result, some specialists considered that President Bush's position could be called anti-life. The unused fertilized blastocysts from IVF can retain potential viability only for a short time in a freezer (and are not normally used for genetically different couples). Hence, current IVF techniques typically have the effect of destroying blastocysts. Critics of Bush's policy argue that if this is immoral, to be consistent, the president should have sought to ban current IVF procedures, thus depriving infertile couples of this approach to pregnancy.

This example shows the great complexity of the contemporary biological processes that are now being linked to actual political decisions. Because some biologists may well contest the formulation above, moreover, the appropriate assessment of controversial issues must be the product of dialogue between researchers of different perspectives and values. Indeed, virtually all statements above will be qualified as new research generates discoveries and potential conflicts over issues that have not yet manifested themselves. Hence, the intersection of evolutionary biology and political theory will remain a dynamic area in which interdisciplinary teaching and research should become far more broadly developed than at present.

Roger D. Masters

See also Disenchantment; Eugenics; Life

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Exception

The concept of the exception is often used to elaborate a critique of liberalism, especially of the liberal rule of law. It is probably most readily associated with the work of Carl Schmitt, who was probably the most influential German jurist of the interwar period and whose work is now enjoying some resurgence in popularity. His idea of the exception is developed in reference to political thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean Bodin, and Juan Donoso Cortés, showing that the concept has a long history in political philosophy. The idea of the exception has also gained attention in debates on the use of emergency powers in the War on Terror and is central the recent work of the Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben.

Schmitt argues for the importance of the exception in the text, *Political Theology,* first published in 1922 and revised in 1934. Beginning with the famous sentence, "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception," *Political Theology* outlines a strong critique of the liberal rule of law through emphasizing the role of the sovereign in establishing when the normal rule applies. For Schmitt, the sovereign is a borderline concept, meaning that through its power of decision, it determines whether a situation is normal or exceptional. This categorization, in turn, determines whether the rule applies because rules can do so only in a normal or ordered situation. If the situation is deemed to be exceptional, however, then the rule of law is suspended. Furthermore, if a situation is exceptional, then the sovereign must also determine what to do in response to it because the constitutional powers that would otherwise take effect may no longer be applicable. In this view, the exception is fundamentally linked to the survival of the state through the decisional capacities of the sovereign authority. In addition, the existence of the exception works to ground emergency powers in contrast to normal rule.

Emergency powers can be exercised by a state when faced with a national crisis, emergency, or declaration of war. In some jurisdictions, such emergencies may include natural disasters. Emergency powers may involve the suspension of certain aspects of constitutional law, although this is not always the case (e.g., in the United States, emergency powers suspend *habeas corpus* but do not suspend the Constitution). In developing his idea of the exception, Schmitt was particularly concerned with Article 48 in the Weimar Constitution and the suspension of basic rights that it allowed. Although emergency powers provisions are usually enacted temporarily to enable the sovereign to respond to a specific emergency or crisis that threatens the state, there have been circumstances in which such powers are enacted indefinitely, notably in Nazi Germany, where the Third Reich suspended the Weimar Constitution indefinitely. Because of various problems, particularly the perceived threat of terrorism, the United States is effectively in an indefinite if not permanent state of emergency. Other countries such as Israel (1948), Egypt (1967), and Syria (1963) have also been in extended periods of states of emergency.

Schmitt's constitutional approach to the role of the exception in politics and legal rule was criticized at the time by the radical German thinker Walter Benjamin. Benjamin saw the exception as having a more intransigent and fundamental role in politics. He writes that the state of emergency enacted by the Third Reich is not the exception but the rule. Furthermore, it is necessary to bring about a real state of exception to combat the inauthentic exception that Fascism represented. For Benjamin, the exception is not simply an occasional event that requires the suspension of normal rule but rather a central feature of law itself. This formulation from Benjamin, which is presented in his essay, "On the Concept of History" (1940), has been important for recent thinkers of the exception, especially Giorgio Agamben.

Drawing on both Schmitt and Benjamin, Agamben argues that the very possibility of juridical rule and the meaning of state authority are at stake in the state of exception. In *Homo Sacer,* he argues that the suspension of the law that is characteristic of the sovereign response to the exception reveals a more profound condition of possibility of law itself. Thus, in the modern world, law operates in a (permanent) state of suspension. He calls this condition the sovereign ban. This idea

of the ban is central to his account of biopolitics and the notion of "bare life," by which he means life that is singularly exposed to death. Guantanamo Bay is one example of this condition of legal suspension and bare life.

Agamben, thus, places the exception at the heart of contemporary juridico-politics: Our condition is effectively one of exceptional politics. He extends on this portrayal of contemporary politics as inherently exceptional in his book, *State of Exception*. He argues that whereas Schmitt attempts to harness the power of the exception back to law, Benjamin's call for a real state of exception radicalizes this power. In doing so, it may allow for a possible response or resolution to the biopolitical violence of modern liberal democracy. While Agamben's understanding of the role of the exception in modern politics has been heavily criticized for some of its more extreme elements, his central thesis that the exception (and the sovereign decision it demands) is fundamental to the operation of law and state authority is important.

In general terms, this thesis highlights the way that the liberal rule of law is disrupted by circumstances for which laws cannot be codified in advance. This reveals the limits of the liberal rule of law, but it also presents a more fundamental challenge. Liberal approaches to political or legal theory that attempt to ground positive law in a deeper normative order do not often deal with the implications of the necessary suspension of the law in conditions of emergency. To do so requires taking on the paradox that central aspects of liberal democratic governance must be suspended to protect itself from a threat. That is, liberal democracy survives through its own suspension.

Catherine Mills

See also Bodin, Jean; Hobbes, Thomas; Liberalism; Life; Rule of Law; Schmitt, Carl; Sovereignty

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EXISTENTIALISM

It is helpful to distinguish between existentialism, as a philosophy of existence that flourished intermittently across Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the existentialist movement, which rose to intellectual prominence in France after World War II. Although the former poses many provocative ethical questions, it remained rather diffuse and apolitical until it was seized on by a group of French intellectuals who identified themselves as members of a distinctive movement led by Jean-Paul Sartre. The latter's influence on radical political thought has been extensive, and despite the movement's demise by the 1960s, an existentialist style of philosophizing about everyday life and existentialist concerns about individual freedom continue to reverberate in contemporary political theory.

There is no consensus as to which thinkers qualify as existentialists, and the label was first proposed by Gabriel Marcel in the 1940s. In addition to those who would explicitly identify with the existentialist movement, the term is applied retrospectively to thinkers such as Sören Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger, with additional names—such as Fyodor Dostoevsky, Friedrich Nietzsche, Albert Camus, and various religious thinkers such as Martin Buber—being associated with important existentialist themes and approaches. Existentialist elements can be discerned, too, in work written in the wake of the existentialist movement, such as that of Frantz Fanon, Erich Fromm, Abraham Maslow, Judith Butler, and the later Michel Foucault. A more useful approach than naming authors is to identify major themes that allow certain ideas or approaches to be designated existentialist.

Key Themes in the Philosophy of Existence

First, philosophies of existence are philosophically radical inasmuch as they renounce the formalism and systematization practiced by traditional philosophy, now viewed as too remote from life and too rational in its approach to Being. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is a particular target of such critiques. With its roots in a skeptical tradition, existentialist philosophy may be characterized as a style of thinking that throws familiar, personal experience into question, often addressing its audience in the first-person rather than positing or classifying truths in an abstract, theoretical way. Existentialists strive for a rigorous analysis of religious, extraordinary, but most often prosaic experiences to explore what they reveal about the human condition.

Second, a corollary of existentialists' ethical interest in what it would mean to live authentically is a critique of the inauthentic life. This is typically associated with mindless conformity to social or moral convention and with an existence that is consequently perceived to be shallow and banal. This pathology chimes with Weberian and Marxist critiques of modernity, complementing critical modernists' concerns about rationalization and alienation. Nietzsche's contempt for the tame herd animals to which life-denying customs condemn us, Heidegger's conception of "everyman," and Sartre's notion of bad faith are all examples of the inauthentic life.

Third, existentialism is associated with autonomy, individualism, and liberty. To some extent, it therefore resonates with liberalism. However, existentialism is interested in the ontological aspects of such norms (such as the nature and limits of free will) and the existential possibility of living them, rather than in political (negative) liberty or normative universals. To exist authentically, existentialists believe, individuals must wean themselves from the security of merely following public opinion, common sense, or scientific or religious dogma. This means recognizing their singularity, perhaps by confronting the uniqueness of their own death, as Heidegger suggests. Authenticity and freedom are associated with taking responsibility for one's own existence and decisions, where determinism or moral imperatives are judged to be alibis excusing bad faith rather than a legitimate explanation of the human condition. Rather than focusing on duty to a rule, the ethical life means existing without hypocrisy but with passionate fidelity to commitments sustained despite the lack of any final reasons or authority to justify them.

This is related to a fourth existentialist theme, which is a concern with subjective experience. Existentialism pays attention to emotions and moods in a way that is philosophically distinctive. Its interest lies not in psychology but in the more general ethos or style of being that a particular mood imparts or in the way an emotional event might shock an individual from his or her complacency. Thus, Kierkegaard distinguishes between the ascetic, tepid way most believers subscribe to religious doctrines and the ungrounded passion of one who chooses in fear and trembling. The particular range of moods on which existentialist thinkers focus—fear, anxiety, nausea, shame, dread, boredom, guilt, *ressentiment*—attracts accusations of nihilism, but it also lends their work affective impact, allowing it to speak to us in a way that is sometimes captured better by literature than by theory and permitting existentialist writing a broader range of styles than philosophy usually accommodates. Nor is this summoning of affect merely gratuitous; it may be used to jolt us from our customary slumbers, forcing us to confront the contingent nature of human existence. Only having done so might an individual acquire the capacity to live according to a different affective economy, expressing perhaps the joyful vitality Nietzsche associates with an affirmation of life. Existentialism is not, however, hedonistic: responding authentically to the human condition is a serious and ongoing process of becoming. Singularity or uniqueness, not narcissism or egoism, is the goal for a hazardous subjectivity that is always in process.

A fifth theme indicates why subjectivity is so troubled: Glimpses of the entirely ungrounded nature of its existence catch it unawares, resulting in vertiginous experiences of contingency or gratuitousness that existentialist philosophy strives to intensify. The inauthentic life is a flight from this unwelcome insight, which forces a realization that there is no higher, transcendent authority to appeal to and no ultimate justification for human suffering. This is eloquently sketched by Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). Humans suffer because they recognize their mortality, but they are most disturbed by the purposelessness of their suffering in

a cosmos where they are merely chance accretions of nature's exuberance. Nietzsche accordingly quotes the mythical wisdom of Silenus: It is better never to be born, not to be, but the second best option is to die soon. Nietzsche rails against the metaphysical comforts that humans create to avoid this wisdom: art, science, ideology, religion, everyday routines—these are so many strategies of denial. Yet, they come at a high price because they cut us off from life, instilling a nihilistic, mean-spirited mode of existence. Only by looking into the void, embracing the world's lack of any ultimate truth or reason, and creating one's own values might one live incandescently as a free spirit or sovereign individual.

A final existentialist theme is more philosophical inasmuch as it entails an ontological inquiry into the nature of existence. It is exemplified by Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927). The preeminent question here concerns what it means to be, to exist. A crucial distinction is made between the kind of inert objective things described by classical science and philosophy and existence as self-expressive, immanently generative Being. Heidegger's concern is that Being has been forgotten, covered over, since the Greeks, and he charges modernity in particular with reducing it to objects: natural stuff that lies ready-to-hand awaiting human mastery. Because it is not possible to access Being directly (fundamental ontology), Heidegger must first embark on an exploration of human existence, or *Da-sein* (literally, being-there). *Da-sein* exists as an opening for Being, an expressive space or clearing wherein Being discloses itself. In imposing anthropocentric meaning on Being and approaching it instrumentally, *Da-sein* strays from its destiny of caring for Being. It turns away by immersing itself in everyday routines and seeking to control beings rather than to question Being. Rather than the Cartesian, cognitive subject, *Da-sein*'s mode of existing is temporal, expressive, reflective. This is what distinguishes it from the raw, brute beings it manipulates and erroneously mistakes for Being as such. Existence is thus a normative as well as an ontological term for Heidegger: the authentic attitude toward Being is letting-be or opening-to.

The Absurd

While the premise of an ungrounded, indeterminate world is a defining aspect of existentialist philosophy, the idea of absurdity is fleshed out graphically in essays Camus wrote around 1940 and in Sartre's first novel, *Nausea* (1938). They describe a world that is not merely devoid of higher purpose but one where the meanings routinely imposed on everyday life disintegrate, robbing the world of its familiarity and yielding an experience of the uncanny. Camus describes awakening to the absurd as a process of undermining and collapse. The connections that make sense of things are broken; The material world seems suddenly alien, nature fundamentally strange; others' gestures are no longer means of communication but a grotesque pantomime. To confront the absurd is to experience an autistic sense of alienation that reveals the unbridgeable gap between our certainty of existing, with its irrational longing for clarity, and a world indifferent to human desire or design. But is life still worth living? Camus pronounces this the fundamental question for philosophy. Suicide, he suggests, is a sign that one has recognized the lack of any profound reason to persist. Yet, he denies that absurdity logically entails suicide: Metaphysical revolt against human futility is preferable, an ever-renewed provocation lived without appeal, without hope, but equally without resignation, as a passionate will to exist. In "The Myth of Sisyphus," Camus retells the Homeric myth of Sisyphus as an account of the absurd hero. Condemned by the gods incessantly to repeat the futile labor of pushing a rock up a mountain, a rock that just as incessantly rolls back down, Sisyphus's tragedy is that he is conscious of the utter purposelessness of his task. His heroism is to live his punishment with scornful lucidity. He overcomes his grief to achieve an absurd victory by performing his task joyfully.

Sartre's account of the nausea provoked by an encounter with absurdity in a municipal park is one of the great moments of existentialist literature. It is not merely the collapse of meaning that disturbs his fictional character, Roquentin, but the realization that this massive, bloated stuff that envelops him, and of which his own embodied self is part, *is* what it means to exist. Its materiality is simply what it is: excessive, superfluous, overflowing and undifferentiated, gelatinous, inexplicable. It is simply indifferent to human measure, yet its viscosity is also threatening, inspiring feelings of vulnerability and disgust. Roquentin does not

embark on joyful revolt. His instinct is to succumb to bad faith by immersing himself in boring habits, resigned to a life without meaning. But his tragedy is that although he seeks only to lose himself, he cannot forget himself: His consciousness refuses the self-annihilation for which he longs.

The Existentialist Movement

While they have found existentialist themes evocative, critics often doubt their ethical, let alone their political import. Despite using normative terms that imply an ethical obligation to others, such as responsibility and commitment, it has not been easy to elicit intersubjectivity from philosophies of existence whose individuals seem to suffer a sense of traumatized isolation when they are not willfully independent. Existentialism's subjects tend to be described in a rather solipsistic way, and when they do encounter others, their response is likely to be disappointment at being misunderstood by them or hostility to those who threaten their freedom. Sartre's statement that "hell is other people" seems emblematic of a lack of empathy with others.

Nevertheless, the ideas of the politically committed intellectual and of existentialism as a concrete philosophy of liberation dedicated to transforming the way we live encouraged a group of French radicals to proclaim themselves existentialists in Nazi-occupied France. Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Simone de Beauvoir composed the main core of the movement while others, like Camus, embraced some of its principal ideas but kept their distance. The movement's members seized the rather inchoate themes of philosophies of existence and gave them a recognizable form they associated with leftist politics. This linkage was by no means inevitable: Nietzsche's politics are more inclined to aristocratic elitism, while the Spanish existentialist Ortega y Gasset gives them a right-wing orientation. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty co-edited *Les Temps Modernes,* the main existentialist journal, until the mid-1950s, when political and philosophical differences resulted in a famous quarrel. Shortly thereafter, the rise of structuralist antihumanism resulted in the eclipse of existentialism as a movement. Its Sartrean form, in particular, was now rejected as a philosophy of subjectivist humanism: a view that supplemented charges by communist critics, who disparaged his individualism. Sartre himself now declared existentialism but an ideological moment of Marxism, while Merleau-Ponty pronounced the Movement dead and turned to exploration of an antihumanist ontology of existence more indebted to Heidegger than to Sartre.

As a movement, existentialism was associated with cultural innovation as well as philosophy. In her autobiography, de Beauvoir recalls with some bitterness that it was often their enemies who applied the existentialist label to their work, with the label soon extending to a certain style of painting, writing, and music whence it was exploited as a new vogue quickly seized upon by the media. By 1947, she laments, existentialism was popularly associated with the brawls, festivities, and sexual licentiousness attributed to a café crowd that adopted an Italian penchant for dressing entirely in black as the marker of their unconventional mode of existence. De Beauvoir concedes, nonetheless, that Sartre was enthusiastic about the youth, jazz, and dance of this countercultural movement. Indeed, after the austerity of the war and the stifling conformity of French traditions, such modes of existence seemed to express something of the existentialist ideas that were transforming intellectual life. Did the new bohemians not exemplify, after all, the life of freedom that Sartre and de Beauvoir seemed to be advocating in their work and which their own lifestyle suggested? In place of the fidelities of bourgeois existence, with its monotonous productive toil, domestic labor, sexual inequality, monogamous family life, and Catholic piety, here was a child-free couple that ate in cafés, lived by writing, engaged in exotic sexual freedoms, traveled extensively, and proclaimed their atheism. Their example inspired many who would became part of the events of Paris 1968, while their rejection of bourgeois life complemented their socialist politics, their rejection of French colonialism, and their affinity with the artistic avant-garde.

All this should not, however, detract from the seriousness with which existentialist philosophy was being developed and its political implications explored. Against the background of the German Occupation, claims that individual freedom is inextinguishable had found a receptive audience.

Existentialists also helped to illustrate the stark political choices—between collaboration and resistance—that ordinary individuals were called on to make. Existentialist humanism was sympathetically received, too, by those who were weary of the dominant liberal idealism but also distrustful of the austere, positivist form of Marxism associated with the French Communist Party.

Existential Phenomenology

Leading members of the existentialist movement all practiced a phenomenological mode of existentialism. Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* is subtitled *A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology;* Merleau-Ponty titled his first major existentialist work *Phenomenology of Perception;* de Beauvoir's work, too, is distinctly phenomenological in its approach. This encouraged a shift away from the language of absurdity to one of ambiguity and contingency. Coupled with phenomenological attention to the lifeworld as a synonym for concrete existence and reinforced by their interest in Marxism, this shift helped the existentialists to understand individual freedom in a context of social constraints and thus to undertake more politically engaged criticism.

The main phenomenological influences on existentialism were Heidegger and Edmund Husserl, whom Sartre had studied in Berlin during 1933 and 1934. Heidegger had already combined the two approaches in maintaining that existents are thrown into a world that has practical familiarity for them on a precognitive level as beings-in-the-world. Husserl had defined the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) as the preobjective, prereflective realm of existence that underlies and precedes philosophical or scientific objectification and which the latter simply takes for granted. His ambition was to describe this primordial realm of lived experience as it appears to consciousness. The philosophical challenge is not to objectify or survey the lifeworld but to plunge into it, analyzing its patterns and meanings as they appear, from within.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980)

Sartre's major work of existentialist philosophy is *Being and Nothingness* (1943). The book is structured by an opposition between being-in-itself (*en-soi*) and being-for-itself (*pour-soi*). The monstrous existence described in *Nausea* now becomes being-in-itself: an irreducible plenitude that is simply what it is. There is not, Sartre insists, the slightest emptiness in its being; not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might enter. It remains inert and self-identical, undifferentiated and indifferent, opaque and solid. Sartre's main interest lies, however, with being-for-itself, and its equation with consciousness and human existence gives his existentialism its distinctively humanist form. Consciousness is an awareness whose self-presence always slips away from it: Its mode of being is not to be what it is and to be what it is not. It lacks both the self-identity of objects and the self-centeredness of the Cartesian "I think, therefore, I am." It is free because nothing determines it. Nothing ties the self to an identity or mode of being. Because it can question, doubt, and negate, it can transcend any particular condition. An individual will, nonetheless, develop a particular style of existing that is manifest in his or her acts and choices. Through existentialist psychoanalysis, people can discover the basic mode of being-in-the-world that orientates their decisions and lends expressive integrity to their character. A life of freedom is one committed to a ferment of self-transcendence whereby the self is constantly recreated through future-oriented projects. *Being and Nothingness* nevertheless reaches the dismal conclusion that human beings are a useless passion, absurd and tragic. Unable simply to be like an object or to renounce their consciousness, the freedom to which consciousness condemns them often reads more like a recipe for intense anxiety than a source of liberation.

The human species is similarly defined by Sartre as being that creates itself historically. His humanism is a corollary of existentialism's atheism. As he would argue in *Existentialism is a Humanism* (1945), if there is no God, then there can be no god's-eye view from which the truth or destiny of humanity is proclaimed. This is the sense of Sartre's rather opaque claim that for the existentialist, existence precedes essence. The human species has no essential characteristics that define it or that underlie its appearances. Through its historical existence, it makes itself what it is. It cannot be, only become.

An attraction of Sartre's work is the way he illustrates these abstract ideas with arresting examples drawn from ordinary life, which in turn illustrate how even the most banal experience can become a site for philosophical reflection. The café waiter, for example, can only play at being a waiter inasmuch as he cannot *be* that identity, which would mean existing in the mode of the in-itself. Insofar as he acts under the illusion that his being *is* that of a waiter, he denies his freedom and is in bad faith. He can, however, interpret his situation in such a way that he chooses to play this role without becoming it, thereby retaining his freedom and his employment. This example has a further aspect that is important in light of critics' common complaint that Sartrean freedom is too voluntaristic and his subjects too disencumbered by their material context. The facticity of the waiter's situation precludes his simply choosing to be a diplomat or to not-be a worker. His freedom resides in giving a meaning to his situation and choosing a response within its constraints. Unlike a determined condition, *the situation* is a relatively open context in which one could always do otherwise. It is a signature concept of existentialist writing.

As subject, I am the one for whom there is a world; yet when I observe the other, I realize both that my world is hemorrhaging away to another center and that the other is looking at me. I spy through a keyhole, immersed unreflectively in the practical task, when suddenly I hear footsteps and realize I am observed. I see myself as the other sees me. I experience shame at falling under the other's gaze, reified as a jealous voyeur. While my situation offers me a range of possibilities, the other's look objectifies me. I am thereby enslaved, a condition that for Sartre is the permanent structure of my being-for-others, who even when they regard me with love, seduce or capture my freedom. If ontologically I am with others, their presence also marks an unassailable experience of alienation, inasmuch as myself-for-others never coincides with my being-for-myself (an experience later captured by Jacques Lacan's mirror stage). Sartre's existentialist analysis of "the look" would influence feminist studies that equate it with the male gaze, as well as postcolonial studies such as Edward Said's *Orientalism*. A good deal depends, in the concept's politicization, on whether the look is reciprocated in an unresolved struggle for recognition or its structures are instantiated in broader relations of power, whereby some categories of person are permanently reified as other.

The analysis of being-for-others did not seem propitious for a socialist politics predicated on collective action and solidarity. Yet, it does challenge liberal views that the self is most (negatively) free when it is left alone. For existentialists, freedom occurs only within a contingent milieu wherein we co-exist. While Sartre's account was also at odds with determinist forms of Marxism, members of the existentialist movement insisted on its compatibility with a humanist Marxism that pays attention to the consciousness of the revolutionary subject and the contingency of history. Existentialism was able to dramatize the mediations between theory and practice (*praxis*) whereby some individuals become committed to action. But was this enough? Although Sartre maintained that humanity's salvation depends on the liberation of the working class, it was difficult to see how the dualism of *Being and Nothingness* and the emphasis on daily experience could either yield a critical analysis of the broader socioeconomic structures that suppress its freedom or describe a genuinely intersubjective field structured historically by class relations. Sartre would rework his philosophy considerably in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960), now referring to the sedimentation of human relationships as the "practico-inert" and trying to establish a historical anthropology predicated on rethinking the dialectic.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961)

Merleau-Ponty was determined that existence should be described in all its concrete, inexhaustible detail as it emerges. He recognizes a debt to Hegel's phenomenology but interprets this through an existentialist lens, insisting on the hazardous emergence of corporeal and historical meaning. In earlier writings, such as *Humanism and Terror* (1947) and the essays in *Sense and Non-Sense* (1964), he attributes a similar appreciation of contingency to Marx. Rather than Sartre's meaningless being-in-itself confronted by a subject, Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on corporeality and the primacy of perception allows him to describe embodied consciousness interacting with a world

saturated with corporeal significance. Corporeal existence entails pre-personal and intercorporeal relationships that support reciprocity and enrichment as well as violence and objectification. Rather than seeing the world as absurd or alien, he describes an affinity and continuity between different dimensions of existence that are only relatively more or less conscious or free to reassemble themselves. He describes the phenomenal body as a reversible dyad whose capacity to touch and be touched by the world introduces reflexivity into the very heart of being. By locating negativity in the flesh of the world, Merleau-Ponty avoids Sartre's dualist ontology of *en-soi* and *pour-soi*. This allows him to describe an existential field, or interworld, as temporal flesh wherein meaning and matter are entwined and the contingent emergence of consciousness is understood from a nonanthropocentric, posthumanist perspective.

This field is alive with signs and portents that orient bodily acts and ensure that objects are not just dead matter but phenomena that matter to us because we coexist with them. In this sense, animals, too, inhabit an existential field, albeit a relatively impoverished one. While symbolic meaning will enhance capacities for expression and enable more complex structuring, Merleau-Ponty insists that corporeal significance is never outrun, with the consequence that reason remains a provisional, creative undertaking. Consciousness is thus put back into a world whose density is set alight by the generative complexity of its relationships. It is this vivid pell-mell of emergent, practical existence that he describes. Within this dense field of intersecting relationships, where sediments from the past and anticipations of the future grant the present its complexity while constraining but also engendering freedom, politics is made. This is the milieu, immune to control but not to interpretation, into which the engaged philosopher or political actor must plunge. From this perspective, Merleau-Ponty offered his analyses of the cold war, rejecting both liberal-capitalism and bureaucratic communism. He demonstrated how existentialist criticism interrogates the style of being-in-the-world a regime actually entails, rather than judging solely on the basis of its ideological self-presentation.

Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir both considered the ethics of using political violence; their conclusions help illustrate existentialist ethics more generally. Neither simply rejects violence as categorically immoral because both recognize that good intentions can yield appalling consequences, while violence is ineliminable from the collective life of embodied actors. They accordingly dismiss a Kantian moralism of good intentions and clean hands. The tragedy of politics is that violence is sometimes necessary—for example, to resist fascism or enact a revolution against oppression—yet, its consequences remain unpredictable. In *Humanism and Terror* (1947) and the *Ethics of Ambiguity* (1948), the two existentialists respectively show how starting from an existentialist appreciation of contingency, there can be no ultimate justification for or against violence, while there is a significant danger posed by those who claim otherwise. Only in retrospect will it become clear whether an act opened or closed the existential field, or made life livable for a greater number. Yet, ethical behavior obliges us to take responsibility for trying. Any table of moral imperatives would act like a kind of bad faith in foreclosing the freedom to decide. The task of an existentialist ethics, therefore, is not to offer guidance but to describe the ambiguity of the political, where despite the contingencies of collective life, life and death choices have to be made.

Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986)

De Beauvoir's work, with its attention to the body as both a lived situation and the medium through which we are situated in the world, is in many ways closer to Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology than to Sartre's. This is her approach in *The Second Sex,* the book that established her as a founder of modern feminism. While the volume as a whole investigates the phenomenology of gendered existence in exquisite detail, the introduction draws on a combination of Sartrean existentialism and Hegelian phenomenology to explain woman's construction as other. Sartre's account of the free subject who continuously transcends himself toward new projects is now gendered: Man, de Beauvoir argues, has consistently been identified as subject and encouraged, materially and culturally, to assume his freedom as autonomous being. Woman, inversely, has enduringly been defined as man's other: Her identity is to be what he is not.

De Beauvoir argues that otherness is a fundamental category of human thought, an idea she elicits from Hegel's account of the hostility between consciousnesses that results in a fight to the death. It is not—as in the Hegelian account—the slave that triumphs, however, nor is there reciprocity: Woman is always the slave. De Beauvoir notes that this self/other struggle is incipient in all group relations, with outsiders perennially denigrated as different and inferior. She recognizes this as the basis of racism, anti-Semitism, colonialism, xenophobia, and class, but its most resilient form is misogyny.

De Beauvoir suggests that the reason for this enduring opposition and for women's failure to contest it lies in its sheer longevity, but this is in turn grounded in women's role as reproducers of the species and thus in their identification with the body. Their heteronymous, inferior status looks natural. It is important to understand in this context that de Beauvoir is both recognizing female embodiment as central to women's oppression and arguing that the way it is lived and its significance remain contingent. She does not argue that the body is natural but gender contingent; rather, she presents the more subtle phenomenological argument that the way the body is experienced as gendered, and the ways in which gender is replicated through corporeal performances, remain contingent. One is not born a woman but becomes one. She describes what it means to exist as a feminine being-in-the-world, illustrated by accounts of how women undergo an apprenticeship into becoming women at each stage of their lifecycle.

The first part of *The Second Sex* explains how biology, psychoanalysis, and historical materialism present sexual identity as a natural destiny and repeats existentialist hostility to all forms of determinism. De Beauvoir does not, however, suggest that the way one lives one's sex is after all voluntary. The female body really does suffer pains and seductions bequeathed by the species, while patriarchy is sedimented in social and quotidian structures that make its avoidance extremely difficult. She describes women's complicity as a mode of bad faith: They retreat into the immanence of the inert thing in-itself by inhabiting a received identity and its roles. Yet, she appreciates that for the powerless second sex, assuming a conventional role as wife, mother, sexual plaything, or domestic laborer is a comforting, if inauthentic mode of existence that grants security, vicarious social status, and material comfort.

Assuming the status of free subject is no easy undertaking, and it is unlikely that sheer resoluteness of the will is sufficient. Collective action is necessary to pursue the material supports needed for living a life of freedom. De Beauvoir accordingly emphasizes the benefits of reproductive technologies like contraception and safe abortion, on the one hand, and a socialist welfare state to relieve women of domestic drudgery, on the other. Even then, choosing employment over motherhood or independence over marriage is not enough, although de Beauvoir advocates both. Women's situation at work is not identical to a man's: Women must negotiate their identification as objects of desire without becoming simply pale simulacra of their male colleagues. Women must become otherwise, living the body and femininity differently, writing new scripts, and developing new repertoires for themselves. In exploring the micro- as well as the macrolevel changes for which the oppressed must struggle, de Beauvoir shows the importance of existential phenomenology as a supplement to more abstract analyses of structural oppression and of politics more generally.

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See also Humanism; Kierkegaard, Søren; Liberty; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Subject

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EXPLANATION

Three key issues drive discussion of explanation in the social sciences: First, must explanation be of a certain form to be regarded as scientific? Second, how does explanation contrast with the notion of understanding? Third, how can explanations be evaluated? The answers interrelate in important ways.

The notion of explanation has at its root philosophical usage a connection to the provision of causes, and in particular of causal mechanisms. This leads by the usual logic of causal or mechanistic explanation to a demand for laws and predictions. For, the thought goes, a law is just a regularity in nature. Hence, any event that can be explained (the *explanandum*) by adverting to the relevant law that identifies its cause should also be predictable, given knowledge of the presence of the antecedent conditions (the *explanatia*). This is the essence of the deductive-nomological (D-N) model of explanation. A great virtue of this model (long associated with logical positivism but surviving its demise) involves the fact that it provides a purely formal or syntactic criterion by which to adjudge whether an explanation exists. The D-N model also provides a straightforward criterion for evaluating the soundness and not just the formal adequacy of an explanation.

However, at this point, matters become contentious, for well-known counterexamples to this model exist. The counterexamples demonstrate that law-like connections may well have no causal connection to the phenomenon to which they may be correlated. For example, a falling barometer may correlate highly with the coming of rain, but the barometer's falling has no causal connection to the rain. Merely fulfilling the D-N model, thus, cannot be sufficient for explanation. Likewise, reasons may count as causes, but reasons do not provide mechanism and typically rationalize actions rather than explain them in the sense of making the actions a logical consequence of some antecedently specified conditions.

A key element involved in criticisms of logical positivism in the social sciences concerns the place of the D-N model and its heirs as defining proper scientific explanation. While some criticisms can be understood as philosophically valid, they can also reflect an animus toward the presumed absence of any normative concerns underlying this model. There may also be doubts regarding the existence in the social sciences of the sorts of laws or robust generalizations on which application of the model relies. The question that lingers, however, is how to evaluate purported explanations, absent some such models.

Explanation Versus Interpretation

In the philosophy of the social sciences, the term *explanation* is typically used as a contrast to that of *interpretation*. The contrast involves many differences. The most fundamental concerns whether or not the goal or purpose of social inquiry should be to reconstruct actions (i.e., purposive behavior) in terms of an agent's (individual actor's) perspective. An alternative view maintains that the purpose of social inquiry should be to develop explanations, that is, accounts that have robust predictive value. Explanation, from this point of view, is unconstrained by any need to reflect or reconstruct the view of agents with respect to the events to be explained. So, for example, economic explanations of choice of marital partner or ecological explanations of cultural traditions employ underlying regularities to account for observed behaviors but diverge from any account that might be offered of those whose behavior is so explained.

The aims of interpretation and explanation appear *prima facie* incompatible. An interpretative account focuses on reasons specific to an agent, a time, and a situation. The expected result

would be an account that did not generalize but applied only to the people and the time studied. These historicist or ethnographic approaches to the study of human behavior must be distinguished from case studies because the latter but not the former are taken to provide a basis for generalizations.

While we owe the term *positivism* to Auguste Comte, logical positivism names the philosophical movement (also referred to as the Vienna Circle) that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s through the writings of associated philosophers, scientists, and social scientists. Following the dispersion of these thinkers to England and the United States due to the rise of fascism throughout central Europe, logical positivism became the dominant account of what defined scientific explanation. Within the social sciences, the term positivism enjoys wide use as an epithet attached to all views that insist that the purpose of social science explanation requires being able to apply generalizations to account for observed cases. Ideally, generalizations used to explain would also allow social scientists to make predictions. In the terminology of logical positivism, a statement of that which is to be explained is termed the *explanandum* (pl. *explananda*); *explanans* is the class of statements (pl. *explanantia*) that account for the explanandum.

Because a primary goal of logical positivists was to help distinguish scientific from pseudo-scientific explanations, two key criteria were developed that were thought to capture the relevant differences. The first offered a syntactic formulation for an explanation. This requirement held that good explanations had a specific form, and this form allowed for the logical derivation of the explanandum from the explanans. This format also required the use of an appropriate law-like or statistical generalization.

The second requirement concerns the need for empirical testability. Logical positivists themselves differed with regard to the so-called logic of confirmation for explanations. The basic split concerned whether testing of hypotheses should stress confirmation or disconfirmation. The essence of the controversy involved the fact that no law can ever be fully confirmed by observed positive cases; the law makes claims about cases seen and unseen, as well as past, present, and future. Thus, no finite amount of observed evidence, however great, suffices to prove that a statement about some observed regularity expresses a law.

However, observational data can *disprove* a supposed law of nature by providing just one counterinstance. Thus, some hold that the purpose of testing should be to seek disconfirming instances of laws. Laws that survive repeated attempts to disconfirm them may then have claim to some degree of verisimilitude. But whatever one's view of the evaluation of proffered explanations by empirical test, the orthodoxy holds that proper explanation requires laws and empirical information that allows for a logical connection between the explanans and the explanandum. Only by virtue of the logical connection can one determine whether the observed instances follow from the statements said to explain them, and only by virtue of the logical connection can one assess whether the generalization appealed to in the explanation has been confirmed or survived disconfirmation, and so has a real use for purposes of explanation. All models of scientific explanation, in short, take explanation to consist in a relation between some theory and instances that the theory is a theory of.

Absent any logical connection between explanans and explanandum, however, no rational assessment of an offered explanation appears possible. This insistence on the syntactic formulation of explanation, one that provides a logical connection between explanans and explanandum, remains an important yet largely unappreciated feature of positivist accounts of explanations. This syntactic standard allowed a clear formal criterion by which to identify a candidate explanation.

A recurrent criticism of positivist models of explanation concerns the principled absence of any need to incorporate the perspective of those whose actions are to be explained. In addition, the syntactic structure of positivist explanation is viewed as also precluding any normative evaluations of the actions. Scientific explanations are typically held to be purely descriptive. Absent an overt inclusion of a normative premise, no normative conclusion can be derived.

For example, in explaining why people might be co-opted to be mass murders in the case of the Holocaust, the use of generalizations that a large majority of people simply tend to obey authority might be employed, together with other

information. However, this might lead to complaints that perpetrators are in fact thoughtless, that is, not portrayed as making a choice about how to act. To the extent that perpetrators did not make choices, then they might appear to be less morally culpable for their acts. Culpability typically involves holding people responsible for the choices they make.

Alternatively, explanations in the positivist mode may be thought to offend against the specifics of the situation. Did the Hawaiians murder Captain Cook because he violated expectations attached to the god Lono, whom Cook was thought to be? Or did they do so because the Hawaiians, as rational agents, perceived Cook for what he was—an agent of an alien political power—and acted to protect themselves from this threat? The difference between explanations here is just the difference between an emphasis on the culturally specific and a universalizing rational agent approach to explanation. The former explains by reconstructing the agents' reasons for doing what they did but yields no generalization. The latter explains by seeing this action as typifying what any rational agent (taken as a generic notion) would do in such a case. The same explanandum event is in this instance explained by incompatible explanantia.

Explanation After Logical Positivism

The demise of positivism and so of the hegemony of positivist accounts of explanation have had mixed impact on debates in the social sciences regarding explanation. In a philosophical context, positivism fails for two fundamental reasons. The first concerns the holistic relationship between the sentences that make up a theory and statements about the evidence taken to support them.

Logical positivism assumes that sentences *taken individually* can be assessed for their truth or falsity. This is critical to the logic of empirical testing, and so of the evaluation of statements deduced from those said to explain or predict it. The inability to assess statements apart from the theoretical context that explains them has, as a consequence, an ambiguity with regard to what statements need revision when an explanatory theory runs afoul of experience. If no single sentence has a logically tight connection to specific statements in the theory, on the one hand, and the recalcitrant experience(s) on the other, then any failure of experience to apparently agree with what theory implies can be accommodated in an *ad hoc* fashion by the explanatory framework.

Moreover, it is important to note that even the staunchest advocates of the positivist models of testing came to holist conclusions about the theory-evidence relationship. Only within the context of a prior theory do statements serve as evidence for or against the explanatory efficacy of the theory in question. Moreover, theories could be adjusted to accommodate apparently discrepant experiences, that is, those that at first might seem incongruous with the way a theory says things should be. This close relationship between how theories characterize the world and the evidence in it came to be known as holism. The chief consequence of this view is the way it clouds questions of when an explanatory hypothesis can be saved by altering other aspects of the theory connected to it, or when the explanation has been refuted by evidence. Historical studies of science offer up numerous cases of how theories variously adapt to or otherwise incorporate apparently disconfirming results.

A second feature of the so-called postpositivist era involves the failure of logical positivism to succeed in providing any way of characterizing the unity of science. The separate sciences, for example, biology and physics, did not, it turns out, neatly fit as a group into positivist-designed models for what the form of explanation had to be for a discipline to be a genuine science. The individual cases of scientific investigation within one or another science could be studied, but no general model of explanation could be tailored to fit all accepted scientific practices, even within those sciences unproblematically regarded as such.

From these specific shortcomings—that is, the failure of logical positivism to provide a demarcation criterion by which to distinguish science and nonscience and to find a syntactic model of explanation adequate to all scientific activity, which could be evaluated for explanatory adequacy by its form alone—arise the postmodern moment with regard to views about explanation. It comes, that is, when philosophy of science appears to lose its grip on what to count as a scientific explanation properly so-called and on the logically and empirically determinate criteria for assessing the goodness of explanations.

Into this philosophical vacuum rushed postpositivist theorists. These theorists were happy to declare the demise of any "master-narrative." Yet, the problems that positivism meant to solve did not disappear or go away. By what mark does one identify an explanation as an explanation? The positivists had a neat, straightforward, and seemingly rationally defensible account of what this mark should be: deducibility. Postpositivist accounts within philosophy have looked to less straightforward but still roughly quantifiable criteria, for example, the ability to unify fields that were previously thought to be unconnected. Informally, such criteria hold that good explanations contribute to understanding, and understanding consists primarily in unifying fields of scientific inquiry.

A shared but unfortunate feature of much that postpositivists offer as explanations concerns the fact that no visible effort goes into examining what might possibly play the role of confirming or disconfirming any of the explanations offered. This appears to be the case whether explanations of social phenomena are advanced in the name of one or another science—for example, evolutionary psychology, decision theoretic models, sociobiology—or are tied to more explicitly political or normative explanatory accounts, as in cultural studies or traditional Marxist theory. Absence of predictions, or failure of prediction, appears to leave these accounts untroubled. Much more so than the natural sciences, the social sciences suffer from the underdetermination of explanation, that is, the fact that competing explanatory frameworks appear capable of accounting for the known data. This fact underlines the desirability of once again having clear criteria for explanations and ways of testing the proposed account. Yet, what constitutes the mark of explanation remains unknown.

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See also Historical Understanding; Interpretive Theory; Positivism; Postmodernism

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EXPLOITATION

Exploitation refers to using a resource, situation, or person for a purpose. In a technical, neutral sense, this might mean no more than making use of a resource for benefit, for example, when the existence of underground sources of energy is exploited by drilling and extraction. In social theory, however, the term implies a normatively negative evaluation of the use being made, although identifying the norm being violated is not straightforward. For example, some have argued that such exploitation is a violation of justice, but this may be identified with a rights violation, a lack of reciprocity, or a failure of equality. Others, again, have concentrated on an infringement of liberty, perhaps construed as the consequence of coercion, or the lack of opportunity for self-development, or autonomy.

The relationship between the neutral and the condemnatory applications of exploitation is complicated by two considerations. First, in the history of social thought, the exploitation of nature was contrasted with the exploitation of people by other people, where this latter referred to the situation in which the direct producer was placed. Exploitation in the wage labor market, in particular, had historical priority in developing the normative usage. But the best-known account of exploitation under capitalism was provided by Karl Marx. His official account of exploitation concerns the fate of

surplus value, and it is highly controversial whether he thought—or was entitled by his own theories of the relativity of values to modes of production to claim—that this was unjust. If Marx was debarred from claiming that capitalism was unjust, his account of exploitation has to be read as a technical, non-normative explanation of the surplus value received by the capitalist.

Second, when the idea of exploitation is applied to natural resources, there may be a normative component—suggesting, for example, that the use is excessive and damaging to the interests of the environment or future generations. We, therefore, have to decide on the relationship in our analysis between exploitation as a term of negative normative evaluation in social relations generally and its application to the circumstances of the direct producer. We might hope for a general account, of which a more specific version could be applied to the position of the worker.

This entry first explores the concept of interpersonal exploitation, briefly discussing Immanuel Kant's concept of treating people as means and Alan Wertheimer's analysis of taking unfair advantage. To explain the notion of taking unfair advantage, the theorist has to elaborate the baseline (or baselines) invoked to justify the charge of unfairness. In the more specific application to the position of the worker, it refers to "the power-based extraction of benefits resulting from control over valued assets." If the case of the worker is to be a more specific version of the general conception, the theorist has then to elaborate on the normative content of the complaint and the relationship between the power, the control, and the benefits. In both cases—the general application and the specific application—the specification of the baseline and the range of counterfactual alternative possibilities will be the site of moral and political disagreement.

The Definition of Interpersonal Exploitation

When exploitation is a category in social theory, perhaps the most general current understanding—and also the most difficult to apply to particular instances—has a Kantian provenance. In this way, the analogy with the exploitation of natural resources is straightforward—in both cases, the core idea is "making use for a purpose." But in the interpersonal case, this making use is regarded as reprehensible because some ways of making use of someone for one's own ends are not acceptable. Exploitation is seen as a way of treating people in which they are not recognized as having their own ends and are used *merely* as instruments of the exploiter. Some instances of interactions seem amenable to this sort of treatment. When it is said that prostitution or pornography exploits one (or more?) of the parties engaged in them, some of the features of narrower accounts of exploitation do not appear to be present. The high-class prostitute, who sells his or her services for substantial sums of money and is not controlled by a pimp, is apparently content in the work, and has the opportunity to engage in other work; the client who is willing to pay and has no special weaknesses—these people interact in ways that would not fall within some narrower accounts of an exploitative relation. The claim about pornography may also, at bottom, be a claim about the portrayal of people as sex objects, as *mere* means to another's gratification. Of course, trafficking and the sex industry are commonly exploitative. Nevertheless, making sense of *some* claims about exploitation seems to require this Kantian account. A moment's reflection, of course, tells us that we must inevitably "make use" of one another in social life, and the problem is to distinguish which occasions are benign and which are to be condemned. It is not clear that the notion of failure to recognize the full personhood of others will help with this discrimination.

Taking Unfair Advantage

A common response has been to refine making use by adding a reference to fairness, and exploitation is widely construed as taking unfair advantage. I took advantage of the services of the bus driver who drove me to work this morning, but I set neither the fare nor his rate of pay, and if there is any unfairness in his position, it does not seem appropriate to associate me with it in any direct way. We therefore need a standard by which to determine when advantage is *unfairly* taken.

In his book *Exploitation,* Wertheimer distinguishes between the general case of exploitation as taking unfair advantage and two particular cases. One of those is harmful exploitation, in

which the exploited person is harmed in relation to some appropriate baseline. The other is mutually advantageous exploitation. Here the exploiter and exploited are involved in an exchange that benefits the exploited person, but the exploiter gains excessively or unfairly by reference to that baseline.

Mutually Advantageous Exploitation

Two points may be made here. First, this analysis is intended to apply to many interactions, including those involving labor. For example, suppose B is in urgent need of funds to secure a very lucrative outcome. A lends B money but requires to be repaid twice what was lent, even though A has to wait only a short time for repayment. This looks like a case of mutually advantageous exploitation. But again, that description might be applied—and, indeed, was, but not of course in those words—to some early understandings of the capitalist/wage-labor contract.

Exploitation Relative to a Baseline

The second point is the reference to baselines. Wertheimer talks about defining harm or benefit according to "some appropriate baseline." Clearly, the analysis does need some standard by which we can determine whether A has harmed B or benefited B, even while taking unfair advantage. Before that, however, we need another standard by which to judge whether an advantage is fairly or unfairly taken. On this view, obviously, A cannot claim to be taking *fair* advantage simply because A confers *some* benefit on B because the characterization refers to unfair or excessive gains. Suppose I have a generous friend who insists on buying two rounds of drinks to my one every time we meet. Am I gaining unfairly? I benefit, but am I fairly allowing him to express his generosity or unfairly taking excessive advantage of it?

Theorizing Exploitation: The Problem of Baselines

This problem of baselines is endemic to discussions of exploitation (and coercion). The notion that exploitation may be defined as taking unfair advantage is not uncommon in the literature, even when not elaborated in the extensive way that Wertheimer does, but fair advantage remains elusive. To take another example of a modern theory of general application, Robert Goodin treats exploitation as "taking unfair advantage of the vulnerable," leaving us in need not only of a standard of fair advantage but also a measure of vulnerability. Goodin is especially interested in characterizing those cases in which a person "plays for advantage when it is inappropriate to do so." This is not to say that Goodin does not try to provide these standards; he has a book on the moral duty to protect the vulnerable and another in which he defends the thesis that the purpose of the welfare state is to protect people against vulnerability. But it is to say that these issues of the baseline or standard are likely to be the focus of controversy about whether any particular interaction or social structure is exploitative, not least in relationships between workers and others. Are poverty, ignorance, and low earning power characteristics of which it would always be unfair to take advantage? Or, more particularly, is it always unfair to take advantage of the fact that someone has no access to the means of production? If the answer in both cases is that it depends on *how much* advantage is taken, we are just redescribing the problem in terms of another version of the baseline.

A contemporary application of this problem arises from the international mobility of capital. If capital is relocated from a prosperous country to a less prosperous one to take advantage of significantly lower wage rates, the advantage may appear excessive relative to a relevant baseline of expectation in the more prosperous country. There will then be argument about the relationship between a moral baseline and the market.

Preconditions for Exploitation Versus Exploitation Itself

Before we go on to look at some theories of exploitation that emerged under nascent capitalism, we should acknowledge that the discussion of exploitation thus far has been concerned with fairness. Exploitation has been characterized as forced unpaid labor, which seems to be a conjunction of coercion (which is liberty reducing) and lack of payment (which is putatively a violation of justice). When Marx talked about *external forced*

labor he used the expression to cover slavery, serfdom, and wage labor, and the focus is again on coercion (which is liberty reducing). If we talk of unfair advantage, the focus is quite clearly on justice; and hence, exploitation may itself not be an infringement of liberty. Of course, exploitation may well be taking unfair advantage of a *precedent* unfreedom, but that does not entail that it adds any *further* unfreedom.

This is the second general problem about theorizing exploitation (the first being the baseline problem). The problem is: How do we distinguish what makes the exploitation possible and what is the exploitation itself? This problem might be illustrated by glancing at some of the theories of exploitation that were developed in the nineteenth century. At the most general level, it seems that analyses of division of labor and of exploitation were stimulated by the coming together of an attempt to understand the new commercial society by contrast to what had gone before and the emergence of the new political economy.

There was general agreement that the new society (whether it be called commercial, as by Adam Smith, industrial as by Henri de Saint-Simon, scientific as by Auguste Comte, or capitalist as by Marx) had as its central characteristic increased productivity occasioned by the new division of labor. At the same time, modern political economy presented and developed the idea of the market as its central intellectual pursuit. Wealth was thought of as that which had exchange value; and some political economists identified political economy as the science of exchanges, or catallactics. But the nature and extent of division of labor was crucial to determining the extent of exchange relations. So who or what controlled the division of labor, and who benefited from it? Was modern division of labor radically different from previous forms or merely an intensification of them? Equally, historical periodizations drew attention to changes in power relations and thus to the question of what had changed about the position of the direct producer. Smith, for example, saw commercial society as *increasing* the independence of the worker, compared to previous formations in which the worker had been dependent on particular other individuals. While Smith acknowledged that wage labor involved giving up freedom for its duration, he also insisted that any restriction on the laborer's right to exercise it (such as restrictions on his movements) violated his natural rights.

Radical arguments, of course, tried to diagnose (what came to be called) exploitation and to offer prescriptions for a society that would overcome it. Charles Hall, writing at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the so-called Ricardian Socialists later, the Saint-Simonians (the first as far as we know to talk about interpersonal exploitation by that name), and Marx are well-known examples. They struggled to provide a diagnosis that was partly related to a concern with poverty and partly an attempt to unravel the mysteries of the wage relationship. Some started from the worker's right to the full product of his labor, some from a concern with the disposition of the value the worker created, and so on. There were many differences in diagnosis and prescription, which illustrate the difficulty mentioned earlier—distinguishing what makes exploitation possible from what is the exploitation. But they all had something to say about the coercive state—in relation to taxation and in relation to its guarantee of property rights. They all examined the nature and distribution of property rights. They were all sensitive to historical change, either because of a periodization of history or because of seeking to explain the detachment of the worker from the means of production. Through differences in emphasis, they came to different conclusions about hopes for a nonexploitative society. Did it require the abolition of wage labor altogether, or a change in the background conditions (for example, a redistribution of productive assets)? But for all these writers, exploitation could be characterized as "the power-based extraction of benefits resulting from control over valued assets," a more specific version of "taking unfair advantage" which mentions power and control and therefore a concern with the freedom of those subject to it. Coercion variously appears in the arguments as state interference with the worker, with its guarantee of property rights, and in the analysis of the wage relation itself. Control over valued assets may well confer coercive power, but also important was the imposition of labor discipline. This discipline was covert in Smith's analysis and overt in Marx's, part of the explanation of the increased productivity associated with division of labor. Both

recognized that the worker subject to that discipline was to that extent unfree.

Andrew Reeve

See also Capitalism; Justice, Theories of; Kant, Immanuel; Smith, Adam; Marx, Karl

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Fabianism

The Fabian Society was founded in London in 1884. Since then *Fabianism* has been prominent in British socialist theory. The Fabian name derives from Quintus Fabius Maximus—the Roman general famous for his delaying tactics in the fight against Hannibal. The early Fabians rejected the revolutionary doctrines of Marxism, recommending instead a gradual transition to a socialist society. The most influential early Fabian theorists included Sidney Webb, George Bernard Shaw, and Graham Wallas. In the twentieth century, prominent Fabian thinkers included the academics Harold Laski and G. D. H. Cole (both of whom were sometimes far more radical than mainstream Fabians), as well as Labour Party politicians and activists such as Beatrice Webb, R. H. S. Crossman, Roy Jenkins, Ian Mikardo, Denis Healey, and Margaret Cole. The Fabian Society survives today as a think tank for moderate British socialists.

When Fabianism emerged in the United Kingdom during the 1880s, collectivism was widely considered necessary for human flourishing. Although some traditional liberals clung to laissez faire politics and economics, theorists of new liberalism, such as T. H. Green in the 1880s, believed that substantial state intervention would be necessary if ordinary individuals were to prosper. In the early years of the twentieth century, the dominant liberal position involved the acceptance and advancement of the extension of public control in industry. This dominant position also involved collective responsibility for children's education and nutrition, housing, employment, along with support for care of the sick and aged. Fabians, who sought to propagate their ideas by means of permeation, targeted collectivist liberal politicians and radical social activists.

Two pioneers of Fabian theory—Shaw and Sidney Webb—were each advocates of this strategy of permeation. Nevertheless, they differed in their views of the most appropriate target. In his essay "Historic" in the *Fabian Essays in Socialism* of 1889, Webb insisted that unconscious socialism had already proceeded through public control of services, largely by the municipalities. He thus believed that the Fabians should strive to influence the mainstream Liberal Party. Although in his preface to the 1919 edition of the *Fabian Essays* Webb said that the Fabians had always intended to create a new party, it was in fact Shaw who pressed for this when Webb saw no need. Shaw hoped to gradually replace rather than merely reform capitalism. He considered that Fabianism would be far more fruitful if it sought to inspire and permeate the existing Radical Party, which, he hoped, would eventually merge with socialist activists in Great Britain to found a new party of the left.

Although permeation remained a key concern among Fabians, some of the other ideas that characterized Fabian socialism in its formative years became less prominent as the twentieth century progressed. This was the case regarding their adoption of David Ricardo's theory of rent, which Shaw had discussed in his essay "Economic" in the *Fabian Essays*. Sidney Webb's idea that pragmatism should outweigh firm commitments was also abandoned as

Fabians influenced by Shaw pressed for more coherent socialist or social-democratic thinking with the aim of influencing public policy.

Shaw had always been more concerned than his fellow Fabians to develop a socialist theory, rather than rely on pragmatism. Sidney Webb, nevertheless, came to accept that the failure to sufficiently emphasize equality was a weakness. In his 1919 introduction to the *Fabian Essays,* he conceded that it was Shaw who insisted that equality must be a key and prominent concern. This should involve not just equality before the law, in eligibility for office and in voting power, but also equality of material circumstances. Notwithstanding this development in Fabian theorizing, the society's publishing activities waned in the late 1920s. Moreover, in the 1930s, the Webbs became supporters of Soviet communism and Shaw momentarily expressed admiration for Benito Mussolini.

Nevertheless, Fabianism was revived with the New Fabian Research Bureau (NFRB), formed by Cole independently of the society in 1931. The NFRB included a number of social-democratic intellectuals, such as Leonard Woolf, William Robson, Hugh Dalton, and Evan Durbin. Laski was briefly involved in the early 1930s. The bureau amalgamated with the Fabian Society in 1939.

Laski and Cole had, by this time, begun to juggle social-democratic and Marxist ideas. Nevertheless, in 1952, in his article "Towards a Philosophy of Socialism" in the *New Fabian Essays,* Crossman disapproved of Laski's efforts to merge Marxism and Fabianism. The Labour Party needed a sense of direction, but not one influenced by Marxism, which forced policy into conformity with an imported, rigid doctrine. Theory needed to challenge the status quo and expose the inadequacy of tradition as a guide to policy. He singled out Durbin for praise for having realized in the 1930s that this was so. For Crossman, theory must be based on the principles of the British Labour Party and inspired by the belief that only human will and social conscience can liberate human beings.

As Bernard Crick's political theory since the 1960s illustrates, influencing public policy has remained a Fabian priority in the contemporary era; thus permeation is still a Fabian activity. Poverty, furthermore, is still a major concern, and gradualism remains key to Fabian strategy. Nevertheless, the search for a coherent socialist theory that Fabians once thought should replace the early pragmatism has now waned. In the early twenty-first century, the society declared that it seeks to define progressive politics from the left of center.

Peter Lamb

See also Collective Responsibility; Equality; Marxism; New Liberalism; Socialism; State; Welfare State

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Face

Face is a pivotal term—together with *the Other*—in the work of Emmanuel Lévinas. Lévinas thought that there are two main tendencies in Western philosophy: autonomy and heteronomy, and that in modern times the former dominates. In Immanuel Kant's works, for example, the rational subject freely legislates and subjects itself to the moral law. Lévinas prioritized responsibility over freedom. In his view, the core of ethical experience is being's inescapable affectivity as it is confronted by the face of the other calling it into question and demanding it to respond. In his phenomenology, Lévinas argued that the empirical other affectsme more than I can see and think, and in that sense, functions otherwise than as an object of my intentionality (namely otherwise than how I understand/imagine it in the context of my habits and knowledge). Although the

other's particular characteristics can always be seen/known/imagined, classified, compared, and so on, I am confronted with a *de facto unique* face that signifies alterity in excess of the sum total difference of these characteristics. Hence, the face functions as a sign of infinity or absolute Other. This is the social expression of the formal structure whereby "in thinking infinity the I from the first thinks more than it thinks" (Lévinas, 1987, p. 54). The face has no identity. It signifies the extreme proximity to me of the other as absolute Other; it lacks essence but awes me as pure mortality, "nakedness and defenselessness" (Hand, 1989, p. 83). Before a face, I am not an actively intending self-consciousness, but a passive *me* in the accusative. Humbled by the face, my ego loses its self-coincidence " . . . as if I were devoted to the other man before being devoted to myself" (p. 84). The *face* and *me* are the two elements of the purely ethical relationship that Lévinas named proximity and face-to-face. This is an asymmetrical, nondialectical, nonreciprocal, and nonutilitarian relationship characterized by radical alterity and infinite and anarchic responsibility of one being for another-*as*-Other: "Responsibility for the other, for the naked face of the first individual that comes along" (p. 84), which goes beyond what I may or may not have committed. The other's face is also a source of my individuation because it serves as a

> ". . . summons to responsibility [that] destroys the formula of generality by which my knowledge (*savoir*) or acquaintance (*connaissance*) of the other man re-presents him to me as my fellow man. In the face of the other man I am inescapably responsible and *consequently the unique and chosen one*. . . . This is the anteriority and chosen nature of an excellence that cannot be reduced to the features distinguishing or constituting individual beings in the order of their world or people, in the role they play on history's social stage, as characters, that is, in the mirror reflection or in self-consciousness." (p. 84, emphasis added)

Lévinas thought that the face-to-face is "primary sociality" (Lévinas, 1969, pp. 304) " . . . whose whole intensity consists in not presupposing the idea of community" (Hand, 1989, pp. 83–84). This is quite distinct from "constructing a community out of an egocentric perspective or, alternatively, an ego out of a conventionalist or social point of view" (Lévinas, 1995, p. 64) and from a master–slave type dialectic. Because of this, Lévinasian ethics is at odds with any ontology of the state or any other political association because it exposes the contingency of sociality and demystifies/denaturalizes any existing bonds. Who is my neighbor? Everyone with a face! "Absolving himself from all essence, all genus, all resemblance, the neighbor, the first one on the scene, concerns me from the first time (even if he is an old friend, an old lover, long caught up in the fabric of my social relations) *in a contingency that excludes the a priori*" (Lévinas, 1981, p. 86; emphasis added). This contingency occasions a responsibility for "my neighbor, for the other man, for the stranger or the sojourner, to which nothing binds me—nothing in the order of the thing, of the something, of number or causality. It is the responsibility of a hostage which can be carried to the point of substitution for the other person and demands an infinite subjection of subjectivity" (Hand, 1989, p. 84). The face and the responsibility, into which it immediately and inescapably summons me, are at once irreducible and linguistic. Being a human, namely a linguistic being, primarily and irreducibly means *dire* (saying) *me voici* (here I am!) (also the Hebrew *hinneni* of Abraham's response to the demand of God in Genesis 22) to the other's face who forbids me to kill (I could not kill the other *as* other; I can only attempt to kill the other as a figment of my imagination) and independent of distinctions (i.e., friend or enemy); I speak *for* the other's sake. *Saying* is the most basic instance of what Lévinas called infinite and anarchic responsibility for the other *as* Other. It obeys no preexisting law other than that the other as Other always comes first, literally first, before me, singling me out and turning me into me by facing me. Meaningful language, or the symbolic order, on the other hand, with its grammar, rules, and themes, is the precariously stable outcome of this ongoing confrontation: reciprocal communication. No adherence to a linguistic code or law can ever absorb my responsibility for responding to the other because the face of the other who commands me to speak is inexhaustible and recedes from thematization. Hence, while Lévinas would agree that there is nothing outside language, he could also claim that the "[F]ace-to-face founds language" (Lévinas, 1969, p. 290).

Following Lévinas's death, more has been written on the question of the relation of face-to-face to politics. Simon Critchley has suggested that the political significance of face-to-face rests in its anarchistic character that allows one to act from a distance from the totalizing state. The demand of the face of the other is "too much" but the subject can "sublimate" it through political praxis opening up the "dissensual space of democracy" (Critchley, 2007; Diamantides, 2007, chapter 5) motivating a "politics of resistance" (Critchley, 2007, p. 89). Less fruitful are eulogistic texts that mistakenly equate the face-to-face with relations based on respect for particularity. Among the critics, Slavoj Žižek has argued that the face "necessarily refers to the human face" (Žižek, 2005, p. 145) and, therefore, excludes the terrifying "inhuman" (p. 158). Specifically, he charges that the "face" functions as a " . . . fetish" that "gentrifies the terrifying Thing that is the ultimate reality of our neighbor" (p. 146) by disavowing the truth that what horrifies us most is not death and the dead but the "monstrous life-substance which persists in the Real outside the symbolic" (p. 172). Arguably, this view rests on misunderstanding Lévinas's views on death as nothingness, which is not true. By contrast, Critchley argues that the other's face "stands in the place of the Real in Lacan" and "the demand of this Thing lodges itself at the heart of the subject" (Critchley, 2007, p. 66), resulting in a constitutionally split subject. A vegetating patient's face, for example, commands responsibility, even as nothing can justify our decision either to keep the patient alive or acknowledge the patient as already dead, precisely because it confronts us with life's monstrous excess, which is epitomized by the literary notions of "the living-dead" or the "undead machine" and by the idea of language as a symbolic undead machine (Diamantides, *The Ethics of Suffering,* chapter 1; Diamantides, "The Subject May Have Disappeared but Its Suffering Remains").

Marinos Diamantides

See also Other; Phenomenology

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Faction

A political *faction* consists of a group of individuals pursuing a specific purpose. The nature of a political faction has changed according to different historical periods. In the era of mass politics, factions had to operate in structured and aggregative contexts; whereas in the era of elite politics, factions could operate as autonomous actors in the restricted electoral arena. Historically, elite factions were the prologue of political parties. During the formative years of the United States, factions were considered a mortal threat to the deliberative spirit of the new republic (as expressed by George Washington's *Farewell Address* of 1796). The rationale of the 1787 Philadelphia Constitution was indeed to prevent the tyranny of factions. A faction was considered to be a "number of citizens . . . adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" (James Madison's "Federalist 10").

Enlarging the size of the polity (through the formation of the federal union) made contrasting a faction with another faction easier. For the American founding fathers, the old republics degenerated

because they were small. In such a context, a number of citizens could, first, constitute a majority and, then, transform that majority in a political tyranny. However, their distrust toward factions did not prevent them from inventing the first political parties of modern history. With the democratization of the country, the danger of factions was tamed through the formation of a highly pluralistic system of parties' and interests' representation and competition. The United States never experienced the tyranny of the majority, although it experienced periods in which powerful minorities were able to stop or to postpone legislation supported by a large majority of the country (as the civil rights' legislation was long obstructed by Southern senators of both parties, the so called conservative coalition). In this case, one might argue that such factions acted as tyrannical minorities.

At the time when Europe was influenced by the Jacobin tradition, factions were considered a hurdle in the formation of the popular will (as all the intermediary groups interposing between the people and the state). Nevertheless, even here, the process of modernization and democratization introduced incentives to the formation of both interest groups (articulating social and economic interests) and political parties (aggregating those interests in the electoral and parliamentary arena). Indeed, the larger the aggregative capacity of the party was, the stronger the pressure was for giving the different interests and values within it a distinctive voice. Regardless of the organizational model adopted by the various mass political parties, they came to register the formation of several factions within themselves. In the era of mass politics, when the gatekeepers of the decision-making process are political parties, a faction needs to organize within the latter for promoting values and careers. In modern political language, a faction is thus "a party in the party." Moreover, factions may also be found in legislative settings (committees and subcommittees), coalescing members belonging to different parliamentary groups or congressional caucuses when issues of an ethical or principled nature are at stake. Factions are inevitable actors of the organization of modern political parties.

Sergio Fabbrini

See also Democracy; Pluralism; Republicanism

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Fair Trade

Fair trade is an international movement for social and environmental justice that develops alternative economic spaces of production, trade, retailing, and consumption. The relevance of fair trade for political theorizing is threefold: It draws attention to the materials around which political contention and mobilization are generated; it challenges assumptions that citizenship and consumerism are opposed principles of action and identification; and it challenges assumptions that political responsibility can or should be contained within national boundaries, or that citizenly acts can or should only be directed against the state.

The goals of the fair trade movement include improving the livelihoods and well-being of small producers; promoting development opportunities for disadvantaged groups of producers, in particular women and indigenous people; raising awareness among consumers of the negative effects of patterns of international trade on producers in the Global South; campaigning for changes in the regulatory regimes governing international trade; and the protection and promotion of human rights. The international fair trade movement consists of certification agencies, producer organizations and cooperatives, trading networks, and retailers.

The fair trade movement began to develop internationally in the 1980s, with the launch of Fairtrade labeling in various national contexts; and in the 1990s, the emergence of international umbrella organizations establishing worldwide standards of labeling and certification began. The growth of markets for fair trade products has been associated with the development of new forms of collective, organized political action that focus on questions

of poverty, sustainability, and justice, and that view states, international agencies, and multinational corporations as objects of contention. Most research on fair trade focuses on the impacts of initiatives on producer communities, assessing the degree to which goals of enhancing democracy, empowerment, inclusion, participation, and sustainability are achieved in practice. And far from being faceless, placeless consumers, fair trade encourages people to engage in various forms of social action as members of collectives, such as church communities, schools, cities, and towns.

Fair trade presents challenges for political theorizing in three areas. First, it draws attention to the importance of the materials around which political contention and mobilization can be generated. Fair trade has focused primarily on particular types of food products, such as coffee, bananas, and chocolate. As it has extended to other commodities, such as cotton, the movement has had to develop new strategies and enroll new actors into extensive networks of campaigning and regulation. The growth of fair trade also generates tensions between different material interests that shape the ongoing development of this movement: between the commitment to small-scale, democratic control over production and the mainstreaming of fair trade into corporate retailing; between the cooperative principles of the fair trade movement with the principles of international labor union movements; and between the global scope of fair trade and the autarkic, localist imaginaries of the organic food and slow food movements.

These tensions draw into view the second key issue that fair trade raises for political theorizing. Fair trade challenges long-standing assumptions that citizenship and consumerism are opposed principles of action and identification. Fair trade is an example of the phenomenon theorized by political scientists as political consumerism. It illustrates the ways in which repertoires of consumerism can be creatively deployed for explicitly political goals of social justice and participation.

Third, fair trade challenges taken-for-granted assumptions that relationships of political responsibility can or should be contained within national boundaries, or that citizenly acts can or should only be directed against the state. Fair trade illustrates the emergence of new forms of transnational political solidarity that are based on ethical commitments; support activism that is often directed toward nonstate actors, such as multinational corporations; and use innovative technologies such as labeling, certification, and the repertoires of popular entertainment. In each case, it is an example of emergent forms of "global deliberative politics" that is reshaping understandings of the objects, mediums, and agents of political action.

Clive Barnett

See also Global Civil Society; Globalization; Global Justice; Social Movements

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Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)

Frantz Fanon was a Martinican psychiatrist, philosopher, and revolutionary whose writings established him as a leading thinker of the twentieth century. Fanon ushered in the decolonial turn in critical theory, a move calling on those both within and outside of Europe to challenge the coloniality of the age and to forge a new vision of politics in the postcolonial period. Fanon's major works include *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), *A Dying Colonialism* (1959), *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), and the posthumously published *Toward the African Revolution* (1964). The contributions of Fanon to political theory center on six areas of inquiry: existential phenomenology, the social-psychological critique of Freudian psychoanalysis, critical race theory, colonialism and the politics of empire, the relationship between violence and revolution, and the concept of freedom.

Intellectual Formation

Fanon was a lycée student of the Négritude poet-politician, Aimé Césaire, and this association with Césaire would animate much of Fanon's thought throughout his formative adult years. Négritude asserted a radical conception of black consciousness amid a world replete with white supremacy. Although Fanon questioned the metaphysical presuppositions of Négritude, he remained forever indebted to Césaire's political theory.

Fanon escaped from Vichy-occupied Martinique to fight voluntarily for the French forces during World War II, only to witness the limitations of Francophone universalism due to the segregation of French soldiers and reduced agency of French colonial subjects. After World War II, Fanon returned to Martinique to assist Césaire on a mayoral campaign. He subsequently left for France to pursue a medical degree. While studying psychiatry, Fanon attended lectures by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and wrote a series of plays. Upon completing psychiatric studies and publishing his first book, Fanon took a post at the Blida-Joinville hospital in Algeria. This geopolitical relocation inaugurated a mutation in Fanon's theoretical unit of analysis from the "I" of Caribbean Martinique to the "We" of the emerging Algerian Revolution.

In addition to Césaire, one of Fanon's crucial intellectual collaborators was French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre. Fanon shared Sartre's desire to ascertain the implications of bad faith for coerced agents and to enact revolutionary change in the human condition by focusing on eradicating bad faith at individual and collective levels. Fanon defended a creolized Marxism that, unlike Sartre, did not banish racial particularities and nonclass forms of identification from politics. Fanon spent his remaining years as an ambassador for the Algerian resistance, never losing sight of his Caribbean roots. He died in Bethesda, Maryland, after undergoing treatment for leukemia. Fanon rapidly composed *The Wretched of the Earth* mainly via dictation prior to his death.

Existential Phenomenology as Critical Race Theory

Fanon developed a novel branch of existential phenomenology that merged inquiry into lived experience with the analysis of race. Prior to Fanon, Heidegger addressed the question of Being, Merleau-Ponty investigated the phenomenology of perception, Simone de Beauvoir explored women's embodiment in a patriarchal world, and Sartre examined the premises of the anti-Semite's metaphysical creation of the idea of the Jew. None of these analyses, however, offered a sustained meditation on critical race theory at a moment when racial states defined polities worldwide. Fanon reoriented the existential phenomenological tradition by applying it directly to the topic of race and anti-black racism.

Fanon probes Sartre's contention that the anti-Semite abdicates freedom in upholding an attitude of bad faith—the conscious act of an agent who avoids responsibility by deluding other agents into believing they are not free. Fanon compares the case of the anti-Semite to that of the Negrophobe. For Fanon, despite areas of convergence, anti-black racism has a uniqueness in that the anti-black racist creates metaphysical positions with regards to the black through overdetermining from the visual exterior the characteristics of this agent. Fanon, in turn, rejects universalizing ontological explanations of human attributes because, as in the instance of the black Antillean, ontology alone cannot explain the Look or racial gaze. Fanon extrapolates this lived experiential position to denounce the universal categories of Freudian psychoanalysis, stating instead that all psychological studies must be understood within social contents.

The Coloniality of Empire

Fanon formulates a critique of empire that is pertinent beyond the colonial period. This critique is based on a refashioning of the veil. W. E. B. Du Bois and John Rawls provide two differing veil conceptions. For Du Bois, the veil explains the double-consciousness and second sight that New World blacks possess and the dual racial-national identity of these agents. The veil is metaphorically living behind a veneer, which could potentially free one or keep one in subjugation. Rawls's concept of the veil of ignorance, in contrast, is a tool for abstracting away from all identity claims and imagining how to construct a just society if agents do not know their identity or status before entering civil and political society. Fanon inserts an alternative third schematic that embraces hybrid identities,

chooses non-ideal over ideal theory, and takes into consideration the real world veil of Algerian women revolutionaries. Fanon's earlier analysis of the phenomenology of race aligns with a later preoccupation with empire, the figure of the Arab, feminist theory, and how veiling or unveiling in the public sphere impacts debates on secularism, fundamentalism, and the architecture of colonial and postcolonial governance.

Revolution, Violence, Freedom

Freedom is the concept uniting Fanon's overall work. In *Black Skin, White Masks,* Fanon formulates love as a means to achieve freedom from states of bondage. Freedom for Fanon must be taken, not given. As his critical reading of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel on recognition and the master–slave dialectic suggests, Fanon acknowledges that a struggle for recognition is unavoidable when opposing agencies exist side by side in a social system. In contrast to Hegel, Fanon does not associate freedom with recognition and the achievement of self-consciousness. Freedom emerges after the stage of recognition, and it requires a confrontation not solely with the identity of another, but with the violence of revolutions.

The Wretched of the Earth is the culmination of Fanon's theorizing on freedom as it presents an analysis of inevitable revolutionary violence outside of an instrumental means-ends continuum. Fanon's exploration into the meaning of intrinsic violence for struggles against the global empire's misadventures offer lasting resources for critical theorists today.

Neil Roberts

See also Critical Theory; Liberty; Multiculturalism; Phenomenology; Postcolonialism; Race Theory; Revolution; Violence

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Fascism

Fascism is a political ideology combining virulent nationalism, extreme political authoritarianism, corporatist or quasi-socialist ideas, and a cultural rebellion against democracy, liberalism, and Marxism. Fascist ideology reached its zenith in Europe between 1918 and 1945, when it was promoted by social and political movements across Europe and sometimes managed to seize the reins of government. And yet fascism is not limited exclusively to interwar Europe. Its ideational and cultural origins can be traced back to the late nineteenth century; and fascist movements and ideas continued to surface in the post-1945 era, when they came to be known as neofascism. The term *Fascism* derives from the name of the Italian movement founded by Benito Mussolini in 1919, and which ruled Italy from 1922 to 1943. In contemporary social science, however, fascism is also used generically in recognition of the fact that many of the features and ideas associated with the original Italian variant have also been espoused by other movements and thinkers outside of Italy.

Although fascist ideology only crystallized and attached itself to a political movement after World War I, its ideational core had already emerged at the end of the nineteenth century: namely, as a distinctive synthesis of nationalist and quasi-socialist ideas, articulated by figures such as Maurice Barrès in France, Georg Schönerer in Austria, Enrico Corradini in Italy, and various anti-Semitic thinkers in Germany. The nationalist socialism adopted by fascism rejected, on the basis of an organic conception of the nation, both the Marxist precept of class struggle and the liberal conception of society as an atomized aggregate of individuals. Instead, it aimed at a systematic, hierarchical organization of society to harness it in service of the national interest—without, however, dismantling the fundamental structures of

capitalism, primarily wage labor and private property. All social and economic activity was to be organized and coordinated in order to maximize national productivity and to sustain efforts of war and imperial conquest led by a strong, dictatorial political regime. Cooperation between all the *productive* classes of the nation would be ensured through corporatist forms of socioeconomic organization. With the idea of a strong state apparatus seeking to extend its control over all aspects of social, economic, and cultural life, fascist ideology was totalitarian in its aspirations. Indeed, the term *totalitarian* was explicitly used by Benito Mussolini and other fascist thinkers in reference to their conception of the state.

Underlying this socioeconomic and political program was a deep, urgent sense of cultural crisis. Fascism (like its nationalist-socialist predecessors) diagnosed the national condition at the turn of the twentieth century as one of precipitate cultural, moral, and spiritual decline. It attributed this national degeneration to what it regarded as the pernicious, disintegrative effects of liberalism, democracy, and Marxist socialism, which in turn were associated with the legacy of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Fascism castigated democracy for generating anarchy and disorder by allowing the wild play of political forces and the impotent quibblings of parliamentarianism. It condemned liberalism for its egotistic, materialistic individualism. And it inveighed against Marxism for its equally materialistic and antinational doctrine of class conflict and international class solidarity. All these forces were understood not only as disrupting the proper social, political, and economic order of things, but also as destroying the nation's moral fiber and spiritual constitution.

Fascism offered itself as a rebellious antidote to this deep national crisis, claiming to be capable of leading the nation to a revolutionary spiritual as well as social and political rebirth. It promised an overhaul of all aspects of life on the basis of a comprehensive set of moral values: the affirmation of soldierly duty and sacrifice, of heroism and virility; the exaltation of authority, hierarchy, and the state; the primacy of the spiritual over the material and of the irrational over the rational; and the cult of violence and struggle (along with the purging of struggle from the domestic arena and its deflection to the international sphere). What must be remembered is that all the dynamic, energetic, and revolutionary impetus of this value complex was to be exercised only against the backdrop of an unquestioned imperative of national order and political authority. This important qualification notwithstanding, the revolutionary and dynamic drive of fascism was one of the main factors that distinguished it from conservatism. Another such factor was fascism's active, systematic embrace of modern technology and an equally systematic manipulation of mass society, mass politics, and mass communication.

The two largest fascist movements, as well as the most successful in achieving and maintaining political power, were the Italian Fascists and the German National Socialists. Italian Fascism, whose ideology was formulated mainly by Benito Mussolini, Giovanni Gentile, and Alfredo Rocco, was of course the paradigmatic case of fascism as a whole. Nazism, on the other hand, is a more idiosyncratic case in view of the centrality of biological racism in its ideology. National Socialism was driven by a biological-racist worldview, particularly a racial anti-Semitism that placed the Aryan race (to which the Germans belonged) at the top of a rigid hierarchy of human races, whereas the Semitic race (a term used to refer to the Jews) was considered not only as the bottom rung of the racial ladder, but also as a deadly menace to the Aryans and to all other races. National Socialism shared most aspects of fascist ideology, whereas the racial, anti-Semitic element came to dominate Nazi ideology and political practice to such an extent as to introduce a major, qualitative difference between National Socialism and most other fascist movements. This difference is most evident in the systematic, industrialized extermination of the Jews undertaken by Nazi Germany during World War II. The exterminatory project became such an overriding obsession that it was pursued even when it robbed Germany's war effort of essential resources, such as labor power and transportation infrastructure. Finally, Nazism also differed from most other fascist movements in its assertion of the primacy of the *Volk* (or organic national community) over the state, in contrast to the typical fascist belief in the absolute primacy of the state.

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See also Corporatism; Nationalism; Race Theory; Totalitarianism

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FEDERALISM

Federalism is a concept that describes forms of government that are organized by a division of power and jurisdiction between the national and subnational governments (typically states or provinces) according to legal and constitutional prescriptions. Federalism embraces a variety of forms, and all federal states have two defining characteristics. First, there is a division or sharing of power among different levels of government. Second, more than one unit of government has responsibility for a citizen living in any part of the country. Federal states are the opposite of unitary states, in which all sovereign power rests in the national government and all other units of government are merely its subdivisions.

Federalism is a much less common way of organizing governments than the unitary model, both historically and in the contemporary world. However, while there are fewer than 20 federal states in the world out of more than 200, they represent a large share of the global population and include many of the biggest and most powerful countries, such as the United States, Germany, India, Mexico, Australia, Russia, Brazil, and Canada. In order to understand federalism, we have to consider its historical evolution as a political principle, the distinct kinds of federal systems, and the current issues and experiences of federalism.

History of the Idea of Federalism

The word federal originates from the Latin term *foederis,* meaning league. The concept of federalism has an undoubtedly ancient pedigree, and it has changed and evolved considerably over the centuries. Some scholars see the first emergence of federalism in the leagues and alliances established among the independent city-states of ancient Greece and Italy. These leagues were in the nature of a confederation of sovereign states that ally primarily for purposes of mutual defense. Unlike in modern federal states, there were no central governments in these leagues with the authority to command and legislate for the separate member city-states. The leagues of classical antiquity did, however, embody the spirit of local self-government that remains integral to federalism today. Other scholars see important elements of federalism in the Old Testament biblical tradition. They identify the biblical notion of covenant seen in the alliance of the 12 tribes in the Hebrew commonwealth as a model for the kind of loosely organized polity with numerous autonomous religious communities bound together by covenants with God and with each other. Daniel Elazar in particular has highlighted the influence covenant theology had on the federalist thinking of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Calvinist thinkers in Europe, as well as the American framers. Yet other scholars look to medieval Europe as a foreshadowing of federalism, wherein the relations of the papacy to the bishops within the church itself, as well as the relations between the papacy and the secular rulers, was sometimes described as a division of authority between different levels and kinds of government.

Despite the classical and Judeo-Christian foreshadowing of federalism, it is commonly held that the theoretical origins of the modern federal state derived from early modern Europe. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe witnessed the rise of the modern doctrine of sovereignty. In the original form articulated by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, unitary government characterizes the modern nation-state. It is also marked by the absolute and indivisible sovereignty that these theorists believed was necessary to secure peace and order. It was in this context that federalism emerged in this period as a theoretical response to the prevailing idea of absolute and unitary sovereignty. The modern idea of federalism rested on the principle that sovereignty can, and should, be limited and in some sense divided.

Early modern federalist thinkers were driven by a variety of motivations. Some thinkers, like Gottfried Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza, saw a

version of federalism with sovereignty divided between cities and estates, on the one hand, and imperial or union authority, on the other, as the only theoretically coherent way to account for the existence of heterogeneous and compound political entities, such as the Holy Roman Empire and the United Provinces of the Netherlands, that simply did not conform in actual practice to the theory of unitary and absolute sovereignty associated with Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. Others such as Johannes Althusius saw federalism in the form of local governments or consociations as a way to protect the autonomy of minority religious communities in a post-Reformation context. Yet others such as baron de Montesquieu and David Hume turned to federalism in the form of confederations or county governments out of concern for the loss of individual and political liberty in the face of the authoritarian tendencies of the highly centralized modern state. Near the end of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant rehabilitated a version of the classical idea of leagues, which he presented as a federation of free republics that would further the cause of international peace and progress. Whether understood as a means to promote diversity, to protect local privileges, to reform international relations, or to encourage the virtues of self-government, federalism emerged in the early modern period as one of the major theoretical alternatives for the arrangement of political power in the modern nation-state.

The American Republic established in 1787 was the first modern federal state created by design. The Constitution produced a union of 13 separate states, each with their own republican forms of government that were subordinated to a central national government, while enjoying considerable autonomy in the constitutional division of power. American framers such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, writing under the pseudonym Publius, not only put preexisting political theory into practice, they also made two major theoretical achievements that furthered the development of federalism considerably. First, by establishing a national government with a direct legal connection to individual citizens rather than member states, they clarified the difference between confederations such as the Articles of Confederation that governed the United States prior to 1787, on the one hand, and federal states such as the Union created by the Constitution, on the other. Second, Madison and Hamilton rejected the traditional idea that republics must be small in order to remain democratic, and that monarchies are naturally suited to large territories. The American framers demonstrated that federalism allows for the extended republic, in which democratic principles can operate in a large territory by means of subdividing the nation into subnational governments. Although practical examples of federalism would remain few in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe, the American model of constitutional federalism would have a profound impact on later European federalist theorists such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Louis Le Fur, Carl Schmitt, and Altiero Spinelli.

In the course of its historical development and evolution from the loose confederations of antiquity to the modern federal state introduced by the United States, federalism developed as a concept with both an empirical and normative dimension. As an empirical principle, federalism is used to describe the structural and institutional arrangement of power distributed among a multiplicity of political bodies representing national and subnational units. Federalism has also, however, come to be associated with certain values, such as tolerance, civic participation, and local self-government, that are often seen as holding intrinsic worth. The dual empirical and normative dimensions of federalism remain an important feature of federalism studies to this day.

Kinds of Federalism

Federalism by its very nature is a flexible concept adapted to local history and changing conditions. There are, however, generally held to be three major types or classifications of federal states characterized and distinguished by various degrees of decentralization of power. First, the *centralized* federal state is formally federal, but in practice operates virtually the same way as centralized unitary states. In this instance, the subnational governments provided for in the constitution have no real role in decision making and are prevented by the central government from exercising genuine autonomy. Russia, Brazil, Venezuela, and Nigeria are examples of centralized federal states today.

A second kind of federalism is often referred to as *mature* federal states. These are federations that may have begun as highly decentralized federations, but have gradually acquired a considerable degree of economic, social, and political integration among its constituent parts. In mature federations, the subnational units exercise constitutionally protected jurisdiction over different areas of public life, but in practice have yielded much authority to the national government as the supreme actor in the constitutional system. The United States, Australia, Mexico, and Germany generally qualify as mature federal states.

The *conciliatory* or *cooperative* model of federalism characterizes the third and most decentralized kind of federal state. This is most common in countries marked by a large measure of cultural, ethnic, regional, or linguistic diversity. The conciliatory or cooperative model of federalism involves an ongoing process of compromise and negotiation between the national government and subnational units. This perpetual process produces considerable equality among political units with respect to the division of power and jurisdictional claims. These federal systems are often distinguished by highly contentious relations between the national government and subnational governments, and thus effective administration typically requires achieving cooperation between them. Examples of the conciliatory or cooperative model of federalism would be Canada, India, and Switzerland.

The principle of subsidiarity is related to federalism, although it can be applied in principle to both federal and unitary states. Subsidiarity is an idea originating in nineteenth-century Catholic social teaching and maintains that the proper level of government for dealing with matters is always the lowest or most local level. If a public service or function can be performed at the local or regional level, it should be. Central authority must only act on matters that cannot be dealt with at the lower level. Although subsidiarity is present in some unitary states, its theoretical and practical connection to federalism is obvious. Many federal states have adopted the principle of subsidiarity, as has the quasi-federal European Union, which explicitly incorporated subsidiarity into Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.

Current Issues in Federalism

One of the historical and continuing problems confronting federal states is the challenge posed by secession, wherein one or more of the member states in a federation try to leave the union or confederation and establish an independent nation-state or join another nation-state. In the past, this has led to civil war in the United States (1861–1865) and more recently in Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

There have been a number of important recent developments in federalist states. First, federalism has emerged in several countries as a potential instrument for social, political, and economic development. For instance, in Latin American countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina, as well as in India, federalism is often seen as a spur to economic development through implementation of local and regional economic policies and as a support for the democratization process as political parties compete for power at the subnational level. Even in highly developed federal states such as the United States and Canada, theories of fiscal federalism have gained great currency recently. These theories of fiscal federalism involve devising strategies by which income distribution and regional equalization can be advanced through the use of tax and spending power by various levels of government.

Second, federalism today is sometimes viewed as an institutional arrangement well suited to provide for conflict management and internal stability in countries with deep political divisions and cultural diversity. In heterogeneous polities such as South Africa, and even in Iraq and Afghanistan, some form of federalism adapted to local conditions and history is a frequently heard prescription for reconstruction and domestic order because federalism offers the promise of balancing the need for national unity with the value of local or regional self-government.

Third, recently we have seen the introduction of federal elements into established unitary states as a means to address specific regional demands or to improve government efficiencies. For example, the federal principle can be seen at work in the United Kingdom with Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish devolution, as well as in Spain's granting of autonomy to Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque region.

Finally, one of the most interesting recent developments in federalism studies has to do with the debate over the federal, or quasi-federal, character of the European Union. Both the supporters and the opponents of greater European integration typically describe their differences in the language and terms of federalism. Opponents of greater integration, known as Eurosceptics, tend to see the European Union as a confederation of sovereign states combined in a political form resembling the classical idea of a league united by treaty. Supporters of greater integration, however, point to the common institutions and authoritative bodies in the Union, as well as the monetary union and proposed common defense and foreign policy initiatives, as proof of the gradual process by which national governments are ceding sovereignty to an eventual Federal States of Europe. In 2005, the demise of the proposed Constitutional Treaty, which sought to strengthen the federal aspects of the European Union, after ratification referendum defeats in France and the Netherlands seemed to mark the victory of the Eurosceptics, but in many respects the push for greater European integration continues in its successor, the Lisbon Treaty. It is perhaps fair to say that the European Union represents another stage in our understanding of the gradually evolving conception of federalism.

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See also American Founding; City-State; Constitutionalism; Pluralism; Publius; Secession; Sovereignty

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Feminism

Feminism is usually thought of as a political and/or social movement, but it also includes the analysis of power in its various forms as it relates to women. It advocates critical inquiry into the more and less obvious mechanisms that distribute power. One cannot state that feminism is a movement advocating equality for women, because some feminists argue that standards of equality developed by the state are based on the exclusion of female identity: The abstract neutral citizen is presumed to be male. Feminist political theory includes a consideration of political action, institutions, movements, social change, and cultural practices, in addition to developing lens of analyses to understand how power is distributed, redistributed, and challenged. Feminist political practice has often aimed at inclusion into the political process and advocated for transformations of governance and the policies of institutions so that they serve the interests of the population in its entirety.

Feminism has proven to be particularly important for the field of political theory, as it points out how our ideas about femininity and masculinity have structured the opportunities available to and expectations for all human beings. Feminism recognizes how ideas and perceptions create the social world. One characteristic of feminism has been to develop a stronger linkage between theory and practice, seeing that challenging commonly held ideas can lead to changing practices, and that emerging practices can challenge received wisdom. For this reason, it is impossible to segregate feminist political theory and feminist political movements; they need to be considered in conjunction with one another. The development of new forms of critique has spurred feminist political action, and

feminist political action has changed theoretical analytics of power.

Feminist Political Practice

At many times women have joined together and acted in concert. But feminism, as a more formal political movement that demanded inclusion in and empowerment through established political institutions, can be described as occurring in three different waves or movements.

The first wave is commonly traced back to the emergence of movements demanding suffrage for women. However, it should be noted that women played a central role in the French Revolution; the fight for universal rights was successful in part because of women's participation in the democratic uprising. In 1789, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen was declared, giving all men within the French state equal rights. Female revolutionary, Olympe de Gouges responded with the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen in 1791; however, her document did not win endorsement by the government or a majority of the French population. Modern feminism and modern forms of democratic citizenship have identical origins. As long as the universal rights of citizens have been declared, women have demanded inclusion. However, this movement was denied success for more than 100 years.

The problem was, what exactly made one an equal citizen? As Aristotle and Locke had established, they believed in equality, but only for those who *by nature* were equal with one another. The biological differences between men and women were taken to signal women's difference from men, hence their inequality. This presented the central conundrum of first wave feminism, should women deny biological differences and claim political equality based on their sameness or on the universality of the human condition? Or should they emphasize their differences and demand the right to represent themselves because they are different from men?

The same problem haunted the suffrage movement in the United States that emerged during the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War. Should women be given the same political rights because they are human beings, which in all essential matters are the same as men, or because they are different from them, and hence in order to be represented, they need to represent themselves? Ultimately, the argument that women are different and more moral than men was one of the winning strategies for achieving women's suffrage in the United States through the 19th amendment in 1911. It was proclaimed that if women were given the right to vote, they would engage in a *national housekeeping* and protect the rights and interests of the vulnerable populations with their new influence inside the established political structure. Paradoxically, women were awarded equal rights because of, not despite, what was considered their natural differences from men. In this way, formal political equality was achieved when all parties were assured that it would not change the natural order of house and home, where women were expected to subordinate their interests to their husband and children.

Second Wave Feminism

The second wave of feminism became a popular movement in the 1960s, but its guiding principle can be traced back to Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex,* which observed, "One is not born, but rather becomes a woman." A clear sign of how little feminist perspectives were understood in the 1950s is that Beauvoir's text, a philosophical reflection on female identity throughout history, was assumed to be a book about the female body. An American publishing company sent the text for review to a French-speaking biology professor at Smith College who was impressed enough by the profundity of the argument that he undertook the translation of the text into English himself!

Whereas first wave feminists ended up gaining political inclusion by endorsing the status quo in private life, Beauvoir's observations challenged the division between political and private life and traced women's secondary social and political status back to their sense of self. She argued that women are taught to see themselves in contrast to men; men are considered the standard, female identity is considered a variation. Beauvoir observes that women see themselves as *the other* and as less essential than men. This view of self is reinforced through family relations, economic opportunities, formal education, and religious beliefs: Virtually every single cultural and political structure becomes

complicit in this view of women. The second wave of feminist practice questioned whether the previously accepted understanding of women's so-called natural differences was correct. They proposed that it might be more appropriate to talk about how women are socialized to be different from men.

Once the theory that female identity was not given but rather a social construction became widely disseminated, the platform for political action shifted immediately. In order to change women's role in the world, women's conditioning, expectations, and self-perception needed to be challenged. As a result of this insight, the "The Personal is Political" became the defining slogan of second wave feminism. In the United States, Betty Freidan wrote *The Feminine Mystique,* describing the lack of social engagement and frustration felt by many women, who experienced it as personal dissatisfaction in isolation from one another. However, Freidan argued that what was experienced as personal was in fact the result of larger social and political arrangements. Feminist politics meant reevaluating one's life in all different realms. Only by changing the patterns of living could the social and political world be changed.

The emphasis on personal identity created all different forms of henceforth untried political practice, from a collective engagement over the division of labor inside the home, to organized advocacy for child care, sexual freedom and experimentation, and rejection of standard conceptions of female beauty. One group of feminists staged a beauty pageant crowning a sheep Miss America in order to expose what they considered the degradation of women in beauty pageants who were judged by looks like animals in a stockyard. Investigation of personal identity created tension between groups of women, as women from different racial backgrounds started to question whether the women's movement was constructed around a white, middle-class female, just as the standards for what was considered the average human being had long been assumed to be that of a white male. There were also divisions between different groups over sexuality: Some groups claimed that lesbianism was the only way to live one's life outside of patriarchy, whereas others argued that such a position would permanently marginalize feminists to the periphery of society. Inevitably, groups began to fracture along racial, ethnic, class, and sexual differences as politics, cultural practices, and personal identity became more indistinguishable.

Third Wave Feminism

The third wave is above all characterized by a plurality of strategies and a desire for inclusivity. The start of the third wave was declared in *Ms. Magazine* in 1992 by Rebecca Walker in a piece titled, "Becoming the Third Wave." Throughout the 1980s, feminism had come to be considered an outdated battle, or one that had been won during the 1970s due to the gain in reproductive choice and the inclusion of girls and women into sports, the military, professional life, and educational institutions. Walker's declaration was that it was not a post-feminist age, but rather that the start of a new form of feminist movement has grown in popularity with the political shifts in the twenty-first century. Women's rights and opportunities appear to need defense, even as women around the world gain more inclusion in the formal political process.

As a result of the innovations of second wave feminism, rather than approaching feminism as a natural alliance among all women, there is a recognition in the third wave that both male and female identity is socially constructed, and that part of a feminist revolution includes restructuring gender identity all along the spectrum of possibilities. There is an increased awareness of transgendered individuals and the need to include them in the movement, as well as a desire to contest and investigate how society defines both masculinity and femininity. Similarly, there is a recognition that not all women hold the same amount of power, and that gender identity intersects with other characteristics in unique ways. There is a growing global consciousness that recognizes that women and men in different countries enjoy different amounts of power, not purely determined by their gender status. For instance, it would be difficult to argue that a powerful American woman such as Hillary Clinton is less empowered than an average man in Eritrea. Different groups seek to build alliances across national borders, so the third wave is characterized by an attempt to envision a more global feminist movement, one that seeks to empower all women and girls, not to accept the success of a

small minority of women as an indication that the feminist project is now complete.

Feminist Political Theory

Greek playwrights and philosophers took up the women's role in the polis and conducted early debates about the role of family, reproduction, and whether women could act in the same capacities as men. One of the earliest works of political theory written by a woman is Christine de Pizan's *The Book of the City of Ladies*. Pizan's exceptional status as a noblewoman who received unusual encouragement in her scholarship from her father provides a feminist lens into the history of political thought. The fact that hers is one of the few contributions by a woman into the early canon of political philosophy underscores the fact that women were very rarely given the tools, encouragement, and audience to develop their ideas. The history of political thought records the history of feminist perspectives largely by their exclusion.

Most generally, the pattern that emerges when surveying the development of feminist political thought is the emergence of feminist interpretations of existing theoretical paradigms such as liberalism, Marxism, and anarchism. However, the debates within feminist movements that examined the construction of female identity as a political process created a radical shift in political thought. New modes of power analytics were developed, understanding that power does not only operate through the more familiar mechanisms of laws, institutions, administrators, and leaders. Instead, we need to understand how power operates in every aspect of the human experience. More recently, schools of feminist theory have been central in developing the paradigms they espouse: poststructuralism, postcolonialism, psychoanalytic, transnational, and eco-feminist movements.

Though each of these movements and paradigms can be identified and to some extent stand apart from one another, it is helpful to identify particular concerns that have dominated feminist political thought and made appearances in all of these different schools of thought. The strands are mutually informing and are best understood as a series of different emphases rather than mutually exclusive paradigms. For instance, a Marxist feminist approach to understanding power may emphasize class distinctions and the exploitation of labor as central. The Italian Marxist feminists had a movement to demand wages for housework, arguing that providing a wage for women's labor would be one way of addressing the root of female inequality. The analysis shifts if one takes a transnational perspective rather than a purely Marxist one, however. Now in an increasing number of homes in more developed countries, even middle-class women pay women from developing counties to perform duties in the home. Does this mean the problem of inequality and gender has now reached a resolution because housework is given a wage? Clearly not, because the wages women earn, the feminization of particular occupations, and the disparities in earning power between females from different countries is a cause for concern. This is one example of the overlapping concerns of different schools of feminist thought. To understand the many forces at work in something as common as hiring someone to clean one's home, one must analyze different expectations about gender roles and familial responsibility, class structure, and transnational economic forces.

Here are four predominant themes in feminist political analysis: feminist ethics, the division between public and private spheres, the politics of identity, and the relationship between gender and political economy. There are other important strands of inquiry, such as epistemology, representation, reproductive politics, and the position of women in relationship to the law. These four themes, however, unify feminist politics and inquiry across a number of different fields.

Feminist Ethics

One school of thought has accepted the differences between femininity and masculinity as they are socially constructed and made arguments that society as a whole would be more just if it were to incorporate female models of behavior into the normative standard. The notion that there is a difference between female and male ethics is longstanding, but its more recent incarnation can be traced back to responses to a survey conducted by Lawrence Kohlberg in 1970, from which he concluded that females were less ethical than males. He asked girls and boys whether it would be right for a man to steal medicine that his wife needed from

a pharmacy. More of the girls responded in an ambiguous fashion, hence Kohlberg concluded that females exhibited less moral reasoning than males. Carol Gilligan wrote a reply to this study, *In a Different Voice,* examining the results of the study carefully. She pointed out that girls were more likely to ask questions about the nature of the wife's illness, whether the man tried to negotiate with the pharmacist, and whether the pharmacist understood the dire nature of the situation.

Gilligan concluded, in a fashion consistent with Beauvoir' observation that women develop a sense of self in relation to others, female ethics are also developed contextually and relationally. They think about how actions will affect relationships between people, not whether the principle itself is right or wrong. Therefore, although self-reliance in principle may be an excellent ideal, insisting on self-reliance for someone who is ill, young, or impaired in some way would be cruel. Different people and situations require different responses; hence ethics is something that needs to be understood in light of the particular situation, not universally applied to all situations.

This sense of morality has been called "an ethics of care" and has been promoted as an alternative to liberal, individualist political institutions that emphasize autonomy, individual reliance, and proceduralism. For instance, in the United States, welfare policies have been seen as fostering dependence that in the tradition of American citizenship makes one's status as a citizen suspect. However, these feminist ethicists insist that dependency is a necessary aspect of the human existence: The sick, young, and elderly in particular need care, and everyone needs care occasionally. A feminist perspective on the welfare state argues that dependency needs to be accepted as an inevitable aspect of the human condition; we should not link state assistance with second-class citizenship. This viewpoint argues that having an ethics of care and interdependence will create a more just and humane model for society, as currently those who engage in the care of others have their work devalued by the marketplace and policy, education, and law emphasizes autonomy and separation, rather than interconnection.

More recently, feminist scholars have also taken feminist ethics and used them to critique standard conceptions of security. Security is frequently defined as a state's preventing harm to its citizens. Feminist scholars have argued that our notion of security needs to be expanded to incorporate all aspects of human needs. People need food and shelter, not necessarily stronger militaries, in order to be secure.

The Division Between Public and Private

One of the more consistent themes in feminist political theory has been an inquiry into how custom and law has divided society into different spheres of activity and regulation. In ancient Greece, Aristotle distinguished the household from the public, arguing that only those who were by nature equals could leave the household, a sphere of dependence and economic production, to enter the public, a space of deliberation, equality, and justice. In this way, he was able to create a form of government that gave citizens the right to rule themselves and others, while simultaneously preserving what he considered a natural hierarchy, excluding women, children, and slaves from participation in governance. John Locke created a similar division in his work: He distinguished paternal and political authority, arguing that the development of new forms of egalitarian rule need not disturb the father's rule in their households. The private realm is considered the realm of absolute freedom and should ideally remain outside of regulation of the state. By delineating the public and private sphere, Locke is able to provide for limited government power, an attractive proposition for those worried about the abuse of political power. The designation also supported Locke's argument for toleration: If all private practices are limited to the private sphere, then it is possible to accommodate different religious beliefs within one government. In short, the division of society into public and private spheres has been a way to define the relationship between family and state and develop the boundary of state regulation.

However, many feminists have looked at these configurations and argued that the division between public and private spheres is deeply gendered. Women are expected to reside in the private sphere and are subject to suspicion and particular criticism when they leave the sphere considered appropriate. Carole Pateman's book, *The Sexual Contract,* argued that social contract theory was

actually a contract of sexual subordination, the liberal model of politics allowed for the perpetuation of patriarchy in private in the name of equality in public.

Some feminists have argued that it is not clear that the privacy of the home is indeed a space of freedom for females and children. If the state adopts a policy of noninterference in the home, who protects women and children who are abused within it? Or for instance, by protecting the freedom to worship as one chooses in private, does the state end up condoning some religious practices that subordinate women? These issues continue to be debated around the world as different religious groups who believe that females must be subordinate to men reside within polities that espouse principles of gender equality.

Feminists have also pointed out that the boundary between families and the state has been sporadically enforced. The state has defined the conditions of marriage and tried to offer incentives for procreation to occur within state-sanctioned marriage. Laws about marriage and adoption continue to be debated, as different groups—from interracial couples to homosexual ones—try to assert their right to have families outside of the realm of government intervention. The state, different religions, and medical and legal practices all define, and to some extent enforce, norms about family structure, sexuality, and marriage. Studies examining the administration of the human body by such powers refer to this cluster of practices as *biopolitics*.

It is crucial to emphasize that there are no actual public and private spheres; they are divisions that have been used to determine both where government regulations and principles should end and also how to understand the relationship between the body and the social world. Nevertheless, these designations have a tremendous impact on how people live their lives and have created social, economic, and familial patterns. For instance, women are still considered keepers of the home, and even if they now work outside of the home as well, they still maintain primary responsibility for providing care for other members of the family. This is what is known as "the second shift." Women who run for office are also scrutinized to see whether they may be neglecting their other duties, such as caring for their children. Although it can no longer be said that women are confined to the private sphere, it is clear that they are still ascribed—and largely accept—primary responsibility for it and are evaluated differently when they become figures in public.

Identity Construction

Since Simone de Beauvoir argued that one is not born a woman, there has been a flurry of inquiry into the difference between sex, a biological category, and gender, socially developed norms of femininity and masculinity. Although initially there was effort to determine the boundary between sex and gender, and what was natural and what was socially constructed, this endeavor was soon abandoned, as it proved impossible to determine (just as, for instance, the debate whether genetic or environmental factors contribute more to a child's development is still unresolved). Some feminists called *essentialists* have sought to define what characteristics are shared by all women. Other feminists emphasize gender as socially developed and are known as *constructivists*. Because gender identity is socially constructed and hence malleable, feminists have tended to focus on how society develops, propagates, and reproduces gendered norms and behaviors. This is understandable from a political perspective, as such inquiries can explore how these expectations have changed and can be changed.

Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble* argued that gender is actually performative, something that we engage not as a reflection of who we are deep inside, because our "true identity" is unfathomable. Instead we are social creatures, and perform the roles for others that we consciously or unconsciously choose. Part of the book's argument rests on an analysis of drag culture, whereby men and women are able to perform the gender identity they choose. In a related argument, others have focused on gender as image. Without the shared systems of representation, it would not be possible for a woman to imitate a man so easily, nor a man to present himself as a woman, or for that matter, for a women to "play" a female. Teresa de Lauretis argued in *Technologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film, and Fiction* that "The construction of gender is both the product and process of its representation" (1987, p. 5). Social images reflect

conceptions of what it means to be masculine and feminine, but also that systems of representation themselves produce gender identity itself.

Recognizing that identity is socially constructed has led to a more general consideration about how different identities are socially formed as well. There is not one single position that all women occupy; instead, female identity intersects with other religious, racial, ethnic, sexual, national, and class identities as well. Once we start to recognize that identities are social constructions, it is important to recognize that many different identities intersect in every individual's life. A shared identity links people together but cannot be assumed to manifest itself in the same way in every individual's experience. For instance, a Latina on the Supreme Court may envision her ethnic identity differently than a Latina artist who lives in Tennessee. Neither woman can be said to be more authentically Hispanic than the other.

This understanding of how people have many different factors constructing a sense of self has led to a newer emphasis on gender as a continuum. Some have argued that one of the problems is that there are only two genders that are commonly recognized, and two options cannot possibly encompass the full range of gender identities that are actually experienced. To impose a binary model on the variety of human experience is to do utter violence to the diversity of human experience. Also, the relationship between gender and sex has come under increasing scrutiny. With more research on biological diversity, it is starting to be questioned whether sex is a socially, not purely natural, construction. Doctors assign genders to babies born with ambiguous genitalia, and considering the experiences of some transgendered individuals, it has been argued that one's gender—one's image of oneself—is more determinate than one's physical attributes.

Gender and Political Economy

One of the oldest branches of feminism was developed in relationship to Marxist political thought, arguing that women as a group performed many of the world's unremunerated and underpaid tasks. Tasks that are considered women's work, if paid a wage at all, are paid relatively poorly. The explanations for this phenomenon are varied, but are the result of social expectations. Women are largely assumed to be dependents. For instance, married women's work is thought of as supplemental to their husband's income, a rationale that was used even if a woman happened to be unmarried. Younger unmarried women are assumed to be largely supported by their fathers. The assumption was that women were dependents themselves, and in turn had no dependents, and therefore could subsist on smaller wages. Conversely, it is assumed that men do have dependents, and therefore their labor needs to be awarded a higher wage. These assumptions often do not correspond with facts, but these beliefs still end up generating a lower wage for women's labor around the world.

Cultural and political patterns have contributed to what some scholars have called the feminization of poverty. In addition to the still intact practice of paying women lower wages for equal work, expectations of family roles also contribute to the poor economic status of women. If children are born out of wedlock, or in the event of a divorce or separation, mothers are frequently given custody of the children. The father may be asked to provide child support, but this rarely amounts to half of the cost of providing children housing, clothes, and food. Due to their socially accepted role as primary caregivers, women then also shoulder more of the economic burden of child rearing, even though they make less! This is just one more factor that means that women around the world have less income and property at their disposal. Their secondary economic status makes women a more vulnerable population and makes them less able to exercise political power.

During the last 40 years, in the newest restructuring of the global economy, women around the globe have been incorporated into the formal and informal global workforce in an unprecedented fashion, as evidenced by the large number of women who now do much of the manufacturing labor. Interestingly, women's roles as caregivers make them desirable as migrant laborers as well. Women from other countries are hired to care for children, work as nurses, and provide cleaning around the world. The predominance of women in these occupations and the need for such positions to be filled means that women migrant workers now outnumber male ones for the first time in modern history. They send portions of

their earnings home to support their families; such earnings are called remittances. Today, many governments openly recruit their female citizens to send them abroad to work. The increasingly widespread practice has created debates in some countries, such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka, about how having an absent mother impacts family structure and child rearing. It may also have long-lasting impacts on gender roles in the countries that most engage in it: What is the role of a male if he is not providing for his family? The effects of economic globalization on women's wages and opportunities, the family structure, and gender roles around the world are still very much evolving and are areas of great scholarly and political interest.

Keally McBride

See also de Pizan, Christine; Equality; Gender; Identity; Social Movements; Wollstonecraft, Mary; Women's Suffrage

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Ferguson, Adam (1723–1816)

Adam Ferguson was a Scottish historian and moral philosopher who wrote during the period of concentrated intellectual activity known as the Scottish Enlightenment. He exerted considerable intellectual influence in Britain, Europe, and America and is sometimes posited as the parent of modern sociology. Yet his reputation has long been overshadowed by those of his more famous friends and contemporaries, David Hume and Adam Smith. Further, despite his disagreements with both of them, it is common to encounter readings in which his ideas and orientations are automatically conflated with theirs, as well as with those of other thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment.

A Pioneering Social Scientist

Ferguson was deeply interested in social change. In his time, the Scottish lowlands were the economic wonder region of Europe, so he was well placed to study the effects of the intense social, economic, moral, and political changes brought on by development. In the first sustained critique of market society, Ferguson offered a penetrating analysis of the social and political effects of specialization, consumerism, expansion, urbanization, bureaucratization, centralization, individuation, privatization, depersonalization, and hedonism,

stressing the importance of (what we now refer to as) social capital and political efficacy to the maintenance of strong polities. He linked this critique to the problem of political corruption, understood in the classical sense as loss of political and martial virtue. Perhaps his most influential idea was the theory of spontaneous order, which later informed the anti-constructivist, laissez-faire strand of classical liberal thinking developed and popularized by Friedrich Hayek. Ferguson also influenced the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, and, more recently, those looking for early sources on the nature and preservation of civil society (e.g., Ernest Gellner).

Insisting on the natural sociability of the species and reacting to commercialism's increasing reliance on instrumental rationality, Ferguson wanted to reinstate the passions as the foundation of community. The result is a defense of noncognitive processes mounted on two fronts. The first is moral and emotional, conceived through the prism of a classical sensibility about the perils of political corruption and focused on the importance of spontaneous affection. The second defense is social-scientific: Ferguson's defense of the passions as the source of social order consists in a highly developed theory of spontaneous order that presages nineteenth-century structural functionalism and signposts and aids the emergence of social science proper. His main target here is the type of a priori reasoning associated with rational constructivism and contractarianism. Social arrangements emerge spontaneously, gradually and almost imperceptibly from the unintended consequences of countless individual actions performed over time; through a protracted process of ad hoc experimentation and adaptation and the preservation and transmission of tacit knowledge via norms.

A Transitional Thinker

Ferguson's philosophy reflects a transitional phase in Western political thought. It straddles traditions; anchored in antiquity and natural religion yet oriented toward the concerns of modern social and political science. Though scholars generally group him in either the republican/civic humanist or liberal camp, his thought is perhaps best understood as a sustained effort to nudge a space between the classical tradition and emergent liberalism.

Whereas the Scottish Enlightenment has been characterized (principally in the figure of Smith) as an attempt "to legitimise bourgeois civilisation at an early stage of its growth" (Mizuta, 1976, p. 1459), Ferguson stood apart as a figure that frequently acted to subvert and *de*-legitimize it. He wanted to understand the processes that underlay the apparent political, military, affective, and moral decay of his own society and to discover how to offset the damage done to a state in which people had lost their virtue and become "incapable of public affections."

Ferguson portrayed commercial life as alienating, isolating, and affectively sterile. The contractual relationships of market society "introduce the spirit of traffic into the commerce of affection" and under the "growing sensibility to interest" and the reigning ethic of the market, we "consider kindness itself as a task" (Ferguson, 1767/1996, pp. 86–88). The "bands" of friendship in commercial society appear to us of a "feeble texture, when compared to the resolute ardour with which [precommercial] man adheres to his friend, or to his tribe" (Ferguson, 1767/1996, pp. 22–23).

By contrast, Smith and Hume both saw commerce as creating superior forms of sociability that enhance personal relations and mutual dependencies. Both reject the simple social forms admired by Ferguson in favor of large scale, nonparticularistic communities regulated by impartial justice. Dismissing Ferguson's fond portrait of an intimate precommercial "knot of friends" united by beneficence and common interest, Hume regards barbarity as a dreary state of "solitude" in which each is compelled to live with "his" fellows in a "distant manner" (Hume, 1987, pp. 270–271). By comparison, commercial life is sociable, congenial, and open, characterized by a proliferation of clubs and societies, all of which reflect the breakdown of aristocratic privilege and other exclusivistic social categories.

Ferguson's pessimism about progress and modernity reaches its lowest point in his opposition to Smith on the issue of citizen militias. Smith had a generally positive attitude to the professionalization of security: An organized system of justice underpinned by regular armies affords "to industry, the only encouragement which it requires,

some tolerable security that it shall enjoy the fruits of its own labour." Standing armies also provide the best defense against foreign invasion. Ferguson disagreed. Dependence on professional armies, coupled with the growth of market culture, results in a generalized and devastating decline in public virtue. Scotland, like other commercial nations, had become "a Nation of Manufacturers, [in] which each is confined to a particular branch and sunk into the Habits and Peculiarities of his Trade." Its citizens were now "gross, sordid, void of sentiments and Manners," ready to be "pillaged, insulted, and trod upon by the enemies of their country" (Ferguson, 1751, p. 14). Whereas Ferguson sees security as an intimacy-enhancing enterprise that could not be safely assigned to an organized state and a specialized standing army, by contrast, Smith argues that such institutions not only offer better security but generate positive changes in the social fabric. By releasing citizens from public duties, they permit them to get on with their independent pursuits while at the same time engendering the levels of trust and order necessary for such pursuits to flourish. For Smith, there is no dilemma of wealth and virtue because he was generally positive about progress and more liberal in his outlook. Ferguson's sympathies could be best described as liberal republican. They are not purely republican because he is deeply ambivalent about progress.

Although progress might erode political virtue, it is also inevitable and natural; a result of the Providentially inspired laws of spontaneous order. Much is gained by progress, including an expansion of freedom and rights, a diffusion of wealth and economic independence, and a welcome diminution of brutality, religious superstition, cruelty, and malice. He hoped that the traditional opposition between private wealth and public virtue was misconceived: Community and commerce, wealth and virtue, civic élan and private liberty might all be balanced rather than played off against each other by the judicious application of such remedial measures as citizenship training within schools and the reintroduction of citizen militias. But Ferguson's attempted reconciliation of the two sets of goals was never decisive; indeed, ambivalence about wealth and progress could be described as the keynote of his oeuvre.

Lisa Hill

See also Civic Humanism; Civil Society; Conservatism; Hayek, Friedrich von; Marx, Karl; Montesquieu, baron de; Passions; Rationality; Scottish lightenment; Social Contract Theory

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FEUDALISM

There have been many feudalisms. If we make an exception of the Marxist-Leninist conception of *feudalism* as that set of production relations preceding capitalism, the core referent of the term is the predominant political structure of Western Europe during the Middle Ages, to such an extent that for nonspecialists, *feudal* is practically synonymous with *medieval*. Historians also use the term to describe periods of Japanese and Chinese history. Sociologists, political philosophers, and op-ed journalists routinely apply it to such a bewildering variety of relationships that the term has lost almost all explanatory power. Yet its very multifacetedness indicates how indispensible feudalism is to analysts and intellectuals. In view of this, the only universally accurate statement one can offer is probably that feudalism is or has become a semantic problem; to solve it would

require a multivolume intellectual history of social science.

Etymology of the Fief

The etymological roots of the word *feudalism* are the Latin noun *feudum* and its cognate adjective *feudalis,* both of which were common by the end of the twelfth century in Western Europe but which even then had a long prehistory stretching back to the early Middle Ages, and ultimately to Germanic and possibly even Celtic languages. Feudum means fief; this is the origin of the bastard term fiefdom, which has entered common usage to describe an illegitimate or at best morally questionable private or privatized power to influence events in a particular category or place. Whatever else the centuries since the Middle Ages have done with the notion of the fief, feudalism is an idea formulated by intellectuals in response to this legal institution. It is therefore essential to gain an acquaintance with the fief. The meaning of the fief has been difficult to establish throughout history. Medieval analysts found the fief to be a slippery concept. One of the most influential teachers of law in the thirteenth century, the canon lawyer Henry D'Souza admitted: "I never heard an adequate definition of the fief." The best consolation he could offer was: "However, it can be described well enough with magisterial [i.e., a teacher's] authority."

About a century and a half later, the equally famous lawyer Baldus de Ubaldis noted during his course of lectures on the Roman law of Justinian that the fief was unknown to the Romans, and further, if they had known of it, they would have disapproved for two reasons. First, the fief seemed to embody an uncomfortable blend of servitude, both of persons and things; and second, a fief brought with it rights of jurisdiction over people, something that according to Baldus's Roman law–conditioned values should only belong to the public authority. This is perhaps the earliest pithy summary of a thesis that would dominate academic work in the early twentieth century, now known as juridical feudalism. The fief that Baldus described was a parcel of rights held by a vassal from his lord in return for a variety of personal services, originally military service. Vassalage itself was a form of personal subjection created by an oath of fidelity and, in many regions of Europe, an accompanying ceremony of personal abasement called homage, resulting in the vassal becoming the lord's *man.* The lord was more than just a landlord, therefore; he had the right to discipline his vassal in a number of ways. Conversely, the vassal's duties were not primarily conceived as rent, or anything like it, but rather as a set of personal obligations, owed because the vassal was a vassal, not because the vassal held a fief (which not all vassals did anyway). However, by the later Middle Ages, the fief was regarded as a key constituent of the feudal relationship, alongside the oath of fidelity. By the time Baldus wrote, indeed for several centuries before his time, it was hard to say whether a vassal owed service because he had sworn an oath of fidelity or because he held a fief. This is why Baldus thought the fief embodied a mixture of principles that a tidy-minded lawyer trained in the categories of Roman law would rather have kept apart. This blend of the proprietorial and the personal was, therefore, one aspect of the fief.

Historians have generally been more impressed by the second aspect of the fief: jurisdiction. This too was a word with a history. It achieved prominence in medieval analysis during the twelfth century as a result of the renaissance in the study of Roman law and came to typify governmental activity for medieval theorists. Even medieval lawyers then saw the fief as a *political* not just proprietorial phenomenon. In that sense, even the most unreflective modern uses of the term feudalism have some basis in historical reality. Baldus did not have any such modern word at his disposal as *state,* but his comment about jurisdiction belonging to the public power rather than to just anyone as a piece of private property at least prepares us for the later conception, prevalent to this day, that whatever is feudal is somehow antithetical and inimical to the state. This usage has a venerable tradition behind it, even among specialist historians of medieval Europe. At the axial point in his now classic study of the Mâconnais region of Burgundy, France, in the early Middle Ages, Georges Duby summed up the situation toward the end of the tenth century as the Carolingian State belonging to the past, whereas the future belonged to the feudality. By feudality (French: *féodalité*) Duby meant feudal retainers—vassals—in distinction to the count, the representative *par excellence*

of the now moribund "public" authority of the Carolingian dynasty. The Carolingians had ruled Francia (formerly Gaul, but Francia since the Frankish invasions of the fifth century) since 751 CE. They are called Carolingian after the second ruler in their line, Charlemagne (aka Carolus Magnus and Charles the Great), in whose person the defunct Western Roman Empire had been resurrected by the papacy at an "imperial" coronation in Rome on Christmas Day in the year 800 CE. At its apogee, the Carolingian Empire stretched from just south of the Pyrenees to beyond the Elbe River in Saxony, from the border with Denmark to southern Italy. Feudalism is what, in a now rather outdated vision of developments, is supposed to have happened to this empire, bothas a symptom and exacerbating cause of its decline under the pressure of external attack (especially by the Vikings) and enmities within the dynasty itself.

The key term in this story was the fief. Counts were the principal representatives of the king-emperor at the local level; they held court, dispensed justice, protected the ruler's estates, mustered the army when necessary, and generally communicated the ruler's orders to the free population. They were sustained by a temporary grant of land and rights known as a benefice (Latin: *beneficium*), which they exploited for as long as their appointment to that particular county lasted. This benefice is carefully distinguished in Carolingian legislation from a count's own property (Latin: *proprium*). That was because the benefice was a perquisite of office; when office became hereditary, which it did as tenth-century West-Frankish rulers lost more and more control over the regions, so did the benefice. From the early eleventh century onward and with increasing frequency, that word beneficium tends to be replaced by the word *feudum* or "fief" in the surviving documentation. This is why the fief always kept that aura of coercive jurisdiction in later centuries, at least as far as lawyers were concerned: It had begun as a form of payment for a public official, defined as such by his exercise of the king's powers in the king's name. Duby's lapidary comment refers to the next stage in the degeneration or "privatisation" of the originally public authority of the ruler. The count himself had already lost control to a lower echelon of violent and parasitic armed men, who by usurpation and other forms of force, had parceled out what remained of the count's powers and settled themselves in fortified settlements, thence and henceforth to dominate, as vassals of the more or less powerless count, the remnants of the free Frankish people and slowly depress their status to that of serfs. Thus is born the late-medieval landscape of a multiecheloned military aristocracy and dependent peasantry.

This is what historians mean by the expression "juridical feudalism": The fief in this vision of things is a *legal* institution, describable in the colorless terms of jurisprudence as a form of property that was held by a vassal from a lord, heritably, in return for military service, implying some (usually formal and weak) power of jurisdiction by the lord over the vassal, and allowing the vassal rights of exploitation not only over land but frequently over people too. As concomitants to the pristine distinctions of a more or less legalistic vocabulary ran brutal social and economic realities of astonishing longevity. The sum of both was feudalism.

Challenging the Notion of the Fief

Every element of the previous story has been challenged, some of them from as early as the sixteenth century, when humanist philologists and lawyers hypothesized Roman instead of Frankish origins for the fief and vassal. In more recent historical scholarship, the count of supposedly public Carolingian character has often been revealed to be a local strong man, enjoying a private or, better, *informal* hegemony, rather than tidily delegated powers of the ruler. The validity of the distinction between private and public coercion is hard to maintain against the results of detailed research into the dynamics of power in the early medieval period. Some efforts have also been made—albeit with less success—to question the legal distinction between the benefice/fief and other forms of property. Local variation over such a vast area as the Carolingian Empire has also been emphasized repeatedly; the story of Western Europe is not entirely the story of the West Franks, that is, the French. What cannot reasonably be denied, however, is the importance from the early eleventh century onward of vassalage and its concomitant, lordship. Literally thousands of documents from all over Western Europe imply a close, though of

course not uniform, relationship between oaths of fidelity, often homage, vassalage, fiefs, and lords. No adequate account of this period in European history could be given that did not ascribe central if not definitive importance to such phenomena in many regions, although certainly not all. Not to recognize this would be to waste the hint that eleventh-century authors themselves give us, for they were much exercised by the implications of vassalage. True, it will not do to posit the state as the counterpart and antonym of feudal relationships between lord and vassal, but other words, truer to the time and its sources, can serve instead.

From the later twelfth century onward, those words would often be found in the texts of Roman law. The demise of feudalism in the West has often been associated with the rise of Roman law conceptions of public power. Roman law is supposed to present a *quasi-absolutist* vision of the relationship between rule and subjection, because the Roman law harks back to the period when the Roman Empire (the real one, rather than its Carolingian imitation) still existed in all its authoritarian might. Historians of political ideas frequently contrast the period of absolutism with the putatively "constitutional" feudal period immediately preceding it, that is, the later Middle Ages. The association of the feudal with the constitutional arises from the notion that the feudal relationship between lord and vassal was contractual: A lord could only demand so much from his vassal. Moreover, several influential legal texts from the twelfth century onward imply or actually state that a vassal may legally attack his lord under certain circumstances, such as for denial of justice or for confiscation of the fief without due cause and a preceding judgment of a properly constituted court. Of course, this vision of things relies on the reduction of all of the most important political relationships between rulers and subjects to the relationship of lord and vassal, and some historians, among them some of the very best, have explicitly defended this proposition, on the grounds that a medieval king's most important subjects were usually vassals, military aristocrats, his natural advisers and companions. The rise of the state is seen as the nemesis of feudalism, in the strict sense that the state is supposed to have arisen on feudal foundations, as rulers exploited the few resources that remained to them as feudal lords over noble vassals and welded them into that complex amalgam of legal and liturgical elements known as later medieval kingship. Once again, the story is worryingly and misleadingly French, but beyond territorial myopia there are strong grounds for questioning a reconstruction of events that posits such a passage from feudalism to absolutism. Crucially, Roman law could be put into the service of antiauthoritarian theories of government in which an abstract or corporate people emerged as the true ruler. Such theories constitute some of the quintessentially *medieval* contributions to the history of political theory, yet they have little or nothing to do with "feudal" conceptions of contractarian rulership and justified resistance.

Feudalism therefore seems to be vulnerable both at the end as well as the beginning. But this does not evacuate it of all meaning and utility in the study of political thought and medieval European institutions. On the contrary, provided some shibboleths are abandoned, it becomes hard to do without a concept of feudalism. Roman law conceptions were not univocally authoritarian; the uses to which the lord-vassal relationship was put in various polemical and reflective works were not exclusively corrosive of authority—so much for the shibboleths. Indeed, feudal terminology underpins some of the most virulently authoritarian political programs of the later Middle Ages, just as Roman law could support popular and consensual politics. Yet this is precisely why we cannot afford to ignore feudal terminology, still less to sublimate it into broader categories of vocabulary and effectively dissolve it as a specific term. Medieval thinkers knew they were tapping a subtly different source when they argued from and about lords, vassals, and their mutual obligations. Henry D'Souza and Baldus de Ubaldis were, respectively, experts in canon and Roman law; one might expect them to have subordinated all reality to the analytical categories with which, as lawyers, they had grown up. Yet each recognized in his own way that there was something different about fiefs and vassals, together with the structure of obligations that gave them shape and meaning; it would be arrogant to assume that we know more about their civilization than they did.

Magnus Ryan

See also Community; Corporation Theory; Hierocratic Arguments; Oaths; Roman Law

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Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762–1814)

Born on May 19, 1762, in Rammenau, Saxony, Johann Gottlieb Fichte was one of the most remarkable and yet most neglected modern political thinkers. Son of an impoverished weaver, a young Fichte became a protégé of a local aristocrat who enabled him to get an education at the universities of Jena and Leipzig. In 1790, while in Leipzig, Fichte read Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason,* which led him not only to abandon a Baruch Spinoza–type determinism, but also to acquire a new understanding of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. From this point on, Fichte claimed to be a "Kantian," and saw his own work as a clarification of the views held by his great predecessor. Nonetheless, Fichte was an original thinker in his own right.

What Fichte found groundbreaking in Kant's work was the idea of moral freedom, of the autonomy of the moral subject. What he rejected was the distinction Kant made between appearance and the "thing in itself," and, correspondingly, between theoretical and practical reason. In Fichte's view, these distinctions established a rift in our conception of man and of the world, and thus undermined the unity of Kant's philosophy. More importantly, however, they threatened to deliver human practice over to the iron necessity of natural laws.

In his quest to salvage freedom, Fichte rejected Kant's logical formalism and negative dialectic, which assumed the existence of the unknowable "thing in itself," and developed a tripartite subject-object dialectic grounded in a social and historical movement. Accordingly, he turned his attention away from nature and natural science, so important to Kant, and built his system around an ethical, historical, and political problematic. Finally, when seeking the one fundamental principle of Kant's transcendental idealism, and thus of all being, he found it in the freedom of self-creative consciousness. He thereby completed Kant's "Copernican revolution," and pursued Cartesian metaphysics of subjectivity to its most radical consequences.

Man was neither a fact nor a substance, according to Fichte, but an act. Foreshadowing twentieth-century existentialism, Fichte claimed that it is through activity that the subject posits itself. This was in radical opposition to René Descartes, who took thinking as his starting point. Furthermore, practical activity was for Fichte the foundation of everything that is and is a source of all experience, knowledge, and thinking. In this creative process, however, the subject is always already limited by something other than itself, which it experiences as resistance or negation. The opposition thus established is resolved in the synthesis of the subject and its other (thesis and antithesis), which always results in the production of new oppositions. Fichte held that by revealing the historical creation and mutual conditioning of opposites as the fundamental structure of all being, he did away with the external opposition of consciousness and being, and thus with the dualisms that plague Kant's philosophy.

This dialectic of self-creation was also the source of Fichte's thinking about human culture and society. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Fichte's entire system was a reaction to the French Revolution and its philosophical implications—so much so that, in his early writings, he grounded the possibility of revolution in the very essence and meaning of human existence, namely in freedom. For Fichte, revolution was a sort of a permanent activity, for one must permanently work on liberating

oneself from external determination, a task one can never fully complete. It is from this standpoint that Fichte interpreted the theory of natural law: Insofar as it is seen as a right to freedom, revolution was for Fichte an inalienable human right, and thus always legitimate. From the same standpoint, Fichte launched into an extensive critique of conservatism, especially that inspired of Edmund Burke, and of its historicism and empiricism.

However, a life in freedom cannot be fought for only by individuals, even though Fichte stated explicitly that the right to revolution belonged to each and every one of them (he later limits it to peoples). According to Fichte, man is destined to live in society, he should live in society, and he is an incomplete and contradictory individual if he lives in isolation. Only in society can man be free.

Guided by the ideals of the French Revolution, Fichte understood political freedom as self-determination and, more particularly, as self-legislation. Under the strong influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, he appropriated the theory of the social contract; the contract is always alterable, and everyone has a right to withdraw from it. Thus founded, the state is understood as a mere means, its sole task being the realization of a "culture towards freedom." Far from being man's purpose, the state was, according to Fichte, a necessary obstacle to freedom, one that withers away as it fulfills its task.

Fichte wrote about this task in greater detail in his work on the closed commercial state. He demanded the satisfaction of, at least, the basic needs of all citizens (proper food, clothing, housing), a planned production and consumption, the right to work in humane conditions, and an extension of leisure time. Influenced by John Locke, Fichte saw private property as based in labor. He was for equality and against privileged classes, for a form of economic and political self-management and against the anarchy of the world market. Fichte promoted elements of state socialism, whose ultimate task was to help create an autonomous individual.

Although there are certain other elements in this picture that could alarm a contemporary reader sensitive to the experiences of totalitarianism, it was Fichte's last writings on the state that acquired a more pronounced (and perhaps disturbing) tutelary aspect. In his search for the possibility and the source of emancipation, Fichte invoked the enlightened leader as an educator and possessor of legitimate force. His role, however, diminishes in proportion to the emancipation of his constituency.

In all his writings, which differ considerably and thus lend themselves to different interpretations (besides a Jacobin and a socialist, Fichte has been labeled a nationalist and even a protofascist), Fichte was always concerned with one question alone: the complete realization of human freedom. In that sense, his work exhibited not only the priority of practical over theoretical reason and of ethics over politics, but also an understanding of politics as a realization of philosophy. The latter two aspects constitute a radical negation of Machiavellianism (even though at one point Fichte did approve of it in international affairs).

Fichte was often seen merely as a transitional figure between Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, especially in the development of idealism and the historical subject-object dialectic. Nonetheless, the importance Fichte assigned to human practice, freedom, and revolution, as well as to the practical power of philosophical thinking had a direct influence on Marxist tradition, as did the expressly emancipatory character of his work, its future-directedness, his socialism, and his critique of the state. His near-heroic personality forever changed our understanding of philosophical existence.

Fichte died on January 29, 1814, in Berlin, Germany.

Miloš Petrović

See also Emancipation; Kant, Immanuel; Liberalism; Marx, Karl; Revolution; Social Contract Theory; Socialism; State

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Filangieri, Gaetano (1752–1788)

Known today mainly as a precursor of modern constitutionalism whose ideas possibly influenced Benjamin Franklin, Gaetano Filangieri was a Neapolitan nobleman who failed to complete his magnum opus *La Scienza della Legislazione* (1780–1791) before his premature death from tuberculosis. In 1774, Filangieri published a minor work *Riflessioni politiche* to support the legal reform project of Bernardo Tanucci in his native Naples. In the same years, as short texts in contemporary Italian journals show, his main project developed.

Precisely at the time when the breakdown of legal common ground between the British and French perspectives on the interstate system took place, *La Scienza della Legislazione* spread throughout Europe and was recognized by influential thinkers on both parts of the opening divide as in tune with their own views. While Europe went to war, Filangieri gained a reputation as a new baron de Montesquieu. Filangieri, however, made a point of his disagreement with Montesquieu, who had treated the legal remnants of the past and the customs that had grown in the course of European history since the fall of the Roman Empire as a legitimate and natural basis for the growth of modern law and government.

Filangieri saw the complex history of Europe as the cause of social and economic disorders, as well as of the Anglo-French "Jealousy of Trade," which as the most recent instantiation of backfiring self-interested politics had caused two world wars. Yet, what made *La Scienza della Legislazione* an important text in late eighteenth-century political thought was Filangieri's insistence that the reform movements of the Enlightenment tended themselves to replicate the confusions of the European legal-political system that they set out to eliminate. Filangieri criticized Jean-Baptiste Colbert financiers and was sympathetic to the marquis de Mirabeau and the reform spirit of the physiocrats. Nonetheless, he accepted commerce, luxury, and inequality as foundations of modern societies. What was required first, in order to reconcile trade and the nation-state and eventually to be able to reform international politics, was a profound "scientific" reconsideration of the moral philosophical foundations of modern law and government and to bring this theory together in one frame with the actual history and current practice of the political and legal system of modern Europe. The confrontation between theory and practice, as the project of Filangieri's science advanced, was to result in a detailed legal reform program for European nation-states and their interaction as a system.

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See also Absolutism; Commercial Society; Constitutionalism; Enlightenment; Feudalism; Montesquieu, Baron de; State of Nature

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Force

Force is a term that encompasses several related concepts. In its most basic meaning, it describes any physical influence on an object, especially one that changes its motion. In the sense of violence or the potential for violence, it can refer to wrongful acts that endanger, injure, or destroy the property, freedom, or life of a person, as well as such acts against the larger community. It can also describe

the legitimate force used by a government to preserve order. The distinction between legitimate force and violence is not always clear, and much of the discourse on the subject revolves around this dichotomy. A good sense of the origins of the debate can be gained from a brief comparison of three ancient notions of force.

Aristotle on Force

Max Weber's definition of the modern state as the institution that has a monopoly of legitimate force for a given territory provides a useful framework in which to examine ancient Greek views on force. The question of what makes a force legitimate occupies several of Aristotle's works. In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle distinguishes between voluntary actions of an individual and two kinds of involuntary actions: mixed actions, which an individual chooses because of threats or extreme pressure, and forced actions, in which there is no freedom of choice at all. These roughly correspond to the modern legal categories of coercion and compulsion. Elsewhere, Aristotle argues that anything that is forced is contrary to nature, and that anything contrary to nature in the sphere of social conduct is unjust, which together appear to imply that forced actions are unjust and therefore legitimate force cannot exist. But it is unclear whether this argument applies to mixed actions and how it changes in the case of groups or governments.

In *The Politics,* Aristotle addresses the latter issue by describing the role of force in his ideal type of government, the monarchy. The king should have a force around him through which he can compel those unwilling to obey. This force should be stronger than any individual or small group, but weaker than the people as a whole. This prevents the kingship from becoming a tyranny, because a correct form of government serves the common advantage of its citizens. Aristotle then lists another set of legitimate purposes for maintaining an armed force in any correct form of government (monarchy, aristocracy, polity): self-defense, exercising leadership in foreign affairs to benefit those who are ruled rather than harm them, and mastery over slaves. The second purpose appears to sanction imperialism through military force, but the emphasis on benefiting those ruled is consistent with the domestic aims of his ideal government. The difficulty lies in whose determination of benefit should apply.

Thucydides on Force

In his work, *History of the Peloponnesian War,* Thucydides offers a memorable example of the problem of legitimate and illegitimate force. In the Melian dialogue, the Athenians threaten to kill every adult male on the neutral island of Melos and enslave the women and children if they do not submit to their hegemony and pay tribute. The Melians attempt to engage in a debate about neutrality and international law, but are rebuked with the classic formulation of realism: The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they must. Only equally strong parties can discuss justice. The Melians refuse to surrender and are eventually destroyed. The Athenians ultimately behave in a way that is inconsistent with Aristotle's account of the legitimate use of force for the benefit of those ruled, but the initial attempt at coercion is ambiguous. The Melians are a former Spartan colony hostile toward Athenian imperialism, so the Athenians could claim self-defense as a justification for their threat of force. On the other hand, their claim that might makes right may reflect Aristotle's third use of legitimate force, mastery over slaves. To the Athenians, the weakness of the Melians combined with their reluctance to submit makes them fit to be slaves.

Force in the Bible

The Hebrew Bible is not univocal in its treatment of legitimate force and violence, but there is a clear sense that only God's authority can guarantee legitimacy. In addition to the Torah's system of retributive justice for individual crimes, which regularly entails physical force as a punishment, the Bible also contains clear examples of collective violence. God regularly uses extreme force to restore the world, and later Israel, as in the case of the Flood or the plagues in Egypt. In the Deuteronomic history, God often demands the total destruction of a particular enemy of Israel, placing them under the ban or proscription. Unwillingness to comply with God's commands in these cases can be disastrous, as when Saul is rejected as King of Israel because he refuses to

destroy Amalek. Likewise, unsanctioned use of force is punished harshly, regardless of the status of the person using it. When King David arranges for the death of Uriah in battle to cover up his affair with Bathsheba, God responds by killing their infant son and condemning David's family to internecine strife. When God is not involved, the legitimacy of force is ambiguous. After the rape of their sister Dinah by Shechem, two sons of Jacob kill the culprit and all the males of his town. Jacob rebukes his sons for making trouble with the inhabitants of the land. Because the episode takes place before the revelation of the law code, without an explicit intervention by God, there is no way to determine whether their violence qualifies as a legitimate use of force.

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See also Aristotle; Imperialism; Just War Theory; Realism; Thucydides; Tyranny; Violence

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Foucault, Michel (1926–1984)

Michel Foucault is best known in political theory for his discussions of power and knowledge during the 1970s. *Discipline and Punish* (1977); *The History of Sexuality, Volume One* (1978); and the interviews and lectures reprinted in *Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, Volume 3* (2000) were widely acclaimed for extending the sphere of the political to include the variety of ways in which individuals were constructed as certain kinds of subject and for showing how relations of power were embedded in all kinds of social relations, including those between parents and children, men and women, doctors and patients, and teachers and pupils. In contrast to normative political theory's concern with the nature, limits, and legitimate exercise of power, he insisted on a descriptive analysis of power focused on the means by which it is exercised. These included the disciplinary techniques deployed in workshops, factories, armies, schools, and prisons from the sixteenth century onward, as well as the techniques relating to sexual behavior employed within families, churches and various kinds of medical practice up to and including psychoanalysis. *Discipline and Punish* provided a meticulous analysis of the various spatial and temporal techniques of disciplinary power, symbolized by Jeremy Bentham's architectural design for a panopticon prison that would ensure continuous surveillance of any kind of institution involving multiple inmates.

Foucault's focus on power relations at the extremities of the social body sought to divert attention away from the traditional figure of sovereign power. Yet he was well aware that micropolitical techniques were not the only or even the most important ways of exercising power in modern industrial societies. At the end of *The History of Sexuality, Volume One* and in his final 1976 lecture, he drew attention to the emergence of another kind of power directed at the conditions that sustain life. This new form of "biopower" took shape during the latter half of the eighteenth century and was accompanied by new forms of statistical, epidemiological, and economic knowledge. It became the focus of his lectures at the Collège de France from 1977 to 1979 and the point of departure for an approach to the political domain quite different to that adopted during the first half of the 1970s. He undertook the study of "governmentality," by which he meant the ways in which the exercise of political sovereignty was theorized, partly in order to show that his approach to power could equally be applied to the government of populations and economic management of an entire society. His governmentality lectures approach the state from the perspective of the technologies of power that have determined its functions and influenced its development, in a manner that parallels his indirect approach to other institutions, such as the asylum or the prison. Against what he referred to as the "state phobia" widespread in contemporary political thought,

Foucault argued that the central political problem today is not the state but the forms of power that have made it what it is. He views the state as the effect or historical residue of the tactics of governmentality that have defined its areas of competence and solidified in its institutions. While these lectures have given rise to an extensive literature of "governmentality studies," much of this has tended to remain descriptive and sociological in character (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006). The publication of these lectures requires a major reassessment of the significance of Foucault's work for normative political theory.

Power and Freedom

Foucault's analyses of micropolitical techniques of power for the coercion, control, and training of individual bodies challenged both the Marxism that informed much of French political thought at this time and the "juridical" theory that provided the historical and conceptual framework of liberal normative approaches to power. Where Marxism tended to treat institutional forms of power as superstructural phenomena necessary for the perpetuation of relations of production and class domination, Foucault drew attention to the ubiquity and relative autonomy of power relations. He advocated an inversion of the direction in which power was analyzed, such that power relations were not understood from the perspective of the sovereign instance or global forms of class domination, but rather described at the extremities of the social order in their particular institutional forms. In this manner, the local forms of power exercised over servants, workers, or the mentally ill were understood as supports on which global political power rested, rather than as effects of state or class domination. The social field appeared as a complex fabric of power relations, woven according to identifiable strategies but without reference to a unique strategist. In the *History of Sexuality, Volume One,* he described a number of such strategies in relation to individuals and populations and strongly criticized, on empirical as well as conceptual grounds, the idea that power was essentially repressive. Far from repressing sexual behavior and discourse about sex, he argued, the modern deployment (*dispositif*) of sexuality has incited and multiplied both.

Where the classical social contract accounts of the origin and limits of sovereignty conceived of power as something like a commodity that individuals possessed and could transfer, Foucault insisted that power was a consequence of relations between physical, institutional, and ideational forces, and that it existed only in the forms of its exercise at different levels of social interaction. He sought to describe power in terms of the techniques and tactics of its exercise in a manner that was not tied to juridical sovereignty or the institution of the state. Initially, Foucault paid no attention to the normative dimensions of the concept of power, focusing instead on the mechanisms and techniques by means of which individual and group domination was effectively achieved. He was widely criticized for his failure to distinguish between domination and benign forms of the exercise of power and for his failure to provide normative grounds for the justification or condemnation of power relations. Jürgen Habermas summed up the view of critics such as Nancy Fraser, Charles Taylor, Richard Rorty, Michael Walzer, Herbert Dreyfus, and Paul Rabinow when he argued in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1987) that Foucault's critical project was incoherent by virtue of the lack of explicit normative foundations: Without these, it amounted to nothing more than an historiographic presentism, a moral and political relativism and the expression of an arbitrary preference for certain kinds of resistance to power.

In an afterword to Dreyfus and Rabinow's influential work *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (1983) titled "The Subject and Power," Foucault responded to these criticisms and set out a detailed analysis of the concept that substantially modified his approach and his terminology. He sought to clarify his differences with the liberal view that sees power as essentially independent of and opposed to the freedom of individuals. For this tradition, the exercise of power is justified only under certain conditions, such as the consent of those over whom it is exercised or the establishment of legitimate political authority. By contrast, his approach drew on thinkers such as Baruch Spinoza and Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, for whom power is constitutive of freedom. On this view, social relations always and everywhere involve power relations

and the exercise of power can be defined in terms of the different ways in which the action of individuals or groups amounts to action on the action of others. Individuals or groups exercise power over others when they act in such a way as to affect the field of possible actions by others. Foucault drew on his discovery of the sixteenth-century proliferation of discourses on ecclesiastical, pedagogical, economic, and political arts of "government," using this term in its early modern sense to refer to all of the ways in which one could act on the possibilities for action of others, for example, by developing or hindering the capacities they acquire or by expanding or limiting the possible courses of action open to them. In short, he now defined the exercise of power as government, where to govern means to structure the possible field of action of others.

Foucault's reorientation of his thinking about power was also informed by the genealogy of the conception of power relations as essentially warlike and involving struggle between contending force undertaken in his 1975–1976 lectures, *"Society Must be Defended"* (2003). This led him to abandon the terminology of bodies and forces, which he had employed in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality, Volume One,* in favor of the view that power is only exercised over another insofar as the other is recognized and treated as a free subject capable of action. In other words, his revised definition implies that power is exercised only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free to act in a variety of ways. This definition allows him to provide a reason for his earlier claims regarding the coextensivity of power and resistance, because it implies that there will always be a spectrum of possible responses to the exercise of power on the part of those over whom it is exercised, ranging from compliance to resistance or outright challenge. In this sense, he argues that there is an "agonism" at the heart of all power relations.

Foucault's modifications of his concept of power go some way to address the criticisms of Habermas and others that he cannot meaningfully distinguish acceptable from unacceptable forms of power. Whereas his earlier studies of technologies of power neglected important differences between the exercise of power over individuals and populations and the exercise of violence or the maintenance of structures of domination, his revised definition of power in terms of the government of the conduct of others enabled him to distinguish clearly between different kinds of power, such as enslavement, domination, or merely affecting the conduct of others. At one extreme, there is the relatively free play of antagonistic actions and reactions in which neither side is assured of superiority because reversal is always a possibility. At the other extreme are relatively fixed relations of domination and subordination where one party's room to maneuver is severely curtailed. In between lies the range of more or less effective ways of directing or governing the conduct of others.

Despite these modifications, Foucault's approach remains focused on the descriptive task of understanding what forms are assumed by the exercise of power and how these might be changed, rather than the normative task of justification or condemnation. However, his subsequent discussions of the moral and political grounds for resistance to particular forms of power suggest a novel kind of response to the demand for normative grounds raised by many critics of his earlier work on power, namely that such grounds are often derived from existing discourses of moral or political right. For example, his 1975–1976 lectures *"Society Must Be Defended"* retrace the vicissitudes of an adversarial discourse of right that grounded its claims in history rather than natural law. He relies on a similarly historical conception of normative grounds for action when he suggests at the end of the second lecture (January 14, 1976) that the appeal to sovereign rights is ineffective against disciplinary power because the system of sovereign right had long functioned alongside discipline, concealing it while continuing to legitimate the exercise of state power. It is as though these were two distinct but intertwined poles of power that functioned in concert: a series of disciplinary coercions that ensured the cohesion of the social body and with a structure of public right built on the principle of sovereignty. The same historical conception of normativity is illustrated by his analysis in his 1977–1978 lectures, *Security, Territory, Population* (2007), of the forms of "counter-conduct" that flourished alongside the institutions and practices of pastoral power in medieval and early modern Europe, and by his parallel remarks about the forms of resistance to modern governmentality

between the late eighteenth and the early twentieth century. His studies of forms of governmentality at the end of the 1970s provide further evidence of his commitment to this kind of contextually grounded criticism. Resistance to political power cannot be content with the denunciation of violence or reason in general, or with the condemnation of the state as such, but rather must question its existing forms. There are no universal grounds for resistance to political power, only particular grounds embedded in a given historical and discursive context. That is why Foucault argues in "What Is Critique?" that it is helpful to understand resistance to power as the art of not being governed or the art of not being governed in a particular way and at a particular cost (*The Politics of Truth,* 2007). The political task, in his view, is not the rejection of power as such, but the criticism of certain ways of being governed.

Governmentality

Foucault's 1977–1978 lectures set out to explore how the fundamental biological features of the human species became objects of political strategy through the development of techniques for the government of populations and management of events that threatened their security, such as food scarcity and disease. However, from the fourth lecture onward, he realigned the study of these security mechanisms within the broader framework of a history of "governmentality" (*Security, Territory, Population,* 2007). Initially, this term referred to the range of institutions, procedures, analyses, calculations, and tactics that were involved in the eighteenth-century government of populations. However, he quickly expanded the scope of his study of "governmentality" by proposing to retrace the different forms of governmental reason that have informed the exercise of European state power since the sixteenth century and that continue to delineate the objectives and methods of modern political government. In this manner, he outlines some elements of a genealogy of modern state government.

Chronologically, the story begins with Christian pastoral techniques for guiding the conduct of individuals. Foucault traced the origins of the individualizing tendency of modern political government to the Hebraic conception of the relationship of shepherd and flock, which was incorporated into Christian pastoral power. This paradoxical form of power individualized by granting as much value to a single sheep as to the entire flock. While the church's exercise of this pastoral power declined after the eighteenth century, Foucault points out that elements of the shepherd–flock relationship remain in the modern state's responsibility for the welfare of individuals. Western societies, he suggests, are unique in their reliance on this "strange technology of power treating the vast majority of men as a flock with a few as shepherds" ("*Omnes et singulatim*" in *Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, Volume 3*).

A key turning point in the formation of modern governmental reason was the emergence of the doctrine of raison d'état at the end of the sixteenth century. Foucault pointed to the emergence of a concern with an autonomous art of political government in a series of anti-Machiavellian texts. These marked the appearance of a type of government that was no longer subject to the requirements of a divine order or the particular interests of a monarch. Foucault suggests that this was an event in the history of Western reason no less important than the revolution in natural science associated with Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei, and René Descartes. Initially, raison d'état was a conservative doctrine that sought above all to maintain the integrity of the state. Although it recognized the need to increase the power of the state through diplomatic alliances, military force, and the circulation of money and goods through commerce (mercantilism), it was not preoccupied with the increase of the state's power and did not take population as the specific object of government. The new arts of specifically political government only acquired their full scope and consistency in the course of the eighteenth century, when population came into focus as the true object of government. Whereas earlier conceptions of government took as their object the territory and its inhabitants conceived as subjects of the sovereign, the eighteenth century saw the discovery of population as an entity in its own right, with its own regularities, rates of death and disease, and cycles of scarcity and abundance. From this point onward, the aim of government was not just to ensure peace and order within the borders of a particular territory, but to improve the condition of the population, to

increase its wealth, longevity, and health. Such a new kind of action on the field of action of populations rather than individuals required new kinds of knowledge, such as statistics and political arithmetic, and new techniques, such as those provided by the means of ensuring security against food scarcity, urban disorder, and disease. The body of doctrine that spelled out the means of enhancing the power of the state by attending to all aspects of the welfare of its population was the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century science of police. According to classic texts such as Nicolas de la Mare's *Traité de la Police* (1705–1719) and Johann von Justi's *Grundsätze de Policey-Wissenschaft* (1756), the state should regulate all aspects of the lives of its citizens, not only roads, public safety, health, and supplies but also religion, morals, and the liberal arts. Von Justi defined police very broadly to include all the laws and regulations concerning the internal life of a state, including those that seek to strengthen and increase its power, to make good use of its forces, and to ensure the happiness of its subjects. Insofar as it was concerned with the welfare and well-being of each citizen, police government was also an individualizing power.

Liberalism

Foucault's 1978–1979 lectures, *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008), analyzed liberalism as the form of governmental reason that sustained the emergence of biopolitical power. In some respects, liberal governmentality represented a significant departure from the principles of raison d'état and the science of police because it introduced new objects, knowledge, and techniques of government. Against the idea that the population was an object in need of detailed and constant regulation, liberalism advanced conceptions of civil society and the economy as naturally self-regulating systems. Government should confine itself to establishing mechanisms that respect the laws of these natural phenomena with the fundamental objective of ensuring the security of economic or other processes intrinsic to populations. Whereas the science of police operated on the assumption that there is never enough regulation, liberalism operated on the principle that there is always too much government. Foucault argued that, from the eighteenth century onward, liberalism provided a framework both for the criticism of techniques of government and the reinvention of those techniques. The most important reinventions of liberalism in the twentieth century were inspired by one of the key mechanisms identified as a natural limit to the power of government, namely the market.

Out of the 12 lectures given in 1979, seven were devoted to the examination of two contrasting approaches to the role of the market and the kinds of government intervention required to sustain it: the Ordoliberalism that inspired the postwar reconstruction of a market economy in the German Federal Republic and American Chicago School neoliberalism. Part of the reason for this turn to contemporary political history lay in Foucault's critical engagement with views common among the French left at this time. Chief among these was an essentialist conception of the state that regarded administrative, welfare, bureaucratic, fascist, and totalitarian forms of state as expressions of the same underlying form, endowed with the same intrinsic tendency to expand and take over all that remains of civil society. Versions of this conception could be found in Marxist theories of the state as an instrument of class domination, as well as in anarcho-Nietzschean theories of the state as the coldest of all cold monsters. Foucault's primary objection to this "state phobic" conception is that it allows its protagonists to deduce critical analyses from first principles and avoid altogether the need for empirical and historical knowledge of contemporary political reality. Its proponents were largely unaware of the history of suspicion of the state from its origins in German Ordoliberalism between the world wars. His genealogy of neoliberal governmentality thus served as an instance of the broader strategy that he describes as putting knowledge of the past to work on the experience of the present.

Foucault's critical remarks about state phobia directed at his own intellectual milieu are offered from the position of a citizen engaged in the background culture of politics. John Rawls distinguishes the background political culture within which citizens argue about all kinds of things related to the political and the public good, including theories of justice and the nature and business of government, from public reason proper, within which citizens, legislators, and government officials argue about constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice (*Political Liberalism,* 2005).

The crucial difference is that in public reason, citizens are constrained by the publicly acceptable conceptions of justice. In a well-ordered and pluralist society, citizens must offer rationalities to one another in terms that all can reasonably be expected to endorse. This conception of public reason is normative in the sense that it expresses an ideal view of the manner in which citizens of a democratic society should relate to one another, but also quasi-empirical to the extent that the limits of public reason, the political values that provide the contours of public reason in a given society at a given point in its history, will ultimately depend on the considered judgments of the society along with the background culture that sustains efforts to systematize such judgments in a political conception of justice.

Rawls and other theorists of public reason do not pay much attention to the ways in which political power can be exercised over and above certain minimal constraints imposed by his theory of justice. Any legitimate sovereign government will have to maintain security, stability, and equality of opportunity while maximizing the production of primary social goods subject to equal and just distribution of those goods. In Foucault's terms, this approach does not concern itself with the "how" of power, even though it is clear that it should do so because large swathes of public policy bear directly on questions of basic justice. At this point, Foucault's analyses of liberal and neoliberal governmentality provide an important supplement to Rawlsian conceptions of public reason. They draw attention to a dimension of political culture that is only marginally present in Rawls's own account, namely conceptions of the nature, purposes, and methods of government and of the ways in which these impact on the basic structure of society and its public policies. They draw attention to a kind of discourse about the nature and function of government that, although it may not form part of public reason itself, is capable of inspiring a range of contributions to public reason on matters of basic justice.

Foucault's account of German and American neoliberal governmentality identifies some of the elements of contemporary public reason and shows how these emerged in the postwar period. Because these lectures were delivered at the end of the 1970s, the marketization of national economies through competition policy and privatization of public services has continued to develop as neoliberal policy has become orthodoxy in most Western capitalist countries. They provide a historical account of the terms in which these debates about public policy took shape in capitalist democracies and point to an important vector of change in the boundaries of public reason during the twentieth century. The founding texts of neoliberal governmentality do not fall within the sphere of public reason narrowly defined, but nor do they fall within the sphere of the background political culture. They occupy an ambivalent place in between background culture and public reason, forming a kind of historically moveable border region that Rawls occasionally refers to as "public political culture." Background culture includes all of the kinds of nonpublic reasons found in churches, universities, scientific societies, and professional groups. It includes the philosophical theories in terms of which philosophers might theorize the political domain, along with the historical, philosophical, and moral theories that inform certain kinds of political parties. By contrast, public political culture refers to the fundamental political ideas current within a given society at a given time. These will include the kinds of ideas about the appropriate functions and techniques of government that Foucault considers under the rubric of governmentality. If the boundaries of public reason are historically mobile by virtue of changes over time in the comprehensive moral beliefs of citizens and to the family of reasonable political conceptions of justice, then Foucault shows us how these boundaries are also mobile by virtue of changes in public political culture and its impact on policy. To the extent that neoliberal ideas have emerged from the pages of academic journals and semiprivate forums to become the guiding principles of government throughout the capitalist world, they have progressed from background culture to public reason proper. In directing our attention to these ideas, Foucault's analyses of liberal and neoliberal governmentality enlarge our understanding of the discursive and normative frameworks within which contemporary sovereign power is effectively exercised.

Subjectivity and Care of the Self

In *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality, Volume One,* Foucault famously argued

that power creates subjects. In the final period of his work from 1980 until his death in 1984, he often suggested that it is not power but the subject that forms the general theme of his research. However, the real novelty of his work in this period lay in the increasing focus on different ways in which subjects are involved in the production of their own subjectivity. The hypothesis that informs his study of the Greek ethics of moderation and self-mastery in *The Use of Pleasure* (1985) is that there is a rich and complex field of historicity in the way that individuals are supposed to recognize themselves as ethical subjects of sexual conduct. In order to analyze this field, he proposed a novel conception of ethics as the form of the relation of the self to the self practiced within a given style of moral life. There are four dimensions to this relation: the part of the self or its actions that is relevant for ethical judgment (ethical substance), the manner in which the self relates to moral rules and obligations (mode of subjection), the kinds of activity undertaken on the self by the self (ethical work), and finally, the goal or type of being the self aspires to become (*telos*). This conception of ethics provides a framework for the analysis of the variety of techniques employed in ancient and Christian forms of care of the self.

The relationship between care of the self and the exercise of power was a constant theme of the ancient literature from Plato to the Stoics. Foucault took this to imply that the kind of genealogy he had undertaken in relation to governmentality must be accompanied by a genealogy of ethics in the sense previously defined. *The Care of the Self* included a chapter on the techniques of self-cultivation that flourished in the first two centuries of imperial Rome and made it a "golden age" in the history of the cultivation of the self. He devoted his 1981–1982 course, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (2005), to exploring this almost forgotten aspect of Greek and Roman culture. He argued that the reconstitution of an ethics of the self remains an indispensable task for present-day politics, if indeed it is true that there is no final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship the individual has to him or her self. His point is not that the relationship of the self to itself is the only source of resistance to political power, but rather that it is an inescapable dimension of any such resistance. For this reason, the genealogy of ethics understood as the forms of government of the self adds an important further layer to the genealogy of governmentality. Foucault's analyses of the ancient arts of caring for the self remind us that, even as subjects of power and forms of subjectivity imposed from without, we are nevertheless free to question present limits and to experiment with ways of going beyond them.

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See also Body; Genealogy; Mercantilism; Power; Rawls, John; Reason of State

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Freemasonry

Freemasonry is an international network of fraternal organizations that took their modern form in the 1710s through the 1720s and became tightly associated with the philosophical developments and social reforms of the eighteenth century. Many of the philosophers and statesmen of the Enlightenment and the American Revolution are known to have been Freemasons, including baron de Montesquieu, Voltaire, Frederick II, Claude-Adrien Helvétius, Benjamin Franklin, and George Washington; and many others have long been thought to have been. Freemasonry was an important vehicle for the transmission of the aspiration to build a civil society on the basis of nonsectarian, nondogmatic rationality, philosophy, and moral improvement. Later, it became a perennial target for opponents of rationalistic enlightened philosophy and its presumed progeny, especially the American and French Revolutions.

Current historical research suggests that freemasonry developed directly out of Scottish and English stonemason guilds—that is, the craft guilds of practicing masons. Stonemasons as craftsmen were well-versed in geometry and mathematics, and master masons practiced something close to engineering and architecture. They were also enamored of a degree of mystical rhetoric and symbolism—famously claiming, for example, that their order was founded by and included King Solomon, who taught the mystical geometric secrets that were used in the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Masonry thus offered an appealing combination of mystery and science to a late seventeenth-century world in which Isaac Newton showed the mathematical and geometric structure of the world and engaged in alchemical research.

At a more mundane level, Masonic lodges began to admit paying members from among the local educated gentry, and to offer themselves as sites for discussion of natural and moral philosophy. By 1717, when four London lodges joined together to form the Great Lodge that effectively founded modern Freemasonry, it appears that the craft guild origins of the organization had been decisively overshadowed by its speculative and intellectual present. The new form quickly spread throughout Western Europe and the British colonies in North America, and by 1750 or so was perhaps unparalleled as an international nongovernmental and nondenominational intermediate organization.

Freemasonry carried over the system of hierarchy (e.g., apprentices, masters, and grand masters) characteristic of guilds, and indeed added to it as Freemasonry became a federated collection (or sometimes rival confederated collections) of local, regional, and national bodies. This hierarchy, and the accompanying tradition that there are secrets and mysteries to be revealed only at higher levels, has often made Freemasonry suspect to democratic and egalitarian temperaments. But the hierarchy within the organization did not track hierarchical distinctions outside of it—a commoner might happen to be a higher-level initiate than a nobleman—and Freemasonry taught an egalitarian ethos within any one of its levels. Accordingly, it was frequently viewed with intense suspicion and persecution by eighteenth-century monarchs and police. The Catholic Church likewise viewed it as subversive, both of appropriate hierarchies and of orthodox belief; Freemasons were required to affirm a belief in a deity but the organization was committed to leaving denominational and sectarian struggles in the pre-enlightened past. Moreover, internal government had a strongly republican structure, and relations among lodges were governed by texts called constitutions. The apparent connections with republicanism, deism, and enlightenment, the international character of the

organization and its British roots, and its secrecy around structures and membership made it an appealing target for those worried about revolutionary or subversive conspiracies. After the French Revolution, the idea that Masonic conspiracies brought down kings became firmly entrenched in part of the popular imagination, and it has remained there ever since. There was undoubtedly an affinity between Masonic ideas and those of the revolutionary era. However, Freemasonry was strongly dedicated to a kind of moral education and improvement that clearly included law abidingness and support for civil order; and in some places, notably Prussia, it was closely connected to the established political order.

Freemasonry was understood as both the embodiment and the vanguard of a meritocratic modernity unfettered by inherited prejudices, distinctions of blood and birth, superstitious quarrels, and medieval ignorance. It modeled civil society in the eighteenth-century sense—a society of equals, governed by known laws and undivided on religious lines—even as it served as a forerunner for civil society in the twentieth-century sense of the web of intermediate voluntary organizations between the household and the state. Metaphors of light and enlightening ran not only through the century's philosophical works but also through Masonic imagery and rhetoric. Freemasonry came to stand for the enlightened philosophy of the era as a whole, and to see its reputation rise and fall along with that of the idea of enlightenment itself.

Jacob T. Levy

See also American Revolution; Civil Society; Enlightenment; Montesquieu, Baron de; Philosophes; Radical Enlightenment; Voltaire

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Freire, Paulo (1921–1997)

Paulo Reglus Neves Freire was a Brazilian educator and critical theorist who influenced the formation of critical pedagogy and educational theory worldwide, while engaging in literacy campaigns and school reform in Latin America and Africa.

Paulo Freire was born into a middle-class family in Recife, Pernambuco, of northeastern Brazil, on September 19, 1921. During the 1929 world depression, Freire's family was forced to move to nearby Jaboatao, where Freire gained an early consciousness of how poverty and hunger affect education and the community. He returned to Recife to attend a traditional, upper-class, all-male high school as a scholarship student. After high school, Freire attended law school while simultaneously studying philosophy and the sociology of language. However, instead of practicing law, Freire's interests and passion for teaching and effecting change through education persisted. Freire taught Portuguese in secondary schools, acted as director of literacy and then as school superintendent in Pernambuco until 1957. João Goulart, president of Brazil in 1961, publicly recognized the democratic and empowering effects of Freire's rural literacy program. Freire was then named director of the commission of popular culture by Goulart. However, when Goulart was disposed by a military coup d'état in 1964, Freire was accused of being a subversive, imprisoned for 70 days, exiled to Bolivia, and left soon after for Chile. In Santiago, Freire published his seminal piece, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. From 1970 to 1980, Freire worked with the World Council of Churches and collaborated with newly liberated African countries Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Cabo Verde. Freire returned to Brazil in 1980, taught at two universities, and helped to found the social democratic Workers Party. As the secretary of education for São Paulo from 1989 to 1991, Freire directly applied the pedagogy that had given impetus to the popular education of his adult

literacy programs to the formal schooling of millions of children.

Freire is the champion of critical pedagogy, and his theories and practices influence philosophers, educators, and politicians alike. He is one of the most prominent educational theorists due to his understanding of the oppressive mechanisms of capitalist education and his vision of literacy as a cultural and political tool in the struggle against such oppression. Freire's primary approach to literacy education was to pose problems having to do with his students' political and economic situation and to teach literacy as a tool for analyzing and understanding the nature of their oppression. This problem-posing education provides a sharp contrast to the top-down state and nationally mandated curriculum and the one-size-fits-all view of learning that Freire labeled "banking education." Banking education refers to schooling that treats students like passive repositories of information, rather than free and critical thinkers. Instead, Freire proposed a dialectical relationship between teacher and student in which both are learners in the educational process. Freire stressed the importance of dialogue and praxis in which participants engage in active learning for the purpose of social change. Freire's pedagogical-political practice engages students in the three-part process he called *conscientização*—critical consciousness raising—in which students "name" their world (that is, they determine for themselves the categories with which to analyze the nature of the socioeconomic system), identify their position in the world, and become transformers of this world. Freirian constructivism guides students to "read the world in the word," or to use literacy to understand and challenge the status quo rather than passively accept it. Freire explained how conscientização is a necessary condition for *revolução*—or revolution that revolves or rolls back the current government through forcible overthrow—but as a nonviolent and popular revolution based on consciousness and not physical force. Freire believed that nonviolent revolução would allow for the development of a more egalitarian system that allows the acquisition of new thoughts, ways of viewing society, and understanding one's position in that society.

Drawing from both critical theory and his faith, which was based in liberation theology, Freire revolutionized education by urging critical educators to systematically change the structure and dominant ideologies of society by reorganizing the means of production and involving workers in their own education. Freire stressed the importance of bridging mind, heart, body, and spirit in learning how to come to a new awareness of selfhood that embraces love and hope. Through such philosophy, Freire brings humanity back into education.

Although Marxist critics have sometimes pointed to Freire's Christian convictions in questioning the revolutionary nature of his thinking, the thrust of Freire's work is undeniably Marxist. Other critics have complained of inaccessible language, idealism, and a simplistic political analysis, and some have questioned the originality and practicality of his approach. However, despite such criticisms, Freire remains a critical visionary who has not only inspired millions of women and men throughout the world, but has also provided a method of hope to lovingly transform this world to a more humane and just society.

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See also Critical Theory; Latin American Marxism; Liberation Theology; Social Movements

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Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939)

Sigmund Freud, the inventor of psychoanalysis, was born in Moravia, Czechoslovakia, in 1856. His family moved to Vienna in 1860, where Freud remained until forced to flee to Britain in the aftermath of the 1938 *Anschluss*. Freud published his first work of psychoanalysis, *Studies in Hysteria* (with Josef Breuer) in 1895, after a career in neurological research and medical practice.

In his 1917 "A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis," Freud described psychoanalysis as the third great blow to human narcissism. The first was Nicolaus Copernicus's refutation of the centrality of the earth; the second was Charles Darwin's refutation of the centrality of mankind to creation. The third was Freud's discovery that people were not even central to their own mental processes: The mind cannot be equated with consciousness because most mental functioning occurs unconsciously. Against philosophical and psychological orthodoxy, Freud insisted that consciousness occurs only in *part* of the mind—what Freud termed *das Ich* (usually translated as the ego)—which only ever attains "incomplete and untrustworthy perceptions" of unconscious mental processes. Thus, the conscious, rational ego is "not master in its own house," a fact for Freud that both summarized the enormity of his discovery and explained why so many people were unwilling to accept it. Despite such resistance, psychoanalysis became one of the most influential psychological schools of the twentieth century.

Conflict and Repression

From its conception, psychoanalysis is a theory of psychic conflict. *Studies in Hysteria* was groundbreaking in attributing hysterical symptoms (a range of conditions like fainting fits, paralysis, and fugue states), not to inherited biological defects, but to psychological conflict between a person's unconscious sexual drives and his or her cultural and ethical ideals. Freud introduced "repression" as the attempt to repel from consciousness the thoughts and memories connected to such intolerable drives. The hysterical symptom emerges as a defense against the return of repressed desire; it is a "compromise formation" that allows both the desire's expression and its repudiation at once. Freud proposed that these symptoms are relieved if the unconscious conflict at the source of a symptom is made conscious. This relief was achieved through new techniques of listening to patients that were alert to symbolic meanings within symptomatic complaints. It was a "talking cure," as one of the patients in the *Studies in Hysteria,* "Anna O," succinctly dubbed it.

Dreams and Two Principles of Mental Functioning

Freud's 1900 *Interpretation of Dreams* launched the psychoanalytic theory of the mind. Freud's theory of dream interpretation demonstrates continual conflict between the unconscious sexual drives and the conscious ego's resistance to them. A dream is a symbolic representation of the dreamer's unconscious desire, rooted in repressed infantile sexuality. Freud's method did not employ universal symbols, but stressed rather the contingency and specificity of dreaming to the life of the dreamer; it is less concerned with the promulgation of a methodology by which the truth of all dreams is discovered, than with exploration of the unconscious *processes* by which the mind works. Chapter 7 of the *Interpretation* introduces Freud's "topographical" model of the mind, dominated by the "unconscious," with smaller areas of the "preconscious" and the (conscious) ego.

This model of conflict leads Freud to propose his "Two Principles of Mental Functioning" in a 1911 paper of the same name. The "pleasure principle" works according to the associative thought processes that enable dream work to escape the censorship of the ego and thus discharge accumulated tension. The "reality principle," faced with the solipsistic limits and unrealistic demands of the pleasure principle, aims at the attainment of discharge through interaction with the "real world." It instigates rational and logical thought processes. The two principles always work in concert, but Freud defines neurotics (those who develop symptoms because of psychical conflict) in terms of a "flight from reality": The pleasure

principle has drawn them away from practical engagement with "reality."

Narcissism and Melancholia

Freud's 1914 "Narcissism, an Introduction" was a major development in his thinking, shifting his focus from instinctual conflict to the relation of self and other. In narcissism, the ego itself (not just external love objects) is invested with erotic energy (libido). Freud is interested in how the ego is formed from a state, which he calls "primary narcissism," in which self and other, ego and object, cannot be distinguished (the situation of the newborn baby).

Freud proposes that repression proceeds not simply from the ego, but from an agency within the ego that contains its moral conscience and cultural standards: the "ego ideal." This ideal is drawn from criticism by parents and all the educational figures who follow. This ideal is the basis for group psychology; identification with others develops in accordance with the common ideal of a family, a class, or a nation. "Idealization" occurs when someone substitutes his or her internal ego-ideal for an *external* object, an expedient that may resolve certain internal conflicts (a "cure by love"), but one that Freud considers undesirable because it leads to a dangerous level of dependence.

"Mourning and Melancholia" (1917) develops the theory of narcissism by proposing a novel theory of "internalized object relations," according to which people identify with others by figuratively taking them into themselves, as internal objects. Thus, even a lost object relation (with the death of a lover, for instance) continues to live on inside a person. Moreover, a part of a psyche identified with an object in this way can conflict with other parts of the psyche. The neurosis of melancholia (depression) produces endless self-reproach because the melancholic person identifies with hated aspects of the lost object and punishes himself or herself for them. Thus, Freud introduces another form of conflict, based on identification rather than the drives. Freud's theories of identification have important implications for his analyses of social life and political power.

The Death Drive and the Super-Ego

The events of World War I led Freud to look beyond the conflict of the pleasure and reality principle to a theory of aggression. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) proposes an inherently self-destructive force in the mind, which Freud calls the death drive, defined as "an urge inherent in organic life to return to an earlier state of things." Aggression is this urge deflected in self-defense onto external objects. Eros, the urge to develop "higher unities," opposes the death drive. Freud subsumes sexuality within Eros, and relates it to Plato's conception of the erotic in *Phaedrus*. These two drives represent Freud's final model of dualistic instinctual conflict in the psyche.

Freud's 1926 *Ego and the Id* introduces a new "structural" model of the psyche, which supplements rather than replaces the "topographical" model of the *Interpretation of Dreams*. This new model divides the mind into three "agencies." The unconscious "id" contains the drives; it is the reservoir of psychic energy, or libido. The id conflicts with the (now *partly* conscious) ego, which defends against the drives with a number of mechanisms (including repression). The super-ego is a development of the earlier "ego ideal." It is the part of the ego that judges and criticizes, holding its moral ideals and experienced by the ego as self-observation. It is formed through the internalization of parental prohibitions and demands. The ego is thus left in an invidious position; it is caught between the ravenous id and the punitive super-ego, like a "politician" desperate to keep favor with irreconcilable factions.

Social and Political Writings

Totem and Taboo *(1914)*

Freud's more overtly social and political writings began on the eve of World War I. Freud introduces his origins myth of the social bond. From Darwin he draws the idea that prehistorically, humanity was organized in "hordes," each ruled by a "primal father" who tyrannized the other men and monopolized the women. History is inaugurated by a crime, the murder of the primal father by a band of brothers and sons. After the murder, no new father came to prominence; instead, society was organized by the equality of the brothers who established the incest taboo to ensure that women were circulated and not engrossed. But the murder was also traumatic for the brothers, who loved as well as hated their father, and the burden

of guilt was passed down the generations "phylogenetically." This guilt, and the repressed incestuous wishes underlying the taboo, Freud views as the structuring inheritance of modern social life.

Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego *(1921)*

For Freud, individual psychology *is* group psychology; he rejects theories of separate group or herd instincts. The strange behavior of crowds is not a deviation from individual psychology. It is the dominance of unconscious drives enabled by the loosening of repression that crowds experience. The ties that bind groups are not based in mutual recognition of interest, but are libidinal. Love, in its widest sense (here Freud cites Plato's Eros again), is what holds groups together.

Freud analyzes group structure in the army and the church, proposing that their libidinal bonds operate in two directions. First vertically, because an illusion is maintained of a leader who loves each member equally. Each individual identifies with his or her leader, who is idealized and placed in the position of the superego. Second, horizontally, because on the basis of this equality of love, bonds extend between the members. The formation of groups through narcissistic identification overcomes internal conflict: Each individual feels loved by the superego, while instinctual aggression is projected outward, to enemies of the group. This shared idealization of the leader as superego accounts for the extraordinary suggestibility of groups: Freud describes the relationship between a hypnotist and patient as a "group formation with two members."

Thus, the authoritarian group is structured as a dyad between leader—Freud ominously uses the word *Führer*—and members; it is a triumph of narcissism, because the ego can feel assured of love and repudiate difference as external to the group. Political absolutism is the absolutism of the ego. Freud returns to the primary social model of *Totem and Taboo* to insist that man wants to be led: He is not a herd animal, "he is rather a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde led by a chief." The fulfillment of infantile desire in the love of the leader allows for the casting out of neurotic conflict; it is an effective, if dangerous, "illusion." Freud suggests a strong parallel between religious and nationalistic fervor, and between individual and national fantasy.

The Future of an Illusion *(1927)*

Freud argues that religion is an illusion because it is the fulfillment the "oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind." Illusions are to be distinguished from error or falsehood: They are defined by their origins in the most basic, infantile desire, rather than a de facto opposition to "reality." Religion for Freud is a way of compensating for humankind's helplessness in the world, and of controlling the drives. Science ought to supersede it.

Civilization and Its Discontents *(1930)*

Freud examines why man suffers discontent (or discomfort, *Unbehagen*) in civilization. He enumerates ways in which people reconcile the demands of unconscious drives with unyielding reality, whether through narcotics, mass delusions, or neurotic flight into illness. As a means to happiness, Freud views love relations with the most optimism: If man cannot manipulate nature or his own body beyond certain limits, then at least libidinal ties might be modified. Acceptable forms of love are simply too uniformly narrow to satisfy most people. At this point, there seems to be an implied solution to man's discomfort in the reform of moral strictures and normative sexual conventions.

But from here Freud turns to a more intractable problem. Civilization also seeks to curb aggression, which is redirected back to the ego through the harsh superego. Freud calls this guilt, which is not the same as feeling bad about having committed a crime (remorse), but is rather a basic painful condition of living in civilization, forced to channel one's aggression away from others. As in *Totem and Taboo,* the superego is formed in infancy: The aggression the child feels toward the father is redirected as guilt to the child's own ego, and the superego is established as an internal agent of surveillance and punishment. This, finally, is why life in civilization is so hard to bear. It is a situation incapable of reform: Guilt is the most important problem in the development of civilization and the price of its advance. Freud insists that education fails to prepare the young not only for

the complications of sexuality, but also the inescapable aggression in all erotic relations.

Moses and Monotheism *(1938)*

Freud's last book, published in England, shifts his social analysis from collective illusions to a theory of the transmission of cultural memory through history. He controversially proposes that there were two Moses. The first was an Egyptian who introduced a monotheistic religion to the Israelites and led them from Egypt. The second Moses followed 800 years later, and synthesized Jewish monotheism with the Midianite god, Yahweh. The first Moses was murdered and (as in *Totem and Taboo*) the guilt that followed the murder became the foundation of religious law. Traditional history disavows the murder and conflates the two Moses.

Freud revises the idea of historiography, proposing that official histories are in fact histories of denial and distortion. With cultural traditions, as with symptoms, there is a latent, "material" truth to be interpreted from a "historical" truth. Freud proposes a mechanics of cultural transmission for this latent truth: Unconscious memory is inherited through the generations, just as are the instincts of the id. It is a kind of cultural Lamarckism, by which characteristics are unconsciously inherited.

After Freud

Later social and political theorists, while often critical of Freud, have turned to psychoanalysis to explain the politics of delusional systems (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari), the connections between fantasy and nationalism (Jacqueline Rose), the problem of national history (Jacques Derrida), the operations of despotic power (Elias Canetti), the dynamics of colonialism (Frantz Fanon), the performances of gender (Judith Butler), and the configurations of race (Anne Cheng).

David James Russell

See also Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm; Psychoanalysis

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FRIENDSHIP

Ideas about *friendship* (*philia* in Greek; *amicitia* in Latin) were central to Greek and Roman political thought. In the Greek world, traditional ideas of morality and justice were based on the idea that one should help friends (*philoi*) and harm enemies, an idea that is known as early as the sixth century BCE, noted by Greek poet and political reformer, Solon, and which the fourth-century BCE philosopher Plato develops and challenges in the opening chapters of his *Republic*. Earlier, in *The Lysis,* Plato had discussed the notion of friendship in terms of loving and being loved, and asks whether friendship was only possible between the good. Although Plato's treatment of the nature and morality of friendship in *The Lysis* was ultimately inconclusive, it opened the way for other discussions of friendship that explored the relationship between morality and utility in friendship. In fact, by raising the issue of what one owed to friends as the opening gambit of *The Republic,* Plato was signaling the importance of friendship to political thought, which was to have repercussions through Greek, Roman, and medieval literature and political theory.

Aristotle, for his part, in the mid- to late fourth century BCE, took up the issue systematically. In his *Politics,* he describes the city as an

"association." In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* on the other hand, he makes clear that all associations are based on "friendship," and that the state is held together by such relationships. Thus, the study of friendship as presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is fundamental to Aristotle's discussion of the state and the political life in *The Politics,* because both man is by nature a political animal who naturally wants to live in political associations, and the state is an association that aims at the highest good.

As a result, discussions of friendship were to become intrinsic to understanding the political life and a significant part of ancient political discourse. Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor at the Lyceum, wrote a (now lost) treatise *On Friendship,* which may have indirectly influenced (through the second-century BCE Stoic philosopher Panaetius of Rhodes) the work of the Roman lawyer and political thinker, Cicero, of the first century BCE, who wrote a treatise of the same name, *de Amicitia.* Another second-century BCE Stoic philosopher, Zeno of Citium, was also interested in communities and the bonds that held them together, and in his *Republic,* like Plato in his, was interested in concord and friendship.

In the first instance, however, friends and friendship for the Greeks had a wider semantic range than modern usage generally allows. For Aristotle, as for other ancient writers, friends could include not only family and comrades (for the tragedian Euripides, companions are like brothers and owe each other the responsibilities of brotherhood), but also a range of nonintimate relationships such as fellow workmen or fellow citizens, and even hereditary "ritualized friendships," which were often arranged between elite families of different cities to act as "quasi-kin" (although these relationships were also often overtly political in nature). Furthermore, side-by-side with a specialized language for relations between states, political alliances between states could also be called friendships (*philiai*). This kind of social labeling for political relationships brought with it attendant, though putative, expectations for the relationships, especially of intimacy, longevity, and durability, though these were not always fulfilled. As a result, there was a deep crossover between the political and the social, or the public and the private, and there was a general expectation that a friend in one context should also be bound by the same expectations in other contexts. This intrinsically political nature of friendship, and its potential lack of intimacy, is an idea that was rejected by the Epicureans and which Cicero later challenges in the *de Amicitia.*

Very aware of both Plato's and Aristotle's discussions, Cicero argues that friendship should be for the pursuit of virtue, not for political ends, and questions whether it is possible for an enemy to be virtuous. He also recognizes, however, the inherent danger in friendship is its manipulation for political ends. This is a point that he illustrates through those who supported Tiberius Gracchus's revolution against the state in the second century BCE, and asks whether it is right for a man to bear arms against his country for the sake of friendship. Certainly, Cicero could call himself the friend of Caesar but not support his political policies.

Yet, for the most part in ancient thought, the basis of friendship was a balanced reciprocity and an exchange of like-for-like. Although Aristotle asserts that friendship between the good and the virtuous was the best kind of friendship, he also says that friendships based on pleasure (especially among the young) or utility (especially among the old) were also possible. Xenophon, the fourth-century BCE polymath, in his *Memorabilia,* claimed that the exchanges of friendship were part of natural justice, and to breach them brought their own punishments; those who fail to make returns are hated for their ingratitude and then are forced to pursue the acquaintance of those who hate them. The integrity of the relationship was founded on the fact that the exchange was supposed to be equal, and indeed it was generally assumed that citizens were alike, and therefore equal, in being free and by their nature in their wish to rule and be ruled. Euripides also picks up the tension between equality and power in his *Phoenician Women* produced about 410 BCE, and has the tyrant Eteocles' mother rebuke him for his ambition, and exhorts him instead to honor equality, which is natural, binds communities together, and creates balance. Plato, in *The Laws,* also repeats the maxim that friendship is equality, and Aristotle says that friendship is said to be equality, and especially in friendships between the good. This idea of balance in and equality in friendship can be found as early as Homer's *Iliad* of the eighth or seventh century BCE, where the heroes, Diomedes and Glaucus,

refuse to fight each other when they meet in battle because of the ritualized friendship their families have with each other, and they make an exchange of armor to reconfirm the relationship. Homer makes the joke, however, that Zeus took away Glaucus's wits because he exchanged his gold armor for Diomedes' bronze, so that it was not equal after all. In the world of the late Roman Republic, Cicero agrees that a friendship should be mutually advantageous, though Seneca in the first century CE deplored the morality of giving gifts on the basis of receiving a return on moral grounds, and the vapidity of pretending generosity. Indeed, Greek literature is littered with complaints about those who did not return favors owed, and so reneged on their friendships and betrayed trust.

In fact, there was an awareness that an equal society based on equal relationships was difficult to achieve, and Aristotle is forced to limit his ideal city only to the *mesoi,* the "middling men," and to exclude farmers, shopkeepers, and mechanics. Otherwise, where he concedes that there may be inequalities of status, the exchange needs to be of different kinds, so that balance in the relationship is achieved. Xenophon, on the other hand, who seems to desire a hierarchical society, thought that unequal relationships were important for creating "willing obedience" by the ruled for the ruler, an idea that later influenced Polybius and Cicero in their idealizations of the perfect state. Indeed, in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE, the nature of equality itself was being questioned, with some arguing that real equality was based on individuals getting what they deserved commensurate to their contribution (which in turn partly legitimated the argument that the strong should rule the weak). This notion of proportionate equality was proposed in opposition to a democratic, or arithmetic, equality, where everyone received the same reward irrespective of what they contributed, and was influential in the political thought of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle.

In the first century BCE, however, Cicero objected to this instrumentalist view of friendship and claimed that real friendship was based on affection. Aristotle had already considered this point, and thought this must be true among friendships between the good, but that it was less important in other kinds of relationships. However, even he finds reason to doubt that relationships based on utility alone could really be friendships after all. For it was generally understood that friendship and goodwill went hand in hand; yet, although goodwill was the beginning of friendship, of itself it was not friendship, just as Cicero argues that friendship does not attend on advantage, but advantage on friendship. However, the role of goodwill (even putative goodwill) in friendship was important, especially in overtly political relationships, by providing the oil to grease the wheels of the relationship (or "the juice" as Aristophanes, the fifth-century BCE comic playwright, called it). In particular, Aristophanes in the *Lysistrata* of 411 BCE compares the handling of political relations in the city to the work of wool carding, where everyone is mixed together in the basket of common "goodwill." For Aristotle, it is affection that can ease the gap and balance the relationship between social unequals; and Cicero says that those of a superior status should allow themselves to come down to the status of their inferiors. Nevertheless, he says, decisions about friendships should not be formed until one is more mature, because friendship should not be ruled by an intemperate goodwill and lead to demands for services that should not reasonably be met.

In line with the positive, and even affectionate, expectation for friendship relationships, even political ones, friendship also presupposed trust. So it was that one trusted one's friends to help not only oneself, but also one's other friends, and to harm one's enemies. Often the first step in establishing a friendship relationship was the giving of a gift or a benefaction that one could only hope would be returned. Xenophon's Socrates in the *Memorabilia* says that this is how friendships, even between family members should be formed; whereas his Hieron opines that a tyrant has few friends, few that he can trust. It was the breakdown in trust that marked the decline in the close relationship that Alexander the Great had with his innermost circle of generals and advisers, his companions.

In the post-Alexander world of the Hellenistic kingdoms of the third and second centuries BCE, relationships between the cities and the central administrations were also built on these "friendship-type" relationships. In particular, the kings bound themselves to cities, and the cities to the kings, by honorific bonds of mutual obligation framed in the language of friendship and goodwill. Part of the

point of using this kind of language was to disguise power relations behind an appearance of benefaction and equality. Similarly at Rome, the language of equality and friendship politely occluded social and political hierarchies without making an impact on the political ideologies of inequality. In the Greek world, however, the ideology of equality remained important, even when it was not achieved in fact.

The Hellenistic cities themselves also awarded honors to the kings, or to the kings' "friends," in order to establish an intimate, or pseudointimate, relationship with the court. Thus, honors of citizenship or financially remunerative tax exemptions were given to the closest companions of the king, either in return for benefactions already given or in the hope that they would be. In this way, the cities themselves took an active part in the dialogue of empire and attempted to redress the power imbalance by awarding honors, which expected a return, to members of the kings' innermost circles. Although these honorific awards were often prospective in nature, they allowed the cities to play the game of benefaction and return so that they not only stood to receive straightforward and substantial benefits for honors conferred (and decrees from this period record substantial services performed for cities by the friends of the king), but also more subtle second-order returns. Thus, cities were, on the one hand, engaging with the institutional processes that brokered power and, on the other, attempting to renegotiate their own position within those processes and the power balance itself.

Yet, not all were sympathetic to the power games of benefaction. The Stoic philosopher Seneca rejected the giving of gifts and benefactions as a means of acquiring friendships, so in this sense he is not far from Cicero, but thought that the importance of the gift was in the intention, not the object, and in the expression of friendship, not in its creation or maintenance. Seneca's moral doctrine of giving for the sake of giving and for the return of feeling, rather than for the return of the benefaction, was also an idea picked up in the thirteenth century CE by Aquinas. However, for the most part, Aquinas closely followed Aristotle's understanding of friendship, although for the medieval theologian and political thinker, the community of friends is formed by those who share in the love of God. In a similar vein for Aquinas, the ultimate friendship is friendship with God, who is loved first as a benefactor and then ultimately for his own sake as a friend.

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See also Aquinas, Thomas; Aristotle; Cicero; City-State; Equality; Plato; Polybius

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FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism is an approach to social explanation associated with the disciplines of anthropology and sociology, although it has also been influential within political science (and political sociology, in particular).

Functionalists are concerned with the properties of systems of interaction, arguing that these systems cannot be reduced to component actions of individual actors. They argue that society should be understood as made up of elements and parts that are organized and interdependent. This organized interdependence constitutes a system, and it

operates as a relatively bounded entity in interaction with an environment. Functional theorists are interested both in the organization of the system and in the organization of its relations with its environment. Emphasis is on self-regulation and the processing of information and learning via feedback mechanisms.

Functionalism was particularly important in the 1950s and 1960s, when it was the direct antagonist of rational choice theory (or exchange theory, as it was then called), with its rigorous adherence to the principles of methodological individualism. However, it came to be criticized for a conservative bias toward equilibrium and social order. The emergence of new social movements and associated radical approaches in the 1970s contributed to its decline. With their displacement in turn by neoliberalism, rational choice theory came to dominate again as an approach better adapted to neoliberal political sensibilities. However, with the emergence of new sciences of complexity concerned with interactions within complex systems and their application to environmental problems such as global warming, systems approaches are increasingly relevant to the social sciences.

The Logic of Functionalist Explanation

Although functionalism mainly came to prominence as a school of sociological theory in the 1950s, its origins can be traced to an earlier generation of writers working in the field of anthropology in the first decades of the twentieth century and in the work of the French sociologist, Émile Durkheim.

Given the anthropological interest in explaining "alien" beliefs and practices not directly intelligible to members of different cultures, a central methodological precept was that behaviors are not explained simply by the identification of the meanings they have for the actors involved in them. They are to be explained by the function they serve for the wider social group. On this view, the meaning of individual actions cannot be understood independently of the wider system of collective practices and beliefs within which they are embedded. These collective practices, in turn, are to be explained by the functions they serve for the system of social life as a whole. Different elements of social life depend on each other and fulfill functions that contribute to the maintenance of social order and its reproduction over time.

Functionalism departs from the traditional logic of causal argument where a cause should precede its consequences. Functionalists identify a causal loop, or feedback, linking cause and effect. For example, when an anthropologist asks: "Why do the Hopi dance for rain?" a functionalist considers the consequence of the dance and notes that it maintains group solidarity. The functionalist concludes that if the rain dance did not have this positive function, it would not be reproduced. Functionalists generalized this to argue that all societies have to meet some universal and interconnected requirements—as well as group solidarity, economic subsistence, social control, sexual reproduction, socialization, education of new generations, and the management of sickness and death—and that these can be the means of access into "alien" cultures and can form the basis of cross-cultural comparisons.

Functionalists are aware of the problem of illegitimate teleology, arguing that the explanation of the origins of a practice should be distinguished from that of its reproduction. They distinguish between *diachronic* and *synchronic* analysis; that is, between the analysis of change of a system and the analysis of the interaction among parts of a system at a moment in time. The latter is the proper domain of functional analysis. However, it proves difficult to maintain the distinction, and most functionalists are criticized for conflating it; or, where the distinction is rigorously maintained, they are criticized for the overemphasis on order.

General Functionalism

Perhaps the most influential functionalist theorist is the sociologist Talcott Parsons. For Parsons, there are four different interconnected systems bearing on human action: the human *organism,* the individual *personality,* the *social system,* and the *cultural system.* The behavioral organism is concerned with the human body as the primary vehicle for engaging the physical environment; that of personality corresponds to the individual actor viewed as a system. It includes conscious and unconscious motivations (or *need dispositions*). Actors respond not only to positive rewards, but also to internalized feelings of guilt, anxiety, and

the need for approval. The social system is a system of positions and roles organized by normed expectations and maintained by sanctions; and the culture system refers to the symbols and meanings that are drawn on by actors in the pursuit of their personal projects.

Parsons's primary focus was the social system. He proposed four functional imperatives necessary to its constitution and operation (the A-G-I-L scheme). *Adaptation* is concerned with relationships to external environments and the utilization of resources in the pursuit of goals. *Goal attainment* is concerned with the direction of systems toward collective goals. *Integration* refers to the maintenance of coordinated relationships among the parts of the system, and *latency,* or pattern maintenance, describes the symbolic order in terms of mutually reinforcing meanings and typifications.

This scheme also provides four subsystems of the social system that can be analyzed in their own right, as well as in terms of their interdependence with other subsystems. Each is defined by the operation of a primary functional imperative, but also involves the secondary operation of the other imperatives. Thus, the economy as a subsystem is defined by adaptive function, but it also has *political* conditions of existence, as well as requirements of appropriately motivated participants. Similarly, there is a polity subsystem defined by the *goal attainment* imperative, with *economic* and *motivational* conditions of existence. The other two subsystems are called by Parsons the *societal community* (defined by the integration imperative) and the *fiduciary subsystem* (defined by the latency imperative).

With these distinctions in mind, it was possible to construct the comparative analysis of politics on a rigorous theoretical basis in terms of the nature of different political systems and their institutional configurations. This was undertaken by a number of political scientists influenced by Parsons. However, the most important contribution was by David Easton, who set out a "behavioral revolution" in political analysis, where broadly normative questions would be replaced by the scientific study of political behavior. The latter was to be understood as a system of behavior, and the major unit of analysis was the political system. As with Parsons, the latter was defined in terms of the authoritative (or binding) allocation of values for society.

According to Easton, the purpose of a systems approach to politics is to identify political activities and processes characteristic of all political systems. The political structures, or institutions, through which these processes are manifested were various and a secondary matter. It is also possible to speak of *parapolitical* systems referring to the political processes associated with any group activity, but, for Easton, the crucial issue was that of the formal political system and its interactions with other formally defined systems and subsystems in its environment. As with Parsons, but without following his precise categories, Easton identifies an "intra-societal environment" made up of ecological, biological, personality, and social systems. The latter, in turn, is divided into cultural, social structural, economic, demographic, and other subsystems.

An innovation of Easton's account is his specification of an *extra-societal* environment (or international society), with parallel subdivisions of international political, ecological, and social systems. Taking the political system as the central focus, the systems approach analyzes the exchanges or flows of effects between these various systems and the political system. The political system is understood to be relatively stable over time, but must manage disturbances that arise in the different regions of the environment. Here, it responds by different kinds of outputs—for example, by administrative decrees, legal statutes, and the like. In this way, political structures can change, while the underlying political process remains stable.

Where Easton suggested that political structures may be various, the formal development of a functionalist scheme, such as Parsons's A-G-I-L scheme, also allows the classification of societies in terms of the level of structural differentiation or institutional specialization around functions—for example, the extent to which political institutions are separated from economic institutions, or economic institutions separated from the household. This analysis gave rise to important studies in the historical sociology of early empires and the rise of modernity. However, the idea of the superiority of higher over lower stages of developmental complexity carries the implication of evolutionary change, where better-adapted forms are realized

out of the deficiencies of lesser forms. Modernity—more substantively, the United States, which Parsons called the new lead society—is the culminating stage of development. Soviet-type societies were regarded as less differentiated along the political and economic axes than liberal capitalist societies and, thus, would betray strains toward convergence with the latter.

Although this analysis now seems quite pertinent with the collapse of Soviet-type systems, at the time it seemed to critics to be an extreme form of teleology. Moreover, it revealed an ideological bias inherent in a scheme that Parsons (and other functionalists) had presented as a "logical framework" without substantive content.

Functionalism as a Research Program

Where Parsons and Easton each regarded functionalism as part of a unified general theory, Robert Merton saw it as an adjunct to the development of empirically grounded theories of what he called the "middle-range." A standard criticism of general functionalism was that it was unfalsifiable, and Merton wanted to establish an approach to theory where it had direct empirical content. Merton identified three unsatisfactory postulates of functionalism that tended to confirm its unfalsifiable character: the *functional unity* (or integration) of a society, *universal functionalism,* and *indispensability.*

According to Merton, it may be that some nonliterate societies show a high degree of integration, but it is illegitimate to assume this would pertain to all societies. It is also possible that what is functional for society, considered as a whole, does not prove functional for individuals or for some groups within the society and vice versa. This suggests that alongside the concept of function, it is necessary to have a concept of *dysfunction,* that is, where the consequences of a practice are negative for some individuals or groups. For Merton, persisting forms have a *net balance of functional consequences,* either for society considered as a whole or for subgroups. Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between functional *prerequisites*—preconditions functionally necessary for a society—and the social practices, or institutions, that fulfill those prerequisites. Although the former are indispensable, it is not required that particular institutions meet those functions. There are always alternative ways of meeting any particular function. Each of Merton's qualifications was designed to transform the postulates into *variables.*

Merton's argument was also important for proposing that functionalism had no intrinsic conservative bias. According to him, Marxism was also a functionalist approach, albeit one that differed from the standard Parsonian approach in terms of how it addressed the question of functional for whom and the possible dysfunctions associated with class relations. Certainly, as Marxist theorists became concerned with specifying the relationships between the economic mode of production and separate spheres of politics and ideology, their approaches adopted characteristic features of functional systems theory with the political sphere, for example, characterized by its management of "contradictions" in the economic system.

From Integration to Complexity

For other systems theorists, the problem with general functionalism was the overgeneralized nature of Parsons's theory. According to Walter Buckley, systems theory could be applied directly to concrete systems without any assumption of the priority of equilibrium over "chaotic complexity," or of consensus over conflict, and without the artificial constraint of just four functions with which to account for differentiation. These ideas were developed by the German sociologist and student of Parsons, Niklas Luhmann, to develop a constructivist, or self-referential, account of systems. Communication, not action, should be the core concept of social science; modern societies, or social systems, are too complex to be reducible to actors' reasons for acting, which can be multifarious. According to Luhmann, self-regulating social systems construct themselves self-referentially as social relationships made up of differentiated subsystems. These subsystems interact, but have their own relatively autonomous logics, and are not limited by a pregiven set of functions.

Differentiation increases communication and the scale and complexity of society. Like Buckley, Luhmann argues that this form of systems theory avoids the priority given to integration in the Parsonian scheme. His theory is not about the reestablishment of equilibrium in the face of contingent

disturbances from the environment, but about the renewal of system elements; all elements must pass away in time, and reproduction is a matter of dynamic stability. Disintegration and reproduction are intertwined. In this way, Luhmann brings functionalist systems theory into dialogue with complexity theory and, thus, posits the possibility that it is in this form that functionalist arguments in sociology and political science will be renewed.

John Holmwood

See also Durkheim, Émile; Empirical Theory; Evolution; Explanation; Marxism; Modernization Theory; Rational Choice Theory; Systems Theory

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FUNDAMENTALISM

The entry begins by asking whether the term *fundamentalism* is a useful category for political theory in its dealing with the place of religion in politics. There are reasons to ask this question despite the fact that prominent scholars work and publish on this subject. Martin Marty and Scott Appleby initiated a large research project conducted at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Marty & Appleby, 1991–1995). Nevertheless, this kind of research on fundamentalism is largely ignored. Instead, people often try to avoid dealing with the term and the issues it raises. For example, one student of Islam states in a footnote: "The word fundamentalism has generally been applied. . . . I side with those who do not find this term helpful" (Lee, 1997, p. 21). No argument is presented. Opinion leaders and policy makers also often avoid the term. At a major conference of the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, attended by representatives of major federal U.S. departments, including the Pentagon, politicians announced publicly that they would not use the term fundamentalism, because it is considered offensive to Muslims. Yet, Islamists themselves do not seem to find the term offensive. To the contrary, the prominent Islamist philosopher, Hassan Hanafi, titled one of his books *al-Usuliyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Fundamentalism)* (Hanafi, 1989). We should ask: Does the focus on Islam in the debate about fundamentalism end up in Islamophobic connotations? Is fundamentalism an Orientalist category or a significant analytical category in the social sciences?

There is regrettably a loose use of the term *fundamentalism* in public debates. To illustrate the worldwide distorted meaning, one can refer for instance to Germany, where a distinction is made between dogmatic and open-minded green ecologists. The former are addressed negatively as fundamentalists, in contrast to the latter, viewed favorably as realists. In order to get away from this unhelpful usage of the term fundamentalism, one needs to bring the notion back to where it belongs: It is an analytical category in the study of religion and politics. Fundamentalism is to be defined with reference to the response of religion to challenges it has been exposed to in the context of cultural modernity. Without considering this context, there would be no proper understanding of religious fundamentalism. The phenomenon addressed is related to cultural modernity. Religious fundamentalism is a response to a challenge. At issue is a global phenomenon that exists in all religions as a response to modernity done in a variety of ways (therefore: fundamentalisms used in plural). The

challenges arising from cultural modernity and its disenchantment of the world are the background for the emergence of this phenomenon under issue.

The discourse of modernity is also a political one and is in substance secular. However, contemporary cultural modernity is in a crisis that promotes the return of the sacred. Today, modernity itself is being challenged and a process of desecularization (Tibi, 2000) is taking place generating challenges that assume in each case the shape of a variety of religious fundamentalisms. Even though the phenomenon of fundamentalism is a global one, the Islamic variety of it is, for a number of reasons, the most prominent case (Sidahmed & Ehteshami, 1996). The origin of the phenomenon is to be traced back to American Protestant fundamentalism (Ammermann, 1991, pp. 1–65).

> What is fundamentalism all about? In "The Fundamentalism Project" a consensus was established to view the phenomenon as an indication of a fight, therefore fundamentalists see themselves as militants . . . they react, they fight back . . . next they fight for . . they fight with particularly chosen repository of resources . . . they fight against others . . . they also fight under God. (Marty & Appleby, 1991, pp. ix–x)

All varieties of fundamentalism claim to be a revival of religion, but despite this claim, they are not an indication of a religious renaissance. At issue is something else: an invention of tradition in the course of a politicization of religion and religionization of politics. Fundamentalism is therefore not only a defensive-cultural response to modernity, but also and foremost an indication of a political phenomenon aimed at a remaking of the world. Habermas aims to deal with a religious renaissance through his notion of postsecular society (Habermas, 2001; Tibi, 2002). This is however disputable.

The fundamentalist is regularly a male who acts as a political man opposing popular sovereignty as sovereignty of the people entitled to determine government and politics. Fundamentalists act as the defenders of God and argue—at least in the Islamic case—for an Islamic world revolution and for the restoration of *hakimiyyat Allah* (God's rule). They believe that God alone is sovereign!

The overarching context of fundamentalism is the reality of a worldtime of globalization. In fact, each civilization is based on a particularism of its own time documented in its own calendar. Additionally, one can speak of premodern civilizations while avoiding evolutionary thinking. There are also civilizations that are not secular and therefore religion based. The historical roots of contemporary and modern globalization are the process of the European expansion. The related processes are viewed as an expansion of the international society established in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648. This globalization is a secular process that results in the mapping of the world into the system of the secular nation-states. It was believed that this mapping was also a part of the universal process of Westernization and secularization. Today, the religious fundamentalisms uprising in non-Western civilizations against the West belie this assumption. Anti-Westernism is, for instance, the substance of Islamist fundamentalism as the vision of a restoration of a religious order against secularity and the West, as well. The U.S. variety of Protestant fundamentalism also contests modernity and it is, despite the great differences to other varieties of political religions in Asia and Africa, a religious fundamentalism and a political religion in the understanding outlined.

On a theoretical-conceptual basis, this entry describes how there is a simultaneity of structural globalization and cultural fragmentation (Tibi, 1998, Chapter 1; Tibi, 2005, Chapters 4–6). This formula refers to the "European expansion," which has generated global structures mapping all civilizations in one process. Parallel to this process of globalization there is no parallel process of a universalization of Western values. In short, cultural universalization does not match the successful globalization of structures. The tensions arising from simultaneity of globalization and fragmentation lead to the emergence of religious fundamentalisms.

Raymond Aron argues in his book *Paix et guerre entre les nations*—published at the height of the cold war in 1962—that bipolarity "veiled the heterogeneity of civilization." Following the end of the cold war, the return of the sacred in the shape of various religious fundamentalisms has been the foremost salient feature of post-bipolar politics.

Secularization has been challenged by religious fundamentalism, which engages not only in a revival of religion, but also in a politicization of it. This is the foremost aspect of the new phenomenon and basically what all fundamentalisms are about. The remaking of the world with regard to government and politics is the basic issue in the fundamentalist agenda.

Fundamentalism also religionizes political, economic, and social conflicts and makes these intractable. The reason for this is the fact that religious claims are viewed as God's claims and are therefore nonnegotiable. In fundamentalism, "God" acts against secular modernity. Therefore, one encounters the major streams of fundamentalism as a revolt against the modern secular structures. This contestation occurs basically in civilizations based on belonging to a religious community. Given this major feature of religious fundamentalism as a "revolt against the West," the phenomenon's occurrence is mainly in non-Western civilizations, despite its roots in U.S. Protestantism. Therefore, it is acknowledged that the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, though a global one, has originated in Protestant Christianity of the United States, not in the world of Islam, nor in any non-Western civilization. Why then is it often associated with Islam?

The fundamentalism project mentioned at the outset of this entry dealt with all varieties of the phenomenon, although it was not spared of the blame of a focus on Islam with the implicit accusation of an Islamophobia. Indeed, the rise and growth of political Islam, interpreted as an Islamic fundamentalism, provides the foremost case in point for the study of this global phenomenon. Nevertheless, Islamists' vision of a desecularization and a remaking of the world is not restricted to Islamic civilization, it applies to the world at large, and therefore the particular significance in case. In Islamist fundamentalism, the connection to terrorism contributed to inflaming a debate that predates 9/11 (O'Balance, 1997). However, the "holy terror of September 11, 2001" (Lincoln, 2003; Elshtain, 2003) revived the implementation of the approach used in the study of religious fundamentalism; it also created obstacles to the same. Since then, it is considered to be politically incorrect to look at political Islam in this way and to relate it to 9/11 as a threat to international security. However, it is a fact that the jihadist terror grew from political Islam. Involved scholars were accused of being trapped between myth and reality, not to speak of the accusation of "Orientalism." The focus on the Islamic case in the study of religious fundamentalism is not only related to media coverage. There are other reasons. Islam is—next to Christianity—the only religious faith that is based on a universalism. The politicization of this universalism results in a political internationalism. This happens in the ideology of Islamism, which is, however, one prominent variety of religious fundamentalism. Islamism is a political Islam that aims at a remaking of the world and therefore its pertinence to political theory. To be sure, Islam itself is not a fundamentalism, and it is for this reason that a distinction is made between Islam and Islamism.

Of course, it would be wrong to reduce the political impact of fundamentalisms simply to the spread of ideas. For sure, religious fundamentalisms do not fall from heaven and do not come from nowhere. All fundamentalisms arise from a crisis situation. On the one hand, there is a crisis of meaning and, on the other, a crisis related to political and socioeconomic constraints, a structural crisis. Some suggest that fundamentalisms are a passing phenomenon and present again the example of Islamism as the Islamic variety of fundamentalism believed to be declining. Nevertheless, that fact of a double crisis in the meaning addressed refers to what is underlying the phenomenon itself. If these constraints are still looming, it does not seem likely that a decline of the phenomenon is to be expected. In addition, fundamentalisms that grow also from a predicament with modernity are not something like a day-to-day politics. For the time being, fundamentalisms seem likely to be a lasting phenomenon for some decades to come.

The end of the East–West conflict promoted the return of religion to world politics, but all fundamentalisms predate post-bipolarity. Nevertheless, the ascendance of the new role of religion in global politics is related to religious fundamentalisms. To look at this global phenomenon with a focus on the case of Islamic fundamentalism need not be based on any bias and may relate solely to the significance of Islamism and its dual character (Jansen, 1997). Even though the fundamentalist movement in the world of Islam, established since the foundation in 1928 of "The Society of the

Muslim Brothers" is based on a politicization of general Islamic beliefs, it is basically related to the challenge of modernity (Watt, 1988). These "Defenders of God" (Lawrence, 1989) want an order/government/*Nizam Islami* based on the specific religious doctrine for a remaking of "world order." This can also be practiced as "Terror in the Mind of God."

In this understanding, jihad has been promoted to a jihadism of an irregular war conducted as terrorism. This kind of resort to religion to legitimate violence as terrorism exists in all religions. In the Islamic case, the combination of jihad as jihadism, for a remaking of the world, is a basic tenet of religious fundamentalism.

In this context, traditional Islamic universalism is reinterpreted as an Islamist internationalism that makes a special case of fundamentalism in world politics (Tibi, 2008).

Fundamentalism is a global phenomenon in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries that challenges traditional secular political theory. The pertinence of the phenomenon can be stated in the reference to the following issue areas:

- Political religion and the challenge of cultural modernity
- Politicized religion, secularization, and desecularization
- Religion and political order on the level of the state and the international system
- Religion and legitimacy
- Religion and law
- Religion and political pluralism
- Religion and political legitimacy

The ideology of politicized religion addressed in this entry as a contestation of the existing order and aimed at a remaking of the world covers all of these listed issue areas. The prominent case of Islamism is one variety of the ideology that religionizes politics. This entry ends by questioning the view that the interpretation of Islamism as a variety of religious fundamentalism suggests Orientalism imposed from the outside on Islam.

Among scholars today, one observes a tendency to decouple Islam and Islamic civilization from Islamism (i.e., the Islamic variety of fundamentalism). The argument presented is that culture and divinities in terms of belief in God have nothing to do with politics and government. These scholars suggest that fundamentalists abuse religion, in this case Islam, as a pretext for furthering their political and economic secular concerns. It is also argued that these references are only superficially presented as an Islamic agenda. True, Islamism is not Islam, but it is not a secular ideology, it grew from an interpretation of Islam, and it is a political religion based on the divine, in contrast to secular political religions, such as fascism and communism.

In short, religious fundamentalisms refer in their quest for a new divine order to religion, but not in an instrumental manner. They are in opposition to the secular nation-state to be replaced by a new order believed to be the true government of God based on divine precepts. The study of fundamentalism leads to the insight that at issue is a competition between religious and secular order. If we look at the writings of major fundamentalists—for instance in the Islamic case—we see the religious-cultural underpinning of their political argumentation. In fundamentalism, the foundation of a religious government is the pivotal concern, as can be shown on the case of Islamic fundamentalists.

The concept of divine order is envisaged to challenge and subsequently replace the prevailing Westphalian order of sovereign states. This order is by its origin Western, as a state system was created in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, but it is the state system of today imposed on the entire world since the wave of decolonization that completed the mapping of the globe into a Westphalian system. This secular political world order is now threatened by religious fundamentalisms, in particular the Islamist one (Philpott, 2002). In some parts of Asia and Africa, these religious fundamentalists question the outcome of decolonization. In the Islamic view, the civilizational response is a rejection of the incorporation of the world of Islam into the international system of nation-states. The new states that have emerged from the dissolution of the imperial Islamic order are formally committed to secular nationalism. In reality, they have never been free from the existing tension between Islam and the nation-state (Tibi, 1997). Religious fundamentalists want to replace these nominal nation-states by states based on religious tenets. To study these realities of the

twenty-first century and their pertinence to political theory is neither an Orientalism nor a politically incorrect inquiry.

Bassam Tibi

See also Evangelicalism

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Game Theory

Game theory offers a common mathematical language that promises to unify modern political theory (from Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and David Hume to contemporary theorists). This entry explains this audacious claim and concludes with two cautionary notes.

A Brief History of Game Theory

Game theory emerged in the 1920s as a branch of mathematics. The first textbook was published in 1944 by John von Neumann, a leading twentieth-century scientist who made major contributions to economics and computing science, and Oskar Morgenstern, an economist. In the early 1950s, propelled largely by the escalation of the cold war and two remarkable theorems by John F. Nash, Jr., game theory's fame grew. Having established early on a symbiotic relationship with economics, it was heralded in the 1980s as a potential unifying language for all the social sciences. Six game theorists have been awarded the Bank of Sweden (Nobel) Prize in Economics.

What Is Game Theory?

Game theory offers a comprehensive analysis of *rational behavior* under circumstances of *strategic interdependence*. However, its definition of what constitutes rational behavior in a social context is controversial.

Game theory assumes that our reasoning is an instrument in the service of prespecified, current, and sovereign ends. Jill ranks the consequences of her actions in terms of their utility to *her* and then behaves *as if* to maximize the (utility) rank of her actions' consequence. This is a form of utilitarianism, which neoclassical economists developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century. It differs both from the deontological approach of Aristotle or Immanuel Kant (according to whom our reason has a capacity to judge that certain actions are right or wrong irrespective of their consequences) and from the classical utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

By treating politics as reducible to the instrumental acts of individuals, game theory confines itself to a particularly narrow form of liberal-cum-methodological individualism. Institutions, ideologies, and norms are explained in terms of behavior driven solely by Jill's and Jack's utility ranks, which are: (a) bleached of all moral and social psychology, (b) interpersonally incommensurable, and therefore (c) incapable of suggesting whether assigning a certain prize or burden to Jack or to Jill serves the common good. While well-placed to explore the conceptual limits of any political theory that models society as a contested terrain on which apolitical agents act, game theory's contribution to political science is impaired by the assumption that agents have no capacity to submit their own (and others') preferences (about outcomes) to rational scrutiny, a capacity that some (e.g., Aristotle, Rousseau) say distinguishes a *ζώον πολιτικόν* (political animal) from the brute.

Consider a situation where what you will do depends on what you think others will do. If the same applies to them, everyone is caught in a web of predictions regarding one another's behavior. Game theorists call this *strategic interdependence* and offer a powerful analysis of how instrumentally rational people behave under it. Consequently, there is hardly a social situation that falls outside game theory's scope. In an election, for instance, both politicians and voters are subject to strategic interdependence. The former choose their policies on the basis of predictions of their rivals' political platform, while the latter often vote in response to predictions of how other voters will behave at the ballot box. In markets, firms choose prices after forecasting the pricing policy of their competitors, who in turn price according to predictions of *their* competitors' prices. Even when it comes to choosing what to wear at a party, we often rely on predictions of what others will be wearing, which in turn depends on what they think we will be wearing, etc. In Shakespeare's words: "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players."

Two Types of Games and Their Relevance for Political Theory

Noncooperative Games

Noncooperative games are strategic interactions where binding contracts between players are not possible *ex ante*. Consider the famous Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), devised in the early 1950s as a demonstration of game theory's potential for the social sciences.

Jack and Jill are picked up for a robbery and placed in separate cells. The assistant district attorney visits each and says: "If you deny the charges, but your partner confesses, you are facing a five-year term. But if you confess while your mate does not, I shall intercede with the judge to suspend your sentence, on account of your assistance in bringing about a conviction. Moreover, I am prepared to put in a good word with the social security people for that pension you are after. To be frank, if you both deny the charges, I shall have to set you free due to lack of evidence. But, naturally, if you both confess, you are both going to jail, say for three years."

Jill, being a rational prisoner, knows that due to the symmetry of their situation, if X is her best choice, it is also the best choice for Jack. But which is X? Of the two symmetrical outcomes "both confess" or "both deny," the latter is vastly superior, as it means freedom for both. However, as long as each prisoner's utility depends on *the individual's* years in prison (and the promised pension), Jack and Jill are caught in a PD that will result in a three-year sentence! Jill (and Jack) muse: "If my partner confesses, I am better off confessing too. And if she (or he) denies the charges, I am again better off to confess (recall the nice pension). *Ergo,* I shall confess *regardless of what my partner does*."

Note that their tragedy is not caused, as one may be tempted to imagine, by the fact that they cannot communicate. Even if they can talk through their cell's wall and agree to deny the charges, their individually best action is still to confess. Hobbes famously made the same point in *Leviathan* when arguing that covenants not supported by the sword are mere words.

The PD fascinated political theorists because it is an interaction where the individually rational choice produces a collectively self-defeating result. Each does what is instrumentally rational to do, and yet the outcome is painfully suboptimal for all. The paradoxical quality of this result helps explain part of the fascination. But the major reason for the interest is also empirical: Outcomes in social and political life are often less than we might hope, and the PD provides one possible explanation of the frequent clash between the private and the collective interest.

Bargaining or Cooperative Games

Things are different in the presence of a mechanism that enforces an agreement—Hobbes's "sword," if you like. This could be anything, from a sense of honor among thieves, the fear of future punishment dished out by an informal institution (such as the local mafia), or the creation of a collective agency such as an association, cooperative, or indeed the state itself, whose purpose is to make covenants bind. In fact, ever since game theory became fashionable, it is commonplace to explain Hobbes's justification of the state's authority as an institution that allows potentially belligerent citizens to escape the PD's logic.

When binding contracts are possible, agents must resort to bargaining to reach agreements on how to divide the mutual gain from avoiding

PD-like traps. Whenever a bargain is struck, some mutual benefit is unlocked, a potential conflict is resolved, and the benefits are distributed in proportion to the bargainers' relative aggression. The most abstract form of bargaining is the Bargaining Problem, which game theory has studied exhaustively: Imagine N persons who are offered the opportunity to divide among themselves an asset of value V. They hold talks that last a finite period and then retire to separate rooms where they write on a piece of paper the percentage of V that each wishes to claim for himself. Afterward, a referee collects these numbers and sums them up. If the sum is less than or equal to 100, each gets what she claimed. If the sum exceeds 100, no one gets anything. What is the rational claim?

The Relevance of Noncooperative and Bargaining Games to Political Theory

The PD captures a host of famous arguments that have left their mark on the theory of the state: (a) Hobbes's suggestion that, without a strong state "keeping us all in awe," we are prone to fall into a PD trap that will wreck peace and make life "nasty, brutish and short"; (b) Adam Smith's optimism that we do not need an interfering state to coordinate production because the profit motive pushes producers straight into a PD that leads them, against their will, to supply the largest possible quantity at the lowest possible price; and (c) Karl Marx's argument that capitalists need the bourgeois state to impose on them a type of behavior that is in *their* interests but which, left to their own devices, they will not adopt, as a result of their PD-like logic.

Of course, there are other classic noncooperative games that relate to central concerns of political theory; for example, Rousseau's parable of the fragility of social coordination, known as the Stag Hunt: A group of hunters strive to coordinate their efforts to catch a stag but find that the only way this will happen is if there is a high degree of optimism within their group that they will, in fact, succeed in coordinating their efforts (otherwise, each defects and seeks small prey). A similar logic underpins John Maynard Keynes's view that the Great Depression was caused, largely, by self-fulfilling pessimism of potential investors.

Game theory formulates simple games that depict most arguments regarding the state crisply and helpfully. Even the anti-state liberal tradition, which began with Hume's idea that order will emerge spontaneously in society through the surreptitious evolution of conflict-minimizing conventions (which later turn into moral norms), is given a new twist when game theory studies the evolution of rational behavior in games (such as PD) that are repeated indefinitely.

Some liberal theorists argue that the legitimate state is one that free and rational people could have agreed to found. Suppose the state we find ourselves living under (with its panoply of laws and institutions) *might* have resulted from some grand bargain between us all. Then, it takes a decisive legitimacy test (notwithstanding the obvious fact that no state ever came about in this manner). If it fails, it must be reformed to correspond to something akin to a social contract that we *could have* all signed, potentially, for the purposes of establishing the rights and obligations of each.

Although different political theorists within the social contract tradition (e.g., Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, John Rawls) offered different blueprints of the legitimate state (and its limits vis-à-vis interventions in the life of its citizens), they all share one simple idea: The state ought to be thought of in terms of some potential agreement among all its citizens regarding the distribution of rights over life and property. But what would that agreement be? Suppose that game theory can offer a uniquely rational solution to the N-person bargaining problem. Then it would be holding the key to the state's legitimacy.

Nash's Two Main Theorems

Suppose a game's *equilibrium* is the outcome to which players tend the more rational they are, and the more confident they become of each other's rationality. In 1951, John F. Nash, Jr., defined it as follows: N players' actions are in an equilibrium when one's action is consistent with one's beliefs about what others will be doing *after rejecting all beliefs which, if held, would lead to actions that would falsify these beliefs*. Equivalently, Nash admitted only beliefs that are confirmed by the acts they recommend. Put differently, he assumed that rational players, who recognize that their competitors are also rational, will always choose acts that are best replies to the acts of everyone else.

Then, Nash went on to prove, in a mathematically awe-inspiring manner, that *every conceivable game possesses at least one such equilibrium* (as long as the set of actions for each player is bounded). This is an immensely powerful result because it gives game theorists the opportunity to claim that they have the key with which to unlock all forms of unregulated social, political, and economic interactions.

In a 1950 paper, Nash proved, against the grain of opinion among social scientists, that all bargaining situations feature a *unique* solution: Rational bargainers, Nash predicted, will settle for the division of the pie that maximizes *precisely* the product of their utility ranks.

Suppose that during a negotiation, Jack offers Jill x% of the pie, but she rejects it demanding a higher share of, say, y%, and threatening Jack that, unless he relents, she will abandon the negotiations with probability p. Jill's rejection is deemed credible if she prefers, on average, the prospect of getting y% of the pie with probability $1 - p$ rather than x% of the pie with certainty. Next, let us define Division A to be an *equilibrium of fear agreement* as follows: When Jill offers A to Jack, and he credibly rejects it in favor of some alternative Division B, then Jill can credibly reject B (for all B) in favor of her original suggestion A. Nash first proves that bargainers will settle only for an equilibrium of fear agreement and then proves that only one such agreement exists: his proposed solution to the bargaining problem.

Concluding Remark

If Nash's two theorems solve both noncooperative and bargaining games, then in principle, game theory holds the key to unlocking the mysteries of both the state and civil society. The point of the liberal state would then be to enact some social contract reflecting Nash's uniquely rational solution to the bargaining problem, while all our individual actions, beliefs, and conventions would be explainable in terms of his equilibrium.

Game theory has not one but two Achilles' heels. First, there is radical indeterminacy, caused by a proliferation of equilibrium solutions. Thus, game theory depicts almost any outcome as the outcome of rational play; but a theory that rationalizes everything explains, in the end, very little. Second, it suffers from deep logical inconsistencies that result from its adoption of a particularly narrow, and simplistic, view of what rational political animals are capable of in a social context.

Yanis Varoufakis

See also Bentham, Jeremy; Common Good; Hobbes, Thomas; Methodological Individualism; Positive Theory; Prisoner's Dilemma; Public Choice Theory; Rational Choice Theory; Rationality; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Social Contract Theory; State

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Gandhi, Mohandas (1869–1948)

Born in Porbandar, Gujarat, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was later known as mahatma or "great soul." His father was a public servant and his mother, who had a great influence on him, was an adherent of a nonviolent strain of Hinduism. Between 1888 and 1891, the young Gandhi studied law in London and was admitted to the bar there. After returning to India for a few years, he moved to South Africa, where he spent most of the next 22 years. In response to its racial policies, Gandhi employed nonviolent civil disobedience and there formulated his theory of *satyagraha,* which can be translated as "truth force" or nonviolent resistance. His campaigns in South Africa were generally directed to the legal and economic conditions of Indians.

On his return to India in 1915, his initial expressions of nonviolent action were not directed against the government, but within a few years, he initiated the first of several mass civil-disobedience

campaigns against British colonial rule, and not all of them nonviolent as Gandhi had demanded. In 1922, he suspended a satyagraha campaign after 22 policemen were killed in Chauri Chaura. His last campaign was on behalf of immediate Indian independence during World War II. The British relinquished power in 1947 but to a largely Hindu India and predominantly Moslem Pakistan. As Moslem-Hindu violence mounted, Gandhi tried to quell the killing and hatred through his appeals for peace and his fasting and calming the areas he visited. On his way to a prayer meeting in 1948, he was assassinated by a Hindu fundamentalist who feared Gandhi's appeals for communal harmony, friendship, and peace.

Gandhi's Theory of Nonviolence

Gandhi is most famously known for his theories of nonviolent civil disobedience and direct action. As he saw matters, violence should never be used, even for ostensibly moral purposes. Violence not only inflicts pain, destruction, and often death on the combatants as well as innocent victims but also changes those who employ violence. Each side believes it must return violence for violence; indeed, combatants are convinced they must apply superior violence if they are to carry the day. Gandhi argued that those locked in violent conflict convince themselves that their end justifies their means, including employing greater levels of destruction and suffering. Because he believed the end can never justify the means, Gandhi insisted that we cannot dispense with moral, ethical, and humane conduct because we think we are fighting on the side of righteousness. On his reading, none of us possesses the complete truth, although most of us grasp important fragments of the truth. Not omniscient, we have no warrant to play god, to determine who is worthy and who is to be violently punished.

Gandhi believed that satyagraha is self-limiting in ways that violence cannot be. Holding that we are all equal and deserving of respect, the *satyagrahi* (or one who practices nonviolent direct action) is said to enter the contest without rancor, hatred, anger, or revenge. Because violence carries such dispositions, Gandhi argued, violence contradicts rational discourse, but the satyagrahi complements and fosters reason. Driven by passions, the best the violent combatant can do is to calculate how to destroy the enemy. Gandhi wants his satyagrahi to bring different people together to talk about what they share and how they can solve problems and settle grievances. But reason and talk, by themselves, are often wanting, and when this is the case, Gandhi wants the satyagrahi to generate nonviolent power and bring grievances to the public agenda in order to approach just solutions. Gandhi claimed that satyagraha is not only philosophically, morally, and politically grounded but also pragmatic. According to him, violence, at best, can provide some temporary relief to the victors, but its evil is permanent.

His strictures on violence, however, did not lead Gandhi to avoid conflict. On the contrary, he embraced it, but with important caveats. The conflicts he spawned, notably against British rule in India and the treatment of the *dacoits* (or untouchables as they were called at the time), were nonviolent and, he argued, designed to promote justice. For Gandhi, injustice meant the domination of others by denying them their autonomy and freedom. One of his most famous books, *Hind Swaraj,* is about self-rule, both for India as a nation and for each of its people.

Action is crucial to Gandhi's confrontation with what he saw as injustice. As he put it, petitions without force are useless, and the force he had in mind is nonviolent mass mobilization. Moreover, Gandhi argued, nonviolent direct action aims at converting rather than coercing his opponents. He reasoned that if his opponents were forced to capitulate to him but were unconvinced that his cause was just, those opponents would return to their old ways at the next opportune moment.

Because his nonviolent campaigns often involved civil disobedience, Gandhi insisted that all possible remedies be taken before laws were broken. When that fails, the satyagrahi is expected to act publicly and accept punishment willingly. According to Gandhi, voluntary suffering reveals the sincerity of the satyagrahi. No one, he reasoned, would risk punishment about matters that are unimportant to the person or beliefs that are not deeply held. He went on to claim that if the satyagrahi was mistaken, any harm from nonviolent direct action would be felt by those protesting and not others.

To face such risks takes courage. Without courage, Gandhi insisted, we let others govern us, and we are not in charge of our own lives. Ruled by

fear, the uncourageous person either has no moral convictions or only weak ones that are not incorporated into the individual's own plan of life. Gandhi's contempt for cowards is vividly expressed in his several observations that if one does not know how to act nonviolently in the face of injustice, it is better to be violent than to accept it. Having said this, he always insisted that nonviolence is superior to violence or quiet withdrawal. For Gandhi, nonviolent politics is available to anyone, whether young or old, physically strong or weak, male or female, learned or unlettered. In this way, he hoped to democratize conflict, involving everyone, not just those with formal power.

Gandhi's Theory of Power

Gandhi was highly suspicious of power, both of state power and nongovernmental power that is lodged in society, the economy, hierarchies of all sorts, and cultural permissions and taboos that open choices for some but constrict them for others. Accordingly, Gandhi called for the dispersal of power, fearing that concentrations of power are apt to run roughshod over the weak. Too often, the powerful convince themselves that they deserve their power, and it is up to them to decide how to use it. The hierarchies that sprout up with imperialism, great wealth, gender, caste, and race elevate some and consign others to continuing subordination. Such asymmetrical distributions of power cannot be morally justified, in Gandhi's view, even though they might be shown to be efficient or productive. Promises of some future good that justifies contemporary human suffering and domination carry no purchase for him. His point of reference is the dignity, worth, and equality of all people now, which cannot be overridden by privilege, convenience, or even perceived necessity.

Although Gandhi believed in nonviolence, the dispersal of power, and respect for all, he recognized that these ideals are illusive; nevertheless, they stand to guide the way in the real world where there is a persistent tendency for power to become concentrated, inequality to expand, and privilege to assert itself. Accordingly, Gandhi wanted people to be skeptical about visible power, but he also wanted to promote a skepticism that questions the claims of nongovernmental powers that justify domination of others and that seek to hide their power and pretend that their power is something else. Claims, for example, that gender or caste or racial inequalities are sanctioned by nature or religion and therefore legitimate are, for Gandhi, masquerades. They hide the constructedness of domination, pretending that those at the bottom somehow deserve their lot and should learn to accept their helplessness and subordination. Only when people are skeptical of the claims of the powerful will they work to change matters.

Gandhi's Views of Modernity and Tradition

Gandhi saw the forces of modernity and modernization generally hiding their power to direct and control human beings and to organize and reorganize society, politics, culture, and the economy according to their own rules. Modern civilization, he repeatedly argued, sees itself as superior to what had preceded it and claims to be justified in imposing standards on life's many facets. Celebrating what is new, it disregards traditions and familiar ways of living. It promises control over nature when, according to Gandhi, we are losing more and more control over our own lives. Moreover, on his reading, modernity favors an impersonal society and economy, shunning the traditional ideal of an interdependent community.

According to him, modern civilization dangles materialism and consumerism before us, greatly multiplying our desires as it promises more and more. But Gandhi found the prize is hollow; modern civilization cannot possibly satisfy everyone's ever-expanding multiple desires. And materialism turns out to be an empty prize because it concentrates on what we can consume, pretending that this is the core of human existence. But life is too rich, textured, and diverse to be flattened along one dimension, according to Gandhi. The depth and breadth of our individual and collective lives requires a dimensionality that materialism by itself cannot provide.

Although he believed that one of the casualties of modern civilization is tradition, something he takes to be generally valuable, Gandhi is hardly an all-forgiving apologist for tradition. He sees it as constructed and evolving and, along the way, justifying various inequalities and subordination, something he found in his own tradition regarding *dacoits* and women. Even though our received

traditions contain corrupted elements, Gandhi insisted that at their core, these traditions contain ideals and moral principles that are important to human beings but are avoided in modernity. On his reading, at their best, traditions teach us that all human beings are equal, that we are not to treat others as means to our own ends, that we have duties and responsibilities to others, and that our knowledge of good and evil as well as of causality is fallible. For him, modern civilization is not necessarily at war with all moral principles. He often employed the modern concept of rights, for example, to describe what he believed was denied to colonial India, *dacoits,* and women. However, Gandhi claimed that modernity, often unwittingly, displaces traditional values with inferior surrogates. Duties to others are shunted aside in favor of personal success, the ties that bind a community are unraveled by the demands of efficiency and productivity, the vitality of the local is smothered by the heavy hands of centralized efforts to coordinate, and the rich diversity of life makes way for a bland consumerism.

Summary and Conclusions

Gandhi remains an influential and original thinker on the nonviolent resolution of conflict. Even so, he has not been without critics. Gandhi claimed that satyagraha is universally applicable, regardless of the target or circumstances. Sympathetic observers have questioned his advice to Jews to resist the Nazis nonviolently. They argue that for all of the faults of British colonialism, it was not Nazism (or Stalinism). Hitler's government would not have been content to disapprove of civil disobedience and imprison the demonstrators; rather it would kill them. Such critics hold that Gandhi's nonviolent confrontations depend for their efficacy on particular conditions and, therefore, are applicable only selectively. Other critics hold that violence will never disappear from the world, and it is both prudent and moral for countries to possess the kind of force that will dissuade and, if necessary, resist aggressors.

Support for this latter position comes from the extraordinary violence of the twentieth century. But this has also been a time when much of the world changed, indeed was transformed, for the better without massive violence, and Gandhi's theory of satyagraha continues to have broad appeal. Both the British and Soviet empires were dismantled without much violence, and apartheid in South Africa crumbled without wide-scale violence. Moreover, many of the world's marginalized have resisted domination and promoted their own nonviolent movements as they pressed for equality without regard to class, race, caste, or gender. However, Gandhi's critique on the excesses of modernity and modernization has not gained the kind of following that his ideas regarding nonviolent protest have. His arguments with modernity and modernization are probably too sweeping and do not provide solid counsel to taming their worst features. However, some in the environmental community react to his suspicions about the dangers that follow a disrespect for nature and an arrogance about exploiting nature.

What weaves the many parts of Gandhi's thinking into a coherent whole is his unswerving commitment to the worth and dignity of every individual. Critical to his understanding is his belief that everyone should be treated equally, that there is no natural or divinely ordained hierarchy that anoints some people as superior and makes others inferior. Therefore, he concluded, there is no justification for treating others as a means to satisfy our own ends, no matter how moral we think these ends are. Moreover, he holds that any human being can know only fragments of the truth. None of us is God, who knows the whole truth, even though we sometimes aspire to be omniscient and omnipotent. In promoting claims that everyone is equal and everyone is limited, Gandhi advanced a nonviolent politics where power is transparent, dispersed, and accountable; a society that attends to the least well-off and recognizes that everyone carries duties to others; and a culture that moves beyond consumerism and recognizes the many facets in any individual's life and shows men and women that they are part of an interdependent cosmos.

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See also Civil Disobedience; Power; Violence

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Gender

Gender is commonly understood to refer to the culturally constructed behaviors, roles, and identities associated with men and women. Simone de Beauvoir's claim that one is not born one but rather becomes a woman is frequently invoked to capture the sense in which what it means to be a man or a woman derives from the social and historical context in which we live rather than from natural or biological fact.

Gender is an important question for political theory. Theorists are concerned with how political institutions and concepts used in political theory are gendered—that is, how their development and definitions have operated to construct and perpetuate gender divisions. In addition, how we understand the concept of gender is itself an important focus for political theorists.

Feminist theorists have pointed out that much traditional political theory, while purporting to be neutral, is gendered. Perhaps most important, feminist theorists have argued that the concept of the person or the individual that underpins much political theory turns out, on closer inspection, to equate to an individual who possesses characteristics—such as rationality, impartiality, and independence—traditionally associated with masculinity. This gendering of the individual was once explicit, as in the French Revolution's Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), but it continues implicitly in the work of much political theory. It persists precisely because of this history of exclusion of women from participation in the political sphere. Although the formal limitations on women's participation in public life have been removed, many feminists contend that this historical exclusion has continued effects. This history has contributed to our understanding of the characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity. The ideals guiding public-sphere participation—reason, impartiality, exercising judgments in accord with universal rules, not sentiment—come to be associated with masculinity and to be defined against the attributes associated with femininity. Thus, publicity, reason, universality, and masculinity are aligned in opposition to privacy, emotion, particularity, and femininity.

How we are to understand what the term *gender* refers to is also a matter of substantial debate within political theory. One interpretation of the meaning of gender is to understand it in terms of a distinction between sex and gender. On this social constructivist understanding, sex is natural or biological—maleness or femaleness—whereas gender is culturally constructed meanings attached to these biological facts—masculinity and femininity.

Other interpretations of gender have challenged the adequacy of the sex/gender distinction, arguing that the idea that sex is a natural fact is not self-evidently true but is itself a culturally constructed notion. An alternative to this understanding of sex as natural and gender as cultural is Judith Butler's influential theory of gender performativity. This theory argues that sex is as constructed a notion as gender is. Performativity theory is a more thoroughgoing version of social constructivism, arguing that there is no natural sex—instead, it is the repeated performance of gender that produces, over time, the effect of a natural sex that underlies these performances. The constant repetition of gender congeals over time to give the appearance of a natural truth underlying these performances. On this understanding, the order of primacy is reversed—it is not sex that dictates or shapes our performance of gender, but rather the repeated performance of gendered behavior that accretes, over time, to produce the idea of an underlying sex.

The notion of gender performativity does not mean that performances of gender are a matter of free choice. Instead, these performances are constrained—they repeatedly cite norms of gendered behavior (in particular norms of heterosexuality),

and in doing so serve to strengthen and perpetuate these norms. This understanding of gender suggests that the means to transform gender come not from stripping away false cultural constructions of gender but instead from performing gender differently—from subverting gendered norms, and in the process, transforming them.

Still other interpretations challenge this approach to gender, suggesting that a performative reading of gender obscures the question of nature. This approach suggests that the constructivist interpretation of gender entailed in performativity theory tends to result in an emphasis on questions of discourse and representation at the expense of thoroughly rethinking the notion of nature and bodily materiality. Theorists associated with this approach sometimes prefer to use the notion of sexual difference rather than gender, believing that this captures more of a sense of the intertwining of nature and culture than is offered by gender.

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See also Body; Feminism; Performativity; Public Sphere; Social Constructivism

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GENEALOGY

The philosophical concept of genealogy, introduced as a term of art by Friedrich Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887), has come to be associated with two related but distinct practices of philosophical reflection. The first—of which Nietzsche's text is the primary exemplar—is critically directed to undermining some aspects or elements of our current evaluative orientation or perspective. The second—which is taken to be exemplified by David Hume's account of the origin of justice in Book III of his *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1740)—is directed to the vindication of some aspect or elements of our current evaluative orientation or perspective. More recently, the critical and vindicatory modes of genealogy have been revived, most notably by Michel Foucault and by Bernard Williams, respectively. What links the two practices is that they each seek to provide naturalistic histories or quasi-historical stories concerning the emergence of an evaluative orientation (say, justice or morality) that are designed to affect our confidence in the value and authority of the object of genealogical enquiry. Genealogy can be located as one kind of approach to the practice of engaging in philosophical reflection through historical reflection; examples of other approaches would include works ranging from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* to Alastair MacIntyre's *After Virtue* and Charles Taylor's *Sources of the Self*.

But on what grounds can (quasi-)historical stories about the formation and development of our norms, values, ethical beliefs, and so on that compose our evaluative orientation play any role with respect to our reasonable judgments concerning the value and authority of that perspective? A condition of the motivation of genealogical reflection is an acknowledgment that the history of how we come to have a given perspective that we now exhibit is not in and of itself vindicatory. In contrast to the Providential views of history targeted by Hume and the teleological views targeted by Nietzsche and Foucault, the genealogist starts from a standpoint in which the historical triumph of a given perspective cannot by itself be taken to underwrite any claim to normative legitimacy.

In the case of vindicatory genealogy, the central example is Hume's genealogy of justice. Hume's strategy is to provide a fictional history that demonstrates how people with certain relatively simple psychological motivations of the kind that we recognize as typical, given a plausible and probable set of circumstances, come to develop a virtue—and hence reasons for action—that they did not previously have. Notably, Hume's account of the

emergence of the artificial virtue of justice is one in which a shift from one outlook to another is explained in functional terms such that the later perspective makes sense of itself and of the earlier orientation and of the transition from the one to the other, in such terms that holders of both outlooks have reasons to recognize the transition as an improvement. A more recent example of vindicatory genealogy that attempts to extend the approach is Bernard Williams's *Truth and Truthfulness*.

Perhaps the earliest example of a critical genealogy is Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Discourse of Inequality,* which similarly starts from a simplified psychology to provide a functional account of how we reach a more complex psychological condition that holders of the early outlook would *not* be able to endorse and that holders of the present outlook must find disturbing. This approach is further developed by Nietzsche's *Genealogy,* in which he attempts to show how the different elements composing morality can be accounted for best in terms that are incompatible with the requirements of the outlook of morality.

More generally, we may say that in the case of critical genealogy, the destabilization of our confidence in a given perspective is accomplished by showing (a) how we have come to be captivated by this way of seeing; (b) how this way of seeing renders us obscure to ourselves in various ways or renders us blind to, for example, forms of power or injustice; and (c) how a shift of perspective can clarify and illuminate our condition to us. Two examples will illustrate the nature of this practice:

1. In *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality (v01.1)* as the first example, Foucault's general concern is based on the thought that we are held captive by a picture of politics fundamentally shaped by discourses and practices of sovereignty—and which leads us to assume that sovereignty is the preeminent locus of political reflection. As he puts it:

> At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis we *still have not cut off the head of the king.* Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty. . . . To conceive of power on the basis of these problems is to conceive it in terms of a historical form that is characteristic of our societies: *the juridical monarchy.* (Foucault, 1978, pp. 88–89)

Foucault's concern is that our captivation by this sovereignty-based picture of politics means that we fail to make sense of our political agency. The substance of this concern is, thus, that in being so captivated, we are blind to the operation of forms of domination articulated through relations of power that this picture does not disclose. His task is, thus, to enable us to free ourselves from this picture such that we may begin to make sense of ourselves as political agents in ways that support, rather than undermine, our capacity for self-government.

There are three stages to the process of genealogical self-reflection. First, Foucault provides an account of two types of political relations, those organized around sovereignty and those organized around biopower, and their relation to each other to unsettle the grip of the sovereignty picture on our political imaginations. Second, by giving an account of the emergence and development of biopower, Foucault shows us how we have remained captivated by the sovereignty picture and how this captivation leads us to fail to make sense of the circumstances and character of our political agency. Third, by enabling us to make sense of our political agency and, in particular, our current failure to make sense of our own political unfreedom, Foucault's account motivates us in terms of our own commitment to self-government to engage in the practical task of overcoming this condition of unfreedom by altering our games of government to minimize the degree of domination within them.

2. In *Strange Multiplicity,* James Tully provides a perspicuous representation of the character of demands for cultural recognition by surveying the range of political struggles that have rendered cultural diversity problematic, causing it to become a locus of political action and philosophical reflection, to outline a set of conventions that would allow speakers their due. To achieve this goal, he offers a genealogy of constitutionalism to lay open to view those conventions that obstruct

our understanding of claims for cultural recognition and, thereby, prevent us from rendering what is due to the advocates of such claims by way of (a) an historical account of how a given language of "modern constitutionalism" has become hegemonic within contemporary constitutionalism, marginalizing and excluding what Tully refers to as the language of "common constitutionalism"; (b) an illustration of how this modern picture causes us to overlook distinctions and uses of concepts in the language of contemporary constitutionalism that enable us to do justice to demands for cultural recognition; and (c) a demonstration that once we are freed from captivity to the conventions of the language of modern constitutionalism, we can see the justice of the constitutional conventions Tully recovers and reconstructs from historical examples of the practice of common constitutionalism for addressing contemporary struggles of recognition.

In both cases, what is initially seen as a limit or bound of reason is exposed by way of the historical investigation to be not natural, necessary, or obligatory but a product of contingent, arbitrary constraint.

It is important in reflecting on genealogy to be clear that it is not a general method for the social sciences; rather, genealogy is a specific kind of investigation designed to address a particular kind of problem, namely, the authority of our current political perspective or some aspect of it, where the scope of "our" is given by the focus of the specific object of investigation. Vindicatory genealogy is designed to support our confidence in the authority of our perspective, and critical genealogy to undermine it, but both take this focus. In this respect, there is no necessary incompatibility between genealogy and other forms of vindicatory or critical reflection that are oriented to different problems.

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See also Agency; Critique; Foucault, Michel; Hume, David; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Power; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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General Will

The central idea in the political thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the general will (*volonté générale*) had already figured in French theological and philosophical discourse for a century before Rousseau appropriated it and made it forever his own.

The general will first gained wide circulation in the writings of Nicholas Malebranche, who employs the term in the *Traité de la nature et de la grace* to characterize the way in which God's will operates in the world. He argues that God wills generally, establishing laws to regulate the universe as a whole, rather than by willing

particularly to assign specific attributes and destinies to individual people and things. Physical deformations and moral evil are not part of God's general will, Malebranche argues, although they arise as predictable but unwilled consequences of the operation of general laws.

In Book 11 of *De l'esprit des lois,* Montesquieu characterizes the legislative activity of a state as the expression of its general will and the action of its judiciary as the articulation of a particular will. Unlike Malebranche, who contrasts the wisdom of God's general will with the arbitrariness of particular wills, Montesquieu attaches no moral valence to either. Montesquieu insists only that the two powers must be institutionally separated because their union in the same body necessarily results in tyranny.

In his entry on "*Droit naturel*" in the *Encylopédie,* Denis Diderot seeks to refute moral skepticism by demonstrating that the general will of all humankind provides the natural foundation of morality. Humanity's general will is always oriented toward the good, he claims, because it aims at the happiness of the entire species. Diderot's general will, however, is an ideal standard known by reflection, not an empirical act of willing.

In the first manuscript version of *Du contrat social,* Rousseau rejects Diderot's account. There can be no empirical reality to a general will of the human species, he argues, because humankind as a whole is so diverse and dispersed that it cannot act as a subject with a single will. As an ideal standard, Diderot's principle cannot satisfy the moral skeptic, Rousseau claims, because what skeptics really lack is not knowledge of the good but a motive to prefer the welfare of others to their own.

The published version of *Du contrat social* explicitly addresses the problem Rousseau thought Diderot had left unresolved. In the preface to Book I, Rousseau announces that he aims to discover the rule any government must follow if it wants its subjects to be both morally obligated to obey its commands and motivated to do so. That rule proves to be the general will.

People as they are, Rousseau holds, are naturally free, and in their freedom, they will the preservation of their own lives and goods. Nevertheless, the extensive needs of socialized human beings make it necessary for all to live in organized communities with others. Rousseau conceives the establishment of any such community as the making of a contract with the following terms: The individuals who join the community accept that their properties and lives will be subject to the supreme authority of the community's general will; the community, in turn, promises to regard each individual as inseparable from the whole community. There is nothing mysterious about this contract and the general will it creates. According to Rousseau, every group of people dedicated to a common purpose has a general will to accomplish that purpose, and the existence of such a general will distinguishes a community from a mere aggregation (*The Social Contract* [SC] 1.5). The body politic or political community is the community that aims at the overall well-being of all its members.

Rousseau's social contract is not, as was Hobbes's, an exchange of freedom for security. It is, rather, the exchange of one *identity* for another, the transformation of individuals into citizens, who collectively are sovereign. The people's sovereignty, according to Rousseau, is both inalienable and indivisible. It is inalienable because it is nothing but the active expression of the citizens' will that the community flourish (SC 2.1) and indivisible because the exclusion of any citizens from political participation would preclude the expression of a truly general will (SC 2.2). In other words, only the entire body of the people can make law, which is, properly speaking, nothing but the declaration of the general will. Because the citizens are bound only by the laws they have themselves made, they are not subject to the authority of any individual person and therefore remain as free as they were before accepting the social contract (SC 2.4, 1.6).

Rousseau adds that the general will is always "upright" (SC 2.3); it aims at what the people believe is good for themselves collectively, which is not the same as saying that it is always good, or wise (SC 6.1). The rectitude of the general will is guaranteed by a combination of its generality and the natural self-interest of the citizens. Because each one benefits from the welfare of the whole, every member has a motive to advance the common weal. As long as the whole body of citizens genuinely seeks the good of the whole community and enacts regulations that bind the entire community equally, the result will necessarily be equitable (SC 2.4).

Rousseau does not waver from regarding the general will as an empirical phenomenon, not an ideal of reason, but he does recognize that it can be difficult to design institutions to discern the content of the general will from the votes cast by citizens in any real political assembly (SC 4.1–4). It is yet more difficult for the people as a whole to discern the substantive content of the common good that it knows it wants in the abstract: Rousseau writes that "the judgment which guides" the general will "is not always enlightened" (2.6). Hence, Rousseau envisions that a wise legislator will propose a code of laws and will invoke the aid of religion to induce the people to will his laws as their general will; if the laws are well adapted to the people, the people will come, in time, to love them and embrace them, not only as the dictates of religion, but also as the basis of their own public happiness.

These difficulties, which Rousseau recognized, became practically manifest in the politics of the French Revolution and the Terror, whose leaders were enthusiastic, if less than careful readers of Rousseau. Mistaking his own will for the general will, Maximilien Robespierre notoriously regarded opponents of his policies as enemies of the sovereign people, who must be expelled from the body politic, which is to say, executed.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel argued that, because it lacked any grounding in an objective ideal of reason, Rousseau's account of the general will led ineluctably to the Terror. Benjamin Constant agreed in blaming Rousseau for the excesses of the French Revolution, but for a different reason: Constant rejects the total subordination of the citizen-subjects to the determinations of the general will.

Immanuel Kant transforms Rousseau's political theory of freedom under the general will into the moral theory of autonomy through the categorical imperative. The general will retains a role in his political theory, but Kant treats it as an ideal standard, not an empirical expression of the citizens' will. In his account, a law is illegitimate only if it could not have been willed by the people as its general will.

After Kant and Hegel, the general will continues as a topic of analysis and discussion, particularly in political theorists working in the idealist tradition, such as T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet, but it never regained the prominence it had held in the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

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See also Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Kant, Immanuel; Legitimacy; Liberty; Robespierre, Maximilien; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Sovereignty

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Global Civil Society

The contemporary study of civil society is generally seen to reflect the relatively recent emergence of activist forms of political participation dating from the 1960s. The movements of that decade seemed to follow a quiescent period in all industrial democracies and, for many, were all the more surprising given the general economic prosperity of the times. But even a cursory look at the historical record suggests that none of these forms of activity or activism was very new, even then. Although we cannot pinpoint a specific date, decade, or even century when "civil society" begins to take on something of a familiar form and recognizable social movements start to appear, it seems safe to say that, by the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the conditions were ripe. With the emergence of social activism during the 1980s in the socialist states of Eastern Europe, the term

civil society was revived; its extension to the global first appeared around the time that the Soviet bloc disintegrated and disappeared. In that context, the term *global civil society* came to refer to the transnational activism and activities of various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements.

Much of the literature on global civil society focuses on the structure, motivations, and activities of NGOs, both domestic and transnational. The global number of NGOs is quite large, perhaps in the hundreds of thousands or even millions, and their activities span a broad range of issue areas and countries. As commonly understood, global civil society almost certainly does *not* include the myriads of civil and civic associations that are largely apolitical, although even these organizations play a role in the structuring and maintenance of state-market-society relations and do, now and then, engage in political activities. Nor is the notion of NGOs ordinarily extended to market actors, such as corporations, even though growing numbers of business associations and companies are deeply involved in activities similar to both NGOs and social movements. And there is the perennial question: Who elected the NGOs? Who are their members, and whom do they represent? And don't the wealthier, more influential NGOs from the Global North dominate the poorer NGOs from the Global South? Finally, many NGOs themselves are constituted as businesses because they must generate income to go beyond voluntary status. Some offer retail goods and services for sale and have annual expenditures greater than $100 million. This is small by corporate standards but quite respectable for many academics and even institutions of higher education (excluding Harvard, Berkeley, and other such wealthy universities).

Whether *global* civil society makes analytical or empirical sense is not at all clear. In a liberal system, civil society is concerned with social reproduction in the private sphere and with ensuring that neither state nor market takes complete control of the bourgeoisie and its "life, liberty, and property." Civil society is regarded as possessing a high degree of autonomy from the state, even as it exercises its control functions. From a Marxist perspective, the division between public and private, as well as the structural reasons for that distinction, are foundational to capitalism, the liberal state, and the activities of capital. Political authority over segments of the public realm is transferred to the private sphere, where property rights are guaranteed by but insulated from the state's direct and structural power. In the absence of a world state, however, it would seem that a global civil society cannot exist because there is no evident global political authority.

There is no world state but, to a growing degree, the global political economy constitutes a singular transnational capitalist social formation that resembles, more and more, a state in the making. Within this arrangement, global civil society is generated through productive power—in a sense, it is willed into existence—as particular agents in command of certain discursive resources seek to impose limits on the autonomy of market-based actors in the face of a very weak global ethical and normative regulatory structure. The majority of these agents pursue their goals through institutions—that is, through the rules and authority of national and transnational agencies and association—and attempt to induce change in the moral behavior of state- and market-based actors. Some agents—especially those commonly described as social movements—work through productive power in an effort to transform the ethical bases of political action and thereby to reconstruct the structural principles governing both domestic and global political economy.

Global civil society is best understood, therefore, in terms of a dialectical relationship between developing modes of public global governance and a global market system that is only weakly regulated by states and international institutions. Global civil society is constituted out of social relations within an expanding global neoliberal regime of governmentality and, with and through the capillaries of productive power, helps to legitimize, reproduce, and sometimes transform internally that regime, its operation, and its objectives. In this respect, global civil society is generated by agents who seek to resist or moderate the expansion of the market into various realms of social life but who may, nonetheless, act in ways that, perhaps unwittingly, support the logics of the market and its further expansion. Paradoxically, the same relations of power that give rise to this form of social action also engender movements that pursue major structural change in the global political economy,

this in a quest to alter the social ethics that enable or constrain individual and corporate autonomy within politics and markets. In other words, global civil society manifests itself in two forms, acting alternatively through markets or politics.

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See also Environmentalism; Global Justice; Performativity; Social Movements

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GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is an essentially contested concept. It has many definitions, and there is little agreement as to its existence, its magnitude, and its operation. For the purposes of this entry, globalization can best be understood as the extension and deepening of flows, rules, and practices associated with capitalism. In this respect, globalization is not a new phenomenon, inasmuch as capitalism has been globally expansive since at least 1500 CE. The relevant question is, therefore, what is new or different about contemporary globalization.

Analytical Approaches to Globalization

Standard arguments about globalization tend to focus on flows—of goods, capital, labor, travel, technology, and information—as measures of the rate, degree, and extent of economic and social change since roughly 1970. Such indicators are relatively easy to quantify, are taken as significant in themselves, and most important, are routinely collected by governments and other authoritative institutions. International trade and capital flows have, for example, grown by orders of magnitude over the past half century, and the information revolution has, as many put it, resulted in an unprecedented "compression of time and space." Response times to events and crises have diminished greatly, and if a currency collapses in Asia, the ramifications are soon felt in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. But these are hardly new phenomena: Although the speed with which things happen has increased, as has the size of flows, they have all been characteristic of the global economy for centuries.

A second, minority view argues that globalization is not happening or, if it is, the magnitude of the phenomenon is little greater than that seen in Europe prior to World War I. Advocates of this perspective focus largely on volumes of cross-border trade and capital flows, along with levels of foreign direct investment. Proportionally, these are less than was the case in 1914, although the absolute magnitude of the international economy is greater, even taking into account inflation rates of more than 1,000% since then. Such a narrow view of globalization rests on a very limited conceptualization of the phenomenon and, consequently, defines it out of existence.

A third approach focuses not on the flows or stocks of things but, rather, the global diffusion of rules, processes, and practices. In this light, globalization has two important features: First, it involves the expansion, extension, and deepening of capitalist social relations, "trickling down" even into those countries and places that are regarded as only marginally integrated into the global economy. Second, there are "knock-off effects" on existing social relations that transform established patterns of employment, wealth, power, status, hierarchy, expectations, and politics, destabilizing customary patterns of production and reproduction, challenging naturalized social hierarchies, and triggering political and social change and upheaval. Globalization thus offers numerous opportunities for the emergence of social movements and other forms of political organization and action, even as it disrupts existing beliefs, values, behaviors, and social relations. At times, these disruptions may generate social violence and even war.

In historical terms, there is little new in this, inasmuch as the present phase of capitalist expansion is only the latest in a centuries-old trend toward worldwide economic integration: As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels declares in the first section of the *Communist Manifesto,* "All that is solid melts into air" (p. 63). Technological change, commodification, accumulation, and cultural change expose the fluidity and hollowness of hierarchies and networks, downsize or eliminate various niches in the societal division of labor, and open or expand others. Although there is a class character to these impacts and their consequences, the political and social alliances that develop to resist such change tend to be based on cultural elements—religion, race, ethnicity—rather than strictly economic or class factors.

Conceptualizing Globalization

Globalization is better understood, therefore, as simultaneously an *idealist* set of beliefs; a *behavioral* set of principles, rules, and activities; and a *material* set of outcomes and infrastructures. Globalization is a form of idealism through reification of a complex process that, it is said, will make the world richer and happier, and it is rationalized and naturalized in the name of efficiency, competition, and profit, as an inevitable concomitant of the historical triumph of liberalism. Globalization is a form of behavioralism in its reorganization of existing institutions, resulting changes in the practices of real live people, and creation of new conditions of normality that are of benefit to some and not others. Finally, globalization is a form of materialism in the sense that flows of capital, technology, goods, and, to a lesser degree, labor move rapidly, putting in place new infrastructures and landscapes of production, exchange, and consumption.

The ideology associated with contemporary globalization is widely identified with neoliberalism, although its origins are to be found in the liberal economic system established through the post–World War II Bretton Woods regulatory regimes. Neoliberalism looks to the market as an institution best suited for fostering both individual accumulation and social progress; it favors minimal political intervention into their operations. Drawing on a crude version of Adam Smith's "invisible hand," deregulated markets are believed to maximize social benefits and utilities. In fact, neoliberalism involves a shift in regulation from the market itself to the political economy in which markets are shaped. When encoded in international law, treaties, and conventions, rules and regulations become globally binding on all signatories, and violators may be sanctioned and fined. Such meta-regulation is less visible to individual participants in markets and more distant from national political institutions but, in many instances, provides specific advantages to capital (see the discussion of intellectual property rights, below).

The behavioral consequences of globalization arise in terms of responses to meta-regulation and in the ways that individuals and societies are reorganized and made to alter older forms of practice. For example, production of high-value agricultural commodities in developing countries for export to wealthy countries may result in land consolidation, decline in subsistence production of food, and migration of landless and unemployed farmers into urban areas. The ability to move large amounts of capital rapidly into high-return, high-risk investments can foster bubbles, and their subsequent collapse can have all kinds of ancillary consequences.

The material consequences of globalization arise as economies grow differentially, and established lifestyles and infrastructures are made obsolete in some locales and built up in others (compare here Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and Shanghai, China). This has transformative impacts on both place and space; although those impacts are rapid, their long-term effects can span centuries. During the current phase of globalization, in particular, the production process has become much more complex, with raw materials, commodities, semi-processed materials, parts, and finished goods moving among locales and plants in different countries according to both interstate/interregional and intrafirm logics of comparative advantage. Rapid and efficient global communication systems have fostered the outsourcing of services such as design, accounting, travel bookings, and so on. The specific forms of these processes, as well as the paths of corporate and social change, are determined less by the relative costs of factors of production, as would follow from the classical theory of comparative advantage. Rather, those forms are

more dependent on factor costs internal to the production chain, the costs of capital—financial, human, and intellectual—the burden of social costs imposed in specific locations, and the size of local subsidies, if any.

Furthermore, besides involving the redeployment of capital and production factors (and, it should be noted, both legal and illegal labor mobility), the current phase of globalization is also very knowledge intensive. It is knowledge intensive in terms of the complexity of production, in terms of the commodification of knowledge, and in terms of our understanding of globalization's impacts on both social and natural environments. The globalization of an intellectual property rights system, through the World Trade Organization's TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement, is only one of several new commodity frontiers that bring most of the world's countries under hegemonic regulation of knowledge production and exchange.

The History of Globalization

The current round of globalization has its roots, as noted above, in the post–World War II economic system propagated by the United States. This, in turn, drew heavily on the nineteenth-century international economy, which was based on the gold standard, protected by the British Royal Navy, and anchored in the City of London. The Bretton Woods (BW) system, devised in large part by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White and modeled to some degree on the earlier British-sponsored system, sought to address the trade, currency, and fiscal crises associated with the Great Depression, which were believed to have contributed to the war. The four major BW institutions were the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, aka, the World Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the dollar-based gold exchange currency system, and the later established General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Their forms and functions were premised on the existence of relatively autonomous, state-regulated national economies, subject only to a limited set of meta-regulations. During its fully-operational lifetime, the BW system was a great success, helping to spur European reconstruction and high rates of economic growth and prosperity in Europe, Japan, and the United States.

Nonetheless, by the 1960s, the currency component of the BW system was coming under growing strain, as international dollar liquidity exceeded demand (the Triffin dilemma) and U.S. trade deficits appeared and grew, fostered by American spending on the Vietnam War and growing imports due to lower tariffs negotiated under the GATT. The oil price hikes and inflation of the 1970s, accompanied by rapidly increasing wages and declining rates of profit, motivated a turn to neoliberalism, on the one hand, and gradual liberalization of capital movements, on the other. During the early 1980s, a double global recession, engineered by the U.S. Federal Reserve to squeeze inflation out of the U.S. economy, set in motion incentives to restructure U.S. and global production and further integrate the world economy through a purely dollar-based currency standard.

Today, although national economies remain notionally autonomous from each other, they are deeply integrated in a number of ways. Most critically, it is very difficult for any country to insulate itself from disruptions, whether economic, political, or social, in other parts of the world. In particular, having yoked their individual prosperity to international trade and exchange as well as growing rates of fossil fuel consumption, virtually everyone is exposed to the massive dollar overhang resulting from recent U.S. budget and trade deficits, extraction of household equity as a mechanism of global demand stimulation, and foreigners' purchase of various forms of American bonds and securities as a store for surplus dollar holdings. Although it is conceivable that one or another major American creditor—China, Japan, the European Union—might choose to break with the dollar standard, there is a general concern that this could cause global financial turmoil that would exceed that during the Great Depression.

The Implications of Contemporary Globalization

As noted above, one of the most important impacts of globalization involves the disruption of social relations that arises from displacement and destruction of older patterns of production, exchange, consumption, and lifestyle. Although this process

is reified as one of the costs of economic progress and the raising of factor productivity, it may also play a role in phenomena such as terrorism. The individual freedom associated with global consumer capitalism helps to erode the social discipline and peer pressures associated with older patterns of behavior and practices, and globalization makes available technologies and methods that facilitate capital and individual mobility as well as the dual use of everyday technology and communications. Because social disruption also involves major shifts in status, hierarchies, and relative well-being, it may foster the formation of both activist social movements and networked terrorist groups and associations. This hypothesis, however, requires further research.

Another significant consequence has to do with the global environmental effects of globalization, evident in at least three ways. First, growing levels of fossil fuel burning and other greenhouse gas emissions appear to be changing the world's climate, although the scale and scope of this change are, as yet, highly uncertain. As a result, however, people around the planet are likely to experience impacts for which they bear little or no responsibility. Second, global trade and consumption of goods and services have impacts far from their points of origins, with deleterious effects on land use, water resources, forests, and cities. In effect, negative environmental externalities are being exported around the world. Furthermore, the transformation of landscapes arising from the relocation of production; the exploitation of forests, minerals, and water resources; and the rise in international tourism, among other processes, are diminishing global biodiversity. Again, these impacts often affect people very different and distant from those who consume goods and services.

Finally, what are the impacts of globalization on people's well-being and social welfare? This is a point of some dispute: Has globalization improved the lot of the world's poorest? On the one hand, the very high rates of economic growth in China and India have raised the incomes of hundreds of millions above the World Bank's official poverty line of $1 to $2/day, and some data suggest that mean incomes have risen in many countries (with the notable exception of those in Africa). On the other hand, there is evidence that the divide between the very wealthiest and very poorest of the world's people has also increased, in both developed and developing countries. According to the UN Development Program, 54% of the world's income goes to 10% of the world's population, while 40% of the world's population receives only 5% of the world's income, a gap that is growing larger.

Conclusion

Globalization is not a uniformly negative phenomenon. It facilitates comparative advantage among countries, regions, and corporations. It can raise incomes and welfare and enhance the social mobility of people who have lacked such opportunities. It fosters a closer and more interdependent world and facilitates knowledge production and education. But globalization also has its downsides and is currently lacking forms of social regulation that could soften many of its harder edges. The future of globalization rests, most of all, on the modes and mechanisms of management and regulation that states, corporations, and other groups are able to devise and implement. Whether these will emerge is also disputed and, in any event, will likely take decades to become effective.

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See also Classical Political Economy; Development; Empire; Imperialism; Liberalism; New Liberalism; World-Systems Theory

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Global Justice

Theories of justice provide principles to guide the moral assessment of existing or hypothetical social arrangements. Principles of distributive justice, in particular, assess the terms on which social arrangements make important economic advantages accessible to people (such as property in productive assets, income, wealth, and opportunities for employment). Until recently, philosophical discussions on distributive justice tended to focus only on the assessment of rules and institutions framing the interactions of individuals within a domestic social structure. There is, however, increasing discussion about principles that address the global level. These principles would orient supranational rules and institutions that affect international markets in capital and labor, international trade and monetary arrangements, the access to natural resources, and the conditions and limits of the sovereignty of states.

This entry articulates current debates on global justice in reference to three kinds of issues. The first concerns the identification of plausible distributive principles. The second focuses on the formulation of conditions under which the global application of these principles would be morally justified. The third area of discussion concerns the issue of whether the implementation of global principles of distributive justice is feasible.

Three Kinds of Distributive Principles

The first area of debate concerns the identification of distributive principles. We can identify at least three kinds of principles:

1. *Basic sufficientarianism.* We should, to the extent that we reasonably can, pursue social arrangements in which everyone has enough access to certain important advantages, thus avoiding absolute deprivation.
2. *Intermediate inclusion.* We should, to the extent that we reasonably can, pursue social arrangements in which everyone has a level of access to certain important advantages, which secures the avoidance of absolute deprivation and the absence of glaring forms of relative deprivation.
3. *Egalitarianism.* We should, to the extent that we reasonably can, pursue social arrangements in which everyone has equal access to certain important advantages, thus avoiding relative deprivation.

According to basic sufficientarianism, we should try to secure that everyone has access to what they need to avoid severe poverty. A standard way of construing this demand is in terms of basic socioeconomic human rights to basic resources, housing, health care, and education. These rights range over objects people need to live a minimally decent life. Although most political philosophers now agree that a global version of basic sufficientarianism is a valid demand, they disagree on its precise status. Thomas W. Pogge and Michael Blake, for example, are among those who see it as a strict demand of justice, whereas others, including Thomas Nagel, construe it as a weaker humanitarian duty. Another disagreement concerns the nature of the fundamental duties of justice associated with basic sufficientarian claims. For Pogge, such duties are negative duties to refrain from depriving others of access to the objects of their basic human rights. John Rawls, David Miller, and other philosophers construe the fundamental duties as being also positive, demanding that we provide others with what they need to live minimally decent lives. The first view can yield positive duties of justice but only derivatively: X may have a derivative positive duty to help Y avoid severe poverty when X has been involved in the causation of the poverty that Y suffers. A typical example occurs when Y suffers poverty partly as a result of an international order (supported by X and others) that encourages corrupt elites to oppress and dominate vulnerable people like Y in poor areas of the world (e.g., by allowing such elites to sell natural resources from their countries in the global markets or to contract debt in the name of the people they rule). Although the second view need not reject this way of yielding positive duties, it can more directly say that X should help relieve the poverty of Y simply because X can do so at reasonable cost. An advantage of this approach is that it does not need to rely on empirical claims about the history of the current world order and counterfactual hypotheses about how it would have proceeded had different political choices been made,

which are quite hard to assess. Another advantage is that it can in principle address all kinds of unchosen poverty, including those for which the global rich are not causally responsible. Its polemic weakness, however, is that in some cases it has less motivational power. Other things being equal, most people feel more ready to act to attend to the needs of others when they are responsible for their suffering than when they are not. Another advantage of the negative duties approach is that it seems more likely to have ecumenical appeal. It might, for example, be convincing even to libertarians, who are normally reluctant to accept distributive demands that are based on putative positive duties to improve the economic condition of others.

Consider now the two kinds of suprasufficientarian principles: intermediate inclusion and egalitarianism. Both principles go beyond basic sufficientarianism, demanding that we be concerned not only with people having enough, but also with people being more or less equally well-off. Principles of intermediate inclusion are less demanding than egalitarian principles. Egalitarianism calls for a pursuit of strict economic equality of opportunity or the elimination of inequalities in income and wealth for which people cannot reasonably be held responsible. Intermediate inclusion demands, instead, that differences in economic prospects not be so wide as to make economic cooperation a matter of sheer exploitation. Natural applications of intermediate inclusion arise in the assessment of policies and decision-making procedures of institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Although less demanding than egalitarianism proper, the global implementation of intermediate inclusion would still make a significant difference. David Miller is among the many authors who indeed argue that in a world of deep economic inequality, international institutions tend to be controlled by the global rich, who routinely use their overwhelming superiority in bargaining power to impose exploitative terms of cooperation on the global poor.

Moral Justification

The second area of debate concerns the issue of what makes the global application of distributive principles morally justifiable. Although the arguments articulated below apply to the three kinds of distributive principles, we will focus on suprasufficientarian principles and in particular on egalitarianism. Indeed, the most contentious issue in contemporary philosophical debates on global justice concerns the question of whether global egalitarianism is justified. Many authors argue that egalitarianism is appropriate for domestic contexts, but not for the global level. There are two kinds of arguments for this conclusion. The first tries to show that the implementation of global egalitarianism is simply infeasible, whereas the second attempts to show that even if it were feasible, the implementation of global egalitarianism would not be obligatory at the bar of justice. In what follows, we consider some debates on the issues raised by these strategies, beginning with the second.

The relevant question is: What has to be true of any two individuals for it to be morally appropriate to claim that principles of egalitarian distributive justice apply to them? There are two broad answers to this question. The first is the *humanist* answer, according to which principles of egalitarian justice apply to all persons qua persons, regardless of their country of provenance. A route to this view proceeds along the following lines. We start by affirming the moral equality of all individuals as ultimate units of equal moral concern for everyone. This is the standard moral axiom of cosmopolitanism. We then proceed to note that an appropriate demand for concern arises when people are disadvantaged through no fault of their own. We proceed to trigger obligations of egalitarian distributive justice by identifying serious cases of this kind of disadvantage that result from people being born in poorer rather than richer countries. Consider two children: Maria, who was born in Nicaragua, and Judith, who was born in the United States. Maria's educational opportunities are significantly lower than Judith's. Is this fair? On the humanist egalitarian view, this inequality in educational opportunities is not fair, as it results from factors beyond Maria's and Judith's control. Equal concern would demand that we do not let unchosen circumstances impose inequalities of access to important advantages such as education, wherever these arise.

The second answer to the question about the scope of egalitarian justice is the *associativist* view, according to which principles of egalitarian

distribution apply only among those who share an associative framework of the relevant kind. There are, of course, many versions of this kind of approach, depending on which associative framework is deemed relevant. The following are some examples formulated by Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel in their 2005 work. According to statism, the relevant associative framework must be co-membership in a political community involving a centralized use of legitimate coercion (a state). According to institutionalism, duties of distributive justice exist where institutions can be charged with the responsibility of assigning the relevant advantages. According to cooperativism, the relevant associative framework is some consequential regime of mutually beneficial cooperation. According to interdependence, the triggering condition is present "whenever the fate of people in one place depends substantially on the collective decisions taken by people in another place, and the fate of people in that latter place depends substantially on the collective decisions of people in the former" (p. 153). Another important form of associativism is, of course, nationalism, according to which people have duties of justice to each other only if they are co-nationals (i.e., they share a certain set of institutions, a language, and a collective history).

The associativist approach qualifies egalitarianism's scope by saying that its appropriate application tracks certain facts of association. Now, philosophers endorsing associativist views are divided on the issue of whether global egalitarianism is justifiable. Some claim that no associative framework of the relevant kind is global in nature, concluding that global egalitarianism must be rejected, at least until the relevant global associative framework emerges. Others argue that associativist premises need not yield a rejection of global egalitarianism. On these approaches, a rich description of the current trends of global economic and political interaction, including overt or covert military interventions, international institutions like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund, multiple regional organizations, international social movements, and so on suggests that some version of institutionalism, cooperativism, or at the very least interdependence in fact yields global egalitarian demands. Charles R. Beitz is among those who argue, for example, that analogues of Rawls's domestic principles of justice as fairness, including global fair equality of opportunity and a global difference principle, are warranted.

It is worth noting that some associativist philosophers who reject global egalitarianism can nevertheless endorse certain global suprasufficientarian demands, advocating a form of global intermediate inclusion involving, for example, the full spectrum of human rights, fair governance of international institutions, and global labor standards. The demand here is not to secure equality of opportunity or condition, but certain (higher than sufficientarian) minima of advantage and a more fair (although not strictly egalitarian) distribution of benefits resulting from some international cooperative ventures.

The cogency of these associativist arguments for global principles depends, of course, on how we characterize the current trends of globalization. They also depend on how frequent and intense global interactions must be for different suprasufficientarian global principles to be deemed morally appealing on an associativist view. Here it seems important to avoid too stringent a view of the depth of the requisite global interactions because this would lead to an uncritical acceptance of the status quo. But it also seems important to avoid an account that is so lax as to dissolve the specificity of associativism. Mere interaction and the possibility of creating schemes of more inclusive distribution may not be enough. Thus, a crucial but difficult task for associativist approaches is to provide criteria for the precise level of international interaction needed for each kind of global principle to be triggered. This is not a problem faced by humanist views, for which it may be enough to show that the implementation of global principles is feasible.

Feasibility

The implementation of a principle may be feasible either because we already possess the institutions needed to fulfill it or because we can create them. Some conceptions of justice favoring global principles claim that there is a natural duty of justice to uphold institutions implementing those principles when they exist and to create them when they do not. Both associativist and humanist conceptions may endorse a natural duty of this kind,

although they would construe it in slightly different ways. For example, associativists would not demand that we create new associative frameworks that could make feasible the implementation of principles of justice that are more exigent than the ones warranted by currently existing associative frameworks. A humanist would, on the other hand, be ready to entertain transitions of this sort, at least insofar as their pursuit does not impose unreasonable costs on anyone.

The issue of what is currently feasible and what can, and perhaps should be made feasible in the future has increasingly become a focus of discussion as philosophers begin to consider the demands of global justice in the non-ideal circumstances of our current world. Circumstances are non-ideal when people are unable or unwilling to honor demands of justice. Examples of such circumstances are the absence of robust international institutions and the lack of a strong ethos of cosmopolitan solidarity. These institutional and motivational deficits pose feasibility obstacles for the implementation of principles of global justice. A response to them would require that we address issues of global *political* justice. Besides the question of what principles should guide the distribution of economic advantages, there is the issue of how decisions regarding such distributions should be made. How should political power be construed in the current context of globalization? What global political practices and institutions are needed to progressively approach the fulfillment of demands of global distributive justice? If we were to face tradeoffs between global political justice and global distributive justice, how should we calibrate them? Many political theorists are starting to address questions such as these. For example, many claim that although it may be true that, for the foreseeable future, a world government would be both undesirable and infeasible, we can and should move beyond a Westphalian framework that fails to limit the sovereignty of states in order to approach global justice. Simon Caney, Robert E. Goodin, and David Held are among those who propose, instead, that we introduce a multilayered system of governance including global authorities and substate institutions besides state-level decision making.

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See also Cosmopolitan Democracy; Cosmopolitanism; Globalization; Human Rights; Justice, Theories of

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GOVERNANCE

From the mid-1980s and onward, *governance* has become a catchword in discussions about how the economy, society, and different kinds of organizations are, or should be, governed. In August 2008, a Google search on *governance* gave more than 50 million hits, almost twice as many as *globalization.* The widespread reference to governance creates frequent translation problems, as many languages do not have a proper equivalent to the term. Because many people tend to stick to the English term, governance has itself become an instance of globalization.

Governance is one of the most fashionable terms within political science, and it is also widely used among practitioners. Part of the attraction is that governance signals a weakening of the state-centered view of power and societal steering, which has dominated the Western world for centuries but now seems to be problematized by contemporary empirical and ideological developments. Governance is a notoriously slippery term. Nevertheless, it aims to grasp the current movement away from the classical form of government through hierarchical command and bureaucratic rule and toward a more open and flexible type of governing based on the participation and interaction of a plethora of public and private actors in different kinds of networks, partnerships, and quasi-markets. These new forms of governance chime well with both the neoliberalist individualism and the postmodern decentering of society because they invoke the principle of "regulated self-regulation," which permits individual and collective actors to work together to find joint solutions while maintaining a large degree of operational autonomy.

Governance is often used in conjunction with other terms. Hence, *good governance* refers to the recent endeavor of international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank to assess and measure the quality of the governing institutions and practices in terms of their stability, interaction, transparency, responsiveness, procedural fairness, effectiveness, and adherence to the rule of law. *Global governance* refers to attempts to develop regulatory policies in response to global problems in the absence of an overarching political authority. *Corporate governance* refers to the institutionalized interaction among many players—including shareholders, management, the board of directors, employees, customers, financial institutions, regulators, and the community at large—involved in the process of directing and controlling business firms. *Project governance* refers to the conditions, practices, and exercise of leadership that help to ensure that projects based on cooperation among several actors lead to innovative and yet feasible solutions. *Multilevel governance* refers to the rise of regional policy making and implementation structures such as the European Union, which link political authorities at different levels while, at the same time, involving relevant and affected actors from the private sector, thus leading to the formation of complex and tangled networks. Last but not least, it should be mentioned that *public governance* has become a buzzword in the consecutive waves of public-sector reforms that are inspired by the *new public management* doctrine, which aims to enhance the role of the market and introduce corporate management techniques in the public sector. The governance literature contains many other examples of the widespread use of the notion of governance, and there is no point in arguing about which of the many usages is the right one. We have to dig deeper and provide a generic definition of governance that can subsequently be used in radial categorizations of different kinds of governance.

Defining Governance

An initial look at the terminological genealogy reveals that governance has its distant roots in the Latin word *gubernare,* which means "to direct, rule, guide," and the Greek word *kybernan,* which means "to steer or pilot a ship" and forms the basis of the notion of cybernetics. From the sixteenth century onward, the notion of *government* becomes a frequently used term in the English-speaking world. Government is derived from the French *gouvernement,* which in turn comes from the medieval French notion of *gouvernance.* Hence,

we might conclude that governance is an old term for providing direction to society that went out of fashion a long time ago and only recently rose to its current fame.

Some contemporary commentators define governance in terms of either the formation of a collective will out of a diversity of interests (politics), a system of rules shaping the actions of social and political actors (polity), or a political steering of social and economic relations based on soft, cooperative policy instruments such as persuasion, voluntary coordination, or procedures for benchmarking of public performance (policy). A few definitions even attempt to combine all three elements in highly inclusive definitions of governance. However, none of these different definitions really captures the distinctiveness of governance, either because they fail to show what governance adds to the traditional notions of politics, polity, or policy or because they fail to put bounds on governance, which tends to include everything and nothing.

Governance is also sometimes defined as a general concept for any pattern of ordered rule including hierarchical government. Although this definition facilitates analysis of how different modes of governance, typically bureaucracies, markets, and networks, are combined in various countries and policy areas, it betrays the fundamental idea that governance implies a change in the role and nature of government. Alternatively, governance can be defined as the complex process through which a plurality of societal actors aims to formulate and achieve common objectives by mobilizing and deploying a diversity of ideas, rules, and resources. This definition emphasizes three distinctive features of governance. First, governance designates a *process* rather than a set of more or less formal institutions. Second, the process is driven by a *collective ambition* to define and pursue common objectives in the face of divergent interests. Third, the process is *decentered* in the sense that common objectives are formulated and achieved through the interaction of a plurality of actors from the state, the economy, and civil society.

Emphasizing the process element makes governance research akin to both policy analysis and implementation studies, which are also looking at processes. Hence, governance research aims to combine process-oriented analysis of policy *input* (policy analysis) with process-oriented analysis of policy *output* (implementation studies). Yet, at the same time, governance research aims to transcend the narrow focus on political and administrative processes taking place within the formal institutions of government. Highlighting the collective ambition to formulate and achieve common objectives is equally important as it takes us beyond the notion of concerted action, which fails to capture the shared ambition of the actors involved in governance to define and solve common problems through joint action. Finally, stressing the decentered character of governance makes it clear that governance cannot be reduced to steering, at least not in the traditional sense where steering refers to the government's exercise of sovereign power to achieve particular, pre-given goals. Defining governance as a decentered process through which policy is formulated, selected, and implemented tends to exclude the kind of unicentric, top-down government that is supposed to have existed prior to the new public management-inspired reforms that have swarmed the public sector from the mid-1980s and onward.

By contrast, governance can be said to include a variety of interactive policy processes. Some of these take the form of *pluricentric networks,* which aim to respond to complex, conflicting, and ill-defined policy problems by facilitating negotiated cooperation among relevant stakeholders on the basis of interdependency, trust, and self-regulated rules of the game. Others take the form of *multicentric quasi-markets,* which aim to respond to problems associated with public monopolies by enhancing negotiated competition in public regulation and service delivery through the establishment of relational contracts between public authorities and private providers. Networks and quasi-markets seldom exist in pure forms, and combinations of the two basic forms of governance are frequent. Public–private partnerships, which combine elements of competition with elements of cooperation, are a case in point.

The state is, to an uneven but increasing extent, supplemented or supplanted by pluricentric networks and multicentric quasi-markets. However, this development does not necessarily result in a "hollowing out of the state," as some commentators have suggested. Most public tasks are still undertaken by fairly traditional forms of bureaucratic

government, and public authorities such as municipalities, regional governments, national ministries, supranational institutions, and international organizations also play an important role in facilitating and managing governance. However, the role of the state seems to vary across the different scales at which governance operates. Hence, whereas public agencies typically play a relatively large role in setting up and coordinating different forms of governance at the local, regional, and national scales, they tend to play a more limited role in relation to global governance and in relation to intra- and interorganizational forms of governance.

The Rise of Governance

The rise of governance, both as a discourse and a set of practices, can be traced back to the Trilateral Commission. In the mid-1970s, the commission initiated a worldwide discussion about "the overload of government" resulting from the mounting expectations of citizens and the limited capacities of public bureaucracies and about "the ungovernability of society" allegedly caused by the decline of public-spirited values. Neoliberal political parties and governments responded to the problem of government overload by recommending the privatization of public enterprises, contracting out of public services, and commercialization of the remaining public sector. In continuation with these neoliberal recommendations, new public management reforms sought to limit the role of elected government to the formulation of overall policy objectives and to place the delivery of public services in the hands of private contractors and quasi-autonomous public agencies operating on the basis of contracts and agreements with central government agencies. In response to the increasing ungovernability of society, new public management has aimed to integrate private organizations and firms in public governance through the formation of networks and partnerships and to enhance the exit and voice options for citizens in public-service delivery through enhanced consumer choice and the creation of user boards.

In political science, there has also been a growing concern for the crisis of the modern welfare state, and in the attempt to provide an alternative to state-sponsored welfare, public-choice theory has highlighted the allocative efficiency of the market. However, the research on steering and control conducted at the Max Planck Institute in Cologne and at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Bielefeld, Germany, has emphasized the limits of both hierarchies and markets. Hierarchies have problems dealing with societal complexity, and markets suffer from collective-action problems. The inherent problems of hierarchies and markets call for the development of new modes of governance based on negotiated interaction among interdependent policy actors. The viability of voluntary coordination beyond state and market is further supported by the work of the American political scientist Elinor Ostrom, who has demonstrated how common pool resources can be regulated through the development of durable cooperative institutions. In the early 1990s, Jan Kooiman summarized the new insights in the claim that no single actor, public or private, has the knowledge and capacity to solve complex, dynamic, and diversified problems. Kooiman and others among his Dutch political science colleagues saw the formulation of governance networks as the solution to this challenge, whereas other researchers saw contract-based partnerships between public and private actors as the way forward. The focus on governance networks resonated well with the works of a number of Anglo-Saxon scholars who had been criticizing the notions of corporatism and neocorporatism for their narrow focus on the tight cooperation among public authorities, trade unions, and business organisations and developed a more open and flexible notion of policy networks that were divided into tight and exclusive policy communities and loose and inclusive issue networks. The emphasis on network types of governance is extended further by international relations theorists, who have developed related notions of advocacy coalitions, epistemic communities, and multilevel governance. Finally, a mixed group of radicals and critical theorists perceive governance either as a neoliberal attempt to "roll back the state" or as the promise of a new democratic order based on associations in civil society that escape the systemic logics implicit to state and market. The latter interpretation turns governance into a prescriptive rather than descriptive concept and invokes the widely contested assumption that civil society is a power-free zone and, therefore, provides the ultimate source of emancipation.

Criticisms and Research Avenues

The research on governance, which sometimes gets carried away in an overly optimistic appraisal of the merits of the new forms of interactive governance, has been met by a series of objections that seem to correspond to the three phases of denial. First, there are those scholars who claim that governance hardly deserves scholarly attention as it remains a marginal phenomenon vis-à-vis the overwhelming predominance of public bureaucracy, which still performs most government functions in most states. The counterargument to this claim will be that governance is on the rise, already plays a significant role in some policy areas, and deserves attention because it blurs the distinction between the private and the public and transforms the role of the state.

Second, among those political science researchers who agree that public policy increasingly is produced and delivered through public–private interaction, many will deny that governance is new and refer to long-lasting traditions for involvement of private actors in the formulation, selection, and implementation of public policy. However, to this unobjectionable observation it should be added that, although governance is not in itself new, it is increasingly considered as an effective and legitimate way of governing society. Hence, what seems to be new is the central role governance is playing in the restructuring of the public sector and its boundaries.

The third and final form of denial is the claim that governance is a new but highly unfortunate phenomenon that should be countered by all means because it creates huge problems in terms of public accountability. While it is undeniably difficult to ensure accountability in pluricentric networks and multicentric quasi-markets, the conclusion is not necessarily that we should return to old-style hierarchical and bureaucratic rule. In our increasingly complex, fragmented, and multilayered societies, interactive forms of governance that bring together actors with different ideas and competences have come to stay. The task is, therefore, to develop new forms of accountability that transcend the traditional forms of electoral and bureaucratic accountability, which merely aim to hold administrators accountable to elected officials, who are in turn held accountable by the voters through regular elections.

The defense of governance research against the three objections raised above does not imply that governance research is a flawless endeavor without any serious problems. The theoretical underpinning of governance research is still relatively weak. There is also an urgent need for methods that combine quantitative and qualitative analysis in the study of governance. Furthermore, only a few empirical studies take us beyond single case studies. These problems bear witness to the fact that governance research has not yet been consolidated into a new political science paradigm. In addition, it should be noted that the new research on governance tends to have an insufficient understanding of the role of power and political conflict, needs to rethink important political science concepts such as sovereignty and democracy, and has been slow to develop tools for assessing the normative implications of governance. The future research agenda will also include: (a) analysis of the formation and transformation of governance arrangements, (b) studies of the situated (inter-)actions of different actors, and (c) reflections on the causes of governance failure and the possibility of meta-governing governance processes through a combination of institutional design, political and discursive framing, process management, and direct participation.

There is no unified theory of governance on which to build the future studies of governance; rather, a broad set of competing theoretical approaches seem to offer crucial insights into the formation, role, functioning, and management of governance. Principal-agency theory envisages the problems arising from incomplete or asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent to carry out a particular task; it can help to analyze the attempts to align the interests of public purchasers and private providers in quasi-markets. Systems theory focuses on communication within and among systems and subsystems and offers crucial insights into the need for intersystemic coordination in the face of fragmentation and complexity and into the various forms of higher order governance (meta-governance) that select, institutionalize, and govern actual governance processes in accordance with particular norms and values. Rational choice institutionalism examines how institutions shape the behavior of rational, self-interested actors by influencing their anticipation

of the consequences of alterative courses of action; it is particularly useful in analyzing the game-like situations through which mutually dependent actors aim to enhance horizontal coordination. Normative institutionalism focuses on how the identity and conduct of social actors are shaped by rules, norms, and values that prescribe what is appropriate for the actors to do in particular situations. It emphasizes the dynamic development of identities, capacities, and political accounts through processes of normative integration and is helpful in analyzing the spread and adoption of new governance paradigms within the public sector. Interpretative policy analysis perceives social actors as interpreting subjects who construct particular, context-bound interpretations of their own identity and their immediate environment and emphasize the role of collectively constructed policy discourses and story lines in shaping the individual actors' interpretations. Last but not least, poststructuralist governmentality theory analyzes the collective rationalities and institutionalized practices that define how to govern and be governed. It shows how a new advanced liberal governmentality aims to shift the burden of government to local networks and partnerships in which the energies of free and responsible actors are mobilized and given a particular direction to ensure conformity with overall policy objectives. Although the different theoretical approaches can be further developed and refined, they all provide important insights into problems and practices of modern governance, and the presence of competing theories founded on different assumptions about the social action and the nature of society fosters critical debates and academic exchanges that tend to sharpen the conceptual frameworks, arguments, and methods.

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See also Accountability; Civil Society; Corporatism; Foucault, Michel; Globalization; Institutionalism; Interpretive Theory; Market; Network; Pluralism; Rational Choice Theory

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Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937)

Antonio Gramsci was one of the pioneers of Western or humanistic Marxism—a tradition that opposed orthodox Marxism for its determinism and its objective materialist conception of history. Disenchantment among Marxists with the prevailing orthodoxy was fueled by unfolding historical events. By the mid-1930s, economic depressions had come and gone without producing the systemic collapse of capitalism that Marx had predicted. World War I, from 1914 to 1918, and the subsequent disintegration of proletarian internationalism nourished the suspicion that the European masses had ceased to be a revolutionary force—if indeed they ever were. The rapid rise of fascism and Nazism in the years following the war reinforced the gathering sense that Marx's predictions were mistaken. In place of deterministic modes of analysis, a new breed of Marxist, influenced by Hegelian categories of thought, began to highlight the importance of human agency, of creative human action, in historical development. Every contribution Gramsci made to Marxist theory was underpinned by his belief in the power of the reflective human subject. This belief itself

may have been spawned by his own triumph over personal adversity.

Gramsci's Early Life

Born in Sardinia, the son of a minor public official, Gramsci endured a miserable childhood. Mocked by other children because of his physical shortcomings (he was a hunchback of diminutive stature) and family scandal (his father was imprisoned for corruption), he compensated by becoming something of a bookworm. His academic prowess was sufficient to earn him a scholarship to the University of Turin, where he specialized in linguistics. While there, he became acutely aware of northern prejudice against southern Italians like himself, and his resentment soon transmuted into political activism. In 1913, he joined the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), which was then (at least officially) Marxist in orientation. Before too long, his literary gifts were recognized, and he became a frequent contributor to party publications. Inspired by the romantic intransigence of Georges Sorel and the neo-Hegelian spiritualism of Benedetto Croce, the young revolutionary displayed nothing but contempt for the scientific reductivism of the more orthodox Marxists. Indeed, he wrote a famous article after the Russian Revolution interpreting that event as a revolution "against *Capital,*" as a victory of will power over Marxist materialism.

Gramsci on Political Organization

If Gramsci's hostility to economic determinism was far from orthodox, his ideas on political organization exposed him to charges of treachery. By 1919, he had become a prominent figure in the Italian factory council movement, its theory elaborated in *Ordine Nuovo,* a dissident socialist publication, during the *biennio rosso* of 1919 to 1920. The central ideal of the *ordinovista* group was that the factory council structure, not the party, should be the main vehicle of revolutionary education, as well as the institutional framework of the future society. The *biennio rosso* was a period of considerable industrial strife, but the PSI seemed strangely reluctant to seize the opportunity for revolutionary mobilization. Gramsci explained their "betrayal" in terms of the logic of parliamentary electioneering, which encouraged the PSI to obey the rules of the game. Trade unions, he added, were no better, as they expressed a view of labor as a commodity. Factory councils, on the other hand, could transcend the logic of capitalism, embedded as they were in the quotidian work experience of the proletariat.

Gramsci and his colleagues thought that this recipe for "revolution from below" was impeccably Marxist, but they never resolved the central conundrum raised by their strategy: How can a reliance on the spontaneous insurrectionary instincts of the proletariat be reconciled with the discipline and coordination necessary for successful revolution? After some initial successes, the council movement petered out as the Italian industrialists, spurred on by a reformist government, made some timely concessions to the unions. Militancy gave way to resigned acceptance. Appalled by this development and alarmed by the growing threat of fascism, Gramsci abandoned the *Ordine Nuovo* strategy and adopted a more orthodox approach, proclaiming the primacy of the party. Along with a group of Leninists who were also disillusioned with the supposed reformism of the PSI, Gramsci helped to found the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in 1921. By now, the former *ordinovista* was spouting a standard Leninist line, routinely comparing revolution to war, and calling for rigorous direction from above by a revolutionary officer class. In 1924, with the blessing of Moscow, Gramsci became both general secretary of the PCI and a member of parliament. The shy and retiring scholar from the Sardinian backwoods, a man with a deformed body and a reedy voice, had somehow become a formidable politician. But survival in a political system where Mussolini was gradually consolidating his power could never be guaranteed. In 1926, Gramsci was arrested for allegedly conspiring to overthrow the government, and he remained a prisoner of the fascist regime until just before his death from natural causes in 1937.

Prison Notebooks and the Exploration of Doctrine

During his confinement, he produced his major theoretical achievement—a vast collection of

notes and (mainly unfinished) essays published posthumously as the *Prison Notebooks* (1929–1935). Despite their elliptical, labyrinthine, and often incomprehensible nature, the *Notebooks* secured Gramsci a place alongside Gyorgy Lukács as one of the great theoreticians of Hegelian and humanistic Marxism. Gramsci's earlier writings, while bearing the imprint of his capacious theoretical imagination, were basically the outpourings of a political polemicist and pamphleteer. The different stances he adopted usually reflected particular circumstances and events. The *Notebooks* offer a more considered exploration of doctrine, set within a more synoptic framework. Prison was for him the functional equivalent of an ivory tower, allowing the former communist functionary to let his mind roam freely. While focusing on politics and philosophy, the *Notebooks* explore an astonishing range of topics, including sociolinguistics and literary criticism. But their most striking feature is their relentless attack on every axiom of dialectical materialism. Like Lukács, Gramsci argued that the orthodox Marxists had wrongly interpreted Marx as wanting to substitute Matter for the Hegelian Idea. According to Gramsci, Marx was a materialist only in the sense that he gave priority to the economic organization of society—which, of course, incorporates conscious human action. In contrast to the orthodox Marxists, Gramsci refused to see people as nothing more than a material object, subject to the same dialectical laws that govern the world of nature. The materialist interpretation of consciousness, correctly understood, had nothing to do with physiological reductionism; it simply held that all things mental—emotions, feelings, ideas—are in some sense the products of social interaction.

Gramsci's emphasis on human subjectivity also led him to deny the common Marxist belief that knowledge was merely the passive reflection of a ready-made universe. The external reality we confront, says Gramsci, is not a pure objective datum, independent of cognitive activity or human purposes. Marxism, it follows, should not be viewed as a scientific description of an objective world, considered in the abstract. Marxism's validity, like that of any other doctrine, must ultimately be determined by practice, by the social functions it performs. Theoretical knowledge and practical activity are two sides of the same coin. Since truth depends on the successful mediation, as distinct from reflection, of reality, theory must constantly evolve to cope with historically modified human experience. Gramsci, therefore, derides the tendency to turn Marxism into a closed system, fitting the whole of reality into an abstract dialectical scheme. To the contrary, Marxism, as he conceived it, was a form of *absolute historicism,* capable of demonstrating its truth only through practical success. Neither Marxism nor any other worldview can claim to be true unless it wins mass acceptance and penetrates deeply into everyday life, he thought. The implicit relativism of his absolute historicism can be misleading; Gramsci explicitly upheld the independent validity of logical and empirical procedures. Perhaps he thought that such procedures could take us only so far when analyzing complex theoretical structures, as such structures usually combine judgments of fact (which can be evaluated rationally) with judgments of value (which cannot be so evaluated).

Because of his stress on "man-the-creator," Gramsci poured scorn on fatalistic conceptions of Marxism, which posited immutable laws underlying social evolution. More specifically, he rejected the notion that human liberation was an inevitable consequence of the internal dynamics of capitalism. Such iron-clad certainty about the future was a direct result of Marxism's fallacious claim to scientificity, he said. Not only was determinism false, in Gramsci's opinion; it was also a kind of bad faith, a culpable form of self-deception by means of which Marxists evaded their historical responsibilities. After all, it makes little sense to risk life and limb in pursuit of an outcome as certain as the rising of the sun. Gramsci was also adamant that economic determinism cannot adequately explain why capitalism persists despite its debilitating contradictions. By reducing thought to a reflex of the productive process, Marx's followers paid insufficient attention to the motivational power of myths and ideas in general. Physical domination, Gramsci insists, is not enough. The cohesion of advanced capitalist society depends primarily on the hegemony—that is, the spiritual and cultural supremacy—of the ruling class, which through manipulation of civil society (and especially the mechanisms of socialization, such as the media, the churches, the trade unions, political parties, educational institutions) manages

to instill its values and beliefs in the rest of the population. Although Gramsci always regarded himself as an historical materialist who explained ideas in terms of their role within a specific mode of production, his theory of hegemony calls to mind the Hegelian principle that any given society embodies a spirit or idea, firmly planted in the psychology of its inhabitants. Herein lies the key, Gramsci tells us, to capitalism's vexatious powers of endurance. Classical Marxists never dreamed of giving such weight to cultural or ideational factors. Their model of society was based on endemic conflict, kept in check only by state violence or the threat of it. For Gramsci, however, the moral and cultural integration of the masses into a system operating against their interests rendered physical coercion unnecessary, in all but the most extreme circumstances.

The theory of hegemony carries important strategic implications and enabled Gramsci to revise the classical Marxist-Leninist approach to revolution—then held as an article of faith. He lamented the fact that most Marxists, preoccupied as they were with economic laws of development, had lost sight of the *political* dimension in human affairs. As an admirer of Niccolò Machiavelli, he understood that Marxism was deficient in the tools of political analysis. Because his fellow Marxists assumed that the foundation of social order was force, they conceived the struggle for socialism as a paramilitary assault on the coercive apparatus of the state. Gramsci acknowledged that this approach was valid in the case of Russia in 1917, where the Tsarist regime lacked developed mechanisms of cultural organization and where social order was founded on a combination of apathy and repression. In modern capitalist states, however, where workers are integrated into the prevailing framework of bourgeois values, the revolutionary forces must engage in a "war of position," aiming to scrape away the whole system of bourgeois attitudes and narratives and to create a proletarian counterhegemony. In the West, revolution *presupposes* a peaceful and gradual transformation of mass consciousness. A military-style attack on the state's defenses will still be necessary (Gramsci called this the "war of manoeuvre"), but the decisive battles will already have been won. Insurrection is the final, rather than the initial act in the revolutionary process.

Gramsci's preoccupation with the battle of ideas encouraged him to analyze the role of intellectuals in shaping mass psychology. He divided them into two categories: (1) *traditional intellectuals* (artists, scholars, priests), who think of themselves as above economic or political imperatives and struggles, and (2) *organic intellectuals* (civil servants, political activists, managers, technocrats, trade union bosses), who are more closely tied to the classes they represent. Although the latter are not normally deemed to be intellectuals, Gramsci wants to make the point that they, as much as their traditional counterparts, are engaged—directly or indirectly—in the propagation of values and attitudes that either sustain or undermine the established order. For him, ideology is not simply something that we encounter in books or lectures or sermons; it is embedded in social and political practices and is expressed in behavior as well as words.

Although Gramsci never advocated a parliamentary road to socialism, proponents of Eurocommunism claimed him as a kindred spirit. One can understand why. His emphasis on persuasion and consent is an obvious source of inspiration to those who wish to integrate Marxism and liberalism. It is, however, his analysis of social order under capitalism that most excites political theorists, especially those on the left of the political spectrum, who are anxious to find an acceptable explanation for the continued acquiescence of the exploited masses. Gramsci's view that subjective preferences are not necessarily reducible to economic interests may seem obvious to most people, but it came as a revelation to Marxists.

Gramsci's Legacy

At bottom, Gramsci's reputation as a theorist stems from his belief that our perception of the world is, to some degree, socially and mentally constructed. By the 1960s, the materialism and positivism of the orthodox Marxists had become extremely unfashionable, and Gramsci's Hegelian leanings struck a responsive chord. He became a symbol for the hopes and dreams of all those who wanted to rescue Marxism from its deterministic associations and to stress instead the contingency of human action and the role of human subjectivity in the historical process. His almost legendary

status has caused some of his intellectual disciples to overlook the subtle nuances and historical limitations of his ideas. This tendency remains strong, although modern Gramscians (or neo-Gramscians) are often content to be labeled post-Marxists, a category of thinkers who refuse to be confined by the classic texts. Particularly significant have been recent attempts to align Gramsci with Michel Foucault's discourse theory, according to which social reality is symbolically constituted in conformity with existing power relations. Gramscian notions of hegemony have even been extended to the international system in an attempt to challenge the dominant assumption of realist international relations that existing categories of analysis (nation-states, permanent conflict) enjoy ontological primacy over alternative (emancipatory) constructions. Although such interpretations ignore Gramsci's insistence on the "facticity" of the external world, they testify to the enduring relevance and fecundity of the *Prison Notebooks*.

Joseph V. Femia

See also Fascism; Foucault, Michel; Hegelians; Hegemony; Historicism; Humanism; Lenin and the Russian Revolution; Marxism; Positivism; Sorel, Georges

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Green, Thomas Hill (1836–1882)

Thomas Hill Green is the leading philosopher of British idealism, the dominant strand in British political philosophy from the 1870s through the 1920s. Often characterized as a conservative communitarian, Green is more accurately understood as a radical republican of a liberal socialist cast. His philosophy was bound up with his civic and political activities, including his campaigning for franchise reform, the extension of university education to women, land reform, and, after 1874, temperance. Green was born on April 7, 1836; entered Rugby School in 1850, where he befriended Henry Sidgwick, before entering Balliol College at Oxford University in 1855. He graduated in 1859, eventually settling into an academic career in 1866. He was Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford from 1878 until his death from blood poisoning on March 26, 1882.

Green held that normative philosophy, including political philosophy, should start from a critical appraisal of one's own world. His philosophy appropriated what he understood as the leading insights of the heterodox biblical criticism of Tübingen Hegelians such as F. C. Baur and the Christian socialism of F. D. Maurice, as well as scriptural sources, especially the Pauline epistles. He combined these insights with those found in romanticism, especially William Wordsworth and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Thomas Carlyle's writings, among others. Green systematized these and other insights within his philosophy. He became increasingly skeptical about Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's response to Immanuel Kant (whom he admired greatly). His later writings, especially *Prolegomena to Ethics* and *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (both written between 1878 and 1882 and published posthumously), indicate the growing influence of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's early writings on the vocation of man and the scholar, although these two publications by Green seem to have reflected maturing convictions that predated serious study of Fichte.

As one might expect of an idealist, Green's political philosophy is founded on his theory of the will. He holds that all individual human beings have the potential to realize their higher capacities

and thereby to manifest God (the"eternal consciousness") more fully within their character and actions. (Green argues that Jesus was an exemplar of this realization, not a uniquely divine being.) The struggle to express these capacities helps to generate and sustain the institutions and practices that constitute the world in which we live. These social forms exist intersubjectively, being socially recognized determinations of broadly systematized concepts and values that, taken together, can make life meaningful and enable the individual to be free. It is unhelpful to analyze Green using Isaiah Berlin's confused category of *positive freedom*. For Green, individuals value most highly the freedom to engage in activities that they choose without external compulsion and which respect their potential as free rational beings with higher capacities. This is the heart of a "free life," with reference to which every institution and action should be judged. Hence, Green holds that "positive" or "true" freedom exists where individuals act on principles that respect their higher capacities and virtues and that they endorse on the basis of their own unconstrained conscientious judgment about what things are either intrinsically valuable or are means to the achievement of intrinsically valuable things. Hence, Green's positive freedom necessarily entails Berlin's negative freedom.

Green rejected social contract theories as misleading myths. Nevertheless, he endorsed Jean-Jacques Rousseau's and Kant's contention that social, political, legal, and economic orders can be compatible with individual freedom, and therefore legitimate, only to the extent that they are endorsed by the conscientious and practical judgments of the majority of those individuals operating within them. This applies both (at the level of virtuous action) to socially recognized systems of moral rights and duties and (at the behavioral level) to political and legal rights and obligations recognized by individuals as participants in the public sphere. Unfortunately, all conventional norms, institutions, and practices serve the interests of relatively powerful individuals and groups over relatively marginalized ones. Consequently, Green stresses that no one should be an uncritical participant in social forms. Through informed and conscientious reflection and, for those individuals with more abstract capacities as well, through philosophy, each individual should attempt to understand society's institutions as historically formed instantiations of Aristotelian virtues (wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice), at the same time to recognize the ambiguities and imperfections inherent within those institutions. As citizens, individuals should seek to honor and refine what their consciences tell them are valuable elements of their society and, just as important, to correct conventional imperfections. Green combines this culturally situated Aristotelianism with reverence for the Kantian categorical imperative to respect humanity and its potential for realization, wherever those are found. Consequently, he holds that any good society must have the formal structure of a "kingdom of ends." Good citizens work to bring this about, partly through their correction of the common good on the basis of which individuals interact as citizens. One such (inherently public) common good is living in a free society: A free society does not exist, for example, if free speech is enjoyed only by a section of the society or if it is enjoyed only due to someone's arbitrary will not to interfere; it can exist only collectively, securely, and for all.

For Green, the state exists to "hinder the hindrances to good life" faced by the individual (in Bernard Bosanquet's words), including illiteracy, ill health, lack of sanitation, and harmful drugs such as opium and alcohol. Yet, in contemporary terms, it is unhelpful to label Green a moral or aesthetic perfectionist, as he understands universal higher potentials as largely abstract and formal. Such potentials can win the individual's rational obedience and loyalty only when instantiated in that person's particular historical circumstances. Moreover, there is no single determinate way in which these capacities should be manifested (although it is possible to identify certain inherently imperfect practices, such as slavery). Green is also not a political perfectionist: As no individual can be forced to do good or improve, all responsible adults must be assured of significant spheres in which they can act on their preferences, as only they can know and act on their own conscience and character. Hence, Green worked for franchise reform, so as to bring as many experiences and perspectives into legislative and political debates at local and national levels. Similarly, Green follows Giuseppe Mazzini, stressing the importance of workers' cooperatives within a regulated

capitalist system. Green's thought continues to attract significant scholarly attention.

Colin Tyler

See also Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hegelians

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Green Political Theory

What constitutes green political theory is contested; at a minimum, it is a form of normative theory that has, as a central and defining focus, a concern for the protection of the natural environment. On this minimal reading, many forms of political thought that seek explicit environmental ends would count as "green." On a maximal account, green political thought has to be in pursuit of not merely environmental ends, but a fundamental restructuring of the institutional bases of economic and political life, along decentralized, deindustrialized, and participatory lines to bring about a truly ecological society. On this latter view, genuinely green political theory is *ecological* whereas the pursuit of more limited ends is merely *environmental*. This entry focuses on those streams of thought that have sought to present a radical challenge to the existing order. It examines the philosophical underpinnings of early radical green political thought, seeking what was distinctive in this, looks at the reactions that this generated, and moves on to assess the more recent integration of green political theory into mainstream political theory.

The Radical Challenge

Historically, many political theories have had something to say about the relationship between human beings and the natural environment. A distinctively *green* political thought, where this relationship is taken to be of crucial importance, can be seen to emerge in response to a relatively recent perception of global environmental crisis. In this view, industrialization has changed fundamentally the relationship between human beings and the nonhuman natural world, and this change threatens the very future of humanity or even all life on Earth. The commencement of this form of political theory is often traced to the 1960s and early 1970s, with the emergence of books such as Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring,* Barry Commoner's *The Closing Circle,* and the Club of Rome report, *The Limits to Growth*.

The first wave of green political theory that followed from these early texts can be divided into its philosophical and political dimensions and, in terms of the latter, between those who sought to bolster the role of the state, at least in the short term, to deal with environmental problems and those who sought the deindustrialization of contemporary society and the decentralization of political power. Philosophically, there are two related areas of importance: metaphysics, on the one hand, and axiology, or value theory, on the other. Some green thinkers sought what they saw as fundamental metaphysical and axiological change, challenging the entire basis of the dominant tradition of Western political thought. This ambition is closely associated with deep ecology, a doctrine given its most explicit outline by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. For Naess, the deep/shallow ecology distinction tracked, roughly, the distinction noted above between ecological and environmental ends. Shallow ecologists seek piecemeal solutions to environmental problems and do not question the underlying economic and political order or the values on which that order is itself based. Deep ecology, on the other hand, is held to be radical in the sense that it seeks to get to the roots of these environmental problems and treat their causes rather than just the symptoms. Deep ecologists seek to foster an ecological worldview in

which human beings would see themselves as just one part of a web of life on Earth, through which any action on our part as human beings would have multiple, indeterminate, and unpredictable effects elsewhere. The warrant for this worldview was allegedly provided by the science of ecology, which deep ecologists took to overturn previously dominant Newtonian scientific frames, which saw matter as featureless and above all separable, for the purposes of analysis, into its smallest constituent components. The holistic science of ecology thus presented a fundamental challenge to the atomistic sciences, such as physics. As with many political theories, there was here an appeal to science to provide an empirical foundation for the underlying view of the world, and like many scientific perspectives employed in the political realm, it was a partial interpretation—of both ecology and Newtonian physics. As historians of scientific ecology have pointed out, there is a holistic strain to ecology, which, for example, sees ecosystems as having supervenient properties that are more than the sum of their parts, but there is also a more conventionally analytical scientific frame employed in ecology, and the latter is currently dominant.

The accompanying deep ecological value theory was one of biospherical egalitarianism—as all forms of life are just knots in an ecological web, we are in principle equally valuable, and so the differential treatment of different entities requires justification. This is not to say that human beings cannot pursue their essential interests at the expense of other species, but rather that those interests would have to be explicitly delineated and, more important, limited and then met in such a way as to minimize the impact they made on the rest of the planetary ecosystem. The interests of other natural entities would have to be considered on a prima facie equal footing with our own, and their vital interests would trump those of ours that were considered nonvital. This might, for example, imply a moral demand for vegetarianism on our part, in that we can meet our vital nutritional needs through a vegetarian diet, and this has less impact on the natural world than meeting these same needs through the consumption of meat products.

This value theory is related to another important set of distinctions that mark out different approaches to green political thought, and this relates to the *source* of the values that greens are seeking to protect. To the extent that deep ecology is a value theory, it is *ecocentric,* which is to say that it sees value residing in the nonhuman natural world, both independently of that world's instrumental value to humans, and also at a level beyond individual living entities. Entire ecosystems are taken to have value, including their nonliving components, and thus major disruptions to those ecosystems are likely to be value destroying. Although deep ecology is an example of ecocentric thinking, it does not exhaust it, and one could hold to an ecocentric value theory without adopting the particular metaphysics or psychological theory of deep ecology. An alternative to ecocentrism is biocentrism: Biocentrists also hold that value resides independently of instrumental value to human beings, but they locate the source of this value in living entities. Ecosystems may thus not have value in themselves, but in their capacity to support life for a variety of species, they do have an indirect but crucially important value. Finally, some green political theory remains resolutely anthropocentric or humanist, despite the fact that anthropocentrism is one of the main targets of ecocentric political theory. In this latter view, the problem with anthropocentrism is that it values natural objects only to the extent that they serve human interests, thus leaving their protection highly contingent and vulnerable to views about human need. However, as humanist green theorists point out, humanist ecologism does not have to be narrowly instrumental. In an appropriate view of what it means to live a fully human life, natural objects can have intrinsic, not merely instrumental value for us, and thus the moral imperative to preserve the natural world can be a strong one. It is worth noting that any of the above views can be objectivist or subjectivist about the sources of value. One may, for example, hold that values are intrinsic in nature but come into existence only in the presence of a being capable of conceiving of value. In the absence of creatures like human beings who can attribute value, value does not exist. Alternatively, one can hold that values exist in nature independently of any valuation by appropriately conscious entities: Neither view is incoherent. More recently, defenders of ecocentrism have tended to see a weak form of anthropocentrism as unobjectionable (human beings inevitably judge the world from the perspective of human beings)

and have turned their sights on *human chauvinism*—the unwarranted privileging of human interests over the interests of other species. Human chauvinism is in this view "species-ism," akin to racism or sexism in its unfounded prejudice.

The extent to which deep ecology is really a political theory as opposed to a moral or even psychological one is moot. Political consequences were, however, taken to follow from this metaphysical reconstruction, and the doctrine of bioregionalism is often taken to be the political corollary of deep ecology. According to this doctrine, political communities should be defined according to natural features such as watersheds and mountain ranges, rather than through mere human artifice. Once delineated, these bioregions should become, so far as is possible, autarkic, sustaining themselves from their own resource base, trading as little as possible, and being politically independent. Once people have adopted deep ecological metaphysics and values, there is no need for an overarching authority to keep bioregions in ecological check, in this view, as the root desire to behave in environmentally destructive ways will have been extirpated.

Eco-Authoritarianism

Eco-authoritarians such as William Ophuls and Robert Heilbroner were more concerned with what they saw as the immediate crisis of resource depletion, pollution, and human population than with views about the nature of reality. If deep ecology can be seen as a form of ideal theory, positing the complete transformation of the human worldview, eco-authoritarians were very much non-ideal theorists, seeking a short-term institutional fix to an impending catastrophe and taking much of the world as it already is. The severity of the environmental crisis allowed no time for long-term value change, in their view, and as the inhabitants of Western democracies showed no sign of changing their overconsumptive habits for the sake of the planet, democratic institutions would have to be suspended so that power could be placed in the hand of an enlightened, ecologically literate elite. No less than the immediate survival of humanity was at stake. Eco-authoritarianism was authoritarian in an often reluctant form, and the suspension of democracy was generally portrayed as a necessary but inevitably temporary phenomenon. In the longer term, value change was possible, and once it had been achieved, then authoritarian rule would no longer be necessary, but it was the only available means to resolve the current crisis.

The Reaction—Environmental Skepticism

This eco-doomsday literature brought a response from those who were skeptical about the entire idea of looming environmental catastrophe. In particular, economists such as Julian Simon emphasized the capacity of human ingenuity to overcome environmental problems and ridiculed the idea that one could merely calculate a stock of resources and a current rate of depletion to come up with a figure for when that resource would "run out." Instead of thinking like engineers, those concerned with resource depletion and overpopulation needed to learn to think like economists. Increasing scarcity would lead to rising prices and therefore increasing incentives to both find and exploit new reserves and to substitute alternative products using cheaper, more plentiful resources. Scarcity is not, thus, a function of physical reserves but of demand and supply, both of which can be made to change if the incentives are appropriate. Simon famously put his money in the position occupied by his mouth and won a bet with the demographer Paul Ehrlich on the future prices of commodities in 1990 from a 1980 base. The prices of all the commodities included in the bet fell between these two dates, making Simon's points that (a) past trends were the best indicators of future trends and (b) for the purposes of human welfare, these raw materials were less scarce in 1990 than they were in 1980. This economist's response to eco-authoritarianism is very much a forerunner of contemporary so-called skeptical environmentalism, associated in particular with Bjørn Lomborg, which also seeks to dismiss the claims of those who hold that environmental conditions are rapidly deteriorating and insists on the application of cost-benefit analysis before committing to substantial interventions to counter the effects of, for example, climate change.

"Eco-isms"

Other strands of green political theory have sought to adapt existing political ideologies to encompass

the environmental problematic. Green political thought has been considered instrumental in the resurrection of anarchism, an ideological perspective often taken to have strong affinities with green objectives, particularly when green is taken in the maximalist sense outlined at the start of this entry. The anarchist distrust of the state and its attendant institutions—as destructive of natural human cooperation—can be traced at least as far back as thinkers such as Petr Kropotkin, and the argument has been recycled by a number of contemporary green thinkers and activists. It is particularly associated with a school of thought known as social ecology, whose leading theorist was the late anarchist thinker and activist Murray Bookchin. States operate in support of major interests such as large corporations, and for their own institutional forms such as the military and the bureaucracy. The state is far removed, both ideologically and physically, from the environmental problems that emerge from current economic and cultural forms of life, and given its commitment to continuing economic growth to resolve distributional issues, it has no incentive to address them. Furthermore, if we scale up to the global level, then states pursuing their own interests have only very weak incentives to cooperate in resolving worldwide environmental problems such as climate change and biodiversity loss.

One strand of green political theory with some influence in activist circles takes this critique further, seeking to overthrow not merely the institution of the state but the entire edifice of civilization. Anarcho-primitivism, as it is known, holds that the only communities in which people have genuine freedom are those that predated the agricultural revolution, that is, hunter-gatherer societies. Once agriculture arrives on the scene, populations require fixed territory, which in turn needs to be defended from other populations, and so a military force of some kind is required, and we start down the slippery slope to the dominant ideology and hierarchical institutional forms of civilization. The division of labor is seen as the first important step down the road to the domestication of human beings by the state. It is not so much that anarcho-primitivists want to take us back to a pure form of hunter-gatherer society, as if the intervening millennia had never happened; they want rather to get people to question the benefits of civilization itself and see beyond a set of taken-for-granted assumptions and commonsense beliefs about the benefits that civilization brings.

Various other mainstream ideologies have also developed a recognizable eco-wing. Perhaps the most developed of these is the ecological reworking of Marxism, which takes two general forms. Either Marx himself is rediscovered as an environmentalist *avant la lettre,* a reading that usually draws heavily on the *Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* (published for the first time in 1932), where Marx discusses the metabolism between humanity and nature and describes nature as man's inorganic body. Alternatively, the reading of Marx is more conventional, but the analytical toolkit that he supplied is adapted for environmental ends. In particular, the critical analysis of capitalism undertaken by Marx is given an environmental twist, and (in one version of eco-Marxism) capitalism is held to have a "second contradiction." Not only does its tendency toward crises of overproduction impoverish the very workers on whom it depends, thus "creating its own gravediggers" (first contradiction), it also fails to reproduce its own ecological conditions of production (second contradiction). In short, capitalism's commitment to never-ending economic growth entails that, ultimately, it will consume its own ecological resource base—it is inherently unsustainable.

More recently, attention has turned to the relationship between green political theory and the form of political theory that has been dominant in mainstream Anglo-American political philosophy in recent decades—liberalism. Green thought has often been taken as anti- or at least nonliberal in its overarching emphasis on the theory of the comprehensive (green) good. Eco-authoritarians were willing to suspend a host of liberal-democratic freedoms to overcome what they saw as an environmental crisis. Green politics can, however, be fleshed out in ways that are more amenable to conventional liberal norms. In particular, environmental goods can be attached to a set of constitutional rights in the classical liberal fashion, in that all citizens can be held to have a right to environmental conditions that are conducive to human flourishing. That said, it is difficult to overcome completely the tensions between the pursuit of environmental goals, on the one hand, and the

commitment (in many versions of liberalism) to autonomy and freedom to choose an individual lifestyle, on the other, leading some theorists to describe green political theory as a postliberal doctrine. In this context, postliberal implies that the commitment to freedom and autonomy that marks liberalism as a distinctive political doctrine is acknowledged and retained insofar as that is possible, but these commitments have also to be refashioned in such a way that they are cognizant of ecological limits. Autonomy is thus always partial and relative to a set of ecological constraints.

A concern with rights brings us to another recent development in green political theory, an attempt to articulate an environmental conception of citizenship. In relation to citizenship, rights owed by the state (and other citizens) tell only half of the story; at the same time, the citizen has a corresponding set of obligations. Contemporary green political theory in this area stresses the notion of the ecological footprint. An important environmental citizenship obligation would be to ensure that one's ecological footprint is not excessive and ideally is no bigger than that which could be enjoyed by all other human inhabitants of the planet (the Kantian sources of this view are evident here) such that we take merely our own share of ecological resources and do not invade the shares of others. This obligation would provide a strong stimulus toward "contraction and convergence," whereby citizens in the developed world reduce their ecological impact to a level that could be enjoyed by all, and as a result, their footprint converges with those of people in less developed countries, whose share is allowed to expand to the same level. This view of citizenship inevitably draws on a cosmopolitan view of that concept: We have obligations of citizenship not only to those with whom we share a nation-state, but to all people of the world.

That green political theory can be co-opted by so many different ideological positions (and we could add eco-conservatism, eco-fascism, or eco-feminism as alternative formulations that have their adherents or detractors) suggests that it may be politically hollow and so available for assimilation by any passing ideological carrier. Is it the case that green political thought can blend, Zelig-like, with ideologies of both right and left, with statist and anti-statist, authoritarian and libertarian forms of thought? Much depends, of course, on how much is packed in to any maximal account of what it is to be green. If it is to have a central concern with environmental protection, then this could be articulated from a variety of ideological positions, but it is also constituted by a very thin account of what it is to be green. If, on the other hand, it is stipulated that a green view must by definition insist on the anarchistic dismantling of the state apparatus, then nonanarchistic ideologies would be disbarred by fiat. This is unprofitable; it may be more fruitful to investigate the ideas and beliefs of those who have claimed the green label and to determine what elements unify them or distinguish them from each other.

Integration With Mainstream Theory

Recent years have seen green political theory move away from its former preoccupation with metaphysics and axiology; instead, it has become far more integrated into the mainstream of political theory. This has been a two-way process: As those with a central concern for environmental sustainability have moved into discussions of this in relation to democracy, justice, obligation, citizenship, liberty, political economy, and other conceptual discussions central to the theory of politics, so those working in these fields have themselves become more sensitive to the pressing environmental concerns of the day. It is less the case today than it once was that there is an identifiable subgenre of green political theory that operates in a sphere of its own, engaging in metaphysical reconstruction, the development of naturally grounded value theory, and disputes about the relative merits of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. This does not imply that green political theory has disappeared; it has rather morphed into a set of questions far more closely related to the concerns of mainstream political theory.

This is particularly noteworthy in the field of social justice theory, where much recent work has been on the topics of:

- *Intergenerational justice:* What do we owe to future people in the light of deteriorating environmental conditions?
- *Environmental justice:* How are environmental goods and bads distributed within present-day human communities?

- *Ecological justice:* Do nonhuman entities have rights grounded in justice?
- *Global justice:* How far do the obligations of justice extend beyond national borders?

One of the central concerns of these debates, especially with respect to both intergenerational and global justice, has been climate change and its effects. This is one area where the works of those from within green political theory and those from a more mainstream approach have come together around an issue of fundamental importance. The expected effects of climate change have profound implications for human well-being, both intra- and intergenerationally, and they raise a series of questions about the obligations of those with historical responsibilities, about the application of discount rates to future welfare, and about whether we can be said to harm people who do not as yet exist.

In the field of democracy, green political theory raises questions about the extent to which existing forms of democracy are able to articulate the interests of those who are not represented (the nonhuman, future generations), about the ability of democracy to deliver solutions to large-scale collective action problems (the eco-authoritarian dilemma has not gone away), about the relationship between democracy and special-interest groups, and about the extent to which forms of direct-action protest should be tolerated in democratic societies. Resolving these dilemmas may involve rethinking contemporary understandings of democracy, and indeed, theorists coming to this question from a broadly green perspective have tended to seek to push democracy in a deliberative or discursive direction, seeing the democratic process less in terms of the aggregation of preexisting preferences and more as a structured field for the engagement of citizens in democratic debate. In its deliberative form, democracy is conceived as being more conducive to the realization of the general, as opposed to factional interest, and the preservation of environmental goods is taken to be the generalizable interest *par excellence*. Green political theorists would not claim that all of the questions they raise for democracy, justice, citizenship, and so on are entirely new. Rather, a green perspective gives a fresh urgency and a new dimension to some long-standing political questions, as well as raising new ones.

Post-Ecologism

A recent development in green political theory has been the positing of post-ecologism, which holds that green political theory was one of the final attempts to rescue modernity from itself; now that it has failed to change society, we are left with a system that seeks merely to "sustain the unsustainable." Post-ecologism is held to consist of four key ingredients. First, the most fundamental idea is the abolition of nature as a unified conception. The implication here is that ecologist politics sought to operate with a single, unified notion of the natural world, whereas nature is a contested concept that can be understood in a wide variety of sometimes contrasting ways. Implicit in the idea of the abolition of nature is the abdication of the subject, as the second element of post-ecologism. The conception of the unified autonomous self employed in modernist ecologist politics is replaced by a subordinated individual embedded in the structures of contemporary liberal capitalism. The third integral notion of post-ecologism is the end of eco-ethics and ecological rationality. This is closely connected to the abdication of the subject as eco-ethics demands an autonomous ethical agent capable of making moral choices, but such an individual does not exist. Finally, post-ecologist politics is taken to be post-problematic in that it is no longer centered on specific ecological concerns. Ecologist politics takes certain physical changes in the world as problematic in themselves, whereas post-ecologism recognizes the register of social construction behind this problem designation and repudiates the naïve connection between physical correlates and problem status.

Although it was never a unified phenomenon, green political theory stands today in a somewhat fractured and multifaceted condition. It might be said without too much exaggeration that the proponents of green political theory in its early days saw themselves as mounting a fundamental challenge to the existing system of values and institutional order, and even our very understanding of the nature of the universe. It might be thought that this very direct challenge has now run its course. Instead, we have theorists working on a diverse range of topics, such as democracy, citizenship, justice, rights, and climate change. For some, this marks a shift to a post-ecologist era. The question is whether this shift marks a loss of coherence and

confidence on the part of green political theorists or the increasing maturity of this form of thought and increasing rather than decreasing influence as green political theory becomes less isolated and is absorbed into the field of political theory more generally.

Mathew Humphrey

See also Anarchism; Climate Change; Deliberative Democracy; Global Justice; Intergenerational Justice; Participatory Democracy

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Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645)

Hugo Grotius (Dutch: de Groot) was born in Delft in Holland. His lasting fame is due to his *De jure belli ac pacis libri tres* (Three books on the law of war and peace) first published in Paris in 1625. It is commonly regarded as the founding text in the development of international law. Grotius also made significant contributions to neo-Latin poetry, classical philology, historiography, and theology.

From his earliest years, Grotius showed remarkable gifts. Enrolled in the University of Leiden in 1594, he studied humanities and law under some of the most eminent men of learning of that era, graduating at the age of 15 in 1598. In that year, he was a member of a delegation from the seven United Provinces of the Netherlands on a state visit to France. As a lawyer, he quickly gained high esteem, and in 1599, he was admitted to the Bar in The Hague.

In 1603, the captain of a ship belonging to the Dutch East India Company seized a Portuguese ship and its cargo in the Straits of Singapore and brought it back to Holland. The lawfulness of what might seem an act of piracy was challenged. The company asked Grotius for a legal opinion, but he gave them a major treatise, which set out principles for a theory of international law, as well as a legal

and moral justification of the seizure. This treatise, finished in 1606, was not printed, probably because it would be politically inopportune when a truce in the Eighty Years War with Spain (which at the time formed a united kingdom with Portugal) was on the agenda. Years later, Grotius could put much of the vast source material he had used for his argument to renewed use in his major work.

The existence of this treatise remained unknown until the manuscript was discovered about two and a half centuries later and published, in 1868, under the title *De jure praedae*. One chapter of the manuscript was, however, revised and published in 1609 under the title *Mare liberum*. It advocated the freedom of the seas and argued that except in coastal waters no one should be excluded from fishing. Its main message, however, was the emphatic rejection of Portuguese and Spanish claims to monopoly on shipping and commerce in the newly discovered lands east and west. Pope Alexander VI (the father of Cesare and Lucrezia Borgia) had granted these monopolies in 1494, but Grotius objected that you cannot give what is not yours. The *Mare liberum* was promptly put on the Roman Index.

Grotius in Dutch Politics

Grotius came to play a significant part in Dutch politics. His rise owed much to the political patronage of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the leading politician in the United Provinces. Grotius was made solicitor-general of Holland in 1607. As pensionary of Rotterdam from 1613, he was *ex officio* a member in the delegation of that city to the States (i.e., legislative assembly) of Holland, the most important of the seven United Provinces that eventually were to gain independence from Spain in 1648.

When the war against Spain was halted by the Twelve-Year Truce in 1609, the Dutch could, in the decade that followed, devote more of their energies to internal conflicts. One side, led by Oldenbarnevelt, preferred the United Provinces to be a confederacy of provinces rather than a federal state, and it favored the Arminian version of Calvinism. The other side, led by Maurice of Nassau, took the opposite view on both matters and prevailed in 1618. As civil conflicts go, this one was comparatively nonviolent, but Oldenbarnevelt was tried and executed in 1619, and two other leaders close to him were sentenced to life imprisonment: One of them was Grotius.

The years in prison were not wasted. Grotius prepared an *Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland* (1631), which remained in use for centuries. So did his best-selling book on the truth of the Christian religion (Dutch verse edition, 1622; Latin prose edition, 1627). It was translated into a vast number of languages. He also translated Stobaeus' Greek anthology into Latin. These literary activities were interrupted in March 1621, when he escaped from prison, thanks to his resourceful wife. He went to Paris, where he was granted a pension by Louis XIII. A French nobleman gave him access to his library. Supported in this way, Grotius wrote the major work on which his fame rests: *De jure belli ac pacis libri tres* (Three books on the law of war and peace), first published in Paris in 1625. He inserted corrections and additions in four subsequent editions. An English translation of 1738, which included translated notes from Jean Barbeyrac's French version of 1724, has been republished. There is also a more recent translation.

Significant Features of Grotius's Major Work

These biographical data throw light on various features of his major work. Grotius's mode of life was not one of scholarly seclusion. His profound knowledge of history was supplemented by his experiences in law and politics. He knew that the pretexts used by princes to start a war were often frivolous, that the conduct of war was abhorrently cruel—even among Christians—and that any attempt to urge perpetual peace would be futile. The best that could be done was to set limits, and the difficulty was to find the right balance between the desirable and the feasible.

His aim was, then, to formulate principles that determine what is a just war and what is just *in* war. These principles are, of course, of a general nature, but when Grotius states in the Prolegomena (the prefatory discourse) that his work will not refer to current events or controversies, the reason can be sought in his particular situation. Any such reference from him, as an eminent person in political exile, could easily give offense in his host country or at home. He wanted to avoid this, not least since he hoped and expected—as it turned out, in vain—that

his exile would be temporary. Moreover, controversial matters would divert attention from his main concern: to explain the grounds for a just war and to humanize the conduct of warfare.

Accordingly, he wrote that he would present general principles rather than particular cases, as mathematicians do. This passing reference to mathematics has given rise to a frequently repeated but totally groundless claim that Grotius adopted a mathematical method in this work. In actual fact, Grotius does offer many particular illustrations to his general principles—but they are at a safe distance, taken from the Bible and from ancient history and literature.

The law of war and peace that Grotius expounds is a higher law different from the legislated or customary law of one civil society or common to a number of civil societies. The leading idea is that it can be discerned by human reason when considering a higher law, the law of nature. He notes that many scoff at the idea—indeed, the number of despisers is so great that he appoints a spokesman for them, the *ancient* philosopher Carneades, who had once delighted his audience in ancient Rome with a speech in which he argued, with exquisite rhetorical skill, that if such a law exists—which is doubtful—only fools would heed it.

Morality and "Realism"

Who were the scoffers? An answer recently proposed is that Grotius had ancient or recent advocates of skepticism in mind. Doubts have been raised about this, and it has been suggested that his main target was rather people who rarely write books: the hard-headed, practical realists in business and politics, who think it foolish to let moral scruples constrain the pursuit of power, gain, or glory. Against the scoffers, Grotius argues that there are principles of justice that give rise to obligations. They have their basis in human nature, which is sociable, and in the essential commonality between all human beings, insisted on by the Stoics. God has created us in this way, Grotius thought, and this is why the principles would retain a degree of validity even if we were to grant (Latin: *etiamsi daremus*) that God does not exist or takes no interest in what we do.

This has been taken as a statement that morality is independent of religion. The appearance of this idea in Grotius was often thought to mark a decisive breakthrough in the history of ethics, by leaving space for a nonreligious, secular ethical theory. His "*etiamsi daremus*" was seen as a source of inspiration for a conception of "autonomy of ethics," which would sweep aside the moral authoritarianism inherent in theological ethics. This was an attractive interpretation for the many who wanted Grotius as an ally in their rejection of Roman Catholic moral doctrine, but it overestimates the distinctiveness of Grotius's outlook. The view that some moral distinctions are independent of divine will did not originate with him. As shown by several authors, a number of medieval thinkers had held that view, and he was well aware of this.

There is, however, a problem with a particular moral concept: obligation. The common view, shared by leading thinkers like Francisco Suárez and almost universally accepted, was that there can be no obligation without a superior authority. Later, the same view was held by Samuel von Pufendorf and Barbeyrac, who on this point disagreed with Grotius, notwithstanding their great admiration for his work. On this point, Grotius can plausibly be interpreted as deviating from the mainstream and holding that certain right actions, like keeping a promise, are intrinsically obligatory: The obligation is not imposed by a superior, but by the person who makes the promise.

The Autonomous Individual

Book 1 of *The Law of War and Peace* explains the notions of a law of nature (*jus naturae*) and a law of nations (*jus gentium*) and argues at length that the use of force is not absolutely prohibited for Christians. Book 2 explains the grounds for a just war. Book 3 discusses what is just in war.

The grounds for a just war are, for Grotius, the same grounds for the just use of force. In principle, the norms apply equally to individuals in a state of nature and to international relations. It is of great interest that his account does not seek recourse to the idea of a higher obligation-imposing law or to the Stoic idea of the community of all mankind. Instead, Grotius appeals to a different set of moral intuitions, involving two basic concepts: a person's *own*—in Latin *suum*—and *a wrong*—in Latin *iniuria*. There are two basic principles. One is that an action constitutes a wrong if and only if

it violates, invades, or transgresses on a person's *suum*. The other is that the use of force against a wrongdoer is permissible if and only if it satisfies one of the following four conditions: It must be intended to punish the wrongdoer, to obtain compensation or restitution, to defend oneself, or to prevent an imminent threat.

In this view, some things are one's own by nature. They are one's life, body, limbs, honor, reputation, *pudicitia* or chastity or modesty, and one's actions or, perhaps more precisely, one's power over one's own actions, one's freedom to act: *libertas*.

By nature, everyone is free; that is, we have a power over our own actions, and nobody has a power over another person's actions. But such a power can be acquired and is called a right (*jus*). One way of acquiring a right is through damage culpably caused by another party, which creates a right that the other party must make good the damage. Another way is by promises proffered and accepted. In these, those who make promises, by willing it, alienate a part of their liberty, that is, their power over their actions, to the receiver of the promise, who now has a right, that is, a power over another's action. This right belongs to the receiver as a part of what is his or her own. Concurrently, obligations spring into being, and failures to fulfill them are rights violations and belong to the list of wrongs. It is also by agreements (promises given and accepted) that private property comes into being and that one's property becomes part of one's own. Accordingly, theft, unauthorized use, trespass, and so on are also wrongs. If a label is needed, the theory outlined here might be called a theory of strict justice.

A similar story is also used to explain the authority of civil government. Again, people are seen as autonomous agents. Their rights and obligations depend on their own commitments (*ex voluntate jus metiendum est*), which result from their free choice. It may not be *the best* choice, but it is *their* choice. So when people decide to enter into a social contract and subject themselves to a ruler—in the early 1600s, social contract theories had become the standard way of founding political obligation—there is, in Grotius's view, wide scope to the possible terms of such a contract. It would be a contract of submission—the people would no longer be sovereign—but the terms could vary. The contract might contain clauses limiting the authority of a ruler. Or it might not: In some circumstances, people might be willing to grant absolute power to a ruler. Either way, the people would be bound by the consent given, in the same way that a woman entered into marriage freely but was then as wife subject to her husband. So some social contracts might leave scope for a right to resist a tyrant, but some might not. Subsequent writers protested: Jean-Jacques Rousseau did so in 1762 most emphatically.

Grotius applied this outlook, in terms of *suum, iniuria,* and the rights and obligations arising from promises or culpable damage, to the relations between sovereign princes and states. As between individuals in a state of nature, *iniuria* alone can justify the use of force, the purpose of which must satisfy one of the four conditions mentioned: punishment, restitution or compensation, defense, or prevention of an imminent wrong.

Sources of Norms

Grotius's theory has been called minimalist in the sense that all is well from a moral point of view as long as we commit no wrong. This is a misunderstanding. His view is that all is well from the point of view of "strict justice" as long as we commit no wrong. But Grotius certainly did not believe that justice is the whole of morality.

This minimalism—according to which an action is morally wrong if and only if it fails to respect individual autonomy—is at the core of anarchism and libertarianism. Grotius's outlook was different indeed. He recognized other sources of norms that affect the use of force and do not have implicit recourse to concepts of personal autonomy or state sovereignty. One such set is the law of nations (jus gentium), norms common to a number of nations—or at least the more civilized ones. To know whether a rule is part of jus gentium, one has to know what is usually practiced. There is a problem with this, in that a practice may be *merely* habitual. To think that a *merely* common way of acting is *eo ipso* obligatory, would be to argue from fact to right. Rousseau complained—unfairly, it would seem—that this is what Grotius was doing. In Grotius's view, the widespread adoption of certain practices could justify a probable inference that it was permissible or obligatory, by the law of nature or by tacit consent between peoples.

Another source of norms is the Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism: We are all citizens of a worldwide community. As members of a community, we are bound to help each other. This principle of solidarity implies that it is not wrong to use force to protect a fellow member of this community against an unjust aggressor. Also, in the absence of a civil court with appropriate jurisdiction, it is not wrong for us to punish a wrongdoer. John Locke called this a "strange doctrine" but endorsed it wholeheartedly in his *Second Treatise of Government*. At the level of international politics, Grotius's theory gives wide scope for humanitarian intervention.

These sources of norms, and others to be mentioned presently, take over when Grotius moves from the *jus ad bellum,* where "strict justice" plays a central part, to the *jus in bello,* where it does not. In addition to the jus gentium and Stoic cosmopolitanism, he invokes from time to time divine law, Mosaic law, the law of the Gospel, Roman law, the law of a particular society, the law of charity, the obligations of honor, considerations of utility, and various other virtues or patterns of decent behavior. He did not indicate any ranking of these sources of norms. In one essay of unknown date, in the past often bound with the major work, Grotius elaborates on the virtues of equity (adhering to the spirit, not the letter of the law), indulgence, and clemency. For instance, a creditor has the right to demand payment, knowing that this will ruin a poor but honest debtor, and yet, charity or some other virtue, such as common decency, makes it a moral duty for the creditor not to exercise this right. Grotius calls rights that cannot be exercised in good conscience external rights, in contrast to internal rights, and distinguishes similarly internal from external justice. (Francis Hutcheson was later to use the same pair of terms.)

Norms of all these different kinds are invoked in the third and last book of *The Law of War and Peace,* which discusses what is lawful in the conduct of a war. The early chapters give an account of standard practices, quite abhorrent in many instances. But at the beginning of Chapter 10, there is a notable statement. Grotius explains that in the preceding chapters many things have been called right and lawful without really being so. They have been so called only because they usually enjoy impunity or because courts of justice have authorized them. Or they have been called right and lawful even though refraining from them would be morally better and more commendable in the opinion of good men. From that point onward, he constantly reminds the reader of the contrast between mere impunity and external rights, on the one hand, and what can be done with a clear conscience, on the other.

Grotius's Legacy

In the centuries that followed, Grotius enjoyed high esteem. From 1625 to 1775, there were 73 editions of the Latin text and translations, and there has been renewed and growing interest since the late nineteenth century. By 1925, the number of editions had risen to 114, and it has increased since. As for publications discussing his work, in the seventeenth century, most were attacks on his theological writings by Protestant theologians. There was less from the Roman Catholic side because his major work had been placed on the Index in 1629, where it remained until 1900. The main reason why Rome took umbrage was that Grotius did not accept the papal claims to supreme authority. His own endeavors toward a reconciliation of the Protestant and Catholic churches received scant sympathy from either side.

Grotius's posthumous reputation was mainly created by a historiography that began with Pufendorf and became influential through Barbeyrac, in which Grotius was described as a pioneer who had broken free from the darkness of scholastic pseudolearning and who had done for moral science what Francis Bacon had done for natural sciences. This view of Grotius as an opponent of scholastic (read: Roman Catholic) obscurantism was widely held. Later scholars, however, have drawn attention to the scholastic precursors for whose writings Grotius had much respect.

Grotius is commonly styled the father of international law. The paternity has been disputed on the grounds that there were precursors such as Alberico Gentili and that large areas of that discipline are not covered in his work; but his seminal importance is indisputable.

Because of Grotius, many organs of international justice have their headquarters in the Netherlands, where in the twentieth century admiration reinforced by patriotic pride at times was excessive. The virtual canonization provoked

opposition. Dutch critics with leftist leanings pointed to the conspicuous absence of democratic and egalitarian sentiments in Grotius's writings.

There have also been objections to his heritage for other reasons. Some writers have felt that his theory in effect was confined to Christian Europe. Other readers of Grotius have arrived at the opposite view. In recent decades, the renewed attention to the youthful *De jure praedae* has led some historians to view him as an apologist for Western, and particularly Dutch, colonialism and imperialism. But if this is true of the young lawyer and politician, it may or may not apply to Grotius as a theorist of natural justice.

Thomas Mautner

See also Colonialism; Imperialism; Hobbes, Thomas; Law of Nations; Locke, John; Natural Law; Pufendorf, Samuel Von; Roman Law; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Scholasticism; Social Contract Theory; State of Nature; Vitoria, Francisco de

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GUICCIARDINI, FRANCESCO (1483–1540)

Francesco Guicciardini, most famous for his historical writings, is nevertheless an important theoretical progenitor of modern representative democracy. A younger, but much wealthier and more prominent contemporary of Niccolò Machiavelli's, Guicciardini served over a long political career in roles as diverse as ambassador for the Florentine republic and administrator for Medici princes and popes. As Machiavelli's chief intellectual interlocutor, Guicciardini reflected on what he called "true and complete liberty" and "the civic way of life." Guicciardini was perhaps the first political thinker to endorse the institutional arrangements associated with modern republicanism: Members of the general citizenry, although discouraged in various ways from holding office themselves, elect public officials from a small pool of worthy, notable, and, in general, more wealthy candidates. Guicciardini's model relieves common citizens of most of the political duties they exercised in ancient democracies and many medieval republics, such as holding lottery-distributed offices, debating policy in large public councils, and deciding political trials in similarly sized assemblies. Instead, he proposes that average citizens apply their generally good judgment to the appointment of "virtuous and valiant" magistrates and that they approve or reject—but never help formulate or amend—laws proposed by those magistrates.

Guicciardini hoped that this novel political arrangement would defuse both the violent interelite conflicts and populist insurrections that threatened and often extinguished liberty in earlier republics. Furthermore, Guicciardini thought that electoral politics constrained and enabled a republic's magistrates in a novel manner: the desire to hold office deterred magistrates from corruption or usurpation, while still leaving them sufficiently wide discretion to deliberate over and make laws conducive to the common good. By devising institutions for

distributing offices that discourage violence among elites or between the latter and the people, Guicciardini hoped that liberty would flourish in republican regimes; by establishing the electoral interdependence of elites and people, Guicciardini expected more responsible behavior from both segments of society.

Guicciardini presciently anticipated that this model of republican government would allow the size of the citizenry to expand in unprecedented ways, securing the fruits of liberty for more and more individuals. In sum, Guicciardini's republicanism (a) makes possible democracies that are territorially larger than city-states, (b) consecrates election as the institutional centerpiece of politics, (c) pacifies competition among both notable citizens and prominent families, (d) enhances government deliberation by consigning it to small senatorial rather than large popular assemblies, and (e) facilitates wide discretion for public officials in the formulation and execution of laws. For these reasons, among others, J. G. A. Pocock's *Machiavellian Moment* in 1975 and Bernard Manin's *The Principles of Representative Government* in 1997 posit a direct line from Guicciardini to Federalist James Madison in the development of modern republican theory and constitutional practice.

John P. McCormick

See also Representative Democracy; Republicanism

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Guild Socialism

During the first decade of the twentieth century, A. J. Penty reintroduced the medievalist guild idea into British political discourse. In a series of articles in A. R. Orage's journal, *The New Age,* in 1912, S. G. Hobson pioneered guild socialist theory. As a theory and movement in the United Kingdom, guild socialism built on the idea that workers in industry should collectively control production with significant autonomy from the state. Guild socialism had authoritarian and individualist wings, the former advocating far greater control by guildlike organizations over individuals within them. Writing from the individualist wing, G. D. H. Cole developed guild socialist theory and had come to personify the movement by the early 1920s. Nevertheless, guild socialism waned in both theory and practice later that decade.

Guild socialism was a radical alternative to the dominant political ideas of the era. Since the 1880s, when they began to challenge classical liberalism and Benthamite utilitarianism, Fabianism and idealism had been prominent theories of state ascendancy in British political thought. By the early twentieth century, Fabianism had strengthened its hold on British socialism. Being a radical alternative to both Fabianism and idealism, guild socialism was one of several challenges to state preeminence in the first two decades of the twentieth century. These challenges also included the pluralism of Harold Laski, J. N. Figgis, and F. W. Maitland; the conservative distributivism of Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton; and the syndicalist ideas developed by Fernand Pelloutier in late nineteenth-century France and later imported into the United Kingdom.

Guild socialism shared with syndicalism the idea that workers should collectively control their industries. Nevertheless, the guild socialists did not agree with the syndicalist doctrine that an implication of this would be some form of revolutionary removal of the state. The guild socialist thinkers recognized that the conditions that may have seemed to favor industrial class warfare against the state in the nineteenth century were certainly no longer present in the United Kingdom. Guild socialist theory aimed to inspire a less class-specific movement than that of syndicalism. The guild socialist movement

involved several key features: a gradual transfer of power from employers to trade unions; a guild system including all workers, whether manual, technical, or professional; and a broader economic policy controlled by machinery outside the guilds, on behalf of the whole community.

In 1906, Penty suggested that industrialism was the major problem of modern society, and he called for guilds to reintroduce craftsmanship in a largely agricultural economy. It is, nevertheless, Hobson who is usually recognized as the first guild socialist. In 1912, he began to portray capitalism and the wage system, rather than industrialism, as the factors that stifled human potential. He did not believe that state socialism would remove this problem. A more viable alternative, in his view, was for trade unions to form a system of cooperating national guilds in large-scale industry. These guilds would monopolize the supply of labor and take control of industry in cooperation with a state, which would act as a final arbiter of conflicts.

Authoritarian guild socialists such as Hobson and Ramiro de Maeztu believed that the guilds should not only control the workers but also interpret the interests of consumers. Hobson had been inspired in the late nineteenth century by the way in which workers were organized collectively but without state control in the workforces that built the Panama Canal.

More concerned than Hobson and Maeztu that each individual should be allowed to develop and flourish, Cole advocated the deepening of participatory democracy as an alternative to the representative model of democracy. Democracy would thus transcend the narrow political sphere and cover all associations in society. Democracy would no longer be undermined by social and economic inequality. Through a substantive democracy, people would enjoy real opportunities for the personal and social self-expression that Cole considered essential to freedom. Cole sought to employ Jean-Jacques Rousseau's general will theory, without its authoritarian connotations, as the basis for a socialist democratic system.

Cole believed that workers in the guilds should have substantive decision-making authority and power over collectively owned wealth. Although he did not consider that the guilds should interpret and control consumer interests, Cole wavered between suggesting that such interests be represented by a range of associations in a functional congress, on the one hand, and stressing that they be represented by the state or an inclusive body that should assume the state's responsibilities, on the other. After developing these ideas from 1913 in books and articles, in his 1920 book, *Guild Socialism Restated,* Cole designed an extensive institutional structure of producer and consumer organizations. Decisions would be made at various levels within this structure. *Guild Socialism Restated* was the high point of guild socialist theory.

By the end of the 1920s, as social democracy and Marxism became more popular, interest in guild socialism had largely disappeared among the British left. Although Cole cozntinued to see guild socialism as an ideal, he now stressed that his main concern was with what socialists could achieve in practice, given the conditions they found themselves in, rather than with what they might achieve in favorable circumstances. After decades of relative neglect, decentralist socialism attracted new interest in the 1970s, notably with the ideas of workers' control and industrial democracy promoted by writers including Ken Coates and Tony Benn.

Peter Lamb

See also Authority; Democracy; Fabianism; Participatory Democracy; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Socialism

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H

HABERMAS, JÜRGEN (1929–)

After a brief look at Jürgen Habermas's background, the entry introduces the three most important parts of Habermas's work: his theory of communicative action and reason, his theory of discourse ethics, and his theory of deliberative democracy. In the final section, the entry gives an overview of Habermas's most recent work, where he applies the theoretical insights to pressing contemporary problems.

Life and Work

Habermas was born in 1929 and grew up in a middle-class family in the small German town of Gummersbach. In 1944, Habermas joined Hitler Youth and was sent to help at the western front. Although the experience of World War II itself does not seem to have influenced his life and writings significantly, the break with Germany's Nazi past and the postwar confrontation with the Holocaust had a significant impact on the young Habermas. This is so to the extent that his subsequent philosophical, sociological, and political work can be seen as attempts to answer the question: How can we guarantee that breaks with civilization such as Nazism and the Holocaust will never happen again? It is against this background that we can understand Habermas's defense of modernity, reason, and the Enlightenment in the form of an intersubjectivist philosophy as it is spelled out in his theories of communicative action and reason, discourse ethics, and deliberative democracy.

After finishing high school in 1949, Habermas studied philosophy at university, and he finished his PhD at Bonn University in 1954. From 1956 to 1959, he was Theodor Adorno's assistant at the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University, and it was during this time he discovered Marxist and post-Marxist critical theory and became radicalized. After jobs at other universities, Habermas came back to Frankfurt in 1964 to take up Max Horkheimer's chair of philosophy and sociology. The 1960s was the period of student protests and, for Habermas, also a period during which he laid the initial philosophical foundations for his later work. From 1971 to 1982, Habermas worked at the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, whereupon he returned to his chair at Frankfurt, where he is now professor emeritus.

Habermas's work can be divided into three periods. During the first period, which runs from the 1950s to the early 1970s, Habermas lays the philosophical and epistemological foundations for his later work, and during this period he also does important work on student protests and the public sphere. From the 1970s to the mid-1980s, Habermas develops his theories of communicative action and discourse ethics based on a pragmatic theory of language. Finally, from the late 1980s onward, Habermas develops a theory of deliberative democracy.

What follows is a discussion of the second and third periods, as these are related to political theory. It is important to note, however, that there is

not a political turn in Habermas's work. From the very beginning, and even when written in the discipline of philosophy, his work has been full of political and sociological considerations. This is also testified by his frequent interventions as a public intellectual in debates in the media (see, for instance, Habermas, 2006, for the most recent collection of political writings).

Communicative Action and Reason

In *The Theory of Communicative Action,* published in 1981, Habermas developed a theory of communicative action and communicative reason. In the book, Habermas uses sociological theory and language philosophy to develop an approach to analyzing social action; in addition, he provides a critique of contemporary society. To understand Habermas's project in that book, it is necessary to go back to his critique of the philosophy of the subject (or consciousness) as he developed it during the 1970s.

Habermas's contention is that, throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have put a subject at the center and have associated rationality with the consciousness of this subject. This is evident, for instance, in the work of René Descartes, but Habermas also finds it in philosophers that are closer to his own thinking. Thus, in Immanuel Kant's work, the clever individual imagines what the moral law is; in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and despite his emphasis on ethical life and hence intersubjectivity, we find a subject writ large, namely, the Prussian state as the foremost representative of history; finally, Karl Marx locates rationality in the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat and its representatives.

Habermas argues that this way of thinking about rationality suffers from a number of flaws. First of all, we find in the philosophy of the subject a subject opposed to the rest of the world, whether the physical or the social world; as a result, rationality is associated with the subject getting its way with the world. Linked to this, Habermas believes that the philosophy of the subject does not have an adequate response to the problem of pluralism. When, as it is clear today, a rational society was not realized by the Kantian, Hegelian, or Marxian subjects in the ways these thinkers envisaged, we face a problem central to all of Habermas's philosophy: How do we coordinate action given that subjects do not see the world in the same way?

Habermas's solution to this problem of pluralism and to the problems he associates with the philosophy of the subject is an intersubjectivist paradigm. As such, he is part of the linguistic turn; for him, there is no unmediated access to the world, whether the physical world of objects or the moral world of norms. Because human beings are linguistic and communicating beings, philosophy, ethics, sociology, and political theory must start from this fact.

This is the reason for Habermas's focus on what he calls communicative action, that is, action oriented toward mutual understanding. When acting communicatively, we do not take an instrumental attitude to others, using them as means to an end, but rather we seek agreement and mutual understanding. That is not to say that we cannot, or should not, act instrumentally in relation to others. Habermas is making an analytical distinction between different kinds of action: instrumental action, strategic action (instrumental action in relation to others), and communicative action. This analytical distinction makes us able to use communicative action as a standard with which to criticize instrumental and strategic action when the latter enter into relationships that should be governed by communicative action.

Habermas links sociology and philosophy, in this case, action and rationality. He links instrumental and strategic action to instrumental rationality, where it is about the efficiency of achieving given goals. This kind of rationality is particularly dominant in the market and in bureaucracy, but it also governs much of our mundane lives as, say, when you consider how to get to work on time. Habermas distinguishes instrumental rationality from communicative rationality, which is linked to communicative action, that is, the process of reaching mutual understanding.

To understand the full force of this distinction and the link between action and rationality, it is necessary to look briefly at what Habermas says about language and communication. As human beings, what distinguishes us is the fact that we are language users. What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: *language*. Through language structure, autonomy and

responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. We use language not just to achieve certain ends, for instance through threats ("if you don't eat your dinner, you'll have to go straight to bed"), but also to defend our validity claims with reasons, a process that may lead to agreement.

Habermas's point is that the aim of mutual understanding—and, hence, agreement and consensus—is built into the very structure of language. That is not to say that this promise of understanding and agreement is (always) realized, but it explains why we cannot reduce language and interaction to instrumental and strategic action and reason. There is something more to communication than getting one's way with others. This also links communicative action to communicative rationality: The latter refers to the promise to vindicate one's validity claims before the tribunal of the public use of reason.

In this way, Habermas believes that it becomes possible to talk about social action as rational—not just as instrumentally rational but, in a different fashion, as communicatively rational. And this makes us able to make judgments about the rationality of institutions and practices in a way that goes beyond asking about the efficiency of those institutions and practices. Habermas locates communicative reason in communicative action and in the fact that, as human beings, we are language users. So, communicative reason is not something specific to this or that community or historical period; rather, it has a universal application.

At this point, it is useful to compare Habermas's position to that of Adorno and Horkheimer from the first generation of the so-called Frankfurt School of critical theory. Whereas Adorno and Horkheimer were skeptical of modernity, Habermas is more optimistic. Adorno and Horkheimer saw the rise of instrumental reason and its problematic results everywhere, from advertising to the Holocaust, and they saw no alternative to this. Habermas argues that this is due to their limited notion of reason; he believes that we need a differentiated notion of reason that distinguishes instrumental and strategic reason from communicative reason.

With communicative reason we have something to hang our emancipatory hopes on. Communicative reason not only gives us hope of a better future, it also provides us with a basis for social critique. Because communicative reason is not implicated by relations of power, it provides us a perspective from which to criticize relations of power. Indeed, Habermas's argument is that we cannot reduce everything to power because we would then be unable to argue that our critique of power is not just another exercise of power. This forms part of his critique of Adorno and Horkheimer and of post-Nietzscheans such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, whom Habermas thinks reduce everything to relations of power. For Habermas such a move is self-defeating, something he sums up with the charge that they are engaged in a performative contradiction. You cannot, the argument goes, at one and the same time criticize power relations and claim that power is all there is.

This performative contradiction argument is another part of Habermas's argument for the unavoidability of communicative action and reason: We must presuppose communicative reason as agents who want to get something done together with other agents. This is so even if we may often (also) be engaged in instrumental and strategic action. There is no way not to presuppose something like communicative reason if we are to coordinate social action peacefully in the long run; it would not be possible to account for this from a perspective that reduces social action to the strategic action by agents facing one another as ends to their means.

Thus, Habermas's notions of communicative action and communicative reason serve as the basis for a sociological analysis of society as well as a critique of existing power relations. Communicative action and reason can, according to Habermas, be shown to be unavoidable facets of communication and social interaction while at the same time providing a critical corrective to contemporary society.

The Theory of Communicative Action is also known for Habermas's so-called colonization thesis. The argument is as follows. Society consists of a lifeworld of norms and institutions that are taken for granted by social agents; this lifeworld provides the background for communicative action and can be questioned in parts. In modern societies, there is a gradual differentiation of systems that become more or less independent of the lifeworld; the state and the market are good examples.

There is a differentiation between lifeworld and systems as well as a differentiation of systems into more and more complex systems and subsystems, for instance, within the state. Systems are governed by instrumental and strategic rationality through systems media such as power (the state) or money (the market).

Habermas does not criticize this differentiation as such; in fact, he believes it is necessary in any modern and complex society. Systems provide efficiency when it comes to coordinating action necessary for a modern society to function. For instance, in order to coordinate traffic in a modern city, it is not enough to rely on an implicit lifeworld background or on communicative action; here systems—state enforcement of laws, regulation of traffic with road tolls, and so on—are useful. The problem arises when systems "colonize" the lifeworld. This happens when power and money come to regulate what should really be regulated by communicative action; the result is anomie and alienation. An example would be the public sphere: if public debate is reduced to a matter of making money (by the media) or exercising power (by corporations influencing the media), citizens become alienated from the public sphere and retreat into their private domains.

Habermas does not propose a return to premodern society; rather, he argues, we must protect the lifeworld against intrusion from systems. Thus, the lifeworld/systems distinction and the colonization thesis provide Habermas with a way to criticize certain aspects of contemporary society, especially capitalism and bureaucratization. And unlike Marxist critiques of contemporary society, Habermas need not base his critique on a class analysis of society or restrict his critique to aspects of capitalism alone.

Discourse Ethics

Habermas's theory of discourse ethics follows closely from his theory of communicative action and reason. The term *discourse ethics* is, strictly speaking, a misnomer as it is rather a discourse theory of validity, that is, the validity of claims to truth, normative rightness, and truthfulness. Habermas developed his discourse ethics in a piece called "Discourse Ethics" in 1983, and it is supposed to provide an answer to the question: How, in pluralist societies, can we talk about something as true, right, and truthful?

For Habermas validity is not something inherent to a proposition or to a norm, but rather the result of discourse, that is, what was earlier described as the public use of reason. When discourses meet certain requirements of full information, equality among the participants, and so on, Habermas talks about "rational discourse." Earlier he used the phrase "ideal speech situation" to describe the same thing. The idea is that in a rational discourse only the forceless force of the good argument counts. In short, a rational discourse is a discourse devoid of power relations, bias, and exclusion.

The argument is as follows. When I raise a validity claim—for instance, "you should ride your bike to work today"—this claim can be taken up by others and problematized (e.g., "but it's raining!"). Validity claims may not be problematized and as such remain part of an implicit lifeworld consensus, but if they are problematized, then we enter the level of discourse and, insofar as the discourse meets certain requirements, we have a rational discourse. Validity claims contain the implicit claim that, if problematized, I am able and willing to test the validity claims in rational discourse and that, potentially, we may arrive at a rational consensus, the outcome of a rational discourse.

The gap between a de facto consensus and a rational consensus provides a critical perspective on any existing consensus. Just as communicative reason provides a critical corrective on existing power relations, rational discourse and rational consensus provide us with a way to point out deficiencies in the process through which society has arrived at a certain consensus, which, it turns out, is false and not truly universal.

Notice that Habermas links rationality to the process or procedure; it is the characteristics of the procedure that renders the outcome (the consensus) rational, not the outcome as such. Thus, it is not a correspondence theory of validity where a consensus should correspond to some external physical or moral reality in order to be rational. This is summed up in the discourse principle (D): "Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses" (Habermas, 1996, p. 107).

Habermas's discourse ethics is deontological; it does not give us norms, but a procedure for testing norms. This is expressed in the moral (or universalization) principle (U): "For a [moral] norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects that its *general* observance can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the particular interests of *each* person affected must be such that *all* affected can accept them freely" (Habermas, 1990, p. 120). Moral norms that have been tested in a rational discourse are equally good (or universally good) for all those possibly affected by the norms.

The moral principle also expresses a notion of autonomy as rational self-legislation: The subjects to the moral norms can understand themselves as also the authors of the norms insofar as they have given themselves the norms through a process of rational discourse. Notice the intersubjectivist twist Habermas gives to autonomy. It does not arise from the self-legislation of an individual or collective subject, but from the process of the public use of reason among participants in discourse.

That discourse ethics is a procedural theory of normative validity is particularly important given the fact that modern societies contain a plurality of ways of life. Again we see why Habermas wants to leave the philosophy of the subject behind: Society cannot be treated as a subject legislating for itself. Rather, modern society must be seen as consisting of individuals with different moral views, and therefore we need an *inter*subjective perspective. For Habermas, this perspective is discourse ethics.

Deliberative Democracy

From the late 1980s onward, Habermas developed a theory of deliberative democracy, which he laid out in *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,* published in 1992. Where discourse ethics was concerned with moral norms, deliberative democracy is, as the title of the book suggests, concerned with legal norms. The task Habermas set himself was to show how modern and complex societies can be integrated through the medium of law in a way that avoids the colonization of the lifeworld by systems, in this case, the state. In other words, how can we avoid citizens feeling alienated toward the law? In *The Theory of Communicative Action,* Habermas suggested erecting a dam against the encroachment of the systems. In *Between Facts and Norms,* he suggests a "sluice" model whereby legal norms (a systems phenomenon) become grounded in the lifeworld and in communicative action. The solution is deliberative democracy.

Like moral norms, legal norms must be rooted in discourse, that is, public deliberation. In this way, valid law, too, is linked to the discourse principle (D), and this is expressed in the democratic principle: "Only those [legal] statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent . . . of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted" (Habermas, 1996, p. 110). Legal norms are valid insofar as those possibly affected by them have given their consent in deliberations that are characterized by full information, symmetry among the participants, and so on.

The result is legal autonomy. The "citizens [are] able to understand themselves also as authors of the law to which they are subject as addressees" (Habermas, 1996, p. 449). Because this self-legislation is rooted in rational deliberations, we can talk of rational self-legislation. The only difference with moral autonomy is that legal autonomy necessarily relates to a certain political community and is therefore not potentially universal in scope.

Habermas links this notion of legal autonomy to what he calls the co-originality thesis. This concerns the relationship between constitutionalism (individual rights) and democracy (popular sovereignty). Traditionally, liberals have given priority to individual rights over popular sovereignty, whereas republicans have given priority to popular sovereignty over individual rights. Habermas argues that the two things—constitutionalism and democracy—are two sides of the same coin and co-original. Constitutionalism and democracy imply one another and should not be seen as competing principles, at least if understood in terms of deliberative democracy. Deliberation will lead to the expression of popular sovereignty, but the deliberations must also be conditioned in certain ways. This is what constitutionalism does: It guarantees that everybody is free and equal. The content of constitutionalism is, in turn, the outcome of democratic deliberations. Habermas's argument is that you cannot have legitimate law without deliberative democracy, and, in deliberative democracy,

constitutionalism and democracy are united and mutually supportive. Only if you have both constitutionalism and democracy can the subjects to the laws (including constitutional laws) understand themselves as simultaneously the authors of the very same laws.

It should be clear by now that the public sphere is absolutely central to deliberative democracy; autonomous law is rooted in the citizens' public deliberations. However, in modern complex societies, direct democracy is not possible, so we need some system of representative democracy. In this respect, deliberative democracy has two institutional implications.

First, representative institutions must be organized according to the principle of the public use of reason. Thus, for instance, public deliberation is central to the parliament, but we can also think of institutions such as citizen juries as ways to institutionalize deliberative democracy.

Second, representative government must be rooted in the public sphere. Habermas distinguishes between, on one hand, the formal political system (the core), consisting of representative institutions, the courts, and the executive and, on the other hand, the informal political system (the periphery), consisting of civil society and the public sphere. The latter—the deliberations in the periphery—must feed into the formal system so that decisions emanating from the formal system can be led back to citizens' deliberations in the public sphere and civil society. Here we have again the "sluice" model where communicative reason is sluiced into the political system, which is in turn thought of as porous and receptive to communicative inputs.

Pluralism, Religion, and the Postnational Constellation

Modern societies consist of a plurality of different ways of life or what Habermas, following Rawls, calls *ethical conceptions of the good life,* for instance, religions. As a result, society cannot be integrated at the "ethical" level because that would inevitably mean imposing one way of life on others. Law must therefore be distinguished from any particular ethical view. This is reflected in Habermas's distinction between the ethical level and the political level of societal integration. We can, so Habermas argues, integrate the plurality of ethical conceptions of the good life at the political level:

> The ethical integration of groups and subcultures with their own collective identities must be uncoupled from the abstract political integration that includes all citizens equally. . . . The neutrality of the law vis-à-vis internal ethical differentiations stems from the fact that in complex societies the citizenry as a whole can no longer be held together by a substantive consensus on values but only by a consensus on the procedures for the legitimate enactment of laws and the legitimate exercise of power. (Habermas, 1998, p. 225)

Laws may reflect political but not ethical values.

This idea of political integration is also fleshed out in Habermas's notion of "constitutional patriotism." Citizens may share allegiance to certain political values, for instance, equality and freedom of religion—what Habermas in the previous quote referred to as "a consensus on the procedures for the legitimate enactment of laws and the legitimate exercise of power." What the content of that consensus is will differ according to time and place; it is not a given, but rather the outcome of deliberations among the citizens.

Understood in this way, constitutional patriotism can therefore be distinguished from nationalism. The latter is problematic insofar as some countries may consist of more than one nation and insofar as nationalism often consists of certain ethical values, such as a particular religion. Nationalism, being "a substantive consensus on values," will not do for pluralist societies; only a constitutional patriotism will do.

During the past few years, Habermas has been increasingly preoccupied with the place of religion in contemporary Western societies. Although he is a nonbeliever, he thinks that religion should be allowed a place in the public sphere. However, religious reasons must be translated into political reasons before they can be allowed to influence law. (The distinction between religious and political reasons corresponds to the one between ethical and political integration.) That is, in the process of moving from the informal to the formal political system, religious reasons must be presented in an idiom that everybody can understand, including nonbelievers and people of different faiths.

Habermas refers to such as society as "postsecular" to stress that, although there is this requirement to translate religious into political reasons, there is, nonetheless, a place for religion in the public sphere and civil society.

Linked to this, toleration must not be understood as a hierarchical relation of a tolerating party bestowing toleration upon a tolerated party as an act of benevolence and from a position of power. Deliberative democracy, Habermas believes, can help us here. If we think of the norms of toleration as the result of deliberations among equals, then the asymmetry between the tolerating and the tolerated disappears. This reflects another aspect of Habermas's postsecular society: We must treat religious persons as equal partners in deliberations about the norms of society, including the norms of toleration. This is so even if, when it comes to legal norms and the regulation of what we have in common as a society, these things must be justified on the basis of political rather than religious reasons.

The nation-state is challenged from within by ethical pluralism. It is also challenged from without by globalization, whether in the form of global capital, terrorism, or pollution. This is another reason why, for Habermas, it is necessary to go beyond the nation-state. The nation-state does not, and should not, necessarily disappear, but, according to Habermas, we need to focus on regional (European) and global (cosmopolitan) levels in search of solutions to problems such as the regulation of greenhouse gases. This is what Habermas refers to as the "postnational constellation."

We need more integration in the European Union, including a common foreign policy. This in turn requires the development of an EU-wide public sphere in order to root EU policy in opinion- and will-formation among the citizens of the European Union (Habermas 2006, Part II). We must also develop global organizations, especially within the framework of the United Nations. The aim of cosmopolitan government is partly to tame global capitalism and partly to enforce human rights.

Thus, for Habermas, the nation-state becomes less and less capable of solving political problems. At the same time, it is necessary to develop political organizations at a higher level that may intervene against national sovereignty. This is the case with environmental policy where decisions within a nation-state can have important consequences for people outside the borders of the nation-state. Given Habermas's notion of autonomy as the identity of those subject to laws and decisions with the authors of those laws and decisions, it is necessary to lift some of those laws and decisions out of the nation-state context and onto a higher level, whether regional or global. When it comes to human rights, we need organizations that can intervene against national sovereignty. It is no longer sufficient to refer to national sovereignty or (democratic) self-determination because the latter must be mediated by human rights. Self-determination that does not take place among free and equal citizens is not self-determination (autonomy) proper, according to Habermas.

Habermas moves beyond the nation-state and beyond nation-state sovereignty with this multilevel form of governance, which is at all levels supposed to be rooted in the public use of reason among those affected by the laws and decisions. This notion of autonomy linked to the public use of reason appears throughout Habermas's work, from his critique of the philosophy of the subject through communicative action, discourse ethics, and deliberative democracy to his recent writings on constitutional patriotism, religion, toleration, and cosmopolitanism.

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See also Critical Theory; Deliberative Democracy; Discourse; Negative Dialectics; Public Sphere

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Happiness

Giving a precise definition of happiness is difficult because of the different substantive conceptions of happiness that people hold; still, it is universally agreed that happiness is a characteristic of good life. Happiness often refers to a pleasant state of mind, but good fortune and moral virtue may also be considered elements of happiness. Although all seem to agree that happiness is what all human beings desire, it is open to debate whether happiness has intrinsic moral value. The role of happiness within a liberal society is a further domain that deserves our attention; apart from the obvious question regarding the attitude that a liberal society should adopt toward its citizens' different conceptions of happiness, there is also a challenging question regarding the possibility of the society's overall happiness and, if such a notion of happiness exists, its relation to the happiness of individual citizens. This entry first contrasts subjective conceptions of happiness with ones that emphasize objective criteria for a happy life. Next, it explores the question of whether happiness has intrinsic value or merely instrumental value. Lastly, it examines the role of the state in providing conditions necessary for happiness and considers the notion of a happy society.

Varieties of Happiness

The linguistic distinction between a happy/lucky person and happiness exists in several languages: *fortuna* and *beatitudo* in Latin, *chance* and *bonheur* in French, *Glück* and *Glücksgefühl* in German. There seem, however, to be exceptions, as in the ancient Greek language, where *eudaimonia* refers to a state of the world that is blessed with good fortune, by virtue of which an individual who leads a "good" life is also in a happy state of mind. Conceptually, happiness may refer to a psychological state of mind of the happy person (a subjective standard linked to a person's desires) or to the virtue or well-being exhibited by persons throughout their lives (more objective standards).

The notion of psychological happiness, familiar to the modern ear, is described by John Stuart Mill as pleasure and the absence of pain, while the contrary state of mind is understood as unhappiness. Its extreme version requires only the experience of pleasant episodes or sensations. The extreme and moderate versions share the idea that a subjectively defined state of mind is sufficient for happiness.

Still, cheerfulness and contentment are not sufficient for a truly happy life. A proponent of the extreme version of happiness defined as pleasure could consider an unending state of hedonic illusions due to a science-fictional hedonic experience machine, even though objective criteria for happiness are not met. Utilitarianism attempts to block illusory pleasures by claiming that the maximum utility is a necessary constituent of happiness; lower pleasures—under which the illusory hedonic episodes would fall—cannot match the utility of higher pleasures, which are so much more valuable and desirable to the extent that no amount of the former could outweigh them. Although we could distinguish between degrees of happiness with reference to how intense and extensive our lower pleasures are, we would never reach the level of happiness that higher pleasures bestow; or as Mill states it, it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Thus, according to the more moderate utilitarian conception of happiness, pleasure depends not only on the degree and duration but, more importantly, on the quality, of the subjective experience.

A view of happiness as based on objective criteria is not far from what we call well-being and is usually associated with Aristotle's definition of

eudaimonia as "living well and doing well" (*Nicomachean Ethics,* I.4, 1095[a]19–20). The emphasis here is on the state of the world that suffices for a happy life: what objectively constitutes happiness from a standpoint that evaluates life as a whole. Although pleasure is typically considered to be one constituent of happiness in the objective sense, it is possible to dissociate it entirely from pleasant episodes of the mind; in this context, Plato praises eudaimonia even when it is accompanied by no pleasant feelings.

This distinction is also related to a worry that classicists raise regarding the incompatibility of eudaimonia with a view of happiness that can exist independently of pleasure. However, one can argue that the person who is happy (*eudaimôn*) in the classical sense will have a qualitatively significant preference to exercise the peculiar human capacities. The pleasure that is attached to eudaimonia is qualitatively different from the mere experience of hedonic episodes: The former results from satisfying articulated preferences, which are well-defined and epistemically accessible, whereas the latter relates to the satisfaction of nonrational desires. The former represents what is objectively appropriate and satisfying for human beings, whereas the latter is limited to subjective contentment. Still, there is an important difference: Eudaimonia traditionally refers to contemplation as the peculiar capacity for human nature, whereas modern objective conceptions of happiness allow a variety of appropriate capabilities that different human beings may have and a multiplicity of happy states of the world when these capabilities are actualized.

The Moral Worth of Happiness

We all agree that we want to be happy; does this imply that happiness is the ultimate value of human life? Does happiness have intrinsic value? Is happiness the ultimate good, or is it complementary to other, moral or external, goods? The different varieties of happiness would offer different answers: Objective notions of happiness typically characterize it as a final good, containing the remaining goods or as not being increased by the addition of other goods. In contrast, the agent's contentment and cheerfulness are central in subjective concepts of happiness. Still, determining whether happiness is universally desired would be instrumental to the question of its value.

The thesis that happiness has absolute intrinsic value entails that other goods, moral as well as external, would either (a) be means to happiness, as in utilitarian views of pleasure or (b) constituent parts of happiness. The Socratic tradition, by identifying happiness as the only morally significant good and by denying any role to external goods for the happy life, is an example of the latter thesis. Plato asserts that, owing to its ultimate intrinsic value, only happiness is desired for its own sake. He presents those who desire external goods as being plainly mistaken, and in his *Republic* he depicts the virtuous person as being inevitably happy even under the most unfavorable circumstances and the vicious as fatally unhappy even when they enjoy every advantage.

Aristotle puts forward a moderate alternative concerning the value of happiness, one that focuses on the significance of virtue, but he also admits the necessity of external goods for the happy life. Starting from the universal claim that happiness is the most desirable good, he concludes that it has also to be the final good. There is a debate on whether the finality of the good indicates comprehensiveness (i.e., including all goods) or perfection (i.e., being the good *par excellence*); this exegetical debate would also determine whether there is a unique or a multitude of happy states. The utilitarian "greatest happiness principle" takes the comprehensiveness side; it maintains that happiness incorporates all desirable goods. Still, desirability is not constituent of the value of happiness, because it would have value even in a counterfactual scenario where it was no longer desired. To put it differently, both Aristotle and utilitarians hold that the universal desire for happiness plays a justificatory role of happiness, without being a constituent part of it.

A disavowal of the intrinsic value of happiness is offered by Immanuel Kant when he proposes rightness as the exclusive and ultimate moral value, the only unqualified good. For Kant, agent-based happiness is an obstacle to the objective moral obligation that is binding on the will of every member of the human species. Although Kant admits that happiness is universally *desired,* he denies that it is *desirable* for two reasons: (1) Our desires for happiness often conflict with

our obligations, which should always take priority and (2) even if there were not a conflict between happiness and obligation, our duty, not our desire for happiness, ought to motivate our actions. Still, Kant agrees promoting the happiness of our fellow humans has moral significance insofar it is purely altruistic and in harmony with the general will. Kant ascribes only instrumental social value to happiness and suggests that the best that happiness could offer is a hypothetical, as opposed to a categorical, imperative—one that is absolute and binding in all circumstances.

The Politics of Happiness

By stating that all human beings have an unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness, the American Declaration of Independence ascribes a central political role to happiness. On the other hand, an ancient Greek tradition of thought starting with Socrates and followed by the Cynics and the Stoics dissociates happiness from the political domain by denying the necessity of external, material or relational, goods for human happiness; instead, happiness, defined as self-sufficiency, is fully up to individuals and cannot be compromised by anything beyond them.

Liberalism also breaks the connection between happiness and the state by putting the emphasis on fairness; as John Rawls puts it, although the right and the good are the main moral concepts, justice has priority over goodness in the political domain. Moreover, liberals deny state intervention in the formulation of citizens' conceptions of happiness, because the odds are that the state would interfere wrongly. Accordingly, the state is restricted to providing equal opportunities for the pursuit of citizens' happiness, by similarly protecting their basic liberties and equally supplying them with the material necessities for satisfying their private conceptions of happiness.

Still, the liberal commitment to equal opportunities for happiness is exposed to some of the difficulties faced by the currency of equality debate. To start with, the liberal state would be committed to value equally any preferences or desires that are, objectively or subjectively, constituents of someone's conception of happiness, even when they are evidently unfeasible or expensive. In addition, state neutrality is arguably an illusion, as it adopts freedom as its central good in the same way that Mill explicitly endorses liberty as the specific conception of happiness that the society should promote. Hence, even the liberal state endorses in practice a substantive, albeit minimal, definition of happiness, which is installed in people's minds by the means of public education, the health system, and similar institutions intended to further public goods. Such a conception also serves as a norm for the evaluation of citizens' requirements for their private pursuit of happiness; for example, the equality of opportunities for materializing the variety of citizens' conceptions of happiness would have to be restricted if some of those conceptions conflict with the liberal ethos. These difficulties suggest that the public domain, even in its liberal version, has to admit a substantive conception of happiness, which would also provide some objectively necessary standards for human happiness. Martha Nussbaum, who has admitted this possibility, argues that the state should aim to provide a social content in which all its citizens can actualize their human capabilities, a substantive list of which she provides.

Other political ideologies that explicitly endorse a conception of the common good would have to openly give their approval to civic happiness. Totalitarianism, religious as well as secular, certainly presupposes a strong version of objectively defined happiness. Karl Marx may be a more difficult case, as he explicitly denies essentialism, but we could identify an underlying objective conception of happiness as a state of human beings that is contrasted with the state of alienation. Socialism and communism affirm a notion of civic happiness.

A final dilemma is whether the happiness that a majority enjoys, and/or the government endorses, could entail the existence of the happiness of the society as a whole. We often speak meaningfully of a happy society, association, or relationship, so there must be something to which such expressions refer. This type of happiness might simply constitute a systemic societal feature: Plato infamously holds that the happiness of society is beyond, and independent of, the happiness of its citizens, taken individually or aggregately. Aristotle deprecates such systemic happiness in favor of an intrinsic relation between society and its citizens by arguing that a happy society is not like an evenness that can belong to a society as a whole but not to any of its parts. It seems closer to our intuitions, which

are tuned with the greatest happiness principle, that the happiness of the society is sufficient—albeit not necessary—for the happiness of (at least some) of its citizens. Granting that the aim of society is to provide security and happiness to its members, a happy society with only unhappy citizens would be inconceivable; even so, citizens have a variety of options for pursuing happiness, even independent of—or within—an unhappy society. Still, despite the relation between individual and social happiness, it seems that the existence of the latter is conceptually possible.

Charilaos Platanakis

See also Aristotle; Desire; Egalitarianism; Equality; Kant, Immanuel; Liberalism; Mill, John Stuart; Plato; Pleasure; Rawls, John; Sen, Amartya; Virtue; Welfare State

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Hart, H. L. A. (1907–1992)

Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart was the foremost legal philosopher and one of the foremost political philosophers of the twentieth century. Born to a Jewish family in Yorkshire, England, Hart pursued his undergraduate education at Oxford and went on to qualify as a barrister. After practicing law for several years, he worked for the British intelligence service MI5 during World War II. When the war ended, he returned to Oxford to take up a fellowship in philosophy at New College. He subsequently became professor of jurisprudence at Oxford (and a Fellow of University College), and still later became principal of Brasenose College. During the closing years of his career as an active scholar, he devoted much of his time to editing and interpreting the works of Jeremy Bentham.

Hart is best known for his contributions to legal philosophy generally and to legal positivism specifically. At the same time that he acknowledged his intellectual debts to his great positivist predecessors Bentham and John Austin, he severely criticized their theories for obscuring the normative dimension of law (i.e., law's orientation toward what ought to be). At the same time, he emphasized that the normativity of law is not necessarily moral; throughout his jurisprudential work, he maintained a legal-positivist insistence on the separability of law and morality. In his classic 1961 book *The Concept of Law,* and in a number of essays written approximately contemporaneously, he presented a hugely influential account of the ways in which different types of norms combine to form the structure of a legal system. He laid particular stress on what he designated as the "rule of recognition"—namely, the array of normative presuppositions that underlie the behavior of legal officials (especially judges and administrators) as they ascertain the existence and contents of the laws in their system of governance. Under the prevailing rule of recognition in a jurisdiction, legal officials are both authorized and obligated to follow specific criteria in determining which norms possess the status of laws. Those criteria typically fix upon familiar sources of law such as legislative enactments or adjudicative rulings or administrative regulations or constitutional provisions.

Although *The Concept of Law* is principally a work of legal philosophy, it contains some important discussions of topics in political and moral philosophy. Hart's first major contribution to political philosophy occurred in his 1955 essay "Are There Any Natural Rights?" In that essay, Hart briefly introduced a theory of political obligation that has come to be known as the "principle of fair play" (a principle later elaborated by his friend John Rawls). That is, he contended that anyone who benefits greatly from the presence of some institution is morally required to bear a commensurate share of the burden of sustaining that institution's existence. Although the principle

of fair play has often come under attack in the four decades since Hart fleetingly propounded it, it continues to be espoused by some present-day political philosophers.

Hart's most sustained entry into political disputation occurred in 1963, with the publication of his *Law, Liberty, and Morality*. Hart wrote in the liberal tradition of John Stuart Mill in arguing that homosexual intercourse between consenting adults should not be legally proscribed. Invoking and defending Mill's "harm principle," which maintains that no activity can legitimately be outlawed unless the activity causes nontrivial harm to somebody other than the participant(s) in it, Hart submitted that consensual intercourse between adult homosexuals does not cause any detriment that would suffice to satisfy the harm principle. In particular, the mere fact that unorthodox sexual practices cause offense to some people who are aware of their occurrence does not constitute harm of any kind that would render legitimate the prohibition of those practices.

In several writings included in his *Essays on Bentham* and *Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,* Hart made noteworthy contributions to debates over the nature of rights and justice. He joined Rawls and Robert Nozick in rejecting utilitarian rationales for sacrificing the vital interests of some individuals in furtherance of the interests of others, but he likewise assailed the extreme individualism of Nozick's libertarian principles of justice. Generally sympathetic to Rawls's ideas, Hart nonetheless challenged Rawls's remarks about the overriding priority of liberty. (Among other things, he queried Rawls's unexplained shift from speaking about the priority of *liberty* to speaking about the priority of *liberties*.) What Hart impugned was not really the priority of certain liberties but instead the claim by Rawls to have derived that priority from a situation of pure rational choice—the "original position"—in which each choosing agent seeks to promote his or her own interests optimally. Hart declared that, instead, the only tenable basis for Rawls's prioritization of certain liberties is a liberal ideal of human personality.

Hart further exhibited his liberal allegiances in his analysis of the nature of rights. He contended that the holding of a legal right by any person *P* always involves the vesting of *P* with legal powers to waive or demand the enforcement of the legal duty that is correlated with the right. Hart adopted this analysis precisely because he believed that no alternative conception of right-holding would capture the role of rights in enabling individual self-determination. His account of rights, like his other political stances, was grounded on liberal values.

Matthew H. Kramer

See also Bentham, Jeremy; Justice, Theories of; Liberalism; Libertarianism; Mill, John Stuart; Natural Law; Rawls, John; Rights; Rule of Law

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Hate Speech

Hate speech is speech or expression that denigrates a person or persons on the basis of (alleged) membership in a social group identified by such attributes as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, physical or mental disability, and others. Typical hate speech involves epithets and slurs (e.g., "nigger," "faggot," "bitch"), statements that promote malicious stereotypes ("Mexicans are lazy"), and speech intended to incite hatred or violence against a group ("Kill all the Muslims!"). Hate speech can also include nonverbal depictions and symbols. For example, Jews and others might label the brandishing of the Nazi swastika as hate

speech, and some feminists consider pornography to be hate speech against women. Critics of hate speech argue that it not only causes psychological harm to its victims, and physical harm when it incites violence, but that it also undermines the social equality of its victims. This is particularly true, they claim, because the social groups that are commonly the targets of hate speech have historically suffered from social marginalization and oppression. Hate speech therefore poses a challenge for liberal societies, which are committed to both freedom of expression *and* social equality. Thus, there is an ongoing debate among liberals over whether and how hate speech should be regulated or censored.

The traditional liberal position regarding hate speech is to permit it under the auspices of freedom of expression. Although liberals who take this position acknowledge the odious nature of the messages of hate speech, they maintain that state censorship is a cure that causes more harm than the disease of bigoted expression. They fear that a principle of censorship will lead to the suppression of other unpopular but nevertheless legitimate expression, perhaps even of the criticism of government, which is so vital to the political health of liberal democracy. They argue that the best way to counter hate speech is to demonstrate its falsity in the open marketplace of ideas.

Proponents of censorship argue that the traditional liberal position wrongly assumes the social equality of persons and groups in society and neglects the fact that there are marginalized groups who are especially vulnerable to the evils of hate speech. Hate speech, they argue, is not merely the expression of ideas; it is rather an effective means of socially subordinating its victims. When aimed at historically oppressed minorities, hate speech is not merely insulting but also perpetuates their oppression by causing the victims, the perpetrators, and society at large to internalize the hateful messages and act accordingly. Victims of hate speech cannot enter the "open marketplace of ideas" as equal participants to defend themselves because hate speech, in conjunction with a broader system of inequality and unjust discrimination that burdens these victims, effectively silences them. Despite these arguments, the American court system, on the basis of the First Amendment, has generally ruled against attempts to censor hate speech. Some universities, however, have controversially enacted campus speech codes aimed at eradicating hate speech.

William M. Curtis

See also Civil Rights; Difference Theories; Dissent; Feminism; Gender; Historic Injustice; Justice, Theories of; Liberalism; Mill, John Stuart; Pluralism; Politics of Recognition; Queer; Race Theory; Rights; Subaltern; Toleration; Whiteness

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Hayek, Friedrich von (1899–1992)

Friedrich August von Hayek was an Austro-British economist and political philosopher who helped to inspire a shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism in the late twentieth century. In 1974 he shared the Nobel Prize for economics, and in 1991, he received the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom. He wrote scathing critiques of totalitarianism and planning, arguing that liberty as well as prosperity depended on a free-market economy. His early work, most notably *The Road to Serfdom,* concentrated on diagnosing what he saw as the failings of totalitarian and social democratic societies. Later, in books such as *The Constitution of Liberty,* he offered his vision of the ideal, capitalist society.

Hayek's views on socialism and markets reflect his theories of knowledge and society. In *The Sensory Order,* Hayek identified what he saw as the limits of reason. In his view, the mind is incapable of standing outside of society and understanding

how society influences its perceptions. Human beings simply cannot know all the details of the social processes. They necessarily abstract from concrete details in order to make models of their environment. Thus, all social knowledge is partial and imperfect. For Hayek, the limitations of reason undermined what he thought was a common rationalist assumption that the mind could master reality. He argued, to the contrary, that the partial and imperfect nature of our knowledge meant we could never know enough consciously to control or redesign our environment. Hayek thus rejected as impossible the rationalist dream of a designed social order. Instead he championed the idea of a spontaneous order. In his view, spontaneous orders arose accidentally as segmentations and conglomerations of individual actions. Equally, however, as a spontaneous order arose, so it was always tested by experience and by trial and error. Spontaneous orders were thus subject to a kind of natural selection.

The distinction between designed and spontaneous orders supports the claim that we ignore society's rules and institutions at our peril, but it does not necessarily lead to a defense of any particular set of rules and institutions. Here Hayek echoed David Hume's argument that there are no universal or objective morals, so social and political norms and rules can take different forms. He condemned rationalist attempts consciously to change or design social rules and institutions, attempts that he thought undermined the natural selection of rules and institutions. Socialism was, in his view, the paradigmatic example of such rationalism.

Hayek viewed socialism as a rationalist attempt to direct economic activity in accordance with an abstract idea of social justice. It was, he argued, the greatest threat to modern civilization, destroying the basis of morals, personal freedom, and responsibility, and impeding the production of wealth. Even mild forms of government intervention led to totalitarianism and impoverishment.

For a start, Hayek argued that whereas socialist ideals of altruism and solidarity may have been appropriate for the hunter-gatherer phase of civilization, they are inappropriate for modern societies precisely because we cannot know the needs of every individual. Socialism increases social dependency and decreases self-reliance; it undermines the freedom and responsibility needed to sustain society. According to Hayek, even if socialism made the state responsible for people's lives, it opened the way to corruption and eroded people's independence, self-reliance, and moral integrity. Socialism led inevitably to totalitarianism.

In addition, Hayek argues that socialism impedes the production of wealth. He offered a range of reasons for believing socialist economies to be inherently inefficient. He drew here on an argument made earlier by Ludwig von Mises: Socialism misallocates resources because without a decentralized price mechanism, the subjective preferences of individuals cannot be identified and fulfilled. He also argued that socialism undermines the competition that drives forward the processes of innovation that increase production. More innovatively, Hayek drew on his own view of reason and knowledge to argue that because people's preferences cannot be measured, socialism more or less necessarily has to end up reflecting special interests. Finally, he suggested that redistribution alters the dynamics of the economy within which they operate so that their outcome is always uncertain.

Hayek believed that, given imperfect knowledge, the only effective way to organize human activity was through a free market. The market coordinates the actions of individuals who have dispersed, decentralized, and fragmented knowledge. The market is a discovery process that matches wants and goods, enabling individuals to coordinate their economic activities in accord with their preferences. So, unlike many economists, Hayek focused on the process that the market sustained, not on the equilibrium to which it gave rise. The market means we do not have to know every element of society to secure coordination.

For Hayek, liberal government was vital to defend the market and the freedom it instantiated. Liberal rule protects personal freedoms from the arbitrary interference and coercion of others. Personal freedom, in turn, facilitates the coordination and discovery of knowledge through a market. Liberal rule consists here of personal freedoms protected through the rule of law. In order to be just and to protect freedom, laws must be abstract, universal, and impartial. Hayek believed, in particular, that the key to freedom is a legal system that protects private property. However, he accepted that coercion legitimately may be used to prevent even worse coercion, and he thus defended conscription and taxation.

Throughout his life, Hayek emphasized the importance of liberty in a market economy under a liberal government. This concept of liberty differs significantly from that of liberty as democratic self-rule. Hayek remained broadly supportive of democracy. But he argued that democratic decision making was not an adequate substitute for the market. In particular, Hayek stressed the superiority of the market to democracy as a mechanism for generating a genuinely collective choice. The market simply aggregates the choices of individuals. Democratic institutions, in contrast, are subject to distortions that prevented them reflecting the genuine preferences of individuals. More generally, Hayek supported democracy not as an end in itself, but as a means of promoting and protecting a liberal market society. Because he recognized that democracy could be used to attack liberalism and the market, he insisted democracy should be restrained by bounds such as the protection of minority rights. Indeed, he suggested that authoritarian regimes could be preferable to democratic ones if they were more likely to protect liberal rights and the market economy.

Mark Bevir

See also Keynes, John Maynard; Liberalism; Market; Neoclassical Economics

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Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is one of the pantheon of "great dead political philosophers." To many, he is best known for his conservatism and his early critique of modern liberalism. For others, what makes him most distinctive is the social idealism that made him such an attractive target for Karl Marx. For neutrals on these issues, his permanent value rests on the distinctive contribution that he made to a wide variety of problems that are the meat and drink of political philosophy. This last is the spirit in which his work is introduced in this entry.

Life and Work

Hegel was born in Stuttgart, Germany, in 1770. His father was a civil servant at the court of the Duchy of Württemberg. At the Tübinger Stift, a Protestant seminary that he entered in 1788, he was a close friend of two outstanding fellow students, Friedrich Hölderlin (the poet) and Friedrich Schelling (the philosopher). His interest in politics and current affairs developed along with their common enthusiasm for the revolutionary events in France. After periods as a private tutor, in 1801 he followed Schelling to the University of Jena, working as a virtually unpaid tutorial assistant and later Extraordinary Lecturer until 1807. Following long spells as a newspaper editor in Bamburg and as a headmaster at the Gymnasium in Nuremburg, he took up his first fully professional university post as professor in Heidelberg in 1816 at the age of 46. In 1818 he moved to take up the philosophy chair in Berlin, Prussia, previously occupied by Johann Gottlieb Fichte. He remained in that post until his death in 1831.

As a philosopher, Hegel is best known for his grandiloquent metaphysical system of absolute idealism. But his work in social and political philosophy is more than just a supplement to this last great effort in philosophical system building. He thought hard about—and wrote about—ethics in its broadest sense throughout his intellectual career. His early theological works were driven by a concern for social improvement and for finding a place for religion as a vehicle of cultural reform. In Jena he finished an earlier essay on the German Constitution and published his critical (1802–1803) essay on natural law (*On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its Place in Practical Philosophy, and Its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law*) in which he introduces criticisms of "individualist" systems of normative ethics, notably Kantian ethics and social contract theories of the

state. In his (unpublished) *System of Ethical Life,* and in lecture materials, the *Jena System Drafts,* he began to develop related concepts of spirit, mutual recognition, and freedom which he would elaborate in the magnificent *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807; henceforth *Phenomenology,* cited at paragraph [¶] numbers). Hegel's ethics and political philosophy are sketched in the "Objective Mind" section of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817) and then in much greater detail in successive drafts of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (henceforth *PR,* cited at section [§] numbers), his fullest and most carefully articulated text in political theory, first published in 1820 as a handbook to accompany lectures. Additional material on social and political philosophy can be found in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History,* the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (both published after his death), and various essays, notably his 1831 essay "On the English Reform Bill."

Key Themes

Idealism

In Hegel's system the study of social and political philosophy—ethics in its broadest sense—is the study of "objective mind." Hegel is an absolute idealist, which is to say, at its simplest, that the world is ultimately constituted by reason. Although absolute idealism has fallen out of fashion in recent times and has always been philosophically controversial, it is grounded in strong intuitions and good questions: If the universe is not, at bottom, mathematical, how can the equations of the physicist disclose its nature? Were the natural world not rational or intrinsically intelligible, how could rational creatures have knowledge of it?

Particularly controversial, however, is Hegel's effort to generalize idealism into the realm of social philosophy (it was this effort that Marx hoped to turn on its head). It claims that social institutions such as families, firms, trade unions, legal systems, and states are structures of mind (or spirit—*Geist* is Hegel's term). The social world is a system of objective mind (as against subjective mind, exemplified in the mental life of individuals), constituted by such mental entities as intentions, expectations, decisions, beliefs, values, rules, conventions, and laws.

Spirit, Reason, and Freedom

Objective mind (henceforth spirit) has a history—indeed, for Hegel, nothing else has a history—with a distinctive theme: Reason works in history to develop patterns of rationality in the social world. Think of the history of spirit as a space-time worm—"Spirit emptied out into Time" (*Phenomenology,* ¶ 808)—moving from civilization to civilization, beginning in the ancient Chinese world and moving to the German (northern European Protestant) world of Hegel's day via India, Persia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and medieval Christianity, and undergoing sequential changes in the process, all driven by the motor of reason. "This Becoming presents a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Spirit has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance" (*Phenomenology,* ¶ 808). Thus social worlds which are irrational, say because the citizens are faced with tragic conflicts between the norms of family life as dictated by religious beliefs and the laws of the state as commanded by the sovereign—this is the ancient world of Antigone as famously described in Chapter 6 of *Phenomenology*—must collapse and go under. This distinctively "ethical shape of Spirit has vanished and another takes its place" (*Phenomenology,* ¶ 475). The modern social world exemplified in the Prussia that Hegel describes in *PR* is the product and culmination of reason at work in history, the historical dialectic that is sketched in the *Phenomenology* and described in detail in *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.* As Hegel puts it in the notorious *Doppelsatz* (double-saying) of the preface to *PR:*

> What is rational is actual;
>
> And what is actual is rational.

This hard saying has been the source of reams of contending interpretations, but its essence is the claim that the modern social world that Hegel describes in *PR* is rational, a structure of reason to be disclosed by philosophical interpretation.

What does it mean to say that reason is both the motor of historical change and the structuring element of the social world? If we think of spirit as a structure of interpenetrating thought and will (for Hegel, as against Kant, these terms do not denote

discrete faculties of the mind), and if we understand the will to be essentially free (as Hegel does), we can understand the *history* of spirit as the story of its striving for freedom and the *actuality* of spirit as the embodiment of freedom in the institutions of the modern social world. The history of spirit encompasses two narratives: first, a speculative history of events and institutions, an account of how humans have learned by trial and error just which forms of social life realize freedom, entrenching those that do and jettisoning those that do not, as, for example, the social practices of slavery and authority-based religion do not; and second, a history of philosophy, an account of how humans have come to understand through philosophical reflection what freedom requires. Absolute freedom (the end point of the *Phenomenology*) is the circumstance wherein spirit is fully self-conscious, understanding that it is free and how it is so—"Spirit that knows itself as Spirit" (*Phenomenology,* ¶ 798). Spirit is thus truly free because there are no barriers or limits to its self-knowledge. Actual social freedom is the condition of social life wherein citizens live freely together and understand how the institutions that bind them secure this freedom. This latter understanding, Hegel believes, is charted in *PR*.

Recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit

Mention of freedom of the will and a commonsense grasp of social freedom as negative freedom, the condition of individual agents who are not prevented by laws or other social conditions from getting what they want, may lead us to think of freedom as an individual possession, a state enjoyed by individual persons. For Hegel, on the other hand, freedom is as much a social achievement as a property of individuals. There could not be a stable, persisting, social world in which one, or some, were free while others were not, in which one, or some, are masters and all others are slaves. History has shown us that societies that are organized in this fashion must change or perish, but in *Phenomenology,* where Hegel first publishes the account of spirit that he has developed, he gives us a deeper argument to explain why this must be so.

Knowledge, he concludes at the end of the first chapter, cannot be a matter of a subject's acquaintance with, or perceiving, or theorizing, a world of independent objects. Consciousness, he argues, requires self-consciousness or self-understanding, and he asks in the chapter on self-consciousness: What do we understand ourselves to be? First, we take ourselves to be living, desiring creatures, but this conception of ourselves is incomplete and unstable, itself consumed, he tells us, in the consummation of desire. We can demonstrate to ourselves that we are not just desiring creatures by distancing ourselves from the pressing urgencies of the living, desiring self—that is, by risking our lives in challenging others to a life and death struggle. This strange kind of self-knowledge discloses to the protagonists that they are both free in the sense that they can cast off natural urges and instincts. Both are willing to give up their lives, after all. Moreover, there is a strong dialectical advance in that both parties to the struggle present themselves and recognize the other as free agents. But this, too, is partial knowledge, of its nature incomplete—brief and passing for the protagonist who does not survive and transient for the winner of the fight, the sad survivor who no longer has an opponent who can recognize him as free. So a further dialectical advance is made into the master-slave dialectic, when the outcome of the struggle is not death but enslavement for the loser who clings to life. The master achieves recognition of his mastery and liberation from the need to work to satisfy his desires; the slave secures his continued existence as a living creature who exists to serve his master.

Next, in a dialectical *bouleversement* that has proved enormously influential, Hegel demonstrates that the project of mastery is a failure and that the true advance in self-consciousness and liberation is taken by the slave. Echoing and amplifying some famous remarks of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the *Second Discourse on the Origins of Inequality,* Hegel maintains that in becoming dependent on the work of the slave to satisfy his desires, and in seeking recognition from an inferior being whom he dominates, the master loses his freedom and fails to secure recognition. Contrariwise, through the self-discipline exerted in the processes of skilled and thoughtful labor, together with the identification and recognition of his intelligent self in the products of his labor, the slave acquires a glimmering of freedom as self-knowledge that is denied to the master. The lessons of the master-slave dialectic are that one-sided recognition fails as a strategy for developing self-consciousness, that the creation of dependents cannot secure true independence, and, crucially,

that personal freedom necessitates relationships of equality between persons who are free.

The insights developed through this bizarre sequence of emblematic figures have been an inspiration and resource for theorists of liberation and social equality ever since: for philosophers and ideologists supporting workers in their struggle against oppressive capitalist owners of the means of production, for the leaders of colonized peoples seeking independence from imperialist domination, and for feminists striving for the equality of women against the hegemony of men. Wage slavery, colonialist exploitation, the subjection of women—all such strategies of domination and subordination—are bound to fail, or so it is claimed on the basis of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. True independence is the mutual interdependence of the "'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'" (*Phenomenology,* ¶ 177), true recognition is mutual recognition wherein the parties "*recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing* one another" (*Phenomenology,* ¶ 184), and true freedom is equal liberation for all.

These appropriations of Hegel's ideas should not blind us to the fact that Hegel was an enthusiastic supporter of burgeoning nineteenth-century capitalism, that he believed that colonialism was an important strategy in the elimination of poverty in the industrialized world, and that the proper place for women was the home. Controversy has surrounded the issue of how far these insights of the *Phenomenology* are developed or compromised in Hegel's later work.

Freedom in the Modern Social World: The Philosophy of Right

In *Philosophy of Right,* Hegel articulates the system of objective spirit that is actualized in the modern social world. In the first section, he writes, "The subject-matter of *the philosophical science of right* is the *Idea of right*—the concept of right and its actualization" (*PR,* § 1). That is, he will describe the social world and its constitutive values (the "actualization" of right) in terms of a philosophical articulation of its inner logic. This gives *PR* a structure that has mystified many readers. For Hegel, this rational or logical structure—of universality, particularity, and individuality (basically the Aristotelian concept of an *individual* substance as a *particular* instantiation of a *universal*)—has a validating or justifying power. This claim can be bracketed off if the institutions and their constitutive norms or values can be defended as having an independent cogency, which they may well have. If they do not, then the system stands or falls with one's acceptance of Hegel's metaphysics.

The Will

The key thought, already latent (albeit in a highly compressed form) in the introduction to *PR,* is that the social world is a structure of freedom because it fully actualizes the free will. The free will combines two elements—(1) the (universal) power of abstracting any (particular) determinate content of the will (as when one holds back from acting to satisfy a desire and considers whether this is the sort of thing one ought to be doing) and (2) some (particular) desire that one seeks to satisfy—into a synthesis of universality and particularity when one decides to act (say, to satisfy this particular desire rather than that). So free agency combines the Hobbesian element of acting from desire and the Kantian element of distancing oneself from otherwise determining desires. One acts freely when one acts to satisfy desires that one has independently validated.

How is this achieved? The basic idea is that one acts freely when one acts in accordance with values (social rules, laws, or norms) that are endorsed as rational. Suppose Adam wants to eat the apple that he sees hanging from the tree. Then he reflects that the tree and its fruit belong to Bill, who is the owner of it and has a right of exclusive possession to it. Because Adam endorses a regime of private property and rights of ownership as necessary for persons to be free, he acts freely when he restrains himself from taking the apple. If, on the other hand, he had (correctly) judged that the apple belonged to no one and that he was within his rights to take it, Adam would have acted freely when he picked and ate it. These are models of free agency, as Hegel understands it. This is *positive,* as against *negative,* freedom on one understanding of the distinction drawn by Isaiah Berlin.

The Argument of the Philosophy of Right

The values engaged when agents act freely are encoded in structures of social norms. How are

these (correct or valid) norms to be identified? Hegel's distinctive story explains that they are constitutive of conceptions of the self with which modern agents have learned to identify. Allen Wood dubs this a *self-actualization* theory. It specifies that agents are free when their actions are guided by a nested series of normative systems, within each of which there is a range of self-descriptions that agents recognize and endorse and thus apply to themselves and their fellow citizens. These self-descriptions are ethically potent in that those who identify with them will acknowledge the constitutive norms of behavior that they encode or actualize. This is a *communitarian* ethic insofar as the moral norms that direct the behavior of free persons are the norms that are actualized by, or embedded within, the communities they inhabit, and it is ultimately the historically formed community—Hegel's rational state—with which persons identify which gives them their ethical life.

Abstract Right

Thus (to follow the sequence charted in *PR*) in Part I, "Abstract Right," we see ourselves and others as *persons,* a technical term denoting the discrete atomic units of agency who are bearers of rights, making claims of right against others and recognizing the reciprocal claims on themselves that other persons make in turn. This is a primitive ethic of individual rights, traceable to Protestant claims on behalf of the integrity of the individual soul in its relations with God and the associated morality of natural rights that was developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Seeing ourselves as persons, we make claims of right to personal integrity, individual conscience and religious faith, and private property. As persons, we freely contract with others and develop a retributive conception of punishment as the legitimate enforcement of these rights. Modern persons, Hegel insists, are ineluctably individualists, separate persons as Rawls claims, governed by rights that operate as side constraints in the fashion described by Robert Nozick (*pace* the modern communitarian who says such a person is a fiction). But Hegel differs from this style of contemporary liberalism in insisting that this minimal self-ascription cannot represent the whole truth about our moral personality because an ethics of personal rights would be impoverished to the point of contradiction. Persons would claim enforceable rights but would be unable to establish a stable system of just rights enforcement. A state of nature regime of rights enforcement would descend into a nightmare of revenge and vendetta in the way John Locke describes in the *Second Treatise of Government*.

Morality

We are persons, but more than persons. In the following chapter, "Morality" (*Moralität*), Hegel explores the possibility that we might establish a set of moral norms to which all might subscribe on the basis of an understanding of ourselves as moral subjects. This of course was Kant's project and throughout this chapter Hegel stalks Kant, gathering insights concerning the nature of human agency but finally rejecting Kant's moral psychology (with its dichotomy of duty and inclination) and Kant's normative ethics (with its employment of the categorical imperative as the definitive test of any proposed moral principle). "From this point of view, no immanent theory of duties is possible" (*PR,* § 135), Hegel concludes.

It would be a mistake to dismiss Hegel's critique of morality as entirely negative. A crucial insight which he endorses is the "*right of the subjective will* [which] is that whatever it is to recognize as valid should be *perceived* by it *as good*" (*PR,* § 132). If we take this as the claim that neither priests nor princes can dictate to us how we should behave (as Kant equally insisted), that norms of conduct should be understood and endorsed by all those to whom they apply, we can see Hegel as accepting a crucial thesis of modern liberalism in its broadest sense. It is a matter of great dispute how far Hegel respects this important right in the details of the argument to follow. It is also important that one recognizes that this right is entirely formal. It does not tell us what the good is. It does not deliver "an immanent theory of duties." For that we have to investigate Ethical Life (*Sittlichkeit*), Hegel's distinctive name for the actual norms of the rational state, that is, the community he inhabits.

Ethical Life

The English idealist F. H. Bradley (1846–1924) described the subject of ethics as "My Station and Its Duties." This gives a clear sense to the difficult term *ethical life*. Our duties are furnished by our

ethical location (our station in life) in communities of sentiment fashioned in history. If this sounds like subjection rather than freedom, Hegel emphasizes that the opposite is the case. "A binding duty can appear as a *limitation*. . . . The individual however finds his *liberation* in duty" (*PR,* § 149). Rather than constrain us, we shall find that our duties make us free: Once we understand and endorse the requirements, we find our natural desires tamed and controlled. We understand that the institutions of ethical life, including notably the state, enable us to realize personal capacities that would otherwise fail to find an adequate expression.

Thus, when we understand the nature of life in the modern nuclear family (the first element of ethical life that Hegel studies)—a life grounded in mutual love but structured by duties to parents, spouse, and children—we will agree that only in this form of domesticity can the human capacity for love and long-term commitment be adequately realized. There is much truth in Hegel's account, but modern readers may find it dated and ethically unacceptable—not least in respect to Hegel's description of the role of women. Hegel's writings are a good target for feminists, but a focus on the passages where Hegel insultingly compares women to plants and tells us that "when women are in charge of government, the state is in danger" (*PR,* § 166A) will miss the nuances of his position.

In the second element of ethical life, civil society (a curiously abstracted construction, gathering together the major nonpolitical institutions of the modern state), Hegel explains how economic, legal, and administrative structures enable "concrete persons" (chiefly, male family members) to satisfy the particular self-interest of themselves and their families. Guided mainly by the writings of British economists, notably Adam Smith and David Ricardo, Hegel developed strong and interesting views (which curiously Marx never discusses directly) on how the capitalism of his day is a liberating force, how the ever more productive forces released by rapid industrialization enable humans to satisfy their increasingly sophisticated demands, and how social classes form in the different segments (agricultural, business, and bureaucratic) of economic life.

The administration of law protects the citizens' rights, enforces contracts, and corrects the deficiencies of state of nature punishment systems, as these were explained in Hegel's concept of abstract right. Two further elements of civil society are the "police," all those social agencies designed to provide regulative and infrastructural support to the system of production, including public education services, and the "corporations," a strange confection of medieval guilds, employers' associations, and trade unions. All these institutions effect, in their fashion, a transformation of self-interest into a common will as individuals associate together to serve their particular purposes more efficiently. But one problem of modern social life obdurately resists solution. He portrays poverty as a deforming scar on the face of modern civilization caused not so much by idleness and stupidity as by the structural problems of market capitalism when, for example, markets collapse or technological change makes ancient skills redundant. The state is evidently necessary to fashion remedies. He mentions redistributive taxation, compulsory work schemes, and even colonization as policy alternatives but shows little enthusiasm for them and does not discuss the issue further when he moves on to discuss the state, the final element of ethical life.

The State

Hegel speaks of the state in two senses. In the first, the rational state, we are to understand the modern system of social freedom that wraps up in a harmonious construction all the normative systems encountered in the modern world. Thus the rational state is the integration of the ethical demands of personal rights, moral subjectivity, family life, civil society, and the political institutions of the state. These ethical demands are harmonious in the sense that individuals can recognize and respect moral rules that derive from all these sources without finding themselves in circumstances of tragic conflict wherein rules conflict and the complex identity of the modern self is torn apart. If there are conflicts, they will be resolved by ordering principles, most conspicuously by obeying the laws of the state. Because the state is rational, there will be no modern Antigones, no moral rebels.

To paraphrase *PR* § 260: The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. As members of it, persons should be able to develop all their capacities and satisfy all the interests they have as individuals, as

family members, and as members of civil society. But they should not and do not live as private persons alone. They recognize their universality, their ties with others. And these ties bind them to serve a common purpose, a universal end that they freely acknowledge as they perform the duties incumbent on them in their particular stations in life, as determined ultimately by the state.

The second sense of the term *state* denotes the "political state proper" or the "strictly political state" (*PR,* § 267). This is a political system with a constitution that Hegel describes in some detail. The political state is a ramshackle, bodged edifice. Hegel's presentation of it disobeys the logical principles that he advanced as constituting the rational structure of all reality. At its head is a monarchy which has a symbolic personal role, dotting the "i"s and crossing the "t"s (*PR,* § 280A), yet also has formidable and decisive political powers. The second element of the constitution is the executive, a civil service owing allegiance to the monarch, who appoints the senior ministers. The third element is the legislative power. This includes the monarch and the executive who oversees its operations. In addition, there are two Estates (roughly assemblies): one a collection of wealthy landowners, the other appointed from the corporations (and not elected by universal suffrage).

As one state among others, states may find themselves at war, which "should not be regarded as an absolute evil" (*PR,* § 324) as good may come of it. It may quicken otherwise dormant and degenerating sentiments of patriotism. Some have found Hegel's views on war abhorrent. Others insist that a full nuanced account should be given and this should be acceptable to sophisticated nonpacifists. Hegel ends the *Philosophy of Right* by locating the rational state in the space of international law (of which he gives a Hobbesian account as consisting of nonmandatory rules and agreements that states should try to keep so long as their own interests are not compromised), and the time of world history, which he summarizes in half a dozen pages.

Is Hegel a Liberal or a Conservative Political Theorist?

Many believe that Hegel's political position shifts from an early radicalism to a later conservatism. There are biographical reasons for accepting this view. As Pinkard explains, Hegel felt forced to accommodate his published views to the critical eye of the reactionary censor after 1818. There are textual grounds for believing that he compromised his political-philosophical beliefs, as reported by K.-H. Ilting in his edition of *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie.* But the sensible reader will not take a position on the general question without the most careful evaluation of Hegel's writings.

These are the conclusions that are safe to draw: Hegel's method commits him to a unique style of conservatism. "When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk" (*PR,* Preface). We cannot tell the world how it ought to be; we are locked into the ethical world we inhabit and seek to comprehend. But this doesn't bar all change. The reality of the world in its fine detail may not reflect the ethical principles that underlie it, so there is space for an immanent critique. Furthermore, the grounding principles of liberalism—doctrines of human rights, the right of the subjective will, as well as associated concrete political freedoms (freedom of conscience and worship, freedom of the press, freedom to find one's own career path, among many others)—are all entrenched *within* Hegel's rational state. They are not moral luxuries or indulgencies, they cannot be rejected; they are as much a feature of the modern political world as Hegel (mistakenly) takes a constitutional monarchy to be. In these respects Hegel is a liberal, but this is not the whole story.

There are many critical questions the reader can target at the detail of Hegel's political settlement: Is Hegel right to dismiss all varieties of social contract theories as individualistic and prescriptive, because he believes them to be historically false? How far does the crucial political sentiment of patriotism, which holds the state together as love unites the family, occlude a properly critical spirit on the part of citizens? How far does the education of citizens, in which religion has a part to play, undermine their rational independence? It is a measure of Hegel's greatness that the probing reader will not find simple answers to questions such as these. And even where it is obvious that Hegel's descriptions-cum-prescriptions

for the rational state are desperately out of date, the intelligent scholar may well find modern equivalencies for the institutions that Hegel falsely believed to be a permanent feature of the ethical and political landscape.

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See also Berlin, Isaiah; Communitarianism; Conservatism; Feminism; Liberalism; Liberty; Marx, Karl

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HEGELIANS

Hegelians, or members of the Hegelian School, are students or adherents of the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), who lectured at the University of Berlin from 1818 until his death. The Hegelian School represents the development and critique of Hegel's project of asking how free and rational action is possible within the framework of contemporary social institutions. After Hegel's death in November 1831, this project confronted new challenges. In the disunited German territories of the 1830s and 1840s, questions of religious, political, and social freedom were sharply posed. The authors who comprise the Hegelian School sought to find, by adapting and criticizing Hegel, resources for grasping central theoretical issues of the modern world. Their thought identifies questions about freedom and citizenship that still retain their urgency today.

The Hegelian School

The Hegelian School was always a very loose association, comprising shifting political and geographic alliances. Intense controversy often raged among its members, much of it over the proper interpretation of Hegel's work, which was still being digested, collected, and edited in the 1830s. These disagreements were first given a systematic expression in 1837 by David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874). Strauss distinguished between right, center, and left Hegelianism, each adopting a different view of the relation between reason and religious faith. According to Strauss, right Hegelians saw Hegel's philosophy as an affirmation of Christianity, left Hegelians challenged or reformulated Christian doctrines, and center Hegelians indecisively straddled both camps. These labels quickly took on wider political meanings, and can serve as rough guidelines, although the individual positions represented in the school were far more complex and variable than Strauss's sketch might indicate.

The evolution of the Hegelian School was conditioned by ambiguities in Hegel's philosophy, and by political conditions in the *Vormärz,* the prelude to the German Revolutions of March 1848. The Hegelian idea of the unity of thought and being, the core of his idealism, implies the historical realization of reason in the world. In his *Philosophy of Right* (1820–1821), Hegel asserted that the real is rational, and the rational is real. This infamous copula is however ambiguous: Does it refer to an accomplished fact or rather identify a tendency, still incomplete? To what extent, that is, do the prevailing forms of religion,

politics, and society correspond to the standards of reason and freedom? Depending on how one answers this question, Hegel's philosophy can be seen as basically legitimating the status quo, or as criticizing institutions and social relations that were still inadequately rational. The Hegelian left took up the latter option.

It did so in response to specific historical factors. Under Napoleonic pressure, the Prussian state had achieved significant agrarian reforms (including abolition of serfdom) in the early years of the nineteenth century, as well as military and educational modernization; Hegel had obtained his professorship at the recently founded University of Berlin through the efforts of the reformers. Resistance to further reforms grew after Napoleon's defeat in 1815. The king of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm III, reneged on his promise of a constitution. In the 1830s, the crown prince (who succeeded to the throne as Friedrich Wilhelm IV in 1840), led efforts to eradicate Hegelian influence from the state and universities, viewing Hegelianism as incompatible with political order and religious observance. Conservatives accused Hegel of pantheism, the heretical doctrine that God and the natural cosmos are one and the same entity. They stressed instead the separateness of God and the world, with Christ as the unique mediator between the human and the divine. This in turn implied a political theology of personal monarchical rule and the assertion of a mystical bond between king and people, one that cannot be captured in any written constitution or body of explicit rules. In response, whereas the right Hegelians simply denied that unorthodox conclusions could be drawn from Hegel's system, the Hegelian left initiated its religious criticism by rethinking the relation of the divine with the human. Religious and political motifs were closely connected on both sides of the ideological divide.

The Hegelian Left and Right

Leading the charge on the Hegelian left was Strauss. His *Life of Jesus, Critically Examined* (1835–1836) contended that the essential Christian message is the *unity* of the human and the divine, but that the gospels had presented philosophical truth in the form of a myth about the birth of Christ, a figure who symbolically represents that unity. The myth was not a deception but was the product of the early Christian community's reflection on its own origins and historical significance. For Strauss, the genuine truth of this doctrine could be retrieved philosophically if the unity of the human and divine were understood—in Hegelian terms—to mean the realization of reason in the world, through the collective work of the human species in time. In its context, this theological argument was politically charged, despite Strauss's caution in the political arena. It offered an analogy to the decisive political question of the day, the contested locus of sovereignty in the state: Does it reside exclusively in the person of a monarch, or is it diffused throughout the democratic community? This analogy was clearly grasped at the time, and conservative authors like Heinrich Leo loudly proclaimed the dangers posed by Hegelianism to the existing state and religion. In 1841, Bruno Bauer (1809–1882), by then one of the recognized leaders of the Hegelian left, savagely parodied these criticisms in his anonymous and quickly banned work, *The Trumpet of the Last Judgement Against Hegel, the Atheist and Antichrist.* Yet Bauer's position remains distinct from, and critical of, Strauss's.

After being associated with the Hegelian right in the mid-1830s, Bauer was radicalized by the tightening conservative grip on the Prussian state. However, he rejected Strauss's conception of a collective mythic consciousness. For Bauer, the question was how individuals, not anonymous collectivities, responded to the problems and possibilities of their time. For Bauer, this meant that the origins of Christianity were literary or fictional rather than mythical. Bauer rejected Strauss's idea that the Christian unity of God and mankind symbolizes the generic perfection of the human race. He contended instead that it expresses the idea that individuals are each capable of *rational* freedom, transforming themselves and irrational objective conditions, to promote progress and the general good. As Bauer's critique of Christianity intensified, he described religion as passivity and self-loss, impeding freedom in personal, social, and political life. Writing on Jewish emancipation, he contended that the real solution was to renounce religion in general and to repudiate the so-called Christian state of Restoration Prussia in particular. In the 1850s, Bauer became vocally

anti-Semitic, describing an immutable racial divide between Jews and Christians. In the 1840s, however, he advocated a comprehensive republicanism. In this theory, freedom and rationality are not simply natural properties distributed or shared among its bearers (as, Bauer thought, Strauss's position implied) but must be consciously and actively affirmed by individuals if they are to be realized. Mobilizing Hegelian terminology, Bauer described this act of self-definition as infinite or universal self-consciousness. Bauer criticized the idea of God as a transcendent absolute being and retained a notion of universal interests that could direct republican citizens in the construction of a new political and social order, suffused with justice and reason. Particular interests had to be subjected to criticism, to test their compatibility with universal emancipation. Failure to self-criticize would lead to stagnation and the conformism of mass society. Bauer's defense of a critical individualism anticipates John Stuart Mill, though unlike Mill, Bauer identified the agency for historical progress not in the competition among particular interests but in the ability to transform them consciously.

Others on the Hegelian left, like Max Stirner (1806–1856) and Edgar Bauer (1820–1886), came to reject republicanism and political democracy as insufficiently radical. In Stirner's concept of "ownness" or uniqueness, individuals are self-made shapers of their own personalities, unconstrained by the opinion of others or by conventional morality. Whereas Hegel viewed the state as an ethical community and an essential forum of freedom, Stirner's anarchism viewed it as a dispensable impediment to self-affirmation and to the free play of interests among liberated egoists. This anarchism does not require active resistance to the state but permits evasion of any political impositions. Edgar Bauer, Bruno's younger brother, advocated even more active opposition to political and ecclesiastical authority. He has been described as an originator of the modern theory of individual or group terrorism. Inspired by radical-populist movements in the French Revolution, he rejected the Hegelian idea that opposites can be reconciled, and he stressed uncompromising struggle against the existing order, including political violence. And, unlike his brother, Edgar Bauer was a socialist, advocating freedom *from* private property.

Freedom and Alienation

In the face of modern competitive individualism and disharmony, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) sought to restore the wholeness of the human personality and to view social connections as a source of fulfillment, not of limitation. Radicalizing Strauss's arguments, Feuerbach suggested that the attributes of God are a projection of the powers of the human species as a whole; religious orthodoxy turned these powers into a fetish or object of worship, treating them as a transcendent, divine person. The task was to reclaim them and to recognize their human character. In *The Essence of Christianity* and other writings of the 1840s, Feuerbach attributed the failures of modern society to egoism and dualism, the split between mind and body, self and nature. Finding Hegel's idea of spirit too abstract to solve these problems, he turned to a sensualistic naturalism or materialism. Feuerbach located the Hegelian unity of thought and being in sense-perception and material interaction with the world. Through this interaction, humans solve problems, improve their consciousness, and overcome egoism and natural propensities to aggression. Describing himself as an anti-Hegelian by 1842, he nevertheless remained a significant figure in left Hegelian circles. Among others, Feuerbach's work influenced Karl Marx (1818–1883), Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), Moses Hess (1812–1875), and even the composer Richard Wagner (1813–1883), who participated in the Revolution of 1848 and, in later life, wrestled with the contradictions between Feuerbach's humanism and the pessimism of Arthur Schopenhauer.

For the Hegelian left, the emergence of capitalism and new forms of urban poverty symptomatized the inner tension and dualisms of modern society. In the late 1830s, Eduard Gans (1797–1839), who took over Hegel's course on political philosophy at the University of Berlin, launched a distinctive new style of Hegelian social critique. Gans saw, in the concentration of economic power, the decisive problem impeding the progress of freedom. Facing emergent industrial urbanization, he revised Hegel's account of poverty and political and social exclusion from *Philosophy of Right,* drawing on French social thought, including Saint-Simon's ideas about association. Foreshadowing the ideas behind modern trade

unionism, Gans argued that the combined power of wage workers could counteract the monopolistic bargaining position of capital owners and lead to a more equitable distribution of wealth. Retaining Hegel's linkage of private property, individuality, and freedom, however, Gans rejected socialist ideas of collective property. He also developed Hegel's theory of the state, stressing the importance of institutionalized opposition to hold government to account.

Following Gans, ideas of opposition, struggle, and social exclusion were central to left Hegelians' understandings of progress toward a more rational society. These ideas were central to otherwise divergent visions of the Bauers and the young Marx. Arnold Ruge (1802–1880) was another influential Hegelian critic whose work reflects Gans's influence. After a 6-year imprisonment for republican political activities in the 1820s, Ruge worked to organize the Hegelian left, editing the *Halle Annals for Science and Art* (1838–1841). In the 1830s, Ruge acted as the conscience of the Prussian state, recalling its more progressive Enlightenment heritage, which (he feared) was being forfeited to advancing conservative forces. As the state proved increasingly intransigent to reforms, Ruge's polemics sharpened. He attacked Romanticism as a handmaiden of the regime, arguing, in an echo of Hegel's critique of abstract ideals of liberty, that it trivialized freedom, reducing it to caprice and arbitrariness. Ruge's primary target remained religious and secular conservatives, who repudiated constitutionalism, national representation, and other liberal reforms. Like Bruno Bauer, he considered Hegel an irresolute republican, whose political thought had to be pushed in the direction of popular sovereignty. When in 1841 stricter censorship regulations prevented publication inside Prussia, Ruge moved the renamed *German Annals* to neighboring Saxony, and in 1843 he emigrated to Paris. He sought collaboration with leading French socialists like Louis Blanc and Pierre Leroux; and, with Karl Marx, he edited a short-lived publication, the *Franco-German Annals*.

The young Marx had attended Gans's lectures in Berlin and, by autumn 1843, had outlined his own socialist theory. Marx described "abstract right," the right of ownership that Hegel and Gans considered essential to personhood, as the ideological expression of capitalist property relations. He concluded further that republicanism offered an inadequate response to the new social problems of industrial capitalism. Marx argued that no merely "political" program of reform could abolish the competitive egoism of civil society, whereby workers were alienated, reduced to instruments of others' wills for purposes of accumulation. The only genuine solution lay in transforming capitalist social relations root and branch. By 1843 Marx had begun his lifelong collaboration with Engels, whose 1845 text, *The Condition of the Working Class in England,* attributed the emergence of urban poverty and resistance to capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. Engels's text is markedly Feuerbachian, invoking the overcoming of alienation and egoism through humanity's retrieval of species-consciousness or general interest. Religious and political motifs remained intimately linked.

The historical importance of the Hegelians lies in their diagnosis of problems of freedom and alienation in modern life, including the political meanings of religion, and questions of economic power and exclusion. These questions have been foremost on the agenda for political and social thought ever since.

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See also Enlightenment; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Marx, Karl; Republicanism

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HEGEMONY

Customarily, hegemony is used in association with its dictionary meaning of supremacy. A hegemonic

group is understood as a powerful group that exercises its dominion over others against their will. This view is antithetical to the meaning of hegemony as originally suggested by Antonio Gramsci. Hegemony involves force, but it is used minimally and at the last resort; and when force is exercised, it is applied with the consent of the ruled. Others use the term in a context of international relations in which multiple nation-states are involved. In this case, a nation-state is considered to be hegemonic when it implements a disproportionate amount of cultural, economic, and political power over others. Again in its Gramscian sense, hegemony is possible when certain international conditions commence. However, Gramsci used the term to refer to relations between social groups within a nation-state in which a dominant class creates a "historic bloc" under its leadership. Hegemony, thus, is both a "spatialized" and a "historicized" concept that allows us to understand power relations between social groups within a specific politicosocial landscape.

The Concept

An important feature of hegemony is that it is multifaceted. Hegemony is not merely a rule exercised through a discursive process, as it is often taken to mean. A hegemonic group does not exert its power by simply superimposing its ideology over society at large. Hegemony involves nondiscursive processes, but most importantly it is the ruling of society in its entirety. A hegemonic class is one that has succeeded in bringing about an accord of varied aims. Hence, hegemony is an all-encompassing mode of leadership that manifests itself in ideological, political, and economic realms. Ideologically, the outlook of in-establishment groups is entrenched to the extent that it assumes the "common sense" of society in general. In this case, ideology is not merely a worldview imposed on the ruled. According to Gramsci, ideology is a lived discursive routine encompassing varied dimensions of social institutions and experiences. Politically, under hegemony the state assumes an expanded role. More exactly, it becomes an "integral state." Not only is its educational and ethical role accentuated, but it creates an aura of residing above and beyond social fissures. Mostly through the medium of congressional institutions, the public is provided with a good reason to believe that the state is a social arbiter. Economically, a hegemonic class actively seeks to transcend a corporatist orientation. By making scarifies of a lesser degree, a fundamental social group constructs a compromised social equilibrium. The sacrifice, however, does not go beyond its "essential" interests.

Clearly, Gramsci's concept of hegemony is not intended to shatter the fundamentals of Marxist theory. Yet it involves a good deal of theoretical reconstruction. First, the notion of hegemony contradicts economic determinism. Conferring the economic system a critical role, economic determinism considers the superstructure of society as epiphenomenal, playing a minimal role in the social-historical process. Gramsci, like Max Weber, saw that politics, idea systems, religion, and the state are more than mere reflections of the economic structure. Consequently, to give ideational and related institutions their proper place, Gramsci made a distinction between two levels of superstructure: civil society and political society. Civil society refers to an ensemble of social relations commonly called "private" and at which hegemony is exercised. Political society, in contrast, refers to "the state," a level at which "coercive power" resides. However, the relationship between the two is much more intricate than a simple dichotomy suggests. Sometimes Gramsci refers to the state as an institution in which elements of both civil and political societies are incorporated.

Second, the concept of hegemony undermines a simplistic approach to constructing an alternative social order. Among other things, it dispels the illusion of transforming society by just conquering the state, especially under circumstances where civil society has become a formidable social terrain and where the state vigorously maneuvers to win the active consent of the ruled. Borrowing military metaphors, Gramsci, accordingly, spelled out two distinct strategies: "war of maneuver" and "war of position." Whereas war of maneuver refers to the process of conquering political power, war of position is a multidimensional course through which civil society is reconstructed before political power is seized. What makes war of position noticeably distinct is that it is a dynamic process conducted both before and after power is assumed by a new leadership. Simply put, war of position is a "total war" intended to transcend failed hegemony,

incorporating war of maneuver as one of its moments.

On the basis of the distinction between the two strategies, Gramsci suggested a reasonable hypothesis why postcapitalist revolution took place in the East and not in the West as envisioned by Marx. The 1917 Russian Revolution was made possible because in Russia, political society largely preponderated over weak civil society, and it was relatively easy for the Bolsheviks to conquer political power. In the West, where there is a proper relationship between political and civil societies, to simply conduct war of maneuver amounts to engaging the outer perimeters of a social order without confronting the bulwarks of civil society on which hegemony rests.

Gramsci's argument may also be extended to explain the cases of failed revolutions. The concept of hegemony suggests that a social revolution is not a swift rupture in continuity; rather, it is a process that begins within "old" hegemony and continues after an alternative hegemony unfolds. Revolutions in the East and other, less-developed nations were wasted in part because the reconstruction of civil society took a stunted direction and political society became a bulky institution that left no space for the development of an autonomous civil society. In regard to the understanding of these "revolutions," Gramsci's concept of "passive revolution" is helpful. Passive revolutions are "revolutions" from above that institute economic and political changes without resulting in a qualitatively distinct social order. Measures are taken by the state to prevent an "organic crisis" that may occasion cataclysmic results. More specifically, these measures are intended to neutralize organized counter-hegemonic forces and even to respond to public grievances before they coalesce into an organized dissent. Hence, passive revolutions are nonrevolutionary revolutions, because society is made to change in certain degrees—not to alter its fundamental structures but to maintain its essential features. Failed revolutions are, accordingly, passive revolutions insofar as they merely involve the elite and thereby disallow a sweeping restructuring of society.

Counter-Hegemony

Hegemony is dynamic and expansive, but it is by no means total. Within any hegemonic order, there is always a set of conditions that cause counter-hegemony. From a Gramscian perspective, the most serious counter-hegemonies are those that creatively react to contracting hegemony to totally transform society. Total counter-hegemony ensues when a historic bloc breaks down due to a failed "compromised equilibrium." The unfolding of a total counter-hegemony entails that a dominant class has gone wrong in coordinating its interests with those of society. This "crisis in hegemony" manifests when the dominant class begins to rely on coercion, and gradually unmediated control of the ruled becomes the rule rather than the exception.

A crisis in hegemony does not mean that the days of "old" hegemony are numbered. There is always a possibility for existing hegemony to reconstruct itself. Moreover, the very existence of crisis does not necessarily imply that an alternative hegemony is fully born. Rather it means the advance to slowly but surely expand and transform civil society has begun. This process is an intricate one, in part because, by virtue of their economic, intellectual, and political power at their disposal, fundamental groups are, as Gramsci notes, with some speed and agility, able to control precarious situations. Besides, the "rupture of the equilibrium of forces" could be permanent or temporary. In cases where the challenge against the system is resolvable within existing hegemony, the rupture is temporary. If the demand is sustained and hegemony fails to reconstruct itself anew, the rupture signals the need for a radical break in intransience.

Afterward, hegemony unfolds in a long and multifaceted process, and this process occurs before crisis proper is revealed. During the heydays of hegemony, a fundamental group enjoys the "active consent" of the public, dissent being conjectural and partial. The basis of active consent is the belief that the social system is inherently open to change. However, as facts contradicting this premise emerge, active consent wanes and "passive consent," marked by contradictory appraisals of social reality, takes form. At this point, counter-hegemony assumes dissent in spite of organized action because individuals undergoing consciousness transformation have not made a decision between the ideology that they have internalized and the emergent perspective that they personally

entertain. In fact none of these outlooks decisively preponderates over the other until an anomalous situation that clearly shakes the foundation of the people's disposition asserts itself.

Alternately the dilemma may be resolved if the integral state that has showcased itself as the defender of universal interest, despite current crisis in hegemony, unequivocally opts in favor of the powerful. At this point, those directly affected by existing organic crisis, and those who articulated its causes, become movement participants. This is the moment when "skepticism with regard to all theories and formulae" followed by "socio-historical criticism" abounds. The emergent social frame grounded in the personal experiences of movement participants takes precedence over hitherto prevailing ideological hegemony. Consequently, counter-hegemony participants withdraw their consent and prepare themselves for a new social order. If, after a long process, they are successful in this endeavor, they create a different social system in which the role of political society has diminished significantly and civil society has expanded considerably.

Application and Extension

The heuristic value of hegemony is not limited to the understanding of the dynamics of counter-hegemonies previously outlined. Social researchers have also used the concept to analyze varied forms of social existence. Cultural study is one of the areas where the concept bore fruitful results. Sociologist Stuart Hall made the most out of hegemony in his analysis of the interchange between representations and ideologies within a cultural milieu. In contrast to the Althusserian notion of ideology, he saw in hegemony a flexible concept that allows one to see social actors as active agents who are not duped by hegemonic strictures. Culture in this sense is not a transpolitical realm merely determined by extradiscursive processes; rather, it is an autonomous site that constitutes social history. Culture is also an arena in which consent and resistance, incorporation and defiance, are played out.

It was on the basis of the foregoing premise that Hall conducted his analysis of "Thatcherism." His main focus was a political anomaly that hardly makes sense if one's attention is concentrated on policy analysis. The anomaly was that during the 1980s the British working classes supported Thatcher's Conservative Party when her economic policies were antithetical to their interests. Using a Gramscian perspective, Hall was able to explain how the Conservative Party ascended to and stayed in power despite its unsuccessful economic policies. According to Hall, the party was triumphant because by making them see "politics in images" it appealed to people's "collective fantasies." To use a Gramscian language, the Conservative Party, with the assistance of the media, waged a "war of position" outside the realm of political society both before and after the seizure of state power. Thatcher and her party, accordingly, were able to win the hearts and minds of the citizenry. It was a different kind of "passive revolution" in which the Conservative Party stayed in power, not by way of economic transformation but by successfully interlinking political and civil societies.

Despite the foregoing notable applications, the concept of hegemony had its share of critics. One of the most serious criticisms was made by political scientist James Scott. On the basis of his studies of peasant resistance, Scott noted that there are certain aspects of dominant–dominated interaction that the concept of hegemony fails to reveal. Because the concept encourages a surface reading of the experiences of the ruled, it does not help capture the hidden weapons of the weak against the ideological establishment. Hegemony is more about the ability of the ruling to exercise their dominance on the ruled, and it treats the latter as though they are passive recipients. The creative, albeit hidden, reactions of the ruled are given scant attention. Three further problems arise as a result of this presupposition. First, the ruled are seen as incapable of cleansing their false consciousness. Left to their own devices, the ruled are unable to demystify dominant ideology. Trans-hegemonic consciousness can hardly arise in sites where people are caught by the strictures of hegemony. Second, the concept of hegemony does not encourage researchers to discriminate between "what is just" and "what is inevitable." Pragmatic submission on the part of the ruled is taken to mean unconditional subordination. Finally, Gramsci assumed that it is at the realm of behavior that the radicalism of the ruled is manifest. In fact it is in their interpretations of their reality that the ruled break from the official definition of the situation. This break does not take

place within the purview of dominant groups, and the ruling do not exercise control or expect submission from the ruled at this level.

On the other hand, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe are more sympathetic to the concept of hegemony than is James Scott. Where Scott sees in hegemony a concept that hinders the understanding of the full range of social conflict, Laclau and Mouffe embrace the notion of hegemony both because of its relevance in the analysis of diverse forms of resistance and its political significance to the project of radical democracy. Yet they quickly note that Gramsci's concept of hegemony cannot be adopted in toto, for Gramsci has not fully extricated it out of a Marxist "monist inspiration." Indeed, according to Laclau and Mouffe, Gramsci's theory marks an important watershed in the history of political thought. His idea of ideology as a material practice, his relational approach to group interaction, his emphasis on the political, intellectual, and moral nature of rulership, and his treatment of political subjects as "collective wills" resulting from the articulatory processes of varied social groupings mark a significant departure from Marxist orthodoxy. Yet Gramsci hardly took the implication of his perspective to its ultimate conclusion. He, accordingly, failed to disengage hegemony from essentialist assumptions. His notion of "hegemonic formation," for instance, is premised on a single unitary principle, although he treats the identity of social elements relationally. Consequently, his theory privileges class position over subject positions (positions related to gender, race, nationality, sexuality, and others).

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See also Civil Society; Ideology; Marxism

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HERMENEUTICS

From its early beginning in eighteenth-century German philosophy, modern hermeneutics has addressed the linguistic mediation of experience, the roots of human agency in intersubjectivity and practice, and the historical situatedness of reason. However, over the past 30 years or so, the meaning of the term *hermeneutics* has been significantly broadened. Today the term refers to anti-foundationalist positions of all stripes and makes its presence felt within practically all subdivisions of the human sciences. In this entry, hermeneutics designates a theorizing of the first-order practice of, and second-order conditions of possibility for, interpretation and understanding of symbolic expression and action.

In the works of Johann Gottfried Herder, Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich Schleiermacher, the Jena romantics, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, modern hermeneutics tackles the most basic epistemological problems of the human sciences, including the question as to what kind of knowledge these sciences can and should aspire to. However, with the ontological turn of Martin Heidegger and his student Hans-Georg Gadamer, the epistemological paradigm is left behind and hermeneutics is reshaped in light of concerns deriving from a broader, phenomenological analysis of human existence. A third branch of hermeneutics, the so-called school of suspicion, develops in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud. In various ways and configurations, these theoretical paradigms argumentatively inform and structurally shape contemporary hermeneutic discourse.

Interpretation and Validity

Although the history of hermeneutics stretches back to ancient Greek philosophy and the textual theories of the Middle Ages, it is only in the second half of the eighteenth century that it emerges as an independent, philosophical discipline. Hermeneutics is no longer a philological response to practical problems arising from the encounter with a specific kind of textual material (often, but not always, epitomized in biblical and ancient sources) but becomes a theoretical discipline that addresses

the universal conditions of possibility for understanding as such. Herder, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and, a bit later, Wilhelm Dilthey ask how interpretation can be ascribed with a dimension of validity: How can the interpreter know that she is not infusing the meaning of an utterance with illegitimate prejudices? This question gains cogency against the background of a new theory of meaning as being linguistically, culturally, and historically mediated and an attempt to carve out a common denominator that unifies the diverse and diverging life forms of different cultures and linguistic communities. (The young Herder appeals to nature, Schleiermacher to humanity, Hegel to spirit, Dilthey to life, and so forth.) Texts and actions from cultures that are temporally or geographically distant from that of the interpreter no longer appear to be immediately accessible through the mediating work of tradition and its authoritative scholarship—indeed, even texts or speech from the interpreter's own culture now figure as objects of hermeneutic scrutiny. The question, for the critical-reflective interpreter, is not "Do I understand utterance x, y, or z?" Rather, the interpreter asks how she can *justify* her interpretation of utterance x, y, or z. There is more to this question than mere epistemic worries. Confronted with temporally or culturally distant literatures and artifacts, the interpreter recognizes and reflects on the ramifications of the situatedness—hence also the potential parochialism—of her own intellectual powers. This motivates the wish to develop nonpartisan standards or criteria in light of which the interpreter can critically reflect on and gradually rid herself of prejudices and cultural bias, thus also lay tentative claims to valid interpretation. Through the appeal to such critical standards, the interpreter suggests that others, regardless of their historical and cultural background, should arrive at identical, similar, or overlapping results by following the same hermeneutic procedures.

The appeal to critical standards in interpretation grows out of a commitment to Enlightenment ideals such as tolerance, plurality, and a celebration of cultural manifold. It is expressive of a will to understand other agents on their own terms and without judging them in light of the ethical, political, and cultural vocabularies of the interpreter. Whether it is grounded in original context, authorial intention, or a criterion such as consensus among interpreters, the appeal to critical standards in interpretation does not exclude such classic humanistic ideals as *Bildung* (education in and through culture), the ongoing expansion of the interpreter's own horizon, and the mutual enhancement of understanding and self-understanding. Per se, the appeal to critical standards does not imply that the interpreter abstracts from or overlooks historical situatedness. On the contrary, it reflects an awareness of the historical conditions of understanding: It is *because* the interpreter is historically situated that critical-reflective procedures are needed, and, conversely, the appeal to such procedures is not due to a repression of historicity in the name of idealized research conditions.

Thus the philosophical territory gained by modern hermeneutics is twofold. First, unlike its predecessors in classical philology, modern hermeneutics does not list the rules for understanding of one subgroup of texts or actions but pitches interpretation as a global enterprise encompassing speech, action, and symbolic expression across the board. Second, it argues that the conditions of possibility for validity in understanding can only be articulated by reference to the a priori conditions of possibility for understanding as such. These conditions, though, are not couched as transcendental concepts, but relate to the nature of ordinary language, intersubjective practice, and the constitution of meaning through individual application of shared and historically developed symbolic-semantic resources.

The Hermeneutic Circle

The notion of the *hermeneutic circle* holds a central place within modern theory of interpretation. It refers (a) to the circular movement between the understanding of the parts and the understanding of the whole, that is, the way in which the interpreter gradually improves her critical hypotheses by moving between the level of the action or text as a whole (perhaps even the action or text in context) and the various steps or sections of which it consists. Through systematic comparison, the interpreter's grasp of the former is assessed in light of the latter, and vice versa. Furthermore, the hermeneutics circle addresses (b) the back and forth movement between text and interpreter. Unlike the inductive generalizations of the empirical natural

sciences and unlike, also, the deductive reasoning of the theoretical sciences, hermeneutics depends on a dialectical interaction through which the interpreter gradually purges herself of false preconceptions or beliefs and obtains a more valid conception of the meaning-content or problem at stake as well as her own situatedness within a given tradition and culture. No positive closure is afforded though this procedure, but only a negative movement of the interpreter freeing herself of illegitimate prejudices and gradually obtaining a deeper self-understanding.

Whether the meaning to which the interpreter seeks access is understood in light of a *contextualist* reference, authorial *intention,* or *consensus* oriented theories, the appeal to critical standards in interpretation has lived on in modern hermeneutics and is represented in objectivist positions such as Emilio Betti's, or, in modified and philosophically more challenging forms, in the work of critical theorists like Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas and their orientation toward the validity dimension of speech and understanding. These latter positions, however, are also indebted to the hermeneutics of suspicion and Gadamer's account of the dialogical structure of understanding.

The Ontological Turn

From the 1920s onward, the young Martin Heidegger would question the epistemic orientation in hermeneutics. Properly understood, he claims, hermeneutics, as a philosophical discipline, is not a matter of assembling the adequate conditions of validity in understanding. Understanding, in his view, is not an attitude that rational agents deliberately adopt while analyzing symbols and actions in a scholarly way. It is, rather, a distinctive mode of existence, a way of life that is unique to human beings: beings who are characterized by their capacity for self-reflection and self-understanding. In exploring the human condition, hermeneutics is not a method or theory choice. Nor is it a subdivision of philosophy. It *is* philosophy—period.

According to Heidegger, the world is disclosed to human beings as a field of meaning. We are beings who *understand* the world, and things present themselves to us, at a prereflective level, as already imbued with meaning. Things do not appear to us through bare impressions that are then, at the level of reflection, conceptually determined and categorized. Most originally, I see a hammer *as* a hammer, a shoe *as* a shoe, a tree and a child *as,* respectively, a tree and a child. This initial as-structure is highlighted through *interpretation* and, finally, given full articulation in the form of *assertion.* The hermeneutic structure of experience poses a challenge to the traditional correspondence theory of truth. Truth, Heidegger claims, does not only or most primarily consist in a correspondence between mental content and matters of fact in the world, but rests with the original disclosure of the world as a field of intelligibility in which things appear in the first place. This disclosure, in turn, is only meaningful when seen against the background of what is not disclosed, what is not or not yet within the pale of meaning. Any search for objectivity in understanding, any appeal to validity in interpretation risks losing from sight this original tension between disclosure and what remains undisclosed, focusing only on the present. What matters to Heidegger is not the approximation of interpretative certainty, but the capacity of the interpreter to take into consideration the interplay between disclosure and the nondisclosed dimensions of being that characterize his or her historical lifeworld context.

As developed in *Being and Time,* Heidegger's ontological turn would prove decisive for a whole host of twentieth-century thinkers. Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu all learned from, and further expanded, Heidegger's analysis of the distinctively human being-in-the-world and his critique of the metaphysics of presence.

The Dialogical Structure of Understanding

Yet it is Heidegger's student Gadamer who remained faithful to the concerns of the young Heidegger. In his magnum opus, *Truth and Method,* Gadamer presents his work as fundamentally Heideggerian in spirit. Yet he is sensitized to the problems pertaining to Heidegger's jargon and critical of his teacher's political naïveté during and after World War II. (Heidegger took up a position as a university rector during the Nazi era and later failed to apologize for his tainted political sympathies during this period.) Wishing to align himself with the legacy of Aristotle, Hegel, and the humanist theory of judgment, tact, *Bildung,* and tradition,

Gadamer launches a hermeneutic thinking that has been characterized as an urbanizing of the Heideggerian province.

In Gadamer's work, the vocabulary of world-disclosure is rephrased as a matter of recognizing the situatedness of reason in history and tradition. The human sciences, he argues, embody a particular possibility of self-understanding: that of the interpreter broadening her horizon through the encounter with works and utterances that are at one and the same time familiar (part of the tradition through which the interpreter is constituted) and other (to the extent that they stem from a temporally distant period). However, this can only be realized if hermeneutics rejects the ideal of the value-neutral interpreter and views understanding as a dialogue or even play in which the interpreter participates (and thus helps realize). The meaning of the eminent works of the tradition does not reside in authorial intention, reference to original context, or consensus among interpreters, but in its realization in ever new and changing contexts. No distinction can be drawn between interpretation and application; to understand is to apply the work within a unique, historical-cultural context. Application, furthermore, is a question of judgment, of a practical skill acquired through training rather than something obtained through the reference to a critical standard against which the interpreter measures his or her hermeneutic hypotheses. In Gadamer's hermeneutics, the effort to understand *better* is replaced by the historical imperative of understanding *differently*.

Although Gadamer has later acknowledged that his original picture of a critical hermeneutics is biased and polemical, his turn to tradition, *Bildung,* dialogue, and judgment has been a source of inspiration for a whole generation of philosophers. Alastair McIntyre, Charles Taylor, John McDowell, Robert Brandom, Richard Rorty, and perhaps even the late Donald Davidson should be counted among that number, and so should critical theorists as led by the later Habermas, Richard Bernstein, Georgia Warnke, and Seyla Benhabib.

The Hermeneutics of Suspicion

If critical theory, shaped by the second and third generations of Frankfurt School philosophers, is susceptible to Gadamer's emphasis on the dialogical structure of interpretation, it also, as mentioned, takes impulses from another direction in hermeneutics—the works of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, the nineteenth-century trio that Paul Ricoeur has aptly characterized as representative of a hermeneutics of suspicion. Although none of these philosophers use the term *hermeneutics* as such, they address a wide range of issues in interpretation. Ricoeur's characterization sheds light on the sustained relevance of their work, while also illuminating the critical-political potential inherent to theory of interpretation. Furthermore, as developed in the work of Ricoeur, the introduction of a critical turn in hermeneutics serves to question central aspects of the ontological philosophy of understanding.

Even though there are obvious differences between the philosophies of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche, Ricoeur's description targets a novel insight into the double or even multiple meanings of symbols and actions. Cultural and political symbols are never what they appear to be. Whereas both Heidegger and Gadamer describe language as a familiarizing factor—"the house of being," in the phenomenological lexicon—Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche insist that language is systematically distorted and that words always mean something other than what they manifestly say. The activity of interpretation—at least Freud and Nietzsche deliberately speak about interpretation and engage in textual exegesis—is one of unmasking the deeper structures of power, will, and desire that motivate seemingly innocent symbolic expressions. At stake is no longer the restoration of lost meaning (be it of a given text, author, or entire tradition), but the tearing down of the chief ideologies of modernity. Hermeneutics, on this program, is a process of demystification; it testifies to the ability of human reason to take responsibility for itself—by acknowledging its own limits.

Heidegger and Gadamer criticize the representational model of truth by insisting on Dasein's being in the world. Decades earlier, Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche, with their hermeneutics of suspicion, implied that the world, as a web of human meaning and practice, is saturated by illusions and systematic self-deception. If human being is self-interpretative by nature, the aim of interpretation is not simply to disclose the

possibilities for a more authentic existence but to uncover the systemic or social mechanisms through which the logic of self-deception is sustained. The self-deception of intellectual and collective consciousness is the ultimate target of the hermeneutics of suspicion.

The interpretative philosophies of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud always figured—and still figure—in the background of critical theory. They also motivate the critical-genealogical project of Foucault, the deconstructive readings of Derrida, as well as Ricoeur's own effort to synthesize ontological and critical hermeneutics. More recently, the hermeneutics of suspicion funnels into and informs strands of postcolonial theory and philosophy of race. Diverse as they are in theory choice and orientations, these contributions all seek to articulate and bring to awareness unreflected relations of dependency and power, thus emancipating the subject, individually or collectively, cognitively or in terms of social institutions, from hypostatized power structures. The Nietzsche-Marx-Freud–inspired theorists insist that the role of critical hermeneutics is to liberate the subject from unwanted power structures by bringing unreflected prejudices to a level of reflection, thus facilitating critical assessment and more autonomous decision making—or at least reflection on the very limits of enlightened autonomy.

In its various forms and shapes, hermeneutics informs political theory, history, sociology, anthropology, and so forth. However, in its multifarious and discipline-specific permutations, hermeneutics, spanning a plurality of different method choices, remains indebted to its conceptual roots in the post-Kantian tradition of European philosophy. Only to the extent that these roots are illuminated and brought to the fore can hermeneutics, as a method choice and critical apparatus across the human and social sciences, be responsibly appreciated and its relevance—and problems—be highlighted, affirmed, and further debated.

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See also Critical Theory; Interpretive Theory

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Herodotus (c. 480–429 BCE)

Herodotus was a Greek historian from Halicarnassus. With his one great work, which he called his "research" (in Greek, *historia*), he both established the discipline of history and composed the first substantial European prose work. He was recognized in antiquity as both the "father of history" and as the teller of "innumerable fictions" (Cicero, *On the Laws,* 1.1.5). His exact dates of birth and death are not known; the best evidence is the latest event he mentions, which occurred in the winter of 430–429 BCE. Some inferences can be made about his life from references in his history to places he visited, but further biographical details are speculative, including the late story that he was exiled and was one of the colonists of Thurii.

His main subject is the Persian Wars—invasions of the Greek mainland in 490 and 480–479 BCE. His work contains numerous digressions into earlier history, especially the hostility between

Greeks and *barbarians* (non-Greeks) and the rise of the Persian Empire, which are neatly woven into the narrative structure through a form of ring composition. His research favors eyewitness reports—he makes a point of distinguishing what he saw himself from what he ascertained from witnesses. He appears to have traveled widely in Asia Minor, Egypt, and the Greek mainland, and he reports local traditions and wonders, taking an interest in ethnology, anthropology, geography, and geology, but above all in the great achievements of people, Greek and non-Greek. In reporting what he has heard, Herodotus does not restrict himself to what he believes. In his narrative he likes to dramatize events, with both public and private scenes recreated for the reader. While his reliability as a historian has long been questioned, it has been shown that in developing the genre of history Herodotus used traditional storytelling techniques passed on from the oral traditions which he drew upon.

Although he was a part of the Greek intellectual enlightenment of the second half of the fifth century, Herodotus retained a belief in the importance of traditional customs and law (*nomos*). He addresses the issue of causation in a sophisticated way. While repeating traditional motifs of revenge and reciprocity on human and divine levels, he takes up the idea of *hybris:* Mortals go beyond the limits set for human greatness and so are destroyed. In addition, he recognized imperialism as a dynamic force that drove the Persian Empire to keep expanding.

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See also Cicero, Marcus Tullius; Narrative; Thucydides

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Hierocratic Arguments

Hierocratic political theory covers questions of papal sovereignty, the relationship between spiritual and temporal powers, and the legitimacy of absolutist papal monarchy. At their most extreme, hierocratic arguments give the pope supreme political and spiritual authority as God's direct representative on earth. As vicar of Rome, the pope is the head of an ordered political body. At the top of this hierarchy is the pope, followed by his church, followed by secular authorities and the laity.

Between the ninth and the fourteenth centuries CE, papal government increased in strength and developed its own political theory, both to explain the theoretical basis for this hierocratic form of government and to illustrate the practical functioning of papal government. Starting in the fifth century CE, Pope Gelasius I (?–496 CE) created a genre of arguments that explained why the pope had a special spiritual link with God and a responsibility to govern other political authorities. Hierocratic arguments limit the authority of secular and national forms of government and thus conflict with medieval imperial and monarchical theories of government. As well as emphasizing the ultimate authority of the pope, hierocratic arguments conceive of a particular kind of ordered Christian society, united and governed by a universal Christian church. In the history of political thought, hierocratic arguments have acted as a catalyst in the development of theories of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and rights. Key hierocratic writers include Pope Gregory VII (c. 1020/1025–1085 CE), Hostiensis (1200–1271 CE), Augustinus Triumphus (c. 1270–1328 CE), and Giles of Rome (c. 1243–1316 CE).

Hierocratic Literature: Groupings of Hierocratic Writers

Papal Theorists

Early hierocratic argumentation centered around the "two swords" theory, a dualistic theory of sovereignty developed by extended glossing of a slight passage in the Gospel of Luke. The theory attempted to balance the sword of spiritual authority with the sword of temporal power. Variations of the two

swords doctrine either handed one sword to papal government and one to secular princes (a dualist position), or tried to hand ultimate control for both swords into the hands of either the pope or a secular prince (a universalist position).

The popes themselves were key originators of two swords literature, with the hierocratic position being successively clarified by popes Gregory the Great (c. 540–604 CE), Gregory VII, and Boniface VIII (c. 1235–1303 CE). Papal bulls and works were amplified by papal theorists such as Anselm (c. 1033–1109 CE) and the canonists. Such literature rejected the dualist position that God had given a temporal sword to lay rulers and a spiritual sword to the papacy. For example, the Decretalist Tancred (1185–1235 CE) argued that the two swords had both been left to the Apostle Peter and his successors the popes, leaving the papacy with the power to confirm, crown, consecrate, judge, and depose of the emperor.

Canonists

Medieval canonists developed a juristic science out of the law of the church and thus produced hierocratic arguments based on the actual practice of the church and the papacy. Canonists, such as Rufinus (c. 1150–c. 1190 CE), argued that the pope exercised supreme and undivided jurisdiction over the universal church. This assertion of judicial authority was a key means of securing papal political authority.

Bernold of Constance (c. 1054–1100 CE) underlined the authority of the pope not only to apply old church law but to make new papal legislation—provided such legislation was not contrary to reason or biblical and apostolic authority. This echoed Pope Gregory VIII's belief expressed in his *Dictatus papae* (Papal Claims; 1075 CE) that only the pope has the right to make new law in accordance with the needs of the times.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries CE, the papal *curia* (papal court) became the supreme body for judicial appeals, with judicial functions being delegated to bishops. Pope Gregory IX (?–1241 CE) issued the *Decretales* (Decretals; 1234 CE) as a comprehensive canon law handbook, in which the hearing of appeals is emphasized as an important demonstration of papal judicial supremacy. In cases of major importance and for certain important institutions, the papal court was in fact the court of first instance in any judicial dispute, a position justified by the canonist Huguccio (Hugh of Pisa; ?–1210 CE) as reflecting the right of the Holy Roman Church to judge all. Using the terminology of Roman law, Huguccio argued that the pope had a jurisdiction by right to act as the universal ordinary who can act as though there are no intermediaries. Gratian's *Decretum* (early twelfth century CE) describes the pope as "lord of the decrees," able to make and abolish law and extend privileges and dispensations.

The Publicists

The papal publicists approached the problems of public law, sovereignty, and office from the perspective of the pontificate. As a group of writers, the publicists are particularly prevalent in the period 1250 to 1350 and while sharing a technical vocabulary with canonist lawyers, they also ranged more widely in their political theory. The works of papal publicists such as Augustinus Triumphus, Giles of Rome and his pupil James of Viterbo (c. 1260–1307 CE), and Alvarus Pelagius (c. 1280–1352 CE) are discussed more fully later in the entry.

The Historical Context

The Political Context (1): Papal–Imperial Conflict

The rise of national monarchies posed a strong challenge to papal supremacy, particularly because medieval ideas of secular kingship redeployed and subverted many of the hierocratic arguments used to support papal monarchy. Thus national kings became a competitor for the role of representing Christ's vicariate on earth.

In the eleventh century Investiture Controversy, the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV (1050–1106 CE) struggled with Pope Gregory VII over the control of church appointments within his empire. Gregory excommunicated Henry and withdrew his papal support for his investiture, provoking military conflict between imperial and papal forces. The emperor's successor, Henry V (1081–1125 CE), was received back into spiritual communion by the papacy only after renouncing some of his investiture rights over church officials at the Concordat of Worms (1122 CE). The concordat recognized the right of the emperor to invest bishops with secular but not spiritual authority.

The tense political competition between secular monarchies and the popes in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries CE produced a considerable body of hierocratic and anti-hierocratic political literature. The arguments between Philip IV of France (1285–1314 CE) and Boniface VIII over papal interference in national affairs resulted not only in the pope's imprisonment by the king, but also political works, for example by Dante (c. 1265–1321 CE), questioning the hierocratic position. An extreme exponent of papal supremacy, Boniface VIII issued the *Unam Sanctam* (Papal Bull on Primacy) in 1302, which declared that it was essential for salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman pontiff. A centralizing figure, Philip IV wished to tax the clergy within his kingdom. Pope Boniface VIII explicitly forbade the taxation, justifying his authority by the placing of the pope over kings and kingdoms by God.

The Great Schism (1378–1413 CE) saw two rival popes elected: one based in Avignon, the other in Rome. Each was supported by different secular powers, and the existence of rival papal powers challenged the abstract theorizing about a universal church contained within papal hierocratic theory.

The Political Context (2): Conciliarism

The second profound political challenge to the papacy's political role came from the conciliarist movement. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries CE, Catholic reformers argued that the community of the Christian faithful should be represented by a council of Christians rather than be headed by the pope. According to the conciliarist account of early Christianity, the Apostles governed the church as a council and Peter was not specially selected as the vicar of Christ. This represented a considerable theoretical challenge to the supreme sovereignty of the pope in spiritual and temporal affairs.

The Foundations of Hierocratic Thought

Platonic Political Thought

Platonic realism ascribes a real existence to abstract universals, positing that although sensory contact with universals is not possible, they nonetheless still exist in an ideal form. When applied to a Christian context this means that the Christian community exists, in a realm independent of time and space, as an abstract universal that is not dependent on the material existence of actual individual Christian believers. The political ramifications of this metaphysical position explain the theoretical discounting of the individual within early medieval hierocratic political theory.

Pauline Political Thought

In his writings such as the *Letters to the Corinthians* (c. mid–first century CE), Paul made an analogy between the undivided human body of Christ and the universality of the Christian Church. The church represents the body of Christ, composed of individual believers governed by the headship of Christ. The church is one, and no part can function separately. In hierocratic theory, the pope continues the headship of Christ over the body of the church.

Political Augustinianism

Augustine's major political work, the *City of God* (413–427 CE), describes two cities: one heavenly and one earthly. The earthly city is motivated by self-interest, whereas the heavenly city is a community of true believers. Although Augustine was very clear that the City of God could not be identified with any human institution and that the church contained elements from both the earthly and the heavenly cities, later Augustinian theory used the idea of a kingdom of God to justify the belief in an *ecclesia* (universal church) uniting all Christians into one spiritual community. Augustinian thought lends itself for use in absolutist political theory and was quickly implemented into descriptions of the absolutist power of papal monarchy.

Major Themes of Hierocratic Theory

The Petrine Commission and the Papal-Divine Link

According to the Petrine theory accepted by the majority of orthodox papal theorists, the pope stands as the successor to the Apostle Peter, whom they argue was divinely ordained as the head of the early Christian church in Rome after Christ's death. Biblical authority for this was taken from the Gospel of Matthew, where Peter is described as the rock upon which the church will be built. One

passage describes the keys of heaven being given to Peter, so that whoever he binds or loosens upon earth will be treated the same way in heaven. The text was interpreted by later papal theorists, such as Augustinus Triumphus, as demonstrating the universal, semi-divine and comprehensive power given to Peter and inherited by the popes. The church represents a spiritual community of belief, which, in the same way that Christ assumed a human form, requires a visible earthly representation in the form of the papacy.

Papal Infallibility

The Middle Ages sees the beginnings of a doctrine of papal infallibility, which is the idea that the pope is incapable of error when expressing doctrinal positions. The canonist Terreni (c. 1260–1342 CE) included a discourse on papal infallibility in his commentary on Gratian's *Decretum* (c. 1336–1339 CE). Terreni argued that the church possessed two keys: one of knowledge and one of power. The exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction united those two keys, and the doctrine of papal infallibility is recognition of the immutability of doctrine produced by authorities in possession of those two keys.

Church Hierarchy

Bonaventure (1221–1274 CE) defined the pope as having a threefold plenitude of power over the universal church. First, only the pope alone has supreme power over the church conferred by Christ. Second, the pope holds this authority in all churches, not just his own Holy See. Third, it is only from the pope that authority flows to inferior clergy in the church. Such a hierocratic position denies the right of mendicant priests to administer sacraments independently of the ecclesiastical structure. According to hierocratic arguments, the power to remit sins via the sacrament of penance is a power that flows directly from Christ to the pope and is then transmitted downward to his bishops and his priests—a strong curtailment on decentralized church sovereignty.

Hierocratic Historical Theory

Hierocratic arguments make frequent reference to ancient biblical history in order to bolster their position, for example, by interpreting the Jewish kings and prophets of the Old Testament as pre-Christian popes. Abraham carried out the same function as the pope, leading the children of Israel in the same way that the pope leads the Christian congregation of the faithful.

The Universal Church and the Roman Law of Corporations

The *ecclesia* (universal church) in hierocratic theory is the universal body of Christian believers and thus encompasses both clergy and laity. Papal theorists frequently refer to this body as the congregation of the faithful. For hierocrats, the church is the only possible political body and it represents the whole spiritual and civil body of Christians.

Hierocratic explanations of the universalism of Christian society make use of the Roman law theory of corporations, which dealt with associations of persons in public and private law. The church embraces the whole of a hierarchy of interdependent lesser corporations. Both the head and the members of a corporation have rights and duties—protected by doctrines of counsel, consent and reparation—and the corporation as a whole has a juridical personality. Such corporative attitudes are often expressed in hierocratic literature by organic metaphors, with, for example, the pope as the head of the church body.

Church–State Relations

The crucial practical issue for hierocratic theory is the relationship between the temporal and spiritual powers. The medieval supernatural sanctification of kingship through the ceremony of consecration gave the papacy a political tool, particularly in relation to the crowning of the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire. In crowning the emperors, papal theorists felt that the popes were actually constituting imperial power and creating papal defenders.

Historiographical Approaches to Hierocratic Theory

Hierocracy and Ascending and Descending Political Power

The Austrian-English medieval historian Walter Ullmann conceptualized the hierocratic and anti-hierocratic debates of the late Middle Ages in terms

of ascending and descending views of political power. On this model, hierocratic arguments represent a descending view of power in which sovereignty is imposed down a hierarchy from pope to laity. Ultimate power is held by God, and it is transmitted downward from his vicegerent on earth on the basis of faith rather than consent. From Ullmann's perspective, until the hierocratic framework was challenged by anti-hierocratic writers like Ockham, Marsilius of Padua, and Dante, there was no possibility of an ascending model of political power based on popular sovereignty. At the same time, Ullmann also argued that medieval political thought contained lingering remnants of populist republican political thinking, which were bolstered by the underlying contractualism of feudalism. This combination of popular will and feudal political thinking explain the ready acceptance of Aristotelian naturalism and the flourishing of anti-hierocratic political thought in the late medieval period.

The English historian Francis Oakley criticizes Ullmann's model for being too rigid. Oakley suggests that Ullmann is forced to overemphasize the influence of Aristotelian naturalism, because his model requires some kind of innovatory factor to explain the shift away from descending theocratic political thought and the late medieval return to the populist-ascending theme. For Oakley, many medieval writers are less purely theocratic or purely populist in their orientation. Thus the papalist James of Viterbo (c. 1255–1308 CE) accepted both the naturalist Aristotelian state (commonly an anti-hierocratic position) and the supremacy of spiritual power over the temporal in order for nature to be perfected (a hierocratic position).

Hierocratic Arguments and Theories of Sovereignty

The British historian of political thought M. J. Wilks categorizes the papal hierocrats Augustinus Triumphus and Giles of Rome as theorists of sovereignty, who argue that the lay ruler has no intrinsic power but develops it by the grant of the pope and that, accordingly, the papacy is the exclusive source of temporal authority. By contrast the German historian W. Kölmel does not interpret papal hierocratic theory as containing such a doctrine of absolute papal sovereignty. Instead, according to Kölmel, the pope confirms temporal rulers in the use of their powers and that temporal authority comes to a secular ruler from the human law and those over whom he rules.

The Canadian historian W. D. McCready takes a compromise position that the papal publicists recognized the intrinsic value of temporal power but accorded it a limited sphere of authority. McCready identifies two incompatible influences within the work of the papal apologists: an Aristotelian acceptance that society and civil government are the inevitable result of man's sociability versus a spiritualized conception of the political in which temporal power is completely absorbed into the supernatural via the pope's sovereignty. McCready argues that rather than conferring complete power to the pope, the papal hierocrats attributed to the pope a plenitude, or fullness, of power.

Early Medieval Hierocratic Theories of Kingship

Early medieval theorizing about kingship tackled the key question of the relationship between monarchical and papal authority and the extent to which ecclesiastical rule should have precedence over secular authority.

Gregory the Great (c. 540–604 CE)

In his *The Book of the Pastoral Rule* (c. 590 CE), Gregory emphasized the tutelary role of the emperor in Constantinople as indispensable to Christendom's development. The emperor was charged with a supervisory role over the church, and Gregory aimed for an intimate union between the papal sovereign and the emperor. By encouraging the emperor to be more Christian, Gregory minimized the boundaries between the two forms of authority and suggested their possible alliance.

Pope Gregory VII (c. 1020/1025–1085 CE)

By contrast, Hildebrand (Pope Gregory VII) argued for ultimate papal authority over the emperor, arguing that he could both make and depose kings and denying the emperor's right to choose his own bishops. In turn, the emperor argued that the papacy's temporal authority derived from secular rulers.

Gregory VII developed Augustine's metaphor of the two cities to explain the difference in origin and purpose of ecclesiastical institutions as opposed to secular ones. Because secular government is ordained by God as a remedy for man's inherent sinfulness, secular princes cannot be allowed to be the final judges in their own cases. The papacy is thus a divine provision to ensure that justice is truly universal. Even the Holy Roman Emperor is subject to justice, and to not recognize this is sinful pride.

Innocent IV (Papal Reign 1243–1254 CE)

Commonly seen as an extreme exponent of papal supremacy and hierocratic arguments, Innocent IV asserted the papal prerogative power in Christendom. Innocent IV went so far as to claim that as vicar of Christ, the pope could elect a monarch to fill any vacant kingdom within Christendom.

Late Medieval Hierocratic Philosophy

Hostiensis (Henry of Segusio; 1200–1271 CE)

Hostiensis provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of medieval hierocratic thought. At the same time, the English historian J. A. Watt has identified an ambiguity in Hostiensis's writings over the power relations between secular and religious authorities. Hostiensis is a key developer of the phrase *papal plenitudo potestatis* (the papal remit of power), which implies both the totality of the papal jurisdiction and the hierarchical relationship between lesser ecclesiastical jurisdictions and the papacy. However, canonist thought as a whole also contained a clear theme of the distinction between secular and temporal power, and both dualist and monist positions can be found in Hostiensis's writings.

Hostiensis draws on earlier hierocratic sources and explores familiar themes such as the unity of Christian society and the temporal kingly role of the pope over Christendom as vicar of Christ. What Hostiensis adds in particular is detailed canonist examples of how spiritual power operates in practice in relation to temporal power. For example, Hostiensis provides an analysis of when spiritual power can legitimize in the temporal sphere. Hostiensis disagreed with the dualistic position that the pope legitimizes in the spiritual order and the emperor in the temporal, arguing instead that only the pope had the power to legitimize in the domain of marriage and heirship. Confusingly, this sole papal right of true legitimization was balanced against an immediate imperial jurisdiction in property matters, such as hereditary succession. Hostiensis developed a distinction between public and private interests and set out a principle that the pope could not intervene in temporal affairs to the prejudice of another party.

Augustinus Triumphus (1243–1328 CE)

A member of the Augustinian order, Augustinus Triumphus wrote his major political work *Summa de potestate ecclesiastica* (Summa on Ecclesiastical Power; 1326 CE) in order to defend papal supremacy. According to Augustinus Triumphus, the pope is the human representation of Christ and the immaterial church. The pope personifies multiple entities, being simultaneously the image of God, the City of God on earth, Christ, and the universal church. Drawing on the text in the Gospel of Matthew describing the keys of heaven being given to the Apostle Peter, Augustinus Triumphus emphasized that the pope's actions during his vicariate bind in heaven as well as on earth and that he therefore exercises a divine will. The pope is therefore a ruler in heaven, on earth, and in hell. Souls in purgatory can be moved at the pope's command; he therefore holds immense spiritual power over individual Christians.

By emphasizing the mixed human-divine nature of papal power, Augustinus Triumphus also developed a distinction between the office of pope and the human officeholder. The pope wields his power by virtue of his office, rather than as a result of his personal ethical and religious characteristics. It is the office of pope that achieves a mystical union between God and church, and thus the pope personally is not to be honored more than the saints and angels.

Alvarus Pelagius (c. 1280–1352 CE)

Drawing on arguments from Hostiensis, James of Viterbo, and Augustinus Triumphus, Alvarus Pelagius set out a strongly papalist view in his *De planctu ecclesiae* (1330–1340 CE), but it was a view marked by conflicting and contradictory

viewpoints. Alvarus's position as a Thomist and a supporter of episcopal autonomy introduced potentially incompatible concerns into his hierocratic arguments.

Alvarus continued an earlier hierocratic theme that the hierocratic system of government is based on belief. Acceptance of the pope's command and his status as an infallible representative of the divine is an act of faith. Alvarus's pope is more than a mere man, but Alvarus uses a Thomist distinction between "potency" and "act" to describe the pope's real power. By virtue of the Petrine commission, the pope has potential power over temporal authority; however, in actuality this is only a latent power.

Aegidius Romanus (Giles of Rome; c. 1250–1316 CE)

A theologian of the Order of Augustinian Hermits, Giles of Rome probably studied under Aquinas in Paris in the 1270s and became an established Aristotelian scholar. Despite this Aristotelian background, Giles's major hierocratic work, *On Ecclesiastical Power* (c. 1302 CE), takes an extreme hierocratic position that all legitimate power derives from the pope, who then delegates certain temporal power to earthly rulers. Giles presents the pope in a quantitative role, ordering all people and things in the hierarchy beneath him according to their number, weight, and measure. For Giles, the Petrine doctrine shows a clear divine handing of office to the papacy, and there is no matching evidence to show that any lay ruler has ever been similarly chosen by God. Therefore, temporal power must be derived from Peter's successors in Rome. However, papal intrusion into temporal affairs should be so exceptional that Giles calls it the equivalent of a miracle. This delegation of legitimacy also extends to property rights, which are not natural but formed by human agreement and remotely authenticated by papal power. The pope's directives are universally binding and form the common law of the universal Christian society.

In contrast, in his work *On the Abdication of the Pope* (1297–1298), which argues for the legitimacy of the abdication of Boniface VIII's predecessor, Giles emphasizes that although the papacy is a divinely ordained office, any particular pope is only elected by the human intention of the cardinals. Although there is no authority superior to the pope to depose him from office (following the standard hierocratic position that the pope has no superior on earth and can only be judged by God), any individual pope can reverse the process of consent to his election by the cardinals and abdicate from the papacy. Because any individual pope can fail practically in his role, the universal church remains the true source of faith and jurisdiction. Thus, under natural law, in most circumstances the lay ruler has a normal right to rule without papal interference.

James of Viterbo (c. 1255–1308 CE)

Written at the height of the conflict between Philip IV of France and Pope Boniface VIII, *On Christian Government* (1301–1302 CE) contains arguments similar to those of Giles of Rome. James rejects any idea of dualism, insisting that the pope wields both temporal and spiritual swords of authority. However, James gives a greater preeminence to the church in his hierocratic arguments than does Giles of Rome, arguing that Christ has given priestly and royal, spiritual and temporal power to the church but that the whole is held by the pope.

The Weakening of Hierocratic Arguments: 1200–1400 CE

Opposition to Hierocratic Theory (1): The French Publicists

John of Paris (c. 1255–1306 CE) developed aspects of the theory of corporations to place constitutional limits on papal power. John equated the relationship between the pope and the church with that between a bishop and his chapter, placing the pope under the same constraints of the corporative doctrines of counsel, consent, and representation. In addition, John argued from Aquinas's theory of mixed constitutions that there should be a wider participation in ecclesiastical government, with ecclesiastical elections choosing those who should serve under the pope.

Opposition to Hierocratic Theory (2): The Aristotelian Renaissance

The rediscovery of Aristotelian political theory in the thirteenth century CE posed a considerable

challenge to hierocratic arguments, as Aristotle argued that government and law were natural features of man's sociability rather than divinely given institutions. The Aristotelian view of property, for example, was that it was a preexisting natural right. This was in contrast to the hierocratic position that property rights are man-made agreements that need to be sanctioned by the church for validity.

Opposition to Hierocratic Theory (3): Theories of Popular Sovereignty

Marsilius of Padua (c. 1275–c. 1342 CE) undermined the universalism of the papacy and questioned its hierocratic authority by denying the whole theory behind the Petrine commission. In *The Defender of Peace* (1324 CE), Marsilius asserted that papal authority was not given by God via Peter but, like any other office, was transmitted by the decision and will of men. The papacy, therefore, like civil forms of government, relied upon popular sovereignty. Contemporary civil strife was in Marsilius's view caused by the papacy's illegitimate assumption of a universal jurisdiction. Such anti-hierocratic positions were to be pursued more fully in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as the Reformation challenged both the practical reality and theoretical basis for papal hierocratic government.

Epilogue: Hierocracy in Modern Political Theory

Weber

The idea of hierocracy continues to be used in modern political and sociological theory in order to understand church-state relations, and sociologists have drawn upon medieval history in order to develop typologies of religious and secular power. In his typology of church-state power relations, Max Weber described a hierocracy as a rationally and bureaucratically streamlined religious and clerical power, exhibiting the following four characteristics: (1) a professional priesthood, (2) with a rationalized body of doctrine, (3) organized bureaucratically into an institution withdrawn from the secular world, and (4) claiming universal dominance.

Weber used the term *caesaropapism* to explain the phenomenon of religious authority being subordinated to the political. Weber distinguished hierocracy (the domination of priests over the political) from caesaropapism (the complete domination of the priesthood by a secular ruler) and made this one of his fundamental dualisms of Western culture. For Weber, independent vertically organized religious hierocracies in the West—alongside feudal aristocracy and the bourgeoisie—have been an important challenge to caesaropapist political practices.

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See also Aristotle; Augustinianism; Divine Right of Kings; Feudalism; Kingship; Sovereignty; State

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Hindu Political Thought

The science of politics *(arthaśāstra)* has very early roots in classical India. With its theories, analyses, and classifications, it tried to show the most effective way for a king to arrange his administration, to make his state flourish, and to expand it if possible. Its aims were thus practical; unlike in Western antiquity, philosophical utopias were not included in the political theory of classical India. This entry first examines the origins of statehood in India and then describes the development of political science in this period, as described in the *Kauṭilīyārthaśāstra* (KAŚ).

In ancient India, the science of politics was known under several Sanskrit names derived from its different aspects: *artha* "profit, goal, usefulness" (*arthaśāstra* "the science of artha"); *nīti* "leading, administration" (*nītiśāstra*); *daṇḍa,* originally a "stick," then the "stick for guiding an elephant (*ankus*)," also "punishment, administration of punishment, administration" (*daṇḍanīti*); and rāja(n) "king" (*rājanīti* "the conduct of the king" and *rājadharma* "the duties of the king," rarely *rājaśāstra*). In religious thought, politics were connected with the three aims of life (*trivarga*): *kāma* (enjoyment), *artha* (profit), and *dharma* (religion).

The Roots of Statehood

In the Vedic period (c. 1500–500 BCE), the society consisted of small nomadic tribes, who wandered around with their cows and horses, fighting and robbing other tribes. Their society had a simple order, mainly concentrated on the organization of warfare. This tradition continued in later tribal oligarchies (the *gaṇas* or *saṁghas*), although they were no longer nomadic, but ruled their own territory. These were not republics in the modern sense, although the word is often used of them. In both cases, the so-called king (*rājan*) was mainly a war leader, elected by the male members of the tribe. For practical matters there was also a council of elders (*sabhā*). Youngsters often formed separate sodalities more or less uncontrolled by the tribe. This form of government continued into the early centuries CE in peripheral areas.

The settled state developed only with urbanization, which took place around 500 BCE in the Gangetic plain. The society now became more organized, with separate professions, trades, and guilds, and also with more control and administration. This also led to established kingship and succession through inheritance. Towns developed forms of more or less autonomous local government. The following period of the regional *janapada* kingdoms ended in the late fourth century with the rise of the first imperial dynasty, the Mauryas. In later history, the periods of strong central power (such as the Guptas in the fourth and fifth centuries) and of numerous petty states

involved in more or less continuous warfare with each other alternated until the arrival of Islam in the Middle Ages.

Candragupta Maurya created the first large empire in India. It was enlarged by his son, and his grandson Aśoka is the first real personality in Indian history with his royal edicts or proclamations carved on pillars and rocks in different parts of his wide empire. In fact, it seems that this was the first appearance of writing in India. The Mauryan period was the time of strong economic and technological advancement. The merchants in towns introduced coinage, while the countryside maintained a barter economy.

It has been suggested that when building an empire, the Mauryas were influenced by the model of Achaemenid Persia or Alexander the Great. In any case, the idea of a universal emperor (*cakravartin*) became an acknowledged ideal in Indian political thought. The development of the royal title illustrates this. The Mauryas were still content with the traditional *rāja(n)* "king," but a few centuries later, the Persian titles "the great king" (*mahārāja*) and "the king of kings" (*rājātirāja*) had become common, and in the Middle Ages, every petty ruler was calling himself the great king. The mere *rāja* was finally reduced to a kind of honorific title.

Theories of the Origin of Statehood

In ancient Indian opinion, as it is transmitted in texts, the existence of the king as the head of the state was absolutely necessary; otherwise, there would be the condition of fish: The stronger eat the weaker (this is the so-called *matsya-nyāya* "the maxim of fish"). There were two competing theories about the origin of kingship: divine origin (the Hindu view) or social contract (Buddhist and Jaina view). In the first theory, the argument was religious. The king was the earthly representant of Indra, the king of gods, representing the eternal order of things. Various elaborate rituals defined his status and esteem. He was an absolute ruler but also responsible for the welfare and happiness of his subjects. In principle, he was a Kṣatriya by birth, but in fact many dynasties originated from some other class and were subsequently given a Kṣatriya status.

The second theory constructed a primeval golden age, when everyone lived in peace and happiness because nature freely produced food and other necessaries. But as time went on, conditions worsened, people had to work for their living and to compete with each other, and soon violence and sin spread. To have a settled basis for life, they arranged a great meeting and elected the best man as their king to rule them, to make laws, and to settle disputes.

Both theories thus had a clear foundation for the duties of the king. However, the developing science of politics was more focused on the might and success of the king than in his duties and the welfare of his subjects.

Political Science

In classical antiquity, as well as in China, the theory of politics was closely connected with the study of history. History was rather neglected in classical India, but politics developed early as an independent subject. However, the beginnings of the formal science of politics in India are lost. Its early roots are only known from the references in the KAŚ, which names a number of lost predecessors (especially Bṛhaspati and Uśanas). The fundamental work of political theory is thus the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya (or Kauṭalya), the KAŚ. Its date is a long-disputed problem. The author is traditionally identified with the minister of Candragupta Maurya (late fourth century BCE), also known as Cāṇakya or Viṣṇugupta, but the text is unlikely to have come from the Maurya Empire. Instead of one large empire, the text supposes a smaller kingdom in the middle of others. In this form, the text probably hails from the period after the fall of the Mauryas (early second century BCE), although some parts of it may originally come from the Maurya period. The whole was probably composed in the early centuries CE. It is quoted in several works of the first millennium; by then, it was already commonly regarded as the most authoritative work on politics.

An idea of the early Mauryan society is found in the Greek fragments of Megasthenes, who visited the Maurya capital as the envoy of Seleucus at the end of the fourth century BCE. His account contains a description of the Mauryan government, with its various departments and officials, including the local government of towns. Additional information is obtained from the

edicts of Aśoka. Here the king explains the shock he experienced early in his reign when he saw the cruelty of the war of conquest. He proclaims that from now on, he will only make conquests through righteousness (*dhamma*). To achieve this, he appointed special dhamma officials in his empire and sent envoys to explain his ideas to the neighboring kings. He obtained an important position in Buddhist legends as a royal saint, but his system of government died with him.

Later works on politics did not contribute much; the KAŚ remained the standard text. Among the later works, the most popular was Kāmandaki's compact *Nītisāra* "The Essence of Nīti" (perhaps eighth century CE), a metrical summary that almost superseded the much longer KAŚ. The material in this work is rearranged in 20 chapters, omitting some of the themes of the KAŚ and adding some new ones. The author's ambitions seem also to be literary rather than practical. Somadevasūri's *Nītivākyāmṛta* "The Nectar of Nīti Sayings" (tenth century) leans heavily on the KAŚ (without naming it), but it also has Jaina moralistic tendencies. He is less practical than the KAŚ and omits many details, but he loves proverbs and similes. Other important works are King Bhoja's *Yuktikalpataru* "The World-Tree of Practical Methods" and Kṣemendra's *Nītikalpataru* "The World-Tree of Nīti" (both eleventh century). Some Purāṇa texts such as the *Agnipurāṇa* and the *Garuḍapurāṇa* contain a nīti section, which is also often included in the Nibandhas or legal digests.

During the Islamic period, the interest in political science diminished, although there are some modern (nineteenth-century) works such as *Śukranīti* and Vaiśampāyana's *Nītiprakāśikā*. In the Middle Ages, even the KAŚ was almost forgotten. It was presumed to be lost, until one manuscript was found in South India and promptly published in 1909. Later on, some further manuscripts and fragments of four old commentaries were found. There are also manuals of the sports and pastimes of the king (e.g., King Someśvara's *Mānasollāsa*).

There is another, quite different tradition of teaching the science of politics. The famous collection of narratives, the *Pañcatantra,* of which numerous critical revisions and translations exist (including medieval versions in Near Eastern and European languages), professes to be a textbook of politics. In the frame story, three lazy and stupid princes have had the usual royal education but have not profited by it at all. Then the wise Viṣṇuśarman promises the king to teach them everything and does this with the means of educational fables and narratives. As the name, "The Five Books," indicates, the stories are divided into five books titled "The Loss of Friends (or Causing Dissensions Among Allies)," "The Gaining of Friends," "War and Peace," "Losing What Was Gained," and "Hasty Actions." Each book has a frame story in which the actors tell a number of subordinate stories to illustrate their ideas of wise politics. The *Hitopadeśa* "Useful Advice," by Nārāyaṇa, is another version of the same.

In addition, there are many short poems and maxims dealing with worldly wisdom and politics. There are several collections of them, which often go under the name of Cāṇakya. A series of 100 poems on nīti was composed by the poet Bhartṛhari in the seventh century, and many were also included in the anthologies of "good sayings" (*subhāṣita*).

Principles of Politics According to the Arthaśāstra

The *Arthaśāstra* is presented as a collection of advice for the king, divided into 15 long chapters or books. All is written in the compact sūtra style. The first book contains a general introduction and discusses the selection of high officials, the arrangement of the secret service, and the education of princes. The second introduces the various departments of administration, their heads, and their tasks and duties. The third book discusses civil justice, and the fourth covers criminal justice (called "the removal of thorns"). The fifth briefly explains some aspects of dealing with emergencies and the sixth, also brief, of wise rule and the ideal state. The seventh explains the six methods of policy, while the eighth takes up some errors and difficulties in relation to these methods. The next five books are devoted to warfare. The ninth describes the preparations for war, the various troops, and the effective use of them; the tenth, the actual battle; and the eleventh, the ways of dealing with oligarchies. The twelfth book gives advice to the king who is weaker than his opponent, and the thirteenth discusses the besieging of fortified towns

and the rule of the conquered territory. The fourteenth is the so-called secret doctrine and is mainly magical in content, and the last book forms a sort of summary of the others.

In many respects, the KAŚ is pragmatic in the extreme. The king should arrange everything to support his rule as effectively as possible. In doing this, he should not let any moral considerations interfere. What is good for the king is also good for the state. And what was good for the king was power and conquest, the continuous striving for expansion, ultimately leading to the universal emperorship. Indeed, the repeated term for the ideal king is *vijigīṣu* "the one desirous of victory or conquest." But this was not an easy task. The daily routine for the king is defined in detail in KAŚ 1, which leaves him hardly any free time. Four hours were considered sufficient for resting. In theory, every citizen had the right to appeal to the king, and the daily receptions were important occasions. Although the king had a minister, a general, and a council of advisers to help him, he was supposed to supervise everything himself. Theoretically, he was simultaneously the head of administration, the highest judge, and the commander in chief. To be safe, the king must never trust anybody.

The idea of the divine origin of kingship and the divinity of the king was useful because of its propaganda value. Thus the king was called a god (*deva*), and the text suggests various ruses to give his subjects the impression that the king has supernatural powers. However, in India the idea never gained the same dimensions as in the Hellenistic monarchies and China. It emphasized his absolute power rather than any real divinity, and there was usually no formal cult of the king as god. The author of the KAŚ was obviously a Brahman and his ideal kingdom was one that wholly supported the traditional class hierarchy and upheld the Brahmanical religion, but at the same time the king was also entitled to use religion—even religious fraud—in politics.

Different types of classifications are typical of classical Indian scholarship. Thus, KAŚ 6 reveals the definition of the seven foundations (*prakṛti*) of the state: the king, minister, land, fort (or fortified capital), treasury, army, and ally. An ideal state consisted of a directly governed (and strictly controlled) central area, whereas the more distant parts, especially the forest regions, were often ruled by vassal princes. The state also controlled the economy, and several key industries were state monopolies (e.g., forest products, mines, pearl fisheries, the salt industry, and the manufacture of weapons). These were often run using forced labor.

The vassals could be royal princes, nominated governors, receivers of a donation, or even former independent rulers of a conquered territory. The position was often hereditary, and a vassal had his own administration and army, although he was obliged to pay taxes, send troops for military expeditions, and participate in the state ceremonies arranged by his overlord. There was always the danger of mighty vassals turning rebellious. To avoid this, they were controlled through spies, and often their children were invited to be educated at court. They were hostages, true, but the idea was also to develop ties of loyalty and friendship between the future king and his vassals. Especially in the second half of the first millennium CE, vassalage developed into a system that much resembled the contemporaneous European feudalism.

The methods of foreign policy were also carefully classified (KAŚ 7). Peace is only one of six possible conditions or methods (*guṇas* or collectively *ṣāḍguṇya*) of politics—and it is recommended only when the enemy is clearly stronger. The other five methods are war, neutrality, readiness for march, alliance, and the dual state, where peace is made with one opponent in order to carry on war with another. A basis for foreign politics is the so-called maṇḍala or circle theory. The immediate neighbors of the king were his natural enemies, and if he was strong enough, he should strive to conquer these enemies. The kings living beyond these enemies were his natural allies, and those beyond these allies were the natural allies of the enemy, and so on. When all went well—the king conquered his enemy in collaboration with his ally, and the enemy kingdom was divided between the victors—the situation was rearranged: The former natural ally became the new natural enemy.

Conquest was thus one of the major aims of the king. Detailed advice is given on how to rule the conquered country and how to win over the population. It was possible that the former king retained his position as a vassal. The ultimate goal of the victorious king was to become a *cakravartin* "universal emperor."

Foreign relations were conducted with the help of envoys as there were no standing embassies. Brahmans and monks were preferred as envoys because their religious authority gave them immunity. This was important, as the envoys were also used for intelligence and the KAŚ recommends the collaboration of envoys and spies. In a society where the kings were usually polygamists, marriages were an important method for confirming political alliances. The harem was often a nest of intrigue, and strict control was recommended. Among the wives, one usually had the status of the head queen. Women normally had no share in male politics, although history records a few dowager queens ruling in the name of their minor sons.

Another important topic in the KAŚ is the selection of high officials. Various tests of their ability, and especially of their loyalty, are recommended. The most capable are recommended for office, but in practice the positions of ministers, counselors, and provincial governors tended to become hereditary. The arrangement of the administration with its various departments is described in detail.

The royal council of advisers consisted—in theory, at least—of 7 to 37 members. The meetings were private. The council discussed matters, but the final decision always belonged to the king. In later times, there are cases where hereditary prime ministers were ruling, while the king remained only a symbol of power (as in Nepal in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). Classical poetry often mentions kings who spend all their time absorbed in amusements and harem intrigues, leaving the governing to the ministers. This is supported, to some extent, by epigraphic evidence.

The counselors had different areas of responsibility: the prime minister (*mahāmantrin*), the court priest (*purohita,* in Hindu states, while Buddhist and Jaina monarchs often included eminent monks in their council), the treasurer, the high collector of taxes, the high judge, the high secretary, and, of course, the commander in chief. These all had the status of minister (*mantrin*), but a number of high officials (*amātya* or *saciva*) were also members of the council (*pariṣad*).

The various state departments were headed by inspectors (*adhyakṣa*) who may also have been counselors. The departments of the royal lands and royal cattle, of state monopolies such as forest and forest products and mines, of royal spinning and weaving houses, the tax department and the treasury were important. Other inspectors were responsible for commerce, customs, goldsmiths, harbors, and seafaring. The preparation and retail of intoxicants, the gambling houses, and prostitution were also important and tightly controlled. To be fair, the KAŚ also includes the care of orphans, the sick, women, and old people among public duties. Especially in later periods, these tasks were often carried out by guilds and castes, who also looked after the quality of their crafts and tried to control prices. In all fields, the KAŚ goes into details, carefully explaining the organization of various crafts; the ideal plans for towns, villages, and fortifications and the best ways for maintaining them; the systems of weights and measures and their control; the examination of jewels, and so on.

The transfer of power often involves problems. In classical India, the king was usually succeeded by his eldest son, if he was capable of taking over. If he was a simpleton or physically disabled, a younger prince took his place. Much emphasis is put on the education of the crown prince and his brothers. The texts warn against dividing power, but an adult crown prince was often nominated as subordinate co-regent (*yuvarāja* "the young king"). In a large empire, he was often sent to govern some distant province to get practical experience and to be far from the court intrigues. If the prince lived in the capital, there was always the danger that he would try to hasten things and overthrow his father. But there were also cases where the old king voluntarily abdicated in favor of his son and became an ascetic or committed a ceremonial suicide. The latter custom seems to have its origins in the Dravidian South; the KAŚ does not mention it at all.

The authorities of political theory fully understood the importance of the economy. The royal treasury was one of the foundations of the state. Taxation was explained and justified as a quid pro quo for the protection offered by the king. Another theory saw all land as royal property and the farmers paying rent as tenants. Both in theory and in practice, the revenue from the land was the main form of public income. But according to the KAŚ, all forms of professional activity were taxed and strictly controlled by the state. Merchants paid duties for their goods on entering a town. The text suggests a sixth part as the proper tax for crops, a

tenth part for goods. A major part of the taxes were received in agricultural products and stored in public storehouses. The KAŚ gives detailed advice on how to arrange tax collecting in the most efficient way.

Usually the taxation was not very oppressive, but sometimes the continuous wars and the swelling court led to excessive taxation. Kāmandaki lists five dangers threatening the subjects: the officers, thieves, other rascals, the king's favorites, and the king's own greed. If the king protects his subjects from these, the king himself will be able to squeeze more profit out of them. Especially in later times, the custom of donating the income from certain areas to high officials (as salary) or to religious institutions (as charity) placed a heavy burden on the state economy because it was deprived of these sources of income. Such donations were recorded on copper plates, which have been preserved and form an important source of historical information. Especially in South India, large temples were important economic forces. Among public expenses, the maintaining of a strong army was one of the most important (and most expensive) items. The general maintaining of the administration took also a major share: The scale of wages was incredibly long. According to the KAŚ, high officials received thousands of times more than laborers and servants. Other public expenses included dams and irrigation works, building and maintaining roads, the running of state industries, and the often very high costs of the court and royal family.

Espionage was important, both in one's own country and in the enemy's. Officials and vassals were controlled and tested in many ways, both openly and secretly. Spies were enlisted from all strata of society—the KAŚ particularly mentions the usefulness of prostitutes and innkeepers in obtaining secret information, whereas the more pious were likely to speak freely to monks and priests. Cooks, barbers, actors, and musicians had their own uses. The main task of the spies was to get people to reveal rebellious thoughts before rebellion took place, but the spies were also testing public opinion and spreading propaganda for the king.

The methods of warfare were ruthless. They included assassination (also used to prevent war or rebellion), the poisoning of the earth and water, the spreading of diseases, and the destruction of harvests. Starvation, thirst, and fire guaranteed the success of sieges, although various siege machines and stratagems were also used. The forest tribes were employed in guerilla warfare. The army was divided into four branches: infantry, cavalry, chariots, and elephants. In early times, the chariots were the most important, but they were soon superseded by elephants. Although conquerors from Alexander to the Muslims soon learned how a well-trained cavalry could easily beat the elephants, Indian princes valued them highly until the coming of firearms.

The text defines three different types of conquest: The "pious conquest" reduces the enemy into vassalage without causing much damage, the "avaricious conquest" seeks for riches and territorial gain, and the "demoniac conquest" ends with total conquest and annexation. A partial pacifist such as Aśoka was a rare exception among monarchs.

A less scientific side of political theory is met in the fourteenth book of the KAŚ, which discusses the use of magic and witchcraft for political aims. Numerous recipes for potions for obtaining various results and their counter-measures are given. The book instructs readers how to destroy an enemy (causing death, blindness, various illnesses, etc.) and how to deceive people with apparent miracles. Some miracles were taken as true. Potions give invisibility, clear vision in darkness, and the ability to walk long distances or fast long periods of time without exhausting oneself.

The KAŚ has often been compared to *The Prince* by Niccolò Machiavelli. Both works indeed share concentration on the king and his interests. In the same way, they consider that the end justifies the means, which may thus be extremely unscrupulous. But Machiavelli was a historian, and his text abounds with instructive historical examples, whereas his Indian colleague almost completely ignores the teachings of history.

Idealistic Tendencies

Despite its often practical approach, the KAŚ is a theoretical work, defining the ideal king and the ideal structure of government as they should be according to the political theory. From inscriptional evidence, it becomes clear that the practice could be different and that there were also important local differences. At the same time, there was

also another type of an ideal model for kings, created in religious circles. The politicians, though often Brahmans, were definitely nonreligious, and the KAŚ often advises the king to make use of the religious feelings of his people, to emphasize his own divinity, to employ Brahmans and wandering monks as spies, and so on. It is no wonder, then, that the philosophical school of materialism, called *lokāyata* or *cārvāka,* had close ties with politics. The ancient sage Bṛhaspati was honored as the founder of both.

In opposition to the pragmatism of the political science, there was the idealistic Rājanīti or Rājadharma, explained in dharma works such as Manu or the *Mānavadharmaśāstra,* the great epic *Mahābhārata,* and others, more or less representing the ideas of religious Brahmans about the right conduct of kings. Much importance was laid on religion, on arranging great state rituals, on maintaining the traditional hierarchical order of the society, and on being liberal to Brahmans. It was said that the two highest classes, Brahmans and Kṣatriyas, must be allies in upholding the hierarchy (and thus maintaining the subordinate position of others). It also seems that usually these two classes held all the high offices between them. A classic example of the different approach is criminal justice: When other evidence fails, the KAŚ recommends torture, whereas the Dharmaśāstra suggests ordeals as the best method of ascertaining the truth.

According to the Rājanīti, the happiness of his subjects was one of the main duties of the king and he was held personally responsible if he failed in this. Some authorities even accepted the dethronement of a bad king. The existence of a king, however, was essential in the texts of dharma as well as of artha. When Somadevasūri claimed that a kingless state would be better than one ruled by a stupid king, he was just using rhetorical exaggeration to emphasize the importance of good education of the king.

There was also a set of knightly ideals somewhat similar to those of medieval Europe. This code of chivalry appears as early as the *Mahābhārata* (where it is also repeatedly violated), but especially in the Middle Ages, some Indian princes (such as the Rājpūts) strongly believed in these ideals and earnestly tried to turn them into reality. When the rules were followed, war turned into a sort of tournament between the opposing kings. Theoretically, the civilian population should not be touched by warfare, but there was no arranged maintenance and the army had to live off the land.

It was certainly hard work to be a king, but in compensation, the king was usually surrounded by great luxury. One result was that the court tended to grow until it became a serious burden to the treasury. The king relaxed in his harem. Other common recreational activities were hunting, drinking, and the game of dice. Many were also patrons of literature and art while others donated money to religious institutions.

Klaus Karttunen

See also Indian Political Thought

Further Readings

The standard edition-cum-translation of the KAŚ is by R. P. Kangle (3 vols., containing the text, English translation, and a study, 1960–1965, often reprinted). The earlier one by R. Shamasastry (1919 and reprints) is also much used. In the Penguin Classics volume by L. N. Rangarajan (1992), the text is rearranged according to themes. The *Pañcatantra* by Viṣṇuśarman and the *Hitopadeśa* by Nārāyaṇa are available in modern translations by Patrick Olivelle and Judit Törzsök, respectively, in the Clay Sanskrit Library series published by New York University Press.

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Historical Understanding

Historical understanding (*Verstehen*) has to do with grasping the intentional content attached to human actions. It is a distinctive approach to the human sciences, typically based on the idea that the meaningful nature of human action requires a distinct epistemology in the form of historical understanding. Philosophers who study historical understanding have generally focused on three interwoven but analytically distinctive concerns. The first concern is to articulate the ontological conditions for the possibility and grounds of historical understanding. The second is to clarify the epistemological nature of historical understanding itself: What does it mean to understand actions that took place in the past? The final concern is to specify the role of understanding in historical explanation: Does understanding have to be accompanied by additional explanatory operations in order to secure its empirical validity?

It is important to dispel two myths about historical understanding. The first myth is that it is just a method for the production of historical facts. The second is that it is an intuitive, quasi-mystical operation that resembles the work of an artist more than that of a scientist. These myths should be replaced with recognition of the philosophical content of historical understanding conceived as an analysis of what it means to base the human sciences on recognition of the meaningful character of human action.

Hermeneutics and History

In the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth, German philosophers drew on the rich, multifaceted traditions of German idealism and hermeneutics to discuss the philosophical foundations of the human sciences and their relationship to the natural sciences. These discussions produced some of the classical statements on historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey's work had a profound impact on approaches to the human sciences within the hermeneutic tradition. Max Weber's work became a starting point for many subsequent debates on the matter within the social sciences. What is more, the German discussions helped to inspire similar ones throughout Europe, including, by way of the Italian Benedetto Croce, the work of the British philosopher, R. G. Collingwood.

Wilhelm Dilthey

Given that historical understanding concerns the intentionality of human action, it is not surprising that discussions of its philosophical principles arose against the background of idealism and hermeneutics. The idealists stressed (albeit in different ways) the primacy of mind over matter in human existence and so attempted to understand that existence. Hermeneutics was preoccupied with questions of understanding externally given linguistic formations (mainly written texts but also spoken communication and even entire grammatical structures and literary genres) by grasping the mental content expressed within them.

Dilthey was the first major thinker in both the idealist and hermeneutic traditions to attempt a systematization of the theory of historical understanding. Dilthey anchors both the possibility and the necessity of historical understanding in ontological arguments. According to his ontology, human life differs from the rest of the natural world in that it consists of an inner world that gets expressed in outer manifestations such as gestures, words, music, poetry, churches, and universities. Understanding, he adds, is the process of grasping the inner content to which outer expressions refer back. It is only by such understanding, moreover, that humans are able to live, act, and communicate in a society. Understanding is a fundamental presupposition of individual and social life. This ontology leads Dilthey to define the human sciences in terms of historical understanding. He concludes that the human sciences, like human life as such, are about understanding expressions; they are about grasping the inner content of outer manifestations.

The process of understanding is important for Dilthey's epistemology. It leads him to raise a question that remains prominent in many later discussions of historical understanding: How can historical understanding be objectively valid? On what grounds can a mental process occurring within the subjective experience of the historian be recognized as a valid interpretation of a given historical phenomenon? Dilthey treats this question of objectivity as one not of methodology but of philosophy. He does not answer it by offering a procedure that if followed by historians would secure the validity of their interpretations. He answers it by an ontological argument that, in his view, guarantees the validity of the re-created past experiences of others in a historian's mind. Dilthey posits the identity of the subject and object of knowledge. In this view, understanding is a universal mode of cognition that is actualized in the historical flow of lived experience, and in that respect the subject and the object of historical interpretation are identical.

Although Dilthey's response to the problem of the validity of historical understanding, and even his theory as a whole, can seem vague, underdeveloped, and even quasi-mystical, his work did much to raise issues that still concern philosophers interested in historical understanding.

Max Weber

Dilthey's philosophy of history was part of a wider debate, raging in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, about the nature of the human sciences, their difference from natural science, and the methodologies appropriate to them. The camp siding with a more historical and interpretive view of the human sciences included, besides Dilthey, the neo-Kantian philosophers Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert and the sociologists Georg Simmel and Max Weber. These thinkers shared the conviction that the human sciences differ fundamentally from the natural sciences in that they require historical understanding. Beyond this shared conviction, however, they each had their own view of the human sciences and of historical understanding. The most influential for the social sciences has proved to be that of Weber.

For Weber, a valid scientific explanation is a causal one, but in the human sciences, causality has to assume a peculiar form in that it requires an interpretive dimension. The importance of interpretation follows, for Weber, from the fact that the human sciences are concerned with psychological and intellectual phenomena, and, more specifically, from the fact that social action arises from the subjective intentionality of the actor. Hence causal explanation in the social sciences depends on demonstrating a concrete relation between a specific action and its subjective motivation, not on formulating general causal laws. Weber's argument is part of his attempt to distance himself from the naturalist conflation of the natural and the social sciences on the basis of a nomothetic epistemology. Yet he establishes this distance, not by Dilthey's ontological arguments, but by a neo-Kantian, epistemological distinction between the natural and the social sciences of the kind made by Windelband and Rickert. The neo-Kantians argued that the natural sciences are nomothetic (they are concerned with formulating general laws and abstract concepts), whereas the social sciences are preoccupied with the individual and unique aspects of reality.

What is the role of understanding within this causal epistemology? For Weber, the meaningful nature of social action implies that understanding constitutes an indispensable part of any historical explanation. Understanding is not merely one way among others of generating hypotheses. To the contrary, it is built into the logic of the human sciences. Nonetheless, Weber also argued that a merely subjective, empathetic understanding of the motive of an action could not by itself constitute an empirically valid explanation: Understanding must be supplemented by causal analysis. The validity of an interpretation thus depended on its satisfying two criteria. First, an interpretation must be subjectively adequate; that is, it must be amenable to empathetic reproduction. Second, it must be causally adequate; that is, there must be a reasonable, demonstrable probability that the hypothesized motive will normally yield the observed action.

How, then, does the scholar go about satisfying this double requisite of subjective and causal adequacy? Weber advocates the deployment of ideal types. Ideal types are conceptual constructs that do not necessarily have any direct correlate in reality. Rather, when the actual course of action deviates from the ideal type, the social scientist can arrive at a causal explanation of the deviations by appealing

to factors such as misinformation, strategic errors, logical fallacies, and personal temperament.

An Alternative to Positivism

Within Anglophone philosophy, hermeneutic themes and the idea of historical understanding became prominent in the mid-twentieth century as an alternative to positivism. For a while, Collingwood seemed to be almost a lone voice in Oxford, drawing on an elder idealism to address hermeneutic themes. By the 1960s, however, a distinctive Anglophone approach to historical understanding appears in Britain, Canada, and the United States. Philosophers such as William Dray, Peter Winch, and Charles Taylor began to draw on Collingwood, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and a range of hermeneutic and phenomenological thinkers to insist on the interpretive nature of the human sciences.

This second wave of theorizing about historical understanding arose in reaction to the neopositivist attempt to reunify the natural and human sciences on a naturalist basis. The neopositivist project consisted of an attack, led by Carl Hempel and also Theodore Abel, on the idea that historical understanding could be a legitimate, scientific form of explanation. Neopositivism relegated historical understanding to the status of a prescientific source of hypotheses and viewed meanings as no more than intervening variables in causal sequences. The neopositivist challenge provoked a lively debate over historical understanding within Anglophone social sciences, and a number of scholars rose to defend its importance. The most systematic rejoinders came not from social scientists but from philosophers such as Dray and Winch.

Anglophone Hermeneutics

Dray, following Collingwood, insisted that historical explanation depends on making sense of the inner world of actors. Dray departs from Collingwood's perspective, however, in his attempt to integrate causal explanation and historical understanding. In particular, Dray argues that the causal explanation of any action requires an understanding of the purposive reasoning, whether conscious or unconscious, articulated or latent, that caused the actor to perform that action. In his view, the historian has an initial expectation as to what a "normal" course of events would look like in a given situation. A deviation from that expectation prompts the historian to piece together those elements of the actor's reasoning that differed from those we would have expected. The investigation is then completed once the accumulation of knowledge of the actor's reasoning is sufficient to account for the "deviant" course of action. The reconstruction of the inner reasoning of historical actors is thus not an arbitrary, intuitive product of pure empathy; rather, it is built up from the evidence.

Winch argues that social life is fundamentally different from the rest of the natural world in that social relations are "internal relations." Social relations exist through ideas held in people's minds rather than through the external, physical aspects of human interaction. Thus all human behavior is meaningful. Winch adds, following Wittgenstein, that all meaningful behavior is a matter of applying intersubjective, socially established rules within specific social contexts. For Winch, this view of human society is logically incompatible with the kinds of explanation associated with natural science. Historical explanation is not the application of generalizations to particular instances but rather the tracing of internal relations. Explanation is a matter of understanding the social actors' own understanding of their reality.

Winch, like Dray, restores the constitutive role of meaning in social life and in our knowledge of it. But, unlike Dray, he rejects any association of historical inquiry with causal analysis. He particularly attacks Weber's view that, in order to attain scientific validity, historical understanding needs to be supplemented by a probabilistic or statistical kind of causal analysis. Statistical operations, according to Winch, can never get us closer to understanding social action. Winch also rejects psychological forms of understanding directed at grasping internal mental processes. In his view, again following Wittgenstein, all understanding (of oneself, of one's reality, of the objects of historical inquiry) is mediated by socially established concepts. All understanding occurs within an intersubjective linguistic medium rather than in private, unarticulated experience.

German Philosophy

While Anglophone philosophy was breaking new ground in theories of historical understanding,

German philosophy also showed its unabated vibrancy. The most prominent late twentieth-century German theories of historical understanding represent two approaches. First is Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose thought is situated, like Dilthey's, within the hermeneutic tradition. Second is Jürgen Habermas, who seeks to revive Weber's project of synthesizing historical understanding with causal explanation.

According to Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics, we are all inescapably born and immersed within tradition. This tradition is present and alive in us in the form of our prejudices. Our prejudices are the fore-understandings through which we understand the world. They constitute the condition for the possibility of all historical understanding. Historical research forms an indissoluble part of the ontological process of our continuous encounter with tradition. It is integral to our ongoing effort to understand that tradition and thereby understand ourselves as historically situated beings.

Habermas partially accepts Gadamer's conception of historical understanding as an indispensable aspect of the human sciences, but he rejects the drive to model the human sciences in their entirety on hermeneutic foundations. Such a hermeneutic claim to universal scope, they argue, elides the fact that society is actually a complex composite of meaningful and linguistic aspects, on one hand, and the constraints of natural forces and social structures of power, on the other hand. These latter aspects of social life generate social patterns that exhibit quasi-natural characteristics. Therefore, causal explanation is needed in order to penetrate and render visible those aspects of social existence that are impermeable to understanding. Nevertheless, Habermas still views hermeneutic analysis as indispensable for making sense of the meaningful aspects of life. Hence the human sciences need to combine causal explanation with interpretive forms of inquiry.

Current Directions

Many contemporary theorists of historical understanding have been greatly influenced by the different varieties of the linguistic turn in philosophy. They, like Gadamer, often consider beliefs to be embedded in language or tradition. In addition, however, they often conceive of philosophy—especially if, like Winch, they have been influenced by Wittgenstein—as an elucidation of our language or the grammar of our concepts. Hence philosophers today tend to conceive of the process of understanding in terms of the way our concepts lead us to make sense of action by attributing beliefs to people. In this view, the grammar of our concepts is such that we make sense of actions by attributing beliefs or intentions to people. Understanding consists, in other words, of our attributing intentionality to people rather than in our re-creating or re-enacting their thoughts.

Mark Bevir and Asaf Kedar

See also Collingwood, Robin George; Genealogy; Hermeneutics; Historicism; Interpretive Theory; Weber, Max

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Historic Injustice

Claims to material reparations and symbolic restitution for historical injustices are based on the lasting impact of the deeds of previously living people on the well-being of currently living people and the moral quality of their deeds, respectively.

These two grounds for claims to redressing historical injustices differ and raise different questions of interpretation.

The Lasting Impact of Historical Injustices

People can make claims to compensation for harms they have suffered. According to the most common interpretation of harm, a person can be understood to be fully compensated for an act or policy when he or she is as well off as he or she would be if the act had not been carried out. As a modern-day descendant of slaves, has African American Robert been harmed owing to the injustices suffered by his ancestors under this interpretation of harm? Robert's existence is the product of a certain genealogical chain not being broken. Hence, the initial kidnapping in Africa, the transporting to America, and the enslavement of his ancestors are (very likely) necessary conditions for Robert's having come into existence at all. Had his ancestors not been kidnapped and enslaved, Robert would most likely not exist. Thus, Robert cannot be said to have been harmed by the kidnapping and enslavement of his ancestors, for had his ancestors not been kidnapped and enslaved, he would most likely not exist. Also, he would not have been better off had his ancestors not been badly wronged. Thus, we cannot rely upon this interpretation of harm and its accompanying interpretation of compensation to ground the claim that Robert has been harmed and should be compensated. The required state of affairs implies the nonexistence of the person claiming compensation. This is the so-called non-identity problem as it arises in the context of providing measures of compensation to indirect victims of historical injustice. In his work *Reasons and Persons,* Part IV, Derek Parfit has analyzed and discussed the problem in depth.

One way to respond to the problem is to allow for a second, namely, identity-independent notion of harm. Under this interpretation of harm, a person can be considered to be fully compensated for an act or policy (or event) if she or he does not fall below a specified standard at a particular time. Robert can be understood as having incurred harm because his ancestors were kidnapped and enslaved. Whether Robert has been harmed due to the way his ancestors were treated depends upon whether the way they were treated has led to Robert's falling below the specified standard of well-being. However, whether or not this is the case will turn on his current state of well-being.

Injustices committed against people in the past may not give rise to claims to reparations today if such claims can be understood to presuppose an indefensible interpretation of property entitlements. David Lyons and Jeremy Waldron argue that the view that once we acquire entitlements, they continue until we transfer or relinquish them is indefensible because there are reasons of principle for holding that entitlements and rights are sensitive to the passage of time and changes of circumstances. Generally speaking, entitlements are sensitive to background circumstances, and they are vulnerable to prescription.

Further, if legitimate entitlement is sensitive to changes in background circumstances, it is possible that the ongoing effect of an illegitimate acquisition and, more generally, of unjust violations of rights of others can become legitimate when circumstances change. This is what is meant by the thesis that historical injustices may be superseded. However, even if supersession of injustice is possible, the claim that it has occurred in any given situation depends on two claims. We have to determine, first, on the change of what circumstances the possibility of supersession depends and, second, that these circumstances have changed in the case under consideration.

The Moral Status of Past Victims of Historical Injustice

Even if we held the view that the non-identity problem excludes the possibility of currently living people being indirect victims of past injustice or that the historical injustice under consideration has been superseded, we will not wish to deny that past people were wronged. We need to inquire into the question of what we owe to the dead victims of historical injustices. One could defend the claim that we are obliged to the past victims of injustices by attributing rights to them. Alternatively we can attempt to show that currently living people can have duties toward deceased persons even if we assume that dead people cannot be bearers of rights today. Joel Feinberg has argued for the possibility of posthumous harm: The interests of people while alive can be harmed with respect to

posthumous states of affairs. This view requires the harm to have occurred before the death of the person, which presupposes a deterministic understanding of the occurrence of the harmful event. Others have argued that currently living people can stand under imperfect duties toward dead people without there being correlative rights of the deceased people. Especially with respect to dead victims of historical injustice, currently living people might be said to stand a general imperfect duty to bring about the posthumous reputation that people deserve. Commemorative acts of symbolic reparation, for example, a day of remembrance, can be understood as aiming to fulfill this duty toward dead victims of injustice.

Accepting Duties Owing to Historical Injustice

First, people will accept the duty of providing measures of symbolic restitution only if, as members of ongoing societies, they can identify with the public inheritance of their society in such a way that they will want to respond to what they consider inherited public evils by participating in public acts of symbolic reparation. Second, transgenerational legal persons (usually states) in whose name previous members committed crimes against others can be thought to accept an obligation to provide indirect victims with compensation. If so, currently living people as members of such entities can accept a (civic) duty to support their legal person in carrying out its policies of reparation that aim at providing just compensation today in light of both the lack of (sufficient) measures of compensation to the direct victims of historical injustices and their lasting negative impact on the well-being of currently living people.

Lukas H. Meyer

See also Affirmative Action; Intergenerational Justice; Justice, Theories of; Rights

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HISTORICISM

The word *historicism* (*Historismus* in German) was probably first used by the German literary critic Friedrich von Schlegel in 1797 when praising the art historian Johann Winckelmann for his awareness of the "immeasurable distinctness" of antiquity when compared to the present. Less than half a century before David Hume (1972) had still claimed that "mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular" (p. 83). Apparently, somewhere between Hume and Schlegel a revolution had taken place in how the West related to its past. The term *historicism* is ordinarily used for referring to this revolution, which was characterized by Karl Mannheim, in what still is the best account of historicism, as the exchange of a "static" for a "dynamic" conception of the world. So not standstill but *change* was now seen as the normal condition of sociopolitical reality.

Self-evidently, this is not to say that (historical) change was unknown to the West before historicism. But there's a difference. Prior to historicism, (historical) change was believed to leave the "substance" of the changing thing itself unaltered. Think of how we may say that a table, in spite of its having undergone change, "substantially" remained the same table it always was, even after we painted it in a different color. This substantialist conception of historical change had its philosophical foundations in natural law philosophy, with its belief in an eternal and unchanging (Stoic) *recta ratio* determining the behavior of all things. And though this belief in a recta ratio is now a universally abandoned curiosity of the past, it still determines how we intuitively conceive of (historical) change.

Historicism replaced this commonsense, substantialist view of change with the view that there are no limits to change and that change may also affect the *substance* of things. This is the historicist "antisubstantialist" view of (historical) change. It

created a number of difficult logical and ontological problems. For example, if nothing is excluded from change, not even a thing's substance, what will then still legitimate us to speak of a "changing *thing*"? What then is the (*un*changing) subject of change to which change is attributed?

Unfortunately, the early nineteenth-century philosophical vocabulary used by the advocates of historicism prevented them from dealing with this problem satisfactorily. But, alas, the problem is no closer to a solution than 200 years ago, mainly because twentieth-century philosophers of language and science (actually possessing the philosophical vocabulary required for dealing with the problem) always unquestioningly accepted the substantialist account of change.

Antisubstantialist Change

Johann Gottfried Herder (1877) was arguably the first advocate of antisubstantialist change:

> The more someone descends into his own self, into the nature and origin of his noblest thoughts, the more he will cover his eyes and feet, and say: "I am, what I have become. I have grown like a tree; the seed was there; but air, earth and all the elements, that I did not pose around me, contributed to developing the seed, the fruit and its structure." (p. 198)

The idea is that something *is* what it *has become* and, hence, that the nature of a thing lies in its history. This is the basic historicist claim. It will be clear that the equation of "being" and "becoming" is a codification of antisubstantialist change, for what remains the same during change (and functions as subject of change in substantialist change) is eo ipso of no interest to the historicist. Next, it is hard to see how anyone can be a historian without agreeing with it: If the historian hopes to have some unique contribution to make to our understanding of the world—a contribution unrivaled by those of other disciplines—only the historicist's equation of "being" with "becoming" will sustain it.

But, once again, if there is change, there must be *something* that changes—and that is itself (presumably) exempt from change. In order to see how Herder deals with the problem, we should focus on his biological metaphor of a tree growing out of a seed. This calls to mind the Aristotelian conception of entelechy, according to which a principle of growth is present already in the acorn, determining how this puny acorn may develop into a mighty oak, while leaving nothing unaltered of the original acorn. Observe, furthermore, the close similarity of Aristotelian entelechy and the Leibnizian notion of the monad as developed in the latter's *Monadology* of 1714. In both cases change and development are accounted for in terms of a principle of growth logically *different* though not separate from *what* grows (oak or monad). Gottfried Leibniz's *Monadology* was all the more important for the emergence of historicism by dividing up the universe into "windowless" individual monads. The notion of individuality, which was to become so central in historicism, has here its most solid philosophical foundation.

For Herder the term *nature* had the same connotation as its Greek equivalent *phusis* (from *phuein* "to grow"): Nature was for him essentially *biological* nature. This effected, for him, a contiguity of the natural and the historical world, as the growth, development, and death of plants, animals, and human beings seem to have their analogues in the emergence and fall of historical entities, such as states or civilizations. This invited Herder to include natural reality into his historicist conception of the world. He thus begins his major work *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* with a lengthy (and remarkably up-to-date) exposition of the coming into being of the solar system and the earth.

Though such crossovers between the natural and the historical world were never wholly abandoned—think of Jakob Burckhardt's habit of discussing historical development in terms of metamorphoses (*Verpuppungen*) and of the biological metaphors of birth, blossoming, and death so popular in, for example, Spengler's and Toynbee's speculative philosophies of history—this soon became the exception in the course of the nineteenth century. J. G. Droysen was the first advocate of so-called methodological dualism, claiming that the methods adopted by scientists and historians are basically different. The commonsense intuition behind this view was best captured by Wilhelm Windelband's distinction between the nomothetic natural sciences (interested in what is recurrent in this world's phenomena permitting of subsumption

under general laws) and the idiographic historical sciences (focusing on what is unique in these phenomena). So the imperialism of the natural sciences claiming that there should be only one reliable method (the one adopted in the sciences) is answered by the historicist's more relaxed view that we should leave both the natural scientist and the historian to their own devices.

Four Meanings of Historicism

Though the word *historicism* has been given many different meanings, it is possible to discern four meanings from which most of the others can be derived. The first and most important meaning is the one according to which the essence, or identity, of a phenomenon is to be found in its past. A second one can easily be inferred from it: In case of nonsubstantialist change, a thing (nation, state or culture) must at each phase of its development substantially differ from what it was before and from what it will be later on. This is why nonsubstantialist change endows each such phase with a uniqueness, or individuality of its own, with the implication that it will be the historian's task to bring out this uniqueness—as Herder had realized when stating that each historical epoch "has its center of bliss (*Mittelpunkt der Glückseligkeit*) in itself," or, as the same idea was most famously expressed by Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886): "*jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott*" (each epoch is immediate to God). In both cases the idea is that each historical epoch should be considered on its own terms—and not as the condition or as the outcome of any other. Observe, furthermore, that both Herder and Ranke speak of *each* epoch, thus achieving a seldom noted reconciliation of universality with historical uniqueness.

Third, the condemnation of anachronisms immediately follows from this second conception of historicism. The historian can effectively avoid anachronisms by identifying with the people from the past whose actions and thoughts he or she investigates. This brings us to (variants of) hermeneutics, such as that of R. G. Collingwood (1994), according to which historical thought is "the re-enactment of the past in the historian's own mind" (p. 282). That is to say, the historian should carry his or her thought back to the past, see the world of the past from the point of view of the historical agent in order to come to an adequate understanding of both. As opposed to Collingwood, German hermeneuticists such as Wilhelm Dilthey and Hans Georg Gadamer emphasize the importance of the so-called hermeneutic circle, insisting on a perennial shuttling from the historian's present to the past and backward again.

Fourth, for Karl Popper historicism denotes the belief—as exemplified in the speculative philosophies of Hegel, Marx, Spengler, and Toynbee—that a pattern can be discerned in humanity's past which can be extrapolated into the future. Popper successfully discredited any such aspirations to predict the future on the basis of the past. A much similar argument was given by François Lyotard, though here the emphasis is on the past rather than on extrapolations to the future. This meaning of the word *historicism* stands somewhat apart from the other three, as is clear from the fact that it was always vehemently rejected by adherents of the second and third meanings of the word, while the adherents of the first meaning can afford to remain indifferent to it.

"Historical Ideas"

Historicism's heart is nonsubstantialist change raising the problem of what is to count as subject of change, if nothing is excluded from change. Herder then appealed to Aristotelian entelechy—but this has the disadvantage that entelechies always are species-specific, which is at odds with the historicist's insistence on uniqueness. This problem was solved with the notion of the "historical idea," as proposed by Ranke and Wilhelm von Humboldt: each historical "thing" (nation, epoch, civilization, etc.) is argued to possess a historical idea, an entelechy, so to say, that is wholly specific for itself and for itself alone. Ranke and Humboldt made the following claims for the historical idea:

1. No philosophical analysis or deductive argument will ever present us with the historical idea: Only the most careful and scrupulous empirical historical research of documents and of whatever the past has left us may tell us how to conceive of the historical idea for one specific topic of investigation. Such proposals will continuously be revised on the basis of new evidence and will result in better insights. Hence results historicists' relentless promotion of the professionalization of history.

2. A nation's or an epoch's historical ideas express what is unique or characteristic of them (e.g., think of associations that accompany terms like the *Renaissance* or the *Enlightenment*). Next, what is unique or characteristic of them is their essence, or identity, best captured by their history or an account of how they could come into being.

3. By presenting the nation's or an epoch's historical idea, the historian has, in a way, *explained* the nation's history. The historical idea is, basically, a claim about how a nation's or an epoch's most important features hang together. Think again of how a notion as the Enlightenment succeeds in giving meaning to an infinite number of phenomena of eighteenth-century Europe—and thus explaining them. Historical phenomena are explained by relating them to the historical idea defining a nation's or an epoch's uniqueness or identity, just as a person's actions may be explained by relating them to the person's character.

4. Humboldt explicitly leaves room for causal explanation apart from explanation in terms of historical ideas even though he is no less explicit about the hierarchy obtaining between them: The former is always subservient to the latter. Causal relationships deal with what are merely the *components* of a nation's or an epoch's essence or identity; the historical idea expresses this essence or identity *itself*.

In fact, Ranke's and Humboldt's historical idea is similar to what William Walsh had in mind with his "colligatory concepts," that is, concepts, such as that of the Enlightenment, colligating many aspects of the period in question. The only difference is that Walsh did not doubt that these colligatory concepts are the *historian's* construction, whereas Humboldt situated them in the *past itself*, as entelechies to be discovered by the historian. This is where Humboldt still was under the spell of the idealist philosophical vocabulary of his time.

Historicism's Demise: The Crisis of Historicism

Historicism was a German invention. From Germany it spread to Switzerland (Jacob Burckhardt), Belgium (Henri Pirenne), France (Lucien Febvre), the Netherlands (Johan Huizinga), Spain (José Ortega y Gasset) and Italy (Benedetto Croce). A "light" variant of historicism slowly made its way even to England and the United States, where resistance to historicism was, and still is, strongest. Finally, the professionalization of history, which was also part of the historicists' program, conquered all of the historical world.

In spite of the popularity of historicism for one and a half centuries, few historians will nowadays still call themselves historicists, even in Germany. This has several causes, most important being the so-called crisis of historicism, which arose from the confrontation of historicism with the neo-Kantianism *en vogue* in most German universities at the end of the nineteenth century. Most variants of neo-Kantianism had inherited from Kant the conviction that values must be eternally valid. This is obviously at odds with what history has on offer. This caused the greatest confusion and despair in the minds of the neo-Kantians (and of theologians such as Ernst Troeltsch who also sought absolute and time-transcendent moral and theological truths)—and historicism was accused of having been the source of the neo-Kantians' discomforts.

A number of comments are appropriate. In the first place, each historian, whether historicist or not, will know that no (moral) values are valid for all times and places. So if the neo-Kantian (or the theologian) prefers to remind blind to this fact, he or she will have to abolish all of historical writing—and not just historicism. Next, if there is a conflict between plain historical fact and the neo-Kantian's dreams of eternal moral truths, had we then not better awaken from these dreams? Moreover, what's wrong with norms and values that are not universally valid? As we know from legislation, values and norms can be perfectly rational and acceptable, though it would be ridiculous to claim a universal validity for them.

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See also Collingwood, Robin George; Hermeneutics; Historical Understanding; Humboldt, Wilhelm von; Neo-Kantianism

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Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679)

Thomas Hobbes is one of the most prominent political theorists in the English language. His many texts, but most prominently his *Leviathan* (1651), established him as one of the key theorists of sovereignty, political authority, and social contract theory.

Life and Works

Although *Leviathan* is his most famous book (and will be the focus of this entry), Hobbes wrote many other important works as well. Many of these other works, particularly *The Elements of Law* (1640) and *De Cive* (1642), serve in some ways as precursors for *Leviathan*. Another important book, *Behemoth,* was an account of the English civil war and came out posthumously, in 1681. Taking his opus as a whole, Hobbes is often regarded as a "protoliberal." Although he wrote before the true advent of liberalism as a social and economic practice, Hobbes is said to have produced many of the fundamentals of the liberal order. Hobbes's designation as a "proto" liberal may also indicate a certain discomfort that many contemporary liberals have with what they see as Hobbes's harsh and authoritarian doctrines. Over the following centuries a variety of thinkers finessed liberal doctrine on sovereignty, law, and political authority, but Hobbes is often given pride of place for having largely conceptualized the founding narratives of the liberal world we live in today (although not in a straightforward or unproblematic manner).

Hobbes lived and wrote during a time of tremendous upheaval in his native England. Years of conflict between the kings of the Stuart dynasty and the English parliament culminated in the English civil war during the 1640s. The war was fought over questions of political centralization as well as over questions of religion. The Stuart kings headed the Church of England, whereas many of the parliamentarians were Puritans, a loosely affiliated religious movement that sought a decentralization of English religious practices concomitant with the decentralization of the state. The war culminated in the capture and eventual execution of Charles I in 1649, leading to the establishment of the Commonwealth of England under the Puritan leader Oliver Cromwell. Because of the war, Hobbes, a lifelong Anglican and a royalist, went into exile in Paris along with the remainder of the court (including Charles's son, Charles II) and Anglican leadership.

For most contemporary Hobbes scholars, the publication of *Leviathan,* 2 years after the execution of Charles I, is understood as Hobbes's reaction to the war and regicide (although, as already stated, *Leviathan* also reflects a lot of the work Hobbes had already written and published years before). Scholars today argue that in *Leviathan,* Hobbes saw that, given the general breakdown in English society, traditional sources of authority were no longer sufficient. In writing *Leviathan,* they say, Hobbes sought nothing less than to create a new rationale for political authority and obedience.

Given this contemporary assessment of Hobbes, it is worth noting that in his own lifetime, when *Leviathan* was published, Hobbes was regarded as a traitor to the crown and the state church. Royalists objected strenuously, for example, to his claim in that book that political subjects have the right to change allegiance to a new sovereign if their existing one is defeated militarily (in other words, the very situation that the subjects of England found themselves in after the war). Anglican clergy also objected to some of Hobbes's claims about the state church in that text; whereas in practice the Anglican bishops had a fairly extensive amount of autonomy from the state, Hobbes insisted that the king have absolute power over all matters of liturgy and scriptural interpretation. He also promoted quite a few unorthodox theological ideas such as a repudiation of the idea of hell.

Following the publication of *Leviathan,* the degree of antipathy toward Hobbes became so great that he came to fear for his life in Paris and returned to live under Cromwell's government. This only sealed his reputation among the Anglicans and royalists for being a turncoat. For the rest of his life, Hobbes suffered from a bad reputation among the very group that he claimed to fervently support (although over time that antipathy lessened somewhat). Some of his most vociferous critics included the Anglican theologian John Bramhall, who accused Hobbes of preaching atheism, and Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, who objected to what he saw as Hobbes's treasonous notions of political loyalty. Robert Filmer, the author of *Patriarcha,* felt that Hobbes's notion of the social contract diminished the role of Adam and Eve in founding human societies. Other critics held that Hobbes evinced an anarchistic tendency. Hobbes's 1668 republication of *Leviathan* in Latin—in which various offending passages were omitted or altered—was likely intended to improve his reputation. Although he was always held with some mistrust (so that *Hobbism* became a term of suspicion by supporters of the Crown long after the Stuarts were restored to power in England), Hobbes managed to outlive many of his critics and thereby end his days in relative peace.

In terms of his reputation, there is thus a great paradox about Hobbes. While he was alive, Hobbes was accused of being an anarchist, an atheist, and a subversive radical. Today, Hobbes is often considered to be an arch-conservative. Hobbes thus has the odd distinction of being generally disliked as a theorist (without being any less influential) even though the reasons for this dislike have changed diametrically. That one thinker could have elicited such extremely divergent viewpoints at various time points both to Hobbes's immense complexity as a thinker and writer as well as to certain tensions which can be found in most of his work, but especially in *Leviathan.* In that book in particular, we see a tension between Hobbes's own political conservativism and the often radical (and possibly subversive) implications of much of his theory of language, his epistemology, and his views about religion. The remainder of this entry will consider both the way that Hobbes is conventionally read in the present time as well as some of the ways his own text might lend itself to being read otherwise (as it was during his own lifetime).

As already mentioned, most contemporary scholars read Hobbes as proposing a fairly stern version of sovereignty as the answer to the problem of political authority. Most famously, in *Leviathan,* Hobbes describes the social contract, a hypothetical moment when human beings emerged out of the anarchic state of nature in order to avoid the dangers and uncertainties of a world without any kind of central authority.

Nature and Sovereignty

For Hobbes the state of nature is not tenable because it always threatens to turn into a state of war. Without some overarching form of authority to bind us, we tend to turn against one another. In his famous description of this danger (arguably the

most famous passage in all of *Leviathan*), Hobbes (1996) tells us that life in the state of nature is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" (p. 89). Without being able to trust one another, people cannot build a future, cannot engage in farming or commerce or other aspects of human life that assume a stable future.

In order to escape this woeful condition, by forming the social contract, each person agrees to submit her- or himself to a common power (which could be one person, some committee, or even everyone in the form of a democratic, representative government), who sets and enforces the laws that bind all equally. Hobbes (1996) tells us that we must submit all of our individual wills to "one Will" (p. 120), the will of the sovereign. The sovereign, he tells us further, is an "*Artificiall person*" (p. 111) who acts on behalf of the people that have authored the social contract. Hobbes offers that in giving power to the sovereign, we bind ourselves so that we in effect "will" whatever the sovereign does (even if we don't actually like the sovereign's actions). The sovereign is not itself bound by the social contract; it may have an interest in keeping the community under its responsibility relatively content, but it has no particular contractual obligations to the people per se. Yet Hobbes does not expect that the sovereign will be overly onerous. He tells us that the sovereign gains nothing from hurting the subjects and that it is reasonable to hope that the sovereign will treat the people relatively well. Yet he also tells us that even if our sovereign is terrible, any harm that it can inflict on its population pales in comparison to what happens to people in the state of nature. Thus the specter of the state of nature (and the danger it poses of perpetual war) serves (Hobbes hopes) to get us to appreciate the government that we have, even if it is a government we don't necessarily like all that much.

If the sovereign has few checks on its power, the duties of the people to the sovereign are, by contrast, vast; the sovereign has the last word in determining laws, adjudicating conflicts, and defining the meaning of terms and measures and other matters of public interest. For Hobbes, where the sovereign is silent (the "silence of the laws"), people are able to think and do as they please. People can choose their own line of work, raise their children as they see fit, and things of that nature. Yet, for all of these "liberties of the subject," we can see that for Hobbes the definition of what the subjects can and cannot do depends on the sovereign's own decision (an insight Carl Schmitt takes from Hobbes in his own analysis of sovereignty). The only rights that the citizen has that are not up to sovereign decision come from the fundamental right to protect one's own life. Because the initial rationale for coming under sovereign authority in the first place is to avoid the dangers and anarchy of the state of nature, if the sovereign cannot protect the subject's life, the subject is no longer bound by the social contract. This is why Hobbes argued that if a subject's sovereign is defeated by war, they have the right to give their allegiance to a new sovereign. Similarly, a subject has the right to pay someone else to fight for him if that subject is too fearful to do so. Finally (however odd this may seem for such a seemingly conservative writer), a subject who is subject to the death penalty by the sovereign has the right to fight for his own life (in practice this may not be such a concession, given that the condemned subject will be fighting against the entire state apparatus).

Many writers have taken issue with Hobbes's sovereign, seeing it as too harsh, too absolute, and not in any way "representing" the people that it purportedly serves. Later writers like John Locke distinguish between the "sovereignty" of the people as a whole and their government, which he saw as subservient to the people's interests. Later still, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued explicitly against Hobbes that the people themselves were sovereign and therefore were not bound by some outside, unbound political authority. Such attempts to ameliorate or relocate the form of sovereignty that we receive from Hobbes are an ongoing feature of political theory to this day. For example, in relatively more recent writings, both H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin have argued against a Hobbesian notion of political sovereignty (i.e., one in which the government or executive branch is sovereign in a way that excludes or limits popular participation).

For Hobbes, however, the absolute authority of a sovereign is necessary; anything short of giving the sovereign the last word on every major decision (save the decision to save and protect one's own life) would be to reduce this key political figure to the very forces that it protects us from. Without a singular will to serve as the last word on

all matters of importance, we would be torn apart by our (inevitable) disagreements.

Above all, Hobbes believed, we need the sovereign to counteract each individual's tendency to consider his own judgment to be superior to that of all others. Hobbes's understanding of the state of nature can be read as a kind of allegory that reveals what this tendency, taken to its logical conclusion, would look like. For Hobbes the English civil war could be blamed, in large part, on the kind of interpretive chaos that ensued when vast numbers of sects and individuals set out to interpret scripture as they saw fit (especially given the fact that they were willing to fight and die for their interpretations).

Hobbes believed that we are readily deceived because of the basic instability and fluidity of language itself. We can use different words to describe similar events with vast consequences for how we think about things. Hobbes suggested, for example, that an act of regicide becomes labeled "tyrannicide" and therefore justified. Without a common way to agree on meaning, we tend to favor our own understanding and interpretation (or, more often than not, the interpretation of some other, influential person).

In the face of the interpretive chaos that such a state of affairs threatens, the sovereign serves for Hobbes as the last word in deciding on the meaning and use of terms. The sovereign's linguistic determinations allow for a widespread and regular public coordination of meaning, thereby providing a basis for a stable political authority as well. Hobbes is effectively arguing that it doesn't much matter what decisions the sovereign actually makes. Although Hobbes (1996) concedes that the sovereign is an "arbitrary government" (p. 471), he argues that we need such government to avoid civil war. Given that an older model of political authority based on divine truths and royal prerogative seemed no longer to function, Hobbes saw sovereignty as serving to replace that prerogative with an appeal to the basic need to make sense to one another, to minimally agree and thereby to survive (and perhaps even thrive).

Hobbes's Conservatism

Although this political view accords with what seems to be Hobbes's own political conservativism, there are ways that his text sometimes seems to undermine his own orthodoxy. For one thing, although it serves as a basis for his notion of sovereign power, Hobbes's radical skepticism seems to make for an inherently unstable basis for that authority. A more conventionally conservative figure might not proclaim the sovereign to be arbitrary and self-motivated as Hobbes does (and such claims did not go unnoticed by Hobbes's peers).

Such an ambivalent epistemological basis for sovereign authority is reinforced by the religious doctrines that Hobbes promotes throughout his work, but especially in *Leviathan* itself. In that book, Hobbes offers two genealogies for the rise of political authority. One is the story of the social contract and the production of human sovereignty. The other is a story about the rise of political authority based on God's own sovereignty on earth. Although Hobbes insists that the religious basis for the political authority he describes is fully in accord with his narrative of the social contract, this other genealogy sets up a rival (and potentially subversive) counter-narrative about the genesis and nature of authority. Whereas the first story is ahistorical and hypothetical, the second story is eschatological and theological in nature. In this other version, political authority is established by what Hobbes calls the first "kingdom of God," in ancient Israel.

In this kingdom, Hobbes tells us that God was actually king of the Jews (with Moses acting as God's "lieutenant"). This kingdom was an iteration of God's earlier covenant with the Jews (made with Abraham). After Moses's death, God's authority was interpreted by a series of prophets and judges, as well as by the people themselves. When the Israelites elected Saul as their king, Hobbes tells us, they effectively displaced God as their monarch, breaking their end of the covenant. This act ended the period of divine rule and ushered in the modern period of human sovereigns that we live in today. For Hobbes the rule of human sovereigns will not end until the establishment of the second kingdom of God, when Christ rules on earth in God's name.

This alternative genealogy is important because of the ways that God is a very different kind of sovereign than the human sovereigns that follow. Although God is the king of an actual human kingdom (ancient Israel), God remains utterly

mysterious. God does not speak to the Israelites except through the mediation of Moses, and even then, God speaks to Moses through visions. Hobbes (1996) tells us it is "a more cleer [*sic*] Vision" than any other prophet ever received (p. 293).

More generally, for Hobbes, God remains a kind of cipher that not only permits but even requires a widespread and public conversation about what God may or may not require of us. Hobbes (1996) tells us that we don't understand anything about God except "*that he is*" (p. 271). Rather than try to determine what is true about God, we can only attribute to God those things that we honor among ourselves. In this way, by seeking to honor God we are also, in effect, determining our own collective interpretations about the good.

Such notions serve as a necessary reservoir of collective decision making that is independent of sovereign judgments; whereas in the time of Moses, we have a case of God speaking more or less directly to a political leader, in our own time we have lost such clarity. Although elsewhere in *Leviathan,* Hobbes approves of the sovereign serving as the last word on virtually all matters, when it comes especially to religious questions, we see the sovereign in a more problematic light. For Hobbes (1996) the religious opinions of our terrestrial sovereigns are only "superstructions of Hay, or Stubble" (p. 413). Human sovereigns offer *an* opinion about God and truth, but certainly what they believe is not any truer than the general consensus about the good that comes out of more collective and decentralized decision-making processes.

Hobbes even sometimes implies that the sovereign opinion is *worse* than the collective opinion. He tells us, for example, that during the time of the Apostles, their own interpretation coexisted with the interpretation of the people. In the absence of any kind of real divine authority (whether in the form of God or Jesus), the ability of people to interpret and think for themselves is a crucial aspect of the conveyance of authority. This, Hobbes (1996) tells us, is just as true in our own time and will remain the case "till Kings were Pastors, or Pastors Kings" (p. 356). In contrast to the time of Moses (a pastor king if ever there was one), contemporary sovereigns are not capable of effectively replacing public conversations about the good with an actual, undeniable truth.

Two Forms of Sovereignty

When we look at the two forms of sovereignty depicted in *Leviathan* side by side (i.e., God's sovereignty and human sovereignty), human sovereigns suffer from the comparison. Whereas terrestrial sovereigns, as we have seen, are not bound by promises, God is bound by covenant. (Hobbes tells us that even after the Israelites break their end of the contract, God remains bound by it.) Whereas terrestrial sovereigns turn their opinions into an unquestionable basis for law and meaning, God's judgment not only permits but requires popular interpretation. And whereas terrestrial sovereigns are arbitrary and random, God is not. Although Hobbes repeatedly insists throughout *Leviathan* that there is a continuity of sovereignty stemming from God's reign in Israel down to the Stuart monarchs of his time, the religious basis of authority that he portrays seems to undermine the authority and relevance of terrestrial sovereigns rather than serve as a basis for their own rule.

If God's kingdom were forever banished, this contrast would not be relevant; if we are effectively stuck with human kings forever, then we had best learn to respect their authority (insofar as we would have no other options). But Hobbes tells us that God's kingdom is to return with the reign of Jesus Christ on earth; our own time remains sandwiched between the two iterations of God's kingdom, and so the contrast between divine and terrestrial forms of sovereignty remains pertinent and troubling.

This sense of the earthly sovereign's nonrepresentativeness and nonresponsiveness is only further reinforced by Hobbes's understanding of language and metaphor. In *Leviathan* Hobbes (1996) repeatedly inveighs against what he calls the "Error of *Separated Essences*" (p. 466), an idolatrous approach to language wherein metaphors and other rhetorical figures come to supplant what they are meant to represent. Such an error leads to an entirely false (and metaphysical) sense of reality, producing what Hobbes calls a "Kingdome of Darknesse" (the subject of Part IV of *Leviathan*). Here, symbols are given a life of their own, independent of their referent.

To illustrate this concept of separated essences, Hobbes gives the example of the soul, a figure of speech originally meant to represent people (such

as when we say "there is not a soul in sight"). For Hobbes, far from remaining a mere marker of personhood, the soul has become a rogue metaphor; it has become immortal and superior to the person(s) that it originally stood for. By making an analogy between the semiotic and the political (an analogy Hobbes frequently makes), one could argue that the sovereign, which similarly is meant to represent the people (but does not) is a "separated essence," an idol that has replaced the people with its own inflated conception. Hobbes (1996) lends support to this reading when he calls the sovereign the "Soule" of the commonwealth (p. 153). Today this comment is usually read as a compliment—a testament to sovereign centrality and vitality—but it could just as easily be the opposite, given what Hobbes has to say about the soul as an idolatrous figure of speech.

To point out how subversive some of Hobbes's inferences about religion, language, and epistemology can be is not necessarily to suggest that Hobbes was a secret radical (although he was accused of being one in his own lifetime). But it does seem fair to infer that taken as a whole, *Leviathan* is less conservative, less straightforward than the sum of its parts. Paradoxically, this author who cared so much about the control and value of meaning penned a work whose scope is so vast and complex that its own "meaning" is a kind of battleground, open for interpretation.

Given his complex theology and radical skepticism, at the very least it seems clear that Hobbes is not the perfectly orthodox thinker he claims to be. *Leviathan,* in particular, is replete with passages that directly challenge religious and political orthodoxy even as Hobbes frequently claimed in that book to be strictly following the sovereign's will on all matters. The very fact that a private citizen such as Hobbes was dictating the proper sovereign powers to the court and clergy can be read as a kind of usurpation of a power that he attributes solely to the sovereign itself.

For all of this complexity, Hobbes's contemporary reputation is fairly straightforward. As a rule, much more attention is paid to his political writings—and in particular his depiction of the state of nature and the social contract—than his lengthy religious and linguistic expositions. (There are of course important exceptions, such as J. G. A. Pocock's work on Hobbes's religious writings.) In the general consensus on Hobbes over the past century, whereas most acknowledge his huge influence, few writers openly defend him. Schmitt is one prominent exception to this tendency (although he too is a fairly controversial figure). Mostly, Hobbes receives a mixture of admiration for having founded much of the modern order and criticism for having done so in such a harsh and unbending manner.

Hobbes's enduring legacy comes from the forms of political, social, and economic organization that have been attributed (at least in part) to his name as well as from an ongoing appreciation of the depths of ideas that come out of writings such as *Leviathan*. In their erudition and breadth, and even in their seeming contradictions, his texts will continue to underlie many of our contemporary political practices and supply the means for fresh readings and rereadings of the question of sovereignty, government, and political authority for generations of scholars to come.

James R. Martel

See also Absolutism; Bodin, Jean; Common Law; Social Contract Theory; State of Nature

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Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawny (1864–1929)

Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse, liberal political theorist and journalist, is best known today for his 1911 *Liberalism,* which became the quintessential statement of British new liberalism. Having begun his studies at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in 1883, Hobhouse was elected a fellow of the college in 1894. He left Oxford in 1897 for Manchester, where he began a long association writing for C. P. Scott's *Manchester Guardian*. He resigned writing for the *Manchester Guardian* on a regular basis in 1902, subsequently also contributing to *The Nation* and other radical liberal publications. In 1907, he was elected to the Martin White Chair in Sociology, the first ever chair in sociology in Great Britain, at the London School of Economics. He held this position until his death in 1929. His writings are marked by three periods.

Early Oxford and Manchester Writings

Hobhouse's first book, *The Labour Movement* (1893), defended trade unionism, cooperation, and state socialism, repeating various Fabian arguments with which he had adopted early in his career. *A Theory of Knowledge* (1896) followed and was very different in its thrust. Much less polemical, it tried to combine Oxford idealism's holism, especially T. H. Green's, with greater deference to evolutionary biology. It therefore represents Hobhouse's first sustained attempt to explore the relationship between mind, morality, and evolution, which preoccupied him throughout his life. Just before resigning from the *Manchester Guardian* in 1902, Hobhouse published *Mind in Evolution* (1901), which was the first of a trilogy devoted to synthesizing philosophy and sociology in keeping with themes which he first began exploring in *A Theory of Knowledge*.

Liberalism Through the End of World War I

Hobhouse next published *Democracy and Reaction* (1904), in which he began working out new liberal themes that he hoped both radical liberals and moderate socialists would find appealing. But Hobhouse's seminal statement of the new liberalism was his *Liberalism* (1911). Contemporary liberal theorists are typically unfamiliar with the new liberals, who include D. G. Ritchie and J. A. Hobson, though some at least know about Hobhouse's *Liberalism*. In *Liberalism,* Hobhouse argues that one can be harmed directly by force or fraud or indirectly by being denied equal opportunities or by being robbed of one's share of socially created value. The right to a living wage, unemployment insurance, and state "tenantry" of land assured all citizens meaningful opportunities to flourish, which Hobhouse happily conceded amounted to "liberal socialism."

Morals in Evolution (1906) was followed by *Development and Purpose* (1913) as the second and third volumes of his trilogy, which had become Hobhouse's venue for working out what he had begun referring to as "orthogenic evolution." For Hobhouse, much like Ritchie, the evolution of human consciousness invests the blind struggle for survival with direction and purpose. Mind and morality are unprecedented orthogenic events allowing humanity to tame the haphazard flow of natural selection. With the evolutionary emergence of humans, methodical cooperation gradually begins replacing random competition. Reason has slowly been replacing instinct, rationalizing and systematizing human moral conventions as societies advance.

Moral Philosophy After World War I

At the end of World War I, Hobhouse published *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (1918), which attacked Bernard Bosanquet's *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899) for its statism and for infecting British political philosophical thinking with German idealism, especially that of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Next followed Hobhouse's second trilogy: *The Rational Good* (1921), *The Elements of Social Justice* (1922), and *Social Development* (1924).

The Rational Good is fascinating for how it reveals just how indebted Hobhouse was to nineteenth-century classical utilitarianism, particularly John Stuart Mill's version. Hobhouse was just as much a liberal utilitarian as Mill is often now characterized, as he was a new liberal inspired equally by Green. And he did not hesitate to acknowledge these intellectual debts, conceding that his moral theory stood closely to Mill's utilitarianism, on one hand, and Green's ethical idealism, on the other. Indeed, Hobhouse's very definition of rational good exhibits just how dedicated he was to accommodating Mill's conception of happiness and Green's conception of self-realization. Viewed as feeling, "rational good" was happiness, whereas viewed as the object of this feeling, it was self-realization. In other words, for Hobhouse, self-realizing lives were simultaneously happy lives. Happiness is the "feeling tone" that accompanies or marks self-realizing lives. Together, self-realization and happiness constituted rational goodness. Because happiness moved in tandem with self-realization, promoting happiness promoted self-realization too, making Millian-improved utilitarianism a perfectly satisfactory substitute method of practical reasoning.

Hobhouse's new liberalism mimicked Mill's liberal utilitarianism in more ways than one. *The Elements of Social Justice,* like his earlier *Liberalism,* defends "prima facie" rights, both negative and positive, as the best *indirect* strategy for promoting rational goodness. By securing meaningful equal opportunities for all, basic moral rights promoted without guaranteeing the "development of personality" in each community member. Genuine liberty, therefore, was each citizen enjoying the greatest possible opportunity for making the "best of himself." And when each person flourished, all flourished even more because each of us is an interdependent social nexus, a "transpersonal reference." Hobhouse's new liberalism, and indeed Green's, Ritchie's, and Hobson's as well, owed much more to Mill than the received view of them acknowledges, which strongly suggests that the new liberalism was more a modification of classical utilitarianism than a rejection of it.

D. Weinstein

See also British Idealism; Equality of Opportunity; Evolution; Happiness; Liberalism; Mill, John Stuart; New Liberalism

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Household

The household held a central place in ancient conceptualizations of power, governance, and community. Although there was no single model of the household in antiquity, Greeks, Romans, ancient Jews, and early Christians shared several presuppositions about its elite form. Within an ancient Mediterranean context, the term *household* (Greek: *oikos;* Latin: *domus;* Hebrew: *bêt'ab*) referred simultaneously to persons and property. As a social unit, most ancient households were centered upon a nuclear core, but they might have also included extended family members (e.g., a widowed mother, unmarried siblings, adopted children), as well as slaves and other dependents. As property, an ancient household comprised the collective lands, buildings, animals, and slaves owned by its members. In ancient Mediterranean societies, which were agrarian based and largely dependent upon human labor, households were

the primary economic unit of production and reproduction. In fact, the English word *economy* derives from the Greek word for household management (*oikonomia*).

Ancient households were largely patriarchal in their organization, with the oldest living male typically (though not always) occupying the position of head of house. Women were closely associated with domestic space and activities, and in most ancient societies there were social and legal barriers preventing their direct participation in political activity. However, the ancients emphasized the fact that the household generated a state's citizens, soldiers, and sustenance. They identified first and foremost not as individuals but as members of households, and they valued wealth exclusively in terms of property ownership. For them, the private household and the activities of its female members were not marginal to public life or political power but constitutive of them. In many respects, modern binary categories of "public" and "private" inadequately express the fluid and dynamic relationship between the domestic and political spheres in antiquity. Indeed it was precisely the household's inextricable relationship to larger social, political, and religious communities (the city-state, the empire, the church, the divine cosmos) that fascinated ancient thinkers.

The Classical and Hellenistic Greek Household

Scholars had once posited a decline in the political significance of the household with the rise of radical democracy in cities like Athens in circa 500 BCE, when aristocratic rule dominated by a few noble families was replaced by democratic rule by an entire male citizenry. However, it is now widely believed that the household remained both empirically and theoretically significant in classical Greece. Membership in an Athenian household, for example, was a requirement for Athenian citizenship: A young Athenian man could not register in a *phratry* or *deme* (the two official subdivisions of Athenian society based, respectively, on kinship and place of residence) and hence could not be counted as a citizen without proof of parentage. And after 450 BCE, Athenian citizenship was a precondition of property transmission: Only the children of married Athenian citizens could inherit or own land. More informally, private wealth (generated by households) enabled Athenian citizens to assert their political status via the patronage of public works, religion, military campaigns, and civic events. Women, who were categorically denied access to political offices, law courts, and the citizen assemblies, also continued to participate in political life through their leading roles in public religious rituals and in household activities, which, scholars now emphasize, were never spatially sequestered within a special women's quarters. Thus, although the emergence of radical democracy unquestionably sharpened the distinction between the domestic and political spheres, it hardly bifurcated them.

Fifth-century Athenian playwrights like Aeschylus and Sophocles explored some of the tensions that developed between the household and the city-state with the emergence of a radical democracy, whereas subsequent thinkers like Plato (429–347 BCE), Xenophon (430–356 BCE), and Aristotle (384–322 BCE) variously analyzed the household and its proper relationship to a more mature city-state. Plato first articulated an idea that became axiomatic in Greco-Roman thought: The household, organized around the core relationship of marriage, was the starting point of the city-state (*Laws,* 720e–721a). The procreative partnership between husband and wife, in other words, was not only the central relationship around which a household formed but also the elemental building block of the larger political community. Elsewhere in *The Laws,* Plato drew parallels between the governance of household and the city-state, positing that the leaders of both institutions governed their subordinates not through force but through their innately superior position, as a father, husband, or slavemaster in the household and as a noble, wise, and strong leader in the city-state (*Laws,* 690a–b). To what extent Plato rejected the household in *The Republic* is moot: Although Plato's utopian city-state eliminated many of the core features of a traditional Greek household (e.g., private property and wealth management, the rearing and education of children in the home, monogamy), Plato also imagined it as a single, organic family. Aristotle in fact criticized Plato on this precise point: The city-state, Aristotle argued, was not simply a household writ large but a community comprising individual households, and as such it was the more

complete form of human organization (*Politics,* 1252a–1263b).

Although Aristotle privileged the state over the household, he nevertheless stressed a synecdochic relationship between them. As the most elemental "part" of the larger whole, the household encompassed the most essential relationships and activities for the achievement of the good life; hence, its management was crucial to the constitution of the city-state. For Aristotle, households and city-states shared the same goals: self-sufficiency (*autarkia*) and the provisioning of a good life for its members. Aristotle's analyses of household management (*oikonomia*) in *The Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics* included discussions of what Aristotle identified as the three primary domestic associations (husband/wife, father/child, master/slave) and the proper means of acquiring wealth for the household's daily needs. While criticizing those who believed household management was itself a political activity, Aristotle used the language of politics to characterize the householder's mode of rule. Whereas a master ruled his slaves despotically, wives and children were free; hence, a husband governed his wife in the manner of a statesman (*Politics,* 1259b) or aristocrat (*Nicomachean Ethics* [*NE*], 1160b), and a father governed his child in the manner of a king (*Politics,* 1259a–b; *NE,* 1160). Like Plato, Aristotle believed that these domestic relations of power were "natural" because the deliberative faculties of women, children, and slaves were incomplete, underdeveloped, or absent (*Politics,* 1254a–1255a, 1260a). Regarding property and the household, Aristotle privileged a limited form of wealth acquisition that was geared exclusively to a household's ideal self-sufficiency. Hence the good householder was to eschew all commercial enterprises, which Aristotle believed encouraged an unlimited accumulation of wealth (*Politics,* 1256a–1258b).

Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (*Oec.*; "the household manager"), the earliest extant Greek treatise on estate management, was also extremely influential in the development of ancient ideas about the household. Structured like a Socratic dialogue, the *Oeconomicus* presents an idealized blueprint of domestic relations and activities on an aristocratic estate. For Xenophon, household management was a specific branch of knowledge (*episteme*) associated with the "true gentleman" (*Oeconomicus,* 6.8). Although he clearly envisioned an agricultural estate, Xenophon focused less on the mechanics of farming and more on the ethics of power that structured the household. For Xenophon, order (*taxis*) was the guiding principle of estate management. The ideal household was a delicately balanced institution, where husband and wife had complementary responsibilities: He was in charge of activities outside of the house, and her domain was within it (*Oec.,* 7). In contrast to Plato and Aristotle, who focused on the male householder, Xenophon underscored the reciprocity of domestic activities and the interdependence of household members, emphasizing marriage as a partnership and slavery as a more nuanced mode of labor. In accordance with them, Xenophon underscored the interconnections of household and city-state by drawing analogies between the ordering of the domestic and the public sphere (*Oec.,* 8.3–9; 9.14–5).

Hellenistic thinkers inherited the ideas of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, recalibrating them to fit new geopolitical realities. By the late fourth century BCE, the independent, democratic city-state had been replaced by large central states, formed by Alexander and his generals, which controlled extensive networks of cities. Although democracy perhaps existed on the local level, the dominant government throughout the Mediterranean world was monarchy (with Rome as an important exception). Among the many consequences of these geopolitical changes was a shift in cultural sensibilities: Hellenistic thinkers often pondered the morality of the individual as a distinct subject rather than as a citizen of the city-state, and his actions were placed within a much broader sphere of action: the divine cosmos. Within this new existential context, the household came to be seen less as generative of, or analogous to, the city-state and more as a microcosm that mirrored the larger order (or disorder) of the empire or cosmos. Discussions of the household by Peripatetic, Stoic, and Neo-Pythagorean philosophers emphasized the centrality of family relations, especially the reciprocal association between husband and wife, in both the formulation of community and the maintenance of cosmic order. For the Stoics in particular, family relationships were among the most essential forms of social bonds, and the life of a well-born, "good" man was only completed

through marriage and procreation. Moreover, Hellenistic thinkers widely perceived estate management as a distinct area of practical, personal ethics. According to a passage preserved by Arius Didymus in his Stoic anthology, the wise man is "both skilled in estate management and the acquisition of wealth" (Stobaeus, II.7, 11g). Consequently, the Hellenistic Mediterranean witnessed a fluorescence of treatises on household management, and the subject "concerning household management" became a popular *topos*. Xenophon and Aristotle remained influential (Aristotle's name and the title of Xenophon's treatise were attributed to three Hellenistic handbooks on household management, known collectively as the *Oeconomicus*). But the Hellenistic treatises charted new ground in their emphasis on the reciprocity of spousal relations, their focus on the perspective of the wife, and their presentation of household management as an expression of the householder's self-mastery (*sophrosyne*).

The Roman Household

Like the Greeks, the Romans conceived the household as a set of social relations organized around the nuclear family and its dependents and as an economic unit of production and reproduction. They also inherited many classical and Hellenistic ideas about the household, from its generative role as a building block of political society to the cosmic importance of its careful management by the householder, his wife, and their slaves. Not only did the late Republican statesman Cicero (106–43 BCE) translate Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* into Latin, but he also reiterated what had become a cultural axiom when he proclaimed that the household was the foundation of civil government and "the seedbed . . . of the state" (*On Duties,* 1.17.54). The *topos* "concerning household management" inspired distinctly Roman agronomical treatises (such as Cato's *On Agriculture* and Varro's *On Rural Matters*), while also influencing additional genres, like forensic oratory, where it came to function as a mode of political praise and invective (cf. Cicero, *Pro Caelio*). The Stoic moralization of household management was also phenomenally influential in Roman thought. To an even greater extent than their Greek counterparts, the Romans perceived household management as an index of the householder's moral status and, as such, a barometer of his ability to perform in the public sphere.

However, whereas the Greeks surely venerated ancestry and certainly perceived domestic life as inextricably linked to politics, the Romans arguably placed an even more explicit emphasis on the household in their formulations of power. Rome was not only a commonwealth (*res publica*); it was also "the fatherland" (*patria*), a nation of people who mythologized themselves as an ancient race of austere farmer-soldiers. "When our elders praised a good man," Cato the Elder (234–149 BCE) wrote, "'good farmer and good cultivator' is how they praised him" (*On Agriculture, praef.* 2). The cardinal Roman virtue of individual duty (*pietas*) was understood to have three overlapping domains: the state, the household, and the gods. In terms of cultural practice, the Roman household was perceived not as a refuge from public life but as a theater for its performance, and public officials regularly used their private homes as venues for the conduct of politics. The household was so central to the Roman worldview that it could be deemed sacrosanct, as it was the place where families worshiped their ancestral gods, who simultaneously watched over household and state (Cicero, *On His House,* 109, 144). For the Romans, the domestic sphere was neither merely parallel to nor (only) generative of the state, but continuous and coterminous with it.

For the first half millennium of its existence as a state (509–31 BCE), Rome was a republic, a quasi-democratic government organized around several citizen assemblies. However, in reality it was a state controlled in large part by a relatively small number of property owners and aristocrats. During the time of the republic, there were property qualifications for entrance and placement within one of Rome's assemblies (the *comitia centuriata*); military service also required a minimum net worth. The Senate, the primary political body in the republic, had no property qualifications for admission in this period, though such requirements would have been, in large part, redundant. Rome's richest households had long dominated the Senate, while the achievement of major public offices depended upon a great deal of personal wealth. Birth was also significant; senatorial families cited (real and fictive) aristocratic genealogies stretching back for generations. Although no single set of families ever monopolized

Rome's political institutions (indeed there was considerable turnover in this regard throughout Roman history) and the aristocracy was always in flux, aristocratic identity was effectively a requirement for senatorial membership. Ancestry was paramount in the Roman understanding of political authority: Lacking a codified constitution, the Romans typically invoked the "custom of the elders" (*mos maiorum*) as the litmus test for the legitimacy of political action or thought.

In conjunction with their emphasis on property ownership and family connection, the Romans had a unique legal and cultural understanding of the father and paternal authority. Many a Roman father was also a *paterfamilias* ("father of the family"), the term Roman legal sources used to denote the oldest male ascendant in a particular family, who theoretically exercised legal, social, and economic power over his descendents. "Paternal power" (*patria potestas*) technically gave a paterfamilias legal control over all property generated by, or bequeathed to, dependent family members, including, in some cases, their wives. Although Roman women could own and inherit property, their marriages during the republic were often conducted in a manner that legally transferred their dependence from their fathers to their husbands. (However, during the imperial period, this changed and most married women remained dependents of their fathers.) Paternal power also technically permitted a father to sell or abandon his children and, according to anecdotal traditions, to kill insubordinate children and immoral wives. Paternal power endured for the duration of the father's lifetime and thus applied to adult children who possibly had households of their own—a facet of social life that ancient observers perceived as peculiar to the Romans. However, given the relatively low age of death for Roman men, most adult children did not have living fathers to wield power over them. Moreover, while this authoritarian characterization of the paterfamilias is authentically Roman, recent studies have emphasized that the ancient sources more typically envisioned the paterfamilias as an estate manager, and not as a domestic despot. His domestic power was in essence legal and economic. Nevertheless, given the Roman privileging of the law and property ownership, patria potestas was a primary expression of authority for elite Roman men.

Rome's transition from republic to empire in the late first century BCE brought important changes in the conduct and conceptualization of political life, but the household remained central. Rome's first emperor, Augustus (31 BCE–14 CE), consistently drew upon domestic images, structures, and practices in order to present his autocratic power as "traditional" and hence legitimate. For example, Augustus reached back to the republican era and resurrected the office of the censor, a magistracy that was in part created by the Roman state to police the moral habits of its elite families through sumptuary laws. In addition to commissioning public monuments that portrayed him surrounded by family members (e.g., *Ara Pacis*), Augustus promoted himself as the ultimate guardian of the Roman household by legislating the severe punishment of adulterers in public courts, penalizing men and women who refused to marry, and offering financial and social rewards to households that produced many children. In many respects, his administration was an extraordinarily large, wealthy, and powerful household: He used his own slaves as his palace officials and created a successor by adopting Tiberius as his son and appointing him as heir. Toward the end of his reign Augustus received the epithet *pater patriae* ("father of the fatherland"), a title that all subsequent Roman emperors claimed. The emergence of a monarchical government thus produced a new Roman expression of domesticity, which presented the emperor as the world's householder and the empire as his household.

The Ancient Jewish Household

Like the Greco-Roman household, the Jewish household was experienced and perceived first and foremost as a socioeconomic institution, composed of people and property. Throughout the pre-exilic period (1200–586 BCE), most ancient Israelites lived as members of multigenerational, patrilocal households oriented around land ownership and agriculture. Households interrelated by blood and marriage in turn formed small settlements comprising members of a larger tribe or clan, who traced their lineage back to a single (real or fictive) common ancestor. Property was held by individual families and passed down through inheritance, preferably along the male line. Daughters could

inherit property only if they vowed to marry within the tribe. In fact, inheritance is the only legitimate form of property transmission described in the Hebrew Bible. Nevertheless, these family settlements were economically, socially, and religiously interdependent, often with their own priests and ancestral religious practices oriented around worship of Yahweh. To a certain extent, the rise of a centralized monarchy under David (c. 1000 BCE) discouraged extended family settlements and encouraged nuclear-familiar connections and religious worship oriented around the royal temple in Jerusalem. However, in terms of the ideological formation of ancient Jewish religious identity and theology, the household remained central.

Kinship affiliation (reckoned exclusively through the male line) and land were paramount in shaping how the early Israelites saw themselves as a distinct and divinely favored race. Genesis opens with a description of a primordial household (a man and woman), which gave rise to the myriad races that together make up humanity. Among them, God chose the household of Abraham and formed a covenant between him and his descendents (Gen. 15–22). Significantly, this covenant was expressed in terms of patrimony: In return for obeying God and moving his family to Canaan, God promised Abraham and his descendents the land before them, a promise that God fulfilled following the exodus of Moses and his household from bondage in Egypt (Gen. 24; Ex. 3:7–10; Duet. 15:4, 19:10, 25:19–26:1). In stark contrast to Greco-Roman conceptions of property ownership, ancient Jews believed that God—and not the individual householder—was the ultimate "owner" of all earthly land (Lev. 25:23). Consequently, the Israelites saw themselves as God's tenants, the heirs of a gift owned by God, which God could revoke if they proved faithless (Ps. 37; Jer. 2:7; Ezek. 38:16). Thus the Hebrew Bible frequently describes God as a father (or even a mother) and a householder, who procreated, nurtured, and educated his child Israel (depicted variously as both son and daughter). In this respect, ancient Jews conceived their religious identity in domestic terms, as the "household of Israel" (*bêt yisreal:* Ex. 16:31; Num. 20:29; Isa. 5:7; Hos. 1:4–6; 5:1) or the "house of God" (Ps. 67).

After 586 BCE, many ancient Jews were members of diasporic communities and typically lived in cosmopolitan cities scattered throughout the Mediterranean world. Consequently, they were exposed to other cultures, especially to Hellenistic practices and habits, which influenced their understandings and experiences of the domestic sphere. Philo of Alexandria (20 BCE–50 CE), for example, echoed Platonic traditions when he argued the politics and household management were virtually interchangeable (*Questions and Answers to Genesis,* 4.165), and his views about the gendering of household activities, with women in charge of its indoor administration, have their roots in the writings of Xenophon (*Special Laws,* 3.169–3.171). Flavius Josephus (37–c. 100 CE) clearly reflected Hellenistic and specifically Stoic ideals when he averred that the ideal statesman must be an expert in household management, "for a house is a city compressed into small dimensions, and household management may be called a kind of state management" (*The Life of a Statesman,* 38–39).

However, a diasporic experience meant that the Jewish conception and experience of the household remained varied. One of the most radical experimentations in ancient domestic life took place among ultra-ascetic Jews known as the Essenes. Although their precise living arrangements cannot be reconstructed, the comments of contemporary observers like Josephus suggest that some Essenes engaged in marital relations solely for the purposes of procreation (presumably maintaining continence for much of the time), whereas others seem to have rejected marriage altogether. There is some precedent for their attitudes toward marriage in Pythagorean and Cynic traditions, but their own texts show that the Essenes' rejection (or recalibration) of marriage was motivated by strong eschatological beliefs. Late antique rabbinic texts reveal stark differences in the ideology of marriage in various regions of the diaspora. On one hand, Palestinian rabbis, who were culturally Greco-Roman, presented a view of marriage that closely followed a Hellenistic paradigm, which posited marriage as the creation of a household that brought social respectability to the husband/householder and enabled him to participate in the larger civic body; on the other, Babylonian rabbis, who lived in more Persian-influenced areas, held a more ambivalent view of marriage, seeing it as "necessary evil" and as a means for men to channel their sexual urges so that they could focus their attention on the study of Torah.

The Early Christian Household

To a certain extent, early Christian households were products of these preexisting Greco-Roman and Jewish traditions. In the New Testament, the household represented the relationship between man and God. Jesus was not only a new Moses and the true teacher but also, in the words of the author of Hebrews, the "son in the house of God" (Heb. 3:1–6; cf. Mk 3:7–12; Lk 6:17–19). Paul and his later imitators pushed this image further still, by describing the Christian community as "the house of God" (*oikos theou*), characterized by social and spiritual unity (Eph. 2:19; I Peter 2:4; I Tim. 3:15). As historians have long noted, many of the earliest Christian communities actually assembled in households, though in certain respects this was more incidental than deliberate; as a foreign religious group, the followers of Christ had little choice but to meet in private spaces like houses or storefronts. Nevertheless, Paul (and his followers) frequently drew on the relations of the domestic sphere to forge what anthropologists call relations of fictive kinship: Paul commonly addressed his followers as "brothers" (I Cor. 1:10; Rom. 10:10) or as his "spiritual children," and in one passage he referred to himself as their "father through the gospel" (I Cor. 4:14–15). More importantly, Paul proclaimed that Christians were both "Abraham's offspring" and God's "adult heirs," who would legitimately inherit the promise of the covenant (Gal. 3:24–4:8; Rom. 4:13–16). This particular formulation exemplifies the manifold influences of Hebrew theology and Roman legal culture on the construction of the early Christian community as a household.

While Paul clearly envisioned the early Christian community as a spiritual household, his views on its earthly counterpart were far more ambivalent. In the Gospels, Jesus had proclaimed that all those who wished to follow him must leave their family and possessions behind—reject, in other words, the persons and property that traditionally constituted domestic life for most Jews, Greeks, and Romans (Mt. 10:34–9; Lk 14:25–33, 18:18–30). The eschatological orientation of both the Jesus movement and the Pauline communities of the mid–first century CE seems to have encouraged some early Christians to heed Jesus's call and renounce certain aspects of the household, especially marriage, marital relations, and the holding of private property. However, Paul's response to this radical social experimentation was inconsistent. Whereas he sometimes encouraged men to embrace continence within marriage and privileged celibacy (I Cor. 7:1, 6–7), he also reinscribed conventional Hellenistic codes of household conduct, such as the importance of reciprocity in the marital relationship, the subordination of wives to husbands, and the need for slaves to obey their masters (I Cor. 7:2–5, 14:34–5; Phil.; perhaps Col. 3:18–4:1, which may not be authentically Pauline).

Paul's ambivalence with regard to the household created the conditions for centuries of debate over precisely what constituted an ideal domestic Christian community: a version of the Greco-Roman model or a new form of society, based not on procreation and property ownership but on a mutual love of Christ and an ascetic commitment to the control of the passions? Proponents of the former penned the early second-century deutero-Pauline letters I Timothy, Titus, and I Peter, which present the traditional Greco-Roman household as the crux of the Christian community. Combining the Greco-Roman conceptualization of the household as a microcosm of society with the Judeo-Christian idea of the church as God's house, the authors formulated a series of household codes (the so-called *Haustafeln*). These codes were directly modeled on the Hellenistic ethical treatises "concerning household management." Using paraenetic language, the codes directed wives to be submissive their husbands, children to be dutiful to their parents, and slaves to be obedient to their masters (Titus 2:1–3:1; I Peter 2:18–3:7). They also rooted Christian clerical authority in household management: "For if a man does not know how to manage his own household, how can he care for God's church?" (I Tim. 3:5, on bishops). By presenting the Christian community as a well-ordered household, the writers endeavored to defend a fledgling Christianity from attacks that its members subverted the hierarchies of the household and consequently upset the ordering of the city, state, and cosmos.

Their anxieties were not unfounded. Like the Essenes, some early Christians experimented with alternative living arrangements. These ranged from a complete renunciation of private property

and domestic relations (especially sexual) to a more graduated balance between a traditional household and a more definitively ascetic institution. The second- and third-century *Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles* were influential in this regard. Many of these fictional narratives feature apostles who preach the rejection of marriage and sex and who encourage men—and especially women—to abandon their domestic roles and seek a new life as a disciple of Christ. By the fourth century, Christians could elect to live in a monastery instead of a classical household, where property was typically held in common and sexual relations were strictly forbidden. However, to a significant extent, these early monastic communities remained entwined with traditional domestic life. For example, many of the earliest female ascetic communities, such as the one founded by Gregory of Nyssa's sister Macrina (324–379 CE), were organized around the structures and rhythms of a typical aristocratic household. This alternative Christian domesticity became integrated with the traditional Greco-Roman value system of honor and status, wherein the household functioned as an index of its members' moral standing. Thus Jerome (347–420 CE) could boast that a young girl's perpetual virginity enhanced her family's nobility and public renown (*Letter,* 130.6). Moreover, early Christian fathers redirected the goals of household management: Traditionally aimed at the creation of self-sufficiency (for either the individual household or the larger community), *oikonomia* became linked in Christian discourses to the proper administration of ecclesiastical property, which was in turn to be used for assisting the poor (Basil, *Homilies on Wealth;* Jerome, *Letter,* 152.9).

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See also Ancestral Tradition (*Mos Maiorum*); Ancient Democracy; Aristotle; City-State; Empire; Gender; Plato; Property; Roman Law

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Humanism

Although the terms *humanist* and *humanism* are relatively recent (500 and 200 years old, respectively), humanist ideas, broadly understood as involving a positive approach to human existence and an appreciation of human endeavor, are much older, stretching as far back as the naturalist philosophers of ancient Greece and the Islamic Renaissance, as well as featuring in ancient Chinese thought, particularly that of Confucius. The basic principles of humanism—the recognition of the worth of all human beings and their thoughts and actions—have thus existed for as long as human civilization has existed. Although often used in vague or dismissive ways, an understanding of the term *humanism* is crucial for political theory: All forms of political philosophy and social organization depend explicitly or implicitly upon a theory of human nature and some idea of what human beings have in common and what they value. There have been many varieties of humanism, both religious and secular, although contemporary humanism is more frequently associated with atheism than with any particular form of religious belief. Debates about humanism in the twentieth century have caused, and continue to cause, much controversy, particularly in Marxist thought and European philosophy more broadly conceived. Although the term *humanism* has dropped out of favor for the most part, many thinkers continue to hold humanist ideas, regardless of whether they describe them as such. These ideas include believing in the moral worth of every human being, being committed to the idea that human beings can solve environmental crises through the application of science and technology, and demanding equality through the enforcement of human rights. On the other hand, others would describe themselves as antihumanists, either because they think that science has actually "de-centered" the human in favor of more fundamental entities, such as genes, or because humanism has been responsible for some of the more disastrous political projects of the past few centuries, for example, that human hubris has created threats to its own well-being through the invention of the atom bomb. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find a political theory that doesn't invoke a theory of human nature, regardless of how it conceives of that nature.

Ancient, Renaissance, and Enlightenment Humanism

The earliest kinds of humanism tended to stress the relationship between human beings and the natural world. Ancient Greek Atomism sought to place human beings in a naturalistic or protoscientific setting that made any resort to superstition or religion unnecessary. The life and death of human beings were understood to be part of a larger natural process of the coming together and dispersal of atoms, and death was nothing in particular to be feared, as it would merely involve a change in the arrangement of atomic particles. However, unlike in later forms of humanism, human beings were not the central focus of Atomist thought. Nevertheless, there was an ethical dimension to Atomist materialism and determinism that involved an idea of living in harmony with and understanding nature that prefigures certain later ideas of ecological and secular humanism. The work of many other Greek and Roman writers also contained humanist ideas, moral and scientific, and this tendency is often referred to as classical humanism. The Greek philosopher Protagoras (c. 490–420 BCE) claimed that "man is the measure of all things" while 500 years later, in the first century CE, the politician and philosopher Seneca declared, "Let us cultivate humanity." The naturalist approach of the ancient Greeks and the ethical imperatives of the Romans were to prove a valuable resource for later humanist thinkers, who often revisited and celebrated their ideas, in various scientific, educational, or ethical ways.

After a long, if not entirely bleak, period in which humanist ideas were mainly sidelined in favor of Platonic and Christian notions of the soul and the subordination of humanity to divine rule, the Renaissance saw a concern with mankind moved center stage, both cultural and intellectually. Although Renaissance thinkers did not use the word as we understand it today, core humanist ideas emerged in this period that express what we currently mean by the term. Renaissance humanism can be characterized by its overall optimism about human capabilities and a desire to strip religious and monarchical authorities and institutions of their supposedly divine power. Renaissance humanism took much of its cure from the Roman thinker Cicero (106–43 BCE) who had argued that *humanitas* (humanity) should involve the art of

living well through the study of the fine arts. Renaissance humanism should not be understood as a philosophy or as a coherent ideology, but rather as a cultural movement based on a particular kind of study. Those who had an education based on Greek and Latin classics were undertaking *studia humanitatis* (the study of the humanities). This is where we get the understanding of the discipline of humanities that persists in higher education to this day. As opposed to *studia divinitatis* (the study of divinity), humanities during the Renaissance involved an education in the following five areas: grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy.

The ideas of Renaissance humanism came to penetrate the wider culture, coming to influence the outlook of many professions, including law, science, and medicine. Many Renaissance humanists were perfectly happy combining their scholarly interests with an ongoing commitment to religious beliefs, so that one could be a "Christian humanist," for example, without contradiction. The broad influence of Renaissance humanism in turn filtered back to philosophical and political thought, where various ideas of human reason became the main focus of theoretical speculation.

The capacity or ability of humans to speculate about and come to understand themselves and the world through the power of thought is a very old idea. Ancient Greek philosophers were among the first to depend upon the idea that human beings could logically work through a claim about the world to test its veracity. From the end of the fourteenth century, notions of reason came to be seen as the best way to uncover the truth about the universe and to structure human communities. Among the first political thinkers to wrest the organization of society away from the grasp of religious and traditional authorities was Thomas Hobbes. Although Hobbes had a rather dim view of human reason, imagining that human beings in their natural state would behave like more like selfish animals that noble ethical beings, he nevertheless paved the way for the idea that human beings would use rational calculation in deciding how best to protect their interests. In doing so, he inaugurated the tradition of contractarianism, in which subjects of a state give up certain natural rights in favor of state protection and rights enshrined in law. Other contract theorists, such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, had a more optimistic notion of human nature, believing that rationality was a key feature in the way in which human beings organized themselves, with or without state intervention. Locke promoted the idea that unjustly treated subjects had a "right to rebel" if their reason was being insulted.

Alongside the increasing importance of reason for theories of political organization, philosophy, in general, came to place more emphasis on the link between reason and human nature. The scientific and intellectual revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gave much more prominence to humans and their abilities to manipulate, control, and understand the world. The Enlightenment thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sought to further stress the role of reason in their conceptions of human beings as autonomous, political, scientific, and moral agents. The French *libertins* and British freethinkers were increasingly skeptical toward anyone who claimed religious or preexisting moral authority, and even if they did not explicitly refer to themselves as humanists, their ideas shaped the practical consequences of the French Revolution, in which a republic that stressed the universality of mankind was established. The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, was also keen to stress the importance of rational critique to the Enlightenment, calling on his readers to dispense with "immaturity" and take up the challenge of daring to know for oneself. It should be noted, however, that for many of these thinkers, their humanist ideas were compatible with certain kinds of religious commitment. Many Enlightenment thinkers were Deists, which meant that they saw the natural world as separate from God and thus comprehensible according to its own laws, which were potentially discoverable by humans. Thus one could be committed to strong notions of human reason and capability while at the same time believing in a higher power. It is not until the nineteenth century that a clear link is made between humanism and secularism, even though we can see elements of this tendency from the very beginnings of ancient thought.

Ludwig Feuerbach: Father of Humanism

The word *humanism* came into its own in the nineteenth century and began to take on many of the

meanings, both negative and positive, associated with it today. German thinkers in the 1830s and 1840s, following Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who tried to systematically reconcile religious, political, and conceptual elements of human existence, were concerned almost exclusively with questions concerning man's anthropological status, his reason, and his political organization. It is in these thinkers, the so-called young and left Hegelians, that humanism began to be seen as diametrically opposed to religion and as a strong alternative philosophical and political position. Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) argued, extremely influentially, that man had alienated his own capacities and abilities into a perfected image of divinity, namely, the Christian God.

It is Feuerbach who first articulates the eminently human origins of religious belief and describes the processes by which mankind alienates itself from its real, practical concerns. It is Feuerbach, too, who breaks with the idea that philosophy must defend the status quo, whether it be the stranglehold of church authority or the dead weight of tradition. He places man at the center of his thought, not in order to assert our dominion over nature but to unite us in our shared identity as a thinking, living, creative species. Feuerbach's most important idea, as simple as it is ingenuous, is that, as he puts it, "the true sense of Theology is Anthropology." In other words, instead of looking to the heavens and the vagaries of religious belief in order to understand religion, we need to turn the question around: What is it in us that needs to believe? Why do we hanker after immortality? Why do we project all those things we admire in ourselves—the capacity to forgive, to create, to love—onto something transcendent we cannot see and cannot prove? Feuerbach's answer lies in demonstrating that every aspect of what we call God corresponds to some feature or need of human nature. We project human capacities on to something beyond because what we imagine is possible goes far beyond what we as individual mortal beings can achieve. As individuals we cannot possibly hope to achieve everything we can imagine, argues Feuerbach, but instead of assuming there must be an entity that is a perfect form of man (immortal instead of mortal, infinitely benevolent instead of petty, all-knowing instead of ignorant), we should reclaim these qualities from religion and understand them in their rightful place—as human ambitions, not godly attributes.

The publication of Feuerbach's major work, *The Essence of Christianity* (1841), which was translated into English by George Eliot (Mary Anne Evans), caused a scandal in Europe and helped many young atheists, anarchists, and communists (including the young Karl Marx) to formulate their opposition to church, state, and philosophical dogma. Feuerbach remained committed to his radical thesis and became even more practical in his later years as he attempted to prove that even the loftiest sentiments have their origins in more practical, human concerns, such as eating and the need for affection. He advocated a combination of rationalism and sensualism that took as its object not the fevered brain of the philosopher nor the fantasies of religion, but real living human beings, understood as a species, as a collective social and political subject. What Feuerbach ultimately proposes is a thorough examination of human nature, its needs, successes, and desires. It is only then, he argues, that we will have a complete "philosophy of the future." Feuerbach's ideas, and their incorporation and later rejection in the work of Marx, set the conditions for twentieth-century discussions of humanism and antihumanism. Even before these later attacks on humanism, and although he shares much of the content of Feuerbach's attack on religion, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) argued that humanism was just a new kind of religion, a belief in "Mankind," and should itself be overturned. Max Stirner (1806–1856) made a similar argument against humanism, arguing that terms such as *mankind* and *humanity* did not correspond to real entities and that we should begin instead with our *ego,* our individuality.

Twentieth-Century and Contemporary Debates Concerning Humanism

Following Feuerbach and other nineteenth-century figures, humanism is strongly associated with the denial of God and the criticism of institutionalized religions. Marx's claim that "religion is the opium of the masses" points to a more general suspicion that belief in another world prevents people from seeing this one clearly. Humanism thus takes on a political and often educational dimension—actively confronting superstition in all its dimensions and

seeking to establish the best possible life for as many people as possible, whether this be through science or policy. The rise in popularity of humanist weddings and funerals points to a growing interest in celebrating human life without reference to the divine. It should also be noted that humanists tend to affirm the equality of the sexes, which also accounts for some of their antipathy toward organized religion.

Nevertheless, in the twentieth century, various antihumanist streams emerged. Some of these concerned the use of terms such as *mankind* and *species-being* in the work of the early Marx. Louis Althusser argued in the mid-1960s that Marx's later writings, *Capital* in particular, did not take the autonomous human being as its primary social agent and that Marx was instead writing about larger, structural forces. Coming out of a different tradition, that of phenomenology, Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) argued that humanists failed to conceive of man profoundly enough, and humanism was too superficial a way of understanding man's mode of being. These various strands of philosophical and political antihumanism are influential today, and various mutations of the humanism-antihumanism debates of European thought of the 1960s and onward are still with us.

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See also Civic Humanism; Egalitarianism; Enlightenment; Subject

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Human Rights

Human rights entail two important types of claim: moral and political. Morally, they reflect the idea that all persons are (should be treated as) free and equal. Politically, they entail the demand that society be organized and power exercised in ways consistent with freedom and equality for all; in particular, they demand a society in which freedom and equality are realized through institutionally protected rights. One way in which human rights are protected is through law (and the rule of law); in this sense, human rights claims can also be legal claims, appeals for redress when institutionally recognized rights have been violated.

To characterize human rights principally as moral and political claims is to acknowledge their protean nature. Who counts as a "person"? What kinds of social arrangements are necessary to ensure the freedom and equality of those persons? Theorists and activists have given sometimes radically different answers to these questions over the past four centuries, and there remain no definitive answers. The origins, universality, philosophical foundations, nature, and content of human rights are all contested.

Origins

However changeable, human rights have, from the outset, been promethean in spirit. They originated in early modern Europe against the backdrop of a rigid feudal social order whose natural hierarchies of birth and status assigned each individual a relatively fixed place in society. Human rights were crucial in leveling these hierarchies, functioning as what Kenneth Minogue (1979) called "the leading edge of the ax of rationalism" (p. 356). That rationalism, articulated by thinkers in what is now identified as the liberal tradition and epitomized in the Enlightenment, began from the radical supposition that all men are naturally free and equal. There was no basis in nature for moral or political hierarchy. For Locke and for many of the philosophes, this radical notion, which would foment revolutions and topple monarchies, was expressed through rights—natural rights or the rights of man. By the end of the eighteenth century, world-shaking revolutions in British North America, in France, and in Haiti demonstrated vividly the power of this simple idea to upend the established order of things.

Human rights were subjected to significant criticism in the nineteenth century. Utilitarians and other legal positivists denied that there could be

any such things as rights that existed apart from the law. Conservatives in the Burkean tradition rejected the rights of man as too radical and socially disruptive, emphasizing the evolution of rights in particular social and cultural traditions. Karl Marx and many communists questioned what they called the "bourgeois" nature of rights, arguing that the illusion of political emancipation promised through rights fell far short of the human emancipation that would attend the overthrow of capitalism. Yet human rights did not wholly disappear from the political or philosophical landscape: Feminists, abolitionists, and others continued to appeal to and develop the idea. Moreover, human rights evolved in new directions through humanitarian projects like the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Geneva Conventions.

In the latter part of the twentieth century, after two horrific world wars, the idea again took up an important place on the world stage, thanks largely to the incorporation of human rights into the UN Charter. On December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; since then, human rights have developed rapidly into the dominant normative discourse of world politics.

One challenge to this story of origins has been mounted by defenders of human rights who see their origin in the West as an embarrassment for a doctrine with universal pretensions. They have argued that human rights ideas have antecedents or analogues in all of the world's cultures and traditions, that every society has an inherent notion of human dignity that makes human rights truly universal. Although human rights express a vision of human dignity, they cannot be equated with human dignity. Human dignity is an idea that comes in widely divergent forms: The medieval European idea of human dignity, for instance, was anchored in a divine world view that assigned everyone a place in a fixed hierarchy. Human rights express a particular vision of human dignity, one anchored in the idea that all people are free and equal. It is precisely because these notions conflict with most traditional social arrangements that human rights have proven so socially transformative.

Universality

Questions about the significance of human rights' Western origin also manifest in debates about their supposed universality. One significant criticism of human rights has been that they reflect a particular set of values that conflicts with many norms and traditions around the world. As an empirical claim this is certainly correct. The question is what to make of that fact. Cultural relativists take the moral position that a culture can only be judged according to its own values and standards, so they reject human rights as alien and therefore inappropriate outside the West. This view was vigorously expressed throughout the 1990s by defenders of the so-called Asian values thesis, which asserted in essence that Asians value community over individuality and are happy to sacrifice personal freedoms for the greater well-being and harmony of the whole.

Cultural relativism as a moral doctrine is problematic; as many critics have noted, it can quickly become self-contradictory (asserting, as a universal truth, that there are no universal truths) or self-defeating (asserting that cultural relativism is the one universal truth). More fundamentally, cultural relativist claims seem to rest on a category mistake, confusing human rights as moral and political claims about how things ought to be with descriptive claims about how things are. The conflict between existing social norms and arrangements—in early modern Europe as much as in contemporary Asia—results precisely from the promethean character of human rights.

It is a separate question altogether whether the values expressed in particular accounts of human rights are desirable and worth defending. What is not clear, however, is what the origins of human rights have to do with this question logically or morally. Clearly emphasizing the Western origins of human rights plays well politically for authoritarian leaders keen to justify their repressive regimes by denouncing human rights as the continuation of colonialism through other means—a charge not without some merit. And, as with most moral questions, there is room for serious debate about the values human rights express. It is reasonable to ask, for instance, whether human rights overemphasize individual freedoms to the detriment of community and collective well-being. But the mere fact that human rights attach or belong to individuals does not prove that they are destructive of community. On the contrary, every community has norms and rules governing relations and interactions among

its members. Conceived this way, human rights are an expression of the values of a democratic community, one that values freedom and equality for all its members. Whether these values are "universal" in an anthropological sense is, again, morally and politically independent of whether they have global appeal. There is little doubt that this transformative promise resonates globally, explaining human rights' wide appeal.

Philosophical Foundations

Questions about the universality of human rights are frequently confused with questions about their philosophical foundations, that is, with questions about the grounding or justification of human rights. Originally human rights were rooted in the natural law and natural rights traditions, justified by what looks to many contemporary critics like mere assertion: claims about reason, self-evidence, and the like. Today human rights are justified in many different ways—through moral constructivist arguments (Jack Donnelly, John Rawls), through interest-based theories (Joseph Raz), through appeals to autonomy (Alan Gewirth) or human capabilities (Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum) or through discourse ethics (Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib). This diversity of philosophical foundations can be seen as a weakness or a strength of the human rights idea. To some prominent scholars, the idea of an "overlapping consensus" on human rights, one in which different people endorse rights and the values animating them for their own reasons, is the best type of justification to be hoped for in a diverse world. Furthermore, as Jack Donnelly has argued, there is plenty of room within a "universal" concept of human rights for flexibility in their interpretation and implementation in different times and places. Still, disputes about the nature and content of rights remain politically important.

Some critics have gone so far as to question whether it really matters how human rights are justified; the lack of settled definitions or agreed foundations has not prevented real progress toward their realization. Indeed, Richard Rorty argues that human rights are not the kind of idea one can "get underneath"—they are useful and appealing in their own right, not because of some additional concept or principle separate from the values they express.

The Nature of Rights

The ontology of human rights is debated not just among moral and political philosophers but also among anthropologists, sociologists, and critical theorists, all of whom, in different ways, are concerned with the uses of human rights in the world—what Richard Wilson has called "the social life of rights." Sociologists and anthropologists tend to view rights from a social rather than a moral constructivist perspective, looking at how rights actually operate in particular societies. Often, they find, discourses of rights are deployed in ways that reaffirm powerful actors and interests and stabilize the existing social order. Similarly, some critical theorists see the operation of human rights internationally as an exercise of power, the iron fist of imperialism concealed in the velvet glove of rights talk. Still other critics view human rights as a form of "biopower" that invokes human need or powerlessness to trump or bypass politics.

Each of these approaches is useful in highlighting how rights operate in the real world of politics. Yet, proponents of these approaches have a tendency to ignore the normative appeal of human rights. Again, many of these critics make a sort of category mistake, jumping from the observation that rights can function in a certain way to the conclusion that the moral and political claims associated with rights are merely rhetoric or ideology. It is perfectly consistent—logically and with much of what we observe about the world—to argue instead that people find the moral and political values expressed through human rights appealing even though the discourse of rights is frequently abused in practice. That appeal consists in the promise of a decent life and represents another important fact about the social life of rights.

Content

That promise of a better life is linked to the protections against abuses of power, discriminatory treatment, and dependency that human rights prescribe. Yet the precise content of human rights remains a subject of controversy. Traditionally rights have been conceived as negative or positive. Negative rights supposedly require only that an actor—typically the state—refrain from violating them; positive rights supposedly require (extensive)

action on the part of the state for their realization. So, for instance, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest seems only to require that the government not arrest people arbitrarily, while the right to an education requires that the government set up and fund schools. Libertarians have long argued that only negative rights—traditionally civil and political rights, plus protection for private property—can be adequately justified, whereas positive rights—traditionally social and economic rights—violate the principle of individual self-ownership. In the context of the cold war, this distinction became conflated with Isaiah Berlin's idea of negative and positive freedom, which tendentiously associated the latter with totalitarianism. The notion was further entrenched in the quasi-historical language of "generations of rights," which identified civil and political rights as the first generation, social and economic as the second, and communal rights, including environmental rights and the right to development, as embryonic third generation rights.

The purported distinctions between positive and negative rights are difficult to maintain, though they have been slow to fade from popular and scholarly discourse on rights. Civil and political rights, such as the right to vote or to receive a fair trial, require precisely the types of affirmative government action supposedly unique to positive rights. Some critics have maintained that social and economic rights are not justiciable (translatable into law); this is false, although it is true that states have been slower to incorporate social and economic rights into law. Others have argued that it is more difficult to identify who bears the obligations corresponding to social and economic rights; this too is false—which is not to say that identifying the relevant obligations is easy. It is simply no harder than in the case of civil and political rights. My obligations in connection with your right to a fair trial are as obtuse as yours with respect to my right to adequate shelter. The solution to puzzles of this kind is typically to view the obligations associated with human rights as social or institutional obligations rather than interactional ones. Society has the obligation to see to your trial and my shelter, and it does so by creating institutions to secure rights and by spreading the burden of those rights on all the members of society in some equitable fashion.

The distinction between negative and positive rights is slowly being replaced by a common understanding of human rights as indivisible and interdependent. This view, affirmed in the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, emphasizes that the protection of each right is essential to the secure enjoyment of the others, both conceptually and practically. Working in this vein, scholars like Sen have stressed, for example, the importance of civil and political rights to successful, human-centered economic development.

Challenges

Today globalization raises important questions about the extent of human rights obligations. Are they limited to compatriots, or do they extend globally? Why? How can any global obligations be met effectively when world politics remains normatively and institutionally underdeveloped? Are human rights adequate to the challenges of the twenty-first century—globalization, terrorism, climate change? None of these questions has clear answers, though human rights figure prominently in debates about all of them and many others. The protean and promethean nature of human rights makes it likely that they will remain salient as humanity tackles these new problems.

Michael Goodhart

See also Cosmopolitanism; Crimes Against Humanity; Global Justice; Intervention

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Humboldt, Wilhelm von (1767–1835)

Wilhelm von Humboldt was an eighteenth-century Prussian political theorist and statesman. He is best known for his influence on John Stuart Mill, particularly Mill's third chapter of *On Liberty* (1869) and its discussion of the vital importance of liberty in relation to the cultivation of the ideal of individuality. A number of figures famous among the German Enlightenment of the period, including Goethe, Schiller, Gentz, and de Stael considered themselves to be friends of his, and his writings were influenced by them.

What is distinctive about Humboldt's liberalism? All liberal theories take seriously the notion of individualism—noting the physical separateness of persons, they consider individuals to be the appropriate unit of analysis from which to begin their analyses. However, individuality denotes something more than individualism, something special: It describes the *unique* qualities that combine to create a particular person in their most individual—unique—form. Achieving individuality was the ideal to which Humboldt devoted his life, propagating a romantic vision as he cultivated the development of his own free, beautiful, many-sided personality. In fact, one of the striking facts about Humboldt's life is that he lived according to the ideals that he espoused. Individuality he understood in terms of the notion of *Bildung*—the complete and all-around development of a person's inner capacities and inclinations, which, for Humboldt, represented the highest humanist aspiration. A polymath, Humboldt had a keen interest in numerous subjects, including ancient philosophy, linguistics, aesthetics, travel, history, politics, and education. Such breadth of learning was entirely consistent with his theory and he lived as an exemplar of it.

Humboldt's type of liberal political theory is variously described as aesthetic liberalism or romantic liberalism. It combines an ambitious and comprehensive moral or aesthetic theory with a cautious political theory. Containing perfectionist and expressive ideals, it shares elements with aristocratic liberal theories insofar as it encourages the pursuit of excellence thorough the cultivation of heroic virtues and strenuous actions. However, Humboldt, like Mill after him, maintained that it was an ideal that was open to all, albeit to varying degrees.

The theory is grounded in a certain view of human nature. Humboldt (1969) maintained, "To inquire and to create—these are the centres around which all human pursuits more or less directly revolve" (p. 76). And "the highest ideal . . . of the coexistence of human beings seems to me to consist in a union in which each strives to develop himself from his own nature and for his own sake" (p. 13).

But it is not an antisocial ideal—far from it. In *The Limits of State Action* Humboldt (1969) describes how individuality is cultivated alongside other many-sided personalities: "Men are not to unite themselves in order to forgo any portion of their individuality, but only to lessen the exclusiveness of their isolation; it is not the object of such a union to transform one being into another, but to open communication between them" (pp. 27–28).

Humboldt's ideas, and especially his antipathy to excessive state control, have sometimes caused him to be characterized as an "unpolitical political theorist" or even as some sort of anarchist. However, this does him a disservice. He was not an anarchist theoretically or professionally. (In fact, he spent many years in public service as a diplomat and later as an administrator, creating the University of Berlin.) At the same time, he did not believe that political activity was conducive to the cultivation of individuality. Rather, one's development occurred under the protection of the state but otherwise apart from it, within civil society. Humboldt was an idealist who championed a variety of human flourishing that required

maximal freedom and therefore a strictly limited role for the state (a "night watchman state") for its achievement.

Unlike many contemporary classical liberal and libertarian theorists, J. W. Burrow says Humboldt was less concerned about the state's incompetence than its ability to turn men into one-sided, machine-like slaves, robbed of their "vital energies," creativity, and multifaceted personalities. In other words, he feared its denial of individuals' true nature, as he saw it. This is because the state operates through procedures of formal rationality, so it will always do violence to the complexity and richness of human experience. According to Humboldt (1851/1969), "A State, in which the citizens were compelled or moved . . . to obey even the best of laws, might be a tranquil, peaceable, prosperous State; but it would always seem to me a multitude of well-cared-for slaves, rather than a nation of free and independent men, with no restraint save such as was required to prevent an infringement of rights" (p. 79).

Humboldt is best known for the short book, *The Limits of State Action,* but he also wrote a piece on constitutions, "Ideas on the Constitutions of the States, Occasioned by the New French Constitution" (1789). Although he tended to focus his attention on ideals rather than institutions, Humboldt mentioned in *The Limits* that he preferred monarchical government to republics. This is because throughout history, monarchies had treated the state as a means to secure freedom, whereas republics had considered the state to be an end in itself.

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See also Liberalism; Romanticism

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Hume, David (1711–1776)

David Hume was a British philosopher, historian, and essayist. He wrote no single treatise on political theory; his views on that subject appeared instead throughout his works on philosophy (*A Treatise of Human Nature, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*); economics, morals, and other subjects (the *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*); and history (the multivolume *History of England*). An older view of Hume that exaggerated his skepticism—real enough in Hume's writings on religion and, more ambiguously, epistemology, but absent from his political writings—has yielded in recent decades to a fuller picture that stresses Hume's original and lasting contributions to jurisprudence, theories of political legitimacy, the analysis of political party and faction, and what would come to be called coordination. This entry stresses those areas, although Hume's contributions to other fields—economics, the philosophy of religion, epistemology, esthetics, ethics, cultural anthropology, and English historiography and biography—were substantial.

Jurisprudence

Hume's most systematic treatment of political theory occurs in his *Treatise of Human Nature* (recast, with greater clarity but some loss of detail and sophistication, in *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*). This work aims to treat the "science of man," that is, the nature and origin of humans' understanding, passions, and moral sentiments, and its treatment of substantive political questions are often meant to illustrate these larger theoretical issues. Hume's treatment of political justice is concerned above all with its origins or

foundations. For Hume, family feeling and other private sentiments such as gratitude are natural—in an empirical rather than a teleological sense; we observe them everywhere. Justice, however, is not natural but artificial, as are two other crucial political and social virtues, fidelity to promises and allegiance to government. Although Hume's argument is complex, a few aspects may be highlighted. First, justice (which, for Hume, like many of his contemporaries, meant almost exclusively the laws and conventions surrounding property and its transference by consent) does not track our sentiments of natural virtue. By nature we are partial—we favor ourselves, our friends, and our near relations over strangers—and the result of these naturally partial sentiments is not justice but the opposite: clannish parochialism and, at the extreme, social strife. John Rawls has stressed this part of Hume's argument ("limited benevolence"), but Hume equally stresses justice's collective and systematic character, which renders it contrary to our benevolent sentiment in many individual cases. For example, when we return property to a rich miser instead of bestowing it on a virtuous pauper, the immediate act rewards badness. But the overall system of property and contract laws is advantageous to both society as a whole and every individual living under it—the latter being the original motive, the former an aftereffect that we can see in hindsight. (Many different systems of property law will do equally well, provided that we choose one that tracks our likely mental patterns, allowing for its easy, habitual adoption.)

Hume argues that the "interested passion" for acquisition—our "interest," for short—is, on an "enlarged" or sophisticated understanding, better served by observing the laws of property (and supporting their enforcement against others) than by flouting them. Our interested motives for recognizing systems of justice are further extended through sympathy—in early Hume this means a tendency to adopt others' sentiments; in late Hume, something more like humanity, a sentiment that leads us to promote human happiness generally—through which, in either case, we identify with the usefulness of these virtues to others. Although the role of sympathy in Hume's argument is not fully consistent, he most commonly and most persuasively portrays it as too weak and contingent to motivate individual acts of justice (especially since such are not publicly useful), but strong enough to reinforce our attachment to systems of justice—as well as fidelity and political allegiance—once they are already in force. Wise political rulers and writers will work on our sympathy to reinforce these attachments and the artificial virtues that arise from them.

Unlike some predecessors who stressed justice's artificial quality (e.g., Thomas Hobbes, who thought sovereigns defined justice through their will, or Bernard de Mandeville, who thought politicians' "artifice" could easily manipulate sentiments to the public advantage), Hume recognizes serious limits to what political manipulation could durably accomplish. The objects of human passions are diverse, but their limits are durable. The artificial virtues are "laws of nature" in the sense of being everywhere useful and formally similar. Every peaceful and prosperous society must have some form of property, promising, and political allegiance. Magistrates over time are able to enforce rules of justice and allegiance only to the extent that these plausibly track our individual and common interests. They can "extend the natural sentiments beyond their original bounds; but still nature must furnish the materials."

Hume never portrays human beings as acting on narrow self-interest. Despite occasionally using the language of selfishness, self-interest, or self-love, Hume much more consistently attributes our need for justice to our natural *partiality* rather than egotism. And he writes extensively and with scorn against reductionistically egoistic theories of human nature. To be sure, from the perspective of contemporary metaethics, Hume's account of partiality may make him seem egoistic in comparison to accounts that start with impartiality (and Hume would not have contested that assessment: He believes that impartiality must be promoted by institutions and education and is not among our natural motives). It is on the level of political and historical explanation that the difference between Hume's account and an egoistic one becomes clear. The triumph of justice requires the transcendence not of atomistic individualism but of substate political allegiances: clan, religion, feudal ties.

For Hume, the virtues of justice, fidelity, and allegiance vindicate not natural rights but a triumph over natural deficiencies. They alone provide the "security," "ability," and "force" that let us

accomplish more than animals. By force Hume means the large-scale projects made possible by collective effort; by ability he means, much before his friend Adam Smith developed the idea, the specialization that "partition of employments" enables. The practice and praise of these virtues do not require much in the way of self-sacrifice or altruism, because the resulting social system enables us all to acquire and keep much more property than we would hold in their absence (i.e., in a purely hypothetical "state of nature"). In his *Essays* and *History,* Hume suggests that even apparently noninstrumental goals, like military glory and artistic expression, are far easier to achieve in a prosperous and ordered regime in which the fruits of one's endeavors can be preserved and improved upon on an ever larger scale.

Authority and Legitimacy

Hume wrote that all government was founded on opinion—even tyrannies, on the opinion of the tyrant's guards. In his time, two theories of legitimacy were prevalent: the Tory doctrine of passive obedience to government and the whig social contract doctrine. Hume opposed his own theory, that is, that the reasons for allegiance involved common and universal advantage, against both—though spending much more time on the whig doctrine as more popular and more theoretically serious.

That the social virtues are artificial and instrumental leads Hume to the conclusion that they cease to be virtues when they no longer serve individual or collective interests. In a famine we neither do, nor should, observe laws against stealing grain. Likewise, under an "egregious," "grievous," or "flagrant" tyranny (which Hume never defines and of which he gives very few examples, but his implied standard is that the tyranny must be so severe as to render the presence of governmental authority less advantageous to subjects than its absence), subjects rightly regard their allegiance as dissolved. Tory passive obedience culpably ignores this, which is why even Tories abandoned it, Hume notes, in the Glorious Revolution. However, because Hume thinks that cases of egregious tyranny are both very rare and obvious to ordinary political actors when they do occur, extended treatment of the exceptions will, Hume thinks, distract from the project of stressing government's usual and immense advantages. Hume therefore deliberately and explicitly refrains from discussing the case—a stance that Henry Sidgwick will later endorse, adopting Hume's reasons.

Whig social contract theory is the more extended target of parts of Hume's *Treatise,* of his *History,* and of his influential essay "Of the Original Contract." Although he admits that primitive societies might originate in explicit consent, Hume doubts the normative relevance of this (because fidelity to promises is just as "artificial" and social a virtue as allegiance); questions the extent to which political arrangements, or changes in such arrangements, can be said to involve consent in large, complex societies; and stresses the elements of manipulation and propaganda in all existing claims to govern by consent. All existing governments must rest their claim to rule on their advantages as compared to actual and achievable alternatives. Because predictably stable alternatives to existing regimes are rarely on offer—the path toward them involving extreme uncertainty and likely civil war—almost all governments, including modern legal or "civilized" monarchies as well as well-designed republics, are legitimate. Toward Britain's mixed form of government in his time, Hume's stance is equivocal. He prizes the exceptional liberty it allows but doubts its stability.

Problems of disputed or uncertain legitimacy (succession disputes or arguments over constitutional precedent, prerogative, and parliamentary privilege) raise special problems for Hume in his *History* and his essay "Of the Protestant Succession." In such cases, both parties of a dispute can claim to be observing settled customs and to be maintaining the established government against those who recklessly risk losing its advantages. When neither side's claim (based on heredity, long possession, present possession, popularity, or other customary sources that subjects durably and in large numbers find plausible) clearly predominates, the question is genuinely difficult and civil war may be the result; this is a large part of Hume's explanation for both the English Civil War and the Wars of the Roses. Once such struggles have been settled with the clear victory of one regime or claimant, that victor—along with the accustomed allegiance to that claimant or regime that grows along with that long possession—eventually settles the issue given the disruptions likely

to follow upon any challenge. Thus the Jacobite (Stuart) challenge to the Glorious Revolution settlement of 1689, though not implausible right after the revolution, was wholly irresponsible by the late 1740s. Likewise, Cromwell was a usurper in his time, but if he had founded a dynasty, it would later, and in retrospect, have been legitimate.

Hume's theoretically consistent but politically flexible doctrine—which both excuses those who hold to regimes or orders that seem customary at the time and advocates acceptance of new regimes once they prove stable and long-lived—causes him to take a complex, dynamic approach to political ethics and historical interpretation. It leads him to praise, for instance, both Charles I's character in defending the legitimate royalist order as he saw it and the constitutional changes forced through by his parliamentary opponents, which in the event proved salutary and consistent with a changing society. From Hume's time to the present, these subtleties have often escaped, not to mention frustrated, those hoping to apply to politics' moral or partisan standards less dependent on circumstance.

Party and Faction

While the pernicious effects of party (or interchangeably "faction") and their management are a pervasive theme in Hume's *Essays* and *History,* his overall conclusions are hard to summarize. Hume distinguishes between personal factions, that is, alliances among pure power seekers, and "real" factions involving some substantive difference of interest, principle, or affection. Hume regards factions of interest as understandable and forgivable and the proper subject of institutional design to mitigate their effects. (Hume's short remarks on this almost certainly influenced Madison's fuller treatment.) Parties from affection, based on attachment to particular leaders, are in a sense irrational given that these figures cannot possibly be the intimately known, personal friends that we imagine them to be, but Hume admits that party feelings arising from such grounds are both common and durable. Parties of principle Hume regards as a modern invention, unknown in the ancient world and initially arising out of sectarian religious strife and its aftereffects. Where political struggles involve such parties, Hume apparently sees no simple method for disarming them (except, perhaps, a withering of the underlying religious or quasi-religious doctrines for which their partisans wage offensive and defensive strife). Several scholars, especially Jennifer Herdt and Donald Livingston, have noted that Hume's treatment of these matters anticipates later ages' vicious clashes of mass ideological parties and movements.

Hume stresses the tendency of party conflicts, regardless of origin, to spin out of control through the effects of redoubled group sympathy and lack of cross-party social ties. Over time, conflict itself hardens animosities, and partisans' judgment of the other party's intentions or motives becomes warped; each side comes to fear spurious (but self-fulfilling) threats from the other. Hume's concern with these phenomena must cast doubt on attempts to associate him with strong versions of the "rational choice" claim that humans act rationally and instrumentally—though he clearly adhered to, and help found, a milder version of this school.

Coordination

Several commentators on Hume—David Gauthier, F. A. Hayek, David Miller, and most recently and thoroughly, Russell Hardin—have noted, for the most part independently and using different theoretical languages, that Hume's account of politics represents what we now call a theory of coordination (in Thomas Schelling's language, roughly though not fully equivalent to what David Lewis calls convention). Because the social and political institutions that we have an interest in supporting are advantageous not individually but collectively, which institutions deserve our support depends on which institutions everyone else believes, or can be brought to believe, deserve *their* support.

Seeing Hume's theory in coordination terms brings together many aspects of Hume's political thought that have often been noted but have proven hard to explain or situate within other theoretical frames. These include Hume's conviction that a variety of regimes are equally legitimate if perceived as such; his determination that different religions are best suited to different regimes; his short and sketchy treatment of magistrates and sovereigns, which play much less of a role if society is a coordination problem than if it is a prisoner's dilemma requiring outside enforcement; his stress

on custom, long possession, and the presence or absence of "settled" or "established" regimes as crucial criteria of justified allegiance; his dynamic theory of political ethics, which can be seen as reflecting shifts from one coordination or focal equilibrium to another; his foundation of political authority on passive (but willing) acquiescence to already imposed settlements rather than active consent to new ones; and his embrace of second-best solutions and suspicion of "projectors" who seek to maximize public good at the cost of stability.

This approach also explains why those who see in Hume's conventions a proto-Burkean deference to tradition or ineffable cultural *Volksgeisten* are probably wide of the mark. Hume defends adherence to current equilibria on broadly utilitarian—but nonmaximizing—grounds. Tradition, in the nonmystical sense of broadly (and perhaps falsely) recognized precedent, plays a strong role in coordinating our actions but is only one source of coordination among many. Hume is perfectly willing to embrace new settlements, even those involving quite radical change, once they have proven themselves a substantive improvement on the old ones and have won general support.

Political Positions

In his own time, Hume's critique of "true" or "old" whig doctrines (the social contract, the ancient constitution) led him to be labeled a Tory; as a defender of constitutional liberty, he called himself a skeptical whig. Current scholars variously label him a conservative or a moderate liberal, depending on how they choose to define those anachronistic terms. As noted earlier, his constitutional conservatism is based on utility rather than mystical reverence for the past (a reverence which his *History* mocked at length and with glee). On matters of sex, social custom, and rank, Hume is largely conventional but, again, utilitarian, and often irreverent toward those who adduced religious or traditional grounding for social conventions. He judges a wide variety of social conventions equally acceptable where they are—and provided that they are—commonly understood and accepted, as long as their consequences were not naturally and predictably contrary to our interests. He suggests that fornication is always a poor idea but that adultery may be another matter; his infamous defense of a double standard toward female chastity is clear enough but probably inconsistent with his nonchalance toward French gallantry. In foreign policy, Hume is a consistent advocate of peace, a critic of the anti-French (and later, anti-Scottish) bigotry common in England in his time, and an unusually fervent opponent of the public debt that Britain had incurred through its wars.

Reception and Significance

Hume's reception in his time differed greatly from his appropriation by political philosophers in modern times. John Rawls and his school have stressed Hume's theory of how moral sentiments develop and may be "modified and corrected" through reasoned critique; these topics, though certainly present in Hume's *Treatise* and other works, were tangential to his main arguments and barely noticed by either Hume's supporters or his critics. Hume's irreligion, expressed both in occasionally explicit jibes against Christianity and indirectly through his secular, nonprovidential theoretical perspective, was much more striking in his day than today, to the point of doing Hume demonstrable professional and social harm (most notably, his being denied a chair at Edinburgh). His refusal to attribute cosmic purposes to historical processes strikes some even now as bearing too little consolation. Hume's refutation in the *History* of the ancient constitution theory of English liberties was of great importance in his time, but his conclusion that liberty requires modern, uniform systems of law and their efficient application by strong states seems, except perhaps in the United States, unexceptional today.

Hume's method and conclusions set him off sharply from the rest of the Scottish Enlightenment, histories of which often resort to naming Hume an embarrassing exception. Hume's antiteleological and antiprovidential approach to both morals and politics directly contradict (and, historically, offended on moral grounds) moral sense theorists such as Francis Hutcheson with whom casual scholars often associate Hume, as well as Scottish natural law theorists before and after Hume's time. As for political and historical explanation, Hume stresses the important role of circumstance and social and political context in evaluating individual choice, but never embraces determinism

and eschews easy doctrines of progress. The "four-stage" theory of progress from savagery to commercial society, common in many Scottish Enlightenment writers, and sometimes considered a hallmark of their work, is all but absent from his work.

Whereas Hume's influence on utilitarian thinkers and reformers from Bentham forward is undoubted, Hume is almost certainly not a utilitarian in the sense of seeking a single aggregative and hedonistic metric for evaluating states and actions. This has resulted in Hume's relative neglect among those who look to utilitarianism to provide such a metric. On the other hand, Hume's reasoned disbelief in anything approximating Christian—or proto-Kantian—accounts of autonomy and of intellectualism in practical philosophy have led him to be treated as a merely transitional figure by historians of ethics who see Kant as a necessary stage of progress or who see the task of theory in Kantian terms. Immanuel Kant, while famously admitting that Hume's skeptical treatment of cause and effect "interrupted [his] dogmatic slumber" and profoundly altered the direction of his metaphysical inquiries, took essentially nothing from Hume's moral and political thought. Likewise, Adam Smith, Hume's great friend, drew inspiration from some of Hume's economic ideas but differed profoundly with Hume on questions of morals, law, and social order.

For these reasons—as well as the lack of a single volume containing Hume's overall political theory and the strong role that coordination theory (little understood until recent decades) plays in his explanations—Hume's political theory has never been as canonical as his philosophy. As coordination theories receive further attention, and matters of party and religion continue to frustrate the theories of many prevalent schools, this status may be changing.

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See also Authority; Commerce; Enlightenment; Justice, Theories of; Legitimacy; Scottish Enlightenment; Social Contract Theory

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HYBRIDITY

Hybridity refers to a composite form of existence and new mode of being resulting from processes of physical, cultural, or geopolitical mixture. It derives etymologically from the Latin word *hybrida,* meaning the offspring of a wild boar and a tame sow. The discourse on hybridity originated in eighteenth-century botanical studies, became central to nineteenth-century zoological analyses, and entered subsequently into human debates concerning biology, the origin of the species, colonial desires, and social Darwinist arguments surrounding racial difference.

The resurgence of discussions on hybridity developed in the second half of the twentieth century with the rise of postcolonial studies and critiques of globalization, cultural imperialism, and the nation-state. Instead of locating hybridity within a biological framework of fixed races and ethnicities, theorists reconfigured hybridity as a political notion and rejected essentialist ideas of race in favor of cultural explanations for multiple influences on an agent. Homi Bhabha's essays and his book *The Location of Culture* (1994) marked a pivotal shift to this latter understanding.

Hybridity provides an integral conceptual intervention that cuts across three prominent intellectual currents in contemporary political theory: the politics of identity, the politics of difference, and the politics of recognition. The politics of identity is associated with post–second wave feminism, critical race theory, gay and lesbian rights activism, and movements seeking to ascertain the essential meaning of the "I" and the individual's place in late modern societies. Iris Marion Young's introduction of the politics of difference emerged as a postmodern tendency aiming to theorize difference and justice among oppressed groups without collapsing

into either essentialist identity politics or the distributive paradigm of John Rawls. Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth, and scholars promoting a neo-Hegelian politics of recognition articulate an alternative third category in order to devise strategies for increasing the public inclusion of groups disavowed within hegemonic cultures. Multiculturalism is exemplary of this turn.

Theorists of hybridity, including Bhabha, Stuart Hall, Édouard Glissant, Paul Gilroy, Nestór García Canclini, and Gayatri Spivak, incorporate perspectives from the aforementioned currents. However, they contend that hybridity pertains to areas beyond those models. Creolization, *métissage, mestizaje,* subaltern studies, and border life are also components of hybridity. Morever, hybridity allows for what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls the provincializing of Europe—a postcolonial mode of thinking that simultaneously brackets Enlightenment universal conceptions of reason and culture and acknowledges ongoing cross-cultural forms of mixture and subjectivity formation inside, as well as outside of, Europe. Postcolonial political theory and the burgeoning field of comparative political theory utilize the idea of hybridity to de-center, reorganize, and expand the boundaries of canonical thought and action.

Critics of hybridity argue that the term has a rhetorical cosmopolitan appeal while failing to address the continued existence of racism, homophobic violence, xenophobic nationalism, and antifeminist initiatives. Supporters respond that it is only by embracing an agent's multiple influences that any single or composite identity and social movement can gain leverage in the political realm.

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See also Identity; Multiculturalism; Politics of Recognition; Postcolonialism; Race Theory; Subaltern

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I

Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406)

The name Khaldūn (meaning eternal or immortal) seems fitting for a scholar who immortalized a theory of world history, its vicissitudes and its connection with ancient Arabia. Ibn Khaldūn was not just an intellectual. He pursued many careers, from being the official document signer (*Ṣāḥib al-'Alāma*) and a secretary under the Ḥafsid dynasty, to heading political missions for the Marīnids and working as a Mālikī judge and professor in Egypt. He was even interviewed by the great fourteenth-century Tartar Emperor Tamerlane. As is the case with most great intellectuals, the verdict on his scholarship has been mixed. While some referred to Ibn Khaldūn as *walī al-dīn* (guardian of the religion), the prominent fourteenth-century Mālikī judge Muhammad ibn Arafa al-Warghamī apparently stated that he lost all respect for the office of the jurist when Ibn Khaldūn was made one (Rosenwald, 1967, p. lvi). We might wonder if such contempt for Ibn Khaldūn came from his creative development of traditional sciences and political categories, which called into question the work of prior historians, as well as scholarship in the Islamic sciences.

Integrating Philosophy and History to Correct Mistakes in Intellectual and Religious Sciences

In his work the *Muqaddima* (or *Introduction*), Ibn Khaldūn develops what he calls a new science for discerning why dynasties rise and fall. Whereas Aristotle argues that *logos* distinguishes man from other animals, Ibn Khaldūn finds that it is man's sciences (which he cultivates through using logos) that make him unique. Drawing on his own unique human capacity, Ibn Khaldūn introduces a new science that bridges philosophy with history in the *Muqaddima*. In the *Muqaddima,* Ibn Khaldūn argues that history must be joined with philosophy to uncover the inner meaning of history. He develops this approach and offers evidence to support it in several volumes, called the *Kitab 1-'Ibar* (or *The Book of Evidence*). He begins the *Muqaddima* by criticizing existing works of history. Ibn Khaldūn argues that historians have misunderstood the underlying basis for world events because they have not analyzed how and why events occur. He suggests that this new science, in which philosophy uncovers the meaning of history, will help historians to stop blindly copying the work of earlier scholarship. Such reproduction leads historians to confuse the essential and accidental conditions for world events. Ibn Khaldūn argues that:

> . . . They presented historical information about dynasties and stories of events from the early period as mere forms without substance . . . as knowledge that must be considered ignorance, because it is not known what of it is extraneous and what is genuine. (Rosenthal, 1967, p. 7)

This criticism, however, is not just an attack on historians. It is leveled at commentators of the

Qur'an and ḥadīth transmitters (those who transmit the sayings and actions of the prophet) also, who do not analyze what they translate. Like earlier historians, these scholars did not use philosophy to challenge their historical assumptions or insights. In this way, they strayed from the truth and committed numerous errors based on false assumptions. This concern about rote replication of preexisting ideas relates to Ibn Khaldūn's broader statements about social decline, which arises (in part) from a lack of innovation and a trend toward imitating the ideas of earlier figures without questioning their positions. This decline is part of a cyclical theory of world history that Ibn Khaldūn develops, in which he transforms Qur'anic terminology and infuses new meaning into political concepts.

Fraternity (*'Aṣabīya*) and Political Authority (*Mulk*) in World History

In Ibn Khaldūn's theory of history, there is a tension between the human traits of fraternity, communal altruism, and solidarity on one hand, and those of individual desires for personal political authority, the acquisition of luxury goods, and a life of ease on the other. These different sorts of traits, from altruism to narcissism, correspond with different phases in the life span of a dynasty. A dynasty lives for three generations, roughly 120 years. One generation is equivalent to the life of a person. Like a person, the dynasty ages from the vitality and purity of a child to the senility and fatigue of a geriatric. Ibn Khaldūn contrasts the early members of a dynasty (a nomadic, Bedouin population concerned with the survival of its community) with those in the later phases of a dynasty (a sedentary group preoccupied with luxury goods and superficial desires).

He presents the early population, the Bedouin or Arab population, as the essence of Arab civilization. To Ibn Khaldūn, the Bedouins represent the purest and most natural form of Arab civilization that is the closest to being *good*. He likens their nature to that of the soul of a child, untarnished by age or experience. These individuals are motivated by feelings of *'aṣabīya* (characterized as fraternity, or a desire to help one's community).

As members of the dynasty age, they acquire greater authority or *mulk* and wealth. With its wealth and power, the group settles in a given location and builds a grander civilization, equipped with a system of law that insures the protection of the people. They build a military that provides for the defense of the community, which people no longer need to provide for themselves. Ibn Khaldūn suggests that these laws and the military prevent people from thinking and acting for themselves, engendering laziness and decreased vitality for the community. The leader becomes progressively concerned with his own well-being and less so with the needs of his people. Mulk, which Ibn Khaldūn depicts as the *telos* of *'aṣabīya*, comes to supplant the altruism that the leader once felt for his people. Members of the dynasty grow to forget about the meaning of *'aṣabīya*, and as a result, the dynasty grows weaker in its senility.

Ibn Khaldūn depicts *'aṣabīya* as the foundation for Arab civilization. *'Aṣabīya* is the normative glue that unites members of a dynasty. It is also what causes nascent dynasties to rise up and conquer those that are in decline. This understanding of *'aṣabīya*, however, goes against more traditional notions of the term. In the ḥadīth, *'aṣabīya* is a pejorative concept of tribalism, linked with the tribes of pre-Islamic Arabia. It is depicted as antithetical to Islamic notions of justice and fraternity. Ibn Khaldūn renders this concept compatible with Islamic notions of community and solidarity. Relating to the Greek notion of friendship or the Christian notion of love, *'aṣabīya* is an altruistic willingness to fight and die for one's community, to insure its survival. Ibn Khaldūn presents *'aṣabīya* as the conceptual antinomy of mulk or secular authority that leads to dynastic demise.

A scholar who articulated a new science that welds history with philosophy, who declared the foundation for Arab civilization, and who articulated a theory of world history, Ibn Khaldūn challenges us to expand our understanding of political theory: For him it was more than just a contest between tradition and innovation or between history and philosophy. Political theory emerges as a posture toward politics, where we consistently ask what perennial trends exist in a world so characterized by historical flux and uncertainty.

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See also Friendship; Natural Law; Polybius

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Ideal Type

The *ideal type* is a strategy of concept formation for the social sciences formulated by Max Weber at the beginning of the twentieth century. An ideal type is not a direct reflection or description of empirical reality. Instead, it is an abstract analytical construct that individual empirical cases approximate or diverge from in different ways and to varying degrees. The description and explanation of individual empirical cases is aided by comparing those cases to the ideal type, identifying the points of their divergence, and accounting for this divergence. Since its formulation by Max Weber, the ideal type has been the subject of many philosophical and methodological debates, as well as manifold applications in empirical research. In its basic characteristics, however, the ideal type has not undergone any significant changes since Weber's time.

The ideal type methodological strategy embodies a distinctive philosophical position regarding the character and limitations of the human or social sciences. Specifically, the ideal type emerged out of Weber's attempt to strike a middle path between nomothetic and idiographic conceptions of scientific inquiry and concept formation. In the methodological and epistemological debates at the turn of the twentieth century, the nomothetic approach understood social as well as natural science to be concerned with formulating general laws and abstract concepts embodying those laws. The idiographic approach, by contrast, claimed that social science has to do with the individuality and uniqueness of historical reality, and advocated the construction of concrete, unique historical narratives. Beyond these differences, both approaches shared the belief that a wholly objective, direct representation of social life in concepts or narratives is possible. Max Weber rejected both the nomothetic reduction of all individual phenomena to general concepts or laws and the idiographic insistence on the historical uniqueness of social phenomena. And he rejected the claim that social science concepts (or narratives) can be direct representations of social reality. His alternative was the ideal type: A strategy of concept formation that acknowledges the historical individuality of social phenomena, but at the same time deploys abstract conceptual constructs to highlight certain significant aspects of empirical reality and enable comparison across cases; without, however, claiming to offer a direct representation of that reality.

For Weber, the most important task of ideal-typical concept formation was to sustain a distinctively social-scientific mode of causal analysis. In contrast to events in the nonhuman natural world, Weber maintained, social action always involves and arises from the subjective intentionality of the actor. Hence, causal explanation in the social sciences depends on demonstrating a concrete relation between a specific action and its subjective motivation. In order to arrive at this kind of causal explanation, Weber advocated the deployment of ideal types that would be neither simple narratives comprising unique individual actions, nor general laws under which individual actions are subsumed. Instead, the ideal type would be an artificial conceptual construct without any direct correlate in reality, serving as a yardstick against which the empirical cases would be compared, described, and ultimately explained. Political scientists, for example, can construct an ideal type of what a purely rational political actor (that is, one acting out of purely rational motives) would do in a certain kind

of situation. They would then compare the actual course of action with this ideal type and attribute observed deviations from the ideal type to factors such as misinformation, strategic errors, logical fallacies, or personal temperament. In this way, even though the ideal type is an abstract conceptual construct, it is not geared to resolving individual phenomena into general classifications, but rather to aiding the description and explanation of these phenomena in their unique particularity.

In addition to deploying ideal types individually, scholars can also combine two or more ideal types to create more complex conceptual systems. A well-known example of such an ideal-typical system is Weber's threefold typology of traditional, legal, and charismatic authority or "legitimate domination." What is distinctive about ideal-typical conceptual systems such as this is that they do not constitute rigid classifications where any given empirical case has to be subsumed under just one type. Rather, ideal-typical systems can capture the fluidity and complexity of individual empirical phenomena in at least two important ways. First, concrete empirical cases can contain a mixture of attributes belonging to two or more of the ideal types involved. One might find, for example, political systems resting on a mixture of traditional, legal, and charismatic forms of legitimation. The ideal-typical typology of legitimate domination offers the conceptual tools for identifying and analyzing this empirical heterogeneity. Second, ideal-typical systems can be helpful in identifying historical movements from one type to another. Thus, Weber discusses cases of historical transition from charismatic to legal forms of domination.

In its attunement to the complex individuality and historical fluidity of empirical social phenomena, the ideal type is more than a method of concept formation. It embodies (at least implicitly) philosophical assumptions about the character of social life, its distinctiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the natural world, and the epistemological exigencies that this distinctiveness imposes on the human sciences. It thus challenges, not only more traditional modes of concept formation, but more broadly, all naturalist and positivist conceptions of the human sciences that attempt to arrange the knowledge of social life in the form of lawlike generalizations or purportedly objective narratives. Within political science, ideal types have, not surprisingly, been deployed mainly by historically minded scholars such as Ernst Haas in his analysis of European integration, Philippe Schmitter in his work on corporatism, and Roger Griffin in his study of fascism.

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See also Historical Understanding; Philosophy of Social Sciences; Weber, Max

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IDENTITY

Identity refers to the fundamental defining characteristic of an individual or group. Having a sense of identity—of being oneself and not another or of belonging to one group and not another—would appear to be intrinsic to human communities, and there is no reason to suggest it matters more to us than it did to our ancestors. Yet the practice of reflecting on identity, of opening it up to critical examination, is a hallmark of our period and points to the existence of a specifically modern set of problems relating to the constitution of selfhood. Where people remain bound by rigid kinship systems and status hierarchies they generally have no cause to address themselves with the question: "Who am I?" Their sense of self and of where they belong is more or less built into the social order. It is only when these traditional ways of ascribing identity break down that the issue of who we are and what we might become starts to present itself. Identity now emerges as something to be achieved, rather than something given, and this

simultaneously gives rise to new possibilities and new risks. The newfound freedom to fashion an identity characteristic of modernity goes hand in hand with the threat of alienation, disorientation, and misrecognition.

Much of the history of modern democratic states could be interpreted as an attempt to release people from their social bonds and give them an equal chance of realizing their identity. The ideal underpinning the revolutionary struggles against domination in the political domain and exploitation in the economic realm was an individuality freed to reach its full potential. Through the universal extension of civil and political rights, on one hand, and the redistribution of income and resources, on the other hand, individuals were to be liberated from the chains of caste and class and given an opportunity to develop their unique talents and capacities. Incorporated in the nation-state as citizens, they were at once similar and dissimilar. No longer discriminated against on the basis of class, gender, religion, or race, they shared a range of common entitlements that gave them the wherewithal to create their own unique identity. In principle, at least, citizenship denied their differences in the name of emancipating their individuality. Yet, as feminists were among the first to point out, the model of the universal citizen was built on an unreflected (male, white, heterosexual) identity that worked to exclude those differently situated.

One of the things that differentiates contemporary politics from this earlier horizon is the attention given to cultural or symbolic forms of domination. Increasingly, the modern preoccupation with the pursuit of individuality and the conditions that could enable it has given way to a far more group-oriented politics based around identity markers such as nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, gender, sexuality, and language. In an effort to overcome residual forms of discrimination and affirm the right to be different, identity groups have sought and won political concessions, exemptions, and privileges, which challenge democratic commitments to common citizenship and universal rights. Precisely how, and indeed if, this new *identity politics* is articulated with a broader project of emancipation is now deeply contested. In their efforts to determine the progressiveness of identity politics, theorists have taken quite different positions, both in relation to the process of identity formation and its political implications. In the course of these debates, the democratic ideal of equality has been extended in new and interesting ways and difficult questions have arisen about the homogenizing force of democratic values themselves.

Critical responses to the new identity claims have inevitably taken their cues from certain underlying philosophical or ontological assumptions about identity formation. Two broad views are discernible here. According to one approach, exemplified in the work of Charles Taylor, identity formation is best understood as a process of self-realization conditioned by intersubjective relations of recognition. Becoming an individual, a distinct human personality, entails a search for authenticity, for that which is uniquely one's own. According to this view, identity finds its measure of success in the extent to which individuals either deviate from or remain true to who they really are. The work of identity is, then, a work of self-discovery, but it is not one undertaken in isolation. Because individuals are always located in communities of language or "webs of locution," as Taylor once put it, the formation (or deformation) of their identity depends on their relations with others. Where individuals are properly esteemed or recognized, their identity is assured. By contrast, where they are forced to confront a reduced, demeaning, or contemptible image of themselves, they can suffer real psychological damage and be saddled with crippling self-hatred.

The second approach, exemplified by the work of William Connolly, tends, by contrast, to highlight the relational and contingent nature of identity. From his perspective, identities are not so much formed through a process of self-realization, as constructed through a process of self-differentiation. Individuals and groups acquire a sense of their distinctness, not by working toward an authentic selfhood that can only be what it is, but by differentiating themselves from others in specific and ever-changing contexts. Every identity is thus implicated in and conditional on difference. By twining identity/difference in this way, Connolly throws doubt on both the possibility and the desirability of an authentic identity, necessary and sufficient unto itself. From his perspective, the idea of authenticity merely works to obscure the contingency of identity—the choices, accidents,

and circumstances that make us one kind of person rather than another—as well as the underlying interdependence between self and other. To assert such an identity (apparently a perennial temptation) is tantamount to trying to overcome contingency and incompleteness by suppressing, excluding, or denying the very differences upon which the self relies for its distinctness.

These contrasting approaches to the process of identity formation or constitution have quite different implications for political thought and action. Where identity is conceived as a form of self-realization conditioned by intersubjective relations, attention is inevitably drawn toward political practices of recognition. If, as Taylor claims, the esteem of others is central to the achievement of a positive self-identity, there are good grounds for granting recognition a central place within an extended theory of democratic justice. The measure of a good society would then turn, not simply on the extent to which it distributes resources fairly, but on the extent to which it recognizes identity groups. In some cases, this would entail little more than the elimination of residual forms of discrimination and disrespect (as, for instance, with the removal of the ban on marriage for gays and lesbians). In others, more controversially, it would involve differential rights that protect identities at risk of marginalization or assimilation (as, for instance, with the provision of collective self-governing rights to indigenous communities). It is by no means the case, however, that all those who subscribe to this conception of identity formation are in agreement as to the appropriate political remedy. Judgments are divided in relation to which identities are worthy of recognition and what forms this recognition should take.

In his key essay, "The Politics of Recognition," Charles Taylor makes a powerful case for recognition as a tool of cultural survival. His starting premise, based on the ethic of authenticity, is that cultures as much as individuals have a way that is uniquely their own. Not all of them, however, are equally secure. In complex multicultural societies where power is unevenly distributed, the identity of nondominant cultural groups such as the Quebecois and aboriginal peoples in Canada (to use Taylor's examples) is constantly under threat. This means that the members of these cultures, despite their formal equality, are at a disadvantage relative to other citizens. The function of recognition in this context is to create a sufficiently robust legal shield to guarantee the existence of these distinct cultures into the future. Taylor is thus supportive of Quebec's attempt to ensure its survival as a "distinct society" by prohibiting francophones from sending their children to English language schools. In taking this approach, Taylor is careful not to allow cultural protections to override fundamental liberal rights to life, liberty, free speech, and so on. But less essential legal privileges and immunities, like the right to choose a language of instruction, can be set aside in order to give threatened cultures a chance of survival.

Taylor's willingness to set aside individual rights for the sake of cultural survival has troubled democratic theorists and led them to reassert the primacy of moral autonomy over collective identity. According to Seyla Benhabib, Amy Gutmann, and Nancy Fraser, for instance, the aim of recognition should not be to prevent cultural demise, but to broaden and deepen the democratic project of eliminating oppression. From their perspective, the public recognition of collective identities is to be encouraged where it works to break down entrenched forms of social exclusion, hierarchy, and inequality. Conversely, it should be resisted where it works to insulate identity groups from critical scrutiny and enables the perpetuation of internal forms of oppression. Thus, the extension of group-specific rights, such as maternity leave for women, would be acceptable because it constitutes a precondition of their inclusion in the public sphere as social equals. By contrast, the extension of full sovereignty to indigenous peoples would not be acceptable, because it makes it possible for inherited cultural practices, such as the unequal treatment of men and women, to continue unchallenged. As Benhabib points out, the underlying aim of recognition should not be to preserve minority cultures, but to expand the circle of democratic inclusion. Differential rights for identity groups are justified only insofar as they extend the moral autonomy of their individual members.

Although the approach taken by these democratic theorists is consistent with the project of emancipation as it is conventionally understood, it is open to the criticism that it presupposes a certain, culturally specific understanding of justice. Democratic principles of freedom and equality are

taken as universal norms against which to assess the claims of identity groups for recognition in the form of collective rights. This means there is limited capacity to draw into question the meaning of oppression and engage with the possibility that minority cultures do not understand their own ostensibly oppressive, hierarchical, or exclusionary practices in the same way as the dominant culture. The issue is particularly manifest in the case of indigenous peoples, but it applies to other ethnic and national minorities as well. At the same time that it has enriched and extended the meaning of equality, therefore, identity politics has also brought the limits of democratic politics sharply into focus. Liberal democracy has emerged as a fighting creed, capable of being more generous in relation to nondominant identities, but attached to certain substantive values that it is unwilling to compromise.

The alternative conception of identity construction as differentiation does not necessarily avoid these problems, but it does open up new perspectives on them. By emphasizing the relational and contingent nature of self-constitution, Connolly makes it possible to bring the limits of identity into question, to explore the boundary that separates the legitimate from the illegitimate, the acceptable from the unacceptable, and the normal from the deviant. As he sees it, there is a "polemical temptation" built into the very dynamic of identity, to translate differences into moral failings or abnormalities. Our dependence on the other for our own sense of distinctness constantly frustrates our desire for self-identity, and this sense of lack translates into outward hostility. The more we seek to secure our identity, to render it necessary rather than contingent, integrated rather than fragmented, the more likely we are to demonize those who are different. The pursuit of identity therefore bears an intimate relationship with the designation of certain behaviors, practices, and modes of being as deviant and abnormal. It is easy to see here how the politics of identity lends itself to strategies of normalization and correction.

In the face of these temptations to demonize and normalize, Connolly calls for a more generous "ethos of engagement" that models ethical relations between self and other. The key to this lies in those "arts" or "practices" of the self that, working at a deeply visceral level, allow us to acquire some critical distance on our own entrenched habits, dispositions, and attachments. These practices of the self are fundamentally designed to disturb our identity rather than reinforce it, but their precise impact will vary depending on the circumstances. At times, according to Connolly, the cultivation of an ethical sensibility will require us to affirm what we have become and resist the desire to find scapegoats for our suffering. Because our relationships with others can be poisoned by envy and resentment, it is important to come to terms with our own failings and limitations. At other times, being ethical will require us disaffirm aspects of our identity, to loosen the grip of strongly held beliefs and convictions and open them up to question. This is not simply a matter of acknowledging the contestability of our beliefs in the eyes of others, but of seeking to make them contestable to ourselves. At no stage, however, does Connolly assume that identity is infinitely malleable. His point is rather that a greater receptivity to identity disruption and disturbance is important to the creation of respectful identity/difference relations in the democratic state.

The ongoing currency and intensity of these debates about the need for recognition and the threat of normalization are revelatory of the extent to which group identity has become a focus of political mobilization and political vision. In the "postsocialist age," as Nancy Fraser termed it, identity has emerged as the new political imaginary. It sets the terms within which justice is imagined, and the sometimes competing, sometimes overlapping theories of recognition and deconstruction sit firmly within its compass. Whether this preoccupation with difference is a symptom of the exhaustion of utopian energies or a sign of a yet uncrystallized new pluralist utopia is still difficult to discern.

Paul Muldoon

See also Citizenship; Democracy; Difference Theories; Gender; Justice, Theories of; Multiculturalism; Politics of Recognition

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IDEOLOGY

The concept of ideology has been vigorously contested and, at certain points, radically reconstructed in accordance with the interests and actions of those who have used it. We can go right back, for example, to the thinker who is often credited with first employing the term ideology in the late eighteenth century, Antoine Destutt de Tracy. *Ideology* is the name that Tracy gives to describe a scientific method, a "science of the formation of ideas," which, in line with prevailing enlightenment aspirations, he believed could promote social progress and the common good.

However, Tracy's initial conception of ideology did not survive unchallenged for long. Napoleon Bonaparte, for instance, engaged in a series of polemical attacks against the "shadowy metaphysics" of Tracy and the school of thought he represented. Deriding Tracy and others in his circle as ideologues, Napoleon complained that they indulged a fanciful and doctrinaire speculation entirely innocent of the practical realities of politics. Napoleon's attack on the ideologues was politically motivated; it was part of a campaign to consolidate his power and discredit ideas that might have threatened his ascendancy. Thanks in part to Napoleon, the word *ideology* suffered a dramatic fall from grace: What had begun as an idea with impeccable enlightenment credentials quickly evolved into a term of abuse.

As this example from its early history shows, the meanings carried by the concept of ideology have shifted over time and cannot be separated from the concrete political struggles through which they emerged. As a result, efforts to pin down the notion of ideology are necessarily provisional and historically specific. Its definition and conceptualization will always be irreducibly anchored in the social-historical context in which it is used.

Despite this historical variability, we can nonetheless discern two broad tendencies in the way the concept of ideology has been deployed. On one hand, the term has often been used in a *descriptive* sense, as part of an effort to explain the terms of social and political life empirically—Tracy's early efforts being a prime example. On the other hand, theorists interested in challenging relations of power and domination have used the term in a *critical and evaluative* sense. Useful as this distinction is, it is important to keep in mind that these are not necessarily exclusive tendencies: Many thinkers have combined both within a single theoretical framework.

Ideology in the Descriptive Sense

Tracy's scientific notion of ideology aimed to explain the empirical conditions under which certain concepts, belief systems, moral ideals, and religious and scientific ideas become socially influential and in turn affect the course of human affairs. Two aspects of Tracy's project deserve emphasis. First, his notion of ideology is *ethically neutralized* in that it does not necessarily imply value judgments about particular ideological commitments. For example, any suggestion that certain social phenomena can be criticized as merely *ideological* in a sense that implies some sort of deficiency is entirely absent from Tracy's approach. Second, he understands ideology in a way that is also *politically neutralized*. That is, for Tracy, the formation and evolution of socially influential ideas and forms of consciousness are not necessarily tied to the sectarian agendas of any particular political constituency. Nor did he think of ideology as a field of study intended to serve the interests of any such political agenda. Instead, Tracy conceived it as motivated by a desire to serve a more generalized, even universal, interest in the progress of society as a whole. This double neutralization has

been an enduring theme throughout the history of the concept, and it continues to figure prominently in the work of key theorists of ideology today.

The recent work of the influential contemporary theorist Michael Freeden is a case in point. Although he occupies a very different cultural and intellectual milieu from that of Tracy, Freeden's effort to approach the concept of ideology from a descriptive point of view nevertheless falls recognizably in the same tradition. To be sure, Freeden rejects Tracy's enlightenment positivism in favor of a more hermeneutically grounded approach that aims to interpret the meanings of conventionally recognized traditions of thought (such as socialism, liberalism, and conservatism, for example). What Freeden would call the shape or *morphology* of any given ideological perspective on the social world is conditioned by the political concepts (for example, conservatism's stress on being sensitive to the wisdom of tradition, or feminism's stress on the prevalence of patriarchy in our gendered political culture) through which it is articulated. The student of ideology, in this regard, needs to acquire a sympathetic understanding of how political concepts function within these larger frameworks. By so doing, she is in a position to decode the meanings around which political consciousness revolves at particular times and places and within specific traditions of thought. Ideologies like socialism or liberalism thereby become available for analysis as systems or bodies of thought that successfully mobilize and legitimize certain politically significant ideas. Consider, for example, the way in which socialist ideology legitimizes the idea that the symbolic meanings we attach to things in social and political life are predominantly determined by economic and class relations.

In mapping out the relations within and between the competing ideologies, Freeden avoids judgments of their relative merits. He is not concerned, for example, to establish that conservatism is somehow superior to eco-feminism, or that socialism is ethically superior to liberalism. Nor does he assume that these ideological complexes can be explained just as crude reflections of the political interests or agendas of their advocates. His point would rather be that they inflect the way in which interests and agendas are themselves actually understood by agents in the political world, and that a close hermeneutical study of ideologies enables theorists to understand exactly how this happens. Like Tracy, then, Freeden's use or theory of ideology implies both an *ethical and political neutralization* of the concept. It refrains from invidious judgments about the relative value of ideologies and refuses to reduce them to the partisan political interests of those who claim to be committed to them.

Ideology in the Critical-Evaluative Sense

The thought of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels provides the paradigmatic example of a theory that mobilizes a notion of ideology in the second, critical, sense. Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, Marx and Engels employ the term in a resolutely polemical fashion, as part of the effort to challenge the forms of domination they discerned within prevailing economic and political structures. For Marx and Engels, the student of ideology cannot rest content with a stance of neutrality in the manner of Tracy or Freeden. Marx and Engels thought this because they did not conceive of ideology just as a field of conventionally recognized partisan antagonists (like socialists, libertarians, radical ecologists, etc.). Rather, they considered ideology to be a form of cognitive distortion that operates at a far deeper level. According to Marx and Engels, conventional notions of socialism, libertarianism, and so forth are merely superficial labels attached to various patterns of ideas that develop at different times, but they do not capture the essence of ideology. In their path-breaking work, *The German Ideology,* Marx and Engels famously liken the operation of ideology to the *camera obscura,* suggesting that to be under the sway of an ideology is, in fact, to see the world in an inverted or upside-down fashion. Ideology here comes to refer to any systematic set of delusions or distortions that arise in agents and that conceal the true nature and operation of the social world within which they find themselves.

The distortions involved in ideological forms of understanding are not simply a matter of faulty reasoning or feeblemindedness on the part of those caught in their grip. According to Marx and Engels, it is not merely difficult, but in some sense impossible, to escape false forms of consciousness—at least insofar as we remain under conditions of social and economic domination (like those they

associate with modern capitalism). Until material human liberation is actually accomplished, we are, Marx and Engels want to argue, inevitably caught up in forms of consciousness that, on one hand, shape the most intimate and basic modes of thinking, feeling, conceiving, and reflecting, and, on the other, systematically misrepresent the actual circumstances of social reproduction. Of course, what Marx and Engels have in mind here is the role economic organization plays in shaping the development and exchange of ideas in social life. As they see it, then, the function of ideology is to give intellectual, moral, and political currency to a distorted vision of social reality. The distortions are symptoms of class domination and will pass away only when the domination of one class by another is itself somehow abolished.

Marx and Engels's view of ideology and their view of its systematic infiltration of ordinary consciousness is provocative. But whether or not one accepts it, it is undeniable that their view entails that the student of ideology is necessarily in part a social critic, seeking to document the ways in which social and economic relations cause agents to lose touch with the reality in which they find themselves.

Not surprisingly, subsequent commentators have disagreed about how best to understand their legacy. Throughout the twentieth century, the Marxist theory of ideology came under attack, even among sympathizers. For example, a Marxist and Frankfurt School thinker such as Theodor Adorno complicates and renders problematic the very idea that we can critique and evaluate ideology in the way Marx and Engels initially seem to suggest. For Marx and Engels, it is imperative that the social critic distinguish between ideology, on one hand, and the social reality they uncover on the other. Where ideology is a form of false consciousness, social reality is understood by the critic to be determined by the economic structure and organization of social relations. Important then, the critic of ideology must have access to, and an understanding of, this social reality, and she must be able to view the operation of ideology from a sufficiently distanced vantage point. Simply put the critic of ideology must be able to stand outside or at a critical distance from the ideology being evaluated.

Adorno questions this very assumption by arguing that there is no critical space or vantage point outside ideology precisely because ideology is always already at play in the discourse the critic uses to evaluate it. Adorno's own critique of what he and Max Horkheimer called "the culture industry" can help clarify this suggestion. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment,* Adorno and Horkheimer argue in broadly Marxist terms that the culture industry (here culture industry means what we would now call mass media forms, such as film, radio, television, etc.) is an ideological form that reproduces the economic structure of what they call late capitalism. They argue, for example, that the culture industry makes us slaves to endless consumption: It gives us the "freedom," as they rather ironically and caustically put it, "to choose an ideology of economic coercion."

Against the consumptive and thoroughly ideological logic of the culture industry Adorno holds out the possibility that modernist artworks or artists (Samuel Beckett would be one such artist for Adorno) can challenge the ideology of late-capitalist society; providing a glimpse, perhaps, of a society that is free from the almost totalizing and dominating logic of the market. Adorno thus entertains the idea that certain forms of art or culture can become autonomous or stand outside and beyond the ideological rough-and-tumble of social-political life. In this way, art and its experience can occupy the place that Marx and Engels reserved for the critic of ideology.

And yet, almost as soon as he suggests that the modernist artwork or artist can somehow stand outside and shine a critical light on ideology, he rejects this as impossible. "It is impossible to conceive of the autonomy of art," says Adorno, "without covering up work." What Adorno means is that it is impossible to find a conceptual vocabulary or a form of discourse with which to talk about what stands beyond ideology (in this case, the modernist artwork) precisely because the language being used (the language of autonomy) is itself filled with ideological meaning (where the very discourse of autonomy itself ideologically reflects and reproduces historical developments in late capitalism). In other words, the very concept of aesthetic (or indeed political) autonomy actually covers up or hides the fact that the economic structure of late capitalism fundamentally shapes it from the very first instance.

To be sure, with Adorno, the critical-evaluative conception of ideology takes a somewhat

paradoxical and rather depressing turn as the very prospect of engaging in a critique of ideology seems to be rendered so thoroughly problematic. At this point, and by way of conclusion, it is worth briefly comparing Adorno's pessimism to the more optimistic outlook of his most famous student and second-generation Frankfurt School thinker: Jürgen Habermas.

One of the key arguments that Habermas makes in perhaps his most ambitious work, *The Theory of Communicative Action,* is that the forms of dominating ideology in contemporary social life (what he calls the "instrumental rationality" of "money and power") can be critiqued from the outside and from a more or less impartial perspective. Habermas challenges the instrumentalizing logic of money and power because he believes that it runs counter to the basic and fundamental form of communicative action (what he famously calls "communicative action oriented to mutual understanding") through which our social and political life is reproduced. Crucially, for Habermas, this form of communicative action universally commits social actors to a certain moral-political or normative outlook that stands beyond or outside the instrumental rationality of money and power. In this way, Habermas advocates a normative critique of ideology, where normative critique suggests the possibility of critically evaluating the ideological for failing to live up to the moral norms (here Habermas thinks in terms of norms of equality, of social reciprocity, and individual autonomy) that are presupposed in and through those forms of "communicative action" that are "oriented to mutual understanding."

Robert Porter and Phil Ramsey

See also Critique; End of Ideology; Enlightenment; Habermas, Jürgen; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Power

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Imaginary, The

The imaginary is the set of meanings, symbols, values, narratives, and representations of the world through which people imagine their existence. The concept entered the political-philosophical debate when, after the linguistic turn, political theorists started to point out that our relationship to the world is always linguistically mediated. Then, the problem emerged of the way in which the set of meanings and representations that are deposited in every language influences our political experience. This, in turn, raised crucial issues, such as that of the autonomy of the individual vis-à-vis the power of such imaginary significations, which often operate at the subconscious level as they are internalized through the very first contacts with language.

In order to show the relevance of the concept of imaginary for political theory, this entry will first discusses the definition of imaginary and then move on to explore its political implications and contemporary transformations.

From Imagination to Imaginary

The conceptual move from the earlier focus on imagination to the current one on the imaginary reflects a passage from a view of human beings as a sum of single individual faculties to an emphasis on the contexts in which they live, as this also emerges in the passage from the concept of reason to a more context-oriented rationality (Johann Arnason). Putting more emphasis on contexts means pointing to the constraints within which the free imagination of individuals operates.

Among the different conceptions of the imaginary, there are those which, drawing inspiration from psychoanalysis, put emphasis on the deep psychological structures of the psyche (Jacques Lacan), others that primarily focus on the social

background (Charles Taylor), and finally those that look at the same time at both (Cornelius Castoriadis). All of them share the idea that there exists a more or less subconscious set of meanings, symbols, values, narratives, and representations of the world that influence the way in which people experience their political world.

Differences remain as to the ontological status of the imaginary significations. For some, such as Lacan, who distinguishes the imaginary order from both the symbolic and the real, the imaginary dimension is distinguished from, if not opposed to, the real one. In this view, the imaginary domain is systematically associated with illusion, distortion, and alienation. For others, such as Castoriadis, the imaginary dimension comes before the very distinction between what is real and what is not, because every society defines in its own way what must count as real in the first place.

Political Implications and Contemporary Transformations

The various ways in which the concept of imaginary is portrayed also has clear political implications. The first and more important is the issue of the autonomy of the individual vis-à-vis the overarching power of the imaginary dimension. While some underline the impossibility to step out of the deep imaginary significations within which we have been socialized, others underline that there always remains the possibility to question them. Castoriadis, for instance, argued that the instituting social imaginary is also at the same time instituted: If individual human beings cannot exist outside the imaginary significations that are internalized through language, it equally holds true that the latter cannot exist without the individual human beings who continuously sustain and recreate them.

The problem of autonomy is further increased in the contemporary conditions of globalization. The diffusion of new media, such as television and the Internet, on the global scale and the increasing role that they play in our lives have determined both a quantitative and a qualitative change as a result of which the imaginary has become much more pervasive and powerful than it has ever been in the past (Chiara Bottici). In quantitative terms, the increase in the number of images that mediate our political life is such that politics has become inconceivable outside of the continual flux of images that enter our screens every day. This has saturated our imaginary, so that only those images that can strike people's imagination by playing on the register of spectacle prevail. The result is the increasing personalization of politics and the prevalence of the register of spectacle over the content of political campaigns.

The qualitative change concerns the role of virtuality. Virtual images are not created once for all, but are processes of perpetual maintenance. Therefore, what is typical in virtuality is that we have no criteria to determine the status of the reality of images themselves.

Finally, together with the issue of the autonomy of individuals, the emergence of globalization has also exacerbated the problem of the borders of the social imaginary. While some authors underline that, because they are transmitted through language, there are as many social imaginaries as there are languages, others point to the deeper commonalities among them and speak of the imaginary in the singular, as if there existed only one deep psychological imaginary common to all human beings. If the former have the problem of explaining how communication is possible between the different social imaginaries, the latter must face the problem of radical diversity persisting even in a world that has become one from many points of view.

Chiara Bottici

See also Alienation; Autonomy; Identity; Ideology; Mass Psychology; Mythic Narrative; Narrative; Ontology; Psychoanalysis; Rationality; Symbolic, The; Virtual

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IMMANENCE

Immanence is the attribute of being internal or remaining within, free from external conditioning. Immanence is opposed to transcendence, which concerns what is above, beyond, or outside. In theology, an immanent conception would hold God to be a divine spirit infusing the world, rather than one that lies beyond and independent of the world. The ancient Stoics assert such an immanent divinity, as does the early modern philosopher Baruch Spinoza, whereas Augustine's God is transcendent. Phenomenology, the science of appearances, aims to isolate what is immanent to consciousness through a phenomenological reduction that brackets off and eliminates anything that conditions consciousness from outside. Following this idea, Jean-Paul Sartre argues, against Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, that the ego, being an organizing principle extraneous to appearances themselves, is transcendent to consciousness, rather than immanent. An immanent critique would be one that derives its standards from within the domain being evaluated, rather than one appealing to transcendent standards, such as Platonic ideas. Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy is an attempt to perform an immanent critique, whereby reason criticizes itself, although thinkers like Gilles Deleuze hold that only with Nietzsche is Kant's aspiration to immanent critique achieved.

The distinction between immanence and transcendence also applies to ontology, the science of being. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's dialectical philosophy can be seen as an attempt to achieve a fully immanent ontology. Hegel seeks to show, first, that every identity negates itself by being constituted by its relations to everything it is not, and, second, that this negation is negated and sublated into a higher unity of differences. For Hegel, this synthetic unity, the Identity of identity and difference, signifies the nature of Absolute Knowledge. It achieves immanence because this Absolute does not depend on anything beyond its own unity. Whatever might transcend this Absolute would be negatively related to it—in being beyond, it would be *not* the Absolute—but this negativity is precisely what dialectics recuperates into unity. Many contemporary theories, particularly *difference theories* of the poststructuralist variety, challenge the success of this attempt to secure dialectical unity. They maintain that the idea of dialectical negation does not account for a kind of difference or Otherness that leaves Hegel's Absolute incomplete. However, the status of this difference reopens the issue of immanence versus transcendence. Some hold this difference to be best understood as a multiplicity immanent to being that shows Hegel's to be a false Absolute. Others hold it to designate a kind of impossible fullness beyond Hegel's Absolute—a fullness that does not exist in any positive form and is certainly never encountered in experience, but that still pervades experience as a kind of specter promising a fullness to come.

Some contemporary political theories unabashedly embrace the sort of transcendence found in traditional Judeo-Christian monotheism. Most, however, either aim to build on starting points that are secular and immanent to this world or seek out an alternative form of transcendence that does not rest on a particular faith. Many contemporary liberal theorists, for example, denounce appeals to notions of human nature or the human good, maintaining that these invoke transcendent standards linked to teleological or theological world views, and try to rest their claims instead on what they consider to be minimal standards of rationality or empirical evidence. Many communitarians, who are often accused by liberal theorists of relying on transcendent standards, seek to ground their goal of a reinvigorated community in society's shared history and traditions, sometimes using this shared history to suggest a kind of quasi-transcendent source for moral agency. Debates between liberals and communitarians do not directly thematize the idea of immanence, but focus instead on metaphysics, the various participants accepting that political theory today cannot rely on the kind of premodern metaphysical positions that invoke a ground that conditions this world from beyond.

However, immanence and transcendence are explicitly thematized in contemporary debates among difference theories and particularly theories of radical democracy. Deleuze is a key figure in these debates for theorists who affirm an ontology

of immanence. Deleuze holds transcendence to be an illusion generated by immanent forces of becoming, and he makes it a political and philosophical task to challenge the transcendent standards that seem to organize political and social life from above. Conversely, many theorists of transcendence, while rejecting the existence of positive transcendent standards, maintain that collective political and social life require that something of this world be raised to the level of a transcendent organizing principle. Often the concept of *hegemony* is invoked to explain the logic of the struggles by which particular standards assume this sort of universal function. Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan are frequently used in the radical democracy theories that support this idea of a necessary transcendence. This is often understood as an *immanent transcendence,* as it does not see transcendence as a positive, existing form, but rather as the promise of something forever absent that underpins worldly attempts to reach it. Because this transcendence is both necessary and impossible to finally realize, politics in these theories becomes a struggle to create always temporary forms of transcendence.

Nathan Widder

See also Augustine; Difference Theories; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hegemony; Multiplicity; Negative Dialectics; Ontology; Other; Phenomenology; Radical Democracy; Spinoza, Baruch

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IMPERIALISM

Imperialism is generally understood to be the policy of extending one's rule over foreign societies leading to the establishment of an empire. Imperialism has recently experienced an unexpected revival. The unique position of the United States in the post–cold war international system has encouraged prominent authors to advocate an open and unapologetic imperialist foreign policy (sometimes in conjunction with other Western states)—whereas their critics identify such policies as dangerous. Because such judgments are based on competing interpretations of historical imperialism, this entry will first provide a historical overview, followed by a brief introduction to theories of imperialism.

Historically, empires have existed across time and space: from the Assyrian, Persian, and Chinese Empires in Asia through the Greek and Roman Empires, and from the Islamic Caliphates around the Mediterranean to the Aztec and Inca Empires in America.

Imperialism is now most commonly associated with the European colonial empires. In the fifteenth and sixteenth century, the Dutch and Portuguese established trading empires in Asia and Africa, and Spain extended its rule over vast stretches of South and Central American land and numerous indigenous peoples, swiftly followed by the Portuguese, and in North America predominantly by the English and French. Africa and South East Asia were divided up by the major European powers toward the end of the nineteenth century. In a rush for colonies, the old colonial powers were now joined by Germany, Italy, Belgium, the United States, and Japan. By the beginning of the twentieth century, almost the entire world was directly ruled by a handful of powerful, mostly European, states.

The early trading empires consisted largely of the establishment and monopolization of trading posts and routes. In contrast, the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in America were based on

conquest and subsequently ruled directly by the imperial power, whereas the English and French colonies in North America, and later in Australia and New Zealand, were based on the displacement of the indigenous population by European settlers.

Whereas sections of the indigenous population occasionally cooperated with the imperial powers, resistance was widespread. This resistance gained momentum during the first half of the twentieth century and eventually led to systematic struggles for independence. By the end of the 1960s, almost all former colonies had become independent states, and imperial rule had lost its moral, political, and legal legitimacy.

Theories of imperialism explain it by focusing on a variety of driving forces. Economic theories hold that economic interests lead to expansionist policies. Thus, profits made from trade led the Dutch and Portuguese to establish their trading empires; the Spaniards extracted gold and silver from their colonies and exploited the labor of the indigenous population, while the English appropriated indigenous land. In addition, it is argued either that falling profit rates in the industrialized European countries drove capitalists to invest abroad or that industrialized countries suffered from overproduction and thus required colonies as captive markets for their products. In either case, economic actors went abroad first and asked for the protection of their government only if and when they met with local resistance or international competition.

Political theories argue that imperialism is either a means to establish domestic stability or to ensure international security. Domestic stability can be furthered by imperialist policies, first, through the *export* of potentially destabilizing sections of society, such as the Puritans or large numbers of poor and unemployed people in the case of early British settlements in America, or convicts in the case of Australia. But even privileged classes who, due to social change, had lost their traditional occupations could be provided with a *playing field* in the exploration and administration of colonies. Second, imperialist policies can function as unifying goals for otherwise fractured political communities, as was the case in Germany before World War I. Finally, imperialism has been seen as a means to increase the geopolitical power of a state and thus to ensure its international security; a prominent consideration underlying the late-nineteenth-century rush for colonies by previously nonimperial states.

Cultural theories highlight the important role of ideas and ideologies in the motivation and justification of imperialism. The prospect, or even obligation, to convert indigenous populations to Christianity thus played an important role in Spanish as well as early English imperialism in America. This religious mission was gradually replaced by the (in)famous *civilizing mission*—the *white man's burden* to bring law, order, and civilization to *barbarian* peoples—so prominent in nineteenth century imperialism.

Which of these theories—economic, political, cultural—best explains imperialism is contested. Ultimately, however, these three dimensions of imperialism can neither historically nor theoretically be separated. In practice, modern European imperialism always combined economic, political, and cultural elements. And theoretically, while economic interests may trigger imperialist policies, these will in turn have political repercussion and require cultural justifications—and vice versa.

The use of the term *imperialism* today implies some continuity with its historical manifestation. Economic theories argue that the inequalities of the global economic order, established during the period of imperialism, are still in place today. And these inequalities explain the continuing economic gap between the Global North and the Global South as well as the resulting political dependency—or neoimperialism. Similarly, centuries of a hierarchical cultural construction of colonizers and colonized—first as Christians and heathens, then as civilized and barbarian peoples—find some continuity today in the juxtaposition of a progressive, secular, and democratic West with a backward, religious, authoritarian Middle East or Africa. Lack of democracy or human rights are used to legitimate interventions and thus lead to what is either endorsed or criticized as an imperialism of human rights. And inasmuch as the pursuit of military and economic security drive today's expansionist policies, even political theories of imperialism may well be applied again.

What is beyond doubt, however, is that centuries of modern European imperialism have deeply influenced the economic, political, and cultural identity, not just of the former colonies, but of the West

itself. From Hugo Grotius and Francisco de Vitoria, through Emmerich de Vattel to the League of Nations, modern international law developed in the context of imperialism; from John Locke and Adam Smith through the Enlightenment, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville to Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Schumpeter, imperialism lies at the heart of European political and economic thought; and from Michel de Montaigne, Thomas More, Tommaso Campanella, and Voltaire through Rudyard Kipling to Joseph Conrad, European culture is shaped by the imperial imagination. And it is reflection on these entangled cultural identities—and the possibility of overcoming their hierarchical nature—that has given rise to postcolonialism as a new theoretical approach in the humanities and social sciences.

Beate Jahn

See also Barbarians; Colonialism; Dependency Theory; Empire; Neoconservatism; Orientalism; Postcolonialism; Reason of State; World-Systems Theory

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Indian Political Thought

There are diverse strands of political thought in ancient India, and this diversity is not premised merely on different understandings of the nature and purpose of polity but also on the philosophical underpinnings of such understandings, such as the significance of the transhuman domain in human affairs, the nature of the self, conception of the world, goals, and purposes of life, and the nature of understanding as such. Some of these strands of thought have a remarkable continuity over time, although their autonomy as a defensible body of thought or even their role in sustaining allegiance to the political order and defending its legitimacy did not remain the same. Sometimes opposition to a dominant strand of thought led to the reconstruction of certain other streams of thought that led to alternative political striving. Existing evidence suggests that there was much contestation within and across strands of thought, and institutions developed even to manage and regulate opposition. Such opposition was not always bound in a binary axis and employed a complex grid to express itself. Eventually the great diversity and complexity of Indian social formation was partly shaped by such dissent and protest. In encounter with modernity, specifically in its colonial version, a large body of this thought was threatened with oblivion, although much of this tradition reasserted itself, often reinventing the modern in its own distinctive way. The nonviolent, open-ended, and mass-based character of the Indian national movement and the liberal-democratic foundations of Indian postcolonial polity helped sustain much of this tradition. For the purpose of presentation, we use the following periodization to engage with this body of thought:

1. The ancient period (to the thirteenth century CE)
2. The medieval period (from thirteenth to the eighteenth century CE)
3. The nationalist phase (from eighteenth century CE to the 1947)
4. Contemporary reflections and enquiries (from 1947 to the present)

The Ancient Period

In the ancient period, there are distinct strands that can be classified as follows:

- *Brahmanical thought*. There is much diversity and variation over time in this strand of thought, although it upheld a framework of shared concepts and concerns throughout to regulate and direct social life.

- *Sramanic (Buddhists and others of similar vein) thought.* This mode of thought expressed a deep disenchantment with the social institutions and ways of life of the world, highlighted individual agency and responsibility, and held out the promise of perfection to discrete seekers.
- *Other traditions,* such as those highlighted in classical Tamil texts.

It is, however, to be noted that often texts were overwritten freely to subserve many purposes, as the reason of the text itself was internal to tradition. There was also much interaction across these strands of thought alongside valiant attempts to guard their distinctiveness, as can be seen in the early Buddhist attempts to draw up a canon, insertion of ideas and viewpoints in schools of thought such as Arthasastra, and setting up *peethas* (seats or centers of learning), as was done by Shankara (788–820 CE), the great exponent of the Advaita perspective. On the scope of political thought and the domain of the political there were significant differences, as highlighted by the terms employed to grapple with them, such as *rajadharma* (duty of king), *Rajyasastra* (science of the state), *Dandaniti* (policy of rewards and punishment), *Nitisara* (a course on leadership and direction), and *Arthasastra* (science of acquisition, protection, and governance) demonstrate.

Brahmanical Body of Thought

The first formulations of political thought in this vein can be found in the Vedas and in the great epics of *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*. In the *Rigveda, rta/rita* (cosmic law) and *dharma* (social order) are closely connected, and by sustaining the social order, the king helps in the reproduction of the cosmic order as such. The Mahabharata bears witness to the great complexity of life with beings and humans at different levels and stages of life, while at the same time related in a larger cosmic embrace. The king is ascribed a nodal role in the reproduction of this life.

Manu, to whom *Manusmriti,* the masterly text on law and jurisprudence, is ascribed, and a majority of the proponents of the *smriti* school of thought believe that human beings have the capacity of transcending the world of necessity and pursuing the realm of freedom while the other creatures are caught in the realm of necessity. The attributes of responsibility and agency are identified as the specific propensities and attributes of the human world. Though humans do not know the working of natural necessity, nor can they ensure the results of their actions, they were autonomous with regard to their motives and reasoning. One of the hallowed formulations of the relation between necessity and freedom is expressed in the moral norm, *niskama karma* (i.e., performance of action that is not premised on its outcome), propounded by *Gita,* a subtext that is woven into the larger text of *Mahabharata*.

The basis of polity is dharma, the sustenance of the social, political, and even cosmic order. The king is the protector of dharma, and gods too are deployed to protect it. Also, by protecting dharma one becomes god or godlike. While there is a universal agreement on the foundational basis of this value, and even the oppositional *Sramanic* Buddhist thought employed a closely rhyming concept *dhamma* in its place, the meaning of the term remained quite elastic and acquired diverse connotations depending on the context. In its predicative sense, it meant "to protect, to uphold, and to be beholden to." In its substantive sense, its connotations were constantly refurbished and referred to a set of core characteristics and dispositions of the social order—as well as of the discrete entities that constituted the world, connected in turn to the cosmic order. In an ideal action, one takes into account the totality in view alongside the distinctiveness of the action one is called on to perform here and now, while at the same time the acting subject is aware of oneself and through his action lends oneself to the realization of the purpose of everyone and everything. The only known strand of thought that pitched itself in opposition to this overarching vision was the *Lokayata,* which decried the assumptions and presuppositions of such a view of life and sought to base itself on the ongoing processes of life, conceiving man as closely bound with nature.

In Brahmanical thought, the polity is seen as the fusion of two powers: *brahma* and *kshatra,* knowledge and power, embodied in the Brahmin and Kshatriya respectively. The duties and responsibilities of the later two classes are foregrounded in this conception. They were expected to work together to sustain an order, dharma, embodying social

roles specified in terms of *varnashramas, purusharthas,* and *gunas*. The four *varnas,* or classes, were Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shurdras, whose tasks were pursuit of knowledge, virtue and teaching; protection and rule; goods and wealth; and service of the rest respectively. Although Manu normatively binds this social division into a hierarchy, even the earlier literature lends itself to such a formulation. This is in spite of the fact that many defenders of this literature in modern times read in it functional division of labor, rather than stipulations of a ranked order. The *ashramas* that paced the successive stages of life of the first three of the four *varnas* mentioned were: *brahmacharya,* the early years of learning and grooming; *grihasta,* the state of the householder; *vanaprastha,* a stage of predisposition to the next stage of *sanyasa* (i.e., renunciation). Every social calling was bound with its own duties. There was, however, a great deal of tension between such a normative stance and the actual life, prescriptions, and practices. Boundaries across social classes remained porous to an extent, although guardians of the existing order increasingly asserted the principle of birth to defend it. Eventually social arrangements that expressed this conception of life came to be trumped by the principles of heredity. The functional division of labor within the family also made the woman dependent on man and servile to him, while eulogizing the virtuous wife and mother at the same time. The four *purusharthas,* or hallowed pursuits, were *dharma* (pursuit of one's duty), *artha* (wealth, welfare, and prosperity), *kama* (love and gratification), and *moksha* (liberation/salvation). The three gunas or attributes that informed men were *satva* (truth), *rajas* (spiritedness), and *tamas* (inertness/blandness). The king, therefore, had to be guided by those who had reflected on and knew the relations across these complex variables and the considerations accorded by the scriptures and customs to them. The role of the Brahmins, therefore, became singularly important as advisers to the king.

In this conception of the political, state/power came to be acknowledged as singularly important because without it the social order cannot be sustained and there would be anarchy. The coronation ceremony, *rajasuya,* symbolically represented the great powers wielded by the king. There are two reasons that are generally suggested for the origin of kingship: divine origin, wherein the Supreme Being, Brahma, himself begot the king to protect the world and social contract. Valmiki in his *Ramayana,* for instance, advances two variants of the second reasoning on the origin of the state. It arose from the desire to escape from anarchy, where might was right and the big fish ate up the small ones, a state of affairs described as *matsyanyaya* (principle of justice among fish). There is also the second explanation, which suggested that state emerged in order to reconcile between different people whose claims and interests led to conflicts and wars. The purpose of the state is primarily to protect, provide justice, and uphold dharma. While these purposes were not wholly coalesced into one, and the protective and welfare role of the state remained a persistent theme, priority was laid on dharma. Emphasis however varied. Manu makes protection the overriding duty of the king. Sometimes justice was seen as integral to dharma. However, the dictates of justice need not be unproblematic. The context, therefore, becomes important in explaining the nuances of a term. The *Mahabharata,* for instance, upholds the principle of expediency, if demanded by the conditions of times, so long as it is for the attainment of public good and not for selfish ends. The path trodden by great men becomes a guide in contexts when principles advanced by scriptures and embedded in customs are in contestation or do not proffer a choice.

This elaborate and complex framework was spelled out in a corpus of legal injunctions in the *smriti* literature, such as *Manusmriti.* As can be seen, such an order, in spite of a great deal of variation in it, could deeply arrest and restrict its elasticity and fluidity. Often the necessity of securing existing arrangements led to an overt emphasis on power, even at the expense of dharma conferring great autonomy on the king/state and marginalizing other elements that kept power within limits. Many of the texts celebrate the role of coercion and punishment, *danda,* as the key function of the state. *Manusmriti* explicitly makes *danda* the precondition for the sustenance of dharma.

The autonomy of the political realm came to be highlighted much more emphatically in the distinct school of *Arthasastra,* epitomized in Kautilya's great text on *Arthasastra.* This school elaborated the institutions and processes of government by

resorting to reasons of state (i.e., modes of its acquisition, preservation, and expansion), rather than to injunctions of scriptures and the legal tradition, while paying lip service to the latter. The concept of sovereignty is a problem in the Brahmanical framework of thought, in spite of the celebratory nature of kingship, although the *Arthasastra* literature inches closer to it.

Often we find a substantive description of the different elements of the state that are required for the effective working of a state, and kingship is seen as the most important of them all. The "Shantiparva" of the *Mahabharata* enumerates seven such constituent elements: *swamin* or king, *amartya* or the officials, *janapada* or the territory, *durga* or the fort, *kosha* or the treasury, *danda* or the army, and *mitra* or the allies. It is interesting that these elements continued to be the enumerations in strands of thought that were not necessarily Brahmanical.

Texts such as Kautilya's *Arthasastra* and Sukra's *Nitisara* emphasize the importance of discipline to the prince and build up a strong typology of princes around the notions of *satvikas, rajasikas,* and *tamasikas,* the first being constant in their duties and protecting their subjects, the courageous and valorous being the second, and the third concerned about their own personal interests, respectively.

This strand of political thought guarded much privilege and ranking but also allowed a place for the contender and the dissenter. However, the position and status of the latter was accepted only in the longer run. At the extreme, this system could become deeply abusive, exonerating certain sections from any social responsibility while endorsing a graded order of dependency and servitude to the rest. While it was quick to notice a countervailing viewpoint, it left little room for reason to shape the system as a whole. In fact, reason itself was graded very low as a guide to action. At the same time, it has to be noted that this arrangement was often internally challenged through arguments and satire and led to rearranging the position and relations across social groups. The ideology of the system placed power in the service of a moral order, but in the process provided a pervasive and decisive place for it. It made room for great learning, toleration, and achievements while reproducing the despicable conditions of those who lived accepting its central tenets. Conceptions of time, history, and change found specific attenuations in the order and design of this thought.

Sramanic Thought

This stream of thought stands in marked opposition to the Brahmanical thought while sharing a worldview and certain categories of understanding in common. By and large, the Sramanic thought redefined the relation between perfection and power differently. It valorized individual perfection and did not hold social institutions and the ways of the world in great esteem. Its partisanship against certain types of privilege and rank, its considerations toward human dignity and what modern language describes as rights, and the place it accorded to diversity and to the dissenter made it the precursor to a specific strand of thought in modern times that emphasized on human dignity, equality, and freedoms. While there are numerous streams in this current of thought, two of them stand out: Buddhism and Jainism.

Buddhist thought counterposes the life of a renouncer to that of the king and court while according priority to a life of *sama* (equanimity/quietude) vis-à-vis that of indulgence and power. There is considerable diversity in different schools of Buddhist thought and changes over time with regard to political ideas. In general, it suggests that the periodic evolution of the world is the backdrop for the formation of social and political institutions. Political authority or kingship is the product of the degeneration that set in the relations between individuals on account of the rise of the institution of property. At the same time, early Buddhist thought acknowledges the existence of republican forms of rule while highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. Unlike brahmanical thought, the various social classes that it enumerates are not the product of divine will but the outcome of voluntary selection of occupations by the concerned classes.

Righteousness (*dhamma*), whose connotations are expansive and are redefined, is the foundational principle of political institutions. It is counterposed to the Arthasastra tradition of kingship, called *khattavijja,* or Kshatriya science, which is derided for upholding the interests of the state or the ruler at the expense of everything else. Righteousness as an attribute of political authority

calls for shunning wrong courses of life, performing a set of duties, and sustaining popular consent through activities worthy of their approval. Reason, which enables one to make right choices and judgments, is suggested as the guiding norm for political authority. Buddhism also developed the concept of *Chakravartin,* the universal ruler, who is seen as the temporal counterpart of the universal teacher, the Buddha.

While there are many things in common between Buddhist and Jain thought, there are some distinctive emphases of the latter. Jainism held that the world is a bondage. It sought *nivritti,* or withdrawal from the world, as its central value, and social institutions including political authority could only facilitate such a process. It subscribed to a much more substantial principle of *karma,* or action. The soul gets inebriated by the consequences of karma binding it in the cycle of birth and rebirth. It subscribed to the ideal of liberation, the right knowledge, or *kaivalya jnana,* through one's own effort. It developed the theory of *anekantavada* (i.e., many sided nature of truth, which suggested that one should try to understand truth in its totality), which requires understanding different points of view. Nonviolence becomes imperative for the purpose.

The *sramanic* thought did not appreciate the autonomy of public life and the role that political authority plays in its reproduction. It tried to reduce the *desiderata* of public authority into a system of dos and don'ts, and given its nonworkability, asked the seeker after perfection to distance oneself from power and the affairs of the world. While it had a positive notion of the human person and his or her capabilities and subscribed to essential human equality, it deployed this understanding toward the search after perfection, rather than in enriching sensuous and lived ways of life.

Other Traditions

There are other traditions of thought that distanced themselves from the two major strands previously highlighted, while incorporating some of their insights and ideas. There are also strands of materialistic thinking, such as the *Lokayata,* which denied the existence of God, soul, and afterlife, and saw human beings as closely bound with the processes of nature, and human mind and intellect as their complex expressions. In a different vein, *Thirukkural,* a classic of Tamil literature composed by Tiruvalluar in the second century CE, argued that the king's office is the foundation of the security of the subjects and celebrated prosperity and this-worldly life guided by wisdom. Tiruvalluar attempted to relate ideas expressed both in the Arthasastra and Buddhist tradition. This tradition of thought, however, eventually became didactic rather than argumentative, celebrating the wise man and the great ruler, holding them aloft as exemplars.

The Medieval Period

Islam reached India through different routes. But soon many of its adherents came to wield political authority.

Thinking Through Islam

Two authoritative texts written during the Muslim rule in India stand out with regard to the reflective consideration they bestow on the conception of political authority, *Fatwa-i-Jahandari* and *Ain-i-Akbari,* the first written by Khwaja Ziauddin Barani (1285–1357) and the second by Abul Fazl (1551–1602). The early Muslim thought in India, particularly the work of Barani, is deeply influenced by Plato and Aristotle. Barani argued that the king is the representative of God on earth and is the source of all power and authority. Royal power is divinely instituted, and he called it *farri izidi* (the divine light) and *kiyan khwarah* (the sublime halo). What is interesting to note, however, are the limits to such authority that he suggested and the kind of autonomy that he granted to reasons of state. He argued that in this wicked world, governance of men is not possible without a strong state endowed with might, prestige, and power of kingship. But at the same time he spoke of moderating such power, making the distinction between regimes that elicit consent to their rule and those who resort to tyrannical methods. He saw the dispensing of justice as an essential function of a sovereign. Further, he regarded justice as a necessary condition for the pursuit of religion, and religion of justice. He also introduced the concept of rights although he had no conception of equal rights. This concern for justice and rights is

reflected in his understanding of law. Therefore, to the four accepted sources of law (*Shariat*), the Qur'an, the *Hadish* (traditions of the prophet), the *ijma* (opinions and ruling of the majority of Muslim theologians), and *qiyas* (speculative method of deduction), he added state law, or *Zawabit,* as an important source of law, although it cannot necessarily contradict the *Shariat*. Needless to add, Barani suggested interesting possibilities of the exercise of political power in the context of religious pluralism.

Fazl accepted that royal authority is divinely instituted. There is no intermediary between God and the king, and therefore there is no place for independent customary and regulatory authorities between the king and the people. The king himself is expected to judge and interpret the holy law. But he made a distinction between true ruler and a selfish king, the former not so much concerned about himself and his power but people's well-being. Both centralized authority and well-being of the people became important considerations in his works. While Fazl stipulated no clear limits to monarchical power, he had contempt for tyranny. He classified society into four tiers with their distinct propensities: rulers and warriors, learned people, artisans and merchants, and laborers, a classification that helped to integrate non-Muslim population in a benevolent conception of rulership, embodied in the rule of Akbar, the Great Mogul Emperor, in whose court Fazl was a minister.

Muslim political thought therefore left behind a twofold normative legacy in India: the primacy of Islam and under it the authority of the human ruler, and primacy of the ruler without any intermediary between him and the people. Social institutions were accordingly adjusted, rather than wholly revamped. While rulers were conceded the power to radically alter such institutions, tyranny was looked down on and consent of the ruled became an important consideration.

The Bhakti Tradition

There are powerful literary and devotional currents in the medieval period that stress equality and equal consideration be extended to others in spite of their differences. A part of the impetus to this development can be traced to the philosophical strands of the past that uphold the equal relationship of the devotee to the Supreme Being or one's equal entitlement to access the divine. Kabir (1455–1517 CE), one of the great saint-poets of the period, argued that it is possible for everyone to approach God directly, with or without any mediation of mosque or temple; all human beings are brothers to one another and there is a fundamental unity to the strivings of all religions. Thinkers of the Bhakti tradition who were generally poets threw scorn at religious ritualism, priest craft, and creedal barriers to access God. Most of them invoked a personal God and spoke of his or her relation to him. What is interesting is the participation of numerous women saints in this movement who were deeply conscious of being women. There is a strong interface between this devotional trend and the articulation of the Sufi trend in India. This tradition cutting across religious, sectarian, and gender divide helped in fostering the value of equality and human dignity.

The Modern Period

The colonial intervention in India was at least partly shaped by the conception of the Orient in general and India in particular that it carried overboard. In the process, there was a selective appropriation of political ideas and traditions in India that were seen as appropriate to the organization and consolidation of power. Elements of the Brahmanical and the elitist Muslim thought and the traditions of the martial races became quite handy to British consolidation of power around which a specific colonial modernity came to be spelled out. Modernity also brought with it a specific conception of reason, rule of law, public good, rights, and public authority. These elements, however, were defined in terms of practical dictates of governance, rather than as principles informing political authority.

The nationalist thought and the kind of modernity that it proposed, therefore, was largely shaped by a twofold axis:

1. The contradictions and possibilities inherent in colonial thought
2. A critique and alternative partly grounded in considerations of the traditions of the past

This twofold axis provided a great deal of complexity to the nationalist thought in India as it had to negotiate through the contradictions of the thought currents of modernity, as well as the challenges posed by cultural inheritance. It led to certain distinct strands within the nationalist thought. The largely nonviolent character of the Indian national movement and massive public participation in it particularly during certain phases provided popular platforms to critically test ideas and viewpoints in open debate and discussion.

Social Reformist, Egalitarian Perspective

This perspective was much influenced by nineteenth century British liberalism and had deep roots in the oppositional stances of ancient and medieval India. It stressed equal rights of human beings and decried the existence of hereditary gradations and rankings epitomized by the caste system in India. It also advanced an incisive critique of colonial modernity for not being true to itself and for continuing an illiberal rule in India. It attacked the widespread superstitions, ritualism, and priest craft prevalent in India and appealed to reason, science, and freedom of choice. It pointed out the internal inconsistencies of colonial rule in India that justified itself on grounds of reason, rule of law, and freedoms but denied the same to Indians. It also pointed out the great gulf that existed between political equality on one hand and social and economic inequality on the other in the modern West and from this standpoint not merely criticized colonial modernity but the very embodiment of modernity in the West and the moral right of those societies to rule over others. These general positions often could become creative in several directions, as they could be confined to liberal snobbery with a narrow understanding of equal political and civil rights. Some thinkers in this line of thought became highly critical of certain traditions of thought in India while upholding other traditions. For instance, Bhimrao Ambedkar (1891–1956) valorized Buddhism and its egalitarian impulse, its moral grounding, and denounced Brahmanism for fostering ritualism, superstitions, and defense of a system of privileges and ranking. Some of them noted other cleavages, such as the domination of Aryan and Vedic-Brahmanical traditions over Dravidian, non-Vedic, and non-Brahmanical traditions. While this perspective attracted a significant section of Muslim intelligentsia, they at the same time raised concerns regarding the rights of minorities in a majoritarian order and the safeguards to their beliefs and distinct practices in an order dominated by a social majority. Sometimes their critique of colonial modernity went hand in hand with an assessment of their own cultural traditions, and at other times they drew attention to the threat that modernity posed to diversity and alternative conceptions of life. Overall, this perspective ardently argued for constitutional democracy with safeguards to minorities, representative institutions, religious freedoms, and equal rights.

Culturist Perspective With Emphasis on Nationalism

The culturist perspective stressed the difference between India and colonial modernity, the latter being an expression of the West. Therefore, colonial modernity was an affront to culture, and it called for forging a unity grounded on culture. In this perspective, constituting India as a nation, as an authentic expression of its culture, was the first and foremost task. This perspective could supply several specific orientations and truly did so. One of them argued that Indian culture need not necessarily be inimical to modernity and its pursuits, but it is the nation constituted around its cultural identity that will eventually decide which aspects of modernity would be acceptable to it. Such a position was upheld by scholar-politicians like Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920). There were others who saw certain features of the cultural domain in India as the essence of the nation and argued the case for nationalism built on the foundation of such an essence, weeding out or subordinating elements that did not conform to such features. Hindu nationalists such as Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966) and Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar (1906–1973) advanced this orientation. There were a few who argued that modernity cannot be equated with a set of specific developments in the West. Other cultures also held out such possibilities, which came to be nipped in the bud with the onset of colonialism.

Critique of Modernity

This position did not primarily pitch colonial modernity against cultural belonging, nor made social reforms central to its agenda, but it rejected some of the central premises and substantial claims of modernity as unwarranted, undesirable, and even pernicious. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1871–1948) was the central figure arguing out this position, which, in turn, had a bearing on culture, communities, and human dignity as well. Gandhi subscribed to the principle of *swaraj,* autonomy of the self and self-regulation, and he thought that such a pursuit became wellnigh impossible under modernity. There were other critical modernists such as Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) who closely equated nationalism with modernity and argued that it "trims minds" and "clips freedom," and through its educational apparatuses regulates thoughts, manufactures feelings, and polices human action. Against nationalism with its trappings in modernity, Tagore called for a dialogue and mutual learning across cultures and civilizations that, he thought, would be truly ennobling.

Diversity, Difference, and Pluralism

In the process of nationalist consolidation, the deep diversities informing India registered themselves glaringly in the pubic domain. While such diversities had existed earlier, contact and interaction with them was either minimal or occasional, and unforeseen contacts were ritually negated, if need be. But in the coming together of the nation, this proved to be quite impossible, and various resolutions for the resettlement of such differences were advanced. There were also a variety of types of differences based on religion, culture, language, deprivation, exclusion, and discrimination. All these constituencies were mobilized during the nationalist phase and in the post nationalist democratic upsurge in India. While there was no single solution to accommodate and respond to this diversity, a mix of the ideas of development—political, religious, and cultural autonomy; equality and nondiscrimination; and preferential considerations under constitutional democracy—came to be suggested as the best solution by mainstream nationalist discourse. It was this mix of ideas that that came to inform the specific brand of secularism in India. The Muslim league that thought that such a mix will not be able to withstand the onslaught of Hindu majoritarianism on Muslim minority went ahead with the demand for a separate nation, Pakistan.

In spite of these differences, many believed that modernity, sooner or later, will replace traditional institutions, beliefs, and ways of life. Soon such verdicts were proved wrong as tradition came to articulate modernity in its own distinct ways, leading to diverse faces of modernity in India.

Postnationalist Thought

Postnationalist thought in India, in the context of a vibrant liberal democratic institutional complex, has relooked at some of the themes of the nationalist discourse, often drawing heavily from contemporary thinking in the West. It is important to note that there is a vibrant feminist position that qualifies most of these themes. Some of the important concerns that were highlighted in the process are the following:

The Modern and Its Other

Political thought in postcolonial India is deeply shaped by an unease with a singular understanding of modernity, its relation with power and domination, and its implications to differences and otherness. Given the contested understanding of modernity and the alternative versions advanced in this regard, this critique remains highly diffused. Environmental concerns and deprivation of the livelihood of communities have added fuel to this critique. While this critique has not necessarily advanced an alternative, it has qualified certain hallowed relations underscored by modernity between man and nature, human agency and philosophical perspectives on understanding and belonging. There is an implicit critique of the modern nation-state that informs it. One of the principal philosophical anchors of this critique is the rejection of a teleological perspective and philosophy of history that is so central to mainstream modernity. Such rejection has led to the appreciation of tradition and modernity cohabiting the same space and myriad ways of exploring their relationships.

Secularism

Secularism remains an important theme in the contemporary debate in India, particularly in the context of its association with modernity, the continuing hold of religious affiliations in a multireligious society, and the appeal to religious majoritarianism under conditions of representative democracy. One of the earliest arguments of mainstream Indian nationalism has been the possibility of differences cohabiting the same sociopolitical space. Such a possibility was pitched against the widely held belief that nations are, by and large, homogenous terrains where people accept their belonging on the basis of a set of shared bonds. In contemporary India, the debate has ranged from rejecting secularism as the foundational principle of Indian polity to its qualified defense.

Democracy

Democratic upsurge is a vibrant presence across the social topography of India and something unique in a post-colonial society. While several explanations are suggested for this upsurge, mainstream political thinking in India (including the left) has rallied in its defense, advancing their distinctive elaborations of the same. Only a section of Maoists have rejected institutions of representative democracy in India, promising in its place a substantively different version of democracy. A great deal of political thinking in India, however, has concentrated on the limitations of Indian democracy: the looming presence of state apparatuses; diverse modes of dominance restricting its reach; and its failure to include and empower large sections of the masses. At the same time, the departure of Indian democracy from a universal version of liberal democracy and its specific articulation in the cultural context of India remains a favorite theme of exploration.

Nationalism, Cultural Domain, and Diversity

Nationalism continues to be one of the central fascinations in the postcolonial thought in India. Several of its facets are held aloft for reflective considerations. One of the popular theses proposed in India is that nationalism is not merely a universal moment but is informed by cultural difference marking it off from others. While cultural nationalism based on religious majoritarianism has acquired much political mileage, secular nationalism informed of differences and diverse kind of identities is pitched against it. Concerns of rights and good and the ways of negotiating across their contentious claims in a democratic polity have been issues of immediate political interest in India. It has given a significant turn to feminist thinking that rested on claims of equal rights. In the context of globalization, nationalism has rebounded back, invoking culture and autonomy quite centrally.

Social Justice and Preferential Considerations

India has had one of the most complex regimes of preferential considerations reaching out to diverse disadvantaged constituencies. What is significant, however, are the sort of justifications offered in this regard. Some of the important arguments in defense of justification of preferential considerations and their relationship to equal rights, democracy, and a conception of selfhood and agency were developed by Bhimrao Ambedkar during the nationalist phase, and provisions for the same were institutionalized in the Indian constitution. Some of the major conflicts between the Judiciary and Parliament and reasons for political cleavages in India's body politic have revolved on this issue.

Some features of Indian thought clearly stand out: It has constantly invoked its own past to redefine itself, although such invocation has bred plurality of interpretations and emphases. While the social history of India is writ large with hierarchy, privilege, and ranking, they have been forcefully countered as well. Demands for equality, respect for agency, and widely shared belief in freedom of worship had engendered an atmosphere conducive to egalitarian values in India even prior to the intervention of colonial modernity. The central concerns of nationalist thought in India, while being receptive to a range of liberal and socialist ideas from the West, are strongly embedded in its distinct cultural legacies. Postcolonial political thought in India, although engaged with some of the significant concerns of political thinking worldwide today, is deeply marked by its cultural context.

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See also Gandhi, Mohandas; Hindu Political Thought; Islamic Political Philosophy

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INSTITUTIONALISM

Institutionalism is a general approach to social science that studies institutions using inductive, historical, and comparative methods. No matter how one defines political science, from its inception it has put much emphasis on the study of institutions. Institutions have often been understood as formal organizations governed by written laws or rules: examples of formal institutions include Parliament, the United States presidency, the courts, government departments, and parties. Yet, the concept of an institution can easily be stretched to include informal organizations; for while informal organizations often lack written rules, they still exhibit patterns of behavior that we might unpack in terms of loose norms. Examples of informal institutions include community groups, voting coalitions, and policy networks.

Institutionalism generally uses inductive, legal, historical, and comparative methods to study formal and informal institutions. The inductive and legal methods are mainly concerned with generating adequate accounts of the way an institution operates. Induction relies on observation to provide such descriptions. A preference for induction leads some institutionalists to express skepticism about more general theories of politics. They prefer, in their own terms, to grasp the particular features of each case, and even to let the facts speak for themselves. The legal method is closely associated with the study of formal institutions. It relies on the study of documents and cases to get at constitutional and administrative laws and norms. The historical and comparative methods are arguably more concerned with explaining institutions. The historical method seeks to explain our current institutions by reference to the past. It is widely seen as a way of explaining the unique features of an institution in a way more general laws cannot do. The comparative method is used in part to identify those features of an institution, such as parliament, that are unique to it and those that are found in other legislatures. It also offers a way of trying to explain the common features by reference to other institutions that the relevant states have in common. Of course, these various methods are not incompatible. To the contrary, most studies of institutionalists rely on a combination of them.

Old and New Institutionalisms

Most of the original nineteenth-century works of political science were broadly institutional. They

concentrated on the formal rules defining state institutions, notably the legislature, bureaucracy, and judiciary. In the twentieth century, behavioralism, rational choice theory, and neoliberalism all challenged this institutionalism. The behavioralists paid more attention to actual activities than to formal rules; they produced studies of voting behavior, political parties, interest groups, and policy networks that suggested the activity of politics often had little to do with formal constitutional laws. Rational choice theorists suggested that political action should be explained in terms of the preferences and interests of the relevant actor, not the formal rules governing the role of that actor. Neoliberals argued that the administrative state with its strong institutional framework needed to be dismantled and replaced with markets and networks that broke down the barriers between state and civil society.

Instiutionalists responded to these critics largely by accepting them and seeking to encompass them under a broader concept of institutionalism. So the 1990s witnessed the dramatic rise of a "new institutionalism." To some extent, the new institutionalism rests on a caricature of the old institutionalism: the old institutionalism is associated with the study of formal institutions, so that the new institutionalism can be identified with a novel concern with informal norms and symbols. In addition, however, the new institutionalism clearly arose as a response to behavioralists, and especially—given that we are talking about the 1990s—rational choice theory and neoliberals.

Rational choice theory deduces models of social life from assumptions about individual behavior. It poses the question: how can we unpack accounts of institutions by reference to individual behavior. Much of the new institutionalism arose in part to answer this question. The new institutionalism pays far more attention to the ways in which individuals both affect and are affected by institutional settings, and, in doing so, it grapples with the inner workings of institutions, the sources of differences between institutions, and changes within any given institution.

Just as the institutionalists reworked their approach, some began to study the more diffuse patterns of governance that flourished under neoliberal regimes and their successors. The greater emphasis on informal institutions helped the new institutionalists to claim as their own the study not only of formal bureaucracies but also of networks. They examined the new governance as a further hollowing out of the state through the spread of policy networks. The attempt to bring markets into the public sector weakened the central state. It had further segmented the executive branch of government. And it had thereby made the state more and more dependent on other organizations within a growing number of networks. Many institutionalists concluded that, under the new governance, the state had to rely less on commands or rules and more on indirect management based on negotiation and trust. Ironically, large parts of the new institutionalism thus came to champion networks against not only the markets but also hierarchic bureaucracies.

So, the new institutionalists retain an elder focus on rules, procedures, and organizations: institutions are composed of two or more people; they serve some kind of social purpose; and they exist over time in a way that transcends the intentions and actions of specific individuals. But, equally, the new institutionalists adopt a broader concept of institution that includes norms, habits, and cultural customs alongside formal rules, procedures, and organizations; they look at informal networks as much as more structured administrative and democratic organizations.

Varieties of Institutionalism

There are a number of ways of dividing the new institutionalists into competing factions. The most common is to distinguish between a rational choice institutionalism, a sociological institutionalism, and a historical institutionalism. These different varieties of institutional theory suggest different answers to questions about the nature of institutions, how institutions influence behavior, and how institutions change.

Rational choice institutionalism is best understood as a response to a particular problem within rational choice theory. The problem is that if we assume that people act to maximize their own satisfaction, we are likely to conclude that they will defect from an agreement whenever honoring it will not serve their interests. The continual likelihood of defection appears, in turn, to make it awkward for rational choice theorists to explain

stable coalitions and institutions. Some rational choice theorists appeal to institutions to solve this problem. They argue that institutions, such as rules of procedure, structure the information that individuals have and thus choices that individuals make. In this view, then, institutions are a solution to collective action problems. Institutions influence behavior by providing the settings within which individuals then seek to maximize the satisfaction of their preferences. And institutions change because people's preferences change.

The sociological institutionalism draws mainly on organizational theory, and it tends to unpack organizations in informal and cultural terms rather than formal and legal ones. Sociological institutionalists thus define institutions primarily by reference to rules, norms, symbols, and beliefs. They argue that institutions influence behavior precisely in that institutions give an individual the beliefs and identities on which he or she then acts. Sociological institutionalists explain changes in an institution by reference to the rise and fall of new symbols and beliefs within the wider cultural environment. New identities arise in society, and as these acquire legitimacy, they begin to spread across institutions where they open up the possibility of contest and change.

Historical institutionalism is more difficult to explain clearly. The difficulty arises because historical institutionalism is, in large part, just a flag of convenience adopted by diverse social scientists, all of who want to continue to undertake fairly broad social inquiries without addressing the microlevel issues about individual behavior that are raised by rational choice theory. If we look for the historical institutionalist view of the relation of institutions to behavior, we find vague metaphors, confusion, or oscillation between rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Still, historical institutionalists often define institutions as formal or informal procedures, routines, and rules. Some of them adopt a calculus analysis and others a cultural analysis of the way in which institutions influence behavior. The calculus approach echoes rational choice theory: It holds that institutions inform individuals' expectations about how others' will behave and thus their calculus of how best to attain their ends. The cultural approach, in contrast, echoes sociological institutionalism: It holds that institutions provide familiar patterns that individuals rely on in their attempt to attain satisfactory outcomes. Finally, historical institutionalists explain changes in institutions in terms of "critical junctures" and "path dependency." These metaphorical terms suggest that institutions generally fix their own development apart from at key moments when crucial decisions are made. The main attempts to give more analytic content to these terms have drawn heavily on rational choice theory.

Future Prospects

The rise of the new institutionalism appears to have fended off—or just simply absorbed—some of the criticisms of behavioralists and rational choice theorists. It is arguable, however, that the new institutionalism has done so at the expense of becoming rather vacuous. When contemporary institutionalists make bland assertions along the lines that institutions matter, they do not answer the question of the microlevel so much as displace it. Rational choice institutionalism is a clear exception: It is clearly rooted in the conceptual assumptions of rational choice theory more generally. The sociological and especially the historical institutionalism, in contrast, appear to leave unanswered the theoretical questions of how and to what extent institutions determine the behavior of actors.

Considerable ambiguity thus remains as to how we should conceive of institutions and what explanatory power we should grant them. On one hand, institutions appear to have a strangely reified form. They are defined as fixed rules or procedures that limit or even determine the actions of the individuals within them. Political scientists are thus able to ignore the contingency, inner conflicts, and construction of institutions. Yet they can do so only by implicitly reifying institutions in a way that neglects the questions of the microlevel. On the other hand, therefore, institutions are sometimes opened up to include cultural factors or meanings in a way that suggests they themselves do not fix meanings, nor thus the beliefs and actions of the individuals who are within them. If we open up institutions in this way, however, we cannot treat them as if they were given. We have to ask instead how meanings and actions are created, recreated, and changed in ways that produce and modify institutions.

The problems of reification have led to an increasing emphasis on the social and ideational construction of institutions. From a constructivist perspective, institutions are the products of actions informed by the varied and contingent beliefs and desires of the relevant people. While this constructivist view does at least address important theoretical questions, we might wonder whether or not we should still think of it as institutionalist in any significant sense. All the explanatory work appears to be done not by given rules, but by the diverse ways in which people understood and applied conventions. Appeals to institutions thus appear to be somewhat misleading shorthand for the conclusions of explorations into the beliefs and desires of the people who acted so as to maintain and modify the institutions in the way they did.

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See also Behavioralism; Rational Choice Theory; Social Constructivism; State

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INSTRUMENTALISM

Instrumentalism is the view that the value of scientific concepts and theories is determined not by whether they are literally true or correspond to reality in some sense, but by the extent to which they help us to make accurate empirical predictions or, as Larry Laudan has argued, help us to resolve conceptual problems. That is, instrumentalism is the view that scientific theories should be thought of primarily as tools for solving practical problems, rather than as meaningful descriptions of the natural world. Indeed, instrumentalists typically call into question whether it makes sense at all to think of theoretical terms as corresponding to external reality. In this sense, instrumentalism is directly opposed to scientific realism, which is the view that the point of scientific theories is not merely to generate reliable predictions, but to describe the world accurately.

Instrumentalism is a form of philosophical pragmatism as it applies to the philosophy of science. The term itself comes from John Dewey's name for his own more general brand of pragmatism, in which the value of any idea is determined by its usefulness in helping us adapt to the world around us. Instrumentalism is thus also sometimes more broadly used to refer to the view that public policy should be judged only on the basis of whether it helps us to achieve social goals.

Instrumentalism in the philosophy of science is motivated at least in part by the idea that scientific theories are necessarily underdetermined by the available data, and that in fact no finite amount of empirical evidence could rule out the possibility of an alternate explanation for observed phenomena. Because in this view there is no way to determine conclusively that one theory more closely approaches the truth than its rivals, the main criterion for evaluating theories should be how well they perform. Indeed, if no amount of evidence can decisively show that a given theory is true (as opposed to merely predictive), it begs the question of whether it actually means anything to say that a theory is "true." It is thus not that instrumentalists do not believe that some theories are better than others, but rather that they doubt that there is any sense in which a theory can be said to be true or false apart from the extent to which it is useful in solving scientific problems.

In support of this view, instrumentalists commonly point out that the history of science is replete with examples of theories that were at one time widely considered true but now almost universally considered false. We no longer accept, for example, the theory that light propagates through the ether, or even that there is such thing as the ether at all. While realists argue that as our theories

become progressively better, they come to more and more closely approximate the truth, instrumentalists argue that if we have come to discard elements of even our best theories so completely, there is no reason to suppose that the most widely accepted theories of our own day will hold up any better. Nor do we necessarily have any reason to believe that our best current theories approximate the truth any more than the ether theory approximated special relativity.

There may nevertheless be a sense in which the instrumentalist and realist positions are not as far apart as they sometimes seem. For it is difficult to say precisely what the distinction is between accepting the usefulness of a theoretical statement and actually believing it to be true. Still, even if the difference between the two views is in some sense only semantic, or one of emphasis, the fact is that most people intuitively do make a distinction between the truth and practical usefulness of scientific theories.

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See also Anti-Foundationalism; Dewey, John; Paradigm; Popper, Karl; Scientific Realism

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Intergenerational Justice

John Rawls famously declared that the concept of *intergenerational justice* "subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests" (Rawls, 1999, p. 251). Taking *justice* to be concerned with the fair distribution of benefits and burdens across some domain, the first problem encountered is what exactly is a generation? Is it the group of all people existing at the same time, or all people whose life spans overlap at some point, or all people enjoying a particular stage of life? Focusing on moral claims of particular people who do not yet exist, rather than the various generational entities to which they belong, much of the recent literature on intergenerational justice addresses theoretical and practical barriers that block, or at the very least complicate, any temporal extension of familiar notions of justice, rights, and obligations. The most important of these are: nonexistence, uncertainty, nonreciprocity, and nonidentity.

Nonexistence

At first glance, considerations arising from the formal nature of justice and rights bar nonexisting entities, whether dead or as yet unborn, from being valid sources of moral claims. Entities that do not yet exist, that is, cannot be welcomed into the circle of justice, as this would involve conceptual incoherence. This claim is made quite explicitly by Hillel Steiner, whose "choice-theory of rights" maintains that a person possesses a right not because of any benefit she might derive from others being constrained from its violation, but rather because she is in a position to claim (or waive) the performance of the duty with which it is associated. The choice-theory's insistence that right bearers be active, choosing agents means that ascribing rights to entities incapable of making choices in the present, or of transferring this role to a third party, is a conceptual mistake. The nonexistence objection does not commit its proponents to the view that existing people have *no* duties to protect the environment that future people will eventually inherit. Such duties may exist, but they are not explicable in terms of an appeal to justice or rights.

Despite its philosophical elegance, both the choice-theory and the nonexistence objection to which it is connected lose their attraction once we realize that (a) justice involves the protection of the interests of future people independently of their (in)ability to function as active, choosing, agents and (b) justice contains ethical categories that cannot always be reduced to the discourse of rights and correlative obligations. In terms of notions of harm and interest, the rival, and far

more intuitive, "interest-theory of rights" holds that an agent, X, having a right implies that "other things being equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty" (Raz, 1984, p. 183). There is no obvious reason for excluding the not yet born from possessing such rights. As Joel Feinberg, Robert Elliot, and other interest theorists have argued, it can be assumed that there will be people who exist in the future; these people will possess interests vulnerable to intervention in a similar way to our own; and the environmental activities of existing people will have profound effects on these interests. In terms of non–rights-based conceptions of justice, Onora O'Neill and others have suggested that existing generations possess wide-ranging duties of environmental preservation to their distant successors, even if these duties have no counterpart rights and do not plausibly pick out particular people at risk. Intergenerational justice, for O'Neill, is instead based on the *imperfect* duties we have toward as yet unspecified, and possibly unborn, agents whom we can assume will feel the impacts of our actions and policy choices. The crucial question is not whether a member of a distant generation can logically be said to possess the essential properties to be regarded as a right holder, but rather whether we already make assumptions about them in our actions, practical reasoning, and social institutions.

Uncertainty

According to the second objection, no generation possesses sufficient or reliable information about the long-term impacts of human activities to realize moral aims beyond securing the interests of existing people and possibly their offspring. So, unlike the case of our contemporaries, we have insufficient information on which to base our duties to remote future people, even if these duties exist in ideal form. This is not to say that we have no predictive ability with regards to the future, but that we have insufficient epistemological grounds to discriminate between alternative hypotheses about the impacts of our actions on future well-being to service claims of intergenerational justice.

At first glance, this may seem to be a strong argument—at least for consequentialists, who evaluate the *in*justice of acts and policies in terms of their tendency to produce valued outcomes. In nearly every current human endeavor, we encounter huge uncertainties complicating attempts to determine the welfare impact of social and individual choices. Areas of human life subject to gross uncertainties are human health, demography, resources usage, warfare, tastes and values, and environmental adaptive capacity. For nonconsequentialists, of course, the issue is more complex, as they focus on intrinsic wrongness of adopting reckless acts or policies rather than the harmful consequences for the victims.

So do the problems associated with predicting the future impacts of acts and social policies deal a fatal blow to intergenerational justice? Should discussion of justice be limited to contemporaries on epistemological grounds alone? One problem with the uncertainty argument is that it overstates the level of outcome certainty that consequentialist justice requires. Relationships among contemporaries, compatriots, and family members are subject to significant uncertainty in terms of tastes, values, and outcomes, and yet we do not question the role of justice in such relationships. A second problem is that, even in the most unclear contexts, we usually know enough about the future to know that it would be a great injustice to adopt policies that threaten the most vital and predictable of future interests, such as access to unpolluted air and water, shelter from the elements, or access to an environment unmodified beyond any reasonable limit of human adaptive ability. Any theory of intergenerational justice rests on the assumption that the relevant duty bearers possess enough knowledge and expertise to identify the key risks to future well-being posed by any given policy. But this requires far less precision than the uncertainty argument would have us believe.

Nonreciprocity

According to the next objection, intergenerational justice is incoherent because justice only binds agents that enjoy mutuality of communication and physical interaction. Existing people will never meet or cooperate with those whose existence postdates their own, with the result that we have

no duties of justice to them. More formally, the following argument arises:

> Premise 1: Reciprocity exists only between people who can affect each other's interests.
>
> Premise 2: A person cannot affect the interests of people belonging to past generations.
>
> Premise 3: Requirements of justice are owed only among those who reciprocate.
>
> *Conclusion*: Acts or social policies that threaten the interests of future people are not unjust.

What can we say about this argument? First, the major premise is highly controversial. Most writers in the liberal egalitarian tradition, for example, deny that reciprocity has any connection to the scope of justice. For them, justice is "subject-centered" in the sense that "basic rights to resources are grounded not in the individual's strategic capacities but rather in other features of the individual herself" (Buchanan, 1990, p. 231). Second, those sympathetic to reciprocity-based justice rarely hold that an entity's lack of threat advantage means that we can do anything to them without treating them unjustly. We might not be obliged to relinquish resources so that nonreciprocators enjoy a full share of society's wealth, but we would not be permitted to kill or wound them.

Third, the argument as a whole restricts reciprocity to a direct and aggressive form of interaction and thereby promotes the interpretation of justice usefully labeled "self-interested reciprocity" by Allen Buchanan (1990, p. 229). The result is that the argument neglects a subtler form of reciprocity based on the provision of benefits for logical intermediaries, where a lack of direct contact renders impossible any direct exchange of benefits. This "justice as fair reciprocity" approach not only generates a more sophisticated and intuitive distributive outlook for contemporaries, but also opens the path to intergenerational justice. Two main possibilities have been explored in the literature. The first—the "Chain of Concern" approach (defended by John Passmore and Richard Howarth)—argues that the existence among human beings of a near-universal sentimental concern for their nearest descendants means that it is rational for each successive generation to treat the well-being of the next as a public good that all should protect. Here, the reciprocity exists between contemporaries, but the requirements of justice to which it is attached are discharged by promoting the well-being of future people. The second—the "Stewardship" approach (defended by Lawrence Becker)—proceeds from the assumption that many of the benefits enjoyed by present people were produced by past people with the overt or tacit intention that they be preserved either indefinitely or for a specified amount of time. The upshot is that the duty to pass on such benefits to future generations is analogous to the duty to reciprocate for benefits received from contemporaries via social institutions, such as blood banks and organ donation schemes.

What should we make of these two responses? One issue worth noting is that the directionality of the duties in each is quite different. The former proposes that present people discharge their duties to each other by providing benefits to future people; the latter proposes that present people discharge their duties to past people by providing benefits to future people. A second issue is that the approaches have different strengths and, especially, weaknesses. The backward directionality of the duties defined by intergenerational stewardship means that the protection of the biosphere is placed at the mercy of benefits that were unintentionally bequeathed and involuntarily accepted. The Chain of Concern approach, by contrast, is subject to problems associated with establishing the duties of nonprocreators, those who do not share the relevant sentimental concern for at least one biological descendant, and the apparent blindness of the approach to the risks of activities that pose a threat for remote generations while being harmless to intermediary generations.

Nonidentity

Consider the following choice between two international approaches to manage the risks posed by global climate change. The example is hypothetical, but draws to a certain extent on recent debates concerning the appropriate successor to the Kyoto Protocol after it expires in 2012. The first approach, "Business as Usual," sets voluntary targets on carbon emissions with the goal of reducing the carbon intensity, but not the overall emissions, of participating states. "Contraction and Convergence," by

contrast, aims to secure each existing and future person fair share of the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere by establishing a global safe ceiling for greenhouse emissions and distributing the burdens of remaining below this level according to a fairly negotiated allocation procedure. The predictable consequence of choosing Contraction and Convergence over its rival would be that, after a century or so, the quality of life enjoyed by the average world citizen would be significantly higher. Would it not be wrong to adopt Business as Usual under these circumstances on grounds of intergenerational justice? The problem is that adopting Business as Usual does not involve any obvious violation of justice for the simple reason that it is almost impossible for any act or policy to harm a particular future person as a result of the extreme contingency of human genesis. This "non-identity problem" (NIP), introduced by Derek Parfit and Robert Schwartz, can be put in more formal terms:

> Premise 1: An act or social policy is unjust only if it makes people worse off than they would otherwise have been.
>
> Premise 2: If any particular person had not been conceived when he or she was in fact conceived, he or she would never have existed.
>
> Premise 3: Adopting Business as Usual or Contraction and Convergence would result in entirely different sets of people coming into existence in the future.
>
> *Conclusion*: Adopting Business as Usual is not unjust to future generations.

How might we rebut this argument? The first thing to note is that in a number of cases, it does not need to be rebutted. That is, there are limits to the argument that question its relevance for scholars of intergenerational justice. First, the argument does not affect our duties to people not yet born, so long as the act or policy choice under evaluation will not affect that person's identity. Second, the argument does not have clear implications when the act or policy in question will predictably render many people worse off than any intuitive understanding of a life not worth living. These people may not be worse off than they would have been, but they may still be said to exist in a state of avoidable agony thanks to the actions of past generations. Third, the argument has no relevance at all for theories of intergenerational justice that seek to promote valued outcomes irrespective of how particular people fare. Following Parfit (1984, p. 393–394), these are known in the literature as "person-affecting" theories.

Despite these limitations, nonidentity poses a profound challenge for theorists of intergenerational justice as the interests and rights and interests of particular people are highly prevalent in the way a host of legal, moral, and political problems are discussed. One interesting response to the problem is to distinguish between "general interests" and "specific interests." James Woodward, for example, argues that Business as Usual would threaten the specific interests of future people (which are connected with their dignity, self-respect, and interest in being born into a safe environment), even if it could not possibly damage their overall quality of life. In effect, what is unjust about Business as Usual is that it brings people into existence possessing rights that could not possibly be fulfilled, even though their bearers are not thereby made worse off than if they had never existed. One problem with this approach is that we might expect the people who later live to waive their specific rights not to be born into a damaged environment, so long as it can be predicted that they will lead decent lives all things considered, though it remains disputed whether such rights can be waived retroactively.

An alternative approach, proposed by Lukas Meyer, rejects the major premise of the NIP on the grounds that it ignores an additional sense in which a future person may be harmed by an act predating their conception. That is, while the NIP presupposes the "subjunctive-historical" sense of harm (according to which, an act harms a person if it makes them worse off than they *would* have been), it ignores the "subjunctive-threshold" sense of harm (that an act harms a person if it makes them worse off than they *should* have been according to some nonarbitrary measure of a decent life). The problem with this otherwise ingenious approach is that it seems at best to finesse, rather than solve, the NIP. For one thing, the subjunctive-threshold understanding of harm could only be used to criticize reckless policies once it is supplemented by an underlying theory of distributive justice that can explain what amounts to a "decent life" that does not appeal to standard understandings of personal

harm. For another, it would have to explain how to resolve conflicts when the two alternative senses of harm support alternative policy choices.

A third possibility is found in the thought that intergenerational justice is primarily concerned with preventing wrongs, rather than harms, to future people. The distinction is a subtle one, but the idea is that reckless acts or social policies are unjust as they culpably fail to comply with any reasonable standards of due care to existing and future people, even if they do not render their victims worse off in any tangible sense. Mankind's rush to pollute the planet, deplete the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere, and exhaust nonrenewable resources is unjust in involving a huge transfer of risk to those unable to protest as a result of their futurity. Reminiscent of O'Neill's focus on imperfect obligations, this *nonconseqentialist* approach traces intergenerational injustice in cases such as the previously mentioned to the negligence and moral failure of the adopters of unsound policies and not to the actual adverse outcomes of their choice.

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See also Climate Change; Environmentalism; Liberalism, Contemporary; Justice, Theories of; Rawls, John

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Interpretive Theory

Interpretive theory poses a set of answers to the question, how do we know what we know about the social world? Interpretive theory has had a long and multifarious history, which can be summarized as an orientation, approach, or method in political studies that arose in opposition to various positivistic, empiricist, in short, natural scientific outlooks within the human sciences. Interpretive theory has drawn from many sources and traditions, and its history and current practice are open to interpretation.

Interpretation and Knowledge in Political Studies

Interpretivists typically go beyond the accepted view that everyone interprets to gain understanding and give explanation, or that interpretation is one among several approaches or types of methods by which human scientists can acquire knowledge. They stand out in arguing that the objects studied by human scientists are themselves interpretations, and therefore require us to grasp the meanings they embody. This concern with meanings, however, equally sets interpretive theorists apart from

one another, as they differ on what meanings are, how they are communicated, and how they relate to actions. The focus on meanings has centered on such diverse entities as beliefs, intentions, discourses, or symbolic systems of signs. Moreover, different interpretive approaches explain differently how meanings operate within society, for instance, through logical progression, structural links between concepts and power, or in terms of individual dispositions.

Beyond Positivism and Interdisciplinary Techniques

Interpretive theories are often clustered negatively, by virtue of their antipositivist presuppositions or methods or both. Positivism, also known as scientific empiricism, began with David Hume's account of causation as the operation of empirical laws, whereby knowledge about the world is justified only by the testimony of the senses, that is, by observation and experiment. Logical positivists, largely associated with the Vienna Circle, extended this idea to the principle of verification, according to which utterances that could be neither verified nor falsified by experience were literally and cognitively meaningless. Knowledge, strictly speaking, was held to be devoid of all speculation, concerned only with what can be positively given, and thus confined to correctly delineated scientific methods of verification. Positivism denoted great optimism about the unity of scientific method and faith in the power of formal logic, both to permit the definition of abstractions and to describe the structures of permissible inferences. While it may be disputed whether the natural sciences have been characterized by logical, cumulative progress through a purely objective science of observation and deductive explanation, such has been the self-conscious aims and techniques in the "hard" sciences. Since the early decades of the twentieth century, emerging trends within the human and social sciences endeavored to be "scientific" in broadly the same sense that the term is applied to physics, chemistry, biology, and so on. The objective was to uncover laws or regularities that govern social and political life.

Political studies in the last 60 years have witnessed the gradual ascendancy of behavioralism, structuralism, and rational choice theory, all of which embody the assumption that the methods and categories recognized in the natural sciences constitute the proper mode of inquiry about the social and political world. Behavioralists made use of scientific techniques of data collection and stressed the use of quantifiable variables to analyze observable relationships. The proliferation of ahistorical conceptual frameworks—such as decision theory, group theory, systems theory, structural-functional theory, political economy, public policy, and voting behavior—all evidence an aim to generate a purely descriptive "value-free" vocabulary. Varieties of structuralism like neo-Marxism and critical realism focus on discovering the unobservable structures that guide or determine events, irrespective of the beliefs of individuals or the meanings of actors. Rational choice theory, while it appears to take individual preferences seriously, relies on deductive models and theoretical parsimony to highlight alleged causal laws operating between atomized units divorced from their subjective and historical situations.

Interpretive theorists across a number of disciplines reject various positivist directions toward crafting a "science of politics," according to which the methods and categories recognized in the natural sciences constitute the proper mode of inquiry for the human sciences. Interpretivists often define themselves in opposition to approaches such as behaviorism, structuralism, and rational choice, whose positivist presuppositions or methods or both suggest that human actions can be fixed in their meanings under lawlike operations. But to regard interpretive theory as primarily a critique of positivist techniques is to miss its claims to rival, if not surpass, explanations of social and political phenomena.

In positioning themselves away from positivist ambitions, interpretive approaches have drawn inspiration from idealist philosophical traditions—notably hermeneutics and phenomenology—and from postmodernist and poststructuralist philosophies. Hermeneutics developed initially as a method of interpreting texts in connection with biblical criticism and expanded as a theory of understanding applicable to the whole social, historical, and psychological world. In his major writings, Hans-Georg Gadamer accounted for the depth and ineluctable subjectivity entailed by the interpretation process. He argued that interpretation

necessarily engages the presuppositions of the interpreter because an object of interpretation can only be understood in terms of the meanings of its parts, which in turn depends on the meaning of the whole. This view of interpretation implies at least three basic premises for interpretive theory: First, in order to be understood, human action and social practices cannot be divorced from the meanings people attach to them. Second, all observers are affected by their social context, so none can give purely "objective" descriptions of facts. Third, knowledge is thus an inescapably practical and historically situated enterprise, not a technical project in abstraction.

In his classic statement "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" (1971), Charles Taylor argued that the nature of human beings makes the natural science model fundamentally inappropriate for the human sciences. Scientism about human and social affairs fails to incorporate intersubjectivity in conceptualizing meanings and thus fails to give adequate account of the nature of their objects of inquiry. Human beings are self-interpreting agents who think and act for reasons of their own, but these meanings are formed and understandable only against the shared background of concrete contexts of social practices also available to others. Thus, the proper mode of social scientific inquiry neither assumes an objective nature to social reality nor reduces the world to subjective personal experience, but takes seriously the intersubjective dimension of socially constitutive meanings. Interpretivists have posited a deep internal connection between language and practice. Political practices, for instance, are not only expressed in but are constituted by the language embedded in them, and that language also gets its sense and significance from the political practices within which it develops. Thus, both the objects of investigation and the tools by which investigation is carried out inescapably share the same pervasive context that is the human world. Interpretive approaches oppose the idea that there is a separate political reality that exists and that in principle can be discovered that is independent of the language of that polity. Conceptualizing human behavior by way of deductive models and atomistic correlations between categories is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of human subjects and their relation to their social context, and not least, their relation to social scientific practitioners.

Interpretive approaches that emphasize the construction of knowledge in the human sciences in particular challenged the behavioralist and rational choice theory's claims to objectivity. Relativists like Peter Winch argued that different cultures and ways of life each generate its own standards of rationality, which is sufficient for evaluating its internal practices. Interpretivists influenced by poststructuralist and postmodern philosophies went further and denounced reason altogether. For Michel Foucault, all modernist projects of redefining concepts for uniformity of measurement and elimination of their evaluative dimensions is hubris and, in all likelihood, sinister. It masks and seeks to control the essential contestability and value-laden nature of political life as well as all our concepts. Moreover, historians and other practitioners should not understand subjects as occupying a realm of subjective intentionality because they are only the scripted products of contingent discourses. Interpretive methods inspired by antifoundational ontologies thus hold that the relevant meanings within cultural discourses and complex systems of signification are coextensive with practices. These interpretivists seek to depict and uncover these meanings by delving into the discordant practices of political life, which are fundamentally irreducible to the products of mind or to self-consciousness.

Interpretive ideas are long standing in the human sciences. As a general category of theory, interpretive theory is a diverse set, including hermeneutics, ethnography, symbolic interactionism, cultural anthropology, poststructuralism, and decentered theory, to name a few. They not only break with established research traditions, but also transcend appeals to interdisciplinarity, and can be thought of as a set of distinctive approaches in political science. Interpretive approaches offer narrative accounts of social and political life and emphasize the meaning-laden and even contingent nature of its subject matter. Interpretivists view human practices as so constituted by webs of intersubjective meanings that giving account of these meanings, which may be tacit or inchoate, requires a depth hermeneutics. Although interpretivists do not, in principle, reject the use of statistics and quantitative measurements, they see their interpretive

analysis as necessarily and appropriately extending beyond the data supplied by empirical inquiry.

Today, interpretive theorists continue to draw on diverse philosophical positions, including hermeneutics, phenomenology, poststructuralism, and pragmatism. These philosophies inform many approaches to the human sciences, including ethnography, symbolic interactionism, and cultural anthropology. Interpretivists in sociology and anthropology, influenced by phenomenology, favor textual approaches and ethnography. Ethnography focuses on the different forms of everyday common sense knowledge and practical reasoning that provide the ontological bases of experience. Cultural anthropologists like Clifford Geertz have called for "thick descriptions" in the study of social contexts. The ethnographer proceeds by recording the meanings that particular actions have for social actors, and interprets the social discourse and its symbols to understand the webs of meaning and significance that operate within those practices. The ethnographer generalizes by guessing at meanings and draws explanatory conclusions from best guesses. The hermeneutic aim, thus, is not just to measure, correlate, systematize, and settle, but to formulate, clarify, and appraise cultural meanings and social practices, acknowledging that because they result from interpretation, the results are always incomplete and open to challenge. A focus on meanings has led some interpretivists to view the task of the human sciences not as explanatory but appreciative; they argue that the human sciences aim solely at a deeper understanding of the rich texture of the cultural objects they study. But many other interpretivists argue that it is a mistake to think that interpretive theory is appropriate only for understanding and not suited for explanation giving in the social sciences, and they reject casting understanding and explanation as alternative goals of social scientific inquiry. They insist that greater understanding is an integral part of explanation giving in the human sciences and argue that we can explain actions and practices only by interpreting the beliefs or meanings that inform them.

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See also Anti-Foundationalism; Explanation; Hermeneutics; Historical Understanding; Narrative; Philosophy of Social Sciences

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INTERVENTION

Intervention is a topic of great normative controversy within the field of international/global political theory. Conceptually, intervention presupposes a society of distinct units with separate spheres of agency, authority, and responsibility. Intervention paradigmatically entails an external agent acting within the preserved domain of another agent or unit. Conventionally in the study and practice of world politics, intervention as a concept refers to coercive acts by states that violate or displace the sovereignty—that is, the political independence or territorial integrity—of another state. This definition of the concept is generally favored by theorists of the English School or "international society" tradition, but is disputed by international "realists," who typically adopt a narrower conception, and cosmopolitan theorists, who endorse a more expansive account that goes beyond a state-centric view of global politics. Debates between and within these theoretical perspectives also center on the legitimacy of intervention as a practice, especially if carried

out for the purpose of protecting human rights or welfare.

In the society of states, intervention is fraught with normative, legal, and political controversy. The twin normative pillars of international society, enshrined in the United Nations Charter, are state sovereignty and the duty of nonintervention. First, all states enjoy equal sovereignty, or a claim to supreme authority within their territorial and political jurisdictions. Second, a natural corollary to equal state sovereignty is the duty of all states to refrain from intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. Coercive acts by states that affect the political independence or territorial integrity of another state are therefore generally considered illegitimate. According to the international society tradition, these norms combine to deter aggressive, powerful states from imperialistic enterprises and to ensure a pluralistic international society of self-governing political communities.

Increasingly, however, these rules of international society have been challenged by the ascendancy of the global human rights movement. The doctrine of human rights asserts universal standards of treatment owed to all people by a political society. Against the pluralist strand of the English School, solidarists within the international society tradition endorse human rights doctrine, and have argued for an international right to intervention against states that fail to protect their members from severe human rights violations, such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other large-scale crimes against humanity.

Cosmopolitan thinkers push the theoretical and institutional implications of the global human rights movement even further. They note that as the agents and structures of global governance have become increasingly diversified and complex. It has become intelligible to conceive of intervention more broadly, as a concept and practice that pertains not only to states and their relations, but also to international and supranational organizations, as well as to global civil society actors. For example, associations of states (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), international organizations (the United Nations), supranational political unions (the European Union), and economic institutions (the International Monetary Fund), as well as organized religions (the Catholic Church), global human rights advocacy groups (Human Rights Watch), and humanitarian aid organizations (Médecins Sans Frontières) can all be agents as well as objects of intervention. Many cosmopolitan theorists envisage the development of global regulatory regimes and institutions that would regulate states, as well as individuals and transnational actors (multinational corporations), in areas such as the use of force, environmental protection, global economic order, human rights, transnational social rights, and immigration. With the development of such a postsovereign global order, in circumstances of noncompliance with global norms in these areas, international and global organizations may have not only a right, but an obligation, to intervene to enforce compliance.

In the contemporary international order, cosmopolitan theorists have argued against absolutist conceptions of state sovereignty as unrestricted internal autonomy, emphasizing an alternative conception of sovereignty as responsibility to protect human rights and welfare. Intervention to address human rights violations is most controversial when the form of intervention proposed involves the use of military force. In much of the international relations literature, and especially within the realist tradition, intervention is synonymous with one form of coercive action—the use of military force—against a sovereign state, and humanitarian intervention as a concept is restrictively defined to refer solely to the use of force within another state's jurisdiction for the purpose of human protection. Not surprisingly, debates about the ethics of humanitarian intervention employ the structure and content of just war theory.

Despite the endorsement of a responsibility to protect doctrine by the community of states in 2005, controversies abound regarding the authorization and operationalization of humanitarian interventions. Should the United Nations Security Council be the sole authorizing body for such interventions, or can regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions of states be legitimate authorizing bodies? How can the United Nations (UN) reconcile its twin roles as a guardian of equal state sovereignty and as an enforcer of universal human rights? Can humanitarian interventions succeed in resolving humanitarian crises? In practice, the vast majority of states are reluctant to commit their military resources to UN-mandated humanitarian interventions or peace support operations. At the

same time, the use of force by the most powerful states tends not to track humanitarian interests. While realists are skeptical about the motivations of powerful states when they do intervene for declared humanitarian reasons, idealists worry that the practice of humanitarian intervention may reveal deeper failures of global governance to address the root causes of politically induced humanitarian catastrophes. The persistence of the non-ideal makes intervention a thorny and enduring topic of normative political theory.

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See also Cosmopolitanism; English School; Human Rights; Just War Theory; Realism; Sovereignty

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Islamic Modernism

In Islamic regions, modernism took many forms, one of which has been termed *Islamic modernism,* signifying the trend's desire to reconcile the Islamic faith with values associated with modernism. The trend is alternatively referred to as *modernist Islam,* drawing attention to the desire of its advocates to use Islamic discourses as a means of pursuing what was seen as the achievements of modernity.

Islamic modernism emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as many Muslim majority states sought to address the conditions of the modern world. Many Muslim intellectuals had reached the conclusion that the Islamic world had fallen behind relative to the West, and they had begun to question the effectiveness of traditional systems in addressing the gap. The question of the relationship between Islam and modernity was not merely abstract, but engendered concrete social, political, and theological significance in the guise of Europe's imperial expansion into Muslim regions.

The modernism of this intellectual movement distinguished it from earlier Islamic reformist and revivalist movements that did not explicitly identify with modernity, from traditionalists who rejected innovations in thought, as well as from secular trends that either downplayed or denied the role of religion in their modernizing schemes. Central to Islamic modernism was the project of ongoing rational interpretation (*ijtihad*) of Islamic texts and principles, which was contrasted to passive imitation (*taqlid*) of tradition and acceptance of dogmas from religious authorities without proof. Islamic modernists were confident that modern scientific thought could be appropriated without harming Islam. Modern values could be translated into Islamic terms, and Islamic values could be translated into modern terms. Reinterpretation was undertaken with a dual purpose: both to make relevant the Islamic faith in the modern world and to provide justification for their worldly ambitions. These seemingly contradictory impulses—the one religious, the other secular—were due to two competing discourses that challenged the Islamic modernist project. Against those who argued that religion was ill-suited to modern social and political reform, Islamic modernists argued that rather than religion holding society back from progress, it is the failure to practice religion properly that is to blame for the relative weakness of Islamic regions vis-à-vis the West. Islamic modernists sought to establish modern humankind's need for religion, offering evidence of humanity's natural impulse toward religion, arguing that shortcomings in the human intellect necessitated religious guidance and the greater utility of religious law over human laws commanding the loyalty and appealing to the conscious of the people. Against those who argued that modern values constitute an accretion to Islam, they argued that modernism was in fact a return to Islam's true spirit of dynamism, and that the modernization of religion promised to increase,

not decrease, religion as a comprehensive facet of human existence.

Islamic modernists were pioneers in educational reforms and in establishing periodicals, publishing houses, and translation projects. Many Islamic modernists also acted as central architects of political reform, contributing to the construction of legal frameworks and governing institutions. Among the movements chief figures was Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (1801–1873), a leading Egyptian education officer; Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi (1810–1889), who held position as higher minister in reforming the Tunisian state; Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), who as Egypt's Grand Mufti pursued reforms in Islamic law, education, and administration.

Some Islamic modernists, like Tahtawi, had traveled abroad and studied European constitutions and sought to appropriate institutions (such as parliaments and elections) and values (such as freedom and equality) that were deemed compatible with Islamic law (*Shari'a*). Equivalences were asserted between the European concepts of "democracy" and the Qur'anic notion of consultation (*shura*), just as Arabic and Islamic terms were equated to the public interest (*maslaha*) and consensus (*ijma'*).

In their quest to reform, Islamic modernists also addressed a number of social issues, such as the status of women and relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Qasim Amin (1863–1908), an Egyptian judge, called for an end to women's seclusion and for the general improvement of their status in society, including education and participation in public life. The concept of the citizen (*muwatin*) as one who shares with others in ties to a homeland (*watan*) are developed in ways that seem more inclusive of non-Muslims than earlier notions of community (*umma*) of the faithful.

Although modernization remains a goal for many in Islamic regions, the decline of Islamic modernism was apparent by the 1930s, as secular ideologies, such as nationalism, socialism, and fascism gained force and religious revivalist movements began to distinguish themselves by placing greater emphasis on the Islamic element and often explicitly fought or rejected what they considered to be foreign accretions.

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See also Islamic Political Philosophy; Islamism; Shari'a

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Islamic Political Philosophy

Political philosophy is the attempt to replace opinion about political affairs with knowledge. For sound rhetorical reasons, it may adopt and adapt the speech and images of the dominant religion. Even so, it remains independent of religion. Thus, political philosophy in the medieval Arabic-Islamic tradition of the Middle East differs from that in the medieval Arabic-Jewish or Arabic-Christian traditions mainly in this rhetorical aspect. Political thought, always limited by the opinions that dominate the setting and time, replaces political philosophy in the modern and contemporary eras.

Background

Political philosophers in the medieval Arabic-Islamic tradition agree that Plato and Aristotle achieved the highest level of knowledge about the universe and its parts. That the revealed religions known through Moses and Muhammad also claim to possess ultimate truth about these very things poses no conflict. As Abu Nasr al-Farabi (870–950 CE) points out, the meaning of philosopher, lawgiver, imam, and king is one. Their goals and activities are identical. His successors argue similarly, each in his own fashion. Averroes (1126–1198 CE),

holding Aristotle in the highest esteem, even as he carries out his duties as judge and jurist, insists that truth cannot contradict truth. If a philosophic teaching appears to conflict with a scriptural one, interpretation of the latter will reveal the basic agreement between the two.

Al-Farabi and his successors rely mainly on Plato's *Republic* and *Laws,* plus Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Rhetoric* in their expositions, but are conversant with Aristotle's works on logic, natural science, the soul, and being (the *Metaphysics*). They investigate lawgiving to understand the political goal of prophecy. Indeed, Avicenna (980–1037 CE) lauds Plato's *Laws* as the best explanation of prophetic lawgiving. Particular differences notwithstanding, all insist on what becomes clear to unaided human reason as the touchstone.

With Avicenna, a conversation among these philosophers begins—each taking note of his predecessors and explicitly agreeing or disagreeing with them. It continues unabated until Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406 CE), then starts again with al-Afghani (1837–1897) in the nineteenth century. Philosophy moved west to Andalusia, Spain, after Avicenna, where it flourished. Ibn Khaldun brought it back to Cairo, but it disappeared with his demise never to return. The theosophy and mysticism so prevalent in the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries abjure political reflection.

Al-Kindi and Al-Razi

Al-Kindi (800–870 CE) initiates philosophical inquiry among the Arabs. But his numerous writings are primarily theological and moral, and his fame now derives from a treatise on metaphysics. A minor work on Socrates, one of two writings on ethics, and two other treatises contain only the germs of a political teaching. He fails to provide a rational account of human existence or its end and thereby ground political inquiry. Even his charming *Treatise on the Device for Driving Away Sorrows,* with its delightful allegory of human existence, ends in aporia—offering strategies for personal coping without seeking to alter the milieu in which we live. Balancing the claims of pagan Greek philosophers and the faithful followers of a new, apparently more readily accessible, wisdom to investigate how the two complement one another with respect to individual well-being, he fails to address its political significance.

Al-Razi (864–925 CE), famed as a physician and teacher of medicine, was also an advisor to rulers and composed over 200 works. His philosophical writings defend asceticism and present justice as control of the passions. Key for him, yet never explicitly defended or spelled out in detail, is the assumption that divine providence permits some creatures to serve others. He therefore distinguishes among humans in terms of how they advance the community's well-being and embraces a hierarchical political order in which it is normal and just for weaker and less valuable humans to serve stronger and more valuable ones.

Al-Farabi to Averroes

Via commentaries on Plato and Aristotle plus probing essays, al-Farabi reaches to the core of their thought and presents it so as to bring politics to the fore. He deems the end of human life—attaining perfection or ultimate happiness—the central theme for these two great philosophers as for any lawgiver, religious leader (imam), or king. Good ones are distinguished from bad in terms of what they view as happiness, how they seek to bring it about, and whom they assist in enjoying it. Mindful that his analysis counters prevailing opinion, al-Farabi constantly points to its flaws and shows how his view accords with the world around us.

His language is simple and direct, as are his teachings. Though they evoke the sense that al-Farabi has Islam and Muhammad in mind, he says nothing precise about either. Muhammad's name never occurs in any of his writings, and he uses the term *prophet* only when enunciating the opinions of dialectical theologians or adherents to a religion. Al-Farabi focuses instead on the question of the best human life, which was central to the teaching of Plato and Aristotle, for why their solution is suspect in his age as well as how such doubt can be overcome. He returns to the perennial questions of human perfection and how it may be attained to show why pursuit of them—the quest for wisdom about them—remains the most important human task. His renown was such that he was esteemed as the "second teacher"—second after Aristotle.

Avicenna's massive and encyclopedic *Healing* comprises four parts: logic, natural science, mathematics, and divine science or metaphysics. He presents the work in the introduction as devoted solely to theoretical philosophy or science and is silent about practical philosophy or science. Not until the end of the section on metaphysics does he speak of ethics and politics, claiming he has placed a summary statement of them there until he will be able to examine them comprehensively in a separate book. Yet his fuller teaching reveals that ethics and politics belong after divine science intrinsically, not provisionally. The human manifestation or practical proof of divine science, they testify to divine providence and the truth of revelation. Because the correctness of their teaching can be verified by Aristotelian or pagan reasoning, it must be seen as consonant with the revelation accorded Muhammad.

His description of Plato's *Laws* as a treatise on prophetic lawgiving indicates how interrelated he deems philosophy and revelation. Moreover, his inquiry into prophecy and divine law explains the nature of law, purpose of political community, need for sound moral habits among citizens, reasons for marriage and divorce, conditions for just war, considerations that lay behind penal laws, and end of human life. Although he does not address the origin of private property nor explain how to train successors to the prophet-lawgiver so that they have the moral habits and character traits suitable to the position, he raises these issues when introducing political science and thus affirms the affinity between the politics of pagan philosophers and the exceptional individual whose prophetic qualities rival or surpass philosophic virtue.

Ibn Tufayl's (c. 1110–1185 CE) philosophical novel, *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* (Living the Son of Awakened), purportedly sets forth "the secrets of the Oriental wisdom mentioned by" Avicenna and exemplified in Hayy's life (p. 95). It outlines the mysterious state attained when one discerns the workings of the universe and communes with the divinity. But it does so indirectly as a means of encouraging the interlocutor to inquire on his own and not be content with a lower degree of insight. Hayy, who is perhaps self-generated, grows up on a deserted island. During seven periods of seven years each, he discovers his natural surroundings and the way they interact via induction. He embraces physics, mathematics, and astronomy; and he discerns the creator plus his messenger or prophet, Muhammad—all without language. Only when he encounters the inhabitant of a neighboring island troubled about the way his fellow citizens practice religion does Hayy learn speech. They voyage to that island intent on demonstrating the correct practice, but fail miserably and return to the desert island resolved to end their days in meditation. Apparently, something more than knowledge and mystical union is needed for sound political rule.

Averroes, revered for his commentaries on Aristotle, also wrote a commentary on Plato and treatises with a view to reconciling Muslim jurists and theologians with the philosophers. For him, the best regime respects the natural order among the virtues and practical arts by privileging the theoretical virtues or by ensuring that opinions and actions accord with the theoretical sciences. He faults the regimes of his day for aiming at the wrong end or failing to respect the natural order among the human virtues. Thus, democracy unduly emphasizes the private and is not able to order the citizens' desires.

He views philosophy and revelation as agreeing that citizens must embrace a good that transcends their immediate well-being. He finds this evident in the way the Qur'an addresses people with different levels of learning in speech suitable to them and the use philosophy makes of rhetoric. Because religion and political philosophy take the whole citizen body into account, they employ different kinds of speech and even practices. Such insight is key to understanding the working of the revealed law and its purpose, as well as the core teaching of Plato and Aristotle.

The Disappearance of Political Philosophy

From Averroes's death in 1198 CE to the advent of Ibn Khaldun almost 200 years later, political philosophy gives way to mysticism and theosophy. It is a period of great political upheaval. In the East, there are the Crusades plus the onslaught of the Mongols, who take Baghdad in 1258 CE. And Andalusia becomes fragmented by internecine strife, even as Christian forces gain greater strength and strive to retake land seized centuries earlier. Yet whereas political philosophy flourished earlier

amid similar unrest, it now falters and, upon Ibn Khaldun's death, vanishes forever. To be sure, faint echoes resound here and there in Persian and Turkish "mirrors of Princes'" literature that offers particular advice to rulers and focuses on remedies to help them preserve their reign. But not until almost 400 years later, when al-Afghani bursts on the scene, is any serious kind of political writing to be found. It is, however, necessary to speak of the last great instance of political philosophy preceding the great drought just noted.

Best known for the lengthy *Introduction* (*Muqaddima*) to his extensive philosophical history of civilization, Ibn Khaldun spent much of his life in political activities. At age 50, he moved to Cairo to serve the Mamluk Sultan Barquq as judge and chief judge, professor, and university president, but, above all, to revise his history and compose its *Introduction*. The latter consists of six lengthy chapters that explore human civilization in general and Bedouin civilization in particular, political association, sedentary civilization, the arts and crafts by which humans gain their livelihoods, and, finally, the different human sciences. His goal is to seize on the "inner meaning of history" or "the truth, subtle explanation of the causes and origins of existing things, and deep knowledge of the how and why of events" (vol. 1, p. 2). An understanding of these matters will permit him to expose "the principles of politics, nature of existent things, and differences among nations, places and periods with regard to ways of life, character, qualities, customs, sects, schools, and everything else . . . plus a comprehensive knowledge of present conditions in all these respects . . . complete knowledge of the reasons for every happening and . . . [acquaintance] with the origin of every event" (vol. 1, p. 43). That, in turn, will allow him to explain the nature of civilization and its accompanying accidents. It promises to provide a comprehensive account of human social organization, its beginnings, as well as its ends. As sweeping as it is audacious, the undertaking calls the transmitted or positive sciences central to the Islamic community into question as much as the practical sciences of politics and rhetoric.

Yet, while explicitly criticizing the political philosophers who precede him, Ibn Khaldun manages to apply their teachings in place of those gathered from the transmitted or positive sciences when analyzing issues most important to the Islamic community. He thus grounds his new science fully in political philosophy. Deeming it "a deep root of wisdom" (vol. 1, p. 2) that provides an explanation of the "causes and reasons for the beginning of dynasties and civilization" (vol. 1, p. 5), he joins his undertaking to that of the historians and the philosophers who went before him. As he explains the way Bedouins become sedentary and then develop new ways of life, ways that decline even as they have flourished, the constants in human social organization come to light: how people come together in social organization, strive to make a living, ascend from necessary tasks to finer ones discovered by means of discerning thought, and eventually seek for the cause of things.

Among the Arabs, his book passed into obscurity as his successors focused on communing or achieving union with the divinity and reduced political inquiry to issues of personal morality or counsel to potentates. Fortunately, it found such favor among the Ottomans that numerous copies were made and preserved.

Political Thought and Political Action

Only with the advent of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani is there a return to the larger questions raised by al-Farabi, Avicenna, Ibn Tufayl, Averroes, and Ibn Khaldun. Al-Afghani writes out of deep concern over the weakness that characterizes the Islamic world in his day. Dominated by Western imperialist powers, even in their own lands, Arab and Muslim rulers seem to have lost all memory of the grandeur and greatness that were once theirs and to have no idea of how they might regain their former rank. His challenge to thoughtful Muslims, first formulated in lectures to university audiences and then distributed in occasional articles read by an educated few, won him the sympathy of Muhammad Abduh (1845–1905); and these two eventually joined forces to launch—from Paris, because no Arab or Muslim country would tolerate al-Afghani's presence—a short-lived journal known as *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa* (The Most Solid Link).

In it, they argue vigorously for independence from foreign domination but see no reason to replace monarchic rule with popular government. They are persuaded that Arab and Muslim peoples

are not sufficiently disciplined to govern themselves well and thus still need the tutelage of a ruler who will train them in the skills needed for self-government. For them, the issue of future self-rule is less important and surely less urgent than overcoming the economic lethargy and uncritical traditionalism that they discern as hindering Muslim peoples everywhere. Thus, in his famous debate with the renowned and ever so positivist Ernest Renan (1823–1892), al-Afghani generously concedes that because philosophy and religion are and must always be in conflict, and Middle Eastern peoples are not nor will soon be ready to forsake religious guidance, it makes good sense to postpone democracy. Unfortunately, such a concession did not dampen the suspicions of the Ottomans. While enjoying their enforced hospitality, al-Afghani came to a mysterious end.

Muhammad Abduh develops this same theme, albeit with a slight twist, as he bases his own political teaching on an attempt to explain the reasonableness of guiding political life by Islamic precepts. His famous *Risalat al-Tawhid* (Treatise on Unity) presents a coherent exposition of how Islam can assist human beings to live together in society and eventually attain the happiness intended for them by the Creator. Abduh focuses on the assistance God offers people by sending prophets who show us how to get along in political community. Drawing our attention to something higher than self-preservation or immediate gain, these messengers teach us how to work together without harming one another or causing evil. In learning to honor a higher being, we are prompted to love one another as His fellow creatures, control our desires, redirect our passions, and regulate our actions. Almost like another al-Farabi, Abduh explicates what prompts the opinions prophets ask us to accept and the actions they urge us to perform.

Whereas al-Afghani addresses his explanations to anyone who will listen, even to the supremely self-satisfied readers of the *Journal des Débats* in his debate with Renan, his primary audience is learned Near and Middle Easterners, Muslim or Christian, who suffer the degradation of imperialist rule. His references are primarily Muslim, and the past age of glory he invokes is one of Muslim hegemony. That tendency is taken further by Abduh, with his emphasis on the soundness of living according to Islamic precepts; but the audience is still a learned one.

With Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), however, and Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi (1903–1979) before him, the audience and the teaching change radically. Both speak to the masses, al-Mawdudi in order to defend Islam and show how easily it can be applied to multiple problems of daily life, al-Banna in order to reform Muslims and awaken them to what they can be as self-reliant and fully conscious followers of their faith. The change in audience and in goal is reflected in the quality of the arguments both offer (i.e., ones far more rhetorical and hortatory than analytical or measured).

Each sees a need for founding an Islamic political regime. Al-Mawdudi considers it the only rule under which Muslims can live freely and fully as Muslims and thus deems it essential that the Qur'anic provisions for personal and communal virtue be implemented. For al-Banna, it makes no sense to deny Muslims the right to national liberation natural to all people; moreover, only a Muslim regime can fight against the atheism, pursuit of pleasure, self-centeredness, and relentless profit seeking that he believes will destroy all of Western society. So powerful was their rhetoric that each spawned groups intent on carrying out their teachings. Yet whereas the Islamic groups patterned on al-Mawdudi's teaching arose almost accidentally, al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood from the very beginning so that his call to other Muslims could be spread more readily and efficiently.

The spokesmen for Islamic government who succeed al-Mawdudi and al-Banna share with them the desire to speak to a larger audience and the willingness to make popular arguments. Rather than rail against non-Muslim and Western colonial or imperialist powers, these spokesmen denounce the Muslim rulers who have come to power after Near and Middle Eastern peoples were moved to act on the teachings of al-Afghani, Abduh, al-Mawdudi, and al-Banna. Whereas al-Mawdudi and al-Banna simply ignore the philosophical teachings of the distant tradition on which al-Afghani and Abduh are only too happy to rely for guidance as well as for evidence of a rich cultural past, new spokesmen—most notably Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) and Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989), but many others as well—dismiss the older philosophers as having been too influenced by a

foreign tradition to be of assistance in an authentic Muslim undertaking. Though they thereby demonstrate how little they have learned from the way al-Farabi, Avicenna, Averroes, and other political philosophers of the past showed such an understanding to be in error, they are not in the least concerned. Their goals are to defend Islam against the aspersions cast on it by Westerners who have failed to understand its merits, to bring about a thorough moral change in Muslims themselves, and to achieve a truly Islamic self-rule rather than an imitation of socialism (as in the Egypt of Nasser combated by Qutb) or an unbridled capitalist consumerism (as in the Iran of the Shah as portrayed by Khomeini).

Qutb's power as an interpreter of Islam and ability to persuade fellow Muslims of the need to renew their religious commitment cannot be underestimated. His popular political teaching is all too simplistic and stark, but purposely so. For him, Islamic political rule is grounded in the Muslim's testimony that there is no god but God, that is, that God is one and that rulership in the life of the individual is centered on God's unity. By so testifying to God's being, rulers will be just and the ruled obedient. Moreover, acknowledgment by the rulers and the ruled that God alone has real power permits consultation between the rulers and the ruled. Consequently, no Muslim government can claim that its authority comes from heaven. A Muslim ruler rules only by the choice of the community of believers, and his authority derives from his observance of divine law. Thus he has authority only so long as he remains faithful to that law. Further, apart from his justifiable claims on the obedience of the subjects and right to ask for their advice or help in enforcing the law, a Muslim ruler has no rights other than those of the common subject. He has no special privileges and certainly no right to oppress others.

Qutb aims his message at Muslims intent on deepening their awareness of Islam and insists that they have nothing to gain from Western learning. He admits the necessity of accepting the results of Western technology and of science generally, but sees no reason to allow philosophy, literature, history, or law to be taught according to the Western or European fashion. In an Islamic society, such subjects should be taught on the basis of Islamic concepts. Instead of teaching history based on the premises that spiritual factors have little or no effect on what happens and that Europe has greatly influenced events while Islam has done so only slightly, teaching it from an Islamic viewpoint privileges the role of spiritual factors and accords Europe no more than its just share of credit. If history and all other learning repose on nothing but interpretations, the Islamic one should be accorded its place.

While still in exile, Khomeini meditated on the governance best suited for current times—one that is Islamic because it is grounded in the divine law. The only acceptable ruler is a jurist who knows divine law and is just. Today, ignorance reigns about governance by the jurist and the need for it. Yet, because the divine law remains valid, the need for someone to administer it is as real now as in the days of the Prophet. Its comprehensiveness shows the need for someone who can devote full attention to its administration.

Now, especially, such a government is urgent: Muslims have for too long been subject to the rule of foreign interlopers who know nothing of the divine law or to fellow Muslims who neglect it in order to rush after foreign laws and customs that are not really suited for such a community. Thus, to help Muslims return to God's rules and abolish injustice, it is necessary to put those rules into effect.

Islamic government, based on the Qur'an and the Sunna, has no need of a legislative body. In its place stands a planning council to coordinate the activities of the various ministries and executive agencies and to advise the ruler. Persuaded that ultimate authority for the administration of the laws should reside in the hands of one man, Khomeini insists on the qualifications of the ruler (knowledge of the divine law and personal justice) and on the principle that no privileges attach to this position. An independent judiciary will be needed to ensure that the divine law is implemented correctly and to permit the people redress for grievances against one another or against government officials. Given the principle that the sole task of Islamic governance is implementing the divine law, it should be considered as nothing more than a means to an end. Thus, no one should seek office for its own sake.

Addressing himself to young students of the divine law, he calls for numerous, varied

propaganda campaigns directed toward the goal of informing the people about how those now in power permit foreigners to distort or discredit the Islamic faith, while themselves failing to live according to its prescriptions. At the same time, the people must be taught about the fundamentals of the faith and apprised of the merits as well as of the possibility of Islamic government. Moreover, because the existing Christian, Jewish, and Baha'i religious centers have goals opposed to these and sometimes even engage in missionary activity, they must be forced to close. Finally, an attempt must be made to reach those who attend colleges and universities in order to inform them of the harmful character of the Western ideas they so innocently adopt.

Before Khomeini returned to Iran to found the Islamic Republic, Ali Shariati (1933–1977) had come to prominence as a teacher and daring critic of the Shah's regime. Sent by the Iranian government to Paris to study sociology and become a university professor, he spent more time in prison or compulsory retirement than teaching. Particularly incensed about the lack of attention paid to Islam in Iranian society and convinced that his fellow citizens neglect Islam out of the erroneous belief that Western science and philosophy respond more directly to their problems, he tries to derive an understanding of history or sociology from Islam. For him, it is not due to chance, determinism, or the efforts of a great man that change occurs, but—as indicated in the Qur'an—due to the people. Yet, given the importance of the Prophet in Islam, Shariati includes him along with the people as a primary factor in social change.

Numerous others—such as Egypt's Abd al-Salam Faraj (1952–1982) and Lebanon's Muhammad Hussain Fadhlallah (born 1935)—follow the lead of Qutb and Khomeini. Tunisia's Rached Ghannouchi (born 1941) can pursue his goals only in exile, while Shaykh Ahmad Yassin (1937–2004), the founder of Hamas in Palestine, was silenced by an Israeli bomb. These, along with Egypt's Shaykh Kishk (1933–1996) and Mustafa Mahmoud (born 1921), as well as Sudan's Hasan Turabi (born 1933) and Morocco's Nadia Yassine (born 1958), share in the desire to improve the material and spiritual well-being of fellow Muslims through encouraging their closer adherence to Islamic precepts and replacing rulers who ignore Islamic law. There are also jurists—Yusuf al-Qaradawi (born 1926), Taha al-Alwani (born 1935), and Khaled Abou El-Fadl (born 1963)—who, by drawing attention to the *maqasid,* or intentions of the law, seek to influence the actions of individuals and direct political policy.

Yet others seek consciously to free themselves as Muslims from the constraints against Western learning imposed by Qutb and Khomeini. Abdol Karim Soroush (born 1945), also in exile of sorts from his native Iran, seeks to make Islam responsive to the issues of the day by showing how the reflections of Western philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger help elucidate the basic texts and beliefs of the religion. Muhammad Arkoun (born 1928), an Algerian who has spent most of his life in Paris, has written much about the need to see Islam through the lenses of Michel Foucault. Yet others, Muhammad Imara of Egypt and Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri of Morocco have turned back to Averroes in attempting to demonstrate the soundness of Islamic teaching in the contemporary world.

Finally, there now exists a number of institutions devoted to showing that Islam is compatible with democracy or with a market economy and seeking to help committed Muslims find ways to navigate ever-more-insistent demands for conformity to secular standards without having to sacrifice their core beliefs. Now, more than ever before, there is desire to know about Islam and its teachings. These institutions and several of the thinkers surveyed in this entry help to ensure the accuracy of what non-Muslims learn about Islam.

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See also Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr; Aristotle; Averroism; Caliphate; Ibn Khaldūn; Islamic Modernism; Islamism; Plato; Shari'a

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Islamism

At its core, the term *Islamism* refers to the use of Islamic doctrine as a basis of political ideology and mobilization. Broadly speaking, Islamists believe that the Islamic faith has an important role to play in the political realm. This being so, Islamism challenges the rationalist assumptions that place politics squarely in the realm of the secular and treat religious doctrine with its attendant transcendent aspects as beyond the political realm. Straddling as it does this religious versus secular divide, Islamism presents a challenge to these existing assumptions that form the analytic frame of social scientific inquiry into the subject. With its ability to question the pertinence of applied categories, political theory has an important role to play in re-envisioning social science's engagement with Islamism as a substantive dialogue that goes beyond the replication of existing frames. This entry summarizes some of the challenges inherent in this project as well as the vast variety of ideological and political variations that the term attempts to capture.

Literalist or Fundamentalist Islamism: The Legacy of Colonialism

The genealogy of contemporary Islamism is best understood in relation to its complex relationship with colonialism and the ideas and forms of government that accompanied the expansion of colonial powers during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. The ideological spectrum of Islamism includes at one end fundamentalist iterations that attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the religion, remaking and reinterpreting these traditions for application to contemporary cultural, social, and political life. On the other end, Islamism can be understood in relation whether they follow majority Sunni schools of thought or Shi'ite schools of thought.

Sunni Islamism

Sunni Islam is numerically the largest denomination in Islam, its name deriving from "*sunnah,*" which means words, actions, or the example of the Prophet Muhammad. In historical terms, Sunni Muslims are those that believe that Ali, the grandson of the Prophet, was the fourth and last rightly guided Caliph, while Shi'a Muslims believe that he should have been the first. There are four major Sunni schools of thought, each named after the jurist who founded them. Examples of notable Sunni Islamist fundamentalists include Sayyid Abul A'ala Maududi (1903–1979) of the Indian subcontinent and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) of Egypt, both of whom wrote and organized in response to colonial powers and whose ideas have influenced Islamist political mobilization in Pakistan, Egypt, and many other parts of the world.

Maududi is notable for a number of reasons. First, he was instrumental in developing a political reading of Islam that both opposed the British colonial presence in India and also presented a political plan of action to mobilize the subcontinent's Muslims. In his writing, he created an elaborate theoretic structure for the Islamic state, giving coherence to the ideas of many preceding thinkers who had been unable to articulate a complete vision for what a polity based on Islam would look like. Writing in a political context where Muslims competed with Hindus to curry

favor with British colonialists, Maududi conceptualized Islamist identity as a competitor both to secular nationalism and also traditional Muslim identity that was relatively apolitical and against pulling religion into the political sphere. It was Maududi, arguably, who gave a modern iteration to the concept of the "*ummah*" or faith community of Muslims as one that was separate and distinct from a secular-national community. Maududi's ideas were the basis of the formation of the Jamaat-Islami, whose platform was the creation of the Islamic state envisioned by Maududi at the heart of which lay the ummah or faith community of Muslims.

While Maududi laid the foundations of Islamism in the Indian subcontinent, his contemporary Qutb pursued a similar project in Egypt. Influenced greatly by the writings of Maududi himself, Qutb penned his iconic text "Signposts along the Road" or "*Ma'alim fil Tariq,*" which has since been translated widely and become the manifesto of Islamist movements around the world, including the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, Hamas in Palestine, and Islamists in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. It was Qutb's ideas that led to the formation of the Egyptian Islamist group the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949).

Building on the work of Maududi and that of other Islamist thinkers before him, Qutb argued that Muslims were in embroiled in a deep moral crisis in which their allegiance to the Qur'an and Sunnah had decayed and they had devolved into a state of ignorance or "*jahilliyya*" similar to the pre-Islamic world. The basis of both Qutb and Maududi's Islamist revivalism thus was to "cure" this problem by a rejection of the materialism and secularism they felt pervaded their societies through Western influence and mobilize them for the actualization of a just Islamic community. Writing in the postcolonial context, Qutb had been a witness to the failures of liberal and socialist regimes in Egypt and was able to provide a political interpretation for these failures as located in their inherent authenticity as departures from the true Islamic way. His execution in August of 1966 by the Nasser regime on charges of alleged conspiracy entrenched his status as a martyr both within the Egyptian context and in the larger Muslim world.

Shi'a Islamism

If Maududi and Qutb were the vanguards of Sunni Islamism, Shi'a Islamism is best identified with the work of Ali Shariati (1933–1977), the Iranian thinker whose work is credited as being the ideology behind the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Shariati, a sociologist trained at the University of Paris, used Islamist ideas to galvanize the Iranian population against the Shah's corrupt regime. While allegedly influenced by the thought of Qutb, it is important to remember that Shariati's work focused strongly around the Shi'a paradigm and hence had crucial theological differences from the Sunni Islamism of Maududi and Qutb. For example, while following the same general paradigm of locating authenticity in a return to Islam, Shariati used familiar themes from Shi'a rather than Sunni religious observance and gave them contemporary significance. A notable instance is his casting of the epic struggle of Hussain, the grandson of the Holy Prophet against the Caliph Yazid ibn e Mu'awiya, as the iconic struggle of the weak and upright warrior of Islam against the corruption and moral depravity of the evil usurper of the Imamate and the paradigm for the struggle of the Iranian people against the Shah's regime. Shariati's ideas and rhetoric was appropriated by Khomeini and eventually became the basis of a populist political mobilization that led to the overthrow of the Shah. The common theme between Shi'a and Sunni Islamism is thus their ability to make Islam politically relevant and recast political action as transcendent duty imposed by faith and having meaning beyond this life.

Modernist or Integrative Islamism

Maududi, Qutb, and Shariati inhabit the fundamentalist end of the spectrum of Islamist ideology; the "modernist" end of the Islamist ideological spectrum includes Islamist thinkers who have developed integrative rather than literalist approaches to the question of Islam's role in the political sphere. Thinkers like Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–1898), Amir Ali (1849–1948), Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani (1839–1897), Mohammad Abduh (1849–1905), and Qasim Amin (1865–1908) all presented different versions of Islam's role in the political sphere, emphasizing plurality, tolerance, and reform as their version of the role

Islam should play. Sayyid Ahmed Khan, dejected by the intellectual decline of the subcontinent's Muslims, argued that the ulama were ill-equipped to deal with the intellectual problems that he saw besieging Islam. However, unlike Islamist fundamentalist thinkers, Sayyid Ahmed Khan believed in and argued for intellectual pluralism, writing exegesis of the Bible as well as the Qur'an. Sayyid Ahmed Khan's modernism was followed by Amir Ali, a Shi'a Islamist modernist who used a comparative approach in understanding Islam using examples from other religions. Most notably, Amir Ali also tried to reconcile the Shi'a notion of apostolic leadership and the pontifical basis of the Sunni Caliphate, saying that the two could coexist. Similarly, Qasim Amin's work on the liberation of Muslim women represented one of the most systematic efforts to justify gender equality using Islamic doctrine. Much of Amin's interpretation of Islamic doctrine to demonstrate its inherent gender equality was in direct response to colonialist critiques of Egyptian women as backward and traditional Egyptian society as inherently patriarchal.

Like Maududi and Qutb, the ideas of these Islamist modernists were also formulated under the colonial period and in response to the challenges of Western notions about political life. Yet their proclivity toward interpreting Islam as a source of intellectual pluralism, religious tolerance, and gender equality present an interesting counterpoint to Islamist fundamentalist readings presented earlier. One crucial difference between the two was that while the work of Maududi, Qutb, and Shariati all translated into actual political movements, few Islamist modernists were able at that time to organize political parties around their ideas in the same ways as was done by Islamist fundamentalist thinkers. This has changed in recent years with the emergence of moderate Islamist parties in countries like Turkey, Morocco, and Egypt, which eschew the fundamentalist positions of Qutb and Maududi and employ a conciliatory approach.

Political Ideology and Political Practice

An exploration of the nexus between Islamism as political ideology and Islamism as practiced politics allows us to appreciate the impact of local political contexts and institutional interaction on Islamist ideas. The platforms used when Islamists participate in electoral politics, the coalitions formed in parliamentary systems of government, as well as the inherent compromises required while working through the democratic process often result in a different vision of Islamism than appears through reading Islamist doctrine. Perhaps as a result of this dynamic, moderate Islamist parties like the Moroccan Justice and Development Party and the Turkish Justice and Development Party all exclude radical strategies as options for political change and have charters committed to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. These parties would never describe their politics as "secular" or drop the rhetorical emphasis on the teachings of Islam as the basis for all political action, because such a focus maintains the distinction of religion-based political action often at the root of their popular appeal.

On the other hand, Islamist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah present greater challenges to the typology of moderate Islamist political parties, because they have both active militant branches and also active political branches that have participated in democratic politics within their national contexts. Hezbollah has been fielding candidates for the Lebanese Parliament since 1992. Hamas also took part in the Palestinian municipal elections in 2005 and won a clear victory in Gaza and the West Bank. The alacrity of Islamist parties to participate in the political process should not be mistaken for an espousal of democratic processes, however, because unlike moderate Islamists, these groups have not agreed to abide by the rule of law or sworn off violence.

A mention must also be made here of militant transnational Islamist groups that go beyond the bounds of territorial politics and see the Islamic community as a nonterritorial entity and the establishment of an Islamic state as a transnational project that transcends national and territorial boundaries. Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) is one such Sunni Pan-Islamist group whose chapters exist in over 40 countries and whose goal is to combine all Muslim countries into a single Islamic Caliphate. Their envisioned state would institute Islamic law as the basis of governance and be led by a Caliph that would be elected by all the Muslims. There has been some

controversy regarding the group's support of violence as a means of achieving its political aims: Members of the group have condemned violence, but some commentators suggest the group treads a thin rhetorical line by preaching engagement with violence if not violence itself. Other groups like al-Qaeda have been directly influenced by the work of Islamist thinkers like Sayyid Qutb. Ayman al-Zawahiri was a follower of Sayyid Qutb during his resistance struggle against the Nasser regime in Egypt. Formed during the late 1980s, al-Qaeda also seeks to establish the Islamic Caliphate but has routinely employed violent means to do so, including claiming responsibility for the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers on September 11, 2001.

Alternate Conceptions of Islamism

While the discussion of Islamism as a force existing solely within the political sphere dominates its discussion within the social scientific realm, some recent work in feminism and anthropology explores Islamism as an arena of agency and resistance where women are able to use Islamic doctrine to expand their mobility and acquire status, influence, and authority within the mosque structure. These discussions suggest an alternate conception of Islamism as a pietist movement centered around mosques and the expansion of feminine autonomy within it. In consciously engaging with the insufficiency of binary categories, such as agency and action, liberation and oppression, in understanding the experience of Islamist women within these movements, such work draws attention to the required re-evaluation of social scientific categories and their application to the understanding of Islamism.

Similar attention to the application of rationalist categories to Islamism has been explored by recent work in political theory. Roxanne Euben for example, argues that there has been an inordinate focus on structural or functionalist explanations of Islamism that seek to locate the appeal or the success of Islamism in structural or functional explanations. Without an investigation into the theoretic content of Islamism, a project that would require a necessary re-evaluation of rational categories that is at the foundation of Western political theory, it is impossible to understand the substantive appeal of Islamism as an idea. Arguments such as these call for a deeper engagement with Islamism that prioritizes the expansion and necessary re-evaluation of modes of understanding and categorization that she sees at the heart of what political theory is supposed to do. These debates within political theory encourage an understanding of Islamism beyond essentialist or reductionist conceptions that see it as simply a reaction to modernity or a reversion to an archaic or medieval form of religiosity and governance.

The value of Euben's argument to the larger project of defining and understanding Islamism is crucial. It is undoubted that since the events of September 11, 2001, Islamism has come into sharp focus. This focus, framed as it has been by two military incursions and the consistent and constant attachment of terrorism to Islamism, has imposed a moral cast on the evaluation and study of Islamism. Due attention must be paid, therefore, to these moral frames, which search for "good" and "bad" Islamisms or the ability of denominators like "moderate" versus "fundamentalist" Islamism to become indicators of ethical normativity and what is politically and morally acceptable. The theoretical consequences of these imprimaturs that deign certain Islamisms as benign and others as virulent can exercise a heavy cost in terms of the ability of theorists to engage with their substantive arguments.

Yet, the conscious disavowal of contemporary politics as a frame for the theoretic understanding and engagement with Islamism should preclude neither critique nor normative arguments regarding the substantive content of Islamist ideology. It should instead promote a healthy skepticism both of the ubiquity of existing rational paradigms as well as substantive arguments made by Islamist thinkers. This move away from reductionism to theoretically engaged critique is thus likely to both expand the boundaries of political theory and also enrich our understanding of Islamism. Finally, it is important to note, as with all projects that involve definition and categorization of political phenomenon which are continually evolving, that this attempt at capturing the core, the ideological genealogy, the political iterations as well as the theoretical and disciplinary challenges in understanding Islamism is at best an intermediary

attempt to provide a window of understanding into a complex phenomenon.

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See also Comparative Political Theory; Postcolonialism

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J

JACOBINISM

The Jacobins were the most radical and egalitarian group involved in the French Revolution. They led the government from June 1793 to July 1794, the most politically radical year of the revolution and also the year of the Terror. During their time in power, they attempted to create a "republic of virtue"—that is, a republic that attempted to purify its citizens of moral corruption. The Jacobins fell from power with the overthrow of Maximilien Robespierre. They were never to achieve power in France again. But they left a long legacy, particularly within France itself, where there continued to be a tradition of Jacobin politics on the left, while on the right the memory of the Jacobin republic has been abhorred.

The origins of the Jacobins lay in the Breton club, which was founded shortly after the outbreak of the revolution in 1789 by deputies to the new National Assembly. It became a focus for patriots (supporters of the revolution). The membership of the club rapidly widened, and it moved into the premises of a former Jacobin monastery in the Rue St. Honoré in Paris. It took the name Society of the Friends of the Constitution but soon became known as the Jacobin club. A network of affiliated clubs sprang up throughout France—as many as 1,544. They maintained connections through correspondence with the mother club in Paris and through the circulation of pamphlets and speeches. The Jacobins were mostly from the middle and professional classes, although a few former nobles were members in the early years.

The Jacobins acted as a debating club and political pressure group rather than as a formal political party. The French revolutionaries were opposed to the idea of political parties, thinking that parties would be used to promote particular interests rather than the good of all. In the early years of the revolution, the Jacobin club was dominated by relative moderates such as Antoine Barnave, Adrien Duport, and Alexandre Lameth who were committed to a constitutional monarchy and a limited franchise. Following the attempted flight of Louis XVI in June 1791 and the gradual unraveling of the constitutional monarchy that followed, the moderates left the club. In late 1791, the club came under the domination of Jacques Pierre Brissot and the group later known as the Girondins, a group that spearheaded the drive to war over Robespierre's objections.

In the summer of 1792, when the monarchy was overthrown and the first French republic founded, the Jacobins moved decisively to the left. The Girondins abandoned the club in the autumn of 1792. It was now under the domination of radical revolutionaries, prominent among them Robespierre, Georges Danton, Louis de Saint-Just, Jean-Paul Marat, and other members of the "mountain" (Jacobin deputies in the National Convention). In September 1792, the Jacobins changed their name to the Society of Jacobins, Friends of Liberty and Equality. In June 1793, the *sans-culottes* (the poorer working-class members, so named because they wore full-length trousers instead of the more

fashionable knee-length culottes) ousted the discredited Girondins from the convention, and the Jacobins came into government.

The Jacobins were hard-liners, prepared to enforce the aims of the revolutionary government and make a concerted effort to gain victory both in the war with foreign powers and with the many counterrevolutionaries within France. To do this, these hitherto idealistic and humanitarian men adopted the tactics of terror. They formed the first government to enlist terror in the cause of a political ideal. The terms *terrorist* and *terrorism* were invented retrospectively in late 1794 to describe the Jacobins and their methods. The Jacobins proved to be cautious about implementing the economic measures desired by the *sans-culottes* and were made uneasy by the violence of the *sans-culottes,* even though the threat of that violence had been enlisted to put the Jacobins into power. The Jacobins curbed the political autonomy of the *sans-culotte* movement, and the *sans-culottes* became disaffected. In the coup of Thermidor (July 1794), Robespierre and Saint-Just were overthrown by other Jacobins, who feared that Robespierre was planning to move against them. The Jacobin government fell with them. The Terror itself began to wind down almost immediately afterward. In November 1794, the Jacobin club was closed down, and many Jacobins fell victim to reprisals in the so-called White Terror.

The ideology of Jacobinism, as it has since been interpreted by political theorists, has inevitably been seen as being closely bound up with the Terror, but Jacobinism was not solely about terror. Indeed, historians have long debated the extent to which the Terror during the Jacobin republic was inherent in the universal principles of liberty and equality of 1789, or whether it was a contingent and pragmatic response to war and civil war in 1793. Jacobinism was founded on the strand of optimism in Enlightenment thought that held that mankind was basically good and that human society could be made better in the here and now, rather than in an afterlife. Jacobins believed in open and transparent politics. They were radical democrats, supporting popular sovereignty based on the vote for all men. Their conception of politics was a moral as well as a democratic one: They believed that it was the responsibility of politicians to consider only the public good—that is, to be politically virtuous. Political leaders should reject financial corruption and refuse to profit personally from their public office. The Jacobins were politically rather than socially egalitarian, although they were opposed to extremes of wealth or poverty. Their social ideal was that of a republic of small producers, peopled by landed peasants and independent artisans.

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See also Egalitarianism; Radical Democracy; Republicanism; Revolution; Robespierre, Maximilien; Virtue

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Japanese Political Thought

Political thought emerged in a coherent form in Japan in the Tokugawa era (1600–1868), when Confucian-trained thinkers sought to make Chinese Confucianism more relevant to their own political environment. Thus began what was to become a fundamental preoccupation in Japanese political thinking thereafter, namely the relationship between ethics and politics. Throughout modern Japanese history, the pendulum has swung between attempts to entangle these two spheres and attempts to separate or differentiate between them. A second central theme in Japanese political thinking has been the imperative of national identity formation in the age of modernization, imperialism, and war, especially in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Tensions between ethics

and politics, and the universal and the particular, enable Japanese political thought to resonate with and enrich the international body of ideas about politics.

Ethics and Politics

The commencement of Japan's modern era is sometimes equated with the arrival of Westerners in Japan in 1853, which resulted in the forced opening of Japan to the world after more than 200 years of national isolation. The threat of foreign invasion encouraged the Japanese to develop a national consciousness and was a catalyst for centralization of political authority as well as regime change in 1868. But the rationale for the associated developments in political consciousness was nurtured in the preceding century.

As Masao Maruyama (1914–1996) has famously argued, modern political thought became evident in Japan in the midst of the semifeudal reign of the Tokugawa shogunate (1600–1868), when scholars associated with the School of Ancient Learning (*Kogaku*) dismantled the logic underpinning of Chu Hsi Confucianism. In Chu Hsi philosophy, personal morality and public life were linked by a metaphysical logic, where essential continuity between ethics and politics, and mankind and nature, packaged social and political stability as an ethical imperative and presented history as a moral lesson for humanity. Ancient Learning thinkers such as Jinsai Ito (1627–1705) and Sorai Ogyu (1666–1727) conceived of the relationship between mankind and heaven in ways that severed this normative continuity. Whereas Jinsai shifted the emphasis within Chu Hsi metaphysics toward the purification of morality by distinguishing between "the way of heaven" and "the way of man," Sorai veered in the other direction. For Sorai, highlighting the practical function of political order assumed primacy in his thinking. Sorai argued that politics was man-made (what Maruyama called *invention*), so it could change dramatically without any impact on moral order. In their different ways, Jinsai and Sorai freed the political realm from moral prescription and opened up a new conceptual space for political thought.

The conceptual opportunity that had been created by Ancient Learning thinkers was exploited with quite different outcomes by members of the School of National Learning (*Kokugaku*). Whereas Ancient Learning scholars took China as their model, National Learning scholars applied a particularistic reading of history to create an ethnocentric and somewhat literal historical philosophy. For instance, Norinaga Motoori (1730–1801) argued that only the Japanese past was a legitimate model for Japanese sociopolitical life. Moreover, in Japan's case, the gods were real beings who were the ancestors of the emperors. The pull of the past was just as powerful in National Learning, but the explicit rejection of foreign models and the advocacy of particularistic religion (Shinto) in place of Confucian cosmology helped consolidate nationalistic thinking in modern Japan. In this way, the Confucian reverence for heaven was seamlessly transformed into reverence for the emperor of Japan. In conceptual terms, emperor worship was only a heartbeat away.

This Japan-centered ideology was given significant philosophical underpinning by the scholars of the Mito fief. As Western ships threatened on the horizon in 1823, they published a manifesto elaborating the organic and historical Japanese spirit binding emperor and nation: *kokutai*. The New Theses (*Shinron*) by Seishisai Aizawa (1782–1863) thereby created the rationale for practical political action that could be legitimized if it was expressed as loyalty to the ethical center of Japan past and present, the emperor. In effect, as Tetsuo Najita points out, this led to a dualism in government whereby the realm of ethics (the emperor) could be quarantined from the realm of political action (government), establishing a circle of legitimacy unburdened by accountability attaching to power (or what Maruyama called "the system of irresponsibility"). Aizawa had sought to arm Japan spiritually and politically against the West, but ultimately, his logic was used to overthrow the Tokugawa system. His ideas also planted the seeds of what in the 1930s and 1940s would become distorted into an ideology endorsing racial supremacy and aggression, the Emperor System.

The Meiji era (1868–1912) saw the political utility of the past and the logic of loyal action confirmed in the shape of a formula for conservative revolution, known as restorationism. As the slogans and ideologies of this tumultuous period reveal, political change was deemed more readily acceptable—and legitimate—if it was justified in

historical terms. *Sonno joi* (revere the emperor, expel the barbarians) equated the intrusion of foreigners with violation of the imperial will and justified the overthrow of the Tokugawa. At the same time, the advent of a new government was justified in terms of imperial agency: The new government would, like the Tokugawa before them, rule on behalf of the emperor. The opportunism of the *sonno joi* slogan was exposed as the transitional rulers presided over the opening of the country to the barbaric West. The notion of restoring imperial rule, implying a return to past practice, became the linchpin of political ideology thereafter, until it was discredited by total defeat in 1945. It made a violent appearance in the 1930s in the Showa Restoration movement, as young officers in the Japanese Imperial Army sought to restore their version of the imperial will through a campaign of assassinations and a failed coup d'état.

The Universal and the Particular

The dualistic logic of ethics and government that was first articulated in the late Tokugawa era acquired institutional form in the 1899 Meiji constitution. The state builders of Meiji Japan knew that to survive in a hostile world and retain national independence, Japan needed to embrace modernity. This meant, among other things, the acquisition of modern institutions such as a constitution and a parliament and the construction of a modern democratic society. The constitution was a hybrid document that confirmed the emperor as head of state and, at the same time, established the emperor as a transcendental entity in political terms. In this sense, Meiji constitutionalism was more than just an institutional arrangement; the locus of the emperor in this institution also made it an expression of national identity.

The Meiji oligarchs who drafted this constitution needed to associate the new modern state with the emperor to borrow the logic of restorationism, namely to ensure that popular loyalty would accrue to the new government and its institutional identity through the emperor and to constrain popular participation in politics to forestall the revival of loyal action against the new government. In the 1889 constitution, the popularly elected parliament was made accountable to the emperor; rights were bestowed on the people by the emperor rather than being inherent; and the constitution itself was framed as a gift from the emperor to the people. Transcendentalism was established as the operative principle of Meiji constitutionalism by declaring the emperor to be both sovereign and sacred and inviolable. In addition, transcendentalism was institutionalized through omission: The military bypassed parliament and cabinet and was directly responsible to the emperor alone; the appointed cabinet was not accountable to parliament; and the wielders of actual power—the oligarchs—were not mentioned in the document at all.

The ideological building blocks that eventually congealed to underpin the Emperor System enhanced the logic of the Meiji constitution by using a combination of myth and force. The 1890 Imperial Rescript of Education led to all school children citing a loyalty oath to the emperor daily, while the 1925 Peace Preservation Law criminalized criticism of the emperor. The 1937 ideological tract entitled Cardinal Principles of the National Polity (*Kokutai no Hongi*) shrouded imperialist expansion in myth and packaged aggression in north and southeast Asia as "co-prosperity" and racial destiny.

Despite the overriding official concern with particularism that accompanied Japan's modernization from Meiji onward, there is ample evidence that many Japanese embraced the promise of universal ideas such as democracy and Marxism in the decades following the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Even the challenge of modernity was reformulated in universal terms by leading popular thinkers. The rendering of modernity as something universally attainable and therefore accessible to all cultures and races was first put forward with massive popular impact by the Meiji prophet of civilization and enlightenment, Yukichi Fukuzawa (1835–1901). In his best-selling book, *Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (published in 1875), Fukuzawa set out to dismantle the historicist logic underpinning restorationism. The imperial institution was valuable in Fukuzawa's eyes not because it was ancient but because it had facilitated the retention of Japan's national sovereignty and independence. What really mattered in the modern age, according to Fukuzawa, was that Japan acquire the spirit of civilization. This did not mean Westernization, necessitating an emasculation of identity; rather it meant that Japan needed to

acquire "science in the material sphere, and a sense of 'independence' in the spiritual sphere." By separating the emperor from national identity formation in political and social terms, Fukuzawa was continuing the trajectory of modern intellectual deconstruction that Sorai and Jinsai had propagated before him.

The pendulum swung back toward accommodation of particularistic concerns with the advent of the Taisho era (1912–1926), also known as the era of Taisho Democracy, when party political cabinets were installed and universal manhood suffrage was implemented. The political theorist of democracy who exemplifies this stage of modern Japan's political thinking is Sakuzo Yoshino (1878–1933). Yoshino invented a new word in an attempt to reconcile the particularistic totem of the emperor with modern democracy in Japan. *Democracy* had been translated into Japanese as *minshushugi* (government by the people). Yoshino's idea of *minponshugi,* which we can loosely translate as "government *for* the people," addressed the unspoken fear that democracy might be culturally incompatible with Japan's polity. It also sought to create an accommodation between emperor and nation that removed the official perception of threat that attached to popular participation in government. Acutely aware of the official aversion to popular political movements such as the Protect the Constitution Movement of 1912–1913 and the Rice Riots of 1918, Yoshino tried conceptually to bring the notion of imperial rule and popular political activism together by presenting democracy as a universal trend that would connect the nation to global progress. Yoshino thereby rationalized democracy as something that served the national interest.

Particularism tainted radical affection among Japanese for another universalist thought system, namely Marxism. Marxism was a powerful intellectual presence in Japan before and after World War II. The tension between universal and particular impulses in Marxism led to the emergence of two antagonistic schools of Japanese Marxism in the 1920s. The Koza (Lecture) group was ultimately judged the orthodox variant by the Soviet Union-based leader of international communism, the Comintern. The Koza theorists regarded Japan as not yet ready for socialist revolution, based partly on their assessment that the presence of the emperor, an essentially feudal economic and ideological force, showed Japan to be poised only for bourgeois revolution, not socialist revolution. The Rono (Labor-Farmer) group, on the other hand, regarded the emperor as an essentially peripheral entity whose presence was not linked to the substructure of Japanese capitalism. To the Rono theorists, the emperor was merely a feudal remnant whose power had already been appropriated by the bourgeois classes. Therefore, Japan was ready for socialist revolution.

In the postwar period, the Koza variant assumed predominance in the academic world, buoyed by the perceived historical implications of Japan's incomplete modernity, which had ended Emperor System fascism. The postwar Marxist movement was plagued by recriminations concerning the wartime failure to resist the Emperor System, and its theoretical coherence would eventually be further undermined as Japanese embraced "miracle" economic growth in the 1960s.

In the reinvigorated debate culture of postwar Japan, the focus of political thought switched to the viability of democracy after 1945. A core idea that emerged out of vehement disputes between Marxist and so-called progressive thinkers like Maruyama was that of *shutaisei* (autonomy). Particularism emerged here once more, as intellectuals sought to base their view of democratic viability in Japan on their analysis of Japan's wartime polity. Maruyama's theory of the state's appropriation of social autonomy during the war led him to argue that democracy in postwar Japan depended on the development of *shutaisei,* meaning autonomous value definition on the part of individuals, who could then act freely on those values. Marxist philosophers were tormented by this interpretation, as it smacked of an individualist worldview instead of historical laws leading to capitalist collapse. Even so, leading Marxist philosophers like Katsumi Umemoto (1912–1974) argued that people who were expected to conduct revolution needed to know why it mattered, earning himself the negative label of revisionist.

As the postwar era unfolded in the shadow of the cold war, pacifism and neutralism emerged as manifestations of the very *shutaisei* that thinkers had advocated in the late 1940s. Perhaps here we can see the coming together of particularistic and universal concerns, alongside a belated reconciliation between ethics and nonstate politics.

The potency of postwar Japanese pacifism as an ethical performance on the part of society against the state remained a dominant antiestablishment political ethos until the first Gulf War in 1991. In the twenty-first century, peacekeeping as a valid use of state power vies with the bogey of neonationalist revival in contemporary Japanese political thought, with the universal and the particular once more competing for ethical primacy in the popular imagination.

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See also Confucianism; Constitutionalism; Democracy; Fascism; Feudalism; Ideology; Maruyama Masao; Marxism; Modernization Theory; Pacifism

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Judicial Review

Judicial review refers to the power of a court to refuse to enforce statutes or administrative rules that, in the opinion of the judge or judges, conflict with the letter or the spirit of the constitution. Judicial review can serve to legitimate and facilitate the enforcement of limits on government and on majorities in constitutional democracies, but the practice of judicial review is controversial because it typically allows unelected judges to override majority preferences. Judicial power, then, is tenuous, and judges must rely on their power to persuade to maintain their authority.

There are two basic models of judicial review: a European model, largely built on a foundation developed by Hans Kelsen, and the American model. In the European model, judicial review is practiced by a specialized constitutional court, often ruling on abstract questions or deciding on the constitutionality of laws before they have been promulgated. By contrast, the American system is applied only in concrete cases involving real disputes between interested parties, and it can be applied by state courts as well as any federal court. Although the European model has proliferated in the years since World War II, and particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union, judicial review achieved its greatest prominence in the United States.

Constitutions define and limit the powers of the government. To be meaningful, these limits must be defined, articulated, and enforced. Independent courts are well designed to take on this function, and many have argued that it is a responsibility they cannot logically avoid. Constitutions are understood to represent a higher law than ordinary legislation; that higher law is the expression of the sovereign people themselves. Ordinary legislation is the product of the agents of that sovereign. Thus, it is impossible to imagine a court sworn to preserve and defend the constitution enforcing the inferior statute and ignoring the superior constitutional provision.

Judicial review has a long history, and early examples include *Dr. Bonham's* case, decided by the Court of Common Pleas in England in 1610, in which Sir Edward Coke ruled that statutes contrary to right and reason cannot be enforced by a court. In the United States, judicial review was first exercised by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1803 case of *Marbury v. Madison,* in which Chief Justice John Marshall insisted that the U.S. Constitution was a superior law and could not be changed by ordinary legislation. Where there is a conflict

between ordinary legislation and the superior constitutional provision, Marshall argued, the Court was bound to enforce the superior provision and disregard any conflicting ordinary legislation.

Judicial review serves various purposes. By having the authority to say what is *not* law, the courts can enhance the legitimacy of government action by providing an independent assurance that the government has not exceeded the limits and boundaries of the constitutional compact. Judicial review offers investors and citizens alike assurances that even the government itself is bound by law, that their investments are secure, and that commitments will be kept. Judicial review also can serve to ease the transition of power; those losing power can protect their interests and will have the opportunity to contest for and regain power in the future. It also can provide a way to balance and resolve disputes that arise in federated and consociational systems in which power is divided or shared among various institutions and levels of government. Strong judicial review is also often embraced in societies interested in protecting deep normative commitments against the possibility of majority tyranny and often particularly in states emerging from totalitarian regimes. The European Convention on Human Rights represents a broad and deep set of normative commitments, and the enforcement of these commitments has actually led to the exercise of strong judicial review even in polities—such as France, Germany and Great Britain—with a deep traditional commitment to parliamentary sovereignty.

Every government official is bound to abide by and support the provisions of the state's constitution, but independent courts are institutionally well designed to take a leading role in the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional bargains. Protected from the vicissitudes of partisan politics, and often serving long and even life-tenured terms, judges are free to enforce the constitutional bargain in ways that elected officials may not. But lacking the tools of enforcement (neither the force of arms, nor the ability to print, raise, or spend funds) judges must rely on their power to persuade and are often restrained in the application of the power of judicial review by the concern that their own authority is tenuous.

Judicial review is not universally embraced. There is great resistance in democratic polities to rulings by unelected judges that override the preferences of majorities. Judges often exercise self-restraint out of a concern that overreaching could undercut their own institutional power and authority. Some suggest that the best way for judges to minimize this concern is to enforce the language of the constitutional bargain strictly and in strict accord with the meaning of those who wrote and ratified these commitments until such time as a new constitutional provision is substituted for the existing provision. Others insist that judges ought to limit the exercise of judicial review to making sure that the political process is functional and open to all interested parties and individuals. If the process is fair and consistent with the constitutional provisions, then (and only then) should courts defer to majority preferences. But for those who insist that constitutions include deep normative commitments and clear protections for minority preferences, limiting judicial review to procedural issues is simply not an acceptable option.

With the spread of constitutional democracy and the growth of supranational governmental bodies and organizations such as the European Union, judicial review is likely to extend, deepen, and become increasingly significant—and so too will the concerns about the risks of judicial overreach. From the European Court of Human Rights to the Constitutional Court of South Africa, from the Supreme Court of India to the U.S. Supreme Court, judges and judicial review are increasingly central players in constitutional systems—but players whose grip on power is tenuous and relies heavily on their ability to persuade, explain, and give reasons.

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See also Constitutionalism; Dicey, Albert Venn; Jurisprudence; Rule of Law; Separation of Powers

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JURISPRUDENCE

Jurisprudence has three distinct meanings. Primarily, it is the philosophy of law, that is, speculative thought about law. It can, however, be used to refer to the study of legal systems. It can also be used to designate judicial precedents as a whole or, more narrowly, case law. It is interesting to observe that these secondary meanings can be respectively mapped onto two fundamental traditions of modern legal thought. Legal positivist jurisprudence is dedicated to theorizing law as a system of rules, and legal realist jurisprudence develops out of a concentration on the judicial process and case law.

Legal positivism originates in the nineteenth century with the jurisprudence of John Austin and Jeremy Bentham, and it is conceived in opposition to the natural law tradition. For natural law jurists, a valid law must conform either to the law of nature (in Stoic and ancient philosophy), to divine law (in Jewish and Christian philosophy), or to certain universal human ends and needs (in secular and humanist philosophy). For positivists, by contrast, the criterion for a law's validity is its source or pedigree, not its content. Positivism establishes a strict separation between what it calls censorial jurisprudence, which aims to reform law, and analytical jurisprudence, which seeks to understand the logical or formal structure of a legal system. In this sense, positivism is critical: It establishes precise limits within jurisprudence by delineating two branches of investigation. A major aim of positivism is to grant censorial jurisprudence its place but to insist that it should not be confused with analytical jurisprudence. In analytical jurisprudence, a law is held to exist, to be valid, if it is posited according to certain formal criteria—whether, for example, it is commanded by a sovereign who is habitually obeyed (Austin), flows from a higher order norm (Hans Kelsen), or is derived from a fundamental rule of recognition, such that whatever the queen enacts is law (H. L. A. Hart). Positivist jurisprudence, therefore, analyzes law as a system of rules, in which each rule (with the single exception of the highest order norm or rule) finds its condition of existence.

Legal realism developed in the first half of the twentieth century in the United States. Inspired by the philosophical pragmatism of William James and John Dewey, the foremost exponents of realism include Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Cardozo, and Karl Llewellyn. It is noteworthy that Holmes and Cardozo were also judges. The main object of analysis for realist jurisprudence is the judicial process. Its position can be negatively and positively stated. Negatively, realism argues that law is indeterminate and that the principal modes of legal reasoning, such as syllogism and analogy, do not account for how judges, in fact, decide cases. Realism opposes legal formalism or mechanical jurisprudence, that is, the belief that rules automatically dictate their own application and that the judge's role is simply to ensure that the case is treated by the appropriate rule. Positively, realism argues that judges reach their decisions by evaluating human goals, practical necessities, and even political and ideological commitments. As Cardozo states in *Ostrowe v. Lee* (1931), "The soundness of a conclusion may not infrequently be tested by its consequences." This pragmatic vision of law and judgment—that judges decide cases and hence law according to what is necessary and useful—leads to controversial conclusions. On one hand, law is nothing other than what officials do about disputes. And, on the other hand, the basis for official decision is no longer (never was) a judgment of logic but one of value. As such, realist jurisprudence raises a persistent controversy of jurisprudence: whether judges apply or create law.

Two compelling perspectives on this controversy can be found in contemporary French thought. In "Force of Law," Jacques Derrida articulates the paradoxical condition for a just judgment. On one hand, law aspires to equal treatment such that decisions must be stable and calculable; but, on the other hand, law must also provide singular responses to unique situations, such that judgment cannot be reduced to mechanical application of rules. In *Negotiations,* Gilles

Deleuze outlines a concept of jurisprudence in response to his critique of human rights as abstract and ineffective. For Deleuze, jurisprudence designates the conjunction of a legal concept (for example, freedom of expression or privacy) with a case. Deleuze's claim is that the concept does not simply cover and treat the case at hand; instead, the two undergo a mutual determination. For example, someone has a sealed drink bought for her that, it so happens, contains the decayed remains of a snail (*Donoghue v. Stevenson* [1932]). She sues and wins, but at the time, no law specified a duty of care to parties without contract. How does that happen? For Deleuze, a new right was created when a concrete problem led the judge to extend a duty of care wherever harm could be reasonably foreseen. Two consequences flow from his concept of jurisprudence. First, the case is seen as formative of law. Here, law develops from singularity to singularity, and cases are not mere instances to be covered by a self-same rule. Second, creativity is viewed as an intrinsic power of judgment, not as an accident or act of will. Deleuze is not recommending creativity on the part of judges; rather, he proposes a jurisprudence that sees creativity as inherent to the operation of law.

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See also American Pragmatism; Bentham, Jeremy; Hart, H. L. A.; Judicial Review, Rule of Law, Singularity

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Justice, Theories of

Justice, on the classical view, is a virtue; specifically, it is a disposition to give each person his or her due. Naturally, there has always been some difference of opinion as to what, exactly, is due to whom under which conditions. The most influential account has probably been that offered by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Distinguishing justice in distribution from justice in rectification, he argues that in the former case, goods are justly distributed according to the proportionate merit of the recipients, and that in the latter case, just punishments and compensations are proportionate to injuries caused. The virtue of justice can thus be understood as a state of character that disposes people to act justly and wish for what is just, so defined.

It is important to observe that this duty of justice (as it is now often called) does not cover the whole range of our practical obligations. It does not, for example, include any obligations we might have to ourselves (prudential obligations) or to the natural world. Arguably, it does not even include all of what we owe to other human beings. The former is obvious, as can be seen from any number of examples. People subject to tyrannical governments often face tragic choices between self-preservation and justified resistance—that is, between giving priority to their prudential or to their justice obligations; similarly, there are many difficult public policy choices that pit important environmental aims against the demands of justice. But when it comes to our obligations to other human beings specifically, justice sometimes seems to have an imperialistic tendency to engross the whole of morality.

Aristotle himself observed the ambiguity this causes: When we describe a person as *just,* do we simply mean to say that he or she is virtuous or moral in general; or do we mean that he or she has some specific virtue or moral disposition in particular? The latter view is better. Sometimes, for example, strict justice demands punishments that, in the nature of the circumstances, would be inhumane. This was supposed to be one of the lessons in Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*—that justice should be tempered with mercy. This tension is most naturally described as a conflict between

competing moral obligations: our obligations of justice, on one hand, and our humanitarian obligations, on the other. For this conflict to even arise, justice cannot constitute the whole of morality.

If, then, we do not take justice to constitute the whole of morality, what best characterizes its special or distinctive features? Here is one view. Humanitarian obligations are obligations we have to other people simply by virtue of the fact that they are (fellow) human beings; it does not matter who they are, for example, or what their relationship to us happens to be. Justice is not like this. It is rather a set of obligations that arise specifically when we share political, social, or economic institutions and practices with others. Very roughly, we might say that the duty of justice is the duty we have to "play fair" and observe the rules of our common institutions and practices. When Aristotle described justice in distribution and rectification, he was in effect describing the accepted norms of fair dealing in the societies with which he was familiar—namely, Greek communities of the fourth century BCE. When there are rewards to be doled out, it was expected that they would be distributed according to merit; when promises were made, it was expected that they would be kept; and so on. The just person plays fair and observes the norms, whereas the unjust person tries to get ahead by cheating and evading the norms. The importance of the duty of justice should thus be clear, for a functioning society is not possible except on the basis of common institutions and practices. So too should be the fact that justice obligations may compete with other important moral obligations and thus cannot constitute the whole of morality. We might say, schematically, that morality includes obligations of justice, humanitarian obligations, and any other obligations we have to our fellow human beings. Ethics, in turn, includes our moral obligations, together with any obligations of prudence, obligations to the natural world, and so on.

If the duty of justice is roughly our obligation to observe the rules of shared institutions and practices, then it has to be asked—will any set of shared institutions and practices do? On this question turns the essential difference between the classical and the modern approach to the problem of justice. Classical political and moral thinkers (like Aristotle) for the most part took the institutions and practices they were already familiar with as given and addressed themselves to such related problems as these: Why should we be just? Can our justice obligations and our prudential obligations be reconciled? Where does justice come from? What is its ontological status? For the moderns, by contrast, these are often peripheral concerns, and the core difficultly is taken to be determining precisely which set of institutions and practices is the right one. (Communitarians are an exception here: They follow the classical view in refusing to answer the latter question, or—which amounts to the same thing—in answering it only by saying that the right institutions and practices are the ones that a given society happens, in fact, to have embraced.)

This brings us to the idea of *social justice:* A theory of social justice is simply a theory about what the right institutions and practices would be. In other words, social justice is the referent of the duty of justice. Aristotle said that the just person not only acts justly but also wishes for what is just; given the shift in emphasis from justice to social justice, it is only natural to regard the duty of justice as including some obligation to realize social justice. Hence, we arrive at John Rawls's definition, which can be taken as the standard modern view, of the duty of justice as the obligation "to support and to comply with just institutions" so far as they exist, and "to further just arrangements not yet established." Because they are the focus of modern discussions of justice, the remainder of this entry will discuss theories of social justice.

The Architecture of Social Justice Theories

In the usual parlance derived from Rawls, let us define the "basic structure" of society as the complete set of political, social, and economic institutions and practices that constitute the relatively stable background conditions or expectations against which the members of a given society live out their lives. Every society has a basic structure. Presumably, at any given time, every society also faces some set of feasible alternatives—many only slightly different, others entirely different than their existing basic structure. At the core of any theory of social justice is a principle or set of principles whose function it is to rank-order existing and feasible alternative basic structures. If the

existing basic structure of society is ranked at or near the top, then we might describe that society as reasonably just (according to that theory); if not, then we might describe it as relatively unjust. In the former case, the duty of justice would constrain the members of that society to support and comply with the existing basic structure; in the latter case, it would direct them to work toward establishing one of the more just alternatives.

Utilitarianism—one of the most powerful and influential modern theories of social justice—provides an illustrative example. According to utilitarianism, there is only one principle of social justice, roughly as follows:

> Societies are just to the extent that their basic structure tends, in expectation, to maximize the sum total happiness of those persons affected by it, counting the happiness of each affected person equally.

There is an extensive debate, of course, concerning the relevant meaning of the term *happiness* in this theory, which I will largely ignore. On what is probably the standard contemporary view, we may simply say that a person is happy to the extent that his or her preferences are satisfied, whatever the content of those preferences happens to be.

Suppose that society *S* has basic structure *B*. If there exists for *S* some feasible alternative *B** that would, in expectation, tend to produce a substantially greater sum total happiness, then, according to utilitarianism, we should regard *S* as an unjust society to that extent. Other theories are more complicated. They might, for example, have more than one principle of social justice, in which case priority rules are needed to generate coherent rankings. But the function of a principle or principles of justice is always the same: namely, to rank-order feasible basic structures. Considered in themselves, these ranking principles are often referred to as *conceptions* of social justice—that is, conceptions of what it means for a society to be correctly regarded as just. Thus, on the utilitarian view, what it means for a society to be just is that its basic structure maximizes sum total happiness.

Conceptions of social justice are constructed, so to speak, out of various parts or modules that fit together in a particular way. Again, taking utilitarianism as our example, we can see that it is built from three logically independent modules. The first is the claim that what matters, from a justice point of view, is the happiness of individual human beings. This module is often called *welfarism,* and it appears in conceptions other than utilitarianism as well. The second is the claim that basic structures should aim to maximize the sum total happiness (rather than, say, maximize equal happiness or something else). The third is the claim that everyone's happiness should count the same—this is intended as an expression of our commitment to the moral equality of all human beings. Utilitarianism is constructed through the precise conjunction of these three components; different theories can be generated by substituting different modules. For example, substituting an equality module for the maximizing module would generate an "equality of welfare" conception of social justice; such theories have been proposed by Richard Arneson, John Roemer, and others. Alternatively, we might substitute aggregate wealth, artistic and cultural development, or something else for the welfarism module, while retaining the maximizing module. And so on. Each of these different conceptions must be assessed on its own distinctive merits.

The principle or principles of justice form the core of any theory of social justice—its conception of what it means for a society to be described as just. There are, of course, many different and competing conceptions of social justice. It follows that a complete theory should offer both a conception of what it means for a society to be described as just and some line of argument purporting to show that, in some relevant sense, this is the *best* or *right* conception. We might think of this aspect of a theory of social justice as a selection mechanism or decision procedure for choosing among the possible competing conceptions.

To be fully effective, this decision procedure must provide some sort of argument for each of the various modules used in constructing the relevant conception. Theories of social justice are not always (indeed, rarely are) worked out so thoroughly. To give one notorious example, John Stuart Mill's argument for utilitarianism turns out to offer an argument only for the welfarism module and not the others: even if he is right that happiness is what counts, it must still be shown that happiness should be maximized and that

everyone's happiness should count the same. The model case of a thoroughly worked-out decision procedure is, of course, Rawls's original position argument. His conception of justice as fairness, as is well known, has two principles:

1. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the difference principle).

Compared with utilitarianism's bracing simplicity, justice as fairness is clearly a cumbersome conception. Unlike utilitarianism, however, justice as fairness has an exceptionally detailed and sophisticated justificatory apparatus. Roughly speaking, the argument is that reasonable people in an original position behind a veil of ignorance would select the two principles of justice as fairness over any of the leading competitors, utilitarianism included. Each of the various working parts of the conception, according to Rawls, can be given support through the original position argument.

The Diversity of Contemporary Theories

There is no agreed-on standard typology of the theories of social justice discussed in the contemporary literature. One possibility is to characterize theories of social justice according to their professed relationship with what are called "conceptions of the good." A conception of the good is, roughly speaking, an account of what makes a human life go better or worse; a complete theory of the good would thus be a complete account of human flourishing.

Some theories start from the assumption that the principles of justice derive their validity independently of any particular conception of the good and thus that the former have a certain sort of priority over the latter—that justice limits or constrains the acceptable conceptions of the good, perhaps. These sorts of theories are generally called *deontological* theories. Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is one example. By contrast, other theories start from the contrary assumption that the principles of justice must derive their validity from some independently established conception of the good and thus that the latter has a certain sort of priority over the former. These are generally called *teleological* theories. Among the latter, some specifically define social justice as the maximization of some independently established good and so might be called *strictly teleological* theories. Other teleological theories might define the right as the honoring of an independently established good in some way other than by maximizing it. Utilitarianism is a strictly teleological theory, insofar as it starts with an independently established good (happiness) and then goes on to define social justice as the maximization of that good. Equality of welfare, by contrast, is teleological, but not maximizing: The best way to honor the importance of happiness to individuals, it might be argued, is to ensure that everyone has an equal opportunity to achieve it. A nonwelfarist example of a good-honoring theory might be Ronald Dworkin's ethical liberalism: In his view, societies are just to the extent that their basic structures are designed so as to honor a specific liberal conception of the good.

Theories of social justice also make assumptions about how a complete conception of the good itself ought to be worked out. One might, for example, assume that there is one best or most excellent sort of human life for everyone: Theories based on this assumption are generally called *perfectionist* theories. Two examples frequently discussed in the contemporary literature are civic humanism and liberal perfectionism. According to civic humanism, the best human life is one of active citizenship and civic virtue in a broadly democratic community; according to liberal perfectionism, the best human life is one based on autonomous self-reflection. (It is not always clear from the literature whether these goods are supposed to be promoted or honored, but both theories are usually taken to be teleological.) Traditional Stoic and Christian theories are also perfectionist, insofar as they are based on a conception of human excellence as moral or religious virtue. Indeed, historically speaking, perfectionism has more or

less been the norm. Many contemporary theories, however, are not perfectionist: That is to say, they are to some extent agnostic toward differing conceptions of the good, at least as a matter of principle. Such theories are variously called neutral, impartial, or antiperfectionist, although each of these terms can be seriously misleading. This is because perfect neutrality or impartiality toward all possible conceptions of the good is impossible, and in any case, it is not always (or even often) the direct aim of such theories. The best term might simply be *nonperfectionist*.

These two issues are sometimes confused with one another. For example, it is frequently assumed that perfectionist theories are necessarily teleological. This is an easy mistake to make, for it is natural to think that if a theory holds one sort of human life to be the most excellent for all, then it must also define the right as the promoting or the honoring of this particular sort of excellence. But the traditional Stoic and Christian theories provide clear counterinstances: Both start with an independently derived conception of the right as moral or religious virtue and then go on to define a good human life as one lived in accordance with those particular virtues. In other words, they are deontological, but nevertheless perfectionist theories. Conversely, teleological theories need not be perfectionist. Utilitarianism is an example of this because it defines the good in a way that is (within limits) agnostic toward what makes people happy: It directs us to satisfy the preferences that people have, regardless of what those preferences happen to be.

Some further groups of theories have not yet been discussed. The first are libertarian theories of social justice, which hold that societies are just to the extent that their basic structures respect the natural rights of individuals. These are deontological, insofar as the relevant schedule of natural rights is generally assumed to derive its validity independently of any particular conception of the good and thus operate as a side-constraint on the latter; and also nonperfectionist, insofar as they are agnostic as a matter of principle toward the conceptions of the good individuals happen to hold. The second are deliberative-democratic theories of social justice, according to which societies are just to the extent that their basic structures realize some form of political equality. These theories (in contrast with civic humanism) are not perfectionist, but whether they are deontological or teleological depends on how the value of political equality is understood. The third are functioning-based theories. These are teleological theories that start with an independent account of human flourishing as consisting in various dimensions of basic functioning. (Among these is assumed to be the freedom to develop individualized life plans, ensuring that functioning-based theories will be nonperfectionist.) Most are not strictly teleological, however, insofar as they usually go on to define a society as just to the extent that its basic structure secures a sufficient level of functioning for everyone.

A final major contemporary theory is communitarianism. Communitarians hold that a society is just to the extent that its basic structure reflects, in some respect, the shared values of its members. It is thus impossible to classify the theory because the shared values of different communities obviously differ widely.

An entirely different way to divide up the contemporary field is with respect to the various decision procedures one might employ. There is not nearly such diversity at this level as there is at the level of principles of social justice themselves. Moreover, many of the traditional decision procedures have been thoroughly discredited, leaving the current field rather narrow indeed. Prominent among the discredited views we find various theological arguments and arguments from nature. The former hold that the correct principles of justice are those that best reflect God's will, either as expressed in Scripture or as rationally deduced from assumed theological premises. These sorts of arguments have been abandoned for obvious reasons. Arguments from nature hold that the correct principles of justice are those that, in some sense, reflect or imitate what we observe in the natural world. Naturalistic arguments were discredited in large part through the efforts of G. E. Moore, who showed that normative conclusions cannot be derived from strictly naturalistic premises. (Does it follow from the fact that malaria is a part of nature that we have no reason to combat it? Of course not.)

In place of these sorts of traditional views, Moore, W. D. Ross, and others in the early part of the twentieth century advanced a crypto-Platonic

doctrine of *intuitionism,* according to which we can apprehend an independent order of (nonnatural) moral facts merely by consulting our intuitive evaluations. Although not without some contemporary sympathizers, intuitionism too has largely fallen by the wayside.

For all intents and purposes, then, only three sorts of decision procedure currently command a significant following. The first proposes that the best conception of social justice is the one that would most advance the prudential self-interest of the people who would live under its guidance. On this view, we can think of the principles of social justice as representing terms of mutual cooperation to which a group of self-interested and prudential bargainers would agree, those terms then presumably deriving their normative justification from some version of ethical egoism. Theories of social justice relying on this sort of justificatory apparatus are often described as *mutual advantage* theories. Justice as mutual advantage has a distinguished pedigree: Versions of the argument were discussed in Plato's *Republic,* later defended by Epicurus, and finally given a sophisticated exposition by Thomas Hobbes. In contemporary political theory and philosophy, mutual advantage arguments have been advanced for utilitarianism and a version of justice as fairness, but they are most often employed on behalf of libertarian conceptions of social justice.

Mutual advantage theories are subject to a number of serious objections. The first is that they would, in their operation, merely replicate whatever imbalances of power exist prior to the terms of agreement: This is because the prudential self-interest of all the parties dictates that they separately make the best use of their respective bargaining power in securing terms favorable to themselves. The second (related) objection is that mutual advantage can give no account of our obligations to people from whom we have no reason to expect benefits—for example, the members of future generations. These are, of course, external complaints. The third objection is internal to the mutual advantage theory itself. Suppose that a group of self-interested and prudential bargainers agree on terms of social justice that would be mutually beneficial if compliance was common. The question remains: What reason does any given member of that group have to comply with those terms on the occasions when unilateral defection would happen to promote self-interest? Within the mutual advantage framework, no workable answer to this last question has yet been supplied.

The second and perhaps currently most popular sort of decision procedure derives from the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and holds that the best conception of social justice is the one that reasonable people would choose under fair conditions. This decision procedure retains the idea that we should think of social justice as representing terms of mutual cooperation, but it replaces self-interested and prudential bargainers with reasonable people and adds that the circumstances of their deliberation must be fair. In this context, reasonable people are generally understood to be those who are suitably motivated to find terms of cooperation acceptable to all; and fair conditions are generally understood to be (at a minimum) conditions of equal bargaining strength. Theories of social justice relying on this sort of justificatory apparatus might be called *consent-based* theories. The most influential consent-based theories are Rawls's aforementioned original position argument; the contractarianism of T. M. Scanlon, Brian Barry, and Thomas Nagel; and Jürgen Habermas's "ideal speech situation" argument. Consent-based arguments have been advanced for utilitarianism, but they are usually employed on behalf of liberal theories broadly similar to Rawls's.

There are, of course, difficulties with consent-based arguments as well. These revolve around what might be called the Euthyphro problem—namely, the ambiguity as to whether the claim is supposed to be that the principles selected express the right account of social justice because they (and not others) would be chosen by reasonable people under suitable conditions; or whether the argument is that reasonable people under suitable conditions would choose those principles (and not others) because they express the right account of social justice.

This brings us to the third and last decision procedure with significant contemporary adherents, also (interestingly) proposed by Rawls: the method of *reflective equilibrium.* On this view, the best conception of social justice is the one that sits well with all the moral (and other) intuitions we have, on reflection, decided to keep. The idea

is roughly to first propose a conception and then test it against a range of cases. Assuming that our intuitions regarding some of those cases (specifically, whether they capture our sense of what justice demands) do not correspond with the results generated by the proposed conception, we will have to make adjustments to the former, the latter, or both. In making these adjustments, our judgments are guided by the relative strength of our various intuitions and by the power and utility of alternative conceptions: Roughly speaking, one conception is better than another if it captures more of our stronger intuitions with greater conceptual efficiency. After an iterated process of testing and adjusting, we eventually arrive at a result we are happy with—in other words, we end up with a conception that rests in equilibrium all the intuitions regarding social justice that we have, after reflection, decided to keep. Relying primarily on the value of coherence, the reflective equilibrium method need not invest initial intuitions as such with unwarranted metaphysical significance; however, it does leave the ontological status of social justice something of a mystery. Thus, no one decision procedure has yet carried the field.

The Frontiers of Social Justice

A theory of social justice is a theory about what would make the basic structure—the institutions and practices of a society—just. As usually formulated, however, such theories are often incomplete. They do not, for example, address justice between present and distant future generations, between the victims and perpetrators of past injustices, or between the members of one society and the members of others. Considerable effort in recent years has been directed at extending the boundaries or frontiers of our theories into these important areas of intergenerational, transitional, and global justice. (These *extensions* are distinct from *applications* of social justice: among the latter we might include the topics of distributive, political, or legal justice.) Unfortunately, space permits only a brief discussion of each.

The question of justice between generations is among the most interesting and the most philosophically challenging topics. Some of the difficulties arise from "time's arrow"—the fact that each successive generation is absolutely power*less* with respect to its predecessors and absolutely power*ful* with respect to its successors. This means that accounts of intergenerational justice cannot rely in any obvious way on notions of mutual reciprocity: We have nothing to fear but also nothing to hope from future generations. Other difficulties arise from the complicated interaction of the problem of resource consumption and the problem of population. How many people should live may depend, in part, on how many resources will be available, and how many resources the present generation should leave for future generations may depend, in part, on how many people will live. There exists a fascinating and highly sophisticated literature that aims to puzzle through these various problems.

Theories of social justice are designed for more or less stable ongoing societies; thus, we have no reason to expect that such theories will work equally well when the continuity of social and political institutions or practices has been decisively broken. The literature on transitional justice addresses the special set of problems that arise in the wake of a transition from a substantially unjust society to a relatively more just one. Most discussions are focused on the transition from autocratic to democratic forms of government specifically, but we might also consider other major transitions, as for example from a slave-holding to a non-slave-holding society. Notice that the issues here are fundamentally issues of the present—namely, what justice requires of us here and now with respect to the fact that, in the recent past, our social or political institutions were substantially unjust. The difficulty is that, in the wake of a transition, there are likely many people around who were complicit in the earlier injustice and indeed who engaged in conduct that, under the new dispensation, is prohibited and (perhaps) punishable. The temptation is very strong, especially on the part of those who suffered under earlier injustice, to call these people to account. But against this must be weighed both pragmatic and principled considerations: Pragmatically speaking, the resistance to justice is likely to be stronger if it is known that all injustices will be punished; and in principle, it is sometimes unclear whether one should be punished for conduct that, at the time performed, was not fully understood to be wrong.

International actors, like individual people, have rights and obligations arising out of a duty of justice. They also, again like individuals, have (potentially) competing prudential and moral obligations. An example of the former might be the obligations of a state to pursue its security interests; an example of the latter might be the duty of any international actor to relieve suffering in humanitarian disasters around the world. The duty of international justice is distinct from these: It is, roughly, the obligation of international actors to further just global institutions and practices. The latter—which might be referred to as the basic structure of global society—include the rules governing the recognition and autonomy of states; the complex nexus of international trade agreements, global capital markets, international lending institutions, and so on; the various practices and conventions of just war; and so on. Different configurations of this global basic structure might be regarded as more or less just, and international actors must have some obligation to bring about and maintain just configurations, so far as they are able. In other words, a conception of global justice is the international analogue of a conception of social justice—that is, it is an account of the referent of the duty of international justice, much as a conception of social justice is an account of the referent of the individual's duty of justice. Global justice has emerged in recent years as one of the most dynamic and productive areas of contemporary research.

Frank Lovett

See also Civic Humanism; Communitarianism; Contractualism; Deliberative Democracy; Global Justice; Intergenerational Justice; Justice in Medieval Thought; Liberalism; Libertarianism; Rawls, John; Transitional Justice

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Justice in Medieval Thought

Throughout and well past the Middle Ages, justice remained a malleable concept that could connote general ideas of right or express subjective claims to compensation or retribution for injury. In concrete situations, disputants could and did exploit royal judicial institutions, or act outside of them, to achieve justice as they understood it. Nevertheless, by the end of the period, justice itself, as a specific duty and function of government, had come to reflect a divine and hence royal responsibility to uphold order in the public interest by determining guilt for offenses against the public interest and imposing the appropriate punishment. This entry describes the Roman roots of the medieval concept of justice and then explores its evolution during the Middle Ages. Although a view of justice as personal and subjective persisted throughout the medieval period, Christian models of justice also had an impact, particularly when rulers in the early Middle Ages claimed to act on God's behalf. The concept of justice as a responsibility of the state became increasingly important in the high and late Middle Ages. The emergence of these themes is traced in this entry.

Objective and Subjective Concepts of Justice

Justice was essential to both the theory and the practice of medieval rulership. A king or prince, because he acted on God's behalf, had to provide justice to those whom he ruled. This duty provided rulers with a powerful way to legitimate their actions when their circumstances permitted them to try to control or interfere in the business of other political actors.

At the same time, however, the way that justice was understood for much of the Middle Ages helps explain the behavior of a wider range of people. For many if not most medieval people, justice was not something objective that was provided or imposed from the top. It was instead something very personal and subjective. Justice was closely connected to the concept of right, as in "my right." To see justice done meant not simply to execute the dictates of the law or reach a judicial decision but rather to restore the—subjectively perceived—right order of things.

Roman Roots

The word *justice* derives from the Latin *iustitia,* a word that in classical Roman usage could also express concepts such as equity, righteousness, or moral rectitude. It was related semantically to *ius,* which at its broadest could designate anything from the binding or obligatory, to right, duty, power, authority, or permission. *Ius* also, however, had a set of specific meanings associated with the law and the judicial authority of the state. *Ius* could refer to a body of human law (although a formal statute or piece of legislation was called *lex*) as distinct from divine law (*fas*—although this word, too, could take on general connotations of right, proper, lawful, etc.). Roman judges or magistrates spoke the law (*ius dicere*), that is, rendered judicial decisions; to get their decisions one went to a judicial court (e.g., *in ius ire*). *Ius* could also mean the legal right to do something, as in *ius eundi,* or "right of way." The relationship between *ius* and *iustitia* was expressed in the great compilation of Roman law commissioned in the sixth century by Emperor Justinian; the part of the compilation designed for students, the *Institutes,* begins with the statement that "justice (*iustitia*) is the constant and perpetual desire to render to each his due (*ius*)."

A similar understanding of *iustitia* appears in the work of the early seventh-century scholar Saint Isidore, archbishop of Seville. In his *Etymologies,* a massive encyclopedia that became the most popular and long-lived reference work in medieval Europe, Isidore placed justice among the ethical concepts defined by philosophy. Whereas prudence had to do with distinguishing bad from good, fortitude with bearing adversity, and temperance with reining in passion and desire, justice (*iustitia*) dealt with giving to each his own through right judging.

Justice in the Early Middle Ages

In the centuries following Isidore, Roman legal traditions survived in Europe for the most part in collections of local or "vulgar" Roman law maintained by churches and monasteries; indications of how these collections were used are sparse. Much of the evidence for how Europeans understood justice in this period, therefore, comes from documents of practice, that is, charters or other texts that describe disputes. These texts show people operating with what Paul Hyams has called an undifferentiated sense of wrong, that is, a sense of wrong that was not divided between criminal offenses against the state and civil injuries to individuals; rather, it was overwhelmingly personal and subjective. This attitude, which drove those with grievances to seek "their justice," appears, for example, in the pervasive assumption that an individual or relatives could wield violence on their own behalf to avenge an injury or insult. It also appears in the equally pervasive practice of paying a blood-price, or *wergeld,* for physical injury and homicide. Both practices aimed at compensating the victim or family for any physical loss or injury and for the lost honor and standing that the injury entailed. A subjective sense of justice is similarly visible in the well-attested phenomenon of negotiated compromise between disputing parties. Accounts of such compromises (often contained in charters for property transfers made as part of dispute settlements) use language and describe ritualized public actions in ways that reveal deliberate efforts to balance the honor and material claims of each side, which were thus each able to claim to their respective support groups that justice had been done.

Both documents of practice and prescriptive texts such as the early barbarian law codes attest to courts headed by authority figures such as counts or judges, as well as by men of local communities versed in legal tradition. These courts served as arenas in which injured parties could raise complaints before members of their communities and appeal for the help of constituted authority; they also served as fora for the negotiation of compromises. That the justice pursued in such courts was nevertheless personal emerges, for example, in the earliest barbarian law code, the Law of the Salian Franks (*Pactus Legis Salicae* [*PLS*]) attributed to the sixth-century Frankish king Clovis. The single use of the Latin word *iustitia* in this text involves a count pursuing someone who had defaulted on a promissory note to "exact justice" for the creditor, that is, to force the debtor to pay the creditor what he owed (*PLS* 50/4).

Early medieval Europe also inherited models of justice with the Christian Bible. These models pointed in different directions. On one hand, the Old Testament frequently recognizes a personal right to revenge. On the other hand, the New Testament in particular asks Christians to requite wrong with love and leave justice and its interpretation to God.

Some early Christian authorities had argued that constituted authority could legitimately wield justice on God's behalf. In the later eighth century, a European ruler tried to institutionalize this claim on a large scale. The Frankish king and emperor Charlemagne, who was emperor from 800 to 814, assembled through wide-ranging conquests what was then an unprecedented amount of power and military prestige. Charlemagne took his responsibility for the Christian salvation of those living in his realm seriously; this responsibility included promoting God's justice. In decrees transmitted via written lists organized into subheadings or chapters (hence, their label, capitularies), Charlemagne sought to limit the personal resort to violence and to bring disputes into courts overseen by his officials. *Iustitia* still fundamentally meant what was "right" (e.g., infractions should be settled *secundum iustitiam*); *iustitia* still inhered in a person or a group (e.g., the "justice" of churches, widows, and orphans); *iustitia* still depended on particular issues under dispute (e.g., "let him be compelled to do justice concerning that for which he was sued"). At the same time, the "most Christian emperor" took direct responsibility for seeing justice done. Royal judges had to make sure that churches, widows, and orphans received justice from their courts; royal legates (*missi*) were sent to the provinces to do justice, to inquire into the king's justice as well as that of other groups, and to compel counts and other local officials to give justice to all. The capitularies also, however, defined a set of offenses, such as harming churches, widows, orphans, or the weak, as injuries to the king as well as to the immediate victim; justice in these cases consisted of paying to the king a fine, or *bannum*.

Charlemagne's vision of justice remained alive in theory after his empire dissolved, but in many parts of Europe, it was submerged by the personal one (which had never lost its strength despite Charlemagne's pronouncements). Given the right opportunities, however, it could be revived. Perhaps paradoxically, it emerges from the so-called Peace of God and Truce of God councils attested in France from the last decades of the tenth century. The councils united clergy and local or regional lords in sworn pacts to uphold peace and justice, which many of the clergy, at least, saw as abandoned by a failing kingship. For the most part, peace and justice in this context meant the peace and justice of the churches, the monasteries, and the defenseless (i.e., widows, orphans, the peasantry, and the poor, merchants, etc.), that is, their freedom from violence and from the arbitrary and uncompensated seizure of persons or property—all of which, for example, the council gathered at Charroux in 989 sought to defend with the aid of divine justice.

However, secular princes were quick to seize the opportunity provided by such councils to legitimate their own authority. For example, Duke William V "the Great" of Aquitaine summoned a council in Poitiers (1000 or 1014) to restore *pax et iustitia*. The council's first decree required disputes over property in the counties governed by the assembled princes to be brought for *iustitia* before the prince or a judge. Should a party refuse to submit to the court's *iustitia,* the prince or judge was to enforce it. Should the prince or judge be unable to compel the recalcitrant party's obedience, he was to appeal to the princes and bishops of the

council as a collective, who would set out to "destroy and trouble" the party until he returned "to the rectitude of justice (*iustitia*)."

Justice in the High and Late Middle Ages

As kings, emperors, and princes throughout Europe asserted themselves in the rapidly evolving economic and political climate of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, they continued to broadcast the image of the Christian ruler as the guarantor of God's justice. In the East Frankish or German realm, kings and emperors adopted the traditions of the sworn peace to issue *Landfrieden,* or land peaces, first on a regional and then on an imperial level. As the twelfth and thirteenth centuries progressed, the German *Landfrieden* increasingly projected justice as a matter for courts and judges who derived their authority from the king. Moreover, they required that violators of the peace, that is, those who violated protections and rights granted to certain places and classes of people by the king, be punished. In England, the Angevin kings, eager to restore the authority of the English kingship after the disruptions of civil war, aggressively exploited their theoretical duty to provide justice for all to insert royal officials into local affairs. After the Constitutions and Assize of Clarendon (1164/66), juries of presentment provided Englishmen and women with a way to charge others before royal judges with violations of a set of royally defined infractions that constituted breaches of the king's peace. Justice for these violations likewise consisted of violent punishment, including maiming and/or execution. Although such punishment was often carried out by the winning party or his (or her) kin, it reinforced a growing tradition that it was a matter for royal judicial institutions.

The idea that justice was a matter for the state was strengthened by the recovery of the complete corpus of Justinian's great law compilation, the *Corpus iuris civilis,* and the revival of Roman law studies in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, first in Italy and eventually throughout Europe. As legal scholars sought to adapt Roman law to the realities of their world, they also tried to work out more precisely how justice related to law and to secular and divine power. Similar efforts were made in treatises on church, or canon law, which had likewise become the object of systematic organization and study. The great twelfth-century canonist Gratian, for example, wrote in his *Concord of Discordant Canons* that what was right (*ius*) was immutable because it derived from divine law, whereas human law (*lex*) could change. The validity of a law depended on equity, for equity was the "mother of justice" (*mater iusticiae* [sic]). Following him, the canon lawyer Huguccio or Hugh of Pisa similarly argued that equity and justice were inseparable, for both sought to give to each his due. Unlike Gratian, however, Huguccio distinguished between natural and positive justice. Natural justice, Huguccio wrote, arises from natural human affections and is thus divine. Positive justice is human in origin; it aims to punish offenders as well as to make good the losses victims had suffered. In contrast to Gratian and Huguccio, the thirteenth-century canonist Hostiensis (or Henry of Segusio, d. 1271) separated justice from equity. He argued that justice *per se* was the strict effort to secure retribution for wrongs; it was justice influenced by compassion that brought about equity.

Justice and Kings

Ultimately, justice, both through punishment and with compassion, came to be associated with kings. In France, King Louis IX, who ruled from 1226–1270, became Saint Louis in part because of his visible concern for justice. According to his friend and biographer, Jean de Joinville, Louis manifested this concern not only in person, but also through his subordinates who ran royal courts throughout his kingdom. Although the king's judicial servants bore the royal responsibility for maintaining order and promoting the common weal, the king himself could intervene in cases on behalf of mercy. As in France, so, too, elsewhere in Europe, justice became a matter for trained professionals acting on the ruler's behalf; at least in theory, royal judges pursued what was beginning to resemble a public justice that did not depend on personal or subjective perceptions of wrong or injury.

In England, for example, royal justices from the thirteenth century on can be seen acting on behalf of an evolving royal common law that eventually came to distinguish between wrongs done to the interests of the kings (i.e., felonies or crimes) and

civil claims for damages (i.e., torts). Justice in the former category of cases meant determining guilt and imposing the appropriate punishment without regard to the claims of victims. In Germany, the earliest systematic compilation of customary law, Eike von Repgow's *Sachsenspiegel* (c. 1235, and widely copied throughout the rest of the Middle Ages and later), traces justice (in the middle Saxon vernacular, *recht,* a very broad word that depending on context could connote law or the specific actions of a court as well as more general ideas of right) from God through the king or emperor, then through regional and local nobles and judicial officials. The *Sachsenspiegel* also emphasizes punishment as a function of justice to a degree that would have been foreign to its early medieval counterparts.

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See also Canon Law; Civil Law; Common Law; Empire; Equity; Jurisprudence; Justice, Theories of; Kingship; Punishment; Roman Law; State; Universal Monarchy; Violence

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Just War Theory

The term *just war theory* may relate to two distinct theories of the laws of war. The first theory explores the current positive and customary regulations that govern warfare, as well as the convictions and principles that underlie it. The second is a theory of the morality of wars, investigating which wars are moral, what is the moral behavior within wars, and in particular the extent to which the contemporary laws of war reflect morality. The first section of this entry provides a brief overview of the main themes in contemporary international laws of war, while the second describes the heated philosophical debate concerning the moral standing of this legislation.

The Laws of War

The international laws of war have two branches: (1) *jus ad bellum,* a code that specifies the circumstances in which states are permitted to initiate or respond to armed attacks, and (2) *jus in bello,* a code that specifies what one might legally do *in* war, thus complementing the *just ad bellum* code, which generally ignores the important question of *how* armies may engage in armed conflicts.

The Jus Ad Bellum Code Post-World War II

The history of the *just ad bellum* code has undergone a dramatic shift in the twentieth century. Sovereignty in the Westphalian world (following the peace of Westphalia in 1648, which established an international system of states) involved a right to resort to war: States and rulers could initiate armed attacks without violating any positive legal norm and without bearing any duty to provide legal justification for their decision to do so. The 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact was a first step toward a different legal treatment of wars. As Yoram Dinstein observes, for the first time, the participating states in this treaty condemned the use of warfare to resolve international disputes. The post–World War II Nuremberg tribunal completed this reform; it universalized the prohibition legislated in the Kellogg–Briand Pact and strengthened it by criminalizing all wars of aggression, condemning them as evil in essence,

and renouncing them as international law's equivalent of capital crime.

In interpreting the legal treatment of wars after World War II, theorists usually appeal to the analogy between the international law and a liberal law that governs domestic societies. The international law prohibits the use of force as a choice of conduct toward another state in the same way that, domestically, the criminal law forbids individuals from inflicting violence on one another. According to John Yoo, in domestic society, the government controls the legitimate use of force in the same way that in the international realm, the monopoly on legal uses of force is held by the supranational organization—the United Nations—and not by individual states.

The domestic analogy is also the principle from which exceptions to the prohibition on waging war are deduced. Subject to the constraints of necessity and proportionality, a private individual in domestic society is entitled to eliminate an imminent threat by harming the aggressor posing it. As Yoo observes, Article 51 of the UN Charter adopts in full the rule of self-defense used in the domestic system in cases where governmental power fails to prevent illegal violence. The article thus states that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations." In accordance with the analogy between states and individuals, the definition of the crime of aggression alludes to the value of territorial integrity: "Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State."

To be legal, a war must satisfy several conditions. The first and most basic condition is *just cause;* and, as we have noted, aggression—that is, armed intervention in the internal affairs of another state—is the clearest just cause for war. Additional conditions are all extrapolated from the limitations to which the right of self-defense in domestic societies is subject. These include:

Necessity (or last resort). States are required to demonstrate, in the words of U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster (criticizing the 1837 attack of the American steamer *Caroline* by the British), "necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberating."

Imminence. According to Dinstein, an aggressive threat justifies war only if that threat is imminent.

Proportionality. National self-defense must not be unreasonable or excessive because, Dinstein posits, the necessity of self-defense justifies such acts only insofar as it is limited to the attainment of that necessity and does not exceed it.

Right intention. The objective of the war should be restricted to national defense and may not include objectives that are unrelated to the just cause of the war.

Probability of success. As Daniel Statman contends, otherwise illegal acts may be justified under the right of national defense only if they are likely to guarantee defense from the perceived threat.

The Jus in Bello *Code*

The international law treats the *jus in bello* and the *jus ad bellum* codes as entirely independent systems; the *in bello* code applies to soldiers, whereas the *ad bellum* code applies to states and statesmen. Strikingly, a state that initiates an aggressive war is condemned by the international law as having committed a crime; but this condemnation finds no echo in the *in bello* code with respect to the soldiers who carry out the war. Rather, legally speaking, soldiers' acts of killing within armed conflicts are permissible insofar as they follow the *in bello* regulations. These regulations are designed to apply to soldiers independently of the cause for which they are fighting. In constructing an *in bello* code, the legislator asks how the duties of belligerents, fighting in accordance with rules of just military practice, are to be determined irrespective of the justness of their cause.

The most fundamental *in bello* rule is noncombatant immunity: Individuals retain their immunity from direct attacks during war if they do not contribute to the furtherance of the war. Michael Walzer identifies this group of individuals as usually being civilians. Noncombatant immunity is further explicated by the rule of *in bello* proportionality,

which regulates permissible collateral damage to civilians: Notwithstanding civilians' presumed innocence, armies have the legal right to harm civilians indirectly or even kill them if and only if the collateral harm inflicted on these civilians is not excessive, given the military advantage gained by it, as observed by Walzer, Judith Gardam, and Thomas Hurka.

A different set of *in bello* provisions regulates the use of force by soldiers against their enemy counterparts. Soldiers are allowed to harm their opponents directly, but they ought not to inflict suffering on them beyond necessity. The law implements this general idea, by, for example, prohibiting the use of expanding bullets (i.e., "dum-dum") while permitting explosive shells. Both cause damage exceeding that of standard rounds, but because the explosive shells also incapacitate a larger number of victims, their use may further a legitimate military objective more efficiently. A final important rule, observes Eric Posner, regulates the treatment of prisoners of war; once they surrender, combatants on both sides regain immunity from attack and from criminal prosecution during and after the war.

The above sketch of the *jus in bello* code suggests that the international law considers soldiers fighting for victory to be exercising the right of self- and other-defense. In effect, the law institutes victory as the only legitimate objective of the fighting troops. It thus makes a clear distinction between the ultimate military objectives of the warring armies—that is, victory—and the final political end at which the warring states aim—the enforcement of their claims (just and unjust alike). Indeed, for states, the victory is only a means to other ends. In the calculation of proportionality, combatants ought to measure the value of a specific military action on the assumption that it is exhaustively determined by the extent to which it furthers their victory. Collateral damage to civilians is proportionate if the military gain—which soldiers are entitled to take as the good effects of a military action—justifies it. This plausible interpretation of the law implies that the ethic of self-defense underlies the limitations and regulations to which combatants are subject within war. Put roughly, combatants are not allowed to target civilians directly, in the same way that potential victims are not allowed to kill an innocent bystander directly to eliminate a lethal threat posed to them by an aggressor. And potential victims should use the minimal force necessary for eliminating the threat posed to them; they have no right to cause excessive suffering to the attacker.

Morality and the Laws of War

Jus ad Bellum: *The Debate between Statism and Cosmopolitanism*

The current debate over the morality of the UN-based *jus ad bellum* code focuses on Walzer's widely studied statist analysis of the accepted post-World War II *jus ad bellum*. Statism defends the paradigm that underlies international law in the name of the right to self-determination: A legitimate state is "owned" by a nation (or a community) whose conception of the good life is protected by the sovereignty of this state. Indeed, the right of collectives to self-determination—a right that emerges from the right of individuals to their common conception of good life—is a *moral* value, which is justifiably the main concern of international law. The value of territorial integrity entails a moral prohibition on interference in the internal affairs of other national communities—hence, the criminalization of wars of aggression. This legalist paradigm is not purely anti-interventionist. There are exceptional circumstances in which such violations are permissible: State-sponsored mass murder, expulsion, or enslavement of a people by its own government undermines the "fit" between the state and the community that owns it. Intervention is *prima facie* permissible also if a community within a particular set of boundaries that clearly contains two or more communities engages in a large-scale military struggle for political independence.

Cosmopolitans like Charles Beitz and David Luban vigorously criticize Walzer's statist apology of the morality of the laws of war. They deny that statehood and national borders have fundamental moral significance. The morality of wars should not be addressed in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity because, they argue, the relevant moral category is, rather, that of human rights. From this anti-statist perspective, the UN Charter–based *jus ad bellum* is both too restrictive and too broad. It is too restrictive in the sense that it prohibits morally permissible humanitarian interventions in the name of the right of political autonomy and self-determination. It is too broad

in the sense that it permits the disproportionate killing of individuals in defense of territorial integrity. According to Luban's cosmopolitan version of *jus ad bellum,* just wars defend basic human rights. This new definition implies that, subject to the constraints of proportionality and necessity, a military intervention in the affairs of another state, if its aim is to protect the basic rights of its citizens, is morally justified. David Rodin's critique of the Article 51's doctrine of national defense presents it as excessively permissive: Wars of national defense are disproportionate and hence morally impermissible unless they can be justified in terms of the right of self-defense of individuals. But only wars that respond to a genocidal aggression are wars in which individuals are literally fighting for their lives. Only such wars can be understood within the conceptual scheme of individual rights.

Jus in Bello: *The Debate Between Statism and Cosmopolitanism*

The *in bello* code treats soldiers as legal equals. Walzer takes legal equality of soldiers to be a reflection of their moral equality. In his eyes, combatants must be treated on the assumption that they each believe themselves to be right. Walzer appeals to ordinary moral intuitions: A soldier who kills other soldiers in battle is not considered a murderer, even if the soldiers he killed were simply defending their homeland. Walzer points out that even the killer's enemies do not consider him to be a murderer. The reason for this is that although a war of aggression is a crime, culpability for this crime lies with the political leader; war is not the soldiers' crime, and they are not responsible for its perpetration.

The above convictions are articulated in a famous scene from Shakespeare's *Henry V*. The king, disguised as an ordinary soldier, is conversing with soldiers shortly before the battle of Agincourt. The king says: "Methinks I could not die anywhere so contented as in the King's company, his cause being just and his quarrel honorable." Yet, one soldier then replies, "That's more than we know," whereupon a second says, "Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough if we know we are the King's subjects: if his cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us." A modern version of an argument for the irrelevance of the cause of the war to the moral standing of the participating obedient combatants would run as follows: States have a right to protect their political independence by using *obedient* armies. The right of states to control obedient armies entails, in turn, a right of soldiers to be obedient, that is, to follow orders, *irrespective of the cause of the war in which they are fighting*. Soldiers have, therefore, a moral right to participate in a war of aggression, and this right constitutes the basis for the moral equality of just and unjust combatants.

It should come as no surprise that cosmopolitans, who find statehood to be devoid of any fundamental moral value, deny that soldiers hold a moral right to be obedient and, therefore, also to participate in a war of aggression. From the cosmopolitan perspective, the flawed *jus ad bellum* theory grounds a flawed set of rules of war (*jus in bello*): Soldiers have no moral right to follow a sovereign's order to go to war without attending to the justness of the cause for which they are fighting. After all, Jeff McMahan contends, in the paradigmatic case, a war of aggression is initiated by a surprise attack against individuals serving in a standing army deployed on its home territory without preparing for war. Clearly, this initial attack on the standing army constitutes a violation of the right to life of the targeted soldiers, who are innocent by any standard. Furthermore, soldiers who participate in a just defensive war do not lose their right to life, in the same way that a guard who uses force to protect a bank from an armed robbery retains his right not to be attacked by the robber. Thinkers who developed this line of thought include Thomas Nagel and Elizabeth Anscombe; yet, as McMahan observes, it can be found in classical jurists like Hugo Grotius, Emmerich de Vattel, Francisco de Vitoria, and Francisco Suárez.

A similar argument undermines the independence of the *jus in bello* and the *jus ad bellum* codes. First, it should be noted that there are historical reasons for the independence of the two codes: Although war was a rule-governed activity well before 1928, up until then, states initiating an aggressive war were not yet officially recognized as wrong. Therefore, in the regulation of warfare, no legal distinction was made between the two sides of

an armed conflict. Consequently, the *in bello* provisions had to apply without making any distinction based on the responsibility for initiating the armed conflict. Unfortunately, under current international law, the independence thesis and the moral equality of soldiers that follows from it are simply incoherent. Rodin asserts that the just war doctrine is committed to what seems like a paradoxical position: Considered as a whole (from a *jus ad bellum* perspective), war is a crime; yet each of the individual acts composing an aggressive war is completely lawful (from a *jus in bello* perspective).

A Responses to the Cosmopolitan Critique of the Jus in Bello

We shall conclude with two responses to the critique of the contemporary *in bello* code. The first response is pragmatic, advancing a distinction between law and morality. Legislators have the power to equalize morally *unequal* soldiers, and they have decisive pragmatic reasons for doing so. After all, the legal rights granted to just combatants by the international law prior to the Kellogg–Briand Pact are still valuable. These rights will not be respected unless the contemporary legislation secures the same benefits to unjust combatants; typically, each side to a war claims that the other side is the unjust one. Hence, were soldiers given a license to deny *in bello* benefits to their enemies, states would never pay heed to international humanitarian law. Thus, an egalitarian regulation of warfare is justified by the mutual advantage its acceptance secures: In the absence of rules that govern combat, Christopher Kutz contends, states might be forced to fight until one of the sides is destroyed, rather than seeking strategic surrender. From this perspective, the independence between the two codes is extremely useful.

The second response is contractarian. It denies the strong distinction between pragmatic and moral considerations. As the pragmatic response pointed out, in constructing a *jus in bello* code, states seek restrictions that apply to all belligerents equally, irrespective of the justness of their cause. The moral equality of soldiers follows from another fact: Combatants alienate their right not to be attacked by the unjust combatants as part and parcel of a set of norms governing combat; these are mutually beneficial to just and unjust combatants alike. It is, then, the tacit acceptance of the fair and mutually beneficial egalitarian law of war that generates the moral equality of soldiers: No combatant wrongs another, provided that they all accept the war convention.

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See also Cosmopolitanism; Grotius, Hugo; Terrorism; Violence; Vitoria, Francisco de

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KANT, IMMANUEL (1724–1804)

Kant is the philosopher of freedom. All of his contributions to political theory can be understood as consequences of his consistent, if sometimes obscure, commitment to realizing human freedom. Taken in its historical context among other late eighteenth-century efforts at Enlightenment, Kant's work aims at human emancipation—from the institutions of the old regime, from social and political domination generally, and even from traditional patterns of thinking. "*Sapere aude!*" Kant exhorted his readers, "Have the courage to make use of your *own* understanding!" (8:35; 17.)*

Early Years

Kant achieved his philosophy of freedom despite rather difficult personal circumstances. He was born in 1724 in the Prussian city of Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) into a harness-making family whose fortunes declined over the course of his childhood. Educated in mediocre schools before his entry to university, Kant later supported himself by teaching large numbers of students in popular lecture courses and secured an appropriate university professorship only in 1770. He never married, communicated with the world outside his native region by post rather than travel, and maintained famously moderate and regular habits.

Although Kant never visited Britain or France, he read about Isaac Newton's physics, David Hume's philosophy, Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political thought, among many other European writers. Rousseau proved particularly essential to the development of Kant's thinking about ethics and politics. Kant's early achievements were in astronomy (he argued that the solar system originated from a rotating nebula of gas, a view now called the Kant-Laplace hypothesis), and in the philosophy of mind. Describing himself as an "inquirer" who once valued only the search for knowledge, Kant credited Rousseau with showing him that even ordinary human beings have innate dignity. This fundamental insight about the inviolability of basic human rights forms the core of Kant's philosophy of freedom, whether it is expressed in Kant's ethics (as humanity as an end in itself), or in Kant's politics (as a limit to coercive force).

Types of Freedom

Kant distinguishes among several types of freedom in his different works, covering metaphysical freedom (the opposite of determinism) in *Critique of Pure Reason* and elsewhere; addressing moral freedom (the opposite of heteronomy) in *Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals* and elsewhere; and leaving political or external freedom to an assortment of essays and books, the most important of which is the first part of the *Metaphysics of Morals* (the *Doctrine of Right*). He defines this kind of freedom as "independence from being constrained by another's choice" (6:237; 393). The opposite of this kind of freedom is despotism. Kant opposes

despotism in all its forms, including the despotism of paternalistic government, social despotism, and the despotism of having one's will determined by material rather than ideal considerations.

Although he never wrote a "critique" of politics as he did for knowledge, morality, and judgment, Kant does apply his famous critical method to the question of political freedom. How, Kant asks, is freedom possible? What are the conditions of possibility for human freedom? This question leads Kant to coercion under the rule of law almost as soon as he posits freedom as the only innate human right. For everyone to enjoy freedom in the sense of independence from others' determination, we need to be able to prevent people from exercising unilateral force on one another. But coercive force is required to stop people from interfering with one another's legitimate exercises of freedom. How can coercive force be reconciled with freedom as independence from another's determination? Legitimate coercion, Kant responds, can be exercised only on behalf of a universal will. Law, and not any one person or group, must determine the limits within which free citizens interact. Thus, the answer to Kant's critical question about the conditions under which political freedom is possible is this: Only under the republican rule of law is human freedom possible.

For Kant, many different kinds of states can qualify as republican (by which Kant means something like what we, in present-day political language, would call "democratically accountable"). The crucial test of republican legitimacy is whether the state's laws reflect the universal will of the people. Laws that reflect any partial will, whether the will of a societal group like the clergy or the aristocracy, or the will of a single despot, always subject individuals to determination by another and are thus illegitimate. Kant mocks the so-called mixed constitution of Great Britain, for example, because the royal house can decide whether or not to go to war, and thus real legislative power lies with the king and not with the people. However, Kant does not expect actual unanimity or even actual majorities to support laws before they can be viewed as legitimate. Instead, he argues that the test of legitimate legislation is whether a whole people could have reasonably supported it. Kant also suggests that any policy that depends on secrecy for its success is necessarily illegitimate.

The problem of realizing freedom as independence from determination by another's choice also motivates Kant's insistence on the separation of powers. Here and elsewhere, Kant makes it difficult to understand his reasoning by adopting a familiar structure from mainstream republican thought while giving it an entirely new justification. Like baron de Montesquieu and other advocates of the separation of powers, Kant argues for a three-branch style of government, including executive, legislative, and judicial authorities. Unlike them, however, Kant uses this structure only to ensure that citizens are insulated from unilateral will (that is, from despotic power). He is interested not in checks and balances but in making sure that the exercise of coercive power always represents the united will of the people and not the private will of some individual or group. The executive branch, according to Kant, must never treat the state as a private holding, but rather perform the universal will of the people as best as this can be understood. Kant illustrates this norm with the example of the absolutist but relatively progressive Prussian King Frederick II, who "at least *said* that he was only the highest servant of the state" (8:352; 325). Concern with preventing despotism by means of a strict separation of powers also motivates Kant's many critical remarks about despotism in ancient direct democracies; present-day representative democracies, if they preserve the separation of powers, would not come in for the same criticism.

For Kant, then, if we are to enjoy freedom as independence of determination by another's choice, we must be subject to a state that enforces the universal rule of law. In this regard, Kant joins the social contract tradition by arguing that everyone is obliged to leave the state of nature and submit to common adjudication of disputes. However, here as elsewhere, Kant's innovative use of familiar terms can be misleading. Only under conditions of universal law is freedom possible. It is wrong, therefore, to refuse to enter into lawful relations with anyone with whom one might interact. Kant does not argue for the entry into the civil condition on any of the usual grounds: for protection of prepolitical rights to one's body or the fruits of one's labor, for instance, or in the service of a rational interest in peaceful coexistence, to take another example. Material considerations could never

ground a Kantian general obligation because they would be not universal but different for everybody. Instead, the idealized Kantian reasoner would leave the state of nature for the rule of law, the only condition under which the exercise of human freedom is possible.

Social Contract

Of course, there is in fact no such reasoner. For Kant, the social contract is important as an idea, not as a historical reality or as a personal obligation. Kant calls the original contract a norm for all actually existing states; he means that real states can be judged according to how well they achieve the standards entailed by the idea of original contract. The norms represented by this idea serve to realize human freedom; another way Kant glosses freedom as independence from another's choice is to say that freedom means obeying laws of one's own making (however indirect that lawmaking may in fact be). Kant argues that the idea of original contract has "undoubted practical reality" just because it functions as a norm for states, in particular binding legislators to make only laws "in such a way that they *could* have arisen from the united will of a whole people" (8:297; 296).

Thinking of the original contract as a norm rather than a reality clarifies Kant's otherwise mysterious insistence that subjects must not investigate the origins of the state that rules them. Kant remarks that investigation into the origins of actual states would certainly reveal illegitimate coercion, adding that such an inquiry would likely be futile because "savages draw up no record of their submission to law" (6:339; 480). Rather than seek critical leverage in the material and historical origins of their particular state, citizens should compare their states with the principles derived from the idea of original contract as a norm. Acting only in the public sphere, critics of the state ought to expose duplicity, artifice, and other failures of the regime to conform to republican principles of accountability. To do more than this, Kant argues, would undermine the rule of law that makes their very freedom possible. The exercise of freedom of the pen, of participation in the public sphere unconstrained by social or political hindrances, should according to Kant be the driving force that moves regimes from despotism to freedom without risking revolutionary setbacks.

No Right of Revolution

Kant's steadfast opposition to any right of revolution has occasioned much comment, most of it calling attention to the ironic contrast between Kant's philosophy of freedom and his admonition to obedience. Some of Kant's arguments are formal, such as his point that to succeed, any revolutionary activity would have to be kept secret and would thus violate the norm of publicity. Others are really empirical hypotheses, including Kant's claim that quick transitions cannot effect the substantive social changes that are required to make progress toward genuine republicanism. Kant's most consistent and substantial argument against revolutionary activity is that it undermines the conditions of civil freedom itself. Thus, he concludes that the kind of gradual reform that is possible through public critique is both more likely to succeed and more legitimate (because it depends on potentially universal arguments, rather than unilateral force). In his late writings, Kant expresses sympathy for the goals of the French Revolution; in fact, he cites the daring of Prussian partisans of the French revolutionaries as indirect evidence of the empirical reality of moral reason itself. He does not deny that revolutionary activity, viewed historically, can promote progress toward freedom. However, Kant consistently advocates gradualism and the public sphere over revolutionary action in the streets or on the battlefield.

Perpetual Peace

"Now morally practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible *veto: there is to be no war*" (6:354; 491). Kant famously argues that human beings can move toward peaceful coexistence in the international sphere as well as the domestic one. Just as the idea of an original contract justifies the surrender of lawless freedom to a state that guarantees the rule of law, so the idea of perpetual peace ought to move states to enter into lawful relations with each other. The analogy is imperfect; the danger of global despotism leads Kant to recommend a pacific federation rather than a world state. Otherwise, however, the logic is the same:

The idea of perpetual peace, like the idea of original contract, functions as a norm to which everyone ought to conform. Kant does not expect states to make themselves vulnerable by behaving as if the peaceful norm were already reality. He does not expect war to disappear entirely. Instead, he argues that even in war, states ought to "always leave open the possibility of leaving the state of nature among states . . . and entering a rightful condition" (6:347; 485).

Kant's view that republican governments will tend to establish peaceful relations with each other has inspired scholars to investigate—and, in the main, to confirm—the so-called "democratic peace hypothesis." Kant provides a series of arguments for the idea that what we would call democratic accountability under the rule of law on the domestic front leads to peace internationally. First, he claims that under republican governance, the people's will would be reflected in policy decisions, and the people, he thinks, will not support costly aggressive wars. By contrast, the incentives facing despotic heads of state would tend to encourage them to opt for war. Second, he argues that republican governments' peaceful examples will serve as a kind of focal point for an expanding and commercially profitable pacific league. Finally, Kant offers both an idealized picture of peaceful international relations and a set of principles that should promote its realization. We should not expect real-world politics ever to achieve some permanent state of perpetual peace (unless, Kant jokes, the peace of the graveyard would count as such). However, "we must act as if it is something real, though perhaps it is not," and always work toward, or at least maintain the possibility of, its attainment (6:354; 491).

This peaceful, republican constitution ought to regulate interaction domestically, internationally, and at the cosmopolitan level (for interactions not governed by states). How can actual human beings work to achieve progress toward such ideal, even unreachable conditions? At the international level, Kant suggests a number of norms to which principled heads of state ought to adhere, including bans on such practices as debt-financed military adventure and the use of assassins as weapons of international intrigue. Because these things undermine the possibility of future peaceful relations among states, they ought to be shunned. However, Kant does admit the possibility that some practices that conflict with right, such as the maintenance of standing armies, might under the right circumstances promote rather than prevent eventual peaceful international relations. In these cases, he argues, they are provisionally acceptable.

Political Progress

Kant also applies the idea of provisional right to domestic politics. Well aware of the enormous gap between the near-feudal reality of much of contemporary politics and the republican ideal of political freedom, Kant argues that real-world leaders ought to consider whether their actions promote or retard the possibility of progress. Discussing the case of existing hereditary privileges, for example, Kant notes that his standard test for legitimacy—whether a people could have decided such a policy for itself—rules out any rightful role for inherited nobility. Rather than proposing active resistance or revolutionary change, however, Kant writes that "the only way the state can then gradually correct this mistake it has made, of conferring hereditary privileges contrary to right, is by letting them lapse. . . . It has a provisional right to let these titled positions of dignity continue" (6:329; 471). Here and elsewhere, Kant is much more interested in preventing actual despotism than in reproducing the ideal forms of republican governance; if public opinion values ancient formalities, Kant supports their continuation, so long as the real distribution of the power to decide becomes steadily more rightful.

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: *the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me*" (5:161; 269): The elements of human existence most relevant to political freedom are our physical location on what Kant called the *globus terraqueus* and the fact that we all apply moral norms to political reality. Given our residence on a round Earth connected by waterways, we are always at least potentially interacting with everyone else: "a violation of right on *one* place of the earth is felt in *all*" (8:360; 330). Even if we do not always agree about the nature of such violations, we can all recognize wrongs by comparing reality with norms of rightful relations. In Kant's vision of

politics, we are on the way to a civil condition under which human freedom is possible. Freedom from determination by another's choice is the innate right of individuals; freedom to decide to make progress toward enlightened self-rule is the "highest right of the people" (6:327; 470).

Philosophy of Freedom

Kant's philosophy of freedom has shaped the modern world to such a great extent that its influence can be mistaken for that of natural reason. The governing doctrines of international criminal courts, human rights conventions, and many other global and local institutions all presume, with Kant, the principle of inviolable human dignity. His influence on modern political theory has been just as critical, but more varied. Nineteenth-century German idealists such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin, and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, were most interested in the consequences of Kant's transcendental idealism for metaphysics, but they also used Kant's concept of human freedom as the starting point for influential theories of society. The two great twentieth-century political philosophers, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, both claim Kantian origins, with Rawls centering his *Theory of Justice* around Kantian abstraction and respect for individual choice, while Habermas's theory of the public sphere starts with Kant's concept of publicity. Kant's legacy for contemporary political thought is broader even than the very influential account of freedom outlined here. Kant's aesthetics, for example, inspired Hannah Arendt's theory of political judgment, while Kant's ethical theory and the Rawlsian theory drawn from it form the basis for contemporary theories of global justice such as those of Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz. Through all these differences of emphasis and interpretation, however, Kant's insistence on the priority of justice remains: "All politics must bend its knee before right" (8:380; 347).

Elisabeth Ellis

*References are to the volume and page number in the standard German edition, followed by the page number from the Cambridge edition, *Practical Philosophy,* translated by Mary J. Gregor.

See also Autonomy; Critique; Emancipation; Enlightenment; Liberalism; Perpetual Peace; Public Sphere; Rule of Law; Social Contract Theory

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KAUTILYA

Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is one of the great political books of the ancient world, but it is little known outside of India. Kautilya (300 BCE) was the key adviser and the genius of the strategy undertaken by the Emperor Chandragupta Maurya (c. 321–298 BCE), who unified the Indian subcontinent in empire. Chandragupta Maurya's grandson was the great Emperor Ashoka (268–233 BCE), who was strongly influenced by Buddhism, ruled in a benevolent but paternalistic manner, and is one of the great kings in world history.

What does the word *arthashastra* mean? Literally translated, it means "science of material wealth," but arthashastra is routinely translated as "science of politics." Says Kautilya, "The source of the livelihood of men is wealth [*artha*], in other words, the earth inhabited by men. The science which is the means of the attainment and protection of that earth is the Science of Politics [*arthashastra*]." The most important element of government is the treasury. "From the treasury the army comes into being. With the treasury and the army, the earth is obtained." Kautilya wrote his *Arthashastra* so that a ruler might "conquer the earth up to its four

ends"—really, the known world of the Indian subcontinent—and become a *cakravartin,* what Indians called a "world conqueror" or "universal ruler."

Kautilya assumed that a monarch would rule, and the king must keep law and order by using punishments (literally, "the rod") and awards appropriately. If the monarch is too lenient, the kingdom will fall apart, and the country will fall into a war of all against all, or what Indian thinkers called "the law of the fishes," that is, a world in which the big fish eat the little ones. If the monarch is cruel, then he or she will be hated and the people will desert or turn on their leader at the first opportunity. Social justice is in the king's best interest.

What are the duties of a king? Kautilya believed that a king must uphold the system of caste (really, class) and subcaste. "The observance of one's special duty leads to heaven and endless bliss. In case of its transgression, people will be exterminated through the mixture of duties and castes." Therefore, a king who ensures that all adhere to their caste duties will find "joy after death and in this life." In addition, a well-ordered kingdom will offer its people what Kautilya rather traditionally saw as the three good things of this life: "material gain, spiritual good, and pleasures."

A monarch must live a disciplined life, enjoying the good things of this world in moderation; a king must avoid becoming addicted to gambling, wine, or women because any of these addictions can compromise a king's judgment. If the monarch rules well, then his or her policies will promote the general good, and here, Kautilya became probably the world's first advocate of something like a welfare state. Paternalistic in almost a literal sense, the king "should favor the stricken subjects like a father." Whereas the king himself, by means of his administration, should "maintain children, aged persons, and persons in distress when these are helpless," judges in the kingdom should concern themselves with the affairs of "women, minors, old persons, sick persons, who are helpless [even] when these do not approach the court."

Kautilya also gave probably the first comprehensive theory of the state; he listed seven key elements of a state: "The king, the minister, the country, the fortified city, the treasury, the army, and the ally." It is probably no accident that he omitted religion because religion, in Kautilya's mind, should be secondary to politics.

Kautilya outlined an astonishingly vast and detailed bureaucracy that would carry out the functions of the state and manage the economy. Historian Stanley Wolpert has appropriately called Kautilya's empire a "socialized monarchy." The state owned all the land but leased it to farmers for life, as long as the family was productive, and farmers generally paid about one sixth of their crop in taxes. In addition, the state administered industry, mines, forests, and harbors. Who else would make swords and shields, chariots and ships? Who else would store grain for times of drought, sickness, or famine? Again, the state treasury is of primary importance. We see this in a passage that says fishermen should pay, as rent for their boats, one sixth of their catch to the state. In dismay, one realizes that the state built and then rented boats!

One can begin to understand the size and scope of the state bureaucracy in reading just a partial list of state officials: director of stores (who stored supplies, food, weapons, and so forth), examiner of coins, director of mines, salt commissioner, superintendent of gold, director of trade, director of forest produce, superintendent of the armory, superintendent of measurements (who standardized weights and measures), collector of customs and tolls, controller of spirituous liquors, superintendent of courtesans, supervisor of elephants, and supervisor of chariots. Kautilya even specified a specific salary for each official.

Kautilya wanted to prescribe suffocating regulations for the people of India; to take a few examples, he wanted rules to stipulate that people should bathe horses twice a day, not throw dirt on a road, and wash clothes only on boards or smooth stones. In addition, Kautilya advocated a spy state. "When [the king] has set spies on the high officials," wrote Kautilya, "he should set spies on the citizens and the country people." It is true that Kautilya saw spies as reporting public opinion, especially popular discontent to the monarch, so he or she could correct injustices, and it is also true that Kautilya insisted that the king should have an assembly hall and "allow unrestricted entrance to those wishing to see him in connection with their affairs." In short, spying reported public opinion to the king, but it was still oppressive. Kautilya also talked openly about arrest on suspicion, as well as torture and the assassination of enemies, the so-called "weeding of thorns."

Kautilya is perhaps best known for his mandala theory of foreign policy, a variation on the principle that an enemy of my enemy is my friend. In discussions of foreign policy, Kautilya advocated attacking any state that is weak, signing a treaty that a king is willing to discard at the moment it is no longer useful, making good use of secret agents and assassins, and winning wars with any kind of deception that might help, including propaganda, invocation of the gods, and disinformation. He outlined three types of war—open war, concealed war (what we call guerilla war), and silent war (a war being carried out against another kingdom without either population being aware of it.) When advocating the generous treatment of captured soldiers, he recognized that the empire needed new citizens. In effect, Kautilya recognized almost no international rules or laws in foreign policy, and he ruthlessly advocated conquest and the unification of India as the way to minimize conquest and killing. To some extent, it worked.

Roger Boesche

See also Indian Political Thought

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Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938)

Karl Kautsky was the intellectual powerhouse of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) from the 1890s until the outbreak of the World War I in 1914, as editor of the party's theoretical journal, *Die Neue Zeit*. He was also, along with Eduard Bernstein and August Bebel, coauthor of the party's *Erfurt Programme* (1891), which influenced all the other European social democratic parties. Seen as successor to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and known semi-ironically as the pope of Marxism until World War I, Kautsky was dubbed a renegade by Vladimir Lenin in 1918, after Kautsky had challenged the Marxist credentials of the October Revolution. Kautsky was, in effect, the first Marxist ideologist of the first Marxist mass political party and was expected to offer a worldview in keeping with the aspirations of the late Engels. In particular, consonant with the *Communist Manifesto,* he saw his job as enlightening the proletariat, making it aware of its historic mission to become a ruling class. His working assumption, in line with the *Manifesto*'s call to "win the battle of democracy," was that the nexus between democracy and socialism was created by capitalism: The logic of democracy was socialism, once capitalism had made the proletariat the majority of the working population.

Kautsky's Marxism reflected the conditions surrounding the birth of the SPD and its continued existence. German Marxists found themselves at the head of an emerging labor movement committed largely to trade union activity and piecemeal economic, social, and political reforms. Retrospectively, this reformism was very much an expression of modernity: a developing, sophisticated division of labor; the growth of parliamentary democracy and large-scale political organizations (whether in the form of state or party); and the emergence of economic organizations (whether trade unions, companies, or employers' organizations). In other words, there existed a potential discrepancy between revolutionary Marxist theory and working-class reformist practice. The SPD, established in 1875, sought to represent the *whole* of the growing German proletariat embodied this dilemma. It was an amalgam of reformists and revolutionaries. *The Erfurt Programme* (1891) gave simultaneous expression to these potentially contradictory maximalist and minimalist aspirations, which Kautsky sought to reconcile. This task helped form the basis of his centrism.

This attempt to maintain a middle ground was even more understandable given the situation faced by the SPD. The German state, its bureaucratic machine, and its army were the most formidable in the world. Socialist activity had been outlawed between 1878 and 1890, with SPD members suffering from different forms of persecution. A background fear was that calls for militant action could again drive the party underground. Thus, winning the battle of democracy had to take account of the fact that the German army could not be confronted head-on but would have to be subverted through the democratic process itself, rendering it "faithless to the rulers." Thus, Kautsky followed the late Engels in holding that working-class attempts to overthrow the capitalist class through violence, as occurred in France in 1848 and with the Paris Commune of 1871, ended only in defeat and were therefore things of the past. Kautsky also argued that as political culture became more democratic and consensual, a massive working-class parliamentary majority would induce the capitalist class to give up its rule relatively peacefully.

Yet, the power of the German state was not the only reason for Kautsky's advocacy of a parliamentary route to socialism. It was a key process by which the working class would develop the political maturity to become a ruling class, along with activities in trade unions and local government. Although objective, economic preconditions were necessary for socialism (socialization of production and so on), subjective ones were equally vital. The working class had to have the organizational cohesiveness and skills to become a ruling class, to become a fully fledged proletarian dictatorship.

Kautsky also justified parliamentary democracy because it was a manifestation of the growing division of labor in modern society, with its division between executive and legislative functions. Given what he saw as the obvious benefits of an increasingly sophisticated division of labor he wanted to minimize the effects of any revolutionary rupture. The danger of violent revolution was that the productive base required for a socialist economy would get destroyed, producing a "crippled capitalism." Again, this was one of the virtues of a parliamentary transition, enabling socialism to be introduced in a relatively orderly manner.

Kautsky's centrist and parliamentarist positions put him at odds with many in the SPD. He opposed the party's revisionist right wing in the early 1900s, not merely because it assumed that the contradictions of capitalism could be eliminated within capitalism, but also because it threatened party unity. Eduard Bernstein, in calling for an alliance with middle-class parties, blatantly challenged the theoretical raison d'être of the SPD, of alerting the proletariat to its historic mission. Kautsky held that the German middle class was by and large conservative and nationalistic. He also opposed electoral and governmental coalitions between the SPD and bourgeois parties because of the fundamental conflict of interests between them. In 1910, Kautsky campaigned against the party's left wing, led by Rosa Luxemburg, who had been inspired by Russian workers in 1905, over the mass strike tactic aimed at broadening the Prussian franchise. Kautsky contrasted the relative strengths of the Russian and German states and feared the response of the German military-bureaucratic machine; he thought the tactic could only harm the SPD's prospects in the forthcoming elections.

Kautsky was not opposed to the mass strike in principle but held that it was not an alternative to electoral activity and should be employed only in the final phases of a revolutionary process, when workers had every chance of winning against the capitalists. During the German Revolution of 1918, his centrism and parliamentarism led him to refuse to opt for either parliament *or* workers' councils as the institutional embodiment of proletarian dictatorship, preferring parliament *and* workers' councils.

The need for party unity and Kautsky's parliamentary strategy also induced him not to oppose Germany's participation in World War I, the beginning of what Lenin regarded as apostasy. While the war lasted, the social and economic issues that could bring the SPD to power through the electoral process were marginalized. In calling for a democratic peace without annexations, Kautsky was prepared to ally himself tactically with the middle classes. His theory of ultra-imperialism supported this electoral strategy in suggesting that World War I did not constitute the final crisis of capitalism because capitalist powers could cooperate in exploiting the economically underdeveloped regions of the globe.

From Lenin's viewpoint, Kautsky's opposition to the Bolshevik Revolution consummated his

apostasy from the Marxist cause. Kautsky's case against the Bolsheviks was grounded on his parliamentary strategy and his appraisal of Russian and world conditions. He rejected Lenin's "weak link" hypothesis—that a proletarian revolution in Russia would detonate revolutions in the West—and he was hostile to the Bolshevik dictatorship, which started with the disbanding of the democratically elected Constituent Assembly in January 1918. Kautsky insisted instead that a democratic parliamentary path was the only viable one in fostering the ruling skills of the proletariat—a vital subjective precondition for socialism. Furthermore, in the absence of imminent world revolution, only one conclusion could be drawn: Economic and social conditions—a numerically small proletariat, a large peasantry, and underdeveloped productive forces—rendered Russia unripe for socialism. Kautsky was also appalled by the denial of full civil and political rights to the former bourgeoisie, demonstrating the Bolsheviks' unwillingness to raise the "whole of humanity" to "a higher plane." He rejected Lenin's idea of proletarian dictatorship, which consisted of a tyrannical form of government, rather than a political condition naturally arising from the proletariat constituting the majority in a capitalist and democratic state. Kautsky characterized the Soviet Union as state capitalist, with the state and capitalist bureaucracies merged into one system.

Kautsky, a Marxist Renegade?

Does Kautsky deserve the opprobrium heaped on him by his critics? Whatever the slight tactical changes during World War I, Kautsky was remarkably consistent, both strategically and theoretically. Thus, if he was a renegade, he had been so throughout his long political career. Indeed, Lenin between 1914 and 1917 made the greater theoretical changes in seeing World War I as representing the terminal crisis of capitalism and the Russian Revolution as the beginning of a global workers' revolution.

The differences between Kautsky and his critics partly reflect various tensions within Marxism itself, either inherent in the theory or arising from the practical difficulty that any political ideology has in adjusting to specific economic, social, political, and cultural circumstances. Thus, on the question of socialist transition, he could claim that he was merely echoing Marx's and Engels's optimism about the efficacy of universal suffrage as an instrument of working-class self-emancipation, of winning the battle of democracy by using the weapons that the bourgeoisie itself had created, as expressed in the *Communist Manifesto*. Marx had also alluded to the possibility of relatively peaceful parliamentary change in such countries as Britain, the United States, and Holland. Marx also, unlike Lenin, made no distinction between bourgeois (that is, parliamentary) and proletarian (that is, direct) democracy. In addition, the later Marx extolled the productive virtues of the division of labor, which Kautsky then, like Max Weber, extended to the operation of the modern state with reference to the legislature, executive, and bureaucracy. Furthermore, Kautsky could rely on the late Engels's observation that street-fighting days were over, given the organization and weaponry of modern armies. Lenin, on the other hand, could refer to Marx's anti-statism, his emphasis on the need to "smash" the state because it reflected the existence of a class society and impeded workers' self-emancipation. Marx also maintained that parliaments concealed the real power of the executive arm of the state. Ultimately, the choice of which Marx or Engels to cite was the product of different conditions in which Kautsky and Lenin were operating. Kautsky's wish to avoid violence almost at all costs meant that he had little to offer to a Russian society, which was in deep crisis and subject to rapid change. Likewise, Lenin was unable to appreciate the depth of the Western working-class's attachment to parliamentary democracy.

The differences between Kautsky and his neo-Hegelian critics, especially Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch, who held that Kautsky's political failure was the result of his philosophic failure, reflected another kind of tension within Marxism. What was the actual status of Marxism? Was it a positivistic and deterministic science of society and history, concerned with historical laws and capitalist structures, or was it a dialectical tool enabling the working class to emancipate itself? Was it structure- or agency-centered? Again, the relevant quotations could be plucked out of Marx's texts. Yet, contrary to these critics' assertions, Kautsky did attempt to overcome this tension. Thus, he distinguished between the determined nature of a *social* revolution (the effects of economic development),

and the will needed to create a *political* revolution (party organization, the level of class consciousness, and political mobilization). As with Marx, Kautsky was keener to insist on economic, political, and social conditions as *limiting* what sort of society and action was possible, rather than to posit a determining relation. Moreover, although he talked about the inevitability of socialism, which the neo-Hegelians claimed encouraged working-class passivity, so, too, did Marx. In both cases, *inevitability* was in a propagandistic register, aimed to inspire the proletariat to take political action rather than induce retreat. And Kautsky's awareness of the unpredictable consequences of using political violence, as demonstrated by the nature of the revolutions in France in 1789, 1848, and 1871, provide the background understanding of his caution on this issue. Indeed, the reluctance to advocate a violent revolution sprang less from his philosophy than from his analysis of the concrete conditions needed for socialist transition.

We should also note that the neo-Hegelians were wrong to assume that Kautsky was a positivist intent on using natural (Darwinian) laws to understand society. Although he was strongly influenced by Darwin in his early years, he later explicitly held in *The Materialist Conception of History* that natural and social laws were different and that human history could not be explained solely in terms of human survival. Finally, the neo-Hegelians claimed that Kautsky divorced Marxist theory from working-class (revolutionary) practice. What we have seen is that Kautsky's theorizing was definitely practice laden but also that his conception of revolution was fundamentally different from the Soviet model. In a sense, Kautsky was an evolutionary revolutionary: He sought to achieve revolutionary ends through evolutionary means.

In sum, Kautsky was a far more complex and sophisticated thinker than he is often portrayed. He was sensitive to some of the tensions within Marxism, but he was also attempting to grapple with the concrete problems of a nascent working-class movement when faced with a state machine that was militarily well organized. Retrospectively, we can see that his model of socialist transition was closer to the limited aspirations of the European working class, but perhaps, he failed to see precisely *how* limited they were. Ironically, when Communists fully embraced the parliamentary road to socialism in the 1970s, they did not turn to Lenin's old adversary for inspiration but to Antonio Gramsci, who was deeply critical of the Second International Marxism as represented by Kautsky.

Jules Townshend

See also Lenin and the Russian Revolution; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Revolution; Socialism; Weber, Max

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KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD (1883–1946)

John Maynard Keynes is not generally considered a political theorist but rather an economist whose

theories have influenced political discourse well beyond his practical contributions as a statesman. In the final chapter of his major work, *The General Theory* (1936), he outlines the elements of a radical English liberal social philosophy. This includes a monetary policy of low interest rates leading to "the euthanasia of the rentier" together with "a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment" and the redistribution of income and wealth by taxation to achieve full employment. Nevertheless, he was not a socialist in the usual sense and strongly supported free enterprise and individual freedom. He regarded these policies, set down in the wake of the Great Depression and the growing influence of the Soviet Union, as the best means to save the free market from itself and to preserve a free society. It is an irony of history that Keynesian policies have come to be understood mainly as the use of fiscal policy (government spending financed by borrowing) to prevent temporary unemployment. Such public works policies long predate Keynes, although he was perhaps the first to justify them by coherent theory.

Keynes was a privileged member of the English Edwardian elite. His father (John Neville Keynes) was a distinguished academic in the University of Cambridge and his mother (Florence Ada née Brown) became the mayor of Cambridge. He was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge, of which he subsequently became a fellow after a short period in the civil service from 1906 to 1908. He made his name after resigning his position as principal British Treasury representative at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, writing his best-selling *Economic Consequences of the Peace,* correctly predicting that German reparations were unpayable. He was a key adviser to the British government throughout most of his career and principal negotiator with the United States over war finance and the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

To understand Keynes's political views, it is essential to have some understanding of his economic theory. *The General Theory* seeks to demonstrate that neoclassical economics is a special case, much as Isaac Newton's theory is a special case of Albert Einstein's. The power of neoclassical economics is its mandate for the political doctrine of laissez-faire, the belief that market forces (competition) will deliver optimal outcomes, in the long run if not immediately, including full employment. Keynes argues, by contrast, that a market economy has no automatic tendency toward full employment and that it is quite possible for high unemployment to persist indefinitely. At the root of neoclassical economics is the idea that the rate of interest keeps consumption and investment demand in line with full employment production capacity. A fall in investment reduces interest rates and saving, with an offsetting increase in consumption, so that overall demand is maintained, at least over time. The rate of interest strikes the balance between the productivity of investment and the thrift of savers. Keynes argues that the rate of interest simply cannot play this balancing role and is in fact the price required, not to reward thrift, but to overcome the tendency to hoard money: Interest is the price of overcoming *liquidity-preference*. For this reason, he writes favorably of the usury laws and of mercantilist theory. Consumption demand is mainly a function of income, and investment demand is mainly a function of the state of expectation and confidence. Expectation is uncertain, and confidence is inherently volatile because of our ignorance of the future.

Keynes's policy prescriptions follow directly. There is no natural reason for a positive rate of interest and the corresponding scarcity of produced capital assets. A policy of cheap money will lead to high investment and employment, together with the elimination over time of the scarcity and return to produced capital: the euthanasia of the *rentier* (someone who lives on interest or dividend income alone). To the extent that the private sector is reluctant to make investments with a positive economic return (Keynes was thinking in particular of housing and other infrastructure), the state should undertake and finance them by borrowing in the same manner as a private corporation: Here we have the socialization of investment. If consumption remains insufficient to provide full employment when all viable investment opportunities have been exhausted despite zero interest rates, income and wealth should be redistributed so as to increase consumption. Nevertheless, Keynes's proposals are heavily qualified by his commitment to the advantages of a free enterprise system in terms of efficiency and

freedom, provided that full employment can be secured by the necessary intervention.

Between 1941 and 1946, Keynes worked toward the reconstruction of the postwar global economic and political architecture and sought to embody his theoretical insights in the Bretton Woods institutions. His main concern was to establish an international monetary system that promoted international trade, employment, and development, partly by avoiding a return to the gold standard and by ensuring that monetary policy was conducted with a view to full employment. Key proposals of his that were not adopted were the need for the IMF to act as a global central bank and for there to be an onus on surplus countries as well as deficit countries to adjust their balance of payments. It is likely that, on account of these omissions, Keynes would have predicted the eventual downfall of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971 and that he would not have favored the regime of financial liberalization and floating exchange rates that followed. His concern, in the words of Winston Churchill, was always to see industry more content and finance less proud.

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See also Liberalism; Market; Mercantilism; Neoclassical Economics; Welfare State

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KIERKEGAARD, SØREN (1813–1855)

Søren Kierkegaard was born in Copenhagen, Denmark, where he spent most of his short but productive life. Kierkegaard intended to bring his readers to a realization of the importance of becoming a Christian—an imperative he thought lost on his fellow residents of Copenhagen, who were contented to sublet this task to the formalities of the established Danish church. Although Kierkegaard's thought is sometimes tarnished by his patriarchal and reactionary views, this does not outweigh his wider pursuits: combating the twin dangers of the hubristic influence of Hegelian ideas in Danish life and the demeaning and dehumanizing relations created by democracy, liberalism, and the demands of equality. Thus, although he was not a political theorist in the restricted sense of the term, Kierkegaard's highly idiosyncratic writings develop a challenging view of the contours of the relationship between the individual and the community as a whole.

Before any examination of Kierkegaard's thought can begin, it is important to note the nature and purpose of the authorship as a whole—a point that Kierkegaard himself makes in the essays contained in *The Point of View*. Kierkegaard produced works both in his own name (signed) and under pseudonyms. In his signed works, Kierkegaard presents his reader with an explicitly Christian position, often in the form of a discourse on a biblical quotation. In the pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard explores aesthetic, ethical, and philosophical positions. These pseudonymous works are not correctly understood as Kierkegaard's *definitive* position: They should be understood as illustrations and explorations of worldly and philosophical positions that Kierkegaard is attempting to encourage his reader to reject. Once rejected, the reader is in a position to make the so-called leap of faith and start the upbuilding work explored in the signed authorship, which is involved in becoming a Christian.

Central to Kierkegaard's thought is the idea that selfhood is not a given but something that individuals must strive to achieve. Kierkegaard explores this idea most clearly in the pseudonymous work, *The Sickness Unto Death*. For Kierkegaard, *true* selfhood (being a Christian) can be achieved only when individuals relate correctly not only to themselves but also to the power that established those selves: God. Although Christian selfhood is normative, it is nonetheless far from routinely accomplished. Indeed, for Kierkegaard, most individuals fail to achieve true selfhood and are mired in the condition known as despair. This is the case because just as an individual can relate

to God, an individual can also relate to any number of other ideas, ideals, projects, or people. These relations (unless underpinned by the central spiritual relation) are in fact misrelations. Despair should not be thought of as manifesting in misery or unhappiness. On the contrary, Kierkegaard maintains that many individuals are not aware of their despair (their misrelation to God) and are even self-congratulatory about their position, role, and achievements in society.

Central to Kierkegaard's account of the political, then, is the need for individuals to recognize their individuality and to set out on the task of becoming Christians. This involves becoming aware of the need to form a correct relation between themselves and God and from there to other individuals. In *Two Ages* (perhaps his most overtly political work), Kierkegaard uses the occasion of a literary review to press home his own conclusions about "the present age." Whereas the previous age (the age of revolution) saw the possibility of individuality and passion, the present age sees the nullification of action in abstract thought. In this way, Kierkegaard condemns the tendencies of both democracy and liberalism. Democracy sacrifices a commitment to the truth to the power of majorities and treats individuals as equals only in the sense of interchangeable units. Moreover, it creates the "anonymous phantom" of the public, which has no fixed direction or ideals and which enables individuals to avoid responsibility by merging their individuality with that of others. For its part, the tendencies of liberalism are to replace the need for commitment and action with endless chatter and procrastination. Under such conditions, passionate commitment to an idea or ideal is made impossible and "envy becomes the *negatively unifying principle.*" Caught in reflection and inaction, individuals cease to be stimulated by the admiration of individuality and instead are further discouraged and devalued by the example of others and so tend to undermine, ridicule, and trivialize achievement. Under such conditions, individuality and the possibility of becoming a Christian are greatly reduced.

For Kierkegaard, individuality was something more than the dehumanizing individualism of economic man. It is also something more than playing a part in society and acting as if one were a Christian. The individual must break away from the demoralizing and leveling influence of "the crowd" and engage with truth. For Kierkegaard, only when an individual has a relationship with God can there be a reforging of their relations on the basis of true spiritual equality with others. Individuals must recognize that others are equal before God and that God commands them to love their neighbor as *spiritual* equals. Duties and obligations to others, then, come not from philosophical reflection but from a commitment to the truth. A community built on such a relation would be a community of individuals who recognized each other as spiritual equals and who found mutual edification in their relationships.

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See also Existentialism; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

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KINGSHIP

Kingship provides a distinctive political philosophy that mediates between mundane political realities and the demands of the divine. Key early models of kingship are provided by Hellenistic, Hebrew, and Persian culture. As a governmental

form, kingship had evolved in the classical period to become the dominant form of European statehood by the High Middle Ages. The body of the king came to represent more than his individual personality and to stand symbolically for state sovereignty. In both the east and the west, monarchy took multiple forms, ranging from small family kingdoms to powerful empires, but several general trends are observable. From the seventh to the twelfth centuries CE, kingship becomes increasingly sacralized and absolutist, followed from the fourteenth century CE by an increasingly scientific, juristic approach to kingship. Classical and medieval ideas of sacred kingship continued to have influence in the early modern and modern periods via theories of the divine rights of kings and absolute royal power.

Different justifications for monarchy are apparent in classical and medieval political thought. Pragmatic accounts of kingship emphasize that kingship is a reward for military prowess. Philosophical accounts contend that kingship is the most efficient way to achieve the common good and that the king is an embodiment of reason. Religious accounts of kingship point to the divine selection and ordination of kings and the particular virtues of the king. Legalistic accounts of kingship base the legitimacy of monarchy on either natural or positive justice. Dominating all these accounts are two characterizations of kingship offered by Plato and Aristotle: the philosopher king and the Great King. Specific questions addressed in classical and medieval theorizing on kingship include: the king's relationship to the natural or divine order; the nature and limitations on a king's pastoral and legislative roles; and the king's relationship with other members of the kingdom. The descriptions of good kingship in classical and medieval literature are partnered by the figure of the tyrant and the question of what obedience is owed to a monarchy that has degenerated into tyranny.

Classical Ideas of Kingship

Persian

Kingship was the defining political form of pre-Islamic Iran. Iranian kings held lordship over the Persian tribal aristocracy and supreme law-giving powers over their subjects as a whole. The title "king of kings" signaled their inheritance of the preceding kingdoms of Babylon and Assyria. The king was not divine but belonged to a family chosen to represent the gods on Earth, and monarchical legitimacy could be determined by the merit displayed hunting or fighting. The king had to fulfill three roles: warrior, divine intercessor, and farmer. A successful king would protect Persia from invaders, gain divine assistance, and add to the prosperity of the land. The Achaemenid king Darius (522–486 BCE), like his Hellenistic successor, Alexander, provided a role model of kingship for later Byzantine, Islamic, and European kingdoms and was particularly adept at exploiting the ceremonial and courtly aspects of kingship.

The interaction of political and religious institutions was complicated in the Persian context by a de facto, but unformalized, connection between the monarchy and Zoroastrianism. As a result, the Persian religious and political system contained a tension between the absolutist character of the monarchy, with a king who insisted on being the arbiter of truth, and Zoroastrian doctrine, which required every individual to pursue the truth.

Hellenistic

In *The Republic* (360 BCE), Plato set out the character of the philosopher king as an ideal form of government. Philosophers alone are able to appreciate unchanging and eternal truths and therefore can rule with reason. Such a philosopher king will be noble, gracious, truth-loving, just, courageous, and temperate. Plato envisaged an elite band of philosopher kings ruling in an authoritarian manner in order to maximize the happiness of the whole state.

Contemporaneously with Plato's philosophical vision of philosopher kingship came the establishment of Macedonian kingdoms. With the use of a highly trained army, Philip of Macedon (382–336 BCE) defeated the southern Greek city-states, which had abolished kingship centuries earlier. Alexander the Great (356–323 BCE) then followed an aggressive military strategy that secured an empire stretching to India. Loyalty to this autocratic monarchy was secured by the representation of the king as a supreme warrior and hunter. Alexander, in particular, modeled himself on the Homeric hero Achilles. In addition,

Alexander used the claim of divine parentage to embellish his authority, but in turn, this claim to divinity entailed an obligation to provide benefaction to his followers.

The Alexandrian model of kingship used the establishment of cities and tribute networks to maintain the king's authority. Although Philip and Alexander both enjoyed kingship as a form of reward for their prowess, the later Hellenistic model of kingship is dynastic, with power consolidated through conspicuous royal palaces and a centralized power structure around the king. This centrality of the king completed the move from the city-state to the royal residence as the dominant political forum.

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) distinguished three different forms of government: rule by one (monarchy or tyranny), rule by many (aristocracy or oligarchy), and rule by all (polity or democracy). Kingship is not an ideal form of government for Aristotle, although he portrays kingship that aims for the common good as a good alternative to tyranny. Aristotle describes the *pambasileus* (Great King) as a supreme king with unlimited authority. The existence of such a king effectively destroys the political city because it removes the sharing of offices and speech. Aristotle prefers a law-based system that respects the equal authority of men to monarchy. Aristotle argues that a ruler must rely on the friendship of his advisers and officials, trusting that they genuinely implement his will, but that the inequality inherent in kingship prevents a king from being able to rely on friendship. Only in the unlikely circumstance that one kingly family excels all other individuals in virtue would kingship be preferable to the law-based rule of many.

In his historical writings, Polybius (c. 203–120 BCE) set out a cyclical theory of government. Kingship emerges as a form of benign government under the aegis of a wise and good king. Inevitably, this kingship will degenerate into tyranny, once the throne is inherited, and the king's successors will abuse their monarchical position for their own gain. Weary of this abuse, aristocrats will intervene to establish an oligarchy before the eventual establishment of a democracy. Once this democracy has in turn degenerated into an *ochlocracy* (rule by the mob) dominated by demagogues, the cycle will start again with the reestablishment of the monarchy.

Roman

The early Roman experience of kingship founded a strong philosophy and legend of antimonarchism. The myth of Romulus and Remus produced an iconography of shepherd kingship and the sense of the king as a chief elected by the people for life to provide care for them as a flock. This relationship between people, elected king, and senate lasted for seven reigns, according to the legend, until Tarquin the Proud (who reigned 534–510 BCE) was exiled by the Senate in response to his son's alleged rape of the wife of a nobleman. The mythology of the overthrow of the monarchy created a powerful republican narrative and led to the dominance of the Roman republic, led by consuls, for the next five centuries.

The reestablishment of Roman imperialism by the Emperor Augustus (63–14 BCE) engendered a new strand of monarchical practice and theory. Roman emperors were both lord and god; their divinity was worshipped by adherence to the imperial cult during their lifetime and divine status after their death.

In the later Roman Empire, the image of the emperor changed with the introduction of Persian ceremonial elements. The early Byzantine pagan writer Themistius (317–c. 387 CE) described the emperor as a copy of Zeus on Earth, and his rule mimicked the heavenly kingdom. This theme of the emperor reflecting divine rule and virtues was later developed by Christian theorists of kingship. Emperor Diocletian (244–311 CE) is notable both for his introduction of ceremonial prostration before the emperor in the ceremony of *adoratio* (adoration) and his iconographic linking of his imperial image to the gods Jupiter, Hercules, Mercury, and Apollo (imperial/divine imagery that under the Christian Byzantine Emperor Constantine would transmute into Christ).

Early Germanic Kingship

Germanic kingship has gained mythological status in later political theory as a form of popular sovereignty that protected common-law freedoms. Nineteenth-century historians in particular were keen to emphasize that Germanic kings were chosen by popular tribal election. More recent historiography has been more cautious due to the lack of detailed source material, and the Roman nature of

later Germanic kingship (from the period after the first century CE) is now increasingly emphasized by historians.

Monarchy and Monotheism

Hebrew Kingship

Two attitudes toward kingship can be found in biblical writings. On one hand, there are descriptions of the emergence of Hebrew kingship with the figure of Saul and the key examples of Old Testament rulers such as Samuel, Solomon, and David. All owe their authority to divine selection and have a special relationship and means of communication with God. However, there is also a tradition of bad kingship in the Old Testament writings, with the Book of Samuel suggesting that the appointment of kings is a form of idolatry because God is the one true king.

The later better-documented Jewish kingship of the Hasmonean (140–37 BCE) and Herodian (37 BCE–92 CE) dynasties united ancestral biblical traditions with Hellenistic forms of kingship. King Herod of Judea (73–3 BCE) exemplifies a particular type of client-kingship. As described by the Roman-Jewish writer Josephus (37–100 CE), Herod maintained his kingdom via complex power brokering with the occupying Roman forces, as well as using family intermarriage to control his court.

Islamic Models of Kingship

Different dynastic phases of Islamic imperialism can be separated out, starting with the early Medina polity, followed by the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE) and the Abbasid Caliphate (749–1258, 1261–1517 CE). A progressive evolution of the idea of a caliphate can be seen, based on the *Qur'an* and the *hadith* (prophetic teachings), but also with independent elements of a regal culture.

Muslim kingship draws heavily on the standard tropes to be found within Hellenistic, Persian, and Byzantine models of kingship. Nevertheless, it also functions as a new political formulation. The medieval Islamic king is God's *khalifa* (vicar), acting as a shepherd for humanity. The caliph is a figure reminiscent of the divinely omnipotent Byzantine *basileus*. According to a Muhammedian saying, a king is God's shadow on Earth. Divinely ordained, he presides over the *Shari'a* (Islamic religious law), demonstrating his *siyasa* (craft of politics). The sovereignty of the king is indivisible, reflecting the monotheistic belief in the one God, and the direct relationship between the caliph and God provided scope for the development of royal absolutism.

Christian Kingship

Along with Old Testament models of kingship provided by figures like David and Solomon, the figure of Christ in the New Testament became important as an example of kingship. For example, the Frankish kings of the eighth century CE invoked the soldier-like qualities of Christ and linked their kings to him via the hallowing of weapons, standards, and the king himself.

Christian political thought developed within an imperial context and, as a result, contained a fundamental assumption that Christian government involved monarchy. Christianity was a radical and threatening sect for its first three centuries, but the unexpected conversion of the Emperor Constantine (c. 272–337 CE) started the evolution of Christianity into a state religion and associated it with one of the most powerful and stable political units, the Byzantine Empire. Moreover, even the Byzantine Empire's enemies were monarchical. Besides the Persian king, the Germanic tribes establishing new kingdoms in the remnants of the western Roman Empire were Christian kings, albeit heretical Arians. The articulation of Christian political thought was, therefore, intertwined with political theorizing about the figure of the king.

Eusebius (c. 263–c. 339 CE)

The Christian writer Eusebius wrote panegyrics for the Emperor Constantine and an explanation for his role as a Christian king (*basileus*). Eusebius combined Hellenistic and biblical themes of kingship. Thus, the familiar classical theme of the king as a representative of the divine on Earth is merged with the portrayal of Constantine as the fulfillment of the Abrahamic prophecy. Eusebius christianized pagan ideas about the relationship between the earthly and the divine. On Eusebius's explanation, Earth reflects the heavens, but rather than being an earthly divinity, the emperor is God's representative on Earth. The emperor could make a special

claim to sagacity through the special guiding relationship that he enjoyed with God via the divine word. This also provided the emperor with a potent political argument derived from monotheism (the belief in one God). Just as there was only one God in the heavens, so there should only be one emperor on Earth. A drive toward conquest and the enforcement of orthodoxy was thus implicit within this Christian conception of kingship.

Augustine's major political work, *The City of God* (413–427 CE), describes two cities: one heavenly and one worldly. The earthly city is motivated by self-interest, whereas the heavenly city is a community of true believers. The cities represent a spectrum of the best and worst human behavior, and the heavenly city is a guiding symbol for Christian rulers as to the kind of society they should create. The Augustinian king rules because of his love of justice rather than for glory. God alone has the power to grant kingdoms and to give power to an individual. Christian rulers are happy if they: rule with justice; are not inflated with pride; put their power at the service of God; are slow to punish, but ready to pardon; punish wrongdoing to direct and protect the state rather than for personal animosity; grant pardon to encourage the wrongdoer's amendment; compensate for severe decisions with the gentleness of their mercy and the generosity of their benefits; restrain their self-indulgent appetites; and act for the love of eternal blessedness and offer to God their humility, compassion, and prayers.

The Augustinian theory of kingship was highly influential in two respects. First, later writers such as Isidore of Seville use the Augustinian idea of the two cities to set out theories of the interrelationship of secular and spiritual power and the extent of the king's authority in relation to the pope. Second, Augustine's work provided an early example of a body of medieval literature called the *mirror of princes'* genre, which sets out the appropriate beliefs, attitudes, and behavior of a monarch.

After the deposition in 476 CE of the last western Roman emperor, the Byzantine emperors in Constantinople lay claim to be the true continuation of the Roman imperial legacy. Emperors such as Justinian (c. 482–565 CE) provided a model of kingship that was pious, legalistic, and ceremonial-minded. Central to this form of kingship was an emphasis on military victory and conquest. The temporal coincidence of the establishment of the Roman Empire by the Emperor Augustus with the birth of Christ was interpreted in Byzantine political theory as a divine signification of the Byzantine Empire's legitimacy and as justification for a mission to unite the world under one Christian ruler.

The *De Administrando Imperio* (948–952 CE) by the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus (905–959 CE) described a hierarchical world family of kings over which the emperor was a father king. Ceremonial and display were central to this model of kingship because non-Byzantine inferiors needed to be intimidated by the splendor of the Byzantine court.

Western Medieval Kingship

The English historian J. M. Wallace-Hadrill identifies a change in emphasis in European kingship in the seventh century CE, arguing that at this point kings moved into an ecclesiastical atmosphere.

Merovingian Kingship

Merovingian kings such as Dagobert I (c. 603–639 CE) viewed their mandate as being to further justice and equity and to protect the church. Royal piety involved the protection of doctrine and morals, of the poor, and of the possession of the churches. The biblical ideals of David and Solomon were used to urge kings to listen to their bishops and to follow the Christian duties as interpreted by the church.

Thaumaturgical and charismatic power began to be ascribed to Merovingian kings in a way that was considerably developed by the later Frankish dynasties of the Carolingians and Ottonians (751–1024 CE). As an example of this, the French historian Marc Bloch traced the history of the belief that kingship conveys healing properties. The kings of England and France, due to their descent from the saintly King Edward the Confessor (c. 1003–1066 CE), were considered able to cure victims of scrofula (a tubercular skin condition) by their touch.

Carolingian Kingship

The Austrian-English historian Walter Ullmann describes the Carolingian monarchs (c. 750–919 CE)

as exercising a co-regency with Christ. Hincmar of Rheims (806–882 CE) provides a detailed contemporary description of the developing Frankish royal consecration rites of the ninth century, which underline this anointed role of the king.

The ideal Carolingian king was a military protector of the fatherland, whose strength crushed heathens and rebels. The imperial court functioned as a great household in which order and purity must be maintained. Piety was a central Carolingian political concept; faithfulness was considered to bind lords to their king in the same way as religious faithfulness. Kingdoms were the personal property of the emperor and the Carolingian Empire was repeatedly divided on the death of individual emperors into its constituent kingdoms. Equally, the Carolingian Empire as a whole carried no centralized monarchical law, and subjects carried their customary law with them.

Alcuin (c. 735–804 CE) urged the Carolingian Emperor Charlemagne (742–814 CE) to be a scholar as well as a leader. Alcuin developed the Platonic idea of a philosopher king in a Christian context to urge kings to pursue Christian wisdom and study and to create a new Christian community—attributes and attitudes that Alcuin also ascribed to Charlemagne. The king's authority demonstrates: *potestas* (power), *sapientia* (wisdom), and *praedicatio* (preaching). The church retains its priestly functions, but the king is both its instructor and protector.

Anglo-Saxon Kingship

Bede (c. 673–735 CE) presented kingly rule as a moral occupation devoted to Christian aims. In his *Ecclesiastical History*, Bede identified two categories of good king: the warrior-convert and the monk-king. Piety and humility were essential attributes of kingly behavior. The church required the king to provide protection, endowment, largess, and the means for Christian warfare. Bede's writings also reveal the cults that developed after the death of several Anglo-Saxon kings and how the development of royal saints could add to the prestige of a royal dynasty.

Alfred the Great (847–899 CE) merged the West-Saxon and Mercian kingdoms to form an English polity. Besides promoting military reorganization and education, Alfred introduced a new legal code, the Deemings (Book of Laws). The idea of the three orders required the king to have praying men, fighting men, and working men and the means to support all three classes of men in terms of gifts, weapons, food, ale, and clothing.

Although keenly Christian in outlook, the primary emphasis of Alfred's writing is on secular power. The British historian J. L. Nelson suggests that at the heart of Alfred's political ideas is a belief in the active compatibility of wisdom and worldly well-being. Alfred conceptualized his kingdom both as a geographical territory that should not be divided and as an abstract authority over men. As a form of patrimonial kingship, land is leased from the king by the three orders and is manned ultimately for his benefit. Those who served special positions for the king (his *thegns*) entered into his friendship, and a culture of service required the king's lords to prefer the temporary deprivation of their wealth to the loss of the king's friendship. Alfred's ideal officeholder is both learned in book culture and capable of applying that learning to the common benefit. In return, officeholders can legitimately expect to be rewarded with wealth. Plotting against one's lord's life provokes the death penalty, although Alfred accepted that there is a right of resistance to unrighteous rulers who damage their realm.

Hierocratic Theories of Kingship

A central problem for Western medieval theorizing about kingship was the relationship between monarchical and papal authority and the extent to which ecclesiastical rule should have precedence over secular authority. Using the metaphor of two swords, Pope Gelasius I (492–496 CE) ascribed distinctive functions to church and state, with the pope exercising a sacred priestly power while the emperor has temporal power. At the same time, the pope is under the temporal jurisdiction of the emperor, while the emperor's spiritual well-being remains the concern of the pope. Because, under this model, neither party operates in an entirely autonomous sphere, the potential for an ongoing theoretical battle over sovereignty and precedence was established.

In his *The Book of the Pastoral Rule* (c. 590 CE), Gregory the Great (c. 540–604 CE) emphasized the tutelary role of the emperor in Constantinople

as indispensable to Christendom's development. The emperor was charged with a supervisory role over the church and Gregory aimed for an intimate union between the papal sovereign and the emperor. By encouraging the emperor to be more Christian, Gregory minimized the boundaries between the two forms of authority and suggested their possible alliance.

Using an Augustinian and Roman law background, Isidore of Seville (c. 560–636 CE) set out an influential theory of kingship that also reveals Visigothic attitudes to kingship (the Visigoths had established their kingdom in the former Roman Iberian territories). Isidore emphasized the harmonious operation of clerical and secular authority. Secular princes are subject to the religious discipline of the church, but in turn they also have a pastoral obligation over the church. The ideal king exercises *potestas* (power) over his people and within his national church. The king exercises a *ministerium* (office) within the church and in administering his power must show *humilitas* (humility). The king is predestined to serve by God as the head of a Christian body, which included the church. The king is God's minister, dispensing justice with complete authority over the health of the kingdom, including the supervision of clerical matters. A king who fails in his duties is a tyrant, but the church must accept such a tyrant as a punishment for sin.

Pope Gregory VII (c. 1020/5–1085 CE)

Hildebrand (Pope Gregory VII) argued for ultimate authority over the emperor, arguing that he could both make and depose kings and denying the emperor's right to choose his own bishops. In contrast, the emperor argued that the papacy's temporal authority derived from secular rulers.

Gregory VII developed Augustine's metaphor of the two cities to explain the difference in origin and purpose of ecclesiastical institutions as opposed to secular ones. Because secular government is ordained by God as a remedy for man's inherent sinfulness, secular princes cannot be allowed to be the final judges in their own cases. The papacy is thus a divine provision to ensure that justice is truly universal. Even the Holy Roman Emperor is subject to justice, and not to recognize this is sinful pride.

In the *Monarchia* (1309–1313 CE), Dante (1265–1321 CE) made an argument for the one monarch, arguing that the well-being of the world requires one secular monarchy. Human potential can be achieved only in peaceful conditions, and peace can be achieved only by the rule of one emperor. Rehearsing the early medieval arguments about papal and imperial spheres of autonomy, Dante argued that human beings pursue two ends: earthly happiness and eternal life. It is the emperor's job to ensure humanity's earthly happiness, whereas the pope has responsibility for humanity's eternal life. For Dante, the emperor and the pope operate in entirely separate spheres, and he strongly rejects the hierocratic arguments made by those such as Gregory VII about the temporal powers of the pope.

The King as Law Maker

The disintegration of the Carolingian Empire in the ninth and tenth centuries CE led to a reconceptualization of kingship within the context of smaller territorial kingdoms, known as feudal monarchy. Writing about the Anglo-Norman (1066–1154 CE), Capetian (987–1328 CE), Angevin (1154–1216 CE), and Plantagenet (1154–1485 CE) monarchies in England and France, the French historian Charles Petit-Dutaillis sets out a picture of monarchy establishing itself within feudalism. Sacral monarchy and feudalism contained latent competing principles, and the regrowth of royal centralized administration and justice caused kings to attempt to curb the feudal aristocracy. Feudalism implied an ability to withdraw allegiance, a freedom that was abrogated by the growth in the royal prerogative. The view of the king as a lawmaker became increasingly prominent by the thirteenth century, with the English jurist Ranulf de Glanvill (?–1190 CE) referring to the king as the "people's shield." Increasingly, the abstract entity of the Crown (an abstract bundle of inheritable royal rights and powers) came to be important.

Bracton (c. 1210–1268 CE) took a legalistic approach to kingship, arguing that a king was rightly so-called only if he came to power legitimately. In Bractonian theory, the king has no equal, but he rules under both God and the law.

In his *De regimine principum* (1267 CE), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE) emphasized the naturalness of monarchy as a form of government. Aquinian kingship is based on natural law, rather

than merely positive justice. Using Aristotelian principles, Aquinas argued that the king ruled for the common good and that subjects were not bound by unjust or inequitable rules. Aquinas suggests that monarchy need not be hereditary; the king should be put in charge because of his virtue and can therefore be chosen from the people. Also, monarchy is democratic in the sense that various virtuous men should also participate in government with the king.

Giles of Rome (c. 1243–1316 CE) expressed a common view of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century political philosophy, that the power of the king should not be limited because he acts for the common good. *De regimine principum* (1277–79 CE) contrasted regal regimes with political regimes, preferring the former because kings are more natural and rule for the good of the people. Rightful rule comes from the king being directed by right reason. The king directs society by his legislation in the same way that the archer controls the direction of an arrow. As a result, the king is a form of living law, who is bound himself by natural law but above the particulars of the justice he administers.

Marsilius of Padua (c. 1280–1342) argued in the *Defensor Pacis* (1324) that imperial power is the sole guarantor of peace. However, Marsilius also viewed the whole citizenry body as a legislator that had ultimate authority over the monarch. Marsilius's views mark the beginning of a new abstract conceptualizing of the state as represented by the citizen body rather than the person of the king.

Early Modern Kingship

Ernst Kantorowicz suggests that kingship was transformed during the period from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, becoming de-sacralized under the impact of scientific jurisprudence. Kingship moved from being Christ-centered to being law-centered.

Machiavelli (1469–1527 CE)

In *The Prince* (1513–1532 CE), Niccolò Machiavelli describes a form of kingship in which force is combined with prudence. Machiavelli approaches the problem of how a new prince, who has not inherited his position, can obtain and maintain his power. Such a new prince needs to combine public morality with private immorality. Although he draws on the classical ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius, Machiavelli has a different aim in writing about kingship. Instead of approaching kingship in terms of its relationship to the ideal form of government, Machiavelli sets out the conditions for monarchical power and its maintenance via patronage structures.

The Divine Right of Kings

Despite the development of models of kingship based on realist and natural law theories, the medieval theories of sacred kingship continued to influence early modern political theory. The French biblical scholar and political theorist Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704 CE) argued for the divine right of kings in his *Politics Derived From the Words of Holy Scripture* (1679 CE). Bossuet's autocratic argument was that ruling by virtue of God's authority legitimized the absolute authority of the king and precluded all opposition to his rule.

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See also Aristotle; Augustinianism; Divine Right of Kings; Feudalism; Nationalism; Parliament; Plato; Sovereignty; State

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Kyoto School

The Kyoto School was first identified as a coherent approach to philosophy by the Marxist intellectual, Tosaka Jun (1900–1945), in the early 1930s. The school is particularly noteworthy because it represents the first genuinely philosophical school of thought in modern Japan; the members developed original philosophical positions by drawing on both European philosophy (especially German idealism) and the intellectual traditions of Japan (and East Asia). Indeed, they were the first generation of Japanese thinkers with access to European philosophy and the last to receive a thorough schooling in the Confucian and Buddhist classics. Whether this synthetic approach makes the Kyoto School a "modern" school of philosophy is the subject of much debate.

During the early 1940s, members of the Kyoto School itself argued that their unique ability to draw on both European and Asian traditions of thought actually meant that they had passed through modernity, while the Western nations (which remained unable or unwilling to assimilate Asian thought) were trapped with all the parochial problems of the modern age (including imperialism). In this way, the Kyoto School is perhaps the first non-Western school of philosophy to resist Western colonialism and imperialism through a narrative of assimilation and progression beyond the modern West. Historically, this appeal to a "world historical standpoint" and the model of "overcoming modernity" coincided with imperial Japan's own attempts to colonize Asia.

Tosaka used the label *Kyoto School* politically to distinguish a group of bourgeois philosophers who creatively (and sometimes critically) developed the work of the school's originator, Nishida Kitarô (1870–1945). The name refers to the fact that the original members of the school each spent significant periods at Kyoto Imperial University in the years between 1911 and 1945, usually under the guidance of Nishida. For Tosaka, the key members of the school were Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), Nishida's junior colleague; and Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990), Nishida's leading student. Today, the group identified with the Kyoto School is wider: In the second generation, it usually includes Kôyama Iwao (1905–1993), Kôsaka Masaaki (1900–1969), and sometimes Hisamatasu Shinichi (1889–1980); in the third generation, Abe Masao (1915–2006) and Ueda Shizuteru (b. 1926); and some commentators would now include a left wing of the (second generation of the) school in the form of Miki Kiyoshi (1897–1945) and Tosaka himself. The exact constitution of the school remains contested, at least partially because the central characteristics of the school's thought have not yet been crisply defined, but also partly because of the controversial political legacy of the school in the twentieth century.

Political Legacy

The political legacy of the Kyoto School is complicated on a number of levels. Despite Tosaka's initial assertions about the school, the ostensible political positions of the various members of the school do not always coincide with each other. Also (and more interestingly), the political significance of the school's philosophy remains deeply contested. Indeed, during the 1930s and early 1940s, while Japan was at war, Nishida and his colleagues were viewed with great suspicion by the authorities and strongly criticized by the right wing for being too liberal and too sympathetic to

Western philosophical positions. However, after the end of the war (which coincided with Nishida's death), the Kyoto School met with severe criticisms (especially from the left), and key members such as Nishitani were purged from their university positions until after the end of the occupation. Perhaps as a result, the postwar work of the Kyoto School moved markedly away from politics and toward the philosophy of religion.

For many commentators, the legacy of the Kyoto School has some parallels with the case of Martin Heidegger in German history. Indeed, interest in the political thought of the Kyoto School was reinvigorated in the late 1980s, following the new revelations about Heidegger's alleged involvement with the Nazi regime. The parallels between the Japanese philosophers' contested relationship with an aggressive and oppressive ideological regime and Heidegger (with whom various of these philosophers were personally acquainted) were enticing. By the 1990s, there was also a resurgence of interest in the Kyoto School in the West, as part of the search for alternative, sophisticated political visions following the end of the cold war and the apparent hegemony of liberalism.

The controversy of the Kyoto School revolves around their formulation of a conception of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (*tôa kyôeiken*) and their moral endorsement of the idea of transnational political units at a time when the Japanese state was aggressively pursuing colonial policies in Asia. The question is whether the political thought of the Kyoto School should be interpreted as a criticism of Japan's policies (formulated as the failure of Japan to meet the cosmopolitan ideals mapped by the school) or as a philosophical justification of the trajectory of the state's actions. Opinion remains divided, but there is an increasing trend toward exploring the theoretical potentials of Kyoto School politics as resources for the solution of contemporary problems, as well as the relationship between these theoretical positions and other mainstream traditions of political thought.

A second and powerful aspect of the political legacy of the school centers on questions of the politics of knowledge and the challenge that the Kyoto School presents to the Eurocentric narrative of the history of political thought. In particular, its sophisticated and properly philosophical challenge to the assumptions of modernity (as envisioned in the European Enlightenment) through a process of *passing through* modernity into a global era represents an important contribution to contemporary debates about decentering global history. In fact, the first moments in the postwar rejuvenation of the Kyoto School came in the increasingly confident atmosphere of late 1970s Japan, when Takeuchi Yoshimi published a critical reappraisal of the school's high-profile 1942 symposium, "Overcoming Modernity." The political implication that overcoming modernity was allied to overcoming the West was as clear in the 1970s as in the 1940s.

Political Ideas

For most commentators, the central philosophical concern of the Kyoto School is the concept of absolute nothingness (*zettai mu*), which underlies much of their thought. This foundation is often politicized as being in contradistinction to Western philosophy, which (according to this generalization) finds its origins in ontology and hence in the question of being. Hence, we find a rather vulgar (and ideologically charged) contrast between nonbeing and being (East and West), in which nonbeing is represented by the Buddhist-derived notion of *mu* (nothingness) rather than by *hiu* (the negation of being or *meon,* Gk). The affinities between this idea of nothingness as a foundational place and Heidegger's notion of *das Nichts* (which opens a place in which beings can show themselves) are intriguing, and they appear to provide for similarly controversial implications in the fields of ethics and politics. Of course, Heidegger was not the first European philosopher to explore a space of nothingness, and the identification of absolute nothingness with Oriental nothingness is more political than philosophical.

One of the key consequences of this foundation is an ambivalent sense of individual subjectivity and agency. On one hand, Kyoto School thinkers (and especially the early Nishida) seem to emphasize that the world is self-productive and, hence, that it does not rely on the actions of individual agents to shape it—indeed, there is a sense here that individual agents exist only in relation to the self-production of the world in which they appear. In a manner of speaking, individuals are generated by (or emanate from) the world, rather than vice

versa. This has clear implications for notions of political and ethical responsibility.

On the other hand, particularly in the later Nishida, individuals appear to be granted active agency and the ability to shape the historical and political world in which they appear. However, there is always a sense in which this agency is self-contradictory (or perhaps dialectical): Individual agents are generated by and in return generate the historical world around them. Indeed, Nishida's particular concern was to model agency in such a way that it could be retained by various levels of actors simultaneously, beginning with the individual, moving through different levels of community (society, nation-state, etc.), and even including the world as a whole. The result is an interesting and radical deprivileging of individual agency in a political world that contains a series of other sources of agency and subjectivity, including the nation and the world itself (and ultimately nothingness). Members of the Kyoto School deal with this problem in importantly different ways.

One of the important corollaries of this multilevel model of subjectivity is that the levels are linked by the ethical imperative toward the self-actualization of greater levels of unity (and thus of subjectivity or personality). These greater levels (e.g., the nation as a level greater than the individual) are mutual activities and should not (must not) be coerced from either side, making them contradictory self-identities. This means that the nation is essentially an ethical category, rather than an institutional one.

For the Kyoto School, the process of history is toward the realization of greater levels of identity (and agency) and, in practice, this means that the school identified the twentieth century as an age of global awakening, in which nations would (and should) be replaced by transnational groupings as the highest level of agency. For Nishida, these transnational groups were known as "particular worlds," and they would evolve mutually from historically familiar regions (i.e., without coercion). Eventually, both Nishida and other members of the school would use the language of the "co-prosperity sphere" to describe these regions, and the East Asia region in particular. Such spheres should take on personalities drawn mutually from their constituent units—that is, they do not replace lower levels of agency but contradictorily unify them into an additional level. In some ways, members of the Kyoto School identified themselves as representatives of this kind of global unity between Western and Eastern traditions of thought.

The pivot of the controversy about the politics of the Kyoto School is whether this sense of transnational subjectivities is buoyed by a kind of cosmopolitan vision, in which all nations respect the integrity of the others and hence join into a form of international federation voluntarily, or whether the universalism implied in this model is actually fueled by a sense of mission among particular nations, and hence whether such a federation is actually a form of empire. In the end, this tension is not resolved by the school as a whole, and its members differed in the extent to which they were willing to endorse a special role for particularity and power. Recent literature suggests that while the logic of the political system of Nishida himself tends toward a cosmopolitan worldview, during the war years, he made sufficient references to a special place for Japan in the new world order to undermine this tendency in the minds of many observers.

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See also Japanese Political Thought

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Latin American Marxism

Much like other third world Marxisms, Marxism in Latin America has during most of its history been forced to navigate the treacherous strait between capitalist colonial powers and the imposition of Comintern doctrine from the Soviet Union.

Origins

Latin American Marxism enjoyed only a brief period of autonomous development prior to the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the 1919 founding of the Comintern. In 1895, Marx's *Capital* first appeared in the region, in a translation by Juan B. Justo—one of many radical physicians to emerge from Argentina—who founded the Argentine Socialist Party (PSA) the following year. But the PSA, like other pre-communist parties in Latin America, embodied a tension expressed in the coexistence of both minimum and maximum (i.e., Marxist) programs, seeing a 1917 split over World War I, which gave rise to the later-renamed Communist Party.

However, as the newly formed Latin American Communist parties were quickly incorporated into the nascent Comintern, local concerns soon took a backseat to directives issued from the Soviet Union, and these official Latin American Marxists had to contend both with their domestic struggles and with the Comintern's sometimes unpredictable lurches, from initial radicalism to the conservatism of the late 1920s and, after 1929, back to an aggressive ultra-leftism.

Mariátegui: Latin America's "First Marxist"

In this context—with most Communists torn between the domestic struggle against capitalism and imperialism and the imposition of an international dogma by ostensible allies—the Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui intervened. A diminutive and sickly autodidact, enamored of poetry, Mariátegui was an unlikely candidate for the title later bestowed upon him: that of Latin America's first Marxist. While Mariátegui was not chronologically the first Marxist in Latin America, this is not what is meant by the phrase. Rather, by successfully charting a third way between capitalist imperialism and Communist dogma, Mariátegui can be seen as the first Marxist to deal with and formulate his theories on the basis of the concrete reality of Latin American life.

When the Comintern was forming, Mariátegui was scarcely 24 years old, but he had already been engaged in journalism for a decade, providing support first for the student movement and later the burgeoning labor movement. In his vociferous support for the 1919 general strike in support of the eight-hour workday, Mariátegui ran afoul of the Peruvian government, and tensions continued to rise until the new government of Augusto Leguía offered the young radical a stark choice: prison or voluntary exile. Mariátegui accepted the latter option, traveling in 1919 to Paris, before arriving in Italy less than a year later, where he was exposed

to both the radical praxis of the Italian factory councils as well as such thinkers as Bendetto Croce, Giovanni Gentile, and Georges Sorel. Mariátegui was present at the historic Livorno Congress of 1921, during which the future adherents of the Italian Communist Party—Antonio Gramsci, also a Sorel devotee, included—walked out, and it has been suggested that he knew Gramsci personally.

If Mariátegui had left his native Peru in 1923 as a radicalized democrat, he returned a communist. But this new faith notwithstanding, Mariátegui soon accepted the invitation of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre to participate in the latter's newly founded, broad-based populist movement known as APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana). In joining APRA, Mariátegui found himself embroiled in the Comintern controversy that he had effectively escaped with his 1919 exile, but initially at least, the tone was less than confrontational as the then-moderate Third International sought to convince Haya and APRA to join up. However, after the massacre of Chinese Communists at the hands of the Kuomintang in 1927—with which Haya identified—the distance between APRA and the Comintern, and as a result with Mariátegui, grew. Mariátegui finally broke with APRA and Haya in 1928, founding the Peruvian Socialist Party (PSP), but he devoted the remaining two years of his short life to resisting the dogmatism of imposed Comintern orthodoxy.

Developmentalism and Indo-American Socialism

Mariátegui's battle on two fronts—against Haya on one side and the Comintern on the other—is perhaps the most decisive conflict in the history of Latin American Marxism, revolving primarily around the concept of imperialism. Haya had distinguished himself from Vladimir Lenin by insisting that imperialism—defined as foreign control of capital—was not the *last* but rather only the *first* stage of capitalism. Seeing colonized countries as predominantly feudal, Haya in effect emphasized the positive, beneficial role of an initial imperialist stage, and APRA was then constituted as an anti-imperialist coalition that sought to bring together the newly empowered national bourgeoisie and domestic capital, as well as the Peruvian masses, under middle-class leadership.

If Haya thereby privileged the *national* element of imperialism—in Quijano's words—Mariátegui would come to privilege the *class* element through an unprecedented understanding of capitalism as a global system. When colonized countries appear on the scene of capitalist development, the global structure is already in place, and for Mariátegui, capitalist penetration of colonized societies did not have the effect predicted by those linear histories we later called developmentalism or modernization theory. As a result, both Haya and Mariátegui recognized the colonial distortions present in the Peruvian economy: Capitalism, the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat had not developed here as in Europe. But the lesson for each was different, and whereas Haya argued for the linear development of capitalism on the European model, Mariátegui responded that due to the structure of the global capitalist system, such development was impossible. While Haya later dismissed Mariátegui's directly socialist program as Eurocentric—implying that the latter mistakenly saw Peru as occupying the same economic level as the European nations—the reality of the situation was quite the opposite, and Mariátegui's socialism responded instead to a deeper recognition of the developmental blockage posed by the global capitalist system.

Against APRA's developmentalist program, Mariátegui developed his own through a concrete excavation of Peruvian history but in so doing ran afoul of Stalinist orthodoxy. During the period prior to the Comintern's 1929 ultra-leftist turn, the strategy imposed by Moscow was not entirely distinct from that of APRA: an antifeudal, anti-imperialist alliance with the national bourgeoisie. But unlike both APRA and the Comintern, Mariátegui was acutely aware that to be antifeudal was not the same as to be anti-imperialist or anti-capitalist. In other words, a variety of classes were willing to replace the landed aristocracy as liaisons of international capital, a willingness that was rooted in large part in the racial divisions that divided Peru.

But here, Mariátegui faced a serious problem: Of all the social classes constituting the Eurocentric Marxist imaginary, he could see none as potential revolutionary agents. Given the lack of capitalist development, the growth of proletariat and bourgeoisie was stunted, and intermediate sectors like the so-called middle class and petty bourgeoisie

were as apt to side with imperialism as the capitalists themselves. Mariátegui's response to this difficulty began in his historical studies of Peruvian society, published in 1928 as *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*. There Mariátegui began to develop the understanding of a new revolutionary subject and social formation suitable for Latin American, and specifically Peruvian, conditions: Indo-American socialism. Rather than making a straightforward appeal for the revolutionary nature of the peasantry, Mariátegui instead identified Incan communism as a traditional Peruvian communal structure (like the Russian *obshchina* recognized in Marx's famous 1881 letter to Zasulich) that could serve as the basis for a modern socialism.

Mariátegui's appeal to local conditions was more than mere expediency but instead constituted a direct criticism of the Eurocentric importation of Marxist theses. This tension with Comintern strictures is evident from the fact that Mariátegui vacillated for nearly a year before forming his own party; and when he did, it bore *not* the prescribed name *communist* but was instead dubbed the Peruvian *Socialist* Party. It was not associated officially with the Comintern until a month after Mariátegui's death.

Popular Fronts to *Foquismo*

In 1935, the Comintern swung wildly to the opposite extreme once again, moving from a policy of ultra-leftism, which denounced all non-communist social-democratic forces as "social fascists," to a popular front alliance with these same forces (including Peru's APRA). Responses to this strategy varied, but the period immediately after World War II was marked by a disintegration of Marxist forces, as critiques of official party and Comintern line proliferated and alternative strategies were sought. Trotskyite sects were proliferating, and local militias emerged beyond Communist control. No single event shook the categories of Latin American Marxism as profoundly as did the 1959 Cuban revolution.

The unexpected revolutionary success of a small and ill-prepared group of revolutionaries confounded official Marxism for a number of reasons. First, this was not a Marxist revolution, but rather a national popular rebellion led by petty bourgeois students under the influence of such Cuban thinkers as José Martí. Moreover, the official representatives of Cuban communism played no role in the rebellion. Finally, if the strategy adopted by the rebels could be interpreted as an extension of Leninist voluntarism, the revolution occurred without the help of a party but rather through the disciplined engagement of a small number of guerrilla fighters. This last element proved explosive—both in the positive and negative sense—creating both high hopes and severe disillusionment.

The transformation of the Cuban revolutionary experience into an exportable doctrine occurred—not coincidentally—through the intervention of a European, specifically the young French philosopher Régis Debray. In his *Revolution in the Revolution,* Debray sought to self-consciously create a Cuban model of revolution, one in which the party (and indeed politics) was replaced by a small unit of guerrilla fighters, or *foco;* hence, the name the doctrine became *foquismo*. Disciplined and highly mobile—and hence organically detached from local communities—the *foco* was seen as the veritable creator of the subjective conditions necessary for a revolution through its daring attacks, which revealed the vulnerability of the state. While the radical voluntarism of *foquismo* was understandably liberating compared to Communist Party popular-frontism, its very intoxicating nature led Debray and others both to misrepresent what actually happened in Cuba and to lead the continental revolution astray.

Inspired by the Cuban example and *foquista* theory, young Latin Americans neglected their own local conditions and took to the hills. From the Dominican Republic to Venezuela, they learned their lessons quickly, and after a series of crushing defeats and setbacks, they began to think more critically about existing models. Many, taking inspiration from the Chinese and Vietnamese struggles—later bolstered by the development of Maoist and pro-Chinese currents—adopted a more long-term strategy of prolonged popular war, which entailed more substantial roots in the popular masses and the development of liberated zones. In fact, the Colombian FARC guerrillas, whom Debray had severely criticized for their strategy of holding zones of militia-type self-defense such as Marquetalia, came to represent the most stable and effective of Latin American guerrilla armies. In

other countries like Nicaragua, experimentation with both *foquismo* and prolonged popular war led to a sort of hybrid strategy, which eventually found success in the 1979 overthrow of Anastasio Somoza.

Alongside this critical development of *foquismo,* the popular front strategy had its greatest successes and greatest defeats within a few short years in Chile. The Chilean Popular Front, the showcase of the success of a prior era of Comintern dictates, catapulted the socialist Salvador Allende to the presidency in 1970. However, if the neglect of the military factor was endemic to popular frontism, this too was Allende's downfall, as his refusal to rupture the military's monopoly on violence and arm his popular support base eventually ensured that there would be no organized resistance to the expected 1973 coup.

Toward the other extreme, the same period that saw Allende's election also saw the birth and development of various urban guerrilla movements, most spectacularly Carlos Marighella's National Liberation Action in Brazil and the Uruguayan Tupamaros. Attempting to come to terms with the demographic transformations of certain Latin American countries—Uruguay was the most urbanized country in Latin America—urban guerrilla movements rejected Debray's rural focus while nevertheless maintaining many of his tactical prescriptions.

From Dependency to Coloniality

As Marxist-inspired political movements were flourishing in Latin America against the straitjacket of Comintern orthodoxy, so too were certain theoretical currents engaged in the effort to provide a new understanding of capitalism, more relevant to the Latin American experience. Most notably, a number of economists centered around the Raúl Prébisch and the CEPAL/ECLA in Santiago de Chile began to develop what would come to be termed *dependency theory*.

Although they were not explicitly Marxist in orientation, the Cepalistas sought in many senses to transpose Marxism onto the global capitalist system, a sort of updating of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg's theses on imperialism. Identifying the economic circuit by which raw goods were extracted from less developed countries, shipped to wealthier nations for manufacturing, and resold to the poor countries at a premium, dependency theorists had identified the source of the continued impoverishment of the third world. Such a view opposed the linear developmentalist models of so-called modernization theory by arguing (as had Mariátegui) that more capitalism led to more inequality, and not vice versa.

This early work on dependency theory fed into several later currents, most notably the world-systems theory pioneered by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, in which dependency theory's binary core-periphery model was supplemented with an intermediary category of semi-peripheral zones. Later work, such as that of Quijano, further developed these theses in a manner inspired by Mariátegui, arguing for the centrality of colonialism in developing a complex of domination known as "the coloniality of power," which comprised economic, racial-ethnic, sexual, gender, and other elements and cross-cut the periods of formal colonization and decolonization.

These currents have combined with many others, including several strands rooted in liberation theology. A number of philosophers have filtered these strands of theology through a specific form of Marxism and the Mariáteguista demand for autonomous Latin American thought to give rise to what has become known as philosophy of liberation, whose best-known figure is Enrique Dussel.

Post-Soviet Marxism

The period immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union was challenging for Marxist-inspired movements worldwide, and Latin America was no exception. Most immediately, the triumphal end of the cold war facilitated President Ronald Reagan's crusade against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, removed electorally in 1990 through a combination of Contra war and CIA intervention.

The first new movement to emerge in the aftermath of the death of Soviet communism was the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico. Established secretly in 1983 by Maoist-inspired supporters of a prolonged popular war strategy, the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN) sought to integrate with indigenous peasant communities to construct the basis for a popular revolutionary army. Both through the geopolitical events in the

Soviet Union and the process of fusing with indigenous communities, however, this plan was eventually altered: Socialism and Marxism were not openly discussed, and political hierarchies were deconstructed and replaced by direct, indigenous-led democracy. Exploding into the public view in 1994, the Zapatista movement has since become a symbol of a new form of subtly Marxist-inspired politics, but one that has broken significantly with all official doctrines.

The years since 1994 have seen something of a rebirth of Latin American Marxism, liberated from the yoke of Soviet orthodoxy and free to plow new terrain. The first large-scale movement to openly embrace socialism has been the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela. Elected in 1998 as a moderate, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez Frías has since shifted to the left, driven in large part by a long history of Venezuelan revolutionary movements. Supporters of the Venezuelan process have announced their goal as the construction of a twenty-first-century socialism—in many cases explicitly invoking Mariátegui's Indo-American variety—but the content of this socialism remains to be determined.

George Ciccariello-Maher

See also Colonialism; Comparative Political Theory; Dependency Theory; Imperialism; Liberation Theology; Maoism; Marxism; Revolution; Sorel, Georges; World-Systems Theory

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LAWGIVERS

Ancient societies traditionally refer to a stage in their history when laws were created and written down. They ascribe it to mythical or historical lawgivers, prophets, or charismatic figures, who played an important part in resolving political or social disputes and in creating a national identity. The Near East produced the Code of Hammurabi (nineteenth century BCE), and Mosaic law preserved in the Torah/Pentateuch (traditionally dated to the early thirteenth century BCE, but probably much later). Some Greek city-states recorded similar phenomena. The best-known Greek lawgivers were Lycurgus at Sparta (date unknown), Draco and Solon at Athens (late sixth/early fifth century), Zaleucus and Charondas in South Italy and Sicily (respectively, seventh and sixth century). They produced clusters of laws rather then full-scale codifications, but these set the basis for a state-enforced legal system and a constitutional framework. However, Greek laws remained rather limited in their scope and impact, in comparison with Roman law and Jewish law (Mishnah, c. 200 CE; Talmud, c. 200–500 CE).

Roman law is one of the most enduring creations of antiquity, as it shaped most modern legal systems. Its development can be attributed to various sources of law, the nature and importance of which changed over time without affecting the coherence of the system slowly emerging from it. Unlike its Near Eastern and Greek predecessors, Roman law emerged from the cumulative production of a large variety of lawgivers over a millennium. It was thereafter used as a source of positive law in many countries or as a model and inspiration in the so-called civil law tradition.

In a textbook (*Institutiones*) that miraculously survived until modern times, the mid-second century CE law teacher Gaius lists the sources of law (*jus*) known to him: statutes (*leges*), plebeian decisions (*plebiscita*), the senate's resolutions (*senatusconsulta*), the emperor's enactments (*constitutiones*),

the magistrates' pronouncements (*edicta*), and the jurists' opinions (*responsa*). Gaius's lawgivers are thus easily recognizable and fall into four categories: the Roman people, gathered in assemblies, in various capacities, but excluding women, resident aliens, and slaves; the Roman Senate, an oligarchic body (composed of former magistrates) whose prestige and authority bore on political life throughout Roman history; the elected—later appointed—magistrates of the Roman people, on the basis of their right to issue edicts and of their competence in controlling judicial procedure, until the Roman emperors took over most of their powers; and, more surprisingly, private individuals (*prudentes*), who issued legal opinions, often at the request of judicial authorities, to fill the juristic gaps left by all other sources of law. These various lawmakers were not equally creative and productive in Gaius's time. Although it reflects Roman law as it had developed over the last half millennium, since the mid-republican period, Gaius's list conceals the changing status of authorities in charge of lawmaking. Conspicuously absent from the list are custom and court decisions used as precedents, the basis of common law and an important source of law in civilist systems.

In Gaius's time, statutes (leges), although still very much enforced, were a thing of the past, first the result of the kings' legislating activity (*leges regiae*), soon to be entrusted to popular assemblies (*comitia*), eventually under the responsibility of republican magistrates, who gave the various laws their names (e.g., *Lex Tullia de ambitu,* named after M. Tullius Cicero, consul in 63 BCE). Statutes were drafted and proposed (*rogatio*) by magistrates, debated in the Senate and subsequently voted by one of the popular assemblies (*comitia centuriata* or *tributa,* occasionally by the *comitia curiata*), publicly proclaimed by the magistrate in charge of the process, registered in writing on wooden or bronze tablets or on stones, and exposed in a public place for everyone to take notice of and to consult. This process of lawmaking could be interrupted at any time for religious reasons (*nefas*) or by a veto from a peer or ranking magistrate or from one of the popular tribunes (*tribuni plebis*). Despite the formal and public aspects of the legislative process, statutes were often very specific in purpose, occasionally retroactive, and altogether lacking in systematization. Roman statutes were not meant to constitute anything resembling a modern law code. They were devised as ad hoc, politically motivated responses to given problems or situations.

One exception is perhaps found in the so-called *Law of the Twelve Tables,* which the historiographical tradition (Livy) assigned to a mid-fifth century BCE committee appointed to provide the city of Rome with the kind of written law code that Greek cities ascribed to lawgivers (cf. above). The 10-member committee (*decemviri*) was expected to write down existing customary/oral laws and to supplement them on the basis of analogy with existing legislation found in various Greek cities at the time. In Roman minds, the provisions of the Twelve Tables constituted the foundation of the Roman civil law (*jus civile*) and were studied by law students until the first century BCE, at least. This code, far from comprehensive, retained great authority even later because some imperial jurists (e.g., Gaius) still commented on it. No more attempt at codification was made before the late third century CE. The text is preserved in a fragmentary form thanks to quotations by literary writers, historians, and antiquarians. Its inner organization is a matter of controversy, and its content deals with private and criminal/sacral law.

Because the voting arrangement of comitial assemblies heavily favored the upper classes, the Roman plebs eventually gathered into *concilia* to vote their own statutes, the scope of which was originally limited to the plebs. This was a natural outcome of the struggle of the orders that plagued the history of Rome from the fifth to the fourth/third century BCE, according to Roman tradition. A *Lex Hortensia* of 287 BCE extended the application of plebiscita to the whole of Roman society, and much of the later republican legislation was enacted as plebiscita (for instance, the *plebiscitum Claudianum* of 218 BCE restricted the right of senators to own freight ships of a certain size; and the so-called *lex Aquilia,* also a plebiscitum traditionally dated c. 286 BCE, provided the legal basis for civil liability up to modern times). The plebs lost most of its legislative powers at the same time as the other popular assemblies, with the transition to the Principate.

Plebiscita, unlike statutes (leges), did not require the formal approval of the Senate. But the senate could also make a resolution on its own, without

the participation of popular assemblies. The *auctoritas* of the senate was such that what the *Patres* considered adequate had a binding status on the whole community and was enforced by magistrates who belonged to the same social stratum. One famous example of this is known in the context of the repression of the Bacchanalia in 186 BCE. The text of the *senatusconsultum* was preserved both as part of Livy's narrative and in a bronze inscription found in south Italy (*Ager Teuranus,* Bruttium). It regulated the rights to form religious associations and had an influence on the later law governing professional associations (*collegia*).

Magistrates' Edicts

The main and most fruitful source of private law during the republican period was, undoubtedly, the magistrates' edicts or *jus honorarium*. As they assumed their yearly functions, Roman magistrates, mostly praetors, aediles, and provincial governors (*proconsules, propraetores*), were required to announce ahead of time the framework of their judicial activities. The edict was merely a list of legal principles that the magistrate took on himself to respect and enforce in matters of private law and civil procedure. It amounted to the promise to grant a legal remedy (*actio*) in given circumstances. Legal rights were inferred from the existence of an appropriate action. According to the famous jurist Papinian (early third century CE), the praetor was thus supposed to "assist, supplement, or correct the civil law (*jus civile*)." Inexperienced magistrates had a tendency to take over some or all of their predecessors' edicts, with the result that major innovations were left to a handful of enterprising magistrates and the edict became more or less fixed as time went by. The most creative phase falls during the last century of the republican period and the early part of Augustus's reign. Under the reign of Hadrian (c. 130), the jurist Salvius Julianus turned the (urban) praetor's edict into an *edictum perpetuum,* the organization of which is reflected in later compilations (Justinian's Code and Digest).

Imperial Enactments

After the reign of Augustus, Roman emperors, as holders of the bulk of political powers, were making judicial decisions (*decreta*) and sending out orders (*mandata*) to their representatives in various parts of the empire. They were also endowed with the right to issue edicts (edicta). Besides, as the highest judicial authorities, they were the recipients of numerous petitions from officials and private individuals to which they (mostly through their chancery) responded with binding decisions (*rescripta, epistulae*). These four types of imperial enactments are called constitutiones. All constitutiones were registered in the imperial archives (*ab epistulis, a libellis*), ready to be pulled out when a similar case arose. Over the centuries, these enactments piled up and became hard to manage without proper codification. A first attempt was successfully carried out under Diocletian (284–305 CE), with the making of the Gregorian and Hermogenian codes, a compilation (and its supplement) of imperial constitutiones from Hadrian (117–138 CE) to Diocletian. Both codes are now lost but were used by Justinianic compilers to make the Justinianic Code in 529 (second edition in 534). A second endeavor of the kind resulted in the making of the Theodosian Code (438), a compilation of imperial enactments dating from Constantine (306–337) to Theodosius II (408–450), by a team of civil servants and law specialists. Most of it has been preserved or could be reconstructed on the basis of later abridgments (*Leges Romanae Barbarorum,* especially the *Breviarium Alarici*). It was also supplemented with the legislation (*Novellae*) passed by Theodosius II and his joint emperor Valentinian III after the promulgation of the Theodosian Code. The last stage of codification was made by Justinian and consisted of a selection from the Gregorian, Hermogenian, and Theodosian Codes and *Novellae,* again supplemented by *novellae* later in his reign. These codifications provide us with a rich collection of imperial enactments in the field of private and public (criminal, administrative, fiscal) law spanning more than four centuries. Most interestingly for historians of Roman law, each *constitutio* is provided with a—sometimes inacccurate—date and provenance, and organized by subject along the same line as the *edictum perpetuum*.

So is Justinian's Digest (published in 533), which preserves an impressive collection of juristic opinions going back to the early first century BCE (Quintus Mucius Scaevola) through the late third century CE (Arcadius Charisius). The jurists of the

classical period (first to mid-third century CE) were the functional descendants of the early republican pontiffs officially in charge of preserving and interpreting the civil law, and ipso facto in control of it. By the first century BCE, some people, originating mostly but not exclusively from the upper classes, were willing to assist magistrates and judges in administering justice by providing technical support in legal matters on a friendly basis (*amicitia*), as members of a consulting group (*consilium*). According to Cicero, jurisconsults were instrumental in defining abstract notions such as "malice aforethought" (*dolus*), good faith (*bona fides*), or equity (*aequitas*). The evidence from the *Digest* suggests that they did much more, commenting on all aspects of private, criminal, and administrative law and engaging in debates on legal issues. The importance of the jurists in lawmaking derives from the lack of professional expertise of both magistrates and judges in charge of the judicial system.

We do not really know how individual juristic opinions fared in courts of law at the time they were issued, but we may presume that some jurists must have enjoyed a significant authority based on the fineness of their legal thinking rather than on their political or socioeconomic background. The second-century law teacher Pomponius wrote a textbook (*Enchiridion*) on the history of Roman political institutions, with due regard to the jurists and their contribution to lawmaking up to the time of Hadrian (117–138 CE). This work has been partly preserved in Justinian's *Digest*. Pomponius recalls the case of Massurius Sabinus: Before being considered the leader of one of two schools of thought (*Sabiniani* as opposed to *Proculiani*), Sabinus was living off his wages as a teacher and reached equestrian rank only late in life, after being promoted by the emperor with the grant of a *jus respondendi,* or permission to produce (legally binding?) juristic opinions, a grant said to have been extended to others but not attested otherwise in our sources. In the late republican period, however, most jurisconsults were part of the senatorial elite. With the change to the Principate, some (e.g., Antistius Labeo) were occasionally at odds with the new political regime but nevertheless could operate freely as consultants. By the second century CE, the jurists had been absorbed by the system and were often holders of high official positions, such as praetorian or Urban prefects, consuls, provincial governors, or civil servants employed in imperial services. The great lawyers of the late second and early third centuries CE, Papinian, Ulpian, Paul, and Modestinus, were very prolific, and remained standard reference for centuries to come, even more so because the strain of great jurists dried up in the mid or late third century CE. Their status as authority in lawmaking was enhanced in the early fifth century, when Theodosius II published his law of citations (426), whereby he gave preeminence to some jurists (those cited above, in addition to Gaius) over others in solving legal issues. The lawgivers of late antiquity were the emperors and their staff, mostly the *quaestor Sacri Palatii.* However, the jurists continued to be active as consultants, lawyers, judges, or teachers. Their opinions, as opposed to those of their predecessors, seem to no longer carry force of law.

Roman Customary Law

No legal system arises out of nothing or operates in isolation. Roman law developed out of Roman customary law and next to other legal systems, which it eventually absorbed or superseded. Many legal concepts and institutions cannot be ascribed to a law and go back to undocumented times and circumstances. This is what the Romans called *mos maiorum* or ancestral tradition. Lawyers and parties could refer to it in courts. Sometimes referring to it got them a hearing; but they got a hearing more by chance than because custom was recognized as a source of law on a par with the other sources already mentioned. Laws and customs from annexed peoples found their way into Roman law. We know from Cicero that written contracts (*syngraphai, cheirographai*) were borrowed from the Greek world and recognized as valid by magistrates. Likewise, the so-called *Lex Rhodia de iactu* governing jettison possibly originated in the customary maritime law of the island of Rhodes in the classical or Hellenistic period and was commented on by classical jurists and expanded by some second or early third-century emperor. Less specifically, the jurists occasionally refer to *mos regionis* to fill voids in Roman law. Contamination could result in a hybrid legal

system as evidenced in the papyri from Graeco-Roman Egypt, showing significant discrepancies between theoretical Roman law and its practical application in a multicultural society.

All the above concern mostly Roman civil law (*jus civile*). The Romans, however, were aware of the fact that they shared some of their legal institutions with other peoples, if not with the whole of mankind, or even the animal kingdom. Justinian opens his own textbook, published in 533, with a reference to "Nature" as a teacher of law: As animals instinctively develop a kind of *matrimonium* (*coniugatio*) with a view to procreating and rearing offspring, all men endowed with a *naturalis ratio* are bound to produce universal and permanently valid laws (*jus naturale* and *jus gentium*), guaranteed by "a certain divine Providence." These were out of reach for Roman lawgivers, who were to focus instead on the more volatile and adaptable *jus civile*.

Jean-Jacques Aubert

See also Ancestral Tradition (*Mos Maiorum*); Ancient Democracy; Assembly; Cicero, Marcus Tullius; Civil Law; Equity; Justice, Theories of; Roman Commonwealth; Roman Law

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Law of Nations

The *law of nations* was the old term for what is now called international law, which purports to establish rules and obligations of sovereign states. It is obviously a special kind of law or a quite imperfect law because no international authority can enforce this law in the same way that states enforce law on their own people.

In the history of political thought, however, this seeming imperfection made the law of nations an especially attractive model for general theories of law and justice. If each national government is obligated to honor the law of nations, then that law must have, in some way, a more fundamental status than national law. The law of nations was thus held to illustrate the fundamental principles of the law of nature. Some of the most influential writers on modern natural law presented their doctrines in treatises on the law of nations.

In late antiquity, manuals on Roman law referred to an *jus gentium*—literally, law of nations. Roman jurists regarded this law as embodying minimal standards of justice, standards by which a Roman court could settle disputes involving foreign merchants. Medieval commentators, including Thomas Aquinas, refer to jus gentium in this sense as a set of generally agreed standards, elaborating principles of natural law but still firmly bound by natural law.

The modern term *international law* was coined by the English reformer Jeremy Bentham in 1789 to emphasize that this law should be limited to "mutual transactions between sovereigns" (matters *between* nations or *inter*national). The new term was quickly taken up in all European languages (*droit internationale, derecho internacional,* etc.) because the idea was already quite congenial to nineteenth-century governments, busily establishing national legal codes to standardize their own domestic law.

Yet, the most influential thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not reject natural

law—as Bentham, himself, did, in the name of the new doctrine of utilitarianism. The great texts of the early Enlightenment instead took the relations between sovereign states as illustrations of a new (although already more restricted) understanding of natural law.

Medieval thinkers had not given sustained attention to the relations between sovereign states. In medieval Europe, where the pope and the Holy Roman Empire still claimed vaguely defined governing powers over all Christendom, no local ruler conceived himself as entirely independent. Neither *sovereignty* nor *state* was a recognized term in medieval writings, let alone a familiar reality.

Modern ideas about the law of nations arose after the Reformation had broken the unity of Christendom, when energetic princes worked hard to fortify their own territories. The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (a nominal Calvinist) published his great treatise, *On the Law of War and Peace,* in 1625—in the midst of the Thirty Years War between Protestant and Catholic powers. He emphasized the rights of sovereign rulers against others, analogizing sovereign rights to property rights, exercised at the will of the owner. Grotius is often credited with providing the first systemized account of international law (in Bentham's sense of the term). Not coincidentally, Grotius was also the first to give a full and clear account of subjective rights—rights viewed from the owner's perspective, emphasizing the right to choose rather than what would be right from an outsider's perspective.

Grotius himself still invoked Aristotleian notions of human sociability to explain why sovereigns would feel obligated to obey the rules of the "great society" of rulers—what was later called the community of nations. Yet, Grotius insisted that non-Christians as well as heterodox Christian rulers could be part of this community and went to some lengths to show that rulers had no necessary obligations to their own subjects, so tyrannical rulers could also be part of this community. Almost all the rules of this very loose community rest on mutual undertakings to respect the rights of other rulers, so that, in the Grotian account, self-interest and consent—rather than older notions of natural law—play the central role in generating the law of nations.

In his *Leviathan,* Thomas Hobbes incorporated many conceptual innovations of the Grotian account and also took the Grotian setting for his starting point: The model for the "state of nature," according to Hobbes, is the condition of sovereign rulers, who remain in this natural state so long as they retain their sovereignty. John Locke's *Second Treatise* envisioned a state of nature in which there was already some natural claim to property and a duty to respect the property of others. But Locke, too, offered the relations between sovereign princes as the model for his state of nature, noting that property rights within each state rest ultimately on an agreement among rulers to respect each other's national domains. But Locke, like Hobbes, still emphasized the insecurity of the state of nature as an argument for consenting to a social contract to establish more reliable government at home.

Other writers held out more hope for international standards—if the rights of states were grounded on the instinct for self-preservation, which seemed such a reliable force in human affairs. The German jurist Samuel Pufendorf, a contemporary of Locke, published a massive treatise, *The Law of Nature and the Law of Nations.* This treatise purported to derive the law of nations from natural reason, where natural reason was associated with Hobbesian ideas about individuals acting to protect themselves.

In the following century, the Swiss diplomat Emerich de Vattel published an extremely influential treatise on the law of nations. It was studied by the American founders and may have inspired some of the phrasing in the American Declaration of Independence. Vattel tried to reconcile edifying rhetoric about rights with recognition of the hard realities of self-interest (as with the interest of neutrals to avoid resisting aggression against others) by giving priority to a voluntary law (established by the practice of states) as against the necessary law (purporting to follow the abstract logic of justice and rights).

In place of Vattel's compromises, Jean-Jacques Rousseau praised the idea of a European peace federation in his "Judgment on Perpetual Peace." The idea was elaborated more systematically in Immanuel Kant's famous essay on "Perpetual Peace." Both derided earlier writers for holding out false promises of security from a law of nations that depended on the self-interest of individual states. Both thinkers also proposed, in their other writings, an exalted vision of human freedom,

perhaps more edifying, certainly more abstract, than the natural law doctrines of their predecessors. As they sought to transcend the political necessities of the quest for security, both Rousseau and Kant ended by abandoning any notion of a natural law rooted in human nature.

The United Nations and various international human rights forums are often seen as contemporary applications of Kantian ideas. They have performed quite poorly in practice, but they continue to be sustained by a characteristic mix of cynicism and utopianism, which prevents participants from disowning institutions they do not actually respect. Early modern thinkers were less ambitious but perhaps more realistic about the sort of justice—and even the sort of peace—which the law of nations could deliver.

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See also Anarchy; Cosmopolitan Democracy; Grotius, Hugo; Kant, Immanuel; Perpetual Peace

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LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy can be broadly conceived as the acceptability of power relations. It is used in two different but not necessarily mutually exclusive ways. Those concerned with political science tend to treat legitimacy as depending on the beliefs of the individuals subject to authority. This approach is often called sociological (or attitudinal) legitimacy. It holds that an agent is legitimate if its subjects *perceive* that it possesses the right to rule. By contrast, normative legitimacy is largely prescriptive and favored by political philosophers. On this view, legitimacy is determined by moral considerations, such as whether an institution is democratic, has received its citizens' consent, and protects their human rights. Thus, an institution is legitimate if it has the right to rule and, on some accounts, if its subjects have a duty to obey its commands.

Sociological Legitimacy

Those interested in sociological legitimacy ask a number of central questions. These include: How is the legitimacy of an institution measured? Why do individuals believe certain institutions are legitimate? How many individuals need to support a regime for it to be called legitimate? In general, for a government to possess this form of legitimacy, what matters is not whether citizens like the government but whether they recognize its right to rule. A government can be unpopular among supporters of an opposition party but still be viewed as having the right to rule because it was elected in accordance with constitutional procedures and norms. Yet, if a government goes beyond its jurisdiction and contravenes the procedures and norms that are held to legitimize its rule (for example, by extending the maximum number of terms constitutionally permitted to hold office), then it may be viewed as lacking the right to rule by its population. In addition, if a regime becomes extremely unpopular, then its subjects may question the rules that are viewed as legitimizing it. For instance, citizens may question not only a particular king's rule but also the hereditary privilege of kings, arguing that this way of deciding who rules should be replaced, perhaps by a more democratic system.

Sociological accounts of legitimacy have been criticized for focusing on the individuals subject to an institution's rule rather than the institution itself. That is, an institution's legitimacy is determined by its subjects' beliefs rather than the characteristics of that agent. The problem for sociological accounts is that an agent can sometimes create and enhance its support by indoctrination and by playing on its subjects' fears and thus be supported by individuals with significant misperceptions. Indeed, a number of egregious governments throughout history have been perceived to be legitimate by much of their population.

It is important to remember, however, that strictly speaking, sociological accounts of legitimacy do not attempt to *justify* an agent's authority

by reference to the beliefs of its subjects. Rather, they attempt to explain and understand if, why, and how an institution is *perceived* to have the right to rule. For instance, the use of propaganda might mean that a government possesses sociological legitimacy, but this is not to assert that the use of propaganda is morally acceptable.

Normative Legitimacy

Normative approaches to legitimacy assert that an agent is legitimate if its rule coheres with certain moral considerations and is therefore morally justifiable. Among normative approaches, however, there is significant divergence about what constitutes a morally relevant consideration and, therefore, what is necessary for an agent to possess legitimacy.

A consequentialist approach to legitimacy holds that an agent is legitimate if it achieves good consequences. This approach itself has a number of variants. The most prominent is utilitarian: An agent is legitimate if it maximizes its subjects' (or overall) utility. Certain utilitarian approaches, however, run into difficulties with offering a convincing account of political obligation. This is relevant if we hold that legitimacy entails a duty to obey the authority's commands. In particular, direct act-utilitarian accounts struggle to explain why an individual should obey an authority's commands in situations where this would not directly maximize utility. For instance, they struggle to explain why an individual should obey traffic laws if there will be a direct benefit from disobeying them.

A leading consequentialist alternative that attempts to get around such problems is presented by moral and legal philosopher Joseph Raz. Two theses lie at the heart of Raz's account of legitimacy. First, according to the dependence thesis, a legitimate institution needs to serve the governed. That is, it must govern in conformity with the reasons that apply to its subjects (their dependent reasons). For example, a puppet government that makes decisions in response to the wishes of a foreign power, rather than the reasons that apply to its citizens, would be illegitimate. Second, according to the normal justification thesis, a legitimate institution needs to be effective at serving the governed. That is, the legitimacy of an institution depends on whether it successfully promotes its subjects' compliance with their dependent reasons. Together, the dependence and normal justification theses capture the intuition that legitimate authorities should, first, serve the governed and, second, do so effectively.

A third thesis, the preemptive thesis, entails that individuals should trust a legitimate authority's judgment on a number of issues, rather than questioning each of its commands. This is because letting a legitimate authority preempt our judgment can be the best way of securing what is important to us (our dependent reasons) in the long run. There are a number of potential reasons why this might be the case: A legitimate authority may be less likely to have a bias; deciding for oneself whether to obey the commands of an authority can cause anxiety and costs time and resources; and an authority can ensure cooperation among parties that disagree.

The main objection to consequentialist approaches to legitimacy is that, on such approaches, an agent can be legitimate because it effectively promotes its subjects' utility or dependent reasons, even though these individuals reject its rule. It seems odd to view an institution as legitimate that clearly lacks its subjects' support. For example, benevolent dictators may look after the interests of their citizens, but if these citizens clearly oppose their rule, it does not seem that the rule can be legitimate. This problem is sometimes claimed to stem from the fact that the consequentialist approach overlooks the moral significance of deep and reasonable disagreement among individuals about how society should be governed. In short, it is argued that a legitimate institution needs to be sensitive to individuals' judgments on the proper organization of society, yet this is not a requirement of the consequentialist approach.

For this reason, some prefer a democratic account of legitimacy. The argument runs as follows: There is reasonable disagreement among individuals about the correct organization of the governing institutions of society; second, given this disagreement, it is important that individuals can see themselves as being treated as equals in decisions made; and, third, democratic decision-making is the clearest way that individuals can see themselves as equals in decisions made.

These concerns about the consequentialist view also, to a certain extent, prompt the contractarian

account to legitimacy. Historically, this has been the dominant approach to legitimacy in political philosophy. The central concern of contractarians is how to reconcile individual autonomy and political coercion. In short, they assert that an agent is legitimate if the individuals under its jurisdiction have consented to its rule. Here the line between normative and sociological accounts of legitimacy can blur. Both contractarian and sociological accounts of legitimacy hold that an institution's legitimacy depends on the support or consent of its subjects. The two approaches differ fundamentally, however. The sociological approach asserts that an agent's legitimacy depends *conceptually* on the support of its subjects. By contrast, the contractarian approach holds that the consent of its subjects is necessary for an agent's legitimacy because this is *morally* required.

What form do contractarians think that this consent must take? Prima facie, express consent is most consistent with individual autonomy. An institution is legitimate only if its subjects have explicitly consented to its rule. But express consent is difficult to establish at the state level. It is rare for citizens to vote whether to belong to a particular state, and even when there are such plebiscites (such as a referendum on potential secession), the wishes of a minority may be left unsatisfied. This raises the problem of unanimous support: On a strict contractarian approach, express consent of all the individuals under the jurisdiction of a particular state is required for that state to be legitimate. This is unlikely, but without it, the state imposes its rule on one or many individuals without their permission and, therefore, in contravention of their autonomy.

One potential way around these difficulties is to turn to two other forms of consent. The first is tacit consent, whereby individuals tacitly convey their endorsement of an agent's rule. Potential indicators of tacit consent include: voting in democratic elections because by voting, citizens consent to the government's rule; not engaging in civil disobedience because by obeying the government's laws, citizens show their approval for its rule; and residing in a particular state because citizens consent to the government's rule by choosing to live under its jurisdiction. It is unclear, however, whether any of these potential indicators is reliable. To start with, citizens may abstain in elections. Alternatively, they may see their vote for a particular party as a way of securing their interests and, consequently, do not intend their vote to be an endorsement of the government's right to rule. In addition, they may not engage in civil disobedience for other reasons (e.g., to avoid punishment). Finally, individuals often have no choice but to reside in one state (e.g., they cannot afford to emigrate, and other states limit immigration).

The second alternative is hypothetical consent. Hypothetical contractarians determine the characteristics necessary for an institution to be legitimate by considering to what rational individuals would, hypothetically, consent. For instance, if asked, rational individuals would consent only to a democratically elected government with strong principles of distributive justice to limit potential inequalities. This approach places much weight on suppositions about to what rational individuals would hypothetically consent. The obvious problem is that such accounts may be mistaken. Indeed, there is substantial variation among hypothetical contractarians about what rational individuals would agree to and therefore what sorts of characteristics are necessary for an institution to possess legitimacy.

That said, the protection of basic human rights does seem to derive obviously from hypothetical consent. A government that violates the basic human rights of its citizens would not be able to win their support and therefore would be illegitimate. For this reason, the protection of basic human rights is viewed by most hypothetical contractarians as crucial for an agent's legitimacy. More generally, it is worth noting that most normative accounts hold that the effective protection of basic human rights is a necessary condition of legitimacy.

It is also worth noting that many theorists hold that a number of moral considerations are relevant for legitimacy. For example, in his generally consequentialist account, Raz allows some scope for consent and respect for the law in a secondary supportive role to the normal justification thesis, to help to meet the burden of proof required to establish legitimacy. Others hold that, in addition to the protection of basic human rights, democratic institutions are necessary for legitimacy. In a similar vein, although political scientists and political philosophers tend to draw a line between

legitimacy and legality, many normative accounts give weight to legal concerns in the overall assessment of legitimacy. That is, one factor in an institution's (normative) legitimacy is whether it governs in accordance with certain legal norms surrounding its rule. For example, a regime that illegally usurps rule may be held to be both illegal—because it contravenes the laws and constitutional provisions on the proper formation of government—and illegitimate—because these laws and constitutional provisions are morally valuable. A number of moral considerations may be relevant, then, when thinking about normative legitimacy.

Political Obligation

Normative legitimacy entails that the rule of a particular institution is justifiable because this institution meets certain moral standards. Some assert that it follows that individuals under the jurisdiction of this institution—its subjects—have a duty to obey its laws and commands. In other words, legitimacy entails political obligation. More specifically, individuals have at least a prima facie duty to obey the commands or laws of the authority, regardless of the content of these commands or laws—there exists a content-independent reason to obey. The point, then, is not that subjects are obliged to obey legitimate authorities because otherwise they will be punished or because the laws or commands are good ones. Rather, individuals are obliged to obey the directives of a legitimate authority *simply because* they are the directives of that authority. For example, we have a duty to obey the speeding laws of a legitimate state because these are the laws of the state, regardless of whether they are good laws or whether we will be fined if caught speeding.

Why might we hold that individuals have a duty to obey legitimate institutions? We saw above that Raz argues that because a legitimate authority effectively promotes its subjects' dependent reasons, the subjects will benefit from letting an authority preempt their judgment (legitimate authorities are better at getting their subjects to comply with dependent reasons than individuals are acting alone). Many contractarians also hold that individuals have a duty to obey legitimate institutions. For instance, Thomas Hobbes claims that we have given our consent to the sovereign and so are morally obliged to follow its commands in turn for its protection.

A number of theorists, however, doubt the possibility of political obligation and, as a consequence, legitimacy. These philosophical anarchists argue that individuals do not possess a content-independent duty to obey the commands of government (although they may still have a duty to obey stemming from other reasons, such as the possibility of punishment and the fact that the law is a good one). Governments do not achieve the moral standards required for legitimacy (some doubt whether such standards are in fact possible). Thus, the tying of political obligation to legitimacy leaves open the possibility that there may be no legitimate institutions.

Weaker versions of normative legitimacy, however, do not insist on a necessary connection to political obligation. They simply hold that an agent whose rule is morally justifiable is legitimate—individuals do not necessarily possess a content-independent duty to obey its commands. Such accounts may also lower the bar for the moral standards required for an agent to be legitimate.

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See also Anarchism; Authority; Consent; Hobbes, Thomas; Power; Social Contract Theory; Weber, Max

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Lenin and the Russian Revolution

The fall of the tsar in March 1917 made possible a wide-ranging struggle within Russian society that resulted eight months later in the Bolshevik Revolution. Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Party, navigated his way through the choppy waters of 1917 with a set of ideas that originated from a variety of sources. One such source can be called Old Bolshevism, that is, Bolshevism as it appeared in the years between the revolution of 1905 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914. In this earlier period, Bolshevism was primarily a Russian solution to Russian problems. A second source was the Left Zimmerwald movement, a current within European socialism that arose in 1915 as a radical response to the challenge of the war and the perceived betrayal of the majority socialists, who supported the war effort of their respective governments. Lenin was the foremost spokesman for the Left Zimmerwald movement. A third source was the hope that Russia, if led by a worker's government, could make "steps toward socialism," even in the absence of a European-wide revolution that would compensate for Russia's backwardness. This idea was an unexpected part of Lenin's 1917 program and appeared in his writings only after revolution broke out in Russia in February 1917. Yet, Lenin was careful to provide even this idea with orthodox Marxist underpinnings. Indeed, Lenin insisted on his own unoriginality. He emphatically asserted that he was merely drawing the tactical conclusions from positions accepted before the war by Europe's most prominent socialist spokesmen.

Old Bolshevism

Starting from its beginnings in the 1890s, the most urgent task facing Russian social democracy was the democratic revolution, that is, the overthrow of tsarist absolutism and the establishment of basic political freedoms. Social democrats regarded basic constitutional rights such as free speech, right of assembly, and right of association as "light and air" for the proletariat (the "light and air" metaphor was fundamental to social democratic rhetoric). Only with political freedom could the Russian proletariat follow the trail blazed by European workers, particularly the Germans, and build a large mass party that ceaselessly propagated the socialist message by all available channels.

The urgency of the goal of political freedom was something on which all Russian social democrats agreed. Also common coin was the assumption that the anti-tsarist revolution could succeed only if energetically supported by the Russian proletariat—indeed, only if the proletariat played a leadership role. In the years before 1905, Lenin had been a principal spokesman for this outlook, one that was particularly associated with the underground newspaper *Iskra*. Lenin had an almost romantic confidence about the revolutionary inclinations of the Russian workers. He was, therefore, hopeful that even a small and persecuted underground party could be the lever that would overturn Russia, as he put it in a famous passage from his book, *What Is to Be Done?* (1902). Lenin's platform in this period can by paraphrased by the exhortation: Let us build an underground party as much like the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) as is possible under tsarist absolutism, so that we can overthrow the tsar and institute the political freedom needed to build a party even more like the SPD.

As a distinctive strategy for accomplishing the urgent task of overthrowing tsarism, Bolshevism arose during the 1905 revolution and only took final shape in the following years. According to the Bolshevik analysis of Russian society, the peasantry was the only nonproletarian class that could be counted on to be thoroughly revolutionary and anti-tsarist due to the peasants' desire for land. The primary task of the Social Democratic Party was, therefore, to get the peasants to follow the lead of the revolutionary workers rather than the liberal bourgeoisie. As the Bolsheviks saw it, the liberals also wanted political freedom but were so afraid of revolutionary upheaval that they were perpetually ready to compromise with tsarism.

The Bolsheviks were so determined to carry out the democratic revolution "to the end" (*do kontsa*) that they were ready to assume governmental power in coalition with peasant parties. This readiness was a violation of the taboo felt by many social democrats against any socialist participation in a bourgeois government. The other main faction within Russian social democracy, the Mensheviks,

rejected the possibility of a "provisional revolutionary government" of this type. The Mensheviks also looked on the peasants as an unreliable and sometimes even a reactionary force. The Menshevik strategy, therefore, aimed at forcing the liberal bourgeoisie to act in a revolutionary manner. Despite the Menshevik claim to greater Marxist orthodoxy, the Bolshevik strategy received the imprimatur of two of the leading lights of European social democracy, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky.

Left Zimmerwald

Zimmerwald is a small resort town 10 kilometers south of Bern, Switzerland. In September 1915, a small group of European socialists who opposed the war met in Zimmerwald to discuss ways of ending the war. Lenin and other Russian socialists such as Iulii Martov and Karl Radek were original members of this group. Lenin was dissatisfied with the outlook of the Zimmerwald majority, so he became the principal spokesman for the current known as Left Zimmerwald. Unlike the Zimmerwald majority, Lenin wanted no talk of peace as the overriding goal. Only socialist revolution could cut off the capitalist roots of war, and socialist revolution, in the short term, might require more fighting rather than less. Lenin also felt that the Zimmerwald majority was too easy on socialists who supported the war and consequently too sentimental about the possibility of resurrecting the Second International (the international organization uniting Europe's main socialist parties prior to 1914).

Lenin summed up the tactics of Left Zimmerwald with the slogan "turn the imperialist war into a civil war!" In other words, use the crisis that was sure to be caused by the war to foment socialist revolution. The *civil war* in this slogan was meant to contrast both with the imperialist war between nations, which pitted proletarian against proletarian, and with the *civil peace* within nations. Civil peace was a pledge to suspend class struggle against the capitalists for the duration. The most famous example was the *Burgfrieden* declared in Germany by the majority leadership of the SPD—a pledge that shocked many socialists, not only those on the far left.

The Left Zimmerwald slogan translated into three main tactical demands. The first of these demands was to work for socialist revolution in Western Europe. Lenin felt no need here to prove that the objective conditions in Western Europe were ripe for a socialist revolution; (he claimed) this had been admitted before the war by all influential socialists in all advanced countries. The war had created a revolutionary situation, and it was the plain duty of any socialist to take advantage of it. Of course, to work for revolution during wartime would weaken the war effort. Lenin accepted this consequence because an imperialist war was by definition an unjust war. He realized that to urge socialists in enemy countries to weaken the war effort would be transparently hypocritical. Therefore, Lenin insisted that working for the defeat of one's own government was a litmus test for a revolutionary socialist.

The second tactical demand of Left Zimmerwald was to found a new socialist international, free of the opportunism that had brought down the Second International. Underneath Lenin's political calculations was an emotional call for purification. He argued vividly in a letter of December 1914 that the European war had at least performed this service to international socialism: It had disclosed the whole extent of the rottenness, vileness, and meanness in opportunism, thereby helping to purge the worker movement of the dung that had accumulated during the decades of peaceful socialist work.

The third tactical demand was to support non-socialist democratic movements in Europe and around the world. Many of Lenin's Left Zimmerwald colleagues felt that national self-determination was yesterday's slogan: unattainable in the age of imperialism, unneeded in the coming age of socialism. Lenin felt strongly that this issue was a litmus test of a person's democratic convictions. National self-determination was one part of a global scenario that emphasized the interaction of socialist revolution in Europe with democratic national liberation all around the world.

Lenin's Left Zimmerwald program was based solidly on ideas that (as Lenin himself insisted) were admitted before the war by all influential socialists in all advanced countries. Particularly influential for Lenin were the prewar writings of Karl Kautsky. Lenin stated in 1916 that he and his fellow Left Zimmerwaldians completely agreed with what Kautsky had been arguing prior to 1914

but that Kautsky had shifted (as Lenin put it) from Marxism to the defense of chauvinism. Lenin's steadfastly high opinion of Kautsky's prewar writings is obscured by his obsessive polemics against Kautsky's wartime writings, in which he attacked something he called *kautskianstvo*. Although this term is translated *Kautskyism,* it does not mean the ideas put forth in the canonical prewar writings of Karl Kautsky. Rather, *kautskianstvo* is the use of high-sounding revolutionary phrases to smooth over contradictions and evade action, in the manner of Kautsky after 1914. A person did not have to agree with Kautsky or even be a Marxist to be guilty of *kautskianstvo*. Lenin's acknowledged debt to Kautsky helps explain why Kautsky and *kautskianstvo* occupy such a central, even obsessive, place in his writings after 1914. Lenin hated Kautsky because he loved Kautsky's books.

Although the majority of Lenin's writings and activities after the outbreak of war in 1914 focused on Europe, the revolution in Russia still remained close to his heart. Lenin's insistence on the impending socialist revolution in Europe did not mean he abandoned his long-held view that Russia was still approaching the democratic revolution for political freedom rather than the socialist revolution. In a crucial document written in October 1915, Lenin showed how he joined Old Bolshevism with Left Zimmerwald. Here he wrote that the task of the proletariat in Russia is to carry out the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia to the end [*do kontsa*], *in order* to ignite the socialist revolution in Europe (Lenin's emphasis).

Lenin's article of October 1915 sketches out a possible scenario that later furnished the basis of the Bolshevik program in 1917. An anti-tsarist revolution in Russia brings revolutionary chauvinists to power, that is, revolutionaries whose motive in removing the tsar was that he was bungling the war effort. In this case, the Bolshevik slogan would be: "against the chauvinists, even if they are revolutionaries and republicans." The Bolsheviks strive for a second stage of the revolution, in which the proletariat assumes the leading role, supported by the "petty bourgeois peasantry" that had been pushed to the left by the burdens of war. This second stage of the revolution resurrects the soviets of 1905, acting now as the core of a new sovereign authority (*vlast*). Such a "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" would then "resolutely carry out the whole of our minimum program" and also propose a just peace. This peace proposal would not be made with any expectation of actually ending the war because the capitalist belligerents would never accept a policy of no annexations. But Russia would now be in a position to wage a just *revolutionary* war, aimed at socialist revolution in Europe and anticolonial revolution around the globe. Lenin was completely confident that a victory of the proletariat in Russia would create extraordinarily favorable conditions for the development of revolution both in Asia and in Europe, as shown earlier by the revolution of 1905 in Russia.

Thus, the idea that the highly democratic soviets created in the revolutionary storm of 1905 could become the basis of a new type of state authority was already part of Lenin's program two years before the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917. Also derived from the experience of 1905 was Lenin's insistence on smashing the counterrevolutionary potential of the army, police, and the elite bureaucracy. Due to a rereading of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels undertaken on the very eve of the outbreak of revolution in Russia, Lenin became convinced that these ideas had the posthumous blessing of the founders of Marxism. This conviction formed the basis of *State and Revolution,* written in 1917 and published in 1918.

"Steps Toward Socialism"

The combination of Old Bolshevism and Left Zimmerwald found in Lenin's theses of October 1915 is silent on one crucial question: How would the workers' government respond to the spiraling economic crises caused by the war? In the case of the European socialist revolution, Lenin had a ready answer to this question. He pointed to the centralized economic apparatus that had been created by advanced capitalism and then perfected and given vast powers by the wartime state, and he argued that a worker government would use this apparatus to move toward socialism. As he wrote in December 1916,

> If, for instance, Germany can direct the economic life of 66 million people *from a single center,* and strain the energies of the *narod* to wage a predatory war in the interests of 100 or 200 financial

> magnates or aristocrats, the monarchy, etc. then the *same* can be done, in the interests of nine-tenths of the population, by the non-propertied masses, if their struggle is directed by the purposive workers, liberated from social-imperialist and social-pacifist influence Expropriate the banks and, relying on the masses, carry out in their interests the *very same thing* WUMBA is carrying out in Germany!

WUMBA stands for *Waffen- und Munitionsbeschaffungsamt,* or Weapons and Ammunition Supply Department—a symbol of the massive state takeover of the economy caused by the war in Germany and in all the belligerent countries.

Any suggestion that this logic could be applied to backward Russia, even in the absence of a socialist revolution in more advanced countries, can be found in Lenin's writings only after the outbreak of revolution in Russia. In an unpublished draft penned on April 8, 1917, the day before Lenin boarded the sealed train that would take him from Switzerland to Russia, he called for measures of economic regulation that he believed would mark the transition to socialism. He granted that socialism could not be achieved in Russia directly, at one stroke, without transitional measures, but he insisted vehemently that socialism was quite achievable and, indeed, urgently necessary as a result of such transitional measures.

This new note was sounded publicly but tentatively in the famous April Theses set forth by Lenin as soon as he arrived in Russia. Although the idea of "steps toward socialism" in backward Russia was a new one, Lenin took care to justify it with traditional Marxist arguments. In the works that best set forth his program for 1917—*The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Deal with It* and *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?*—he argues that trustification within the advanced sectors of the Russian economy, the power of the banks, and the regulatory institutions set up by the tsarist government during the war constituted a solid base for possible steps toward socialism. In fact, movement toward socialism was inevitable—*if* the government responded in a vigorous way to the economic breakdown that was destroying Russian society. But, in Lenin's view, the government's response depended entirely on its class basis.

Take the Power!

Ultimately, the success of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in 1917 was based on the success of the message they sent to the workers, soldiers, and peasants. This message can be conveyed with three words and a punctuation mark: "Take the power!" *Power* here translates *vlast,* a word that could also be translated as "sovereign authority," the ultimate source of legitimacy and decision making. Everybody in Russia realized that the key question that confronted the country after the abdication of the tsar was the identity of the vlast. Everybody realized that only a *tverdaia* vlast, a strong and tough-minded sovereign authority, could effectively respond to the multiple crises buffeting the Russian society.

The Bolsheviks insisted that "the nature of the class that holds the vlast decides everything"—and they meant *everything.* They told the Russian *narod* that as long as the vlast was controlled by their enemies—the landowner, the capitalist, the *burzhui* in whatever form—the imperialist war would continue, the economic collapse would continue, the postponement of radical land reform would continue. Troubles would cease only when the workers as a class took the power and fulfilled their historical mission of leading the *narod* to revolutionary victory.

The Bolshevik slogan of "take the power!" was in striking contrast to the political program of the moderate socialists, who felt that coalition with liberals and other bourgeois forces was necessary. This coalition strategy was embodied in the Provisional Government that was set up immediately after the fall of the tsar. At first, the socialists intended only to support the Provisional Government while remaining outside it, but the pressure of events forced them to take a more and more visible role in the various cabinets that came and went so rapidly in 1917. The moderate socialists became thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the masses by the manifest failure of the Provisional Government to put an end to the interlocking spiral of economic, social, and military crises.

Distinct from the Provisional Government, and more and more hostile toward it, were the soviets created almost immediately after the fall of the tsar. The Bolshevik slogan "All power to the soviets!" was a practical equivalent for "take the

power!" The soviets were class-based institutions that excluded the bourgeoisie by definition. As the year went on, many activists from the other socialist parties began to reject the idea of coalition and to subscribe to a program of soviet power, not restricted to any one party.

Lenin insisted that only a vlast based on the workers and peasants could respond effectively to the national crisis. His concrete policy suggestions were based on the three layers of his evolving political outlook. From prewar Old Bolshevism came the first, land to the peasants. Just as in 1905, Lenin now insisted that local peasant committees take over the land on their own initiative (and he added some thoroughly unrealistic assurances that the result would not be chaos but greater order).

From the layer of wartime Left Zimmerwald, Lenin took peace for the peoples. In accordance with Left Zimmerwald doctrine, the ultimate aim of his projected peace initiative was to spark socialist revolution in the advanced capitalist countries. When the war-weary population of the belligerent countries realized that their governments were actively preventing a just democratic peace, they would rise up in revolt.

Finally, from the most recent layer of "steps toward socialism" came the policy that can be called WUMBA for the people. Lenin convinced himself that the kind of wide-ranging regulation of economic life found in countries like Germany could solve Russia's gargantuan crisis—but only a truly revolutionary, truly democratic vlast would have the energy and nerve to carry it out. "Make a socialist revolution!" was therefore not the heart of the Bolshevik message in 1917, but rather: "create a vlast based on workers and peasants!"

Lenin's Wagers

In Bolshevik eyes, the October revolution represented the establishment of a truly proletarian vlast and the beginning of the long journey along the path to socialism. Lenin's program of 1917 represented a series of wagers on what a proletarian vlast could accomplish. For about a year and a half after the October revolution, Lenin remained confident that the wager would soon pay off. But as the months and years dragged on, Lenin was forced to defer many of his dreams. The introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the decriminalization of the previously underground free trade in grain in spring 1921 were only the most dramatic steps in a process of rethinking and retreat that began at the latest in 1919.

Out of the three sources of Lenin's 1917 program—Old Bolshevism, Left Zimmerwald, and "steps toward socialism"—the most successful wager was the one taken from Old Bolshevism. The wager that a workers' government could obtain enough peasant support to bring about a vast social transformation of Russia was put to the severest test possible during the civil war but was finally vindicated.

In 1917 and 1918, Lenin had ambitious hopes that the vast economic crisis would stimulate the peasants toward collective, and therefore "higher" forms of agriculture production. In 1919 and 1920, he was forced to admit the collapse of these hopes. In stark contrast to Stalin in 1930, Lenin responded to the failure of a voluntary move toward collective agriculture by insisting all the more strongly that violence could not be applied to force the peasants to adapt higher forms of production.

The Left Zimmerwald wager on revolution in Europe failed almost completely, forcing the Bolsheviks to seek trade relations with bourgeois governments and to foment revolution in what would later be called the third world. The wager on "steps toward socialism" also came up short, and the Bolsheviks were fully aware of the enormous compromises required by the civil war (contrary to a widespread misconception that the so-called "war communism" of 1919–1920 was viewed by the Bolsheviks as a "leap into socialism"). A massive underground market, highly inegalitarian incentive methods in nationalized industry, a growing "new bourgeoisie" made up of speculators and middlemen—these were some of the capitalist features of the Soviet economy, even before NEP.

While acknowledging all these bitter realities, Lenin believed to the end that the most fundamental wager had indeed paid off. "Proletarian power" had been established and successfully defended in Soviet Russia.

Lars T. Lih

See also Marxism

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LEVELLERS

The Levellers agitated for social, political, and economic reform during the English civil war. They advocated a representative national government based on frequent elections and a broad franchise. They called for a written constitution that guaranteed freedom of conscience, banned trading monopolies, and prohibited military conscription, and they sought to eliminate the political power of the king and House of Lords. The Levellers did not describe themselves as democrats, liberals, or republicans, but they gave voice to essential aspects of each of these modern theories of government.

As a political movement, the Levellers were important for what they did as well as for what they said. They organized petitions that challenged the supremacy of Parliament. They mobilized soldiers and junior officers, disputing the authority of commanders. And they published pamphlet after pamphlet, hundreds in all, to educate and energize the English people. Although the Levellers did not use terms like *popular sovereignty* and *the public sphere,* they helped create the settings within which these concepts thrive.

The leaders of the Leveller movement—John Lilburne, Richard Overton, and William Walwyn—first became acquainted in 1645. Individually and then collaboratively, they argued for freedom of conscience and religious toleration. Starting from these spiritual and ecclesiastical concerns, they turned quickly to reconsider basic postulates of the English polity.

The official manifesto of the Leveller movement was the Agreement of the People. Distinct yet overlapping versions were issued in November 1647, December 1648, and May 1649. Ironically, the intellectual foundation for the Agreement was provided by the very government it sought to reform. In 1642, Parliament defended its decision to take up arms against the king by appealing to the politics of necessity. A "malignant party" surrounded the king, corrupting his judgment and threatening the nation's survival. The ancient maxim *salus populi suprema lex*—the good of the people is the highest law—justified extraordinary measures. According to parliamentary spokesman Henry Parker, "as some precedents ought not to be rules for us to follow, so none can be limits to bound our proceedings."

Parliament presented itself as the essence of the kingdom, "the very people itself artificially congregated, or reduced by an orderly election, and representation." Initially, the Levellers did not challenge this article of faith. But in the spring of 1647, conservative Presbyterians seized control of the government and threatened to end the war by imposing religious uniformity, disbanding the New Model Army, and restoring the king. The Levellers seethed with rage. Parliament could no longer be trusted to protect the common weal. For the first time, the Levellers spoke of returning to a state of nature; for the first time, they called for a movement of armed resistance; for the first time, they promoted their own "way of settlement." The "free Commons of England" was "the real and essential body politic," and it—"or any part of it"—was empowered to preserve the nation.

In this context, the General Council of the Army assembled at Putney to debate the first version of the Agreement of the People. Scholarly

attention has focused on a heated exchange over the franchise. Colonel Thomas Rainborough's riveting claim that "the poorest he that is in England, hath a life to live, as the greatest he," was met by Commissary-General Henry Ireton's equally commanding assertion that only those with "a permanent fixed interest" were entitled to vote. Broadening the franchise was of unquestionable importance to the Levellers. Other momentous issues included whether soldiers were free to disobey the commands of Parliament. The Levellers argued that "unlawful engagements" ought not to be kept. Ireton was unsettled by this claim and countered that if "covenants freely made" and "freely entered into" were not kept, then social order was not possible.

At stake in the Putney debates was not whether there would be constitutional change, but who had the right to define it. Ireton's devotion to the ethic of promise keeping contained an important premise: Soldiers should remain soldiers and allow crises to be resolved by their superiors. The Levellers, by contrast, advocated a broad distribution of political judgment. The first three articles of the Agreement called for frequent elections, a broader franchise, and more equal representation. The fourth and final article, in turn, imposed procedural and substantive limits on the powers of the government.

Contemporary scholars sometimes argue that liberalism and democracy are in tension with each other: The protection of rights appears to threaten the rule of the people. To the Levellers, however, self-government and limited government were inseparable: "the freedoms of this nation will never be secure, until the extent of the power and trust of the people's representatives, and the people's reservations to themselves, be clearly declared."

Leveller power rested on the weakness of others. As long as the leaders of the army and Parliament needed their support, they were able to advance their goals. By mid-1649, however, Oliver Cromwell successfully reasserted military discipline, and the Rump Parliament—having abolished both monarchy and House of Lords—held sway over the government. The Levellers were crushed. Memory of their vibrant ideas and daring practices was lost in the mists of history, only to be rediscovered in the late nineteenth century when transcripts of the Putney debates first came to light. The Levellers have been at the center of debates over the history and meaning of liberal, democratic, and republican ideas ever since.

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See also Common Law; Democracy; Hobbes, Thomas; Liberalism; Republicanism; Social Contract Theory

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LIBERALISM

Liberalism is the label for a diverse family of views and practices that began to take shape in England and Europe in the wake of the Protestant Reformation, emerged in several countries as a powerful force in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and now dominates political discourse throughout much of the world. The interests of this family's many branches extend into matters of government, the organization of society, and the nature of a good life for human beings. Although these branches are loosely united by shared commitments to a set of values and institutional arrangements, they are also susceptible to quarrels and even bitter estrangements.

Early History

The terms *liberal* and *liberalism* acquired their modern meanings gradually throughout Europe

over the first few decades of the nineteenth century, beginning with Napoleon Bonaparte's use of the phrase *idées libérales* in his Proclamation of the 18th Brumaire 1799. In 1810, a faction in the Spanish Cortes that opposed royal absolutism adopted the label as its own, and within a decade, liberalism had entered the English lexicon to signify the holding of liberal opinions in politics or theology. In the early years of the century, English writers often adopted the Spanish form *liberales* to give the label a pejorative connotation—ironically, because the Spanish advocates of liberalism had from the beginning invoked John Locke and other Anglophone authorities in support of their cause. Only in the 1860s did the radical wing of the whigs in British politics begin to call themselves the Liberal Party, about the same time as the Liberal Republicans began to use the label in the United States and a half-century before it was deployed consistently in American political discourse. Thus, the liberal tradition of political thought was originally constructed retrospectively by writers who discovered affinities between their own values and those of earlier thinkers who sought to limit the reach of political authority.

Liberalism emerged as the product of two intertwined developments in early modern Europe. The first was the creation of modern states with the concomitant emergence of semi-autonomous civil societies. The second and roughly contemporaneous development was the invention and spread of a set of values and priorities that broke with the religious traditions that had prevailed in feudal and clerical practice in medieval Europe.

In contrast to other political formations, including the manorial and feudal systems that prevailed in much of medieval Europe as well as earlier and contemporaneous empires, the modern state is characterized by authority that is centralized, extensive, and comprehensive to an unprecedented degree. Although the feudal system, which was based on a network of reciprocal relations in which superiors provided protection in return for obedience and service from those below them in a hierarchy, was arguably rather comprehensive by virtue of the obligations it imposed on vassals and villains, it was highly decentralized. While imperial authority was extensive, it was not at all comprehensive because regions or provinces normally retained considerable autonomy. The modern state, then, is a distinctive formation that deploys concentrated power and adopts standardized techniques to maintain order and extract revenues. At the same time, the modern state draws most of its strength and vitality from a flourishing civil society, which is made possible by a separation of the institutions, powers, and rights of property from those of sovereignty, a separation that was absent in the manorial and feudal systems that prevailed in Europe before the early modern era.

The gradual differentiation of state and civil society contributed to the formation of liberalism in two major ways. First, the standardized techniques and measures on which both modern states and modern long-distance systems of exchange depend included the adoption of uniform codes and rules. For both the state's newly extensive and elaborate structure of authority and extended markets to operate efficiently, a clearly defined and widely applied system of rights and obligations was required. The development of these systems, which came to maturity with the French Revolution and the collapse of the *ancien régime* toward the end of the eighteenth century, provided the intellectual basis for claims about the rights of individuals, which were commonly conceived as expressions of their formally equal civic status.

Second, the concentration of power that underpinned claims of absolute sovereignty in the seventeenth century, coupled with the growth of dispersed power in an emergent civil society, led to objections and resistance to abuses of power by states. Thomas Hobbes, the preeminent theorist of the early modern state, argued in 1651 that no state can be viable over the long term unless it includes some person or body of persons who possess "absolute and arbitrary" sovereign power, adding the deliberately provocative claim that there is no real difference between tyranny and sovereignty. Liberals from Hobbes's time onward have found this claim both preposterous and dangerous, and they have sought to refute it by counterposing inherent rights and liberties of individuals against the state.

The second development that helped spawn liberalism was a shift in religious values and priorities. In retrospect, the most conspicuous early sign of this shift can be found in the writings of the Protestant reformers, especially Martin Luther. Repudiating the prevailing teachings and practices

of the Catholic Church, Luther insisted that Christian faith involves a direct relationship between the individual and God, requiring no institutional intermediary, such as a priest or a church. Luther's own attitudes and assumptions were no more liberal than those of his Catholic antagonists. Like them, he believed that there exists a single correct set of beliefs about matters of ultimate importance and a single right way of life for human beings. His principal difference with Catholic orthodoxy lay in his insistence that each individual Christian should grasp and believe in these truths, rather than trusting to ecclesiastical institutions for spiritual guidance. This line of thought naturally encouraged the conclusion that nothing could be more important to a person than freedom of conscience and, by extension, the freedom to shape his or her own life in accordance with his or her beliefs.

Luther and other early reformers believed that once Christians were freed of the encumbrances of clerical authority and church traditions, they would find their way to the one correct interpretation of Christian scriptures and the one true way of Christian life. In fact, the Reformation spawned a rapid proliferation of doctrinal differences, the formation of a large variety of rival churches and sects, and ultimately protracted violent conflict among protagonists with deep religious and other differences. To avoid the resulting destruction and expense, rulers began, often grudgingly, to accept the coexistence of rival faiths within their own territories and in neighboring states. This policy of religious toleration began as an expedient. Only later would social critics depict it as required by moral and religious principle.

Even as an expedient, however, the policy of toleration signaled a shift in priorities from a value system that at least ostensibly placed highest priority on salvation and the world to come to one that, as a practical matter, treated the lives, liberty, and well-being of individuals as the preeminent priority of policy. As this shift gradually took hold, the Lutheran commitment to the idea of freedom of conscience came unmoored from Luther's assumption that this freedom would lead people ineluctably to embrace the one true way of life. The idea of freedom of conscience began to acquire a truly liberal character. It gradually became associated with the anti-Lutheran assumption that there is *no* one true way of life, at least not one that is accessible to finite human beings on this Earth. With this transformation, the central values on which liberalism rests had emerged.

Political Ideas

The theory of liberal constitutionalism was the first and most basic model of a liberal political regime. It seeks to arrange institutions so that they disperse power as widely as possible while preserving sufficient concentration of power to maintain the security of individuals and to enforce the law. This theory, which was developed by John Locke, the baron de Montesquieu, James Madison, and others, was a response to the theory and practice of royal absolutism. Four points, including accretions to the theory after Locke's time, constitute the framework of the theory. First, the power of rulers should be limited by clear definitions of the scope of their authority and by a division of governing authority into discrete functions performed by separate individuals or bodies of individuals (separation of powers). Second, rulers should be constrained by the rule of law. In other words, they should rule by promulgating laws that are knowable to all as well as general in form and universal in application, so that they apply to the rulers as well as to all other citizens. Third, the state must respect certain rights of individuals, including a right to religious freedom and a right to own and to transfer private property. Fourth and finally, the theory asserts that the authority of rulers rests ultimately on the consent of the ruled.

The Enlightenment produced a new branch of liberal thinking that soon came to compete with and sometimes overshadow its original growth. Although Locke and other early writers in the constitutionalist tradition often made bold claims, their objectives were limited, in part because they remained wedded to the assumption that the capacity of human beings to reshape their social world is quite modest. A century after Locke, many thinkers, inspired by the success of Newtonian mechanics, had cast this assumption aside. These thinkers believed that human beings are capable in principle of comprehending the social world, discerning the laws of nature that determine the ways in which it works, and, with this knowledge, designing institutions that would lead to the elimination of a host

of miseries and imperfections. The wary and essentially defensive stance of the early liberal constitutionalists was replaced in some quarters by a rationalist faith that envisaged the accomplishment of ambitious social objectives.

This more ambitious outlook led to the growth of two extraordinarily influential ideas. One of these was nurtured by liberal thinkers from its inception. The other was initially developed outside the tradition and was only gradually integrated into later liberal thought. The first idea is what Adam Smith called the system of natural liberty and later thinkers often call the market system. Smith argued that the primary engine for the generation of wealth is the division of labor and that it works most efficiently when it is based on a decentralized system of decision making by private individuals and businesses. He also argued that in this kind of economic system, human relations are based on equality and reciprocity instead of entrenched differences of status and privilege. In this vision, human relationships are thoroughly voluntaristic.

The affinity between this set of ideas and liberal values is clear. The idea of a system of natural liberty seemed to embody the liberal commitment to the freedom of individuals to shape their lives in accordance with their own values while at the same time securing the conditions of economic well-being. The principal political implication of this idea is that governmental power should be restricted to the provision of security and the enforcement of just laws, which enable people to engage in private planning and reach enforceable agreements with one another. This idea is central to the branch of the liberal tradition that is commonly called classical liberalism.

The second major idea that grew out of the Enlightenment is that of a state that is bureaucratically regulated to achieve defined social objectives. Originally developed by philosophical radicals like Jeremy Bentham and nonliberal thinkers such as Henri de Saint-Simon, the idea of a regulatory state was especially attractive to those liberals who feared that individuals' rightful entitlements might be threatened by social and economic inequality. As Adam Smith himself recognized, the system of natural liberty encourages the accumulation of private resources and private power. As a counterweight, many liberals have hoped that a powerful state that administers laws and regulations in a rational manner might combat the accumulation of private power as well as guaranteeing to all its members at least a minimal level of welfare. This line of thinking can be discerned in the work of such self-described liberals as T. H. Green, L. T. Hobhouse, and more recently, John Rawls.

The primary drawback of the regulatory state is that it concentrates power in the hands of politicians and administrators. This tendency is mitigated by democratic institutions and procedures, which force politicians to act with some degree of responsiveness to an electorate. As we have seen, the theory of liberal constitutionalism as envisaged by Locke already held that the authority of rulers rests ultimately on the consent of the ruled. Madison and the other drafters of the Constitution of the United States incorporated this principle into their constitutional design while imposing numerous checks on popular power, which they feared might otherwise lead to a tyranny of the majority.

During the nineteenth century, many liberals, led by James Mill toward the beginning and John Stuart Mill at mid-century, began to support some degree of democratic control of political leaders, and in the twentieth century, most liberals have consistently endorsed democratic political institutions in some form. But democratic institutions cut both ways, in some respects supporting while in others undermining liberal values. Although democratic institutions return some power to the people that would otherwise be wielded by political leaders responsible to no one except themselves, they return that power to the people as a collectivity, not as individuals. Liberals who believe that individuals should be as free as possible to shape their lives in accordance with their own values have reason to be troubled by the kind of concentrated private power that seems to be an inevitable consequence of minimally regulated market systems. But they also have grounds for deep concern about the concentration of power that is characteristic of modern regulatory states, even when their leaders are subject to democratic controls.

Social Theory

The notion of consent has played a significant role in legal and political thinking since ancient times.

The principle of *volenti non fit injuria*—where consent has been given, there is no injustice—was central to the Greek and Roman laws of contract, and in ancient Hebrew writings, the notion of consent played an important if ambiguous role in the conception of the covenant the Israelites received from their God. In the wake of the post-Lutheran emphasis on the freedom of individuals to shape their lives in accordance with their own beliefs and values, however, the idea of consent assumed a considerably larger role, one that came to dominate liberal social theory.

Thomas Hobbes's adoption of the idea of a contract as the centerpiece of his political theory in the mid-seventeenth century provides a robust preview of the role of consent in later liberal thought. To be sure, Hobbes was no liberal. He was a vigorous defender of political absolutism and a critic of the nascent theory of liberal constitutionalism, which had been used in his own day to justify parliamentary rebellion against the Crown. He was also, however, a highly unorthodox proponent of absolutism, who argued that political authority is based neither on a natural hierarchical order of things nor on a divine right of kings, but on a contractual agreement among free and equal human beings. Moreover, Hobbes applied the ideas of consent and contract to domains of social life that are far removed from politics as it is ordinarily conceived. Even the family, he argued, is based on a contract in which children consent to obedience in return for the protection they receive from parents. His wide application of the ideas of contract and consent prefigures the liberal social theory that flowered more than a century later.

The idea that social relations should approximate as nearly as possible to contractual relations among equals is at the heart of liberal social theory. We have already taken note of Adam Smith's idea of a system of natural liberty. One of Smith's arguments in favor of that system was that it would lead to unprecedented wealth. Of equal or greater importance to Smith, however, was the argument that the system of natural liberty is incompatible with relations of servitude—that is, of domination and submission. Along with Immanuel Kant, the philosophical radicals, and many others, Smith believed that entrenched differences of status and privilege are incompatible with human dignity. Most of these thinkers assumed that agents should enjoy the fruits of their own achievements and be held responsible for their own shortcomings, but they should not enjoy privileges or suffer deprivations that are unearned.

From a microcosmic point of view, the idea that humane social relations should ideally reflect consensual agreements among equals was appealing for two reasons. First, it can reasonably be assumed that in the absence of force, fraud, or gross misinformation, people will enter into contractual relations freely only when they expect to gain from those relations. This encourages the conclusion, drawn by many liberals, that social relations must be mutually beneficial to the extent that they are contractual. Second, the idea of contract was appealing because that idea seemed uniquely appropriate to a conception of individuals as free and responsible individuals. Kant gave special emphasis to this tight connection in his moral philosophy.

The history of liberal social theory can be told as the story of how the notion of human relations as contractual relations was applied in increasingly radical ways to undermine a succession of privileges and status inequalities, from inequalities of class to inequalities of gender and beyond. By the late nineteenth century, commentators often observed that the basis of social relations in the most highly developed societies had shifted from community to society, from being dominated by status relations that are inherited or ascribed to being dominated by relations of a contractual character.

Yet, the resulting vision of society as an immense network of contractual relations is bedeviled by difficulties with which liberals in the twentieth century and beyond have struggled, with limited success. First, in many instances, such as in numerous employment relations, the parties to contractual agreements typically are unequal with respect to bargaining power and information. Where this is true, contractual relations may protect rather than abolish relations of domination and dependency. This is no trivial issue, for it arises in some extremely important contexts—employment and marital relations, for example.

Second, even if a contractual relationship is beneficial to both (or all) those who are parties to that relationship, contractual agreements frequently have harmful effects—or *externalities,* as they are labeled in the economic literature—on people who

are not parties to the agreement. Examples include agreements among commercial and industrial parties that result in the dumping of undesirable by-products (pollution) and agreements that amount to collusion or monopolistic behavior. Many of these externalities can be and have been reduced or eliminated by regulation, but the fact is that those regulations limit and restrain the freedom to engage in contractual relations prized by liberal social theory.

Human Flourishing

Sometimes (particularly in the closing decades of the twentieth century), it has been argued that liberal political theory is independent of any substantive conception of the good life or of any particular theory of the ultimate ends of life. Indeed, some liberal writers have argued that a stance of neutrality with respect to the ultimate ends of life is the essence of liberalism. There is a sense in which these assertions are accurate, but it is a narrow sense.

It is certainly true that a commitment to toleration of a considerable range of conceptions of the ultimate ends of life is among the most fundamental of all liberal tenets. Yet, this claim itself imposes limits on the range of liberal toleration, limits that liberal political theorists have sometimes found it difficult to set. The kind of life liberals have generally valued is a life of individual autonomy. The best sort of life, according to this view, is one in which individuals ascertain their distinctive values and shape—or in the more dramatic language some liberals deploy, *create*—their own lives to accord with those values. It follows from the idea that a good life is a life of individual autonomy that the choice of one's ultimate ends is a strictly individual choice that should not be dictated by the political institutions or social arrangement that shape the society within which one lives. In this sense, a liberal conception of human flourishing is committed to a stance of neutrality with respect to the ultimate ends of life. However, it also follows from the same idea that a good life is one in which individuals choose their ends and shape their lives in accordance with them. In this latter sense, liberals are committed to a highly substantive conception of human flourishing.

One way to reveal the character of this conception of human flourishing is to contrast it with some of its rivals. The liberal idea of individual autonomy is at odds with the notion that it is good for human beings to submit to any external authority that is beyond their understanding. It is inimical to the notion that a life in which individuals accept roles that are prescribed for them or in which they accede to ends that are given to them, rather than to ends they prescribe for themselves, can be a good life. It is hostile to the notion the some human beings might thrive in relations of dependence. Typically at least, liberals value lives of self-assertion over those of submission. They value active personalities over passive ones, independence over dependence, freedom and self-creation over acceptance of predefined values, norms, and roles. This liberal conception of human flourishing is expressed most vividly in the writings of Smith, Kant, W. von Humboldt, John Stuart Mill, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and John Dewey; and among more recent writers, Joseph Raz and John Rawls. It is a particular conception that is incompatible with some, although not all, understandings of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Although most of the earlier liberal writers were keenly aware of the divide between the idea of human flourishing they endorsed and the conceptions they were rejecting, some recent writers either have expressed only a hazy awareness of this divide or have dismissed it as unimportant. To them, it is unthinkable that any person could defend one of the more traditional conceptions of human flourishing if that person has fully understood the liberal idea. However, the superiority of the liberal ideal of individual autonomy is not self-evident. Many people flourish without being autonomous. In the end, there may be powerful reasons to prefer the kind of society and polity in which a norm of individual autonomy is widely accepted as the favored model of human flourishing over any kind of society that endorses and attempts to enforce an alternative norm. However, liberals will not be able to make the case for this preference as long as they adhere to the norm of individual autonomy as an article of faith or pretend that it is not a contestable ideal of human flourishing.

Liberal Prospects

In the political domain, modern liberalism is riven by internal tensions between those who think that

underlying liberal values will best be served if market systems flourish as fully and freely as possible and those who, mindful of the gross inequalities to which relatively pure market systems lead, favor a robust regulatory state. It is also divided by a tension between these two schools of thought, both of which grew out of the optimistic rationalism of the Enlightenment, and the earlier liberalism that focused more narrowly on avoiding or combating tyranny. The Enlightenment faith in the capacity of human beings to comprehend the social world and to design institutions that will overcome its most serious imperfections has not been borne out as fully as its early proponents hoped. Yet, where constitutional democracies have taken root, they have reduced the potential for tyrannical rule dramatically. Where market systems have flourished in concert with at least moderate regulatory regimes and institutions for welfare, they have significantly alleviated the social and economic pathologies that in earlier periods resulted in severe immiseration.

In social theory, liberalism has continued its long-standing pattern of growth into new territory while being checked from time to time by social forces that have resisted the conversion of virtually all social relations into contractual relations. The feminist movement, which originated with the campaigns for women's suffrage and for widespread acceptance of birth control, gathered force in the last third of the twentieth century largely on the strength of a conception of marital relations as contractual relations between equal partners. At the same time, the family has been a major locus of backlash against the advance of liberal social ideals. At least in the United States, one of the countries in which the feminist movement has advanced the furthest, the idea of the traditional family based on predefined gender roles has enjoyed a significant resurgence in popularity for the past generation, at least. The popularity of the idea of freedom of contract probably peaked in the nineteenth century. Again and again, governments have pushed back against the growth of the regulatory state, with some success, but the age of *laissez-faire* and *caveat emptor,* to the extent to which it ever existed, seems now to be relegated to a distant, almost-forgotten era.

In the early twenty-first century, liberals face challenges that go well beyond these long-standing tensions. It is not clear how extensive the liberal tradition's resources are for facing some of the major problems on the horizon, including the problems posed by an international state system that remains relatively anarchical and is composed of states spanning a broad spectrum, from the very strong to those that have failed altogether; the difficulties created by a rapidly evolving world economic system in which crucial decisions are made by leaders whose lines of responsibility to those whose interests they ostensibly serve are tenuous at best; and the dilemmas posed by powerful forces of nationalism and knotty questions about how and where to draw boundaries between political communities. Yet, the most momentous questions liberals face today are those that put into play the values at the heart of the liberal tradition. Can liberals find a basis for rational conversation with nonliberals and antiliberals—with people who do not accept the historic liberal commitment to the freedom of individuals to shape their lives in accordance with beliefs and values those individuals have subjected to rational scrutiny? Can liberals recognize the dignity in lives that are *not* lived in accordance with or in pursuit of the ideal of individual autonomy without relinquishing their commitment to that ideal? If not, then the prospects for liberalism as an ultimately persuasive conception are bleak because the alternative to rational persuasion is the use of force.

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See also Autonomy; Equality; Justice, Theories of; Liberalism, Contemporary; Libertarianism; Liberty; Modus Vivendi; Rights; Rule of Law

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Liberalism, Contemporary

The political theory of contemporary liberalism is dominated by the figure of John Rawls. In his two most famous works, *A Theory of Justice* (1971) and *Political Liberalism* (1993), Rawls fashioned more or less demanding liberal conceptions of political morality that represent the point of departure for alternative liberal and nonliberal conceptions.

To understand debates within contemporary liberalism fully, we must draw a distinction between the political principles that it propounds and the fundamental philosophical ideals on the basis of which those principles are defended. The political principles of contemporary liberalism pertain to the regulation of major social, political, and economic institutions. In this regard, contemporary liberalism affirms the toleration of diverse ways of living and beliefs, or what Rawls calls "conceptions of the good." Liberal toleration finds expression in its affirmation of various civil and political liberties—the freedoms of conscience, speech, and association, as well as democratic freedoms and protection against discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or sexuality. A second distinctive feature of contemporary liberalism is its ambition to reduce the deep and extensive inequalities that beset contemporary industrial societies. Indicative of this ambition are liberal principles of equal opportunity, which seek to improve social mobility, and variously formulated proposals to reduce inequalities of income or to make such inequalities work to everyone's advantage.

A variety of interpretations of the liberal ideals of freedom and equality have been propounded, and there are ongoing significant disputes within liberal thought over political principles and policy: about the limits of toleration and the character of its hostility to the various inequalities that beset the contemporary world. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that liberals share a commitment to a number of principles that distinguish them from alternative conceptions of political morality, such as libertarianism.

Liberalism and Libertarianism

Libertarians share liberal beliefs concerning toleration and the protection of freedom, but they do so on the basis of a commitment to rights of self-ownership and private property. These commitments lead many libertarians to depart from liberal views. This is clearest with respect to socioeconomic matters. For example, whereas liberals insist that discrimination by employers on grounds of race or sex is unjust, libertarians claim that there is no enforceable obligation on private property holders to exercise their property rights in a nondiscriminatory manner. Similarly, while liberals define an individual's economic entitlement by reference to what that individual would enjoy under economic arrangements that are designed to achieve a fair distribution of resources between citizens, libertarians like Robert Nozick offer a conception of entitlement in which taxation of income from work is theft and the voluntary transfer of monetary resources, by gift or exchange, must be free of regulation by the state.

Less commonly appreciated is how liberal and libertarian commitments to freedom differ. Liberals regard the basic freedoms they value—freedom of conscience, expression, alienation, and democratic

rights—as inalienable, that is, individuals do not enjoy the power to transfer these freedoms to others via a voluntary contract. By contrast, libertarians treat these freedoms as part of a bundle of rights that protect self-ownership and private property, freedoms that can be voluntarily transferred to others. For example, Nozick grants individuals the right to sell themselves into slavery and, indeed, his view requires the state to enforce contracts of this kind.

Political Principles (I): Neutrality and Perfectionism

While a commitment to principles of political morality that honor freedom and equality is the common core of contemporary liberalism, there is no such agreement with respect to how liberal principles and institutions are further specified or best defended.

For example, although liberals are identified in part by their adherence to toleration, they disagree over whether it is the appropriate business of the state to take a stand on controversial questions of the good life and to promote valuable forms of living through the use of its powers. Those powers include the use of the criminal law to prohibit damaging lifestyles, or more modestly, the use of educational institutions to cultivate valuable conceptions of the good, or the deployment of the state's powers with respect to subsidizing or taxing certain lifestyles to encourage individuals to abandon unworthy conceptions and embrace worthy ones.

The debate between so-called neutralists and perfectionists requires some clarification. With respect to neutrality, it is common to distinguish between two conceptions: *justificatory* and *consequential* neutrality. Consequential neutrality involves the idea that the consequences of political activity should be equal for individuals pursuing different conceptions of the good. The thought here is that different conceptions should be equally easy to pursue or that the state should not affect the relative costs and benefits of pursuing different conceptions. This version of neutrality, often attributed to liberals, is, in fact, rejected by most contemporary liberals as indeterminate, impracticable, or undesirable. For example, it is plain to see how political decisions regarding public holidays can have unequal effects with respect to the costs and difficulty of pursuing different religions. Public holidays that correspond to the Christian festivals of Christmas and Easter, for example, advantage Christians compared to members of other religious groups, for whom important religious dates conflict with work and school requirements. Yet, if there is a good argument to preserve public holidays, any date that is selected will inevitably be more beneficial for followers of certain religions.

Rather, contemporary neutralist liberals affirm *justificatory* neutrality—the idea that the reasons for adopting particular legal or political arrangements should not depend on controversial conceptions of the good. Neutralists draw a distinction between two kinds of normative ideal. First, there are various ideals concerning our political status—our status as individuals or citizens entitled to treatment as free and equal agents and the legal rights generated by that status—that liberals insist generate important reasons for political action. As we have seen, liberals endorse principles that guarantee civil and political freedoms and a level of socioeconomic provision for everyone. Second, however, there are certain other parts of ethics—relating to our place in the universe, the existence of God, and the worth of different nonpolitical goals such as the value of different personal projects or relationships—that, neutralists claim, do not generate reasons for political action. For instance, there is considerable disagreement over whether gay sex is a sin or a valuable kind of sexual relationship. Neutralists insist that the state should not take a stand on that issue. Instead, political arrangements should be arranged in a manner that is capable of acceptance by individuals who take opposing views of it. The claim that individuals have an interest in enjoying freedom of expression and association and in possessing various opportunities and resources regardless of sexuality is designed to satisfy this requirement of justificatory neutrality.

Perfectionists claim that all ethical ideals and values generate political reasons. Some perfectionists, like Joseph Raz, are liberal in their political conclusions. For example, many who believe that one of the elements of a successful life is personal autonomy favor liberal political arrangements because the development and exercise of autonomy require being exposed to a variety of lifestyle options from which to choose and

the possession of liberal freedoms and material resources so that individuals can bear witness to, and pursue their ethical convictions. Autonomy-based perfectionist liberals might accept that it is legitimate for the state to favor certain techniques for supporting valuable conceptions of the good. They might allow the state to require schools to promote a particular religion and, indeed, offer tax exemptions for associated religious establishments, for example. However, because they favor the good of individual self-determination, such perfectionists remain hostile to various illiberal legal arrangements: For instance, they agree with neutralist liberals that apostasy should not be a criminal offense.

The ideal of personal autonomy is not the only basis on which perfectionist liberalism is defended. Some liberals, such as William Galston, appeal to what they take to be less controversial claims about *value pluralism*. Liberal institutions, these authors claim, are best defended on the basis of an acknowledgment that several different kinds of ethical life are valuable, only some of which include the value of autonomy. These liberals tend to emphasize the value of freedom of expression and association as centrally important. As we shall see, they argue that the reach of liberal ideals is more limited than autonomy-based liberals believe.

Fundamental Philosophical Ideals: Political Versus Comprehensive Liberalism

The distinction between neutralist and perfectionist liberals concerns a debate about whether state officials and, perhaps, legislators can legitimately appeal to controversial ethical and religious ideals in framing and defending their conduct. This debate overlaps with the debate about the philosophical foundations of liberalism. Rawls draws a distinction between two kinds of liberalism: comprehensive and political. Comprehensive liberals offer political theories with liberal conclusions that are premised on controversial ethical ideals. Rawls cites Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill as liberals who defend their political proposals on the basis of contested claims about ethics: in Kant's case an ethic of moral autonomy; in Mill's, an ethic that stresses the value of human improvement through the development of "higher pleasures" and individuality. Within contemporary political philosophy, Raz counts as a comprehensive liberal, as does Ronald Dworkin. The latter offers a number of different defenses of liberal institutions. He has developed what he calls the "challenge model of ethics" in which a good life consists of a successful response to an appropriate challenge. More recently, however, Dworkin has developed a justification of liberalism that, while comprehensive, aims to cultivate widespread appeal. His two founding principles are that individuals' lives have equal intrinsic importance and that responsibility for the success of one's life lies primarily with oneself.

One comprehensive defense of liberal institutions, and indeed political neutrality, entertained by Bruce Ackerman and Brian Barry, draws on ethical skepticism: the thought that we cannot know which of the different conceptions of religion or the good life is true. Because these truths are inaccessible, it is claimed, we cannot legitimately impose any particular ethical values on citizens through the law. This defense, however, has been widely criticized. Liberal principles of toleration are themselves normative in character because they tell lawmakers how they should act. If skepticism is applied to all normative views, then it is inconsistent with supplying a justification of liberal principles because the truth about whether the state should be tolerant would be as inaccessible as the truth about whether a religious life is a mistake. Alternatively, this defense might claim that skepticism applies only to certain normative claims, such as whether abortion is morally wrong or the value of homosexuality, but not to claims that relate to toleration or equality. However, it is not obvious why this claim should be accepted. Many are as convinced that homosexuality is a worthy form of sexuality as they are in the soundness of liberal principles, and it is difficult to see how such people are mistaken in their reasoning about ethics and morality.

By contrast, *political* liberals, like Rawls, offer a defense of liberal institutions on the basis of ideals that make no reference to our place in the universe or what it means to lead a good life. Rawls begins his account with a set of claims about our interests in virtue of being free and equal citizens. Such citizens are not viewed as permanently tied to any particular conception of the good life; rather, they are free to reflect on and revise the life plans they

follow. Therefore, in addition to our interest in becoming citizens who deploy a sense of justice, we have an interest in having the liberties and opportunities in place that will facilitate our reflection on ethics and enable us to pursue our life plans. On the basis of these interests, Rawls offers a defense of liberal institutions that supports not only the freedoms of conscience, expression, association, and so on, but also a range of socioeconomic provisions, such as guaranteed health care to a certain level, compensation for unemployment, and a decent level of income for all.

Rawls's desire to avoid controversial ethical claims in justifying liberal principles is motivated by an empirical observation about the inevitable effects of the protection of civil freedoms and a normative commitment to a conception of political legitimacy involving justification to each citizen. The empirical observation is that social and political institutions that preserve freedom of conscience and expression will inevitably produce a diversity of ethical and religious belief and practice. Various explanations of this diversity might be offered: The account might refer to mistakes in reasoning, the different positions from which individuals evaluate the world, or the difficulty of weighing different ethical considerations. If value pluralism is true, then this might also supply an explanation of actual ethical pluralism, but Rawls does not rely on this explanation: Because he aims not to take a stand on these ethical matters, his theory is compatible with value pluralism but not reliant on it.

Turning to his normative ideal of legitimacy, Rawls insists that the defense of principles of political morality should ideally appeal only to goods and claims that individuals can endorse. If this ideal of legitimacy is accepted, then given ethical pluralism, the kind of justification of liberal political principles that is required is one that is not wedded to any particular account of ethics, for such an account would inevitably fail to win the acceptance of some citizens. Thus, Rawls offers a public justification of liberal principles, a defense that appeals to values and ideals, such as those of freedom and equality, that are embedded within the tradition of democratic politics and thought since the Reformation and that can be endorsed by individuals holding conflicting conceptions of the good.

The ideal of legitimacy, which provides the normative basis of political liberalism, is controversial. Others have proposed conceptions of legitimacy in which acceptability to everyone considered separately is not the decisive consideration (e.g., Raz). Rawls's commitment to this ideal, however, is motivated by the value of political autonomy, which he traces back to the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. For Rousseau and Rawls, the fundamental question of political philosophy is to explain how we might be subject to legal constraints, as we involuntarily are throughout our lives, while remaining free as individuals. Their shared answer to this question is to deny the claim that we can be free only if legal constraints are removed. Rather, they insist that we can be free, despite being subject to coercive constraints, if the goods that such constraints realize are ones we value ourselves. The Hegelian character of this view is that if individuals endorse the aims and justification of political principles that constrain them, they can come to regard their own society as a home rather than an alien environment.

Political Principles (II): Social and Economic Justice and Legitimacy

As noted above, contemporary liberalism is distinguished from libertarianism, in part, because of its commitment to reducing the economic inequalities that characterize modern industrial societies. One of the central projects of contemporary liberal thought has been to try to identify the right conception of distributive justice. In *A Theory of Justice,* Rawls proposed a reasonably demanding conception of justice, which advocated the reduction of class-determined inequalities (his principle of "fair equality of opportunity") and income redistribution to the maximum advantage of those with least wealth and income (the difference principle).

Other liberals have proposed more or less demanding accounts of justice. Dworkin, for example, defends a conception of equality, liberal equality, which allows income inequalities to be generated in virtue of the different life choices individuals make but which compensates individuals for their bad luck with respect to biological endowment or social starting point. By contrast, Raz's liberal conception includes a rejection of egalitarianism, and others have developed conceptions of justice in which individuals have *sufficient*

social and economic goods or in which more or less *priority* is attached to the interests of less advantaged individuals.

Rawls's work on political liberalism led some to believe that he had abandoned his earlier commitment to social justice. That this is a misreading is evident in Rawls's final statement of his conception of justice, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement,* in which he presents his account of justice as consistent with political liberalism. Nevertheless, an important distinction between *justice* and *legitimacy* should be noted. Conceptions of justice seek to identify a fair distribution of good and bads. By contrast, the question of legitimacy concerns the conditions that justify political authority, the conditions that generate a duty on citizens to comply with the law. As Rawls interprets the ideal, while his own conception of justice passes the test of legitimacy because it does not rest on any particular controversial view of the good life, other conceptions that propose different and, perhaps, more modest principles of social justice also pass this test. For the purposes of legitimacy, a democratic choice between different liberal conceptions of justice might be acceptable: Realization of the difference principle is not necessary for the state to be legitimate. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that to count as legitimate, such a conception must satisfy certain criteria: It must give priority to the protection of civil and political liberties, secure educational and employment opportunity for all, and provide individuals with the health care needs and economic wherewithal to be active citizens and to pursue their goals, projects, and relationships.

Political Principles (III): The Reach of Liberalism

Turning to other issues of political importance, contemporary liberals are divided about the extent to which their conceptions of justice and legitimacy generalize to other domains. Consider, first, the issue of global justice and the reach of the liberal commitment to equality. Some liberals, such as Rawls and Thomas Nagel, restrict the application of their liberal conceptions to domestic political matters and elaborate and defend more modest proposals for international and global institutions. They agree that among the principles of political morality that apply globally are a concern for certain human rights, a duty to come to the assistance of countries that lack the resources to maintain acceptable governments, and duties of humanity to come to the aid of those who suffer poverty. Yet, Rawls distances himself from cosmopolitan liberals (e.g., Charles Beitz) who extend a Rawlsian conception of justice to defend radical redistribution from the Global North to the Global South. Nagel has argued that we appeal to a conception of justice to assess whether a set of legal institutions that claim our allegiance is entitled to the obedience of its citizens. At the global level, however, while an intergovernmental agreement might affect the fortunes of individuals in other parts of the world, considerations of justice do not come into play because such agreements do not claim these people's allegiance.

The modest proposals of Rawls and Nagel have, however, been criticized on several grounds. Some appeal to the Rawlsian claim that it is proper to apply principles of justice and legitimacy to arrangements that significantly affect people's lives without their consent. Thomas Pogge's cosmopolitan account, for example, cites the way in which rich countries and global institutions support illegitimate and corrupt governments throughout the world by granting them privileges with respect to borrowing, selling resources, and purchasing arms. Because individuals throughout the world are born into these arrangements that significantly affect their life chances, it is appropriate, he claims, to scrutinize them from the point of view of justice. Other cosmopolitans appeal to different grounds for extending liberal principles. If, as many liberals accept, there is a reason to compensate individuals who suffer worse life chances because of the family circumstances into which they are born, it is difficult to see why individuals who are born in parts of the world that afford them fewer opportunities should not also be compensated.

There are also disputes among liberals with respect to the reach of principles within a society. For instance, the ideal of neutrality might be applied more or less widely. It might be applied narrowly to regulate the choice of a constitution and the basic rights of citizens, so that these rights are not conditional on individuals holding particular conceptions of the good. Some take this view and assert that it is consistent with neutrality for politicians or individual voters to press for particular legislation on

the basis of their controversial convictions about ethics and religion. Liberal democrats of this kind might not object to legislation that promotes the religious practices of the majority; legislation, for example, that requires schools to educate pupils in accordance with those practices or that subsidizes the costs of pursuing those practices. Such legislation, they argue, is compatible with the maintenance of a constitution that does not take sides with respect to these controversial matters. Nevertheless, other liberals extend the reach of liberal principles to include choices made by politicians or voters. They claim that if the case for some kind of neutrality is that it is valuable for individuals to affirm the rules and laws that constrain them, then this affirmation is denied by normal legislation that is framed in accordance with the ethical convictions of the majority as well as by constitutional law.

Second, consider the distinction between liberalism justified by appeal to the ideal of autonomy and that defended on the basis of value pluralism. In principle, autonomy-based liberalism can justify certain kinds of interference into family or cultural life that value pluralism cannot. With respect to certain famous legal cases—*Wisconsin v. Yoder* and *Mozert v. Hawkins Board of Education,* for example—that concern the rights of parents to shield their children from exposure to what they take to be irreligious views and practices, autonomy-based liberals have argued that the child's right to a future in which she or he can exercise autonomous judgment on the basis of an understanding of the alternatives overrides the right of parents to raise their child in accordance with their religious convictions. In general, autonomy-based liberals are critical of cultural practices that place autonomy-inhibiting restrictions on its vulnerable members, particularly children who cannot be thought to consent to those restrictions. By contrast, value pluralists who deny that autonomy is necessary for leading a good life tend to accept that parents can legitimately educate their children in any one of a number of ways, only some of which facilitate an autonomous future for their children.

Criticisms of Contemporary Liberalism

Throughout its history, liberalism has faced various challenges that take the form that its commitment to freedom and equality is *incomplete*. For example, certain socialists and feminists have criticized liberal accounts for not extending these ideals to the workplace, economic choices, or the family. Susan Moller Okin has criticized historical and contemporary liberal accounts for failing to appreciate that the treatment of women within the family is the basis of gender inequality and unfreedom for women. G. A. Cohen's critique of Rawls's conception of justice rests on the alleged arbitrariness of the distinction between the rules that govern socioeconomic institutions, such as the tax and benefit system, and the ethos that should motivate individuals in their daily economic choices, such as the choice of how hard to work. Cohen's target is Rawls's difference principle, which requires economic institutions to maximize the wealth and income of the least advantaged. That principle generates a duty on the part of citizens to vote for political parties that most effectively benefit the least advantaged. But as Rawls elaborates the principle, it permits inequalities of income to arise if they are beneficial in terms of generating incentives for productive individuals to take jobs that are particularly valuable for society or to work harder. However, Cohen insists that if the needs of the least advantaged are our concern, then there seems no reason why this should not extend to guide those other economic choices of individuals. In his view, our duties to the least advantaged should be expressed as an ethos that involves the productive working to benefit everyone without receiving greater than equal rewards.

Okin and Cohen share the view that liberals misidentify the distinction between so-called public matters, with respect to which individuals are accountable to others and considerations of justice apply, and nonpublic matters, which need not be constrained by justice. Liberals have responded to these criticisms in more or less concessive terms. Some are prepared to redraw the contours of the distinction between public and nonpublic. For example, Rawls accepts that his liberal conception should protect women from the involuntary disadvantage that is often generated by a gendered division of labor in society and the family. In other cases, liberals are less concessive. For example, many liberal theorists reject Cohen's proposal of an egalitarian ethos,

claiming that our daily economic decisions with respect to how hard to work, for example, cannot be regulated in a transparent, publicly justifiable manner without intolerable surveillance of our lives.

Another prominent critique of contemporary liberalism claims that it is too individualistic. The critique can take various forms. For example, so-called communitarians have claimed that liberals mistakenly assume that we can attend to the interests, rights, and duties of individuals without acknowledging the importance of the cultural communities in which they live. Different lines of criticism have been advanced in this vein: (a) some claim that principles of political morality can be justified only by reference to the shared values of particular communities; (b) others claim that liberals ignore or disregard the importance of social communities in terms of making available a range of relationships and goals, or generating cultural practices that give individuals' lives meaning; and (c) others emphasize that individual well-being is best served by involvement in the shared pursuit of common goods, which, they claim, liberals deny. Liberals resist the communitarian critique. Two strategies of response have been pursued. First, liberals have agreed with certain claims about the importance of community but insist that their view already incorporates such claims or that it can be revised to satisfy communitarian worries. To illustrate this type of response, notice that Rawls himself claims that his conception of justice can be regarded as valuable because it facilitates the realization of a significant political, or collectively produced good—the good of a well-ordered society. And Will Kymlicka has developed a conception of multicultural citizenship, which incorporates certain communitarian insights within a liberal framework. Second, liberals have responded less concessively to certain kinds of communitarian criticism. They have challenged the idea that it is always possible to identify a community with freely shared values and, even if that could be done, they reject the thought that political principles should merely reflect shared values. This second response emphasizes that contemporary liberals, like many of their precursors, do not regard themselves as offering ideological support for the status quo but, rather, conceptions of political morality that provide resources for a thoroughgoing critique of prevailing social and political arrangements.

Matthew Clayton

See also Equality; Justice, Theories of; Liberalism; Liberty; Rawls, John

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Liberation Theology

Liberation theology emerged during the political and cultural upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s in developed and developing countries alike. Critical of human rights violations suffered under authoritarian regimes and of market economies that bestowed the preponderance of benefits on a powerful few, liberationists developed their political theory out of biblical injunctions against the rich in favor of the poor combined with modern social science critiques to identify the origins of social injustice. Diverse versions of liberation theology erupted out of this theory under such loosely defined categories as political theology, black theology, feminist theology, Jewish liberation theology, and Palestinian liberation theology, among others. The political theory of liberation theology achieved a moderate degree of public support during the latter quarter of the twentieth century in some regions of the globe, particularly in Latin America.

The political critiques and advocacy of liberation theology have influenced various attempts at reform and revolutionary change, particularly in the base communities of Brazil (1970s), in the Sandinista Revolution (1979) and Nicaraguan government (early 1980s), and in other liberation movements in countries embroiled in the Central American wars (1970s and 1980s). The attractiveness of liberation theology then waned with the signing of peace accords, the replacement of several authoritarian regimes with democratic governments, and the growing popularity of conservative and predominantly Protestant evangelical efforts. Nevertheless, the social conditions that originally gave rise to the call for liberation remained largely unchanged. During the last decade of the twentieth century and into the early part of the twenty-first century, liberation theology has resurged in popularity, most visibly in the Zapatista liberation movement in Mexico (1990s to the present) as well as the presidential administrations of liberationist Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti (1991, 1994–1996, 2001–2004) and Lula da Silva of Brazil (2002–2006, 2006–2010). Then-Senator Barack Obama's presidential campaign in the United States also revealed a liberationist influence from Senator Obama's pastor, Rev. Jeremiah A. Wright, Jr., who described his beliefs as rooted in the black liberation theology of James Cone and others.

Liberation Hermeneutics

According to Latin American liberationists, conventional theologies fail to criticize the root causes of poverty and oppression due to their flawed techniques of interpreting holy scripture. Their failure originates from rules of scriptural interpretation or *hermeneutics* used to explain revelation as unchanging and morally authoritative. From their restrictive interpretation of scripture, Christian theologians typically identify rigid propositions from the Old and New Testaments to serve as static elements in the construction of their theologies. With regard to contemporary social issues, conventional theologies generally presume the legitimacy of contemporary politics and thus are rarely capable of significant opposition to unjust policies. These theologies then tend to be appropriated by the state as ideological justification for the perpetuation of unjust political practices and economic arrangements. Liberationists declare the need for theologies that provide an effective critique of the dynamics and moral status of contemporary politics.

In contrast with mainline religions and conventional theologies that tend to do little more politically than admonish followers to be virtuous citizens, liberation theology urges the application of a hermeneutics that confronts social injustice by appealing to the moral criticisms of society found in the prophetic narratives of the Bible. To this end, liberationists encourage the reading of biblical stories from the perspective of the present-day reader who is affected and offended by social injustice. Thus, the stories are interpreted in light of the reader's own commitment to the liberation of the marginalized members of society, such as the poor, women, racial minorities, and unrecognized

nationalities. In addition, liberationists incorporate contemporary social science methods for explanations of and solutions to problems of social injustice, even as they search the ancient scriptures for moral guidance with respect to the ethical problem of political marginalization. The social application of liberation hermeneutics results in critical reflection on the "sinful social structures" of contemporary politics, particularly within the global economy.

Sinful Social Structures

Many liberationists incorporate Marxist class analysis to analyze economic and political conditions. They argue that traditional capitalism and contemporary neoliberalism support economic arrangements that exploit the majority of citizens, leaving them in a state of impoverishment with little likelihood of improvement. Furthermore, when organizing themselves to challenge unjust political and economic policies, exploited workers encounter either harsh repression that disregards their basic human rights or minimal economic reforms that hardly promote justice. Given their "preferential option for the poor," liberationists condemn as sinful the social structures that leave the majority of citizens suffering needlessly.

Today, Latin American liberation theology tends to focus on the domestic dynamics of class divisions and the economic pressures of corporate globalization as the main source of poverty and oppression. Influenced by liberation hermeneutics, which merges biblical ethics and social critique, other liberationists focus on matters of unequal race relations, religious intolerance, inequitable gender conditions, or supernationalism as containing the primary source of injustice. In addition to preaching the ethical obligation of condemning unjust social practices, liberationists also recognize a responsibility to advocate specific measures for eradicating the unjust social structures themselves. Often relying on the biblical story of the Exodus as the principal paradigm of liberation, liberationists encourage political involvement and, at times, social revolution to confront and overcome social injustice.

John R. Pottenger

See also Biblical Prophets; Class; Dependency Theory; Exploitation; Feminism; Freire, Paulo; Globalization; Hermeneutics; Human Rights; Justice, Theories of; Latin American Marxism; New Liberalism; Revolution; Socialism; Theology

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LIBERTARIANISM

Libertarianism focuses primarily on the drawing of robust boundaries where individual action—good or bad—ought to be free from intervention and coercion. As a political morality, it specifies the limits of state authority and the use of force, as well as the obligations imposed on the state to enforce rights and arbitrate between competing claims.

A range of theories that purportedly attach singular or primary value to the ideal of individual liberty go by the name *libertarianism*. These theories are animated by a set of distinctive and common concerns. Among them are a deep suspicion of central government and coercion; a favorable view of the market, which may go as far as regarding its outcome as beyond the scope or conceptual concern of distributive justice; and a view of

private property as either exhaustive of all individual rights or at least the most significant right of them all. It is the particular view of distributive justice that has attracted the most attention in contemporary philosophical debate, not least due to Robert Nozick's lively and sharp defense of libertarianism in his 1974 *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*.

In what follows, three major forms of libertarianism are introduced, and three key themes common to these forms of libertarianism are discussed.

Forms of Libertarianism

Three major types of libertarianism may be discerned: (1) *consequentialist* libertarianism (a prominent example, on which subsequent discussion will focus, is the theory proposed and advocated by Friedrich Hayek); (2) a libertarianism inclined to the right (henceforth, *right libertarianism*), which sanctifies entitlements in natural resources and approves of the distributive outcome of the free play of these entitlements; and (3) a libertarianism inclined to the left (henceforth, *left libertarianism*), which seeks to correct the distribution that naturally follows from unequal holdings, reflecting an egalitarian concern. The latter two types are sometimes joined under the label *natural rights-based* libertarianism.

Consequentialist Libertarianism

Hayek's peculiar brand of libertarianism is in some sense consequentialist and ostensibly practice oriented. Focusing on the beneficial outcome of restraining government, it seeks to zealously safeguard individual liberty to counter the slippery slope of state interventionism in both political and economic spheres. Any form of intervention or planning by central government is bound to regress into coercive arbitrariness and impoverishment of the economy.

Natural Rights-Based Libertarianism

Natural rights-based libertarianism, in either left or right variant, is strongly indebted to John Locke. This theory sees the role of the state and the justification of coercion as consisting exclusively in the protection of individual rights. It views all basic rights of individuals as ultimately specifiable in terms of property rights with the principle of self-ownership, the notion that people have full ownership over their bodies and capacities, at their core. This idea protects individuals against coercive measures that might harm them, such as torture or enslavement, or that might lead them to act in unwanted ways; it also prohibits anyone, including the state, from coercing people to perform any morally required act that they do not wish to engage in and that they have not contracted to perform. In its strongest interpretation, however, it also allows individuals to alienate some of their personal rights—to voluntarily enslave themselves or to permit their being tortured.

Either on the basis of self-ownership or independently, individuals can also come to acquire rights over external assets such as natural resources as well as the products of these resources and their labor. Appropriation may be controlled by a (Lockean) proviso that to some extent takes account of the interests of others (e.g., to leave enough and as good for others). Nevertheless, such a structure of ownership rights, coupled with an unequal distribution of natural talents and good fortune, is very likely to lead to significantly unequal material welfare. Although some right libertarians may regret this outcome, they will insist that state coercion is not the means to remedy it.

The strong intuitive appeal of the principle of self-ownership, together with a genuine egalitarian concern, has led some political philosophers to seek a reconciliation of these two ideals. Left libertarianism shares with right libertarianism the view of individual rights as, at bottom, property rights; it also has a strong notion of self- ownership at its core. Where the two differ is with respect to ownership over external resources. Left libertarians deny the idea that entitlements over unowned natural resources may be unilaterally acquired, subject only to a weak condition of nonharm (i.e., a weak version of the Lockean proviso). They view the world in its initial moral state as unowned, with all people having equal an claim to it. Those who acquire private exclusive control of resources and land are required to duly compensate those who thereby have been denied access to resources.

Themes of Libertarianism

Three themes will now be expounded: (1) liberty, (2) markets and justice, and (3) limited government.

For each of these themes, the following analysis is intended to show how a particular view developed—from consequentialist through right to left libertarianism—as an advance on earlier views or a response to problems encountered, sometimes completing a full circle. Also, it demonstrates how, within each form of libertarianism, the view on the role of government might rely on a certain view of distributive justice, which in turn depends on a particular conception of liberty. The unfolding of these themes will provide a fuller account of the three forms of libertarianism.

Liberty

Negative freedom, as the absence of impediments to action, is what libertarians invariably take as their foundational value. Which impediments to action count as coercive and therefore freedom restricting? As we shall see, libertarians are not all in accord on this question.

Hayek's conception of liberty is that of the absence of coercion. It is the state of being able to direct one's own life and not being subject to the arbitrary will and direction of another person. What makes coercion bad is its effect on both the individual and society. It prevents the coerced from fulfilling the potential of their mental capacities, and consequently it denies the community the benefit of the contribution they could have made.

Coercion must be distinguished from the kinds of restrictions we encounter daily. Specifically, setting conditions or terms to render services or benefits is not a form of coercion on this view. This is primarily true in trade settings. Most of what we need or want we get from other people. We cannot force these people to work for us or to provide us with the goods we desire. They must be free to set the conditions under which they will be willing to do so.

Genuine coercion might be exercised by a monopolist of a life necessity. But unless the following two conditions hold, then whatever hardship results cannot count as coercion. First, the good supplied by the producer must be indispensable; if people can do without it, they cannot be coerced. Second, there must be no other producers or employers. If there are many others, none can coerce, for they can remove only one opportunity among many to purchase a good or to earn a living.

One might think that the status of individual employees vis-à-vis the class of employers as a whole (being forced, as they are, to sell their labor power) can hardly be described as free. Yet, Hayek insists that even if this is a fair description of the circumstances of employees, they are not coerced because they are not subjected to any particular will, but rather to the resultant unintentional pressure of the impersonal market. Even if there is just one employer and the employment is an essential life necessity, the employee is still not coerced because no one intentionally put him in this restricted choice situation. Hayek's conception of coercion centers on the intention of the coercing agent—perhaps rightly so. But in terms of outcome, the circumstances appear indistinguishable from the perspective of the harmed subject. Whether this is the intended consequence of coercion, properly speaking, or the unintended result of some events and behavior, the situation equally calls for redress, the misfortune is the same, and, moreover, Hayek's analysis notwithstanding, it is implausible to describe the evil of the situation in terms other than reduced liberty.

Most right libertarians hold a notion of freedom by which only unrightful action restricts freedom. On such a view, what matters is not the intentions of the constraining agents but whether they acted within their rights. The view seems to be that only if an agent acts impermissibly, constraining other people's options by violating their right, can the latter's freedom be considered restricted. Two main lines of criticism have been raised against this conception.

The first objection is that such a moralized notion of being forced to do something and of freedom leads to absurd consequences. Consider Nozick's marriage partners example. Twenty-six women and twenty-six men want to get married and are named A to Z and A′ to Z′ in decreasing preferential order. A and A′ voluntarily choose to get married, each being the most preferred option of the other. Their first option having been removed by the marriage of A to A′, B and B′ marry each other. So it goes all the way down to Y and Y′. Now, Z and Z′, whose only other option is to remain single, finally marry each other. Nozick thinks that the voluntary nature of their act is due to the fact that A to Y and A′ to Y′ all acted within their rights. Some have found this

supposed connection absurd. The history of the narrowing down of options does not seem relevant to the issue at all. If instead A to Y abducted A′ to Y′, the situation of Z and Z′ would not be altered. Their preferences, as well as their available options and the choice they eventually make, are identical in both scenarios. It is difficult to see what could justify ascribing coercion in this revised case but not in the original example.

The second objection to the proposed conception of freedom concerns its role in an argument that grounds property rights. On this account, the truth of the proposition that P's freedom to use X is violated depends on X being P's property. So P's ownership of X cannot be based on the fact that P's freedom is violated. To see this, suppose I have a justified (property) right to the chair I am using. If you take the chair away from me, then you violate that right and, therefore, also reduce my (moralized) freedom. But if you were to inquire as to the justification of my right to the chair, I could not point to the reduced freedom due to not respecting that right because whether or not my freedom *is* reduced, on this account, depends on whether or not I have a (justified) right to the chair.

Left libertarians are not content with such a moralized notion of freedom. The central issue is what sort of obstacles might count as freedom restricting. A conception of liberty that recognizes coercion only to the extent that it suppresses options the agent has a right to choose, cannot discriminate among different sets of rights. Because all it requires is that a system of rights, any such system, is perfectly enforced, nothing concerning the substance of the rights is implied. Freedom as the absence of coercion would be consistent with slavery, for example, or with any other system, repressive as it may be. If slaves have no right to leave the master's estate, they are not being coerced when they are prevented from doing so, and they are as such free. Such a formal definition of coercion is insufficient and must be buttressed by some substantive notion of the rights people have. The most central of these rights, and the one most relevant to freedom, is the right of self-ownership. Coercion, still moralized, then becomes the prevention of action protected by a system of rights including that of self-ownership.

But coercion is not the only possible freedom-restricting obstacle. Security in one's rights, whatever they may be, together with a robust notion of self-ownership, are still insufficient for any effective freedom. Any sort of act in the world involves the use of external objects of which we cannot be assured by mere formal self-ownership. It follows that control of external resources must be seen as freedom enhancing and the lack of such resources as freedom restricting.

Hayek's distinction between wealth or power, on one hand, and freedom on the other is thereby questioned. It is disingenuous to claim that people who have insufficient funds to take a round-the-world cruise are nevertheless free to take the trip because they are not prevented from doing so. Surely, the man-made institution of private property prevents them from boarding the boat without buying a ticket. Without the money, we are not really free to join the cruise, and the worker who has no option but to starve or accept the low-paid and disagreeable job is not really free to turn it down.

Moreover, it is not merely the lack of access to external resources that would count as freedom restricting. Any obstacles—internal as well as external, produced deliberately or by accident or not produced at all, removable or not, can be freedom restricting. As such, the left libertarian conception of freedom is purely descriptive and morally neutral.

The Status of Markets and Distributive Justice

In Hayek's view, the concept of distributive justice is meaningless in an economic regime governed largely by the market, and the attempt to apply it is counterproductive. The concepts of justice or injustice are appropriate only with respect to the result of intentional action. Accordingly, the distribution of benefits and burdens is unjust if it were the result of a deliberate allocation by particular people, rather than the outcome of the free operation of impersonal market forces. On the other hand, an attempt to redistribute according to some favored conception of so-called social justice *is* unjust.

One might object that we can, and normally do, evaluate certain outcomes or states in terms of justice even when they are not the consequence of human agency, and even if there is no one to be blamed. Moreover, the market order is maintained and regulated by human purposeful activity. Hence,

we can identify some responsible agents for the results of market processes. Last, the effects of markets can be "corrected," and surely that makes the decision to intervene or not and its implementation subject to moral appraisal.

According to Hayek, a conception of social justice seeking to trace merit or desert and to reward individuals according to the value of their contribution to society is confused. The notion of value to society is a meaningless construction. Even if we had a compelling notion of moral worth (merit), contribution to society (desert), or need, we would still have no idea about how to combine these into one uniform measure. We might then fall back on material equality and distribute earnings equally. The rationale of earnings is to function as indicators of the most beneficial behavior. Determining them equally, or on the basis of merit, desert, or need, will defeat their purpose.

An attempt to impose some distributive ideal will cause the market to fail in its capacity to adapt quickly and effectively to changing circumstances—a task it accomplishes admirably due to the transmission of information via the price mechanism. In such a case, prices can no longer be relied on to convey the information required for individuals to decide where best to direct their resources, efforts, and skills. At its best, planning would achieve the same result as the market. But unlike the *impersonal* workings of the latter, the orders imposed by a human administrator would be, as such, coercive and unjust.

But these difficulties arise only if redistribution displaces and supersedes prices, that is, if a central authority sets about to fix prices and wages so as to realize its distributive ideal. It need not arise if redistribution is enacted without interfering with free exchange and market price-setting. This possibility surprisingly receives some support from Hayek (1973), who does not oppose a guaranteed social minimum provided "outside the market." So one may ask why not go further and provide full material equality outside the market through redistributive tax and transfer policies after prices have had their effect?

On the right libertarian view, distributive justice is a misleading term. Contrary to what it suggests, there is no central distribution. Things come into the world already attached to individuals in ownership relations.

Nozick's entitlement theory of holdings specifies the conditions under which a person is entitled to things in his or her possession. The theory consists of three schematic principles:

1. A *principle of justice in acquisition* specifying the method by which unheld things become the property of an individual, the kind of things, their extent, and so on. Something akin to Locke's theory of appropriation is thought to fill the details of this principle, whereby original acquisition is somehow connected to, if not directly implied by the idea of self-ownership.
2. A *principle of justice in transfer* specifying the method by which a person can transfer title to some holdings to another person, or the method by which a person can acquire a title to the holdings of another. What comes to mind here are the conventional rules of transfer in a capitalist market society: primarily voluntary exchange (i.e., the trade of commodities and labor) but also gifts, inheritance, and donations.
3. A *principle of rectification of injustice* specifying what, if anything, ought to be done to correct for past injustices.

A just distribution is one in which each holding was acquired by the individual who possesses it either according to the first principle, according to the second principle from someone else who is entitled to that holding, or as a result of an application of the third principle. Thus, once initial holdings are set, justice is conserved through the operation of the unbridled market. Political intervention is required only to correct for conquest, usurpation, enslavement, theft, fraud or coercion. Otherwise, the government has no business in prohibiting or undoing "capitalistic acts between consenting adults."

It is considered an advantage of entitlement theory that it endorses unpatterned distributions. A distribution is patterned when the share of each individual is determined by some natural dimension, when it can be described by a slogan of the form: to each according to. . . . For example, distribution according to moral virtue, contribution, IQ, needs, simple equality, and so on are all patterned principles.

By contrast, according to entitlement theory, each individual's entitlements are determined by a

vast number of uncoordinated individual acts that are, pattern-wise, arbitrary: by gift or inheritance, through exchange or as a product of labor, as profit from investment or interest on loans; the sources of holdings and their relative share in a portfolio vary from individual to individual. The outcome of such a complex system of transfers and retransfers is a distribution that corresponds to no simple pattern.

The problem with patterned distributions is that they are unstable. Their maintenance requires constant interference with liberty. In Nozick's famous example, an original, arguably just patterned distribution of holdings is transformed when spectators are willingly pay an extra quarter to watch Wilt Chamberlain play. At the end of the season and after one million spectators, Chamberlain ends up with $250,000—much more than anyone else. Now, to maintain the pattern, the central distributing agency must return that sum to the spectators, thus restricting their freedom to use their property as they see fit. However, one could argue that what patterns really upset is not liberty as such, but a particular distribution of holdings or a certain property regime, which of course the patterned principle explicitly challenges. So perhaps this is no reflection on patterned principles.

A further indictment of patterned principles is that they require redistributive taxation to sustain. Taxing an individual's earnings amounts to taking the produce of a certain number of hours of work. In effect, according to Nozick (1974), it is equivalent to forcing the individual to work that number of hours for the benefit of someone else.

A closer look, however, reveals that what is at issue here is not coercion, but expropriation. Because both labor and material resources are factors in the product, whether taxation of earnings is a violation of property rights depends on the extent of ownership one might have with respect to the material of which the product is formed. Much hinges on the details of the principle of acquisition: how previously unowned material becomes owned. At this point, left libertarians split with right libertarians (as well as among themselves).

The right libertarian doctrine of original appropriation is based on three premises. First, no one has an initial claim over any part or share of the originally unowned world. Anyone can grab and accumulate as much as he or she is able without thereby violating any rights. Second, people fully own themselves. Formally, they have the moral and legal right to do with their minds and bodies as they see fit. How far they can act in the world crucially depends on how much control they have over material resources, an aspect not guaranteed by the principle of self-ownership. Third, original acquisition might nevertheless be restricted by a very minimal proviso that no one be made worse off by an appropriation as compared to the situation in which there is no system of property at all.

Left libertarianism aims to reconcile self-ownership with some redistributive measures at least with respect to natural resources and any income they might generate. Accordingly, left libertarians have challenged one or another of the three premises of the doctrine of original appropriation in the following ways:

1. Equal concern for the interests of everyone—including latecomers, the unfortunate, the handicapped, and so on—might require rejecting simple nonownership. Steiner (1994) claims that everyone is entitled to an equal share of natural resources, thus challenging the world nonownership premise.

An arrangement whereby each individual owns exactly one nth of the total resources is difficult to implement because births and deaths are unequal in number. It is also inefficient because some less capable people control resources that could be put to better use by others and also because economies of scale are lost. Finally, it is undesirable because it jeopardizes the security people need in their holdings.

Institutionally, it might imply a scheme along the lines proposed by Henry George. Individuals can acquire as much land and other natural resources as they wish, provided they pay a rent to society that reflects the market value of the resources they control. Severe inequalities will persist because this mechanism does not compensate for differences in income-generating talents and differences in needs.

2. Philippe van Parijs (1995) challenges the sufficiency of formal self-ownership as an attractive conception of freedom. For individuals to enjoy substantive self-ownership, they must have control over some significant amount of natural resources. A free society, in terms of real liberty, must guarantee a more equal distribution of resources allowing

each person to have the greatest possible opportunity to do whatever he or she might want to do.

The institutional form this suggests is an unconditional basic income at the highest sustainable level. Such an allowance paid by the state is *unconditional* in the sense that it is paid regardless of the beneficiary being unemployed, unable to work, willing to accept a suitable job or undergo suitable training. It is also *basic,* although not designed to cover basic needs or a decent existence, in the sense of being a foundational income, to which any other income—from work, property, or social insurance—can legitimately be added.

3. Michael Otsuka endorses an egalitarian interpretation of the Lockean proviso. A weaker proviso places some people at an unfair disadvantage. Under such a scheme those who come first, or are more fortunate in any other way, can unfairly remove all the opportunities to appropriate from everyone else. The egalitarian proviso, in effect, permits the original acquisition of no more than one nth of all resources, weighted according to their objective value (e.g., fertility) and the subjective value for the acquirer (e.g., capability). Under this scheme, people are equal in terms of their opportunities for well-being. Hence, this version of left libertarianism is more egalitarian than either of the previous two.

Limited Government

Hayek views the threat of totalitarianism in the 1930s as a natural development of collectivist tendencies in the ideals and social structures of European countries at the time. Foremost among these ideals is what he refers to as planning—the central direction and conscious regulation of all economic activity. Against this ideal, he maintains that the role of government in the economy should be mainly confined to setting up and monitoring the framework for the efficient functioning of competition: an appropriate legal system, money, markets, and channels of information—where these can't be provided by private enterprise. Government may also have a role in the provision of public goods, environmental protection, and some workplace regulation, when compatible with competition. What is unacceptable is the supplanting of competition by planning, rather than supplementing it where it is impractical.

Two central arguments are presented against the intervention of government in the economy.

1. *The argument from ignorance*. Technological progress, division of labor, the growing complexity and extent of modern society, and the diversity of ends and means make it increasingly difficult to obtain a coherent and complete picture of the economic process. Coordination by some central agency, then, appears indispensable to the planners. But the economy is increasingly complex to such an extent that it is naïve to think that any one agency can attain a synoptic view of the economy and facilitate coordination by conscious control. The most reliable way to achieve effective coordination is precisely the flow of information by means of the price system. Prices provide all the information required to make decisions without the need to see the whole picture. Individual decisions, in turn, transmit new information, which flows swiftly and efficiently to where it is required. However, the price system can fulfill its function only under genuine competition, where individuals need to adapt to price changes and do not control them. Compared to this decentralized method of solving the coordination problem, Hayek (1944) says, central direction by government appears "incredibly clumsy, primitive, and limited in scope" (p. 37).

2. *The argument from arbitrariness*. Leaving the economy to run on its own, without guidance, results in an impersonal tyranny of a sort over a considerable portion of individuals' lives. Instead of the impersonal mechanism of the market, planners seek to introduce a conscious plan administered by an accountable elected government. But the very possibility of formulating such a plan is doubtful, and the inevitable failure will lead to arbitrariness and tyranny of a much more disturbing sort. It is impossible for any mind to grasp the diversity and multiplicity of needs competing for available resources and to analyze these needs, attaching appropriate weights to each, to form a coherent plan. It is impossible to agree on a particular scale of value, and planning within certain confined spheres, once embarked upon, expands to embrace all spheres.

The ineffectiveness of democratic assemblies is due to the impossible task with which they are

charged. Majority decision cannot produce agreement on the whole direction of a society's resources. Deciding by majority makes sense where the choice is between two or three alternatives. But where the alternatives are limitless, there will be in all likelihood as many alternatives as members of the legislature. Voting clause by clause will produce an incoherent decision rather than a comprehensive plan. Eventually, the task must be delegated to experts who, without a given single goal, will inevitably impose their own scale of preferences on the community. Hence, in practice, Hayek (1944) says, they are given power to make arbitrary decisions with the force of law.

Advocates of natural rights-based libertarianism, both left and right, typically agree on some general limitations on any state. Accordingly, it is unjust for the state to use force against people

a. for the sake of promoting some morally desirable goal or restricting morally undesirable behavior where no other person's rights are involved (strong *anti-moralism*);

b. for their own benefit or interests against their will (strong *anti-paternalism*);

c. for the benefit to others, even to guarantee that they do their fair share in a social cooperative scheme for the benefit of all (strong *individualism*);

d. for the sake of preventing individuals from exercising their enforcement rights (i.e., to prevent them from using force to prevent others from violating their rights).

Limitations (a) and (b) amount to Mill's famous harm principle endorsed by both liberalism and libertarianism. In opposing the principle of fairness, (c) is distinctly libertarian. Thus, a libertarian state will avoid compulsory jury, community, or military service. Moreover, it seems it could not impose a tax to finance such institutions or public goods, including law enforcement itself, not to mention a more strongly redistributive scheme such as those proposed by left libertarians. Although this is compatible with a *very* minimal sort of state, it is unclear how any kind of state might be made compatible with (d). A monopoly on the use of force must prevent individuals from exercising their enforcement rights. The question arises as to what, other than the unlikely case of universal consent, might justify a libertarian state.

Peter Vallentyne (2007) proposes to impose the costs of enforcement on rights violators. This solves the problem raised by limitation (c) so that at least redistributing enforcement services among those who do and do not pay is unnecessary. Under the proposed scheme, rather than some or all beneficiaries having to pay for the system, violators themselves financially maintain enforcement. Furthermore, although the libertarian state claims a monopoly on the use of force, it doesn't prohibit individuals from enforcing their rights independently. The point is that all force must be *authorized* by the state, not that all use of force must be *administered* by the state. Hence, the problem raised by limitation (d) is finessed because no individuals are prevented from justly exercising their enforcement rights.

One problem with the novel idea of having rights violators pay for the system of enforcement is that the burden will be unjustly imposed only on those who are captured, tried, and found guilty—not on all those who manage to evade justice. Although punishment and the compensation they will pay their victim will be proportional to their crime, their payment to support the system of enforcement will be grossly disproportionate.

A second weakness with this account is that it ignores the problem of the necessity of judgment. We need judgment to decide when a right has been violated, which of two sides has been wronged, what is the appropriate use of force to prevent a rights violation or to punish or to exact compensation. The state, as the agent of some or most individuals, will have, when it judges it appropriate, to protect them against the attempted enforcement by other members or nonmembers—against the latter's judgment. Thus, in effect, these other members or nonmembers will be forced to accept the state's judgment and will be prevented from exercising their rights of enforcement. Hence, limitation (d) cannot be so easily finessed.

Nozick (1974) attempts to justify the libertarian state by showing how a state might evolve without universal consent and without violating any individual rights. Individuals in a state of nature might find it expedient to band together

forming *mutual protective associations* to protect their rights. Such associations will need to allocate protective duties among members and to form a procedure for deciding when their members' complaints (against other members or outsiders) are valid and justify intervention. Some *commercial protective agencies* may also be formed, whereby individuals may purchase such services and be exempt from any protective duties themselves. Division of labor, market pressures, and economies of scale contribute to the emergence of *dominant protective agencies* in each geographical area. Still, such dominant protective agencies in a territory fall short of being a state because they neither claim monopoly over the use of force nor provide protection for all within their territory.

The dominant protective agency within a territory would be permitted to prohibit unreliable and risky enforcement by others, at least until they can settle the issue of whether these independent individuals are justly and proportionately punishing for presumed transgressions, thereby coming to hold a de facto monopoly in the use of force. Thus the *ultra-minimal state* is established by morally permissible means. Enforcing such prohibitions requires compensating those prohibited from acting in a risky manner that may have turned out to be harmless. The most cost-effective way of doing this is by extending protection to everyone within the territory including those who have not paid for this service. The ultra-minimal state is thus transformed into the *minimal state*.

Nozick's account avoids the problems raised by limitations (c) and (d) by stipulating a general right of enforcement and by allowing rights transgression when compensation is made. Thus, the evolving state can prohibit self-enforcement based on its own judgment and the redistributive aspect in providing universal protection, even to those who do not pay, is justified on the basis of a principle of compensation. This rationale for redistribution does not hold for other desirable goods and services and hence cannot justify their redistribution. So no state more extensive than the minimal state is justified.

One serious shortcoming in this account is methodological. It is questionable to what extent hypothetical histories could justify actual states. That is to say, how does the fact that a state similar to our own *could have* evolved without violating any rights possibly make the state with its actual history of libertarian rights violations just?

Left libertarians want to justify more than the minimal state. The provision of public goods and the correction of other market failures, as well as some redistribution, are justified on the basis of a right to an equal share in natural resources, real liberty, or an egalitarian proviso. Thus, although left libertarians have a similar view of what could justify the state, they need to justify more extensive state activities. Left libertarianism, like right libertarianism, aims to justify a state that doesn't violate any individual rights. Where they differ is on what rights these individuals have.

Daniel Attas

See also Anarchism; Egalitarianism; Hayek, Friedrich von; Property; Rights

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Liberty

Liberalism seems to be the dominant position among political theorists, philosophers, and laypeople in the West. Almost by definition, liberty is the central value of liberalism. However, what exactly liberty is and why it is important are disputed.

There are a number of philosophical questions regarding liberty. (In this entry, the terms *liberty* and *freedom* are used interchangeably.) First, one can ask what the concept of liberty means. Second, once these questions are answered, one can ask what kind of value, if any, liberty has. Liberty is not by definition a valuable thing. Third, if liberty has value, one can ask how much value it has. A fourth question—which institutions best produce liberty—is more social-scientific than philosophical, but most political theorists will be interested in this question as well. This entry considers each of these topics in turn.

The Meaning of Liberty

Philosophers often separate liberty or freedom into two broad kinds, negative and positive. To call a liberty negative is not to judge it—negative liberties are not by definition worse or less valuable than positive liberties. Rather, negative liberty connotes the absence of constraints, interference, or obstacles. Positive liberty connotes the presence of something, usually a power or a capacity of some kind. If somebody ties a bird to the ground, this means it lacks the negative liberty to fly. The reason it cannot fly is because someone stops it. However, suppose the reason the bird cannot fly is that it is a penguin—a flightless bird. It does not have the positive liberty to fly. The reason it cannot fly is because it lacks the relevant capacity, not because there is an obstacle in its way.

Philosophers have offered a number of accounts of negative liberty. One straightforward definition is that liberty is the absence of any obstacles to achieving one's goals. On this view, anything—including other people, the weather, animals, laws of physics—that make it more difficult to achieve one's ends counts as an infringement on liberty. This definition, like most, allows that there is a continuum between being completely free and completely unfree. A person with no obstacles is freer than a person with one major obstacle, who is in turn freer than a person with two major obstacles.

Philosophers have tended to offer more moralized definitions than the previous account, which regards any obstacle whatsoever as infringing liberty. Many philosophers confine themselves, rather, to discussing just those cases where other people impose the obstacles. Metaphysically speaking, an obstacle is an obstacle. Still, suppose one person cannot move because he or she has been wrongfully imprisoned. Suppose a second person cannot move because he or she has been imprisoned after being found guilty of a crime. Suppose a third person cannot move because a tree has fallen on him or her. The metaphysical differences among these obstacles are slight, but the moral difference is significant. For these kinds of reasons, one popular view of liberty holds that it is the absence of impediments imposed by other people, while yet another popular view of liberty holds that it is the absence of impediments wrongfully imposed by other people.

There are also a number of different views of positive liberty. One popular view of positive liberty is that one is free just in case one has the power or capacity to do what one chooses. A rich man and a poor man might both have a right to buy a yacht—that is, a negative liberty that prohibits others from stopping them from buying one—but only the rich man has the power (and thus the positive liberty) to do so.

Some philosophers worry that the power to do as one pleases might simply turn one into a slave of one's passions. Accordingly, this leads some to argue that liberty is the power to do what is right. A stronger version of this view holds that liberty is the power to do what is right without the temptation to do otherwise. On this view, a truly free person would always act as practical reason deems best without any impulse to act otherwise.

A less moralized version of these last two accounts holds that we are free provided our beliefs, actions, desires, and the like are suitably authentic. On this view, we are free provided that the desires and impulses guiding our actions properly express our own nature, rather than being the mere products of the influence of others. This view stresses rational self-direction or autonomy as essential to freedom.

These are only a few of the accounts of liberty political theorists and philosophers have offered. Some philosophers dispute whether the distinction between positive and negative liberty is ultimately tenable. They worry that they collapse into each other. Some reject positive conceptions of liberty in favor of negative conceptions, and vice versa. Some think that only negative liberty should be called liberty and that the concept of positive liberty is inherently confused. Others, especially republicans, attempt to offer new accounts of liberty that combine both negative and positive elements.

Philosophers and laypeople use the word *liberty* to refer to a wide range of states of affairs whose differences are obvious but whose similarities are obscure. Given that there are so many conceptions of liberty in philosophical and commonsense discourse, one might wonder if the concept of liberty can be usefully defined at all. On this issue, there are three possible positions. The nihilist holds that the concept is ineradicably confused and that there is no coherent definition of liberty. The monist holds that it is possible to identify a single, unitary, coherent notion of liberty that fairly captures the common use of the term. The pluralist holds that the concept liberty represents a plurality of different but related things. A pluralist might think every conception of liberty listed above captures a way in which the term *liberty* can reasonably be used. Pluralism provides the most straightforward account of how the term *liberty* is actually used. Still, many philosophers find monism attractive because they hope to provide a simplified, more unified account of liberty than found in day-to-day talk. Those philosophers who lean toward nihilism about liberty tend to do so as a result of what they regard as the failure of monists to provide a satisfactory account.

Settling on an answer to the question of what it means to be free leaves open a further question: What thing is free? Theorists often talk of individual people being free, but it seems to make sense to talk about collectives, such as democratic bodies, legislatures, tribes, or nations, as being free. The freedom of individuals and the collective potentially conflict. For instance, in an unlimited democracy, nothing stops the majority from doing as it pleases, and as a result, this might mean that no single individual in that society enjoys much freedom.

Also, for any given conception of liberty, there are different aspects or spheres of life in which one might use that term. For instance, political liberty concerns the ability of individuals to contribute to and participate in governance. Civil liberty concerns the rights of individuals against government, such as rights of free speech, assembly, due process in court, and the like. Social liberty concerns issues of tolerance and social pressure individuals face from others. Economic liberty concerns the power of individuals to satisfy their wants, to work as they choose, or to make contracts. Psychological liberty concerns the degree to which citizens can make free or rational choices as opposed to being in the grip of their own biases, irrationality, and neuroses.

The Value of Liberty

Once one settles on an account of what liberty is, one can then ask what kind of value, if any, that kind of liberty has. The point of defining liberty is not to settle debates about its value but to enhance them by making it clear what is being discussed. On many of the conceptions of liberty discussed above, liberty is not guaranteed always to be valuable to the free person. For instance, the power to do what one chooses could be dangerous to a child or to an adult with self-destructive wants. Or, if a person is too poor to buy a yacht, the fact that no one will wrongfully interfere with his or her goal of buying the yacht might do little good. Or, consider typical communitarian criticisms of liberalism. The communitarian critic of liberalism and the liberal agree that individuals in an open, tolerant, liberal society are more free than those in the more collectively oriented society the communitarian prefers. However, the communitarian critic claims that these liberal freedoms are not worth having because liberty leads to people having stunted, isolated, disconnected lives. Accordingly, one might hold that liberty has no value whatsoever or even has some disvalue.

On the supposition that liberty is valuable, there are three kinds of value it might have. Liberty could be intrinsically valuable, instrumentally valuable, constitutively valuable, or some mix of the three.

To say liberty is intrinsically valuable means that it is valuable for its own sake or as an end in itself. For instance, one might think that it is good

that people do not wrongfully interfere with each other, even if noninterference does not lead to any further positive result. Perhaps what makes this good is simply that it means people respect each other.

To say liberty is instrumentally valuable is to hold that protecting or promoting liberty tends to lead to other valuable consequences or outcomes. For instance, many argue that freedom of conscience, thought, and lifestyle are instrumentally valuable in helping to achieve scientific and social progress. Economists argue that protecting economic freedoms is important not as an end in itself but as a means to making people wealthier and happier. Many defenders of democracy hold that protecting political freedoms tends to produce better quality government.

Finally, one might hold that liberty is constitutively valuable, which means that liberty is a part or piece of some other valuable thing. So, for instance, suppose one holds that rational self-development is the best form of life. On this view, having the positive freedom (the capacity) to control one's passions and to formulate rational life plans is part of what constitutes a flourishing life. A happy life is composed of different constitutive parts: virtue, rationality, pleasure, positive freedom of a certain sort, and so on. Alternatively, one might argue that liberty is an important component of justice. A just society is a free society, and so liberty is good because justice is good.

Settling what kind of value liberty has does not settle how *much* value it has. In particular, a person who thinks liberty has only intrinsic value does not necessarily hold that it has more value than the person who thinks liberty has instrumental value. The first person might think liberty is an end in itself, but not a very important end, while the second person might hold that liberty, although valuable only as a means to achieving other goods, is extremely important. (In parallel, oxygen is not an end in itself, but few things are more valuable to humans.)

Debate over the value of liberty tends to focus on two issues: (1) whether liberty is more important than other competing values and (2) the degree of instrumental value liberty has. As an instance of the first, consider that the goal of protecting and promoting liberty could potentially come into conflict with the goals of promoting equality or moral virtue. (It could also be that free societies are reliably more equal or more virtuous, but it will still be an interesting question which value is more important when conflicts do occur.) As for the second issue, determining the amount of instrumental value liberty has requires more than philosophical analysis. One needs to examine historical, sociological, psychological, and economic evidence to see what happens when people are free and when they are not.

The Institutions of Liberty

Philosophers have often claimed that different conceptions of liberty entail different political ideals. For instance, some have argued that if one thinks negative liberty (the absence of interference from others) is important, one should support some sort of capitalist regime, but if one favors positive liberty (the power to do what one wants), one should support some sort of socialist or redistributive regime. This is mistaken for a number of reasons.

Even once one has settled on a view of the nature and value of freedom, this leaves open what institutions best promote and protect it. Identifying a conception of liberty and determining how valuable liberty is, so defined, do not entail as a matter of logic that it is government's job to protect or promote liberty. However liberty is defined and regardless of what value it has, the proper role for government as protector or promoter of particular liberties cannot be settled by philosophical analysis alone. One needs to examine the social scientific evidence to see what actually happens when people rely on government or any other institution to play a given role.

Even if one determines that government ought to promote and protect a given kind of liberty, that does not settle how the government ought to do it. In particular, it does not settle whether the government ought to use direct or indirect means. For instance, suppose one holds that positive liberty, in the sense of the power to do as one wants, is the most important value to be promoted by government. The government might attempt to promote this among citizens directly by offering subsidies, grants, free goods, and the like. Alternatively, the government might attempt to promote this indirectly by providing a basic institutional framework (such as the rule of law, constitutional representative

democracy, courts, and a well-functioning property rights regime) under which people can be expected to act in ways that promote positive liberty. Or, it might provide a mix of the two, as is often seen in contemporary Western democracies. Determining what mix of indirect and direct strategies best promotes any given conception of liberty is largely an empirical question to be answered through social scientific investigation.

One important part of this investigation will depend on how people can be expected to act under certain rules. If one assumes that everyone will comply with the rules, then one will favor a different set of institutions than one will favor on the assumption that some or many people will not comply or will try to abuse the rules for their own favor. Many writers on liberty have been suspicious of government power. If their suspicions are correct, this makes a difference as to how much power a reasonable person would want government to have in its attempt to promote liberty.

Accordingly, it is possible for a laissez-faire capitalist and a market socialist to have exactly the same values and to share a conception of freedom and of its value. In this case, their dispute is not moral or philosophical. Rather, it is over a set of empirical claims about how the world works and what it takes to achieve those values in the real world. For these kinds of reasons, contemporary political theorists concerned about liberty often do highly interdisciplinary work.

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See also Berlin, Isaiah; Constant, Benjamin; Liberalism; Liberalism, Contemporary; Libertarianism; Natural Rights; Republicanism; Rights

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LIFE

The concept of life has a long history within Western political theory and philosophy, but its importance has increased significantly in recent years. Since Aristotle's exclusion of natural life from the realm of politics and the correlative formulation of *bios politicos* or a distinctively political way of life, the concept of life has presented numerous complexities for political theory, perhaps as much as it has in areas such as philosophy of biology and moral philosophy, albeit in different ways. These complexities have generally been taken up more explicitly in the European rather than Anglo American traditions of political theory. They have particularly been brought to the fore in the past 20 years or so, with the formulation and theorization of the idea of *biopolitics*. The French scholar Michel Foucault initially focused attention on this concept in the first volume of his *History of Sexuality* and in course lectures such as *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics* during the 1970s. More recently, the concept has been centrally important in Italian political thought, especially that of Giorgio Agamben, Antonio Negri, and Roberto Esposito, among others.

Aristotle's Distinction Between Natural and Political Life

In terms of considering the concept of life in political theory, the most influential formulation is likely to be that of Aristotle in *The Politics,* where he claims that the city-state exists not for the sake of living, but for the sake of living well. He goes on to claim that the city-state exists by nature, and furthermore, that the human being is by nature a political animal. Consequently, humans who exist

without a city-state are either sub- or superhuman. The importance of Aristotle's formulation is thus twofold: It establishes a distinction between *living* and *living well,* or between natural life and political life, where it is only in the latter that the nature of being human is fully realized. In addition, his formulation highlights the tight integration of humanity and politics, such that the nonhuman is constitutively deprived of or excluded from the political sphere because of its essential nature. Aristotle's theory of life is known as *entelechism* because he held that all living organisms maintained a specific functional principle or end within themselves. For instance, being properly human meant having and fulfilling the ends or function of human beings. This function was *logos,* which can be understood as rationality and language and which Aristotle saw as being most fully realized in the *polis.*

Arendt on Labor, Work, and Action

One of the most profound contemporary responses to Aristotle's conception of politics and life is that proposed by Hannah Arendt. In her classic work, *The Human Condition,* she revisits Aristotle's construal of the relation between life and politics and proposes her own tripartite distinction of labor, work, and action, all of which correlate to the most general aspects of human finitude—mortality and natality. Labor relates to sheer survival, fulfilling the basic biological processes of the human body and the things that sustain them. It refers to activities such as baking bread, growing grain and fruits, and so on. Work relates to the unnatural dimension of human existence and bestows a degree of permanence on the products of human endeavor; it strives toward the production of *things* and the shaping of a "world" or inhabited environment for humans. Action, the most highly valued of Arendt's triptych, specifically addresses the political sphere; it is the only one of these three dimensions of human activity that goes on between people without mediation of matter or things. As such, it reveals the fundamental condition of human plurality, and moreover, it is specifically addressed to the political task par excellence of beginning something new.

Given this, Arendt argues that the fundamental category of political thought in distinction from metaphysics may not be mortality, as it is often supposed, but natality. The critical dimension of Arendt's unique conception of labor, work, and action is that in the modern era, the distinctiveness of these spheres has been occluded such that labor and work are no longer separable; moreover, the valuation of labor has reversed and now supersedes that of action. Consequently, politics itself has been devalued and occluded.

Agamben and Esposito on Biopolitics

The recent contribution to theorizing biopolitics made by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben can be seen as extending this insight into the occlusion of politics, although Agamben's interpretation of Aristotle is significantly different. For Agamben, Aristotle consigns Western political thought to a biopolitical paradox in the very act of dividing human life from itself—that is, in separating natural life (*zoe*) and political life (*bios*). By introducing this division or caesura into human life, Aristotle opens the way to the biopolitical capture of life in the sovereign exception.

Moreover, this division of human life from itself gives rise to the category of "bare life," which is central to Agamben's construal of biopolitics. Bare life, he argues, is distinct from both natural and political life and emerges from their separation; it is natural life that is politicized through its exposure to death. However, the death to which it is exposed is not a metaphysical condition (insofar as mortality is intrinsic to human life, for instance) but a political one: It is the death to which the sovereign may put those subject to its power and violent abandonment.

While Agamben finds the origins of biopolitics in foundational texts of Western political philosophy, the most deadly paroxysm of biopolitical violence occurs in the modern Western political condition. In reference to German Nazism and the system of extermination camps it established during World War II, Agamben makes the controversial claim that the camp is paradigmatic of the exposure of life to death in modern biopolitics. In *Homo Sacer* and elsewhere, he argues that it is not the city that characterizes the modern world, as some political theorists and sociologists have claimed, but the camp: The camp is the "*nomos* of the modern." Thus, in his closest analysis of the

ethical implications of the Nazi extermination camps in *Remnants of Auschwitz,* Agamben identifies the *Muselman*—inhabitants of the camps who had lost any will to live and any sensate relation with the world and others around them—as the preeminent figures of Western biopolitics. But Agamben's damning view of biopolitics and the production of bare life that it entails is not wholly negative, for just as the *Muselman* signals the reduction of the human to the sheer fact of living, it also signals the possibility of transformation by somehow passing beyond this extreme limit into a new "form-of-life" in which the separation of natural and political life would no longer be possible.

Agamben's construal of concentration camps focuses on the production of bare life; another Italian philosopher, Roberto Esposito, challenges this view and the corresponding theory of biopolitics. For Esposito, the biopolitics of the Third Reich are the result not of the interminable separation of political and biological life and the consequent production of bare life but rather of the absolute coincidence of politics and biology. He argues that the Nazi regime is characterized by a complete biologization of politics: While biological metaphors such as "the body politic" and "national health" have a long history, this conjunction of political and biological concepts is not metaphorical in the Nazi regime. Instead, any distinction between these two spheres collapses completely, such that biological criteria guide political action.

More specifically, however, it was not simply biological ideology that shaped Nazi politics, but the concrete authority given to medicine within the workings of the regime. Doctors oversaw the massive production of death under the Nazis during World War II and lent their authority and expertise to radical experimentation on human subjects and to the T4 program of eliminating people with disabilities and gassing Jews. These programs of eugenics and extermination were undertaken and justified through a discourse of disinfection and cleansing of the German nation of the "bacteria" that threatened it from within.

The role of doctors in the medicalized political production of death in the Nazi regime is well documented, but it would be blinkered to imagine that such practices are alien to liberal democracies. In fact, the eugenics movement arose in the United Kingdom and the United States before the central doctrine of improving human stock through eliminating "degeneracy" was imported to Germany. In the United States, this doctrine led to enforced sterilization of women considered to be feebleminded, on one hand, and on the other, public health programs to promote higher birth rates among those perceived to have good genes. As this suggests, although theorists of biopolitics have focused on totalitarian regimes such as the Third Reich, liberal democratic states have their own violent history of the integration of politics and biology.

Foucault and the Concept of Biopower

Perhaps one of the distinctive strengths of Foucault's approach to the concept of biopolitics is that it focuses on the history of the management of life within liberal arts of government. In the final chapter of *History of Sexuality,* Volume 1, Foucault argues that politics in the West assumed a new form in the late eighteenth century, such that biological life itself became the object and target of political power. He argues that this transformation occurred through a fundamental shift in the rationality underpinning the operation of the political technologies of power, from a power of deduction to one of production. Power no longer operated through a sovereign violence imposed on subjects from above but through the *normalization* of life. Thus, rather than "taking life or letting live," the biopolitical state accords priority to the maxim and associated practices of "fostering life or disallowing it."

As Foucault indicates in course lectures such as *Security, Territory, Population,* the emergence of biopower entailed the correlative emergence of a specific political subject that had previously not existed, namely, the population. With the growth of disciplines such as statistics in the eighteenth century came the crucial capacity to count the population, to draw inferences from population samples, and to track trends and establish norms across populations. Consequently, the population emerged as a subject of a power geared toward the management and intensification of life, and the wealth and well-being of the state was increasingly measured in population terms.

Consistent with this, as well as with his study of the history of the prison in *Discipline and Punish,*

Foucault identifies two axes involved in the historical emergence of biopower. The first, an anatomo-politics of the human body, aims at the individual body and its regularity in relation to the social body of which it is a part; disciplinary power is characteristic of this axis. The second axis focuses on the species body and works from the level of population to the individual body. Foucault calls this the biopolitics of the population. The political interest in biological processes such as the control of human reproduction, death rates, life expectancy and longevity, and the health of populations can be seen as a fundamental to this axis.

Furthermore, Foucault argues in *History of Sexuality* that the modern regime of biopower was indispensable to the emergence of capitalism because this economic system is not possible without the "controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes" (p. 141). Capitalism "had to have methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern" (p. 141).

Foucault's understanding of the relation between life and capital revolves around the idea of "docile bodies," in which the forces of the body are simultaneously intensified and subject to more or less rigid controls. Thus, he emphasizes the use value of life forces for capital. While at times he suggests that the forces of the body also escape and challenge the technologies of power and capital, a fuller articulation of the transformative and creative potential of life and the body appears in the work of Antonio Negri and his longtime collaborator, Michael Hardt.

For Hardt and Negri, the notion of biopower refers to the tendency on the part of sovereignty to exert power over life itself, a tendency that is manifest in the production of social life itself in its entirety. But, against this power that strives to subjugate the forces of life, Hardt and Negri also emphasize the capacity and potential of life over which sovereignty attempts to rule to challenge and transform the structures in which it is manifest. They identify this as the power or potential of the multitude to create social relationships in common. This, they suggest, represents a new possibility of politics beyond imperial biopower.

Current and Future Issues in Biopolitics

It is debatable which of these theories best illuminates the relation between life and politics today and whether any of them sufficiently captures the complexity of the current political, economic, and social environment in which we live. But one thing is certain: Never before has biological life been so *valuable* within global capital. That is to say, with the explosion of biotechnological industries in the past decade, biological tissue, ranging from human embryonic stem cells to obscure plant varieties and human organs for transplant, is now available for global profiteering in an unprecedented way. This integration of life in systems of financial circulation is indicated in notions such as *biocapital* and *biovalue,* generated by anthropologists and sociologists of biotechnology and biomedicine in recent years. At the same time, however, other scholars interested in the phenomena of war, genocide, poverty, and global human trafficking, for instance, argue that human life has rarely had such little value. This apparent differential valuation of life and the living is perhaps the central horror of modern biopower.

Catherine Mills

See also Arendt, Hannah; Aristotle; Biopolitics; Eugenics; Exception; Foucault, Michel; Multitude; Sovereignty

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Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865)

Abraham Lincoln's contribution to political theory may be analyzed in terms of the theoretical, practical, and historical implications of his thought and leadership. Theoretically, his speeches and writings provide one of the greatest moral justifications of democracy ever given to the world. Practically, his actions provide a model of prudent statesmanship—that is, the ability to apply moral principles correctly under the legal, social, and political circumstances of the time. Historically, he is at the center of America's national myth, the sustaining narrative that defines us as a common people based not on blood, but on fidelity to the principles of the Declaration. As the embodiment of the American experiment, Lincoln has represented the following things to the American people: the savior of the Union, the great emancipator, man of the people, the first American, and the self-made man.

Although he was not a political theorist per se, Lincoln articulated some of the most profound and enduring insights about the nature of equality, liberty, democracy, constitutionalism, and the meaning and destiny of the American experiment in self-government. His Gettysburg Address, which distilled the essence of the American creed, famously defines democracy as a form of government "of the people, by the people, for the people."

Lincoln probed the moral foundations of democracy to vindicate the American regime from the hypocrisy of slavery. He was compelled to provide a coherent understanding of democracy and its core principle of equal consent in response to the twin threats of slavery and disunion. Lincoln maintained that equality was "the central idea" of the American regime and "the father of all moral principle." And he viewed equality as an inclusive principle that applied in the abstract to all individual human beings at all times. Moreover, his view of equality appreciated both the dignity and depravity of our common human nature. Given that all human beings are all equally imperfect, "no man is good enough to govern another man, *without that other's consent*. I say this is the leading principle—the sheet anchor of American republicanism," he said in a speech, "The Monstrous Injustice of Slavery," on October 16, 1854. Thus, no one can be entrusted with absolute power over another. In sum, Lincoln emphasized that the core principle of democracy, equal consent, was utterly incompatible with slavery.

The above view of equality and consent was the moral touchstone of Lincoln's leadership as opposed to proslavery rivals from both South and North. For example, in contrast to Lincoln's view, Southern disciples of John C. Calhoun understood the principle of equality in collective terms, as applying to the equal rights of states and to the corporate body of citizens within these states. Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln's nemesis from Illinois, interpreted the principle as applying exclusively to white men of Anglo-American ancestry. Speaking of the efforts of his opponents to displace the founding principles of the regime, Lincoln explained in a letter to Henry L. Pierce on April 6, 1859:

> But soberly, it is now no child's play to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation. . . . The principles of Jefferson are the definitions and axioms of free society. And yet they are denied, and evaded, with no small show of success. One dashingly calls them "glittering generalities"; another bluntly calls them "self evident lies"; and still others insidiously argue that they apply only to "superior races."

Lincoln's view of equality was informed by the natural law teaching of the Declaration of Independence. Indeed, Lincoln interpreted the Declaration as a moral covenant that promulgated the first moral principles of a just government. Given this understanding of the Declaration as a moral imperative, Lincoln rejected the moral relativism implicit in Douglas's notion of popular sovereignty, which taught that the justice or injustice of slavery was determined by the preferences and choices of territorial settlers.

Lincoln trusted in reason's ability to discern self-evident truths about politics and universal laws of nature. It was in view of this trust that he considered the principles of Jefferson to be "the axioms and definitions" of free society. His appeal to natural theology against slavery was influenced by the Enlightenment thinker William Paley; and his views on political economy and self-improvement borrows from the Enlightenment rationalism of Francis Wayland.

In response to proslavery theologians and ministers from the South who appealed to the Bible in defense of slavery, Lincoln developed a civil theology that envisioned the fundamental principles of equality, consent, and liberty in the Declaration as articles or dogmas of a "political faith" or a "political religion." Contrary to southern clergymen's exploitation of the Bible to justify slavery, Lincoln argued that the natural law teaching of the Declaration was confirmed by the following precepts from the Bible: "man created in the image of God" in Genesis 1:27; "The Golden Rule" to "do unto others" in Matthew 7:12. To be sure, Lincoln's concise definition of democracy, dating to August 1, 1858, is itself an expression of the Golden Rule, "As I would not be a *slave,* so I would not be a *master.* This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the difference, is no democracy." Other biblical references cited against slavery included: "the Great Commandment" to "love one's neighbor as oneself" in Matthew 22:37–40; and the injunction to "earn bread by the sweat of thy brow" in Genesis 3:19.

Lincoln is relevant to political theory not only in view of his ability to affirm so powerfully ideas about equality and democracy, but also in view of his ability to put these ideas into action. Most notably, Lincoln's leadership sought to harmonize moral obligation to the principles of the Declaration with legal obligation to the rule of law in the Constitution. His oft-stated paramount object was to preserve the Union, but for Lincoln, this also meant preserving the principles for which the Union stood as well. His policy of the Emancipation Proclamation was calculated to achieve the twin goals of preserving the Union and ending slavery within lawful boundaries.

Lincoln's extraordinary use of executive power in suppressing the rebellion—for example, his Emancipation Proclamation, his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, his raising of funds without congressional approval, and the creation of military tribunals to try civilians—has been debated among political scientists and historians in terms of the enduring question of balancing freedom and security and wartime. Lincoln himself viewed the Civil War as a test that would decide the fate of democracy as a form of government. In his *Special Message to Congress* of July 4, 1861, he posed the question in these terms, "Is there, in all republics, this inherent, and fatal weakness? Must a government, of necessity, be too *strong* for the liberties of its own people, or too *weak* to maintain its own existence?" Critics doubted whether the Constitution would survive Lincoln's efforts to preserve it. Defenders claim that the text of the Constitution itself distinguishes between peace and wartime. They cite the doctrine of executive prerogative, claiming that president has enhanced authority in times of crisis to preserve the state and to bend the Constitution without breaking it.

Lincoln's legacy in American history is by no means uncontested. Various currents in American political thought and history have viewed him as an unprincipled pragmatist, an unrepentant racist, a misguided utopian, a messianic figure, the destroyer of civil liberties, the nemesis of states' rights, and the progenitor of the modern bureaucratic welfare state. However, critics and defenders alike agree upon the centrality of Abraham Lincoln to the character and destiny of the American regime. One cannot understand American political thought without engaging the towering figure of Abraham Lincoln.

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See also American Founding; American Revolution; Slavery in the United States

Further Readings

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LOCKE, JOHN (1632–1704)

A recent essay on John Locke begins with the claim that he is the "most influential philosopher

of modern times." Although it is difficult to be quite so categorical as this, the judgment expressed is surely a plausible one, particularly in the area of political philosophy. Locke's well-known influence in America is one piece of evidence; the general (although not universal) dominance of the ideal (if not reality) of liberal democracy in the world today, an ideal that Locke had a great hand in fashioning, is another.

Locke, of course, was not only a political philosopher. His philosophic activities extended into nearly every area of human inquiry, and his *An Essay on Human Understanding* (1690), a founding text of modern epistemology, stands as one of the seminal texts in the history of philosophy. Locke's political thought is contained primarily in his *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), although also of great political relevance is his *Letter on Toleration,* a text purporting to settle the vexed question of the proper place of religion in political society. Other Locke texts are of greater or lesser political importance, but for present purposes, the *Treatises* will be the focus of interest.

The Biographical Context of Locke's *Two Treatises*

Locke, it is now generally agreed, wrote the *Two Treatises* a decade or so before he published it in 1690. Like most of Locke's philosophic writings, it was both a work of political philosophy in conversation with the tradition and a text directed toward the political situation of Locke's day. He most definitely did not live the life of an ivory tower intellectual. From 1666 on, when he met Anthony Ashley Cooper, later (1672) the first Earl of Shaftesbury, Locke's life veered between the quiet of the philosopher's study and the rough and tumble of a very rough politics. Locke became part of Shaftesbury's household, a trusted adviser, aide, tutor to Shaftesbury's grandson, and—because Shaftesbury was a leading figure in English politics of the day—Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1660s and from 1672 to 1673 Lord Chancellor; he was much caught up himself in politics. Associating with Shaftesbury introduced Locke to politics at the highest level, so that he never wrote of politics as a mere theorist or armchair thinker.

Associating with Shaftesbury also introduced him to political danger at the highest level. Shaftesbury was sent to the Tower of London and finally into exile in Holland, where he died in 1683. Because of his Shaftesbury connection or because of his own activities and suspect loyalties, Locke felt threatened enough that he too fled to Holland in 1683, where he stayed until 1688. He returned to England in the wake of William of Orange's successful invasion and the triumph in the Glorious Revolution.

It is widely believed now that *Two Treatises* was mostly written in the period from 1679 to 1683, before Locke fled to Holland. At the time, his patron Shaftesbury was promoting the policy of excluding James, Duke of York, from succeeding his brother Charles II as king. Some of the whigs, those opposing the king, and perhaps Locke, too, favored violent action to get their way. Much was seen to be at stake—whether England would follow France down the path to absolutism and whether a known and open Catholic would be king. This is the immediate context for Locke's *Two Treatises,* a work that bears the marks of that context in its effort to develop a strong and unequivocal case against the legitimacy of absolutism, whether in the biblical form of Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha,* in the rationalist form of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan,* or in the equivocal form of Hugo Grotius's *Law of War* and *Peace.*

Although the Second Treatise is usually read separately from the First Treatise, Locke announces in the full titles of the works their intimate connection. In the First Treatise, "the false principles and foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, and his followers are detected and overthrown." The "Second" is "an essay concerning the true original, extent, and end of civil government."

Locke's Critique of Filmer

Filmer was a political thinker best described as a political theologian; he defended absolutism on the basis of biblical doctrines, in particular on the basis of the doctrine of the creation of Adam alone and the derivation of all other human beings, including Eve, from him. This, thought Filmer, was God's particular way of indicating that, like God, Adam was singular and the source of all who came after. As source, Adam, like God, had moral supremacy over his issue. Building on this foundation, Filmer laid forth his principles: the absolute

obligation to the illimitable royal power grounded in divine right.

Locke begins with a critique of Filmer, for he aims to overturn both divine right and absolutism, replacing them with popular consent and limited government, respectively. Filmer was not perhaps the most typical of the divine right thinkers, but he made what was probably the most extreme case of the day for those two abominations, as Locke saw them. The most obvious take-away points from the *First Treatise* were few in number, but they were powerfully argued and persuasive to most readers. Although Filmer claimed to build entirely on scripture, Locke said, the good book did not in fact support the propositions he was putting forward. Filmer misquoted, or took out of context, or interpreted tendentiously, or drew insupportable inferences from the texts on which he relied. Locke supplied plentiful examples of all of these flaws. His point seems to be, then, that although Filmer claims to be giving us the authentic biblical political doctrine, the Bible does not actually support Filmerean divine right absolutism.

Although in his positive development of his political doctrine in the Second Treatise, Locke does not develop his theory from biblical texts, he does claim that his position is consistent with scriptures in a way that Filmer's is not. There might be a more radical thought underlying Locke's treatment of Filmer, however. Locke insists that Filmer builds wholly on scripture, although in fact he does not. Locke attributes to Filmer some important doctrines, purportedly derived from the Bible, which Filmer does not endorse. Locke, for instance, attributes to Filmer the view that Adam's authority over Eve derives from the Fall, when Eve persuaded Adam to eat fruit from the forbidden tree and they were cast out from the Garden of Eden. But Filmer is very clear that it does not, and Locke can claim that Filmer so agues only on the basis of a very blatant misrepresentation of Filmer's text. This misrepresentation, so irrelevant to a critique of Filmer, is very relevant to a consideration of the biblical doctrine on politics, or at least to some very widespread interpretations of biblical political doctrines, for at least since Augustine, the Fall has been a prominent part of Christian political thought. One way to understand Locke's argument in First Treatise is to see him using Filmer as a stalking horse for something more fundamental lying behind him, the Bible itself. Locke claims in his title to have laid bare the "false foundation of Sir Robert," a phrase ambiguous enough to refer to the Bible as the "foundation" of Filmer's thinking. Most contemporary readers of Locke are resistant to reading Locke's First Treatise in that way, for they are impressed with his piety and biblical rootedness. Whether or not the evidence goes so far as to support the radical conjecture presented above, it is very clear that Locke does not present his thinking as biblically grounded. As Locke says well into the First Treatise: "reason" is man's "only star and compass" (Vol. 1, p. 58). The only instrument or means of guidance mankind has is reason; that implies that the Bible is not a reliable guide unless it can be shown to agree with reason. It is reason and not revelation that leads; the Bible is to be read in such a way as to harmonize with what reason independently tells us. If we do not put reason first we can be carried "to a Brutality below the level of Beasts" (Vol. 1, p. 58).

The place of reason in Locke's thinking helps us understand an oft-noted feature of his Second Treatise—unlike the First, it hardly cites a biblical passage and never as *the* ground for any claim Locke is raising, although at times as support or in agreement with claims he believes to be true on rational grounds. Thus, he says in one place, "whether we consider natural *Reason,* which tells us . . . , Or *Revelation,* which gives us" a similar lesson (Vol. 2, p. 25).

The Second Treatise

The title of the book announces the topics of the Second Treatise to be "the true original, extent, and end of civil government." The list of topics gives a good catalog of the organization of this book. Chapter 1 is a brief introduction, recapitulating the results of the critique of Filmer and distinguishing political power or government from other sorts of power and authority, followed by seven chapters on the "original," that is, the origin of civil society in the context of and in contradistinction to the "original" of other sorts of authority such as father–child (Chapter 6), husband-wife (Chapter 7), and master–servant (Chapter 5), with all of which the political relation of magistrate–subject (or citizen) is often confused, particularly by Filmer.

The section of chapters on "the original" is followed by seven chapters on "the extent of civil government," including an important chapter on the legitimate purposes of government, which set boundaries to its extent (Chapter 9). Here Locke presents his doctrine on the forms and proper structures of government, a doctrine governed in all places by his understanding of the proper extent. The section on extent is then followed by a series of chapters on the end of government, a phrase that Locke apparently intends in the sense not of *telos* or purpose, but of ending or conclusion. Here he takes up four topics, all of which involve "the end" of government—conquest (Chapter 16), usurpation (Chapter 17), tyranny (Chapter 18), and the "dissolution of government" (Chapter 19).

The State of Nature

No part of the Second Treatise is better known or more commented on than the first section on "the original" of civil government, for here Locke adumbrates his doctrine of the state of nature (Chapter 2): The true original of government cannot be understood unless we understand the "true original" altogether as a state of nature, that is, a state without legitimate political authority of any sort. The "state all Men are naturally in . . . is a *state of Perfect Freedom* to order their actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave or depending on the will of any other Man." The state of nature is at the same time a "state of equality," where no person has more authority than another.

Locke sometimes speaks as though the refutation of Filmer of itself justifies or even compels that we begin thinking about politics by positing a state of nature. That appears to be a logical fallacy, for one can conceive of other options than Filmer's divine right monarchy and Locke's state of nature. Much of the brunt of the critique of Locke and the other social contract philosophers since the seventeenth century has indeed consisted of dissents from the notion that a state of nature is the proper starting point: It is said to be historically, sociologically, and psychologically false to the nature of human beings and of human society. Despite Jean-Jacques Rousseau's heroic efforts to demonstrate that human beings could well survive in state of nature, most of the critics point to the facts of human birth and childhood helplessness, to say nothing of natural human gregariousness, to contest the plausibility of the state of nature.

Closer study of Locke's argument shows that these many critics have much mistaken his position (perhaps confusing it with Rousseau's) and that, moreover, he does not rely on the simple inference from the refutation of Filmer to establish the state of nature as his point of departure. Locke invites confusion and misunderstanding because he does not treat the state of nature in a simply univocal way. At times, he is quite determined to present it as an actual empirical condition: He refers, for example, to rulers of different nations as being in a state of nature relative to each other because "they have no common superior." He also mentions instances such as two otherwise unconnected individuals meeting on a desert island.

These situations certainly do meet the conditions for a state of nature—no common authority exists over the parties—but they do not effectively bring out Locke's point in positing a state of nature as the beginning or origin of politics. His concern is to establish "the original of civil government," a possession of something Locke calls "civil society," which in turn is characterized by the presence within it of "political power." That is defined by Locke as "a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties" (Vol. 2, p. 3). Many readers have noticed that Locke appears to be committing a category mistake when he calls political power a right; perhaps we would understand his point better if we translated his term *political power* into our term *authority*. He does not mean to be merely descriptive as do positive political scientists, who take power to be a fact and not a right. According to Locke, political power is rightful or legitimate power. We can rightly redefine Locke's task in his quest for the original of civil government to be the attempt to answer the question: What gives some the right to coerce others, even to the point of killing them?

Locke's beginning point is a suspicion or doubt of the rightfulness of coercive power, or, rather, the demand that such power be morally justifiable. It is not so much that demand in itself but the ground of that demand that leads Locke to posit the state of nature. The ground, in a word, is natural rights;

all human beings have rights to life, liberty, and estate. To have a right to such things means that these are not be interfered with without a morally valid reason, if at all. The right to life must include as part of it a right to the unimpairedness of bodies, the platforms of life. That human beings are rights-bearing creatures implies a general moral immunity from coercion, except when morally justified.

Natural Rights

Locke puts before his readers two alternative theories of the grounds for positing natural rights. There is, first, his well-known workmanship argument: "men being all the workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; . . . they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's Pleasure" (Vol. 2, p. 5). Having been made by God, humans are his property. As owner, God has the right to do what he will with his creatures, but humans violate God's property rights, that is, wrong God, when they interfere with the life or liberty of other humans. Natural rights, understood primarily as immunities from interference by others, accrue to individuals by virtue of their all being God's property. It should be noted that Locke's workmanship argument is meant to be an argument of natural rather than positive theology.

Locke also suggests another ground for rights: "every man has a property in his own person" (Vol. 2, p. 27). In one obvious respect, this claim is very different from the first one, for here individuals are said to be self-owners whereas in the first, God is said to be their owner. Locke is unclear on how these two claims are to be reconciled, and the scholarly literature is much divided on the issue. Perhaps he did not feel the need to clarify that matter for the politically relevant consequences of the two claims about ownership are much the same—natural or human rights. It is worth nothing that in the Second Treatise, Locke makes no effort to prove either divine or self-ownership. Those tasks are left for his *Essay on Human Understanding,* where he provides a natural proof for the existence of a creator God and develops a theory of the self-possessing self (See Vol. 2, p. 27, and Vol. 4, p. 10).

Because Locke has established in First Treatise that God has not appointed any individual human beings to exercise his proprietary rights, and because Locke's inspection of the natural order shows him that nature also does not mark any with "authority . . . to destroy . . . another," nobody by nature or divine designation possesses *political* power, the right to put another to death. All then are equal in authority; none has any. But this is precisely what the state of nature is—a state of no authority. Locke begins with the state of nature, for it captures the implications of the fact that human beings are equal rights-bearers. Locke's state of nature neither raises nor needs to raise any implausible claims about human beings ever living in a dissociated state or being by nature asocial. Thus, the criticisms of Lockean politics raised by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and many after him are based on a rather elementary misunderstanding of Locke's argument.

Law of Nature

Locke's beginning point is a state of nature, a condition of liberty and equality, but, Locke insists, this is nonetheless a state with a law "to govern it," a law that sets moral limitations on what human beings may rightfully do (Vol. 2, p. 6). Locke rejects the Hobbesean conception of the state of nature as a condition with no restraints, a condition where every man has a right to everything.

Locke never presents a comprehensive account of the content, principles, or grounds of the law of nature, however (Vol. 2, p. 12). The most general statement on the content of the law of nature provides that "when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind" (Vol. 2, p. 6). Locke's development of the idea reveals an important but fairly limited set of duties: One "may not unless it be to do Justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb, or Goods of another" (Vol. 2, p. 6). That is, the natural law limitations appear to be the obverse or corollaries of the natural rights that human beings possess. As one has, for example, a right to life, so others have a duty not to interfere with that life, a duty that follows automatically from the right itself. Locke's law of nature appears largely to express those correlative duties and thus to be the implications of the original natural rights.

Locke spends far more space on one implication of the law of nature than on the content or grounding of the law of nature. "The Execution of the Law of Nature is in that State [of nature] put into every man's Hands, whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree as may hinder its violation" (Vol. 2, p. 7). Such power may be a part of or derived from this law of nature, but it has the character of a right: Notice that Locke does not affirm a duty or obligation to enforce the law, but a right or moral permission to do so.

The executive power of the law of nature plays an important role in Locke's theory, in the decisive respect differentiating his theory of the social contract from that of Hobbes. According to Locke, it is not generally morally permissible to use force against others, but one may do so only in the service of protecting the rights of oneself or of others. One is justified (but not morally required) to use force to protect the rights of others because the guilty party has forfeited the immunities that go along with possessing rights, or because all can rightly consider a rights violator as a potential threat to their rights, that is, as one who has no respect for the system of rights and immunities (Vol. 2, p. 16).

This executive power prevents the law of nature (and natural rights) from being "vain," for without it, there would be no morally acceptable way to safeguard preexisting moral immunities (Vol. 2, p. 7). It also contributes to the breakdown of the state of nature into a state of war for it empowers all to act as enforcers of their own and others rights in circumstances that make it very difficult for both self and others to distinguish clearly between legitimate actions in defense of rights and illegitimate incursions on rights. In large part, the problem arises from the right under the executive power to act preemptively, to act before a threat has ripened into a perhaps unpreventable and irreparable harm (Vol. 2, pp. 16, 136).

The executive power under conditions of the state of nature guarantees a descent into a state of war, a state where rights are "very insecure." Under conditions of "no authority," the empowerment of everyone to act to secure rights leads to a condition of all being radically insecure in their rights. The solution, of course, is the establishment of authority, which is the transfer to the community of what is now seen to be the dangerous executive power of the law of nature; the contractors resign this power but not the entirety of their natural rights as in Hobbes. Society or the government that is formed to wield the resigned executive power on behalf of society derives only such powers as are resigned, and these are the powers to protect rights. The "true original" of political power indicates clearly its proper extent.

The Social Contract

No more than the state of nature itself is the social contract to be taken as an actual historical event. It is rather a reconstruction of what rational actors, understanding both their rights and their insecurity without government, would do to better secure themselves. (See, for example, Vol. 2, pp. 137, 164.) Rational individuals will create not only a government but a certain sort of government, what we now think of as a liberal order. In the first place, rational actors will understand that government is an artifact of their rational willing: As an artifact, it has been made or should be understood as existing for certain specific purposes, namely, to secure their preexisting rights. Rational individuals will understand the shortcomings of the state of nature that produce the radical insecurity of life without government. Although there is a law to govern the state of nature (that is, a set of rational moral rules or restraints), these do not of their own accord suffice. Although the law exists "yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow it as a law binding to them" (Vol. 2, p. 124). That is, the law is not known sufficiently. Moreover, the system of self-enforcement (Locke takes it for granted that the use of the executive power will fall to interested, not disinterested, parties) means there is no disinterested judge to apply the law to resolve controversies (Vol. 2, p. 125). Finally, with no organized enforcement of the law, the naturally strong are able to ride over the weak despite the law of nature (Vol. 2, p. 126). Rational individuals recognize, then, that the chief lacks of the state of nature are the absence of a legislative authority to particularize and promulgate the law, an independent judge to resolve disputes under the laws, and a potent neutral executive to enforce the law. From his doctrine of the state of nature, Locke thus generates the modern theory of separation of functions.

Rational individuals will thus form or will a political system containing these three functions. Anticipating an argument that his great disciple, baron de Montesquieu, was to make more fully in the next century, Locke also concludes that rational individuals will establish a government that separates the powers in different and independent institutions (Vol. 2, p. 143). The separation of powers is one device by which rational actors attempt to assure that the government they establish will serve the ends for which it exists. All "well-framed governments" separate the legislative and executive powers (Vol. 2, p. 159). (Locke considers the judiciary part of the executive, but he does insist on a judiciary significantly independent of the executive head.)

True Extent of Civil Government

Locke concludes that the "true original" of government implies not only separated powers but limited power as well. That means, in the first instance, legislative supremacy over the executive (Vol. 2, p. 149). It also means limitations on the powers of the legislature. Although the core of the limitations is substantive—protection of the rights of all and *salus populi* so far as that is possible, the limitations Locke specifies are more formal than substantive. The legislature must rule by standing public law, not by arbitrary decrees. The laws must apply equally to all (Vol. 2, p. 142), including especially the legislators themselves. Locke sees these two requirements together as the best guarantee of good governance, or at least of governance aiming at the public good (Vol. 2, p. 138).

Although Locke is strongly in favor of legislative supremacy—conceptually, the legislative function is primary, and practically, the legislature, possessing the will but not the force of the community, is more safely entrusted with supremacy. Nonetheless, Locke also demonstrates that there must be a large scope for independent action by the executive, which Locke calls by the traditional name of prerogative. His is not, however, the traditional doctrine of prerogative (Vol. 2, p. 163). He defines *prerogative* as a "power to act according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it" (Vol. 2, p. 160). Given his emphasis on legislative supremacy and his concern to establish and maintain rule of law, and given his fear of executive power, his broad prerogative power may seem surprising. Locke and his rational individuals/social contractors recognize that it is not always "necessary or useful to set precise bounds to . . . power in all things" (Vol. 2, p. 164). Political life is too uncertain, too subject to unpredictable and threatening contingencies, for it to be entirely governed by rules and procedures established in advance (Vol. 2, p. 160). Locke, a great champion of what we have come to think of as constitutionalism, recognizes the limitation to the aspiration to constitutionalism. At the same time, he reminds of the dangers of this kind of executive power freed from law and legislative control. Although he generally seeks to control political power by law, he recognizes that at the end of the day, this cannot be entirely done. The executive can appeal to the public good as justification for exercises of prerogative. Locke is confident that if "this power" is "imployed for the benefit of the community, and suitably to the trust and ends of the government, [it] never is questioned" (Vol. 2, p. 161). When the prerogative is questioned, there is "no judge on earth" to settle a dispute between the executive and the legislature. The people themselves, in what Locke quaintly calls the "appeal to Heaven," must judge through some extralegal means. Locke's openness to revolution or the routinization of political violence is a corollary of his attempt to develop a viable constitutionalism marked by the maximum possible rule of law.

The End of Civil Government

Just as Locke's development of the true extent of civil government flows from his account of its true original, so his discussion of the end of civil government builds directly on what he has shown about its extent. Recall that where Locke speaks of the end of civil government in his title, he means the end in the sense of the death or destruction of civil government. His section on the end thus comprises a survey of four circumstances or ways in which civil government may come to an end. Conquest is the equivalent of "demolishing an House" (Vol. 2, p. 175). Usurpation, which occurs when a person or persons other than those designated in the established political order seize power, is also a kind of death for civil government

because a usurper "hath no right to be obeyed," which means that juridically there is no government (Vol. 2, p. 198). Tyranny, which Locke defines as "the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to," has the same fatal effects as usurpation (Vol. 2, p. 202). Finally, in a kind of summary chapter, Locke speaks of "the dissolution of government," a chapter in which he lays out his well-known doctrine (usually misnamed as) the right of revolution.

Locke's conclusion on the true extent can be well summarized in the formula he frequently uses—that civil government does not comport with "arbitrary or absolute power." Locke has two complementary arguments to establish that conclusion, corresponding to his two alternative accounts of the basis of rights. One account derives ultimately from the workmanship argument: Because men ultimately belong to God, they do not have absolute and arbitrary power over themselves, and therefore, they cannot establish government with such power over them (Vol. 2, p. 135). Locke has a second explanation for why there can be no arbitrary power; this one conforms to his self-ownership argument.

> Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their Lives, Liberties and Fortunes; and by stated Rules of Right and Property to secure their Peace and Quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give any one, or more an absolute Arbitrary Power over their Persons and Estates.…This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the State of Nature. (Vol. 2, p. 137)

That is to say, this second argument concludes against absolute and arbitrary power whether or not human beings have the power to establish such. Contrary to the position taken by many scholars, Locke's argument in the Second Treatise does not depend unequivocally on the theological arguments he sometimes deploys. This is not to say, of course, that he should be taken for that reason to have rejected the theological argument.

In any case, Locke's position on the end of civil government follows seamlessly from his clear rejection of the legitimacy of absolute arbitrary power and his affirmation of institutionally and constitutionally necessary means to the effectuation of nonarbitrary government. Government that goes beyond its bounds is no government at all. When governments act beyond their powers, they are using force without right and thus, literally, provoking a state of war with their citizenry. The citizens may then act as they have a right to in a state of war—they may resist illegitimate authority and act to establish new legitimate government. When they do so, Locke insists, they are not rebelling—it is the authorities who go beyond their legitimate powers, who reintroduce the state of war, and who, therefore, rebel—in Latin, *rebellare*—bring back war (Vol. 2, p. 226). Locke then denies that he is a teacher of rebellion and disorder, as he strives to make resistance to rulers more respectable than it had ever been.

Michael Zuckert

See also Civil Law; Civil Rights; Consent; Dissent; Liberalism; Natural Law; Separation of Powers

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MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLÒ (1469–1527)

In the history of Western political thought, few thinkers have been as influential—or as controversial—as the sixteenth-century Florentine statesman Niccolò Machiavelli. The author of a wide-ranging collection of writings, Machiavelli was a true Renaissance man. He lived a political life of both practical and theoretical importance, while making an important contribution to Italian literature as well. Often misunderstood, his writings have been characterized as representing a cynical, duplicitous quest for power at all costs; hence the colloquial term *Machiavellian*. In fact, the author of *The Prince* and the *Discourses on Livy,* among other works, was a founder of modern political thought who never endorsed the idea that "the ends justify the means." His corpus is rich, complex, and variegated, something that has led to numerous—and sometimes vastly different—interpretations.

Machiavelli's legacy is part of the advent of modernity. However, it involves the recovery and reconceptualization of classical humanism. By being a critic of his own times, he pointed to the past, especially to Roman antiquity, for guidance toward the future. Doing so allowed him to break the religious fetters of medieval political thought, particularly the biblical tradition. This had two consequences: the reemergence of civic republicanism and the idea that politics is fundamentally independent from ethics. The rejection of Christian political morality explains why he was able to cast his gaze back onto the ancient model of Roman pagan culture, as well as to set the stage for a view of politics as an autonomous sphere of social life.

Background and Context

Machiavelli was born in the Italian province of Tuscany, in the city of Florence, on May 3, 1469. He studied Latin from an early age, as his father Bernardo was a lawyer and had ties to humanist circles. He entered public life when he was elected second chancellor of the Republic of Florence, which principally managed Florence's territories. He also served as advisor to Piero Soderini, gonfaloniere of republican Florence after the Medici were driven out of power. He was also known as the creator of the city's militia and as secretary of its war magistracy of Ten, or "Ten of War," the committee responsible for Florence's foreign and diplomatic relations. In addition to his military experience, Machiavelli was involved in many diplomatic missions, including those to France, Siena, the Papal Court, the German emperor, and to Cesare Borgia. His political career ended upon the return of the Medici to Florentine rule, which led to his imprisonment and torture. He wrote his major works thereafter. In 1513 he wrote *The Prince,* seeking employment and dedicating it to Lorenzo de' Medici, although the work was originally written for Giuliano de' Medici. Around that time he also wrote his defense of republican government, *The Discourses on the Ten Books of Titus Livy*. He died in 1527, having failed in his attempts to return to political activity.

During much of Machiavelli's life, his homeland, Florence, was in crisis. Constantly at war or in tension with its neighbors, Florence was also prey to internal and external threats. Internally, powerful elites—such as the Medici family—dominated politics and became corrupt, that is, oriented merely toward their own interests. Externally, the city-state was encroached upon not only by regional rivals, such as Siena and Pisa, but also by more distant enemies, such as the French and the Spanish. In this context of instability, Machiavelli found guidance in the writings of the ancient denizens of the Italian peninsula, specifically the Romans.

Machiavelli wanted to see a free, independent, peaceful, and stable Florence. Moreover, he dreamed of seeing it expand and become a dominant player in the region. For this reason, he read the works of the Roman historian Titus Livy, who recounted the rise of Rome and its transformation from a small republic into a magnificent empire. On reading this, Machiavelli became convinced that Florence could emulate the ancient Roman example and perhaps reach the same imperial power that Rome had reached. He found many admirable aspects of Roman rule and believed that its tradition of civic humanism and republicanism made it strong.

The Recovery of Classical Civic Humanism

Disgusted by the corruption of his Florentine contemporaries, Machiavelli sought solace in the virtues of the ancients. In his analysis of the first ten books of Titus Livy's history of Rome, Machiavelli analyzed what made Rome strong internally and externally. According to Machiavelli, any society is made up of two principal groups or classes: the *grandi* (elites) and the *popolari* (the people). These two groups will never see eye to eye, as they have different interests: The elite seek to govern, and the people just want to be left alone to lead peaceful lives. These two groups, or "humors," as Machiavelli calls them, are almost natural entities. They correspond to the existence of two different human drives: one to control and one to be left alone. The people are the conservative element of the body politic, and the elites are the ambitious component. In his reading of Roman history, Machiavelli deduced that these two groups could never be made to agree; they could, however, learn to not just coexist, but even thrive, under the right institutional circumstances. Thus, for Machiavelli, social conflict generates political greatness. This idea, among others, sets him apart from his contemporaries, who abhorred sectarianism and conflict.

Machiavelli examined Roman law and found that its structure and organization, its "modes and orders," allowed for a balance of power between the patrician and the plebeian elements of Roman society. Both of these elements had a say in the drawing up and institutionalization of laws and rules. This arrangement, where the elites and the popular sectors share power, allowed for his conception of a mixed constitution, whereby elites could manage the state, but only under the supervision and with the input of those from the common citizenry. This arrangement, Machiavelli found, was mutually beneficial to the interests of the two humors. Hence, it worked for the common public good, in other words the *res publica*. Although Machiavelli often sided more with the popular sectors of society, arguing that they are the ultimate judges of public policy, he was cognizant that a balance was necessary. Various mechanisms, such as agrarian laws and laws related to calumny, were institutionalized so that this balance could last. If these laws were followed by all, without exception, and enforced in a comprehensive manner, the legal system would support social stability. Thus, the rule of law was also central to Machiavelli's understanding of republicanism. All citizens must be willing to adhere to the city's laws, and this in itself is part of Machiavelli's conception of *virtù*. A virtuous citizen is one who adheres to the law and partakes in crafting it.

Crucial to Machiavelli's brand of republicanism is patriotism. A state cannot function properly if its citizens do not feel a love for their own country. For Machiavelli, this is a love of not only the country's laws but also its way of life. Machiavelli enjoyed strolling through the city streets and the countryside of his homeland, talking with laborers and drinking and playing games with average townspeople, something that made him appreciate the unique culture of his country, which was, most specifically, the city-state of Florence, but in a larger sense Tuscany and even all of Italy. This subjective love of the place where he was born and grew up is essential to his republican patriotism: It is the basis of a willingness to serve one's

country as a soldier if necessary (Machiavelli despised the use of mercenaries) and to promote its well-being above that of other states. It is clearly reflected in the last chapter of *The Prince,* in which he urges the liberation of his homeland from foreign invaders.

Separation of Politics From Ethics

One way that this love of country can be encouraged, in Machiavelli's republican political thought, is through the proper use of rhetoric. He acquired this by examining the history of ancient Rome, where great orators like Cicero were key to the flourishing of the Roman virtue of patriotism. Rhetoric, an art in Roman antiquity, was recovered during the Italian *Quattrocento,* and Machiavelli was part of this movement. For him rhetoric was valuable in itself, for it possessed artistic value. But it also had an ancillary, political, value: The capacity to persuade others through the artistic use of words was cardinal to forensic life and also helped to generate a common sense of Roman identity. Thus, Machiavelli emulated the great rhetoricians of old, by writing many of his own works in a rhetorical vein. Chief among them was his masterpiece in the traditional mirror of princes' genre, *The Prince.*

It is through rhetoric that the second dimension of Machiavelli's legacy is revealed. The separation of political life from morality becomes evident when we question the very nature of rhetoric. Aimed at persuasion, Machiavelli's conception of rhetoric does not have to adhere to strict rules of veracity. As long as an audience is moved through flowery language, passionate speech, and poetic diction, rhetoric is successful, even if it is slightly mendacious. Whereas it is immoral to tell lies (according to most accounts), the use of fabrications within rhetoric is acceptable as long as it serves to further persuasion. This is one example of the way that Machiavelli pushed the envelope of how far political practices could move from ethical injunctions.

Machiavelli went far in questioning the relationship between politics and ethics. It is not that he did not care for morality. His writings show clearly that he wanted peace, order, stability, and some prosperity for his homeland for moral reasons: He wanted average people to enjoy the fruits of daily life without fear. He also wanted his homeland to achieve a level of greatness, comparable to that of Rome. This in itself is not a moral issue if morality is understood as a question of absolute good and evil, but it is an ethical issue if ethics is defined as how one should live in a community. For Machiavelli, greatness, magnificence, and being admirable are what a political order should aim for. And, sometimes this may require the use of immoral means, such as war, to protect a community and its greatness. Only good arms are the sinews of good laws.

As Machiavelli examined the corruption, weakness, and inefficacy of his Florentine homeland and compared it to the glorious power of ancient Rome, he saw the significance of religion. He saw that the Romans used religion successfully to motivate citizens. Machiavelli tended to see religion as a way to promote political values, rather than as a value in itself. He observed, for instance, the importance of treating the augurs of the Roman "chicken-men" (priests who presaged the outcome of a battle according to whether their chicken would eat or not before the fight) seriously, for, in this way, soldiers could be convinced that their gods were on their side and thus they would fight more valiantly. Thinking about the religion of his own land and times, Machiavelli concluded that Christianity was a religion that, in its emphasis on humility, modesty, poverty, and equality, would hamper the progress and grandeur of an expanding state. He offered a trenchant critique of Christianity, evident in passages such as *Discourses* II.2.2. Believing that Christianity promotes a sort of weakness that is not compatible with the quest for glory that is fundamental to his political theory, he generally treated Christianity as a problem rather than an asset. However, he noted its rhetorical force, for he appreciated the persuasive power of men such as Savonarola, and he invoked religious language in order to persuade. Although Machiavelli's God is a rhetorical one, he did see the efficacy of Christian men who spread the power of the Roman Church through unarmed propagation of ideas.

By examining critically what he thought were the weaknesses of Christianity, Machiavelli pushed further the space between political and moral life, as Isaiah Berlin tells us. It is in *The Prince,* as well as in other writings, such as *A Description of the Methods Adopted by the Duke Valentino When Murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo,*

the Signor Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, where he eventually came to question the utility of following conventional morality in political life. Although written for the specific and mundane purpose of acquiring a job as an advisor to the Medici, the short manual of power that is *The Prince* is a work in moral theory enriched with real-life examples. Fundamentally, the message of this work is to show that to be successful in politics, a leader must be able to act without regard to conventional morality. Throughout the work, there are various examples of this, such as the spectacular execution of Borgia's own lieutenant, Remirro de Orca, who was cut into two pieces and displayed in a piazza, something that left the people "satisfied and stupefied." This act was both politically expedient and awe-inspiring, while also completely immoral. Machiavelli approved of this sort of leadership, which he saw exemplified in the person of Cesare Borgia.

The Prince contains Machiavelli's radical teaching, which is the necessity to act against morality when politically expedient. This is the core of what Leo Strauss, a chief interpreter of Machiavelli, argued when he said Machiavelli is a "teacher of evil." The central figure of *The Prince* is Borgia, a vicious man whom Machiavelli describes as the ideal political leader. Hence, the supreme realist, Machiavelli, acted paradoxically as an idealist when he mythologized Borgia. Borgia's spirit of amoralism and immoralism pervades the text. This is the other side of Machiavelli's notion of *virtù:* It is not merely about acting patriotically for the motherland, it is also a courageous and defiant attitude that allows the transgression of moral principles in order to acquire, maintain, and expand power. Rooted in the Latin term for male (*vir*), *virtù,* according to Machiavelli, is a valuation of masculinity, understood in the archetypal manner of independence, aggressiveness, courage, confidence, brashness, and voraciousness.

The Prince seeks to teach potential leaders that they must become masters of *virtù,* be they male or female. Borgia, in Machiavelli's idealized account, possessed a character that combined four essential components of *virtù:* the ability to act with force, to use fraud, to have foresight, and to be flexible. Moreover, he was loved by Fortune, since much of his success was a consequence of being the son of Pope Alexander VI. Power is the basic terrain of politics, and any regime or ruler needs it. It is acquired and established by great leaders, those who, according to Machiavelli, can use these four qualities. Machiavelli opposes *virtù* to Fortune rhetorically: the capacity to act with force, dissembling, foresight, and flexibility will help to master fate, since "Fortune is a woman." This is represented by Borgia, a man much admired by Machiavelli in spite of the facts that he had family ties to the clergy, was of Spanish descent, and was no republican but in fact an enemy of Florence. Machiavelli believed humans control almost half of their lives' events, whereas luck or Fortune rules the rest. Thus he left out Christian providence from this equation. Using *virtù* appropriately will help tame life's vicissitudes.

In *The Prince,* all three sides of *virtù* are portrayed in a positive light. The use of force or violence is a recurring theme. From the very foundation of a state, violence, represented by the lion, is the guiding principle. Great founders such as Moses and Cyrus are mentioned. The great prince or leader must also be a master of disguise, or, in Machiavelli's symbolism, a fox: He must learn to act fraudulently to fool his opponents and to lie whenever it will be politically expedient. By using the symbols of the lion and the fox in a positive manner, Machiavelli implicitly criticized Cicero, who urged rulers to be humane. Machiavelli preferred the image of the centaur Chiron: a leader made up of human and also beastly (i.e., violent) parts. For Machiavelli, if a prince allows his personal morality to trump what is in the best interest of his state, he fails as a leader. This is part of the tradition started by his contemporary Francesco Guicciardini, that of *ragion de stato,* eventually to be called *raison d'état* (reason of state), which is the basis of realist international relations, as Friedrich Meinecke underscores. We also see Machiavelli's promotion of the idea that the leader must be flexible: He or she cannot have a single way of doing things but must adapt depending on the circumstances.

Questioning the political utility of Christianity at a time of Catholic dominance both in the realm of religion as well as in the city of Rome, Machiavelli lived dangerously in a moral sense. He effectively exposed to public view what everyone knew but no one dared to speak: that politics is a dirty business. Machiavelli's understanding of *virtù* sidelined the

medieval idea that politics should be controlled by Christian virtue and the classical idea, found in Aristotle, that *arete* (rational virtue) must guide political life. Perhaps no Machiavellian dictum is as emblematic of this as the idea of "cruelty well used": A political leader must use cruelty at the right time and in the right dosage in order to achieve his political aims. A similar, if less potent, version of this appears in his exhortation to princes (in *The Prince*) to learn "not to be good." Ideally, a ruler should be loved and feared, but since it is difficult to achieve both at the same time, to be an efficacious ruler, a man must cultivate and manage fear both within and without the state. In the words of Montesquieu in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Machiavelli was full of the spirit of his idol, the Duke Valentino, or Cesare Borgia.

Machiavelli's Modernity and Method

One crucial dimension of Machiavelli's contribution to political theory is his methodology. Owing to his originality, commentators have struggled to determine his precise intention and his mode of approaching politics. By pointing to his purported effort to see how things are, not as they should be, in political life, many have claimed that he is one of the first modern political scientists. Such is the view of Ernst Cassirer and Augustin Renaudet, for instance. Machiavelli examined the workings of *lo stato* and wrote about some general rules regarding its workings. For some, such as Quentin Skinner, he was the first to theorize the modern state. He also cast his gaze on human nature, rather than on divine law, as a way to organize social life. Thus, he must be considered seriously as one of the founders of a scientific or objective study of political phenomena.

This transformation of political method involves moving away from Christian doctrine and toward humanism. Unlike medieval political thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas or Augustine, Machiavelli did not attempt to square human politics with Christian virtue or commands. At the same time, his recovery of republicanism is a reinterpretation of the classical account: Unlike Aristotle, for instance, Machiavelli did not have a teleological view of human development that required active participation in the *polis*. For him, freedom to create one's laws and to not be subordinated by foreign powers was more important than individual flourishing within a community. Given these crucial distinctions from both the liberty of the ancients and the Christianity of medieval thinkers, Machiavelli must be seen as at the vanguard of modernity.

The turn toward new ways of ordering political life, however, is not uncomplicated. Machiavelli had a nuanced understanding of modern politics. This is most visible in his poetic and dramatic works, such as *The Golden Ass* and *Mandragola*. These artistic works show that, for Machiavelli, the dawn of modernity brings with it an intensification of the sense of being lost and alone in a world of flux. Hence, Machiavelli cannot be seen as a proponent of the simple idea that pursuing ever-increasing power is a clear solution to the travails of modern politics or that progress is inevitable. Machiavelli's literary works add depth and texture to his political ideas and also provide an alternative to the notion that he developed an exact political "science" in anything more than a merely metaphorical way. For this reason, it may be more accurate to say that Machiavelli was concerned with describing the art of politics rather than the science of politics. Such is the view of Jacob Burckhardt and Herbert Butterfield, among others. Still, the debate over Machiavelli's method provides ample room to think about the very meaning of modernity and the exactitude of political knowledge. Machiavelli was a pivotal figure in the transition from medieval thought to early modern ideas. As such, his writings reveal premodern concepts such as the idea that human physiology is made of up fluids or humors that are affected by the cosmos, a cyclical conception of history, and also a persistent engagement with religious symbols and biblical themes.

Legacy of Machiavelli

By contrasting the failures of modern Florence to the successes of ancient Rome, Machiavelli highlighted the crisis of his era. At the same time, he knew that one could not simply return to the way of the ancients. He saw in humanism the key to learning from the past in order to forge a more promising future. Humanism, understood as the centrality of human experience and nature as opposed to that of God in public life, came to

permeate the Renaissance. In Machiavelli's view of politics, this meant a renewed concern with the city as such, as the sphere of human development. But it also meant the need to take a hard look at human nature, foibles and all. This led Machiavelli to see that immorality is part and parcel of human nature.

This process led Machiavelli to displace the traditional foundation of politics, that of ethics. Did he reestablish politics on a different basis? One important interpretation is that necessity becomes the key foundation of his political philosophy. His legacy involves the abrading of the distinction between republics and principalities as a matter of political necessity. A strong executive is needed if a republic is to function well. It must always be aware of external threats, for Machiavelli believed rulers are always either engaged in war or thinking about war. This stance of perpetual vigilance is not only necessary for principalities, but must also be heeded by republican leaders. The importance of making one's laws while preventing the encroachment of always-aggressive foreign powers with a proactive foreign policy is an element of Machiavellian thinking that has had a far-reaching influence. Machiavelli's brand of republicanism had a significant influence both in England through James Harrington as well as in the founding of the United States, as J. G. A. Pocock showed. It is important to note, however, that Machiavelli did not approve of republics whose economic growth was at the center of their expansion. He believed citizens should be deprived of wealth while public coffers should be enriched, and in this sense he cannot be seen as a proto-capitalist thinker.

An alternative interpretation of his refounding of politics on a new base is to be found in the fact that he was a man of letters and a creative playwright as well as a poet. As such, Machiavelli suffused his entire oeuvre with aesthetic principles. The admiration for the glory and power of Rome, the spectacular executions carried out by Borgia, and the valuation of heroism, even if tragic, are part of this artistic outlook on power that Machiavelli drew up at the height of Florence's preeminence in the arts. In his view, politics is about appearances, changing of forms, representation and misrepresentation, and the imitation of the ancients, something that is evident even in fanciful parts of his *Florentine Histories*. And, like much art, it deals in the expression of emotions, whether these are love, fear, or hope. Although he never entirely severed the link between ethics and politics, Machiavelli—an artist, statesman, and political theorist—went far in building a new, aesthetic foundation for politics.

There are limitations, however, to the Machiavellian legacy. As the transitional figure from medieval to modern political thought, Machiavelli had difficulty in dealing with some tortuous problems in political theory. He treated religion as an instrument, although it appears that it can be a basic motivating drive per se for political acts even today. He also came to believe that Christianity was an effete philosophy that would undermine modern states. Yet, European colonialism all over the world was often tied to Christian values and missionaries—for instance, in the conquest of the Americas by Spain, something that Machiavelli largely ignored when he discussed Ferdinand of Aragon. Moreover, he admired the dazzling power of empires, without properly seeing the contradiction in espousing both a republican love of liberty and an expansive, territorial conception of power, which, by definition, takes away the freedom of others. He also believed that only free, republican states could grow and expand successfully, something that was contradicted by the rise and expansion of nondemocratic states such as China and Russia. Still, in the richness of its originality, Machiavelli's corpus is itself a founding act of modernity.

Diego von Vacano

See also Civic Humanism; Civic Republicanism; Reason of State

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Mahatma Gandhi

See Gandhi, Mohandas

Maine, Henry Sumner (1822–1888)

Sir Henry James Sumner Maine was a British jurist who invited scholars to take a more historical and anthropological approach to law. Maine's theory of legal development posed a significant challenge to the positivist legal theory of John Austin by arguing that there were no abstract, timeless necessary notions in law, but that legal doctrines and concepts were the product of the societies in which they had evolved. In his major work, *Ancient Law* (1861), Maine put forward a theory of legal development. The earliest law, he argued, consisted of the judgments of rulers claiming divine inspiration. It was succeeded first by an era of customary law and then an era of codes. In *Ancient Law,* Maine argued that societies that codified their law early in their history—as Rome had with the codification of the Twelve Tables (c. 450 BCE)—became progressive, whereas those which codified later, such as India, remained stationary. In progressive societies, law continued to develop in response to three external impetuses: fictions, equity, and legislation. These ensured that law would keep up with the needs of the people.

In *Ancient Law,* Maine also traced the evolution of modern individualistic societies out of primitive patriarchal ones. The basic unit of early societies was the family, which was headed by an absolutely supreme patriarch. In such societies, there was relatively little law to regulate relations between different kinship groups. Over time, the individual replaced the family as the basic unit of society, and a more sophisticated system of civil law developed. Maine's theory was encompassed in his famous phrase that the movement of progressive societies has hitherto been one from status to contract. Although politically conservative, Maine was an enthusiast for the individualistic, laissez-faire society in which he lived.

In his later work, Maine expanded his critique of Austin. His experience as an administrator in India convinced him that Austin was wrong to define all law as being the commands of a sovereign enforced by his sanction. Such a view of law not only was incapable of explaining Indian customary law but, when applied by English administrators on the subcontinent, had the effect of distorting it. For Maine, English conceptions of political economy could equally not simply be applied in India. In his later writings, he also developed his ideas on the evolution of property. Abandoning his earlier distinction between progressive and stationary societies, and developing his interest in anthropology, he argued that the study of societies such as India provided living examples of the European past. A comparison of Indian, Irish, Russian, and Slavonic societies could help show the development of individual property rights out of joint-property holdings.

Well written and catching the enthusiasm of the age for theories of progress, Maine's work proved highly popular in his lifetime. After his death, his

influence waned. If lawyers accepted his modification of Austin's jurisprudence, Maine's historical approach was not taken up by later English jurists. Nor did anthropologists accept his anthropology, which was wedded to a patriarchal theory which was soon rejected.

Michael Lobban

See also Hart, H. L. A.; Sovereignty

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Mandeville, Bernard de (1670–1733)

Bernard de Mandeville was an influential eighteenth-century political economist, social theorist, and satirist. Born in the Netherlands to a family of physicians, Mandeville attended the Erasmian school in Rotterdam and, in 1685, matriculated at the University of Leiden to study medicine. Soon after receiving his degree, he traveled Europe, perhaps to escape public scandal after he and his father were implicated in the 1690 tax riots in Rotterdam. After briefly returning to the Dutch Republic in 1694, Mandeville immigrated to England. While practicing medicine in London, Mandeville actively pursued his literary ambitions until his death in 1733.

A prolific prose writer and satirist, Mandeville is best known for his masterpiece *The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits,* a complex work of social satire, political economy, and moral theory. It began as a long poem, *The Grumbling Hive: Or, Knaves Turn'd Honest,* published in 1705. The poem depicts a wealthy hive of bees, driven by pride to pursue material gain and social esteem, even by vicious means. Disturbed by their own behavior, the bees decry their moral failings even as they grow wealthier. Their god answers their cries; he rids the hive of vice and renders the bees honest. After this intervention, the hive is radically transformed. Industry and commerce come to a halt, and the newly impoverished hive is deserted by the bees, who fly away to live contentedly in a tree hollow. Mandeville pointedly notes in the poem's moral that virtue alone will never make a nation great. Rather, it is only vice that, when properly managed, can generate the industry and wealth that sustain a commercial society.

The Grumbling Hive garnered little attention, but Mandeville continued to develop its central claim: Many of the self-interested impulses held to be reprehensible by members of polite, commercial societies were the very same human drives that made it possible for these societies to flourish. In 1714, Mandeville republished the poem, with a preface on the origins of morals and a set of prose commentaries, as *The Fable of the Bees. The Fable* went relatively unnoticed, and Mandeville expanded his commentaries and wrote two new essays for an edition published in 1723. This version of *The Fable* finally thrust Mandeville directly into the center of eighteenth-century British debates about the relationship between commerce and virtue. Mandeville's position invited moral and political critiques from many members of the reading public as well as a crusade against *The Fable* by the Grand Jury of Middlesex. Undaunted, he responded publicly to his attackers and used the debate surrounding *The Fable* as an opportunity to develop its ideas.

Mandeville's followers and critics alike understood *The Fable*'s central claim to be that private vices yield public benefits. In the text, Mandeville draws connections between socially recognized vices and prosperity to suggest that all who enjoy prosperity are ultimately complicit in the persistence of vice, whether or not they intend to be. *The Fable* contains many examples illustrating this point; one of the more striking ones details a robber's decision to spend money outfitting his favorite prostitute. According to Mandeville's map of an interdependent commercial society, everyone, from the local seamstress to any number of commercial textile traders, profits from the stolen money the thief uses to buy his gifts. Mandeville argues that

the structure of exchange and the division of labor that support commerce make it impossible to fend off the long-reaching effects of vicious activity. Without calling for reform, he articulates not only the complex structure but also the moral underpinnings of commercial society and sets an intellectual agenda for the political economists and philosophers who follow him in the coming decades.

More controversially, Mandeville also claims that what men take to be virtue is in fact merely pride redirected in the interest of generating public goods. He depicts people as naturally self-interested and preoccupied with the gratification of their own passions rather than with the well-being of their fellows. Over time, he argues, people have been socialized to channel or suppress self-regarding passions into virtuous other-regarding behavior. Flattery and the threat of shame or promise of reward have taught us to perform virtue. The egoism that drives invention, creativity, and the acquisition of wealth in a commercial society therefore also promotes the practice of virtue.

Despite initial efforts to cast aspersions on *The Fable* and its author, Mandeville's work offered fruitful material for a generation of philosophers trying to make sense of a new commercial world of changing social, political, economic, and moral dynamics. Mandeville focused attention on the idea that a commercial society was composed of self-interested individuals and gave voice to the central moral paradox that later eighteenth-century theorists viewed as a problem for commercial societies—the idea that private vice could yield prosperity for all. His account of the manipulation of self-interest for the purposes of civilizing and socializing egoistic human beings grounded later studies of the emergence of culture and society, such as those of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith. Moreover, his work encouraged both Smith and David Hume to consider the consequences of living in a moral order generated by self-interested, commercial individuals and to elaborate how such an order is stabilized and made livable. However much his successors might have disagreed with his conclusions or tone, Mandeville set a series of questions and problems that were central for Enlightenment thinkers preoccupied with the possibilities and challenges of commerce.

Emily C. Nacol

See also Commerce; Commercial Society; Enlightenment; Hume, David; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Scottish Enlightenment; Smith, Adam

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Manners

Every human society maintains itself through the regular interaction of its members. Those interactions take place within the framework of institutional arrangements of power and authority, social practices that structure everyday life, and systems of expression, or cultural forms, that give ways of life meaning and purpose. But it is the patterns of behavior that define the relationships between the individuals involved in different institutions, practices, and cultural forms that support—or undermine—those arrangements. These patterns of behavior are the subject of manners, and they are important for social inquiry for reasons that go well beyond the fact that matters of manners touch on every aspect of our lives. This is plainly evident when we consider that for all of us the earliest, most significant, often repeated, and regularly reinforced lessons we learn are about how to behave. These lessons continue throughout our lives: We are constantly reminded of what proper behavior is and should be, and we quickly learn to expect, and demand, that others behave properly as well. Manners, in short, are both ubiquitous and essential. Every human society maintains itself through the regular interaction of its members, and manners are what makes those interactions work.

The study of manners is part of nearly every form of social inquiry. In political theory, however, that study focuses on particular *kinds* of manners, which differentiates the interests of political theorists from those of other students of manners, and the meaning of manners in politics is further refined by distinguishing between formal and informal arrangements in political communities. This entry reconstructs the logic of these distinctions by examining the definition of manners in political theory, analyzing the forms and functions of manners in politics, and reviewing how the study of manners fits into the history of political theory.

Defining Manners

Examining the etymological roots of manners offers a useful way of beginning to make sense of similarities and differences in the various ways we think about manners and how political theorists have conceptualized their particular approach to the subject.

The word *manners* is derived from the Latin *manaria,* the feminine form of *manuarius,* the literal translation of which is "belonging to the hand" (*manus*). Interestingly, discussions about manners frequently focus on how we use our hands, as in instructions regarding etiquette, where, for example, the use or placement of the hands in eating, greeting, or meeting with others might be at issue. This makes sense: Our hands are arguably the most common if not most effective way for us to relate to the external world. But for political theorists it is the *symbolic* meaning of what "belongs to the hand" that is the key to conceptualizing manners. Manners are about the management of our surroundings and especially our relations with other people, and in this our hands (*manus*) are, symbolically (and etymologically) speaking, everywhere: We *manage* our surroundings, we *manipulate* our circumstances or other people, we *manifest* our intentions in various ways, we *maneuver* in order to make or get our way, we *maintain* our goods or our reputation, our labors are often *manual,* and it is a *manual* we would consult in trying to accomplish some task.

This brings us to another way in which the meaning of manners in political theory is both similar to and different from other uses of the term. Manners are about behaviors that shape our relations, but for political theorists the interesting behaviors are those that follow *patterns.* The synonymous use of manners and habits, from the Latin *habitus* (disposition, character, or condition), intimates this dimension of meaning, yet even here there is more to be said about the kinds of patterns with which political theorists are concerned. In some usages, manners and habits may describe individual patterns of behavior, as in discussions of someone's mannerisms or their manner of writing, running, dressing, eating, and the like. For political theorists, it is the patterns of behavior that individual members of groups or communities *share* that are most relevant. Etymology is revealing here, too: The word *manners* is not only used synonymously with *habits,* but in political theory both are also used synonymously with *customs,* from the Latin *consuetudo,* or *customary usage,* a term that clearly embodies a social or collective referent.

What we have then are patterns of relational behavior shared by members of a group, but there is one more important conceptual theme that is critical for understanding manners in political theory. When groups of people share patterns of relational behavior, these are usually not randomly or arbitrarily generated. Rather, these patterns of behavior give relations a particular meaning or identity. Social scientists of every sort may be interested in these meanings, but for political theorists it is patterns of behavior that bear on moral or normative matters that distinguishes their conceptualization of the subject. The fundamental question here is how certain behaviors promote, undermine, or transform purposes, ends, or goals that define what a good life is or should be. This normative dimension of manners can be seen in the synonymous use of manners and mores, from the Latin *mores* or "conduct, character, or morals," a reference to norms of proper behavior. Thus—to sum up this conceptual reconstruction thus far—when political theorists talk about manners in politics, it is typically in reference to patterns of relational behavior shared by members of a group that affect the realization of a particular conception of the good life.

At this point it should be evident that the study of manners in political theory is part of a broad range of inquiries we would readily recognize as matters of manners, but that political theorists are specifically interested in a particular subset of

those behaviors. What we need to make clear now is how this distinctive understanding of manners fits in the study of politics, for there is more to politics than manners—even the particular kinds of manners political theorists study. Examining the ways that political theorists have addressed and conceptualized the forms and functions that manners take can help situate the place of manners in the study of politics.

The Forms and Functions of Manners

Among the most significant general characteristics of manners that are relevant to political inquiry is the fact that they are both *specific* and *mutable*. Even a cursory consideration of the variety of forms that manners can take in any given society or any particular period of history demonstrates that what constitutes manners in one sphere of activity may have nothing do with what constitutes manners in another sphere of activity. For example, manners are often gender specific, and what constitutes appropriate behavior, or good manners, for men and women is often significantly different.

This seemingly trivial observation has important implications for our inquiries precisely because it has far-reaching implications for our lives. The variability of manners means that patterns of behavior required for us to manage effectively and efficiently in all aspects of our lives cannot be easily reduced to a simple—or even a manageably complex—set of behavioral guidelines. This variability is further exacerbated by the mutability of manners. Here, too, nothing more than a cursory examination is required to establish the fact that what passes as manners in any particular sphere of life at one point in time can be completely different from what passes as manners in that same sphere of activity at another point in time. Consider manners of gender as a case in point: In Western societies today, men who go out in public wearing wigs of long curly white hair might have their masculinity questioned, but until the early decades of the nineteenth century, it was men who *did not* wear wigs of long curly white hair in public who might have had their masculinity questioned. What is implied here is that sometimes our goals change and we change our manners accordingly; in other instances we find that the manners we practice do not advance the goals we have, and this may be another reason to alter our manners.

What the variability of manners suggests is that our lives—and societies—are subject to the facts that we want many different and sometimes incompatible things, that we do not always behave in ways that enable us to get the things we want, and that the things we want change. These basic facts of life are important for political theorists because they raise significant theoretical questions and serious practical challenges for the pursuit of human excellence and happiness, the pursuit of "the good." And it is helpful to think of them in reference to manners because in political theory, the way that we respond to the messiness of life that is reflected in the variability of manners, and the unpredictability that is created by the slippage between the manners we have and goals we want, is itself essential to the pursuit of the good life and thus to how we "do" politics.

We can unpack this claim by considering the sanctions communities use to make people comply with preferred patterns of behavior, and what those sanctions tell us about both the behaviors in question and the ideals they promote. In political theory, the relevant conceptual boundary seems to be located between behaviors that are subject to formal sanctions on one side and behaviors that are subject to informal sanctions on the other. In political inquiry, behaviors subject to formal sanctions are typically included in the analysis of institutions; behaviors that fall under the purview of informal sanctions are the stuff of manners.

The basis of this distinction needs to be clearly understood, as it is absolutely critical to the study of manners in political inquiry. The distinction turns on complex arguments about what kinds of behaviors ought to be and can be effectively regulated by formal sanctions and what ought to be and can be effectively regulated by informal sanctions. It has to be emphasized that these are not simply additional examples of ongoing disputes about the relationship of the individual and the collective, a very large and influential tradition of discourse that some theorists have described as encompassing all of political theory. Nor are they simply about institutional design, another influential tradition of discourse that some theorists have described as the most important theoretical and practical issue for political theory. For political

theorists interested in manners, both of these characterizations of the discipline are wrong: The debate about appropriate sanctions assumes that even the best designed institutions cannot function if citizens do not have the (noninstitutionally sanctioned) manners that enable them to work as they should, and it assumes that the behavior of individuals is always relevant—even when it is not formally sanctioned—to the realization of the good that different regime arrangements embody. The question at the heart of the distinction between what belongs to institutional analysis and what is a matter of manners is whether it is better—or possible—to secure compliance by coercion, or whether it is only possible—or better—to secure compliance by relying on the informal sanctions of shame, ridicule, scorn, contempt, disdain, or other attacks on reputation and character.

These are enormously complex questions, and in the history of political thought they have produced a wide range of arguments and a provocatively interesting literature. For our purposes, these arguments are about how institutions and manners are, to use a phrase popular among social theorists, "mutually constitutive"—or simply, that you can't have one without the other. It is also useful to understand that when political theorists are talking about what manners are and should be, they are thinking about patterns of relational behavior shared by members of a group that affect the realization of a particular conception of the good life, and which should not or cannot be enforced by law, administrative imposition, juridical action, or police powers.

Perhaps the most important question begged by this discussion is why is it useful to think about how manners are discussed and analyzed in political theory? A short excursion into the history of manners can help provide the answer.

A Very Short History of Manners

There are a number of good reasons why we might be interested in the study of manners. One is that it has been an important topic in the history of political thought. Plato's argument that the best kind of polity is one in which individuals understand their proper place in society, Aristotle's argument that statesmanship is the art of fitting constitutions to the character of a people, Machiavelli's argument that successful rule requires both good laws and good habits, and baron de Montesquieu's argument that the Spirit of the Laws requires forms of government that complement the principles—"the manners and mores"—of a people are but a few examples of how political theorists have made manners central to political analysis.

Another reason political theorists study manners is because they matter for our lives. Put another way, we ignore them at our peril. Indeed, what the history of the study of manners suggests is that it is in moments of crisis and change that manners matter most, and some of the most influential work in the discourse of manners has been written in or about moments of crisis. For Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Livy, Polybius, Sallust, Machiavelli, Milton, Sydney, Harrington, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hume, Smith, Ferguson, the American founding fathers, French revolutionaries, and many others who have been concerned about manners in politics, crisis was the context of their reflections, and every one of them recognized that we ignore manners in politics at the risk of inviting chaos or despotism.

This brings us to a third, and perhaps the most compelling, reason we might be interested in the study of manners. In the last decades of the twentieth and now in the early twenty-first century, we appear to be in or nearing another crisis of manners. For many years now, politicians, pundits, and scholars have been talking with urgency about why manners should matter to us. Rudeness, incivility, lack of decency, the decline of respect, irresponsible behavior, rising crime rates, family breakdown, cynicism about government, and even economic distress and difficulties are a few of the myriad problems in democratic societies today that have been attributed to the neglect and deterioration of manners.

Where we are now, then, may be the best reason to be interested in how political theorists have studied manners in politics. Now may be as good a time as any to remember why the earliest, most significant, often repeated, and regularly reinforced lessons we learned as children were about how to behave. What the study of manners in political theory can teach us is that in order to get the kind of society we want, we may need to think carefully about how we should treat each other.

Stephen Leonard

See also Chivalry; Citizenship; Civic Republicanism; Commercial Society; Scottish Enlightenment

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Maoism

Maoism is generally synonymous with the thought of Chairman Mao Zedong, who ruled China from 1949 to 1976. Maoism is best understood within the larger context of Marxism and the communist revolutions of the twentieth century. Marxism is generally understood as a theory that claims that the contradictions of capitalism would lead people to create a revolution aiming to construct a new socialist society. However, twentieth-century revolutions in general, and the Chinese revolution in particular, happened in places where the contradictory logic that Marx described in *Capital* had not developed. The various tenets of Maoism must be understood as an alternative Marxist political theory, which emphasizes aspects other than, or in addition to, the contradictions of capitalism. Maoists attempt to show how revolutions in the third world could be part of a world-historical transformation of capitalism. This entry first briefly summarizes Marx's understanding of the possibility of socialism and then discusses certain key themes of Maoism, namely, the emphasis on the peasants, Mao's theory of "new democracy," and Mao's vision during the Cultural Revolution.

Marx and the Possibility of Socialism From Capitalism

During the first half of the twentieth century, Marxists generally described history as consisting of a sequence of stages, including slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism. They contended socialism would emerge out of the contradictions of capitalism and, more specifically, from the conflict between the workers and capitalists. On this view, capitalism differs from previous modes of production because in capitalist society, overtly political ties or hierarchies binding, for example, serf and lord are dissolved and people in society must satisfy their needs by buying and selling commodities in exchange for money. The majority of people in capitalist society have nothing to sell except their labor power, and they sell this to capitalists who own the means of production. The capitalist makes surplus-value by buying labor on the market and then selling the products of this labor for a greater price than what he or she paid for the labor. The capitalist drives to increase profits and thus aims to squeeze as much labor out of workers as possible. According to this basic reading of Marxism, eventually, workers will not tolerate being exploited, and when they realize that they have nothing to lose but the chains that force them to sell their labor, they will revolt and create a new society, in which the means of production are collectively owned by workers.

From the previously described perspective, the possibility of socialism is contained in the contradictions of capitalism. There are a number of reasons for this. For example, it is only in capitalism that there emerges a class that is at once free from the transparent or overt oppression of hierarchical bonds and yet systematically exploited. However, another major transformation that makes socialism possible is the radical increase in productivity and technology, which makes possible a different way of organizing production relations. In other

words, as Moishe Postone has pointed out, in Marx's view, as technology improves, wage-labor becomes more obsolete, but at the same time, the capitalist mode of production is organized around wage-labor. Therefore, increased productivity from technology does not benefit the worker and often leads to unemployment. As technological advances make wage-labor less necessary, capitalism—a society around factory-oriented labor, capitalists, and surplus value—also becomes obsolete; this opens the possibility of people delinking technological advances from the profit motive and democratically organizing this productive power for the benefit of humanity. However, the realization of this possibility is not a natural outgrowth of capital society; it is a political project.

Mao's Predicament and the Problem of Voluntarism

The two major socialist revolutions of the twentieth century, the Russian and the Chinese revolutions, did not occur in places where the contradictions between labor and capital were developed, and they did not take place in areas of great technological development. Hence Mao and other Chinese Marxists faced the problem of how to create socialism in a largely rural society that had not experienced the various contradictions of capitalist production. Mao's response to this question is complex and has led scholars of Mao's thought to debate about whether he was a voluntarist.

Specifically, although Mao did not reject the basic tenets of Marxism, he stressed that China could create a revolution and begin on the socialist path by mobilizing China's large peasant population. Some scholars have considered this an example of Mao's voluntarism, because he seems to argue that political mobilization can effect transformation to socialism even where, according to orthodox Marxist theory, conditions are not ripe. According to Maoism, it is because third world countries are on the periphery of the global capitalist system and have not fully developed capitalist forms of life that they develop a resistance to this system. So while not neglecting the importance of class conflict within a society, Maoism also underscores the contradiction between imperialism and imperialized regions. The position of the imperialized regions on the outside or periphery gives the inhabitants of those regions a critical vantage point from which to see the problems of capitalism and posit alternatives based on existing modes of life.

In his discussion of the transition to socialism, Mao continues a legacy that began in the late Qing dynasty and he gestures in two directions. Because China and other countries on the periphery of the global system faced capitalist expansion in the form of imperialism, they developed a two-pronged response to it. On one hand, they realized that they needed to industrialize and develop modern technology in order to retain their autonomy. But on the other hand, intellectuals and political activists on the periphery of the world system could see the problems of capitalism and envisaged an alternative world, free from exploitation, inequality, and imperialism. Mao's project involved both of these tendencies. He sought to build a strong industrialized nation-state and also, eventually, to transcend the conditions of the present global system. Related to these different goals, Mao put forth two related theories of democracy and politics. These theories roughly correspond to phases in Mao's political career, namely, the periods of New Democracy and the Cultural Revolution.

On New Democracy

Mao outlined his theory of new democracy in his essay "On New Democracy," published in 1940. In this essay, Mao explained that socialist revolutions that occur in colonial or semicolonial nations have a dual task. They must create an independent nation-state and realize certain political and economic ideals associated with the bourgeoisie, such as industrialization and democracy. However, these goals would not be seen as ends in themselves; rather, they are a stepping stone in the process of a long battle to overcome global capitalism and create a radically new society.

In making this argument, Mao reinterprets the significance of the Chinese political movement associated with the protest of the Treaty of Versailles on May 4, 1919. This movement, known widely as the May Fourth Movement, was usually considered a bourgeois movement promoting science and democracy. However, Mao contends that after the May Fourth Movement, the political leaders of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution were the proletariat and not the bourgeoisie.

In Mao's view, because of this leadership, advocates of democracy in China, especially under the guidance of Chinese communists constantly aimed beyond bourgeois democracy toward socialism.

Maoism and the Cultural Revolution

Some of the contradictions embedded in Maoism clearly emerge in Mao's theory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Many scholars have dealt with the Cultural Revolution in terms of Mao's personal ambitions to gain power, but this encyclopedic entry focuses on some of Mao's theoretical contributions during this period. Mao's theory of New Democracy presented socialist countries with the contradictory task of promoting ostensibly bourgeois ideals, such as democracy and industrialization, while at the same time aiming to transcend them to create socialism. With the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949, China attained national independence and began to industrialize under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Put simply, Mao's theory of the Cultural Revolution points out that, although China was governed by the members of the CCP, given that they were implementing policies related to industrialization, which implied succumbing to the imperatives and standards of global capitalism, the possibility of merely reverting to the path of capitalism was an imminent danger. Mao was concerned about this from the 1950s and debated Liu Shaoqi and other high leaders of the CCP who claimed that exploitation was good because it would promote productivity. Some party officials argued that by merely increasing productivity, China would eventually attain socialism.

By 1966, against this emphasis on economic development, Mao underscored politics and stressed that if China were to continue on the socialist road, people needed to create a new type of political culture that encouraged mass participation and criticism. In 1949, China followed the Soviet model of socialist government and implemented a centralized bureaucracy, which succeeded to some extent in creating policies of equality and in developing the economy. Mao was generally skeptical of state-centered forms of organization and his theory of the Cultural Revolution represented an attempt to infuse the Chinese political system with a form of participation that had overtones of direct democracy. In other words, he believed that members of the CCP were not actually representing the people and thus the masses needed to participate in politics by actively, and at times violently, criticizing their superiors.

Mao's theory of the Cultural Revolution also involved a critique of the division labor between the technocratic elite and manual laborers. Generally, modern capitalist society stresses mental over manual labor and what is usually called knowledge refers exclusively to the former realm. In an attempt to rectify this tendency, Mao sent a large number of intellectuals and elites to the countryside to learn from the peasants and through working in the fields. In the countryside, intellectuals were to acquire a type of knowledge that was not available in books, a type of practical knowledge that Mao believed was essential to being a complete human being.

These policies of the Cultural Revolution met with limited success. However, following Wang Hui's and Alessandro Russo's investigations, Mao's promotion of radical political practice and his critique of elite education in the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s corresponded with a global crisis in governance. This was also a global crisis in the state-centric model of capitalist development. In the face of this crisis, people in various parts of the world incorporated Maoism into their politics of resistance and hoped to make the government and the economy more accountable to citizens. By the 1980s, when the new neoliberal phase of global capitalism was more or less consolidated and the Chinese government had officially declared the Cultural Revolution to be a colossal failure, Mao's theory of the Cultural Revolution seemed to be a thing of the past. Indeed, since the 1980s, the Chinese government has tried to promote a nonantagonistic Mao by stressing his "New Democratic phase" while downplaying the socialist project. However, by the 1990s and into the 2000s as the inequalities associated with neoliberal capitalism became increasingly apparent, Chinese intellectuals have often returned to Mao's theory of the Cultural Revolution as a resource to develop a critical perspective on the present. Since Mao's revolution, rural people in states on the periphery of global capitalism around the world have drawn inspiration from Maoism. Movements in Nepal and Peru

provide two recent examples. Despite how movements that draw on Mao's thought are evaluated, today, in a world where the contradictions and crisis of capitalism have become increasingly global, Maoism is significant in posing questions about the relationship between spaces on the periphery of the global capitalist system, politics, and the possibility of radical social transformation.

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See also Chinese Revolutionary Thought; Marxism; Socialism

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Market

A market can be defined as a relatively stable network of institutions or organizations that enable the exchange of goods and services among producers and consumers, usually (but not always) on commercial and monetary terms. Conceived in this way, markets are necessary but insufficient predicates of capitalism, which entails a system of production based upon private ownership as well as a market-based system of exchange. Beyond these basic definitional outlines, however, a number of tensions surrounding the concept derive from disagreements about the organization of market capitalism, the state's role in regulating it, and the degree to which markets are naturally arising and self-equilibrating or, rather, politically created and sustained.

A conventional view, common to contemporary economists and many political scientists, traces the market concept back to Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776), which provides a seminal understanding of market exchange even though Smith rarely uses the term *market* itself. For Smith, the "general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange" (p. 117) derives from human nature, as does the increasing specialization and division of labor through which nascent markets gave rise to modern capitalism. Markets are guided by an "invisible hand," whereby the pursuit of individual self-interest translates into collective welfare. Smith's conception reflects not only an optimistic view of exchange as an engine of mutual benefit, but also the small-scale, incipient capitalism of Smith's time.

The localized character of markets under early capitalism underpins contemporary debate about the appropriateness of extending Smith's model to larger-scale, contemporary economies. It also suggests the need to distinguish among understandings of the market along two dimensions—first, the scale and scope of market forces, and, second, the degree and type of regulation of market-based exchange. Neoclassical economists such as Milton Friedman, along with neoliberal political figures like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, have assumed that Smith's world is both similar to and constitutive of our own. As a result, they have maintained that market-based exchange is a natural human predilection and that aggregate welfare is best served by both extending the *scope* of market forces and minimizing their political *regulation.* As a result, Friedman and most neoclassical economists have argued, the only ethically acceptable and economically viable posture for governments to adopt is one of expanding the use of markets, both domestically and internationally, and regulating them minimally.

This historical treatment of markets stems from Smith's notion that market exchange derives from human nature, which presumably has changed little

in the intervening two centuries. Somewhat oddly from a contemporary perspective, Karl Marx shared with Smith a view of market exchange as an organic outgrowth of human nature, but he drew very different conclusions about its consistency with human happiness. In contrast to Smith, Marx saw markets as the handmaidens of a system, dominated by the bourgeoisie, that produces insoluble class tensions, alienation, and, eventually, the cataclysm of revolution.

These two competing conceptions—one of capitalist markets as sources of welfare, the other of markets as fonts of immiseration—continue to color contemporary debates about the relationship between markets and government. Many have questioned neoliberals' confidence in "pure" markets as an ideal form of economic and social organization and as an engine of expanding opportunity. Karl Polanyi, for example, argued in his influential book *The Great Transformation* (1944) that the vision, born from "the utopian springs of the dogma of laissez-faire" (p. 144), of markets as self-regulating and hence requiring little in the way of government control was both unattainable in fact and profoundly disruptive in its attempted implementation. The attempt to create the "self-regulating market," predicated upon the "fictitious commodities" of land, labor, and money, led to a "double movement," with the state first acting to create markets and extend their reach and, subsequently, society clamoring for protection against resulting economic dislocation. Though Polanyi's argument is problematic in its functionalism and its broad-brush depiction of market institutions, it highlights some of the stubborn tensions within the concept of markets. By identifying market-based exchange, rather than the system of production, as the ultimate source of immiseration, Polanyi's work also represents a shift in emphasis, if not a fundamental paradigmatic break, from classical Marxian analysis.

Views such as Polanyi's also foreshadow contemporary debates. The neoliberalism of recent decades has again assumed that markets are ontologically stable—that they are unitary "things" that are self-equilibrating. Such views obscure the fact that the term *market* is a proxy for a complex network of institutions and organizations that together provide the means for exchange. In this sense, the "market" is actually a metaphor based upon a Smithian image of autonomous, skilled individuals engaged in "truck and barter." Such images have not conformed to market dynamics since at least the early nineteenth century. As capitalism has grown exponentially in scale and complexity, and Smith's world has become more and more remote, claims that markets are self-regulating systems that are stable and automatically serve the aggregate welfare, precisely to the extent they are "free" of government control, have further lost credibility.

These contemporary tensions point to the contested character of conceptions of markets. Contending uses of the concept will persist as long as debates continue about how markets function, the extent to which they are embedded in social organization, and the state's desirable and necessary role in extending their scope, regulating them, and guiding their development.

Mark Vail

See also Commercial Society; Network

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Marshall, T. H. (1893–1981)

Thomas Humphrey Marshall was a British sociologist renowned for his argument that the development of the welfare state in the twentieth century had introduced a novel form of citizenship—"social citizenship"—which granted to the citizens of modern industrialized states the rights to material resources and social services. Marshall argued

that this social citizenship complemented and reinforced the civil and political citizenship that had been won in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively.

Marshall was born into a wealthy professional family and educated at Rugby School and Trinity College, Cambridge. After spending World War I as a civilian internee in a German prisoner of war camp, Marshall returned to Trinity College as a history fellow in 1919. He stood unsuccessfully as a parliamentary candidate for the Labour Party in the 1922 general election. Marshall later recollected that, although this experience convinced him that he was temperamentally unsuited to political campaigning, his brief tenure as a parliamentary candidate was important because it brought him into close contact with working-class people for the first time and directly exposed him to the injustices and prejudices of the British class system. When his fellowship at Trinity expired in 1925, Marshall was appointed as a tutor in social work at the London School of Economics, which remained his main institutional base throughout the rest of his career. He was appointed to a professorial chair there in 1944, but he also undertook significant roles in public service, working for the Foreign Office from 1939 to 1944 and, in his final post before his retirement, as director of the social sciences division of UNESCO from 1956 to 1960. Marshall's career therefore spanned a period of significant social, political, and intellectual change. He had a ringside seat at the depression and class inequality of the 1930s; at the prosecution of a so-called people's war by the British state between 1939 and 1945; at the emergence of the postwar welfare state, presided over by the 1945–1951 Labour government; and at the arrival and professionalization of the discipline of sociology in British universities.

Marshall's most influential piece of writing was his essay "Citizenship and Social Class," originally delivered as the Alfred Marshall Lectures in Cambridge in 1949, only a few years after the Labour government had passed into legislation William Beveridge's wartime plans for universal social insurance. Marshall's essay focused on the gradual historical transition away from medieval societies, in which civil, political, and social privileges were bestowed as a single package on those born into high-status social groups. Marshall argued that, as capitalism and the modern state emerged, a new, egalitarian, and legally defined form of community membership began to take shape: This status of "citizenship" slowly pulled apart the package of privileges hitherto given exclusively to the well-born. In the first instance, Marshall said, the eighteenth century saw the gradual acceptance of the idea of equal civil rights—such as the freedom of speech, the right to own property and conclude contracts, and the right to justice. With the rule of law thus entrenched, Marshall continued, the nineteenth century then saw the expansion of the franchise and hence the universalization of political rights—such as the right to participate in making political decisions and to elect representatives to parliament. Finally, according to Marshall, in the twentieth century social citizenship began to emerge, with the right to material resources and social services increasingly regarded as an integral component of each citizen's package of rights. With the state now guaranteeing universal access to health care, education, housing, and social insurance, Marshall argued that this new raft of social rights had replaced earlier ideas of providing material assistance only as a matter of charity or, as under earlier social welfare legislation, of making state assistance conditional on recipients forfeiting their civil or political rights.

Various criticisms have been leveled against Marshall's account, among others that it merely offers a specific narrative of modern British history rather than a general social theory, and that it oversimplifies the complex evolution of the status of citizenship in Britain itself. However, the most widespread objection pressed against Marshall in recent years is that he presented a rather complacent story of inexorable upward progress, leaving out the bitter struggles involved in winning basic individual rights for all and assuming that the final victory of social rights was an irreversible achievement. His name has therefore become a byword for the smug and triumphalist social democracy that is alleged to have been widespread on the moderate left after 1945 and that was to receive a rude awakening with the rise of the New Right's populist crusade against the welfare state in the 1980s. However, this objection underestimates Marshall's theory. As David Lockwood has pointed out, Marshall's essay should actually be seen as a

subtle attempt to integrate, and improve upon, core themes in social theory drawn from Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. Marshall took from Weber the insight that social stratification can be grounded on the basis of status as well as class and, in particular, that the state plays a central role in legally determining status stratification. Marshall focused on something that Weber did not consider in any detail, namely, that the defining feature of the modern legally determined status order is that it is based on equality rather than inequality. The emergence of the status of equal citizenship, derived from the universal legal authority of the modern state, therefore stood in marked tension with the inequality generated by the market-based life chances of different social classes. In addition, the ideal of equal citizenship furnished Marshall with an answer to Durkheim's attempt to come up with a plausible basis of social solidarity in modern, highly stratified societies. Durkheim had argued that the interdependence created by the division of labor itself, coupled with strong occupationally based associations, would foster greater social cohesion. Marshall maintained instead that it was the ideology of universal civil, political, and social citizenship that would cement together individuals otherwise placed in opposing interest groups by their unequal class positions.

Seen in this light, Marshall's main insight was that there was a sharp tension between the slowly emerging legally authorized equality of the modern state and the great class inequality of capitalist societies. With the emergence of the civil rights to own property and make contractual agreements, Marshall argued, the inequalities of political power and economic resources that structure individual life chances come to seem arbitrary, inequitable, and in urgent need of redress. The widening of the franchise and the creation of social rights are consequently required to address this tension between civil equality and political and economic inequality. Marshall did not see this as an effortless, teleological process but, on the contrary, as the fruit of centuries of difficult struggle. He naturally took pride in the achievements of the British welfare state of the 1940s and hoped that the future might see further progress toward a more egalitarian society. But Marshall did not underestimate the continuing, and in some ways intractable, tension between social rights and the market. As he put it, "in the twentieth century citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war," and he offered the firm injunction that "the basic conflict between social rights and market value has not been resolved" (Marshall, 1950, 29, 73).

Ben Jackson

See also Citizenship; Class; Durkheim, Émile; Rights; Weber, Max; Welfare State

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Marsilius of Padua (c. 1275/80–1342/3)

The Italian political thinker Marsilius of Padua (c. 1275/80–1342/3) is one of the most intellectually significant fourteenth-century political theorists in the West. Marsilius's writings primarily reflect his thoughts on the conflict between the elected Roman emperor Ludwig the Bavarian and Pope John XXII. While Marsilius can be considered a political actor in his own right, by virtue of his authorship of important political treatises, he also served as a counselor. In fact, Marsilius's theory of the relationship between the papacy and the Roman empire, a topic which covers most of Marsilius's major work, *Defensor Pacis* (1324), had a significant impact on Ludwig's politics. Despite the fact that Marsilius's theories on the relationship between secular and ecclesiastical powers was of major interest to his contemporaries and influenced political discourse in the centuries that followed, including in the Age of

Reformation, scholars interested in his work focused for decades primarily on his secular theory, as outlined in the relatively short first discourse of the *Defensor Pacis*. In his later and shorter works, *De translatione Imperii* (c. 1324–6) and *Defensor minor* (c. 1341), Marsilius advances some of the ideas previously outlined in his major work *Defensor Pacis*.

Life

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of Marsilius's political theory, relatively little is known about his life and career. Born in Padua c. 1275/80, he divided his life between scholarship and politics. The first confirmed date related to Marsilius is his appointment to the position of rector of the University of Paris in 1313. Then, in 1316 he was appointed canon of Padua. Two years later, he was promised the first vacant benefice in Padua by Pope John XXII, a benefice he never received. Instead, in 1319 he began serving on diplomatic missions for his hometown of Padua. An epigram at the end of *Defensor Pacis* reveals that he completed this work on June 24, 1324, in Paris. Soon thereafter, he moved to the court of Ludwig the Bavarian in Nuremberg, under circumstances that remain unclear. Marsilius later joined Ludwig on his expedition to Rome in 1327. In the same year, Pope John XXII condemned Marsilius as author of *Defensor Pacis* in the bull *Licit iuxta*. Meanwhile, Marsilius worked on *Defensor minor*. In 1343 Pope Clemet VI reported his death.

Secular Thoughts

Although Marsilius's secular thought takes up relatively little space in this entire work, it nonetheless provides the framework for his theory on the relationship between temporal and ecclesiastical power. His main concern is the establishment of an independent secular sphere. He believed that divine authority cannot be relied upon to justify temporal power. Consequently, Marsilius locates the origin of all temporal power in the citizenry. Basing his theory on the idea that those who establish a rule will be most likely to follow it, he conveys the right to establish law as well as the right to elect and, if necessary, to remove a ruler from his office, to the citizens or "the weightier part thereof." To avoid the problem of having two conflicting authorities within one commonwealth, he integrates the priesthood into the secular state and subjects it to the temporal authority. The fundamental idea behind this is Marsilius's theorem that those who benefit from the temporal realm must also be subjected to it and its coercive jurisdiction. Although Marsilius is not a democratic thinker in any modern sense, his secular theory is based on the principle of as much active participation as possible of the citizenry in the political process. The heart of it is the core political sphere of jurisdiction.

Temporal and Spiritual Power

Marsilius's ecclesiastical theory oscillates around and opposes the papal claim for absolute power in temporal and spiritual affairs. After integrating the priesthood into the secular political realm, his main concern is the repositioning of the papacy. As a medieval author, he cannot do without the papal office. Because all coercive power has its origins in the citizenry, he has to define the papal office in a way that the pope is able to fulfill his religious duties without interfering with the temporal authority. Central to Marsilius's solution to this problem is his theory of the general council, an institution that is responsible for the interpretation of divine law. The council is a representative institution of the faithful, that is, all Christian believers. It is composed of lay and priestly representatives. In cases of dispute, the lay representatives outvote the priests. The pope's responsibility is limited to presiding over the council and setting its agenda. In the *Defensor Pacis* Marsilius ascribes to the secular community the right to back decisions of the general council with coercive power and to integrate them into the community's human law. This theory implies that the religious orientation of a community is subject to approval by the citizenry as human legislator. This theorem, however, is problematic when it comes to the question of excommunication, because in medieval times, excommunication did not mean solely the exclusion of a citizen from the sacraments, the excommunicated lost his status as a citizen as well. Consequently, in his later work *Defensor minor*, Marsilius goes one important step further by stating that no divine law should have any

impact on the civil status of a citizen. Whereas the judge in this world is the human authority, the judge in the next world is Christ. Offenses against divine law, therefore, should not be judged by a human judge.

Bettina Koch

See also Canon Law; Conciliarism; Dante Alighieri; Hierocratic Arguments

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Maruyama Masao (1914–1996)

Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) was a historian of Japanese political thought and a political scientist who became a pivotal intellectual presence in post–World War II Japan. Renowned for his sharp intellect and incisive analysis, Maruyama addressed the vital issues confronting his country at a time of crisis and confusion after defeat in 1945. He was the first to enquire why ordinary Japanese had followed their government into a disastrous war, who was responsible for that war, and what needed to be done in order for Japan to build a liberal democratic society in the postwar world. His core intellectual concerns formed the mosaic of his opus: ultranationalism and nationalism, fascism, modernity, democracy, and autonomy. Maruyama was primarily a scholar, but he also became engaged in political activism, notably in the pacifist movements of the 1950s and in the movement against revision of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty in 1960. He remains the defining theorist of democracy in his country.

Maruyama's life was punctured by the upheavals of world history in modern times. His first political memory was the violent aftermath of the Great Kanto earthquake of 1923, when Koreans and anarchists were murdered by the police. He entered senior high school in 1931 when the Japanese army transgressed into Manchuria, and he graduated from Tokyo University as military aggression in China transmogrified into war in 1937. Having entered academic life at the prestigious Tokyo Imperial University (Tokyo University), he was called up late in 1944, eventually serving at an intelligence unit based in Hiroshima. Here he witnessed the horrific aftermath of the atomic bombing on August 6, 1945. Astonishingly, Maruyama wrote his first postwar essay, "The Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism," in the immediate aftermath of the searing experiences of Hiroshima, defeat, and demobilization.

For two decades Maruyama was one of Japan's leading political thinkers and critics, but as the world lurched into a frenzy of antiestablishment protest in the late 1960s, Maruyama found himself to be a primary target of student anger. For them, Maruyama was the epitome of the postwar elite, and therefore, someone who needed to be purged from a position of intellectual leadership. Long plagued by ill health, Maruyama retired from Tokyo University in 1971, but continued to write on subjects as diverse as ancient Japanese political thought, the work of Meiji era thinker Yukichi Fukuzawa, and theories of loyalty and rebellion. He was awarded honorary doctorates by Princeton and Harvard universities in the 1970s and became professor emeritus at Tokyo University. His death on August 15, 1996, lent a tragic symmetry to his life, which had been so focused on deciphering and overcoming the elements that had led to Japan's surrender on August 15, 1945.

Maruyama's conceptualization of democracy involved several core ideas, with the idea of autonomy (*shutaisei*) emerging as paramount. Maruyama commenced his reading of modern Japanese history with the conviction that Japan's experience of modernity from the late Tokugawa period (1850s) onward had been incomplete. Institutions, ideas, and technologies were selectively learned and modified to suit a society in transition from the

feudal to the modern, but the subjective energy that characterized modern society (he also called it "the open society") was missing. As Japan became embroiled in the tensions that permeated world affairs in the late 1920s, militarism partnered with national and racial myths came to dominate the domestic scene. For Maruyama, this resulted in the fatal absence of autonomous value definition on the part of individuals and facilitated the state's absorption of society in its war-time ideology of emperor worship and external aggression. In Maruyama's view, individuals who could not act on the basis of values they had defined themselves did not represent modern citizens; likewise, a society that was undifferentiated from the state could never properly be democratic. Similarly, healthy nationalism was one that coexisted with a developed democratic ethos, something that in Japan had become distorted into ultranationalism in the 1930s because of the fatal congruence of semi-modernity and national ambition.

For Maruyama, defeat in 1945 was an opportunity for Japan to forge its own democratic polity and complete the modern trajectory. This was a huge task in the context of Occupation (1945–1952), the advent of the cold war, and the accelerated economic growth of the 1960s. In the late 1940s, Maruyama argued that the lack of autonomy in war-time Japan had manifested itself politically as the absence of a sense of responsibility, whereby Japan's leaders acted on values invented and imposed on them from above and outside themselves, creating what he called a "system of irresponsibility," where authority and morality did not coexist. Maruyama likewise posited that Japan's fascism was a twist on its European counterparts, in that its momentum was top-down rather than bottom-up. The authoritarian dynamic, with its totalitarian outcome, represented for Maruyama a poverty of autonomy that had to be addressed before Japan could embrace the modern essence of liberal democracy.

Much has been written about Maruyama prior to and following his death. Critics point to his supposed pro-Western bias, leading him to find Japan's own experience inadequate by comparison. Though he later lamented his failure to locate Japan in an Asian historical context, his consistent intellectual devotion to elaborating autonomy—its essence, function, and acquisition—spoke of a predominant adherence to ideas that were universal rather than particular.

Rikki Kersten

See also Autonomy; Democracy; Democratization; Fascism; Japanese Political Thought; Nationalism

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Marx, Karl (1818–1883)

Born in the Prussian Rhineland, Marx studied at Bonn and Berlin before becoming a radical journalist. His work was suppressed, and he left Prussia but was expelled from Belgium and France. He lived in England from 1849 until his death. In 1844 he met Friedrich Engels. They wrote voluminously both as independent authors and in partnership. In the twentieth century, many ruling communist parties claimed allegiance to Marx's ideas. Most other countries had opposition parties ostensibly inspired by Marx. Marxism became one of the most influential ideologies of the twentieth century.

Hegelianism

As a student Marx was influenced by the work of G. W. F. Hegel, who considered each person's

mind to be a limited manifestation of the universal *Geist,* or spirit. Hegel saw the history of the world and its progress toward freedom in terms of the dialectical development of spirit, whereby thought proceeded by contradiction of an idea, then resolution of the contradiction. Stages of consciousness would lead to the determinate self for itself.

According to Hegel, people had been unaware of the universal nature of spirit, seeing each other as external, foreign, and hostile. Mind in the individual person was thus unfree and alienated from itself. People would become free when the spirit manifested in them achieved self-consciousness. This would happen when their ideas coincided with those of the state, in which freedom is realized.

In Berlin Marx joined the Young Hegelians, who rejected the notion of the universal mind or spirit as the ultimate reality of all things. "Universal spirit" or "universal mind" could refer collectively to all human minds, the dialectic being the path to human liberation. The radical Young Hegelians believed that the notion of spirit overcoming alienation could be reinterpreted as an account of human self-consciousness freeing itself from the illusions that prevent it from achieving self-understanding and freedom.

Ludwig Feuerbach went a step further, saying that existence precedes thought. Not just religion but any philosophy concentrating on the mental rather than material side of human nature was a form of alienation. Marx went still further in 1843 in *On the Jewish Question*. He argued that economic life, rather than religion or philosophy, was the chief form of human alienation. Money was the barrier to human freedom.

In the postface to the 1873 edition of *Capital, Volume 1,* Marx said his dialectical method was exactly opposite to that of Hegel. The process of thinking was not the creator of the real world. Ideas reflected the material world as they coalesced as forms of thought.

Alienation

In *On the Jewish Question* Marx derided civil or human rights. These so-called "rights of man" were based on a misunderstanding of humans as selfish, egoistic creatures. Furthermore, the social division between private and public in modern capitalist society meant that people saw themselves as both private individuals and citizens pursuing the common good. This dualism that characterized modern bourgeois society prevented individuals from associating in communities. Human beings were thus separated from their essential social nature, becoming atomistic individuals, rather than species-beings.

The idea of the species-being is key to Marx's thought on alienation in his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844. Alienation, for him, is the material process by which human beings come to be dominated by things they create from nature. The human creative origins of those things are denied. The loss of control of one's creations becomes institutionalized by social and economic arrangements. Creations lose human value, coming to represent only the money they can obtain in the market. Human labor becomes nothing but a commodity, to be exchanged on the market at its lowest price. Moreover, the richer the worker's production is, the poorer the worker becomes. Meanwhile, the relationship between workers and their products becomes that of persons and alien objects. The poorer workers become, the greater is their alienation and exploitation.

Marx identified four aspects of alienation: (1) from the product; (2) from the activity of labor, with ownership and control of the work process being taken over by the capitalist employers as the capitalist division of labor prevents creative work; (3) from the species-being, humanity being a particular creative species characterized by their work and production of things from nature; and (4) from other workers who are seen as rivals, this being the practical expression of alienation from the species.

Marx perceived humans as object creators. Workers unable to master their material conditions were dehumanized, left with biological, animal-life functions. Motivated by greed, the exploiters were driven by an urge that was beneath humanity. Humans would eventually overcome alienation by regaining control over their creations in a communist society—not crude communism of just communalizing property, but true communism where private property would no longer be desired.

Marx's ideas on alienation contributed to his views on class struggle. He became convinced that criticism and philosophy alone could not overcome human alienation.

In 1844, in his manuscript *Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction,* Marx referred to the proletariat as the class with radical chains. If those chains were broken, humanity would be emancipated. The proletariat, by liberating itself, could emancipate all other spheres of society. At this time Marx saw the proletariat in terms of specifically German emancipation but thought this would develop into the wider human emancipation. The proletariat's universal suffering and role as the object of injustice in general meant that its recovery would require the complete redemption of humanity. The problem of overcoming the social and economic source of alienation could thus be solved.

In *The German Ideology,* written in 1845 and 1846, Marx and Engels argued that with the abolition of the basis of private property, and thus also of the alien relation between men and what they produce, people would gain control of the mode of their mutual relations. They developed the materialist conception of history (which they had earlier discussed less systematically in *The Holy Family*) arguing that the socioeconomic process forms the basis of human society, from which politics, the law, and religion derive. In his later works Marx would refer to these derivative elements as the superstructure and sometimes wrote "estrangement" where he might earlier have written "alienation."

The Materialist Conception of History

In *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels discussed the division of labor that develops as big business comes to dominate the economy. As this division grew, the productive forces appeared independent of, but alongside, individuals. This was because the individuals to whom the productive forces belonged were divided and in opposition to one another, thus obscuring the fact that those forces can only operate in the intercourse and association of individual human beings. Unnatural individualism led the real-life content of persons to be robbed from them. The social change necessary for the development of productive forces was prevented. The division of labor thus seems to be a process that he would have described in terms of "alienation" in his earlier work.

In 1859, in the preface to *A Critique of Political Economy,* Marx offered what he called the "guiding thread" for his studies. Summarizing his materialist conception of history he said that, independent of their will, people enter into relations of production, which constitute society's economic structure. Such relations correspond to the existing condition of material productive forces, or forces of production, which include not just the means of production, such as tools, machines, and factories, but also skills, knowledge, experience, and other human faculties. "Relations of production" refers to relations between people who produce. Productive forces condition relations of production, which in turn condition the legal and political superstructure in a class system. Social consciousness reflects the superstructure. Although this account involves economic determinism, in a letter to the Marxist Joseph Bloch, Engels said that he and Marx had always recognized that political, religious, and other elements influenced the course of history, the economic element being the ultimately determining one.

In the 1859 preface to *A Critique of Political Economy* Marx suggested that the proletariat would escape from this situation. In the dialectical process the relations of production would eventually become outdated as they became insufficiently advanced to foster those forces and allow them to progress. The conflict that ensued would be resolved in favor of the productive forces. New relations of production, the material preconditions of which had matured within the old society, would better accommodate the continued growth of society's productive capacity. This dialectical process would eventually bring about a communist revolution.

In the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 Marx and Engels wrote that the history of society amounted to the history of class struggles. Although the modern bourgeois society differed from the feudal society it replaced, class oppression had changed in form rather than disappeared. The bourgeois class that was now the oppressor had found that it was under pressure (from the proletarian class that had grown within the capitalist system) to change. Marx thus believed that oppression and opposition to it rested on economic foundations.

Marx discussed these economic foundations in detail in *Capital, Volume 1* in 1867. (Engels compiled and edited two other volumes from Marx's notes after his death.) Marx argued that the

development of capitalism led logically to the accumulation of capital in increasingly fewer hands. To survive, capitalists had to sell more cheaply than their rivals. This meant increasing productivity of labor and larger scale industry with ever more sophisticated machinery.

Turning again to the increased impoverishment of the proletariat in relation to the wealth they had produced, Marx said this resulted from the accumulation of capital and the never-ending demand for increased capital. The capitalists expended just enough to keep workers and their families alive.

Marx presented the labor theory of value from which, along with the concept of the commodity, he derived his concepts of use value, exchange value, and surplus value. Unlike exchange value, use value is not specific to commodity production or capitalism. The commodity is the form taken by the product under capitalism. Taking this form entails the displacement of use value (usefulness, which characterizes products and commodities alike) by exchange value (exchangeability, which characterizes commodities alone). Abstract labor, labor in general, is a source of exchange value. The value of a commodity is equivalent to the average number of hours of labor necessary for its production. Workers are paid less than the labor value of the product.

Just as exchange value abstracts from the specific quality of goods, treating them as commodities, so labor power says nothing about factors such as the worker's personality. Through machinery and the division of labor, capitalism greatly increases the productivity of human labor. Capitalists obtain the use value of workers' labor power, and pay only the exchange value. The increased productivity is skimmed off from workers' output in the form of surplus value. As labor power is a commodity used to produce more value than it has itself, the process involves exploitation by the capitalists of their workers.

Marx noted that in capitalist society relationships between workers and their labor are often described as relationships between things. Marx saw this as commodity fetishism. Echoing his earlier views on alienation, for him, not only are workers divorced from control of their products but their view of work is problematic. Believing that politics had a role in sustaining this situation, Marx took an interest in the state.

The State

In 1842 Marx wrote an article titled "The Law on Thefts of Wood." Legislation had come into force in the Rhineland concerning the theft of firewood. Although traditionally, wood gathering for fuel was a common right, the influence of the idea of individual property rights, rather than communal property rights, was now conditioning the role of the state. Wood gathering had become an offense. This redefinition of property rights meant that poor people now had to pay for things such as fuel that they had previously been able to gather freely.

The following year, in his article "Defense of the Moselle Correspondent," Marx wrote that the poverty of the Moselle wine growers was broadly the result of objective economic relationships, which determined the actions of both private individuals and individual political authorities independently of will on either side. In those early journalistic articles Marx was exploring the split between civil society, in which private material interests compete, and the state. He began to discuss this more clearly in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* in 1843, in which he criticized Hegel's abstract idea of the state as the representative of society. What Hegel had overlooked was that the activities of the state are determined by and subordinate to private property.

In his *Philosophy of Right* Hegel argued that in political life the individual transcends the egoism of civil society, becoming a public-spirited citizen. Civil society denotes the sphere of relations between the public sphere of the state and the private realm of the family in which citizens associate voluntarily and manage their own affairs. Because of the competitiveness of civil society, individuals had become estranged from the state and community. Reconciliation of the individual's position in the state and civil society would come when individuals recognized that the virtues of public institutions could help bring about spiritual reunion with fellow citizens. He said, moreover, that a universal civil service was devoted to the general interest. Any conflicts of civil society could be resolved by the state, which is the rational form of organization wherein the human spirit fulfils its historical potential. In Marx's view Hegel presented an idealist view that ignored the basic truths of society. Politics actually reflected the divisions and

competitiveness of civil society. Even the modern representative state was distant from and unresponsive to the concerns of ordinary people, who faced exploitation in capitalist society.

For Marx, in his *Critique,* the state sustained the privileges of property owners. The civil service, moreover, pursued its own interests. The oppressed clung to illusions about the state's universality, neglecting their real needs. Perhaps surprisingly, in this early period of his work he believed that the way forward would be through universal franchise. This would lead to the dissolution of the state and civil society as separate spheres. Private property would be transformed into common property. The civil service would no longer be able to treat public affairs as its own private business. There would be self-determination of the people involving direct rather than representative democracy.

Thereafter, Marx and Engels explored the state's subordination to private property, notably in *The German Ideology* in 1845. Furthermore, the division of labor played a central role in their thought. Marx traced the origin of the state to the division of labor. The state, in contradiction to the real interests of all members of society, served as a screen giving a false air of community and concealing the real class struggle.

In the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 Marx and Engels provided their most powerful and influential comments on the role of the state in the bourgeois economic order. The development of industrial production was gradually polarizing the population into two classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat. All other classes were in decline as the bourgeoisie increasingly dominated the economy. Many artisans and small shopkeepers were becoming proletarians as they lost out in the competitive processes and had to sell their labor. Marx and Engels considered that revolution would be necessary, as the legal and political life of the society was conditioned by the capitalist mode of production. The executive of the state now resembled a committee of the dominant, bourgeois class. This state executive managed the common affairs of the bourgeoisie as a whole. The state was now the political expression of the dominance of the bourgeoisie.

In fact Marx recognized that this was an oversimplistic view of the state. He sometimes said that a fraction of the ruling class, rather than that class as a whole, controls the state. For example, in a series of his articles that Engels would later compile and publish as *The Class Struggles in France,* Marx studied the French monarchy that had been restored after the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte. Discussing the financiers under King Louis-Philippe, Marx said the members of this fraction, rather than the ruling class as a whole, were the effective rulers.

Marx was, thus, not entirely consistent on the nature of the state. Indeed, he believed that the state and its institutions might even act in ways that would not be endorsed by some or even many in the privileged class. He recognized that the state might be able to act with far greater autonomy than he and Engels implied in their broad generalizations in the *Manifesto*. Marx also recognized that the state would sometimes respond to interests other than those of the ruling class, so long as this responsiveness was circumscribed, as it could not be allowed to conflict with the interests of the dominant class. The state would still be acting in the long-term interests of the capitalist system.

Marx developed his more advanced theory of the state from 1848 until 1851, a period of much revolutionary activity in France, followed by reaction, great uncertainty, and political instability. In 1851 Louis Napoleon seized power and proclaimed himself emperor in reaction to the revolution. Marx published *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* in 1852 as an account of these events. Louis Napoleon (Napoleon Bonaparte's nephew) took power of the massive centralized French state seemingly as an individual who embodied the national will independently of class. This was, however, an illusion. Louis Napoleon represented the peasants, the largest class on whom he relied on for support to gain power. The peasants could not represent themselves; each family was self-sufficient. They did not feel themselves to be a class. They were incapable of enforcing their own interests in their own name. This did not, however, mean that Louis Napoleon became the instrument of the peasantry. His role was more of a paternalist figure—a representative who appeared as their master. Furthermore, Marx claimed that Louis Napoleon saw it as his mission to safeguard bourgeois order, for which he needed to respect the property of various groups within the bourgeoisie. This required the repression of the peasants, who nevertheless still supported him in the

illusion that he could repeat his uncle's policies. The state took the role of arbiter.

Marx believed that the placation of different interests takes place within the limits of the capacities of capitalism. Bonapartism—the political dominance of the executive—occurs in capitalism when no group is able to dominate the legislature and control the executive. The bourgeoisie loses its hold on power at a time when the working class is incapable of taking power.

Marx envisaged that, where the class struggle is equally balanced, the state apparatus could operate with greater autonomy from direct control by capitalists. Some scholars describe his view as one of relative autonomy. Although Marx realized that the state institutions and personnel might sometimes side with the exploited and use power independently of the dominant economic class, he saw the state as a condition rather than an instrument of class oppression, as the state must, ultimately, preserve law and order. An orderly climate for capitalist development was thus secured. Crucially, were the state to undermine the process of capital accumulation, it would simultaneously undermine the material basis of its own existence.

Marx discussed the demise of the state in *The Civil War in France*. At the end of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, with Paris under siege, the French government withdrew from the city, leaving the National Guard effectively in power. The Central Committee of the Guard organized elections in which Parisians took control of their city in the Paris Commune. One third of the Commune's members were manual workers. The Commune lasted for 2 months before being crushed by French government forces.

Marx said the working class could not simply take hold of the existing state machinery and wield it for its own purposes. Over many decades a centralized state power had developed, with its standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature. The state power had assumed more and more the character of the national power of capital over labor. In Paris, the Commune had posed a challenge to this situation. What, however, was necessary to overcome the distinction between state and civil society and the use of the state for partial ends was the development of the state into the political form of the emancipation of the masses.

Marx discussed the revolutionary transformation of the state in his *Critique of the Gotha Program* of 1875. Freedom would mean changing the state from its position of dominance of society to one of subordination to society. This would involve a period of revolutionary transformation. The state would take the form of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat in the transition to communism.

Revolution and Communism

In *Theses on Feuerbach* in 1845 Marx listed 11 theses that summarized his disagreements with Feuerbach. The 11th stressed the importance of changing the world, rather than merely interpreting it. Revolutionary change is part of Marx's guiding thread in his 1859 preface to *A Critique of Political Economy*. Although he did not mention communist society in the thread, he suggested that, after the revolutionary change from capitalism, society would for the first time not be based on antagonism.

Marx's revolutionary thought developed as he read about the French Revolution of 1789, which he saw as a bourgeois revolution. The rising bourgeois class had changed the political structures in accordance with changes that had already been taking place in the property structure. One sort of minority class rule, bourgeois class rule, had taken the place of the earlier minority class rule.

Marx also experienced the Industrial Revolution, which accelerated the productive capabilities of society. Recognizing that the Industrial Revolution was bringing dire poverty to the producers of wealth, he also envisaged the potential for great social change. He said in the 1859 preface that as people realized that the productive forces are capable of providing more than they do, the pressure for social revolution would grow. The bourgeoisie, in developing the productive forces of society, had created the conditions for the next revolutionary transformation of society. The productive forces were potentially powerful, but the conditions of bourgeois society could not accommodate their advancement. Some productive forces had to be destroyed or new markets conquered. Such crises would become more destructive and extensive. The proletariat would overcome their isolation and

competition. The bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels suggested in the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, would produce its own gravediggers.

Revolutionary consciousness was needed to unite the national and international revolutionary struggles in the movement. This consciousness would develop as the proletariat grew in number and became more concentrated in industry. This would allow the proletariat to recognize its strength.

Marx and Engels's revolutionary thought is more complex than it may seem. With the long-term aim of proletarian revolution, they favored alliances with the peasants when the proletariat was in the minority. They supported the German bourgeoisie in 1848, hoping that it would overthrow the monarchy, as had been the case in France in 1789. This would pave the way for the proletarian revolution.

Marx briefly, and optimistically, considered the revolution imminent in the atmosphere of 1848. The revolutions were quelled, and Marx was particularly concerned about the failure of the Paris workers' insurrection that year. Nevertheless, in a speech to the Central Committee of the Communist League 2 years later he insisted that revolution was still in prospect, if now on the horizon. A successful revolution would require the unfolding of economic events. He attacked his opponents in the League for wishing to organize for immediate revolution. They were thinking that the revolution would be a mere effort of will, rather than the product of realities of the situation. He stressed that preparation for the revolution, changing society, and training for political power may take years or even decades.

For the unusual case of Germany, Marx now recommended permanent revolution, by which revolution would be uninterrupted, as the bourgeoisie and then the proletariat came to power. In this case the need for separate revolutionary stages—bourgeois and proletarian—was eliminated.

Marx's suggestion in 1843 that universal suffrage might help bring about the new society came at a time when his ideas were in a transient state after his earlier Hegelianism. In much of his other work until 1850, Marx assumed that political revolution would involve the use of force. In some of his journalistic articles of the early 1850s he said universal suffrage would only be a threat to the bourgeois state if there was a secret ballot, paid members, and annual elections, and also if the proletariat was the largest class with consciousness of itself as a class. Nevertheless, after 1850 he began to argue that it might be possible to achieve communism peacefully, with a majority in the legislature, in the most advanced countries such as England, Holland, and the United States. He stressed, though, that if the peaceful revolution were to be opposed by the violence of the existing holders of power, physical force would become an acceptable revolutionary weapon. The choice between peaceful means or the use of force to achieve political power would be a tactical matter, depending upon the particular case in question. Marx always feared that there would be a reaction against peaceful change. He believed that a workers' state would need to follow the revolution to overcome the initial problems. As he put it in a letter to fellow socialist Joseph Weydemeyer in 1852, the class struggle would necessarily lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat, which would only constitute the transition to a classless society. In the longer term, according to Engels, the state would wither away.

Marx derided utopian socialists who offered blueprints for the new society. He was mainly reluctant to offer detail about the future society. He had, though, discussed the future communist society in utopian terms in two of his early works—the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844 and the *German Ideology* of 1845–1846. In the *Manuscripts* he was critical of forms of communism that distorted the essence of private property or the human nature of needs. He favored a form that would not only abolish private property but also eradicate human self-alienation. People would thus reappropriate the human essence for themselves.

In *German Ideology* Marx and Engels said that in communist society the division of labor would be abolished—people would not be tied to a particular occupation. Moreover, the split between the particular interests of the individual and the common interest of society, which had characterized human relations since the end of simple societies, would disappear. Communism would introduce a society with modern technology and highly developed productive forces. This would require the abolition of private property. It would, moreover, require a new way of

thinking and even a change in human nature. He considered human nature changeable, reflecting the material conditions of one's epoch. In communist society human nature would take on a new character. He believed greed, envy, and other traits would disappear in a society based on communal property and socially organized means of production.

In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx wrote that, after the revolution, bourgeois society would be replaced by an association of all people wherein the free development of each would be the condition for all people to develop freely. In this new society, Marx hoped, people would take a new attitude toward work.

In *The Civil War in France* more than 20 years later, Marx stressed that he was aware that the Paris Commune of 1871 was not a socialist revolution; but he was impressed by its democratic character and endorsed the belief of the communards that deputies should see themselves as mandated delegates, or communal agents. These delegates were subject to recall and revocation at short notice. Moreover, the deputies were restricted to workman's wages, so candidates would not seek office or motives of personal gain. The combination of executive and legislative functions in the Commune assembly would prevent bureaucracy, which grew from the formal separation of those functions. A future socialist democracy, he believed, should take note of these developments.

Four years after the crushing of the Commune, in *Critique of the Gotha Programme,* Marx outlined two phases of communism. In the early phase, after the revolution, individual producers would receive back from society exactly what they contributed, except for necessary deductions for society. Individuals would be paid for their labor and buy consumer goods. In the higher phase of communism people would contribute to society according to their ability and draw from the common stock according to needs. Productive forces and cooperative wealth would increase with the all-around development of individuals. Only in this phase could the restrictions of bourgeois right be overcome. Marx hoped for a new morality in society, which would allow communism to develop.

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See also Alienation; Class; Exploitation; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hegelians; Marxism; Revolution; Socialism; State

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Marxism

The history of Marxism can be encapsulated in a number of paradoxes. Karl Marx (and Friedrich Engels) called for a society in which all its members would be free. Yet his later followers (Joseph Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Pol Pot, to name a few) established deeply authoritarian and often barbaric regimes. This paradox may be explained, in part, by another: Marx firmly believed that proletarian revolutions would occur in advanced capitalist societies. Yet apart from having a formative influence on the German labor movement and,

before that, World War I, in world-historical terms Marxism has been much more enthusiastically embraced by relatively undeveloped countries (Russia, China, Cuba), in their quest for independent economic development and opposition to Western imperialism. Although communist parties have been influential in Europe (in interwar Germany and in postwar France and Italy), they have never managed to dominate the political agenda. Here is another paradox: Whereas the Western working class has, by and large, remained resolutely reformist rather than revolutionary, Marxism (even in the United States, but especially in Europe), since the 1960s, has had an enormous influence on the humanities—especially history, literary studies, political science, philosophy, anthropology, geography, and development studies. Contrary to the founders' intentions, Marxism has often served as a guide to explaining and interpreting the world rather than changing it. This entry explores these paradoxes through a discussion of the core ideas of Marxism, its political expressions, and the schools of Marxism that have evolved in the academy: Western Marxism, structuralist Marxism, analytical Marxism, and post-Marxism.

Core Ideas

Marxism became an "ism" during the period of the Second International (1889–1914), when Engels (Marx's lifelong collaborator), Karl Kautsky, and Georgi Plekhanov made Marxism a scientific worldview, explaining both nature and society. Soviet Marxism, diamat (shorthand for dialectical materialism), continued in a similar vein. Yet, what is most is distinctive about Marxism is that unlike other communist utopias, such as Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516), its conception of the good society claims to be realistic, arising out of the contradictions of capitalism, and proposes a political practice that depends on a concrete analysis of existing social, political, economic, and, indeed, cultural conditions.

Marxism consists of three interconnected elements: ethical, explanatory, and practical. These three elements were combined within a teleological conception of history, the idea of historical progress, and the idea that history had a meaning and direction, namely, the realization of freedom for the whole of humanity. Thus, the "real" and the "good" facts and values were in the process of coalescing. Marx's view of history, known as historical materialism, focuses primarily on how societies produce their material means of existence and, to a lesser extent, on how they reproduce themselves. At the meta-level, the forces of production (principally, technology, labor power, and forms of productive cooperation, especially the division of labor) provide the historical dynamic. They develop within certain relations of production (ownership relations), and when these productive forces can no longer develop within a certain set of relations, profound social revolutions occur and new relations predominate, facilitating the further development of the productive forces. The defining feature of any society is the existence or nonexistence of class relations, of ownership relations and the control of the surplus produced (exploitation). There also exists some form of state, law, and ideology (the superstructure) that protects the existing relations of production (the base) and the interests of the economically dominant class.

Within this framework of broad forces or relations of production, Marx more specifically sought to demonstrate how capitalism's contradictions would provide the preconditions for a communist society, enabling the proletariat to get a greater sense of its historical mission and thereby lessening the birth pangs of historical transition. He held that there were three central contradictions between the forces and relations of production: The first was between capitalists' drive to make the division of labor ever more sophisticated, involving increasing degrees of cooperation (an aspect of capitalism's productive forces), and the private appropriation of the collective wealth produced (ownership relations). The second interlinked contradiction was that capitalists, in competing with each other, were compelled to increase the amount of unpaid labor (exploitation) from the workforce. Not only did this mean that industrial conflict was endemic to capitalism, with capitalists attempting to get workers (a force of production) to work harder in some way, but also that capitalists had to continually invest in new technology to reduce the wage bill and increase output. This led to the third contradiction: Capitalist production relations fettered productive forces as a result of an in-built

tendency for the rate of profit to fall as investment became more costly and the rate of return fell. Thus, there was a contradiction between capitalism's productive potential and its performance.

For Marx the working class was central to the transition to communism because it had an interest in overthrowing its capitalist exploiters, especially as they would be increasingly immiserated through economic decline. The logic was that the exploited class—because they exploited no one (unlike the bourgeoisie under feudalism) and would become the overwhelming majority in society as capitalism spread globally—would create a classless society once in power. The logic of their position also meant that given the cooperative nature of their work, concentrated in factories, the working class would have to continue cooperating under communism. Given their numbers and concentration in factories and towns, they had the potential power to transform society. Finally, as a result of its struggles with capitalists, the working class would eventually form a revolutionary party that understood the direction of history and would organize the overthrow of capitalism.

From a communist viewpoint, what was also special about capitalism, apart from creating its own "gravediggers," was its capacity to make labor power enormously productive. This meant that communism would be a society in which there would be little conflict resulting from material scarcity, and that the amount of time required to produce life's necessities could be reduced so that people could become self-fulfilling, autonomously directed individuals. Labor would no longer be a commodity or the means to the end of capitalist profit. Marx's ideal was of a nonmarket society, with distribution according to need and contribution according to individual capacity or ability. The state as an instrument of class domination would also disappear as society became increasingly classless and many spheres within society became democratized.

Marxist Politics: Problems and Issues

The viability of any political ideology lies in its ability to adapt to existing and new circumstances in order to provide the basis for successful political action. The earliest dilemma that Marxists had to face was over the choice of reform or revolution that first arose within the German Social Democratic Party, the most successful organization within the Second International (1899–1914), with mass electoral support, buttressed by an influential trade union movement. Marxists found themselves at the head of a newly emerging labor movement that was far more interested in piecemeal reforms than proletarian dictatorship in an era of German economic dynamism. Eduard Bernstein wanted to revise Marxism to bring it into line with the reformist energies of the German labor movement by challenging Marxism's revolutionary teleology. Rosa Luxemburg, in defending the teleological goal, held that capitalism would at some stage face economic collapse and that, in any case, the capitalist state could only offer limited reforms to workers that could be taken away at any time (including the democratic structure). The reform/revolution issue underpinned the debate between Kautsky and Lenin after the Russian Revolution of October 1917. Kautsky, who had been the chief ideologist of the German Social Democratic Party before World War I, held that the violent and unconstitutional way in which the Bolsheviks had come to power was deeply authoritarian and broke the link between socialism and democracy. Lenin, on the other hand, insisted that the working class could only come to power through violence and that Soviet power constituted an expansion of democracy in contrast with the parliamentary form, where the executive set the agenda. This dilemma again resurfaced in the 1970s when many European "revolutionary" communist parties fully embraced parliamentary socialism and abandoned the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" that had been brought into such disrepute by Stalin and other communist dictators, to become fully paid-up social democrats.

The Russian Revolution also raised the question of how legitimate it was for Marxists to organize a proletarian revolution in conditions of economic and political backwardness, challenging Marxism's standard assumptions. Although Lenin justified this strategy by arguing that Russia was a weak link in the imperialist chain and that a revolution in Russia would ignite a global proletarian revolution, as events turned out, this proved a dubious hypothesis. The Soviet Union remained isolated, and not surprisingly Stalin's "socialism in one country" doctrine gained credence. What followed

in the late 1920s and early 1930s was breakneck industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture, involving even the physical elimination of all opposition. Nevertheless, the principle of state-organized model of industrialization to overcome economic backwardness provided inspiration for many countries fighting for national independence after World War II, especially China and, later, Cuba. The question posed by Kautsky and those to the left of him remained: Could such regimes claim much fidelity to Marx's vision of communism? Were they thriving workers' democracies, of the workers, by the workers, for the workers? Communist parties claimed to represent the workers, but in disallowing any opposition to emerge, such claims were never put to the test. In any case the urban intelligentsias often provided the cadre of such regimes, and the social basis of the Chinese revolution of 1949 was the peasantry. Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese leader, resolved the representation problem by claiming that the Chinese were a "proletarian nation."

Indeed, third world revolutions over the long term raised the question of what were the social sources of radicalism, especially as the working class in the West has largely opted for reformism as first suggested by Bernstein. The so-called new social movements, concerned with issues of race, gender, sexual orientation, peace, and ecology increasingly gained in strength beginning in the 1960s and seemed to offer far more radical activism. Linked to the question of the revolutionary potential of the working class has been capitalism's economic resilience that Marx could not have anticipated. If capitalism had continually faced chronic crises as depicted in *The Communist Manifesto,* there may of course have been greater grounds for holding to Marx's revolutionary assumptions.

Marxism in the Academy

Paradoxically, although the origins of Marxism in the academy were closely tied up with the failure of the Russian Revolution to spread to the West and the bureaucratization of Soviet rule—that is, with working class defeat—Marxism has flourished in the academy since the 1960s, and in many areas of the humanities it has entered into the mainstream in a relatively uncontested sense, as it became fused with other research paradigms, especially those connected to language and psychology. The four main schools or currents of Marxism within the academy can be identified as Western Marxism, structuralist Marxism, analytical Marxism, and post-Marxism. A fifth current may be added, which may be termed classical Marxism, which has resisted many of the trends and fashions within the academy and has retained a far greater political economy perspective, emphasizing the importance of capitalism and class in understanding political life. Many academics have been attracted to Marxism not merely because of its moral appeal (solidarity, ending exploitation, individual and collective self-realization) and powers of social, political, and ideological critique, but also because of its capacity to explain the world, past and present.

Western Marxism

Although many academic Marxists have often avoided the question of political action, Georg Lukács (1885–1971) and Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), the two main founders of what is termed Western Marxism, had been political activists. Both were deeply influenced by the Russian Revolution and its implications for Marxism. Both concluded that it represented not the triumph of a deterministic Marxism and the laws of history as adumbrated by historical materialism, but the triumph of human will, political agency, and the dialectic of theory and practice. And just as Lenin had become strongly influenced by his reading of Hegel during World War I, they, too, returned to what they saw as the Hegelian roots of Marxism. They rejected the objectivist and positivist Marxism of the late Engels and Kautsky that seemed to explain revolutions in terms of natural laws. Lukács, in *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), saw the Russian Revolution as the result of the dialectic of subject and object, where the proletariat ceased to be the object of history and became aware of itself as a self-transforming *class* and thereby as a world-transforming or totalizing subject. In doing so, it overcome the reified, fragmentary nature of society under capitalism and also the subject–object dualism that Hegel believed could be overcome in thought.

Although Gramsci was far less interested than Lukács in the realization of philosophy through

revolution, he was just as keen to formulate a nondeterministic Marxism and explore the nature of revolutionary working-class consciousness, or rather its absence. In his famous *Prison Notebooks,* penned while incarcerated by Mussolini between 1926 and 1935, Gramsci maintained that in advanced, complex capitalist societies, unlike pre-1917 Russia, bourgeois domination rested far more on consent—on ideas—than the force of the state. Consent was created through the institutions of civil society—the church, schools, trade unions, political parties, and newspapers. Gramsci used the term *hegemony* to describe this form of domination. He drew the conclusion that a much longer and complex war of position, in contrast to a Bolshevik war of maneuver, was needed and involved the creation of a new common sense within these social institutions, involving a complex series of alliances. In this process the proletariat would need its own organic intellectual—the Marxist party—just as the bourgeoisie had its own practical organizers—civil servants, political leaders, industrialists, technicians, managers, teachers, and the like.

The most important group within Western Marxism was the Frankfurt School, originally known as the Institute of Social Research. Founded in 1923, it decamped in the United States in 1933, to return to Frankfurt in the early 1950s. Its key figures were Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), and, later, Jürgen Habermas (1929–). It developed a body of Marxism that it called critical theory, building on Lukács's critical subject–object dialectical framework (although the proletarian subject vanished) and his concept of reification as well as on Weber's observations on the growth of bureaucratic rationalization and instrumental reason. A central concern was with the loss of a critical, reflective—indeed, human—standpoint in Western societies, whether in the high culture of art, music, literature, and philosophy, or in the low mass cultural consumption of popular music and film. In Marcuse's phrase, the world had become one-dimensional. Critical theorists maintained that the contemporary human sciences, grounded on positivism and empiricism and being supposedly value-free, reflected the growth of instrumental reason and were therefore conservative. Although such science was crucial in conquering nature (the positive side of the Enlightenment), when applied to understanding society, it could only lead to the domination of human over human in the name of utility and efficiency. In other words, the interests that such ideologies served became obscure.

Although they were concerned about the bureaucratization of the socialist project in the Soviet Union, the members of the Frankfurt School devoted more of their energy to explain the loss of the critical impulse in Germany that witnessed the rise of totalitarian Nazism. Unlike the political economy approach of classical Marxism, members of the Frankfurt School resorted to psychoanalytical explanations, especially the decline of male authority within the family, which led to the rise of the authoritarian personality. The psychoanalytical dimension was especially prominent in Marcuse's work. In *Eros and Civilization* (1955) he gave a progressive twist to Sigmund Freud's notion of sublimation, suggesting that the repressive work ethic was no longer required in a world of technologically created abundance. However, in his later *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), he was pessimistic about the liberating role of technology, with consumerism integrating workers into capitalism. Only those outside the system—the unemployed, the unemployable, and racial minorities—were still in touch with their critical faculties.

Habermas, too, was critical of modern capitalism and its bureaucratic form, particularly its, or the system's, colonization of the lifeworld of individual autonomy. Yet he was more optimistic about modernity than were his Frankfurt predecessors. He developed his own critical standpoint based on an ideal speech situation of unconstrained and undistorted discussion, leading to what he later called "communicative action." Thus, the realm of instrumental reason could be controlled through a consensus of shared understandings required to coordinate action. In his later years he maintained that liberal democracies could serve as the actual basis of this standpoint, although it is far from clear that the money and power of those who steer the system do not undermine this ideal.

Structuralist Marxism

If Habermas saw the normative potential in language, Louis Althusser (1981–1990), a member

of the French Communist Party, saw its explanatory, scientific potential, which he indeed pitted against the humanist, Hegelianized Marxism initiated by Lukács. Althusser was responding to the crisis of Marxism in the mid-1950s, when Stalin was strongly criticized by the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviets invaded another proletarian country, Hungary in 1956. Humanist, existentialist Marxists such as Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) were developing a Marxism independently from the Soviet diamat (dialectical materialist) version that could potentially have united socialists, communists, and Catholics in France. He also wanted to defend the autonomy of intellectuals within the French Communist Party. In *For Marx* (1965) and *Reading* Capital (with Étienne Balibar, 1970), influenced by French philosophers of science Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, Althusser sought to put Marxism on a rigorously scientific basis through a symptomatic reading of Marx by making sense of the silences in his writings. He concluded that there existed an epistemological break in Marx's work, between the Hegelian and Feurbachean philosopher of alienation: philosopher of human essence and human freedom on one hand, and on the other an objective, value-free scientist who developed concepts that centered on the mode of production, such as forces and relations of production.

Althusser argued that Marx was, in effect, in the process of developing a structuralist methodology of the kind later seen in the work of the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009), who based his work on the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). The understanding of social structures could be modeled on what was regarded as the inherent structure of language. Just as the meaning of words was relationally derived from the meaning of other words, so societies had to be thought of in terms of interrelated dimensions. Rejecting the simple base/superstructure model, the social totality was constituted by three interacting levels or practices: the ideological, the economic, and the political. Yet true to Engels, the economic in the last instance determined which level was dominant. Thus, society and history could be explained in a far more complex way than by a simple dialectical teleology as proposed by Hegelian Marxists. To capture this complexity, Althusser used the term *overdetermination*, a concept derived from Freud's analysis of dreams, to describe how history and society consisted of a condensation of multiple contradictions. On this reading the Russian Revolution did not have to be seen as an aberration, departing from the orthodox Marxist teleological schema that assumed that socialism was possible only in advanced capitalist countries. Indeed, he famously maintained that history was a process without a subject.

Perhaps the most dramatic implication of his structuralist rendition of Marxism was his rejection of the Hegelian Marxist emphasis on class consciousness, crucial to historical transformation. Rather, consciousness, subjectivity, and indeed morality were the effects of these complex structures. Individuals were the unwitting bearers of these structures, their roles ideologically created. The self was an ideological effect. Social relations were therefore not the product of individual intentions. Althusser drew a further conclusion, shocking even to an orthodox Marxist, that ideology was required to ensure that social roles were reproduced in *any* society and was therefore a permanent feature of the human condition. It would not disappear with the coming of a classless society.

For Althusser the epistemological and scientific dimension was essential, as science was required to get behind the appearance of things; science had enabled Marx to uncover the exploitative essence behind the fair wage agreement between capitalist and worker. Thus, much scientific labor was needed to understand the ideological effects of contemporary capitalism.

Analytical Marxism

In attempting to reassert Marxism's rigorously scientific credentials and dismiss Marxism's Hegelian historical teleology, Althusser inadvertently paved the way for analytical Marxism, which flourished in the 1980s. Although there was little political or methodological agreement among analytical Marxists, they were all equally committed to methodological rigor, definitional clarity, and logical consistency. Moreover, apart from G. A. Cohen's *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence* (1978), the inspirational text for this group, they were far keener to reconstruct Marx's ideas than demonstrate their validity (especially given the problems of collective action for the

proletariat), using techniques of rational choice, game theory, and mathematical modeling derived from neoclassical economics, all normally premised on the microfoundations of methodological individualism. They started with Marxist questions (e.g., What is exploitation? Why are workers not revolutionary?) but did not come up with Marxist answers.

Cohen sought to rebut the criticisms made by British analytical philosophers (especially H. B. Acton and John Plamenatz) in the 1960s. He distinguished between Marx's teleological, Hegel-inspired *philosophy* of history, which he rejected, and Marx's *theory* of history, which could be defended, especially if given a functionalist gloss. Thus, although he gave the development of the productive forces throughout history explanatory primacy, the productive forces did not create production relations themselves, but made use of existing relations that facilitated their further development. Supposedly Marx was more concerned with talking about directionality in history than its inevitability.

Given the rejection of Marxism's teleological aspect, with the real and the good (almost) inevitably coalescing, the normative and explanatory elements became detached from one another. The analytical Marxists' areas of research reflected this separation, with Cohen and John Roemer moving into the realm of moral philosophy and John Elster and others more interested in social and political explanation. Elster took exception to Cohen's functionalism because it ruled out conscious human intention. Rather, he sought to reconstruct Marx on methodological individualist lines: Social phenomena were to be explained as the outcome or aggregate of myriad individual choices and actions rather than by some hidden purpose (e.g., social reproduction or proletarian emancipation of humanity). Supraindividual entities (humanity, classes) therefore had no ontological independence. In seeking to develop a general theory of exploitation after rejecting Marx's idea that it was premised on the labor theory of value and the capitalist's extraction of surplus value from the worker, Roemer also based his argument on individualist methodology. Exploitation occurred because of the differences in the distribution of initial productive assets or endowments, which included individual skills and talents as well as instruments of production. Thus, exploitation could occur in all exchanges, not merely between capitalist and worker, but in situations where some are more talented than others, because some have to work longer than average to earn their "consumption bundles." Thus, hypothetically, those who would be better off if they played their own game by taking their talents and their per capita share of external resources elsewhere are deemed to be exploited, according to Roemer. Thus, exchanges between those equal in assets and endowments could not be deemed exploitative.

Whereas Roemer used economic modeling to develop normative theory, Cohen applied the techniques of analytical philosophy to criticize mainstream liberal discourses on equality. He attacked Robert Nozick's libertarian notion of self-ownership used to defend economic inequality, and he questioned John Rawls's difference principle (inequalities are legitimate if they improve the lives of the least well off). In attempting to marry equality and individual autonomy, Cohen became a "luck" egalitarian: Although individuals had to be protected against brute luck, there was still scope for personal responsibility. And although he held that the self-ownership principle helped explain Marx's theory of exploitation, he emphasized that it was not only workers who experienced injustice.

Post-Marxism

Like analytical Marxism, post-Marxism also began to flourish in the 1980s, but it differed fundamentally. Post-Marxists regarded the search for foundations as chimerical, whether analytically as stable meanings or methodologically as "micro" explanations. They also differed because, apart from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe whose seminal text was *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985), it was not a self-conscious intellectual movement. Post-Marxism is a label that can be loosely applied to a variety of thinkers, to those who were *not* neo-Marxist in wanting to update Marx. Their thinking was either Marxism "plus," as in the case of feminists whose dual systems explanation of women's oppression combined patriarchy and class analysis, or they went beyond Marx. Whatever the large differences between

them, they shared a common view about the failings of orthodox Marxism, which they saw as a form of conservatism or worse. They rejected its grand narrative, a teleological view of history with the proletariat liberating humanity from the shackles of capitalism. The underlying assumption of historical necessity ignored the contingent, the circumstantial, and the unpredictable.

Often influenced by the events of May 1968 in Paris, in which students proved to be more radical than workers, post-Marxists turned for inspiration to the new social movements, which advanced the causes of sexual and ethnic identity, ecology, and peace rather than the proletariat. They rejected the idea that Marxism was a science. Instead, Marxism was a political discourse, an expression of power relations, often of a distinctly totalitarian kind. Its claims to truth and transparency were bogus. Indeed, given their sensitivity to problems posed by language and human psychology, post-Marxists were far more committed to the idea of the indeterminacy of meaning and the singularity of human experience. Thus, rather than the knowing (Marxist) Party guiding the proletariat in accordance with historical laws, those who sought to bring about social transformation had to speak for themselves. This implied that democracy, albeit of a radical type, was more important than communism. Democracy was also essential because Marxism assumed that most human conflict would disappear in a classless society. Laclau and Mouffe, in particular, stressed that human desire stemming from a congenital "lack" would always destabilize human relations. Democracy was the best way of insuring that such desires did not result in domination. Most post-Marxists, however, were not anti-Marxist. Jacques Derrida, perhaps speaking for many post-Marxists in *Specters of Marx* (1994), explicitly associated himself with its critical spirit in relation to liberal democratic capitalism. The problem was that Marxism did not go far enough in its radicalism, which had to embrace an unpredictable and unknowable future.

Classical Marxism and Its Derivatives

Despite these different Marxist trends within the academy, there have remained thinkers far truer to the political economy spirit of Marx, who use his ideas to understand the contemporary world and its antecedents. This spirit lives on in such journals in the Anglophone world as *The Socialist Register, Historical Materialism, Science and Society, Capital and Class,* and earlier editions of *New Left Review,* in the writings of Ellen Wood, David Harvey, and Alex Callinicos, or the "regulation school" started by Michel Aglietta in the 1970s. There are also those who use Marxism as a starting point of analysis but do not feel constrained by a fidelity to Marx, such as Bob Jessup and Roy Bhaskar, founder of the critical realism school of thought.

Conclusion

Despite the paradoxical history of Marxism and its political and intellectual fragmentation, the existence of many liberalisms, feminisms, and conservatisms shows that fragmentation can be an expression of strength as much as weakness. Politically, Marxism may be a spent force, with capitalism proving to be far more resilient and the working class less revolutionary than Marx anticipated. Nevertheless, for the first time in human history we live in a globalized capitalist world, in which human relations become increasingly commodified, with deeply unequal benefits and burdens, serious economic downturns, imperialism(s), rampant militarization, and the planet ecologically challenged. Whatever Marx's intentions to produce a body of radical theory that was not utopian, the evidence suggests that he was not successful in this respect. On the other hand, his analysis of capitalism helps to bring *any* normative thinking down to earth, trenchantly demonstrating how, in the contemporary world, the realization of liberal, and indeed democratic, ideals are profoundly utopian within the capitalist context. In thinking outside the liberal democratic "box," Marx, with all his theory's imperfections and overblown ambitions, offers rich resources as a critique of the contemporary world and as an explanation of how it is as it is.

Jules Townshend

See also Analytical Marxism; Exploitation; Gramsci, Antonio; Habermas, Jürgen; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hegemony; Kautsky, Karl; Lenin and the Russian Revolution; Maoism; Marx, Karl; New Left; Postmodernism; Rational Choice Theory; Regulation Theory; Socialism; Structuralism

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Mass Psychology

Interest in mass psychology has heightened since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as many wonder about Islamic fundamentalism and the waves of apparent mass fury that it has released around the world and which seem to appear almost weekly on U.S. television. Not so easy to see are the forces of mass psychology at work in society. Yet, if Freud is correct in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (originally published in 1922), the principles are the same.

According to Freud, in the group the individual is liberated from the forces of repression, allowing him or her to more freely express his or her unconscious impulses. The apparently new characteristics of individuals in groups are nothing more than the emergence of characteristics that were present all along but kept on a tight leash by the ego and superego, or conscience. In other words, there is no such thing as a "group mind." Groups are nothing more than the attributes of the individuals within them. What changes is how relatively unrepressed these individuals become when they have given themselves over to the allure of the group, the promise that they will not have to forever inhibit their unconscious desires, especially their anger and hatred toward others. A nation at war, whether just or unjust, does not escape this psychology.

What holds groups together? In part the sheer pleasure of being part of the mass of humanity that is no longer required to repress its desires, particularly the pleasures of aggression. But that is not enough. The leader holds the group together, says Freud. Individual members of the group identify with each other, but only in a superficial way. Each imagines that he or she is in an individual relationship with the leader. The relationship may be real or imaginary, but it is as if each member of the group is bound to every other member of the group only because they have the same leader. The result, according to Freud, is that it is incorrect to define humanity as a herd animal, one that gathers around its own, like sheep. Humanity is a horde animal—that is, a follower of leaders. One possible criticism of Freud is that he did not fully appreciate the way in which an idea or an ideology could take the place of a leader.

Developed out of his experience treating the victims of "shell shock" (now called posttraumatic stress disorder) in World War II, Wilfred Bion came to see groups as existing in a perpetual state of tension between their work tasks, such as building a bridge or running a hospital ward, and the more basic dependency needs of their members. Rarely are these basic dependency needs addressed directly; instead, they are acted out in ways that are often destructive of the group task. In a well-known and possibly apocryphal story illustrating the tension between task and need, a nurse in a hospital ward is said to have blurted out in the middle of a ward meeting, "We could be such a fine unit if we just didn't have these damn patients to take care of."

The three unconscious patterns into which groups tend to organize themselves, patterns that invariably detract from the task at hand, are, according to Bion, the dependency group, the fight–flight group, and the pairing group. Dependency groups act as if they tacitly assume there is a leader who can magically meet the

group's need for security and nurture. Another basic assumption is the fight–flight group, the group that acts as if it is faced with a terrible danger it can neither name nor specify. The third basic assumption is the pairing group, in which members of the group assume that a couple, usually heterosexual, will pair off and eventually bear a child who will save the group.

These are, for the most part, ridiculous assumptions, but they survive because no one questions them; generally no one even notices the assumptions are getting in the way of the group's work. It is the task of the psychologically aware leader to call attention to these unconscious dynamics, when they occur, without making a big a deal of it. In other words, knowledge of group psychology helps get the work of the group done; it is generally not an end in itself, except as a special field of study. Sometimes group psychology is simply practical.

A self-educated longshoreman, Eric Hoffer published *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* in 1951, when the memory of the Nazis was still fresh, and the influence of communism throughout the world was a frightening phenomenon. In the days after September 11, 2001, Hoffer's work has experienced something of a renaissance.

Seeking to explain the appeal of mass movements, Hoffer wrote that they attract not those who seek to bolster the self but those who seek to be rid of the burden of the self. For those who lack individual hope, mass movements provide a group substitute. Mass movements attract charismatic leaders, frequently of limited intelligence and originality. These leaders use the slime of frustrated souls as the mortar binding the bricks of a new world, an image Hoffer draws from the Book of Genesis.

Hardly an attractive picture of the true believer, it is surprising but important to note that Hoffer concludes that fanaticism and mass movements are the great invention of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Without fanaticism and mass movements, nothing truly new would be brought into the world; instead, the social world would slowly die of entropy. Dangerous to live with, fanaticism and mass movements would, in this sense, be even harder to live without.

C. Fred Alford

See also Freud, Sigmund; Ideology; Psychoanalysis

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May Fourth Movement

News that the Paris Peace Conference would not return the Shandong territories to China but instead transfer the German interests to Japan sparked student demonstrations in Peking on May 4, 1919. Although the march from Tiananmen Square was orderly when it began, the day ended with violence—Chinese foreign minister Cao Rulin's residence was sacked; the minister to Japan, Zhang Zongxiang, was beaten up; fighting broke out between students and police, resulting in one student death; and 32 students were arrested. In the days that followed, demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts spread throughout China. The demonstrators garnered widespread support, not only from students and intellectuals but also from industrialists, merchants, and workers. Disillusionment and anger with great power politics and leaders that betrayed the ideals of democracy and people's self-determination, which had been identified with the Allies' cause, compounded by the weakness and treachery of the Chinese government, which sold out the nation's interests for secret loans from Japan, awakened the people to a burning sense of crisis and an urgent need to "save China."

The May Fourth Movement began earlier in what was initially known as the New Culture Movement. In the aftermath of China's military defeat by Japan, and the humiliation of the 1915 Sino-Japanese Treaty based on Japan's notorious "twenty-one demands," designed to turn China into a Japanese colony in all but name, many Chinese believed that nothing short of a new culture was needed to save China. Thousands of Chinese students who had studied overseas in America, Europe, and Japan returned with new ideas, and numerous foreign publications were translated into Chinese,

feeding a movement to replace traditions blamed for China's weakness and problems and to usher in a new China, modern and strong. A well-known component of this movement was literary reform. Vernacular language, being much more accessible to the common people, was promoted; this resulted in improved communication between the educated and the general populace, which had a significant impact on the politics of subsequent years.

All kinds of Western political theories were also introduced to the Chinese during this period. Socialism and anarchism were introduced via Japan as well as France. French ideas, whether of democracy and liberalism, or nationalism and Marxism, were so influential that some refer to the May Fourth Movement as the Chinese "French Enlightenment"; others called it a "Chinese Enlightenment" or "Chinese renaissance." John Dewey's pragmatic social liberalism also gained considerable influence, as did Bertrand Russell's guild socialism during their visits at this time. Among the key players and those inspired by the movement were founding members of the Communist Party, such as Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and Mao Tse-tung. Chinese interest in these political theories was far from academic; the Chinese were looking for solutions to urgent problems. Many issues that have subsequently preoccupied Chinese political theorists and intellectuals were inspired by the controversies and unresolved problems of the May Fourth Movement. Nationalist sentiments, which united people at the height of the movement, did not last but for the most part ended by 1921 with the eventual split between the liberals and the Communists.

Sor-hoon Tan

See also Anarchism; Chinese Liberalism; Chinese Revolutionary Thought; Guild Socialism; Liberalism; Maoism; Marxism; Socialism

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Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872)

Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) was an Italian political activist and a nationalist theorist who is considered one of modern Italy's founding fathers. Born in Genoa, a port city of northwestern Italy, Mazzini earned a university degree in law, but showed more interest in literature, aesthetics, and politics. In 1830 he was arrested because of his affiliation to the patriotic secret society Carboneria. Choosing exile over imprisonment, he moved to Marseille in southern France, where he founded the political movement *Giovine Italia* (Young Italy) and its homonymous journal. The movement aimed at Italy's liberation and unification, in the form of a democratic republic. In 1834 Mazzini founded in Bern, Switzerland, the short-lived *Giovine Europa* (Young Europe), a republican alliance with German and Polish patriots. In 1837 he moved to London, where he made the headquarters of his political activities in favor of a unified Italy. Mazzini returned to Italy in 1848 and was among the leaders of the Roman republic of 1849. He returned there permanently only after the country's unification in 1861, while still fighting for the conquest of Rome, the future capital and one of Mazzini's most hailed political symbols. When Mazzini died in 1872, he was still living under an assumed name and in hiding as a dangerous republican wanted by the Italian police. Most of the political and military coups he had planned in the previous decades had ended in failure and bloodshed, and the Italian nation had been created as a monarchy and not as a republic. Nonetheless, Mazzini is still considered one of the major inspirations behind Italian political unity and the foremost leader of the democratic currents of the *Risorgimento* (the nineteenth-century movement for Italian national unification and independence).

Mazzini's political thought developed chiefly in contact with, and under the influence of, French currents, such as the moderate republicanism

stemming from the revolution of 1830; the Saint-Simonian doctrine (a Hegelian protosocialism that spread across France between 1828 and 1830 and was marked by contrasting ultrademocratic and reactionary traits that shaped profoundly Mazzini's religiosity); and elements of liberal Catholicism, particularly as articulated by Felicité de Lamennais. Other influences came from the political culture of exiles—particularly Polish exiles—living in France, such as the poet Adam Mickiewicz. Mazzini always remained an antisocialist, from his critique of Charles Fourier in 1836, to his later attacks—in the context of the First Socialist International Congress—on Karl Marx and his followers, and on the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, both of whom he criticized for their materialism, internationalism, and atheism.

Mazzini's political vision was chiefly centered on the concept and ideal of the nation. He developed a form of nationalism that was universalistic and irenic, and thus he rejected political antagonism and xenophobia. Mazzini's understanding of nationalism—exposed in the founding documents of his movement and in writings such as *Foi et Avenir* (Faith and Future) of 1835—was based on the notion of nationality (in French: *nationalité;* in Italian: *nazionalità*), as representative of the national character and mission of each people, attributed by God, and the grounds by which every nation was obligated to fight and be unified. All nationalities needed to develop and affirm themselves harmoniously: They had to ally themselves to one another in the fight for their right to freedom and sovereignty. According to Mazzini's definition of 1835, nationality was a common thought, a common principle, a common aim, and the part that God assigned to a people; the mission it should accomplish on earth. This voluntaristic conception of the nation, echoing Jean-Jacques Rousseau's and French revolutionary and constitutional thought, was reinforced by the fact that Mazzini imagined the nation as necessarily republican and democratic. The mazzinean interpretation of the nation nourished a tradition of nationalist thought that would later include Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points of 1918 (affirming the right to sovereignty and self-determination of all nations) and would extend into Asian (especially Indian) and South American nationalist movements.

In 1846 and 1847 Mazzini published a series of articles in the *People's Journal,* under the common title *Thoughts Upon Democracy in Europe*. Here, the Italian patriot confronted the major social doctrines of his time, criticizing and distancing himself from Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism, Charles Fourier's collectivism, and Louis Blanc's and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's radicalism. He also distanced himself from the authoritarian elements of the Saint-Simonian doctrine, which nonetheless still partially shaped his political vision. In contrast to these thinkers, he proposed a tutelary conception of democracy (he considered democracy an educational problem), based on duties instead of rights and on a collective and spiritual aim for society and the people.

Mazzini's social thought was delineated most systematically in his booklet *Duties of Man,* published in 1860 on the basis of previous articles from the 1840s. This was a sort of decalogue in which Mazzini laid out his traditionalist and paternalistic conception of the lower classes. Enumerating the duties of workers toward God, the family, the fatherland, and humanity, he invoked the cooperation of capital and labor and condemned socialism and communism. Mazzini defended the right to private property and attacked collectivism, and he represented society as based on social harmony and subordination to authority.

Mazzini's thought, often unsystematic, was based more on the evocation of formulas and slogans than on clearly defined concepts. Partly for this reason, it would later be appropriated and instrumentalized in Italy by parties with different, even conflicting, political aims on both the right and the left, and particularly by the fascists and antifascists in the first decades of the twentieth century.

Simon Levis Sullam

See also Nationalism; Socialism

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Mead, George Herbert (1863–1931)

George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) is regarded as one of the classical American philosophical pragmatists. He is known today primarily for his account of the social origins of reflective thought and the self, although his work has wider ramifications. It has been influential in social psychology, interactional sociology, and social philosophy, more generally.

Mead studied with Josiah Royce at Harvard, where he also became acquainted with William James. After incomplete doctoral work at Leipzig with Wilhelm Wundt, and further work in Berlin, he took a position at the University of Michigan with John Dewey and Charles H. Cooley. When Dewey left for the University of Chicago, Mead joined him, helping to create a strong group of philosophical pragmatists there. In Chicago Mead was also involved with Jane Addams's Hull House and other reform efforts.

Mead considered his approach to social psychology a form of "social behaviorism" but distinguished it from John Watson's behaviorism. Mead's approach viewed acts as developing over time, like Dewey, and utilized a tripartite theory of signs, like C. S. Peirce. In doing so, he was able to account for the development of higher mental processes rather than attempt to reduce or eliminate them or presuppose their prior existence.

The Conversation of Gestures and Social Meaning

The notion that an act unfolds over time suggests that its early phases serve as signs of forthcoming behavior to other organisms. Mead termed such preparatory acts serving as signals to others, such as changes in posture, gaze, or vocalization, *gestures,* following Wundt. As animals interact, they learn to respond to earlier and earlier signs of each other's coming actions. As a result, their interaction becomes something like a conversation of gestures, a mostly unconscious dance of feints, counter-feints, and counter-counter-feints. The overall drama that unfolds is the product of this process of responding in an anticipatory though largely unconscious fashion to the implicit meaning of one another's gestures.

Like Peirce, Mead argued that meaning involves a triadic relation between sign, interpreting response, and object signified, and not just a dyadic relation between sign and signified: "A gesture by one organism, the resultant of the social act in which the gesture is an early phase, and the response of another organism to the gesture, are the relata in a triple . . . and this threefold relationship constitutes the matrix within which meaning arises" (quoted in Strauss, 1956, p. 178). If a cocked arm leads another boxer to duck, the former is interpreted by the latter response as meaning a blow—an interpretation that may or may not be confirmed subsequently. This approach has the advantage of showing how meaning is "a development of something objectively there as a relation between certain phases of the social act" rather than something subjective located in the head (p. 178). It also allows meaning to change as interaction proceeds, so that an act may become, and come to mean, something different than initially anticipated.

Language, Mind, and Self

Mead treated speech as a specialized form of gesture, noting that vocal gestures are useful because, unlike facial gestures, they allow one to perceive one's own gestures as others do. Whereas most gestures have meaning only for another, some come to have the same meaning for an actor as they do for others in a social act. Mead termed these *significant symbols,* or elements of language.

Mead believed that reflective thought arises from learning to use significant symbols to respond to the meaning of one's own acts as others would. It is essentially a "conversation of gestures" that one has with oneself: "Thought . . . is only the importation of outer conversation, conversation of gestures with others, into the self in which the individual takes the role of others as well as his own role. He talks to himself" (quoted in Strauss, 1956, p. 42). Mead interprets the self in terms of this reflective social process applied to determining the

meaning of one's own attributes or behavior. This involves the same interaction between an active phase, the "I," and a passive or appreciative phase, the "me." Having a "self" is having the ability to carry on an inner dialogue between the "I" and the "me," thereby reaching conclusions about oneself as viewed by others. This doctrine has proven extremely congenial to those political theorists who seek to preserve the essential aspects of Hegel's theory of recognition while jettisoning its problematic metaphysical setting. A recent example of this sort of appropriation of Mead's ideas can be found in Axel Honneth's *The Struggle for Recognition.*

All of these social processes are learned by participating in social activities, first in simple play, such as alternating being chaser and chased; then in games involving stable rules, such as tag; and finally in more complex cooperative activities involving a common or public good (the attitude of the "generalized other"). Adult social behavior involves learning to respond from these first, second, and third person perspectives and harmonizing these perspectives.

Mind, Nature, and Emergent Evolution

The wider aim of Mead's philosophy was to develop an integrative approach to the relationship between mind and nature. Rather than regarding these as opposing things—one ideal, the other material—Mead sought to find "such a place for mind in nature that nature could appear in experience" (Mead, 1932, p. 161). In other words he sought a naturalistic account of the emergence of mind adequate to account for a scientific understanding of nature.

One key to this project was the adoption of the act as a biological unit of behavior in between the units of physics and those of the social sciences (Mead, 1938). Another was the notion of emergent evolution. According to Mead everything has "sociality," or the possibility of being different things at the same time. Which identity is actualized is a contingent matter that depends on situational specifics. As a result, evolution is continually being worked out rather than determined, with new objects and properties emerging within nature. When animals evolved, or humans with reflective intelligence, they changed nature itself, giving natural objects new properties, such as functioning as "food" or inspiring worship. The past itself is remade as people use an interpretation to create a different future to which it is a "past." Nature and history are continually evolving, and people are among the agents contributing to this evolution.

Eric Bredo

See also American Pragmatism

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Mercantilism

Mercantilism was the predominant approach to theorizing political economy and designing economic policy in early modernity. The mercantilist period stretched roughly from the sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century, and Britain and France were arguably the dominant nation-states in the mercantile system. Mercantilism should not be understood as a wholly systematic theory of political economy; in fact, *mercantilism* and *mercantile system* were terms of art coined by political economists—most notably, Adam Smith—who were formulating critiques of the predominant ideas and policies of early modern European economic powers. Rather, mercantilism is better seen as a somewhat disparate set of policies and justifications for these policies that can be distilled into a set of core ideas, chief among them the belief that a nation-state's wealth or prosperity depends on its store of capital and that the best way to increase prosperity is by maintaining a favorable balance of trade. Although mercantilism declined in popularity toward the end of the eighteenth century, strains of its protectionist theories live on,

especially in contemporary debates regarding international trade.

Mercantile policies developed, for the most part, from mutually beneficial collaboration between the governments of larger trading states and their prominent merchant classes. Governments were largely interested in maintaining domestic employment and building a sizeable cache of gold and silver currency to support the standing, professional military forces that were increasingly seen as essential to the security of wealthy nation-states. To achieve these goals, governments imposed levies and taxes on classes of merchants and producers, who, in return, sought support for their business endeavors at home and abroad.

The partnership between the mercantile classes and central governments resulted in a number of protectionist policies, chief among them those aimed at maintaining a favorable balance of trade. Domestically, governments enacted policies that organized industries into guilds and established monopolies in both their local and colonial markets. They also promoted new industries by pouring in capital and waiving constraining guild rules and taxation. These policies were aimed primarily at increasing production and subsequent exports, largely of manufactured goods rather than raw materials. On the international side, mercantilist policies worked to limit the importation of manufactured goods by a number of means, including imposing tariffs on imports, setting quotas, and, in some cases, placing strict prohibitions on the importation of certain goods, namely those produced domestically. Other policies were designed to control the trade routes themselves; for example, England's seventeenth-century Navigation Acts barred foreign merchants from participation in England's domestic and colonial trade and routed all shipments to its colonies through England.

The primary end of all mercantilist policies was to ensure a favorable balance of trade for the nation-state in question. The conventional wisdom was that a nation's wealth could be measured in terms of its supply of bullion, so trade was considered profitable only if states were achieving a trade surplus and hence pulling in more hard currency for the national stockpile. Critics of mercantilism, most notably Adam Smith, attacked both the premise that bullion constituted wealth and the argument that a perpetual positive balance of trade was desirable or even possible. To be fair, by the time Adam Smith struck the definitive blow against these tenets in 1776's *The Wealth of Nations,* the mercantilists were already beginning to deemphasize the importance of bullion, if not their commitment to maintaining a positive balance of trade.

Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* remains the most trenchant critique of mercantilist policies and what Smith called the mercantilist spirit. Following the French physiocrats and his friend David Hume, Smith argued that wealth should not be equated with gold and silver, because the value of bullion, like that of other commodities, varies according to the laws of supply and demand. Smith's analysis of trade policy also supported the view that trade, when freely entered, should be a positive-sum enterprise for both parties, rather than a zero-sum game. Smith famously argued that nation-states were most likely to experience economic growth if they traded freely with others, as trade expanded the available market; allowed trading states to specialize in what they were best positioned to produce; and increased productivity for all participants. Smith argued that trade barriers and domestic monopolies were thereby imprudent and in fact hampered the prosperity of nation-states and their general populations, even though they might bring short-term economic benefits to particular interest groups. In that vein, he attacked the politics of the mercantile system, railing against the collusion between traders and governments to deceive the public about the best means of increasing national wealth.

The Wealth of Nations effectively sounded the death knell of the mercantile system, which some scholars argue was already in decline before Smith published his incisive critique. By the mid-nineteenth century, most of the policies of the mercantile period were effectively overturned. It is worth noting, however, that vestiges of mercantilism persist in present-day debates about international trade. Even as that trade brings economic benefits overall, it still damages particular domestic industries and sectors of the population. Contemporary debates about when and why to intervene in international trade still reflect the concerns and questions that animated the theory and practice of international political economy during the mercantile period.

Emily C. Nacol

See also Classical Political Economy; Commerce; Commercial Society; Hume, David; Physiocracy; Smith, Adam

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METAPOLITICS

Metapolitics designates, either positively or negatively, a particular relation between politics and the thinking of politics, that is, between historical instances of politics, governance, and policy making, on one hand, and categories of theory, intellectual history, or philosophy, on the other. It is the name for an encounter, or missed encounter as the case may be, between action and thought, even while its most recent usage is meant precisely to cancel out all traditional oppositions between practice and theory, between history and conceptuality, or between the real and the speculative. In the ideological realm, the invocation of metapolitics over the past 200 years has covered the full spectrum of possibilities, from the liberal Enlightenment to antirevolutionary Catholicism and from a neo-pagan New Right to the proposal for a reinvention of communism. This vacillation is partly due to the fact that the term is used both as a programmatic self-description and as the name for a position pejoratively ascribed to others.

Among German liberal thinkers such as Gottlieb Hufeland, August Ludwig von Schlözer, and Carl von Rotteck, credited with having coined the term, metapolitics refers, first, to the theoretical study of the principles of right derived from the state of nature and, then, to the theory of the state as such, independent both of politics in the narrow empirical sense and of statistics as the history and theory of constitutional right. In this sense, the term *metapolitics* acquires the meaning of a metaphysical study into the principles of politics, its fundamental grounds, and its ultimate ends. This is also how Joseph de Maistre, albeit from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, introduced the expression into French. Metapolitics would thus be to politics what metaphysics is to physics, or, put differently, it amounts to a metaphysics of politics. De Maistre's antiliberal perspective, in which politics is a matter of transcendent if not God-given values, dominated the history of metapolitics until the close of the twentieth century. The religious and more properly messianic dimension, on the other hand, is best expressed in the work of the Polish philosopher and mathematician Józef Maria Hoëné-Wroński, who saw metapolitics as a union of religion and philosophy.

Metapolitics, in this first broad sense, is the study of the ultimate founding ideas, myths, and values behind all concrete forms of political practice. It signals both a movement by which political science becomes increasingly self-reflexive and the possibility of rooting the empirical and mundane in transcendent or transcendental—frequently divine or eschatological—principles. As such, the term frequently acquires a pejorative connotation, for example, in Peter Viereck's study into the dark cultural and spiritual roots of Nazism.

Beginning in 1930, the term has also been adopted as the program title for an eschatological regrounding of modern politics, especially in the work of the Italian philosopher Silvano Panunzio and his student Primo Siena, now residing in Chile. They seek to restitute the sacred roots, mythic symbols, and eschatological values to a disenchanted and secularized modern world. Metapolitics, combining a "sacred science" (metaphysics), a "profane science" (politics), and a "prophetic and regal science" (eschatology), would thus be opposed to the dominant "crypto-politics" of capitalist multinational corporations, media conglomerates, and drug cartels. The ultimate goal of this struggle, symbolized in the opposition between the Eagle and the Serpent, is the return to a transcendent linkage between politics and Christianity. Other figures who continue in this same vein include Attilio Meliadò and Giovanni D'Aloe.

In 1968, with an international seminar titled "What Is Metapolitics?" organized by the conservative think tank GRÉCE (*Groupement de Recherche et d'Étude pour la Civilization Européenne*), metapolitics became an official

watchword of the European New Right, led by the French writer Alain de Benoist. Paradoxically borrowing many insights from the New Left, most notably the Gramscian idea of "cultural war" and the struggle for "hegemony," de Benoist and his followers in Belgium (Louis Pauwels, Robert Steuckers), the United Kingdom (Michael Walker), Germany (Pierre Krebs), Italy (Marco Tarchi, Carlo Gambescia), and Russia (Alexander Dugin, Eduard Limonov) give primacy to the struggle for cultural power over and above any concrete policy making, or politics as usual. Part of this struggle involves a will to return to the Indo-European roots and the so-called originary values of Europe, as opposed to the false universality of Christian-American hegemony.

Especially in Italy, following the example of Benedetto Croce's study of liberty, metapolitics becomes more value neutral as a near synonym for the conceptual history of ideas in political science and philosophy. For Giacomo Marramao, a metapolitical study of the antinomy of system and action that continues to undergird the theory of new social movements may thus help us overcome the reign of postpolitics, without having to reach back for a metaphysics of politics or prophetically announcing a superpolitics. This understanding of metapolitics is indebted to the work of Manfred Riedel who, in his *Metaphysik und Metapolitik,* likewise argues for the semantic analysis of the concepts of the political, without relying on a doctrine of metaphysical foundations.

The Argentine philosopher Alberto Buela, who otherwise is close in spirit to Panunzio, Siena, and Alain de Benoist's New Right, has tried to separate his own understanding of metapolitics from both its metaphysical underpinnings and its messianic expectations. Following the Greek, *ta meta politika,* he defines metapolitics as the mixed discipline, being both political and philosophical, that goes beyond politics and seeks to ground it in its ultimate raison d'être, that is, "the nonpolitical ground of politics."

For Jacques Rancière, metapolitics is one of the three main figures of political philosophy, or what he calls "the politics of philosophers," the other two being archipolitics and parapolitics. All three serve to obscure, displace, or deny the operations of politics proper. Metapolitics, which Rancière associates with Marx, does so by submitting real political practices to a double verdict, either of being mere appearances that hide the truth of the underlying social class struggle or else of falling short of the realization of a genuine politics in which society would reach its fulfillment and its end.

Alain Badiou's recent proposal in *Metapolitics,* finally, is diametrically opposed to all extant definitions of this notion. For him, metapolitics can become the exact opposite of a political philosophy bent on defining the political or even the nonpolitical ground of politics, provided we accept that politics, as a truth procedure or militant form of emancipatory practice, is already in itself a mode of thinking. Ironically, although Badiou and Rancière share a similar understanding of the operations of emancipatory politics as egalitarian and universalist, the latter thus sees metapolitics as an obstacle that covers up the play of liberty and equality inherent in such politics, which the former with the same concept—despite the fact that its history is steeped in right-wing ideology—proposes to think through and set free.

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See also Natural Rights; New Left; New Right; State; State of Nature

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Methodological Individualism

Methodological individualism is a doctrine in the philosophy of the social sciences about the relationship between society and individuals. The idea can be formulated in several related but somewhat different ways: Social facts are constituted by facts about individuals; social entities are composed of individuals and their properties and relations; social structures and entities are nothing but ensembles of individuals and their behaviors; social explanations must be derivable from facts about individuals; scientific statements about society must be reducible to statements about individuals and their properties and relations; social laws or generalizations must be derivable from general facts about individuals. There may be other possible formulations as well.

The idea of methodological individualism is one that has appealed to philosophers and social thinkers for almost as long as there has been systematic thinking about social science. Modern philosophy of social science began in the nineteenth century, and John Stuart Mill's theories of social knowledge contained the assumption of methodological individualism. In *A System of Logic* Mill argued that social phenomena are nothing but the aggregate result of the actions and dispositions of individuals; so the foundation of the social sciences should be found in the laws of psychology. A classic twentieth-century statement of the doctrine was presented by J. W. N. Watkins, who argued that the most fundamental explanations of social phenomena must be derived from facts about the beliefs, goals, and constraints of individuals. Max Weber also assumed the doctrine, particularly in the context of his definition of the object of sociology as social action carried out by individuals.

In recent years, methodological individualism has had a rebirth of interest among philosophers. The thesis can be formulated as a statement about explanation, as a thesis about social ontology, or as a statement about intertheoretic reduction. The explanatory version, as stated by Daniel Steel, holds that it is possible and desirable to explain social outcomes exclusively in terms of the actions and behaviors of individuals. James Woodward's fundamental idea is that one explanation is more fundamental than another if it is invariant with respect to a wider range of interventions. The ontological version, as stated by Daniel Little, maintains that social entities and their properties are constituted by individuals and their actions; social entities have no independent existence. The intertheoretic version, as stated by Julie Zahle, holds that it is possible to reduce theories containing social properties to theories containing only properties of individuals.

Methodological individualism is the limited version of a family of perspectives on social explanation that we might refer to as "agent-centered" approaches to social explanation. Here the general idea is that we explain social outcomes as an aggregate result of the actions, choices, and mentalities of individuals. Individuals' behavior and choice constitute the causal dynamics of social outcomes. A special case of the agent-centered approach is the field of rational choice theory: the view that social outcomes can be explained as the aggregate effect of the individually rational actions of a set of actors. But agent-centered approaches can give more "social-ness" to the individual than the founding statements of methodological individualism would permit. For example, the position

of methodological localism, as formulated by Little, identifies socially constituted and socially situated individuals as the foundation of social explanation, but explicitly denies the idea that all social facts are reducible to bare psychological facts about individuals. Rather, individuals are themselves constituted and constrained by previously established social conditions. A recent strategy—expounded by both Jon Elster and Little—in approaching the issue of the relationship between social facts and individual facts is to postulate that social-level statements and causal judgments need to be provided with *microfoundations,* that is, descriptions of the pathways through which socially situated individuals are led to act in such a way as to bring about the macro-level fact.

The logical contrary of methodological individualism is the idea of social holism, most explicitly advocated by Émile Durkheim. Holism is a form of antireductionism. Antireductionists maintain that there are facts about the social world that do not reduce to facts about individuals. Society is autonomous with respect to the individuals who "make it up." There are social forces (e.g., systems of norms) that exercise causal power over individuals rather than norms being constituted by the psychological states of individuals. Other varieties of social holism are possible as well. Structuralism is the view that social structures exercise autonomous causal properties—for example, linguistic systems, kinship systems, or modes of production.

It is important to highlight some points that methodological individualism does *not* entail. methodological individualism does not entail that individuals are egoists or purely self-regarding. It does not entail that individuals are not social. It does not entail that social facts do not have causal consequences—for other social facts and for individual behavior. It is indeed possible to reframe almost all substantive sociological theory in terms that are consistent with the reasonable conditions implied by methodological individualism. Even Durkheim's central theories can be formulated in a way that is innocent with respect to the charge of "action at a distance." And, from the other direction, even a theorist with as clear a commitment to methodological individualism as Max Weber, is still able to make macro or holistic claims about the causal importance of factors such as religion or morality.

Considerations

Arguments in favor of methodological individualism derive from several valid observations. First, there is the point that social facts are evidently constituted by the thoughts and behaviors of groups of individuals. Social movements are composed of individuals with specific psychologies and beliefs; organizations are composed of individuals in concrete relationships with each other; and, arguably, moralities and cultures are made up of individuals with specific beliefs and values. Second, there is the point that social "laws" are rare, exception-laden, and conditional; so there is a methodological reason to look for the more basic laws that may regulate social behavior—at the level of individuals and their psychology. Third, there is a preference for ontological parsimony: If we can explain social facts in terms of facts about individuals, then we do not need to attribute ontological status to social facts and entities. Fourth, there is a concern about obscurantism that is appealing to many philosophers; the idea that social facts might be autonomous with respect to individuals gives an impression of occult causal powers or action at a distance. So there is a range of reasons to think that social outcomes are made up of or determined by the aggregate results of individuals and their interactions.

Are there any arguments in support of holism? There are. First is a very reasonable point deriving from pragmatic objections to reductionism. If we know on ontological grounds that the behavior of the whole depends upon the features and behavior of the constituent parts and nothing else (the heart of the theory of supervenience, discussed later in this entry), but we also know that it is entirely hopeless to attempt to calculate the one based on facts about the other, then perhaps it is justified to consider the whole as if it embodied causal processes at the macro-level. So there is a pragmatic argument available that recommends the autonomy of social facts based on the infeasibility of derivability.

Second is the plausibility of the idea that there are large historical or social forces that, for all intents and purposes, are beyond the control of any of the individuals whom they influence. The fact that a given population exists as a language community of German speakers or Yoruba speakers has an effect on every child born into that

population. The child's brain is shaped by this social reality, quite independently from facts about the child's agency or individuality. The grammar of the local language is an autonomous social fact in this context, even though it is a fact that is embodied in the particular brains and behaviors of the countless individuals who constitute this community. But this is probably similarly true when we turn to systems of attitudes, norms, or cognitive systems of thinking.

It is obvious but perhaps trivial to observe that the vector of influence flows through individuals who possess the grammar, norms, or folk beliefs—this is the ontological reality captured by the methodological individualism thesis. But perhaps a point in favor of a modest holism is that the fact of the commonality of Yoruba grammar can be viewed *as if* it were an autonomous fact, even though we know it depends on the existence of Yoruba speakers. The point of the holism thesis is that the social fact of the current grammar is coercive with respect to current Nigerian children in specific communities, and, perhaps, likewise with respect to other aspects of social cognition and norms. And this takes us some distance toward Durkheim's central view: the autonomy of social facts.

Advocates for a modest social holism might maintain two plausible positions: (1) that all social facts are embodied in the states of mind and behavior of individuals but (2) that some social facts (institutions, social practices, systems of rules) have explanatory autonomy independent from any knowledge about the particular ways in which these facts are embodied in individuals. The first is an ontological point, and the second is a point about explanation. In other words, we are not forced to choose between agent and structure; rather, agents influence structures and structures influence agents.

Reductionism

The doctrine of methodological individualism sometimes represents a form of reductionism from one area of scientific theory to another. Reducibility means that the statements of one scientific discipline should be logically deducible from the truths of some other, more fundamental discipline. Thus it is sometimes maintained that the truths of chemistry ought in principle be derivable from those of quantum mechanics. Mental states must be reducible to a set of facts about neurophysiology; statements about living organisms must be reducible to a set of facts about the molecular chemistry and physiology of cells. A field of knowledge that is not reducible to another field R is said to be autonomous with respect to R. Advocates of the reductionist version of methodological individualism, then, maintain that theories about social entities and properties must be reducible to theories and statements about individuals and their properties.

A somewhat less restrictive view than reductionism is the theory, as explicated by Jaegwon Kim, of supervenience between levels of scientific description. According to the theory of supervenience, facts at one level of description are fixed or determined by facts at a lower level of description. To say that X supervenes upon Y is to say that there is no difference between states of affairs concerning X for which there is not also a difference in states of affairs concerning Y. This is a less restrictive doctrine because it does not require derivations of the facts of X from facts of Y. The theory is first applied to mental states and states of neurophysiology: There can be no differences in mental states without some difference in neurophysiology states. Supervenience theory implies an answer to the question of whether one set of facts "fixes in principle" the second set of facts.

This provides the beginnings of an answer to one of the fundamental issues raised by methodological individualism: If we believe that social facts supervene upon facts about individuals, then we are forced to accept that the totality of facts about individuals fixes the facts about society. However, supervenience does not imply reducibility in principle, let alone reducibility in practice between levels.

In short, for a variety of reasons it is reasonable to take the view that social facts supervene upon facts about individuals, but that social explanations are autonomous from laws of psychology. At the same time, the requirement that social explanations require microfoundations appears to be a reasonable one: We need to know what it is about the circumstances and motives of individuals such that their ordinary socially situated choices and behavior result in the social

processes and causal connections that we observe. And in field after field it is possible to demonstrate that it is possible to provide such microfoundations.

These arguments suggest two things. First, holism and individualism are not so sharply opposed as perhaps they appear. But more important, two styles of social explanation are validated and compatible: the compositional or aggregative model of explanation—explain the outcome as the aggregative consequence of the behavior of large numbers of individuals—and constraining or filtering explanations—the structuring of individual behavior that is created by the workings of social institutions. The first model of explanation corresponds well to the assumptions of methodological individualism, whereas the second corresponds to the idea that structures and large social factors cause patterns of individual behavior. Neither has antecedent priority over the other.

Daniel Little

See also Durkheim, Émile; Philosophy of Social Sciences; Rational Choice Theory; Weber, Max

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MICROPOLITICS

According to the idea of micropolitics, to understand the political sphere it is not enough to study the behavior of large-scale political formations such as the state or the nation, nor is it enough to start from the apparently essential structure and interests of the political individual. To understand politics, we must also attend to the political character of the everyday and see how the texture of day-to-day life produces particular political subjects, with particular patterns of beliefs, habits, affects, desires, and perceptions. Political subjects are formed not just by the state, or the economy, but also by micro-level formations, such as pop culture artifacts, or the organization of the household, as well as the specific and unpredictable interactions between them.

As an explicit concept, micropolitics was developed primarily by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their text *A Thousand Plateaus*. However, micropolitics is also deeply influenced by the work of Michel Foucault (who frequently invoked "micromechanisms of power"), as well as the microsociology of Gabriel Tarde.

Micropolitics and the Political Subject

Whereas many forms of political theory take political subjects and their interests as pregiven and then seek to describe their interactions, micropolitical analysis looks at the various social, political, cultural and economic forces that function to produce particular types of political subjectivities. An example of this is Foucault's work on disciplinary spaces, in which he investigates how the specific ordering of bodies in prisons or schools serves to produce certain forms of subjectivity and agency. A micropolitical approach will reorient a research agenda away from the large-scale mechanisms of control and organization and toward those forces operating at the personal and prepersonal level to produce certain patterns of habits, behaviors, perceptions, interests, beliefs, and desires. For example, in Deleuze and Guattari's account of fascism, they argue that the fascist state cannot be explained solely by its macropolitical order of authoritarian control (as there are many authoritarian states that are not fascist). To truly explain fascism one has to look to the micropolitical level, to see the way in which a fascist subject is produced which accepts, and even desires, repression.

However, it is important that we not develop too functionalist an understanding of micropolitics. Micropolitics is not simply the act of producing and organizing subjects in ways that maintain entrenched power structures. If we understand micropolitical power solely as organized by, or even originating from, macropolitical centers (such as the state or the capitalist economy), then we have missed the point entirely. Though macropolitical imperatives such as state or economic necessity are not absent, local formations (the organization of the neighborhood, the household, the office) are just as likely to play a key role in the constitution of political subjects. Micropolitics involves a vast and complex web of forces, too diffuse to be rooted in any centralized organizations and deeply responsive to the particularities of local situations. Sometimes this web of micropolitical flows conjugates in ways that shore up large-scale structures of administration and organization. Other times they connect in such as way as to produce what Deleuze and Guattari call "lines of flight," which leak out around the large-scale aggregations and power centers of macropolitical formations. In this regard, micropolitics is as much a theory of how macropolitical formations hang together as how they fall apart.

Collective Identity

From the perspective of micropolitics, most forms of political analysis simply assume what is to be explained: namely, how it is that countless diverse individuals can come together to act in an orderly manner and think of themselves as bearing some form of collective identity. Where a macropolitics perspective accounts for identity in terms of large aggregations, a micropolitics view studies a field of infinitely varied individuals, who can sometimes come to circulate around certain forms of collective identity. For example, where some forms of macropolitical analysis see the binary duality of *classes* (bourgeoisie/proletariat) held together by inherent connections of economic interests, micropolitical analysis instead see a complex and varied *mass*. This mass contains butchers, bakers, and candlestick makers (as well as artists, the unemployed, intellectuals), each of whom has multiple ways of conceiving of their economic interests (immediate interests versus aspirational interests), as well as multiple forms of noneconomic interests (familial, national, religious). This *mass* of individuals (each a mass of possible interests and identifications) will only crystallize into the unitary identity of *class* if specific micropolitical processes are present: processes of subjectivity formation that will highlight some forms of interest over others; deployment of affective attachments and identifications that might have their source in religious or nationalistic drives. These macropolitical aggregates will be held together by a shifting multiplicity of different micropolitical forces. At times this broad segmentation into classes will remain stable. But the masses of individuals underneath will continue to flow and shift, occasionally leaking out and around these identities, potentially connecting in unexpected ways to produce new, unanticipated identities.

Micropolitics and Scope

It should also be noted that what makes micropolitics "micro" is not the scope of its effects, but the singularity or locality of the web of forces that produce those effects. Micropolitical effects can be

conterminous with the entire social field. Take the question of the economic sphere. To explain the functioning of the economy, researchers must of course take into consideration the actions and decisions of macropolitical actors such as states, central banks, and corporations. However, we must also consider the vast and complex movements of the stock market: flows of capital that are driven by countless decisions made at the level of the individual, each produced by a singular and local convergence of micropolitical forces of desire, fear, belief, and attraction (rooted in everything from a sense of familial responsibility to the fever pitch of business reporting on the news). The confluence of these individual decisions (themselves rooted in preindividual forces) will produce systemwide effects—the surges, panics, booms, and busts—which will determine economic possibility.

Simon Glezos

See also Biopolitics; Foucault, Michel; Multiplicity; Subject

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Mill, John Stuart (1806–1873)

John Stuart Mill was a major philosopher who made contributions to many areas of philosophy, including moral and political theory. He was the eldest son of James Mill, who held a senior administrative position in the East India Company, which looked after the affairs of British India. James Mill was a close friend and disciple of Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the doctrine of utilitarianism. According to utilitarianism, the rightness of an act depends on whether, among all the available alternatives, it maximizes the happiness of those affected by it. Utilitarians take into account the various dimensions of happiness, such as its intensity, duration, and the number of people affected.

John Stuart Mill was educated at home by his father, who subjected the young Mill to an intense and wide learning process. Mill made remarkable achievements at an early age. He was appointed to a position in the East India Company, where he worked for 35 years, rising to the top position of examiner. He found time to write many of his works while he was in the service of the company. His recovery from a mental breakdown at age 20 led him to develop new interests and to be open to new influences. He developed a close but platonic friendship with Harriet Taylor, the wife of a merchant. Two years after the death of Harriet's husband, Mill and Harriet were married. They were dogged by bad health, and about 7 years later, Harriet died. Mill continued to write prolifically. He was elected to the House of Commons and served for one term. He unsuccessfully tried to pass a motion giving women the vote. The enfranchisement of women was a cause very close to both Mill's and Harriet's hearts. Mill died in Avignon, France, where he and his stepdaughter, Helen Taylor, had spent much time close to the grave of Harriet. He was buried there next to Harriet.

Liberty

The love of liberty, anxiety about its current state, and fear for its future dominated Mill's political theory. For him, a free and tolerant society was essential for people to realize their individualities and to attain what he called "the dignity of thinking beings." The essay *On Liberty,* published in 1859, is rightly considered to be his major work in political theory. He warns against the "tyranny of the majority" in a democracy. The tyranny would find expression in oppressive laws and organized public opinion. The majority, with a uniform set of values and preferences, would be intolerant of conduct that they disliked or disapproved of. Mill argues that coercive interference with the conduct of individuals is never justified for a moralistic

reason, that such conduct violates what the majority regards as the correct moral standards, or for a paternalistic reason, that interference promotes the individual's own good. The only proper basis for interference is to prevent harm to others without their consent, although Mill also seems to allow for interference with acts that are public offensive nuisances, such as perhaps public sexual intercourse, that do not harm others in any ordinary sense. However, his remarks on such publicly offensive acts are passing, and he does not think that they bear on the central issue of liberty. Although he would certainly reject mere offense as a basis for interference, there is an important issue, which he does not discuss, as to when public offensive acts, which unavoidably intrude on people's daily activities, may be interfered with.

The central reason for interference with individual conduct which Mill rules out as improper is moralistic. His examples include the prohibition of the eating of pork by Muslims when they are in the majority and the prohibition of Sunday trading by Christians. Majority disapproval of a form of conduct, however genuine or intense, is never a good reason for interference. Appeals to purely religious reasons, such as that the conduct in question is "forbidden and abhorred by the deity," are never justified. Instead, it has to be shown that the conduct harms others without their consent. Even then, the harm of the conduct must be weighed against any harm resulting from the interference. But there is no case for such balancing when the conduct is merely disliked or disapproved of. From this it is clear that Mill would not regard the mere fact that an act violates the moral values of someone else, even when these values are shared by the community at large, as a relevant harm. However, it is a different matter if, for example, it can be shown, as some have argued, that unchecked violations of a society's shared values would lead to a distinct harm, such as the breakdown of law and order. Mill's intention is to revise the whole framework within which issues of individual liberty are discussed. Enlightened people might agree with him that, where the majority's values are mistaken, they should not be imposed on all. But Mill points out that even enlightened people go wrong in merely wanting to replace the majority's values with their own better values. The correct framework is one in which, in the absence of harm to others, individuals should be allowed to engage in conduct that goes against the majority's values, whether or not they are enlightened.

Mill also excludes paternalistic reasons for interference with individual conduct. The fact that a person's conduct is imprudent, or that it harms himself, is never a good reason to forcibly stop it. This is the case when the person is aware that the conduct is harmful and yet chooses to proceed with it. But Mill gives the example of a public official forcibly stopping an ignorant person from crossing an unsafe bridge. Interference is justified when there is no time to warn him of the likely and unwanted harm if he crosses the bridge. A distinction is sometimes made between weak or soft paternalism and strong or hard paternalism. The former permits interference only when the person's decision to act in a self-harming manner is encumbered in some way, such as in the case of the bridge example when the person is uninformed about the consequences of the act. The probability or certainty of the harm is not in itself a good or sufficient reason for interference, in the absence of the encumbrance. On the other hand, strong or hard paternalism justifies interference even when there is no encumbrance, provided that the likely harm is serious enough. Mill is against strong or hard paternalism, but his bridge example shows that he favors at least some version of weak or soft paternalism.

Mill's view on the proper basis of social intervention is often formulated in terms of a distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding conduct. It is said that he defends the absolute freedom to engage in self-regarding conduct, while he allows for interference with other-regarding conduct when the balance of costs and benefits of such interference is better than that of noninterference. The area of self-regarding conduct is then identified as conduct that does not affect others, or which does not adversely affect them. This account of Mill's view has led to the objection that we are not isolated individuals but live in human societies and, except for the most trivial forms of conduct, all our actions will affect others in some way. The class of self-regarding conduct is therefore practically empty. But the objection is misplaced. Mill clearly acknowledges that all conduct in society can affect others. He wants to rule out certain kinds of effects as irrelevant for the purpose of

interference. It is best to formulate his view in terms of a distinction between relevant or good reasons for interference and irrelevant or bad reasons for interference. The absoluteness applies to his claim that moralistic and paternalistic reasons for interference are always or absolutely ruled out as irrelevant, whereas harm to others is always a good reason for interference. The alternative account, in terms of different areas of conduct, with the self-regarding area to be kept absolutely free of intervention, runs into the difficulty that an area of conduct, identified in general terms, can have different effects in different circumstances. One cannot rule out in advance that a type of conduct, which is normally harmless, could in certain circumstances be harmful. Consider Mill's examples of drunkenness in private as opposed to a policeman being drunk on duty. In the latter case, the policeman would be unable to perform his duty properly, whereas the private citizen, drunk at home, would not be in similar breach of duty. But as some have pointed out, if a high proportion of the population are drunk at home at the same time, there could be serious harm caused by the inability to respond to an unexpected emergency. It is a different matter, however, to justify interference with private drunkenness simply because the majority disapproves of mere drunkenness, even when there is no harm.

For Mill, a free society must have freedom of thought and discussion, as well as freedom of action. Such a society provides a social environment in which individuals can reliably form their opinions, and, where appropriate, act in accordance with them. Part of the justification for freedom of discussion is that it exposes and eliminates error and thereby facilitates the discovery of true beliefs. In the absence of discussion, and in the presence of censorship, we can never be sure that the received opinion is true, or partly true. The truth may lie wholly or partly with the suppressed opinion. However, Mill does not treat freedom of discussion simply as a truth-tracking device, effective as it may be. It is even more important for him that people should not hold on to their beliefs, even if true, in a dogmatic manner, with little or no understanding of their meaning and the grounds supporting them. Truth should be held as a living truth, sensitive to the available considerations that count for or against it, rather than as a dead dogma, which does not properly influence conduct. Mill sees intellectual progress not simply in the replacement of false by true views but also in the way in which we seek the truth, arrive at our cherished beliefs, and hold on to them. "Knowing the truth" is the ultimate goal. Those with this aim are willing to subject their views to argument and evidence and are willing to modify or reject them when the evidence or argument goes against them.

Mill's case for freedom in society extends beyond freedom of discussion to freedom to act in accordance with one's fundamental beliefs and values when these do not cause harm to others. He attacks the role of custom in directing people to uncritically accept or reject ways of life. Customs are bad when they limit people's conceptions of permissible or worthwhile human lives without their reflecting on or considering alternatives. Mill believes that because people's personalities and potential interests are so diverse, there is no one way of life that suits all persons. If there were, the distinctive human faculties of choice, judgment, and discrimination would not be exercised in the blind acceptance of customs, or in the imposition of one way of life on all. It is when individuals exercise choice that they realize their individualities. A society in which individuals are free, both in thought and in action, to explore and to conduct "experiments in living" without harming others would be a rich and diverse society. Each person would be autonomous in choosing a worthwhile life in accordance with his or her own values, influenced but not coerced by discussion with others and by the examples they set.

Mill's Utilitarianism

Mill was brought up to be a utilitarian, and the version of utilitarianism that he knew in his youth was Bentham's: seeking to maximize happiness. Happiness was construed in hedonistic terms as pleasure and the absence of pain, or where both were present, as a balance of pleasure over pain. This provided a basis for social reform through an attack on social institutions that were not conducive to the maximization of happiness. Until he was 20, Mill remained faithful to Benthamite utilitarianism. Then he had a mental breakdown and a period of depression. He discovered that he would not be personally happy even if all the

social reforms he had advocated were realized. During the process of his recovery and after that, he was open to new influences and became critical of aspects of Bentham's doctrine. Although he always considered himself a utilitarian, the version he subsequently developed emphasized qualitative, as opposed to mere quantitative, differences in happiness.

In his essay *Utilitarianism,* he famously declared that a human being dissatisfied was better than a pig satisfied. The qualitatively superior pleasures are those involving the exercise of distinctive human faculties. Mill uses the choice of competent people as the criterion of the higher pleasures. If those who are familiar with both pleasures agree that one is better than the other, then that indeed is the higher pleasure. Mill regards the intellectual pleasures as higher than purely sensory pleasures.

This helps to explain the high value that he places on the development of individuality. A person who has individuality would be enjoying the higher pleasures as he or she would be exercising the distinctive human faculties. Those with individuality act autonomously in choosing appropriate ways of life for themselves, rather than simply and unreflectively following custom. Mill claims that his case for individual liberty rests on utilitarian grounds, although he construes utility in a different sense from Bentham's. What he wants to avoid is not only a defense of liberty as a natural right but also one that relies on Benthamite utilitarianism, appealing to a purely quantitative notion of happiness. It would then be hard to explain why the majority's deep displeasure with the unorthodox and custom-defying conduct of individuals should be discounted, in the way that he obviously wants to. Unlike a Benthamite utilitarian, Mill does not regard liberty as a mere means to happiness, replaceable, where appropriate, by alternative means. Instead, for him the exercise of liberty in making considered choices between lifestyles and acts is partly constitutive of having individuality. Developing one's individuality is Mill's conception of a good life. Unlike other conceptions, individuality is not identified with a single substantive way of life, such as that of a person living in accordance with the details of a specific religion, or an unworldly scholar forsaking the pleasures of the outside world for the solitude of the library, or a happy and prolific parent devoted to the upbringing and friendship of children. People's autonomous choices are likely to lead them to a diversity of individual lifestyles, each one suited to a particular person but none suited to all.

Given that an environment of freedom produces diverse expressions of individuality, as well as some mechanical and unthinking conformity with custom, there is the political issue of whether one person's individuality, or freedom, can be traded off against that of another's in order to bring about the maximum development of individuality. In other words, is individuality a goal that ought to be maximized? It is a feature of Bentham's goal of maximizing happiness that it is permissible to trade off the happiness of one person in order to further the greater happiness of others. If the majority is made happier by suppressing the liberties of a small minority, then such suppression is justified from the Benthamite perspective. But in setting harm to others as the threshold to be crossed before there can be social and political interference with the conduct of individuals, Mill effectively prohibits such trade-offs. Each and every individual has the liberty to develop her individuality, or not to do so, independently of whether or not such development, or its failure, contributes to the maximization of aggregate individuality.

Individual liberty here amounts to a right. This appeal to a right to individuality seems to be an appropriate formulation of the role of individuality in his defense of liberty. My rights are often understood as setting limits on what others may do in order to promote good ends. Thus if I have a right to life, then unless I have forfeited it by, for example, threatening the innocent lives of others, I may not be deliberately killed in order to save more lives. Saving lives is a good end, but it should not normally be pursued by violating the rights of others. Depending on the strength of the right, there may, however, be some situations in which its violation is justified, such as, for example, in order to avoid a major disaster. But violations of a right are not justified just because there is a slight balance of good consequences over bad in doing so. Some indirect utilitarians would defend such rights by arguing that sometimes the best way to promote a desirable end is not to aim at it directly and consciously, but rather to conform to certain useful rights that are generally productive of the best consequences. For example, those who seek

happiness might be well-advised to seek it indirectly by engaging in various activities spontaneously and for their own sakes. They might in the long run find greater happiness by adopting such an indirect strategy. Whether or not Mill embraces some version of indirect utilitarianism in his defense of individual liberty is a matter of debate. It is at least compatible with one of the lessons he learned in recovering from his mental breakdown. He then realized that happiness is better achieved by seeking other things as ends in themselves.

So for Mill, the liberty of individuals should not be curtailed even in the cases of those who, when given the opportunity to develop their individualities, repudiate it and instead voluntarily submit themselves to the direction of customary practices. Although Mill once quoted with approval the remark, "Some men are wise, some are otherwise," he does not, in *On Liberty,* confer power on the wise to impose their opinions and values on others. Such coercion by the majority is unjustified. But it is also unjustified when it is imposed by the minority with more enlightened views. Coercion is incompatible with the development of individuality, which requires free choice as a crucial condition. It is also corrupting to the wise. But the wise have the freedom to point to new and better ways of life. Indeed, they have the obligation to help others to improve by advising and persuading them.

Representative Government

Although Mill was fearful of the tyranny of the majority, in his essay *Considerations on Representative Government,* he argues for some form of democracy or representative government. In large communities it would not be practicable for all citizens to participate directly in the affairs of the state. Some form of representative government is necessary, which leaves ultimate sovereignty in the hands of citizens. Citizens would still be able to participate directly in some public affairs, such as by service on juries, and of course in the exercise of the vote. Democracy is best for his society at the time. A good government is one that is adapted to the capacities of its people, while at the same time also helping them to improve their capacities. Despotism, even when it is benevolent, is bad because it is not conducive to the moral and intellectual development of a people. In a despotism, it is only the despot who is actively engaged in politics, while the people remain mentally passive. Political participation has educational effects in that it enlarges the interests of citizens. Democracy is best because it allows for the widest participation. One needs the franchise to participate, and so Mill seeks to extend the rather restricted franchise of his day to include women and the working class. He does not go so far as to propose its extension to all adults because he believes that there are certain minimal requirements to be met. The first seems to be a competence test, which excludes the illiterate and the innumerate, unable to do simple arithmetic. Those who do not pay taxes, and those who receive parish relief, should also be denied the vote because they might use it to extract money through taxes from others, without any cost to themselves.

But the suggested restrictions seem unjustified, given Mill's belief that a crucial aspect of political participation is that it promotes the intellectual and moral education of citizens. The uneducated are incompetent in certain respects, but they are not necessarily incompetent to make certain political decisions when the facts are presented to them. They may well have greater moral strengths than some of the educated. If Mill is right, then political participation can also improve their general competence and capacities. The same considerations also apply, perhaps to an even greater degree, to those who are not taxpayers.

In *On Liberty,* Mill states that his case for liberty applies only to human beings with mature faculties, and not to children. It also does not apply to "backward" societies in which a paternalistic despotism would be appropriate. His doctrine of liberty is relevant only when people have the capacity to benefit from free and equal discussion. In societies that have reached the relevant stage of development, it looks as if no further distinction is made between adults belonging to different social groups as far as the stated capacity is concerned. The denial of the vote to some of them therefore deprives them of the improvement of which they are capable.

Mill argues strongly for allowing women and the working class to vote. Apart from the educational effects of political participation, he thinks that only those who have the vote have the means to effectively protect their own interests. They

cannot rely on others to do so, not because others are narrowly self-interested, but because others do not share their perspectives of where their true interests lie. Even well-meaning employers, whose circumstances are very different, might not understand the plight of ordinary workers who go on strike for better conditions. Nor would even loving husbands or adult sons understand the point of view of women confined to childbearing and to looking after the home. Mill's exclusion of certain groups from receiving the vote can perhaps be partly justified if they do not in fact have distinctive interests different from those of the groups with the franchise. But it seems most unlikely that, for example, the interests of very poor non-taxpayers are duplicated by those of taxpayers, although Mill seems to think that all manual laborers have similar interests.

There remains the question of whether giving the vote to non-taxpayers hands them a license to act selfishly in taxing others indiscriminately. Here Mill's other proposals are relevant in eliminating, or at least severely limiting, the extent to which one group can pursue its own interests at the expense of the rest.

Mill believes in giving plural votes to the "instructed minority." According to him, democracy does not require that the votes of all citizens should have the same weight. The more intelligent voter should be given two or more votes. In the absence of a reliable national system of examination that picks out those with superior mental ability, Mill maintains that a person's occupation can be used as an indicator of superior mental ability, such as being a banker, merchant, or manufacturer, or being a member of the liberal professions. He also suggests relying on whether or not people have passed major examinations, such as their being university graduates. He places a safeguard against the abuse of power by those with plural votes by ensuring that their combined votes should not outweigh the total votes of others. Mill thinks that with plural votes there would be greater diversity of views in parliament, thereby enhancing discussion, the pursuit of truth, and social progress.

For similar reasons, he favors proportional representation. To be elected to parliament, each candidate must have a certain quota of votes. Voters can choose from the whole gamut of candidates in the country. Each voter expresses several preferences. Once a candidate has received the required quota, other voters who have voted for him will have their second preference counted, and so on. In this way candidates with enough support scattered throughout the country, rather than concentrated in one locality, can still be elected. This is likely to ensure greater talent, as a voter has a choice from the whole country and is not limited by what is offered in "the local market."

Mill believes that parliament should serve as a forum for discussion of ideas, while the technical aspects of legislation and administration can be left to an expert body of professionals who are ultimately responsible to elected members of parliament. The presence of the instructed minority in parliament, and the greater weight given to their votes, enable unpopular views to be heard and to have influence in challenging prevailing views. Mill believes that ideas are crucial to social progress, and the instructed would have great authority if they are united. The social power of those with ideas and convictions is much greater than the power of those who are motivated solely by interests. To be most effective, the instructed should exercise their own judgments and express their own views on the issues they discuss, rather than being bound by pledges to vote in conformity with the views of those who voted for them. Mill also opposes secret ballots. For him a parliamentary vote is a public duty to be exercised with accountability. Members of Parliament should promote the common good and not their personal or class interests.

We can see how Mill's proposals reflect his account of good government. Adapting to prevailing social circumstances involves giving recognition to the inequalities of educational qualifications and intellectual capacities of different groups. At the same time, good government must provide opportunities for people to improve their capacities. The extension of the franchise gives greater protection to groups with different interests from socially more favored ones. It also enables groups, whose current circumstances are somewhat confining, to extend their perspectives and interests.

Women and Personal Independence

In the case of women, receiving the franchise is only part of what is required for them to be treated

equally with men. In *The Subjection of Women,* Mill argues that the current marriage institution subordinates wives to their husbands, making them the equivalent of slaves. Such "marital slavery" deprives the relationship of husband and wife of "marital friendship," which can only be realized when there is equality between them.

Women are also unjustly denied entry to the professions and to educational institutions. They lack "personal independence," which is "an element of happiness." They often enter into unequal marriage relations because there are no better options. Without equal opportunities, women's achievements would not match those of men. The current differences between men and women are regarded as "natural," when in fact they are the products of social circumstances. Until men and women have equal opportunities, Mill believes, we will not know the nature of women. And until then, the relationship between men and women will continue to be marred by false and untested perceptions.

Just as Mill argues for personal independence for women, he also believes that workers need to be given a degree of independence in the arrangements of their working lives. In *The Principles of Political Economy,* he maintains that some cooperative partnership between workers and capitalists, involving the sharing of profits, would be better than the current relationship of dependence of workers on capitalists. But an association of workers themselves, with unequal wages for different types of contribution, would be even better.

Mill was critical of existing property arrangements and the vast inequalities they generated. In his posthumously published "Chapters on Socialism," he is sympathetic to a version of socialism, but he rejects as disastrous the alternative offered by revolutionary socialists of forcibly taking over private property. The present system of private property has many possibilities for peaceful improvement. One change is a decentralized form of socialism, which starts off in small units of villages or townships and is extended, if it proves successful, to other similar small units. However, he thinks that at the level of management, and given current human motivations, a capitalist system, which allows managers to keep all the profits derived from successful management, might be better. He does not offer a final verdict on the overall superiority of one system to the other. Instead, he maintains that, with the present intellectual and moral capacities of people, some system of private property needs to be maintained, but not the current flawed version.

Mill claims that, whereas "backward" countries need increases in production, advanced societies need better distribution. He looks forward eventually to "a stationary society" in which there is a high level of material prosperity for all, and people will focus on nonmaterial improvements in social life. Among the benefits of such a society would be the enjoyment of the "beauty and grandeur" of nature. Presumably, the society will also be truly free.

C. L. Ten

See also Bentham, Jeremy; Liberalism; Liberty; Methodological Individualism

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MILLENARIANISM

Millenarianism, millennialism, or chiliasm refers to a set of ideas that has its origins in the Christian New Testament book of Revelation 20, a passage that declares a messianic reign on earth for a thousand years (hence the term, influenced by both Latin and Greek words for a thousand). The literal expectation of a period of 1,000 years tends to be ignored in most expressions of the belief, even though some modern biblical literalists down the centuries have hung onto it. For example, 2 Esdras 7:28, a text that is roughly contemporary with the book of Revelation, has a messianic period of 400 years. In the book of Revelation, the millennium is not the final goal of the divine purposes, which takes place when the New Jerusalem comes down from heaven to earth, and there are new heavens and a new earth (Isaiah 65:17 and 66:22). This belief is sometimes combined with the millennium (e.g., in some Fifth Monarchy texts of seventeenth-century England and perhaps also in the work of Joachim of Fiore). In the book of Revelation it should be noted that the millennium is depicted as a time of perfection when humanity is not subject to the ravages of evil. The coming of the millennium would be preceded by anxiety and disaster, so human history is not a gradual process of improvement of conditions in the world (what is often described as the postmillennial position). The Last Things are linked with the First Things as the new age is seen as the Garden of Eden, in which there would be the removal of sin and the causes of sin.

What is distinctive about belief in a millennium is that it is very much "this worldly"; this feature has pervaded discussions in both religious and secular contexts.

The discussion of the millennium in this entry is based on Jewish and Christian sources rather than on similar kinds of understandings in other religions, but this background offers an important heuristic category with which one might approach such phenomena in other religions. There are overlaps between millenarianism and utopianism. The origin of the latter, however, is from Plato though it was given its "utopian" formulation by Thomas More in his book of that name. Such secular evocations of a future age of perfection were common in the modern period, when the intertwining with the Christian tradition took place.

Also important for the study of millennialism are those strands within the New Testament that exhibit an outlook investing present persons and events with a decisive role in the fulfillment of what Norman Cohn terms "the pursuit of the millennium," that is, bringing the new age about by human action rather than leaving it to some kind of divine intervention. So, the present becomes a moment of opportunity for transforming the imperfect into the perfect; history and eschatology become inextricably intertwined; and those who have been privileged to stand on the brink of the new age believe they enjoy a role in history. 1 Corinthians 10:11 is typical in speaking of Christians as the "ones on whom the ends of the ages have come." The present is marked by an awareness that a unique fulcrum in history has been, or is about to be, tipped.

It is with regard to a "this worldly" eschatology that sociologists have used the term, thereby reflecting the widespread "this worldly" eschatology of fringe groups in Christian history who have held the belief. Sociologists consider that people with millennial hopes are often desperate and alienated and that millenarian movements, whether in Christianity or in other religions, all look forward to an imminent reversal of political arrangements in this age, so that the downtrodden (among whom are the holders of the millenarian beliefs) either become the leaders in the new age or have a share in a quality of life denied to them in the old age. Examples of such millenarianism exist, but the general sociological theory is too simple. People have been attracted to millenarianism for a wide variety of reasons. For example, Christian radicalism has often appealed to educated but disaffected intellectuals such as Thomas Muentzer in Germany.

Karl Mannheim's discussion of the "chiliastic mentality" in *Ideology and Utopia* (1929) illuminates this kind of thought and action, as he uses the "chiliasm of the Anabaptists" and other events of the sixteenth century. Of significance for

Mannheim was the moment when apocalyptic hope, with a millenarian hue, was fused with the demands of the oppressed strata of society. It is a necessary reminder of the way in which apocalyptic symbol, and social and political movements together, may make a potent mix of social revolt. Mannheim describes the characteristics of those who actualize the apocalyptic and eschatological texts as those who typify what he terms "the chiliastic mentality." He describes the heart of his understanding as the moment the eschatological hope interferes with the world and conditions historical events. Acting on such beliefs disrupts patterns of behavior and relating, which is exactly what we find in some parts of earliest Christianity. What is more, time is, in some sense, hallowed, as the present becomes a particular, propitious moment. Whereas Mannheim makes great play of the fact that this way of linking the millennial and political action is a feature of the modern period, it echoes themes from the New Testament, wherein characters such as Jesus and Paul were not just interpreters of sacred texts or prognosticators of the fulfillment of their promises, but they live out the promises, and they believe themselves dwelling in the midst of the fulfillment of these promises and so act accordingly.

Christopher Rowland

See also Apocalyptic Ideas; Utopianism

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Mirror of Princes' Genre

Mirrors of princes are advice literature, outlining basic principles of rulerly conduct and of the structure and purpose of secular power, often in relation to either a transcendental source of power or abstract legal norms. Such texts were as popular in the Latin West as in the Islamic world, or Byzantium. In the Islamic world, an emphasis on pragmatic guidance, on the administrative and procedural aspects of governance, while stressing the role as moral exemplars of those holding power, prevailed: Mirrors of princes were, to a greater degree than in the West, manuals of effective governance. They consequently encompassed a wider range of themes and sources, and their influence on Western thought becomes clearly visible in works from the thirteenth century onward. Islamic mirrors also drew on a variety of pre-Islamic traditions and, with their often strictly regional focus, similarly foreshadowed later developments in the West. Byzantine literature, with its emphasis on one hand on collections of maxims and examples, and, on the other, individualized advice to specific rulers, reflected the situation in Western Europe for much of the tenth through the thirteenth century and drew on similar sources of antique and early church thinking about power.

In the West, mirrors emerged with the acceptance of Christianity as official religion in the fourth century and include, for instance, book 5 of St. Augustine's *Two Cities* (c. 410), which linked the office of emperor to the maintenance of a moral society, and sought to exemplify the duties of royal lordship and the responsibility of the ruler for the moral welfare of his subjects. It has to be read alongside Pope Gregory I's *Pastoral Care* (c. 590): Though centered on the role of bishops, rather than secular lords, the emphasis in *Pastoral Care* on humility as a key virtue of those holding worldly power, on the moral temptations of secular might, and on the need to provide moral leadership by example made it a key reference point for future writers.

A series of writings produced in seventh-century Iberia and Ireland were also influential, foremost among them Isidore of Seville's *Etymologies* (c. 630), which contains a classic definition of royal power: *rex a rectum agere* (the word *king* derives

from acting righteously) and *non regit qui non corrigit* (he does not rule who does not correct). This definition formed the basis for most medieval thinking about kingship. A widely copied treatise on virtues and vices by the so-called Pseudo-Cyprianus (c. 690), an otherwise unknown Irish writer, established a clear link between moral and political authority and explained how the personal moral shortcomings of individual rulers influenced the fortunes of their people. This extended to royal responsibility for floods, famines, and foreign invasions (as divine punishment for a ruler's failure to abide by a strict moral code). In the eighth century, *De Institutione Regia* (On the Royal Office) by Jonas of Orleans (c. 831), centering on the *communitas* (community) of the faithful and drawing on Isidore and Pseudo-Cyprianus, offered a clear distinction between the tyrant and the just ruler in relation to their engagement with the moral imperatives of a Christian community. During the period from the tenth to the early thirteenth century, few mirrors were written. Instead, political theories were formulated in historical writings, often aimed at royal patrons and designed to offer a series of models of respectively good and bad political behavior. The so-called coronation *ordines* (orders), accounts of the liturgy celebrated during a ruler's coronation, and a rich genre of advice literature emerged, normally in the form of letters.

Mirrors of princes experienced a revival in the twelfth century, most famously in John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* (c. 1159), which applied classical concepts of the organological structure of society (the realm resembling a body) and which, for the first time, discussed the right to resistance (the murder of tyrants), but which was still deeply rooted in familiar models of royal power. The same is true of texts like Godfrey of Viterbo's *Speculum Regum* (Mirror of Kings) of circa 1180–1183, Helinand of Froidmont's *De regimine principum* (On the Government of Princes) of circa 1200, and Gerald of Wales' *De Principis Instructione Liber* (Book on the Education of a Prince) of circa 1217. It was the beginning reception of Aristotle in the thirteenth century, however, that profoundly transformed theoretical writings about kingship. Much of this revival centered on the court of Louis IX of France, with Gilbert of Tournai's *Eruditio principum et Regum* (Education of Princes and Kings) and Vincent of Beauvais' *De morali principis instructione* (On the Moral Education of a Prince), both circa 1259. The Aristotelian influence, mediated via translations of a different Islamic tradition of kings' mirrors (including the pseudo-Aristotelian *Secretum Secretorum*), became apparent not so much in the content of these texts as in their structure and presentation (which became more thematic and abstract, drawing less on historical, biblical, or exegetical precedent). This changed with the two perhaps most famous examples of the genre, Thomas Aquinas's *De regimine principum* (c. 1255) and the eponymous work by Giles of Rome (c. 1277–1279), which became the most widely copied mirror of the Middle Ages. These texts combined established thinking with references to natural and feudal law, elaborated the right of resistance, and stressed the responsibility of the ruler to work for the common good. The increasing 'national' focus of these texts (commissioned by or written for specific rulers, rather than as general academic treatises) led to a flowering of vernacular texts from the thirteenth century, with either translations of Giles' text or independent works appearing in Old Norse (c. 1255), Castilian (1292–1293), or Catalan (1327–1330). This also corresponded to a desacralization of theoretical writing, which drew increasingly on Roman law (rather than theology), fed into the humanist writings of Petrarch (1382), and aimed at rulers of smaller territorial entities such as Austria, Hainault, Brabant, Holland, and Florence. The Western tradition of mirrors laid the foundations for later Renaissance theories of politics and political theory, and thus for modern political science.

Bjorn Weiler

See also Body Politic; Counsel; Hierocratic Arguments

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Modernization Theory

Modernization theory denotes a diverse body of literature on development produced by a group of economists, political scientists, and sociologists during the 1950s and 1960s. A simple dichotomous concept lay at the core of the paradigm. Human societies were either traditional or modern. With the history of Western industrialization as a benchmark, these theorists defined a modern society as a technical, cosmopolitan, secular, and dynamic entity able to control nature and expand scientific knowledge. Most importantly, modernity required the rationalization of authority, a complex division of labor with a differentiated yet interdependent structure, and mass political participation. In contrast, traditional societies lacked these features. With simple economic and social structures, traditional groups looked inward, resisted change, remained passive toward nature, and maintained parochial political systems. This crude dichotomy served as the unifying conceptual framework for the modernization paradigm.

Modernization scholars conflated an explanatory theory of prior Western development with a prescriptive theory aimed at transitioning recently independent, poor, traditional countries into modern industrial states. Deeply influenced by the behavioral revolution in social science, leaders of the modernization research program emphasized the use of empirical methods to uncover the laws that governed this transitional development process. The theory assumed that modernization was a global phenomenon in which diverse postcolonial traditional societies would irreversibly converge around a universal form of modern society. This Western model exhibited certain components and historical phases that applied to any society without reference to specific culture or geography. Because all societies moved through the same lengthy stages, modernization theorists formulated a systematic blueprint to rapidly accelerate this development process through state intervention and advanced technical knowledge. At the zenith of its influence during the cold war, the paradigm provided the most explicit and scientific plan for reshaping developing nations into modern states.

The Origins, Development, and Zenith of the Modernization Paradigm

The modernization paradigm originated as a new type of sociological theory to frame the ongoing changes among a burgeoning number of postcolonial nations in the years immediately after World War II. At the vanguard of this movement, Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, and Marion Levy drew heavily from Émile Durkheim's classic study of industrial society and Max Weber's iconic conception of modernity to pioneer a holistic approach to development. They argued that the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy involved a fundamental transformation of the entire social structure. With a myopic focus on economic policy in postcolonial countries, these theorists ignored the inseparable links between these agrarian societies and their traditional cultures, social structures, and political institutions. Given these links, the introduction of new technology into a peasant society would not automatically engender industry. Rather, the growth of an industrial economy required that the entire nation morph into a modern society. These sociologists therefore set out to construct a grand theory that would explain this process.

In *Toward a General Theory of Action,* Parsons and Shils established the conceptual and analytic core of the fledgling paradigm. Their sociological theory asserted two basic assumptions. First, a society represented the integration and interaction of individual, social, and cultural subsystems. A proper combination of systems produced a stable society in a state of static equilibrium. Second, individual behavior explained the operation of these systems, and groups of individuals held cultural values that influenced their actions. Parson and Shils defined these collective values as "dichotomous pattern variables" in order to construct two polar ideal types corresponding to "traditional" and "modern" societies. Development therefore involved the movement from traditional to modern values, along with a necessary transformation of individual and social subsystems. This transitional challenge, conceptual dichotomy, and functional mode of analysis anchored the ensuing array of modernization theory research.

Levy pioneered the application of Parsonian social theory to comparative political analysis and advanced several key propositions of modernization

theory. In *The Structure of Society,* Levy joined an updated version of the conceptual dichotomy with a functional approach to abstract the United States and Western Europe as archetypes of advanced modernity. Although the Soviet Union was also a modern state, it connoted a pathological deviation from the healthy capitalist path of Western liberalism. All other countries wallowed in various stages of underdevelopment in the residual traditional category. Though he considered modernization a holistic process, Levy viewed the primary problem as the maintenance of order and social control during the transitional period of modernization, while also steering these countries away from the unhealthy path represented by the Soviet Union. The state therefore had to lead the development process to keep a lid on disequilibrium. Backward traditional societies required the intervention of a highly centralized, powerful, and often authoritarian state. Consequently, Levy introduced the proposition, later picked up by Walt Rostow, that the bridge toward modernity need not necessarily be democratic. However, with proper assistance from the United States, the end point of transition would eventually be liberal democracy.

Modernization theory became the dominant paradigm of political development studies in the 1950s and early 1960s under Gabriel Almond's leadership of the Committee on Comparative Politics. In an important strategic move, the members of the Committee on Comparative Politics adopted a modified version of the Parsonian traditional–modern dichotomy stripped of explicit references to Western civilization. Although modernity was still based on the history of the United States and Western Europe, these assumptions were now implicitly buried within the concept. The modern polity was simply a democratic Keynesian welfare state. The redefined framework positioned the modernization paradigm as the lodestar for political development among academics and political elites. Within the academy, the new dichotomy unified the various area studies research programs under the leadership of the modernization theorists. A variety of scholars began to marshal empirical evidence to measure how close each developing country came to resembling the archetype of global modernity. In the context of the cold war, the theory became attractive to both American and postcolonial elites who wanted clear and justifiable plans for modern development devoid of blatant ethnocentricity. By the time the Committee on Comparative Politics held its last formative meeting in 1959, modernization theory had established itself as the core locus for development studies.

The modernization paradigm reached its apogee in 1960 with Almond's formative introduction to *The Politics of Developing Areas,* a book that he coedited with Coleman. Invoking a modified version of functionalism, Almond defined a system as a comprehensive, interdependent, and demarcated unit that integrates all actions and structures within a whole, so change in one subsystem produces consequent changes in all other parts. However, in a departure from Parsons and Levy, Almond shifted the focus toward the political subsystem. He posited that all political systems perform the same basic functions, processing *inputs,* such as interest articulation and public demands on services, and producing *outputs* in the form of rules, public goods, and conflict resolution. Thus, the concept of a political system applied to all independent societies regardless of geography, culture, or time. However, the structures that perform these universal functions varied according to the degree and form of specialization. With the American constitutional system implicitly at the apex of structural development, Almond defined modern structures as highly complex and differentiated, whereas traditional structures remained simple and underdeveloped. By establishing comparative politics as the systematic study of these structures, Almond effectively expanded the boundaries of the discipline to encompass the globe.

Social and Material Exemplars of the Paradigm

The modernization research program produced two principle strands of theory. Sociocultural theorists, exemplified by Daniel Lerner and Karl Deutsch, generally explained modernization from a series of variables and mechanisms rooted in cultural values and behavior. In contrast, more materialist scholars accepted these behavioral foundations but focused instead on economic growth as the driving variable behind modernization.

Lerner emphasized cultural values supporting modernity and accordingly defined the

traditional–modern dichotomy as behavioral patterns exhibited by groups of individuals within society. Examining survey data from Middle Eastern countries in his manuscript *The Passing of Traditional Society,* Lerner inferred that because the direction of social change always moved from the traditional to the modern, modernization was unequivocally a unilinear process. That society formed an interlocking system in which "all good things go together" was the corollary of this irreversible process. Lerner used these propositions to construct a four-phase logic of the modernization process that began with urban migration economic development, accelerated through increased literacy rates, catalyzed with advanced media communications, and culminated in mass political participation. Because Lerner assumed these phases were reciprocal and mutually reinforcing, he saw deep and rapid modernization as a systemic, progressive, and universal process that produced social and political stability.

In a similar exploration of the modernization process, Deutsch argued that the mechanism of social mobilization determined economic and political development. Modernization constituted two stages. First, economic development broke down traditional processes of social life, such as old institutions, expectations, and identities. Subsequently, these elements had to coalesce around a new stable and modern pattern. Deutsch assumed these processes of social mobilization produced jointly reinforcing effects and eventually reached a "take-off" threshold that produced significant social and political change. However, before this point, these processes generated a tremendous strain on the capabilities of the government to satisfy the increased needs of society. Deutsch argued that there was a real and immediate danger of these countries adopting communism to deal with these challenges. In this sense, modernization would *not* automatically produce capitalist democracies. To steer these countries away from the pathological option offered by the Soviet Union, the United States needed to deliberately intervene in the social mobilization process by offering technical knowledge and development assistance.

Seymour Lipset advanced a more materialistic version of modernization theory that linked economic development and institutional legitimacy to the endurance of democracy. Drawing on a global range of social and economic indicators, Lipset presented the seminal correlation between high levels of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, education, and the persistence of democracy. As a result, countries with high chances of sustaining democratic political systems in 1959, such as Israel, Japan, Lebanon, and the Philippines, resembled European institutions and economic conditions. Unlike other modernization theorists, Lipset carefully stipulated that his conclusion did not support a necessary or causal relationship between the variables examined. However, insomuch as his work posited a probabilistic correlation between wealth and democracy, it supported American cold war development policy to shape the institutions of foreign countries through economic aid and direct political intervention.

In the popular *The Stages of Economic Growth,* Rostow constructed a similar materialist theory that posited an evolutionary model of modernization dependent on a phased process of economic growth. In the transition across the Parsonian dichotomy, Rostow argued that all societies passed through five stages: the traditional baseline; a precondition period; the great take-off; a drive to maturity; and, finally, modern society. Although modernization meant global convergence, the specter of Soviet communism provided countries starting this economic process with an alternative to Western-style capitalism. Specifically, Rostow pointed to the precondition phase as the most politically dangerous point when nations might become infected with the "disease" of communism. In simple language that resonated clearly with the American political elite fighting the cold war, Rostow provided a theoretical justification for massive economic aid programs and direct military intervention in countries to fend off communism until these fledging nations could "take off" toward "healthy" capitalism. Until nations such as Vietnam left the runway, democracy and human rights would have to wait.

From Criticism to Rapid Demise

By the mid-1960s, the modernization juggernaut started to slow down. Attempts by Mancur Olson and Richard Bendix to highlight problematic aspects of the theory foreshadowed its ensuing demise. Olson directly challenged the conventional

materialist wisdom that intense levels of economic aid would strengthen poor countries. Although Olson agreed with Lipset that the absolute income level correlated with stability, his evidence underscored that the rate of growth during the transitional period was directly correlated with instability. Bendix came out swinging against the crude cultural variants of modernization theory. He rejected the traditional–modern dyad, the notion of global convergence, and the functional approach that conceived complex societies as natural systems in equilibrium. Instead, Bendix proposed a historical-comparative analysis to bring spatial and temporal differences back into focus. Subsequent scholars essentially picked up the baton from these early critiques.

As the 1960s came to a close, Samuel Huntington looked back at the postwar deluge of authoritarian military coups and leveled his classic critique of modernization theory. In the groundbreaking *Political Order in Changing Societies,* Huntington posited that rapid economic development replaced traditional governing structures and social norms with modern expectations and aspirations. When these new social demands outpaced economic growth, the public turned to political participation to effect change. Unfortunately, developing states often lacked the institutional capacity to respond to complex social and economic demands. This gap between public expectation and state efficacy undermined political stability as social groups resorted to alternative avenues. Contrary to the functional holism of modernization theory, Huntington argued that all good things do not go together. Economic development did not automatically birth strong and effective political institutions. Rather, in a slew of nations throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the attempt to cross the traditional–modern bridge resulted in state paralysis and violence, followed by authoritarian or communist coups to restore order.

Dependency and world-systems theorists shifted the unit of analysis from domestic society to the capitalist world economy and leveled a series of popular critiques against the modernization paradigm. In the most coherent articulation, Immanuel Wallerstein argued that the capitalist division of labor entailed the historical development of unique types of production for different products in core, semiperipheral, and peripheral regional zones of the world. Each zone had independent political and economic requirements corresponding to the type of labor employed. Furthermore, this global production structure linked zones together through terms of unequal exchange and thereby promoted asymmetrical development. Over time, these differences grew into severe disparities among states, making global convergence impossible. As a result, contemporary underdeveloped nations could not follow the same path toward modernity as the West had followed. Instead, each state needed to find a unique route dependent on its own historical characteristics.

The modernization paradigm thus found itself under attack from conservative critics, such as Huntington, and more leftist world-systems theorists. Set against the historical backdrop of profound pessimism and cultural upheaval as the Vietnam War devolved into a quagmire, a new generation of political scientists rapidly discredited and abandoned the once mighty modernization research program.

Contemporary Reexamination and Revival

Despite the nearly universal rejection of modernization theory by scholars throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the end of the cold war ushered in a proliferation of globalization discourse throughout the 1990s that resurrected core elements of the old paradigm. Just as in the 1950s, explanatory and prescriptive theories of modernization returned to influence both academics and American political elites.

Within political science, a new body of research reexamined both cultural and materialist strands of modernization theory. Once again, the cultural strand claimed that democracy and stability depended on cultural institutions, practices, and values. Specifically, these scholars pointed to social trust and legitimacy as necessary variables for the survival of modern democratic states. However, this scholarship left itself open to charges of teleological inference, as it was difficult to determine whether cultural variables were the cause or effect of democratic institutions and economic development.

In a more productive move, a reconsideration of the materialist modernization hypothesis yielded an insightful conceptual innovation to explain why

so many rich countries were also democratic. This research separated modernization into "endogenous" and "exogenous" concepts. The former stipulated a causal relation between development and the probability that poor countries transition to democracy, whereas the latter posited that wealth simply makes democratic states less likely to collapse into dictatorships. Debates surrounding the logic and empirics of these two arguments attempted to directly grapple with the democratization phenomenon without the muddled assumptions of the old modernization paradigm.

In a wave of optimism reminiscent of the post–World War II decade, the American political elite eagerly entertained a group of prescriptive theorists led by Francis Fukuyama that trumpeted a progressive vision of history converging on a global model of modernity. Heralding advances in global communication and transportation technology, the new modernization theorists envisioned the United States once again leading poor countries toward their inevitable future as capitalist democracies. Times had changed, though. As a model for development, neoliberal free-market capitalism had replaced the old Keynesian welfare state. Similarly, the pathological alternative to Western development had switched from communism to Islamic extremism. An army of technocrats set out to remake postcommunist and developing countries, only to engender a series of increasingly severe financial collapses, concomitant with a gradual slide in several countries toward authoritarian rule. As a global economic downturn tarnished neoliberalism and the United States and Western European countries struggled to contain an endemic fiscal crisis, prescriptive modernization theory drearily headed back to the cemetery.

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See also Behavioralism; Dependency Theory; Democratization; Development; Durkheim, Émile; Functionalism; Globalization; Systems Theory; Weber, Max; World-Systems Theory

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Modus Vivendi

A *modus vivendi* is literally a "way of living," a working arrangement between contending parties that enables peaceful coexistence while the parties attempt to work out the dispute. In contemporary political theory, it has become associated with a way of thinking about the stability of a society characterized by deep pluralism—whether ideological, religious, national, cultural, or ethnic. The term has also become associated, in particular,

with the work of the American philosopher John Rawls and his account of the conditions required for a society to be not only just but stable. This entry reviews Rawls's analysis and its limitations.

For Rawls, a "well-ordered" society is one in which citizens affirm the same general conception of justice, not because of enforced religious, cultural, or philosophical ideology, but on the basis of publicly justifiable principles and the considered judgments of its citizens. A well-ordered society not only advances the good of its members but is also effectively regulated by a shared conception of justice. This "political" conception of justice, Rawls claims, is one that could gain the assent of citizens, despite deep pluralism. A society organized around such a conception is stable, Rawls argues, not in an empirical sense but in the normative sense: It rests upon a publicly justifiable conception of justice, wherein society is conceived as a fair system of cooperation, and citizens as free and equal.

Rawls contrasts this conception of a well-ordered, stable society with that of a "mere" modus vivendi. A modus vivendi, for Rawls, is akin to a treaty between states. The terms and conditions of a treaty represent an equilibrium point between the two parties, but each remains ready to impose its will on the other if the advantages of breaking the agreement begin to outweigh the costs. Stability is thus conditional and fragile. By analogy, a society founded on a modus vivendi is neither well-ordered nor stable, and social unity only ever apparent.

However, there have been attempts to rescue the notion of a modus vivendi from this Rawlsian analysis. The more seriously one takes pluralism, the greater the pressure on the Rawlsian conception of a well-ordered society. A more realistic account of stability might require embracing something like a modus vivendi. And there might be a form of modus vivendi that is less than a Rawlsian overlapping consensus, but more than a mere peace treaty. Rawls seems to assume that a modus vivendi entails that the parties remain committed to overturning the arrangements whenever possible. But a modus vivendi might well acquire resilience and commitment over time, just because of the persistence of plurality and the increasing awareness of the parties that this is indeed the best way to proceed, given the circumstances they face.

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See also Disagreement; Liberalism, Contemporary; Pluralism; Public Sphere

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Mohism

Mohism names a philosophical tradition from ancient Warring States China associated with Mozi (5th to the early 4th centuries BCE) and his school. Mozi's followers, the Mohists, formed a quasi-religious and paramilitary community committed to promoting social and political reform through propagating the doctrines of their teacher. The community appears not to have survived the unification of China under the Qin Dynasty (221–206 BCE).

As with the case of their chief rival Confucianism, Mohism is primarily aimed at offering a solution to the social and political chaos perceived to characterize Warring States China. For the Mohists, the desired outcome is a state of ecumenical order in which "right" rather than "might" prevails over human affairs and where the least well off are cared for. To this end Mohism made various policy prescriptions addressed especially to the political elite.

Within Mohism, a policy prescription is to be justified (or rejected) in terms of its conforming to various criteria of moral rightness. The two main criteria are a policy's propensity to promote the impartial benefit of the world (suggesting a form of state consequentialism) and accordance with the Heaven's will (suggesting something in the region of a divine command doctrine of right). Whatever the relative status of the two criteria, the impartial benefit of the world—sometimes narrowly construed in terms of people having their

basic material needs met—appears to be the operational criterion by which Mohist policy prescriptions are justified.

Mohist writings contain a state-of-nature account, reminiscent yet different from that of Thomas Hobbes, in which it is argued that people fight in the primitive state because of widespread conflict over values. The conclusion is drawn that unity in people's moral views, maintained by a panoptic hierarchy of rulers and leaders through education and coercion, is a necessary condition of social and political order. In the area of governance, Mohists advocate that rulers make government appointments on meritocratic considerations rather than kinship and social background. In political economy, they inveigh against aristocratic extravagance in funeral rituals, music display and lavish expenditure in general. In the area of international relations, not only did the Mohists condemn military aggression as immoral, they were also involved in lending aid to states threatened by military aggression through their expertise in counter-siege technology.

Finally, Mohism also includes a religious dimension to its political doctrines though here, as elsewhere, the underlying concern is ultimately with social and political order. Apart from the (already mentioned) notion that Heaven's will is a source of right, the claim is also made that widespread belief in the existence of providential ghosts—supernatural agents of Heaven—that punish the wicked and reward the just is useful and necessary to the maintenance of social and political order.

Hui-chieh Loy

See also Chinese Liberalism; Confucianism

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MONARCHOMACHS

The monarchomachs ("those who fight against monarchs") were sixteenth-century French Calvinist theorists who criticized absolute monarchy and religious persecution, while defending various related doctrines of ancient constitutionalism, social contract, and resistance to unjust or tyrannical government, up to and including tyrannicide. Although French Calvinists had long offered intellectual justifications for resistance to persecution, the term *monarchomachs* is generally reserved for those who wrote after the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572, an event that made clear that henceforth persecution had royal support. The three most important figures in the movement were Francois Hotman, the author of *Francogallia* (1574); Theodore Béza, successor to Calvin as leader of Geneva and author of *On the Right of Magistrates* (1574); and the pseudonymous Stephanus Junius Brutus, the author or authors of *Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos* (1579), often thought to be Philippe Mornay du Plessis. The Scottish thinker George Buchanan is also often included, as he was by the Scottish absolutist George Barclay, who coined the word *monarchomach* as a term of abuse. While they did not agree among themselves on all matters of method or substance, they shared a great deal and are usefully thought of as a group.

The idea that unjust laws might be disobeyed or resisted is an old idea in political theory, and so is the idea that some rulers act so lawlessly or tyrannically that their rule might be resisted *in toto*. The

monarchomachs, however, contributed novel modern elements, including a pre-Lockean characterization of fundamental constitutional law as a contract between king and people. When the contract was broken by royal overreach, not only was the duty to obey lost but under at least some circumstances a right or duty to resist—to enforce the contract—came into existence.

Hotman was an important legal scholar in the humanist tradition, who taught Roman law at a number of institutions including the University of Paris. Like other legal humanists, he was skeptical that the Roman law had continuing legal meaning for European societies, and he argued for renewed attention to the (broadly Germanic) customary law of France. Roman law was often opportunistically deployed by apologists for absolutism, who noted that *voluntas principis legis habet valorem* (the will of the prince has the force of law). But Hotman maintained that the customary constitution of the French kingdom was broadly opposed to the royal absolutism emerging in the theory and practice of the French monarchy. Instead, it rested on popular consent made manifest in the Three Estates, which Hotman maintained had even held the authority to elect kings. With its emphasis on the Frankish and Gallic—that is, not Roman—origins of the kingdom, Hotman's book became the standard collection of legal-historical evidence drawn on by antiabsolutists in later French debates.

Béza's *On the Right of Magistrates* overlaps considerably with the longer *Francogallia,* but draws much more heavily on biblical arguments than on constitutional history. The conclusion that magistrates who rule tyrannically should be resisted by force remains the same.

Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos (The Vindication [of Liberty] Against Tyrants) is a somewhat different work. First, it freely uses Roman legal arguments alongside ancient constitutionalist ones. The author explains the foundation of government in a contractarian way and draws on Roman legal reasoning about contracts; he also draws on the natural law thinking associated with parts of the Roman legal tradition. Second, it is less thickly tied to the details of *French* constitutional history in particular than is *Francogallia* and is less theologically specific than *Magistrates,* and so appears more like a general normative political theory to modern eyes. Third, it offers a theory of organized resistance that builds on constitutional structures. The author argues that individual persons should not take it on themselves to resist, but that subordinate magistrates within the constitutional order may organize armed resistance to protect that order against tyranny. This is an important and original contribution to the theory of resistance, one that circumvents the traditional problem that "the people" have no institutional mechanism for reaching a unified collective decision to resist. Finally, unlike Hotman, the author of the *Vindiciae* characterizes France's judicial *parlements* as constitutionally appropriate bodies that might check royal power in the absence of the Estates General.

The great intellectual rival of the monarchomachs in their own day was Jean Bodin, who, in his book *Six Books of the Republic,* defended a near-absolutist conception of sovereignty and denied that ancient constitutions or mechanisms of consent could coherently limit the authority of a sovereign king.

Francogallia and the *Vindiciae* in particular remained widely known in Calvinist Europe; the French Calvinists (Huguenots) who fled to Amsterdam took the monarchomach intellectual legacy with them. The *Vindiciae* was published in English and condemned and burned in England during the turbulent 1680s. The crisis of the years before the Glorious Revolution—the suppression of Calvinist Puritanism by the suspected crypto-Catholic Charles II, the Exclusion Crisis over whether the openly Catholic James II would be allowed to take the throne, the attempted assassination of both Charles and James, and the intermittent turns to absolutism and rule without Parliament—resonated with the French events of a century before, and the English supporters of resistance turned to the earlier French works. After the Glorious Revolution, *Francogallia* was translated into English and published as an important piece of Whig ancient constitutionalism, with an attached argument that the Estate-centered ancient constitution of France was the ancient constitution of all Europe—and that the book therefore confirmed the legitimacy of parliamentary resistance to absolutism.

Jacob T. Levy

See also Ancient Constitutionalism; Reformation; Revolution; Social Contract Theory

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Montesquieu, Baron de (1689–1755)

Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, was an aristocratic owner of Bordeaux vineyards and, along with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the two philosophers who defined the contours of the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment. Born Charles-Louis de Secondat, he inherited from an uncle the lands around the village of Montesquieu and a seat on the provincial court, the *Parlement de Bordeaux*. Secondat thus became the baron of Montesquieu and *président à Mortier* in the Bordeaux court. The baron eventually sold his magistracy, preferring the delights of Paris salons and European travel. He subsequently passed 2 formative years in England. Then, alternating between Paris and his estate, the Chateau de la Brède, he spent 20 years working on *De l'esprit des lois* (The Spirit of Laws, 1748), which became the master text of Enlightenment science.

Early Works

Montesquieu published two early books that merit attention. The first, the *Persian Letters* (1721), was an epistolary novel that followed two Asian travelers in their philosophically motivated voyage to the allegedly enlightened West. Montesquieu satirically reversed the usual trope regarding the superiority of things Western over the habits of others. A best seller, the book was arguably the opening shot of the French Enlightenment across the bow of a complacent establishment. Its ironic, skeptical, and heretical tone encouraged in readers the kind of detachment that they would be called upon to acquire if they were to take part in the rational criticism of ancient superstition. But the work could also be read as a cautionary tale against the attitude of the skeptical Enlightenment. Its protagonist, the Persian Prince Usbek, was an antihero, a devotee of Enlightenment science, to be sure, but at the same time a man who, despite his learning, was prey to cognitive illusions and uncontrollable rage. The book projected a double vision of Enlightenment. Enlightenment in this treatment was a moral and cognitive template for the critique of society, but it came with a warning about the motives of those who took part in it: A despotic impulse is potentially at work in those who seek mastery through cognitive resources alone.

Montesquieu's second book, *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline* (1734) did no favor to the republican cause in exhibiting the sad fate of self-government in the natural life cycle of the Roman republic from birth to maturity and then to slow death in a despotic empire. There is speculation that, had he not been scared off by the censor, he would have published at the end of the *Considerations* a little essay advocating, in contrast to Rome, the superior staying power of liberty-loving England.

The *Considerations* was also an essay on historical causation, a reply to Christian providentialism. For Montesquieu, the success of Christianity had a purely secular explanation. *Considerations* was, in addition, a critique of Machiavelli. The latter praised Rome's imperial ambitions because for the Italian author only external war could unite a republican people and stave off internal corruption. This fascination with war as a continuation of domestic politics filled Montesquieu with horror. He continued the debate with Machiavelli in *The Spirit of Laws* where he argued that commercial interests would eventually render such a disruptive politics impractical.

The Spirit of Laws

It is useful to consider two distinct views of that vast and sometimes disorderly edifice *The Spirit of Laws*. For Raymond Aron, it was the foundational

text in modern sciences of society. From this perspective Montesquieu's aim was to identify the complex chains of causality that, over many generations, establish the "spirit" of various and diverse peoples and nations. Institutions and ways of thinking that are seemingly remote from one another combine to create a determinate political effect. Different kinds of "commerce," distinct climates, populations, terrains, religions, different systems of laws, customs and manners, contingent events that set precedents—all play a role in the constitution of what is called "cultures," more specifically "political cultures," which might be one way of rendering Montesquieu's term *esprit* (spirit) into contemporary social science idiom.

The role of commerce, that is, markets and market societies, loom large in this argument. Markets are celebrated not for their own sake but for their political effects in taming military impulses or the predatory instincts of princes and in opening civilizations to one another. Montesquieu called commerce a form of "communication" among nations. Often accused of naïveté on this subject, Montesquieu was far from sanguine about all the effects of this sort of communication. Commerce could destroy people as well as lift them up. It all depended on the particular circumstances. Montesquieu did, however, predict that commerce would eventually permit humans partially to transcend the horizon established by the nation. But like present critics of globalization, he never thought that the state could ever be fully transcended.

There is another view of this great book. As it is specifically the spirit of "laws" that the title announces, this second account deserves priority. *The Spirit of Laws* is a great exercise in comparative law and constitutional thinking. As such, as Jacob Levy has argued, it recovers the arguments of ancient constitutionalism—this stretches to Aristotle's understanding of constitution as amalgamating customs and institutions, the prime example being medieval "Gothic" monarchy—and makes its conclusions available to modern constitutional thinkers like James Madison and Benjamin Constant. In this respect Montesquieu was an alternative to the modern rationalism of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke's contractual arguments.

At the heart of the constitutional project is Montesquieu's typology of regimes. For Montesquieu, regimes come in three sizes. Like the bowls of porridge that confronted Goldilocks, these regimes are typically small, medium, and large, that is to say, republics, monarchies, and despotisms. It is important to add that none of these constitutional forms of government is a self-sustaining institution. To work well, each "form" of government requires a "principle." Form and principle are the two elements of the regime. The principle is best understood as the mentality or social psychology of the people who live under these forms or make these institutions work, namely, virtue for republics, honor for monarchies, and fear for despotisms.

Virtue was no mild palliative. It called for harsh monastic discipline, especially in the "democratic" version of the republic. (There was another variant, the aristocratic republic that called only for moderation in the elite.) "Virtue" assured that republican citizens would be obedient to their own laws, no simple task.

As for monarchical "honor," it was not only the distinctive claim of the landed aristocracy, however important, for other, nonaristocratic social groups could live by their own standards of honor, creating the spectacle of a diverse and plural society animated by standards that meant something different to each group. Honor had an important task. It encouraged individual ambition and political disobedience. Both gave a needed centrifugal spin to the polity that was a counter-weight to the centralization of power in the throne. What Montesquieu thought about how monarchy worked suggests interesting parallels to other heterogeneous, decentralized, pluralist societies, wherein the central problem is the absence of moral consensus. For Montesquieu honor was fluid and unstable, an ever-changing medium that allowed each group to maintain its self-defined sense of dignity against other groups and against the state. He effectively asked why we should expect moral or any other kind of unity except of the loosest procedural kind in a society with this kind of centrifugal individualist spin to it. Honor made the formal and legal organization of monarchy workable, paradoxically, by specifying when actors should engage in illegal behavior, something that no set of formal rules could logically have justified. This illegal adherence to legality constituted the complex "spirit of the laws" in monarchy. It was the predecessor to its democratic equivalent, the doctrine of civil disobedience.

The "fear" of despotism erased both virtue and honor, which the despot had to destroy if he was going to rule. Montesquieu had evidently a dim view of Hobbes's conclusion that only fear could found states. Incidentally, Montesquieu describes bad government as despotism, thereby avoiding Aristotle's name for it, tyranny. For Montesquieu, the bad governor rules like the master of a household, like a *despote,* a patriarch who rules over women and slaves. One can detect a protofeminist critique in this analogy. Bad government is bad because it is patriarchal. There is much to explore here: For instance, in book 19 Montesquieu argues that the freedom available specifically to women correlates well to the general level of freedom in a state.

Let us return to the question of size and the progression of small states to expand into larger polities. (Montesquieu's prime example was always classical Rome.) The republic is typically small. Any exercise in territorial expansion would threaten to undermine the very bases of republican self-rule. (This was obviously a dilemma for figures like Madison, who sought an "expanded" basis for republican government.) The expanded republic, that is, democratic government presiding over too much territory, will eventually, Montesquieu thought, resort to monarchical devices of rule where the political role of ordinary people would be diminished. Monarchy, in turn, is threatened by its own temptations to imperial expansion. This aggrandizement leads to the unraveling of monarchy into despotism.

Montesquieu's association of despotism with rule over vast distances gives his thought an anti-imperialist hue. However, this tendency is offset by the evident imperial temptation in book 10, chapter 4, when the author speculates that conquest by an enlightened power over an unenlightened people might be justified when in the unenlightened country abusive rule is combined with a mentally paralyzed people—Montesquieu calls it *la tyrannie sourd* (deaf tyranny), the symptom displayed by a people who are not capable of understanding their own distress.

The story of regime transformation—from republic to monarchy to despotism—seems to favor the republic over politically worse alternatives, but this is a false conclusion. For Montesquieu, only despotism is rejected, and occasionally it is not all that firmly rejected. Where there are no other alternatives and administration seems like a rational response to dire necessities—Montesquieu's view of China where a large hungry population faces an always endangered rice crop—then even despotism was quietly accepted. Montesquieu's critics dislike his tendency to assign despotism to a region, namely, the hot climates of Asia, but he also saw despotism in England under Cromwell.

To avoid despotism, a people would be fully justified in finding refuge in either a republic or a monarchy. Both are legitimate forms of rule. At the same time, they appeal to different moral standards and attract different partisans. Importantly, they are not suitable to every historical circumstance. This still begs the question whether, nevertheless, the republic was a superior form of government because, in terms of territorial extent, it stood further away from despotism than did monarchy. This is a misleading analogy. The opposite claim could be made. Highly disciplined citizens make republican self-government possible, but for Montesquieu this very discipline cuts off too many other kinds of freedom, almost certainly the freedom of women, but also the freedoms associated with local self-rule, regional autonomy, the possibility ethnic or religious enclaves, vast differences in ways of life, all of which the republic could not sustain or tolerate and only monarchy was (potentially) good at sponsoring.

Montesquieu famously proposed that neither monarchies nor republics are intrinsically free by their nature. The potential of monarchy to tolerate the freedoms inherent in plural and diverse lives was only a potential. Montesquieu was a monarchist in the context of French politics, but a reformist monarchist. For instance, the sacral duties of the king were scarcely mentioned in the text. As for the republic, not only does the discipline of citizenship (one form of freedom) call for the sacrifice of many other kinds of liberty, but the very effort to establish the republic might too easily skid off the road, as had happened, Montesquieu thought, during the effort to establish an English republic during the civil war. These passages on England could easily have been read on the eve of the French Revolution as a warning to French Republicans. France was too large to go down the road traveled earlier by the Puritan revolutionaries. But this does not mean that there were no checks and balances in the customary French constitution as it existed. It is the

very essence of the ancient constitutionalist argument that Montesquieu passed on to Madison and Constant to claim that practices that have evolved over the generations could easily have as much wisdom and prudence in them as any wholly new contractual document.

For Montesquieu, the French courts or *parlements* preserved public liberties through acts of dissent to royal decrees. Montesquieu, who was something of a free-thinking skeptic in matters of religion, was nevertheless an ally—a detached ally—of the Jansenist jurists and religiously motivated pamphleteers who sought in the courts a center of resistance to both Pope and Crown. Between 1748 and 1771, when the courts were effectively squashed by Chancellor Maupeou, *The Spirit of Laws* could be read as a sophisticated repository for an ideology that promoted the constitutional rights of the *parlements* and hinted at their transformation into an English-style parliament. At this pragmatic level of political engagement, Montesquieu's thought was hostile to the pretentions of executive power and accordingly sponsored pluralist politics and a rule of law mediated by a "division of powers" that pitted French courts against the concentration of executive and legislative power in the hands of the king.

Montesquieu never used the somewhat misleading phrase "separation of powers," which famously entered into public discourse across the Atlantic by both Federalists and anti-Federalists in the debate over the preservation of American constitutional liberties. Both parties nevertheless agreed on the gist of Montesquieu's argument, that however unwisely united or allied the executive and the legislature may be, all was not lost for political liberty if judicial independence could be sustained.

Ironies can be detected in Montesquieu's argument about English liberty and in the Americans' appropriation of that argument under the heading of the division of powers. First, Montesquieu's portrait of England in book 11, chapter 6 and in book 19, chapter 27 captures only a transitory moment in English political life before it set out on the path to parliamentary absolutism with an executive strictly subordinate to the legislature (though in reality the executive as prime minister dominates parliament). The result is the standard Westminster model of democratic government. The way in which parliamentary democracy fuses executive and legislative power obviously violates the spirit of Montesquieu's separation of power doctrine that instead the Americans took over in an experiment, which is now the standard alternative to Westminster, namely, presidential democracy.

Second, the Americans were designing a constitution for a republic but adopted a mechanism of rule, separation of powers, which for Montesquieu was central to the establishment of monarchy. The legal doctrine of the separation of powers of book 11, chapter 6 depends on the social basis of monarchical government set out in book 2, chapter 2, where the author insists that monarchy requires "intermediate powers," "intermediate ranks," and "channels through which power flows," giving as examples the independence of nobility, clergy, cities, and other associations. Because of the argument about intermediary bodies, Montesquieu enjoys the reputation as the great theorist of the pluralism. However, he thinks that pluralism works best under monarchy and possibly not at all under the more unified republic, whereas his readers want to adopt his concern for diversity and pluralism to the democratic project.

There is a way out for some interpreters of *The Spirit of Laws*. Montesquieu famously hints that in England one may find a republic hiding behind its monarchical form. Readers have taken from this claim the idea that England was not a monarchy at all, but a republic. But this idea makes nonsense of Montesquieu's warning about the dangers inherent in an English republic. In any event, for Montesquieu, "form" carries much weight. In adopting Montesquieu's remedies for the constitutional problems of monarchy, the Americans may have created a free and richly diverse society, but they may also have diluted what Montesquieu thought were the powerful effects of fully republican participatory citizenry.

Montesquieu as a Monarchist

Montesquieu was a monarchist in terms of his political hopes for France and for the rest of Europe. Even with democratic amendments, England was still monarchical in its form and principles. But was Montesquieu purely and simply a monarchist, or is there also enough room in his vast work for a republican thinker? This is too complex a topic to develop here. Suffice it to say

that the monarchical Montesquieu was well adapted by Edmund Burke, Madison, and Constant to their various projects and needs, but Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an attentive and close reader of Montesquieu, seized upon Montesquieu's republican themes. Rousseau was closer to his predecessor than is sometimes supposed.

The typology of regimes remains the key to Montesquieu's thinking. From Montesquieu's writings we can see it as an example of government whose citizenry is undercommitted to public things. By contrast Montesquieu's republic was a model of overcommitment to public life. Thus, monarchy countenanced heterogeneity, that is to say, pluralism and diversity, which the republic could less well tolerate. The possessors of monarchical "honor" were, however, filled with "prejudices" that arose from close attachment to their respective local traditions, habits, and circumstances. In monarchy, customs attached people to their roots. They acted from within entrenched local understandings and addressed the general good from partial perspectives.

In the republic, however, customs acted upon citizens in order to release them from rooted local understandings. There, the pull of custom was justified only to the extent it freed people from partial perspective.

Montesquieu offered a political philosophy that intensively explored the continuum of possibilities in different kinds of commitment to public and private life. In the two decent, if opposed, regimes thus theorized, he proposed two contrary origins for effective political action, neither of which was wholly commended and neither of which would be always successful in avoiding the worst outcome, despotism. He left it up to his readers to resolve the ambiguity and ambivalence always present in his encyclopedic reflections on the subject.

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See also Burke, Edmund; Commerce; Constant, Benjamin; Enlightenment; Publius; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalism is a political idea about the proper way to respond to cultural diversity. Multiculturalists argue for more inclusive conceptions of citizenship, justice, and democracy, which extend special recognition and rights to cultural minority groups. The origins of multicultural theory can be traced in part to the dissatisfaction with liberalism's inattention to the value of community and the legacy of historic injustice against racial and ethnic minority groups, and a search for more inclusive ways to accommodate the racial and ethnic diversity generated by immigration to North America and Western Europe in the latter half of

the twentieth century. Multiculturalists contend that the proper response to cultural diversity is to supplement the common set of civil, political, and social rights with a set of group-differentiated rights and accommodations for marginalized groups. Although multiculturalism has been used as an umbrella term to characterize the politics of a wide range of historically disadvantaged groups, including African Americans, women, gays and lesbians, and the disabled, most self-identified theorists of multiculturalism tend to focus their arguments on immigrants who are ethnic and religious minorities (e.g., Latinos in the United States, Muslims in Western Europe), national minorities (e.g., Catalans, Basque, Welsh, Québécois), and indigenous peoples (e.g., Māori in New Zealand, Native peoples in North America).

Multiculturalism is closely associated with "identity politics," "the politics of difference," and "the politics of recognition"; they all share a commitment to revaluing disrespected identities and changing dominant patterns of representation and communication that marginalize certain groups. But multiculturalism is also a matter of economic interests and political power; it demands remedies to the material and political disadvantages that people suffer as a result of their minority status. Examples of multicultural accommodations include exemptions from generally applicable law (e.g., religious exemptions), state subsidies for the pursuit of group practices (e.g., public funding for minority-language schools), special political representation rights (e.g., ethnic quotas for party lists or legislative seats), or limited self-government rights (e.g., qualified recognition of tribal sovereignty). This entry provides an overview of the philosophical foundations of multiculturalism and considers its main weaknesses.

Foundations of Multiculturalism

One possible philosophical foundation for multiculturalism can be found in the communitarian critique of liberalism. Liberals are ethical individualists; they insist that individuals should be free to choose and pursue their own conceptions of the good life. They give primacy to individual rights and freedom over community life and collective goods. Some liberals are also individualists when it comes to social ontology (what some call methodologist individualists or atomists). Atomists believe that you can and should account for social actions and social goods in terms of properties of the constituent individuals and individual goods. The target of the communitarian critique of liberalism was not so much liberal ethics as liberal social ontology. Communitarians reject the idea that the individual takes precedence over the community and that the value of social goods can be reduced to their contribution to individual well-being. They instead embrace ontological holism, which views social goods as "irreducibly social." Charles Taylor combines a holist view of collective identities and cultures to a normative case for a multicultural "politics of recognition": If diverse cultural identities and languages are irreducibly social goods, then there should be a presumption of their equal worth. The recognition of the equal worth of diverse cultures requires replacing the traditional liberal regime of identical liberties and opportunities for all with a scheme of targeted rights for marginalized groups, such as limited self-government rights for the Québécois.

An alternative foundation for multiculturalism is liberalism. Will Kymlicka has developed the most influential theory of multiculturalism based on the liberal values of autonomy and equality. Culture is said to be instrumentally valuable, for two reasons. First, it enables individual autonomy. One important condition of autonomy is having an adequate range of options from which to choose. Cultures provide contexts of choice, which provide and make meaningful the social scripts and narratives from which people fashion their lives. Culture is also instrumentally valuable for its connection to individual self-respect. Echoing theorists of communitarianism and nationalism, Kymlicka says there is a deep and general connection between a person's self-respect and the respect and recognition accorded to the cultural group of which he or she is a part. It is not simply membership in any culture but one's own culture that must be secured because of the great difficulty of giving it up. Kymlicka moves from these premises about the value of cultural membership to the egalitarian claim that because members of minority groups are disadvantaged in their access to their own cultures, they are entitled to special protections.

One might question whether cultural minority groups really are "disadvantaged" in the way that

Kymlicka suggests; why not just enforce antidiscrimination laws, stopping short of any positive accommodations for cultural minority groups? He replies that state neutrality with respect to culture is a chimera. Whereas states may avoid official establishment of religion, they cannot avoid establishing one language for public schooling and other state services. Although offered as a general normative argument for minority cultural groups, liberal multiculturalism distinguishes among different types of groups. It offers the strongest protection to indigenous peoples and national minorities (indeed, Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism is a theory of nationalism). Immigrants are viewed largely as voluntary economic migrants who are expected to integrate. Immigrant multiculturalism is understood as a demand for fairer terms of integration through mostly temporary group-differentiated measures (e.g., exemptions, bilingual education) and not a rejection of integration.

Other political theorists have looked beyond liberalism in search of more pluralistic bases for multiculturalism. This is especially true of theorists writing about diversity and multiculturalism from a postcolonial perspective. On such a perspective, the case for tribal sovereignty rests not simply on premises about the value of tribal culture and membership, but also on what is owed to Native peoples for the historic injustice perpetrated against them. A postcolonial perspective also seeks models of constitutional and political dialogue that recognize culturally distinct ways of speaking and acting. Multicultural societies consist of diverse religious and moral outlooks, and if liberal societies are to take such diversity seriously, they must recognize that liberalism is just one of many substantive outlooks based on a specific view of man and society. Liberalism is not free of culture but expresses a distinctive culture of its own. This observation applies not only across territorial boundaries between liberal and nonliberal states, but also within liberal states and its relations with nonliberal minorities. As Bhikhu Parekh argues, liberal theory cannot provide an impartial framework governing relations between different cultural communities. Instead, he argues for a more open model of intercultural dialogue in which the liberal society's constitutional and legal values serve as the initial starting point for cross-cultural discussion while also being open to contestation. James Tully surveys the language of historical and contemporary constitutionalism with a focus on Western states' relations with Native peoples to uncover more inclusive bases for intercultural interaction.

Critique of Multiculturalism

Some critics contend that the multicultural argument for the preservation of cultures is premised on a problematic view of culture. Cultures are not distinct, self-contained wholes; they have long interacted and influenced one another through warfare, conquest, and trade. Today through global migration and economic and communications networks, people in many parts of the world live in multicultural contexts and possess multiple identities. Indeed, many cultures themselves are already cosmopolitan, characterized by cultural hybridity rather than purity. Even traditional cultures are not untouched, for good or for ill, by the global exchange of information and knowledge. Moreover, aiming at preserving a culture runs the risk of privileging one allegedly pure version of culture and freezing that in place, regardless of surrounding social, economic, and political conditions. Some multicultural theorists accept the cosmopolitan view of cultures as overlapping, interactive, and interdependent in their formation, but they still maintain the importance of special protections for minority groups to preserve the distinctiveness of their cultures.

A second major criticism of multiculturalism is that it is a "politics of recognition" that diverts attention from a "politics of redistribution." We can distinguish analytically between these modes of politics: a politics of recognition challenges status inequality and the remedy it seeks is cultural and symbolic change, whereas a politics of redistribution challenges economic inequality and exploitation and the remedy it seeks is economic restructuring. Working-class mobilization tilts toward the redistribution end of the spectrum, and the gay rights movement toward the recognition end. Critics worry that multiculturalism's focus on culture and identity diverts attention from, or even actively undermines, the struggle for greater economic equality, partly because identity-based politics may undermine potential multiracial, multiethnic class solidarity and partly because many

multiculturalists tend to focus on cultural injustices while ignoring economic injustices. Ethnic and national minorities have engaged in both modes of politics, seeking remedies to material disadvantages and marginalized identities and statuses. In practice, both modes of politics are required to achieve greater equality across lines of race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexuality, and class, not least because many individuals stand at the intersection of these different categories and suffer multiple forms of marginalization.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of multiculturalism is that it may threaten rather than promote the freedom and equality of individuals. Multiculturalists have focused on inequalities *between* groups in arguing for special protections for minority groups, but group-based protections can exacerbate inequalities *within* minority groups. This is because some ways of protecting minority groups from oppression by the majority may make it more likely that these groups will be able to undermine the basic liberties and opportunities of vulnerable members. Group leaders may even exaggerate the degree of consensus and solidarity within their groups to present a united front to the wider society and strengthen their case for accommodation. As feminist critics emphasize, some of the most oppressive group norms and practices revolve around issues of gender and sexuality. Extending group rights to patriarchal cultural communities may help reinforce gender inequality within these communities. Examples include the use of "cultural defenses" in criminal law, recognition of religious arbitration over family law, and self-government rights for indigenous communities that deny equality to women in certain respects. This critique is especially troublesome for liberal defenders of multiculturalism who aim to promote intergroup equality while preventing intragroup oppression. Liberal multiculturalists stress that group rights need not and often do not have this effect since ethnocultural groups in Western democracies do not seek to limit the basic liberties of their own members. But this empirical premise may not be born out in a great many cases. The challenge then is to identify whether a particular case of minority group rights is consistent with ensuring the freedom and equality of all group members. If not, liberal multiculturalists would in principle have to argue against extending the group right or extending it with certain qualifications, such as conditioning the extension of self-government rights to national minorities on the acceptance of a constitutional bill of rights.

A fourth critique of multiculturalism is expressed more in public opinion rather than political theory. At the start of the twenty-first century, there is talk of a retreat from multiculturalism as a political program in the West. There is little to no retreat from recognizing the rights of national minorities and indigenous peoples; the retreat is restricted to immigrant multiculturalism. Part of the backlash against immigrant multiculturalism is based on fear and anxiety about foreign "others" and a nostalgia for an imagined time when everyone shared thick bonds of identity and solidarity. Nativism is as old as migration itself, but societies are especially vulnerable to it when economic conditions are especially bad or security is seen to be threatened. In the United States the cultural "others" are Latina/o immigrants, especially unauthorized migrants. Since September 11, 2001, Muslim immigrants have also come under new scrutiny in the United States, and concerns over security and terrorism have been invoked to justify tougher border control. The number of Muslim immigrants in North America remains relatively small in comparison to the numbers in Western Europe, where Muslims have become central to the merits of multiculturalism as a public policy. In Western Europe, the concern is not only over security but also the failures of multiculturalism policies to integrate and offer real economic opportunities to foreigners and their descendants in the host societies.

The backlash against multiculturalism raises new challenges for defenders of multiculturalism. What is the relationship between multiculturalism and the integration of immigrants, especially those who are ethnic and racial minorities? Are liberal multicultural terms of integration really the most inclusive terms of integration? What is the relationship between liberalism, culture, and religion? Understanding the challenges that immigrants are said to pose to liberal values requires sustained engagement not only with the ideas of culture, ethnicity, and nationality but also religion and race and the political and economic effects of these different categories in particular contexts.

Sarah Song

See also Citizenship; Communitarianism; Cosmopolitanism; Historic Injustice; Identity; Justice, Theories of; Liberalism, Contemporary; Nationalism; Pluralism; Politics of Recognition; Postcolonialism

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Multiplicity

The concept of multiplicity has attained prominence largely through the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995). Deleuze developed the concept in his book *Bergsonism* and explored its political ramifications most relentlessly with Félix Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*. A multiplicity is an entity that originates from a folding or twisting of simple elements. Like a sand dune, a multiplicity is in constant flux, though it attains some consistency for a short or long duration. A multiplicity has porous boundaries and is defined provisionally by its variations and dimensions. Deleuze and Guattari redefine as multiplicities many of the key terms of Western political theory—including race, class, gender, language, state, society, person, and party. Their method aims to render political thinking more nuanced and generous toward difference.

Deleuze employs the term *multiplicity* as part of his broader project to overturn Platonism. Human cognition, according to Deleuze and his predecessors Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson, simplifies the world of intuition. This often benefits human survival and flourishing. It ensures, for instance, that humans can trust that an "apple" contains good nutrition even though humans only ever encounter *this* or *that* apple. Platonism codifies the common sense belief that human concepts match up with nature's articulations. Plato posited a universe of the One and the Multiple in which humans perceive inferior copies of perfect ideas. The doctrine reassures humanity that orderly patterns transcend the world of manifest difference. Modern philosophy's task, for Deleuze, is to break from the Platonic cast of mind and grasp multiplicities in their singularity. A multiplicity is neither a copy of a model nor a fragment of a higher totality, but a purely unique event. The concept helps humans conceive and appreciate a world where things creatively evolve to form new and surprising assemblages.

Deleuze differentiates two types of multiplicity: one that aligns with Platonic metaphysics, science, and common sense, and another that intuits a deeper reality. Deleuze designates the first type of multiplicity quantitative or numerical. Quantitative multiplicities, most simply, can be counted. They are actual, objective, and extensive; are represented in space; possess an identity; and differ in degree from one another. The intellect, for example, adds up the apples in a barrel, confident that they are fundamentally the same despite differences in size, color, ripeness, and so forth. The other type of multiplicity Deleuze denotes qualitative and continuous. Qualitative multiplicities, such as a human mood,

cannot properly be counted. They are virtual, subjective, and intensive; are experienced in lived time; and differ in kind from one another. Many of the dichotomies that recur throughout Deleuze's philosophy—arboreal and rhizomatic, molar and molecular, the major and the minor, the organism and the Body without Organs—aim to dive beneath surface appearances to capture the elusive singularity of each society, language, politics, or individual. Deleuze emphasizes that the two multiplicities coexist and interpenetrate. Each type of multiplicity captures a side of being and perception. Science accurately portrays one side of reality—the one that coheres into regular patterns that can be observed and catalogued. Philosophy's role, however, is to tailor concepts for purely unique events.

The concept of multiplicity reconfigures the ancient dispute between reason and poetry. Quantitative multiplicities can be captured through logical, mathematical, or scientific propositions. Qualitative multiplicities require a broader palette to color in the nuance of each thing, and here, philosophy forms alliances with painters, authors, directors, or sculptors. Philosophers create concepts that align with artistic percepts. That is one reason that Deleuze cites artists such as Virginia Wolff or Marcel Proust. When Wolff experiences herself as a school of fish, she portrays the lived sensation of being a qualitative multiplicity open to powers and affects circulating in the universe. Deleuze constructs philosophical concepts, such as the virtual, to describe the source of animal-becomings that permeate our subjectivity. For Deleuze, philosophers should investigate the world using the tools of both reason (quantitative multiplicities) and poetry (qualitative multiplicities).

Politically, the concept of multiplicity draws attention to minority-becomings. Majorities are quantitative multiplicities; the actors, positions, and votes are discrete and perceptible. Minorities can also be quantitative multiplicities, if their properties are clear and distinct. Minority-becomings, however, are qualitative multiplicities. They constitute fuzzy sets that elude the standards of the majority or minorities. Deleuze acknowledges that politics is always composed of a majority, minorities, and minority-becomings. Democracy requires the governance of majorities, but a politics of difference also welcomes and respects minority-becomings, that is, unfamiliar ideas, actors, positions, practices, and parties. The politics of multiplicity radicalizes liberalism by extending receptive generosity toward elements that perplex or transform social norms.

The example of gender may illustrate the stakes of Deleuze's project. Male and female are quantitative multiplicities, recognized by biological distinctions and assigned cultural roles and norms. Within the realms of Platonism, science, and common sense, this binary aggregate is real and corresponds to a natural division. Deleuze supports the feminist project to make females, a "minority," equal to men. Yet Deleuze also thinks that this duality conceals a great deal of gender's complexity. Gender is a qualitative multiplicity that enfolds genetic variation, parenting styles, social roles, cultural norms, charismatic friends, music, and public policy. Beneath the crude binary of male and female flow a plurality of tiny sexes. A politics of multiplicity may help these virtual sexes cross the threshold into actuality in such fields as family law, athletic competition, economic justice, and cultural representation. A politics of multiplicity also instills hope that political bodies can be transformed through careful chiseling of their borders.

Nicholas Tampio

See also Becoming; Difference Theories; Event; Micropolitics; Postmodernism; Singularity

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MULTITUDE

In the vocabulary of the Roman historians Sallust, Tacitus, and Quintus Curtius and the philosophers

Seneca and Cicero, the term *multitudo* is one among many to refer, more or less pejoratively, to the crowd, the populace, or the masses. It appears in the margins of some philosophical texts from the Middle Ages, but it is only in the context of early modern political thought that it becomes a major concept (in its Latin and English form). In the work of Thomas Hobbes, and most prominently in the writings of Baruch Spinoza, the multitude is a major political factor and it becomes an element of one of the first attempts to develop a modern concept of democracy. Hardly in use for many centuries, the term has reappeared rather recently, through attempts of several contemporary political theorists and philosophers to revitalize and actualize some elements of Spinozian political thought.

For Hobbes, the unorganized masses represent a serious threat to social stability and political order. Because the multitude is composed of a multiplicity of different subjects with different capacities, desires and opinions, it cannot be treated as a reliable entity of political life. Rather it is the unified body of a people that is necessary to found a commonwealth that can be governed by a sovereign. The multitude only reappears in times of crises when the unity of the people dissolves and the sovereign power of the state is in jeopardy.

Whereas Hobbes excludes the multitude from politics proper, his successor Spinoza takes the almost opposite direction. For him, too, the multitude, which is prone to superstition and subjected to effects it cannot control, on one hand remains an unstable and unpredictable factor in politics that can turn into a mob any day. On the other hand, the multitude is nothing less than the very basis and ultimate reference point of state power. The moment in which the multitude, guided by just laws and reason, manages to act in concert is the moment of the greatest power imaginable. The state is nothing above or beyond its citizens; rather, it is the combined, collective power of the multitude. Only a political system that can successfully integrate the diversity and heterogeneity of the multitude will reach stability and will be able to fully use the knowledge and potential of its citizenry. Although Spinoza's official political philosophy does not endorse democracy as the best form of political rule unconditionally, his insistence on the constituent power of the multitude in all political systems places him firmly in the tradition of radical democratic thinking.

The idea that the foundation of political power is not to be found in any preestablished unity (as the homogeneity of a people or a nation) or in a process of a unifying political act (as the legal constitution of a "body politic") has strongly attracted contemporary political theorists searching for new ways to think about political struggle and community beyond substantive unity. Most importantly, for several theorists coming from the Marxist tradition, especially Antonio Negri, the concept of the multitude has proven fruitful for the purpose of describing political mass movements and social resistance against the globalized political and economic system. Merging Spinoza's conception with Karl Marx's idea of "living labor" as the ultimate creative and productive force, a new, materialist concept of the multitude has emerged that has been successfully introduced into current debates on the state of global democracy and global resistance. Just as state powers ultimately depend on the multitude, the global capitalist system depends on the multitude of living and working subjects. The self-organizing multitude is the site where knowledge, value, and affects are produced.

According to some authors, the system of global capitalism will not be able to rule and exploit the multitude indefinitely. The rise of new technologies and new forms of affective labor and the increasing complexity of global communication and interaction might help the new global multitude to resist the parasitic global powers that keep them from realizing a form of real global democracy. Other theorists, such as Paolo Virno, resist the rather utopian and sometimes even determinist assumptions underlying such an outlook but still insist on the use of the concept for analyzing contemporary political struggles and contemporary forms of life. Speaking of multitude rather than class can at least help to reveal that in the age of increasing immaterial production and global flexibilization of the workforce, the sphere of labor has lost its autonomy, and the demand to be productive and creative has spread across contemporary life.

Although many theorists agree on the productivity of the concept of multitude for social analysis, its value for political theory remains controversial. Serious doubts have been raised whether this notion successfully refers to a new political

subject and whether the Spinozian concept can be applied to contemporary politics. It may be useful to rethink global democracy not only from the perspective of legal and political institutions but also in terms of the heterogeneous democratic mass movements and their social struggles. Yet there may be less reason to believe that political history will eventually take the turn to the liberation and peaceful self-organization of the multiplicity of political subjects.

Martin Saar

See also Democracy; Empire; Hobbes, Thomas; Marxism; People, The; Social Movements; Spinoza, Baruch

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Mythic Narrative

Mythic narratives are narratives of a particular kind. If narratives are, broadly speaking, ways of linking events, mythic narratives are successions of events that grant them not simply meaning but also significance.

After being neglected for a long time by political theory, mythic narratives are today getting more attention. So, for example, Chiara Bottici and Ajume Wingo have recently argued that we need to explore not only the conditions for public reason but also the conditions for public mythic narratives. Public mythic narratives play an important role in political mobilization. They convey the crucial beliefs of a social group or society in an emotionally effective way and may not be incompatible with the principle of the autonomy of individuals.

This entry discusses the difference between mythic narrative and narrative in general. It examines the role of mythical narrative in politics and in the normative issues that politics raises.

Narrative and Mythic Narrative

The concept of narrative has been widely debated. This increased sense of the importance of narrative reflects the attention to the symbolic dimension of politics, the postmodern critique of the "grand narratives," and the emphasis on language that followed the so-called linguistic turn. Social and political theorists have investigated the ways in which narratives, as succession of events, contribute to making sense of the political world in which we live. Narratives make sense of our experience, and in so doing, they contribute to shaping the identity of both individuals and social groups.

Not all narratives are alike. As a series of events, the basic performance of a narrative is to provide meaning. Even a very banal series of events such as "This morning I took a shower, then I had breakfast while reading the newspaper" is a narrative; it provides a meaning to the beginning of my day. But narratives relevant to politics are usually much more complex than this. Examples of studies of political narratives include Henri Tudor's discussion of the Nazi myth of the Aryan race and Wingo's analysis of the narrative of the American founding fathers. The degree of complexity, drama, and symbolic impact of a narrative can vary substantially. If simple narratives, such as the morning routine mentioned earlier, occupy one end of the spectrum, mythic narratives are at the opposite side in terms of complexity.

A myth does not simply provide meaning but also significance to human existence. *Significance* is more than meaning; something can have meaning and still remain completely insignificant. Mythic narratives add significance and drama by accounting for the origins of things or where things are going. It is from the identification with such a drama that the specific *pathos* of a mythic narrative derives.

Mythic Narratives and Politics

Mythic narratives convey the fundamental beliefs of a social group or society and therefore influence

politics in a variety of ways. Most often they are not learned but rather apprehended through a more or less unconscious cumulative exposure to them. By watching television, listening to political discourse, seeing advertisements, going to school, and so on, we are exposed to a large variety of stories, some of which have a deep mythical impact on our psyche. When this happens, mythic narratives influence our political choices in ways that, to a large extent, escape our capacity for critical scrutiny. Christopher Flood suggests that, having entered our basic and most fundamental perceptions of the world, mythic narratives are consequently difficult to dismantle. Contemporary examples of such narratives include nationalist myths (Tudor), the myth of the proletarian revolution (Georges Sorel), and the narrative of a clash between civilizations (Bottici).

To conclude, political mythic narratives are mapping devices through which we look at the world, feel about it, and also act within it as a social group. Properly speaking, political mythic narratives cannot be falsified because they are not scientific hypotheses about the constitution of the world. They aim to create their own world and can therefore always potentially reinforce themselves. The practical dimension of a political myth cannot, however, be separated from its cognitive and aesthetical dimensions. Mythic narratives provide fundamental cognitive schemata for the mapping of the world: By reducing the complexity of experience, they enable us to come to terms with the multifaceted character of the political world we live in. On the basis of these mapping devices, people also *feel* about the world and *act* within it. Myths thus have an aesthetic dimension; they cast events in a dramatic form.

Chiara Bottici

See also Freud, Sigmund; Identity; Ideology; Imaginary, The; Mass Psychology; Myths; Narrative; Rationality; Sorel, Georges; Symbolic, The

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Myths

Myths are narratives that provide significance to our actions and conditions of existence. Myth is, however, a difficult concept to define. The reason for this is that it has been the object of much theoretical speculation, and every author has found in it the objects with which he or she is most familiar. Linguists have found a world of signs and names, psychologists a product of the deepest parts of the human psyche, philosophers a primitive form of philosophy, sociologists and anthropologists the expression of the fundamental beliefs of a society, and so on.

In the face of this richness, it is surprising that political theorists have largely neglected the topic of myth. Political theorists often dismiss myth as a primitive form of thinking, which disappeared with modern politics. Political myth, in particular, has thus remained a relatively marginal topic. Recently, however, scholars such as Chiara Bottici and Ajume Wingo have explored the relevance of myth for political theory. They highlight the importance of myths and other forms of symbolism for both political mobilization and the preservation of a polity.

Common language depicts myth as false and unreal, as in the expression "myth of progress." The idea that myths are false and unreal is misleading. Contemporary theorists of myth all agree that myths are much more than this: Myths contain the fundamental beliefs of a social group or a society and, as such, cannot easily be dismissed.

The Genealogy of Myth

Common language tends to depict myth as a false account of reality, as in expressions such as "the myth of welfare" or "the myth of progress." This approach is misleading and derives from a series of

prejudices against myth that are rooted in the Western evolution of the concept.

Mythos is an ancient Greek word that means "word, speech." As such it was used as a synonym for *logos,* the word associated today with "reason." It is only relatively late, around the fifth century BCE, that the term *mythos* specialized in the sense of "narrative, tale." It is when philosophers started to vindicate the difference between their professional activity and that of traditional poets such as Homer and Hesiod that the term *logos* began to specialize in the sense of "discourse, calculus, reasoning" and, as such, to be distinguished from "myth," that is, "tale, narrative." Still, the idea of the falsity of myth was not yet part of the primary meaning of the term. For instance, even Aristotle seems to value myths: In his *Poetics,* he says that *mythoi* are the constitutive elements of poetry, whose truth is even superior to that of history because the latter tells facts as they happen, whereas the former tells them as they could have happened according to the different human characters.

It is only with the affirmation of monotheism that myths came to be associated with paganism and polytheism and therefore with the idea of false and deceitful tales that are potentially dangerous. In a monotheistic worldview, there is no space for the pluralism and polytheism of myth. It is not by chance that in Europe during medieval times, ancient mythical material either fell into oblivion or, when possible, was read as an allegory of the superior truth of the Christian message.

The end of the Middle Ages and the affirmation of modernity did not bring with it a better evaluation of myths. Perceived as a primitive form of thinking, myths were believed not to possess any truth. In their attempt to ground the autonomy of the individual on pure reason alone, philosophers during the European Enlightenment associated myth with superstition. As a consequence, every effort was made to eliminate it from politics. It is only in the ambit of aesthetics that myths were given a legitimate place.

Romanticists attempted to revaluate the power of myth, by arguing that it is in the ambit of myth that human beings could find liberation from the abstractness of reason and intellect. In so doing, however, Romanticists simply reproduced the same dichotomy of "myth" versus "reason" upon which Enlightenment was based and did not promote a full abandonment of it.

Contemporary Approaches

More recently, various theorists of myth have shown that, in fact, modernity never got rid of myth. Quite on the contrary, it is in typically modern phenomena such as the big social movements and nationalism that myth's specific political role becomes conspicuous. Well-known examples are the Nazi myth of the Aryan race, which Ernst Cassirer explored, and the proletarian myth of the general strike, which Georges Sorel analyzed.

Recent anthropological theorists have proposed that human beings are all "primitive" in that we all share certain fundamental needs. Myths did not disappear from modern politics, notwithstanding all the rationalism that has entered it. Myths are narratives that contain fundamental moral and theoretical beliefs of a society, and thus there is no reason why they should have disappeared. They respond to a fundamental human need, that is, to live in a world full of meaning and significance, which modernization has not been able to obviate.

Anthropological research has also been useful for revealing the similarity and analogies between mythical beliefs across cultures and epochs. Psychologists have tried to explain this phenomenon by looking at the psychological invariants that they display. In particular, psychoanalysts have pointed to the role of unconsciousness in this process. By relating myths to other forms of symbolism, myths can be seen as collective manifestations of the human psyche that reveal and conceal at the same time its deepest unconscious tendencies (Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung).

The discovery of the role of the unconscious has been crucial for an understanding of the functioning of myth. Together with psychology, hermeneutics and phenomenology have also provided research in this direction. Whereas Kàroly Kerènyi has analyzed the way in which myths, by telling the origins or destinations of things, "ground" (*begründen*) the world we live in, Hans Blumenberg has argued that myths are narratives that respond to a need for significance that changes according to circumstances. Precisely because a myth has to ground a world that continually changes over

time, it is best understood as a process rather than as an object.

A myth typically expresses itself through variants: In each context the same narrative pattern must generate different variants in order to accommodate the new circumstances. If it cannot do so, it ceases to be a myth and becomes a simple narrative. Every narrative can provide meaning that is generally understood, but myths, in contrast, also provide significance. Indeed, as Bottici claimed, something can have a meaning and still we remain completely indifferent to it, whereas something that is significant is something we feel close to.

Significance can be generated on both conscious and unconscious levels. By underlining that myths are processes of continual elaboration of narrative plots that take place in between the two levels, phenomenological research converges with much of the sociological and political research on myth. Sociological and political researchers have been analyzing the ways in which myths convey crucial beliefs of a social group or society by producing and reproducing them in the most different social settings: from official media and propaganda to art, film, advertising, and dinner conversations.

Myths and Politics

A political myth is the elaboration of a common narrative, which grants significance to the political conditions and experiences of a social group. What makes a political myth out of a simple narrative is neither its claim to truth nor its content. For instance, there is nothing political per se in the fact that the world is about to disappear. Notwithstanding this, the narrative of the millennium, which stems from this idea, worked as a political myth, and as a powerful one in certain contexts.

What makes a political myth out of a narrative is (a) that it solidifies and reproduces significance, (b) that it is shared by a given group, and (c) that it can address the specifically political conditions in which a given group lives. A political myth must respond to a need for significance (otherwise, it would be a mere narrative and not a myth), and it must be shared because it must address the specifically political conditions of a social group. One can define politics in the more general sense of whatever pertains to the *polis* (polity) and to decisions concerning the fate of a community or, in a more restricted sense, as the specific form of power that is characterized by the threat of recourse to legitimate coercion. In both cases, politics concerns the life in common, and this is ultimately the reason why, in order to be *political,* a myth must be shared.

The first consequence of this definition is that a political myth cannot be reduced to the stories taken from books and archives. These are only *some* of the products of the process of elaboration of political myth. To establish whether a narrative is a political myth or not, we must look not only at its production but also at its reception, at the ways in which it is shared, at the worldview it promotes, and at the sort of actions it invites. Political myths have a clear practical purpose. They are not only the result of social groups that are already given, but they can also be the means for creating new groups. To put it bluntly, political myths are both the result of, and the means to create, a common identity.

The second consequence is that political myths are not usually learned once and for all but rather are apprehended through a more or less conscious cumulative exposure to them. According to Flood, this also explains the solidifying power of political myths and their capacity to condense into a few images or "icons." By means of a synecdoche, any object or gesture—a painting, an image, a song, a film, or an advertisement—can recall the whole work on myth that lies behind it. This is also the reason why it is often difficult to analyze them: The elaboration of a political myth takes place through icons that allusively refer to the given narrative instead of explicitly conveying it.

Today, the elaboration of a political myth can take place in the most different settings: speeches, arts (visual and performing), rituals, and social practices. This pervasiveness is exponentially augmented in contemporary societies. Due to the role of media in our life in general and of politics in particular, we are exposed to a potentially infinite number of icons. All this has further increased what Flood has called the "primacy effect" of political myth. By remaining at the unconscious level, political myths can deeply influence our basic and most fundamental perceptions of the world, thus rendering them particularly hard to dismantle later on. If political myths have always been difficult to analyze, precisely because their elaboration

takes place at a more or less conscious level, then the recent emergence of powerful new technologies has rendered them less and less perceivable and therefore more subtle. Political myths have become the unperceived lenses through which we experience the world. They are part of our basic components of everyday perception of politics, and for this reason they tend to remain unquestioned. A recent example is the myth of the clash between civilizations: Often criticized as a scientific theory, according to Bottici, it has nevertheless become a lens through which many people across the globe perceive and feel about our political world.

The fact that political myths largely sit in the unconscious makes it particularly difficult to evaluate them. Properly speaking there cannot be a single and identifiable myth-maker. This, however, does not mean that we have no criteria according to which they can be judged. They cannot be judged simply according to their "truth," because they do not aim to "describe" the truth of the world but rather to create their own world. They are not disinterested scientific theories about the constitution of the world, but expression of a determination to act within it. It is therefore from a practical point of view that we must judge them. Political myths put on stage certain models of conduct, and it is therefore such models we must examine, to judge whether they are appropriate to the political values we choose and the political circumstance we live in.

As Wingo has stated, political myths are not therefore always incompatible with the principle of individual autonomy. There can be circumstances in which they are, as is the case of oppressive political myths such as that of the Nazi Aryan race. But this is not always the case. They can also be the means for a political critique and thus for autonomy. For instance, the proletarian myth of the revolution has also been, at times, a means for a critique of injustice and exploitation. Still, as the use that totalitarian regimes have put myths to has shown, even the same myth can turn into a means for oppression in a different context. In conclusion, it is always at the particular circumstances in which a political myth operates and at the specific variants of it that are at work that we must look in order to evaluate them.

Chiara Bottici

See also Freud, Sigmund; Identity; Ideology; Imaginary, The; Mass Psychology; Mythic Narrative; Narrative; Rationality; Sorel, Georges; Symbolic, The

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N

Narrative

Narratives are sequences of nonrandomly connected events. In this general sense, narratives are everywhere. Biographies, curricula vitae, historical texts, letters, novels, reports, medical case histories, law text, and even scientific texts are, or contain, narratives. Narratives are therefore relevant to politics because they are ways of connecting events. By linking together events in space and time, they are a way of making sense of the world. News, discourses of politicians, reports of various kinds, law texts, biographies—all of them are politically relevant narratives. They are means to make sense of the political world and, as a consequence, also of our place within it.

This centrality of narratives raises crucial questions for political theory. If narratives are ways to make sense of the political world we live in, then he or she who can impose them or influence the way we formulate them has the greatest power. Who tells the relevant stories? Which forces determine the crucial narrative plots? In order to discuss these questions, the entry first examines the definition of the concept of narrative and then explores the way in which it influences politics.

Narrative: Toward a Definition

The attention to narrative is a relatively recent phenomenon. The emphasis on language that followed the linguistic turn, the attention to the symbolic dimension of politics, and the postmodern critique of the "grand narratives" have brought about what we may call a "narrative turn" in social and political sciences. Social and political theorists have recently started to investigate the role that narratives play in our lives and our ways of living in common.

Yet, the definition of narrative is still very much contested. The previously mentioned definition of narrative as a sequence of events is a very minimal one, which must be taken as a compromise between different approaches. Structuralists, for instance, typically look for the invariants of narratives. Since Aristotle, it has become commonplace to underline that narratives have a beginning, a middle, and an end. Narratives provide meanings because they contain a trajectory. More recently Russian and then French formalists distinguished between story (or *fabula, histoire*), the basic description of events, and discourse (or *sjuzhet, discours*), that is, their organization through different techniques.

This, however, remains a disputed distinction. Events are always already organized. Properly speaking there are no brute facts: As far as something is perceived and inserted in a sequence of other events, there is already a choice and therefore an organization. This is the reason why different scholars start their investigation of narrative with the observation that a narrative always presupposes someone who tells it. This may appear a truism, but it has the important function of underlining that a narrative always presupposes the choices of whoever created it.

If narratives are not simply objects but processes of telling narratives, then they presuppose

not simply a teller but also an audience. Recently, both linguists and sociologists have underlined that the meaning of a narrative is given not just by the teller but also by the receiver. Meanings are not something that the teller puts in a narrative and are thereafter delivered into the mind of the recipient, but rather are the result of complex processes of telling and receiving. This is the reason why we should qualify the previously mentioned definition by saying that narratives are *perceived* sequences of nonrandomly connected events (Michael J. Toolan). Indeed, a series of events that is not perceived as such by the receiver is not a narrative but a simple juxtaposition of facts.

Narrative and Politics

Narratives are ways to connect events in a nonrandom way, and therefore they are a powerful means to provide meaning to the political world we live in. By connecting events in a nonrandom way, they are a means both for world making and self making. They tell us both what is the sense of our political world in general and also of our place within it. In other words, they are a means for constructing both our identity in general and our political identity in particular.

Which forces determine such a process of narrative telling? In very general terms, we can distinguish between those who emphasize that dominant narratives are means for the missionization and colonization of selves (Michel Foucault) and those who adopt a more interrelational approach underlining the complexity of the process of production-reception and the potentially active role that the receiver can play (Chiara Bottici). In his analysis of the technologies for the construction of the selves, Foucault argued that conversational practices such as letter writing, confessions, teaching, counseling, and so forth, are means for socializing individuals to dominant narratives or truth regimes. This view rightly underlines the normative impact that narrative can have, but it overlooks the variety of possible responses on the side of the receiver.

Furthermore, it overlooks the large variety of narratives that each influence politics and, in particular, the fact that they do it in different ways. As a series of events, the basic performance of a narrative is to provide meaning. Even a very banal series of events such as "This morning the president had breakfast with the prime minister" is a narrative. But narratives that are most relevant to politics are usually much more complex than this. Think of political myths such as the Nazi myth of the Aryan race, that of the American founding fathers, or that of the proletarian revolution (Bottici). The degree of complexity, drama, and symbolic impact of a narrative can vary a lot. If simple narratives occupy one end of the spectrum, mythic narratives are at the opposite side in terms of complexity and practical impact.

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See also Identity; Ideology; Imaginary, The; Mythic Narrative; Myths

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NATIONALISM

Nationalism is generally defined in one of three ways: (1) an abstract notion that human society is divided into nations, (2) a sense of belonging to a given national group, or (3) a political ideology that holds that national communities should be coterminous with nation-states and that these communities should govern themselves. These three definitions are frequently augmented by a typology that seeks to distinguish nationalisms either by characteristics or behavior, variously differentiating them as separatist, ethnic, civic, cultural, classical, or liberal.

A single accepted characterization of nationalism is difficult to reach, partly because a commonly accepted definition of "nation" proves elusive. In contrast to states—political units possessing concrete borders, institutions, and the legitimate use of force—nations are far more

amorphous. Scholars debate whether nations are timeless, ancient, or modern and whether nations came before nationalism or vice versa. Those who suggest that nations are modern are further challenged by the need to determine who created nations and why, prompting a debate about whether they were devised from the top down or the bottom up. Some view nations as objective phenomena that are characterized by common language, culture, history, ethnicity, or religion. Others suggest that nations are "imagined," more a product of the mind than of physical reality.

Most nations take the form of nation-states, a situation in which the national community is coterminous with the institutions and legitimacy of the modern state. This objective represents the ultimate goal of nationalists. Stateless-nations exist when a national group believes itself to be a minority within a larger nation-state. Stateless-nations often generate "separatist" nationalisms—one of the most widely cited, and often vilified, examples of nationalism.

This entry provides a concise overview of several of the major issues and questions involved in the nationalism debate. It begins with an exploration of the most common schools of thought concerning nations and their origins and then examines the various typologies of nationalism itself.

Nation: Definitions and Origins

Nationalist Interpretation

Nationalists believe that nations have always existed and that they are a natural product of humankind's need for coherent social organization. According to this view, every nation is unique and is distinguished by individualized characteristics, such as language, culture, traditions, and geographic homeland. Furthermore, as nations are timeless, all nationalists must do is draw people's attention to their unique identity, culture, and history in order to reawaken deeply internalized national desires. Put another way, nations produce nationalists and not the other way around.

The nationalist paradigm is self-sustaining. Because it is assumed that nations have always existed, the past is easily interpreted in terms of national groups and nationalist struggles. Historical information is easily molded to form a coherent historical narrative that supports and advances the interests of national groups today. Thus, for example, modern Scottish nationalists point to the early fourteenth-century "Declaration of Arbroath" as proof of the long-term viability of the Scots as a distinct national community. This document, a letter to the bishop of Rome written by a collection of churchmen and nobles to demonstrate that a Scottish claimant to the throne of Scotland was more legitimate than an English claimant, is now used to show that the Scottish struggle for independence is at least 700 years old. Certainly, nationalists argue, a 700-year-old struggle for freedom from English domination trumps the 400-year-old Treaty of Union signed in 1707. As political legitimacy is enhanced by historical lineage, the notion that nations are timeless helps lend significant support to the claims of modern national communities. Perennial struggles such as that between the English and the Scots are easily explained by looking to a long history of discord engendered by conflicting national agendas.

The overwhelming majority of academics challenge this vision. Scholars point out that definitions change with time. The meaning ascribed to words similar to *nation* during the ancient and medieval periods was often quite different than it is today. Each Greek *polis* (city-state), for example, undoubtedly possessed its own unique *ethnos* (ethnic identity), yet this does not mean that a polis was the same thing as a nation. Without the benefit of widespread mobility or the ability to disseminate ideas broadly, premodern identities were necessarily more limited in scope. Thus, whereas nationalists point to the Declaration of Arbroath as a clear example of a long nationalist struggle, nonnationalist scholars argue that the document actually mirrored an established legal form of the period, used very different definitions than those utilized today, and was written by a collection of individuals whose allegiance was anything but fixed. Indeed, many of its authors were executed for treason only a few weeks later, apparently after having switched sides.

Although it lacks scholarly support, the nationalist interpretation of nations remains potent because it speaks to a common assumption that age brings authenticity. The greater the patina of age, the more "real" something is. If nations existed in the past, perennial struggles such as that between the English and the Scots are legitimized.

Furthermore, it is difficult to step outside of one's own experience. As modern society is intensely nationalized, it is more difficult to imagine an age without nations than it is to believe that nations are timeless.

Modernization Theory

Modernization theory offers a polar opposite interpretation of nations to that forwarded by nationalists. According to modernization scholars, nations were created by nationalists and are entirely modern. Nations are no older than the French Revolution. Rather than being based on a timeless reality, nations were created almost from whole cloth. The Enlightenment generated new intellectual ideas about liberty, freedom, and self-rule. The Romanic movement fostered historic narratives filled with past glories. And the Industrial Revolution necessitated a much broader conception of society than existed previously. These three factors combined to make nations both logical and possible. In an age of rapid urbanization, it was vital that people from often vastly different rural communities be resocialized to live in newly established urban metropolises. The challenge for nationalists was to develop strategies whereby others might be converted to the new secular religion they had begun to create.

The nationalization process demanded that people learn to speak the same language, internalize the same sense of history, and respond to a common collection of traditions and symbols, many, if not most, of which were created to form the foundation of a new national community. It followed that public educational institutions were introduced to teach young people to be members of the nation. Languages were standardized and literacy promoted. Printing presses ran overtime producing books, newspapers, and broadsheets that perpetuated the existence of collective interests and beliefs. Rural traditions, often quite localized, were refashioned from being examples of regional "low culture" to newly nationalized proof of a collective past. Toward this end, romantic composers such as Bedřich Smetana drew on folk culture to create music that was of more interest to a respectable elite than to peasants. The "purity" of traditional rural life was more widely disseminated: A mythology of horizontal unity replaced a vertical notion of class-based difference. All of this was supplemented by the nationalist interpretation of history. French school children learned of the great nationalist hero Jeanne d'Arc and her efforts to defeat English invaders intent on destroying France. English children learned about Alfred the Great's successful fight against Viking invaders. Students in the United States were raised on tales of the struggle against English oppression and the fight for freedom, while also being told that their nation-state represents the pinnacle of social and political evolution. The newly created national mythology quickly became self-perpetuating, generating its own legitimacy via the logic just described.

Among scholars, the modernization argument is currently dominant, yet there remain divisions. First, scholars differ about the precise process whereby nations were constructed. For some, nations are a direct result of the French Revolution. When the French people asserted their right to choose their own government, they encouraged a much larger belief in self-determination and in a set of collective interests held by the people at large. The notion of "the people" became a potent ideological force that was translated into action by groups beyond the borders of France who were anxious to find liberty, equality, and freedom of their own. Where one nation existed, others necessarily followed.

Other scholars, most notably Liah Greenfeld and Philip Gorski, find the origin of modern nations in the Protestant Reformation. In England, the act of nationalizing the church essentially made God an Englishman. Safe in the knowledge of their divine grace, the English people went on to form a world empire and the first industrialized state. Clearly the national idea worked, so other states such as France, the United States, Germany, and Russia soon followed suit by nationalizing their own people. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, Protestants used biblical imagery to fashion themselves as God's chosen people. Although they might face a fierce challenge from Catholic Spain, theirs was a divinely ordained struggle that would succeed; unity was both called for and achieved. Like England, the Netherlands soon became a world economic superpower, prompting others to follow its model. If we extend this argument to its logical conclusion, it follows that the success of nation-states soon inspired stateless groups to

adopt the nation as a rhetorical tool; the language of the nation-state was every bit as effective for promoting the interests of minority ethnic groups as it was forwarding the goals of the state. Stateless-nations were born.

Still another version, most closely associated with Ernest Gellner, suggests that nations were created by the immediate needs of the Industrial Revolution. Industrial society required that not only should people be capable of living together in close quarters, but they also needed to possess a common language that would allow for the kind of rapid retraining and easy mobility required by industrial capitalism. Nationalists soon met this need by creating an educational system, new traditions, and a common mythology that bound together the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

If nations were created, one is left with the question of who created them. Thus, the second major debate among modernization scholars focuses on whether nations were created from the top down by political and economic elites, by subalterns whose strong sense of identity necessitated that elites adopt folk culture as their own, or by some combination of both bottom-up and top-down forces. Most existing scholarship assumes the top-down explanation. If industrialization made nations necessary, then the work of converting low culture into high culture must necessarily have been undertaken by social and political elites—government officials and factory owners—in whose interest it was to formulate the most productive economic system possible. In contrast, critics argue that such a widespread conspiracy would demand considerable premeditation and planning: a level of foresight for which there is little obvious substantiation. Yet there is also scant evidence to show that the bottom of the social ladder involved itself in any effort to make regional culture national. Most subalterns were simply anxious to survive and had little time to create nations. In the past several years, a growing chorus of young scholars adopted the third view, that nations are actually the product of an ongoing negotiation that is neither bottom up nor top down. Groups from across society added their voices and ideas, gradually shaping modern nations. Although more and more studies reflect this third view, the bottom-up/top-down debate among modernization scholars is far from settled.

Postmodernism

It is arguable whether a truly "postmodern" interpretation of nations and nationalism exists, although many interpret Benedict Anderson's widely cited notion that the nation is an "imagined community" as representative of postmodern scholarship. Reacting against the idea that nations are falsified or invented, Anderson places stress on the idea that nations are created and exist purely within the minds of believers. Whereas all communities are imagined—no community larger than a family is physically tangible—nations differ from these in the way in which they are imagined. Whereas people have always believed themselves connected to others they will never know, Anderson suggests that in the past, these links were thought of in terms of threads of kinship. Nations do not involve direct family linkages, however, and therefore separate themselves from older concepts of community. Even more important, Anderson claims that nations represent what he calls a "deep, horizontal comradeship." They extend beyond class so that all members of a nation, regardless of their material wealth, are equally obliged to all other members. These imagined connections make nations tremendously powerful social networks and make it possible for people to willingly die for an idea.

For Anderson, the process of imagining nations is inseparably connected to the development of "print capitalism," and he places great weight on the distribution of ideas through books, newspapers, and other printed products. Like modernization theorists, Anderson emphasizes the role of Enlightenment ideas and the role of industrialization; indeed, Anderson's view should probably be interpreted as another variation of modernization theory rather than as an example of postmodernism.

Ethno-Symbolism

Ethno-symbolism represents the most recent approach to understanding the historical evolution of nations and nationalism. Developed by Anthony D. Smith, a student of Ernest Gellner, ethno-symbolism suggests that nations as they are known today are modern but they are not invented. Nationalists could not create nations ex nihilo because nations are based on almost timeless

ethnie: various traditions, historical memories, language, and other sociocultural factors. Whereas nation-like identities are almost primordial, nationalism itself is modern, a relatively new creation based on a reformulation of ancient ethnie to meet contemporary demands. Reformulated or not, the long roots of modern nations and nationalism offer important clues, argues Smith, about why nationalism is such a potent ideology. Invented traditions could not possibly spark an almost organic allegiance. In contrast, ethnie change very slowly, carried along by a people over time, passed from elders to the young. Although not biological, these traditions give the impression of being an organic building block of the people. It is no more possible to separate people from their cultural base than it is to remove their brains.

One of the most famous examples of the "invented traditions" that modernization theorists cite as evidence of the creation of nations is the development of Scottish Highland dress during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In essence, the argument holds that a Quaker factory owner developed the so-called short kilt so that his Highland workers would not be caught in the factory machinery. In the years that followed, tartan fabric was transformed into a symbol of clan membership and countless family tartans were developed and catalogued to meet market demand. Meanwhile, the kilt became a popular national outfit for Scots from both the Scottish Highlands and the more Anglicized Scottish Lowlands. Ethnosymbolists challenge this narrative, noting that distinctive Highland clothing far predates the specific form of the kilt and that, although tartan fabric might not have been closely identified with specific families, it represented a significant fashion statement in Scotland. Furthermore, it is impossible to argue against the primacy of clan loyalty in Highland life. The precise markers of Highland distinctiveness may have changed, but the peculiarly Highland culture certainly existed in the more distant past, forming an important component of regional identity—so much so that the English government actually passed a law against Highland dress in 1747.

The debate about the origin and definition of "nation" persists, with none of the major schools of thought willing to yield an inch. Although an agreed-upon explanation for the historical evolution of nations is probably unattainable, the need for consensus about a definition of "nation" remains urgent.

Typologies of Nationalism

Given division over the definition of nation, it should not be surprising that there is little consensus over the nature of nationalism. For many, nationalism is inherently divisive, a product of the far right of the political spectrum. Nations accentuate differences, demanding that like people are placed together at the expense of those deemed to be outsiders. It follows that the logical result of nationalism is xenophobia, violence, and even genocide. Others note that, more often than not, nationalism is banal; nations exist to bind people together, to create unity. Sometimes violence is a result of nationalist activity, but such situations are rare. The far more common face of nationalism is that of countries such as France and the United States, where patriotic celebration is more prevalent than violence and where nationalism is celebrated by fireworks, not fire fights.

With agreement seemingly impossible, scholars of nationalism instead posit an extensive typology of nationalism. Most frequently, one finds reference to ethnic, cultural, banal, separatist, classical, and liberal nationalisms. In essence, this taxonomy is based on a series of assumed opposites that address either the defining characteristics or the behavior of national groups.

Ethnic Versus Cultural Nationalism

By far the most common distinction is that between ethnic and cultural forms of nationalism. According to this view, some nations are defined primarily by racial characteristics, whereas other nations are identified by cultural traits, such as common language, traditions, or history.

Racism and nationalism are not the same things, but ethnic nationalism joins the two ideologies together. According to this classification, ethnic nationalists believe that the world is divided into distinct ethnic or racial groups. Because nationalism assumes that members of the same national groups should be joined together in a self-governing state, ethnic nationalists use racial arguments to justify self-rule. Those who are not part of the

ethnic group represent a threat because they promise to dilute and so undermine the nation. Those who see nationalism as a divisive ideology often cite ethnic nationalism because the inherent sense of racial threat often leads to violent behavior. The genocide carried out by Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims during the 1992–1995 Bosnian War is often mentioned as an example of the result of ethnic nationalism.

Whereas the ethnic variety is seen as the sinister face of nationalism, the cultural form tends to be more celebrated. According to this classification, nations are made unique by having distinctive markers such as language, history, or traditions. These common traits should be celebrated and saved, the members of the national community protected. National claims are premised on the idea that speakers of the same language enjoy more in common with one another than with nonspeakers. Likewise, if cultural traditions are shared, those who take part are bound together by common interests and ideas. The nineteenth-century Irish-Ireland movement stands as a clear example of cultural nationalism. Participants in this movement pointed to Ireland's history of Gaelic speaking and sports as obvious distinctions between the Irish people and the British regime in Ireland. Efforts were made to protect the Irish language by promoting Gaelic speaking; to isolate Irish-speaking areas, or Gaeltachts, from Anglophone influence; to raise Gaelic games, such as hurling, to widespread popularity; and to demand an Irish government that would actively promote these interests.

Banal Versus Separatist Nationalism

Most media discussion of nationalism focuses on national groups anxious to separate from established nation-states. Separatist groups may be cultural or ethnic in nature, but they are unified by their belief that nations should govern states. When larger nations subsume smaller ones, the smaller nation is justified in attempting to create its own state. Separatist groups include the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, Parti Québécois in Quebec, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque Country, and the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland.

The tactics adopted by separatist groups to attain their objectives vary widely, ranging from terror campaigns as waged by ETA and the IRA to the democratic approach utilized by Parti Québécois and the SNP. Likewise, the various groups imagine the precise nature of their nations differently. Thus, on one hand, the SNP bases its call for Scottish independence primarily on economic factors, suggesting that the British government does not fairly represent Scottish interests. The SNP refers to this argument as "civic" nationalism. On the other hand, Parti Québécois bases its call for an independent Québec on cultural and linguistic differences, arguing that if Québécois culture is to be safeguarded, Québec must separate from the rest of Canada.

Although separatist nationalism is most cited in news coverage, according to social scientist Michael Billig, the reality is that most nationalism is "banal." The political leaders of countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, or France are not usually termed nationalists, yet the people of these countries are often more nationalist than are those where separatist movements are active. In stateless-nations, where national groups struggle to create their own nation-state, nationalist leaders must constantly work to mobilize the population. In contrast, most people in successful nation-states are unconsciously nationalist. Among these communities, nationalism exists to unify a people. Nationalism is simply a fact of daily life and a day-to-day reality. Discussion of the "national interest" stands in for impassioned calls for struggle.

Of course, unifying nationalism can quickly and easily change shape as needs alter. During international sporting events or in the face of external threats, "banal" nationalism quickly transforms into a more active "hot" nationalism. The group's nationalism thus becomes overt (though it is often called "patriotism" rather than "nationalism"). Flags proliferate. Rhetoric is impassioned. For example, in the months and years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans mobilized along nationalist lines, drawing on rhetoric of national unity to create a sense of certainty amid fear. The external threat posed by "the terrorists" necessitated an immediate and unified response. Of course, within these calls for unity was a sense that it was "us" against "them," generating the type of xenophobia that critics of nationalism point to when

suggesting the often divisive nature of nations and nationalism.

Classical Versus Liberal Nationalism

In recent years, political philosophers tackled nationalism after previously expressing little interest in the topic. In particular, a debate raged about the morality of nationalism. Given that even the most inclusive "banal" nationalism can become exclusive when a feeling of collective threat is experienced, there is a very real question whether nationalism can be conceived as "ethnical."

"Classical nationalism" demands that members of the nation be vigilant about protecting their ethnocultural group. Citizens might be expected to buy goods manufactured in the nation-state or to actively protect indigenous culture at the expensive of "foreign" threats. Although not inherently dangerous, classical nationalism can easily become exclusive if outsiders are deemed a threat to the community.

Philosophers, led by theorist David Miller, challenge the notion that nationalism must necessarily show a negative face and suggest that "liberal nationalism" might actually promote democracy, human rights, and global stability. The argument in favor of liberal nationalism branches out from the debates outlined previously in this entry. Miller, for example, argues that there is little reason to quibble about the distant ethnic origin of nations or to suggest that nationalists lie about their history. Although there may be ethnic roots and although there is considerable inaccuracy in nationalist history, nationalities are capable of rapid change—within a generation, perhaps—and even the most questionable nationalist mythologies are not completely wrong. Likewise, the reality is that the most successful nations are not those with a single ethnic community, but are instead multiethnic. These successful nations tend to be democratic and tend to forward a strong sense of social justice.

As nations demand that members feel a high degree of obligation to their national community, there is potential to use nationalism to promote positive social and political values. According to Miller, nations lend themselves far more to social justice than to injustice. The more that is asked of a national group, and the more those demands involve the promotion of fairness, the stronger the state and the international community become. Claiming that there is much to be gained by protecting common culture, Miller adds that the state is in an excellent position either to assist in this protection of a national culture, if doing so would be beneficial to the larger national project, or, in cases where culture is hotly contested, to adopt a neutral policy that robs *all* competing groups of potentially divisive power. Finally, he adds that nations help support the idea of strong democracy. Nationalism demands that the people are loyal to the nation first, putting the interest of the national community ahead of personal interests. It demands that people trust one another. Trust is an essential cornerstone of democracy; thus, nationalism promotes democracy.

Naturally there are many critics of liberal nationalism. If nations have long histories, perhaps they are not as easily manipulated to advance Enlightenment ideas, as those promoting the idea of liberal nationalism would have it. Likewise, even if a sense of internal harmony reigns, the tendency to quickly move from a banal to a "hot" form of nationalism is ever present. Perhaps the notion of a kinder and gentler nationalism is little more than a romantic idea.

The End of Nationalism?

During the early- to mid-1980s, when many of the books at the heart of the debates were published, many scholars predicted the disappearance of nations. If nations were invented to meet the specific needs of the Industrial Revolution, or if they developed as a result of print capitalism, then, scholars suggested, nations and nationalism would eventually outlive their usefulness. The realities of a globalizing world of multinational corporations, instant communication, and rapid transportation would deterritorialize identity. Just as print may have made it possible to identify with a heretofore unimaginable number of people, so modern technology and modern capitalism engender the possibility of a global identity. Surely, scholars suggested, new realities will turn us all into citizens of the world.

The reality seems to be rather different. It is true that the post–9/11 world is undoubtedly more globalized, the Internet makes it possible to

instantly communicate worldwide, and Islamist terror organizations apparently seek objectives not defined by nationalist agendas. Yet the answer to these concerns is anything but postnational. The American response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, was decidedly nationalist. Politicians still communicate with constituents using nationalist language. Global communication and easy world travel actually promotes difference as people vigorously seek out the "other." Flags continue to be potent symbols. Nationalist struggles for self-determination continue to take place around the world. Although it is possible that nations and nationalism will eventually diminish in importance, that reality has yet to be realized.

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See also Modernization Theory; Postmodernism; State

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NATURALISM

This entry provides an overview of the naturalistic trends of ancient political thought and contrasts them with variants of contemporary naturalism. It also presents a selection of key naturalistic theses in ancient political thought.

Naturalism in Contemporary Philosophy

There are two main variants of contemporary naturalism: methodological and substantive naturalism. At the core of methodological naturalism is a particular understanding of the relation between philosophical inquiry and contemporary science (hard science, like physics; soft science, like sociology or political science; or both). According to methodological naturalists, philosophy needs to be congruous with scientific methodology. Methodological naturalism is developed as a reaction to the practice of armchair conceptual analysis that dominated Anglo-American philosophy since Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege and maintained a strict division between philosophical and scientific inquiry. According to the philosophical tradition of conceptual analysis, philosophy differs from science in both its object of inquiry and its methodology. Philosophy aims at the study of logical relations between concepts with the aid of a priori analysis. Some methodological naturalists claim that philosophical inquiry must be altogether replaced by scientific inquiry (replacement naturalism). Some others adopt the more moderate thesis that the goal of philosophical inquiry is to provide norms of proper theorizing on the basis of successful scientific practices (normative naturalism).

Substantive naturalism takes two forms: ontological naturalism and semantic naturalism. Ontological naturalism is the thesis that reality consists of one type of entity: natural entities (also referred to as physical entities). Natural entities are the objects of study of the natural sciences and to which the laws of nature apply. For example, ontological naturalists deny that there are mental events or properties (e.g., thoughts or emotions) that either are not reduced to, or do not properly cause, physical events or properties. Semantic naturalism is the thesis that nonnatural predicates (like "good" or "beautiful") have the same reference as relevant scientific predicates, that is, predicates that are used in the language of hard or soft sciences, and that a proper philosophical analysis of nonnatural predicates should identify their coreferential scientific counterparts. For example, a proper analysis of "good" should show that it refers to the same property as "utility maximize," which is amenable to proper scientific inquiry. (This classification of contemporary naturalism relies heavily on Brian Leiter's useful classification.)

Naturalism in Ancient Political Thought

Assimilating naturalism in contemporary philosophy with the naturalistic doctrines of ancient political theorists and philosophers may lead to confusion. For example, though the political philosophies of Plato and Aristotle have important naturalistic trends, these thinkers are hardly methodological naturalists. The congruence of philosophical inquiry with political science, which methodological naturalism about political philosophy could be taken to recommend, makes sense only in a context in which philosophical and scientific inquiries are properly individuated. However, philosophical and scientific inquiry about the political realm are not neatly distinguished but are rather interwoven in Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies. It is equally misleading to take naturalistic elements in Plato's political philosophy to indicate commitment to substantive naturalism. Plato does not identify nature as the proper object of a natural science (at least as natural sciences are currently conceived) and allows nonphysical entities (e.g., souls) to be parts of the causal network of nature.

The naturalistic trends of ancient political thought are best captured by reference to two kinds of naturalism: "explanatory" and "justificatory." Nature is invoked by ancient political theorists in order to explain social phenomena (e.g., the development of city-states and the emergence of law) and to justify and recommend social arrangements (e.g., specific constitutions). Nature is also understood in primarily two ways: either broadly as world nature, that is, an arrangement of the world that includes human nature, or more specifically as human nature.

Explanations by reference to nature (either world nature or human nature) may be of two types. On the one hand, reference to nature may explain why something is *possible*. In this sense to say that X is natural (or by nature) is to say that world nature or human nature makes it possible that X occurs. In this manner we should understand Aristotle's theses in *The Politics* that the city (*polis*) exists by nature (1.2, 1252a30–31) and humans are by nature political animals (1.2, 1253a2–3). Aristotle's point is that humans have an innate impulse for political life, which is accompanied by an inner capacity to develop practical wisdom and moral virtue. The innate capacities of humans make it possible for political organizations like cities to exist. (This account of Aristotle's views follows Fred D. Miller, Jr.'s, interpretation.) On the other hand, reference to nature may explain why something is *necessary* or *unavoidable*. In this sense, to say that X is natural is to say that world nature or human nature not only makes possible but somehow necessitates that X occurs. Thucydides refers in this sense to human nature to explain why in war and especially in civil strife (*stasis*), men will always engage in acts of extreme immorality: "And numerous and horrible were the things civil strife produced in cities—these have occurred and will always occur as long as human nature remains the same" (3.82.2; cf. 3.45). Thucydides' point is that human beings have innate immoral and destructive tendencies. These tendencies are, even under the rule of law in peaceful societies, hard to restrain (3.84). But in a lawless strife, they always manifest themselves with brutality.

In naturalistic justifications one adduces normative reasons in favor of something. This is how we should understand references to human nature within the context of the Stoic theory of appropriation (*oikeiôsis*). The Stoics believed that there is an innate tendency of human beings to identify with and care for other human beings. They further acknowledge that bad education might "corrupt" this natural tendency in human beings, which indicates that for them the natural tendency of appropriation has a normative dimension (*Diogenes Laertius,* VII, 8). Their point is that we should avoid the destructive function of education and follow our natural tendency instead. In a similar manner we should understand Callicles' reference to world nature when he claims that according to nature, it is just for the more powerful to have more (*pleon echein*) than the weaker (*Gorgias,* 482e2–484c3). According to Callicles, human laws have inverted the moral order that exists according to (world) nature. They postulate that it is bad to do wrong (i.e., to take more than others), whereas what is bad, according to nature, is to suffer injustice (i.e., have less than others). By referring to what is just, according to the natural order of the world, Callicles intends to recommend taking more (*pleonektein*).

Naturalistic justifications presuppose naturalistic explanations. For example, the fact that the tendency of appropriation is natural explains why

it is necessary that human beings will feel (up to a degree) compassion for each other. Similarly, the fact that injustice, as having more, belongs to the natural order of the world explains its existence in the world. However, naturalistic explanations do not exhaust the content of naturalistic justifications. Their additional point is that we have normative reasons to conform to what is natural.

A final distinction worth drawing concerns two senses of human nature. On the one hand, human nature may signify a particular person's capacities or abilities, which require education and habituation to be properly developed in stable traits of character. For example, this is how we should understand Plato's account of the nature of the philosopher kings in book 6 of *The Republic* (485b10–487a8). Plato refers inter alia to the abilities of the philosopher kings for quick learning and for strong memory (486c1-d3) and their tendency to be sociable and gentle (486b6–13). These natural abilities need to be developed through the appropriate education in the perfect city (487a7–8) in order to become stable traits of character. On the other hand, human nature may signify the stable traits of character of a particular person who has received the appropriate education and habituation. This is how Plato uses the term in *The Republic* (395d1–3) when Socrates asks: "Haven't you noticed that imitations (*mimêseis*), if they continue from early childhood onward, turn into habits and nature (*phusis*) of one's bodily gestures and one's tone of voice and one's state of mind?" In this passage Plato refers not to one's natural abilities that need to be developed by appropriate education (which involves mimetic activities as its predominant feature), but to the *outcome* of that education, one's developed personality. (A similar distinction between two senses of human nature is drawn by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics,* II.1, 1103a17–26.)

Some Naturalistic Theses in Ancient Political Thought

The pre-Socratic philosophers were primarily interested in the study of world nature. Some of them (Alcmaeon of Croton, Anaximander of Miletus, and Heraclitus of Ephesus) believed that rules of justice govern the workings of the world and are analogous to rules of justice that govern social conduct. For example, Anaximander believed that all beings in the world came from some *apeiron* (unlimited) stuff. In this original state there was a dynamic balance of opposites, which is (world) justice. When some entities come into being from this original *apeiron* stuff, they upset the original, just balance. Their "injustice" is punished by their decay and ultimate destruction. Political justice is an analogous balance of power in social arrangements.

With the Sophists a new theme emerges: the relation between nature (*phusis*) and positive law or convention (*nomos*). Two camps of thought may be distinguished. On the one hand there are those who take nature and positive law to be antithetical. The following illustrates two of the forms this antithesis may take:

1. According to (world) nature, it is just that powerful people pursue their own advantage and have more than others. Positive law tries to restrain and curb the demands of nature by making some type of social equality (conventionally) just. This is the way Callicles formulates the antithesis between nature and law in the *Gorgias*. It is an antithesis between two conceptions of *justice:* natural justice and conventional justice.

2. Justice is conformity with the laws of one's city. Failure of conformity with the laws results in punishment and shame when it becomes public. However, conformity with the laws of one's city frequently conflicts with the demands of human nature (that one pursues one's natural inclinations). So the best course of action is to conform with justice in public (so as to avoid punishment and shame) and nature in private. This is how Antiphon formulates the antithesis between nature and law, on one reading. It is an antithesis between two different kinds of *harm* resulting from violations of the demands of nature and law, respectively.

On the other hand there are those who take nature and positive law to be compatible. For example, Protagoras argues in Plato's *Protagoras* (320a6–328d2) that as a result of Hermes' distribution, all humans share in justice (*dikê*) and moderation (*aidôs*), and this sharing enables them to form societies. Justice and moderation can be understood as natural capacities that need education and habituation to develop into virtue proper.

The fact that these capacities are natural is suggested by Protagoras's explanation of why the sons of some people famous for their virtue are not as virtuous as their fathers (326e6–328c2). Protagoras ascribes the difference in virtue to people's "natural" aptitude (see the use of *euphuestatos* in *Protagoras* 327b8): Some people are by nature able to achieve a higher degree of virtue than others, though all of us are by nature able to achieve the level of virtue necessary for participating in society. Protagoras rejects both that conventional justice is incompatible with natural justice and that the law is ultimately harmful to the citizens. On the one hand, conventional justice is in fact the development of a natural capacity for virtue. On the other hand, the benefit human beings gain by observing laws is not simply avoidance of shame and punishment. Protagoras takes the formation of societies to be necessary for the survival of individuals (322b1–323a4) and thus to serve more basic interests than the ones Antiphon's account allows for.

It is impossible to do justice here to the naturalistic trends of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies. Only an outline of some of their positions is presented here. Like Protagoras, Plato believes that there is no irreconcilable conflict between law and nature. Not only is conventional justice compatible with human nature but it is instrumental to the perfection of human beings and the attainment of psychic harmony. People attain justice in their souls by performing conventionally just actions (*The Republic,* 443c9–444a2). Further justice is a property of the world nature understood as the world of the Forms, which the social arrangements in the perfect city of *The Republic* imitate (500b8–501c9). The social arrangements of the perfect city are explained and justified by reference to both the demands of human nature and the demands of world nature. Only in the perfect city is human nature fulfilled and only the perfect city imitates the just order of the world of the Forms. Plato's explanatory and justificatory naturalism is intertwined with his elitism. He claims that few people (the philosopher kings) are able to understand the nature of true justice and act morally if left free. The majority of people are unable to attain moral perfection on their own. For this reason they should subordinate themselves to the authority of the philosopher kings in the perfect city (474b3–c3).

As noted, Aristotle holds that the polis exists by nature and that humans are, by nature, political animals. Aristotle resorts to human nature to explain how political organizations are possible. In addition to these two theses about the naturalness of polis, he maintains a third thesis, which is central to his naturalism. He claims that the polis is, by nature, prior to the individual (*Politics,* 1.2, 1253a19). His point is not that human beings can exist only in societies. He is best understood as saying that the polis is more complete than each of its citizens taken on his own and thus that social life is a more perfect form of life than solitary, asocial existence. Aristotle also holds some notorious views about the nature of women and slaves (*Politics,* 1.13, 1259b18–1260a24). He takes women to be, by nature, subordinate to men because their faculty of deliberation lacks authority and cannot properly guide their actions. He also believes that some human beings lack the faculty of deliberation and thus are unable to rule themselves. These people are, by nature, slaves and should be subjected to the despotic rule of a master.

Objections to Naturalism

The basic problem for both explanatory and justificatory naturalism concerns the viability of a proper account of nature. On the one hand, the idea that world nature includes a normative just order conflicts with contemporary substantive naturalism and methodological naturalism. (Physical science does not reveal and its methodology is inconsistent with the assumption that there exists such an order.) On the other hand, it has proven notoriously difficult to differentiate between what is the direct result of one's natural makeup and what is the result of one's cultural upbringing.

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See also Aristotelianism; Aristotle; Constructivism; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Plato; State of Nature

Further Readings

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Natural Law

The tradition of natural law goes back to antiquity (notably Marcus Tullius Cicero); it was then incorporated and further developed in Christian moral philosophy (Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham) and saw its most important development as a response to the civil and religious wars during the early modern period. In the seventeenth century, natural law theory clearly was at the height of its theoretical development (Thomas Hobbes and Samuel von Pufendorf were the most important theorists), and its influence across most of Europe not only was felt in dominant political discourses but also was prominently present in the curricula of most law students. Its increasing theoretical elaboration and differentiation dominated moral and political philosophy, and on the practical side, its wide-ranging dissemination during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries influenced the formation of European bureaucracies and civil servants.

Since the fifth century BCE, natural law has provided a system of norms, and since no later than Cicero, it claimed validity and judicially binding force for all human beings. This claim was universal and founded on the assumption that all rational beings were able to grasp and thus follow these dictates of right reason. Such an assumption is controversial, and the development of increasingly sophisticated natural law theories bears testimony to the attempt to argue for such a universal system of binding norms. This complex and far from coherent tradition can be divided into three main strands of natural law theories: (1) pagan or ancient, (2) Christian, and (3) modern. Natural law theories also provided the general foundation for the Western idea of the social contract as the underlying rationale of legitimate state authority, as well as the basis for international law and the claim that each human individual is the bearer of inalienable rights, which should not be confused with modern human rights. Nevertheless, in its different variations, such a claim to a universally binding system of norms still informs modern discussions about human rights and their status and validity in a multicultural world with conflicting customs, religious beliefs, and moral values.

Pagan Natural Law

Before Plato, ancient philosophers perceived natural law as belonging exclusively to the natural sphere and not to that of the human. Heraclitus was the first who perceived natural law as being also part of the constitution of the polis and, more importantly, as the inherent order of the universe. His concept was, however, still limited to the physical powers and did not anticipate the later connotation of a normative system. Applying natural law to the social human sphere, Heraclitus thus described the mutual dependence of the ruling and the ruled. His system expounded the exercise of power in society and already showed some awareness that it was related to the idea of justice, but conceptually there was no clear distinction made between the natural order of things and a normative order.

This concept resurfaced in Stoic and Thomist philosophy as eternal law (*lex aeterna*), which aimed to establish this distinction and to found a normative system of morality and law. Antiphon, a philosopher who belonged to the Sophist School, still argued that right should be derived from the natural order of things, that is to say, the limited concept of physical natural law. In this conception human law is artificial and thus not natural. The inherent consequence for Antiphon and other Sophists (e.g., Hippias) was that only the natural is correct and hence binding. The notion of just and unjust depends on what is perceived as being prescribed by nature. Laws decreed by humans are secondary and arbitrary and thus do not have the same obligatory force as natural laws. Only nature can provide the foundation of obligatory laws.

Anonymus Platonis was the first who argued against this position and combined these naturalistic arguments with the theory of a contract in which humans engaged for their own benefit and thus protected the weak against the strong. All enjoyed freedom and property in this society, but according to Anonymus Platonis, this decreed right was still perceived as being established against nature and thus remained nonobligatory. Another Sophist, Iamblichus, took this argument up and developed it further, arguing that following Protagoras's theory of human culture, people had joined in only society because they could not survive in isolation. Men had committed themselves to establish society by contract only because it had proved impossible to live in society without the rule of law. It was on these necessities that the regulations of a normative order were based, and these regulations allowed for the existence of justice among men. In this new concept and understanding, the idea of what was naturally right began to change significantly.

Plato, too, founded the order of society on human needs, which demanded the division of labor and the institutionalization of the exercise of political power. Similar to Iamblichus, Plato believed that the legal order was ultimately founded on human nature, precisely because it provided the necessary framework to serve human needs. However, he never called his theory a natural law theory, because he believed that the transcendental being of the idea was the true foundation of his theory of justice. Plato clearly overlooked that this position was still deficient to prove the obligatory character of the normative order of a polis, and much more so a universal normative order, beyond a concrete political entity. His argument can only inform humans about their self-interest in the existence of such an order, but not that they should always perceive it as absolutely binding on all their actions.

It was Aristotle who developed a clear understanding of the decisive difference between purposeful rational actions and behavior that is oriented according to existing norms. He distinguished between the possibility and the reality of the human condition. This allowed him to show that the notion of a natural foundation of human political society was indeed "natural," not because of human self-interest, but because it was inherent in human nature to realize its full potential in a political association. This argument encountered immediately the problem of whether these norms were universal. In the end the argument did not go beyond Antiphon's earlier assumption that the natural and legal order were to be seen as the same thing.

It was Cicero who, building upon the Greek Stoic tradition and notably Chrysippus, made considerable progress regarding this *problematique*. For him man was not a political but a social being. This meant, among other things, that the conception was no longer aimed at a specific political and economic experience of the Greek polis, but could be universalized. The law of nature is perceived as a universal commanding and prohibiting norm that obliges all human beings. In this way, the connotation of natural law shifts toward a demand or duty that obliges all human beings. The imperative character of natural law also meant that Cicero and the Stoics had to elaborate on the difference between law *(lex)* and right *(jus)*. In the context of this argument, law was equated with right reason; this allowed Cicero to identify an alternative source for the authority of law. It was possible for Cicero to claim that "law . . . is the distinction between just and unjust things, produced in accordance with nature" (Cicero, *On the Laws,* II-13, p. 134). Thus natural law had received a prominent and independent existence, which superseded and informed positive law (*jus civile*) as well as international law (*jus gentium*). This kind of law is assumed to be eternal and omnipresent. It prescribed the duties each human being had toward his fellow beings. Everybody could conceive these duties because of his right reason (*recta ratio*). Despite the remaining terminology of *jus naturale* (right of nature), the emphasis had thus clearly been shifted from right to the prescribing law of nature.

Christian Natural Law

The foundations of pagan natural law—that is, eternal nature as the basis for universally binding right and human reason as a way to conceive of these existing norms—were at odds with Christian religion. Because according to Christianity the world was founded ex nihilo by divine revelation, which transcended human reason and understanding, it would have been expected that Christian

theologians would criticize pagan natural law. However, Augustine (354–430) and, following him, Aquinas (1224–1274) incorporated pagan natural law into Christian theology and philosophy. Augustine is indeed very close to Stoic Ciceronian philosophy and effectively claimed that pagan natural law was fully absorbed by Christian morality. This was fostered by the fact that Christianity had eventually become the exclusive state religion of the Roman Empire in 381 under Theodosius the Great. Aquinas was the first to elaborate a systematic natural law theory, in his *Summa theologiae*. He combined aspects of the heterogeneous traditions of pagan natural law, Roman positive law, Greek natural philosophy, the early church fathers, and early scholasticism in an impressive systematic doctrine. Despite this achievement he was unable to forge a coherent theory free of contradictions stemming from these opposing traditions. He divided right into eternal law (*lex aeterna*), natural law (*lex naturalis*), human law (*lex humana*), and added the divine law (*lex divina*). This allowed him to incorporate divine law into the pagan teleological concept of right.

The foundation of Aquinas's theory of law was the revealed order of God's creation. In contrast to the pagan natural law theory, Aquinas perceived this order as a normative one and not as a previously held order of being. The eternal law, which humans could perceive because they were endowed with reason, informed the positive human law. Duns Scotus (1266–1308) introduced a fundamental critique of this natural law tradition, because he doubted that the obligatory force of natural law could be derived from reason alone. He claimed, on the contrary, that only God's will could introduce binding norms to humans. This dramatic shift of the argument introduced the notion of voluntarism; that is, that for him, any rational norm or law depended on the will and enforcement of a lawgiver. Only on this basis could he comprehend the possibility of effectively binding and obliging human will by norms. Ockham (1285–1349) developed this voluntaristic natural law theory further, but it was only in the seventeenth century that it developed its full potential, notably in the theory of Hobbes.

The Spanish Scholastics revived the Thomist natural law theory in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Francisco de Vitoria (1485–1546) is the most prominent of these thinkers, followed by Vázques de Menchaca (1512–1569) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Vitoria contrasted the allegedly superior competence of the theologian against the allegedly deficient competence of the jurist. This was part of the centuries-long struggle between these two faculties that is now conveniently and slightly misleadingly summarized as the process of secularization. At the time of Vitoria's own writing—despite the upheavals caused by the Reformation—the theologians were still clearly in the stronger position and the importance of religion for the sixteenth and even seventeenth centuries should not be underestimated. The question of whether the prospect of eternal life in paradise was jeopardized by behavior in this world was of paramount concern. Man in the postlapsarian state (after the fall) was in a morally precarious situation, prone to sin and potentially inclined to mischief toward fellow men. The reason for establishing state authority—able to decree and, if need be, enforce laws—lay exactly in this need to address the shortcomings of men's deficient *fallen* nature. Thus state authority is necessary to remedy individual human deficiencies. The contrast between theologians and jurists is less straightforward and obvious because theologians like Vitoria claimed superiority even over legal and *worldly* matters. This dominance of the theologians regarding natural law theory, as well as its implications for international relations, was profoundly challenged in the early seventeenth century.

Early Modern Natural Law

The predominant theory of political and social philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be identified in the "modern" or postscholastic natural law tradition, which was inaugurated and shaped by the influential writings of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and then further developed by philosophers and scholars like Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), Pufendorf (1632–1694), and Christian Thomasius (1655–1718) or later modified by Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), Christian Wolff (1679–1754), or Emer de Vattel (1714–1767). Conventionally, Grotius and Vattel are perceived as the starting and end point of "modern" natural law theory. It is characteristic of this new approach that it was

undertaken by jurists and philosophers, stemming from a Protestant background, against the predominance of theologians. The natural law theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are therefore an essential part of the process of secularization. Grotius had still maintained, relying heavily on Cicero and the Spanish scholastics, that natural law was universally binding. He claimed that this assumption rested not only on a theoretical and conceptual basis, but also on the fact that natural law was indeed manifest within human experience. Despite Grotius's importance for the development of international law, his contribution to the natural law theory is less innovative than claimed by later natural law theorists such as Pufendorf. Regarding the discussion on which grounds natural law could be universally obligatory, Grotius ignored the insights of Duns Scotus and Ockham and it was Hobbes, and following him Pufendorf, who truly rose to this challenge.

Hobbes wanted to know the source for the existence of norms and on which basis they could really claim validity. His concept of the state of nature is key to this new approach. The passions and the fear of death dominate in this natural state and make man a potentially dangerous being who might want to harm others. Consequently, man is forced to be extremely cautious toward his peers. Second, man has a right to everything (*jus in omnia*) in the state of nature, but as Hobbes is quick to show, this results in the war of all against all, because this right is not protected and not enforceable. On the contrary, everybody might claim, with the same right, the same thing. Therefore, even if we wanted to, we should not trust other people as long as there is no sovereign to protect our rights. Hobbes's main aim in the construction of the state of nature was to demonstrate compellingly the need to leave it, which is achieved by creating the civil state endowed with sovereign power. The sovereign is created either by conquest or contract. The negative and dangerous predicament of the state of nature is eventually overcome by the creation of the *Leviathan* and it is difficult to argue against the compelling argument that man is indeed better off under the legal framework of a state endowed with legitimate and exclusive authority to provide the means to enforce law and peace and to protect its citizens. The only valid criticism is that of Locke, which has been constantly reiterated. Locke simply questioned whether Hobbes's concept of an absolute sovereign would not indeed rather endanger than foster man's liberty and security, if there were no mechanisms for controlling the sovereign to ensure accountability and thus effective prevention of misuse of the sovereign's (unlimited) power.

But this aims rather at the outcome of the contract than at its logic, which was actually shared by Locke, and its ability to create a state endowed with sovereign power under the conditions of the Hobbesian state of nature. His reference to the laws of nature is an important prerequisite for the contractual creation of a state to leave the state of nature, of which the first was to seek peace. But how is it possible that man can trust others and be prepared to engage in a contract under the conditions of the state of nature? For a satisfactory answer to this obvious contradiction one needs to consider time, which is exactly what Hobbes did in his theory. The social contract is not meant to be a contract that is made and fulfilled at a single moment in time, as is the case in a property contract. In Hobbes's creation of the state by contract, this is obviously not the case. There is no defined moment in time at which any of the contractual partners can claim to have fulfilled their obligation. It is a permanent effort that everybody subscribes to in making such a contract. This continuous performance demanded by the contract provides the safeguard against those who do not adhere to the contract, taking advantage of the good faith of those who do. Because of this procedural character the trust we invest in others remains a calculable risk. We can, therefore, seek peace and not be thrown back to the second best, inherently much less stable, and consequently much more dangerous situation, which is to rely on our capacity for self-defense. This allows for a realistic and fairly secure framework in which the sovereign can be created (cf. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* XVII, p. 120). Once the sovereign is in place, he will declare the necessary laws to organize civil society and will take the responsibility of safeguarding the adherence to these laws. From here on, other questions and problems ensue, as manifested in Locke's criticism.

However, it was Pufendorf rather than Locke who took up Hobbes's theory in an innovative and original way. The underlying discourses in natural

law theories had been changed dramatically by Hobbes. Three areas of concern can now be identified: (1) The question of the source and obligatory character of universal rights and laws, as described in Hobbes's state of nature (right to everything and natural laws), had been poignantly resurfaced. (2) Closely related to the state of nature scenario, the troublesome question of whether self-interest or sociability was the prevailing character of human beings needed to be addressed. (3) Natural law theory had to tackle the issue of how to legitimate sovereign state power and to what extent the natural laws actually informed and potentially limited the exercise of this power. In Pufendorf's natural law theory, these aspects were interwoven. Departing from the Hobbesian concept of a state of nature, Pufendorf tried to reconcile the assumption of human self-interest with the idea of man's sociability. Similarly to Hobbes, Pufendorf claimed that the potential insecurity and the lack of legitimate and enforceable justice in the state of nature were its main disadvantages. This was, above all, a juridical argument, because at the heart of these disadvantages lay the absence of a legitimate sovereign power capable of administering peace and justice. Very similarly to Hobbes, Pufendorf argued that there could be no obligation for man without a coercive sovereign authority. In *On the Duty of Man and Citizen,* Pufendorf maintained that

> the true and principal cause why heads of households abandoned their natural liberty [in the state of nature] and had recourse to the constitution of states was to build protection around themselves against the evils that threaten man from man. . . . Admittedly, natural law teaches that men should refrain from all infliction of injuries. But respect for that law cannot guarantee a life in natural liberty with fair security. (Pufendorf, *Duty of Man,* II-5, p. 133f)

But these negative consequences that resulted from man's self-interest in the lawless state of nature were counterbalanced in Pufendorf's theory by a second aspect of man's nature.

This combination of man's self-interest with his sociability was profoundly innovative, because sociability was no longer mutually exclusive with self-interest. On the contrary, Pufendorf maintained that, in the long run, only sociability will guarantee and foster the realization of man's self-interest. This assumption differs not only from the classical Aristotelian understanding of human nature but also from that of Grotius. Pufendorf had asserted that sociability was not only a human inclination, in the sense of Aristotle or Grotius, but also the fundamental natural law that everybody should respect and pursue for the sake of their own interests. This is the argumentative link that Pufendorf establishes between sociability and self-interest.

Thomasius followed Pufendorf's natural law theory to a considerable extent, reiterating the attacks against the natural law theories of Protestant theologians and insisting on the separation of theology and jurisprudence. In the various stages of his writings on natural law, Thomasius carved out a coherent theory of how to achieve peace and security for a society made up of different Christian confessions such as Calvinists, Lutherans, and other dissenting "sects." The role the state was to play in this endeavor was considerable, insofar as, similar to Hobbes and Pufendorf, Thomasius relied on the concept that all laws are derived from externally imposed obligation. These obligations were no longer linked to moral or religious demands but were conceived as an autonomous domain of external obligations imposed by a political superior. The reintroduction of morality (via the *decorum* and *honestum*) in his *Fundamenta* introduced the notion of love into morality, which was later taken up by Hutcheson. But at the same time, this move now served effectively to establish a hierarchical structure of the political sphere of external laws (*justum*) over the sphere of morality.

Both Pufendorf and Thomasius fostered the picture of a linear and purposeful development from Grotius to their own writings. But the early modern natural law is far from being just one coherent tradition or doctrine, despite the opposite claim by some of its leading adherents at the time. The predominant contemporary debates about the state and sovereignty, morals and religion, or toleration and resistance were all closely linked and argued with references to natural law. Pufendorf's work played a central role in many of the contemporary debates of the early eighteenth century. Although most of the various discourses later used some aspects of Pufendorf's theory, it was frequently exploited with near contradictory aims and purposes. The translation of Pufendorf's writings on

natural law by the Huguenot refugee Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744) guaranteed widespread dissemination of these writings all over Europe. Thus Pufendorf was easily accessible to the French republic of letters. The different influences and various adaptations of the natural law tradition by the philosophes are difficult to define. It is not only the relationship between Pufendorf and Barbeyrac that makes it difficult to assess Pufendorf's direct influence but also the very fact that natural law for contemporary Francophone intellectuals was filtered by at least two generations of French-speaking Swiss jurists (notably Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui and Vattel). The influence of natural law was more self-evident in its university-based guise in Scotland than in its less outspoken form in the French salon culture.

The Scottish philosophers were deeply influenced by this Protestant, continental—mainly Dutch, Swiss, and German—brand of thought. In particular, three generations of professors holding the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow (Gershom Carmichael, Hutcheson, Adam Smith) proved to play key roles in incorporating the natural law tradition. Consequently, the importance of Pufendorf's natural law theory for the Scottish brand of moral philosophy has been stressed for a long time. The most significant contribution to the natural law tradition was made by Hutcheson, whose moral philosophy was founded on virtue, which manifested itself in beneficial *caritas* or *benevolence*. Hutcheson's approach not only highlights a crucial conceptual discrepancy between Pufendorf's theory and his own, but it seems also clear that their intentions were less congruent than Hutcheson had implicitly suggested. Hutcheson criticized Pufendorf and Hobbes, in that he asserted that virtue is a natural sentiment in man and thus independent from, and possible without, civil laws.

The crucial argument at the heart of Hutcheson's own theory in the course of his controversy with Bernard de Mandeville (1670–1733) was that the differentiation between the state of nature and civil society does not tell us anything about the natural disposition of man. Thus it remained still to be clarified in how far virtue and *moral sense* were natural to man. However, Hutcheson was far from being satisfied to derive human sociability from a calculation of self-interest or divine laws. He countered Mandeville by trying to strip Pufendorf's doctrine from its Hobbesian premises. Underpinning Pufendorf's arguments with this completely different emphasis allowed him to reconcile Shaftesbury's arguments with Pufendorf's natural law theory. Virtue and *moral sense* lay thus at the heart of Hutcheson's doctrine and were responsible for man's deeds in the state of nature as well as in civil society, as it was inherent in human nature to follow the lead of moral sentiments independently of exterior dispositions. Hutcheson's theory thus anticipated and informed the utilitarian philosophy of the nineteenth century. This idealistic outlook on man's nature eventually manifested a radical departure from Pufendorf's skeptical perception of human nature, which underpinned his natural law doctrine. The fundamental question, which all philosophers discussed, was how moral obligation could be established and secured in order to foster human society. Natural law constituted one important part in this intellectual struggle to analyze and envisage the improvement of human society. But differing concepts of the scope and function of citizenship led to contrasting adaptations and deployment of elements from the same canon of natural jurisprudence.

Natural Law and International Law

The key argument of the natural law theorists concerning international law consisted in the assertion that interstate relations could be regulated by a code of law, enshrined and present in natural law. The assumption that natural law itself could already be perceived as an obligatory law was indispensable for this theory. Grotius maintained that right could exist only with a corresponding obligation. But because for him natural law was demanded by right reason and given by God, the obligatory character of nonpositive natural law could become the basis for legal relations among sovereign nations. This notion of obligation derived from natural law is at odds with the strict voluntaristic idea of right in Hobbes. Hobbes's differentiation between the *foro interno* and *foro externo* is crucial, because it reveals one fundamental difference from most other natural law theorists, who believed the laws of nature to be already sufficiently binding on man and sovereign states. The early modern tradition of international law, from the Spanish scholastics to Grotius, did not attempt to justify international law with a theory of

sovereignty. Rather, it was basically concerned with empirical conditions of war and peace, and the possibility of establishing regulations that would allow restrictions on war and that could also foster and secure peace treaties. Because it proved impossible to avoid war in the first place, their writings aimed to circumscribe warfare. Among the early modern natural law theorists, the Swiss theorist of jurisprudence Vattel presented the most significant theory of international law on the basis of natural law. Similar to Vattel, Pufendorf had already advanced this kind of argument. Both thinkers used the Hobbesian state of nature as the fundamental insight into interstate relations. They did not stop there, but applied the laws of nature in order to overcome this anarchic scenario of an unregulated right of everybody to everything. Their theory of duties, derived from natural law, provided the basic means by which the sovereign is urged to comply with the commands of natural law in international relations. Whereas Hobbes highlighted the problems occurring from the absence of any sovereign power governing the relationship between nations, Vattel pursued an opposite route. If one perceives the obligation to follow natural laws as characteristic of the state of nature, as Vattel did, then the equation of the state of nature and international relations can be seen not only to describe the potential conflicts, but also to provide the means by which they may be settled. A certain weakness in this natural law argument cannot be denied, if one reads Vattel's assumption of the validity of natural laws against the Hobbesian concept of the state of nature. The idea of sovereign states reproduces the antinomy of rights as perceived in the state of nature, and this problem still remains for our own time as far as the relationship between nations is concerned.

Peter Schröder

See also Aquinas, Thomas; Cicero, Marcus Tullius; Grotius, Hugo; Hobbes, Thomas; Human Rights; Locke, John; Pufendorf, Samuel von; Social Contract Theory; Sovereignty

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Natural Rights

Wherever human beings have experienced a common life together under government, they have made claims upon and against one another, as well as upon and against the government that claims authority over them. When doing so, they have relied on particular political vocabularies or languages in which to express those claims. Sometimes the words in their vocabulary are new, invented in the course of political thinking and activity. Sometimes they are drawn from existing political or legal vocabularies or taken over from ordinary language and put to new use. So it was with the language of natural rights, which emerged in

Europe in the medieval period and was employed by a succession of thinkers and writers down to the eighteenth century and beyond. The exponents of natural rights language drew upon the languages of Roman law and canon law in developing a vocabulary to express claims to those things to which human beings were entitled prior to, and independent of, the claims of political authority. This entry provides a thumbnail sketch of some of the pivotal moments in the history of the development of this vocabulary.

At the center of these developments was one word in particular: the Latin word *jus*. In the Roman law tradition, a jus was originally understood to be something objectively right or just that specified what was due between persons and things as parts of an ordered whole. This understanding harked back to an older idea, owed to the Greeks, that justice was the condition of any complex whole in which the parts fulfilled their particular functions. The Greeks had construed nature as a complex whole and found in it the pattern for justice between persons under government. Thus Aristotle, for one, distinguished between natural right or justice (*physikon dikaion*) and legal right (*nomikon dikaion*), the latter being grounded in and beholden to the former. The Romans had absorbed these ideas and translated them into their own idiom. In the process, they had come to emphasize the customary rights (*jura*) of persons, which specified what was right or proper for them as Romans, over natural rights (*jus naturale*), which specified what was proper for them as creatures, but they had retained the idea that what was specified was in essence objective: a thing that was allowed to people if they satisfied an independent standard set by custom or by nature.

Thomas Aquinas reversed this emphasis, restoring the primacy of nature over custom upon which Aristotle had insisted. In his writings he identified several meanings of *jus,* but on his account its primary meaning was "the just thing itself," the object of the virtue of justice. What was just, in turn, was given or conditioned by the rule or law that specified what was due to each person in justice. Of these rules, the most immediately salient was the law of nature (the *jus* or *lex naturae*), which God had promulgated at the creation to regulate the order that He had made. Natural law provided an ideal standard for human interactions even as it furthered the good of the universe as a whole. It was through doing their parts in this whole that individual human beings would flourish: There could be no conflict between the good of the individual and that of the whole. If people had been imbued by God with certain powers and faculties, then this was to enable them to perform the duties prescribed by His laws. Accordingly, the meaning of *jus* could be extended to include not only what was objectively right, but also those possessions or powers that enabled human beings (subjects) to do right—an ambiguity apparent in the rendering of *jus* into modern English variously as law, duty, or right.

Aquinas's position involved a further ambiguity, in that the law of nature, which specified what was right, existed both beyond the world (as rules in the mind of God) and within it (as the natural inclinations of each thing toward the end God had in mind for it). The distinguishing characteristics of modern natural rights theories may be understood as growing out of attempts to clear up these ambiguities: The idea that natural rights can be assigned to individuals who then possess ownership and discretion over them has its origins in the notion of subjective right. The subjective right, according to Aquinas, is subordinated to objective right. The idea that such rights cannot be prescribed—in the sense that they belong to human beings as human beings (not as creatures of God or members of particular political communities)—has its origins in the notion of human beings as bearers of natural powers, propensities, and faculties that enable them to perform certain actions or entitle them to certain sorts of treatment, which, according to Aquinas, are ordered to divinely instituted ends.

These two lines of development are conceptually independent of one another, but they were closely intertwined historically. As a result, the history of natural rights theories has come to be written in two quite distinct ways: as a history of the development of the idea of subjective rights and as a history of the development of the idea of human dignity as the basis of those rights. Richard Tuck has argued that the origin of natural rights as subjective rights should be traced to the conciliar movement of the fifteenth century, in particular to the writings of the French theologian Jean Gerson, whereas Brian Tierney has emphasized instead the contributions of Gratian, William of Ockham, and

the Spanish scholastic thinker Francisco Suárez to the doctrine that human sociability and dignity are the bases of all law and right. Their accounts should not be read as disjunctive alternatives but rather as two sides of the same story.

On Tuck's view, it was Gerson who first distinguished categorically between jus as a power or possession of persons and what was objectively right. In establishing this distinction, Gerson had equated jus with ownership (*dominium*), which belonged to people naturally and which licensed in them the power (*facultas*) of obtaining whatever was necessary for their preservation. This had the effect simultaneously of individuating rights, as rights were now rooted in individual subjects, and of assimilating freedom (*libertas*) to rights (*jura*), as it was generally acknowledged that freedom was one such facultas. It was left to others to work through the wider possibilities inherent in this position.

In the first instance, this work was undertaken by a group of Thomist and neo-Thomist theologians based at the University of Paris in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Among these theologians, the most significant were Conrad Summenhart, John Mair, and Jacques Almain. Summenhart was credited by Tuck with elucidating the notion of subjective rights as active rights, that is, powers that enabled individual human beings to claim what they required for themselves. Mair and Almain contributed the innovative notion that the most effective way to claim such things was to appropriate them for one's own use. Thus it could be said that people had property in the things that they used to preserve themselves. One striking implication of this manner of speaking was that, other things being equal, freedom, as much as any other right, would count as a property and so might be traded like any other property, in exchange for protection or preservation. On this basis, a strongly individualistic doctrine of natural rights might conceivably be used to justify absolute government just as easily as to hold such a government to terms. Perhaps for this reason, others were unwilling to countenance the idea that the right to liberty could be traded away.

Writing in response to the St. Bartholomew Day's Massacre of 1572, in which scores of French Protestants were summarily executed by the Catholic authorities and numberless others died in the violence that followed, some Protestant thinkers argued that men were born in a condition of natural liberty and that this liberty was a privilege of nature that could never be rightly withdrawn or disavowed. From this they inferred that government must therefore originate in an act of free consent, because there could be no such thing as government without the decision of naturally free people to establish it, a point that the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* of 1579 underlined emphatically. In parallel, they played up that aspect of natural law thinking that emphasized the natural powers and sociable propensities of human beings and played down the notion of natural law as a set of divine rules standing outside the world. This allowed them, on the one hand, to suggest that governments had certain responsibilities toward their subjects and could be resisted (if not removed) if they failed to meet those responsibilities and, on the other hand, to dispense with appeals to divine law or religious obligations to justify their rights and liberties. Natural rights in this context meant those basic powers or freedoms that political authority, itself the product of a social contract or agreement, had to take into account. If these rights retained the connotation of duty in being derived from natural law, there was little sense that they were the correlates of objective duties to God.

A further series of refinements to natural rights language was introduced by thinkers of the early School of Salamanca, including Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, and, latterly, Suárez. Vitoria had been trained at the University of Paris, and on his return to Spain he began to disseminate the ideas he had inherited from Mair and Almain. It was by this rather circuitous route, whose windings have been charted by Annabel Brett, that Suárez came to restate systematically the view that jus in its strictest sense referred to the moral power that every human being has over oneself and one's own property, or with respect to what is due to one, especially in the matter of one's own preservation. This view subsequently entered the mainstream of Western political thinking in the seventeenth century via the writings of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius.

Grotius argued that in its most fundamental sense jus meant a capacity or power possessed by an individual human being that enabled him to do or have something justly. To have a jus, in this

sense, was to be able to engage in certain beneficial actions without censure or external restraint. Grotius thereby extended Suárez's emphasis on self-preservation, placing self-interest at the center of a juridical system that composed a complex whole. But he also echoed the Protestant thinkers of the preceding century in suggesting that this whole operated according to principles of sociability lodged in human nature. Famously, Grotius insisted that these principles would be operative even should it be granted that there were no God and He had no care of human affairs (the so-called *etiamsi daremus* clause).

By subsuming natural law into human nature, Grotius decisively removed discussions of rights from the ambit of moral theology into that of moral philosophy. He opened the way for discussions of rights that, appealing to certain natural facts (such as the fact of being human), came in time to be cast in the language of human rights that is so ubiquitous today. But he continued to conceive of rights as elements in a complex of juridical relationships fixed by law—albeit a law that merely codified certain natural propensities and characteristics of human beings—and so was able to use jus in its objective sense too, the meaning it bore in the title of his great work of 1625, *De Iure Belli ac Pacis* (The Rights of War and Peace). Matters took another turn with Thomas Hobbes.

Hobbes stipulated peremptorily that the subjective meaning of jus was the only legitimate one, that the right people had by nature (*jus naturale*) was a liberty to do whatever they judged necessary to their preservation, in contradistinction to the law of nature (*lex naturalis*) by which they were forbidden to destroy themselves. Law and right, he declared, differed as much as obligation and liberty, and the two should not be confounded. Thus it was Hobbes who opened the way for rights to be discussed and asserted without reference to law at all, and to be filled out with whatever content the individual judged necessary to his or her preservation and flourishing.

Natural rights thinkers after Hobbes recoiled from the more extreme implications of his views, but they accepted his stipulation that a right was paradigmatically a liberty. So much is evident in the writings of John Locke and Samuel von Pufendorf. With Locke, these liberties were understood as grants from God, the pendants of duties to Him, our neighbors, and ourselves, which were derived from natural law. Where Pufendorf followed Grotius in discovering the basis of this law in man's characteristics, Locke treated it rather as a set of divine commands to be inferred from without. In reconnecting rights with law, Locke was able to specify the content of those rights to the triumvirate of life, liberty, and estate. In Locke's view, any government that threatened these rights vitiated its authority, because government was an agency authorized only to protect people and maintain their rights.

In the eighteenth century it was a crude version of Locke's view that predominated. Locke was taken to have said that under the law of nature (which was construed in Grotian rather than Lockean terms) every man had the right to life, liberty, and property, and it was the job of government to secure these. It was a version of natural rights doctrine along these lines that seems to have inspired the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, though it is worth noting the Hobbesian undertones in both: The rights they proclaim are generous in number and scope, and the first speaks of the right to pursue happiness—something very much at odds with Locke's own understanding of rights.

Whether or not these declarations marked the apotheosis of natural rights language, it was already coming under attack. Jeremy Bentham pronounced natural rights simple nonsense—indeed nonsense upon stilts—having earlier rejected natural law as the standard of morality. For a long time this attack pushed natural rights language into retreat, but it has recently attracted renewed attention following the rediscovery of Aristotle and Aquinas by analytical philosophers. The language of human rights, meanwhile, has taken on a life of its own.

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See also Civil Rights; Grotius, Hugo; Hobbes, Thomas; Human Rights; Locke, John; Natural Law; Roman Law

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Negative Dialectics

Negative Dialectics (1966) is often seen as the most fully developed philosophical text of Theodor Adorno (1903–1969). Adorno was a philosopher, sociologist, and theorist of music and literature. A key member of the Institute of Social Research, commonly known as the Frankfurt School of critical theorists, he returned to West Germany in 1949, after having lived in exile in the United States since the late 1930s. Adorno wrote prolifically on topics in social and political thought, philosophy, and aesthetics. His influence in Anglophone social theory has grown steadily since the first translations of his work in the late 1960s. In recent years, Adorno's ideas on negativity and identity, instrumental and administered society, the culture industry, and twentieth-century musical forms have been influential in social and political theory, Continental philosophy, cultural studies, musicology, and literary theory.

Negative dialectics is also the name of a system of thinking that Adorno maintains would better be called an antisystem. The work is a culmination of his lifelong grappling with Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's metaphysical idealism. Adorno aims to take elements from Kant and Hegel while denying the systematic claims, by Kant to categorically separate intelligibility from sensibility, and by Hegel to integrate all aspects of particularity as moments of an all-encompassing conceptual universality. According to Adorno, both systems inculcate passivity, an uncritical acceptance of existing social hierarchies and institutions. However, both philosophers are seen by him to offer crucial resources for a more critically conceived and socially transformative philosophical outlook. From Kant, Adorno draws the point that concepts can never wholly cover or exhaust the particularities they comprehend. Adorno calls this the preponderance or priority of objects over the subjects who seek to know them. Its consequence, in his view, is that metaphysical idealism fails in its attempt to set the mind over the world and that positivism, which claims to deal pragmatically with the facts as we find them, misses or conceals the intrinsically dynamic quality of things. From Hegel, Adorno takes the insight that dialectical thinking is consistent reflection upon what he calls the nonidentical, that is, difference or particularity. Adorno argues that Hegel saw that identity in thought (i.e., categorization of different instances under the one concept) is dependent on nonidentity but failed to do justice to this insight. Negative dialectics, in contrast to its Hegelian counterpart, refuses to consign differences to any overarching conceptual identity. Hegel propounds a logic of total integration, whereas negative dialectics points to what Adorno calls a logic of disintegration.

Philosophers must think against their own grain in an effort to acknowledge the gap between things and their conceptual, covering ideas. Adorno notes ironically that the use of concepts to unseal the nonconceptual places negative dialectics (the mode of his own thinking) in the situation of baron Münchhausen, who sought to pull himself from a swamp by his own hair. But this need not make impossible the project of thinking both with and against concepts. Adorno provides a sociological argument for negative dialectics to bolster the purely philosophic effort. Drawing primarily on Karl Marx's theory of value, with additions from Georg Lukács's development of the idea of reification, Walter Benjamin's allegorical rendering of commodities, and Alfred Sohn-Rethel's paralleling of logic and economics, Adorno argues that the capitalist economic principle of exchange is at once the substratum and the effect of the philosophical principle of identity. This means that the transformation required to break the stranglehold of identity thinking is not only a conceptual change but a social or economic shift away from the exchange relations of capitalist society. If it is through those exchange relations that individuals

and performances are made commensurable and identical, then a change in the social relations will carry with it a change in the manner and effects of our thinking. Despite his largely pessimistic outlook on modern history, Adorno was yet hopeful that human beings want their social relations to be based on freedom and that a society reconciled with reason would be nonviolent and free.

Under the regime of what he calls "identitarian thinking"—which mirrors the dominance of capitalist commodity exchange—ideas, physical objects, and human subjects are categorized and traded as purely fungible entities. By contrast, in what he calls the reconciled condition, both human existence and conceptual thought would exist above identity and above contradiction. Adorno is certain that this is a utopian condition; yet it is not inconceivable or purely imaginary. Indeed, Adorno suggests that we already conceive such a world whenever we speak of identifying *with* people and things instead of identifying them *as* objects with this or that value and as persons of this or that type. It seems then that Adorno's philosophy is not a logic-baffling invocation of nonidentity in every respect so much as an argument for a notion of identity that escapes the framework of identitarian or classificatory thinking. He says as much, in stating that the logic of identitarian thought says what something comes under or what it represents, whereas the thinking of nonidentity tries to say what something is.

This alternative sense of identity, a sense in which nonidentity contains identity, can hardly be stated without paradox, and *Negative Dialectics* is an enigmatic work that seeks to open up the sensory and lived world through concepts but without reducing the world to concepts. Adorno's suggestion that for thinking to be true it must think against itself evinces his awareness of the paradox. Negative dialectics is an antisystematic philosophy that aims to think conceptually while questioning the invariance and categorization that concepts themselves require. His questioning of the embedded idea of identity as exchangeability points to the seriousness of Adorno's refusal to sanction assumed patterns of thought rather than to the absurdity of that refusal.

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See also Critical Theory; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Kant, Immanuel; Marx, Karl

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Negativity

Negativity, together with cognate words such as *the negative* or *negation,* is a common term in political theory, but it remains an elusive concept. The paradox of the negative is that it is, in principle, averse to definition or identification because this would render it fixed, positive. Sometimes used casually to describe a state of mind or attitude, it also has profound significance within certain philosophical traditions. Negativity is especially crucial for critical approaches and in particular for dialectics, where it received its most elaborate development in the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx. In the twentieth century, negative thinking is perhaps most associated with the Frankfurt School, but existential phenomenology is also important in locating negativity ontologically. The terminology of the negative has subsequently been eschewed by poststructuralists, deconstructionists, and vitalists, who instead espouse affirmation, creativity, and difference. It is these three approaches to negativity—critical–dialectical, phenomenological–ontological, and poststructuralist–affirmative—that structure this entry.

Before proceeding with this discussion, it is germane to acknowledge that disparate references to the negative appear in additional contexts, usually as an adjective. For example, Isaiah Berlin famously distinguished between negative liberty, or freedom from, and positive liberty, or freedom to. In this case he supported the negative version. Michel Foucault, on the other hand, distinguished between negative and positive approaches to power but commended the positive version: not because he favored power as such, but because he advocated an analytics that recognizes its productive, constitutive force as opposed to its merely coercive, negating capacities. In recent political philosophy,

too, one sometimes finds references to negative theology: an allusion to an absent God associated with messianic themes found in thinkers such as Jacques Derrida. More prosaically, political writers often use negativity as a pejorative description of attitudes that seem unduly pessimistic. This ranges from casual expressions of exasperation (e.g., "Oh, you're just being negative!") to charges that a theory is unhelpfully negative or nihilistic because it offers no constructive alternative.

Negativity, Dialectics, and Critical Theory

The preeminent thinker of the negative is Hegel. For Hegel the dialectic is the movement of negativity and it is negativity that drives the dialectic. His work unfolds an ontological, logical, and historical process of becoming that works itself out through the internal operations of the negative. A thing (or subject) does not possess any positive, self-sufficient identity. Situated among other things (or subjects), it develops a provisional but increasingly complex identity over time by excluding or negating, by differing from, what it is not. In more technical language: Determination is negation and negation is determinate. Rather than the inert logic of Aristotelian contradiction that leaves A and non-A opposed, there is a lively interpenetration of initially antithetical terms, engendering a third that is more than the sum of its parts. Through this process of determinate negation and synthesis, phenomena assimilate aspects of their others and thereby expand to become more encompassing, more rational. To put it another way, phenomena that at first appear most immediate and simple according to common sense are actually the most abstract. They become concrete through a process of mediation, whereby false or limited assumptions are negated and greater relationality enriches their overall significance. Imagine, for example, the sort of argument deliberative democracy favors. While two participants might start with crude statements of their respective interests or opinions, reasoned conversation is intended to negate prejudices vulnerable to critical interrogation; the result is a more informed, more valid, perspective that exceeds what either interlocutor initially believed. Interacting with the material world through, say, creative labor similarly entails the negation of immature presumptions, as more effective ways of re-forming nature are explored through experience; as a consequence, both matter and consciousness are changed through their encounter. Indeed it is difficult to escape this dialectical movement of the negative, because to criticize it is to bring another antithesis into play that feeds into the dialectical process of enriching knowledge and experience.

Without needing to ascribe any mysterious agency to it, one can see why this movement of the negative has a progressive impetus. Most dialectical thinkers endorse this sense in which criticism has a progressive, emancipatory trajectory without necessarily believing it will culminate in a completed totality, such as communism or absolute knowledge. It is, rather, the creative–destructive ferment of the negative that is important. The model of thesis, antithesis, synthesis captures this dynamism poorly, and Hegel's supporters tend to view it as an unnecessarily crude formula for the lively productivity of the negative as the internal dynamism of things.

What remains powerful about dialectics is the critical purchase it gives on the present. An enduring implication of Hegel's philosophy is that any institution or identity is a contingent, provisional stabilization that contains the forces of its own destruction and overcoming. Everything is in motion because every positive form depends on what it is not and contains internal lacunae and tensions, limits and one-sidedness, and hence falsity, contingency, and openness. In this sense temporality is an important aspect of negativity because everything evolves over time, propelled by its own lack and dependency on relationships with its others. Every given object or meaning is alive with possibilities not yet realized, and in this sense it is not (yet) what it has the potential to become. Negativity thus implies a resolutely historical, interpretive, contextualizing approach to all phenomena.

As a consequence, negative thinking mounts a fundamental challenge to ideologies that present meanings or institutions as ahistorical or essential. This is the critical logic Marx applied to the material world to show that capitalism and its accompanying liberal values are temporary, social phenomena. Not only can they therefore be changed by collective action, but a dialectical interpretation of history also discloses which forces are in ascendancy, the weaknesses and anachronisms of the prevailing system, and the interests

that its preservation serves. Feminists have used a similar logic to challenge beliefs that the family is a universal, natural arrangement as opposed to a historical institution fecund with internal antagonisms. From such perspectives, the legacy of Hegel and Marx is not a redemptive grand narrative but a way of engaging critically with the current state of affairs that recognizes every apparently positive form as shot through with negativity. Negative thinking undermines the self-assurance of common sense and dominant interests to break the spell of the given. Politically it suggests radical praxis: action informed by theory and theory informed by analysis of contemporary experience and social structures. It summons a negation of conditions as they are, hence the negative's affinity with revolution and revolt, rejection, refusal, opposition, and radical questioning.

This kind of negative thinking was best exemplified in the twentieth century by the first generation of critical theorists, notably Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse. For them, the crucial insight of Hegel, but especially of Marx, was that negativity operates within society and not merely in thought. Critical reasoning means identifying the contingencies, antagonisms, irrational shortcomings, and transformative forces operating beneath the surface of late modern societies. They quickly reached the conclusion, however, that history had prematurely ended, the transformative impetus of the negative being foreclosed by a combination of monopoly capitalism, total administration, instrumental (calculating, technological) reason, and the anesthetizing effects of mass culture. The sense in which the positive or affirmation is the enemy of negativity comes across clearly, indeed militantly, in their work. Thus Adorno rails against a fetish of the positive and sets against it the seriousness of unswerving negation that refuses to sanction things as they are. In *Negative Dialectics* he would practice a resolutely nonidentity thinking, struggling to sustain the openness of the dialectic against every form of closure by keeping in play the fragments and antagonisms that subvert every positive synthesis.

There was also a more precise form of positivism the critical theorists attacked. When Adorno and Horkheimer wrote a series of essays on sociology during the 1950s, methodological positivism was their main target. In these essays, they warned against the trend for methods of natural science to be applied to the human sciences, with positivists insisting on a fact/value separation that reduced sociology to the observation, classification, and recording of facts. As a consequence, the (negative) critical or normative dimension is evacuated from the study of society to become impotent abstraction, whereas social science is rendered positive in the threefold sense of replicating the empirically given as a reified reality, uncritically endorsing the facts as they are, and becoming an instrument for use by powerful elites averse to change. As they summarized it, the philosophical impulse to transform "ought" into "is" surrenders to an acceptance of the "is" as the "ought." This situation was exacerbated by the rise of logical positivism, whose aim was to cleanse language of normative terms such as *liberty* or *justice,* now presented as no less chimerical than ghosts or gods in their metaphysical obsolescence. Marcuse voiced similar concerns in his book *Negations,* arguing that negativity had been almost entirely extinguished from late modern culture.

When Marcuse identified such societies as one-dimensional, it was the second dimension of the negative he found suppressed. Some of the chapter headings of *One-Dimensional Man* are indicative of his concerns: "Negative Thinking: The Defeated Logic of Protest"; "From Negative to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality and the Logic of Domination"; "The Triumph of Positive Thinking: One-Dimensional Philosophy." Marcuse, like Hegel, practiced determinate, immanent negation: an identification of the suppressed possibilities of the present at its current level of techno-productive development, specification of its irrationality in developing massive military and ecological threats to life itself, and analysis of the system's failure existentially to satisfy its own ideals of freedom. Against this totality he called for a Great Refusal, although his work is testimony to the difficulty of identifying oppositional forces capable of setting the negative in motion once more.

Negativity as Ontological

Much modern thinking remains in the shadow of Cartesianist dualism, which presents consciousness and the material world as ontologically dichotomous. An advantage of dialectics is its

demonstration of the irreducible reciprocity and entwining of such oppositions. This has a twofold significance for considerations of negativity. First, as the existential phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued, dialectics had fallen into crisis by the mid-twentieth century because its practitioners rarely managed to sustain its negativity. Failing to negotiate the complex relationships and reversals between subject and object, they fell onto one side of the Cartesian divide, espousing either positivist realism or moralistic idealism. Reinvigorating dialectics, he concluded, required a return to ontology in order to locate the negative within Being itself. Second, Merleau-Ponty's principal interlocutor was his fellow phenomenologist Jean-Paul Sartre, who had also tried to identify negativity ontologically but had replicated the Cartesian divide between an inert, fully positive material world in itself and a free, transcendent consciousness that is the source of all meaning and change: hence the title of Sartre's major work, *Being and Nothingness*. The negative is equated here with consciousness (nothingness) that is untrammeled by, and disengaged from, the world, thus precluding the all-important exchanges or mediations that critical thinking requires.

Merleau-Ponty argued in response that negativity is neither Being nor non-Being, but the effulgent interworld between where a dense and layered texture of mediations proliferates. Like Hegel he emphasizes the importance of difference in setting this "between" in motion, but he is also influenced by Martin Heidegger, who had invoked Heraclitus's claim that it is the cleavages, intervals, and joints within Being that are the condition of meaning or history and without which there would be merely a repetition of the same (Sartre's plenitudinous in-itself). Unlike Sartre's consciousness (for-itself), this negativity is not a hole or void in Being but a productive rift or fold within its very fabric: generative difference rather than transcendent subjectivity. In some ways this brings Merleau-Ponty's thinking closer to Gilles Deleuze's cosmology, but he persists in equating Being with existence and speaks here of a natural negativity. Although this is not necessarily human existence, the generativity of the negative is traced to the reflexivity of the self-sensing body that touches and is touched by itself. It is in this noncoincident, reversible relationship that an interval or slippage, a productive differentiation, occurs in the flesh of the world, opening it to contingent unfolding wherein meaning and matter are inseparable. For the political actor this underpins realization that he or she is ineluctably situated within a complex, shifting field of forces and reversals to be interpreted from within, whereas for the critic it means constant vigilance against dualist presuppositions and sclerotic concepts or powers. Whether or not Merleau-Ponty still calls this a "hyperdialectics," its practitioners are more reflexive, and the field they engage is more multiplicitous and contingent than the dialectical choreography of Hegelian or Marxian negativity.

Poststructuralist Affirmation

It is currently fashionable for radical political theorists to eschew the language of the negative and to embrace affirmation instead. This stems partly from hostility to dialectics, in particular to the allegedly Christian–humanist metanarrative of redemption that underpins the logic of the negative. A second factor is Nietzschean vitalism as developed by Deleuze. Deleuze draws attention to the relationship between the noble and the slave described by Nietzsche in *The Genealogy of Morality*. Or rather, there is no relationship between them and certainly not the sort of dialectical struggle for recognition Hegel had described. For Nietzsche the slave's opposition is one of mean-spirited resentment that says no to life and ushers in a history of nihilism, whereas the noble simply ignores the slave's pale existence and instead says yes to life, embracing its wild vitality. Deleuze espouses this exuberant, creative affirmation over what he sees as the joyless seriousness of the dialectic. Ontologically, too, he takes issue with the logical, binary form the dialectic seems to take in opposing and reconciling contradictions, arguing that difference is more fundamental and unpredictable, more open to chance and the event, than the orderly advance of the dialectic.

Derrida, too, insists that deconstruction is not negative or nihilistic but positive—linked to promises, responsibility, laughter, and dance rather than to critique and rejection. He proposes deconstruction precisely as a way of escaping the dialectic of opposition and assimilation: Instead of synthesizing binaries, he reveals their undecidable multiplicity. His notion of internal genesis and interminable

spatiotemporal deferral—*différance*—nonetheless draws on Ferdinand de Saussure's structural linguistics, which still has, as Derrida acknowledges, an affinity with Hegelian negativity inasmuch as it relies on the claim that in language there are only differences without positive terms.

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See also Critical Theory; Critique; Difference Theories; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Marx, Karl; Negative Dialectics; Nihilism; Ontology

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Neoclassical Economics

The term *neoclassical economics* delineates a distinct and relatively homogenous school of thought in economic theory that became prominent in the late nineteenth century and that now dominates mainstream economics. The term was originally introduced by Thorstein Veblen to describe developments in the discipline (of which Veblen did not entirely approve) associated with the work of such figures as William Jevons, Carl Menger, and Leon Walras. The ambition of these figures, the first neoclassicists, was to formalize and mathematize the subject in the aftermath of the so-called marginalist revolution.

Economics is, according to one definition, the science that studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses. Neoclassical economics pursues this study by means of supply and demand models that determine prices based on the subjective preferences of producers and consumers. Neoclassical economics relies on subjective preferences for determining prices in order to escape from the so-called objective value theory of classical economics, according to which the value of goods could be established by reference to some basic commodity (usually corn) or the labor input required to produce a good. Neoclassicists hoped that by jettisoning objective value, economics could be placed on a more scientific basis as an essentially descriptive and predictive theory of human behavior.

Political theory, by contrast, involves both positive and normative elements. It is a positive science to the extent to which it aims to describe and predict political behavior. It is a normative science to the extent to which it prescribes how agents should behave in the political arena and what the best political institutions are. Neoclassical economics is relevant to both of these elements.

Method Versus Subject Matter

Neoclassical economics can be understood in terms of both its subject matter and its method. The subject matter of economics deals with variables, such as incomes and prices, and aggregates like gross national product, employment levels, and inflation rates. The method offers a way to think about large-number interactions within markets, although in principle the range of social institutions can be extended to include politics. The characteristic features of the neoclassical method are instrumental rationality, methodological individualism, economic self-interest, equilibrium analysis, and the use of mathematical techniques.

Instrumental Rationality

Agents are supposed rational in the broad sense that their behavior can be explained in terms of their preferences. Preferences are assumed to be determined by the agents' desires and beliefs and well ordered with regard to outcomes. For many purposes, preferences can remain specified only up to certain abstract structural features, such as consistency (in particular, preferences must be transitive), completeness (all bundles of goods must be ranked), and convexity. This latter requirement

forms the basis of "relative price analytics," focused on the behavioral effects of changes in the relative prices of different objects of value. More specifically, rational individuals are assumed to respond to any increase in the price of a good by consuming less of it. This simple relative price proposition turns out to be surprisingly powerful in predicting behavior in economic settings and includes specifically the basis of institutional analysis: Institutions yield different social outcomes because they alter the "incentives" that agents face.

Methodological Individualism

Neoclassical economists conceive of economic behavior as a complex of exchanges between rational *individuals* and tend to discount, and sometimes dismiss, notions of group rationality. Often, the rational actions of individuals will not advance the purposes of a group to which those individuals belong or, for that matter, advance the aggregate interests of group members, because of "prisoner's dilemma" problems. In a (one-shot) prisoner's dilemma, it is never rational to cooperate although cooperation is mutually beneficial. Neoclassical economists therefore regard it as question-begging to offer explanations of social phenomena in terms of the interests or purposes of groups (be they races or genders or social classes—or even families or firms). They do not, of course, rule out the possibility that groups *may* act in the aggregate interest of their members. But whether groups do or do not so act is a contingent matter—and certainly not one that is logically guaranteed by the assumption of *individual* rationality.

Economic Self-Interest

In principle, agents' preferences could have any content whatsoever: agents could be benevolent or could be driven by group interests or a desire to comply with group norms. But in practice, there is a strong tendency to ascribe predominantly self-interested motives to agents and, relatedly, to rely more on institutional mechanisms that bend interests to the service of duty than on agents' inherent sense of dutifulness. Accordingly, the first question economists are likely to ask of institutions is what (economic) incentives they give rise to. Equally, when individual agents interact, neoclassicists generally assume that each agent maximizes his or her own well-being, considered apart from the well-being of the other agents with whom he or she interacts.

Equilibrium Analysis

In the resultant interplay among rival interests, neoclassical economists tend to conceptualize stable social outcomes as forms of "equilibria," in which the strengths of the various contenders are in balance. Analysis proceeds by examining changes in external circumstances that would alter the strength of different forces and thereby induce all to change their behavior in particular directions. The "external circumstances" in question include policy changes by governments and changes in broader institutional arrangements—though there is an issue as to how far government action should be regarded as "external" to the social system.

Mathematical Techniques

Economists have been much drawn to the use of mathematical techniques to formalize the large-number interactions with which they deal. To be sure, sometimes the use of those techniques obscures rather than illuminates analysis, and sometimes, it seems, economists can become so captivated by the techniques as to treat them as ends in themselves. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to deny the power of mathematics, or of abstract reasoning more generally, in dealing with the kinds of issues that economics has engaged.

Other Applications of the Neoclassical Approach

The neoclassical approach to economics can be extended to nonmarket decision making. Markets are only one social setting in which large numbers of independently motivated actors interact to jointly produce social outcomes. Politics, the law, the church, academia, science itself, and the arts are other examples of social settings that involve a similar coordination of individual behavior. Moreover, increasingly, these spheres of activity mutually interpenetrate, so that a satisfactory analysis of some phenomenon in one arena often requires appeal simultaneously to the political and social and economic forces that are in play. Neoclassical economists have seen their methods

as a way of combining and synthesizing these forces within a single frame of analysis—hence the application of economic methods to the study of political processes in particular.

Perfectly Competitive Markets

The distinct features of the neoclassical approach to economics can be usefully illustrated with brief reference to classical economics, in particular to Adam Smith's metaphor of the "invisible hand." Smith's metaphor expresses the idea that, under certain conditions, the behavior of agents who act in their own interests can also ultimately promote the public interest. Smith claimed specifically that the freely operating market under the "system of natural liberty" (without force or fraud) would constitute such an invisible hand process. Although agents are assumed to be neither particularly benevolent nor cooperative by nature, the exchange processes that the free market allows were seen to mobilize vast benefits from large-scale human cooperation that are individually not attainable.

The neoclassical version of this claim is embodied in the so-called fundamental theorems of welfare economics, which assert that all perfectly competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal, and all Pareto-optimal points are equilibria of a perfectly competitive market under some initial distribution of goods. Pareto-optimality is defined as the situation in which all possible mutually beneficial moves have been made. Interestingly, the neoclassical version of this result follows David Ricardo's formulation in which gains from exchange arise from exploiting natural differences among agents according to principles of comparative advantage. In the Smithian version, by contrast, the gains from exchange arise not merely from natural differences but from gains from specialization (which generates artefactual differences in each individual's productive capacities).

Although the fundamental theorems of welfare economics are typically derived under fairly demanding conditions, including perfect knowledge on the part of consumers, the results can be extended to more sophisticated settings in which there is risk and where agents are not necessarily ideally rational or perfectly informed. In these more complicated settings, the idea has been to treat information as a good that commands a positive price and to treat calculation as costly, so that certain kinds of imperfect rationality will be a rational response to calculative limits. Even so, the results are dependent on perfectly competitive conditions: Where there are imperfectly competitive conditions, some departure from optimality is to be expected, with the size of the expected losses broadly a function of the asymmetries in market power between buyers and sellers in a given market.

There is, however, a more significant limitation to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics. The theorems are restricted in their scope to private goods that are excludable. Markets cannot guarantee the optimal provision of public goods and collective consumption goods. Indeed, under plausible conditions, nonexcludable goods (such as defense or law and order) and nonpatentable discoveries may not be provided at all. Even accepting the limited normative reach of Paretian concepts, therefore, markets cannot reliably deliver much that is required for their successful operation, such as a secure system of property rights, and many goods that are important for human flourishing, such as public health measures or plausible theories about the working of the economy.

Further, Pareto-optimal outcomes are not necessarily just. Pareto-optimality is consistent with slavery if slaves cannot purchase their own freedom. It is also consistent with very large disparities in income levels. Although the fundamental theorems of welfare economics state that any Pareto-optimal outcome can be realized by a suitable initial redistribution of goods, perfectly competitive markets remain neutral with regard to distributive issues. In other words, the neoclassical defense of perfectly competitive markets can offer only a partial foundation for a comprehensive theory of cooperation, because the normative basis of evaluation that the neoclassical approach offers is too thin. Political philosophers such as Robert Nozick (1974) and David Gauthier (1986), for example, have taken this lack of normative justification as a starting point to embed markets into broader theories of social and economic cooperation that balance efficiency considerations with concerns for justice.

Nevertheless, the neoclassical analysis of markets carries important normative implications: First, the analysis demonstrates that the benefits available from human cooperation are considerable.

Neoclassical economics depicts social interaction as potentially "positive sum": Benefits enjoyed by some individuals need not imply a loss to others and can often lead to additional gains. Second, in mobilizing the mutual benefits available, there is a significant task of coordination among individual participants, a task that markets perform well for private excludable goods. Third, in part, markets work well in this coordination role because they induce predominantly self-interested persons to serve others' interests. It might be said that markets economize on benevolence, which tends to be a scarce good for many human interactions. Finally, the neoclassical account helps to identify cases of "market failure"—cases in which markets cannot guarantee optimal outcomes.

Normative Analysis and Democratic Decision Making

The economic approach tends to conceptualize normative analysis in terms of choice. Choice is invariably comparative, and so normative evaluation is framed as a comparison of the arrangement/policy/institution being evaluated with the relevant alternatives (say, the situation that would prevail in the absence of the action under assessment). Specifically, "market *failure*" (however understood) is relative to the demonstrated success of some notional alternative to the market. In short, when anything in the prevailing situation is judged undesirable, the neoclassical response is always to ask: compared to what? Many think that growing unemployment levels, inflation, underprovision of public goods, or significant inequalities in the distribution of income, wealth, and consumption require the government to step in and provide a remedy. Neoclassical economists, by contrast, insist that government intervention is justified only if there is a reasonable expectation that democratic politics will do better in relation to the policy issue than will the market.

On this view, the prospects for effective political intervention in the economy cannot be properly assessed without an empirically informed and realistic account of the workings of democratic politics in agreement with the analysis of markets drawn from conventional economics. Over the past half-century, neoclassical economists have sought to provide just such a theory under the rubric of "public choice theory" (or sometimes "rational choice political theory" or "positive political economy").

Public choice theorists follow the neoclassical approach in assuming that political agents, like economic agents, are essentially self-interested. Voters are, after all, the same individuals who act as consumers in markets; and those who exercise political power, such as bureaucrats and politicians, can be thought of as producers of policy outcomes. Like other producers and consumers, these individuals are more likely to act in the general interest of the community if encouraged to do so by institutions, norms, and legal coercion. Accordingly, many public choice theorists are concerned with those features of democratic institutions that seem most relevant in inducing self-interested politicians to act in the interests of voters. Consequently, the main focus of public choice analysis has been on electoral competition, specifically on whether such competition shares the virtues and efficiencies of market competition.

Much of the analytic firepower of public choice theory has been focused on the peculiar properties of majority rule. Even when individual voters have well-defined transitive preferences over electoral options, the collective, operating under majority rule, may well exhibit intransitive preferences, because the composition of the majority can change. In fact, the issue is not just one for majority rule. The famous Arrow (1951) impossibility theorem shows that under reasonable restrictions, transitivity can be absolutely assured only if one appoints one of the group members as effective dictator. In much the same spirit, Richard D. McKelvey (1976) demonstrates that, in general, it is possible to move from *any* policy outcome to *any* other by a sequence of moves all of which are approved by the majority.

These theorems are developed at a quite abstract level and the question of how deeply they bite in practice remains controversial. However, the voting paradoxes, on which they depend, can be avoided only if individual preferences lie in one dimension and are such that outcomes closer to any voter's ideal are preferred over outcomes that are farther away (which seems on its face to be a very restrictive condition). In this special case, the outcome of the voting procedure corresponds to the median along the one dimension of

the individual ideal points (see Anthony Downs, 1957). For a two-party system this means that there are forces that tend to make both parties locate at the same median point. This median-voter outcome has some normatively desirable features: It will normally involve some level of public goods provision and some significant redistribution from richer to poorer citizens (see Meltzer & Richard, 1981).

The public choice approach has proven controversial among political theorists; one critic referred to it as "democracy bashing." However, as public choice proponents have insisted, if moving from markets to politics is taken to transform the motives of the participants, some explanation of this rather remarkable alchemy is required. It cannot simply be assumed.

One influential criticism of the public choice approach is that it ignores the ways in which democratic discussion can transform individual preferences. Deliberative democrats argue that individual preferences are shaped in a process of public deliberation and they must be publicly justifiable. On their view, political outcomes are seen not as compromises between given and irreducibly conflicting private interests, but rather as the result of mutual deliberation that ideally leads to rational consensus. In this case, voting procedures could be replaced entirely by public deliberation. This possibility, however, seems remote in a pluralistic society where individuals may hold irreconcilable values. Moreover, similar problems can be shown to emerge in the aggregation of majority beliefs even where no conflicts of interests or values are present. A majority of some decision-making group might believe proposition *A* and a majority believe proposition *B,* but no majority believes both *A* and *B*. Majorities, in general, do not hold rational beliefs even when all the individuals have totally rational beliefs.

One particular challenge conventional public choice theory faces is the "paradox of voting." Rational individuals vote only if the costs of voting are lower than the benefits of voting. As such, it seems that a rational individual will not vote at all, because the economic benefits of voting are negligible: The chances that one's own vote makes a difference in any reasonable-sized electorate are close to zero. To solve this problem, and thus to explain actual voting behavior, Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin (1998) developed the expressive account of voting, which regards voters as rational but claims that, in the context of democratic participation, their rationality takes a distinctive form.

The expressive account of voting assumes that most people have a desire to express their support of things of which they approve and their opposition to things of which they disapprove. Brennan and Hamlin argue that voting behavior reflects such an expressive desire. Voting is much like cheering at a football match. Football fans cheer for their team not because they believe that cheering will cause their team to win. Instead, they cheer because of the expressive satisfaction that it provides. But if this is so, then individuals may vote on quite a different basis from the way they act in markets: The considerations that weigh in choosing an asset portfolio are not the same as those that weigh in deciding who to vote for. This implies that individual self-interest may play a much smaller role at the ballot box than orthodox public choice theory suggests. The expressive argument thus may provide some justification for a kind of two-hats account of voter and consumer behavior.

One of the primary virtues of the economic approach to political analysis is that the formality and analytic explicitness of the economic method encourage clarity about the precise assumptions being made about political processes. Just as the normative evaluation of markets involves both a positive, descriptive component and then an assessment of the properties of the social outcomes to which markets give rise, so political analysis proceeds in two steps, in which the positive analysis of political processes and their normative evaluation of the resultant outcomes are undertaken separately. This separation of positive (or factual) and normative (or evaluative) analysis is a point on which neoclassical economists insist. And even if one were skeptical about the merits of rational choice political theory, one might nevertheless regard that separation as an important principle of sound normative analysis.

Conclusion

Neoclassical economics should be of interest to political theorists for two rather different

reasons. First, many issues of interest to political theorists have an economic dimension. For example, environmental measures may have costs in terms of the general well-being of individuals (including, specifically, the poorest); pursuing distributive justice will often serve to reduce that which is to be distributed; otherwise attractive policy measures may have undesirable incentive effects; and so on. Second, neoclassical economics offers both a framework for analysis of how institutions work and a substantive body of relevant propositions and empirical evidence. The domain of such institutional analysis includes, specifically, the political institutions that, at least on some readings, are the core of political philosophy's concerns.

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See also Keynes, John Maynard; Pareto, Vilfredo; Pareto-Optimality; Smith, Adam; Value-Free Social Science

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Neo-Confucianism

Neo-Confucianism refers to the broad-ranging revival of Confucianism that began in the eleventh century CE during the Song dynasty (960–1278) and continued until at least the early Qing dynasty (1644–1911). Neo-Confucians were critical of the influence of Buddhism and Taoism on their society, and yet they drew on Buddhist and Taoist ideas to articulate their distinctive interpretation of Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism is perhaps most famous for its metaphysical doctrines, but it also represents important and influential developments in political philosophy that dominated Chinese theorizing about politics for close to a millennium. It was during the Song dynasty that the Chinese civil service examination system attained its mature form, underpinning a literati culture whose core texts emphasized the responsibilities of the elite to their own moral cultivation and, as a result, to the well-being of "all under heaven." These dual responsibilities were often articulated in terms of the ideal of "inner sageliness and outer kingliness (*neisheng waiwang*)."

The roots of what would become the neo-Confucian ideal of the sage king lie deep in the Chinese past. Scholars have traced it to the shamanic kings of Chinese antiquity, and by the classical era it was manifest in many ways. The slogan "inner sageliness, outer kingliness" was widely used by neo-Confucians to express the intimate relation, or even identity, that they saw between inner moral cultivation and external, political action. "Politics" or "kingliness" here takes on an extremely broad meaning: Moral cultivation requires actualization in terms of the sociopolitical

order at each stage and level of political engagement. Personal and public are intertwined. Perhaps the most succinct recognition of this appears in passage 2:21 from the classical-era *Analects:*

> Someone said to Confucius, "Why do you not take part in government?" The Master said, "The *Book of History* says, 'Oh! Simply by being a good son and friendly to his brothers a man can exert an influence upon government.' In so doing a man is, in fact, taking part in government. How can there be any question of his having actively to 'take part in government'?" (Confucius, 1979, p. 66)

In other words, being virtuous in the most intimate of contexts still has political significance. Neo-Confucians expand on this basic idea, arguing for the creation of a variety of nonstate institutions that straddle any distinction between moral and political. They also provide a metaphysical theory that justifies seeing all aspects of one's moral/political life as interdependent.

Neo-Confucian political theory centered on the ways in which neo-Confucians endeavored to guide the ruler, and the polity more generally, to do the right things. In practice this often meant trying to limit the power of the state and ruler. No limits were needed if the emperor was following the Way, but efforts to guide the ruler functioned as limits insofar as the ruler is not perceived as following the Way. There are three primary, interrelated sources of guidance. First is the theoretical grounding for limits and guidance provided by *li,* which has been translated as "coherence" or "principle." Second is ritual ceremony and the sense of ritual propriety that serves to restrain rulers. Last is the vexed and complicated world of laws and institutions, which sits in an uncomfortable relation with the central Confucian belief that it is ultimately the quality of the person that matters most. In each case, attention must be paid to the precarious balance that neo-Confucians sought to establish between providing grounds for the respect and obedience that all individuals, themselves included, owed to a sage ruler, and yet leaving room for them to educate and criticize a flawed but improvable leader.

The metaphysical doctrine of coherence (*li*) applies at both micro- and macro-levels. It refers to the way that things in a particular context fit best together. Universal coherence (*tian li*) is the way that all things fit best together; often this is elaborated in terms of things being in harmony. In both cases, *li* is understood to be an objective fact not alterable by anyone's opinion, though it is sensitive to differences in local context. When one follows the pattern of universal coherence, one is following the Way (*tao*). Neo-Confucian political philosophers use coherence in two complementary ways. First, it is invoked to justify the reverent attitude on the part of subjects toward their ruler, as a hierarchical ordering of human society was understood to be part of coherence: namely, the way that humans best fit together. At the same time, coherence also justifies asking the emperor to heed the advice of his minister. The minister's claim to authority would be based on a deep knowledge of the classics—which express the early sages' articulation of coherence—and on extensive personal cultivation. Still, in practice, loyalty and obedience tended to come first.

The second form of guidance is ritual (also romanized *li,* but an entirely different Chinese character). A great deal of the daily life of Chinese emperors was subject to ritual regulation, as were most of their public performances and major decisions. Contemporary scholars have noted the ways in which this ritualization could, in certain circumstances, empower individuals to stand up to rulers, to "speak truth to power." The resulting checks to imperial authority were significant, even though hardly inviolable, and martyrdom was sometimes the price one had to pay for insisting on ritual correctness. In any event, rituals clearly did function to constrain emperors, both in everyday circumstances of which there is no record—because whatever temptation the emperor resisted, thanks to ritual requirements, was not recorded—and in famous cases of conflicts between an emperor and his court.

The Chinese term *fa* refers to the third and final source of limits on, and guidance for, the ruler and his ministers. *Fa* is usually translated "law," but it is important to understand that for neo-Confucians, *fa* has broad and narrow meanings. Narrowly understood, *fa* refers to legal codes; when used more broadly, it is better translated as "institution" or "system." Legal codes are one type of institution, but when *fa* is used in its broad sense, a much wider

range of institutions is envisioned. One famous discussion of *fa* lists property arrangements, schools, marriage ceremonies, and expectations for military service. To some degree, *fa,* in both of these senses, served to constrain or direct governance—and, in particular, to limit the ruler.

The classical Confucian Xunzi held that governance was by men, not *fa*. This belief, that it is the interpreters and implementers of *fa* (in both senses) who are decisive rather than the *fa* themselves being crucial, would also dominate neo-Confucian thinking on these topics. Neo-Confucian philosophers like Zhu Xi (1130–1200) believed that no institution (*fa*) is perfect, and all institutions require good men to interpret and implement them. Similar sentiments can be found in many of neo-Confucian writings. Although the important Ming dynasty thinker Luo Qinshun (1465–1547) recognized the importance of institutions, noting that they are necessary for general moral improvement and increasing material prosperity, he, too, maintained that in order to institute or reform *fa,* one must get hold of the right men.

One side of the neo-Confucian view of *fa,* in short, is that they are not fundamental guarantors of good governance. This stemmed in part from the harsh criticism many neo-Confucians leveled against the radical institutional reforms instituted by Wang Anshi (1021–1086) in the early Song dynasty. Rather than top-down institutional reforms, most neo-Confucians wanted stress put on personal moral cultivation; interpreters have labeled this an "inward turn." It would be a mistake, though, to see Song dynasty neo-Confucians as relying solely on individuals' solitary efforts at moral cultivation. Recent scholars have emphasized the "middle-level" institutions that neo-Confucians came to emphasize as critical supports for individual improvement and, ultimately, as a basis for reforming the state apparatus itself. Zhu Xi and other neo-Confucians promoted and wrote extensively about institutions like academies, village compacts, and regulations for family lineages. Such institutions, Zhu hoped, would help to reunite the shattered link between "inner sageliness" and "outer kingliness" and thus lead to the broader realization of coherence.

It is significant that some thinkers from the Song dynasty and later wanted to push the role of institutions even more into the foreground. The clearest instances of this trend come from the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, and in particular, from the trenchant political manifesto *Waiting for the Dawn,* completed in 1663 by Huang Zongxi (1610–1695). For our purposes the key is the emphasis Huang puts on *fa,* which he uses in the broad sense discussed earlier. A healthy polity is based on well-designed institutions like schools, property regimes, and ceremonies that train people to be social citizens rather than selfish egoists. Huang contrasts these institutions with those promoted by recent rulers, which he characterizes as "anti-institutional institutions" (or "unlawful laws"): In this case, the educational system, property regime, and ceremonies are designed solely to glorify the one family who happens to occupy the throne—whether they deserve it or not. Huang then famously asserts: "Should it be said that 'There is only governance by men, not governance by institutions (*fa*),' my reply is that only if there is governance by institutions can there by governance by men" (Huang, 1993, p. 99). He goes on to explain:

> If the institutions of the early kings were still in effect, there would be a spirit among men that went beyond the institutions. If men were of the right kind, all of their intentions could be realized; and even if they were not of this kind, they could not slash deep or do widespread damage. (Huang, p. 99)

This is certainly not the modern notion of "rule of law," but its recognition that good institutions can restrain even the worst of men is nonetheless important.

In conclusion, neo-Confucian philosophers clearly recognized the need to guide and constrain rulers. They did not retreat from politics but, to the contrary, put forward a variety of proposals and values—including the roles of ritual, middle-level institutions, and the ideal of *li*—that met with varying degrees of practical success. As modern Chinese critics have pointed out, though, the continued belief in a unified realm of moral politics, overseen by a sage king, has left China vulnerable to leaders who justify horrible excesses in the name of their individual sagely vision. One of the major themes of post–neo-Confucian political theorizing since

the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, has been whether Confucianism today can and should come to accept some version of democracy and individual rights.

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See also Confucianism

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Neoconservatism

Neoconservatism is a new conservatism that began to exert influence on American politics after 1945 and reached the height of its power during the administration of George W. Bush (2000–2008). Neoconservatism combines conservative social policies with liberal economics and a Realpolitik (i.e., realist) approach to foreign policy.

Neoconservative social policies are characterized by opposition to abortion, same-sex marriage, and sexual liberation, especially for women. They favor "family values," which they associate only with traditional families; they defend prayer in the schools, the right to bear arms, capital punishment, and harsh legal penalties for young offenders. They are closely allied with the Christian Right and share the latter's opposition to secular liberal culture and its inclination to promote individuality, diversity, and critical thought while undermining community, cohesiveness, shared values, and nationalism.

Despite their communitarian approach in the social sphere, neoconservatives speak the language of rugged individualism, independence, and self-reliance, where economics is concerned. They favor free markets with minimal government regulation, corporate capitalism, and the Protestant work ethic, which champions sobriety, diligence, and thrift. It is commonly observed that neoconservatism suffers from a conflict between the conservative and communitarian social policies on one hand, and the liberal and individualistic economic policies on the other. But the conflict may not constitute any intellectual confusion if the values of community, cooperation, and mutual dependence belong to the sphere of women and the family, while rugged individualism and competitiveness belong to the manly sphere of business and profits. Moreover, the contrast between the two spheres may not be all that great when we consider the fact that it is not petit bourgeois economics that is championed, but corporate capitalism, which requires hierarchy and conformity for all except the chief executive officers.

The admiration for capitalist economics distinguishes neoconservatism from the classical conservatism of Edmund Burke, which harkened back to a landed gentry whose wealth was more stable

and less portable. But no such landed gentry existed in the United States except in the slave-owning South. As a result, American conservatism was associated with the Confederacy and had a decidedly anti-American flavor, until the emergence of this new conservatism that is rooted in bourgeois economics.

Despite their paean to populism, neoconservatives are not willing to allow the market to determine the values of society. They believe in a vanguard elite that can shape the values of society and the will of the people. Deeply influenced by the elitist, antiliberal, and antimodernist ideas of Leo Strauss, Irving Kristol, the father of neoconservatism, denounced the liberal elites of the United States—lawyers, judges, doctors, professors, and teachers—and maintained that they should be replaced by conservative elites. The latter would respect religion, promote family values, and harness the Protestant work ethic at the heart of the market economy, while undermining the liberal and hedonistic culture that the market generates—a culture that is epitomized by the social unrest of the 1960s, a culture that is so intoxicated by freedom that it cannot meet the existential threat of Communism.

No one was as candid as Samuel Huntington, who declared that America's liberal institutions had to be suspended—at least until the Communist threat was averted. In contrast to supposedly feeble-minded liberals, Senator Joseph McCarthy grasped the gravity of the Communist threat. Irving Kristol tells us that the first generation neoconservatives—Daniel Bell, Irving Howe, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Nathan Glazer, Norman Podhoretz, and others—were devotees of Leon Trotsky until they were "mugged by reality" in the form of Joseph McCarthy, who convinced them that the world was a dark and dangerous place and that liberals could not fathom the harsh realities of political existence.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the neoconservatives experienced a crisis of identity. In the absence of the "evil empire," their political program lost its raison d'être. But with the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in September 2001, neoconservatives regained their stride and the ear of the U.S. president. America's unmatched power on the international stage led the second generation of neoconservatives—William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Francis Fukuyama, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, David Frum, and others—to insist that the United States must take advantage of its "unipolar moment" to defeat all her enemies once and for all. The goal of "full spectrum dominance" was outlined in great detail in the famous Internet think tank, "Project for the New American Century," long before the Bush administration came to power and the events of 9/11 made the implementation of this foreign policy a reality. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were intended as the beginning of a series of small wars that were intended to eliminate all enemies and achieve American global dominance. But the conquest of these small and powerless countries (without nuclear weapons or air forces) turned out to be a much greater challenge than anticipated. Despite holding high-level positions within the administration, many of the neoconservatives blamed the incompetence of the Bush administration for its failure to implement their ideas. But they did not question those ideas. However, political theorists should reflect on whether the foreign policy of the neoconservatives could be implemented by the most competent administration imaginable. And, if such a super-competent administration could exist, would it be desirable for the United States, let alone the world?

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See also Burke, Edmund; Conservatism; Liberalism; Realism; Strauss, Leo

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Neo-Kantianism

Neo-Kantianism refers to a cluster of academic philosophical trends that dominated German universities in the Wilhelminian era (1870–1918). The founding of the German state came with a crisis of orientation. An initial wave of liberal university appointments gave way to repression of Catholics, laws against socialists, and political anti-Semitism. In this atmosphere, a return to Kant represented recourse to an Enlightenment philosopher who was both unassailably German and deeply humanistic, whose thought had earlier given rise to Prussian institutions of military and educational reform, and who promised a genuine intellectual alternative to the then regnant "worldviews" of materialism and pessimism. Issued at a time of cultural and political malaise (Bismarck's Germany alienated many and inspired few), the call for philosophy to return "back to Kant" (so formulated by O. Liebmann) was initially quite vague, but the brief spell of liberal university appointments produced several vibrant intellectual centers that exerted far-reaching influence beyond the ivory tower, as measured by the many reform socialist movements and political theories of the early twentieth century that can be traced to personages trained in one or another center of neo-Kantian thought.

The most important "schools" of neo-Kantianism are the Southwest German School, centered at the universities of Heidelberg and Freiburg and represented by Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband, and the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, represented by Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. Whereas the Southwest German School produced more nationally conservative thinkers (late in life, Rickert even joined the NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers Party]), the Marburg School inspired many reform socialists, among them Eduard Bernstein and Victor Adler.

Among those who shaped the Marburg School was Friedrich Albert Lange, whose popular *History of Materialism* impressed even the young Friedrich Nietzsche. Lange and his literary executor, protégé, and successor at Marburg University, Hermann Cohen, helped restore "critical idealism" to its rightful place at the foundation of both the sciences and the humanities by arguing that materialism (i.e., the assumption that the worlds of human making, the state, and, more generally, civilization, are determined by their evolutionary physiological and material economic conditions) was nothing but a heuristic hypothesis and hence proof of the "sufficiency of the hypothesis" (a Platonic expression). With one stroke, this Kantian turn in philosophy restored the possibility of ethics as the foundation of a politics of reform, education, and social activism. This was of great consequence for the development of European socialism in that it provided a philosophical alternative to Marxism, arguing for legal reform rather than revolution.

The term *neo-Kantianism* obscures the intellectual originality of some of these critical idealists, who deviated from Kant in significant ways. In terms of political philosophy, Cohen, for example, takes issue with Kant's emphasis on morality and justifies legality as the more pertinent concern in the construal of a state based on the pursuit of justice. Echoes of this political theory are evident in the works of Hans Kelsen and Ernest Barker. As an epistemological school with a decidedly political bent and with an emphasis on a common "transcendental method" rather than a shared doctrine, Marburg neo-Kantianism was the point of departure for many intellectuals of the twentieth century, including the religious socialist theologian Karl Barth; the neo-Marxist theorists Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, and Georg Lukács; and the social philosopher José Ortega y Gasset. In Russia, neo-Kantianism's influence, though long repressed by Stalinism, continues today as an alternative to both religious-mystical and dialectical-materialist schools of political thought. In the United States, Ernst Cassirer's *Myth of the State* (posthumously published in 1946) was the last contribution to political theory of a Marburg neo-Kantian.

As a decidedly secular theory of the state, Cohen's introduction to Lange's book on materialism argued for a "resolution" of the content of religion into ethics. On the other hand, in a move reminiscent of classical metaphysics, Cohen's own work on ethics reintroduced the "idea of God" as the "law of truth" into ethics. Though emptied of any specific cultural content, this "law of truth" indicates the asymptotic point of meeting of nature (as the mathematical construal of determinate

characteristics of "being") and of an "ought" that is no more than the formal direction in which the state (understood as any concrete totality of laws) is to move in order for it to approach the realization of the ideal. Religious readers dismissed Marburg neo-Kantianism as too abstract. Cohen's epistemology does without reference to a "thing in itself" that is somehow anticipated or striven or responded to by our perception and intellection; rather epistemology proceeds from scientific knowledge that progressively corrects itself and therefore constantly requires a reevaluation of its presuppositions. This leads to a fluid and dynamic set of categories of thought. Ethical theory proceeds on the analogous assumption of certain "facts of culture" whose validity and progressive reshaping rests on similarly axiomatic presuppositions, in this case presuppositions of agency, freedom, responsibility, and so forth. One of the characteristic aspects of German law, the law of associations, known in English legal theory through Ernest Barker's translation of the Prussian legal theorist Otto Gierke, was used by Cohen as a paradigm to show how larger social or rather legal formations proceed from the speech acts involved in contractual law. Associations and other particular formations also allow Cohen to argue for the perpetual value and necessity of minorities and their constitutive role in the structure of the state. By this, Cohen fought a battle against the totalistic and homogenizing tendencies of modernist conceptions of the state.

The rise and decline of neo-Kantianism is tied to the careers of individuals appointed to full professorships in the 1870s and nearing retirement in the second decade of the twentieth century, that is, shortly before, during, or after World War I. But the moment most generally associated with the official demise (or dismissal) of neo-Kantianism was the meeting, in 1929, at Davos (Switzerland), between Cassirer and Martin Heidegger. At this meeting, which, largely due to Heidegger's account, is remembered as an intellectual duel, the question of the legacy of Kant was prominently raised, and it seemed, to many of the young intellectuals assembled at Davos, as if Heidegger had successfully deconstructed neo-Kantianism as little more than "Wilhelminian bourgeois philosophy." Today it seems that, even though Heidegger may have won the duel, it is preferable to think of the state in terms of an ongoing experiment in establishing justice for all, and of states as necessary fellow wanderers on the path of humanity to a Kantian "world peace," rather than in the terms of the collective expression of the biological striving to persist of a particular people, as the Nazi state endorsed by Heidegger was conceived. Recent political thinkers indebted to Kantian critical idealism include Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls, and Agnes Heller, a student of Lukács.

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See also Habermas, Jürgen; Justice, Theories of; Kant, Immanuel; Rawls, John

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Neo-Platonism

Neo-Platonism is an interpretation of Plato that posits not only a realm of eternal essences, or Forms, above the flux of material existence, but a principle of unity higher than being, to which the forms owe their integrity, both as individual entities and as a class. Because the philosopher's goal is approximation to this perfect unity, the regulation of corporate or individual life in the lower sphere can be of interest to him or her not as an end but as a means to emancipation. The founder of neo-Platonism, Plotinus (c. 205–270 CE), regards the political virtues as the lowest in an ascending scale. His pupil Porphyry (c. 232–c. 305) devised a more rigid system in which the political or practical virtues are the lowest of four categories. They must, however, be achieved before the higher virtues can be cultivated, and Porphyry, as an adherent of the Pythagorean tradition, believes that the philosopher has a role in shaping civic harmony. Iamblichus (c. 245–325)

and Macrobius (fl 400) hold a similar view, though social goods are less interesting to these thinkers than the posthumous rewards that accrue to the individual from his patriotism. Proclus (410–485) composed a commentary on Plato's *Republic,* in which the justice of states is understood to be good insofar as it mirrors the godlike harmony of the cosmos and enables the soul to rise above the transitory and plethoric phenomena of the material world. Neo-Platonism acquired an increasingly religious character, and its later beneficiaries include the Christian Nicholas of Cusa and the Moslem Abu Nasr al-Farabi.

Before the Roman conquest of the east, the Greek philosopher was often an aristocrat or a legislator; under this foreign yoke he was more commonly found in opposition than in authority, when he could be found at all. By the third century CE, the supine maxim of the Epicureans—"live unknown"—had become the watchword of the Pythagorean sect, although its founder was supposed to have governed cities. A similar change in the temper of Platonism is illustrated by Plotinus, who is commonly agreed to have been the first great philosopher after Aristotle and the pioneer of the disciplined and creative exegesis of Plato's works that we now call neo-Platonism.

Plotinus

Plotinus studied in Alexandria under the obscure Ammonius Saccas from 232 to 243 CE, but if there was a successor to Ammonius after his death in 243, it was not Plotinus. Instead the latter set off to fight the Persians in the train of the Emperor Gordian III. Because Gordian was the senatorial candidate for the throne in an era of civil strife, it has been inferred that Plotinus, who bears a Roman name, was also attached to the senatorial party; his biographer Porphyry states, on the other hand, that his intention was to converse with Persian and Indian philosophers. The same witness adds that he "fled" to Antioch after the death of Gordian, and again it has been argued, by those who believe that the emperor was assassinated by his own troops, that the danger arose from his loyalty. We cannot, however, be certain of the manner of Gordian's death, except that it coincided with a defeat of the Roman army by the Persians; the flight of Plotinus may have been prompted simply by a desire to escape the enemy. Perhaps following his original design, he came to Rome, where his circle included rich Italians and natives of his own city. He appears to have owned no property, relying instead on the hospitality of unmarried women. There is evidence of a friendship with the Empress Salonina, but what we hear of his dealings with the Senate indicates not that he was well liked by that body, but only that he was not afraid to incur its enmity. The senator Rogatianus was on the point of taking up the consulate when he decided, at the instance of Plotinus, to inconvenience his colleagues by resigning the post and adopting the austere and secluded life of a philosopher. When Plotinus formed the notion of setting up a city of philosophers in Campania, with a constitution modeled on the teaching of Plato's *Laws,* he was unworldly enough to seek funds from the emperor, but the impoverished Gallienus would have spurned the project even if it had not been opposed, as Porphyry avers, by hostile members of his court. It was in Campania, at the house of a rich friend, that Plotinus died in 270 of an illness whose symptoms resemble those of leprosy, deserted by all friends except Eustochius, an Alexandrian doctor who may been the first to disseminate an edition of his works.

The edition that has survived is that to which Porphyry gave the title *Enneads,* because, after he divided and distributed the writings of his master, he arranged them into six cycles of nine. Of these, the first cycle, representing ethics and the discipline of the body, is the only one to contain a treatise *On Virtue.* In this short essay Plotinus denies that the civic virtues—fortitude, prudence, temperance, and justice—can have any place among the transcendent principles. In this world, they perfect the inchoate harmony of the social group; in the higher world, that harmony is eternal and can be impaired only by the exercise of any dynamic faculty. We must speak of a paradigmatic relation, not one of similarity, between the goods of the higher realm and those of ours. At the same time, insofar as moral discipline brings measure to human lives and imparts a beauty to our activities, it produces a resemblance to the divine, because measure and beauty are both properties of the intellectual realm, in which the highest of conceivable goods are realized. Furthermore, the quotidian virtues remove the obstacles to the elevation of

the soul to a higher sphere. Wisdom or prudence frees us from the caprice of the body, temperance subdues the passions, fortitude induces contempt for death, and justice subordinates the lower faculties to reason. In this treatise, then, the political virtues—so described because they are nursed and manifested in political society—are prized chiefly because they promote the assimilation of soul to intellect. Plotinus held, however, that the highest principle is not intellect but the ineffable source of unity and existence, which he terms the One, the Good, and, sometimes, God. It is by virtue of the ubiquitous causality of the One that a house or a chorus retains cohesion; it is because they conduce to integrity in the soul and work together for the soul's deliverance from the body that wisdom, temperance, fortitude, and justice are goods in a limited degree.

Porphyry

In reducing his master's system to a series of aphorisms, Porphyry devoted a long and partly original chapter to the virtues. Distinguishing four categories—the political or practical, the cathartic, the philosophical, and the paradigmatic—he follows Plotinus in granting the political virtues only an emollient role in freeing the soul from the vanity and discord of the body. Although he deplored the contumacy of Christians, and may once have been engaged in an affair of state, he left no treatise on political science. The only associations that he contemplates in his extant works are philosophical brotherhoods, especially those held together by a regimen of abstinence. In his *Life of Pythagoras* and his treatise *On Abstinence,* he declares not only sacrifice but the eating of meat unworthy of a philosopher, and he compares the Pythagoreans to other elective societies, such as the Essenes and Brahmins, who were held together by mutual assistance, communal labor, and the renunciation of superfluous goods. Opponents of this way of life protested that it would not only rob priests and artisans of their livelihood but deprive civic life of a visible symbol of concord. Porphyry replies, in the Pythagorean tradition, that it is the custom of killing and eating beasts that breeds injustice and internecine war in the human sphere. In any case the sanctity and fecundity that the Pythagoreans ascribed to their emblem of justice, the tetractys or number 4, sufficed to prove that they did not despise the political virtues. Similar facts and arguments are rehearsed in the longer treatise *On the Pythagorean Life* by Porphyry's younger contemporary Iamblichus who concurred with him in regarding the sacrificial cult as inferior to the intellectual path of the philosopher, but maintained that there are lower gods who require these ministrations and humans who are the better for offering them. This belief that the cosmos as a whole demands not a uniform but a hierarchic polity also governs the Pythagorean theory of government in the civic realm. Both Iamblichus and Porphyry record that Pythagoras met his death when he and his friends were driven from the city of Metapontum in southern Italy by a populace that had tired of their austere and patrician government, and perhaps also of their refusal to cultivate friendship with outsiders. The political ideal of the Pythagoreans, in short, was one of equality among oligarchs, though with the sanction that these oligarchs were forbidden, like Plato's guardians in the republic, to derive material profit from their rule.

Both philosophers studied Plato's *Republic* as a prolegomenon to his *Timaeus*. Porphyry understood it as an ethical treatise preparing the soul for the contemplation of divine activity, and Iamblichus apparently held that its subject is the ideal city, conceived as a microcosm of the universal order. Philosophy in the Latin-speaking world was never so sharply divorced from political activity, and around 400 CE, Macrobius, a pagan of the senatorial class, produced a commentary on the sixth book of Marcus Tullius Cicero's treatise *On the Commonwealth,* in which the statesman Scipio Aemilianus learns in a dream that his soul is destined to be a star. Macrobius endorses Cicero's reasoning that no man would come through the toils of public life with unblemished honor unless the promise of fame were reinforced by the hope of immortality. Adducing Plato's arguments for the natural immortality of the soul, he also follows Plato in finding the pattern and source of civic harmony in the unfaltering revolution of the spheres. At the same time it is evident that the arithmology of the Pythagoreans, the ascent to the loftier virtues in Plotinus, and the musical proportions that determine the alignment of the planets are of more interest to him than anything on earth.

Proclus

Proclus was a thinker of more intellectual substance. Born in Byzantium and raised in the prosperous territory of Lycia, he was equipped for political life by birth and wealth, but, as a pagan of integrity, could not aspire to any of the numerous offices that were now reserved for Christians. Settling in Athens, where he was not a citizen, he nonetheless took part in civic assemblies, financed education from his own purse, and undertook the restoration of ancestral cults that had fallen into abeyance. His biographer Marinus adds that his virtues were of the noetic order, higher than the political and attainable only by those who can escape the importunities of the body and fix their minds resolutely upon the most lasting objects. According to Marinus, he mastered the theory of politics from Aristotle's book of that name, together with Plato's *Laws* and *Republic*. His commentary on *The Republic* was among the most voluminous of his writings and thus accords to the work a prominence that it had not hitherto enjoyed in Platonic schools. Declining to arbitrate between those who held that its subject is justice in the soul and those who read it as a political treatise, he argues that the justice of individuals and the just city are of a piece, the latter differing from the former in the multitude of its parts as a material entity differs from its form. Like his predecessors, he regards *Timaeus* as Plato's masterpiece. Observing that it begins as an epilogue to a discussion of the ideal constitution, he suggests that *The Republic,* which embodies this discussion, was conceived as a propaedeutic symbol of harmony in the universe, whereas the story of a mythical war between Athens and Atlantis, which precedes the cosmological speculations of *Timaeus,* mirrors the elemental conflict between the forces of generation and those of permanence. In Athens, which corresponds to the ideal, legislation represents the graduated diffusion of power from the transcendent principle. In Egypt, the proliferation of roles obscures the threefold division of the ideal commonwealth, and previous authors, Porphyry included, had matched each role with an order of daemons. Proclus, however, maintains that the seven occupations fall into three tiers, each corresponding to a class of gods, with the number four, or tetractys, at the base (which is also the center) as the cement of political unity. Even in praising his adopted Athens, Proclus is a typical neo-Platonist, who can admire a human institution only insofar as it exemplifies the taxonomy of divine powers in the cosmos under the indivisible fatherhood of the One.

The Legacy of Neo-Platonism

In 529 CE, the Athenian schools of philosophy were closed by the doctrinaire emperor Justinian, and only an underhand negotiation preserved the neo-Platonic school in Alexandria. It was probably the intransigent paganism of the neo-Platonists rather than any public fomentation of dissent that inspired these measures. If this philosophy left an enduring mark on Christian thought, it was in the writings that appeared, about this time, under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. Until the author's claim to have been a disciple of Paul was exploded in the fifteenth century by Lorenzo Valla, these texts could be cited to prove that there was a precedence of honor among the angels that prefigured the distribution of ministries within the church. Dante in his *Convivio* annexes one of the nine angelic orders to each of the cosmic spheres, and the most impressive work in this tradition is also one of the latest, Nicholas of Cusa's *Catholic Concordance*. Dominic O'Meara (2003) suggests that a newly discovered tract, *On Political Science,* is inspired by Dionysius and discerns a late flowering of the pagan school in al-Farabi's treatise *On the Perfect State*. Certainly both works are neo-Platonic, if this term connotes a studious indifference to the contingency of human institutions and the multiplicity of human ends.

M. J. Edwards

See also Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr; Dante Alighieri; Philosopher King; Plato

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Neo-Republicanism

Before understanding the contemporary political theories called "neo-republican," ushered in by the "republican revival" of the late twentieth century, we must consider the earlier republican traditions that inspired them. Republicanism as a political theory stresses the importance of citizen virtue, political participation, a distinctive conception of liberty, and widespread dedication to the common good. But republicanism as a descriptive term has been applied to so many institutions, practices, commitments, and historical periods that it risks confusing casual observers, a concern expressed by Thomas Jefferson and John Adams long before it was voiced by present-day scholars. For the sake of clarity, we may classify republican theories according to the historical traditions from which they derive or according to the principles that distinguish them.

Historical Traditions

Classifying republican theories according to their earliest historical influence generally means aligning them with either ancient Athens or ancient Rome. Athenian republicanism, taking its bearings either from a stylized reading of Aristotle's political theory or from a romanticized version of Athens' actual practices, highlighted the transformative potential of strict civic education and virtue, widespread political participation, and orientation toward a transcendent common good. (Aristotle also focused on political institutions and rule of law as means of containing political conflict.) Roman republicanism took its bearings from Roman jurisprudence and critiques of Athenian populism that rejected the latter's institutional instability and political excesses. It contrasted the independence of free citizens with the dependence of slaves. Subsequent theories of republicanism can be classified as either neo-Athenian or neo-Roman. This classificatory scheme carries significant appeal. Some scholars have divided republicanism more broadly into Greek and Roman traditions, a strategy with the advantage of including theorists such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who took his bearings not primarily from Rome or Athens but from the disciplined, ascetic, ancient Greek city-state of Sparta. Contemporary neo-republican theorists can draw upon the Greek tradition, the Roman tradition, or both.

Perfectionist and Institutional Republicanism

Alternately, we may classify theories of republicanism according to their thematic affinities and group them into two distinct traditions: perfectionist and institutional republicanism. The former tradition attempts to combat political problems by improving people morally and politically; the latter emphasizes institutional innovations, including separation of powers and rule of law, in order to uphold individual freedom. The distinction between perfectionist and institutional traditions corresponds roughly, although not perfectly, to the Greek/Roman distinction, and contemporary neo-republican theories can draw upon either tradition or both.

Theorists in the perfectionist and institutional traditions share an emphasis on citizen virtue, republican liberty, and dedication to the common good regardless of their historical era, but they conceptualize those themes quite differently. The perfectionist republican conception of liberty resembles what the twentieth-century philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin called "positive liberty," a liberty that actually requires self-control or self-mastery and a formative moral and civic education. The "perfectionist" element derives from an aspiration to perfect, or at least radically improve, human beings through that formative education and through the practice of virtuous political participation. Virtuous political participation embodies citizens' liberty and represents an end in itself, partially constituting not only the good life for individuals but the common good for all. Many perfectionist republicans, whether neo-republicans in the contemporary era or theorists from past centuries, insist on a significant measure of economic equality to avoid relations of dependency that might undermine citizens' political autonomy. Perfectionist republicanism differs sharply from liberalism, because its proponents may prioritize the community's good over any particular individuals who comprise it and may also conceptualize statecraft as soulcraft. Stated differently, perfectionist republicans may encourage government to shape citizens' inner selves and pathways

to happiness, aspirations that liberals tend to place out of political bounds.

Perfectionist republicanism encompasses, for example, the political theory of Aristotle and the political practice of Sparta, in the classical world; the works of Rousseau, Gabriel de Mably, and many early American Anti-Federalists, during the early modern era; and Hannah Arendt, Alisdair MacIntyre, Benjamin Barber, and Carole Pateman, in the modern or neo-republican era. In other words, it encompasses the tradition sometimes called "civic humanism" and also forms of participatory democracy that advocate civic education, civic virtue, public deliberation, orientation toward the common good, and the intrinsic (as opposed to merely instrumental) value of political participation. The point is not to establish definitively that all of those theorists and practitioners are rightly called both perfectionist and republican. Scholars have long debated such labels. The larger point is that the listed theorists and practitioners are deeply embedded in past and current discussions about republicanism and cannot be excluded without unduly silencing a broad range of scholarly voices.

Institutional republicans, conversely, regard free political institutions as constituting citizens' liberty, with liberty conceptualized as freedom from domination. Freedom from domination means the status of being immune to arbitrary interference by others. Yet institutional republicans distinguish this type of freedom from the liberal ideal of noninterference typically associated with what Berlin called "negative liberty." Liberals who champion negative liberty might regard any given law as a necessary evil, an interference with freedom tolerable only because it prevents other, worse interferences with freedom. But institutional republicans who defend freedom as nondomination can regard positive laws as instruments of freedom insofar as they prevent relations of domination. Just laws interfere with citizens' lives for the sake of safeguarding all citizens from the arbitrary interference of other individuals, groups, or institutions. Further, institutional republicans object to the conception of liberty as noninterference because noninterference does not preclude relations of subservience. A slave "lucky" enough to have a beneficent master would be in a relationship of domination even if the master chose not to interfere most of the time. Thus, institutional republicans may object to practices, relationships, or institutions that involve the *potential* for domination—the potential for arbitrary interference with one's choices—even if no one is currently being dominated. Such a stance might translate into redistributionist public policies if the public were to deem great economic inequalities a potential source of domination. It might indicate extensive governmental regulation of private companies and industries in order to ensure that workers and small businesses would never fear domination by "big business" or multinational corporations. The main point for institutional neo-republicans is that liberty as nondomination must be the supreme political value.

Institutional republicans also generally champion mixed government—combining elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—as an essential resource for balancing power and preventing domination. Republican theorists in the institutional tradition include Marcus Tullius Cicero and Polybius in antiquity; Niccolò Machiavelli, James Harrington, baron de Montesquieu, and James Madison, in the early modern eras; and Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, Cass Sunstein, and Maurizio Viroli, among the neo-republican theorists of the present day.

Neither the Greek/Roman nor perfectionist/institutional classification scheme implies exclusivity. Specific theories or practices might combine elements of both. Aristotle shares the institutional focus on mixed government and rule of law; Rousseau devotes much of his *Social Contract* and his constitutions for Poland and Corsica to institutional bulwarks of republican freedom; and a range of early American republicans combine Greek and Roman, perfectionist, and institutional elements. The same can be said of certain contemporary neo-republican theorists, such as Michael Sandel and Benjamin Barber, who call for an increased governmental role in shaping political virtues and moral dispositions while also respecting constitutional limitations and rule of law.

The Republican Revival

Republicanism has often been framed as a theory of opposition: opposition to political theories and practices deemed corrupt, oppressive, or alienating. Aristotle's republicanism—which advocated

the rule of law, civic virtue inculcated by strict education, and the balancing of different economic classes against each other—opposed Athenian democracy's populist excesses. Rousseau's republicanism opposed not only the existing French monarchy but also what he took to be an alienating, oppressive, property-dominated political theory espoused by seventeenth-century social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. The late twentieth-century republican revival in North American and European scholarship, which informed the contemporary neo-republican movement, opposed a liberal tradition that some scholars regarded as excessively individualistic and morally hollow.

Republican revival scholars, including historians Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J. G. A. Pocock, as well as neo-republican political theorists, have challenged earlier interpretations of European and American political theory for allegedly overlooking vital republican influences. They have interpreted the early sixteenth-century theorist Machiavelli, for example, not as a conniving, amoral advisor to princes (a fairly traditional view) but rather as a patriot who championed virtuous republics, rule of law, balanced institutions, and pursuit of the common good. Such neo-republican scholars have also challenged a long-standing interpretation that viewed American history as a narrative dominated by the liberalism of seventeenth-century theorist Locke, a narrative that emphasized property rights, limited government, and individuals' independence, all rooted in natural law that existed independently of government and could legitimate popular revolution. The revised view interprets American history through the lens of misunderstood republican influences (derived primarily from English theorists but occasionally from Romans and Greeks as well) that advocated rigorous civic education and citizen virtue, public deliberation about the common good, and hostility to social and economic hierarchies.

Legal scholars such as Bruce Ackerman and Cass Sunstein have drawn upon the republican revival historical narrative to inform neo-republican theories of constitutional interpretation and judicial politics. Sunstein emphasizes the early American value of public deliberation to promote a kind of "deliberative democracy," not only among citizens but among elected officials. Toward this end he advocates strong judicial protection of individual rights, especially minority rights, to establish the civic equality that equal public deliberation would require. Ackerman utilizes republican revival scholarship to oppose the emerging legal doctrine of "originalism." Originalism would limit constitutional interpretation to discovery of the written constitution's understood meaning at its time of enactment or amendment and thus would curb what some conservatives feel to be inappropriate judicial activism. Ackerman locates, in the founders' underappreciated republican principles, a commitment to popular sovereignty that could override constitutional rigidity and allow Supreme Court justices to forge constitutional law enshrining widely held, deeply considered public convictions.

Neo-Republican Theory and Liberalism

To reiterate an earlier point, the republican revival that paved the way for contemporary neo-republicanism arose out of dissatisfaction with the liberal tradition's predominance in the United Kingdom, North America, and Australia. The political theory of liberalism comes in many varieties, but all of them stress the importance of limited government, individual rights (with property rights often accorded special prominence), and individual autonomy: the individual's ability to decide his or her life plan without interference from others, consistent with a similar liberty for others. Some critics have charged liberalism with promoting greed, selfishness, and the breakdown of traditional community values (by allowing individuals the right to choose their own paths to fulfillment). Socialism, communism, and anarchism represent several of the more influential ideological challenges to liberalism. Although these ideologies themselves contain many variations, socialism generally advocates limitations on private property and state control of economic distribution and key industries; communism generally advocates the elimination of private property; and anarchism may advocate the elimination not only of private property but of state governments as well (sometimes allowing for small-scale, democratic governance at the local level). Neo-republicanism challenges liberalism less radically, so much less radically that neo-republicans and liberals have debated the extent to which neo-republicanism differs from liberalism in the first place.

Neo-republicans with roots in the perfectionist tradition tend to criticize liberalism for an impoverished conception of liberty, an excessive emphasis on rights to the exclusion of duties, and a failure to appreciate civic virtue and political discourse, which help us to discover and promote the common good. Liberalism's emphasis on autonomous individuals allegedly debases public discourse into a series of private votes or market transactions, as each individual chooses his or her conception of the good life without looking to fellow citizens for input. Neo-republicans rooted in the institutional tradition join perfectionist neo-republicans in attributing to liberalism an impoverished conception of liberty and an excessive emphasis on rights to the exclusion of duties, but with less emphasis on public deliberation about the common good. Theoretically, citizens need not participate extensively in public affairs for the conditions of nondomination to obtain, although institutional neo-republicans may differ on the levels of citizen participation required. Institutional neo-republicans generally place more weight on constitutionalism and the rule of law as the forces responsible for ensuring nondomination.

Responding to the neo-republican critiques, some liberal scholars accuse perfectionist neo-republicanism of dangerous tendencies toward coercion or exclusivity. Advocating "statecraft as soulcraft" might require a very strong and intrusive government, one that could override citizens' autonomy in the best of circumstances or tyrannize over them in the worst. Further, the impulse to mold citizens around a single norm of virtue or communal identity might exclude a range of legitimate values and voices. Institutional neo-republicans can avoid most of those criticisms, but some liberal scholars question whether institutional neo-republicanism differs from liberalism in most important respects. For example, they question whether republican freedom differs essentially from liberals' conception of liberty as noninterference. They also question whether republicanism's emphasis on civic virtue differs meaningfully from that of other political theories. They point to a civic strand within the liberal tradition that requires inculcation of specific liberal virtues such as toleration, reciprocity, and self-reliance. Some have proposed versions of a "republican liberalism" that stress the importance of citizen duties as well as rights, common interests as well as self-determination, without jettisoning liberalism as an overarching political philosophy.

While perfectionist neo-republicanism unquestionably diverges from liberal principles, future scholarship will continue to debate the philosophical distinctions between institutional neo-republicanism and liberalism, as well as the prospects for neo-republicanism to inform public policy and the public philosophy.

Ben Berger

See also Civic Humanism; Civic Republicanism; Domination; Participatory Democracy; Republicanism

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Network

Broadly defined, a network is a group of interdependent actors and the relationships among them. Networks vary widely in their nature and operation

depending on the particular actors involved, their relationships, the level and scope at which they operate, and the wider context. The actors within a network might be people, states, transnational corporations, or a mixture thereof. The relationships between actors are always interdependent, but they can vary from close ties, such as those within a family, to occasional impersonal and mediated interactions. Networks can appear at the level of the school playground or high court justices around the world. They appear in unstructured social environments and in highly formalized, rule-bound settings.

Network theory arose from a number of overlapping trends in social theory. Most of these trends arose as part of a shift to rather ahistorical forms of social analysis in the first half of the twentieth century. Functionalism, structuralism, systems theory, and other such approaches attempted to explain social facts in terms of synchronic relationships and patterns of historical narrative. The nature and behavior of a unit derived from its function or place within a larger whole. The concept of a "network" appeared as one way of describing some of the relevant wholes; a network was a whole composed of a set of actors or units and their relations to one another. Within the social sciences, the concept of a network became popular in all kinds of areas. In ethnography, it provided a way of conceptualizing not only family relationships but also migratory patterns from tribal villages to cities. In social psychology, it provided a way, especially within sociometry, of examining the interpersonal relationships within groups so as to identify informal leaders and social rankings. For many people, the most obvious uses of the concept of a network today are within information technology. The World Wide Web is the "net," a set of interlinked computers forms a network, and so on.

The concept of a network often forms one of three items in a classification of different modes of coordination and organization. Networks differ here from hierarchies and markets. One difference is the basis of the relationships between actors: Whereas markets are based on property rights and contracts, and hierarchies are based on something like an employment relationship, networks are based on the exchange of resources. Another difference is the medium of exchange between actors: Whereas markets rely on prices, and hierarchies rely on authority, networks depend on trust. A third difference is the means of resolving conflicts: Market systems use bargaining and the courts, hierarchies use rules and commands, and networks use diplomacy. A final difference might be culture: It is thought that markets have a competitive culture, hierarchies instantiate a culture of subordination, and networks encourage a culture of reciprocity.

The distinctive properties of network forms of coordination are usually traced to the interdependence of the actors within the network. This interdependence means that none of the actors can attain his or her aims unless he or she cooperates with the others. Hence networks differ from markets in which actors are independent of one another and able to achieve their goals through buying and selling. The interdependence of the actors within a network also means that no one actor can order the others to act in a certain way: No actor is so dependent on another that it has to obey that other's commands. Hence networks differ from hierarchies in which the authority of one actor enables it to ensure the compliance of another.

Some theorists have sought not only to distinguish networks from other types of organization but also to draw up typologies of different types of network. One simple typology is that between formal and informal networks. Formal networks are associated, say, with legalism, planning, the management of decisions, and a structured allocation of resources. Informal networks, in contrast, are linked with trust, discussion, collegiality, and unstructured exchanges. If we ponder the distinction between formal and informal networks, we might notice that formal networks closely resemble hierarchies. It might seem, therefore, that all these typologies should not be taken as offering a discrete set of distinct organizational forms. Rather, they offer us ideal types taken from a larger spectrum of different possibilities.

Advocates of networks ascribe a range of advantages to them. Typically networks are said to offer a kind of dynamism and flexibility that hierarchies cannot, and yet also to foster cooperation and stable relationships in a way markets cannot. Some advocates of networks argue that these advantages are especially relevant to the contemporary world. They argue that the world has become increasingly complex and interconnected, and the pace of change is becoming faster and

faster, all of which puts a premium on the kind of dynamism and flexibility associated with networks. Many contemporary problems require the state to draw on diverse organizations for specialist funding, resources, and expertise. They also argue that the rise of new knowledge-based industries means that prosperity and efficiency increasingly depend not on competition but on the kinds of cooperative and open practices that facilitate the exchange of ideas and information. Public sector, voluntary sector, and private sector organizations all benefit from stable and creative relationships based on trust and participation.

Not everyone is so enamored of networks. Even advocates of networks often argue that they are not always appropriate and that the state should rely on a mixture of hierarchies, networks, and markets, adopting whatever organizational form is most apt in any given case. Other critics worry that the explosion of networks has gone too far. They accept that networks have benefits, but they argue that beyond a certain point they lead to a fragmented and unwieldy system of governance. The state loses the ability to effectively implement public policies. Perhaps the main criticism of networks, however, is that they can undermine democratic values such as accountability. The sheer institutional complexity of networks obscures who is accountable to whom for what. Even if networks are more responsible to citizens, and even if they allow for more participation, they still might threaten some of our democratic values.

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See also Bureaucracy; Civil Society; Community; Market; Organization Theory; Social Capital

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New Left

The term *New Left* describes a broad range of left-wing activist movements and intellectual currents that arose from the late 1950s. Often regarded as synonymous with the student radicalism of the 1960s, culminating in the uprisings of 1968, it may also refer more narrowly to particular segments within or alongside the 1968 movements that sought to give them theoretical coherence and political direction. New Left radicalism related campus protest to U.S. civil rights activism; to third world national liberation struggles; to mass strikes and university and factory occupations in a diverse array of countries; and to wider forms of anti-capitalist and countercultural protest. The diversity of sources and forms of revolt complicates attempts to identify shared features of the various currents, but among those most commonly cited are a libertarian and democratic impulse; an emphasis on cultural as well as political transformation; an extension of the traditional Left's focus on class struggle to acknowledge multiple forms and bases of oppression, including race and gender; and a rejection of bureaucracy and traditional forms of political organization in favor of direct action and participatory democracy. In theoretical terms, the New Left's major contribution was to a process of revision and diversification within or around Marxism, especially with regard to concepts of class, agency, ideology, and culture.

New Left currents first arose in Europe in response to the perceived moral discredit of official communism following Nikita Khruschev's "secret speech" in February 1956, which revealed the extent of political repression under Stalin's leadership. French and British groupings adopted the label "New Left" to denote their search for a socialist "third way," distinct from official communism/orthodox Marxism and from mainstream social democracy. Antinuclearism and opposition to cold war bipolarity were critical rallying points for the disaffected communists, independent socialists, and young radicals who formed the New Left's constituency. Anticolonialism and the rise of the "third world" acquired increasing salience, especially after the Cuban Revolution of 1959. In the United States, the New Left grew out of student

socialist activism, especially as this intersected with, and was inspired by, the black civil rights movement. The main U.S. New Left organization, Students for a Democratic Society, was founded in 1960 and published its political manifesto, the Port Huron Statement, in 1962. As American involvement in Vietnam escalated, opposition to the war, seen as the overarching symbol of cold war imperialism, became the major focus for U.S. activists and their counterparts elsewhere. New Left movements generally avoided traditional and party-political forms of organization in favor of strategies of mass protest, direct action, and civil disobedience. The highpoint of New Left activism was reached in 1968, as a wave of radical protest swept across the globe. The revolutionary mood dissipated through the 1970s, although important lines of continuity still exist between the New Left movement and new social movements such as feminism and environmentalism. A minority of activists went on to found clandestine "revolutionary" organizations practicing violent direct action; examples of these include the Red Army Faction (also known as the Baader-Meinhof gang) in West Germany and the Weather Underground in the United States. Others moved into far-left parties and groups that proliferated in the 1970s.

The New Left produced no unified body of political theory. In many countries, including the United States, it was primarily an activist force, although in France, West Germany, and Britain, theoretical production was an important concern. The range of theoretical influences on which New Left currents drew was extremely diverse, including the philosophical existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, various forms of revisionist or neo-Marxism, the "third worldism" of Frantz Fanon, the guerrilla strategy of Régis Debray, the Marxist structuralism of Louis Althusser, Maoism, and Trotskyism. Initially, the rediscovery of Marx's early writings, particularly his concept of alienation, was key—part of a humanist reorientation within European Marxism in which the ethical and moral dimensions of Marx's thought were emphasized as an alternative to the sterile economism of orthodox communist interpretations. The concept of alienation was influentially reworked by the Frankfurt School thinker Herbert Marcuse, whose *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) argued that advanced industrial capitalism had created a totalitarian society in which human needs and interests are constructed and manipulated through consumerism and communications media so that resistance to the status quo appears irrational and impossible. Despite the pessimism of his analysis, Marcuse was sympathetic to the student movements and, in common with the sociologist C. Wright Mills, whose 1960 "Letter to the New Left" helped forge transatlantic connections within the milieu, invested hope in the potential of peripheral social forces such as students, racial minorities, and third world national-liberationists to effect radical change. This was part of a broader theoretical trend in which the agency of the working classes of advanced capitalism, increasingly viewed as co-opted and depoliticized by consumerism, came to be doubted, although this remained a controversial issue within the New Left.

Thinkers of the New Left also made groundbreaking contributions to analysis of culture and communications. Departing from Marxist orthodoxy and convinced that new conditions of consumer capitalism required fresh thinking, British theorists, including Stuart Hall and Raymond Williams, theorized culture as constitutive rather than simply reflective of social and economic processes. They offered pioneering studies of the role of advertising, television, and the mass media, as well as investigating the potential of youth and other subcultures to challenge and subvert ideological messages. Antonio Gramsci, an interwar Italian Marxist whose analysis of capitalist hegemony drew attention to the role of ideology and culture in reproducing capitalist dominance, was a critical influence. As it developed within and beyond the New Left, "cultural studies" drew on new theoretical developments, notably structuralism and post-structuralism, to become a discipline in its own right. Such gradual permeation and mutation are also characteristic of the wider theoretical legacy of the New Left, whose life span encompassed the early careers of numerous notable intellectuals and activists, including Perry Anderson, Tariq Ali, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Rudi Dutschke, Stuart Hall, Tom Hayden, C. Wright Mills, E. P. Thompson, Ralph Miliband, and Raymond Williams. The British journal *New Left Review*, founded in 1960, is the most significant surviving forum of the original New Left: It continues to demonstrate the eclectic and experimental approach to theoretical and

political questions that gives the New Left its distinctive character.

Madeleine Davis

See also Agency; Alienation; Civil Disobedience; Civil Rights; Class; Culture; Environmentalism; Existentialism; Fanon, Frantz; Gender; Gramsci, Antonio; Maoism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Socialism; Participatory Democracy; Structuralism

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New Liberalism

New liberalism refers to a body of distinctive legislation on social welfare enacted between 1906 and the outbreak of World War I. Herbert Samuel, Winston Churchill, and David Lloyd George were three of the government members most directly involved. The expression, however, was in use already. At the time of the defeat in 1895 of an earlier Liberal government, the Spencerian libertarian Joseph Hiam Levy voiced the hope in the *Personal Rights Journal* that John Bull had begun to realize what the "new liberalism" means.

The reforms were not the outcome simply of pressure from working people for increased social security. Wider perceptions of economic decline, compared with Germany and the United States, and awareness of evidence of the persistence of poverty and ill-health (from the work of Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree) were fueling anxieties over the condition of Britain. More fundamentally, a shift was arising in ways of conceptualizing the state and society, to which new liberalism was a political response. Older conceptualizations of the state as reactively regulative of the spontaneous lives of its citizens (as for John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer) were facing explicit challenges from idealist social thought, associated directly with Thomas Hill Green, David Ritchie, and Bernard Bosanquet, and echoed strongly in the Fabian socialism of Beatrice and Sidney Webb. The state and its citizens were part of a moral or organic unity, "society." In particular, society was a unity in which governments and "successful" citizens had the (hitherto neglected) power through social action to constitute, and thereby enhance and not merely regulate, the social, moral, and material lives of the poor. A "good society" could be directly achieved as the deliberate end of policy, or, in the application of Spencer's orthogenic social evolution contributed by Ritchie and Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse, and compatible with orthodox idealist social thought, the state could take control of the direction and pace of social evolution.

Herbert Samuel, familiar with these ideas, argued in 1895 that classical liberalism, as based on Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism and Adam Smith's economics, was "sapped and raddled." In the *Progressive Review* for December 1896, he characterized the "newer Liberal school" as favoring an extension of the powers of the state

> to enforce, whenever possible, such conditions of employment as the public conscience approves as just, to improve the surroundings of working-class life, to render the resources of education equally available for the poor and the rich, to alleviate the miseries of unemployment and the destitution of the old, to reform the system of land tenure, to take under public control any industry which it is found can be managed in that way with greater advantage to the community, and to provide a fair standard of comfort for all who are in State employ.

His *Liberalism* of 1902 called for, from an idealist intellectual foundation, old age pensions, labor exchanges, and workmen's compensation, all prefiguring actual legislation. The state was to be the agent of the community.

Winston Churchill emphasized mitigation of the consequences of failure, with provision of a

minimum below which persons cannot fall yet above which they may compete with vigor. In 1901 he described Rowntree's *Poverty: A Study of Town Life* as making his hair stand on end. Rowntree's research in York had found that the poverty of the people there extended to nearly one fifth of the population; nearly one fifth had something between one and a half and three fourths as much food to eat as the paupers in the York Poor Law Union. To Churchill thus was a terrible and shocking thing. Seven years later, in the Liberal government at the Board of Trade, he declared his dedication to new liberal innovations in a letter to Asquith: "The Minister who will apply to this country the successful experiences of Germany in social organization may or may not be supported in the polls, but he will have at least left a memorial which time will not deface of his administration." He outlined a 2-year plan, giving pride of place to his own interest: labor exchanges and unemployment insurance; national infirmity insurance; state industries—afforestation and roads; modernized Poor Law, that is, classification; railway amalgamation with state control and guarantee; education compulsory until age 17. "I say," he finished, "thrust a big slice of Bismarckism over the whole underside of our industrial system, & await the consequences whatever they may be with a good conscience" (quoted in Jenkins, 2001, pp. 146–147).

Under the Liberal government formed in 1906, a range of innovations stand out. In 1906, local authorities gained powers to provide meals for needy schoolchildren, and in 1907 school medical inspection of children was introduced. In 1908 the Children Act (owing much to Samuel) abolished the committal of children to prison, instituted a system of juvenile courts, and gave some protection to children suffering from parental neglect. Samuel was involved too in the Prevention of Crime Act (1908), which established a national system of "Borstals" for reformatory education; in the authorization in 1910 of vocational guidance in schools; and in the Probation of Offenders Act of 1907, which effectively inaugurated probation in Britain.

In 1908 old-age pensions were enacted (pressure for which dated back for 30 years). They were for people older than age 70, and they were means-tested, noncontributory, and paid through the Post Office. In the area of work there was legislation on workmen's compensation provisions, on labor exchanges to promote the "fluidity" of labor (owing much to Churchill and William Beveridge), and on regulation in certain trades of wages and hours worked.

The National Insurance Act of 1911 is especially notable. It introduced two independent contributory schemes of health and unemployment insurance. Both involved a tripartite financial structure, in which contributions for each insured person came from the insured person, the employer, and the state. The health insurance scheme was administered through "approved societies," but unemployment insurance was directly undertaken by the state (though with provision for the involvement of trade unions). The Webbs complained that health insurance would be open to the manipulation of malingerers and would do little to prevent ill health, but it did secure the medical benefit of free access to general practitioners and a cash sickness benefit to the insured person, designed to compensate for the interruption to earnings. It owed much to Lloyd George's desire to build on old-age pensions, but on a contributory basis. He visited Germany in August 1908 to study its insurance schemes. The development of concrete proposals for Britain proved a struggle, with interested parties—the friendly societies, the commercial insurance companies (such as the Prudential) with large financial interests in door-to-door collection of premiums for death or funeral benefits, and the medical profession—all having much to lose in the face of a novel statutory provision. Eventually agreement was reached that friendly societies and the "industrial" insurance organizations (and trade unions and employers) could administer the scheme as the "approved societies." Insurance was compulsory for all workers earning up to the point income tax became payable, but selection of the approved society was a personal matter. Doctors providing the medical benefit were organized into panels, by a separate administration. Statutory unemployment insurance, planned in a symbiotic relationship with the provisions of the Labour Exchanges Act of 1909, was virtually without precedent anywhere. The experimental scheme (associated with Churchill, with assistance from Beveridge) was confined initially to trades without casual employment and where unemployment was

cyclical, temporary, and predictable (such as building, shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, iron founding, and construction of vehicles). It was markedly less controversial than health insurance.

The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, appointed by the Conservatives in 1905, reported in 1909. Its majority and minority reports wanted the poor law abolished, but differed over what provision should replace it. New liberalism largely left it alone. However, the administration of old-age pensions and insurance was beyond the poor law's remit, thus terminating its hegemony over legally based assistance for poor people.

New liberal benefits in the form of cash payments may have been designed to achieve a fairer society, but recipients were free to choose how to spend them. This feature was not incompatible with more orthodox liberalism, but it represented a dilution of the "pure" new liberal ethos most clearly associated with its earlier reforms, embodying a direct tutelary role through the provision of services rather than cash. However, it did open up a chasm between the Liberals and the Webbs, who preferred measures ensuring people were employed and cured over unsupervised payments.

New liberal reforms dropped from the headlines as two general elections were triggered in 1910 around a constitutional crisis involving the House of Commons and the House of Lords over the Lords' rejection of the 1909 budget's financial measures, partly associated with them. New liberalism, though, is not the whole story of twentieth-century Liberal governments: A prominent Liberal minister at the time, John Morley, could object to homegrown "Prussian bureaucracy" (in his *Recollections,* Vol. 1). New liberal thinking survived World War I, but Liberal political muscle was wasting away.

The reforms were not part of an "unfolding process" in which they could be counted a necessary step toward the "welfare state" of the 1940s. Rather, they represented divergent Liberal incorporations of idealist social thought and its organic view of social problems coupled with its character-building solutions at a point in time.

John Offer

See also Dewey, John; Fabianism; Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawny; Liberalism; Marshall, T. H.; Progressivism; Welfare State

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New Right

The term *New Right* is usually attributed to the American author and former Republican activist Kevin Philips (1940–). It has been used with increasing frequency since the mid-1970s, in association with political and intellectual movements in several countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the United States. More recently, it has been used in connection with populist politicians in certain European states, such as Jörg Haider (1950–2008) of Austria and Pim Fortuyn (1948–2002) of the Netherlands.

However, most commentators trace the origins of the New Right to developments within the American Republican Party in the early 1960s and associate it with Barry Goldwater (1909–1998) and his 1964 campaign for the U.S. presidency. Although Goldwater's bid proved unsuccessful, the broad framework of ideas that informed his campaign was subsequently sustained within generously funded think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute. Generally speaking, these ideas were not new at all; the only novelty was the vigor with which they were expounded.

Ideas

The New Right is commonly supposed to advocate a mixture of "traditional" social values and economic liberalism. One familiar theme is the importance of the family. Authors associated with the New Right typically argue that well-adjusted children cannot be raised unless both parents are

present. From this perspective, they oppose any legislation that eases the process of divorce, especially for couples with children, and condemn any system of taxation and state benefits that either penalizes the nuclear family or encourages childbirth outside that institution. The notion of civil partnerships between individuals of the same sex is regarded with abhorrence.

New Right authors, notably Charles Murray (1943–), have identified children born out of wedlock with a growing "underclass" of individuals who are liable to participate in violent crime and other forms of "delinquency." In the United Kingdom, a variation on this theme was put forward by the Conservative politician Sir Keith Joseph (1918–1994), who spoke in 1974 about a "cycle of deprivation." The idea that overgenerous welfare benefits generated a "dependency culture" became a commonplace of right-wing political commentary in the 1980s.

In economics, many members of the New Right have been influenced by the work of Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992), in particular by *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), in which he argued that state intervention in economic matters would lead to the extirpation of liberty in other crucial respects. This libertarian aspect of the New Right was also expounded by Robert Nozick (1938–2002), especially in his *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974), in which he defended inequality arising from freely negotiated contracts against the more redistributive implications of John Rawls's (1921–2002) *A Theory of Justice* (1971).

The Political Fortunes of the New Right

The increasing potency of the New Right as a political force after 1970 can be attributed to international and domestic factors. On the one hand, American failure in the Vietnam War accentuated existing fears of communist encroachment. On the other, there was a growing feeling within some liberal democracies that the state had taken on excessive responsibilities in the economic sphere, while becoming too "permissive" in moral matters. In the eyes of the New Right, there was an obvious link between these factors, epitomized by the tendency of left-wing activists in the West to attack such "bourgeois" institutions as marriage and the family. On this view, the moral and social fiber of the West was being undermined so that it would be less capable of resisting the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The same process was making it more likely that liberal democracies would adopt communist ideas without direct Soviet intervention, either through revolution or even by peaceful democratic means.

The answer, for the New Right, was to stiffen the sinews of liberal democracy through the adoption of an ideology that provided a mirror image of communism. When postwar prosperity in the West was seriously undermined by the economic shocks of the mid-1970s, the New Right was ready to provide an alternative to the centrist policies that had generally prevailed in liberal democracies since 1945. In the United Kingdom, New Right ideas never enjoyed widespread public popularity, but Margaret Thatcher (1925–) endorsed them in full, and having taken the leadership of the U.K.'s Conservative Party in the same year that Kevin Philips coined the term *New Right,* she embarked on an 11-year stint as prime minister in 1979. Ronald Reagan (1911–2004), who was elected to the U.S. presidency the following year, adopted a similar ideological stance.

Although the political pioneers of the New Right owed their success (at least in part) to luck, it was not long before a plausible rationale was provided for this turn of events. In a globalized economy, it was argued, capitalists were sure to favor states whose governments advocated free-market thinking. At the same time, potential overseas investors would like to feel that they were putting their money into countries with relatively stable societies. If their theoretical utterances were any guide, Thatcher, Reagan, and similar politicians in countries like Australia and New Zealand offered a combination of increased social stability and greatly enhanced profit potential, compared to the situation under their moderate predecessors.

Although politicians of the New Right have enjoyed no more than mixed success in office, the impact of their ideas has proved to be enduring. In the United Kingdom, for example, "Thatcherite" policy initiatives were largely retained and, in some cases, pushed even farther by the Labour Party during the premiership of Tony Blair, prime minister from 1997 to 2007. In the United States, the influence of the New Right over the Republican Party was exemplified by the thinking of Newt

Gingrich (1943–), Speaker of the House of Representatives from 1995 to 1999.

The Coherence of the New Right

A major problem in assessing the New Right is the sheer diversity of individuals and groups commonly covered by that term. For example, European populist leaders like Haider and Fortuyn exploited antipathy toward immigrants to increase their public appeal. Whereas some might regard this as a logical product of New Right thinking, it could also be argued that the New Right emphasis on freedom implies unhindered movement of peoples across international boundaries. Similarly, some New Right pronouncements on dependency could be taken to imply that the "feckless" poor should be deterred from producing children, through one means or another. Yet in countries like the United States, some members of the New Right have joined forces with the Religious Right, who uphold the sanctity of life regardless of circumstances.

The problem here is that the term has proved all too successful, and that any right-wing ideologue who eschews the "middle ground" of politics is virtually guaranteed the "New Right" label, whether he or she wants it or not. A more telling criticism is that even "orthodox" representatives of the New Right, like Margaret Thatcher, have embraced incompatible ideas in economic and social matters. Especially since the collapse of communism, it has become clear that left-wing ideas played a relatively minor role in eroding traditional morality within liberal democracies. Critics argue that the impact of the free market has been a far more subversive force. On this basis they argue that, in defending the market as a bastion of liberty, the New Right may have unwittingly proved far more destructive of shared moral understandings than either the Old Left or the New left.

Mark Garnett

See also Conservatism; Hayek, Friedrich von; Liberalism; Libertarianism; Market; Neoclassical Economics; Neconservatism

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Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm (1844–1900)

Friedrich Nietzsche is a provocative thinker who, although largely neglected during his lifetime, now exercises a wide influence in many areas of the humanities. His legacy for the study of politics is, however, hotly contested. This entry reviews central concepts in Nietzsche's thought, as well as controversies concerning them, and then examines the significance of Nietzsche's work for political theory.

Nietzsche was born on October 15, 1844, to a Lutheran pastor and his wife in Röcken, Prussia; his father died when Nietzsche was 4 years old. Nietzsche's academic training was in the discipline of philology (classics) rather than philosophy, and he achieved considerable academic success at a young age. However, at the age of 34 he took early retirement from the University of Basel due to ill health. He spent the next decade moving around Europe in search of affordable accommodation in a climate conducive to his well-being. Despite proposing to (at least) two women, Nietzsche never married. In 1889, he suffered a mental breakdown while in Turin, Italy, from which he never fully recovered. The last decade of his life was spent in the care of his mother Franziska and sister Elisabeth. During those years he lapsed in and out of lucidity and was incapable of writing.

Apart from a brief stint in the Prussian army, which ended when Nietzsche injured himself while trying to mount a horse, and his friendship as a young man with the composer Richard Wagner, Nietzsche's life was relatively uneventful. However, if he is correct that "the greatest thoughts are the greatest events" (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and*

Evil, section 285, 1886/1973, p. 195), then by this standard, his life was full of events. Each of the works produced from *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872) to his last, including his quasi-autobiography *Ecce Homo* ([Behold the Man] 1908) is original, challenging, arresting, exacting, and unsettling.

Signature Concepts

A sense of Nietzsche's innovative thinking can be gleaned by regarding some of the concepts, ideas, and phrases he originated. He is well known for the doctrine of the will to power, although exactly what this doctrine means is widely debated. Nietzsche sometimes presents the will to power as a monistic metaphysical thesis, according to which the urge to increase power surges through every living thing. As one of his oft-quoted formulations of this doctrine in *The Will to Power* declares, "The world itself is the will to power—and nothing else! And you yourself are the will to power—and nothing else!" (Nietzsche, 1901/1967, section 1067). From this perspective, human beings are manifestations of the will to power, and a fundamental human motivation is the desire to increase one's power. According to this outlook, every human action is driven by the will to power, even actions that seem self-denying.

This view that the exertion of power is all-pervasive in human life, even if it is sometimes masked, helps us to understand another of Nietzsche's unique ideas—his distinction between master and slave moralities. Master moralities are doctrines that affirm and promote the values of strong and powerful individuals. They emphasize martial strength, courage, hardness, cruelty, competition, conflict, and glory. Master moralities are elitist: They do not hold that all human beings can attain these heights, but rather accept that some, and usually most, members of society will have to live by different and lower standards. The paradigmatic slave morality for Nietzsche is Christianity. Christian values like meekness, mildness, humility, turning the other cheek, loving one's enemies, and blessing the poor in spirit both appeal to, and serve the interests of, those who are themselves weak in mind, body, and spirit. As an egalitarian doctrine, Christianity contends, however, that its values and virtues are equally applicable to all individuals, weak or strong, great or humble. Nietzsche claims to expose this egalitarianism as an expression of Christianity's will to power, for it provides a way in which a weak majority can dominate and emasculate a stronger, superior elite.

The egalitarian pretensions of Christianity are, in Nietzsche's estimation, driven by what he labels the *ressentiment* of the weak. Seeing that some people are superior to them in strength and nobility, the weak majority resents rather than admires their greatness. Inferior individuals react to the greatness of others by devising a morality or value scheme that brings everyone down to their lowest common denominator. Nietzsche depicts Christianity as having achieved what he calls a "transvaluation of values" by overturning the master moralities of ancient Greece and Rome. Modern doctrines of liberalism, democracy, and feminism, all of which are premised on a belief in human equality, arise in the wake of this transvaluation. The influence of Christianity on Western culture and politics has been, in Nietzsche's estimation, momentous and largely (but not wholly) deleterious, for it is a herd morality that has spawned other herd moralities.

Nietzsche thinks, or perhaps hopes, that the reign of Christianity is waning. He is well known for the pronouncement, voiced first by a character dubbed "the madman" in *The Gay Science* (1882/1974) that God is dead. This claim does not commit Nietzsche to the belief that God was ever alive: Rather, what he seems to mean is that belief in a Christian god is beginning to decline in Europe, partly as a result of the rise of modern science. Thus the second part of the madman's claim that "God is dead" is that "we have killed him." It is unclear what will replace Christianity, but there are hints that Nietzsche looks forward to a new transvaluation of values, with the rise of what he calls the *Übermensch*. This Nietzschean term can be translated as the "overman" or the "superman," but as neither is satisfactory, it is preferable to retain the German original. These *Übermenschen,* or "higher" humans, will institute an era of cultural and ethical renewal by promulgating new (or ancient) ideals of self-love, self-assertion, independence, individuality, creativity, and generosity.

A distinguishing feature of these Übermenschen will be their ability to affirm the idea of the eternal return (or the eternal recurrence) of the same.

Although this doctrine of eternal return is sometimes presented by Nietzsche as if it were a metaphysical belief that history repeats itself over and over again, most contemporary interpreters read it as a psychological or existential thought experiment. According to this interpretation, great individuals can affirm the idea of reliving their life over and over, just as it has been in every detail, with all its pleasures and delights, suffering and indignities, great and small. Thus the passage titled "The Greatest Weight" (section 341) in *The Gay Science* presents two possible individual responses to the prospect of the eternal return of the same. One is to "throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus." The other is to declare, "You are a God and never have I heard anything more divine" (Nietzsche, 1882/1974, pp. 273–274). Great individuals are able to respond in this second way, having the courage, self-love, and joy in life to want to live their own life over and over again, not least because it is their own.

As his view of moral schemes as expressing the will to power, his claim that ressentiment fuels Christian values, and the thought experiment of the eternal return all testify, Nietzsche was profoundly interested in the psychology underlying the adoption of ethical positions. He continually inquires into the psychological sources for judgments about what is good or bad, noble or base, attractive or repugnant. Nietzsche described himself as a psychologist, as someone committed to penetrating the depths of human motivation, however murky they may be. This central role that he accords to psychology in explaining morality also brings us to another of his leading conceptual innovations. Nietzsche uses the term *genealogy* to describe a particular way of approaching morality historically, one that he takes his own writings to exemplify. His genealogical investigations into the origins of moral ideas and ideals typically reveal the origins of lofty moral concepts, such as altruism and self-denial, to lie in base, mundane, and material interests. These all-too-human origins have, however, been forgotten or covered over with the passage of time, so that uncovering the history of morality requires a hermeneutics of suspicion that refuses to take things at face value and insists upon interrogating morality's self-representation.

Contested Meanings

Nietzsche's readers continue to debate the meaning of each of these key ideas—and of many others from his fecund texts—as well as trying to determine whether and how his various ideas relate to one another. The continuing puzzle of Nietzsche's legacy for philosophy in general and political theory in particular can be linked directly to the innovative and demanding nature of his antisystematic philosophical style. In an aphorism from *The Twilight of the Idols* (1889/1968), Nietzsche proclaims his mistrust of all systematizers: "The will to a system is a lack of honesty" (section 26, p. 27). His inveighing against "all systematizers" need not, however, mean that Nietzsche's thought is devoid of all coherence, consistency, or continuity. What it does mean is that his readers have to work to find these things in his thought, for Nietzsche refuses to present his ideas and arguments neatly packaged.

Any overview of Nietzsche's thought must also make some reference to his idiosyncratic writing style. In all his writings after the four essays that comprise the *Untimely Meditations* (1873–1876), Nietzsche eschewed any overtly clear, coherent, and continuous treatment of traditional scholarly topics. From *Human, All Too Human* (1878) onward, his work exhibits a variety of writing styles and philosophical topics mixed together. The most conventional of his later works in terms of scholarly style is *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic* (1887), which is broken into three essays. But as its subtitle signals, this work is not conventional in any other regard. These tendencies toward stylistic diversity and frequent changes of focus challenge the reader to lend coherence to (or impose coherence upon) Nietzsche's seemingly disjointed reflections. One consequence of his unorthodox and exacting writing style, and the requirement it makes of the reader to seek out continuity in his views, is that there is wide disagreement among Nietzsche scholars about what he is trying to teach us. This ambiguity ranges across all aspects of his thought—from his views on metaphysics to ethics to epistemology to aesthetics. The debate about Nietzsche's meaning is just as evident when it comes to assessing the significance of his work for political theory.

Political Ideas

There is no discrete work in which Nietzsche explicitly addresses political questions; instead, his observations about politics are scattered throughout his texts and interwoven with his views on all manner of topics. The nearest thing we have to an extended reflection on politics comes in book 8 of *Human, All Too Human,* "A Glance at the State." This comprises 45 numbered sections whose length varies from one line (section 482) to three pages (section 472) and whose topics range across a wide diversity of political matters. From looking at the titles Nietzsche gave to just four of the sequential entries, we can see how varied are his foci: Consider "Of the Nobility" (section 440), "Subordination" (section 441), "Conscript Armies" (section 442), and "Hope and Presumption" (section 443). Because of this variety in style and topic, it is hard to retrieve a clear and distinct position on politics from book 8. Any such attempt is further confounded by the fact that the rest of the book also contains observations about politics.

However, even if we could recover a clear position on politics from this work, there is still the problem that many of Nietzsche's ideas changed over time. It is commonplace to distinguish three phases in his corpus. Nietzsche's middle period comprises *Human, All Too Human,* "Assorted Opinions and Maxims" (1879), "The Wanderer and His Shadow" (1880), *Daybreak* (1881), and the first four books of *The Gay Science* (aka *The Joyful Wisdom*). This period is demarcated, at one end, by contrast with his early writings such as *The Birth of Tragedy* and the *Untimely Meditations,* with their enthusiasm for Wagner and Schopenhauer. It is demarcated at the other by the sui generis *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883) and Nietzsche's subsequent writings.

This tripartite periodization is salient for any attempt to elicit Nietzsche's views on politics. The early writings evince some enthusiasm for a classically inspired renaissance of German culture under the guidance of artists like Wagner. In the middle period, Nietzsche is much more interested in the future of Europe in general than of Germany in particular. From these writings onward, he continually excoriates German nationalism and refers repeatedly and positively to the idea of being a "good European." It is also usually agreed that his political views are more moderate in the middle period than in the later works. One issue that scholars must address, therefore, when advancing their interpretations of Nietzsche, is to what extent their findings are shaped by the particular texts they draw from and, conversely, whether they can extrapolate from a particular text or set of texts a view that belongs to Nietzsche unmodified.

Nietzsche and Nazism

In the first half of the twentieth century, Nietzsche's name was typically associated with German and Italian fascisms. Any automatic association of Nietzsche with Nazism has since been discredited and can be explained, to some degree, by the artful machinations of his sister Elisabeth, who was a Nazi sympathizer, and the highly selective use of some of Nietzsche's writings. In his landmark book *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist,* Walter Kaufmann debunked the idea that Nietzsche subscribed to any conception of a master race, was an advocate of German nationalism, or supported anti-Semitism. Kaufmann concluded not only that there was no basis for the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche's thought but, rather more extravagantly, that Nietzsche's views were more antithetical to Nazism than were the views of any earlier or contemporaneous prominent German.

Yet to accept that Nietzsche's politics are not synonymous with Nazism leaves open the question of whether some elements of his thought could be taken to nourish fascist beliefs. Whereas Nietzsche abandoned any trace of German nationalism with his earlier writings, and had many positive things to say about the tenacity of the Jewish people, he does not, for example, recoil from the use of violence: Indeed, at times he glorifies violence and cruelty. He is also relentlessly critical of modernity, which could foster a belief that a dramatic reorganization of social and political life is necessary. He is full of admiration for strong and powerful individuals who pursue their course—be it political or artistic—with little regard for its impact on others. And despite Kaufmann's best attempts to disentangle Nietzsche from Nazism, some questions about this continue to be debated by scholars today. These include whether there are any anti-Semitic aspects to Nietzsche's thought, exactly what role his sister played in endearing him to the Nazis, and to what

extent he can be held responsible for the use of his ideas by fascists.

As this indicates that, although any ready, uncritical association of Nietzsche with Nazism has been jettisoned by most Nietzsche scholars, there is still considerable controversy about what exactly Nietzsche has to contribute to our understanding of politics. In the English-language scholarship alone, three major rival approaches to this question can be discerned. The first sees a defense of some form of aristocratic politics in Nietzsche's writings; the second finds no politics at all. The third approach plumbs Nietzsche's thought for resources for the ongoing revitalization of democracy.

Aristocratic, Nonpolitical, and Democratic Nietzsches

One school of thought contends that Nietzsche calls for a massive reform of the political and social structure of modern societies. On this interpretation, Nietzsche is an elitist who is fiercely critical of all modern political doctrines—liberalism, democracy, socialism, and feminism—because at root they perpetuate the false Christian belief in equal human worth and dignity. Instead of political organization being premised on any version of this belief, Nietzsche recommends the revival of some form of aristocratic rule, according to which a stratum of superior individuals rules, and political and social life are set up to protect and promote the interests of that elite. Proponents of this view often point to passages resembling this one from the fifth book of *The Gay Science* (section 377), "We Homeless Ones":

> We "conserve" nothing, neither do we want to return to any past periods; we are not by any means liberal; we do not work for "progress"; we do not need to plug up our ears against the sirens who in the market place sing of the future: their song about "equal rights," "a free society," "no more masters and no servants" has no allure for us. We simply do not consider it desirable that a realm of justice and concord should be established on earth (because it would be the realm of the deepest leveling and *chinoisierie*); we are delighted with all who love, as we do, danger, war and adventures . . . we count ourselves among conquerors, we think about the necessity for new orders, also for a new slavery—for every strengthening and enhancement of the human type also involves a new kind of enslavement. . . . We are no humanitarians; we should never dare to permit ourselves to speak of our "love of humanity." (Nietzsche, 1887/1974, pp. 338–339)

On this interpretation, Nietzsche's searing criticisms of the politics of his day were designed partly to persuade his readers that a dramatically different form of politics is desirable. Proponents of this view cite passages in Nietzsche's writings that suggest that the democratization of Europe is preparing the conditions for its own supersession: By spreading the idea of political equality, democratization ultimately makes people more amenable to subjection to a strong leader. At the end of a long paragraph in *Beyond Good and Evil* to this effect, Nietzsche concludes that "the democratization of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the breeding of tyrants—in every sense of that word, including the most spiritual" (Nietzsche, 1886/1973, section 242, p. 154).

A very different view of Nietzsche's significance for political theory is held by those who maintain that his real interests lie outside of political structures and relationships and focus instead on the abilities of individuals to shape themselves. The first principal exponent of this view was Kaufmann, who, from the 1950s onward, translated many of Nietzsche's works into English and strove to clear Nietzsche's name of its baleful political connotations. Kaufmann also aims to offer a comprehensive reconstruction of Nietzsche's thought. However, having argued that Nietzsche was not a protofascist, Kaufmann offers no further discussion of political matters. He maintains, instead, that Nietzsche's central concern lay with the individual's quest for self-perfection. Fellow proponents of the view that politics is of no relevance to Nietzsche argue that questions of political self-determination were beyond his remit. On this view, Nietzsche writes exclusively to and for individuals, not institution builders.

Some proponents of the nonpolitical Nietzsche find support for their reading in Nietzsche's self-depiction as "the last *anti-political* German" (*Ecce Homo,* "Wise" 3, emphasis in the original). However, in the context in which Nietzsche was writing, "anti-political" need not imply indifference to questions of political organization. Instead, to be anti-political meant to resist the modern idea

that the political sphere should be separate from, and not answerable to, other spheres such as culture and religion. Originally the term had pejorative connotations, coined as it was by critics of this position. Nietzsche, characteristically, transvalues the term to make it a badge of honor. He does not see politics or the modern state as the highest good in human life but believes that they should be subordinate to other values and ends, such as the flourishing of culture and the well-being of higher human beings, his Übermenschen. Indeed, in a work written in the same year as *Ecce Homo,* Nietzsche uses the term *anti-political* when outlining his belief in the necessary antagonism between politics and culture. According to him, "All great cultural epochs are epochs of political decline: that which is great in the cultural sense has been unpolitical, even anti-political" (Nietzsche, 1889/1968, *Twilight of the Idols,* "What the Germans Lack," 4, p. 63). This suggests that the flourishing of culture is not indifferent to, or detachable from, the state of politics; rather, when political power is strong, it is more able to shape and determine culture; when political power is weaker, cultural development enjoys more autonomy.

Nietzsche is not an anarchist; he accepts the state can provide a useful framework for social order. However, he insists that it should not be exalted or considered an end in itself. This is especially so in the modern era, when the state's rationale is the preservation of life rather than any higher goal. A powerful state should not be mistaken for the pinnacle of human excellence. In this we see the other side of his anti-political coin: Just because a state such as Bismarck's Prussia displays great military strength does not mean that it has a vibrant culture. And just because a state, such as France, may be defeated in war does not mean that its culture is inferior. Nietzsche's belief that the state is not worthy of worship, that there are higher goals in life, particularly those to do with cultural achievements, is reiterated in the third of his *Untimely Meditations* on "Schopenhauer as Educator." In section IV of that essay he reports that he is "concerned with a species of man whose teleology extends somewhat beyond the welfare of a state . . . and with [this kind of man] only in relation to a world which is again fairly independent of the welfare of a state, that of culture" (Nietzsche, 1874/1983).

A variation on this theme that Nietzsche has no philosophy of politics holds that even if he did express views about political matters, they do not add up to an organized, prescriptive theory of politics. Irrespective of any illusions he might have harbored to the contrary, this line of interpretation concludes that Nietzsche has nothing to teach us about politics. His opinions about political matters are of no philosophical importance.

A third position agrees with the first position (i.e., that Nietzsche's thinking *is* relevant for politics) but construes its relevance in a completely different way. These scholars see Nietzsche as offering useful ways of strengthening democracy, of making it more robust, vital, and inclusive. The general thrust of this reading is that whatever Nietzsche says explicitly about politics does not exhaust the value of his contribution to our understanding of politics. If we turn from his overt remarks about politics and train our gaze instead upon his ethical and ontological claims, we find inspirational ways of thinking about a politics that is more egalitarian, creative, and progressive that are not available in the work of canonical political thinkers of the past or in the work of major political thinkers of the present.

Nietzsche in the Plural

Nietzsche was, from the start, claimed and acclaimed by readers with a wide array of political commitments. There is, therefore, nothing especially unusual about the existence of these competing schools of Nietzsche interpretation today. Because of the elusive nature of his writing and his rejection of systematic thinking, some textual evidence can be found to support all of these positions. But to say that all are plausible is not to say that all are equally plausible. Proponents of the aristocratic Nietzsche need to clarify what role higher human beings should have in a politics of the future: Should they be actual rulers or simply oversee a political process that leaves them largely free to pursue other goals? Nietzsche's many dismissive remarks about political activity suggest that he does not see this as a particularly worthy endeavor, but it is unclear how higher human beings could control a regime and keep it on track while playing only a minimal role in its maintenance. Partisans of the second approach—that Nietzsche is a

nonpolitical thinker—still need to address the question of what mode of political organization is most conducive to promoting individual self-creation and self-overcoming. Some regimes provide their members more latitude and resources for private self-creation than do others. Adherents of the view that Nietzsche's political comments carry no philosophical weight also need to supply and defend criteria for determining what claims do and do not carry philosophical weight in his writings.

To complicate even further this question of what Nietzsche contributes to our understanding of politics, we need to recognize that these three divergent approaches are underpinned by different views about hermeneutics and the function of political theory. Those who find an aristocratic Nietzsche claim that they are taking him at his word, even though they may personally dislike the position they attribute to him. Proponents of the third school of thought—the democratic Nietzsche—tend to follow, if only implicitly, Michel Foucault's approach to Nietzsche interpretation. According to this approach, Nietzsche's ideas are there for his readers to use as they will, even if this requires their distortion and deformation. There is no need to be faithful to Nietzsche's supposed intentions if his ideas can be made useful for our purposes.

Given the ambiguities surrounding his meaning, the question remains as to why anyone seeking to deepen their knowledge of political theory would read Nietzsche at all. There are, after all, many other nineteenth-century thinkers who offer a more straightforward view of politics: Marx, Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill spring to mind here. One thing that Nietzsche's interpreters all agree upon is that reading his work is a bracing experience. He forces us to read, and reread, carefully and curiously: Nietzsche demands active readers, not slavish followers. He offers us ideas and ways of thinking that are not available elsewhere. He requires us to rethink many of the things we readily take for granted, stimulating us to interrogate what is usually left unthought in our approaches to politics, whatever they may be.

Note: Section numbers refer to original numbering by Nietzsche; page numbers refer to the works listed in the Further Readings.

Ruth Abbey

See also Agonism; Aristocracy; Counter-Enlightenment; Democracy; Foucault, Michel; Genealogy; Nihilism

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NIHILISM

Nihilism has always been a term of abuse. Almost no one in the history of philosophy claims the title of nihilist for his- or herself; rather, from the first use of the term in philosophical disputes of the eighteenth century, *nihilism* has been a charge by one school of thinkers against another. Although many groups have been accused of nihilism, the accusation generally is taken to mean that a thinker, or thinkers, denies the existence of any natural values and, hence, denies the possibility of any moral scheme whatsoever. Alternatively, it can mean that philosophy renders life meaningless in some fashion or deprives human action of any intelligible purpose. Here we shall be concerned to understand the two most common uses of nihilism:

1. As an accusation against rationalists and materialists, typified at first by Baruch Spinoza, but later by science in general and especially Darwin
2. As an accusation against postmodernists, typified by Friedrich Nietzsche

The term *nihilism* is also sometimes used with reference to a Russian nihilism, derived mainly from fictional characters in the pages of Dostoyevski and Turgenev who are either (or both) supremely egoistic or suicidal. Insofar as this term has real historical purchase, it probably describes a small movement of the 1860s whose intellectual content is similar to that contained under (1) above.

Although he did not invent the term, F. H. Jacobi (1743–1819) was the first to introduce it into philosophical discourse in a detailed way in his *Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza* (1785). Although it may seem bizarre to modern readers, for whom Immanuel Kant is a touchstone for moral philosophy, it was Kant (and, to a lesser extent, Johann Gottlieb Fichte) who were Jacobi's main polemical targets even though he developed his criticism through an interpretation of Spinoza.

Spinoza's philosophy, in Jacobi's view, had begun the march to nihilism through its radical monism centered on the idea of a universal substance. Neither faith nor free will was compatible with this premise, though Spinoza's followers sometimes denied it. The mistake, Jacobi argued, began with the belief that all cognition could be reduced to the understanding of efficient causes. Not only did this leave no room for creation or miracles, but it also excluded the possibility of real choice and, thus, any kind of morality. Kant's critical philosophy, Jacobi believed, while seeming to refute Spinoza's perspective, had actually compounded it. Although Kant sought to restore a space for subjectivity, he left the Spinozistic picture of nature largely untouched and merely constructed an alternate realm that had no direct point of contact with the real world. Kantianism was nihilistic to Jacobi because it created this subjectivity out of thin air and left it powerless to affect material events governed by natural laws. So Kant's dualism was no improvement on Spinoza's monism and perhaps worse in that it created the illusion of having countered it. From Jacobi's perspective, the only alternative was to understand divinity and faith as the true ground of subjectivity and human freedom as well as the properties of the natural world.

Although he meant the term to target only critical philosophy's efforts to reconcile subjective freedom with Spinozistic necessity (and not simply the latter by itself), it is easy to understand how, by extension, Jacobi's charge of nihilism could eventually be lodged against every kind of materialism and, indeed, against modern science in general. Thus Dimitri I. Pisarev, one of the primary figures in most descriptions of Russian nihilism, was known for little more than his introduction of Darwin's ideas to Russian-language readers. Through the mid-nineteenth century then, nihilism was a charge generally hurled against those who appeared to deny free will via scientism or mechanism.

In the late nineteenth century, Nietzsche began to use the charge of nihilism in a related but slightly different way. Ironically, he was then accused of leading a movement that he had only meant to identify. Like his predecessors, Nietzsche used the term *nihilist* to name a philosopher who, in some sense, deprived the world of foundational sources of meaning. Although this might include scientists, Nietzsche was much more concerned with modern historians, who documented the variety and flux of moral systems across cultures and periods, and with philosophers like Schopenhauer, who demonstrated the fundamentally chaotic, time-bound nature of experience. Although these authors were not nihilists, Nietzsche argued that such work would have a nihilistic effect on European culture by depriving its morality of theological foundations without providing any kind of alternative.

Though Nietzsche saw his own philosophy of anthropocentric valuation as a corrective to this situation, his keen diagnosis of modern historical relativism was seen by many as an endorsement of it. Again by extension, the term *nihilism* came to be deployed against any kind of moral or historical relativism and, eventually, against the group of writers known collectively as postmodernists. Although it is true that many postmodernists share Nietzsche's belief that morality has no firm *natural* basis, it is largely their opponents, and not the postmodernists themselves, who draw the conclusion that there are therefore no values whatsoever or that no morality is possible. In the twentieth century, then, the charge of nihilism has been used largely against post-Nietzscheans like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty, although it is not uncommon to see writers, especially in the Catholic tradition, who continue to use it in its former sense of representing the outcome of rationalism or Darwinism.

In sum then, the term *nihilism* has been used in two nearly opposite meanings. In the first case, it named writers who made the world so predictable that it deprived human beings of the capacity for moral choices; in the second case, it named writers who made the world so unpredictable that it deprived human choices of any meaning. In both cases, these writers existed largely, but not entirely, in the minds of their opponents.

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See also Kant, Immanuel; Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm; Postmodernism; Spinoza, Baruch

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NONVIOLENCE

Nonviolence has its roots in almost every religion in the world: Jainism, whose chief precept is *ahimsa* (non-harm); Judaism, which commands one to pursue peace; Christianity, whose three peace churches—the Society of Friends, the Mennonites, and the Church of the Brethren—have been witnesses to nonviolence for hundreds of years; Islam, whose nonviolent exemplar Badshah Khan (1890–1988) was an inspiration to Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948); and Buddhism, one of whose most recent nonviolent exemplars is Thich Nhat Hanh (1926–).

Nonviolence, however, is understood in various ways by various theorists: It is a way of living, a political strategy, and a moral or spiritual principle.

Some theorists, such as Gene Sharp (1928–), regard it solely or primarily as a political strategy. Others, such as Thich Nhat Hanh and Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), may prefer to regard it solely or primarily as a way of life or a moral principle. Still others, such as Mohandas Gandhi and perhaps Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929–1968), regard nonviolence in all three ways: a way of life that is at the same time a moral principle and a political strategy.

Gandhi was probably the first person to attempt to treat nonviolence somewhat scientifically, as a way of life to be tested against experience as a hypothesis and modified accordingly. Disliking the term *passive resistance* because nonviolence can be active as well as passive, and disliking the term *nonviolence* because it seems merely a negation when it is often quite positive and productive, Gandhi solicited ideas for a new term and, with the help of others, coined the term *satyagraha,* which means, literally, clinging to truth. The Hindi word *satya* means truth, the word *sat* means being, and the word *graha* means grasping. Gandhi believed that because all people are finite beings, they cannot, by their nature, grasp the entire truth in any circumstance; they must of necessity discover more of the truth in beings outside of themselves. Thus, to destroy or kill another being precludes one from discovering the full truth. To cling to truth, one must be nonviolent. So for Gandhi, the pursuit of truth, which he also called God, is the highest pursuit, and nonviolence is the only means by which one may attain it.

However, for Gandhi, the pursuit of truth is active. One must cling to the truth as one sees it, but in clinging to it, in refusing the demands of others that tear one from that truth, one may not harm others lest one also destroy whatever they might possess of the truth. To the extent that one's nonviolent actions win others over to the pursuit of truth via nonviolence, the greater the overall movement is toward truth.

Among those who studied Gandhi's techniques were Richard Gregg (1885–1974), who visited and interviewed Gandhi in the 1920s, and Joan Bondurant (1918–2006), who visited and interviewed him in the 1940s, both for extended periods of time. Both Gregg and Bondurant focused on the dynamics of his nonviolent political action, including his constructive programs. Gandhi's constructive programs were an integral part of his efforts to help people overcome their own powerlessness through self-education, self-employment, and self-sufficiency. After Gandhi's assassination in 1948, more writing about Gandhi's political strategies emerged, most notably the writings of Sharp, who recognized Gandhi's strategic brilliance. In 1973 Sharp published a work, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action,* which has become a classic in the field of nonviolence understood as a political strategy. Although the work was not focused on Gandhi, it relied heavily on many of Gandhi's insights but added greatly to the systematization of nonviolent tactics, the theory of nonviolent strategy, and the history of nonviolent action when employed as a political or social strategy.

In 1982 Richard Attenborough's Academy Award–winning film *Gandhi* popularized Gandhi anew. The film contributed to such an increase in scholarship about nonviolence that the field is now wide and diverse.

Sharp and others who have spun off of Sharp's groundbreaking work, such as Peter Ackerman (1946–) and Jack DuVall, insist that nonviolent strategic action need not be underpinned by a moral or spiritual commitment. They eschew the use of the term *nonviolence* because they believe that the spread of nonviolent political action can be accomplished more effectively if people are not led to think—wrongly, they argue—that one must accept nonviolence as a moral principle before one can practice nonviolent strategy. They argue further, that nonviolent strategic action, even without a moral underpinning, is far more preferable to violent strategic action, both in terms of the reduction in harm that accompanies all conflicts where it is used and in terms of the long-term benefits that nonviolent strategic action brings to conflicts. These benefits, they claim, include democratization of political processes and a decentralization of power.

Central to understanding nonviolent strategic action is the notion that power in an institution or government rests on the consent of those governed: If the governed withdraw their support, the leadership falls. Thus, power can be gained and oppressors toppled by enabling those who are governed to overcome fear, educate themselves in general and about nonviolent strategy and tactics in particular, and grow in numbers around a particular cause or set of causes. The extent to which those with grievances reject violence in pursuing their

goals is, in large part, the extent to which they will attract greater numbers and credibility—and, thereby, power—to their cause.

Founded in 1914, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) has been active in promoting a spiritually based form of nonviolence that is, at the same time, politically active. FOR maintains an active staff of approximately two dozen people, many of whom have been involved in successful nonviolent movements and actions in the Philippines, Latin America, and the Middle East. Among its members is James Lawson, a civil rights leader who was instrumental in desegregating Nashville, Tennessee, through lunch counter sit-ins and store boycotts. Students whom he trained, among them Bernard Lafayette and John Lewis, became the youth leaders of the civil rights movement in the United States and have remained leaders late into their lives.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) is another organization important in the history of nonviolent social action in the United States. Under the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr., Lawson, and others, SCLC played a major role in the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.

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See also Anarchism; Civil Disobedience; Gandhi, Mohandas; Pacifism; Thoreau, Henry David

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Oaths

Oaths—promises that are made binding by the swearing of the maker on something that that person holds to be sacred—were a central feature of the political tradition of ancient Greece and Rome, and they played an important part in the Jewish and early Christian traditions of the ancient world. In Greece, the oath was the way in which religion contributed to social harmony and political stability. The Attic orator Lycurgus of Athens was said to have claimed in the fourth century BCE that the oath was what held Athenian democracy together.

Various things were required for an oath to be officially sworn. First, the person swearing the oath made a declaration, which was either an assertion about past events or a promise to undertake certain actions in the future. (Oaths can thus be either "assertory" or "promissory.") Then the swearer had to specify a sacred power that was to be the witness to the declaration and the guarantor of its truth. In the Greek world, Zeus or one of the other gods was the usual guarantor. Finally, the swearer had to specify a curse or punishment that he or she would receive if the assertion was false or if the promise was not carried out. In ancient Rome, oaths were sworn upon the Jupiter Stone in the Temple of Jupiter, which was on the Capitoline Hill.

Perhaps the most famous ancient oath in the contemporary world, the Hippocratic Oath, taken by doctors when swearing to practice in accordance with ethical guidelines, was made on the authority of Apollo, Asclepius, Hygeia, and Panacea. Other famous oaths from the ancient world include God's promise in the book of Genesis never to destroy the world by flood again and Aegeus's promise to Medea in Euripides' *Medea* that he will grant her asylum in Athens in exchange for using her magical skills to ensure that his period of childlessness comes to an end.

It was in the ancient world as well that the oath became the cornerstone of the legal system and a prerequisite of witness statements at trials. As a result, Walter Burkert, professor of classics at the University of Zurich, has argued that the oath underpinned and tied together religion, politics, morality, and both civil and criminal law. Indeed, as a project established at the University of Nottingham to study the oath in ancient Greece has shown, oaths are referred to or uttered in almost every surviving text from that time period. Oaths also played a significant part in Germanic and Norse chivalric culture in feudal Europe.

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See also Ancient Democracy; Mythic Narrative; Myths; Roman Law

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OLIGARCHY

Oligarchy (*oligarkhía*) denotes the rule of the rich few. In ancient Greece (where the name originated), oligarchy was a political regime in which the ruling power (*arkhé*) was held by a small group of wealthy citizens (*óligoy*) or a class chosen by census. The regime of the Four Hundred that overturned Athenian democracy in 411 was an oligarchy. Since its inception, the term has referred particularly to the determination of a social class to acquire political power in order to further its own interests and so implied not simply a government *by* the few, but rule by *and for* the few. Oligarchy tends therefore to be unfavorably contrasted with *aristocracy,* rule of the few (best and wisest) for the benefit of all, although from the point of view of modern egalitarian ideals, both will seem objectionable.

Oligarchy in Antiquity

Oligarchy is a form of class rule, and so from the beginning, efforts to analyze it have focused on the distinctive character of oligarchs and their class interests. In *The Republic,* Plato depicted oligarchic men in the following way:

> Men of this stamp [oligarchs] will be covetous of money, like those who live in oligarchies; they will have, a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please. (Book VIII)

In *The Politics,* Aristotle echoed Plato's view that acquisitiveness and a fixation on economic wealth are integral to an oligarchical class mentality and hence oligarchical public culture. Thus Aristotle treated oligarchy as a degenerate political regime not only because the few exercise power in their own interests, but also because they construe those interests in a narrowly economistic fashion. Both Plato and Aristotle noted a closely related deficiency of oligarchical regimes: their tendency to exacerbate antagonisms between the rich and poor. Oligarchical elites, they argued, typically enjoy their status and privileges at the expense of the populace or the many, those whose lives depend on their own work, either because they own no property at all or because their holdings are too small to exempt them from liability to work. Although in *The Republic* Plato ranked oligarchy above democracy, he condemned both regimes for conflating political authority and private power. In one, political authority is predicated on the private interests of the wealthy; in the other, it is predicated on the private interests of the poor. Plato argued that this precludes civic friendship, unity, and peace. This influential analysis strongly implicates the class connotations of oligarchy in its failings as a political regime.

In Athens, the theoretical identity of oligarchy as a class and as a model of political power came to be shaped precisely in its actual struggle against democracy. In the Pseudo-Xenophon's (or Old-Oligarch's) *Constitution of the Athenians* (c. 430s BCE), oligarchy was directly opposed to democracy. The opposition between them reflected rival interpretations of political equality. The democratization of Athenian society consisted in a progressive expansion of the community entitled to an equal share in public responsibility. Initially, this privilege was restricted to those who belonged to the narrow class of the knights or nobles. They were later joined by members of the middle class that fought in the *hoplite* and eventually by the lower class of *thetes*. In this way political equality (*isonomia* or equality before the law, and *isegoria* or the equal right to speak in the assembly), initially reserved by those who shared a privileged social position (equal treatment of social equals), was transformed into a principle distributing political rights without regard to social position. The Pseudo-Xenophon was among the first to regard this process as a degeneration of the ideal of political equality typical of democratic regimes. Later on, Plato's *Laws* and Aristotle's *Politics* offered a more systematic account of this contrast between good and bad equality (associated with oligarchy and democracy, respectively).

According to Aristotle, both arithmetical equality (treating different individuals equally or making the unequal equal) and proportional equality (treating different individuals differently or making only the equals equal) are important in a good

government but only if they are used in the right domain. For instance, from the fact that all should be treated equally by the law or in a tribunal it does not follow that they should also share equally in political power. On the other hand, from the fact that official responsibilities are discharged by an elite, it does not follow that only the members of this elite should have the right to sit in the assembly or enjoy legal equality. The dualism of equality emphasized in the oligarchical polemic against democracy had tremendously important effects on the meaning of democracy, which came to be defined as a mirror image of oligarchy. Both regimes, Aristotle argued, apply the two equalities in an absolute and simple way: proportional equality becoming the privilege of the few (in oligarchies), arithmetical equality that of the many (in democracies). From an Aristotelian standpoint, these regimes are equally problematic in that they both institute monopolies of political power. Yet, by mixing the two kinds of equality propitiously, each can check the other, effectively neutralizing the monopolistic tendencies of both the few and the many, or so Aristotle maintained. He concluded that although the best form of government must institute equality before the law and equal access to the law-making process (making and obeying laws was the condition of freedom), some magistracies should nonetheless be distributed according to competence or by election. The good constitution (*politeia*) was thus a mixed one. In this context, Aristotle associated oligarchy not simply with social status and property ownership but also with personal qualities, intellectual and moral. Presumably, property owners were required by their business to develop and refine those mental qualities that any government would also demand. In the end, then, Aristotle did not regard oligarchy as irredeemably bad; it becomes vicious only when unmoderated by countervailing forces (the same could be said of democracy). For this reason the mix of the two would produce a good constitution.

Although oligarchy, through its antithetical relation to democracy, came to absorb some aristocratic attributes, it was never confused with aristocracy. The aristocratic ideal of a ruling class stressed distinctive natural or acquired individual qualities, in particular, certain ethical virtues (courage, honesty, wisdom, prudence) and intellectual skills (competence in administering and devising financial plans). Property was not essential to the characterization of aristocracy as it was in oligarchy. The polemical confrontation between democracy and oligarchy makes this clear. The identification of democracy with the "rule of the poor" and the emphasis on the low economic status of the ruling demos gave property a central role in that confrontation. Thus oligarchy, and not aristocracy, was the polar opposite of democracy; democrats equated oligarchy with the predation of the wealthy, whereas oligarchs assumed that democratic regimes must be inimical to the interests of the propertied classes.

Oligarchy in Modern Society

The specters of class legislation and of the politics of economic resentment reemerged in the eighteenth century with the reinvigoration of democratic ideals. In "Federalist 10," we read that the main risk to which a free government is exposed comes from factions, in particular, those factions that defend the interests of religion and property. Fanaticism on the one hand and envy on the other are the two dangerous passions that the republican constitution must tame without sacrificing freedom. But although the Federalists proposed the republic as a mixed constitution in a way that recalled ancient Aristotelian ideals, the moderns added something new to the classical analysis.

Two and a half centuries earlier, Niccolò Machiavelli undertook to simplify the classical typology of regimes, particularly the Aristotelian one. Machiavelli distinguished only two basic forms of government: one good (the popular or "republican") and one bad (government by the one or the few). However, he did not equate the former with simple democracy but conceived it on the model of the Roman Republic, as a mix of aristocratic and popular elements. For Machiavelli, government by the few is inherently bad in all its forms; unlike the authors of antiquity, he made no exception for aristocracy. His innovation was remarkable and inaugurated a way of thinking about government that is close to ours: No matter how good an aristocracy might be, rule by a political elite is acceptable only if the people retain, and regularly exercise, the right to monitor them and hold them to account.

So although the dualism of democracy and oligarchy was as central in the modern political tradition as it was in ancient Athens, it persisted in an altered form. After the French Revolution, commentators often directly identified oligarchic power with the aristocratic ancien régime and leveled some distinctive objections to it. According to this new critique, oligarchical government was subversive of peace and moreover ineffective in coping with the complexity of modern society. Giuseppe Mazzini, a leading European advocate for democratic national self-determination, strengthened his claim for a new continental order by depicting the European powers of his times as oligarchic and naturally predisposed to war. To him, oligarchy meant a system of social and political power that aimed to protect a privileged class. This, he maintained, inevitably exposed both domestic and international community to a permanent risk of conflicts and instability. Mazzini concluded that oligarchy promotes war whereas democracy promotes peace. Karl Marx discerned a similar linkage between an oligarchical class structure and a propensity toward conflict. His analysis of the Bonapartist degeneration of the democratic revolution of 1848 and the repression of the Commune of Paris of 1871 referred explicitly to the dictatorial power of an oligarchic class. To Marx, oligarchy was identical with capitalist dictatorship (with proletarian dictatorship as its opposite) or the use of the coercive power of the state by the dominant class in order to perpetuate its economic supremacy over the entire society.

Under modern conditions, oligarchy did not simply put liberty and security at risk. It was also a symptom of increasingly bureaucratized modes of social control. John Stuart Mill, a founding father of modern liberalism, denounced the oligarchic structure of power in mid-nineteenth-century English society and recommended several democratic reforms as a corrective (especially the extension of suffrage to women and to members of the working classes). To some extent, Mill's arguments reprised those of the ancients. Thus he contended that the republics of antiquity persisted only because the competent few were effectively checked by the many and because under purely oligarchical conditions there is no way to guarantee the choice of competent magistrates. But Mill put a new twist on this familiar argument. Although aristocracy and nobility were becoming ever more anachronistic, he noticed that complex modern societies increasingly depended on a class of competent, responsible, and conscientious administrators. This threatened a new, bureaucratic, form of oligarchy, which Mill named *pedantocracy*. Writing several decades after Mill, Max Weber similarly suggested that modern government could be characterized as a bureaucratized incarnation of the sort of privileged clerisy that had first emerged in the Catholic Church.

The path of analysis that Marx, Mill, and Weber inaugurated in the modern conceptualization of oligarchy was extremely important. It indirectly inspired a new critique of parliamentarianism that became influential at the turn of the twentieth century. But to understand this, we need first to see how the relationship between democracy and oligarchy was transformed by the development of modern systems of electoral representation.

All Power Is Oligarchic

In antiquity, the selection of rulers by election was not associated with democracy but rather with aristocratic and oligarchical regimes. For Herodotus, Aristotle, and Plato, electing leaders presupposed hierarchical discrimination—for, to be electable, one must prove oneself to be superior, or in some way specially worthy of the public responsibilities for which one hopes to be selected. But this sense of distinction conflicts with democratic ideals of equality and for that reason ancient democracy rejected election in favor of sortition (selection by lot). As anyone who has served on a jury knows, lottery is necessarily *indiscriminate*—blind to the qualities of the chosen. By contrast, candidates in an election must bring out their differences and claim for superior qualifications. This led the ancients to perceive a close affinity between election and oligarchic or aristocratic rule and to doubt the compatibility of election and democracy. In the eighteenth century, this tension between democracy and election was reasserted by baron de Montesquieu, the Federalists, and Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès. Nevertheless, these writers all believed that modern government had to be a mix of democracy and oligarchy, equality and inequality. According to them, the novel forms of political representation characteristic of modern

political systems are crucial for combining these otherwise incompatible elements.

By the end of the nineteenth century, many scholars observed that established systems of parliamentary government were drifting inexorably toward oligarchy. As Carl Schmitt pointed out, after several decades of performance, parliamentarianism has

> produced a situation in which all public business has become an object of spoils and compromise for the parties and their followers, and politics, far from being the concern of an elite, has become the despised business of a rather dubious class of persons. (*The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy,* Preface to the second edition [1926])

As a result, the eighteenth-century ideal of a propitious mix of oligarchy and democracy, which the Federalists touted as the crowning achievement of the modern republic, came to be regarded with mounting skepticism. This was particularly so among those who argued that social and political inquiry should proceed on the model provided by the natural sciences. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a number of political analysts impressed by this ideal of an unsentimental, value-free, and rigidly empirical form of social science developed a distinctive "theory of elites." The three most influential of these elite theorists were Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels. They maintained that the electoral system upon which the parliamentary government relied was not a mixture of democracy and oligarchy but rather truly oligarchical. Elections served to gather popular support for government by a minority, thus making oligarchy irresistible and legitimate. The classical opposition between democracy and oligarchy gave way to the theory that all social and political organization is fated to become oligarchical, no matter how democratic it was originally intended to be. Without leaders to speak for it, the demos is necessarily a voiceless, formless mass. In the eyes of these theorists, then, democratic regimes are incapable of concerted political action unless oligarchical elites impose order and purpose from above. Michels gave the name of the "iron law of oligarchy" to this phenomenon, which he thought universal, that is to say, observable in all forms of social life, from industry to government, from parties to unions.

By asserting that all forms of government are necessarily oligarchic, the theory of elites obliterated the older, classical distinction between democratic and oligarchical government. The ideal of a democratic society systematically ruling from below was dismissed as ideological or absurd or impossible. Differences in forms of government were nothing but the circulation of elites by different methods. In this view, oligarchy becomes a social necessity, not a degeneration or a corrupted form of government. In addition, modern electoral politics gave birth to a new kind of oligarchical organization: the political party. Although purporting to be receptive conduits of a democratic will, political parties are in reality would-be elites. Electoral competition forms the venue in which they vie for control. Once they win power, however, parties govern as oligarchies, standing above the ruled and imposing their will upon them. And when out of office, they are little more than oligarchies-in-waiting. Michels's "iron law," the claim that all political power, regardless of origin or democratic intent, ends up imposing itself oligarchically, thus poses a fundamental challenge to modern democratic ideals. It is a challenge to which representative democracy is still struggling to find an answer.

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See also Aristotle; Bureaucracy; Democracy; Equality; Federalism; Herodotus; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Marx, Karl; Mazzini, Giuseppe; Mill, John Stuart; Montesquieu, Baron de; Pareto, Vilfredo; Parliament; Plato; Political Participation; Weber, Max

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ONTOLOGY

Ontology is a traditional branch of philosophy concerned with the "science of being" and thus with the basic categories of existence or reality and their relations to one another. The term *ontologia* has its origins in scholastic writings of the seventeenth century, but the ideas and questions associated with ontology have their origins in various strands of ancient philosophy, including Aristotle's definition of metaphysics as the science of being qua being; the statement in Plato's *Sophist,* which opens Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time,* that the meaning of being remains perplexing; and the claims of the pre-Socratic Parmenides of Elea that only the one being "is" and that nothingness does not exist. In analytic philosophy, ontology has come to designate the study of the entities whose existence must be presupposed when affirming a scientific theory.

Nevertheless, ontology is still often associated—and in some cases identified—with metaphysics and therefore with traditional problems of free will and determinism, the relationship between spirit and matter, and the nature of eternal or divine truths, which are common to premodern and theological doctrines that are today considered by many political theorists to be defunct. As a result, many contemporary political theorists have sought to avoid engagement with ontological questions. This is especially true of dominant forms of contemporary liberal theorists, who take as their starting point the idea that there can be no agreement on fundamental issues concerning human nature or the human good. These theorists instead aim to establish a basic structure of rules for social life without relying on deep ontological commitments, which they consider to be more properly matters of private faith. It is in this spirit that John Rawls, for example, refers to his liberal theory as a political rather than a metaphysical one.

On the other hand, depending on how the terms are understood, metaphysics can be treated as simply one type of answer to the ontological question "What is the meaning of being?" In this respect, proclamations of the "death of metaphysics," the "death of the [metaphysical] subject," or the beginning of a "postmetaphysical age" need not close the door to ontology as a relevant field of inquiry. And, indeed, many recent critics of liberalism, from communitarian, feminist, post-Marxist, and poststructuralist circles, engage in such inquiry. They accuse theorists of the liberal approach, who seek to distance themselves from ontology, to have merely assumed a position from which ontological questions seem dismissible and to have continued to rely covertly on an incoherent ontology of the disengaged human subject or the subject prior to its attributes and ends. These accusations, in turn, have led critics to a renewed interest in the relationship of ontology to political thought, although some contemporary theorists maintain that an ontological perspective does not necessitate any political or ethical doctrine and that ontology and politics should rightly be kept apart.

The turn to ontology in political theory has focused not on the science of being per se, but rather on our human being, or, to borrow a phrase from the early Heidegger, on our "being-in-the-world." As political theorists with different approaches to ontology have converged in opposing commitments to the disengaged or disembodied subject at the heart of methodological individualism and liberal theory, they have explored the constitution of the human subject in its relation to

language, historical context, and social forces. This may not seem to be a faithful or proper use of the term *ontology*. However, theorists supporting this human ontology—which may or may not be humanist—can and often do move on to address topics of traditional ontology, such as the fundamental nature of identity, difference, space, time, and truth. In this way, the turn to ontology goes beyond the social constructivist thesis that we create our social world and its truths through our practices and discourses. Although in many instances the contemporary theorists who turn to ontology share social constructivism's anti-foundationalist and anti-essentialist orientations, they nevertheless make positive assertions about the nature of reality. However, wary of resurrecting the dogmatic metaphysical claims of premodern ontologies, many of these theorists openly acknowledge the contestability of their claims. Stephen White thus refers to the ontological turn in political theory as a turn to "weak ontology," opposing it to "strong ontology," which would make ultimate claims about the way the world is and insist upon an external ground for political thought and action. White argues that it is necessary to wrap ontological commitments into political thought so that contemporary critics of foundationalist theory avoid falling into a nihilistic trap of tearing down old values without providing alternatives; those supporting weak ontology, for White, acknowledge its own limits, allowing contemporary theorists to affirm positive moral and political judgments without replacing one foundational truth with another. Although one may question whether the ontologies that White calls "weak" can consistently and coherently maintain the self-critical stance he attributes to them, and whether "strong" ontologies are necessarily unable to indicate their own limits, this characterization of "weak" ontology does capture much of what contemporary theorists who turn to ontology have sought to do.

Ontology and Difference

The initial step in political theory's ontological turn—the critique of the disengaged subject—focuses on the concepts of identity and difference. The idea behind the disengaged subject is that this subject can rationally choose its ends because it exists independently of the experiences, attributes, and heritage that constitute its "thick" character and because this character is not required for a purely rational choice. But this notion of the subject is incoherent, because no entity could exist if the properties and attributes that define what it is were removed. If all a thing's properties were secondary and inessential, the subject supposedly standing behind them would amount to a nullity: The only "thing" that has no properties is nothingness. On the other hand, a subject's attributes or properties, which delineate its identity and, in the case of a human subject, allow it to make choices, are necessarily relational. Saying a subject is green, for example, signifies a relation to another subject (it is green for another who perceives this quality) and to other things that have the same or different colors or even no color at all. Its properties all being relative, if the subject is no longer treated as an independent and transcendent entity, then its identity becomes a product of its relations to others. Its identity, what it is, is constituted by its differences, by what it is not.

However, here it becomes necessary to distinguish two types or orders of constitutive difference. The first type constitutes identities but can also harmonize them in their differences from one another. This approach, which is often associated with Hegelian dialectics (although there are several ways to read Hegel on this point), holds a subject's identity to be secured in relation to an other or others, analogous to the way the identity of "white"—in the sense of its meaning or its place in a schema of color—is given through its difference from "black." White is defined by its difference from or opposition to black—white is white because it is not black, and so forth—and, similarly, a subject's identity is delineated only by reference to the way it differs from what it is not. This conception makes difference constitutive, but also mediating: It separates terms such as *black* and *white, subject* and *other,* establishing their distinct identities, but it also collapses these differences, as each term reciprocally holds the other's identity in its own, allowing an identity between them to be attained. Differences on this level have a spatial quality, in the sense that they may be organized in terms of their proximity to, or distance from, the identity they anchor. The place of "white" is determined not only through its relation to its opposite, "black," but also through its relations to various

intermediate shades of gray, some that are similar and closer to it and others that are farther away. Similarly, one could consider a political subject's identity to be defined by its relations both to friends or allies who are similar to it and to enemies who are alien. At this level of difference, a displacement of identity occurs, as the subject's identity is dependent on others who are external and even opposed to it. However, the end result is a return to identity, now established across constitutive differences. Identity can even be established between opponents, between friends and enemies, as each is necessary to the other's being.

The second type of difference is also constitutive, as a subject's identity, again, is constituted by its relations to others. Unlike the first type, however, this difference does not secure or delineate a subject's identity by relating it to others who are also identified through the relation. Rather, it relates the subject to an Other (the capitalization is intended) that is enigmatic and indefinite, unable to act as a secure anchoring point that would allow an identity to be defined through contradistinction. Taking again the example of a political subject, one could imagine its encountering something or someone that could not be categorized as either a friend or an enemy. This Other would not provide the sort of marker needed for the subject to position itself against it. Thus, with respect to this kind of difference, the spatial terminology of proximity and distance no longer functions: The difference in question is fugitive and cannot be located on a spatial—or, for that matter, a temporal—continuum that would fix its position relative to the subject whose identity depends on it. This second-order difference thereby calls into question the adequacy of a conception that organizes differences by degrees ranging from similarity all the way to polar opposition, as the first type of difference does. For many political theories that follow the route into ontology, this Other displaces the subject in a fundamental way: As it cannot be identified or fixed itself, it calls into question the capacity for a subject's identity to ever be finally settled.

Contemporary debates among the political theories that take the ontological turn often concern how this second-order difference or Otherness is conceptualized. One common formulation holds it to be a fundamental lack of being within the subject that prevents the subject from ever attaining the completeness of a fixed and full identity but that drives the subject to seek this impossible fullness. Another holds it to be an excess of movement or becoming that always destabilizes the subject in indeterminate ways but also compels the subject toward new forms of being. Theorists advocating quasi-theological conceptions—associated, for example, with Charles Taylor's communitarianism—treat this Other as a fugitive moral source partially open to human reflection and able to orient the subject toward moral agency. Others, associated with Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, hold it to exercise an absolute but ultimately impossible moral imperative of responsibility to that dimension within others that exceeds identification and categorization. Some feminist theorists hold that it marks a sexual difference that disrupts attempts to establish clean and final divisions between male and female or masculine and feminine. These formulations share the idea that although this difference is part and parcel of the being of language, it is never fully expressible. Language, which is structured through the relations of difference and opposition characteristic of the first order of constitutive difference, can beckon toward this second-order difference but never grasp it completely. Disagreements over the formulation of this difference also relate to questions of immanence and transcendence in political philosophy. As Otherness cannot be fully grasped in language or experience, it prompts questions as to whether it indicates something transcendent to being or a multiplicity that remains immanent to being. All of these ontological formulations invite the charge that they merely repeat and return to the kind of claims to Truth found in premodern metaphysical ontologies. Their proponents' shared response to this charge is that political theory is impoverished if the risks inherent in ontological speculation are not taken.

Ontology and Politics

The diverse turns to ontology in political theory inspire many different reformulations of key concepts in politics. By developing the theme that the subject is not pregiven and is instead constituted through its relations, it introduces questions over the nature of power and resistance at this

constitutive level. As second-order difference fundamentally displaces the identity of the subject, many political theorists hold that individual and collective subjects can secure themselves only to the degree that their relation to this enigmatic difference is effaced or repressed, so that subjects can be constituted through relations to identifiable others such as friends, enemies, and so forth. Power, in this sense, creates subjectivity through a constitutive exclusion of excessive difference and the hegemonic act of securing an identity, while resistance appears in the way this exclusion is never final and the certainty of the subject's identity is always again called into question. Alternatively, some political theorists use their ontological explorations of difference to theorize new forms of pluralism that go beyond the kind of friend/enemy relations that are common in political thought and practice, or, more generally, to theorize new forms of ethical and social being. Recent theories of "radical democracy" are almost all indebted to the turn to ontology in political theory, and the disagreements among various strands of radical democratic theory are frequently ontological in nature. According to these theories, like many others that play a part in the ontological turn, the domain of politics extends beyond the narrow confines of institutional practices or the restrictions imposed by the separation of public and private realms. They hold politics to be a contestation that reaches into the way modern subjects are constituted and represented, and democratic politics to be a mechanism to expose the relations of power involved in these constructions and to challenge the social and political truths that organize them. Mainstream political thought and practice, they maintain, are devoid of crucial issues about the constructed nature of identity, power, and truth because they refuse to engage in the ontological inquiries that would allow these issues to come to light. Conversely, they argue, it is by confronting these issues that the space of politics is opened up.

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See also Communitarianism; Difference Theories; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hegemony; Identity; Immanence; Liberalism, Contemporary; Methodological Individualism; Other; Power; Radical Democracy; Subject; Temporality

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Organization Theory

Organization theory examines bureaucratic entities such as firms, schools, states, hospitals, political parties, and nonprofit groups. These social collectives share explicit goals, and hierarchies and employ written documents to manage work. Researchers in this area are motivated by the ubiquity and importance of bureaucracies in contemporary society. The formal organization is used to coordinate complex tasks in a wide variety of settings, such as manufacturing, education, politics, and medicine.

Organization theory addresses questions about the logical status of organizations, the relationship of individuals to organizations, the organization's legal and social environment, and the dynamics of entire industries. Scholars interested in the logical status of organization are concerned with the nature of organizations. These scholars ask whether organizations are in any sense different from the mass of individuals who constitute them. Those interested in the relationship between organizations and individuals focus on how the bureaucratic environment affects the activities and well-being of individuals. Others ask how the actions of firms are determined by other firms, the state, and the public. Organization theory informs political theory by showing how organizations

accomplish their goals and relate to individuals and the state.

The Logical Status of Organizations

Contemporary organization theory starts with the work of sociologist and economic historian Max Weber. Weber's writings provided a basic definition of the organization that has acted as a benchmark for subsequent work. Weber defined an organization as a group of people who participated in a formal hierarchy with clearly defined roles. Within the organization, work was managed by professional supervisors who relied on expert training and written documentation. Weber's commentary provided additional insights into the nature of organizations. Organizations are a particularly modern phenomenon because their existence relied on widespread literacy, a modern cash economy to pay workers, and the delegation of duties according to ability instead of inherited status. The modern bureaucracy stood in stark distinction with earlier forms of social life, such as kinship groups, which relied on inherited occupational statuses, informal social ties, and coordination of work through nonwritten personal contacts.

Later scholars asked whether there was any reason to ascribe organizations with a special logical status. Did organizations possess properties that were not easily reducible to those possessed by individuals? Weber's commentary on organizations suggested that from the perspective of the individual, organizations appeared to be timeless entities. For example, citizens perceive the state to be a permanent entity that has existed before them and will likely exist into the indefinite future. Thus, the organization is a stable arena for action that merits special attention.

Scholars in the twentieth century provided different answers. In the 1950s, behavioral scientists Herbert Simon and James March focused on the routines enacted by individuals within the organization. From this perspective, the organization is defined by its goals and the individuals who perform routine tasks that accomplish those goals. Thus, the organization is highly analogous to a computer that is defined by the hardware and the programs it implements.

In contrast, economists such as Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson focused on contractual obligations to distinguish those within the firm from those not in the firm. The organization was defined as those people bound to owners through contracts that limited access to the labor market. Both economists emphasized that contracts between employers and workers created social boundaries between the firm and other market participants. In a similar vein, management researcher J. D. Thompson argued that there was a "core" of workers who were needed to operate the technology that helped the organization accomplish its goals. Joan Woodward defined organizations by their relation to their core technology. Thus, the organization deserved special attention as a stable pattern of technology and social relations.

The Individual and the Organization

Organization theory has often emphasized an asymmetry between the individual and the bureaucracy. Organizations are often depicted as large and immutable social entities that can overwhelm individuals. Indeed, legal scholars often observe that organizations are granted rights analogous to those for people. The law, especially in the United States, often gives organizations rights and privileges that are distinct from the people who work in the organization. It is routine for organizations to own assets, file legal complaints, and act on behalf of other people and organizations. They can be fined and punished by the state. The consequence of this legal doctrine is that organizations can possess a distinct advantage in conflict with individuals. Due to their ability to acquire substantial resources and act consistently without the need for unchanging personnel, organizations can sustain conflict in ways that can be matched by few individuals. It is also the case that the law creates circumstances where individual workers may not be held accountable for their actions.

Organization theory also asks how individuals behave within bureaucratic settings. Workplace psychology takes the organization as an additional factor affecting individual decision making and personal well-being. For example, in studies of mental health, organizations play an important role because they are a potential stressor. However, much organization theory takes the view that the bureaucratic environment is a distinct context for

human action. The hierarchy of authority, the organization's goals, and its routines are influences that present incentives and constraints that deserve special attention. The organization is viewed as the place where individuals are rewarded for their actions in the market.

Much writing focused on the emotional and social dimensions of life inside organizations. Some early writers argued that individuals developed close personal attachments to organizations. Administrators developed a strong identification with the organization itself, even to the detriment of their other personal relationships. Phillip Selznick described how administrators were torn between their formal obligations and their loyalties to the "locals" the organization served.

By the mid-twentieth century, much theory viewed the organization as a choice-making environment. Neoclassical economics relied on models of organizations that viewed individuals as making optimal choices from clearly defined options. Scholars of the Carnegie School emphasized that organizations operated in complex environments where information was scarce and there was great ambiguity about goals. Instead of making optimal choices, organizational participants were forced to settle for satisfactory choices. This was called bounded rationality theory.

Carnegie School writings have found popularity among political scientists who find that policy decisions happen when unexpected political events force state agencies to address issues with whatever policy ideas are available. These models cast the individual actors as passive agents who exploit opportunities generated by the organization. In contrast, a neoclassical economist would view government decisions as the product of an administrator's attempt to maximize some goal (e.g., votes or budgets) with a clearly defined set of strategies. The difference stems from the need to model different phenomena. Political scientists are interested more in group decision making where many actors opportunistically respond to a variety of ill-defined problems, whereas economists focus on fairly well structured decisions.

The Organization and Its Environment

Jeffrey Pfeffer and James Thompson drew organization theory in new directions in the 1960s and 1970s when they observed that firms depend on outsiders for survival. Firms require money, workers, and legitimacy if they are to continue operating. Organizations are political entities that must accomplish a task and respond to social pressures. Resource dependency theory states that behavior is a response to resource streams. This observation led to the "open systems" perspective in organization theory, which de-emphasized the distinction between behavior inside organizations and what happens outside the organization. Theorists working in the open systems tradition closely examine how investors, state regulators, consumers, professional groups, and voters all impact the structure and behavior of organizations. In contrast, closed systems theory designates styles of research that emphasize the internal workings of organizations, such as workplace psychology and bounded rationality theory.

Open systems theory soon resulted in a profound change in organization theory. Starting with the work of John Meyer and Brian Rowan in the late 1970s, organization researchers in sociology, education, and political science posited that organizations were strongly influenced by their political environment. If organizations needed to show that they were legitimate, then it was possible for persons outside the organization to wield tremendous influence. Administrators had to do whatever social elites demanded, or they risked the possibility that the organization would fail. Outsiders who disapproved of the organizations could withhold funds, approval, or certification.

The link between social environments and organizations inspired a wide variety of research. Some scholars believe that organizations were very sensitive to their environment. Administrators working in a complex and vague environment needed to show to investors and other supporters that they were legitimate. This argument suggested that behavior reflects social values. For example, firms may want to show that they treat workers in fair ways. A concern with showing fairness may lead administrators to appoint ombudspersons or create policies that facilitate worker complaints. Education provides another insightful example. Schools provide written curricula so that outsiders may see what they are teaching. The school does this to show it adheres to cultural standards about what is appropriate in schools.

The sensitivity to social environments has encouraged these scholars to focus on conformity. If the public has well-established ideas about what is appropriate for organizations, firms and other organizations within a sector will adopt the same procedures to satisfy these cultural imperatives. Though organization theorists have recognized the importance of social conformity, there is disagreement about the consequences. One strand of scholarship asserts that these pressures for conformity are very strong. Models of legitimate organizational behavior become taken for granted by workers and managers. Deviations from these models lead to harsh sanctions. A college, for example, that refuses to teach courses that are considered "normal," such as literature or chemistry, may not obtain accreditation, may be viewed as illegitimate by scholars, and potential students may avoid the institution. These pressures would make survival difficult for this hypothetical college.

In contrast, other organization theorists describe a more complex relationship between organizations and their environment. Working from the ideas described by John Meyer and Brian Rowan, scholars question the linkage between organization and environment. It is often argued that organizations show only minimal compliance with social expectations and legal regulations. Administrators expend much effort on shielding workers from an intrusive public. The organization's public image is designed to assure outsiders that work is legitimate so that workers can have discretion over their jobs. This process is called *decoupling*.

Much of this research is inspired by schools, which claim to enforce teaching standards but allow teachers much liberty in how they conduct their classroom. According to this view, school teachers prize the autonomy of their classroom and resist attempts at external control and standardization of teaching. School practices such as lesson plans and classroom visits are designed to assure outsiders that the institution is doing what is considered proper. Once outsiders have shifted their attention elsewhere, teachers may continue to conduct their work as they see fit.

The recent emphasis on organizational environments coincided with the rise of population-level organization theory. Michael Hannan and John Freeman introduced the idea that the population of organizations was an important unit of analysis. In much the same way that biologists study populations of living things, Hannan and Freeman thought that it was worthwhile to study populations of organizations, such as automobile manufacturers, newspapers, unions, or churches. The key theoretical insight was that the creation and disbanding of organizations could be modeled analogously to the birth and death of organisms. Competition over resources affects the ability of organizations to enter and survive in their environment. This strand of research has been called organizational ecology. Later renditions of ecological theory have avoided biological analogies and focus more specifically on competitive processes. Much empirical research discusses how crowding within market niches affects exit and entry into markets. Current research uses the language of demography to describe population processes and how specific organizations establish their identities within these populations.

A third approach to organizations and environments focuses on networks. Scholars in this tradition attach great importance to the relationships between firms. Early work focused on the social relationships between managers. Inspired by Marxist social theory, some organization researchers believed that managers acted together as a sort of ruling class. These scholars then examined how firms were related by analyzing corporate boards of directors. Two firms were related if there was at least one executive who was on both boards of directors. Analysis of these data showed that leading American firms did belong to dense interfirm networks, but it was difficult to link a firm's position in this social structure to particular outcomes, such as market share or profitability.

Later uses of network theory employed a purely structural perspective. Scholars were less interested in investigating class politics and more interested in describing an organization's network. For example, management scholar Ronald S. Burt has argued that networks may have "structural holes" that represent economic opportunities. Burt's argument is that the absence of ties between two groups of organizations represents an absence of trade. An entrepreneurial firm could then act as a "bridge" between blocks of firms that were previously disconnected. Sociologist Harrison White is well known for applying network analysis to the study of organizations. He argued that a firm's identity

depends on networks. An organization develops its identity based on the other firms and individuals who interact with the organization. This theory is different from the traditional view of organizational identity, where managers develop the firm's identity in an attempt to target an audience. Other scholars use network theory to describe worker relations within organizations, the relative position of firms within an industry, and the use of social ties as resources.

Links to Political Theory

Organization theory raises a number of issues for political theory. One issue is the organization's status in society. What rights and obligations do organizations have? Social scientists, unsurprisingly, have offered a wide range of opinions. The economist Milton Friedman once said that firms have no duties except to make profits for shareholders within the confines of the law. James Coleman offered an intermediate position. He noted that rights given to organizations may be justified, but there are also serious costs. All people may benefit from organizations that have legal rights because they promote risk taking and insulate owners from actions carried out by rogue workers. Coleman also noted that individuals may be at special disadvantages in disputes with organizations. Managers may use the firm's resources to promote their own interests, at the expense of their obligations to customers. Critics of contemporary health care practice, for example, may point out that health maintenance organizations may have reduced health care costs, but often at the expense of high-risk patients who are arbitrarily denied coverage for innovative procedures. Critics have lodged that this might not happen as often if HMO (health maintenance organization) managers were directly liable for their decisions.

The policy implications are unclear. Some critics have argued that limited liability should be abolished or that the corporation's legal status be reduced in other ways. The purpose of this reform is to make individual workers and managers more responsible for their actions. Other critics have responded that making shareholders directly liable for their actions, without the protection of the corporation, might reduce investment in firms and thus limit economic growth. These critics also appeal to fairness; a person who owns one share of stock should not be exposed to the same risk as the manager who is responsible for an action.

A second issue is the conflict between the formal and informal dimensions of the organization. A central theme in organizational research is that the formal written rules are an incomplete description. Organizations are saturated with values, networks, and informal practices. This raises a problem from the perspective of political theory. It is often thought that good behavior is based on abstract principles as embodied in written rules. This is the motivation behind the concept of "due process." Decision making improves when individuals follow rules that were developed by legislators, managers, or other authorities. However, as sociologist Viviana Zelizer notes, this is incompatible with everyday life in organizations. Rules are often underdetermined and incomplete and cannot cover all situations. Rules may also be viewed as antiquated and irrelevant. In practice, workers and clients in firms develop their understandings of what is appropriate. For example, it is expected that the police not arrest every person who violates some aspect of the law. The police are expected to make judgments about which rules are important and which violations merit attention. These choices depend on the community's values, the police officer's relation to citizens and other officers, and informal practices developed within a police department.

Often, policy makers have sought to diminish the influence of the informal by increasing formal rules. However, this approach has limits. One limitation is that circumstances change. The event that motivated a new rule may not be relevant for future decision making. Another limitation is that many situations are difficult to describe, and it is best to shift decision making to those persons with great experience. In the best circumstance, workers within an organization may develop interpretations of rules that best help them accomplish their goals.

A third issue is that organizations may be responsible for increasing risk. A number of scholars have observed that organizations may have a large role in creating the conditions for disasters. Charles Perrow has argued that organizations are complex systems that concentrate hundreds or thousands of people into relatively small spaces. For this reason, organizations enable disasters. For

example, manufacturing firms often require that large numbers of people work in close proximity to each other, often in hazardous conditions. The deeper point that Perrow makes is that disasters are a normal aspect of organizations. Highly complex technological systems often have flaws that are difficult to detect and nearly impossible to predict.

Diane Vaughn makes an even more critical point about risk and organizations. Even when managers have a good sense of the risk involved, they often develop a culture within the organization that is highly tolerant of risks. Accidents become "normal," and deviance from safety procedures is accepted. In a highly influential analysis of the 1986 space shuttle disaster, Vaughn argues that engineers were well aware of the risks involved with the design and operation of the *Challenger* shuttle but had developed a tolerance for that risk. Case studies such as Vaughn's raise critical questions for political theory. How should the public evaluate the risk created by organizations? If workers develop a dangerous tolerance for risk, how should their actions be regulated? How can outsiders even properly evaluate risk when the knowledge for doing so is held by organizational insiders?

A fourth issue raised by organizational theory concerns democratic control. As noted throughout this entry, there are many ways that organizations can evade public scrutiny. They can ritualistically satisfy public regulations, insiders can monopolize knowledge, and executives can attempt to co-opt the state. Voters, state regulators, and private accreditation groups may find it difficult to monitor organizations for these reasons.

Political scientists have usually focused on two mechanisms to counter these tendencies: periodic monitoring and problem response. In the first case, outsiders periodically audit or investigate an organization. This helps mitigate problems associated with resistant insiders or with organizational cultures that tolerate risky behavior. On the other hand, it is possible that organizations may use minimal candor and transparency to satisfy auditors. Managers of publicly traded firms may provide information in ways that hide a firm's financial difficulties, or elected officials may distort public statistics to enhance their image among voters. In the second case, regulators investigate bureaucracies only when clients complain. For example, a city may choose to lightly regulate its police department but increase monitoring when there are reports of police abuse. This may help address the problem of bureaucracies ritualistically obeying public regulations because regulators can save resources for the worst abuses and thoroughly investigate them. However, the problem remains that organizational insiders may hold knowledge that outsiders need to complete their monitoring. So far, political theory has not addressed in depth how the public may make organizations less resistant to public scrutiny.

Finally, organization theory has been brought to bear on the issue of how democracy, science, and other Western institutions have spread to the rest of the world. Under the rubric of world polity theory, numerous scholars have argued that states belong to a global political system dominated by the Western capitalist democracies. Much in the same way that individual firms signal their legitimacy by mimicking more established firms, states show they are legitimate by adopting democracy and other Western practices. Furthermore, there is now a global community of nongovernmental organizations that bring Western values and practices to every region of the globe.

The international transmission of democratic governance raises important questions for democratic theory. Is the adoption of democracy ritualistic or genuine? For example, how often do states adopt open elections only as a pretext for continuing an authoritarian government under a new guise? Does democracy encourage freedom within states? There is evidence for both views. It is the case that many repressive states claim to introduce elections, only to arrest people not in the ruling party. However, recent scholarship suggests that once a state adopts democratic practices, it is under pressures to faithfully implement them, though the process may be slow. It has been argued that democratic states join an international community that exerts normative pressures on state leaders.

Conclusion

Organization theory is the study of firms, schools, states, and other bureaucratic entities. Starting in the late nineteenth century, scholars looked at the firm as a rationally ordered system. Throughout the twentieth century, this view came to be seen as

incomplete. Organizational life is characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity, cultural values, and networks. Organizations are designed to accomplish certain tasks, but they also must respond to external social and legal pressures. This contemporary perspective raises important questions for political theory. Rather than being extensions of the public, organizations may have complicated relationships with the rest of society. The organization may grow to acquire its own rights, present new risks, and evade public accountability. Its goals may be amended or subverted by these social processes. For these reasons, organization theory will continue to provide insights for political theory.

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See also Bureaucracy; Institutionalism; Network; Structure

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Orientalism

Orientalism can refer to several distinct but related phenomena. Contemporary scholars typically use the term to refer to Edward Said's theory that Western ideas about "the Orient," often stereotyped or overgeneralized, are complicit with a broad history of Western colonial and neocolonial domination of the East. In this conception, Orientalism is both a general discursive formation related to material and historical relations of domination and a quality of specific texts, ideas, or actions. More specifically, however, Orientalism may refer to the scholarly discipline of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that encompassed the study of languages, literatures, religions, philosophies, histories, art, and laws of Asian societies, especially ancient ones. This scholarship also inspired broader intellectual and artistic circles in Europe and North America, and so Orientalism may also denote general enthusiasm for things "Oriental." Finally, Orientalism was a school of thought among a group of British colonial administrators and scholars who argued that India should be ruled according to its own traditions and laws, thus opposing the "Anglicanism" of those who argued that India should be ruled according to British traditions and laws.

Said introduced Orientalism as a subject of political theorizing when he argued that Orientalism was a general historical phenomenon by which the West represented, analyzed, and ruled over "the East," or "the Orient." Central to Said's thesis was that the stereotyped, romantic, and racist images of "the Orient" common in Western literature, philosophy, and popular discourse should not be analytically separated from histories of Western scholarship about the East or from the political histories of Western domination of the East. Said analyzes Western texts that posit a fundamental division between East and West; assume authority over, and ascribe negative characteristics to, the former; and, together with other such works, form a general discourse of Western mastery of the East. Orientalism in this understanding tells us nothing about its ostensible subject, the East, but reveals much about the West, whose self-perception requires the contrasting "Other" of the East. Using Said's formulation, the history of Western political thought can be read for assumptions, tropes, techniques, arguments, conclusions, and consequences that both derived from, and contributed to, Western colonialism in Asia. Said's original formulation has been thoroughly criticized, but his framework has also been extensively applied, revised, and extended, particularly by scholars in the field of postcolonialism.

Said named this very broad phenomenon after a more particular scholarly practice that emerged in late eighteenth-century European centers of learning and their colonial outposts, when the study of the languages, literatures, religions, laws, and art of the Orient became a major focus of scholarly attention and intellectual energy. In this era, the number of Europeans researching the Orient dramatically increased, and new forms of institutional support in universities and scholarly associations encouraged Orientalist research and its dissemination. A frequent theme of this scholarship was that Asia had once been host to great civilizations that had since fallen into their current state of decay, and Said theorized the significance of this idea for the authorization of Western scholarship and colonialism. Many Orientalists were connected to a colonial bureaucracy, but others were not, and their positions on colonialism varied. Orientalism as a scholarly field was dominated by research in the French, English, and German languages and associated centers of learning, and its subjects ranged geographically from the North African Mediterranean to East and Southeast Asia. One of the most significant "discoveries" of Orientalists was that Sanskrit and many European languages were related to each other, which implied that Europe and India shared historical origins. This "discovery" has been credited with the origins of the comparative method in the humanities and social sciences. During the twentieth century, "Orientalists" began to favor the term *Asian Studies* to describe their work, in an effort to distance it from the associations with colonialism and neocolonialism of the term *Orientalis*m.

In the wake of this Orientalist research, scholars and artists took up ideas about Asian societies, arts, and traditions in their intellectual and creative works, and images of and ideas about the Orient or specific peoples or parts of it became common tropes in popular literature and even decor. Thus Orientalism was a significant philosophical and aesthetic movement that reached beyond the relatively specialized circle of Orientalist scholars, beginning in the late eighteenth and into the nineteenth centuries, and in some forms and places it lasted much later. The history of Western political thought of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including but not limited to the Enlightenment, Romanticism, liberalism, and socialism, abounds with theorists who drew on Orientalist research or common assumptions about Asia, often in order to draw a contrast between an Asian government or society and those of modern Europe, or to find in Asia a picture of Europe's past.

The terms *Orientalism* and *Orientalist* first took on a markedly political meaning in the English language, however, to signify those English scholars, bureaucrats, and politicians who, over a period spanning the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, fought changes in colonial policy in India brought by the "Anglicists," who argued that India ought to be ruled according to British law and institutions. The Orientalists, in contrast, argued that India ought to be ruled according to local laws and traditions, and some of these Orientalists were those who conducted research on ancient laws of India and traditional legal structures in an effort to codify them and thus produce texts by which a colonial bureaucracy could govern. As contemporary historians have revealed, British efforts to understand,

codify, and govern according to what they believed to be local tradition often brought about significant changes in social and political life in India.

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See also Colonialism; Empire; Imperialism; Other; Postcolonialism

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OTHER

The other—in contradistinction to the *same*—is a key concept in strands of continental philosophy, Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, and their application by social scientists. The precise function of the term differs among theories and should be used in a strict technical sense. While "the other" is always taken to be constitutive of the self-same subject, this often means that it is a means for the subject's self-positing. Thus, in much of psychology, identity proceeds from the autarchic act of separation from a real or imaginary "other" through practices of inclusion/exclusion that form and sustain boundaries. By contrast, in Jacques Lacan's and Emmanuel Levinas's ethics, the subject is constituted in a purely heteronomous manner through exposure to a radical Other.

The modern origins of the term lie in German idealism. Johann Gottlieb Fichte's insight that subject-formation depends on others was radicalized in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's master–slave dialectic. While this "socialized" the solipsism of Kantian autonomy, Hegel's view was that, once constituted, consciousness feels threatened by its other and aims at destruction or synthesis. This "allergic" effect of otherness has since inspired many theories and critiques. It often resonates implicitly, for example, in Carl Schmitt's political theology whereby all political phenomena are analyzed in terms of the friend–enemy distinction and willingness to fight to death. Contemporary social scientists use the Hegelian version of the term while carefully rejecting the historical necessity of any mastery over others. Thus, in postcolonial and gender studies the "othering" of particular individuals or groups is analyzed as part of processes of control that can be resisted, as in Simone de Beauvoir, Edward Said, and Michael Warner on the "othering" of women, colonized peoples, and subjects of homosexual desire, respectively.

A significant modification to the "allergic" view of otherness occurred in existentialism. Building on the phenomenological distinction between reflective and prereflective levels of experience, existentialists substituted the autonomous subject by the autarchic existent that relates to its existence independently and prior to its consciousness of others. Consequently, the relation with others becomes secondary to the problem of solipsistic existence. For Jean-Paul Sartre, the other is not a life-threatening fact but a construct of being in order to display/limit its existence (at the cost of alienation). In 1936 Levinas cast doubt on existential autarchy in *On Escape*. The absoluteness of the existent was described as "deficient" because it is experienced as a suffering by the "living thing" (*le vivant*). Levinas's innovation was to claim that the reverse of this is a persistent if impossible "desire for escape" from having to be or not be. These ideas can be related to Levinas's mature work on ethics and responsibility culminating in his view that the only way I can sample freedom from solipsism entails becoming hostage to the demands of the other man and live and act "*as if* [italics added] I were devoted to the other man before being devoted to myself" (Levinas, 1989, p. 84); hence, "to be I signifies not being able to escape responsibility"; "to be a self is to be responsible before having done anything" (Levinas, 1996, pp. 17, 94). This freedom-in-subjection, however, is never realized, because responsibility is infinite and entails the endless inadequacy of my initiative and action; hence, the subject becomes "obsessed" and "persecuted" by otherness. Simon Critchley, using Freudian categories, diagnoses the Levinasian ethical subject as a "traumatic neurotic," "split" between itself and a demand that it cannot meet and marked by an experience of "hetero-affectivity" (Critchley, 2007, p. 61). He warns that the "internalization" of this

is "nothing other than the experience of conscience," and "without the experience of sublimation, conscience cruelly vivisects the subject" (Critchley, 2007, p. 87).

In Levinas's post–World War II theoretical trajectory, the experience of otherness was analyzed as "non-intentional affectivity" and "consciousness without intentionality." The themes were chosen so as to fall neither into the being–nothingness opposition nor the notion of the existent: insomnia/wakefulness, eros/the "feminine" and, finally, the trauma of radical passivity/infinite responsibility. The restless, wakeful insomniac feels exposed to the other but is neither fearful nor occupies a position of mastery; the subject of eros reaches out to the beloved with an attitude of "patience," not power or powerlessness. Occasionally Levinas articulated this with the idea of the infinitely demanding yet never present scriptural God, but overall Levinas prioritized ethics over metaphysics. Otherness is neither the result of an act by the self nor an original freedom of the empirical other but an "event in existing different from the hypostasis by which an existent arises" (Levinas, 1989, p. 50). The event is the epiphany of the other's *face,* whereby a particular other becomes a sign of absolute alterity—capitalized Other—and commands responsibility not by virtue of its difference but through the affective surplus that it produces in me. Levinas confusingly wrote the term inconsistently with and without a capital "O," but commentators have adapted a convention systematizing the two uses. "The other" means a particular social other whom I can see and know by virtue of our differences; in this case visibility, representation, and knowledge act as "bridges" over our separateness; this is not other in fact but "someone co-opted into the world of the solitary ego which has no apparent relationship with the other-qua-Other, for whom the other is an alter ego known by sympathy, that is, by a return to oneself" (Levinas, 1978, p. 85). The Other means the absolutely unknowable and un-representable dimension to the—necessarily social—human experience that cannot be undone or neutralized and that the daily confrontation with any others' *face* epitomizes. Even in murdering another, its Otherness remains: It has not been negated or controlled. Thus Levinas's theory constitutes a critique of both Husserlian and Sartrean views of the other, respectively, as another me in the visual field and as object. Social phenomena cannot be analyzed solely in terms of knowledge of others because "knowledge does not surmount solitude. By themselves reason and light consummate the solitude of a being as a being, and accomplish its destiny to be the sole and unique point of reference for everything" (Levinas, 1987, p. 65). Society, then, must be understood in terms of the traumatic experience of otherness that is both irreducible and linguistic. Language is constitutive of all ordinary human experience but the obsessive and radically passive dimension of the traumatic exposure to the Other via each other's *face* is a condition for language: The "face to face founds language" (Levinas, 1969, p. 290). Without the patient disposition of individual beings to serve (serve, not "tolerate") each other, there could be no language and no complex human association. The domain of ethics, therefore, cannot be equated with the rules and laws of the symbolic order. Any notion of measured responsibility in systems of legal or political morality is derivative of the anarchic and infinite responsibility that obsesses me before any other-as-Other. This means that the conception of the self as autarchic/sovereign (and, by extension, any construction of a community out of an archic perspective or, alternatively, of any *arche* out of a conventionalist or social point of view) is flawed. No one can rest in identification or indifference on the basis of knowledge or lack of knowledge of others. Always-already prevented from self-identity, "I" relate to myself in the accusative: *me*. To be *me* means to occupy a singular position of radical passivity before the other-as-Other that no initiative can consummate and no inaction evade, to the point of obsession and persecution.

Levinas rejected criticisms that his ethics valorizes relations of spatiotemporal proximity at the expense of political and legal responsibility within communitarian and corporate forms of human association, most forcefully in *Otherwise Than Being: Or Beyond Essence*. He clarified that responsibility for the neighbor-as-Other is not exclusive but, on the contrary, it is constitutive of all forms of responsibility to innumerable others irrespectively of how distant or obscured these are:

> The others that obsess me in the other do not affect me as examples of the same genus united

> with my neighbor by resemblance or common nature, individuations of the human race, or chips off the old block. . . . The others concern me from the first. Here fraternity precedes the commonness of a genus. My relationship with the Other as neighbor gives meaning to my relations with all the others. (Levinas, 1981, p. 159)

This is at odds with any ontology of the state or any other political association because it exposes the contingency of sociality and demystifies/denaturalizes any existing bonds. The neighbor "absolves himself from all essence, all genus, all resemblance" and always concerns me "from the first time (even if he is an old friend, an old lover, long caught up in the fabric of my social relations) *in a contingency that excludes the a priori* [italics added]" (Levinas, 1981, p. 86). This contingency occasions a responsibility for "the other man, . . . the stranger, the sojourner, to which nothing binds me—nothing in the order of the thing, of the something, of number or causality" (Levinas, 1989, p. 84).

Derrida's criticism about the impossibility of the other's "pure presence" prompted Levinas to engage with issues of language and representation through a distinction between the "saying" and the "said." Infinite responsibility to the other-as-Other must not be collapsed with the content of particular actions and decisions—which are the "said"—but "traced" in the impossibility to justify these to *every* other. This impossibility results in delirium or contradiction—the saying that belies the said—which inevitability attaches to every justification. To say that one is infinitely responsible for the other-as-Other, therefore, is not to privilege one particularity over another at the expense of universality; rather, the message seems to be that the responsibility is anarchic. Therefore ethics cannot be used to "authorize" or justify any decision or action (or inaction) just as no justification or authority can be the sufficient cause or reason of a decision or action. In this regard Critchley's (2000) work on the relation between the Levinasian ethics and deconstruction is seminal.

A related but radically different use of the term is crucial in Lacan's reformulation of the Freudian unconscious following the linguistic turn (viz., the insight that signifying elements have no positive existence and no fixed relation to what they signify but are purely constituted by virtue of their mutual differences). The absolute otherness of things-in-themselves is the unfathomable Other of language, the "Real," generating nothing but horror. The emergence of the subject that can engage in social relationships requires the passage to a gentrified "imaginary other" who acts as a mirror. This requires the agency of the "big Other," namely, the symbolic order. Conceived in terms of the grammar of a language, the "big Other" consists of the performance by humans of insubstantial impersonal rules. There can be no "functioning" social relationships without a fine balance among these three registers of the Other. The total suspension of impersonal Law (i.e., without submission to *some* law) will leave the subject left open to the horrific otherness of others; if the operation of the impersonal Law becomes so efficient that it totally shelters each subject from its neighbor's alterity, human subjects are reduced to cogs; if a subject relates to the Law directly and stops mirroring itself in each of its confusingly many human others, this is a subject without uncertainty close to psychosis.

Slavoj Žižek, using Lacanian theory, has charged that the Levinasian use of the term fits into an era of political correctness and serves what Alain Badiou called the "permissiveness" through which contemporary Empire operates (Žižek, 2005, p. 134). Žižek argues that the ethical priority Levinas accords to the other-as-Other occurs at the expense of third parties ("the Third") and, therefore, acts against the requirements of justice and universality. Consequentially "the true ethical step is the one *beyond* the face of the other . . . for the *third*" (Žižek, 2005, p. 183). Žižek's critique is by no means conclusive. Arguably the "Third" is never a purely transcendental fact but an empirical one, as he or she can only have an impact on me *as* a face; indeed in the Levinasian scheme of things, obsession with the other-as-Other renders complete facelessness and impersonality impossible even in the modern highly complex world run by bureaucracies (Diamantides, 2007, p. 182). In a separate, highly complex, argument Critchley suggested that commitment to justice-politics is needed to sublimate the Other's infinite demand on the subject. This means a transformation of the ethical subject from obsessing about responsibility to a particular other-as-Other into a political subject,

"identifying a particularity in society and then hegemonically constructing that particularity into a generality that exerts a universal claim"—mentioning, by way of example, the case of indigenous identity that is "a political achievement and not an accident of birth or an extra-political cultural given" (Critchley, 2007, p. 91).

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See also Existentialism; Face; Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Freud, Sigmund; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Psychoanalysis

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P

PACIFISM

The term *pacifism,* which is now applied to a number of historical and contemporary stances toward war, did not appear until the early twentieth century. In 1902, a Frenchman at an international peace congress used, and perhaps even coined, the word *pacifism* to mean *antiwarism.* Its linguistic roots, of course, suggest more positive implications: making or doing peace.

Nevertheless, the common element in pacifist positions is negative: disavowal of war and/or participation in war. Many pacifists disavow both a state's use of armed force in interstate conflicts and their own personal participation in such armed force. Yet this distinction is important because some pacifists disavow participation in war, seeking to disassociate themselves from their government's policies by refusing to serve in the military, pay taxes, and so forth, without seeking to alter their government's military policies or to propose a political alternative to those policies.

Pacifism is not necessarily passive in the face of perceived wrongs—that is, it usually opposes, often quite vigorously, injustice and other wrongs—but it calls for nonviolent means to overcome such policies and actions. It agrees with just war proponents about the goal of a just peace, but it disavows the use of armed force to achieve that goal and/or participation in the use of armed force.

Types of Pacifism

Pacifism is distinguished from several other approaches to war, particularly just war theories (which hold that war can be ethically justified under certain conditions) and political realism (which downplays the role of moral norms in the realities of international life and stresses the need to wage war in some circumstances). All of these approaches have a variety of forms. It is important to recognize the numerous varieties of pacifism because interpretations and evaluations depend on the type(s) of pacifism under examination.

The following typology distinguishes four main types of pacifism according to their mode of reasoning (i.e., whether the reasoning is nonconsequentialist, consequentialist, or some combination). In addition, the ground of a pacifist position may be particularistic (e.g., based on revelation) or universalistic (e.g., based on natural law or reason). The pacifist position may apply to certain individuals or groups who can apprehend those fundamental principles, or to all individuals and groups, including states, because the fundamental principles are universal and human beings have the natural capacity to grasp and apply them in statecraft. The ground of each pacifist position will also include various philosophical, theological, and anthropological premises. And it will determine, in part, who may and should be agents of pacifism—individuals, religious and other organizations, or the state.

It is also important to consider both the *strength* or *stringency* and the *scope* or *range* of pacifist

positions: On the one hand, there is a question about the strength or stringency of the disavowal of war—that is, whether this disavowal is absolute, presumptive, or relative. On the other hand, there is a question about its scope or range—that is, whether it applies to all wars, only to modern wars, or only to certain kinds of modern wars, and whether it is limited to warfare itself or if it also extends to other or even to all armed force (as some anarchist pacifists hold).

Legalistic-Expressive Pacifism

This first type of pacifism, often represented in religious traditions, views nonviolence as obligatory. Its ethical framework is nonconsequentialist because it holds that some features of acts and policies other than their intended and foreseen consequences make them right or wrong; those features include fidelity to the moral law or witness to certain values or expression of particular virtues. Whatever its form, this type of pacifism cannot accept the use of armed force by states against other states, even to avoid terrible consequences. Hence, it tends to be absolutist.

Historically, legalistic-expressive pacifism has often been sectarian in the sense that it stands in opposition to the society's dominant moral framework, including just war theory. Indeed, some interpreters hold that absolute pacifism, the total rejection of violence and war, usually stems from world rejection, rather than being an independent or freestanding position.

Insofar as it rests on a particularistic ground, such as revelation, this type of pacifism cannot easily offer directions for states. It functions largely in a prophetic mode. In order to offer directions for public policies, it would need to find a broader epistemological basis (e.g., natural law) or to appeal to the society's dominant moral framework (e.g., pacifist appeals to just war criteria to condemn the war in Vietnam or to reject the use of nuclear weapons).

Some proponents of legalistic-expressive pacifism (e.g., some Mennonites) oppose participation in war, and express their opposition through conscientious objection or refusal. They disassociate themselves from the war without offering pacifism as an alternative for the larger society. Legalist-expressive pacifism stands in sharp contrast with the next type of pacifism, which offers an alternative for national policies based largely on claims about the likely consequences of pacifism.

Consequentialist Pacifism

This second type of pacifism holds that if individuals, groups, and even nations would adopt pacifism as their policy, their actions would on the whole produce a net balance of good over bad effects. Even though it is directed at national policies, this type of pacifism is not merely a political position because it is based on a moral imperative to produce the greatest good. Its predictions about the consequences of a state's adoption of a pacifist stance depend on some contested assumptions about human nature and the world. For example, critics of this type of pacifism challenge the effectiveness of nonviolence, especially in confrontation with totalitarian regimes pursuing oppressive and even genocidal policies.

It is difficult to defend absolutistic pacifism from a consequentialist perspective—at most, nonviolence would appear to be presumptively rather than absolutely justified. And the fundamental problem remains: the justification of claims about the positive long-term effects of pacifist policies in the face of immediate consequences that appear to be terrible and perhaps even irreversible if pacifism is followed. However, consequentialist pacifists stress that wars do not always achieve their ends, are almost always unsuccessful for one side, and are often unsuccessful for both sides. Furthermore, they note the comparative costs of nonviolent and military efforts. They also brush aside charges of ineffectiveness, observing that insufficient effort has been devoted to making pacifist policies work, in contrast to military solutions. Some versions of consequentialist pacifism are negative rather than positive. They hold that pacifist policies would produce the least evil. In its modern form, this negative pacifism often blends with technological pacifism (the fourth type) because of the terrible and indiscriminate destructiveness of modern war.

Redemptive-Witness Pacifism

The third type of pacifism combines features of the first two types. Whereas the first type holds that pacifism is right even if it is ineffective, and

the second type holds that pacifism is right because it is effective, the third type holds that pacifism is both right and effective. Pacifism is faithful to a revealed moral code or expresses fundamental ethical values or virtues, and it also—perhaps therefore—produces good consequences.

In this version of pacifism, by renouncing the use of lethal force, individuals, groups, or states indicate that they are trustworthy (i.e., that they will not harm others) and express their trust in others. Thus their actions can evoke others' trust and trustworthiness. Redemptive-witness pacifists consider nonviolent actions and policies to be therapeutic and even redemptive. Even if nonviolent agents are attacked, their attackers will fail in the larger public forum when they attempt to justify their actions.

In combining elements of the first two positions, this third type of pacifism is subject to objections about both the obligatoriness and the effectiveness of pacifist actions. In particular, pacifist claims about effectiveness often appeal to contested views of human nature and metaphysical or theological beliefs, such as the Quaker conviction that it is possible to reach God in every person, Mohandas Gandhi's contention that the law of suffering works, and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, insistence that unmerited suffering is redemptive. Critics charge that this type of pacifism is foolishly unrealistic and hopelessly optimistic in face of historical evidence that shows accepting suffering does not transform oppressive regimes so much as beget more suffering.

Technological Pacifism

The fourth type of pacifism is different because it accepts just war criteria but holds that a rigorous application of these criteria entails negative judgments about modern, especially nuclear, wars. Modern weapons of mass destruction violate the standards of discrimination and/or proportionality for the just conduct of war (*jus in bello*). Wars involving these weapons—or potentially involving these weapons—may also fail to meet standards of reasonable chance of success and proportionality that a state must satisfy if it is to undertake a war justly (*jus ad bellum*). Some nuclear pacifists emphasize one or the other of these sets of standards, while others apply both.

The distinctiveness of this position is that its criteria are drawn from the just war tradition, that it is shaped by the available technology of warfare, and that it applies only to the present age. Its "no" to modern (especially nuclear) warfare is what attracts the label "pacifist," but its logic of reasoning is clearly distinctive vis-à-vis the other types. Even though its proponents may use absolutistic language, technological pacifism is a contingent position that could change as weapons and defense systems develop. Because it is based on just war criteria, technological pacifism is addressed to states as well as individuals and religious communities. However, it may not offer clear policy directions about the possession of weapons of mass destruction. For example, employing just war criteria, the U.S. Catholic bishops disavowed the *use,* not the *possession,* of nuclear weapons, and offered a strictly conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence for the present. Because this fourth type is an extension and application of just war criteria, the remainder of this entry will focus on the first three types of pacifism.

Debates About Pacifism in Politics and Public Policy

As is already evident, debates about pacifism often focus on whether it is a legitimate option in politics and public policy. One of the major twentieth-century critics of pacifism, the political realist Reinhold Niebuhr, expressed genuine appreciation for absolute legalistic-expressive pacifism that calls for nonparticipation in violence without attempting to offer a political alternative. For him, this type of pacifism is a legitimate part of a general religious withdrawal from the world, including political responsibility, in an effort to attain perfection. As such, this type of pacifism stresses a stringent interpretation of the requirements of neighbor love and reminds society of the distinction between the ideal and the real, thus helping to maintain an uneasy conscience about war and participation in war. However, Niebuhr views this form of pacifism, though valuable in these ways, as politically irrelevant and irresponsible.

The second and third types of pacifism, which claim to offer effective political alternatives, are, from Niebuhr's perspective, even more confused and mistaken when they interpret neighbor love to

mean nonviolent resistance, rather than pure nonresistance, and when they affirm that humans are basically good and can and will respond to nonviolent resistance. Some of the claims and counterarguments about effectiveness and consequences were previously noted.

Important developments have occurred in the pacifist tradition in recent years, as John Howard Yoder, Stanley Hauerwas, and others have developed pacifist positions that challenge the powerful realist conceptualization, classification, and critique. Several points are noteworthy.

First, even though many contemporary religious pacifists operate from a legalistic or expressive perspective, they often refuse to accept consignment to political nonparticipation and irrelevance. Rejecting or qualifying the mainstream definition of politics that focuses on the use of force, they argue that the "political" has to do with the *polis,* that is, with people's common life and their conversation about the good. Hence, pacifists can legitimately challenge and attempt to reshape the sociocultural context, such as militarism, of political decisions to wage wars.

Critics sometimes charge that pacifists should stay out of the discussion about the justifiability of particular wars, just as in Vietnam or Iraq, because, after all, pacifism disavows all wars or at least modern wars. Pacifists respond that they can still argue against particular modern wars by invoking publicly available just war criteria. And they can challenge society to apply those criteria rigorously and with integrity, rather than simply as a way to legitimate every war.

Opponents also charge that pacifists are inconsistent when they favor one side over another in armed conflicts. However, neither logical nor moral inconsistency is evident when pacifists view the ends and cause of one side as ethically superior, even in a violent conflict.

Against dismissals of their proposals as unrealistic and idealistic, pacifists stress that political realism actually holds an impoverished view of political reality, particularly by concentrating so much on armed force. According to pacifists, realists often cannot appreciate the potential of nonviolent alternatives because of their closed view of reality. Properly understood, pacifists note, even just war theories generally require that armed force be a last resort, after nonviolent alternatives have failed.

Critics admit that pacifists helpfully remind society of the presumption against the use of armed force and the need to seek nonviolent alternatives to armed conflict. However, they charge that pacifists neglect another part of the just war tradition: the set of requirements for the just conduct of war (*jus in bello*), including the principles of discrimination between combatants and noncombatants and of proportionality. Pacifists seem to share with realists the conviction that war is hell and even murder, and the only moral question is whether or not to enter it. As a result, even though pacifists remind the society of the moral boundary between peace and war, they tend to neglect the importance of moral conduct in war after that boundary is crossed.

A final question addresses whether the state should exempt pacifists from conscription for military service and, if so, which pacifists and under what terms and conditions. After a vigorous debate in the United States about conscientious objection, particularly during the Vietnam War, this issue disappeared with the adoption of an all-volunteer army in 1973, but it can be expected to return to the policy debate if military conscription returns. When states with military conscription consider whether to recognize conscientious objection to military service, there are often debates about the fairness of exempting pacifists from military service and about the need to require them to perform an alternative service, as well as about the conditions they have to meet in order to qualify for exemption, such as sincerely holding certain kinds of pacifist beliefs.

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See also Absolutism; Gandhi, Mohandas; Just War Theory; Nonviolence; Realism

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Pain

Serving as the backdrop to issues such as torture and cruelty, political theorists approach *pain* in terms of its sociolinguistic ambiguity. To political theorists, the central question is not only how to define pain from a physiological perspective, but also how to see pain as a world-altering force that influences our understanding of agency, community, and government.

The first thing to note about these issues is how the meaning of pain has changed throughout the history of political thought. In Ancient Greece, there were as many as six groups of words linked up with pain, stretching from a shooting pain (*odunè*) to feelings of mourning (*penthos*) and worry (*kèdos*). The church fathers, above all Augustine, limited these meanings to a paradigm in which pain was a sign of sin and human finitude. Encouraged by the Cartesian revolution in modern philosophy and science, this paradigm was replaced by the competing visions of liberalism and utilitarianism, which interpreted pain as either a physiological disturbance that one defines on an individual basis or as lack of pleasure that decreases a society's overall happiness.

Contemporary theorists focus on issues of knowledge and politics following from these modern visions of pain. In *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,* for example, Richard Rorty affirms the claim by Judith Shklar that cruelty is the worst thing we do, but goes on to criticize liberals and utilitarians for claiming to know the difference between justifiable and nonjustifiable pain. Such knowledge is groundless, Rorty argues, foregrounding the contingency of our desire to avoid suffering. In another critique, Wendy Brown draws on Nietzsche to identify what she calls "wounded attachments." Wounded attachments arise when a person or a group blames someone else for the pain they feel from not being their own masters, and in turn bases their identity on the pleasure that arises from this blaming. According to Brown, these attachments define liberal democracies, which undermine the goal of freedom as self-mastery by relying on, and in some cases promoting, cultural and economic inequalities.

A set of themes has emerged from these critiques. First, without a physiological essence, pain is a politicized phenomenon whose meaning depends on issues of culture, economics, and religion. Not only does this view collaborate with neurological studies focusing on chronic pain, it underscores the value of approaching pain in a contextually informed manner. Second, visions of and attitudes to pain help to shape political action. The visions and attitudes do so because they define the limit between the tolerable and the intolerable, and because this limit directs our notion of legitimacy. In an age where torture, cruelty, and genocide remain high on the agenda, pain will thus continue to preoccupy political theory.

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See also Agonism; Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm; Pleasure; Violence

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Paine, Thomas (1737–1809)

Thomas Paine was a radical democratic political propagandist and inventor who played a pivotal role in the American Revolution and participated in the French Revolution. Born in Thetford,

United Kingdom, to a modest working class family and raised as a Quaker, Paine lived a tumultuous life characterized by unremitting professional failure and personal tragedy in his early years, extraordinary literary success and political prestige in his middle age, and misfortune and controversy in his final two decades. The largely self-educated Paine tried his hand at staymaking (his father's profession of corset making), excise collections, and shopkeeping before he published his first political pamphlet in 1772, *The Case of the Officers of Excise,* which urged salary increases for excise officers in order to prevent their poverty and corruption. He went on to become an enormously influential political thinker who helped popularize radical and liberal causes, including the abolition of slavery, women's rights, the rule of law, natural and civil rights, written constitutionalism, free trade, the advancement of science, welfare state policies, land reform, and deism. Since his death, Paine has been considered an inspiration for working-class radicals, internationalists, land reformers, libertarians, freethinkers, socialists, and progressives of all stripes in the United States and Great Britain.

Paine's ideas as a political thinker are bound up with his life as a political actor. With a letter of introduction from Benjamin Franklin, Paine decided to make a fresh start in America at the age of 37, where he established his reputation as a bold polemicist. He returned to England in 1787 to promote his design for a single-arch iron bridge, but ran afoul of the law. He was convicted of seditious libel for publishing the antimonarchical *Rights of Man* in defense of the French Revolution's aims. He sought refuge in France, where he became an honorary French citizen, but soon fell out of favor with the dominant Jacobin Party. He was imprisoned and nearly lost his life for pleading that deposed King Louis XVI be spared from the guillotine because of his support for the American Revolution. On his return to America in 1802, Paine was reviled for the unorthodox religious views he expressed in *The Age of Reason* and for misguided attacks on George Washington, who was unfairly blamed for Paine's imprisonment. Because he relinquished the rights to his publications in order to make them widely available to the public, Paine died in poverty.

Paine in America

Paine made a signal contribution to revolutionary political thought almost as soon as he arrived in Philadelphia. In January 1776, just over a year after his arrival in America, he anonymously published *Common Sense,* a fiery pamphlet that articulated many of the liberal egalitarian themes and ideas that Paine would further develop in his subsequent writings. *Common Sense* was the first major document to call for total independence, and the 43-page pamphlet sold over 100,000 copies in its first three months alone and was immediately translated into French. Even though his ideas were not particularly original, Paine popularized ideas associated with radical egalitarian philosophers and liberal social contract theorists like John Locke.

What set Paine apart from other political writers in this era was his adoption of a clear, direct, and forceful style of writing that helped democratize political discourse. Scholars credit Paine with introducing a new literary form that expanded the public sphere to include average readers unschooled in Greek and Latin. Unlike contemporary writings laden with classical references, foreign expressions, and flowery language directed at elites, *Common Sense* used plain arguments and commonsensical reasoning that avoided the abstruse language associated with philosophical writings. Paine used his ability to present complex problems in a straightforward manner, which enabled him to demonstrate the interdependence of public and private interests in the American cause.

Paine invoked universal principles of natural rights to justify the American struggle against British despotism. Setting a pattern he would follow in his subsequent writings, Paine described the American struggle for freedom and equality as a struggle that concerns mankind as a whole. Even though many of his arguments in support of independence made points specific to the American case, Paine exhibited a cosmopolitan orientation that made him a self-styled citizen of the world.

Progress and Enlightenment

Like liberal social contract theorists before him, Paine sought to demystify government by tracing its origins back to the voluntary consent and self-interest of political actors. He consistently emphasized the need for each generation to govern itself

free from the encumbrances of custom and tradition. A product and exponent of the Enlightenment, Paine was an uncompromising critic of the superstitions, ignorance, and tyranny associated with the past and an equally unapologetic champion of the reason, science, and freedoms he identified with the future. He was a fearless advocate of free inquiry and free speech in politics, society, and religion. The freedom to examine and criticize errors was essential to the promotion of freedom and the advancement of society.

Paine called for a complete break with the ideas, practices, and institutions of the past, especially aristocracy, monarchy, and hereditary succession in all its forms. This break with the past is most evident in his enthusiastic endorsement of both the American and French Revolutions. In his view, a revolution signifies more than a mere change in the form of government. A revolution entails a complete change in social and political attitudes, ideas, and principles.

Perhaps the most pervasive theme in Paine's writings is the idea that no generation owes anything to the ones that came before it. As he stated in *The Rights of Man,* his reply to Edmund Burke's conservative critique of the French Revolution, "Government is for the living, not the dead." Each generation has the opportunity and even the responsibility to begin the world anew. Precedents in law and politics carried no weight for Paine unless they were consistent with right principles.

Popular Sovereignty and Representative Government

Even though Paine never articulated a full-fledged theory of government, he consistently championed an egalitarian form of republicanism based on the principle of popular sovereignty. According to Paine, the term *republic* did not refer to a specific form of government, but to the legitimate end of government. In all cases, this was the public good, which demands security for the natural rights to life, liberty, and property of all.

Paine's egalitarianism helps account for his advocacy of simplicity in the structures of government. Many of his contemporaries looked to the unwritten British Constitution as a model of institutional balance, but Paine rejected the complexity associated with the separation of powers, bicameralism, and other structural arrangements found in mixed governments. Instead, Paine advocated a democratic government with a unicameral legislature. Because there are no fixed distinctions of class in a democracy, Paine believed it would be ludicrous to have one part of government check another part. He expected strict adherence to the rule of law to keep government officers in check. This stance made Paine deeply suspicious of executive power and averse to the idea of lodging extraordinary power in the hands of a single person

The chief source of security for the rights and interests of the people rests on the strength and vitality of society, not on the particular form of government. Paine drew a sharp contrast between society and government that helps explains both his distrust of political authority and his confidence in the people. Whereas society conforms to the goodness and sociability of mankind, government is rooted in mankind's loss of innocence. Society meets the common interests of individuals because it is based on natural principles of equality and freedom that enable individuals to prosper. In contrast, government is an artificial contrivance that tends to produce war, poverty, debt, and other social and political ills. In fact, it bears primary responsibility for corrupting human nature. Government is a necessary evil, so the less it governs, the better. Paine anticipated that the progress of society and civilization would make government less and less necessary over the long run.

Paine's hostility to government, however, did not lead him to embrace anarchy. He was not opposed in principle to governmental activity per se, but to the wasteful and immoral objects that most governments have historically pursued. He distinguished between representative governments based on election from royal and aristocratic governments based on hereditary succession. Government by hereditary succession is in all cases a criminal monstrosity based on injustice. It violates the principles of nature because it substitutes the accident of birth for the requirement of ability. The absurdity and artificiality of royalty are evidenced by the fact that imbeciles and children so often find themselves on the throne. He ridiculed the notion that abilities could be passed on from parent to child and quipped that the word "Nobility" stood for "No-ability."

Hereditary government is an evil because it tends to sanction many varieties of exploitation and violence, including unnecessary wars of succession. The inequality in hereditary governments also tends to destroy sympathy for the plight of the lower orders of society. Another reason that Paine opposed monarchy and aristocracy is that they breed laziness and idleness among the ranks of the privileged. Moreover, the maintenance of their lifestyle often required exorbitant taxes that robbed workers of their rightful property.

Where direct democracy is not possible, the only legitimate form of government is representative government because it alone is based on the natural right to self-government. Representative government is superior in every respect to hereditary government because it combines power with knowledge. For one thing, it tends to elevate only those who are mature and qualified enough to govern. For another thing, it is stable because changes in government are less likely to provoke violence or intrigue. In addition, it is more responsive and accountable to the people. Government based on equal representation is more likely to pursue the interest of the entire nation and not just favored classes, religions, industries, or regions. Paine also believed that representative governments are more likely to live at peace with one another because the national prejudices fostered by monarchs were likely to disappear with the spread of natural rights and common sense.

Written Constitutions

Paine was a strong proponent of written constitutions because he viewed them as constituent acts of the people. He believed that there were two aspects to any constitution: first, as the origin of government and the source of its power; and second, as the chief restraint on the powers of government. A constitution is antecedent to government and forms the basis of its legitimacy—as long as constituted by the people. To ensure that a constitution reflects the will of the nation, Paine recommended ratifying conventions like those used in the United States. Once established, the purpose of a constitution is to serve as a control on government by setting legal limits on its powers. In keeping with the idea of progress, Paine argued that every constitution should be subject to amendment by the nation.

Economics and the Welfare State

Paine's views on economics paralleled his views on politics. Paine generally supported the emergence of a new capitalist economic order. At a time when many European powers were pursuing protectionist and mercantilist policies that impeded commerce, Paine avidly supported free trade because it was conducive to peace and the prosperity of all parties. He also supported the sanctity of contracts and the creation of a national bank in the United States to promote the circulation of money and facilitate trade.

Paine inveighed against wasteful government spending and high taxes, but his criticisms were rooted more in humanitarian concerns for the poor than in libertarian arguments for small government when it came to fiscal policy. The thrust of his assault on tax and spending policies focused on policies that benefited the privileged at the expense of the poor. Paine believed that the money saved by avoiding unnecessary wars instigated by monarchs could be used to fund programs to alleviate the suffering caused by poverty, illness, accidents, and old age. These ideas were most fully developed in *Agrarian Justice* and the second part of *The Rights of Man,* where Paine proposed programs that anticipated the development of the modern welfare state: public education, the creation of a progressive tax system, maternity benefits, family allowances, unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, an inheritance tax on large estates, and outright grants to 21-year-olds that would enable them to become independent. This kind of public support is a right, not an act of charity. Because the rich derive so many benefits from society, they owe a part of their affluence to the rest.

Religious Dissent and Deism

A staunch proponent of religious freedom and toleration, Paine opposed attempts to enforce religious orthodoxy as a violation of natural rights and an impediment to progress. Even though he always argued for freedom of individual conscience and professed to believe in God, his writings became increasingly hostile toward all forms of organized religion. One of his primary objections to organized religion concerned the fact that it is so often used to justify illegitimate political practices and forms of government, including monarchy.

Paine's views on religion were most fully articulated in *The Age of Reason,* a full-throated assault on the inconsistencies and absurdities of revealed theistic religion. Paine professed to be a deist, someone who believes in an impersonal God who has created the universe but refuses to interfere in human affairs, but his scathing criticisms earned him a reputation as an atheist, especially in the United States. He rejected all established churches as human inventions used to keep mankind in ignorance and subjection. Religion must be compatible with the understanding of reason. Unless one has direct personal communication with God, revelation is nothing more than hearsay, subject to the same evidentiary requirements one would use in any other area of life. The word of God was not to be found in obscure religious texts written by poets, but in the natural world. By studying Creation itself, Paine believed it would be possible for humans to discover the immutable laws of nature and set humankind on the path toward greater enlightenment and progress.

Though the nature of God is ultimately unknowable, Paine was confident that the best way to serve God was by promoting moral goodness and the cause of human freedom. This was Paine's own lifelong endeavor and perhaps his greatest legacy to radicals and freethinkers.

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See also American Founding; American Revolution; Burke, Edmund; Liberalism; Locke, John

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PAN-AFRICANISM

Pan-Africanism arose as a philosophy to restore the humanity and dignity of people of African descent. It is based on a basic and simple proposition, the idea that African people are human beings who think and have a right to live on the planet Earth. Pan-Africanists in the twenty-first century continue to confront old questions of the hierarchy of humans that became embedded in Anglo-American thought from the period of the slave trade to the present.

The Pan-African movement was the principal agency for the self-definition of the African people in the twentieth century. One of the principal credos of Pan-Africanism was that the people of one part of Africa were responsible for the well-being of Africans in every part of Africa, and Africans everywhere were to accept this responsibility. This movement has been manifest at the subjective level of race consciousness of African peoples and the objective level in relation to the organizational forms that Pan-Africanism has taken over the century. The organized form is more widely known with the written record focusing on the seven Pan-African Congresses held between 1900 and 1994. In institutional terms, the Organization of African Unity was the most concrete manifestation of Pan-African aspirations. Today, the African Union represents the organizational form of state-centered Pan-Africanism.

The quest for self-definition arose out of the concrete realities of the partition of Africa and the massive violence, destruction, genocide, and division that arose at the end of the nineteenth century and the rise of racism and racial violence in the United States. The small intelligentsia in the African diaspora was the main spokespeople for the ideas of African independence and dignity.

Pan-Africanism from below was manifest in the consciousness of the ordinary Africans on both sides of the Atlantic. This brand of Pan-Africanism inspired the largest mass movement of the twentieth century on both sides of the Atlantic in the form of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). The UNIA had branches in all parts of the world, with its newspaper, the *Negro World,* acting as the voice of the Pan-African movement in the period of the Harlem Renaissance.

Pan-African consciousness of Africans rose to become a force in international politics following the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. The global Pan-African movement was a major force of the antifascist movement similar to those who were fighting against fascism in Europe. The ideas of Ethiopianism that was a variant of Pan-Africanism had been widely held among Christianized Africans during the nineteenth century. Taking the biblical references to Ethiopia as the basis for the rallying point around the independence of Africa, Ethiopianism as a brand of Pan-Africanism represented a manifestation of spiritual and cultural autonomy for Pan-Africanists. In this period of fascism and war, the Pan-African scholars such as W. E. B. Du Bois, George Padmore, C. L. R. James, and Aime Cesaire articulated the ideas of liberation and redemption. In the French speaking territories, Négritude was another variant of Pan-Africanism.

During the nationalist phase, the period of the struggle for self-determination and independence, the intellectual leaders of the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester, United Kingdom (like Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta), became actively involved in politics. The nationalist movement embraced the idea that independence was to be the basis for the regeneration and reconstruction in Africa. Cheikh Anta Diop of Senegal and Frantz Fanon of Martinique were among those who transcended the preoccupation with governmental structures and sought to link the Pan-African project to the decolonization of the mind. Fanon traced the mental illnesses associated with colonial rule in Algeria and linked the transformation of the health and sanity of the people to Pan-African liberation and African unity. Diop reflected on the importance of African matriarchal traditions in what he called the Southern cradle of human transformations and invoked the contributions of the Egyptian civilizations in his writings on the cultural and linguistic unity of Africa that was to be the basis of Pan-Africanism. Walter Rodney and Julius Nyerere were among some of the noted Pan-African scholars who defined the Pan-African agenda in the twentieth century.

Struggles against colonialism and apartheid were the principal reference points for Pan-Africanism on the African continent between 1960 and 1980. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in May 1963 as a compromise between countries who wanted full mobilization to counter Belgian and French incursions in the Congo and countries that wanted appeasement with imperialism. This compromise led to the formalization of Pan-Africanism of African states. The Pan-African News Agency and the Africa Cup of Nations (in soccer) are the two Pan-African institutions most well-known to Africans at home and abroad.

In 1964, the OAU created the Liberation Committee with the mandate to support militarily, politically, and diplomatically those countries still under apartheid and colonial rule. However, OAU member states undermined one of the principal tenets of Pan-Africanism with the clause of noninterference in the internal affairs of African states, which protected dictators who were members of the OAU.

Pan-Africanism was at all times a brand of nationalism and internationalism. In the twentieth century, the civil rights movement in the United States acted as a beacon for this internationalism, and it was from organizations such as the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC) of the United States that the internationalism of the movement was realized to embrace the mobilization of Africans in all parts of the globe. Malcolm X had been at the forefront of exposing U.S. racism, and other leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., Angela Davis, and Kwame Ture (formerly Stokely Carmichael) were well-known voices of the civil rights movement. Writers and cultural artists such as Amiri Baraka, John Coltrane, Lorraine Hansberry, Toni Morrison, Alice Walker, and James Baldwin carried the message of black dignity beyond those formally organized in political organizations. Jazz artists and African American singers were representatives of this movement, and

their messages of "respect" and black pride were communicated widely throughout the world.

Bob Marley was another notable Pan-African spokesperson of the century, with a universal message in his music of African unity, love, peace, and human emancipation. Africans and non-Africans alike embraced his music and ideas and his message of Pan-African emancipation. The Rastafari movement was an expression of Pan-Africanism from the grass roots and could be distinguished from the Pan-Africanism of states as manifest in the OAU. It was this vibrant Pan-Africanism from below that influenced the new variation of Pan-Africanism that transcended states, which is manifest in the declarations of the sixth and seventh Pan-African Congresses, held respectively in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1974, and in Kampala, Uganda, in 1994.

By the end of the twentieth century, African women had emerged with a new definition of Pan-Africanism that emphasized the humanity of Africans and not simply the independence of states. The struggles against violence, warfare, destruction, and violation had taken the Pan-African discussion to a new level. In the process, there was a sharp distinction between the Pan-Africanism of the leaders and the ordinary people.

Horace Campbell

See also Liberation Theology; Postcolonialism

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Paradigm

A *paradigm* is a generally accepted or widely shared set of concepts, assumptions, values, and practices that constitute a way of understanding or approaching a particular discipline, especially a scientific discipline; it is similar in some respects to Michel Foucault's concept of an episteme. It is typically impossible to completely characterize the underlying logic of a particular paradigm because a paradigm consists, at least partly, of a set of pretheoretical commitments that determine how we see the world. In this sense, a paradigm is as much the language in which we formulate our concepts as it is a particular set of concepts. Thus, a paradigm is perhaps best thought of as a practical model for how to think through or handle a particular class of problems, rather than as a set of explicit rules that we might follow.

Originally, the word *paradigm* was a grammatical term for the set of the inflected forms of a word that serve as a model for the inflection of other, similar words. Thus, the forms of a regular verb like "walk"—walk, walks, walked, walking—provide a paradigm for the conjugation of related verbs. The word *paradigm* came to have its contemporary sense in Thomas Kuhn's work on scientific revolutions. Kuhn used the word *paradigm* to describe the predominant way of thinking during periods of what he called "normal science," in which most researchers share a relatively fixed approach to their field. In this sense, a scientific paradigm tells researchers what kinds of problems they should solve, provides methods for solving those problems, and gives them tools for evaluating the success of their solutions.

The features of a paradigm in this sense are not dictated by the nature of a given field but rather represent one specific approach among other possible alternative approaches. Kuhn argued that different paradigms are incommensurable insofar as they do not share the same theoretical language or evaluative criteria. That is, the concepts and assumptions of one can never truly be translated into the language of the other, making comparisons between them difficult at best. Therefore, Kuhn suggests that the choice between two rival paradigms may be arbitrary and irrational. For example, astronomers were not forced as a matter

of logic to switch to the Copernican model of the solar system, but they could always adduce new hypotheses to make the old Ptolemaic system work. So Kuhn compares the shift from one paradigm to another that occurs during a scientific revolution to the "*gestalt* switch" that occurs when we abruptly perceive something in an entirely different way, such as when we go from seeing the famous duck-rabbit image as a duck's head to seeing it as a rabbit's head.

Robert de Neufville

See also Anti-Foundationalism; Discourse; Foucault, Michel; Instrumentalism; Scientific Realism; Social Constructivism; Structuralism

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Pareto, Vilfredo (1848–1923)

Vilfredo Pareto was a pioneering Italian economist and social theorist, whose positivist approach to the study of society was crucially influenced by his early training as an engineer. The young Pareto did not seem destined for an academic career. Until 1893, he worked in business but also dabbled in politics and journalism. He was an outspoken advocate of free trade and British liberalism—a stance guaranteed to breed disillusion in the Italian setting, where protectionism and rampant clientelism hindered democratic development. By the early 1890s, Pareto's economic interests had become more theoretical than practical, and he began to publish contributions to the fledgling discipline of mathematical economics. These writings were sufficiently impressive to earn him a chair at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland, which he held from 1893 to 1907.

By the turn of the century, Pareto was losing interest in pure economics and rekindled his interest in political polemic, albeit in a more detached, scholarly manner. In *Systemes Socialistes* (1902), he mounted a scathing attack on socialism, which he eccentrically equated with any form of government intervention, including the imposition of tariffs. He also made it clear that his youthful infatuation with democracy was misguided. In *all* forms of government, he now concluded, leadership is by the few at the expense of the many. While he agreed with Marx that history was essentially a struggle for scarce resources, he took exception to the German's assumption of causal asymmetry between economic and political power. The clash between different interests, according to Pareto, could not be reduced to one schematic form. The powerful will always exploit (or to use his preferred term *spoliate*) the powerless, but the sources of their power are many and various.

Pareto did not, however, abandon his interest in economics. In *Manuale di economia politica* (1906), he developed his famous idea of Pareto-optimality, which assumes that a society is enjoying an optimum allocation of its resources at the point where no one can become better off without making someone else worse off. Any change beyond this point cannot be justified on economic grounds. Such a change must be based on moral and political considerations. In specifying the limitations of pure economic theory, Pareto was expressing his growing dissatisfaction with neoclassical economics, which posited an abstract world of (ideally) rational economic agents maximizing their utilities in an (ideally) free market. By now, he was convinced that human actions were largely sustained by sentimental beliefs, resistant to the dictates of logic. Economic functions could not be studied in isolation from other social processes—and the science capable of comprehending the full range of social action was sociology, or—to be more precise—*political* sociology, whose primary task was to analyze the distribution of power in society.

Bored by his lecturing duties and sustained by a massive inheritance, Pareto resigned his chair in 1907, retreated to a mansion in the Swiss countryside, and devoted himself to the production of his masterwork, *Trattato di sociologia generale* (1916), possibly the most suggestive work of political science published in the twentieth century. He begins by dividing human activity into "logical" conduct, in which means and ends are objectively related,

and "non-logical" conduct, where they do not correspond. The latter, we learn, is the principal ingredient in social life, and it supplies the basic premise of his *psychological approach* to social dynamics. Instinctive drives, which typically underlie nonlogical conduct, are the main sources of action for Pareto, though human beings contrive the delusion that their actions reflect rational deliberation and theoretical constructs. To illustrate his point, he divides these constructs into two elements. One varies over time and place and comprises the justifications and explanations we apply to our behavior. He calls these "derivations" because they derive from the *constant* elements in a theory, which correspond to deep psychological imperatives and are called "residues" in his parlance.

Pareto identified two main classes of residues. Class I reflects the "instincts of combinations"—the capacity to create and invent. Class II manifests the instinct of "aggregate persistence"—the natural human tendency to conserve and consolidate. Each class corresponds to a personality type. Borrowing terminology from Machiavelli, he divides social actors into two categories: foxes (cunning, clever) and lions (stolid, forceful). His famous theory of elites is founded on this distinction. Although all societies are oligarchic, regardless of what their constitutions might suggest, the ruling elite will consist primarily of either lions or foxes. For him, history is the graveyard of elites, as no ruling group can consistently combine the contrasting qualities required to sustain their domination. The foxes are good at manufacturing consent by forming alliances and striking deals, but they are incapable of wielding force when necessary. Their attempts to buy off or persuade their opponents ultimately prove futile, at which point they will be overthrown by an elite of lions, who understand coercion but lack adaptability. Requiring the assistance of class I types, the class II elite is eroded from within, as their psychological limitations allow the foxes to infiltrate their ranks and gradually transform the nature of the regime. Believing that history displays a constant pattern of circulation between these two types of elites, Pareto welcomed Mussolini's takeover in 1922, as it seemed to confirm his theory that an elite of foxes (effete parliamentary "democrats") would be violently supplanted by an elite of lions. Despite his cyclical theory of historical change, Pareto assumed that society had a natural tendency to remain in a state of equilibrium—an assumption that leads some commentators to view him as a pioneer of functional analysis.

Although Pareto's works are as complex as the reality he tried to capture, critics have often reduced his thought to simplistic formulae, depicting him as a science worshipping positivist, a psychological reductionist, and/or a protofascist ideologue. True, he applied the inductive/experimental method to the study of social phenomena, stressed the uniformities of human behavior due to fundamental dispositions embedded in human evolution, and criticized democratic regimes and humanitarian values as shallow and fraudulent; yet he did not deny the limitations of the scientific method. Nor did he ever deny the creativity of the human being as a semiotic animal, capable of actuating and intensifying certain instincts by engaging in symbolic discourse. Even less did he gainsay the dangers of nationalism, censorship, and racism—doctrines with which he is sometimes associated. Still, Pareto was a Machiavellian pessimist, who highlighted the irrational side of social life and who poured scorn on the creative power of *reason*. He will never be a hero to *progressives*.

Joseph V. Femia

See also Democracy; Elite Theory; Functionalism; Pareto-Optimality; Positivism; Realism

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Pareto-Optimality

Pareto-optimality is a concept of efficiency used in economics and political science named after the Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto. A state of

affairs is *Pareto-optimal* (or Pareto-efficient) if and only if there is no alternative state that would make some people better off without making anyone worse off. More precisely, a state of affairs x is said to be Pareto-inefficient (or suboptimal) if and only if there is some state of affairs y such that no one strictly prefers x to y and at least one person strictly prefers y to x.

The two so-called fundamental theorems of welfare economics contain the most famous applications of the concept of Pareto-optimality. The first theorem states conditions under which the allocation associated with any competitive market equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, whereas the second theorem states conditions under which any Pareto-optimal allocation can be achieved as a competitive market equilibrium following the use of lump sum transfers of wealth.

The set of states of affairs and the set of people whose preferences are relevant for determining Pareto-optimality depends on the context. For example, in the first and second fundamental theorems of welfare economics, the set of people includes every member of the economy, and the set of possible states includes every technologically feasible allocation of commodities. Alternatively, the Nash equilibrium to the prisoner's dilemma is said to be Pareto-suboptimal because each player prefers an outcome different from the outcome resulting from the equilibrium strategies.

The concept of Pareto-optimality is often not very discriminating. A state of affairs x is Pareto-optimal provided that for any alternative state of affairs y, one can find at least *one* person who strictly prefers x to y. If one takes a sufficiently wide view of preferences and includes preferences informed by moral principles or other sentiments, such as envy, then many states of affairs satisfy this condition. The concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or potential Pareto-efficiency is more discriminating and finds wider use in economics. According to this concept, a state of affairs x is inefficient if there is some alternative state of affairs y, such that at y there is a set of possible lump sum transfers of wealth from those who are better off under y to those who are worse off, such that with these transfers, everyone is at least as well-off under y as under x.

Economists typically find Pareto-optimality to be extremely plausible, indeed indisputable, as a *necessary* condition that good laws, policies, and allocations must satisfy, although few would claim that it *suffices* to make a law, policy, allocation of commodities, and so on, good. A common reason (outside of economics) for rejecting it, even as a necessary condition for a state of affairs to be good, is its reliance on subjective preferences.

Sean Ingham

See also Prisoner's Dilemma

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PARLIAMENT

The idea of a deliberative body meeting to provide counsel can be found in both classical and medieval forms. Numerous bodies such as the Athenian Assembly or the Roman Senate share some resemblance to the modern constitutional idea of a *parliament* by virtue of the fact that they: allowed deliberation on policy or law; reviewed and advised on policy and law; controlled the raising of finance and military manpower; provided representation of certain groups; or controlled other power brokers whether imperial or religious. However, there is no cohesive idea of parliament until early modern constitutional thought. Tracing this early institutional history of parliaments has been important for political theory because of the potent modern mythologizing of early forms of civic assemblage and the strong desire to identify such institutions as democratic precursors of modern parliaments.

Ancient and Classical Parliaments

Athenian Democracy

Athenian democracy in particular has frequently been referenced by political theorists as a

historical example of a democratic parliamentary body. Within the Athenian political system, major political decisions were made at mass meetings of the citizen body, with a balance of political decision making between the council and the assembly. The council represented a widening of political participation from the existing council of nobles. Solon initially created a citizen's council of 400 in 594 BCE, demonstrating this changing philosophy of representation within the *polis* (city-state) toward a republican constitutional form. The successor council of 500 established by Cleisthenes in 507 BCE was chosen annually by lot, with each tribe allocated 50 places. Each councilor had to be over 30 and could serve for only 2 years during his lifetime. The council sat every day, and its presidency rotated between the tribes, with a foreman being drawn by lot from the presiding tribe every 24 hours.

Functionally, the Athenian council existed to direct the assembly, another precursor to modern parliamentary forms. With roughly 40 meetings in a year, the assembly also had provision for anyone to speak to the people on matters of interest. In a special emergency, such as a military threat, the assembly would meet for an extraordinary assembly. Sources for the operation of the council and assembly include the historical works of Thucydides, Xenophon, the political work of Aristotle, and the oratorical speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines. Historians disagree about the reality of popular participation within the council and assembly. Despite the possibility that every Athenian male could sit on the courts, participate in the council and the assembly, and hold many offices, there is evidence to suggest that effective political power was exercised by an active elite minority.

The Roman Senate

The Roman senate provides a contrast to the Athenian democratic institutions. Functionally, it was similar to its Athenian predecessor. It was a deliberative rather than a law-making assembly, so it had the power to make official appointments and declare war. However, membership was more constrained because only Romans of senatorial class could be members; and it became an increasingly subservient body as the Roman polity evolved into an empire.

Nordic Parliaments

Norse communities provide examples of medieval institutions that were conceived right from the start as a form of popular representation. The Icelandic Althing (founded c. 930 CE), the Faroese Ting (founded c. tenth century CE), and the Tynwald on the Isle of Man (founded c. 979 CE) all lay claim to being the oldest parliamentary institutions in the world. Made up of annual outdoor meetings composed of all free men, the assemblies decided on laws and dispensed justice. Presided over by a law speaker, the Thing also had the power to elect chieftains.

The Growth of Constitutional Thought

The Evolution of Royal Councils

Other parliamentary bodies evolved from advisory councils. In England, the Anglo-Saxon *Witenagemot* (Meeting of Counselors) and its successor the Norman *Curia Regis* (Royal Council) were advisory councils to the king composed of nobles who held their lands directly from the king. The tension between nobles and the crown and their desire to constrain his tax-making and legislative authority provoked the evolution of the council into a parliamentary body. Thus in 1215, the nobles secured *Magna Carta* (the Great Charter) from King John, a constitutional document, that agreed for example that the king could not raise taxation without the council's consent. In 1265, a rebellious noble, Simon de Mountford, called a parliament of his own supporters without the consent of King Henry III. Edward III recognized this body in his Model Parliament of 1295, which included not only ecclesiastical and noble figures, but also representatives from the country's boroughs. This theme of the development of parliamentary structures being hastened by noble resistance and a noble insistence on the monarchy governing with their consent is echoed in the French Wars of Religion in the sixteenth century. Again, French protestant nobles used a renegade parliamentary body to challenge the crown's absolutism.

Ideas of Parliamentary Authority

Parliamentary institutions were further strengthened by the growth of constitutional theory that

focused on the functions of particular bodies, their legitimacy, and their agreed limits. The state was embodied by the assembly of the relevant estates in the presence of the king, so that a parliamentary body acted with the monarch as the guardian of the realm. Thus in England, Sir Thomas Smith argued in the sixteenth century that absolute judicial and legislative authority lay with parliament and that judges were accordingly unable to render acts of parliament void. Thus, even before popular sovereignty became the dominant explanation for parliamentary authority in the civil wars of the seventeenth century, European parliamentary bodies had already asserted their place in relation to ecclesiastical and monarchical authority.

Helen Banner

See also Democracy; Kingship; Lawgivers; Republicanism; Roman Commonwealth; Sovereignty

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Participatory Democracy

Participatory democracy is a form of government in which the citizens have the opportunity to make decisions about public policy. It seeks to promote self-rule and self-determination, with individuals actively making the decisions that determine the laws by which they are governed. Citizens are given a central role in the decision-making process through, say, public discussion, negotiation, and referenda. The role of the state is less to make decisions on behalf of its citizens than to provide them with information and sites and spaces for communication and dialogue.

Participatory democrats express ideals of self-rule that can be traced back at least as far as early modern forms of civic republicanism. Self-rule is, in this sense, a moral value that predates the rise of liberal democracies. Indeed, after the rise of liberal democracies, civic republican values inspired many radical, and even Marxist and anarchist, critics of liberal government. However, current debates about participatory democracy took off in the 1960s when political theorists such as Benjamin Barber and Carole Pateman made strong normative arguments for greater citizen involvement. Perhaps more importantly, it was also in the 1960s that new social movements arose, including the American civil rights movement and the women's movement, championing groups that were excluded from representative institutions.

One of the best ways to grasp the nature of participatory democracy is to think of it as an alternative to representative democracy. Most participatory democrats, at least since the late nineteenth century, have been inspired in part by dissatisfaction with the restricted opportunities for participation provided in modern representative democracies. In representative democracies, citizens delegate the tasks of decision making and policy implementation to elected officials and appointed bureaucrats. Their participation is thus largely restricted to the election of politicians who then "represent" the interests of their constituents in making decisions and holding the bureaucracy to account. Advocates of representative democracy argue that it is more efficient, especially in large states with large populations. Many participatory democrats counter with normative arguments about self-rule and citizenship: We are perhaps free only insofar as we actively determine the rules under which we live. In addition, some participatory democrats argue that popular participation leads to more effective policies in that it promotes trust, understanding, and consensus. These arguments for participatory democracy often bring it into close alignment with other forms of radical democracy, including associative democracy and deliberative democracy. Associative democrats typically advocate more participation but in the context of a pluralist system in which power is divided among a

number of groups and associations. Deliberative democrats argue that citizens should decide which laws and policies they ought to pursue through public dialogue and debate.

Although participatory democracy can be an alternative to liberal democracy, it is important to recognize that participation is a continuum. Participatory democrats simply stand farther along this continuum than do their representative counterparts. The radical theorists and social movements of the 1960s did not typically want to do away with all democratic elections, representatives, and assemblies. Rather, they wanted to give greater voice to excluded groups.

So, democracy is, almost by definition, about providing avenues for popular participation. Varieties of participation include the electoral process, grouping, citizen-government, and more direct participation. The electoral process allows citizens to select their representatives. Group participation allows citizens to combine in associations within civil society, and it allows these groups to have a greater or lesser voice in policy making: common groups include churches, businesses, and trade unions. The concept of "citizen-government" refers to a diverse set of mechanisms by which citizens can convey their opinions and preferences to politicians; the mechanisms include public meetings, congressional hearings, and citizen surveys. Although participatory democrats value all of these forms of participation, they often place a particular emphasis on more direct forms of participation. Methods of direct participation include initiatives, referendums, and citizens' juries.

Participatory democracy has been implemented within temporary experiments and small groups. There have been televised examples of deliberative opinion polls: political scientists collect a group of diverse citizens and let them make decisions and formulate policies. Various private and voluntary organizations have constituted themselves as cooperatives or adopted highly participatory forms of decision making. Community development corporations arose in response to economic issues within communities and became instruments of participatory democracy as they promoted the same principles of democracy within the organization and by means of affecting change in their respective communities. However, critics often argue, despite such experiments, that such extensive participation is simply too costly or too difficult to operate effectively in large, diverse, modern societies.

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See also Civic Republicanism; Deliberative Democracy; Democracy; Radical Democracy; Representative Democracy

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Passions

The *passions* have become a recent focus of interest in political theory, though opinions differ on the extent to which full appreciation of the passions has been neglected throughout the history of Western political thought. The new (or renewed) interest has been driven by at least three distinct strands in contemporary intellectual history: new work in the philosophy of mind and psychology that has questioned conventional accounts of the relationship between emotions and reason; growing questioning of, if not discontent with, the dominant paradigms of John Rawls and Immanuel Kant in contemporary political theory; and practical concerns of a more meaningful experience of democratic citizenship.

There has been a growing sense of the inadequacy of contemporary suppositions about the workings of the mind with regard to the nature and functioning of reason and passion. Passion can be regarded as a particularly strong or evident, and

perhaps more self-conscious, manifestation of the more general phenomenon of emotion. To understand the place of passions in political theory, it is helpful first to understand more general trends in the assessment of the nature of emotion.

Although there is no agreement on the precise meaning or use of the relevant terminology, there is a general acknowledgment among scholars from diverse disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, and literature, that there is a much more complex relationship among what had been called the faculties of reason and emotion than what was previously thought. New theories of the intricate interconnectedness of reason and emotion have been developed from a wide number of perspectives. On the one hand, it is recognized that for the very experience of emotion to be possible, there are a number of cognitive conditions to be fulfilled, cognitive conditions that at times overlap with what has sometimes been called reason. For example, the emotion of anger is only possible on the condition of an assessment that one has been wronged in some way. Judgment can be regarded as a structural condition for most forms of emotional experience. On the other hand, it is also acknowledged that pure cognitive and rational processes unassisted by affect (such as we might find in robots and other forms of artificial intelligence or in individuals with abnormal brain functioning) are deficient in certain types of understanding and thus quite incapable of making appropriate decisions. Such calculations might neglect the existence of special relationships among people or neglect a particularly important aesthetic dimension of the matter at hand.

This general direction of analysis leaves plenty of room for questions to debate, including the nature of bodily and neurological inputs and their explanatory force for emotional experience; the degree to which emotion can be reduced to cognitive components; and the relevant place for a concept of the subconscious in mapping out emotional experience.

Historically, passion had been used as a term to connote the passivity of the subject with regard to emotional experience. More recently, it has taken on the sense of those emotions felt in a particularly intense way and that are most likely to motivate individuals to act. In that sense, passion can be considered the most overtly political form of political experience, especially with the suggestion that it can be felt not only individually, but also shared among individuals under certain conditions.

In addition to this focus on the functioning of the human mind and how reason and emotion intersect in an empirical sense, there has been new attention, among scholars of political theory in particular, on the appropriate place of reason and emotion in a normative theory of politics. Analysis and deconstruction of the Rawlsian paradigm in political theory, a paradigm that had been dominant in Anglo-American circles of contemporary theory since the 1970s, has revealed a less purely rationalistic basis for politics than previously acknowledged. Specifically, both defenders and detractors of the general Rawlsian approach have recognized that his theory leaves more room for emotional life than previously acknowledged. This is particularly relevant to his understanding of the need for a desire for justice among citizens of properly constituted societies, a desire that Rawls recognized as essential to democratic politics early on in his career with his 1963 article on Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In this reconfigured form of Rawlsianism, emphasis on the neutrality and impartiality of the state has given way to an emphasis on the need for particular commitments and dispositions among the citizenry that are necessary to motivate them to choose and sustain a just regime. In more general terms, and as has been made more explicit in broader discussions of contemporary political theory, although reason may be essential for working out a just procedure for well-functioning liberal democratic regimes, a normative model also requires an emotional substructure to ensure a strong commitment among all citizens to the values of their regime. At the least, strong emotions and passions associated with attachment to basic values of equality, freedom, and justice are regarded as essential for the solidity and stability of any democratic and/or liberal regime.

There are political theorists and political scientists who press further on this issue. For some, it is not enough to suggest there is only a set of passions linked to basic liberal-democratic commitments that are relevant for an understanding of liberal-democratic politics. The traditional normative model, by either ignoring or sidelining the passions in day-to-day political deliberation, engenders an unrealistic and unhealthy model of

proper political functioning. For these theorists, a deeper understanding of citizenship requires us to appreciate a wide array of emotional and passionate expression and to see it as normal and desirable in ongoing political life. If we can learn to appreciate the expression of political passion, political elites and the media might come to understand that political behavior in contemporary democracies is not as dysfunctional as it is often thought to be. This understanding can in turn reconcile citizens to a greater extent with their own functioning democracies and decrease what has been regarded as a widespread sense of cynicism and alienation. Although this may not provide direction for broader policy initiatives, this theory suggests that a more positive appreciation of emotionally driven behavior as endemic to political life will assist in enhancing the democratic dialogue and strengthening the practice of citizenship.

All three strands explored here converge on the need to acknowledge a more central role for political passion than previously acknowledged in political theory; they also acknowledge that such a call must have its caveats. The consequences of mass emotional manipulation can also be dangerous, and stories of the interwar period and beyond are still close enough at hand to recognize this fact. In this context, the challenge for a new generation of theorists will be to combine this appreciation for passions in political life with some mechanism or criteria that will allow for the adjudication between good manifestations and somewhat dangerous or inappropriate ones.

Rebecca Kingston

See also Desire; Liberalism, Contemporary; Justice, Theories of; Rawls, John

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People, The

In common usage, *the people* can designate either (a) unspecifically, a group of persons, such as a nation, tribe, race, or other form of community, which may or may not be perceived to share a collective identity; or (b) politically, the total body of enfranchised or eligible citizens of a state. Either way, the people of a geographical region or country are not usually coextensive with its population, which includes, for instance, other ethnic groups or foreign residents. The politically defined people are subject to the legal order of a state and, depending on the state's constitution, possess some form of influence or control over its institutions and government. In direct democracy, the people are the ultimate source of political authority; under absolute autocracy, where the sovereign personifies the state, the notion of citizenship is arguably meaningless and the distinction between people and population is redundant. Yet in practice, every form of government requires some form of consensus and distribution of power to avoid the breakdown of society, which is corollary to noncompliance among disempowered masses and uncoordinated government by sovereign citizens; and vice versa, the claim made by most modern governments that political authority derives from the people can be reconciled with a range of methods, despotic as well as liberal, by which the will or approval of the people is communicated to the political authority and translated into policy.

This entry provides a survey of the ways in which the people have been conceptualized as a body politic and their will represented in government.

It begins by comparing how popular will was accommodated in the government of ancient city-states and modern country-states and concludes with remarks on how in post-Romantic conceptions, the people have come to be viewed as an agent with a collective identity and mass mentality on which to establish state ideology or policies of control and coercion.

The People as a Source of Authority

The English noun *people* derives from the Latin *populus* and conveys much of the meaning originally attached to the word in Roman political thinking. Like the people of a modern nation state, the *populus Romanus* comprised the whole of the citizen body (even though in accordance with ancient norms the latter excluded women, children, slaves, and foreigners) and was perceived collectively as a group that acknowledged Roman law and displayed a sense of common statehood. Indeed, by the late republican period, the expression had become a technical designation for the Roman state, synonymous with *res publica* (literally the "public matters"). Furthermore, the *populus* included the *plebs* (poorer citizens or, increasingly, the urban masses of Rome) and thus disregarded, like its modern equivalent, social differences in wealth and status in favor of political unity.

But etymology is of course not a purely formal development, detached from contemporary society. Prior to the French Revolution, *the people* stood (like its French counterpart *le peuple*) primarily for the commoners, as distinguished from the nobility or the official classes. The modern usage, designating the legal subjects of the state at large, became predominant in the course of the nineteenth century, simultaneously with the reorganization of modern states on the basis of the nonmonarchical forms of government attested in the classical tradition. The model of choice was the constitution of republican Rome, which had evolved between the deposition of the last Roman king, Tarquin, in 509 BCE and the assumption of power in 31 BCE by the first Roman emperor, Augustus. The republican system, based on a division of power between the senate, the electorate magistrates, and the popular assemblies, was both flexible and indirect enough to be adaptable to the demographic and political conditions of modern country-states. The other ancient tradition of nonmonarchical government, exemplified by the democratic constitution of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, presupposed comparably small city-state units with a high degree of interaction and integration between rural and urban inhabitants. The world's first and possibly most direct form of citizen rule, democracy was too radical for unmitigated adoption in modern states. It was generally despised as mob rule prior to the cautious reappraisals by John Stuart Mill and the British historian George Grote. To this day, the influence of ancient democracy is restricted mostly to the sphere of theory and ideology, rather than institutions and practice, notwithstanding the proliferation of self-advertised "democratic" governments in the twentieth century.

In both the republican and the democratic systems, the will of the people was established through voting in assemblies, although in contrast to its Roman counterparts, the Athenian assembly (*ekklesia*) was a place of deliberation as well. The latter was open to all adult male citizens and accorded each of them an equal vote and voice, even though in actual practice the development of policy proposals and speech making was left to charismatic and knowledgeable individuals from distinguished families. The assembly acted as a court and elected those few magistrates (notably generals) who were not appointed by lot. But the primary function of its meetings was to decide on policy and legislation. Whereas the Greek assembly was essentially identical to the citizenry and the sovereignty, ordinary Roman citizens had to be convoked by magistrates and met in a number of separate assemblies (*comitia*), and instead of developing policy and legislation, they only voted on proposals brought to them by magistrates, which required subsequent ratification by the aristocratic senate. In addition, the assemblies had the power to confirm or elect certain magistrates, such as the tribunes, who were meant to "represent" popular interests in the decision-making processes of the legislative bodies. Thus, although the *populus Romanus* championed a common political identity, the actual running of the state entailed a division of the citizen body into aristocracy and plebs, and a

corresponding distinction between those subject to government, the ordinary people, and those who govern, the senate.

The two key principles of the republican system, popular representation and the division of powers, lent themselves particularly well to implementation in modern states because neither of them required universal suffrage or the abolishment of oligarchic institutions. Political representation in particular denotes nothing more than the presence of some sort of procedure by which the will of the ordinary citizens is communicated to the legislative authority, such as a monarch or a parliament. This procedure usually involves "representatives" who could be elected by the people or appointed by the legislative body itself. Modern interpretations of the principle range famously from the absolute and potentially despotic soverign advocated in Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* who, once authorized by the people, must rule unencumbered as he sees warranted, to the more liberal notions of social contract proposed by John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, according to which governments possess authority only with regard to specific goals sanctioned by the citizens. Locke and Rousseau delivered the blueprints for many of the parliamentary governments established after the American and French Revolutions. Although these are now habitually known as "democracies," we need to remind ourselves how much the modern norm differs from the classical constitution: Instead of participating directly in decision making, the agency of the voter is almost always restricted to choosing between candidates who were nominated by political parties and thus tend to represent the views of their party rather than the voting citizen. This system disregards not only the notion of binding delegation, in which elected representatives accurately and consistently represent the wishes of those who voted for them, but also Edmund Burke's more conservative system involving a "natural aristocracy"—a body of representatives chosen on the basis of their personal qualities to act as free agents in accordance with their own best judgment.

The People as a Collective Agent

In the nineteenth century, the people increasingly came to be seen as a collective body whose political cohesion was rooted in the same national spirit that determined other cultural traits, such as language, religion, and ethnicity. At the core of this normative conception of identity is a biological metaphor that views people as individuals undergoing a life cycle: They are born, mature, prosper, and in due course die, or are (through migration, mixture, or technological or ecological change) transformed. Correspondingly, individuals and people alike were thought to have a "character" that was not subjective and historically contingent but objective, intrinsic, and more or less constant. This idea of individual identity writ large may be implicated when nationalist historians and politicians invoke certain aspects of culture and traditional custom as a guideline for policy decisions. Moreover, some prehistorians still classify and analyze their find assemblages in terms of *archaeological cultures* attributable to a group of people (usually the remote ancestors of a particular region's present inhabitants), an approach that presupposes an unproblematic and fixed relationship between material culture and ethnicity and offers unfortunate opportunities for political manipulation.

The notion of the people as a unified being with an inherent consciousness was originally developed by the German philosophers Johann Gottfried von Herder and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and gave rise to the concept of the *Volksstaat,* a "people-state" in which government institutions are in perfect agreement with the spirit of the people. This notional people-state resonated with the nationalist ideologies that spread in post-Napoleonic Europe, especially those relating to the unification movements in Germany and Italy, though given the growth of similar intellectual trends in postcolonial contexts in the Americas and Africa, it would be misleading to speak of a direct or necessary relationship between nationalism and philosophical idealism. The emergent nation-states were compatible with the principles of the people-state insofar as government was based on the autonomous rule by a homogeneous group of co-nationals. In actual practice, the high-minded notion of spiritual harmony between people and government allowed for a range of doctrinaire interpretations of the people's will, to the effect that political representatives could be regarded as superfluous and minority opinions as degenerate.

Both in Nazi Germany and in Soviet Russia, the professed concord between leaders and the people was periodically reaffirmed through mass events and popular acclamations in order to uphold the illusion that the people were sovereign in spirit as much as in fact.

The retrospective analyses of the totalitarian regimes of twentieth-century Europe have nurtured a variety of sociological approaches studying the people as a mass society. Initially, in the 1950s and 1960s, these were pessimistic in outlook and subscribed paradoxically to the same people-as-individual metaphor as the Volksstaat concept. In this perspective, the widespread receptiveness to Nazi and Bolshevist ideology was at least in part explicable by the derooted condition of modern society, as manifest in the impersonalized relations of capitalist economy, bureaucratic government, and life in industrialized urban sprawls in general. In some sense, the study of mass movements diagnosed collective groups of people in terms of the symptoms and neuroses observed in distressed individuals. Thus, the mass society whose traditional forms of custom and morality had been rapidly eroded by modernity was thought to display the same insecurities and lack of orientation that made social outcasts susceptible to extreme ideas promulgated in the political agitation of ruthless leaders.

Mass culture analysis has been somewhat discredited in recent years because it failed in its chosen task of establishing a clear relationship between political extremism and the sudden disruption of traditional associational structures. Furthermore, it runs the risk of producing an upmarket version of elitism that does not substantially differ from the indignation that ancient intellectuals were already prone to voice over the fickleness and lack of political sophistication of the poorer citizenry. For instance, although few modern commentators would doubt that political awareness was unusually developed and widespread among the Athenian citizen body, concerns about the supposed folly of the people typically ran high among philosophers living under the democracy. The association of the normally neutral word *demos* ("people") with the poor majority of the citizens and the corresponding understanding of *demokratia* as "mob-rule" was born almost concurrently with Athens's democratic constitution. Similarly, ancient perceptions of mass psychology foreshadowed their modern successors in the assumption that the uneducated people were particularly impressionable and easily overwhelmed by the machinations of charismatic orators. Thus, when Athenian conservatives rationalized the events of the Peloponnesian War, they found that the *demagogues,* originally a neutral term for expert "leaders of the people," had plied the masses with flattery and misled them into making decisions that were bound to ruin Athens's political standing as a Mediterranean superpower.

More recent studies favor a constructionist approach to collective identity, focusing on the context and defining parameters of individual choice. In this position, group identity, whether political or ethnic, is never inherent or naturally determined but deliberately adopted as a motive for individual allegiance and action. Moreover, the changing balance of political authority between the people and the state is seen less as the zero-sum game as it used to be. For instance, while the accession of the first Roman emperor had reduced the formal influence of popular assemblies in state affairs, most scholars would find it difficult to decide whether the political power of the ordinary citizens had "really" declined or increased. If anything, the scope for dynamic interaction between leadership and people had vastly expanded under the empire thanks to the abundance of public spectacles and other opportunities for popular acclamations, which became an important source for imperial legitimacy. The reciprocal relations between emperor and people, and the concomitant exchanges in symbolic capital, are too complex to allow easy differentiation between hegemony and obedience.

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See also Ancient Democracy; Citizenship; City-State; Hobbes, Thomas; Locke, John; Mass Psychology; Nationalism; Representation; Representative Democracy; Roman Commonwealth

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Performativity

Performativity names a clutch of theoretical approaches that overturn traditional understandings of identity and agency by arguing that identity, rather than *preceding* action, emerges only as the *product* of reiterated acts. Identity is performative, then, in the sense that repeated action brings it about. Performativity also relocates agency from being grounded in a fixed identity that would precede it, to appear only within the repetition of acts.

Performativity has come to be closely associated with the arguments and writings of Judith Butler, but it has deep philosophical roots that stretch back to the conception of discursive practices in Michel Foucault, to speech act theory, and to the genealogical approach to subjectivity and history first articulated by Friedrich Nietzsche. Performativity is neither an empirical thing that can be observed *in* the world, nor is it an abstract idea *about* the world. Rather, performativity names a theory *of* the world—of how both human identity and political agency work in that world. As a theory of identity, performativity must be differentiated primarily from essentialism, but also from certain senses of radical constructivism. As a theory of agency, it must be distinguished from both voluntarism and determinism.

Essentialism insists on the existence of a fundamental human essence, which establishes identity and serves as the ground for all human agency. Agency, our capacity to act, depends on this essence (and, on some accounts, is thus determined by it), and our identity is thus a reflection or expression of our underlying essential being. In stark contrast, the theory of performativity sees human identity as formed *through* a repetition of practices and behaviors; we "are" only (in) what we do. Identity and agency cannot be established prior to entry into the cultural, social, and political realms; rather, both who we are and our capacity to act emerge only *within* those realms. What appears to be the prior "essence" of human identity appears only afterward, comes about only by way of performativity. In refuting essentialism, performativity thereby also eschews any determinist account of human action because it denies the notion of a presocial essence that would determine our actions.

However, the concept of repetitive *performative* acts must be carefully separated from the notion of a theatrical *performance*. This central distinction allows performativity to resist the temptations of voluntarism and the dangers of certain forms of radical constructivism. Although performative actions are chosen actions, agents cannot choose any act (cannot perform any identity) they wish because they act against a background of cultural norms and behavioral expectations (and their identity emerges within that context). Identity is thus analogous to theatrical performance to the extent that who we are emerges only over time, through repeated actions, gestures, and behaviors; there is nothing deeper than the "character" that we play. But human identity is also nothing like a theatrical performance because we cannot play any character we wish. We must operate within the roles that are available to us, only rarely can we switch roles, and the penalties for playing our "characters" incorrectly (through so-called gender deviance, or queer sexuality, or a host of other non-normative practices and appearances) prove to be extremely high. Thus, the theory of performativity offers an account of human agency attentive to the social and political contexts that both enable and constrain action, and it provides a theory of identity linked but not reducible to material, bodily existence.

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See also Essentialism; Feminism; Foucault, Michel; Genealogy; Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm; Queer; Social Constructivism

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Perpetual Peace

The term *perpetual peace* is associated with the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and his 1795 essay titled "To(wards) Eternal Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" ("*Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf*"). The term *perpetual peace* refers to both (a) a type of enduring peace and legal state that Kant thought should and could be attained among existing European states, and potentially spread across the globe, and (b) a process or logic by which that lasting peace might be attained. Kant's conception of perpetual peace has been remarkably influential: within academia as the basis of contemporary democratic peace theory, and outside academia as a constant reference point for projects of international institution building, such as the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU).

Historical Context

Though Kant's conception has attracted the most interest, he was not the first to use the term perpetual peace, and his essay should be read, at least in part, in the broader context of a tradition of writing on perpetual peace. That tradition would include the Abbé Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre's essay *Paix Perpetuelle* (1712), Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe* (1761), and perhaps Jeremy Bentham's *A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace* (1789). These authors all shared a concern for establishing lasting peace and legal order among the states of Europe, though they differed considerably in their understanding of how such a peace might be achieved and what institutional arrangements would maintain it. It is Kant's conception of eternal peace, however, that has been the primary focus of both historical and contemporary discussion.

The immediate context for Kant's essay was the Peace of Basel between France and Prussia that brought an end to prolonged hostilities between France and the first coalition of monarchical states. In this context, Kant's essay can be read as expressing support for this treaty, the First French Republic, and envisioning a path by which a more enduring peace could be established and maintained. The more general context of the essay is Kant's lifelong effort to elaborate on the political and legal arrangements under which humankind can fully exercise its autonomous moral capacities.

Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

Kant's conception of perpetual peace includes a stringent definition of the meaning of peace, an account of the domestic and international institutional forms required to secure peace, and an account of the logic or process by which these institutional forms emerge and are capable of guaranteeing perpetual peace.

Kant defines peace as an end of all hostilities and a removal of the underlying causes and reasons that are the source of hostility. Perpetual peace as the permanent removal of the causes of hostility is distinguished from a mere postponement of hostilities that leaves the underlying causes untouched. Because humans in the natural state find themselves in a state of war, the state of peace must be founded, secured, and guaranteed. Although humans are potentially moral beings, their moral capacities cannot be counted on, thus this peace must be founded in such a way that it would be secure among a people of "intelligent devils." To found such a state of peace, anyone who might mutually affect another should be brought under *lawful* relations. Domestically, this means bringing people under *republican civil constitutions*. Internationally, this means brining nations into an ever-expanding *free federation of states*.

Kant believed peace could be founded and secured domestically in civil constitutions of a republican form. A state is said to be republican if it embodies three principles. First, it guarantees the freedom of all members of society, freedom being understood as a right not to obey external laws that one has not consented to. Second, all subjects are to be governed by a single common legislation. Third, an equality of all citizens before the law must obtain, meaning no one can obligate another under law without at the same time subjecting oneself to the same law. Republicanism is a constitutional principle according to which executive

power is separated from the legislative power, and the idea of an original contract, or consent of the governed, is seen as the only basis of rightful legislation. Republicanism is distinguished from forms of despotism, in which laws represent the arbitrary will of the ruler against the general will of the public. Significantly, in Kant's view, democracy was a form of despotism (to be contrasted with true republicanism), because it united the executive and legislative powers in the hands of the same people. Kant thought that domestic peace could be founded by means of republican constitutions without relying on the moral motives of subjects. Driven together by internal or external conflict, relying on purely selfish propensities, a people could erect a republican constitution that promotes the common good by impeding or balancing private interests.

According to Kant, however, domestic republican constitutions are not sufficient to found and guarantee eternal peace. Just as individuals in a state of nature find themselves in a lawless state of war, nations find themselves in an analogous lawless state of nature that tends toward war. Thus nations, like people, must be brought into legal relations in order to guarantee peace. It is generally assumed that Kant thought legal relations among nations (*Völkerrecht*) should be based on a *free federation of states*. Nations should freely enter into a union of nations (*Völkerbund*), which would be similar to civil constitutions but would retain the independence of the member nations. This free federation of states can be distinguished from stronger forms of association, such as a world state or a state of nations (*Völkerstaat*). The union of nations is also distinguished from weaker forms of alliance and treaties. Republican nation states are to come together in a legal federation that, gradually extending itself across the globe, would guarantee an end to all war. There remains some interpretive debate whether Kant thought a free federation of states would be sufficient to secure eternal peace, or whether he thought it was a second-best but imperfect compromise, required by the reluctance of nation-states to submit their sovereignty to a single, unified, coercive government.

Having specified the institutional forms necessary for eternal peace (i.e., domestic republican constitutions and a free federation of states), Kant further elaborates on a logic by which these institutions might produce and guarantee peace. Kant developed what might be called a "republican peace" theory. He thought that organizing domestic constitutions on the republican model would lead to eternal peace in at least two ways. First, because republican states require the consent of citizens to go to war, it is far less likely that republican states will initiate wars. This is because in republican states, decision-making processes are responsive to those who will bear the full costs of going to war. By contrast, in non-republican states, it is easy for a ruler to decide to go to war knowing that the subjects will bear the costs of the decision. Thus, Kant suggests that a world consisting of nations organized on the republican model would be sufficient to guarantee peace, or at least to greatly reduce incidences of war. It is this logic of a "republican peace" that continues to be influential and the source of much discussion. Second, Kant seems to have thought that even if republican domestic constitutions weren't sufficient to guarantee eternal peace, they were more likely to form and enter the sort of federation of free states that could secure peace. Again, the logic is similar. Because republican states are responsive to the interests of citizens, it is more likely that republican states will enter a federation of states, even at the expense of the domestic ruling class, when it is in the interests of citizens to do so.

Finally, Kant supplements his account of republican peace with a seemingly strange account of how nature and history are teleologically ordered to bring about eternal peace on the model of a free federation of republican states, even if one lacks the moral fortitude to do so by one's own will. This teleological account of nature and history must be understood in light of Kant's entire philosophical project; only then does it become clear why Kant thought such an account was necessary. Therefore, Kant's defenders think his idea of perpetual peace, the free federation of states, and the logic of a republican peace can be detached from his teleological account of nature and history.

Influence and Reception of Kant's Idea

Kant's idea of perpetual peace has been influential in at least two contexts. First, it has served as a model for projects of international institution building, such as the League of Nations, the UN, and the EU. Kant is thought to have provided a

philosophical justification for highly federalized forms of transnational and international organizations, and against more hierarchical forms of world government and more anarchical forms of nation-based sovereignty. Second, Kant's ideas are the basis of an influential theory or research program in international politics known as *democratic peace theory*. Following Kant, democratic peace theorists posit a relationship between forms of domestic constitutions (democratic) and propensities for waging war. Democratic peace theory appropriates the logic of Kant's argument, insisting that democratically constituted nations responsive to and representative of citizens' interests will be less likely to go to war. It should be noted, however, that contemporary theories of democratic peace, while appropriating the logic of Kant's argument, differ in their assessment of the democratic state. Whereas democratic peace theorists insist democracy is the best form of state organization, Kant categorized democracies as a form of despotic rule, no less likely to go to war than other forms of despotic rule.

Critics

Critics of Kant's idea of perpetual peace have focused on three different points. First, some have questioned whether a free federation of states is capable of guaranteeing perpetual peace. Kant's account of lawful relations in the republican civil constitution suggests that submission of individuals to a single coercive sovereign power is necessary to secure peace. This suggests that the appropriate analogy for lawful relations among nation-states would be for each to nation to submit to a single world-state with coercive sovereign power. Second, critics have questioned both the logic and empirical validity of Kant's claim that republics are inherently peaceful. As a conceptual matter, there's no a priori reason to think that public policy responsive to citizen preferences will lead to fewer wars. As an empirical matter, it is unclear whether republican nations have in fact been more peaceful than other nations. Critics have suggested that while republics may refrain from fighting one another, they are just as likely, perhaps even more so, to go to war with nonrepublican nations. Finally, critics have objected to the teleological account of nature and history that Kant thought necessary to guarantee perpetual peace and to motivate moral action.

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See also Democratic Peace; Kant, Immanuel

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Pessimism

Often misunderstood as a negative disposition, *pessimism* is a long-standing tradition in modern political philosophy with roots in ancient philosophies of the self, such as Stoicism and Epicureanism. Like its opposite, optimism (which takes a variety of philosophical forms in liberalism, Marxism, and pragmatism, for example), pessimism presupposes modern linear conceptions of time, which replaced the cyclical accounts of ancient philosophers and historians in the late Renaissance period. Although its best-known exponent is probably Arthur Schopenhauer, pessimism appears at least as early as the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Other prominent pessimists are Giacomo Leopardi, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Miguel de Unamuno, E. M. Cioran, Albert Camus, Theodor Adorno, and Hannah Arendt. This entry summarizes the major themes of pessimism and briefly describes some of the major trends within the pessimistic tradition.

Central Themes of Pessimism

The principal idea of pessimism is that the human condition (but not necessarily human nature) is marked by severe and persisting flaws that cannot be eradicated. Different pessimist philosophers disagree over the central features of the human condition and over the nature of the flaws. So, for example, a pessimist might agree that technology has become more powerful, yet deny that this improves the prospects for removing the systematic injustice and unhappiness endemic to human

affairs. Although some pessimists (e.g., Rousseau, Cioran, Adorno) have at times maintained that there is an active deterioration of human society under way, the more common stance of the pessimist is simply to deny the existence of progress while maintaining the linear historical perspective of modern temporality. Theorists of decline thus form a subset of the pessimistic tradition, and the thesis of decline is not included in the writings of many of the best-known pessimists like Schopenhauer.

Many theories of pessimism begin with an ontological assessment of the circumstances of human consciousness. Pessimists often emphasize the close connection between linear time-consciousness and consciousness per se. Human self-awareness is distinguished from animal intelligence, many have argued, by our sense of past and future and our related sense of identity as something stretched out over a linear temporal framework. This account of consciousness is hardly limited to pessimists; nor does it distinguish between those pessimists, like Schopenhauer, who believe that time, as an a priori mental structure, does not derive from some preexistent metaphysical or ontological frame (see *The World as Will and Representation*) and those, like Rousseau, who accept the more common Newtonian account of a natural universal time (see *Discourse on Inequality*). But pessimists stress consequences of the time-bound quality of consciousness that are not emphasized elsewhere.

Although time-consciousness is a necessary condition of reasoning, this does not, for the pessimists, establish its beneficial character because, according to them, it also entails considerable burdens. Chief among these is the awareness of our own eventual death, which time-consciousness brings about and which animals are supposedly free from. The idea that all life must end in death is not, to the pessimist, cause for despair or inactivity, but it does set an existential bound to our purposes, which optimistic perspectives often fail to acknowledge. If death is not to deprive our lives of meaning, we must have an understanding of meaning or value that can accommodate the universality of this border to our experience.

Time-consciousness also implies that we are fully aware of the transience of all things, including those we value most. The impermanence of all objects is taken by pessimists to deprive us of security in any achievement or possession. Thus, to live a time-bound existence is to live with our feelings of desire and loss magnified by our sense of time future and time past without any corresponding increase in our sense of enjoyment. Though we have the same physical pleasures and pains that animals do, enlarging our mental universe through time adds to the latter more than the former.

Although pessimists do not necessarily view history as having a universally negative trajectory, they do believe that, because of the ontological conditions previously described, history consistently generates irony in that it repeatedly exemplifies the thwarting of technological or scientific efforts to improve the conditions of life. Leopardi even went so far as to argue in *Moral Essays* that human happiness was sustained by illusions and that, as reason progressed and destroyed these, human beings were increasingly deprived of the basis for happiness. More commonly, Schopenhauer argued that material progress encouraged a belief in increasing satisfaction, which itself turned out to be illusory.

Because of this and other paradoxes, pessimists have often spoken of human existence as absurd or as partaking of absurdity, terms made especially popular by Camus. These words evoke a persistent mismatch between human desires and the means available to achieve them, or again, between our pursuit of happiness and our capacity to reach or sustain it. Thus, while pessimism is not itself a result of unhappiness, it certainly constitutes an explanation for widespread unhappiness, especially when that unhappiness is not explained by physical distress.

Given this diagnosis, the great division within pessimism regards what sort of life practice constitutes an appropriate response. One kind of pessimist counsels resignation of one form or another. Authors like Rousseau and Schopenhauer have suggested a withdrawal or quasi-Stoic distancing from ordinary human affairs to minimize frustration. Writers like Nietzsche and Camus, however, while in no way retreating from the pessimistic conclusions previously noted, have argued that there is nonetheless a basis for an active engagement in life. They suggest a form of action that is focused on the present. That is, they suggest combating the effects of time-consciousness

by detaching one's motivations for action from a set of values that project justification into the future and considering, insofar as this is possible, only their contribution to problems immediately at hand.

It is often suggested that pessimism must end by endorsing suicide, but in fact pessimists uniformly oppose suicide, except in the circumstances of extreme physical suffering that many other moral systems also make an exception for. What is true is that pessimists take the arguments for suicide seriously and do not simply assume, as other perspectives do, that the continuation of life is simply or naturally good. Rather, they agree that establishing the goodness of life is a central philosophical problem.

Philosophical exponents of pessimism often employ a distinctive, aphoristic style in their writings. The aphorism (shorter than an essay but longer than a maxim and more structured than a fragment) provides a quick analysis into a large issue without necessarily suggesting a resolution. A set of aphorisms together can thus produce both the sensation of and insight into the ontological disjunction that is central to the pessimistic analysis. It was Schopenhauer's use of this style that both brought him fame and, perhaps as much as his conclusions, distinguished his approach from that of more academic philosophers writing in a mandarin style.

Varieties of Pessimism

Pessimism has appeared in at least three major forms: cultural, metaphysical, and existential.

For cultural pessimism, the burdens of time-consciousness appear particularly in the area of social mores. Rousseau first brought the central elements of cultural pessimism together in the 1750s in public letters and *The Discourses*. In *Discourse on Arts and Sciences* he argued that European morality had not been improved by the intellectual developments of the Enlightenment. Instead, he took the side of the Spartans against the Athenians and argued that morality required material and even intellectual simplicity. In *A Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau discussed at more length the obstacles to happiness that emerge as human beings transition from an animal-like existence, which is innocent of time, to true human consciousness with all its attendant difficulties. In his later works, Rousseau insisted on the high degree of flux in temporal affairs, that is, on the refusal of the universe to remain fixed in any one form for analysis or security. Rather than disparaging reason, then, Rousseau's claim was that the Enlightenment's celebration of reason had not sufficiently appreciated reason's opponent—a chaotic universe that resisted its power.

The political theory of the cultural pessimists reflects this sense of the relative weakness of human beings' ability to alter these circumstances. Rousseau clearly defends a republican form of government in *On the Social Contract*, for example, but he does so because of its potential to arrest, but only temporarily, the social dynamics unleashed by time-consciousness. The formation of a general will removes individuals from their time-bound individual goals and creates a community that exists primarily in the moment. The emergence of a true sovereign thus recreates some of the conditions of prehuman animal existence. Even in this text, however, Rousseau is clear that no form of government can endure indefinitely; the best governments merely last longer than others. But their success is not marked by permanence but by giving their citizens an experience of freedom through participation in the general will.

By contrast, metaphysical pessimism, typified by Schopenhauer, rejects this kind of political solution as well as the attention paid to cultural questions and focuses more completely on the individual's personal situation. As a Kantian, Schopenhauer largely eschewed questions of the origin of consciousness and concentrated on its structure. He emphasized, as earlier generations of pessimists had, the centrality of time. Unlike the cultural pessimists, however, Schopenhauer, taking some Kantian positions to a certain extreme, considered time to be fundamentally unreal. Hence, he considered our conscious experiences to be illusory. However, he doubted the ability of any form of social or political organization to deliver us from this illusion.

The illusory nature of human experience had, for Schopenhauer, two important consequences. First, relief from the suffering induced by time-consciousness does not return us, as it did in Rousseau's work, to a condition of animal happiness, but rather to boredom, the pure experience of

time. Second, escape from the dilemma of pain and boredom is to be sought only through personal practices of asceticism or self-denial. In this, Schopenhauer followed the Stoics, who suggested that suppression of desire was the best route to the relief of unhappiness. Although Schopenhauer believed that compassion for the suffering of others was appropriate, both as a moral and political principle, in fact the state could do little to relieve the suffering created by time-consciousness. Schopenhauer's concrete recommendations thus involved fortifying the self against external incursions and a retreat to private experience.

In contrast, Nietzsche, who called himself a "Dionysian pessimist," attempted to turn Schopenhauer's own conclusions against him and describe a pessimism that was specifically activist in its orientation. Nietzsche argued that Schopenhauer's condemnation of suffering relied on the sort of moral and metaphysical premises that he otherwise specifically condemned. Rather than lament our illusory fall into time, Nietzsche suggested that we celebrate the conditions of flux and dynamism that earlier pessimists had spurned. Although he acknowledged the suffering that linear time-consciousness produces, Nietzsche argued that using such suffering as a basis for withdrawal falls into the trap of measuring life as a whole from a utilitarian perspective. Schopenhauer, that is, had attempted to hold up a dynamic world to a static measuring stick, without saying where the measuring stick came from. By contrast, a more fully pessimistic perspective would not draw a distinction between the self and the world in flux and would thus allow for a posture of engagement. Suffering could be endured when it was understood as the inevitable accompaniment of change, freedom, and individuality. However, Nietzsche did not spell out in any specific terms what sort of political behavior would result from this posture.

In the twentieth century, pessimism has often been associated with existentialism. Though this identification is not incorrect, it should be noted that it is much more true of figures like Camus than of others like Jean-Paul Sartre. Camus' description of the absurdity of the human condition in *The Myth of Sisyphus* became a touchstone of contemporary pessimism and influenced writers across a wide range of perspectives. Though twentieth-century pessimists were more likely to follow Martin Heidegger's approach to temporality than Rousseau's or Schopenhauer's, the outcome was much the same, that is, an image of human consciousness as fundamentally disconnected or at odds with the universe it is forced to inhabit.

In his earlier works, Camus' response to this was not so different from Schopenhauer's, that is, a retreat into an existence of aestheticized experiences that afforded momentary escape from the ordinary conditions of consciousness. However, in his post–World War II writings, especially *The Rebel,* Camus began to articulate a more politicized pessimism.

Camus emphasized first that the pessimistic diagnosis described a condition that all humans shared and thus created a basis for a sense of solidarity. Schopenhauer had done much the same, but the solidarity that he described was the purely passive one of sympathy and compassion over shared pain. Camus, in emphasizing that we also shared the experience of absurdity, described this as a context that could stimulate political participation. Like Rousseau, he emphasized that such participation could not be stretched out over time but must reject the temporalization of experience by focusing on the moment. But rather than it leading him to the idea of the general will, Camus took this point to imply that we should abjure long-term judgments of benefit and make sure our contributions to political life have an immediate effect. A theatrical director himself, he repeatedly used the metaphor of acting, not to aestheticize politics, but to describe an activity whose benefits are nonexistent if they are not immediate, both for the actor and for her audience. For Camus, this kind of participation was exemplified by the work of the French Resistance, in which he had taken part. The resistance, he argued, had fought without any particular hope of long-term success, but simply with the sense that their actions *enacted* freedom in the moment of their occurrence.

Since Camus, the general task of reconciling human freedom with the burdens of temporality has been taken up most specifically by Adorno and Arendt, both of whom have emphasized, in rather different ways, the potential for a strong political dimension to pessimism. In sum, the tradition of pessimism, having taken firm root nearly three centuries ago, remains a distinctive and vigorous approach to political theory that deserves

continuing attention as one of the main approaches to have developed in the modern West.

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See also Anti-Foundationalism; Arendt, Hannah; Buddhist Political Thought; Counter-Enlightenment; Happiness; Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Schopenhauer, Arthur; Temporality

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PHENOMENOLOGY

Phenomenology is best understood as an internally contested tradition or movement within twentieth-century philosophy that is distinguished by its radical openness and commitment to describing phenomena as they appear, without distortion by theoretical commitments or presuppositions. Phenomenology has been important in the human sciences both as a negative means for criticizing predominant forms of behaviorism, positivism, and naturalism and also as an alternative positive approach to the human sciences, also known as social sciences. Phenomenology has had less influence within the discipline of political science than in the other human sciences. Increasingly, however, phenomenological approaches are being used in combination with interpretive approaches to challenge the predominant positivistic forms of political science. Likewise, though the historical relation between phenomenology and political theory is minimal, there is an increasing number of contemporary political theorists explicitly drawing on the phenomenological tradition. Though there is no single phenomenological approach to political theory, a diversity of phenomenological approaches have emerged, each of which provides an alternative to the neo-Kantian normative form of political theory that has dominated in the past 40 years.

Phenomenology has been understood in at least four different ways: as a *disciplinary field* in philosophy, as a specific *method or domain* of inquiry, as a *tradition or movement* in the history of philosophy, and as a general *orientation*. It is sometimes thought of as a *disciplinary field,* distinguished from other disciplines within philosophy, such as ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics. Indeed, the *Oxford English Dictionary* defines phenomenology as the science of phenomena as distinct from ontology. Understanding phenomenology as a disciplinary field is problematic, however, because some of the most prominent self-identified phenomenologists did not make such disciplinary distinctions. Indeed, early adherents to phenomenology often equated phenomenology with philosophy as such, or less ambitiously, as the basis for epistemology, ontology, or ethics. Similarly, any attempt to understand phenomenology as a method or area of inquiry runs into the same problem. Many prominent practitioners of phenomenology rejected the notion that phenomenology is a method or that its area of inquiry was circumscribed. Thus, the most promising way of understanding phenomenology is as a tradition or movement within the history of philosophy.

The term *phenomenology* has been in use at least since Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). In the nineteenth century, the term distinguished a descriptive approach to philosophy from hypothetical-theoretical or analytical approaches. Phenomenology as an influential *movement or tradition* within the history of philosophy becomes discernible in the early twentieth century with the publication of the *Logical Investigations* (1900) by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl. Narrowly conceived, the phenomenological movement would also include the prominent philosophers Martin Heidegger, Maurice

Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, and their contemporary disciples and adherents. More broadly conceived, the phenomenological tradition could include early twentieth-century English linguistic phenomenologists such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, and the contemporary English language adherents to Wittgenstein. Most broadly conceived, the phenomenological movement would include those thinkers and approaches that were directly influenced by phenomenology. Such a list would include prominent twentieth-century thinkers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, along with influential movements such as hermeneutics, structuralism, and deconstruction. So conceived, the phenomenological movement is quite expansive, including thinkers and approaches that are often in deep disagreement with one another. Thus, the phenomenological movement is best understood *as an internally contested tradition* or ongoing debate, united by shared dilemmas, shared oppositions, a shared set of abstract commitments, and a shared orientation. As such, phenomenology has been one of the most influential traditions in twentieth-century philosophy.

Although there is considerable disagreement within the phenomenological tradition, at a sufficient level of abstraction a phenomenological approach can be identified by reference to shared oppositions, a shared set of commitments, and a shared orientation. Phenomenology is a *descriptive* approach to philosophy. As such, phenomenology can be distinguished from *normative* approaches that pronounce on the goodness or badness of phenomena; from *analytic* approaches that aspire to make true propositional statements, valid arguments, or analyze linguistic meanings; and from *natural science* approaches that aim at causal explanation of phenomena. Phenomenology aspires toward adequate descriptions of phenomena, or the way things show up in *our experience* in a *meaningful* way. Phenomenology takes experience and meaning as the proper locus of philosophical inquiry and attempts to clarify or make intelligible the way things seem meaningful and the background structures that make meaningful experience possible.

Adequate description of meaningful phenomena as they seem in experience is approximated by (a) avoiding seeing phenomena through distorting philosophical presuppositions and abstract theories and (b) retaining a radical openness or receptivity to phenomena as they present themselves. Although phenomenology aspires to achieve a nondistorted relation to phenomena, it should not be confused with varieties of foundationalism that hold that we can have unmediated, certain, or final knowledge of reality. Rather, phenomenologists believe the only way we can check our descriptions of phenomena is by constantly and repeatedly returning from our descriptions to the phenomena as they appear in undistorted experience. Phenomenologists are committed to constantly reworking descriptions and theories in light of a radically open or receptive relation to phenomena as they appear. Thus, the basic aspiration of a phenomenologist to "return to the things themselves" should be understood as an *orientation,* or a commitment to description undistorted by presuppositions, and a radical openness to phenomena as the final arbiter of competing descriptions.

Phenomenology and the Human Sciences

In the twentieth century, there emerged within the human sciences an increasingly articulate "phenomenological perspective." This phenomenological perspective has mostly defined itself in *opposition* to the prevalent forms of positivism, behaviorism, and naturalism that approach the human sciences as if they were continuous with the natural sciences. By contrast, phenomenologists resist the a priori assumption that methods and forms of explanation that predominate in the natural sciences must be appropriate to the human sciences. Phenomenologists approach social phenomena openly, without presuppositions as to which methods or forms of reasoning are appropriate to apprehend the phenomena.

Though they start with a radical openness toward social phenomena and a willingness to consider whichever description or explanation provides the best intelligibility, there is a notable tendency toward antinaturalism among adherents to phenomenology. That is, most phenomenologists believe that an openness to social phenomena reveals a logical and methodological asymmetry of explanation and concept formation between the natural and social sciences.

Phenomenology tends toward antinaturalist forms of social explanation for two reasons. First, phenomenological openness to phenomena results in a heightened awareness of the nonrational dimensions of human existence, habits, nonconscious practices, moods, and passions that resist the forms of explanation prominent in the natural sciences. More important, the phenomenological openness to phenomena as they appear results in an emphasis on *meanings* as the proper locus for understanding social action. These meanings can be subjective or objective, private or social, conscious or embodied, but all social explanation adequate to the phenomena will proceed by reference to these meanings. Phenomenologists tend to view social scientific explanation as a second-order enterprise, requiring an understanding of the meanings, ideas, reasons, intentions, and motives of social participants. These meanings, in turn, are intelligible only in terms of the background practices, rules, conventions, and general worldview(s) that constitute a form of life. Phenomenology reveals that neither meanings nor the background contexts within which meanings are intelligible can be grasped by the sorts of physicalist and naturalist forms of explanation that predominate in the natural sciences.

The phenomenological approach to the human sciences has affinities with recent analytic philosophy of language and action influenced by the later Ludwig Wittgenstein. Although both approaches emphasize the centrality of meanings in social explanation, and thus the asymmetry with explanation in the natural sciences, phenomenology can be distinguished from analytic approaches to the human sciences by its more expansive understanding of "meanings." Whereas recent analytic philosophy has emphasized the centrality of linguistic, symbolic, and conscious meanings, phenomenology has focused on a much wider range of meanings, including unconscious, pre-reflective, prelinguistic, and embodied meanings. The most influential adherent to the phenomenological perspective in the human sciences was the Austrian sociologist Alfred Shutz.

Phenomenology and Political Science

By contrast with the other human sciences, the phenomenological perspective within political science has remained largely underdeveloped. This can be attributed to the emergence of varieties of interpretivism within political science, heavily indebted to the later Wittgenstein and his English-language adherents. Interpretivism does much of the work in political science that phenomenology does in other human sciences, criticizing predominant forms of positivistic explanation and providing alternative forms of explanation more sensitive to meanings. Although interpretivism has proven adequate for displacing predominant positivistic forms of explanation, as a basis for an alternative approach to explanation in political science it has serious limitations. This is because interpretivism emphasizes the centrality of linguistic, symbolic, and mental meanings, often neglecting a wider range of precognitive, pre-reflective, nonlinguistic meanings embodied in social practices. A truly phenomenological approach to political science, committed to understanding and explaining political phenomena by reference to the whole range of meanings and background contexts of social participants remains to be developed.

Phenomenology and Political Theory

Historically, political theory has remained on the borders of phenomenology. The major early figures of the phenomenological tradition, though often politically active, mostly refrained from theoretical reflection on politics. On the face of it, phenomenology seems to be of little relevance to contemporary political theory. This can be attributed to the explicitly *descriptive* orientation of the phenomenological tradition and the reluctance of prominent phenomenologists to deal with matters of normative justification. The descriptive orientation of phenomenology stands in stark contrast to the normative bent of most contemporary political theory. To the extent that political theory has become an abstract exercise in normative justification, applied ethics, or reasoning about ideal forms of social relations, it would seem that phenomenology has relatively little to contribute to political theory. That said, phenomenological approaches to political theory can be discerned in the works of early phenomenologists, and increasingly, philosophers working in the phenomenological traditions have taken up issues central to political theory.

Beneath the variety of emerging phenomenological approaches to political theory, they are united

in their rejection of the predominant neo-Kantian or Rawlsian approaches. As such, phenomenology provides a critical alternative to the type of political theory that has come to predominate the past 40 years. Phenomenology functions as an alternative approach to political theory in at least three distinct ways: (1) by radically reconceiving political theory as a descriptive practice, focusing on issues of interpretation and explanation as opposed to normative justification; (2) by accepting the predominant normative approach to political theory but supplementing it with phenomenological description when required; or (3) by accepting the normative orientation of political theory but radically reconceiving normative justification and normative judgment.

Descriptive Phenomenology as Political Theory

A phenomenological approach to political theory might entirely reject the prevailing normative orientation of political theory and reconceive political theory as a descriptive practice. It might do so in three distinct ways. First, a purely descriptive phenomenological approach to political theory might aspire to provide adequate descriptions of specific political phenomena, such as authority, legitimacy, power, freedom, responsibility, and processes of socialization, that have historically been the focus of political theory. A phenomenological description of these phenomena would stand in contrast to both normative accounts of the phenomena and analytic linguistic analysis of the same concepts. Second, a descriptive phenomenological approach to political theory might aspire to provide systematic or very general descriptions of the social world in its entirety. Phenomenological political theory conceived along these lines would be distinguished from political science that avoids systematic or broad description and alternative systematic approaches to studying politics that are theory driven, such a formal theory, rational choice theory, behaviorism, and forms of positivism. The phenomenological approach would be distinguished by a commitment to remaining open to phenomena as they appear and refusing to make phenomena conform to theoretical presuppositions. Third, a descriptive phenomenological political theory might aspire to offer an ontology of the social world. Such an approach would clarify the unique ways in which the social or political world exists and the conditions of possibility of the being of such a world. Hannah Arendt's work on the public world exemplifies such a descriptive ontological approach grounded in phenomenology.

Descriptive Phenomenology Within Prevailing Normative Political Theory

Alternatively, a phenomenological approach to political theory might accept the predominant normative orientation of contemporary political theory but provide a needed descriptive supplement. To the extent that all normative theory inevitably makes descriptive claims about the world, humans, and institutions, phenomenological description might contribute to such normative theory. Thus, communitarian critics of liberalism, such as Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, have explicitly drawn on phenomenological descriptions to question the presuppositions of liberal political theory. These critics believe that phenomenological description reveals the liberal conception of the subject and the relation between individual and society, to be ideological or radically at odds with reality. Phenomenology might go beyond critique and attempt to provide alternative descriptions of subjectivity, institutions, and the social world, on which a less ideological and more realistic political theory might be based.

Phenomenological Reconception of Normative Political Theory

Phenomenologists sometimes accept the normative orientation of contemporary political theory while rejecting the prevailing neo-Kantian conception of normative justification. We can distinguish between two such types of *normative* phenomenological political theory. The first rejects neo-Kantian forms of normative justification in favor of forms of normative justification that more closely track actually existing normative practices. Thus, some phenomenologists, such as Hubert Dreyfus, subscribe to neo-Aristotelian conceptions of normative judgment as masterful contextual judgment, or *phronesis*. On this account, actual normative judgment consists in doing the appropriate thing in the appropriate way at the appropriate time. Such

contextual judgment is an art or a capacity that is acquired through practice and is irreducible to rules or abstract principles. A normative political theory based on such contextual judgment would recognize the need for experienced artful judgment, would organize institutions such that positions would be occupied by people with the relevant capacities, and would organize society so as to produce leaders and citizens with the capacity for contextual judgment. Likewise, some contemporary political philosophers, such as Michael Walzer, draw explicitly on the phenomenological tradition in order to reject neo-Kantian forms of abstract justification in favor of social interpretation. For Walzer, actual normative practices of justification consist in mediating competing interpretations of historically inherited communal values. An adequate phenomenological account of our normative practices shows that there is no perspective outside of historically inherited values that we can abstract to in order justify our preferred interpretations. A political theory sensitive to the interpretive nature of justification would give up on abstract justification in favor of historically situated persuasion. Finally, some existential phenomenologists, such as Sartre, think actual normative practices and normative judgment consist in making decisions, taking a stand, or being committed, without recourse to principles grounded in abstract universal reason. A political theory that accepts an existential or decisionist account of practical reasoning would renounce a view of politics that attempts to ground decisions in universal reason and would instead focus on issues of commitment, integrity, and sincerity.

Finally, some phenomenologists, rather than grounding normative justification in an account of existing normative practices, have reconceived normative justification as *ontology*. In the second half of the twentieth century, there have emerged multiple phenomenological approaches to ethics, each of which conceives of ethics as ontology. Ontological approaches to ethics and politics attempt to ground normative "ought" claims in the being or essence of things. Thus, phenomenologists have attempted to adequately describe the being of man, or the being of society, and from such descriptions, derive judgments about what is a good person or a good society. These phenomenological ontologies of man and society have varied widely, and so too have the ethics and politics derived from them. Existentialist phenomenologists have emphasized that the being of man and society is a function of the choices we make. Communitarian phenomenologists have emphasized that the being of society precedes individuals, and that individual choice is always situated in, and constrained by, prior historical communities. French phenomenologists, such as Lévinas and Derrida, have drawn on phenomenological ontology to defend forms of ethics and politics that are radically open to the Other or open to possibilities yet "to come."

Although there is a wide variety of phenomenological approaches to political theory, each stands in stark contrast with predominant ways of doing political theory. Phenomenological political theory holds the promise of a radically reconceived form of political theory that is more adequate, both descriptively and normatively, to political phenomena as they appear undistorted by theoretical presuppositions of how we think they ought to appear.

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See also Anti-Foundationalism; Existentialism; Hermeneutics; Interpretive Theory; Ontology

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Philosopher King

The ideal of a *philosopher king* was born in Plato's *Republic* as part of the vision of a just city. It was influential in the Roman Empire and

revived in European political thought in the age of absolutist monarchs. It has also been more loosely influential in modern political movements claiming an infallible ruling elite.

In Plato's *Republic,* the leading character, Socrates, proposes the founding of a city in a speech as a model for the individual soul. Such a just city will require specialized military "guards," divided subsequently into two groups: rulers who will be "guards" in the sense of guardians, dedicated to what is good for the city rather than for themselves; and soldiers who will be their "auxiliaries" (Cooper, 1997, Books 2–4). Already at this stage of *The Republic,* it is stressed that the guardians must be virtuous and selfless, living simply and communally as do soldiers in their camps (p. 416e), and Socrates proposes that even wives and children should be in common (pp. 423e–424a).

At the outset of Book 5, Socrates is challenged by his interlocutors to explain this last proposal. In response, Socrates expounds three controversial claims, which he acknowledges will expose him to ridicule. The first is that the guardians should include qualified women as well as men: thus, the group that will become known as "philosopher kings" will also include "philosopher queens." The second claim is that these ruling men and women should mate and reproduce on the city's orders and to serve its eugenic interests, raising their children communally to consider all guardians as parents rather than attach themselves to a private family household. These children, together with those of the artisan class, will be tested, and only the most virtuous and capable will become rulers. Thus, the group to become known as "philosopher kings" will be reproduced by merit rather than simply by birth. Finally, and crucially for the present topic, Socrates declares that these rulers must in fact be philosophers:

> Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide . . . cities will have no rest from evils . . . there can be no happiness, either public or private, in any other city (473c–473e).

Socrates predicts that this paradoxical claim will elicit even more ridicule and contempt from his Athenian contemporaries than will equality for women rulers or communality of sex and children. They saw philosophers as perpetual adolescents, skulking in corners and muttering about the meaning of life, rather than taking an adult part in the battle for power and success in the city. On this view, philosophers are the last people who should or would want to rule. *The Republic* turns this claim upside down, arguing that it is precisely the fact that philosophers are the last people who would want to rule that qualifies them to do so. Only those who do not wish for political power can be trusted with it.

Thus, the key to the notion of the "philosopher king" is that the philosopher (man or woman, as we have seen) is the only person who can be trusted to rule well. Philosophers are both morally and intellectually suited to rule. Morally, because it is in their nature to love truth and learning so much that they are free from the greed and lust that tempts others to abuse power. And intellectually, because they alone can gain full knowledge of reality, which in Books 5 through 7 of *The Republic* is argued to culminate in knowledge of the forms or ideas of virtue, beauty, and above all goodness. The city can foster such knowledge by putting aspiring philosophers through a demanding education, and the philosophers will use their knowledge of goodness and virtue to help the other citizens achieve these so far as possible.

So the emphasis in the Platonic notion of the "philosopher king" lies more on the first word than the second. While relying on conventional Greek contrasts between king and tyrant, and between the king as individual ruler and the multitudinous rule of aristocracy and democracy, Plato makes little of kingship per se. That he had used the word, however, was key to the later career of the notion in imperial Rome and monarchical Europe. To Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic emperor, what mattered was that even kings should be philosophers, rather than that only philosophers should rule. To François Fénelon, the cardinal charged with the moral education of the grandson of Louis XIV, the crucial issue was that kings should possess self-restraint and selfless devotion to duty, rather than that they should possess knowledge. The enlightened despots of the next century, such as Frederick II of Prussia and Catherine the Great of Russia, would pride

themselves on being philosopher kings and queens. But philosophy by then had left behind Plato's focus on absolute knowledge, signifying instead the free pursuit of knowledge and the implementation of reason. Meanwhile, in the Islamic world, the medieval philosopher Abu Nasr al-Farabi had championed the notion of a religiously devout philosopher king. The notion of such a figure acting as the interpreter of law or jurisprude inspired the Ayatollah Khomeini and the revolutionary state that he shaped in Iran. Finally, and more broadly, the notion of the philosopher ruler has come to signify a general claim to domination by an unaccountable, if putatively beneficent, elite, as in certain forms of Marxism and other revolutionary political movements.

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See also Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr; Enlightenment; Islamic Political Philosophy; Plato

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Philosophes

The thinkers who called themselves *philosophes* were a diverse group who lived in France in the eighteenth century and led an intellectual movement that came to be called the Enlightenment. They are usually credited for inventing the language and concepts that were used during the French Revolution, but they did not participate themselves in the Revolution because all the most prominent members of the group had already died when the Revolution broke out in 1789. The group includes figures like Voltaire and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who disagreed on many fundamental issues. What united them intellectually can best be seen in the *Encyclopédie,* published by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert between 1751 and 1772. The *Encyclopédie* was an ambitious, twenty-eight–volume attempt to account for all aspects of human knowledge, both theoretical and applied. It was also a highly effective propaganda tool that sought to disseminate the ideas of the philosophes. Paradoxically, given the appropriation of the language of the philosophes by the leaders of the French Revolution, the philosophes (with the notable exception of Rousseau) did not put political theory at the center of their concerns. Tactical prudence is a partial explanation for this fact: any writing that offended the Church or the State could cause legal trouble. However, even if self-censorship is taken into account, it is clear from the writings of the philosophes that there was no thought of questioning the legitimacy of the French monarchy or imagining alternative systems of government. The focus of their intellectual and propaganda efforts was elsewhere. The philosophes sought to draw all the consequences (including political consequences) of the scientific revolution.

As d'Alembert writes in the preface to the *Encyclopédie,* philosophy (what the philosophes do) is another name for science. The philosophes were enthusiastic backers of the New Science. The tree figuring the subdivisions of knowledge that appeared at the beginning of the *Encyclopédie* was adapted from the divisions proposed by Francis Bacon in the *Advancement of Learning* (1605). Like Bacon, the philosophes divided human learning according to three faculties: memory, reason, and imagination. Philosophy was the domain of reason. In the *Encyclopédie,* philosophy was divided into natural and human; human philosophy was divided into logic and morals; morals was divided into general morals and particular morals (i.e., jurisprudence); jurisprudence was divided into natural, economic, and political jurisprudence. For the philosophes, what is now called political theory was jurisprudence, or the science of laws. Thus, politics was derived from jurisprudence, and jurisprudence was derived from morals. It is worth comparing this system with the one proposed by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan* (1651).

Hobbes divided philosophy into natural philosophy and politics. Political theory was therefore one of two branches of human knowledge. For the philosophes, it was a branch much farther down the tree.

The equation between political theory and jurisprudence was characteristic of the natural law tradition, illustrated in the seventeenth century by Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and John Locke. The philosophes believed in the existence of a natural moral order, consistent with the dictates of reason, and knowable through the exercise of our rational faculties. Any rational being had an immediate sense of what was just and unjust. This sense was the first foundation of legislation, and it existed even in the absence of positive laws. For the philosophes, it manifested itself most clearly in a negative way, through the sense of outrage one felt spontaneously before the illegitimate use of force and the oppression of the weak by the strong. Oppression was an insult to both nature and reason.

The philosophes followed Locke in arguing that political authority was based on a contract between the government and the governed. Diderot claimed that nature gave no one the right to rule and that freedom was a divine gift. Only parental authority, within limits, had a natural foundation. Political authority was based on the consent of the governed. The philosophes applied this notion to all forms of government, including France's monarchy. They argued that the king had the right to relinquish his crown, but could not transmit it to someone else without the consent of the nation because it was the nation that had crowned the king. In legal terms, the crown was the nation's property and the king had usufructuary rights (i.e., the right to enjoy a property one does not own) to the crown. The king himself was a member of the nation and had the right to govern, but not the right to change the system of government. The transmission of the crown to the king's oldest son could not be subject to challenge because it was a condition of the contract between the king and the nation. Only if the royal family was extinguished and no heirs could be identified through the rules of succession would the crown revert to the nation. The *Encyclopédie* has a long article on "freedom," which is divided into natural freedom, civil freedom, political freedom, and freedom of thought. Natural freedom is the right to do anything that does not hurt others. Civil freedom is the freedom that comes from obeying the laws, when the laws are enforced by an independent judiciary. Citizens have political freedom when a clear separation of powers makes them confident that they need not fear the actions of their fellow citizens. Freedom of thought is the ability to think rationally and without prejudice.

The belief in progress the philosophes had was based on their belief in the fundamental importance of the progress of science and technology. In his *Essay on Manners* (1756), Voltaire described the history of the world as the history of the progress of the human mind, from feeble beginnings to the tremendous accomplishments of the present. Voltaire did not focus on political and military history, but rather on the ways in which advances in scientific and technical knowledge had changed human behavior in all aspects of life. In that sense, the succession of political regimes and the adoption of this or that system of government were less important than the emergence of softer, more rational, and less violent ways everywhere. For Voltaire, progress in the arts and sciences went hand in hand with better government and a decrease in religious and political passions. Voltaire's advocacy of religious toleration flowed from the same principles: because religious minorities like the Protestants were no longer a threat to the state, they should be allowed the protection of natural law (i.e., family and inheritance rights, but no political rights). Voltaire wanted for Protestants in France the status that Catholics had in England. For Voltaire and the philosophes of his generation, belief in progress was therefore tempered by a sober assessment of political and social reality. It is only with the philosophes of the following generation, like the marquis de Condorcet, author of *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1795), that the belief in progress took some utopian overtones.

The philosophes did not see their mission as limited to the advancement of knowledge. They tried to influence things in a concrete way by appealing to public opinion and swaying it in the direction they wanted. Voltaire spent considerable time and energy for the rehabilitation of Jean Calas, a Protestant who had been wrongly convicted of murder and executed. The Calas case was treated as a symbol of religious fanaticism getting

in the way of true justice. Voltaire's focus was less the French judicial system than religious prejudice itself, which he felt was the root cause of the miscarriage of justice. The biggest propaganda effort was the *Encyclopédie* itself, which was aimed at increasing knowledge and decreasing prejudice. At the same time, public opinion for the philosophes did not mean the population at large but rather the well educated (i.e., a very small segment of the population). In the *Philosophical Letters* (1734), Voltaire insisted that the philosophes were neither a religious sect nor a political party, and he downplayed their influence, which he said was limited to intellectual pursuits and could not possibly threaten civil peace. A recurring feature of the writings of the philosophes is an attempt to educate and influence the rulers themselves, on the assumption that enlightened rulers will work for the public good. Voltaire put great stock in his friendship with Frederic the Great of Prussia before the two had a dramatic falling out. He praised the modernizing efforts of Peter the Great in Russia. Diderot was a protégé of Catherine II of Russia. The "Politics" article of the *Encyclopédie* ends with a complacent allusion to the *Anti-Machiavel,* a treatise written by Frederic with Voltaire's help, and it implies that Frederic is a philosopher king.

Distrust of (or outright hostility to) organized religion, especially the Catholic Church, was a shared trait of the philosophes, who viewed religious fanaticism as the biggest threat to civil peace everywhere. At the same time, the philosophes saw organized religion as the most effective tool for enforcing moral standards in the population at large. Most of the philosophes were deists and observed the rituals of organized religion as a matter of social conformity while believing in an architect of the universe, whose existence could be ascertained through rational means. A few (Diderot and Claude-Adrien Helvétius) were atheists.

The two greatest political theorists associated with the philosophes, the baron de Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, were in a sense peripheral to the group. Montesquieu wrote one article (on "taste") for the *Encyclopédie,* but he died in 1755, long before the completion of the series. His *Spirit of the Laws* (1748) received a cool reception from Voltaire and the other philosophes. Rousseau's contribution to the *Encyclopédie* included one important article on political economy, which foreshadowed the theories of the *Social Contract*. All his other articles were on music. After the publication of the *Second Discourse* (1755), which was derided by Voltaire as naive primitivism, Rousseau kept his distance from the group, and he became estranged from Diderot, who had been a close friend.

There were philosophes on both sides of one of the most important debates of the eighteenth century: the debate on luxury. Voltaire subscribed to the paradox enunciated by Bernard de Mandeville in the *Fable of the Bees* (1714): private vices, public benefits. He saw the development of commerce and the general increase in wealth as a potent civilizing force that curbed violent behavior and favored wiser, more moderate government. The starting point for Rousseau's political theory was the rejection of the idea that greed could be the foundation of a stable political order. Writing on political economy for the *Encyclopédie,* Rousseau argued that the most important task of government was to educate the people in the love and respect of the laws, because the greatest support for public authority lied in the hearts of the citizens. This emphasis on republican virtue was originally a minority view among the philosophes, but it became widespread in the second half of the eighteenth century. Both Montesquieu and Voltaire had praised the English system of mixed government and argued that political freedom was the happy result of the conflict between the king and parliament. Later in the century, there was greater skepticism regarding the stability or desirability of systems based on countervailing powers.

Belief in a natural moral order was not shared by everyone in the group. Neo-Epicureans like Helvétius (whom Diderot criticized) thought of justice and morality as artificial constructs and posited self-interest as the first principle of human behavior. On the other hand, Helvétius followed Locke's theory of consent, and he shared Rousseau's love of republican virtue. The axioms of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism can be found in large part in the political theory of Helvétius.

The philosophes were active members of the Republic of Letters, a European network of scientists and writers, and their ideas were disseminated throughout Europe. David Hume and Adam Smith were major interlocutors of the philosophes. The young Adam Smith professed his admiration for

Voltaire, and he wrote an enthusiastic review of the first volumes of the *Encyclopédie*. In Italy, Cesare Beccaria applied the principles of the philosophes to a reflection on penal systems. In Germany, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing wrote about the history of humanity as progress toward the rule of pure reason. The leaders of the American Revolution were well versed in the writings of the philosophes, especially Montesquieu, but also Voltaire and Rousseau.

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See also *Encyclopédie*; Enlightenment; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Voltaire

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Philosophical Radicals

The *philosophical radicals* were of group of politicians, philosophers, journalists, and writers who campaigned for British parliamentary reform during the period of 1817 to 1841, and who were associated with the *Westminster Review,* a quarterly journal founded by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and James Mill (1773–1836). The group was a loose coalition with no definitive membership list, but it certainly included James Mill, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), George Grote (1794–1871), John Cam Hobhouse (1786–1869), John Arthur Roebuck (1802–1879), Francis Place (1771–1854), Joseph Parkes (1796–1865), and Sir William Molesworth (1810–1855), among others. They are often associated with the struggle for the passage of the Great Reform Act of 1832, but they are actually only one part of a complex story that led to this important milestone in British politics. Among the philosophical radicals, parliamentary reform was seen as a necessary condition of introducing more radical social and political reform. Some of the most significant social reforms in the period immediately following the Great Reform Act, such as the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, are often associated with the philosophical radicals, although many of the advocates of such reforms, such as Nassau William Senior, were never part of the movement.

What distinguishes this group from others in the lead up to the passage of the Great Reform Act and from other radical forces in British politics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century is that they were self-consciously ideological politicians. The precise nature of that ideology is a deeply contested question, and many subsequent historians of the movement, such as William Thomas, have challenged the extent to which anything as coherent as

a single set of doctrines animated such a diverse group. Given that the group included both James and John Stuart Mill, there is some substance to the skepticism about ideological coherence. John Stuart Mill's philosophical development is generally seen as a critical engagement with, and partial rejection of, the legacy of his father and of Jeremy Bentham. That said, the identification of the group as philosophical radicals was freely accepted, and it was underscored by a common identification with the ideas of Jeremy Bentham and his leading philosophical acolyte, James Mill. Both were cofounders of the *Westminster Review* in 1823, a quarterly journal that was explicitly founded for "philosophical radicals." How far this self-identification involved subscription to a series of discrete doctrines or a single theory is a contested question, and it is not easily answered by looking at the contents of the *Westminster Review*. The most famous and systematic account of the theory of philosophical radicalism is that offered by the French historian and political theorist Elie Halévy (1870–1937) in *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism*. Halévy's account is a philosophical reconstruction that ranges far beyond Bentham and James Mill, and it has proved a controversial interpretation of the development of Bentham's own political theory. This entry does not endorse Halévy's interpretation, but it will emphasize the importance of Bentham and James Mill as the source of some of the deeper contradictions within the movement that ultimately lead to its break up and decline.

Jeremy Bentham and James Mill: The Theory of Philosophical Radicalism

As Halévy correctly points out, the philosophical radicals drew on a lot of ideas and thinkers, including Adam Smith (1723–1790), David Ricardo (1772–1823), and John McCulloch (1789–1864), yet chief among them was the English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham and, from 1809, one of his principal followers, the Scottish political economist and historian of India, James Mill.

Bentham was 60 years old when he met James Mill, sometime around 1807 and 1808. In 1809, Bentham drafted the *Parliamentary Reform Catechism,* one of the main works that was to inspire radical parliamentary reformers in the 1820s. From 1809, James Mill, together with his young family, began taking working holidays with Bentham at his summer retreat in Oxted. It has been claimed that James Mill converted Bentham to radical reform and a greater sympathy for democracy. Undoubtedly, the association of the two men transformed Bentham's impact on the movement that became philosophical radicalism, in particular by broadening the network of individuals connected to the reclusive "hermit of Queen's Square Place." Yet it would be too simplistic to claim that without James Mill, Bentham would not have turned to radical reform and a commitment to representative democracy; not least because both Mill and Bentham endorsed significantly different conceptions of representative government.

One explanation for the claim that Mill encouraged Bentham to endorse radical reform is based on Bentham's equivocal position on democracy and the franchise in his early writings. In his early works, Bentham adopted a position familiar to that of many eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers, who saw their task as guiding the existing powers toward the path of rational and enlightened government. Whether government satisfied the condition of enlightenment depended on how it used power, rather than where power came from and in whose name it was exercised. This approach fit well with Bentham's utilitarian philosophy as one that made the answers to all institutional questions contingent on whether they served the greatest happiness. If enlightened despotism delivered more happiness than republican liberty, then the utilitarian must choose enlightened despotism. In practice, Bentham did support some strategies for political reform during the 1780s on utilitarian grounds, but he became much more conservative following the French Revolution and the Reign of Terror, even going as far as writing a defense of "rotten boroughs"—the archetype of all that was wrong with the English Constitution. Bentham was clearly not a life-long democrat, although few were in the eighteenth century. Yet it would be equally wrong to see Bentham as an occasional supporter of political reform. Bentham's experience in attempting to secure the adoption of the panopticon prison in the face of the opposition of powerful landed interests had demonstrated the way in which particular groups could use positional advantages to frustrate enlightened reforms.

This view was to culminate in his theory of "sinister interests" that was to play such a role in his reform projects in the first three decades of the nineteenth century.

James Mill also became a defender of representative government, but it is clear that his argument in the *Essay on Government* (1820) differed significantly from Bentham's defense of a universal franchise and frequent parliaments. Whereas Bentham chose to adopt the mechanism of a universal franchise as a way of holding the "ruling few" accountable to the "subject many," Mill was more concerned about who should be the ruling few. Mill was committed to the idea that government should be in the interest of the governed, but he was less clearly a utilitarian than Bentham. In order to bring the interest of government into line with that of the governed, it was necessary to confine active rule and therefore the franchise to the middle rank of society. This claim has often been interpreted in class terms, so that Mill is seen as advocating a shift in power from landed aristocracy to the emerging industrial middle class. Yet Mill's view is more complex. His account of the "middle rank" owes more to the idea of an educated elite (people like himself and Bentham) who would understand political economy and social science and therefore support long-term social and economic progress even if it seemed to result in temporary impoverishment during economic downturns. Mill was also fearful of the leveling tendencies of populist radicalism and the effect on the security of property that might result from a universal franchise. One consequence of this was Mill's advocacy of a relatively high property qualification for the franchise and the idea of virtual representation. On this view, groups were represented as long as their interests were represented. Consequently, it was less important to enfranchise the working poor, than to make sure that the "middle rank," who best represented the common interest, ruled. James Mill also famously used the idea of virtual representation to exclude women from the franchise: women's interests were already represented by either their fathers or their husbands, so they did not need the vote. Bentham on the other hand, rejected the idea of virtual representation and advocated—albeit in private—universal franchise, an idea that was to be taken up by John Stuart Mill in on *The Subjection of Women* (1869).

The Struggle for Reform

The events leading up to the Great Reform Act are complex and involve intricacies of party politics that could not have been controlled and would hardly have been influenced by the activities of such a relatively small group. That said, they did have a number of successes, such as the return of two radical members of Parliament for Westminster in the 1820s, one of which was J. C. Hobhouse. James Mill's impact is also significant, in that he argued that parliamentary reform was necessary to avoid the threat of revolution. Given the occasions of mass unrest, popular demonstrations, and the organization of political unions in favor of reform, there was some truth in Mill's argument. Nevertheless, it also illustrates the equivocation at the heart of the movement, between the Benthamite advocacy of a near universal suffrage and the Millian advocacy of a shift of power between social classes or ranks. James Mill's more cautious arguments for an extension of the franchise to a different social rank could be seen to have won the day given the relatively modest expansion of the franchise in the eventual Great Reform Act of 1832.

The End of Philosophical Radicalism

The Great Reform Act finally received royal assent on June 7, 1832. Its consequence was significant in beginning the transformation of subsequent political life in Great Britain. It was the first of a number of reform acts throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that eventually resulted in adult male and subsequently female suffrage. That said, the immediate consequences were less dramatic. Although the act increased the franchise, it remained very small, comprising around six hundred thousand out of a population of fourteen million. The enactment of the Great Reform Act also transformed the prospects of the philosophical radicals. The reform of Parliament, which had been central to the philosophical radicals' political agenda, was modest, but it opened up the opportunity for many radical ideas to be put into effect. In 1834, the Poor Law Amendment Act was passed, which introduced a system of indoor relief for the poor. Led by Bentham's follower, Edwin Chadwick, and Nassau William Senior, a Ricardian political economist, the new system, with its policy to make poor relief less eligible than the lowest

paid labor, was a far cry from Bentham's panopticon prison. Chadwick's Poor Law system illustrates how the radical agenda that had combined political reform and social and economic reform began to unravel. The association of philosophical radical reform with "less eligibility" and the dehumanizing treatment of the poor and "cold calculation" in policy making became the target of critics such as Thomas Carlyle, Benjamin Disraeli, and Charles Dickens. The latter authors have done much to shape the subsequent popular perception of the philosophical radicals in novels such as Dickens's *Hard Times* (1854).

A relatively modest change in Parliamentary suffrage was sufficient to open up early nineteenth-century government to forces for social and economic reform. Whether this resulted in a nineteenth-century revolution in Government inspired by Benthamite principles remains a contested question. In the period following the Reform Act much radical debate shifted from institutional questions to policy questions. As a consequence of this shift in direction the philosophical radicals faired less well as a group. In terms of party politics they failed to form a significant and coherent group and fell apart over such issues as Lord Durham's mission to Canada. John Stuart Mill had already abandoned the *Westminster Review* and became a more remote figure from the group as his personal life, especially his relationship with Harriet Taylor, soured relations with former friends such as J. A. Roebuck. However, the most important impact of post 1832 politics on the philosophical radicals was the emergence of class politics, manifested most clearly in the Chartist movement from the 1830 to the 1850s. Dissatisfaction with the Reform Act was by no means confined to the working classes, but the rise of Chartism and the growth of class politics in response to wider social and economic changes illustrated the shortcomings of the underlying ideological compromise that was at the heart of philosophical radicalism. Interestingly, Francis Place, the London Tailor, who had been an associate of Bentham and a political organizer of the philosophical radical cause in London, was one of the authors of the original People's Charter in 1838 for the London Working Men's Association, along with William Lovett. Place, who was always a consummate politician, had a much more developed sense of the demands of practical politics than any other philosophical radical. The Chartist's political strategy, with a series of mass rallies and grassroots activism, shifted political attention from Parliament and journals as the main sites of radical politics; a move that was hardly surprising given the narrow electorate even following reform. When Parliament was to serve as the focus of major political changes in the 1830s and 1840s it did so in ways that further marginalized the distinctive contribution of the philosophical radicals.

The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 transformed the structure of party allegiance in Parliament and gave birth to the modern Liberal and Conservative parties. Both parties drew on a similar class base but raised ideological differences that were to shape subsequent debates within and between the parties over the relative merits of laissez-faire or state activism. This precisely exposed the ambiguity in the Benthamite utilitarian legacy, the logic of which supports state activism, but the advocates of which tended to support laissez-faire. An ideology that gave no clear direction on this issue and that was taken up by supporters of free trade or of an activist state could never form the basis for a viable political coalition, and this eventually led to the demise of philosophical radicalism as a unified political force.

Philosophical radical ideas did not simply disappear in the face of class politics and the subsequent struggles for parliamentary reform. John Stuart Mill was to retain an important political profile as a member of Parliament for Westminster from 1865 to 1868. He became an advocate of women's suffrage and of a more sympathetic stance to socialist redistribution while remaining one of the most important classical political economists of the nineteenth century. Mill remained an awkward party figure, but his career illustrated the fact that the radical philosophy on which the movement drew did not die with it. Indeed, many ideas were absorbed into the main ideological forms of nineteenth- and twentieth-century British politics. In this way, a relatively short-lived movement was to have an important impact on subsequent British politics.

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See also Bentham, Jeremy; Mill, John Stuart

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Philosophy of Social Sciences

The *philosophy of social sciences* seeks to understand the nature of the study of human behavior and social relations. It is consequently a metatheoretical endeavor—a theory about theories of social life. To achieve their end, philosophers of social science investigate both social science as it is practiced, as well as the nature of those studied by the social sciences, namely, human beings themselves, in an attempt to discern the appropriate logic of inquiry for this area of study. The philosophy of social sciences can be broadly descriptive (unearthing the fundamental conceptual tools in social science and relating them to the tools employed in other human endeavors), prescriptive (recommending that a certain approach be adopted by the social sciences so that they can accomplish what the recommender thinks social science ought to accomplish), or some combination of these. Because the philosophy of social sciences addresses an enterprise with enormous political import, and because metatheories of social science invariably are connected to substantive theories of social life itself and moral visions about it, the philosophy of social sciences has had a deep connection to political theory from its beginnings.

Historically, philosophers have often framed the philosophy of social sciences in terms of the question: "Can the social sciences be scientific in the same way that the natural sciences are?" (The approach that answers this question affirmatively is called *naturalism,* whereas that which answers it negatively is dubbed *humanism;* a number of approaches attempt to combine these approaches into a synthetic whole.) Given this framework, the term *philosophy of social sciences* can arguably mislead by suggesting that to be legitimate, the study of human behavior and social relations must be scientific in the way the study of plants and planets is, which is to say that the term seems to imply naturalism. To avoid suggesting this, practitioners sometimes denominate their field of inquiry: "philosophy of social inquiry" or "philosophy of social studies." But by whatever name the field is called, it ought to be clear that whether or how the study of human social behavior is scientific is an open question that is part of the business of the philosopher of social sciences to address.

Naming the area to be studied "social studies" also calls attention to how wide the field of inquiry into human behavior and relations is. In addition to the core disciplines of economics, political science, anthropology, and sociology, the social studies also include such disparate disciplines as archaeology, demography, human geography, linguistics, social psychology, and aspects of cognitive science, among others. This should indicate the range of the field that the philosophy of social sciences encompasses and how diverse the questions, methods, concepts, and explanatory strategies are within this field.

Another question for any philosophical account of the social sciences concerns the boundaries for such an undertaking, and thus how the social sciences relate to disciplines closely allied to them. Biology and neurophysiology, ethology and psychology, and history and cultural studies all surround the mainstream disciplines and have important contributions to make to them. What exactly is the relation of sociology to psychology, for instance? Can or should evolutionary biology ultimately replace sociology? Are the social sciences necessarily historical because human phenomena are so embedded in particular cultural and social conditions that what is discovered is applicable only to them, or can the social sciences be ahistorical, discovering laws or other regularities or causal mechanisms that are universal, applying to all people at all times? These are but a few of the questions philosophers of social science address in their reflections on what is involved and at stake in studying human behavior and social relations.

Three broad areas of concern have long dominated the philosophy of social sciences: the relation between causal explanation and the interpretation

of meaning, the nature of theory in the social sciences, and the role of critique in social science. Examining the sources of these areas of concern gives a good idea of the sorts of questions and approaches philosophers of social science have developed and employed.

Meaning and Cause

Human phenomena are self-evidently meaningful—they are typically performed for a purpose and express an intention, and often follow rules that make them what they are: People don't just move their limbs or emit sounds, they vote, or marry, or sell, or utter sentences, and when they do, their actions and relations appear to be different in kind from the behavior of amoebae or shrimp. Philosophers mark this difference by saying that humans *act,* whereas entities that lack consciousness or that lack the capacity to form intentions merely *move.* How should the interpretation of the meanings of actions fit into the study of human behavior? Does it introduce elements that make such a study different in kind from studying entities whose movements are not meaningful?

Those who give an affirmative answer to these questions insist that social science must either be an *interpretive* endeavor, or must at least provide a role for the interpretation of meaning within it; for them, meaning is the central concept in the social sciences. German theorists of the late nineteenth century initially developed this line of thought most perspicuously in conceiving the social sciences as *Geisteswissenschaften.* (Geisteswissenschaften means the science or study of "spirit;" the term *spirit* harkens back to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit,* in which spirit referred in part to the broad intellectual and cultural dimension of a people. It is something of a historical irony that Geisteswissenschaften is a German translation of John Stuart Mill's term "the Moral Sciences"—an irony because Mill's term as articulated in book VI of his *System of Logic* paid no attention to meaning.) Philosophers such as Wilhelm Windlebrand, Heinrich Rickert, Wilhem Dilthey, and other *idealists* argued that human phenomena are the product of conscious and intentional beings who became so by means of enculturation, and this means that the human sciences must concentrate on meaning and its interpretation as they attempt to understand human life.

The idealist line of thought continued into the twentieth century and beyond. Most notable is the application of *hermeneutics* to the study of human social life. ("Hermeneutics" derives from the Greek word *hermeneuein,* meaning "to interpret"; it in turn comes from the Greek word for the god Hermes who carried messages from the other gods. Hermeneutics is the science of the interpretation of written texts. It originated in the modern period in reflections on what it means to interpret the meaning of the Bible.) A number of hermeneutical theories of the social sciences have been developed, the most significant being those of Hans-Georg Gadamer, especially in his masterpiece, *Truth and Method,* and Paul Ricoeur in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences.* Hermeneuticists argue that human actions are the expressions of ideas and feelings and as such are essentially meaningful phenomena. To understand them is more akin to interpreting a text or a painting than it is to dissecting the innards of a cell and the causes that produced them. Meaning, not cause, and understanding (meaning) not (causal) explanation, is the rallying point for philosophers of social science of this persuasion, though they offer richly different accounts of what is entailed in interpreting meaning.

A cognate line of thinking developed largely in England and the United States out of the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, especially his *Philosophical Investigations,* a work that argued for the essentially social nature of meaning and that parsed this in terms of rule following. Philosophers in so-called analytic philosophy, most notably Peter Winch in *The Idea of a Social Science,* applied this to the social sciences, hoping to show that the study of human beings involves a scheme of concepts and methods of analyses that are wholly unlike those in the natural sciences.

Phenomenology is another branch of idealist philosophy of social science that emphasized the uniqueness of studying beings who are conscious and who know that they are. Edmund Husserl created phenomenology in the early part of the twentieth century; a number of important thinkers, most notably Alfred Schutz and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, developed Husserl's insights, suitably changing and refining them to make them applicable to the study of human social life.

Phenomenologists focus on the fact that human doings are consciously undertaken, and are thus essentially intentional in character. They have an "inside" to them that phenomenologists argue cannot be ignored when studying them. For this reason, humans cannot be studied the way plants and molecules are; instead, the structures of human consciousness must be unearthed and shown how they are expressed in human relations and actions. Human acts are typically gestural in that they express some psychological state and cultural location, and much of what humans do is the result of psychological states and cultural locations—motives, desires, goals, feelings, moods, as well as the "life world" in which psychological beings necessarily exist. The study of human life consequently involves such things as empathy, reliving what others have experienced, grasping the structures of the "life world" of those one studies, and the like. This way of thinking has underwritten a variety of approaches in the social sciences, the most well-known being ethnomethodology, a type of sociology formulated by the sociologist Harold Garfinkel in his classic *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Ethnomethodology seeks to uncover the "taken-for-granted" structures of everyday life and to delineate how they are maintained and changed over time.

The social sciences that figure most saliently in humanist approaches that centrally feature the interpretation of meaning and consciousness are anthropology, history, and those parts of sociology that focus on the margins of mainstream life. The reason for this is that when confronting the behavior of those whose linguistic, cultural, and conceptual worlds are significantly different from their own, social analysts cannot ignore questions of meaning. Indeed, the first question normally asked in these situations is, what do "they" mean in doing "that"—indeed, what is "that" that they are doing? Is it a religious rite, a political ploy, or an economic endeavor? Do "they" even draw these—to us moderns, straightforward—distinctions? Moreover, these disciplines also strikingly confront a host of questions that trouble philosophers of social sciences, questions that are grouped around the topic of *relativism* (the doctrine that either experience, assessments of value, or even reality itself is a function of a particular conceptual scheme; these are called, respectively, epistemological, moral, or ontological relativism). Do you have to be one to know one? Can one really translate what others in a different culture are saying, feeling, believing, or doing (this is sometimes put as a question about the *commensurability* of conceptual schemes)? Do people in different cultures live in different worlds? Must we assume that others are rational? Is there a conception of rationality that transcends particular historical or cultural locations? Must we comprehend others in their own terms? Is our meaning of the behavior of others what *they* mean by it? Answers to these and cognate questions have significant bearing on how one envisions the social sciences and assesses their achievements.

But not all philosophers of social science believe that meaning is something on which the social sciences should focus. Despite the fact that human actions and relations are clearly meaningful on their surface, some philosophies of social science have denied that meaning ultimately has (or should have) a fundamental role to play in the social sciences. One of the most noteworthy of these is *behaviorism,* an approach that dispenses with inner mental states and cultural meaning altogether, thereby rendering meaning otiose as a category of a final science of human life. Instead, human behavior is conceived as a response to external stimuli, a response regulated by the patterns of conditioning that have been inculcated into the organism. Other variants of the approach that deny that the interpretation of meaning is of fundamental import in the social sciences include *systems theory* and *structuralism*. Systems theory envisions society as an entity whose various parts play functional roles in order to keep it going or keep it in equilibrium; such roles are played out by those who inhabit them, whether they know that they are doing so or not. Structuralism asserts that agents do not create the structure of meanings through which they act; rather, as social subjects, they are created by this structure such that their acts are mere expressions of it. As a result, the job of social science is to unearth the elements of this structure and to reveal its inner logic. In both systems theory and structuralism, the meaning that behavior has for those performing it is ultimately irrelevant in explaining it.

Behaviorists, systems theorists, and structuralists base their approaches on the assumption that

human behavior is the result of prior causes in the same way that the behavior of plants and animals is. This assumption is one that it is difficult even for those who conceive social science to be largely or purely an exercise in the interpretation of meaning to ignore: They too must confront the fact (if it is a fact) that even meaningful phenomena are caused by other phenomena, both meaningful and not. An account of a society's worldview, or the meanings that underlie the actions and relations of its members, does not explain why the society has this worldview or an individual undertakes an act with this meaning, or how worldviews or meanings are transferred to its members or are culturally maintained, or why just these meanings and not others predominate, or what led to deep changes in them. Answering these questions calls for *causal explanations* that pick out the conditions that in certain circumstances produce or prevent certain types of (meaningful) acts and relations. Once this is acknowledged, a number of philosophical questions arise: What are causes? (A *Humean* construal of cause has dominated the answers to this question, but a *critical realist* answer to it has gained numerous adherents more recently.) Are the causes of meaningful human actions and relations of the same sort as the causes of nonmeaningful phenomena? More broadly, if causes can be said to be *explanations* of phenomena, and meanings to be the *interpretations* of them, what is the relationship between explanation and interpretation in the social sciences? Answering these questions leads to questions about the nature of theory in the social sciences.

The Nature of Theory in the Social Sciences

Questions about the role of causes in the social sciences become all the more urgent when it becomes clear that the social sciences investigate phenomena that go beyond the intentions and meanings of behavior. Social scientists are also interested in *systematic regularities* that characterize particular societies or even society as such. They are also interested in mapping out the basic *structures* of a society and the resources, social and otherwise, that underwrite these structures. And they are concerned with the *unintended consequences* of actions and relations. In all of these investigations, social scientists go beyond deciphering the meaning and import of acts and relations to uncover the broader causes and effects of them. Indeed, depending on how broad and successful social science is in this, causal explanations become integrated into theories of (aspects of) social life—theories that typically go far beyond the self-understandings of the agents involved. Keynesian or monetarist theories in economics, kinship theories in anthropology, exchange theory in sociology, and modernization theory in political science are examples of theory in the social sciences. Questions about the nature of social scientific theorizing abound: Can theories in the social sciences involve genuine laws, and what makes a regularity into a law? Can the social sciences make warranted predictions about future actions or relationships? Are the theories in the social sciences reducible to more general or base-level theories? Should the social sciences ultimately aim at explanation in terms of individual actions or in terms of groups or group structures (i.e., should bottom-line explanations in the social sciences be *individualistic* or *holistic*)? How should the relationship between social structures and individual action best be conceived? Are functionalist theories—which are widespread in the social sciences—truly explanatory? In addition to these questions, other questions arise because of the role of the interpretation of meaning in the social sciences; put generally, what ought to be the relation between the interpretation of meaning and causal or functional theories? Do the former constrain the latter, or do the latter constrain the former? Are the latter different in kind because of the former?

To these sorts of questions, humanists have sometimes insisted that causality in the social sciences is a different sort of beast than causality in the natural sciences; others have tried to work out a middle road that attempts to synthesize the best of both the naturalist approach, with its focus on causality, and the humanist approach, which focuses on meaning. The methodological writings of Max Weber are a particularly vivid instance of this.

An important class of theories in the social sciences—so-called *competence theories*—are a distinctive type: Theories of this type possess an essentially normative character because they involve an elaboration of what rationality requires. Examples of this type of theory are rational choice and game theory (including prisoner's dilemma games), Noam Chomsky's theory of transformational grammar,

and Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative competence. Examining these examples points to ways that theorizing in the social sciences may be fundamentally different from that in the natural sciences.

Meaningful actions involve rationality because they consist of following rules, procedures, principles, and the like. For example, in order to utter a sentence (or marry, or vote, or checkmate an opponent in chess, etc.), a speaker has to act in accordance with linguistic rules that specify what must be done in order for an utterance to qualify as a sentence of a certain sort. Or, again, principles of economic reasoning specify how much product to bring to market in order to maximize profit. An actor's competence is his or her mastery of the rules or norms of rationality that apply to a particular activity, and competence theories are those that seek to detail what these rules and norms are. They proceed by discovering how an idealized actor who is perfectly rational or who has perfectly mastered the relevant rules would behave in various choice situations. Of course, the performance of any given actor may only imperfectly embody this idealized competence, so that one question social science must answer is: Under what conditions do rational actors indeed act rationally? In general: What is or ought to be the relation between competence theories and performance theories?

Another way that theories in the social sciences are different from those in the natural sciences derives from the fact that the entities being explained in the social sciences (i.e., human beings) themselves possess their own theories about what they and others are doing. One might call these theories the agents' self-understandings or their *ideology*. Moreover, it is plausible to claim (though some theorists have denied this) that agents' ideology is an important element in how they behave. But this raises the question, what is the relationship in social scientific theories between, on the one hand, the ideology and the self-understandings of the agents themselves, and, on the other, the theoretical constructs that social scientific observers of their behavior might propose? Does the former take precedence over the latter? Does the former constrain the latter? These are questions that philosophers of the natural sciences need not address because the phenomena studied in natural science are not the product of the ideology of that which is being studied. Indeed, the notion of ideology points to an activity crucial in the social sciences, but one potentially in tension with its scientific aspirations, namely, *critique*.

The Role of Critique in the Social Sciences

Critique becomes a possible dimension of social science because the self-understandings that serve as a basis for the actions and relations of agents may themselves be systematically mistaken. That is, agents' self-understandings may be at variance with their situation, and they may characterize themselves and others (their motivations, their emotions, their beliefs, etc.) in ways that display self-ignorance or even self-deception. They might be under the control of an ideology that may mask their social and personal reality, or they might be the victims of an irrationality that stymies them and makes them act in unintelligent or deluded ways. Such irrationality may lie beneath their frustrations or the social conflicts in which they perforce find themselves. All of this opens up the possibility that in order to understand and explain what such people are doing and how they are relating to others, social scientists must engage in what is called *ideology critique:* They must assess the basic self-understandings of those whom they study as to their truth and rationality, they must explain why and how any self-misunderstandings arose and continue to function, and they must suggest in what ways these misunderstandings can be corrected. Examples of important social theories for which ideology critique is central are those of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Jürgen Habermas, and some feminist theories.

Deconstruction is yet another form of critique in the social sciences, one inspired by the philosophy of Jacques Derrida and postmodernism more generally. Deconstruction is the procedure in which that which is hidden in an entity (such as a category or a social formation) is brought to light and shown to have been part of this entity, even though it ostensibly is something antithetical to it. For example, the category "heterosexual," and a social order based on this category, might rest on a contrast between heterosexuality and homosexuality, in which the latter is typically conceived as defective. But deconstruction might show that heterosexual identity is in fact parasitically dependent

on homosexuality, even as it tries to exclude or subordinate it—indeed, that homosexuality may even be a hidden aspect of the identity of heterosexuals. What is true for the opposition between heterosexuality and homosexuality may also be true for other antinomies: white versus black; colonizer versus colonized; sane versus mad; or the saved versus the damned. In these and similar cases, deconstruction seeks to show how such oppositions inadvertently invert, or collapse, or spill over into one another. In general, deconstructionists believe that schemes of meaning, despite their apparent coherence, often embarrass their own ruling conceptual logic, and so deconstructionists fasten on points of tension, ellipses, silences, or margins to discover the ways these schemes come unstuck or contradict themselves. They do so in part as a way of understanding the nature of the social formations and the tensions within them that these schemes of meaning underwrite.

The assessment of rationality and/or the coherence of schemes of meaning (including ideology critique and deconstruction) raise questions about the *objectivity* of social science. How do social scientists go about assessing rationality or meaning coherence in a way that avoids simply judging others on the basis of the scientist's own predilections? How can such an enterprise be cognitively responsible? Of course, questions about objectivity arise even if assessment of rationality and meaning coherence are thought to play no essential role in the social sciences, for the simple reason that social science investigates phenomena that include the social scientists themselves and that often have close bearing on their own values and what they hope or fear for themselves and their fellow humans. So the question inexorably arises: What role do social scientists' own values, or the values of the discipline, play in their theories, explanations, interpretations of meaning, and critiques, or what role should they play? Can or should the social sciences be *value free* (and what does this entail)? Are the so-called facts of the social sciences genuinely facts, or are they necessarily projections of the scientists' own values? Even more generally, how should objectivity be conceived: Does it require that social scientists become blank slates? Should they remain utterly neutral? Can objectivity be conceived in terms of intersubjectivity?

It ought to be clear that the social sciences are indeed complex enterprises. They involve at least three main undertakings: the interpretation of meaning, causal explanation, and critique. An adequate philosophy of social sciences will perforce have to answer the question, "What is the relationship among interpreting the meaning of acts, causally explaining them, and critiquing the ideology on which they are based?" This question is central in the philosophy of social sciences, whereas it plays no role at all in the philosophy of the natural sciences.

Relation to Political Theory

Even though philosophical theories of the social sciences are metascientific theories (theories about theories), and thus might appear to have no connection to political theories about how societies should best be organized, metatheories about the social sciences are in fact characteristically connected to substantive theories of social life and to moral visions about it. Thus, the philosophy of social sciences has deep connections to political theory. The explanation for this is that what counts as a good theory of social life cannot easily be separated from a sense of what counts as a good society. There are at least two reasons why this should be so: First, metatheories consist in part of accounts of how the knowledge gleaned from social science should be used in social and political life, and questions about how knowledge should be used are inherently normative questions. Second, understanding and explaining social phenomena require assessments of their rationality and the coherence of the meanings that underlie them on the part of social scientists, and such assessments are also essentially normative. Thus, it is no accident that from its very inception, the philosophy of social sciences has been coupled with political theory. This connection has continued right down to the present day.

Arguably the philosophy of social sciences began with the writings of Claude Henri de Rouvry, comte de Saint-Simon, who proposed that human history could be divided into three stages, the last of which—the scientific—would involve understanding social life scientifically and applying its results to politics (a reform in which the "the government of men by men" would be replaced by

"the administration of things"—an administration that would be possible only because of the knowledge that a scientific study of humans would provide). Auguste Comte developed this line of thinking, calling for and roughly outlining a truly scientific understanding of human behavior and society as part of his program to reform politics in what he called the positivist age (one can see the relationship between the philosophy of social sciences and political theory in the title of his most succinct statement of his views: "The System of Positive Polity: A Plan for the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society"). Comte deeply influenced John Stuart Mill, who developed a sophisticated account of social science in book VI of his *System of Logic,* "On the Logic of the Moral Sciences." It is interesting that, against Comte, Mill thought that a human science constructed along the lines of natural science would undergird a truly liberal democratic society, rather than an administered one. In recent years, those who have advocated a naturalist approach in the philosophy of social sciences have continued to draw the connection between their version of naturalism and the use of social science so conceived for political life. Some (ranging from the apocalyptic B. F. Skinner in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity,* to the more measured Karl Mannheim in "The Prospects for a Scientific Politics" in *Ideology and Utopia,* to the more pedestrian calls for social and economic planning such as Harold Lasswell's *A Preview of Policy Science*) have claimed that social science properly understood and practiced underwrites an active use of social-scientific knowledge in the shaping of social life. Others (such as Milton Friedman in *Capitalism and Freedom*), though equally committed to the scientific nature of social science, have claimed that social science underwrites at most a limited role for planning and intervention.

Those who have rejected naturalism for humanism of one sort or another have not been loath to draw out the political implications of their work. Earlier it was mentioned that many German theorists in the late nineteenth century rejected the idea that social science can be like natural science; this line of thought reached it apex in the writings of Max Weber, who wanted to articulate a methodology adequate to the understanding of cultural, economic, and political phenomena, in part because he thought that such an articulation had profound implications for political life (his famous essays, "Science as a Vocation" and "Politics as a Vocation," make this abundantly clear). In more recent times, the somewhat politically conservative implication of the hermeneutic approach is evident in the writings of Gadamer, just as the somewhat radical political implications of ethnomethodology are articulated in the writings of Garfinkel.

Meanwhile, yet other conceptions of social science were being promulgated in part for decidedly political reasons. Thus, Marx's remark in the *Theses on Feuerbach* that "heretofore philosophers have only interpreted the social world; but the point is to change it" was a prelude not just to an alternative account of social life but also to an alternative account with explicit political intentions of how social life should be studied. In particular, Marx envisioned a social science that was not just *scientific* (in the sense of providing explanatory hypotheses that are empirically testifiable), but also *critical* (in the sense that it revealed the ways in which social arrangements and behavior were internally inconsistent and were thus untenable in the long run), and *practical* (in the sense that it provided a course of action to transform the social arrangements so that they no longer were marred by their internal contradictions). In this, Marx was not unlike that other great theorist of human behavior who focused on the ways it is inevitably neurotic and on ways that its neuroses could be managed if not eliminated, Sigmund Freud. In the twentieth century, the so-called Frankfurt School of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and most notably today, Jürgen Habermas, has continued to proffer a critical understanding of social theory as the basis for altering what its thinkers see as the repressive structures of modern life. Other important thinkers have also offered models of social analysis that are explicitly tied to moral and political goals, including Foucault's *genealogy* as a weapon against what he called the disciplinary society, and feminist accounts of social science promulgated as a way in part to undermine patriarchal society.

In general, the deep connection between social science and political action means that philosophy of the social sciences will always have an important relationship to political theory.

Brian Fay

See also Agency; Anti-Foundationalism; Behavioralism; Critical Theory; Critique; Emancipation; Empirical Theory; Empiricism; Essentialism; Explanation; Functionalism; Genealogy; Hermeneutics; Interpretive Theory; Paradigm; Phenomenology; Postmodernism; Rationality; Realism; Science of Politics; Scientific Realism; Structuralism; Structure; Systems Theory; Value-Free Social Science

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PHYSIOCRACY

Physiocracy is an intellectual movement that arose from the encounter between François Quesnay (1694–1774), physician to King Louis XV, and Victor Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau (1715–1789), a noble landowner, famous for his book *L'ami des hommes* (1758). In the 1760s, the movement gained momentum thanks to the emergence of talented men such as Pierre-Samuel Dupont de Nemours (1739–1817); the abbot Nicolas Baudeau (1730–1792), who placed his periodical (*Les Ephémérides du citoyen*) at the disposition of the school; and Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière (1719–1801), a former administrator in the French West Indies who became the author of a major book, *L'ordre*

naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques, in which the political views of the school were made available to a wider public.

Physiocracy means the power of nature. The term came from the role that Quesnay and his followers gave to nature in the production of wealth. The fertility of mother earth rendered the agricultural sector the origin of wealth, or net surplus (*le produit net*)—industry and trade adding no more than the cost of labor (wages) to this original value. The physiocrats considered free trade, whether international or national, of the utmost importance (Steiner, 1998) because this would reduce costs. The policy was contrasted starkly with contemporary mercantilist thinking, according to which money flows consequent on a positive balance of trade (in which exports were to be preferred to imports), trade was thought to be the source of wealth and power, and monopolies were positively welcome.

In a series of papers published in the *Encyclopédie* during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), Quesnay outlined how the wealth of the country could be increased by free trade in grain. Building on this, he constructed an argument that demonstrated how taxation of the net surplus could promote the military power of the nation. A systematic exposition of the doctrine was published by Mirabeau—and Quesnay played a major role in the writing of these books—as *La théorie de l'impôt* (1760) and *La philosophie rurale* (1763). Their proposals for a policy of free trade were partially and hesitantly implemented in the mid-1760s, but this prompted political unrest, and traditional grain trade regulation was reintroduced in the early 1770s. Adam Smith was impressed by their arguments and met some members of the group while traveling in France during 1764. Their economic and political views were still current during the French Revolution (Dupont was a member of the Constituent Assembly); and this was not least owed to the fact that major political leaders, such as the marquis de Condorcet or Abbé Sieyès, were well versed in this new political economy, even if they were opposed to important features of it (such as the nature of wealth and of political organization).

Legal despotism (*le despotisme legal*), or the inescapable authority of the law of nature, was the unfortunate name that Quesnay gave to the physiocratic conception of political organization. After the baron de Montesquieu's critique of despotism in the *Spirit of the Laws,* this was an unfortunate choice of terminology. Consequently, physiocratic political theory was easily derided, and then abandoned—notably by French liberal economists who had welcomed it as a proponent of laissez-faire economics, but condemned the physiocrats as political thinkers. Nonetheless, historians and political theorists have come to consider physiocratic theory as an important stage in the making of modern political thought.

In Quesnay's political economy, interest is the focal point of political organization. This contrasts with Montesquieu, who had claimed that honor was the source of action in a moderate monarchy, and to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who had placed virtue at the heart of his republic (Charles & Steiner, 1999; Faccarello & Steiner, 2008). Enlightened interest is the foundation, thanks to which economic government can perform its function: providing food and realizing supreme military power. Michel Foucault, in this respect, is correct when grounding his conception of liberal governmentality on the physiocratic view of markets (Foucault, 2007): Markets are a clear instance of a social device through which actors are driven by their interest. Hence, in the new form of political organization, the legislator governs by allowing economic agents to carry out the actions that they freely intend. The object of government would be the population in general, and not the three orders of the ancien régime; and political economy would be the cognitive resource.

Economic government could be organized in terms of two different systems. According to Quesnay's (2005) *Despotisme de la Chine* and to Le Mercier de la Rivière's *Ordre naturel,* the king would govern with the aid of adepts in the new science of political economy, so that he might be sure that positive laws were the implementation of natural laws. Quesnay's *Tableau économique* offered a simple decision rule: A good positive law must increase the amount of *produit net* available to the country. In contrast to this technocratic approach, Mirabeau and Dupont (when secretary to A. R. J. Turgot as Louis XVI's *Contrôleur général des Finances*) were in favor of representation for the landed interest in local assemblies, which would have control of local administration, including the administration of the tax system. In

each instance, education would play a major role alongside public opinion in securing an optimum economic order for the nation, conforming to the perspective that Jürgen Habermas (1989) has articulated.

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See also Biopolitics; Classical Political Economy; Condorcet, marquis de; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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Place

The concept of *place* is familiar in everyday life. We map our spatial world into discrete places, ranging in scale from the microscopic to whole galaxies. Moreover, this concept is a complex one that straddles a number of fields: political science, geography, planning, environmental studies, sociology, philosophy, architecture, and other branches of social theory. Consequently, any discussion of the concept of place must go beyond traditional political theory.

In one sense, the concept of place is obviously political. Politics is to a significant degree about the governance of demarcated territorial units, from ancient empires and city-states to the modern nation-state and subnational divisions and municipalities. In political theory, the spatial elements of politics go back to classical thought. Aristotle offered a kind of place, the *polis* or city-state, as an ideal site for politics, and discussed at length the proper spatial dimensions and physical layout of the polis. Later theorists, notably Jean-Jacques Rousseau, undertook similar discussions about the physical bounds and characteristics of the political community.

Perhaps more importantly, place is a political concept because spaces are constituted through social and political deliberation and conflict. Places are not just political units, but political *creations*.

It should be noted that the concepts of space and place are also used metaphorically in politics and political theory, through terms like public sphere or public sector. Such spatial metaphors reflect how social interactions, political deliberation, and other forms of public life have often been carried out in spatially defined areas, including marketplaces, meeting halls, government buildings, legislative houses, churches, town squares, pubs, and sidewalks. Such spatial imagery lends itself to nonspatial realms of political interaction, such as the Internet (i.e., cyberspace) and other telecommunications and mass media.

The entry elucidates the theoretical and political significance of the concept of place and also notes some of the relevant literature. The entry first defines *place,* a concept that is most clearly developed in the field of geography, and distinguishes it from a related term, *space*. The next section outlines recent and contemporary issues in theorizing about place and place-based politics. The entry concludes with a discussion of the politically controversial nature of place.

Defining the Concept of Place

What is a place? In somewhat technical terms, David Harvey says that a place is a physically distinctive parcel of space with rough boundaries that persists over time. However, though a place is demarcated out of space, the concepts of space and place should be distinguished. The term *space* generally applies to abstract physical dimensions that can be represented quantitatively as measurements

or sets of coordinates. Furthermore, a unit of space, such as a cubic meter or square foot, is universal—it is the same everywhere. Places, by contrast, are particular, distinctive, and concrete and must be described qualitatively. Places are constituted by objects and their various attributes, as well as by social and physical relationships and ascribed meanings. There is also a temporal dimension here—to be a recognized place, these constituents must persist in some arrangement for some period of time. An important point, the constituents *are* the place—there is no preexisting spatial "container" that surrounds them. A spatial unit only comes into real existence in the form of an actual place and its constituents. As noted by Henri Lefebvre, absent actual places, space is abstract and conceptual.

Geographers see places as constituted by both natural (i.e., nonhuman) and social influences: geological, chemical, biological, and ecological forces and interactions; physical substances; living and nonliving things; human artifacts; social relations; human language; and cultural meanings. *All* places qua places, even wilderness areas, the ocean floor, or other places lacking a significant visible human influence, are in some measure human creations. Certainly, the Earth's physical structure, ecology, and topography precede human interaction with the world. However, human beings—and probably other highly evolved animals—must interpret the naturally given in order to map it into bounded, discrete places. Lefebvre thus famously talks about the "production of space" as a social process.

Though places necessarily have some stability, they are also dynamic in terms of character and dimensions, changing in response to natural and social influences. At the same time, places themselves influence the objects, forces, and relationships that constitute them and the beings that inhabit them. Consequently, Robert David Sack describes places and human identities—both individual and collective—as mutually constitutive. Thus, people identify themselves to a significant degree with the places where they live, work, play, or visit, and their interactions with such places shape and modify the character of these locales. Geographers therefore emphasize how culture is spatially embodied, enacted, and developed through places and human interactions with them.

The boundaries of places are also dynamic and ambiguous. Boundaries are porous to countless external natural and social influences that do not respect rigid demarcations. Moreover, boundaries are also often fuzzy, as places shade into one another, even when they have established legal borders. Politics often rely on clearly established boundaries, but such boundaries are continuously transgressed by a variety of forces and interactions. For example, the boundaries of the United States are legally defined with respect to Mexico, but ecological and social influences flow back and forth across the borders, and it may be difficult to determine, for example from a cultural standpoint, when one is precisely in one nation or another. The difficulty of defining a place's boundaries is of course exacerbated by the fact that individual places themselves embrace myriads of shifting, evolving places within their own bounds.

Place in Contemporary Social and Political Thought

Contemporary geographers like Doreen Massey, often reflecting postmodern sensibilities, have put great emphasis on the shifting, unbounded, and internally diverse and hybrid nature of places. With globalization, and its associated increase in the transcontinental flows of people, capital, goods, culture, information, invasive species, and pollution, social theorists have also posited an actual decline in the stability of places and place-based identities, especially since the 1970s. Manuel Castells argues that a "space of flows," constituted by global networks and exchanges of capital and information, is disrupting place-based and identities and relationships. Many contemporary social and political theorists thus talk of a "deterritorialization" of human existence.

Contemporary geographers and political theorists also stress the fundamentally contested nature of places and their boundaries. Because places are partly the result of human interpretation of the spatial world, the creation of places is inevitably bound up with conflictual political dynamics. Relevant political forces here include cultural, moral, religious, ideological, and ethnic differences; power relations (such as race, class, and gender); conflicts over resources and territorial jurisdictions;

and debates over the proper treatment of the natural world.

Given such contestation, no place has a single, undisputed character. How does one define the character of a multiethnic, multicultural city like Toronto, London, New York, Miami, or Los Angeles? Is Northern Virginia really part of the South? Does the cultural character of New Orleans depend on it being a fundamentally African American city? Is the identity of East Jerusalem Israeli or Palestinian? Is Northern Ireland Protestant or Catholic? Are the forests of the Pacific Northwest richly diverse, vibrant old-growth ecosystems, or are they overgrown, "decadent," and in need of management through logging? Is a neighborhood slated for demolition and redevelopment "blighted," or is it a thriving community and home to its residents?

Political and social theorists have accordingly focused on the various political dimensions of the creation of places. Among these are the interaction between conceptual representations of places and the lived experience of place; the role of capitalism in constituting and commodifying the spatial environment; the disruption of place through globalization; the role of racial and class segregation and identities in shaping the geography of cities; the role of economic, political, and sexual privilege in constituting that most intimate of places, the home; the role of home as, conversely, a refuge for women or people of color resisting domination by men or whites; and, more generally, the role of various intersecting social relations in unsettling notions of place as stable or clearly bounded. Most of these perspectives also emphasize the influence exerted by places themselves rather than seeing places as merely passive recipients of social and natural forces.

Another key area for political theorizing about place has been in the field of urban politics. Much of this theorizing has come from urban planners. Reflecting the importance of place in defining identity and culture, twentieth-century planners like Charles-Édouard Jeanneret (a.k.a. Le Corbusier) and Jane Jacobs debated how the built environments of cities and other communities should best be designed to promote certain human goods. As James C. Scott recounts, these debates often revolved around whether communities should be more or less centrally planned by government or business to maximize efficiency and related values like mobility and ease of administration, or whether communities should nurture a complex, diverse street life. While Le Corbusier and other "modernists" inspired mid–twentieth-century, top-down public and private sector redevelopment efforts like urban renewal, Jacobs and other critics of modernism inspired neotraditional planning movements like new urbanism.

Political struggles over place are also central to environmental politics, and environmental political theorists have investigated the contemporary politics of place as an important source of ecological values and resistance against globalization, capitalism, technocracy, and anthropocentrism. Wilderness and biodiversity preservation efforts; environmental justice movements against local toxic pollution and environmental racism; antisprawl movements; neotraditional urban planning; local conservation alliances between environmentalists and resource interests; and efforts to revive local agriculture have all championed the protection of place against what they see as the homogenizing, dislocating, antidemocratic, exploitative, and ecologically destructive character of global capitalism. These movements often affirm the value of a "sense of place." A sense of place entails a detailed awareness of the character and history of one's ecological and social environs, and an identification with, and attitude of care for, one's locale.

The Controversial Nature of Place-Based Politics

Place-based movements have been critically received by contemporary theorists. Harvey and others point out the potential for place-based identities and movements to breed parochialism and reactionary nostalgia and foster impotence in the face of global economic and political forces. It also hardly needs to be said that the protection of ethnically, racially, or religiously defined places from outsiders has led to chauvinistic violence and even genocide. Contemporary political and social theorists also argue that too much emphasis on the importance of place in human social and political life threatens to promote an unfounded, "essentialist" account of human nature as fundamentally dependent on geographic awareness and identity. Moreover, environmental political theorists

caution that an overemphasis on place preservation can lead one to disregard the dynamic character of places and stifle a place's healthy ecological and social development. They also argue that some environmentalists, particularly bioregionalists, tend to overlook the socially constructed and politically contested nature of places and instead see the natural world as providing a ready-made geography, with discrete regions and ecosystems, for human beings to inhabit.

However, a rejection of place-based politics might itself be deeply problematic. Despite the dangers of attachment to place, having a recognized, stable set of places that one inhabits, identifies with, and cares for may indeed be fundamental to navigating the spatial world. Both Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger emphasized the importance for human flourishing of coherent, enduring spatial surroundings. More recent theorists, including Iris Marion Young in a discussion of the politics of home, have reiterated similar themes. Indeed, the contemporary theoretical emphasis on places as fluid, porous, contested, hybrid, or diverse may overlook the importance of spatial coherence and stability in human experience.

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See also Arendt, Hannah; Aristotle; Environmentalism; Essentialism; Globalization; Green Political Theory

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Plato (427–347 BCE)

Plato was the first ancient Greek political philosopher and indeed the first philosopher to leave a large and systematic body of work exploring the relationship between ethics, politics, metaphysics, and epistemology. His importance is such that Alfred North Whitehead famously described all European philosophy as a series of "footnotes to Plato" (1978, p. 39); he also founded the first prototype of the modern university, known as the Academy, where Aristotle studied under him. He is often seen as the founder of utopianism, though the word was invented by the sixteenth-century humanist and Platonist Thomas More, and so it is in strict terms an anachronism to use it of Plato.

Living in the ancient democracy of Athens (punctuated in his young manhood by two oligarchic coups) and witness to the trial and execution by the democracy of his revered teacher Socrates, Plato left the city for some years afterward, traveling probably among the politically and philosophically distinctive Pythagorean societies of southern Italy, and at some point made the first of three visits to Syracuse. He went on to compose a large number of written dialogues, most of them featuring Socrates as a character. Two of these dialogues are an order of magnitude larger than all the others, and they—*The Republic* (with Socrates) and *The Laws* (without him)—are in modern times considered to be the major works of Plato's political thought, sometimes supplemented by the shorter and more enigmatic *The Statesman.* But in fact, all of the dialogues have some bearing on politics, and many of them—including the sequence of dialogues aligned with Socrates' trial and death, the engagement with the value of rhetoric in *The Gorgias,* and the parody of Pericles' funeral oration in *The Menexenus*—are permeated by it. This entry considers Plato's engagement with Socrates

and Athens, and then explores the respective contributions of *The Republic, The Statesman,* and *The Laws,* concluding with remarks on the purposes of Plato's writings and the overall nature and contribution of his political theory.

Plato, Athens, and Socrates

Plato was born into two aristocratic families in a society in which the place of the aristocrats was politically problematic, though economically privileged. Athens was the leading democracy and intellectual and artistic center of the Greek world, having overthrown tyrants at home and then withstood Persian monarchical military force. By the time of Plato's birth, Athens was locked in a lengthy struggle with Sparta, a complex society allying itself with oligarchies that drastically restricted political participation to wealthy elites, as opposed to the Athenian-led democracies enfranchising the artisans, rowers, and farmers, whom Greeks referred to as the "many" and the "poor." Both before and after their defeat by Sparta and the temporary overthrow, and then restoration, of the democratic regime in 404/403 BCE, Athenian democrats insisted on the equal claim of each (male) citizen to political participation not only in the plenary assembly, but also in being able to be selected by lot to serve as jurors (there being no expert judges) and as officials and members of various public bodies. Democratic equality meant equal laws for rich and poor, equal opportunity to serve in most public roles, and equal opportunity to make one's case in the assembly or the law courts. To exploit that opportunity, in the absence of any formal or public educational system, Athenian citizens—especially the wealthy elite—were increasingly tempted to send their sons for training in rhetoric and other forms of intellectual debate and display by local and visiting experts. Such technical training complemented the pervasive learning of myths and ancient epic poetry, recited to musical patterns, and the tragic and comic drama that the city commissioned for its festivals. Philosophy, at the time of Plato's birth, was a general term for wisdom; there were some speculative texts on the nature of the physical universe with moral implications, but no discipline of ethical or political inquiry.

This was the world that Socrates challenged. While he did his duty as a citizen, he did not seek political power or influence. And although he was born to an artisanal family of sculptors, he did not seek wealth through his teaching; indeed Plato's Socrates proclaims that he did not teach at all. (Socrates left no writing of his own; we know of him from a small number of texts, which paint varying portraits, so we concentrate here on Plato's depiction of him.) Instead, he spent his time associating with a wide range of people: Athenian and non-Athenian, young and old, ignorant and self-proclaimed experts. In Plato's version of *The Apology* that Socrates gave at his trial, Socrates says that he did this in order to understand what the Delphic oracle had meant in telling a friend that no one was wiser than Socrates. Socrates concluded that he was wise only in knowing that he was not wise. But he was driven to inquire not about the nature of reality, as "pre-Socratic" philosophers had done, but about how one should live, arguing that the wise would live virtuously and that it was imperative to discover what the virtues were. The politicians and experts with whom he engaged did not stop to understand the nature of courage before waging war or claim to understand the meaning of virtue when teaching rhetoric. Most important, the democratic procedures of Athens gave no formal weight to knowledge or virtue, allowing citizens to make public arguments and decisions on the basis of their own desires or delusions. These themes—the nature of knowledge and virtue and the importance of knowledge in political rule—dominate Plato's presentation of Socrates and indeed his dialogues as a whole. It is in this sense that all of the dialogues are political.

While Socrates' life had posed challenging questions to democracy, his death at its hands seems to led Plato to a disgust with democracy that matched the disgust of the oligarchical faction in Athens that he had already conceived (despite being closely related to several of the leading conspirators). Athenian democracy was clearly unable to tolerate Socrates. This posed to Plato the questions not only of how one should live as an individual, but of what a society would look like in which someone like Socrates would be valued as beneficial rather than feared as dangerous, and more generally, of what was the nature of political knowledge and how it could be expressed in public arrangements, including rule and education. To

answer these questions, Plato invented a new literary genre and indeed transformed the notion of philosophy itself. In *The Republic,* he focused on the question of an ideal city, to be ruled by philosophers who are akin to Socrates; and in *The Laws,* he focused on a second-best city, where the law itself embodies the knowledge that had been the province of the philosopher kings in *The Republic.* Yet as this formulation suggests, although the city of *The Laws* is clearly stated to be a second-best ideal, this does not mean that Plato's fundamental theoretical and political concerns are not cogently expressed within it. Scholars are divided on whether Plato's works share the same outlook ("unitarian"), or whether his views changed over time ("developmentalist"); a compromise would suggest that although the foci and contexts of the dialogues alter, the underlying concerns and ambitions remain constant. The Socratic investigation of the good life led to the investigation of what sort of polity could accommodate that life, all the while exploring the underlying values and virtues on which such ethics and politics rely, and the associated logical, epistemological, and metaphysical questions that they raise.

The Republic

Whereas many Platonic dialogues, especially those featuring Socrates, end inconclusively in *aporia,* or pathless confusion, *The Republic* succeeds (at least on its own terms) in countering the two most dominant and dramatic challenges that are posed within it: that justice is simply a mask for exploitation by a ruling class of those it rules (advanced by Thrasymachus in Book 1); and that justice is, although not so drastically exploitative as Thrasymachus contends, a social settlement that would be better for each individual to violate, if he could get away with it (advanced by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book 2, though as a thesis they wish to hear refuted rather than one they endorse). To do so, Socrates redefines justice by means of delineating a virtuous city and a virtuous soul, and then identifying the specific source of justice (widely accepted as one essential element of virtue) within each. This delineation is itself a redefinition, as Socrates carves up social structure and psychology in ways that democratic Athenians, at least, would have generally rejected, but seeks to make this plausible to his elite young Athenian interlocutors.

Specifically against the egalitarian Athenian polity previously described, Plato insists that there must be a separate group of rulers within the city, divided into those performing strictly military functions and those who will exercise a broader guardianship based on wisdom. Thus, he divides the city into three classes and insists that although citizens must be chosen meritocratically for each group, they must be made to believe that where they belong is natural and necessary. (This is to be done in part via the "noble lie" of common citizen earth origin but distinct types of inborn souls. The sinister aspects of this lie have frequently been discussed, not least in Karl Popper's powerful attack on Plato, but the fact that the lie is to be believed, if possible by the rulers as well as their subjects, suggests that it is not a method of propaganda as Popper alleged, but rather a mythic source of social cohesion.) This is a view of politics that bases a notion of rule in the idea that some rule and others are ruled, and where the identity of these groups does not change. Aristotle would dramatically reject his teacher on this point in defining the citizen as one who shares in both ruling and being ruled (*The Politics,* Book 3), but we can also see that although Plato rejects such reciprocity and participation, he is equally rejecting the notion of politics and rule as inherent domination, which is advanced by Thrasymachus in *The Republic,* Book 1. Instead, he is arguing for a notion of rule that is beneficent, aiming entirely for the benefit of the subject, rather than the benefit of the ruler. Indeed, despite their inherent virtue, the rulers of the ideal city are to have an austere regime imposed on them to protect their subjects further: They are not to possess any private property, instead being fed and housed by the city, and they are not to form their own families, instead procreating at the city's orders and raising their children communally. These stringent measures, known imprecisely as Plato's "communism," have had a significant afterlife of their own in political theory, inspiring the French revolutionary Gracchus Babeuf, for example.

The specific parts into which Plato divides the soul would also have been controversial for an Athenian reader, although it has been extremely influential in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and,

more generally, Western thought since Plato. He subordinates the source of pride and anger, which the Greeks called the *thumos,* to the rule of reason, treating it as a subordinate means rather than as an independent source of value as the competitive, touchy Athenians tended to see it. And he controversially denudes appetite, seen as only part of any capacity for evaluative discrimination, in order to argue that it must be wholly controlled by reason. Finally, while in the case of the city he had argued that political rule will benefit the subject, so he claims that the psychic rule of reason will benefit the whole person by taming his subject appetites and thumos, enabling him to identify himself with his human attributes rather than his lionlike thumos or beastlike appetites. The notion that citizens' happiness—in Greek, *eudaimonia,* which can be roughly understood as a blessed life of good fortune and flourishing—should be the aim of politics, and that this depends on individual self-rule where possible, to be supplemented or replaced by political rule where necessary, is a key contention in political theory.

Who are these rulers to be? *The Republic* is radical in arguing that they must be philosophers, and so refers to them as "philosopher kings." Only philosophers, driven by the love of truth and learning, will be sufficiently indifferent to ordinary desires and appetites to ensure that they will not misuse their power for personal gain. Such a philosophic nature is a requirement for being a philosopher, but it must be allied with a range of physiological and temperamental good qualities, and then perfected by gaining knowledge. Within the just city being described, this will be done by a thorough process of education. Such education must begin at birth, or even before, with proper treatment of pregnant women, and develop through childhood games, stories, and songs that train both body and mind into the habit of being governed rationally and moderately. For example, children are to be educated not to express excessive emotion at funerals. Those youth deemed capable of continuing to a full philosophic education will engage in mathematical studies combined with military training; after the age of 30, they will be trained in philosophy and dialectic; and at 50, those surviving further intellectual and practical tests will be brought to see and comprehend the good in itself, which they will then use as a model for ordering themselves and the city as they alternate turns of ruling with one another.

The notion of the good in itself, referred to as the Form of the Good, together with the other Forms, such as (particularly stressed in *The Republic*) Justice and Beauty, is one of the most complex and influential aspects of Plato's metaphysics. Although scholars are divided as to whether the Forms should be interpreted as another higher world transcending the physical world, their political role is less controversial. The Forms embody the objective political knowledge that the rulers need and on which their rule is based. Yet *The Republic* is able to give only similes for the Forms, rather than to define them fully. The Form of the Good is compared, famously, to the sun: Just as the sun makes visible the physical world, so the Good makes intelligible the world of the Forms (however one interprets that). And most indelibly, the city's predicament insofar as it rejects knowledge of the Forms is compared to being trapped in a cave, in which the prisoners have only artificial firelight and reject the very idea of natural sunlight (an image again of the Forms) as offensive to their own condition. (The role of simile in the dialogue is carried further with the construction of the myth of Er in the closing book, which mixes the traditional Greek notion of Hades with an idea of reincarnation to convey the moral message that the happiness gained from well-ordered souls, and the unhappiness caused by souls dominated by appetite or thumos, continues into any future life. Use of myth by Plato, and its relationship to his rational arguments, is a major field of study in itself.)

The insinuation that existing democracies are like caves carries over into the analysis of the imperfect regimes into which the ideal city is said inevitably to decline. The notion that the ideal city is inherently politically fragile has again been influential. Although the flaw identified by Socrates focuses on the inevitable eventual failure of the philosopher kings to grasp the right moment (*kairos*) for action, later traditions of Greek- and Roman-inspired republicanism would focus on the inherent fragility of popular virtue. In tracing the decline from the ideal aristocracy (rule by a group of philosopher kings and queens) to a timarchy governed by honor rather than reason; an oligarchy governed by the desire for wealth; a democracy governed, or rather not governed, by the

oscillation of moods and desires; and a tyranny dominated by the basest desires of greed and lust, it emerges that only in the ideal city are city and soul in harmony. Only in the ideal city will its inherent psychological and sociological tendencies be self-reinforcing. All the other regimes are by nature unstable. For example, while the oligarch in the oligarchic city still has a measure of order in his soul, though supplied by calculating avarice rather than by reason, his son will rebel against this order and give free rein to his diverse (though not yet overpoweringly tyrannical) desires. So it is not only that the rule of reason establishes the right kind of stability; it is also that only the rule of reason can ensure stability at all.

The Statesman

Although *The Republic* argues for the need for rule and the need for it to be based on knowledge, it says surprisingly little about the precise nature of that connection. What sort of knowledge is relevant to politics? This is explored in a dialogue in which Socrates is featured only at the outset, but the main speaker is described as a Stranger from Elea, who, in the companion dialogue, *The Sophist,* is asked to explain the Elean view that the sophist, statesman, and philosopher are three distinct kinds, rather than being merged into one or two. Having defined the sophist (not once, but seven times) in *The Sophist,* Plato turns in *The Statesman* to do the same for the statesman. Thus, the dialogue focuses on the nature of the statesman, who is defined by his type of knowledge in relation to other types of knowledge, rather than exploring any political structure of an ideal regime.

The statesman's type of knowledge emerges slowly and after several methodological changes of direction. An initial set of divisions of different forms of knowledge or skill (*technai,* in Greek) leads to an estranging definition of statecraft as simply herding the human animal. This is corrected by a constructed myth, this one designed to show that humans are capable of autonomy and that they need specific forms of political care distinct from caring for their other needs, rather than being the animal-like subjects of a generalized herding. But the myth is criticized in turn for having been overly long and complex, and this leads to a discussion of the appropriate kind of measure for philosophical matters (qualitative, in terms of the right or appropriate, rather than merely quantitative). And this qualitative measure, in the domain of time, specified as the notion of the *kairos,* or right moment, will turn out after a further methodological innovation (comparing the division of statecraft to the example of weaving) at the heart of defining political knowledge. The other arts must all be used in the city and are essential to care for various aspects of human life. But the job of the statesman is to determine the right moment at which these arts—and in particular, the arts of generalship, rhetoric, and judging—should be used. The statesman must also try to embed this knowledge in the community, by moderating the opposing temperaments and virtues of his citizens by modulating their opinions and, through arranged marriages, also modulating the characters of their progeny. Thus again, albeit in a few sketched pages at the end of the dialogue, we find Plato stressing the need for knowledge and reason, not only to rule as it were from above and outside, but also to be incorporated into the fabric of life through eugenics, education, and culture.

A final key political innovation of the dialogue is its discussion of law. Famously, the Eleatic Stranger contends that whether rule is according to law or against it is not a valid criterion of rule: only knowledge is such a criterion. But his young Athenian interlocutor finds this hard to accept. The Stranger defends his view by imagining a world in which all decisions and judgments of the arts were entirely governed by law: He imagines that such a world would collapse of stultification and ignorance. Thus, he suggests that law is irrelevant to knowledge, though he concedes that in the absence of a true statesman able to give orders to each person at once for their whole life, law may be an essential, if second-best, expedient. That judgment of law as an alternative to knowledge may seem to be drastically altered in *The Laws,* where law is presented as an embodiment of *nous,* divine wisdom and reason. But in fact, in both dialogues, knowledge provides the fundamental title to rule. Where knowledge is lacking, something else will have to fill the gap, as the law made by nonexpert assemblies can do in *The Statesman.* But law may alternatively be based on and embody knowledge, as proposed by the founders of Magnesia, the second-best ideal city of *The*

Laws, who themselves are implied to possess that knowledge (perhaps not soaring to the philosophical heights, but sufficient for founding the city).

The Laws

Consisting of 12 books and apparently unfinished, *The Laws* is an even vaster and more complex work than *The Republic,* and one that until recently has been sorely neglected in modern discussions of Platonic political theory. Socrates makes no appearance in it. Instead, the discussion is led by an Athenian Stranger who is making a pilgrimage on Crete with two other elderly men, one a Cretan and one a Spartan. Thus, the dialogue is framed by an acknowledgment of the presence of the gods, and this theocratic framework is carried over into the constitutional arrangements they propose for the city of Magnesia (a city that the Cretan has purportedly been invited to help found and lead as a new colony). The discussants refer to a city similar to that described in *The Republic* as the best regime, but as one that should be treated as an ideal for approximation, rather than for wholesale implementation. Thus, in place of *The Republic*'s ban on property and family for the rulers, all the citizens of *The Laws* will be allowed households, but their land will be granted to them by the city, and their fertility regulated within marriages. Similarly, rather than rejecting democracy as a principle of government altogether, Magnesia will blend the principles of monarchy and democracy exemplified by ancient Persia and ancient Athens, respectively, as Crete and Sparta are said to some extent to do. The people will have varying levels of political privileges according to their property class, and will participate in magistracies, but the law will be supreme (and the counterpart to philosopher kings will be adapters of the law, rather than direct rulers).

The notion of law itself is altered in this dialogue: whereas in *The Statesman* it had been defined as a stubborn autocrat who dictates by force, in *The Laws* this is seen as only one method of rule, and an inferior one at that. Better is a double rule of law, in which persuasive preludes or preambles convince most citizens to obey before the autocratic use of force (in the form of a threatened sanction) need ever kick in. But here again, contrary to some interpretations, it is the knowledge embodied in the law that licenses it to rule. The method of rule—whether by applying persuasion or applying the last-ditch option of force—is secondary to that fact, important in itself.

The Laws continues and intensifies the deep concern with the minute details of education and culture that we found in *The Republic.* The first book is almost exclusively about the varying Cretan, Spartan, and Athenian regulation of drinking parties or symposia, and later books give detailed and practical proposals for criminal, civil, and commercial law, proposals that can be shown to draw on a deep knowledge of actual practice in all these cities, and that share both Athenian and Spartan preconceptions in varying respects. Yet there are only two mentions of philosophy in the work, and although it contains one piece of magnificent philosophical argumentation for the existence of the gods and their concern for humans, it is significant that this piece of philosophy is itself devoted to a theological topic. The theological horizon of the dialogue, a dialogue concerned with making itself a suitable subject of study for the future Magnesians, narrows its philosophical horizons while displaying more fundamental political continuity than might at first be recognized.

Conclusion

Plato's political thought is complex and in some respects elusive: The dialogue form should make us cautious as to what extent any given position, even of the leading interlocutor, can be simply ascribed to Plato. Beyond those interpretive disagreements, there is controversy over the basic shape of his thought: whether the pinnacle of philosophical and political ambition in *The Republic* degenerates into compromise and disappointed hopes in *The Laws.* The notion of such a degeneration is often tied to the story of Plato's three journeys to Syracuse. This story is told in 13 Letters, which may be authentically by Plato but are probably a production of his school, and so must be considered with that in mind. Plato had first visited the court of the tyrant Dionysius in about 387 BCE, and is said to have become close to his advisor Dion. When the son of Dionysius succeeded as Dionysius II, Dion is said to have tried to make him a philosopher king, with Plato returning in about 367 BCE to help. The venture failed, Dion was banished, and a third visit

by Plato to Dionysius II a few years later was unsuccessful in persuading him to recall Dion. The writing of *The Statesman* is sometimes associated with the second voyage (it is dated also by possible hints in its precursor and companion *Theaetetus*), and the sad story as a whole, with a transition from *The Republic*'s faith in philosopher kings to the Athenian Stranger's claim that no human can be trusted to rule without corruption. Yet in fact, both dialogues accept that the possibility of a noncorrupt potential ruler may depend on divine fortune. *The Republic* makes no claim that a philosopher king will certainly appear (there is no guarantee of this, though it is said to be possible), whereas *The Laws* does not give up on the rule of reason, even though not associating it with the rule of particular individuals in the second-best city. Rather than seeking evidence of discouragement in this sequence of the three political dialogues or in the dialogues as a whole, one can see the dialogues themselves as a bulwark against discouragement. As surrogates for political activity, and as sites of thinking and questioning, they constitute Platonic political theory as a formidable and still living enterprise.

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See also Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr; Ancient Democracy; Aristotle; City-State; Happiness; Myths; Neo-Platonism; Tyranny; Utopianism; Virtue

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Pleasure

The nature and desirability of *pleasure* (*hedone* in Greek, *voluptas* in Latin) was a key question in ancient ethics and one that had important political and social implications. Bodily pleasures in particular were frequently felt to require strict control by the individual. At the same time, the provision of access to pleasure also functioned as an instrument of social control.

The imaginary society depicted in the Homeric epics (composed around 700 BCE) placed a high value on the sensual pleasures of life, on sex, baths, food, the last two being offered to guests as part of the rituals of hospitality. Such pleasures were, however, only fleetingly available to the warrior heroes as a result of their efforts in battle. Even here, however, certain pleasures may prove dangerous; two examples in *The Odyssey* are the story of the Sirens (Book 12), whose song lures sailors to their deaths, and the honeyed lotus fruit (Book 9) that makes those who consume it forget their home and thus their identity.

Later periods of Greek culture came to regard pleasure as distinctly problematic. One factor in this change may have been the development of the city-state and the consequent weakening of the aristocratic culture and its replacement with a more collective ethos that tended to view material luxuries, and the physical pleasures derived from them, with suspicion. Thus, the Athenian General Pericles is said by Thucydides (Book 2) to have presented

the availability of pleasure, at the right moment, as one of the characteristic advantages of democratic Athens. Yet he praised the Athenian war dead in the same speech for placing the needs of the city before their personal enjoyment and that of their families. In the account of the physical and ethical impact of the plague at Athens that follows, the citizens' privileging of their personal pleasure is presented as a key symptom of the city's moral collapse.

The Greek moralizing and didactic tradition frequently contrasted the easy pleasurable life with the hard effort of the morally laudable one: In the story of the choice of Hercules, attributed to the Sophist Prodicus (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.1.21–34), the allegorical figure of Vice is associated with pleasure, luxury, and a beautiful appearance. Like Hercules, Odysseus becomes a figure for self-control and moderation (*sophrosyne*) in the face of temptation that were put forward as the ethical ideal.

Among the ancient philosophers, Plato depicted Socrates in *The Philebus* arguing against the proposition that pleasure was the chief good in human life. His disdain for the body, in particular, led to the rejection of physical pleasure and, in *The Republic* (Book 3), Socrates severely criticizes the Homeric depiction of gods and heroes as susceptible to the pleasures of food and sex. However, Socrates, in *The Philebus,* distinguishes between different kinds of pleasure: Mixed and inferior pleasures are associated with various aspects of social life—envy of fellow citizens or the conflicting passions aroused by tragedy and comedy—whereas the intellectual contemplation of geometric form is mentioned as a source of undiluted pleasure. Similarly, philosophical discussions, such as those depicted in the Platonic dialogues, may be a source of pleasure themselves. This distinction between different qualities of pleasure is developed in Book 9 of *The Republic* and given a political dimension: The tyrant is a slave to base and sensual pleasures, whereas the philosopher king enjoys rational pleasures, and the democrat lies between the two extremes, but his freedom to pursue pleasure degenerates into tyranny.

Aristotle, in *The Nicomachean Ethics,* similarly criticizes the unbridled pursuit of pleasure as a lack of moral control (*akrasia*) (7.11–14 and 10.1–5). However, pleasure is defined as resulting when an entity is able to act in accordance with its natural state (e.g., when a body is healthy or when mind is free to contemplate) and virtue is a necessary guide to choosing the correct pleasures.

The Hellenistic philosophers developed contrasting theories of pleasure: for Epicurus, pleasure was the supreme good, but it derived from the absence of physical pain and, most importantly, mental anxiety. Therefore, this entailed a careful choice of physical pleasures in order to avoid those that had potentially painful consequences, like overindulgence. Epicurus also sought to remove sources of needless anxiety, like false beliefs about divine punishment, in order to achieve the state of *ataraxia,* freedom from mental disturbance. The Stoics, by contrast, viewed pleasure with great suspicion and did not accept that it was the natural aim of all creatures. Pleasure was one of the passions that appealed to the lower, "irrational," and impulsive part of the soul: The first stirrings of these passions are felt by everyone, but the wise and rational man or woman will resist them.

In Rome, the distribution of pleasure was used for political ends. The rulers of Rome during the republic, and later the emperors, offered entertainments to the people in return for loyalty and popularity. In consequence, the Latin term *voluptas* (pleasure) is regularly used in the sense of "entertainment." A Stoic like Seneca rejected the games on the grounds that the pleasure they brought made the spectators more prone to vice.

In later antiquity, both pagan philosophers and early Christian thinkers inherited and developed the suspicion of bodily pleasure that existed in earlier philosophy. Both pagans and Christians attributed emotions in general to the workings of demons. Male sexual pleasure was an area of intense concern. In its extreme form, asceticism, Christianity rejected all bodily comforts. In practice, however, in the cities of late antiquity, the pleasures of the public entertainments continued to be offered. Despite the opposition of the church fathers, Christian emperors were powerless to stop providing entertainments for fear of the discontent that would be caused. The ascetic Christians who withdrew from public life to live in isolation perceived the city, with its various institutions of pleasure, as a particularly dangerous place. Early Christianity did, however, allow for a positive form of intellectual and spiritual pleasure: Origen argued in his commentaries on *The Song of Songs* for an intense spiritual joy, and Augustine understood a

type of pleasure (like Plato's intellectual pleasure) to be enjoyed by those who were free from sin.

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See also Aristotle; Augustine; Body; Happiness; Passions; Philosopher King; Plato; Theater: Antiquity and Middle Ages; Virtue

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Pluralism

At its most general, *pluralism* in contemporary political theory is the idea that we should attend to difference and multiplicity in society and politics in contrast with sameness and unity. Beyond that, pluralism can mean many different things. The multiplicity in question can be of political parties, interest groups, spheres of authority, or of religious, moral, or ideological beliefs, or paradigms of belief, or of cultures and ways of life, or of goods or values. The purpose of drawing attention to these dimensions of plurality may be to provide an empirical description of a culture, society, or political system, or to make a normative recommendation to the effect that some such aspect of diversity is desirable and ought to be promoted or accommodated.

The following are four main areas in which conceptions of pluralism have been advanced, either descriptively or normatively. Special attention will be paid to "value pluralism," as it is the least familiar.

Political Pluralism

Pluralism is commonly invoked as a description of politics in modern liberal democracies. In this sense, it refers to the multiplicity of interest groups and political parties that contest power in democratic systems and to the different locations and forums among which that power is divided. This contrasts with authoritarian or totalitarian political systems in which power is not divided or shared but concentrated in a single source, and in which plural interests and beliefs are discouraged.

By extension, pluralism can also mean the normative claim that democratic principles and institutions are superior to authoritarian ones, or that a polity benefits from having a vigorous contest for influence among many competing interest groups—as James Madison argues, for example, in *The Federalist*.

A related but more specific sense of pluralism refers to the doctrine advocated in the early twentieth century by the "English pluralists," G. D. H. Cole, J. N. Figgis, and H. J. Laski, who argued for a radical decentralization of political authority.

Pluralism of Belief

Another widely used sense of pluralism is to label the empirical observation that different people believe different things—particularly in modern societies, and especially when it comes to matters of religion, morality, and politics.

One of the most influential formulations of this claim, and one of the most significant attempts to draw out its political implications, is found in the later work of John Rawls. According to Rawls, modern societies are deeply conditioned by "the fact of reasonable pluralism"—the fact that individuals and groups hold strongly divergent views about how best to live, many of which are equally "reasonable" in the sense that they cannot be demonstrated to be false or inferior to other views. In the face of such reasonable pluralism, Rawls recommends a "political" liberalism that requires people's allegiance to liberal norms not as a "comprehensive" conception of the good, but only in the public realm of citizenship for the purpose of fair social cooperation.

Cultural Pluralism

Yet another dimension of pluralism emphasizes the diversity of human cultures. Again, this can be descriptive or evaluative. Descriptively, cultural pluralism refers to the fact that there are multiple

cultures or ways of life present within a single political society or globally. In its evaluative sense, cultural pluralism is the idea that multiple cultures ought to be accommodated and perhaps encouraged.

In effect, cultural pluralism in its evaluative sense is coextensive with "multiculturalism." Its various forms range from systems in which one culture is dominant but others are tolerated to arrangements in which multiple cultures receive public recognition and support on an equal basis. Both of these possibilities have been argued for within a liberal framework (e.g., Chandran Kukathas and Will Kymlicka). Alternatively, some political theorists have argued that genuine cultural pluralism requires political arrangements that go beyond the constraints of liberal democracy, which are sometimes argued to be themselves culturally biased (e.g., Iris Young, James Tully, and Bhikhu Parekh). Arguments of this kind usually commend intercultural "dialogue," in which liberal voices are no more privileged than others, as a central institution, practice, or image for a just society.

As a description of most modern societies, cultural pluralism is undeniably true. As a normative doctrine, its strengths include its apparently open-minded, tolerant inclusion in the political conversation of many cultural perspectives, some of which have been systematically excluded in the past by narrow and rigid forms of moral universalism. Its weakness is its tendency, especially in its nonliberal versions, to slide into moral relativism. If all cultures must be respected regardless of content, then harmful practices can be legitimated by cultural backing, and individual freedoms and rights, indeed toleration or respect itself, become just the contingent preferences of some cultures among others.

Value Pluralism

Moral or value pluralism is the idea, classically formulated by Isaiah Berlin, that there is a plurality of distinct or "incommensurable" values or goods. These often come into conflict with one another, giving rise to hard choices. For example, when liberty and equality collide, it may be difficult to determine how to rank them or trade them off against each other. Pluralism in this sense is contrasted with moral monism, according to which a single value or small set of values overrides or serves as a common denominator for all others—as, for example, in utilitarianism, where all values are measured in terms of "utility." For pluralists, utility (however defined) is no more fundamental or weighty or all-embracing than other important values. The political implications, if any, of value pluralism are widely disputed, with liberal, conservative, and "agonistic" views being the main players.

Note that value pluralism cuts across the other kinds of pluralism mentioned so far. In contrast with pluralism of belief, value pluralism does not make an empirical claim about the variety of people's actual beliefs, but rather a metaethical claim about the nature of moral (and perhaps other) value. In principle, value pluralism could be true even in the unlikely event that everyone happened to have the same moral beliefs—that is, even if everyone came up with the same answers to the hard choices pluralism imposes on us. In contrast with cultural and political pluralism, value pluralism emphasizes the plurality not of cultures or interest groups, but of values or goods. Moreover, a value-pluralist outlook is not committed by definition to multiculturalist or other pluralist political arrangements because its cultural and political implications are contested.

The concept of value pluralism can be said to have four main elements. First, at least some moral values are objective and universal. In Berlin's account, this means that there are at least some things that have in fact been valued by most human societies over long periods of human history. An alternative version is proposed by Martha Nussbaum, who argues (inspired by Aristotle) that certain goods (or "capabilities") are essential to human well-being. In either version, this first element of value pluralism immediately sets it apart from the relativist view that there are no shared human values. Second, there are several such universal and objective values—their plurality is irreducible. Third, these values often come into conflict with one another—as in the example of liberty and equality.

The fourth element of value pluralism is the most distinctive: The basic human values are "incommensurable" with one another. Literally, this means that the values are not subject to a common measure. The general idea is that they are so distinct from one another that each must be

regarded as an independent consideration, making its own unique claims on us that cannot be translated into any other terms. So, "liberty," for example, speaks with its own voice or has its own unique weight, and the same goes for "equality."

However, the more precise meaning of incommensurability, and the closely associated issues of its ethical and political implications, is vigorously debated. One way of approaching this debate is to look at the different answers people have given to the question of how we can choose among incommensurable values when they come into conflict. There are perhaps three main interpretations of choice under incommensurability, and each of these corresponds to a different account of the kind of politics that best fits with a value-pluralist view.

First, there is what might be called the "subjectivist" view. According to this, incommensurable values are wholly incomparable with one another; consequently, choices among them must be ultimately nonrational, or not guided by any reason that is decisive over others. This view implies acceptance of "agonistic" forms of politics that emphasize the inevitability, even desirability, of contests for power or recognition rather than reasoned debate and consensus. This position has been attributed to William Connolly, for example.

A common objection to the subjectivist-agonistic interpretation of pluralism is that it neglects ordinary moral experience. People are in fact often able to find decisive reasons for ranking or trading off conflicting incommensurables, if not in the abstract then at least in (some) particular cases. For example, it is true that impartial justice cannot be ranked ahead of personal loyalty in absolute terms—that is, in every case. But in a particular case there may be good reason to prioritize one over the other: justice will come before loyalty for the trial judge or public official, personal affiliation will come before impersonal evenhandedness for the parent or child.

Consequently, a second interpretation of choice under pluralism is often advanced: the "contextualist" view. Decisive reasons to choose in one direction rather than another may be generated by context. "Context" is of course open to a range of interpretation, but perhaps the most common understanding upheld by pluralists equates context with culture. Berlin, for example, sometimes refers to the need under pluralism to seek guidance from "the general pattern of life in which we believe." This approach implies a conservative, traditionalist approach to politics, in which moral and political choices are determined by reference to existing cultural traditions or settled ways of life. Such a conservative reading is found, for example, in some of the work of John Gray, and more consistently in the thought of John Kekes.

The problem with the conservative interpretation of pluralism is that although a specific situation may justify a particular value-ranking, cultural traditions claim authority across a range of different situations. Why accept one particular value-ranking as generally authoritative rather than another?

A third account of choice under value pluralism, which might be called the "conceptual" view, appeals beyond cultural context to principles of universal scope. These come from reflection on the concept of value pluralism itself. In Berlin, this possibility is no more than hinted at, but arguments along these lines have been developed by other writers. Here are three possibilities.

1. *Diversity of goods.* If pluralism is true, then there is a multiplicity of irreducibly plural values, and each of these has an independent claim on us. Prima facie we have reason to promote each of these values, hence as many as possible in a given situation—unless or until we have good reason to select some rather than others. Hence, at the level of a society, there's a prima facie case for policies that enable people to pursue more rather than fewer values. Given the general goal of value diversity, liberalism, with its strong emphasis on individual liberty, would seem to be a strong candidate for the best political vehicle within which to pursue that goal.

2. *Reasonable disagreement.* In the pluralist view, cultures or conceptions of the good life are essentially generalized rankings of incommensurable values. Many such rankings will be equally reasonable, and concerning these there is consequently room for people to disagree on reasonable grounds. It follows that, contrary to the traditionalist interpretation, pluralists cannot resolve the deepest value conflicts simply by appealing to a traditional or local conception of the good. Under pluralism, these are subject to reasonable and therefore permanent disagreement. Rather, the optimal political framework from a pluralist

perspective will be one that accommodates reasonable disagreement concerning the good, instead of endorsing and imposing one particular version of the good. Again, liberalism has a strong claim to meet this requirement.

3. *Personal autonomy*. Pluralism rules out reliance on both abstract monist rules, like utilitarianism and traditionalism. Both universal rules and local traditions represent particular value-rankings, which may be challengeable for good reason in particular cases. Therefore, pluralists should be willing to question the applicability of these predetermined norms and to rely on their own judgment in a strong sense. In other words, pluralists should have a capacity for autonomy because there are no ready-made norms conclusive enough to relieve them of that burden. If autonomy is required for good judgment under pluralism, then pluralist judgment is best made in a political environment supportive of autonomy—that is, once again, liberalism.

What kind of liberalism will this be? It will probably be a comprehensive liberalism, in contrast with Rawls's political liberalism, because it is grounded in a controversial account of the nature of the human good. Within the family of comprehensive liberalisms, the proper understanding of liberal pluralism is disputed between two main alternatives: first, a "Reformation" liberalism (so labeled and defended by William Galston), emphasizing the moral authority (within limits) of cultures and an ideal of group-based toleration; second, an "Enlightenment" liberalism, stressing the ethical weight of plural human goods over the authority of cultures, and emphasizing personal autonomy as an especially important (but not always overriding) value.

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See also Agonism; Autonomy; Berlin, Isaiah; Conservatism; Dahl, Robert; Disagreement; Discourse; Liberalism; Liberalism, Contemporary; Multiculturalism; Rawls, John; Toleration

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Political Participation

Unlike other political values and institutions closely associated with the contemporary practice

of democracy—like liberal rights, human equality, representation, elections, and mass parties—*political participation* among broad segments of the citizenry is so fundamental to the practice of democracy that it is impossible to conceive of democracy without it. Despite the diversity of institutional forms in which democracy has appeared over the last 2,500 years, democracy has always indicated a political society in which citizens, relative to members of other kinds of regime, have superior opportunities to engage in political life. How much and what kind of political participation is required in order for a democracy to exist are open questions, but that democracy needs widespread and regular political participation from its citizens is one of the few essential criteria that unites democracies from all times and places and distinguishes them from rival forms of government.

Yet, despite this broad theoretical consensus that political participation is a democratic good, there is still considerable debate within political theory about political participation, especially in three thematic areas. First, political theorists have long disagreed about the reasons why participation is considered valuable and, by extension, about what types of activities properly constitute participation. Second, there is ongoing debate about the permissible criteria on the basis of which a democratic polity might limit participation. And third, to the extent it is held that most contemporary liberal democracies do not maintain a sufficient level of political participation, there is disagreement relating to the empirical causes of this shortcoming, as well as the philosophical question of how to conduct democratic theory in light of it.

Participation as a Good

Although participation is generally held to be a good, the reasons provided for this differ. At least five explanations for the value of participation can be distinguished.

First, there is the *liberal* argument for political participation: that the protection of an individual's private rights and interests is greatly assisted by, and perhaps even demands, political rights to participate as a free and equal member in the institutions of political life. According to this account of political participation, which finds voice in such thinkers as John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and more recently Judith Shklar, civic participation is above all a defensive mechanism against real or potential abuses carried out by government or other citizens. If such participation leads to the enactment of laws and policies, these are less the creative act of a popular will than they are the programming of government in accordance with the pregiven, usually economic interests of civil society. Hence, the liberal model of participation links up with economic theories that understand politics primarily in terms of overseeing markets, protecting property, and maximizing social welfare.

Second, since Aristotle, there is the *teleological* tradition that conceives of political participation as the end of a happy and well-functioning life. Here, the argument is that human flourishing involves the opportunity to engage in civic life with one's peers. This claim was taken up by civic humanists of the Renaissance, like Leonardo Bruni, who celebrated political life as a setting for the realization of human virtue and as a practice that would bring glory to both the individual and the city. Teleological arguments have also been a familiar feature of the so-called republican revival in political thought. According to Hannah Arendt, a major figure in this revival, what makes political participation unique is that it takes place in a context of equality and nondomination, as opposed to the violence of technology and nature and the hierarchies of private and economic life. The political space, Arendt argues, offers participants the opportunity for self-disclosure, as well as the chance to engage in unpredictable, history-making events that escape the repetitive cycles of natural and biological processes. Political participation thus provides a chance to humanize—or rehumanize—one's life.

Third, political participation has been validated in conjunction with the ideal of *autonomy:* a democratic people's capacity to author the laws under which it lives. On this account, political participation enables citizens, otherwise confined by traditional norms and practices (and the hierarchies these usually involve), to consciously direct and refashion the norms and conditions of public life. This is a modern idea. It links participation to freedom in the sense of taking control of the destiny of the polity vis-à-vis forces of nature,

unregulated social processes, and other contingencies. The validation of participation in terms of autonomy can be found among various forms of democratic idealism, whether the participatory democratic tradition inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the tradition of deliberative democracy as it has been presented by Jürgen Habermas and many other contemporary supporters, or the pragmatic tradition introduced by John Dewey. Autonomy is probably the most ambitious conceptualization of the benefits of political participation insofar as it understands civic life as a tool by which a contingent historical generation might turn to politics to express its unique will and identity. One problem with this view is how to relate the individual participant to the majority, because it is not immediately clear how the participation of a single individual, in a polity with millions of inhabitants, could constitute the meaningful authorship of that citizen. For this reason, theories that treat participation in terms of autonomy are often lead to invoke a common good—as something that either is formed or is presupposed by practices of democratic authorship.

Fourth, a long-standing explanation for why political participation is a good is that it serves a *developmental function* for citizens who engage in it. This development has been conceived intellectually (participation develops the capacity to reason and to think for oneself), morally (participation expands a citizen's ability to trust others, transcend a selfish and overly materialistic perspective, and adopt a common point of view), and therapeutically (participation allows citizens to overcome the alienation, deracination, and anomie of modern life). The developmental argument figures prominently in the justifications for popular government offered by Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville—and, more recently, in the work of political economists who have emphasized political participation as a partial solution to the debilitations of poverty. Although empirical proof of this developmental thesis remains minimal, it continues to be influential, in part because it provides a defense of participation and democracy that makes no claims about complex and controversial processes of authorship and representation. Instead, the developmental thesis relates to the more modest, yet perhaps more palpable, educative benefits of active political life.

Fifth, the developmental thesis has been elaborated in a *community-based,* rather than psychological, manner: namely, as the claim that political participation provides various social benefits to the communities where it occurs. As Robert Putnam has argued, political participation, understood broadly to include not just engagement with government but associational life in civil society, increases the level of social trust within a community and thereby tends to improve communal values like the quality of schools, the crime rate, corruption, and tax evasion.

It is important not to exaggerate the differences between these five models. Because they are explanations for why political participation is a good—not whether it is so—they all share the common perspective of endorsing participation in civic life. Moreover, most democratic theorists subscribe to multiple perspectives. Rousseau, for example, is an originator of both the authorship and developmental models. And civic republicans are likely to acknowledge elements of all the models, with the possible exception of the first.

Nonetheless, these bases for supporting participation are distinct, and they have clear consequences for ongoing debates about how to define what properly may be considered genuine political participation. For instance, theorists informed by either the teleological or authorship models are likely to take a stricter view about what constitutes political participation, arguing that it be confined to formal acts of governmental decision making and not include mere membership in the voluntary organizations of civil society. The teleological and authorship models likewise foster a critical stance toward voting as too occasional, reactive, and binary to sufficiently enable citizens with the capacity to realize their nature or autonomously author the values, norms, and preferences that are to guide a free public life. By contrast, exponents of the developmental account of participation—whether individual or communal—are likely to adopt a wider view about what constitutes political participation. So long as participation promotes a civic education and positive effects for the community, it matters less to such theorists whether the participation is formal or informal, or whether it is linked to a substantial bifurcation between political elites with extensive decision-making authority and everyday citizens whose engagement

is only minimally involved with actual legislation. For liberals, the question of what constitutes participation cannot be separated from the results such participation has in protecting preestablished rights and interests. At the very least, though, liberals are concerned that citizens have full political rights and that, following Rawls, the fair value of these rights be realized.

Limits to Participation

Despite the existence of a broad consensus that, ceteris paribus, participation is a good thing, there is nonetheless widespread acceptance that political participation is not the only value in a democracy, and that, accordingly, political participation might properly be limited on the basis of at least three different criteria. Just how such processes of limitation are to proceed, however, remains controversial.

First, political participation is generally held to be constrained by the need to respect individual rights and liberties. This means, on the one hand, not mandating political participation, but rather respecting the rights of nonparticipants to drop out of the political process. With very few exceptions, such as Belgium and Australia, democracies do not impose mandatory voting; and conscription in the armed services, once a common practice for acculturating youth into a nation's political life, has increasingly been abandoned in favor of voluntary armed forces. On the other hand, limiting political participation in the name of respecting individual liberties means ensuring that both the activities of participation (such as public protests) and their consequences (such as laws) respect the rights of minorities and nonparticipants. The question of how to balance the right of participants to take meaningful political action with the right of nonparticipants and minorities to have their liberties shielded from such action remains a vexing practical and philosophical problem.

A second well-established limit to political participation is that it ought to be structured through a constitutional framework. Although revolution remains, in a certain sense, the paradigmatic example of political engagement, the political participation that democratic theorists usually have in mind is not revolutionary in nature, but rather something that flows through recognized institutions, respects existing legal norms, and seeks change through predefined, nonviolent, well-established channels. To be sure, this constitutional limitation is not universally recognized. In the United States, for example, democratic radicals from the late eighteenth century initially assumed that the meaning of popular government would consist not simply in the empowerment of locally elected legislatures (in place of monarchical authority), but that, additionally, the people at large, whenever they assembled, might override the formal authority of legislatures and other governmental organs. Such a perspective has had little impact, however, both because of the lack of radical energies on which it depends and because of the philosophical difficulties of how to define what might constitute a people at large.

A third limit to political participation involves the claim that it is not just the quantity of political participation that matters, but its quality. The most important theoretical contribution in this regard undoubtedly has come from theorists of deliberative democracy. Although deliberative democrats usually do not reject outright nondeliberative forms of participation—like voting, referenda, protests, or public opinion polling—they look to supplement and reform these practices through deliberative discourse and its alleged capacity for rationalization and legitimation. Even if most contemporary exponents of deliberative democracy no longer share the elitism that shaped the classical accounts of deliberation in Aristotle, Edmund Burke, and Mill, it is nonetheless the case that, in espousing deliberative discourse as the ideal method of political engagement, deliberative democrats focus primarily on how those empowered to make decisions ought to speak to each other and only secondarily on the accessibility of decision-making contexts to ordinary citizens. Whether and to what degree the practice of deliberation might accommodate widespread political participation is an open question in contemporary political theory.

Each of these limits not only represents a standard by which to judge better and worse forms of participation, but also indicates the way other values, irreducible to political participation, play a constitutive role in contemporary liberal democracy.

Nonparticipation

It is a common concern in political science to worry about existing levels of political participation, either because the absolute level is deemed too low (especially in countries like the United States where only approximately one half of the electorate votes) or because of the decline in various forms of political participation—including voting, party membership, and membership in voluntary organizations of civil society—that has occurred in most Western democracies since the middle of the twentieth century.

One question is causal: What explains the low levels of participation and, more generally, what empirical factors are correlated with political participation? Here, research routinely underlines the importance of socioeconomic status, as participation levels are highly correlated with such factors as an individual's income, occupation, and especially education. It is also the case that participation tends to be stratified in parallel with gender, racial, ethnic, and age-based hierarchies. Other important correlates of political engagement include home ownership and the length of residence in a particular locale. With regard to the decline in political participation, popular explanations often emphasize the decline in active forms of recruitment by political parties and voluntary organizations (whereas passive forms of recruitment, like check writing, have increased over the last few decades), a decline in ideological identification, and the stresses of mass society, where both the enormous size of contemporary polities as well as the tremendous technological, organizational, and financial resources required for effective political action within them alienate would-be participants from political life.

In addition to these empirical concerns, there is also the theoretical challenge of how to integrate the lack of full participation into normative models of democracy. Here, three approaches can be distinguished. First, there is the idealist approach that, even when it recognizes that existing levels of participation are too low, responds by arguing for the attractiveness of a polity characterized by greater participation. This approach is reflected by defenses of participatory democracy, such as Benjamin Barber's *Strong Democracy,* which simultaneously critiques existing levels of civic engagement while holding up the ideal of a more fully engaged citizenry. Second, there is the apologist perspective that acknowledges less than full levels of participation, but refuses to draw pessimistic conclusions. One of the oldest claims in this regard is the division of labor argument, found especially among early French constitutionalists like Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès and Benjamin Constant, that political life is a specialized task best handled by professional politicians so as not to burden busy citizens at work in modern commercial republics. In a similar vein, it has been argued more recently that low levels of political participation actually reflect public contentment with politics and a kind of tacit approval of existing laws and social structures. Third, a minority of theorists integrate an appreciation for low levels of ordinary political participation into their democratic theories by distinguishing between an everyday political life characterized by meager participation and special moments of heightened engagement. Both Bruce Ackerman's notion of "constitutional moments" and Sheldon Wolin's theory of "fugitive democracy," for example, present widespread civic activism as an effervescent and exceptional occurrence, taking place against a background of normal politics typified by much lower levels of political activity.

Outside of these three approaches, however, there is also quite simply an unwillingness to face the condition of nonparticipation. This unwillingness can be found in the heavy emphasis placed on voting (which of course is the exception, not the norm, of democratic life); in the way common, nonparticipatory forms of political experience, such as attention to politics and political knowledge, are subsumed beneath a primary focus on more active forms of political behavior, like campaigning and running for office, which are quite rare; and in the widespread assumption that the power of public opinion and the existing machinery of electoral politics are sufficient to make government accountable and responsive to the electorate, despite low levels of formal political participation among the citizenry. In general, then, even though most citizens most of the time are not participating in political life, much democratic theory and analysis proceeds as if this were not the case. How to handle the phenomenon of nonparticipation—and how to distinguish lower from

higher levels—seem a likely avenue of future research within democratic theory.

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See also Autonomy; Citizenship; Civic Republicanism; Democracy; Liberalism; Participatory Democracy; Representative Democracy

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Political Perfectionism

Political perfectionism is the view that one primary task of the state is to promote the good life. This view is as much about the good as it is about the state. It presupposes an objective conception of the good in the sense that a person's life is worthwhile if it exhibits a certain objective goodness or qualities not reducible to the person's own subjective likes or preferences. As such, political perfectionism is closely associated with ethical perfectionism.

Ethical Perfectionism

Historically, ethical perfectionism has defended the view that the good life consists of realizing a certain goodness inherent in human nature, such as certain intellectual or ethical faculties and virtues that are thought to be distinctively and essentially human. On this view, ethical perfectionism is about perfecting human nature, hence the term *perfectionism*. However, there are contemporary proponents of ethical perfectionism who do not subscribe to such a human nature–centered account of the good life, but to what is sometimes called an objective list approach. According to this approach, a person's life is good to the extent that it realizes some objective goods, such as satisfying social relationships, aesthetic experience, amusement, and play. Different contemporary proponents of this view may give different lists, but most of them think that these values are plural and distinct and that they cannot be organized and ranked into a hierarchy of goods. "Perfectionism" may not be the most suitable term for this objective list approach, for it does not suggest making perfect human nature as such. It does not even suggest, as least according to some proponents, that everyone should attempt to maximize these goods. How many and how deeply these goods should be pursued and realized in an individual's life is a question that does not seem to have a general answer fit for every person. Despite the unfitness of the term *perfectionism* for the objective list approach, proponents continue to use it to describe its position and to contrast it with opposing theories of the good, such as subjectivism or hedonism.

Perfectionist View of the State

Although different theories of political perfectionism may subscribe to different objective accounts of the good, they are united by a common understanding of the task of the state, which is that the state should create favorable conditions for people to appreciate and pursue the objective goods that make their lives better. As such, political perfectionism stands in opposition to the recent doctrine of state neutrality, which holds that the state should remain neutral toward conceptions of the good life and should neither invoke them in any justification of state action nor actively pursue them by political or legal means. In the last few decades, many liberal philosophers have strongly challenged political perfectionism and defended state neutrality. The debate between liberal neutrality

and political perfectionism touches on some of the most fundamental issues in political philosophy, such as the purpose of the state, the basis of political legitimacy, and the proper scope of state's authority.

In the long history of Western political thought, political perfectionism was a dominant view of the state. Many thinkers, from Plato to Thomas Hill Green, were political perfectionists. Furthermore, it seems that the perfectionist view of the state is a natural one. Many people care about the quality of their lives and have an interest in leading a good life, just as they have an interest in health, education, and employment. So if the state exists to help citizens pursue their interests by offering health services and education and promoting the economy, it seems natural that the state should also assist citizens by promoting objective goods that make lives better.

Joseph Raz, one of the influential defenders of political perfectionism, has given a forceful argument for the naturalness of the perfectionist view of the state. The argument has several steps. It starts with the claim that if something is good or valuable, then there is a reason to bring it about. It follows that there is a reason, though not necessarily a conclusive reason, to bring about valuable goods and ways of life, for they can make it possible for people to lead better lives. The second step in the argument is that if a reason applies to citizens, then it also applies to the state, for the state's task is precisely to help citizens to act on reasons that apply to them. In the case of the good life, if citizens have a valid reason to pursue valuable goods and ways of life (call it a perfectionist reason), then the state has a perfectionist reason to guide its action as well, and hence the naturalness of political perfectionism.

But naturalness does not imply correctness. Raz's argument immediately qualifies that although it is natural for the state to act on perfectionist reasons, these reasons may be overridden by concerns for effectiveness or personal autonomy. He argues that the state should not act on perfectionist reasons if such action would conflict with either of the following two constraints: First, individual action by citizens is more effective than state action in pursuing the desired results; and second, it is more important that citizens decide for themselves, even if they make a mistake and do not achieve the desired results, than if they get the desired results without choosing them. So the state should act on perfectionist reasons, but only within the constraints of effectiveness and personal autonomy.

The third and final step of Raz's argument is that although the two constraints may rule out state action in many cases, they do not justify a blanket exclusion of perfectionist goals as proper state pursuits. First, it is not the case that individual action is always self-sufficient. The market and civil society may harm as well as promote valuable ways of life and social practices conducive to the good life. And there is no reason to believe that state intervention in social life always creates more harm than good. The matter can be decided only on a case-by-case basis by looking at the best available evidence on the comparative advantages of state versus individual action. Second, it is also not the case that as a general rule people always prefer deciding for themselves what to do, even if mistakenly, rather than following the dictates of state authority. It all depends on the subject matter of the decision in question and the means of state intervention. One may consider the example of marriage. Many people in modern society want to decide for themselves whom to marry, even though they know that they may make bad choices and that some other agent might make better choices for them. However, when the matter is less personal, such as the promotion of arts and knowledge in society, and when the means of state action do not infringe on personal autonomy in any serious way, such as taxation, subsidy, and advertisement, then there is no reason that people must prefer individual action to state action if the state action is more effective. In sum, whether or not a particular perfectionist goal should be pursued by the state is a question to be judged on the merit of each case; it cannot be rejected in a blanket way by a general exclusionary rule like the doctrine of state neutrality.

Critique and Defense of Political Perfectionism

Despite its traditional dominance and apparent naturalness, political perfectionism has been strongly criticized in recent decades. Proponents of state neutrality have argued precisely for an exclusionary rule—a blanket rejection of conceptions of

the good life as a proper basis for state action. Ronald Dworkin is one such proponent. He states that one of the key tenets of liberalism is the view that political decisions must be independent of any particular conception of the good life or of what gives value to life. Because the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception or another. But if effectiveness or personal autonomy cannot justify such an exclusionary rule, what general reasons can do so?

Different proponents of neutrality have given different reasons, but one commonly invoked is the idea of respect for people. The idea is that the state would be treating people with disrespect if it justifies a policy or law by appealing to a conception of the good life with which people may reasonably disagree. Coupled with the belief that conceptions of the good life are objects of reasonable disagreement, the idea of respect for people supports an exclusionary rule that bars the state from appealing to any particular conception of the good life, for in doing so, the state would show disrespect to people who hold different conceptions.

Perfectionists have at least two replies to this argument. First, it may be said that the argument is too weak to reject perfectionist pursuits of the state. That a conception of the good is the object of reasonable disagreement does not entail that the conception is faulty or should be discarded. People may be said to be reasonable in making a judgment if they try their best to be intellectually honest, open-minded, and be willing to consider all points of view. But in this sense, reasonable people may still make mistakes so that their rejection of a certain view may be wrong even if it is reasonable. In this case, the state does not necessarily treat them with disrespect even if they disagree. Second, let us suppose that the argument is right and therefore that the state should not appeal to controversial conceptions of the good life (i.e., those that are objects of reasonable disagreement in the previous sense). But the state typically makes many different kinds of judgments and policies that are as controversial as judgments about the good life, such as those on social justice, public health care, national defense, environmental protection, and education, just to name a few. As a result, the argument of respect for people would also require the state to step out of many of its traditional policy areas, and this seems too radical a result for many liberal proponents of neutrality to accept.

In many of the liberal defenses of state neutrality, there is an asymmetrical treatment of the good life on the one hand and of other traditional state pursuits on the other. But why is the state's enforcement of controversial decisions problematic only in the case of conceptions of the good life and not in other traditional pursuits? What arguments can be given to justify the asymmetry? One argument, given by Thomas Nagel, is that on issues about justice, national defense, and such, although citizens may reasonably disagree with a particular policy, essentially all agree on the need for a unified state policy in that area. Local disagreements can be accepted and contained by a higher-order agreement on the need for state action and policy. For example, because citizens agree that a unified national defense policy is necessary for the survival and security of the country, they can reach a higher-order agreement to allow the state to make such a policy, even if it turns out to be controversial in the eyes of some citizens. But no such higher-order agreement can be obtained in the case of the pursuit of the good life, for there is no such necessity for a unified state policy on this matter.

Those who are sympathetic to perfectionism may reply that this is an impossibly stringent criterion of necessity. Such a criterion would exclude other issues that liberals would agree are appropriate objects for the state to pursue; for example, failing to adopt and act on a unified policy on education or environmental protection would not necessarily jeopardize the security or survival of a country. If, however, we move away from such stringent criteria as survival or security to a more relaxed one, such as improvement of the citizens' well-being, then traditional state pursuits such as education, environment, and public health would pass through, but so would perfectionist policies, for they also seek to improve citizens' well-being and can be effective.

John Rawls's argument in *Political Liberalism* can be seen as providing another answer to the asymmetry problem. Rawls distinguishes between disagreement on public policy and disagreement on the reason(s) used to justify that policy. For him, reasonable disagreements over social justice and other public policies can be acceptable so long

as the policies put forward by the state are justified in *terms* that are acceptable to citizens in a constitutional democracy—in other words, so long as they are justified by appealing to what he calls "public reasons," an expression that refers to the shared political values embedded the political constitution and culture of a constitutional democracy. If citizens justify their proposal in public reasons but come to different conclusions about what the state ought to do, this difference can be settled by means of majoritarian voting procedures. What is not permitted is that the state justify its policies—whatever the subject matter—with reasons that are not public and shared, but reasons derived from what he calls comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines, which are diverse and not commonly shared by citizens in a liberal pluralistic society. Hence, Rawls's argument against perfectionism is this: because perfectionist reasons are drawn from comprehensive doctrines of the good life, the state may not justify its policies with these nonpublic reasons.

To this argument, perfectionists may reply that not all judgments on the good life as such arise out of comprehensive doctrines or have to be drawn from them. There are many widely shared specific judgments about different aspects of the good life, as the objective list approach argues, such as aesthetic experience, satisfying social relationships, meaningful work, amusement and play, intellectual and cultural achievement, and personal autonomy. These goods are generally regarded as desirable for their own sake, and they can be found in many valuable ways of life. The acceptance of these goods need not presuppose any particular comprehensive doctrine. Rather, they are compatible with a great many such doctrines and are widely accepted by many people in modern society. So perfectionist values—at least a substantial number of them—can be regarded as public reasons to which the state may appeal in justifying its laws or policies. Although Rawls's argument does rule out comprehensive doctrines of the good as the basis of a state's policies, it may not rule out specific values that are commonly shared, and they seem not in short supply in liberal societies.

Joseph Chan

See also Liberalism; Pluralism; Public Reason; Rawls, John

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Politics of Recognition

The *politics of recognition* describes a politics that has arisen in recent years in which groups demand recognition for their identities. The identities at issue have been of many sorts, but include those associated with race, ethnicity, culture, religion, gender, sexuality, and disability. They also include minority nationalities and indigenous peoples. The politics of recognition is often contrasted with the "politics of redistribution"—a politics that treats class as the primary social category and the distribution of income and wealth as the primary issue of social justice. The politics of recognition is sometimes said to have supplanted the politics of redistribution, so that complaints of social injustice have shifted away from material inequalities and toward inequalities that consist in, or arise from, the misrecognition, nonrecognition, or

negative recognition of particular groups. Whether this shift has really occurred and, if it has, whether it should be welcomed are controversial questions. Some theorists regard the separation of the two issues as misplaced, and some, such as Axel Honneth, interpret all social struggles, including those over material inequalities, as struggles for recognition.

Recognition is a necessarily social phenomenon, involving both a recognizer and a recognized. To recognize is to acknowledge, but it is to give acknowledgment of a particular sort. Acknowledgment can be normatively neutral or negative; I might, for example, acknowledge another as inferior or unworthy, but that is not the kind of acknowledgment that people normally seek. "Struggles for recognition" are struggles for positive forms of acknowledgment: for recognition of status, legitimacy, or merit.

Recognition can be given through a society's formal arrangements or rules as, for example, when a society enfranchises a group or accords it a right of collective self-determination. But it can also be sociological, so that a group's enjoyment of recognition depends on the way in which it is viewed and treated by a society's members at large. What is going on in an act of recognition can also vary. Sometimes recognition is a matter of noticing and acknowledging, such that the act of recognition neither creates nor contributes to the value of what it recognizes. When we recognize the achievements of a great novelist or a great athlete, we do not think that the recipient's greatness is a product of our recognition. Rather, the author or athlete has merit independently of our recognition; we simply discover and acknowledge it. But sometimes recognition has a more constitutive role: It confers, rather than notices, value. That is typically true of recognition of status. When a society recognizes the members of a previously subaltern group as "equals," the group's equality of status can be understood as itself a product of the society's recognition: The group's legal or social status consists in the manner in which it is regarded and treated by others.

A third variant is recognition that sits ambiguously between, or that draws on, both of these forms. Consider recognition of a government's legitimacy by the international community. The international community will have criteria of legitimacy so that its recognition consists, in part, in its noticing and acknowledging that the government satisfies those criteria; to that extent, its recognition is not merely an act of will. Yet, in our world, recognition by the international community entails more than mere noticing; the act of international recognition itself serves to confer legitimacy on a government.

Recognition can be either general or particular. It is general when it recognizes by including the recognized in some general category, such as person, human being, citizen, or equal. Historically, struggles for recognition have commonly been for recognition of this general sort. Excluded or marginalized groups have, for example, sought recognition as people entitled to the same rights, freedoms, and status as others who already enjoy that recognition, or recognition as citizens entitled to participate on terms equal with others in the life of their society. Groups have also sought recognition as nations or peoples, entitled to the international status and the collective rights of self-determination that should accompany that recognition.

However, the "politics of recognition" is now more commonly associated with the "politics of difference" than the "politics of universalism," and thus with demands for more particular forms of recognition. Indeed, those demands are often associated with complaints that merely general forms of recognition are inadequate, homogenizing, and oppressive. Many groups now seek endorsement of their particular identities. So, for example, many gays now demand that straight people should endorse the legitimacy or the equal worth of gay sexuality; and an ethnic group or indigenous people might demand that outsiders should recognize the value of its culture and regard it as equal. Although demands for general recognition are normally demands to be included and treated identically with others, demands for particular recognition can be—though they are not always—demands for different treatment. These demands are still normally registered as demands for equality, but for a more "genuine" equality that is sensitive to the different needs of different identities rather than the difference-blind approach.

Demands for particular recognition often go beyond demands for status and become demands for recognition of merit. A minority may demand,

for example, not only that the majority accord it a status equal with their own, but also that they recognize the minority's way of life as possessing a value equal with their own. Demands for recognition of this sort are especially problematic. Given that people possess different and conflicting values, they cannot accord merit recognition indiscriminately. They can recognize that someone else has a status equal to their own and a right to live a life of which they disapprove, but that does not require them, absurdly, to applaud—or to pretend to applaud—what they deprecate. Moreover, when we move from status to merit, demands for equal recognition become unsustainable. We can insist that people accord one another an equality of status, but we cannot reasonably insist that, wherever they cast their gaze, they must discover an equality of merit.

Peter Jones

See also Difference Theories; Equality; Identity; Multiculturalism; Queer; Race Theory; Social Movements

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Polybius (c. 200–118 BCE)

Polybius was one of the three greatest ancient Greek historians, along with Herodotus and Thucydides. Polybius agreed with them in writing history as a disciplined intellectual analysis of the past, rather than a mere chronicle of events or propaganda for a political purpose. Like Thucydides, he focuses on political and military history, because this is the information his audience of aristocratic leaders needs to know most in terms of practical lessons. Besides other works now lost, Polybius wrote a 40-volume history of the rise of Rome to world power; only one fourth of it survives, yet this alone runs to about 800 pages. These *Histories* show Polybius's interest both in analyzing the causes of violent interstate interactions and his interest in the characteristics that make states strong or weak in a competitive world.

He was born to an aristocratic and wealthy family in Megalopolis in the Peloponnese, around 200 BCE. Megalopolis was a constituent town of the federal state called the Achaean League, which was organized on democratic principles, and Polybius—though recognizing that some kings could be outstanding leaders—was always wary of one-man rule. He received a sophisticated political education from the circle of men around his father, who was himself a prominent politician. Polybius was elected cavalry commander of the league (the equivalent of vice president) in 170/169, and a bright political future appeared likely. But his policy of caution toward Rome in the Third Macedonian War led the Romans to deport him to Italy as a political suspect, where he remained for decades. In Italy, he began his life over again as an exile, adapting to the situation by writing his massive work on the rise of Rome. He became well known and respected in Roman aristocratic society—though he was not afraid to criticize certain Roman policies. He was allowed to return to Megalopolis in 150 BCE, where he worked on his project for the rest of his life. He lived to a vigorous old age.

Polybius is most famous in the modern world for his argument in Book 6 of the *Histories* that it was the inherent strength of Rome's political system and way of life (its *politeia*) that allowed the Roman Republic to survive the Second Punic War—allowed Rome to fight to victory despite catastrophes such as those Hannibal inflicted on Rome at Cannae (216 BCE). Polybius described the political institutions of the Roman Republic in detail, stressing their basis in a system of checks and balances among three coequal branches of government. These were the consuls, the senate, and the people's assemblies. Drawing on the

political theories of Aristotle, Polybius argued that this "mixed constitution" (neither monarchy nor aristocracy nor democracy but a mix of all three) was a superior system and provided the efficiency of a strong executive (the consuls), the stability of a politically experienced group of leaders (the senate) at the heart of decision making for the state, and the power of public support and unity (voted by the assemblies) for the policies the senate proposed. Moreover, while Aristotle had touted the superiority of the "mixed constitution" in theory over the three simpler forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy), Polybius could point to the most powerful state of his time where it worked in actuality. Polybius's description of Rome in Book 6 had a profound impact on the founding fathers of the American Republic; Jefferson and Madison employed his work in creating the American system, and especially the idea of a republic as a system of checks and balances among three coequal branches of government. But politeia to Polybius meant more than political institutions: in explaining Roman ability to survive the Second Punic War, he emphasized not just the strength of institutions, but Rome's political culture as well, including widespread ideals of patriotism, physical courage, and self-sacrifice.

In discussing relations between states, Polybius emphasized the negative impact of the lack of international law: the absence of any authority with the power to interpose justice or compromise between fierce competitors meant that war was a normal outcome of the clash of interests between states. The prevalence of war is precisely why Polybius praises the Roman institutions: They enabled the republic to survive the inevitable heavy blows to which any state was liable in the Hellenistic anarchy. Besides the prevailing lawlessness, the other major element in interstate relations that Polybius underlined was what he called the growing interconnectedness (*symplokê*) between the eastern and western halves of the Mediterranean world. The two halves of the Mediterranean had long existed as two separate state-systems, a western system (centered on Rome and Carthage), and an eastern system (centered on the three great Greek monarchies in Macedon, Syria-Mesopotamia, and Egypt)—but starting during the Second Punic War, the two separate systems began to merge into one large system, where events in one part of the Mediterranean deeply affected decision making in the other part. The survival of Rome and the rise of Roman power were instrumental in bringing about the unification of the eastern and western subsystems—a condition reached, Polybius indicates, when he himself was writing circa 150 BCE.

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See also Herodotus; Roman Commonwealth; Thucydides

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Popper, Karl (1902–1994)

Karl Popper was a major twentieth-century philosopher of science and social theorist. He was born in Vienna, Austria, to a family of Jewish extraction. In his mid-teens, he was influenced by Marxism. The death of some workers in a demonstration that the Austrian communists had organized led him to question the rationality of his commitment to Marxism. Popper initially remained a socialist, but he became discontented with socialism because of problems of bureaucracy and increasingly critical of the Marxist-influenced political tactics of the Austrian Social Democrats.

Popper's initial academic concerns were in psychology, but he also developed strong interests in science and probability theory. His doctorate was related to methodological issues in psychology, and he increasingly turned to philosophy, one product of which was his *Logik der Forschung,* published in German in 1934 (Popper, 1959). Popper developed a striking, fallibilistic theory of scientific knowledge as progressing through "conjectures and refutations." One consequence of this, Popper stressed, was that there are no experts in the sense of people whose ideas were beyond question.

Popper, needing to flee Austria, obtained a lectureship in New Zealand. He started work on his *Open Society and Its Enemies* when Germany invaded Austria. In this and associated work (e.g., *The Poverty of Historicism*), Popper took issue with intellectual ideas he saw as influencing antidemocratic and totalitarian tendencies of the time, as well as offering his own suggestions about politics. Although political philosophy was not his major interest, his political writings are extensive—including essays in various collections of his writings, and the posthumous compilation of unpublished and previously uncollected papers, *After the Open Society*.

Popper's *Open Society* is a passionate work, in which he took issue with what he saw as historicist tendencies in Plato and Karl Marx. Historicism, for Popper, was the view that history has a particular direction or inherent periodization, which it is the job of the social sciences to discern, and which should influence our political goals. Popper, by contrast, argued that our fate is in our own hands. He also criticized utopianism—the bringing of visions of an ideal society to politics and attempts to plan society on the basis of such ideals. Popper argued that social change might be found unsettling and lead to a nostalgia for a stronger sense of community. Popper argued that life in an "abstract" open society, with its relative lack of face-to-face contact, might be unsettling. But accepting this, he thought, was a price that we must learn to pay for our freedom.

Popper's positive ideas included a passionate ethical individualism, which, he stressed, could be altruistic. He argued that what today one would call communitarianism typically misrepresented individualism as egotistical. Popper argued for the protection of the individual. His concerns were not just for liberal rights, but also for freedom from economic exploitation, and he favored a guaranteed income out of taxation. His approach had a Kantian feel to it, in which the significance of government was stressed, and it has some parallels with the recent revival of "republicanism." He also argued that the agenda for governmental action should be determined by a "negative utilitarian" agenda: more precisely by what people from different perspectives could agree called out for remedy, such as suffering and injustice. To this agenda, Popper argued that we should adopt an experimental method of "piecemeal social engineering." This would involve tentative experimentation with solutions to these problems, which—because of human fallibility, and as human actions typically lead to unintended consequences—should be the subject of monitoring. Here Popper stressed "the rational unity of mankind"—that is, that all people could potentially offer such feedback.

The Open Society is packed with ideas—notably in its extensive footnotes. Popper wrote the text in a clear and simple manner, and was concerned that this might give people a misleading impression that it was simplistic. Those approaching his *Open Society* should also consider that when Popper wrote it, he did not have a theory of how ethical and metaphysical claims could be rationally assessed (although in his view they were meaningful). The result is that it was at crucial points "decisionistic," rather than making use of his later view that such ideas can be assessed rationally if put forward as solutions to problems. *The Open Society* was influenced by aspects of Marx's views and by Popper's knowledge of, but disagreement with, Leonard Nelson's criticism of democracy. After World War II, Popper moved to the United Kingdom and taught at the London School of Economics until his (active) retirement.

Popper's later political writings include an acknowledgment of the significance of tradition and a critique of "the myth of the framework"—the idea that we can have fruitful discussions only with people with whom we are in fundamental agreement—although he also stressed the difficulties of reaching consensus. His later explicit realism in the philosophy of science, which he was willing to have described as "modified essentialism," has been argued should lead to modifications of his criticism of Marx's essentialism. Popper's ethical sentiments in *The Open Society* could be described as an egalitarian humanitarianism, and he was clearly looking to experimental, if piecemeal, government-led reform. Over the years, Popper became a little more conservative, but not in any systematic manner. Although he is sometimes grouped with "free market" conservative theorists, this misunderstands his views, and he was, right up to some of the writings of his later years, critical of free market ideology. His final work—included in *After the Open Society*—was a

plea for the introduction of a system of licensing for those involved in the production of television programs because of his concerns about the effects of the depiction of violence on children.

Jeremy Shearmur

See also Historicism; Liberalism, Contemporary; Marxism; Plato

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Pornography

There is little agreement about what constitutes *pornography*. The broadest definition, unusual today, is that it is any sort of sexually explicit visual or written material. The most restrictive definition would confine it to sexually explicit material that portrays and celebrates violent and degrading acts. In between are definitions that pick out material that is "obscene," another term that poses definitional problems. Although hard to define, pornography is an important topic for political theory: It raises questions about the relation between the state, law, and morality, and it raises hard questions for the topic of freedom of expression. Should law be used to promote moral views? And is all censorship wrong? Social conservatives, liberals, and feminists debate these questions, and liberals and feminists differ among themselves.

The social conservative view of pornography rests on a number of claims. The traditional family is an indispensable part of the good society, which is possible only if there is a climate of sexual restraint, and pornography—understood in quite a broad sense—tends to undermine that climate. And it is an essential role of the state to promote a moral climate that sustains important institutions. Those claims have been challenged by critics. There could be a good society containing multiple kinds of families, they say, and perhaps we are moving toward it. And sexual restraint may have been necessary in the past only because people were required to conform to a narrow family type. Perhaps, anyway, pornography acts as a safety valve, rather than undermining sexual restraint between people. And finally, states have no mandate from any democratic or constitutional source to promote a way of life that is regarded, by some, as good.

Liberals, however, are torn on the issue. On the one hand, freedom of expression is among their traditional demands, and they will suspect any proposal to restrict it, for they regard barriers to free expression as barriers to social learning. On this basis, they are likely to respond especially sharply to censorship proposals based on the idea of "obscenity," for what is taken to be obscene simply reflects prevailing standards, and obscenity-based censorship will thus be deeply conservative in effect, merely enshrining existing prejudices. Moreover, liberals, unlike social conservatives, object to putting the resources of the state to use in promoting moral views. Those resources should be confined to the prevention of harm. When they are used to suppress things on the sole ground that they are immoral, the implication is that the state is declaring some people's tastes to be unworthy—and no good theory of the state includes that within its legitimate aims.

But suppose pornography *harms?* If it harms people, then liberals will conclude that it must be taken off the list of protected forms of expression—like hate speech in most Western societies. If the harm in question is that involved in its production, then one set of questions arises. If actors in porn movies are assaulted, ordinary categories of crime apply. If criminal offences are held to be mitigated by the victim's consent, then issues arise because here, as elsewhere (e.g., in the case of prostitution), we do not have an agreed idea of what "consent"

requires, and advocates of prosecution are likely to favor a narrower idea of it. If the harm in question is harm occurring after the production of pornography, as a result of its distribution, then matters become more complex. Despite their resistance to limits on expression, liberals will be worried by forms of expression that tend to undermine their own ideals of equal liberty, and pornography that has an obviously inegalitarian tendency—because it portrays and celebrates the degradation of women—will be objectionable. Further, liberals may be driven to rethink the values that underlie their defense of free expression in the first place: Do these values support the freedom to express anything at all, or is their reach restricted to, say, political, scientific, or scholarly discussion? That question takes us to the foundations of liberal toleration itself.

For many feminists, the issue overlaps with the liberals' concerns. Does pornography—at least violent and/or degrading pornography—harm women? Three replies need to be distinguished: (1) pornographic representations amount, in themselves, to harm—they are a form of aggression; (2) viewing pornography leads particular individuals to acts of violence against women; and (3) the diffuse, cumulative effect of viewing pornography reinforces a socially prevalent idea that women are of value only as objects of sexual attraction, so that their ability to attain their own self-chosen aims is comprehensively undermined. Now if the first view claims nothing about consequences, it seems to merge with a moralistic view of the state that needs further defense, whereas if it does claim something about consequences, it seems to merge with one of the other views. The second view, if true, would clinch the matter, but evidence for it is elusive. The third view is compelling—even though evidence is elusive here too—at least to those who agree that we are entitled to make plausible guesses when important matters are at stake, especially when basically no important rival value stands in the way. However, if the issue is diffuse harm, things other than pornography—advertising, romantic novels—may be no less damaging.

Some theorists, however, see (some kinds of) pornography as a positive good. They see it as a way of transgressively breaking down taboos that restrict pleasure, or the categories that restrict pleasure's formulations. Finally, there are those who might agree with restrictionist arguments in principle, but object to censorship because in practice, even if sustained by good arguments, it will embody the bad judgments of the censor.

Richard Vernon

See also Equality; Feminism; Hate Speech; Liberty; Mill, John Stuart; Toleration

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Positive Theory

Positive political theory, also known as formal political theory, is the study of political phenomena through the use of formal language and analytical models. *Positive theory* distinguishes itself from normative theory in that it focuses on explanation or prediction of political outcomes rather than on normative political ideas. It is also distinguished from other empirical theories, such as anthropological and sociological approaches, in that it aims to develop deductive systems of knowledge. That is, in positive theory, certain statements are given as axioms or assumptions, and other statements, called theorems, are logically deduced from them. Whereas assumptions are supposed to be as simple as possible, theorems make statements about complex political phenomena and generate hypotheses that are testable against empirical observations. Positive theorists acknowledge that every theory-building attempt requires abstraction from reality, and thus, it is necessary to assume certain things. They attempt to make assumptions as explicit as possible, so that once data falsify the implications of a given theory, one can know what part of the theory should be modified.

Although not a defining characteristic, positive political theory, in practice, is mostly developed

within the framework of rational choice theory. Most models in positive political theory follow methodological individualism (i.e., they seek microlevel explanations in which individuals are the units of analysis). Moreover, they assume individuals are instrumentally rational, meaning that the individual has a well-defined preference over the outcomes that can result from her actions, and among her actions, she chooses the one leading to the best outcome. Typically, models include political actors relevant to the topic they study (e.g., candidates and voters in models of elections) and, for each actor, a simple objective is specified (e.g., a candidate maximizes her vote). Models are analyzed to find a stable point, called an equilibrium, in which no actor can be better off by changing her action. Because microeconomic theory has long applied this type of modeling and equilibrium analysis, positive political theory is sometimes called a (micro)economic approach to politics.

The pioneer of positive political theory within the discipline of political science is William H. Riker, who contributed to the field not only by his research on political coalitions, voting, and strategies, but also by building the Rochester school of political science. While Riker's publications in positive theory first appeared in the early 1960s, earlier studies from other disciplines, such as economics and mathematics, inspired Riker and contributed to later development of positive political theory. Among the most influential are Jon von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's work on game theory, John Nash's work on game theory and bargaining, Duncan Black's work on voting, Kenneth Arrow's work on preference aggregation, Harold Hotelling's work on spatial competition, and its application to democratic elections by Anthony Downs. Positive theory has continued to develop since then, becoming one of the central methods in various subfields of political science, including comparative politics and international relations.

Seok-ju Cho

See also Empirical Theory; Rational Choice Theory

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Positivism

Positivism is a philosophical attitude. Its main features are trust in science, opposition to metaphysics, and unified science. The last is the thesis that all sciences use the same method. Positivists share a common set of philosophical principles. However, sometimes they adopted different views on some important topics. Hence, there have been several strains of positivism—social, evolutionary, critical, and logical positivism. This entry describes each of these, examining the work of seminal thinkers in each of these areas.

The father of positivism was the French thinker Auguste Comte (1798–1857), who developed social positivism. Comte's primary aim was the reform of society. He greatly contributed to the birth of sociology. John Stuart Mill, the English philosopher, was one the best-known representatives of social positivism. Herbert Spencer, an English philosopher and sociologist, put great emphasis on evolution. His view is called evolutionary positivism. Richard Avenarius (1843–1896) and Ernst Mach (1838–1916) were mainly interested in philosophy of science. They gave birth to critical positivism. They asserted that pure experience is the only valid source of knowledge. Critical positivism influenced the development of philosophy of science in continental Europe. Finally, logical positivism was the leading school in the philosophy of science during the first half of the twentieth century. It exerted a major influence on American philosophy. Logical positivists denied the soundness of traditional philosophy. They asserted that many philosophical problems are indeed meaningless.

Social Positivism: Comte and Mill

Comte assigned to positivism the task of improving society. He believed that a reform of society was necessary to prevent moral and political anarchy. The French Revolution had destroyed the old social and political system. Every effort to establish

a new stable system had failed. Comte ascribed these failures to the lack of understanding of the laws that govern the dynamics of society. He believed that these laws have the same status of the laws of natural sciences. They are the subject matter of a new science, which Comte called "social physics" and later "sociology." The laws studied by sociology are important because they can give reliable forecasts, which are essential to predict the effects of the reforms.

Comte affirmed that he had discovered an important fundamental law about the development of ideas. It was the law of the three stages. The law states that human conceptions develop through three stages or phases. Comte called the three stages the theological, or fictitious; the metaphysical, or abstract; and the scientific, or positive. In the theological stage, the aim of research is to discover the first causes of events. These causes are identified with the will of deities. At its highest perfection, the theological stage keeps only one supernatural being—God—as the first cause of every event. The metaphysical stage substitutes the will of supernatural beings with the effect of abstract forces. Eventually, the metaphysical stage recognizes that only one force is needed—nature. The scientific (positive) stage consciously stops the vain search for the first causes. Science more fruitfully searches for the laws of connections between events. Science does not ask "why?" but "how?"

Comte built his classification of sciences on the foundations provided by the law of the three stages. Sciences reach the positive stage according to the complexity of their subject. The simpler arrives first; the more complex arrives later. The first natural science to reach the positive stage was astronomy. The other sciences that have reached the positive stage are physics, chemistry, and physiology (i.e., biology). Mathematics, the indispensable instrument needed by every science, plays a special role. The only science that still has not reached the positive stage is social physics (i.e., sociology). The aim of positive philosophy is to establish sociology as a positive science. Sociology, in its positive stage, can give reliable forecasts based on exact laws. Hence, sociology can help in improving society because reliable forecasts are essential tools to reform the society.

Comte stated that all sciences employ the same methods. Hence, there is no difference in principle between mathematics, natural sciences, and human sciences. Therefore, sociology uses the same method as biology and physics. The unity of science is the unity of method, not the unit of theories. It is impossible to explain all events by means of only one general theory. Every science utilizes the results of the simpler sciences. However, complex sciences are not reducible to simpler sciences. For example, though biology utilizes the information provided by chemistry and physics, it is not reducible to them.

Comte expressed a strong aversion to democracy. He suggested that government had to be i n the hands of industrialists, businessmen, and bankers. Inspired by the organization of the Roman Catholic Church, Comte planned a society based on obedience and hierarchy. He even developed a religion of humanity as a substitute for traditional religion. Women were responsible for the defense of morality. This rather surprising suggestion was probably influenced by his infatuation for Clotilde de Vaux. He met her one year before her death.

In the hands of Mill, who published a sympathetic review of Comte's philosophy, positivism reached some interesting results. Mill pushed the unity of science to the point of considering mathematics a kind of natural science. The laws of mathematics are not a priori, but their origin is in experience. Logic is an empirical science, too. Mill introduced utilitarianism—the theory that the rightness of an action is measured by the happiness that it produces—in the realm of positivism. He opposed utilitarianism to Comte's view that extreme altruism is necessary to produce the greatest happiness.

Evolutionary Positivism: Spencer

For Comte, unified science was the unity of method. For Spencer, unified science was the unity of theories. Hence, Spencer searched for a unifying principle. He believed that evolution is the general principle that can unify all fields of knowledge. Evolution shapes everything. It shapes inorganic matter, living organisms, individuals, and society. Evolution is the process of aggregation of matter and dissipation of motion. The structure evolves from a simple, incoherent, and homogeneous state into a complex, coherent, and heterogeneous state. The reverse process—dissolution—is

the acquisition of motion and the disaggregation of matter. To understand these definitions, look at the nineteenth-century theory about the solar system's birth. Initially, there is a gaseous nebula. Its structure is simple, incoherent, and homogeneous. Matter moves freely in the nebula. Later, matter aggregates into the sun and the planets. Their structure is complex, coherent, and heterogeneous. The gravitational influence of the massive bodies limits the movement of matter.

Both evolution and dissolution remain active in every stage of the life of every structure. There is a permanent competition between evolution and dissolution. During the juvenile phase of its life, an organism experiences the predominance of evolution. The life ends when dissolution prevails. The alternating predominance of evolution and dissolution is the norm in the intermediate phase of maturity. Equilibrium is impossible—its probability is too low. Even human society evolves according to the law of evolution and dissolution. The division and specialization of labor is the consequence of the evolution from a simple to a complex state. Evolution explains why society cannot be stable. There is no equilibrium in the struggle between evolution and dissolution. Hence, society is always subject to more or less radical changes. Every society is destined to ruin due to the final prevalence of dissolution. The law of evolution and dissolution thus governs society and living organisms in the same way. However, society lacks the kind of consciousness typical of living organisms. Society is not conscious, whereas its parts—the individuals—are conscious. On the contrary, living organisms are conscious, whereas their parts are not conscious. On this difference, Spencer based his extreme individualism. Society exists only to benefit the individuals.

Spencer, following Jean-Baptiste Lamarck's theory, believed that the traits acquired during the life of individuals are inheritable. Parents can transmit to their offspring the characteristics and the habits that they acquired as an adaptation to the environment. The organisms best adapted to the environment have greater probability that their offspring is best adapted too. This is the law of the "survival of the fittest." Society cannot intervene to mitigate the life of the "unfittest," because such an action is against the survival of the fittest. Those who care about the suffering of the poor interfere with the evolution. They make the struggle for existence harder for the worthy. Who are the unworthy, the unfittest? They are the unsuccessful and the reckless. They are the poor—this was Spencer's belief.

Critical Positivism: Avenarius and Mach

Critical positivism, also known as empiriocriticism, is the kind of positivism developed by Avenarius and Mach. The German philosopher Avenarius asserted that the distinction between things and concepts (i.e., mental images of things) is ill founded. He argued that in pure experience, the things are not distinguishable from their mental image. Our internal activity creates the two separate entities—the thing and its image—from pure experience. Avenarius called this internal activity "introjection." We can solve many philosophical problems by recognizing that the distinction between things and concepts is not given, but is the result of introjection. For example, the mind–body dualism is a meaningless problem. Introjection creates the distinction between the body and the mind, thus generating a false problem.

Mach was an Austrian physicist and philosopher. "Mach number" is the term for a unit of measure of speed. The name celebrates his pioneering studies on supersonic motion. Mach asserted that the Inertia of a body depends on the mass of the other bodies. Einstein named this principle "Mach principle." He acknowledged the positive influence that Mach's principle exerted on the birth of relativity theory.

Mach is well known for his theory of the economy of thought. The purpose of science is to provide us with an economic description of nature. Scientific theories are not literally true or false. We judge scientific theories according to their usefulness. The measure of the usefulness of a theory is its ability to give reliable predictions and procedures for acting on the world. Mach believed that science is an adaptive response of human beings to the environment. Science helps humanity in the struggle for survival.

Various themes of positivism converge in critical positivism. One theme is Comte's view that positive science gives predictions that help in planning actions. Another is Mill's utilitarianism, applied to the scientific enterprise. Unity of science is interpreted as the unity of physical and psychic.

Evolution explains science as an adaptation to the environment.

Critical positivism inspired the Russian physician and revolutionary Alexander Bogdanov. He held important positions in the Soviet Union in spite of his conflicting relation with Lenin. Bogdanov attempted a synthesis of critical positivism and Marxism. Lenin severely criticized Bogdanov's work. Lenin accused critical positivism of being a disguised form of idealism derived from George Berkeley's philosophy.

Logical Positivism

Logical positivism was the leading school in philosophy of science until the 1950s. It arose in Austria and Germany in the 1920s. Its members were the most distinguished philosophers of science of the first half of the twentieth century. The complete list is so long it would be useless in this context. One can specifically remember Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Hans Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap, and Carl Gustav Hempel. Their ideas were progressive, liberal, and sometimes socialist. Due to Nazi hostility, many logical positivists left Austria and Germany. They moved to the United States, where they influenced American philosophy. Currently, the influence of logical positivism persists, especially in the way philosophy is practiced and taught. This influence is evident in at least two points. One is the attention that philosophers pay to the analysis of language. The other is the central role played by formal logic and probability theory.

According to logical positivism, the only valid sources of knowledge are logical reasoning and empirical experience. Contrary to Mill's opinion, mathematics is a priori and reducible to logic. Natural and human sciences are grounded on experience. Their method is the same. There is a bi-dimensional unity of science. First, there is the unity of method. This unity is indeed partial because mathematics has its distinctive method. Second, there is the unity of theories, because every science is reducible to physics. Hence, contrary to Comte's opinion, social sciences are reducible to biology, which is reducible to physics.

There is no room for metaphysics in the philosophy of logical positivism. Metaphysics is the result of logical mistakes. One source of logical mistakes is the ambiguity of natural language. Another source is Kantian philosophy, which affirms that one can acquire knowledge without the help of experience, relying only on reason. The persistence of metaphysics in philosophy is a consequence of social and economical struggles. There is an alliance between metaphysics and theology in defending traditional social organizations. The competition between metaphysics and positive philosophy is thus a struggle between different political, social, and economical viewpoints. One purpose of logical positivism was the reform of education, university, philosophy, and art. The final goal was the construction of a "constitutive system" in which every statement is reduced to the concepts of a lower level. At the lowest level, every statement refers directly to the experience. From this goal follows the search for clarity, neatness, and intersubjectivity. They are reachable using a neutral symbolic language. This kind of language eliminates the problems arising from the ambiguity of natural language.

Logical positivists were active in advertising their ideas. They organized several congresses on epistemology and philosophy of science between 1929 and 1937. They planned an *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* that was never completed. Only the first section, *Foundations of the Unity of Sciences,* was published between 1938 and 1969. It contains two volumes with 20 monographs.

Mauro Murzi

See also Empiricism; Mill, John Stuart; Spencer, Herbert

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POSTCOLONIALISM

Postcolonialism is a stance framing theoretical or cultural responses to the diverse effects of modern European colonization. It also commonly implies a political commitment, because in the act of responding to the postcolonial condition, the theorist or artist strives to transform oppressive forms of sociality that arose in the context of modern European empire building and have often been sustained, even after decolonization. In seeking to describe, explain, and disrupt this complex history, the field of postcolonial studies is primarily focused on cultural analysis, which draws from various social and political philosophies to encompass a multitude of approaches and emphases that often conflict and contest each other. Accordingly, postcolonialism must be described not only in terms of the key concepts that characterize, unify, and delimit the terrain of postcolonial engagement, but also in terms of the internal debates defining a variety of positions within the broad field of study. In turn, the diversity at the heart of postcolonial experiences, conceptualizations, and expressions of worldly reality prompts new and emerging forms of postcolonial political theory, which challenge received notions of universality, neutrality, and consensus. In so doing, postcolonial political thought transforms established Western political theories and rethinks many of the concepts that conventionally ground political discourse, including power, citizenship, sovereignty, constitutional agreement, and entitlement.

Key Formulations

Colonization is the conquest and control of other people's territories. Imperialism is the policy and ideology of economic expansion that drives colonization. Colonialism is the discursive framework a colonial power mobilizes in order to justify acts of colonization. Much work carried out within the theoretical framework of postcolonialism is critically addressed to colonialism and the cultural practices that it created, and that in turn sustained colonial influence during periods of colonization. Other postcolonial work attends to the ways in which this colonial ideology was contested and disrupted at the time of colonization by the cultural agency of colonized people, eventually resulting in decolonization.

For each of the European colonizers, the existing material and social conditions they found in the colonial locations created particular perceptions and understandings of the inhabitants and determined distinctive ways of acting on them. The way in which the imperial center imagined the colony and its inhabitants significantly affected the type of settlement it engaged in and the system of governance it imposed. In turn, the various modes of establishing colonial relations created various types of imperial self-concept, which were, nonetheless, clustered into a common set of ideological justifications defining a culture of colonialism. The diverse nature of colonial practice also impacted variously on the inhabitants of the colonial locations, determining the particular nature of the transformation of their societies, economies, and cultures, and provoking the distinctive forms of resistance they engaged in. Accordingly, participants experienced colonialism and decolonization in dissimilar ways according to the specificity of their location and the nature of their identification with, or revolt against, a particular empire: The study of this diversity of experience is the focus of much of contemporary postcolonialism.

Other strains of postcolonial thought are tempted to search for generalizations in describing and explaining the vast reach of European colonization in terms of the driving force of capitalism. Indeed, much early postcolonial work on colonial oppression offered explanations inspired by Marxism and couched in universal terms of economic class exploitation. Early critiques of colonialism asserted that no matter where it took place, colonization essentially involved the economic exploitation of the colonized class by the colonizing class. An integral aspect of this early

postcolonial analysis was its contribution to the revolutionary resistance movements and liberation struggles associated with decolonization. This revolution was understood to involve the return of power, reclamation of land, and seizing control of the means of production. In this way, early postcolonial work, such as Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), was often firmly linked with a Marxist agenda, and the objective was not simply the removal of colonial structures of authority, but also the dismantling of the capitalist system that had been imposed at the time of colonization.

Culturalism is another perspective characteristic of much of early postcolonial thought. At times deliberately countering the economic reductionism of classical Marxist diagnosis and prescription, culturalist analysis privileges the central role culture plays, not only in the maintenance of colonial power but also in the resistance techniques of colonized people. In works including *Orientalism* (1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), the influential Palestinian-born postcolonial theorist Edward Said first considered the power of colonialism as it is practiced through the manipulation of culture. He examined the way cultural forms, including religion, literature, and advertising, constructed colonized people as exotic, uncivilized, and inferior in relation to the colonizers. The most significant part of this analysis is Said's insistence on the dependence of the colonizing class on this discourse in order to define itself as the embodiment of a superior civilization, thereby simultaneously constructing a moral justification for colonization in the form of the obligation to "civilize" the inferior "other."

However, as Arif Dirlik has argued, culture is at once a tool assisting the construction of colonial hegemony and simultaneously a technique of liberation when colonized people mobilize cultural forms of their own making in order to contest the verity of the "exotic" and "inferior" representations imposed on them. In another influential early postcolonial text, *Black Skin, White Masks* (first published in 1952), Frantz Fanon asserts that, in a social world shaped by colonialism where the identity of the colonized individual has been racially determined and disfigured, a significant political response available to the colonized native is to affirm the authenticity of a positive cultural identity derived from the fact of "blackness." However, Fanon rejects the notion that there are essential qualities and characteristics that capture racial nature and experience, like those celebrated by Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor, and other poets and theorists of the Négritude movement initiated in Paris in the 1930s: rhythm, physicality, emotive sensitivity, a mystical connection with the natural world.

Fanon explains that the problem is not simply that Négritude utilizes archaic forms of racial identity to assert a positive cultural presence grounded in past traditions that can lack contemporary relevance; just as colonialism homogenizes the identities of diverse peoples by universally labeling them as primitive and inferior, so too Négritude asserts a universal Negro culture that ignores actual heterogeneity in the problems facing colonized people in different parts of the African continent and diasporas. The promotion by colonized people of their own cultural identity grounded in past traditions usually resists colonial oppression by providing an alternative and positive image of racial and cultural identity. However, both colonialism and Négritude impose an artificial stereotype on an actually diverse collection of people. Fanon therefore insists that colonized people must resist colonial authority, not through abstract and universal ideas, but through localized cultural and political practices aimed at national liberation.

Indeed, much of postcolonial study is devoted to the canon of so-called third world literature, which gave authentic voice to the experiences and national aspirations of colonized people. In choosing their own terms of representation for themselves and their histories, oppressed people undermined the logic of colonial authority by discrediting and dismantling the discourses that supported justifications for imperialism. However, once again, concepts such as "third world" and "nation" are generalizing categories that can work to deflect critical attention from the diverse ways in which suppressed cultural groupings *within* nations may continue to be exploited by class hierarchies that predate colonization, or that were introduced with the imposition of capitalism and remain after decolonization. Suppressed groups within nations may also have been excluded from liberation movements and nation-building processes, complicating postcolonial analyses of decolonization.

Although Marxist and culturalist inflections continue to characterize much contemporary work in postcolonialism, the early tendency to use generalizing categories of analysis is often now attenuated by a careful consideration of the way vast differences in location affected the material circumstances of colonization. This attention to detail and difference enables a more nuanced materialist analysis of colonial power and resistance that is sensitive to the local cultural dimensions of its construction and justification through the complex interaction of class, race, and gender in localized relations of social practice. In emphasizing the heterogeneity of postcolonial experience, a significant strain of contemporary postcolonial study draws on constructivist thought, including deconstruction and poststructuralism, with the result that the early culturalist and Marxist approaches have been supplemented, and somewhat contested, by the development of the more clearly poststructuralist and deconstructionist aspects of Edward Said's argument in *Orientalism,* notably through the respective writings of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Homi Bhabha.

Spivak's work is often addressed to postcolonial theory itself. She insists that the complex nature of colonization and decolonization necessitates a robust and multifaceted analysis through a complex array of theoretical perspectives. Accordingly, she is identified, among other things, as a "feminist, Marxist, deconstructionist." In her celebrated essay, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1985), Spivak challenges the assumption that colonized people can adequately represent themselves within the established terms of Western political discourse in order to recover a lost or silenced, definitively "subaltern," speaking position. In fact, she insists that the colonized individual is never a stable site of resisting agency, being always already inscribed with multiple, at times contradictory, sites of identification, including gender and economic class. Where the subaltern might exercise agency within one system, this agency is simultaneously effaced by the other systems of representation. In critiquing the methodological and epistemological assumptions underscoring the notion of representation that lies at the heart of much Western theory, her analysis incidentally attends to the ways in which postcolonial theory derives its terms of reference from the discourse of the colonizer. This occurs because of the privileging, following colonialism, of Western philosophy and literary conventions, and the tendency toward uncritical use of representative political categories, such as "nation," which can naturalize the territorial boundaries imposed during colonization. In so doing, Spivak deconstructs the given centrality of Western style theory and political practice, and without specifying a more positive program, nonetheless holds out the possibility of other types of resistance strategy that do not operate wholly within the terms of reference established in, and by, Western thought and practice. Spivak's work is particularly complex, therefore, because she draws from strains of Western theory, like Marxism and constructivism, while simultaneously warning that postcolonial theorists must attend to the productive bias associated with the Eurocentric worldview of such theories. Spivak, too, is in certain ways guilty of this, but she firmly grounds her own work in a careful acknowledgment of her own situation and privilege.

While retaining aspects of culturalism and the Marxist analysis of class exploitation, Spivak's work significantly contributes to deconstructionist postcolonial theory. Such postcolonialism strategically challenges established representations, such as "the West" and "the third world." In so doing, this kind of thought disrupts the political authority attached to such representations by insisting that such concepts are not certain and true reflections of a given reality. Deconstructionist analysis instead insists on the permanent potential of shifting powers of cultural expression and construction, which are associated with a critical power to disrupt and transform dominant expressions of reality. Although established representations may attain a hegemonic acceptance as certain fact, this belies their actual nature as unstable and transient constructions of a reality that is always in production, and so always open to alteration.

In conducting this kind of analysis, deconstructionist postcolonial theory has often attended to representations that establish the authority of a colonizing class. For Homi Bhabha, the most significant feature of colonial discourse is not that it persuasively constructs a false representation of colonized people as uncivilized and inferior, which then mobilizes a justification for a political end, but rather that it reveals aspects of colonial identity that suggest its own internal conflict and lack

of coherence. Bhabha's own analysis consequently draws not only on poststructuralism and deconstructionism, but also on psychoanalytic theory, in order to attend closely to the process and the politics of colonial identity formation. In fact, Bhabha's work is situated within a long tradition of postcolonial thought, including the works of Octave Mannoni, Albert Memmi, Frantz Fanon, and Ashis Nandy, which also draw on psychoanalytic concepts for the interpretation of the colonial condition, but focus primarily on the psychological effects of colonization on the self-concept of colonized people. Bhabha instead draws attention to the ways in which colonial desire and the self-concept of the colonizer are marked by ambivalence. This ambivalence is discernible in colonial discourse about the colonized "other," which is conflicted by simultaneous instances of attraction toward the alluring, exotic other, and revulsion at the perceived baseness of the other. Furthermore, such revulsion is often coupled with the explicit fear that contact with the other might contaminate or blur the division between colonizing subject and the objects of colonization, thereby undermining the logic of racial distinction that underpins colonialism. According to Bhabha, by manipulating this tension between the simultaneous desires to appropriate the attractive other and to repel the base other, colonialism can be contested or unraveled from within, collapsed by its own internal instability.

With this dissonance in mind, Bhabha elaborates "mimicry" as a resistance strategy that can be used by colonized people. In assimilating to colonial culture, the colonized individual mimes the colonial subject by taking on the pretensions of the "superior" culture and affecting the speech, values, system of production, and fashion of the colonizer, and so is at once recognized as similar or assimilated, yet disturbingly dissimilar: "not quite/not white." The mimic confronts the colonizing subject with a "menacing" and partial reflection, rearticulating and simultaneously alienating the identity of the colonizer through the act of mime, returning the colonial gaze on the colonizer so that the constituting ambivalence of the desire that structures colonial identity is plainly visible: The desire to assimilate and the desire to differentiate is at once marked on the posture of the colonized mime. For Bhabha, when it is self-consciously practiced by colonized people, mimicry marks a sign of political resistance and civil disobedience. However, because it is limited to the deconstruction of the colonizing power, mimicry surely falls somewhat short as a resistance strategy. It offers no alternative vision of society, no positive reconstruction of an alternative relationship.

The evident limits to the usefulness of mimicry in thinking about resistance and transformative agency are the focus of much criticism directed toward deconstructionist postcolonial theory, and indeed constitute the primary debate between poststructuralist and Marxist types of postcolonialism. The critique of fixed representation or cohesive political identity has seriously complicated Marxist notions of political agency, which relies on a coherent notion of an oppositional resisting class. In response, Marxist versions claim that poststructuralist and deconstructionist postcolonialism obscure analysis of the "real politics" behind imperialism and exploitation, namely global capitalism. By emphasizing the fragmentation of identity and history, such theory is also perceived to undermine the collective efforts of resistance against colonization made by oppressed people through their unifying narratives of nationalism. Poststructuralism is thus perceived to be politically motivated by the imperial desire to deflect and deny due recognition of resisting subjects in a deliberate construction of a disabling politics coinciding with the emergence into subjectivity of previously subjected peoples.

Although it does undermine the traditional Western grounding of political agency in a concept of coherent moral identity, poststructuralism is not entirely devoid of a notion of subjectivity. In fact, selfhood is always in construction and defined in relation to others: Subjectivity is situational, relational, and developing. This resonates with attempts by some postcolonial theorists to think identity in terms of diaspora, hybridity, situation, and performative strategy. However, Marxist or materialist postcolonialism not only worries about the scope for agency and resistance in postcolonial theory influenced by constructivism and psychoanalysis, but also criticizes the ways in which such theory privileges "discourse" and "text" as the cultural products of the "speaking subject" under analysis, thereby neglecting the primary political, social, and economic "context" of enunciation. Marxists

including Aijaz Ahmad, Benita Parry, and Arif Dirlik accuse poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theorists of postcolonialism of indulging a privileged class preoccupation with issues of individualism, self-expression, and identity, which they argue shifts critical attention away from the material and social causes of political oppression.

The four key formulations of postcolonialism—Marxist, culturalist, poststructuralist, and psychoanalytic—are often defined against each other in terms of the debates they enter into. These debates are not particular to postcolonialism, but are illustrations of disputes taking place within the broader field of political theory, which have been brought into a postcolonial context. Although the terrain of postcolonial studies is characterized by internal rifts and conflicting philosophical allegiances, a number of key issues and concepts that are particularly relative to postcolonialism have emerged from these debates. Although approaches to these differ according to one's theoretical preference, the engagements they invite may be thought of as unifying features across the field of postcolonialism.

Key Concepts and Engagements

Much postcolonial work employs or interrogates the concept of "place." At a most concrete level of analysis, such work attends to the geographical and demographical consequences of colonialism, particularly by investigating the various ways in which colonialism transformed the places it acted on. The colonial scramble for land and the associated "carving up" of continents resulted in the imposition of new territorial boundaries, which were sometimes quite arbitrary and ignored existing geographical, social, and cultural divisions and distinctive forms of law and political governance. This has had lasting effects, creating serious ethnic tensions that continue to plague war-torn regions of the world today, such as Palestine or the disputed territory of Kashmir.

The postcolonial study of "place" may also involve attention to the dislocation of colonized people and the ways in which their cultural traditions at once survived and were transformed through processes of colonial settlement in new and far-flung places. The study of the postcolonial diasporas and the ways in which exiled migrants and slaves transformed their cultural figurations of "home" in relation to both their homelands and their new situations, as well as in relation to the global dispersal of their relations and traditions, provides significant insights into the postcolonial condition of many communities.

Colonial fantasies of "place," read through cultural forms, including literature and cartography, also provide fuel for the postcolonial analysis of colonial politics. The stark political division between the colonial center and the colonies is often represented in colonial discourse in terms of a spatial metaphor that locates the colonial power center stage in the metropolis and the colonies as circulating around the periphery like dependent moths around a flame. The ongoing tendency to place the colonial power at the privileged center of analysis is discernible in contemporary discussions that employ a politicized conceptual distinction between the first and third worlds, or the "The West and the Rest": The critical deconstruction of the continuing power of such representations is the objective of certain postcolonial analysis.

Another way in which "place" importantly figures in postcolonial studies concerns indigenous people's traditional relationship with their lands, which in locations including Australia and Canada is often nonproprietary and instead grounded in a sense of spiritual belonging that entails a deep sense of obligation and care. Associated with the study of indigenous conceptions of "place" and "belonging" is the criticism of the narrow Eurocentric understandings of communal relation to land and the colonial failure to acknowledge structures of governance that emerge from communal property. This failure of colonial perspective continues to disadvantage indigenous claims for self-determination today.

In raising questions about situated communities and the way colonialism transformed existing power relations and imposed new structures of social domination and convention, the concept of "place" also opens onto the study of postcolonial social interaction. Much postcolonial work considers the "hybridity" of postcolonial communities: the multicultural mixing of people and their traditions as a result of colonial translocations. An important aspect of postcolonial social theory is its emphasis on the ethics of responsible interaction, mutual recognition, and multicultural coexistence,

and increasing attention is now directed toward conceptualizing types of political institutions that can express principles of collective agreement while acknowledging and respecting social diversity.

A second concept preoccupying much of postcolonial study is "production," which closely links with questions of productive control, agency, and resistance. In part, this concerns economic control and exploitation following colonization. However, "production" also entails a dimension of social construction, which refers not only to economic output, but also to the ways in which a community constructs and expresses its sense of self through cultural creations, including literature and art, and its organization as a type of social arrangement or mode of governance. Much postcolonial work engages with processes of cultural and racial identity construction, particularly the ways in which colonialism has impacted on the self-concept of colonized people. Also of interest are the ways in which colonized people have responded to this impact by reinventing and redefining the concepts they use to represent themselves, at times also using new forms of expression, such as the novel, enlisted from the colonizers. Other postcolonial work criticizes the way in which colonialism imposes dominant forms of culture and knowledge, including language and theory, which can undermine authentic expression and can result in the loss of traditions already made vulnerable during colonization.

A third concept too common in work in the area is postcolonial "temporality" and the continuing historical consequences of colonialism. Much of postcolonial study is concerned with the legacy of the colonial past in the present and the question of reparative justice: patterns of globalization, international economic inequalities, systemic poverty and disease, migration, and ongoing military conflicts and border disputes may all be traced back to colonial roots. In fact, many thinkers have been hostile to the notion of *post*colonialism as signifying a historical remove from colonialism, pointing out that for many indigenous people who are still caught up in relations of domination and are still struggling for the recognition of their territorial claims, there is little that is "post" about their experience of colonization. Accordingly, rather than denoting an evaluation of a historical achievement already reached, the term *postcolonial* best describes an ongoing stance of engagement with colonialism, which includes not only tracing its historical impact on material locations, but also resisting habitually imperial modes of action and thought. This involves careful attention to inventing new ways of regarding and transforming the material world and new forms of sociopolitical interaction and governance based on principles of mutuality and pluralism. These concerns define an emerging field of postcolonial political philosophy.

Postcolonial Political Theory

Postcolonial emphasis on place, particularity, historic injustice, and the politics of representation and expression challenges received notions of universality, neutrality, and consensus and calls for a politics of difference and recognition, prompting new principles of postcolonial political thought. Emerging work in this area rethinks many of the concepts that conventionally ground Western political discourse, including power, sovereignty, constitutional agreement, and entitlement.

The crux of the postcolonial challenge involves a critique of the ideal of universality, which underpins the structuring principles inherited by Western political thought as a legacy of the Enlightenment: humanism, consensual public reason, and historicism. Postcolonial thinkers, including Robert Young and Dipesh Chakrabarty, identify the collusion that occurs between Enlightenment philosophy and imperialism when Western norms of human and social experience, political organization, and historical trajectory are presented as neutral and universal, thereby excluding alternative social forms and histories and devaluing them as inferior. Although polarized within Western political thought, both liberalism and communitarianism share this legacy, and postcolonial criticism encompasses both traditions. Thus, political philosophers influenced by postcolonialism assert that liberalism denies difference through its formalization of individualism in an ethic of rights, which assimilates individuals under a common measure of essential human nature that is indifferent to group affiliations and concerns. However, communitarianism also denies difference by positing group unity as an ideal pursued through affiliation and identification. Even so, because it is the dominant

tradition within Western political philosophy, the full force of postcolonial critique is usually directed at liberal cosmopolitanism, and often specifically at John Rawls's (1971) theory of justice.

This liberal vision of justice as fairness is particularly problematic from a postcolonial perspective because it champions individual liberation as the human transcendence of group differences, including race, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This emphasis on individual liberty neglects the political significance of group differences in just processes of public deliberation. In fact, postcolonial historiography demonstrates that ignoring group difference is less often liberating than it is a form of oppression. Colonialism leaves a legacy of oppression and domination that is manifest and experienced through group differences of privilege and disadvantage. Postcolonial political philosophers argue that by ignoring group differences, liberal individualism perpetuates existing patterns of domination because it does not provide the necessary institutional mechanisms to allow disadvantaged groups to achieve public equality with dominant groups. Whereas liberalism strives to remain blind to group differences in the effort to treat all individuals equally, postcolonialism asserts the political relevance of groups and the need to maintain political institutions that recognize group identities and preserve their visibility in the public arena.

Furthermore, Iris Marion Young argues that liberalism does not simply fail to address significant issues of group inequality in the aftermath of colonization; liberal humanism also results in a politics of assimilation that perpetuates cultural imperialism because it presents the Western liberal individual as a neutral and universal human norm. This approach normalizes historically privileged forms of social and political identity and marks "deviant" identities as substandard and inferior. Colonized individuals may aspire to mainstream equality, but they do so in a social environment where the standard has already been set by the colonizing class. Liberalism seeks to eliminate oppression by eliminating group difference, which requires individuals to assimilate to a norm that masquerades as universal and neutral but is in fact particular and privileged, inherited from colonialism. The liberal claim that all individuals are treated impartially simply masks the group privileges that attach to the norm.

Western liberal democratic political institutions are founded on this problematically "universal" notion of the normative (rational, self-interested, autonomous) citizen-self. Democratic processes of public deliberation and consensual agreement take place within a forum that assumes the relevant existence of "but one public reason," exercised by individuals who meet on the common footing defined by their "universal" enjoyment of an "equal standard" of citizenship. The institutional forms of liberal democracy also assume a state-centric view of power: Constitutional arrangements are designed to moderate and mediate the political relation between state and citizen, and both state and citizen are viewed as unified and well-defined entities with clearly defined rights and obligations demarcating their respective boundaries and permitted spheres of engagement. The state itself is understood in terms of undivided sovereignty, defined in terms of the territorial unity described by the *nation,* which is in turn ideally represented as a cultural unity of homogenously identified, equal citizens. Postcolonialism issues challenge these sets of assumptions by insisting on the irreducible multiplicity of subnational cultures, the existence of plural forms of political expression and reason, and the recognition that political power extends beyond the institutional structures of the state to encompass forms of social and cultural domination arising from colonial history, in relations between diverse cultural groups that constitute modern societies.

Rather than subordinating real diversity to ideal principles of overarching identity or universal experience, postcolonial political theory responds to these challenges by devising new forms of political expression and accommodation capable of acknowledging and recognizing political and cultural pluralism. At times, this response occurs within liberalism, as can be seen for example in the work of Will Kymlicka, who seeks to elaborate formal principles of justice based on differential rights protecting the equality of citizen participation in cultural life. More commonly, postcolonial political philosophy escapes the conceptual boundaries defining the political logic of liberalism. For example, William Connolly insists on a necessary ambiguity and fluidity within concepts central to the notion of legitimacy within democratic theory, such as "nation-state," "consensus," and "citizenship."

In his view, such conceptual flexibility is logically required for legitimate democratic practices of political expression. Sharing this view, Duncan Ivison argues that postcolonialism compels recognition of the need to cultivate supple and plural forms of public reasoning capable of registering diverse cultural concerns and interests historically ignored by colonial law.

Such principled pluralism must be reflected in forms of governance capable of mediating difference in order to find genuinely common agreement. To this end, James Tully has developed a notion of postcolonial constitutionalism appropriate for adjudicating the diverse claims for cultural recognition characteristically voiced within postcolonial and multicultural societies. He argues for a dynamic form of conciliation of such claims through constitutional discussions in which participants pragmatically reach periodic agreement on appropriate forms of accommodation and mediation of their differences. Informed by a "spirit of mutual recognition" and a commitment toward the accommodation of cultural diversity, Tully's constitutional framework for postcolonial negotiation and mediation is governed by three primary conventions of justice: mutual recognition, continuity, and consent.

Much postcolonial political thought is similarly devoted to exploring concepts that might successfully express "nonstandard" claims for cultural and political recognition, such as indigenous rights to native title, cultural rights of minority groups, divided sovereignty, and the right to self-determination of "internal nations" within formally constituted political states. Such concepts are created for the purpose of mediating traditional (precolonial) political structures or practices and the institutional forms of Western liberalism imposed with colonialism. When successful, this process of philosophical mediation expresses crucial, and often conflicting, aspects of dissimilar political traditions in a new composite form that transforms them both. Postcolonial political philosophy may accordingly be characterized as the attempt to theorize a hybrid middle ground for the mutual recognition and conciliation of the diverse political conventions, concepts, and practices that now coexist in formerly colonized societies.

Simone Bignall

See also Colonialism; Culture; Difference Theories; Empire; Fanon, Frantz; Globalization; Historic Injustice; Identity; Imperialism; Multiculturalism; Nationalism; Orientalism; Politics of Recognition; Race Theory; Subaltern

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POSTMATERIALISM

Postmaterialism is a concept most often associated with the work of American political scientist Ronald Inglehart. In his books, *The Silent Revolution* (1977) and *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies* (1990), Inglehart argued that the growth of affluence in Western industrial societies in the decades following World War II had lead to a fundamental transformation of cultural and social values. Employing Abraham Maslow's concept of the "hierarchy of needs," Inglehart claimed that once the conditions of material security had been realized in a society, its members were likely to pursue nonmaterial goals focused on personal relations, autonomy, and self-realization, or what might be described as matters concerning the "quality of life." This is precisely what had happened in advanced industrial societies in the late twentieth century. A shift to nonmaterial—or "postmaterial" values as Inglehart dubbed them—had profoundly affected culture and society. Politics, work, religion, family life, and gender relations were no longer regarded principally as the means by which individuals or groups achieved physical security and well-being, but rather as vehicles through which autonomy and recognition of plural identities and interests could be secured. For Inglehart, the postmaterialist shift is empirically demonstrated in data from major surveys indicating intergenerational changes in attitudes and values in industrial societies during the late twentieth century.

The movement toward postmaterialist values is said to have had a profound effect on the nature of politics and collective action over recent decades. In the first half of the twentieth century, the domestic politics of industrial societies were shaped by the conflict between labor and capital. Socialist parties and trade unions sought to secure for the industrial working class basic material security through a mixture of state regulation of production, a more equitable distribution of wealth and income, and the introduction of welfare services funded from general taxation. Parties and interest groups representing the owners and managers of private capital resisted such policies in order to protect the existing distribution of property. But, in the context of a long period of peace and nationally managed economic development after 1945, class-based politics began to unravel. Unprecedented levels of economic growth and technological change, a high rate of employment, a wider distribution of wealth and income, and the creation of welfare states, transformed the conditions of the industrial working classes. The goals of achieving full employment, a living wage, and decent working conditions having been met, the labor and socialist movement had lost its founding rationale. In these circumstances, radical politics moved away from questions of economic ownership and distribution, and toward questions of personal autonomy and the democratic control of public power.

The development of a postmaterialist politics was further facilitated by the massive expansion of education—and particularly higher education—post-1945. Large numbers of working-class and lower-middle-class people were now provided with the opportunity of a liberal education of the kind that undermined parochial worldviews and values. During the 1960s, this context allowed for the flourishing of radical ideas about the expansion of civil liberties, popular democracy, international peace, feminism, and environmentalism that informed the "new social movements." The emergence of these movements in the 1960s can be taken as evidence of the transition from materialist to postmaterialist values. Subsequently, the ideas of such radical political movements came to inform "mainstream" politics, as well as general cultural mores and practices. In this respect, postmaterialist values have left an enduring mark on the societies in which they emerged. Furthermore, Inglehart claims in his more recent work that postmaterialist social and cultural change follows a developmental logic that means it will occur in any society with the right antecedent conditions—namely, a prolonged period of peace and industrial economic development. Thus, postmaterialist values are on the rise in societies such as China and will likely increase the momentum of democratizing movements.

As an account of social and cultural change in contemporary societies, postmaterialism faces a number of problems. First, at a conceptual level, it is not evident that there is any clear distinction to be made between "material" and "postmaterial" values in general. Questions of physical security and well-being and questions of autonomy and identity often go hand in hand. For example,

feminists who argue for women's reproductive rights are concerned with "material" issues—the question of a women's autonomy in respect to her body is inextricably connected to questions of the public control and distribution of reproductive technology. Definitions of "material" needs and wants are socially and historically variant. Second, Inglehart's work has a specific empirical focus on evidence concerning change in cultural and social values in advanced industrial societies in the late twentieth century. However, on the basis of such empirical evidence, Inglehart makes a claim about the general trajectory that industrial societies take as the result of a particular logic of development. As such, Inglehart's theory is a modified form of the modernization thesis, one that considers the economic and technological changes of the modern industrial period (i.e., over the last two centuries) to have had a fundamental effect on the character of social, cultural, and political life. But if we want to demonstrate such a thesis on the kind of empirical basis that Inglehart invokes, we would have to look at intergenerational changes in cultural and social values not just in the late twentieth century, but over at least the last 200 years. The lack of extensive or reliable data in this area severely hinders such an exercise, even before we take into consideration the difficulties of interpreting evidence concerning subjectively meaningful beliefs and values in different times and places. Finally, and related to this second criticism, postmaterialism is open to the charge of economic or even psychological reductionism—political attitudes and actions are reduced to levels of economic and technological development and the affective status of individuals. The importance of specific political practices, discourses, ideologies, movements, and events thus tends to be underestimated in postmaterialist accounts of contemporary socioeconomic, cultural, and political change.

Jason Edwards

See also Modernization Theory; Postmodernism; Social Movements

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POSTMODERNISM

Postmodernism refers vaguely to a bundle of philosophical ideas associated more or less accurately with a bundle of philosophers and theorists. The ideas include antihumanism, antifoundationalism, antiessentialism, antirepresentationalism, antihistoricism, an ethic of self-fashioning, a predilection for irony, and an antipositivist utopianism. The philosophers and theorists include Jean Baudrillard, Drucilla Cornell, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, Richard Rorty, and arguably some of their precursors, most notably Friedrich Nietzsche. Yet although postmodernism is often used in this way, it is at best vague and arguably misleading, because the relevant theorists differ more than they agree, and because little effort is usually made to specify which ideas are being associated with the term.

Superficially, postmodernism conveys a temporal notion of what comes after modernity. It is, at least in this respect, the ideational equivalent of postmodernity conceived as a new social formation. Yet we should be extremely wary of any suggestion that postmodernity as a social formation gives rise to postmodernism as a set of ideas—a suggestion generally made by those who represent postmodernism in hostile terms as the ideology of late capitalism. A slightly more promising suggestion would be to understand postmodernism as a critical reaction to modernist ideas of the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, especially in the arts. Yet this modernism itself often included many of the themes that are most characteristic of postmodernism, such as a kind of self-reflexivity, suspicions of representationalism, and even a kind of utopian politics.

Once we give up trying to locate postmodernism in relation to an alleged modernity, we can concentrate on unpacking it in terms of the themes mentioned earlier.

Epistemological antifoundationalism is the belief that knowledge cannot be grounded in indubitable, timeless, transcontextual principles. This belief leads postmodernists to challenge concepts such as neutrality, objectivity, reason, and method; that there are means by which we might uncover certainties. Postmodernists are skeptical of what is often described as a modern, enlightenment faith in mental processes as a way of gaining and organizing knowledge of the world. Postmodernists challenge the authority of science, law, religion, philosophy, and other master discourses that project a special access to truth. This epistemological antifoundationalism prompts postmodernists to deny that knowledge progresses toward rational self-consciousness and perhaps even freedom. Postmodernists typically reject the concept of the mind as a "mirror of nature" that could accurately reflect the world—a concept of mind they often associate with a tradition of metaphysical epistemology in which truth hinges on the quest for knowledge that is self-evident to a rational mind. Contrary to a popular caricature, postmodernists do not claim that we can never know anything. They just emphasize that knowledge is produced. Their accounts of the production of knowledge vary widely, moreover, from appeals to a pragmatic consensus to accounts of the operations of power.

Antihumanism refers to the broad claim that the subject or individual person is not an unconditioned or autonomous agent. Many postmodernists associate humanism with the idea that man directs himself and history through his rational will and agency. Hence, their antihumanism suggests a rejection of a belief that man works at perfecting himself and a belief that history is progressive. As antihumanists, postmodernists challenge a range of what they (arguably utterly mistakenly) take to be the modern concept of the subject: these include the sovereign subject, the rational intending self, and the unified conscious individual that preexists its own entry into the social and cultural order. Antihumanism was of particular importance for many of the leading French poststructuralists, such as Derrida and Foucault.

The theme of antihistoricism refers to a devaluation of historical causes and processes of development. Postmodernists challenge attempts to project a meaning onto historical events in order to establish some kind of progressive teleology. Postmodern antihistoricism rejects ideas of a linear or dialectical progression to history. Indeed, postmodernists tend to regard all grand narratives of historical development as power-saturated products of the unique moments at which they were articulated.

Ontological antiessentialism is the belief that being has no ultimate or true nature. Postmodernists generally hold that reality is not discovered as necessity, nature, or God by means of logic or experience. Rather, reality is produced through various contingencies and in various contexts. Some postmodernists even suggest that the categorization, classification, or analysis of reality into underlying parts is pointless or even misguided. Their ontological antiessentialism thus overlaps considerably with an antirealism that entails a denial of any authentic reality lying behind our representations or even behind modern consumer society and power.

Antiessentialism and antirealism open the way to an ethic (or aesthetic) of self-fashioning. Some postmodernists describe aestheticization as a practice of resistance to bourgeois society. Others describe it as a practice of resistance to codified gender relations. For Foucault, the notion of stylized self-fashioning, typically undertaken at the site of the body, was an attempt to break out of particular regimes of subjectivity and to refuse to be normalized into a well-regulated individual. Some postmodernists, following Foucault, appear to suggest that aesthetic self-fashioning involves a turn away from ethics and politics toward desire, pleasure, and play. Others appear, in contrast, to require any adequate self-fashioning to be a protest against prevailing social norms.

Linguistic antirepresentationalism is the belief that language, far from being a neutral medium through which consciousness is manifested, is that through which the world, our understanding of the world, and even we ourselves, are continually produced and reproduced. For most postmodernists, language is not a tool that we use to refer to objects that preexist it; language is not a transparent instrument with a referential relation to an objective world. Rather, objects (and we as subjects talking about them) cohere only in language and social discourses. Language is slippery and opaque, and it is constitutive of the world rather than descriptive of it.

The presence of a theme of irony among postmodernists is in large part a response to a bind that

arises from their linguistic antirepresentationalism. On one hand, linguistic antirepresentationalism entails a challenge to the use of concepts or words to refer to the world. On the other, we have to use language to convey thoughts, ideas, arguments, and the like. Hence, postmodernists face a bind: They deploy concepts that they do not accept (at least not at face value), and they cannot avoid doing so if they are to use language at all. Derrida responds to this bind when he places words under erasure; he crosses words out so as to alert his reader that although these words are being used they should not be taken literally. Likewise, Rorty defines irony as facing up to the contingency of one's most central beliefs and desires, and so allowing that they do not refer back to anything outside of time and chance. Critics of postmodernism can mistake such irony for frivolity, obfuscation, or irresponsibility. A more sympathetic view would recognize that it is a response to specific philosophical binds generated by some of the other themes that characterize postmodernism.

Finally, the theme of antipositivist utopianism is evident in the desire of many postmodernists to look ahead to a better set of cultural arrangements. Sometimes this theme sits awkwardly alongside the argument that all knowledge, representation, and ethics are partial, exclusionary, or even laden with power. The more postmodernists stress the latter argument, the more difficult it becomes for them to ascribe content to a utopian vision. Foucault expressed this difficulty when he suggested that to posit another system is to participate in our present system. Some postmodernists even imply that it is impossible to conceive of an alternative order let alone defend one. Hence, critics claim that postmodernism has an apolitical or cynical orientation. Yet a number of postmodernists—including Cornell, Derrida, and Rorty—convey a sincere, if conflicted, hopefulness that they express in diffuse futural terms.

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See also Foucault, Michel; Singularity

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Power

The notion of *power* is one of the fundamental conceptual elements of political theory, yet it remains rather elusive. A great variety of different conceptualizations of power have been suggested by political theorists, yet there is no general agreement on a definition, let alone on a conceptual framework for how to use the term. Although this fact sounds detrimental to political theory's ambition to scientific rigor, there might be something to be learned from it, namely that contested political keywords like power play different roles and have different functions in specific political theories. In the broadest sense and roughly in tune with the use of the term in many everyday contexts, power can be generally described as the capacity to bring about certain effects. This wide meaning of the term can be found in Aristotle's usage of the Greek term *dynamis*. In the narrower context of social action, the concept of power refers to the ability of an actor (i.e., an individual or a group) to make other actors do (or suffer) something. Speaking of actors as "powerful" or describing an action as an "exercise of power" refers to this attribution of causality: An actor is said to be able to produce a certain outcome and thereby to influence or determine the behavior of others.

Among modern social scientists, Max Weber gave this core idea, which might historically be traced back to Thomas Hobbes's use of the term, its classical formulation when he wrote that the concept of power refers to the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his or her will, even against

resistance. This formulation does not cover all aspects of power, but it covers many instances and cases in which the theoretical concept of power is employed. Using it as a guideline and elaborating its systematic implications can serve as a way to give an outline of what one might call the standard notion of power in modern political theory. It relies on an essential connection between power and domination and has undergone continual renewal and revisions over the last century. But it can also serve as a point of departure for introducing several alternative ways of using the concept of power that focus on power's constitutive or productive function. Finally, there remains the question about the very function of the concept of power in political theories.

Power and Domination

The Weberian idea that power refers to an actor's capacity to influence or determine another actor's behavior or to carry out his or her will, even against the other's resistance, has been the core of the traditional concept of power, and it has been reformulated in many ways. A famous restatement was suggested by Robert Dahl: An actor has power over another to the extent that he (or she) can get her (or him) to do something that she (or he) would not otherwise do. Several characteristics of this usage of the concept of power can be noted. First, it binds power to conscious actors and their intentionality. Second, it explains the efficacy of power on the basis of assumptions about a clear causal relation between two forms of action. Third, the counterfactual assumption treats power as something that gives an external motivation for action to the second actor that might even bring her (or him) to act against her (or his) own original free will. Objections have been raised against all of these assumptions. Why should power be effective only in cases of explicit intentions and expressed wills? Why should power depend on the always fallible knowledge about the effects of an action? Why should power always entail the agonistic moment of the suppression of one will? And finally, for many political theorists it was clear that all of these highly theoretical assumptions pose serious obstacles to an empirical study of power.

A number of revisions to the original schema were proposed, among which the most important were attempts to suggest a multidimensional vision of power. The first major revision was to include not only overt action but also nondecisions (or the avoidance of certain actions) as major instances of the exercise of social power. On the level of communal political decisions, for example, it was argued that the real power might indeed lie where efficient agenda setting is exercised, so that certain questions are not even posed. Power here is not only exercised through action but also, and maybe more importantly, through the structuring of the space of possible actions. In yet another influential step, a "third face" of power was detected in exactly those actions and mechanisms that influence and distort what people think to be their own interest and will. This is indeed a "radical view," as Steven Lukes has called it, that transforms the whole framework of the standard concept of power. Leaving open the possibility of radically manipulated wills and consciousness (i.e., of ideology in the strong sense) makes it impossible to rely on social actors' own expressed intentions and self-explanations. *Power* therefore ceases to be a term that can be dealt with in the framework of the theory of action alone and calls for a more sociological elaboration.

Power and Its Forms

This is where a multiplicity of theories comes in that try to account for structural power. In their view, power not only refers to individual actions but to networks of intersubjective and institutional relationships that crucially determine which actions can be taken by individual actors. Social power, as it were, is also the power of structuration, and it cannot be assessed on the level of individual behavior alone. Although this perspective gives priority to social institutions and material inequalities among social groups, others have argued that it is foremost on the level of discourse and meaning where power is generated and distributed. On this view, it is epistemic and symbolic patterns of knowledge and meaning that decisively shape social action. Such systems of discursive or symbolic power prove effective to the extent that they manage to neutralize conflicts between different social groups by discursively creating symbolic hierarchies between them. Differences in status and worth can therefore become naturalized and

almost invisible. In these cases, the most pervasive form of power is one that is not even observed by the social actors involved.

But all of these revisions leave the original idea intact that says that power is basically to be seen as an impediment to action or a suppression of freedom. It is therefore fair so say that the standard notion of power works from a concept of domination and envisions the paradigmatic scene of power as an asymmetric relation between single actors struggling for superiority. Of course, many of the different theories falling under the rubric of the standard notion allow for quite different forms of power, and for many of these theories it has become a key interest to draw distinctions between different forms of exercise of power. The dominant and most plausible view in this framework is to think in terms of a spectrum that reaches from actions almost totally determined by power on one extreme to actions almost fully autonomous on the other extreme. Near the first extreme, forms of "raw" power as physical violence, brute force, or coercion can be found. In the middle, there are various forms of repression, regulation, control, and sanction, but also milder cases of influence and guidance. Ideological manipulation and discursive framing might also be placed somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Near the second extreme, there are forms of persuasion and seduction, various kinds of authority, and arguably even the power of rational argumentation. To draw clear-cut distinctions between these forms has proven difficult, but the mainstream of political theory has followed this general model in one form or another. Its core idea from Hobbes to Weber and Lukes is to think about power in terms of greater or lesser degrees of impediment to agency. It remains, therefore, ultimately a model that conceptualizes power in terms of domination.

Power and Constitution

Whereas the standard model of power, rooted in the theory of action but extending to more general versions of social theory, views power as essentially negative (i.e., detrimental to agency), alternative accounts have stressed another of its semantic connotations. The second sense of power clearly appears in the distinction between the two Latin terms for power, namely *potestas,* in the sense of command and domination, and *potentia,* in the general sense of capacity. This second sense (which is also present in the Italian *potenza,* the French *puissance,* and the German *Vermögen*) refers to power as a productive force that brings about rather than represses something. This meaning is sometimes referred to as "power to" in opposition to "power over" (in the sense of domination), but this side of power might be best termed "constitutive." Several theories of power have tried to articulate this side or function of power by focusing less on individual acts of power exercise between people and more on the very creation of social relationships or even social entities through power.

In these quite heterogeneous alternative frameworks, rather than referring to acts that repress or impede, power refers to the media or processes in which sociality, consensus, and communality are brought about and shaped (e.g., in the theories of Hannah Arendt or Talcott Parsons). This sets power in sharp contrast to domination and expresses the idea that power has to be created collectively and is not just there to be found. But it also shows that power is the very basis on which collective social action is possible and that it can never be fully substituted by the rule of force or violence. Power, as it were, manifests itself as empowerment, as the bringing about of new forms of agency.

Although this might seem too optimistic a view, power as constitutive has also been taken to refer to its capacity to bring about the very elements of the social, like systems of knowledge, patterns of conduct, and social institutions (e.g., in the work of Michel Foucault). To say that power not only acts on but even "produces" bodies and subjects requires speaking about power in terms of social ontology and the very constitution of the social. This does not mean that power as constitution is not bound up with systems of control, repression, and hierarchization. On the contrary, one can argue that the efficacy of certain systems of control and regulation exist only on the basis of their capacity to produce and shape the affects, mentalities, and self-conceptions of subjects. Although the alternative frameworks differ enormously on how to spell out (and how to evaluate) power's productive or constitutive function, they share a common criticism of the standard model. The latter remains too

fixated on the case of the power of existing social actors over others, and it neglects the constant reconfiguration of the social world through mechanisms of power.

Power and Critique

The relationship between the standard model and the alternative models is a complex one, and it seems clear that this is not a matter of theoretical preference. Several attempts have been made to integrate both sides or dimensions of power, domination and constitution respectively, into a single theoretical framework that could account for the entire realm of phenomena that can be described as instances of power. These integrated models, however, tend to become rather abstract because the gap between the theoretical perspectives of the theory of action and social ontology has proven difficult to bridge.

There also remains the question how the concept of power should function in a political theory. Some theorists insist on the neutrality and purely descriptive nature of the term, but for many others the concept of power refers to a web of concepts with normative implications. In the case of many political theories following the standard concept, the strong negative link between power, agency, and freedom suggests that a society should strive for the critical exposure and active struggle against all forms of power that cannot be given acceptable legitimacy. Such political theories will then need to give an account of the very criteria that decide on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of power in general and on the exercise of legitimate political power in particular. Theorists that work from the broader ontological understanding of constitutive power, however, hesitate to call for a critique of power as such. They tend to suggest more context-specific analysis and local resistance to specific forms of power, and they insist on the deep ambiguity of power. Most importantly, they refer to the fact that the very capacities to think critically about and turn against power may themselves be products of power. This demands a self-critical and reflexive stance toward one's own implication into and complicity with networks and practices of power.

Finally, the diversity of understandings and models of power in the history of political thought, as well as in contemporary political theory, suggests that power is less a "perennial problem" than a moving target of theoretical analysis and political critique. By giving priority to certain cases of power (e.g., armed violence, class struggle, symbolic violence) over others, by conceptualizing the basic mode of power differently (e.g., as conflict or consensus), and by envisioning the aim of politics in a particular way (e.g., as a balance of forces or the eradication of illegitimate violence), political theories themselves take side in a struggle about the adequate understanding and the preferable practice of politics.

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See also Agency; Arendt, Hannah; Domination; Foucault, Michel; Ideology; Subject; Weber, Max

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Prisoner's Dilemma

The *prisoner's dilemma* is one of the most famous and important concepts in game theory. In the classic version of the two-person prisoner's dilemma, two agents—labeled A and B—each

have two actions available: "cooperate" or "defect" (abbreviated C and D), and each person chooses her action simultaneously without knowing the other person's choice. The situation can be represented by the following matrix:

Table 1 Payoff Matrix

	C	*D*
C	4, 4	0, 5
D	5, 0	1, 1

Source: Author.

Note: The payoffs correspond to the different possible combinations of actions.

The rows correspond to player A's actions, the columns to player B's actions, and the numbers in each box indicate the "payoffs" to the players if the corresponding combination of actions is chosen, with the first number referring to player A's payoff. For example, the upper-right box corresponds to the outcome in which A chooses C and B chooses D, and A receives a payoff of 0 and B receives a payoff of 5. These numbers are intended merely to represent the agents' preferences. For example, that A receives a higher payoff when C, C is played than when D, D is played simply means that A would prefer the outcome induced by C, C to the outcome induced by D, D.

The prisoner's dilemma derives its name from a common interpretation of the game used for pedagogical purposes, according to which the two players are suspected partners in crime being interrogated by a district attorney, who gives each the option of confessing to the crime (defecting) or keeping silent (cooperating with one's partner). Different amounts of prison time correspond to each combination of actions, with the prisoners' preferences over these outcomes being those represented by the payoff numbers mentioned earlier. The game has been used, however, to study many social interactions in economics and political science.

If both players choose D, then neither player has an incentive to change her choice of action, *given* the other player's choice of D. For example, if A were to choose C instead of D when B is choosing D, she would get a payoff of 1 instead of 2. Likewise, the payoff to B of choosing D is greater than the payoff of choosing C, when A is choosing D. Because each player is choosing a "best response" to the other player's strategy when they play (D, D), game theorists call this pair of strategies a Nash equilibrium. Yet, despite the fact that D, D constitutes a Nash equilibrium, each player would prefer the outcome resulting from C, C to the outcome resulting from D, D. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium to the prisoner's dilemma is said to be Pareto-suboptimal or Pareto-inefficient.

Sean Ingham

See also Pareto-Optimality

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PROGRESSIVISM

Progressivism refers to the political and social reform movement that brought major changes to American politics and government during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Progressive reformers made the first comprehensive effort within the American context to address the problems that arose with the emergence of a modern urban and industrial society. The U.S. population doubled between 1870 and 1900. Urbanization and immigration increased at rapid rates and were accompanied by a shift from local, small-scale manufacturing and commerce to large-scale factory production and mammoth national corporations. Technological breakthroughs and frenzied searches for new markets and sources of capital caused unprecedented economic growth. From 1863 to 1899, manufacturing production rose by more than 700%. But this dynamic growth also generated profound economic and social ills that challenged the capacity of the decentralized republic that had dominated the United States during the nineteenth century. This entry describes the efforts of Progressives to address these changes and the long-range impact of the Progressive movement.

Goals of Progressivism

The Progressive movement accommodated a diverse array of reformers—insurgent Republican office holders, disaffected Democrats, crusading journalists, academics, social workers, and other activists—who formed new organizations and institutions with the common objective of strengthening the national government and making it more responsive to popular economic, social, and political demands. Viewing themselves as crusading reformers at a critical juncture of American history, Progressives were the rare practitioners of American politics whose writings and rhetoric verged on political philosophy.

Above all else, the Progressives sought to come to terms with the concentration of wealth, specifically the giant trusts, which they saw as uncontrolled and irresponsible units of power in American society. By the turn of the century, economic power had become highly concentrated, threatening the security of employees, suppliers, and customers. These industrial combinations created the perception that opportunities were not equally available in the United States, that growing corporate power threatened the freedom of individuals to earn a living. Reformers excoriated the economic conditions of the 1890s—dubbed the "Gilded Age"—as excessively opulent and holding little promise for industrial workers and small farmers. Moreover, many believed that the great business interests, represented by newly informed associations such as the National Civic Federation, had captured and corrupted the men and methods of government for their own profit. Party leaders—both Democrats and Republicans—were seen as irresponsible "bosses" who did the bidding of "special interests."

In their efforts to grapple with the challenges of industrialization, Progressives championed three principal causes. They promoted a new governing philosophy that placed less emphasis on rights, especially when invoked in defense of big business, and stressed collective responsibilities and duties. In line with these new principles, Progressives called for the reconstruction of American politics, hitherto dominated by localized parties, so that a more direct link was formed between government officials and public opinion. Similarly, reformers demanded a revamping of governing institutions, so that the power of state legislatures and Congress would be subordinated to an independent executive power—city managers, governors, and a modern presidency—that could truly represent the national interest and tackle the new tasks of government required by changing social and economic conditions. Progressive reformers differed dramatically over how the balance should be struck between these three somewhat competing objectives, as well as how the new national state they prescribed should address the domestic and international challenges of the new industrial order. But they tended to agree that these were the most important battles that had to be fought in order to bring about a democratic revival.

Above all, this commitment to remaking American democracy looked to the strengthening of the public sphere. Like the Populists, who flourished at the end of the nineteenth century, the Progressives invoked the Preamble to the Constitution to assert their purpose of making "We the People"—the *whole* people—effective in strengthening the federal government's authority to regulate the society and economy. But Progressives sought to hitch the will of the people to a strengthened national administrative power, which was anathema to the Populists. The Populists were animated by a radical agrarianism that celebrated the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian assault on monopolistic power; their concept of national democracy rested on the hope that the states and Congress might mount an assault on the centralizing unholy alliance between national parties and the trusts. In contrast, the Progressives championed a new national order that completely repudiated the localized democracy of the nineteenth century. In his influential book, *The Promise of American Life,* Herbert Croly challenged his fellow citizens to embrace a truly *national* form of democratic government. Only by doing so, he suggested, could they prove themselves worthy of the ideals of self-rule and responsible citizenship to which the republic had been dedicated.

In their quest for national community, many Progressives revisited the lessons of the Civil War. Edward Bellamy's admiration for the discipline and self-sacrifice of the Civil War armies was reflected in his enormously popular utopian novel *Looking Backward.* Men and women alike were drafted into the national service at the age of 21, on the completion of their education, where they remained

until the age of 45. Bellamy's reformed society had thus, as his protagonist Julian West notes with great satisfaction, "simply applied the principle of universal military service," as it was understood during the nineteenth century, "to the labor question" (Bellamy, 1888, p. 30). In Bellamy's utopian world there were no battlefields; but those who displayed exceptional valor in promoting the prosperity of society were honored for their service.

Bellamy's picture of a reformed society that celebrated military virtues without bloodshed resonated with a generation that feared the excessive individualism and vulgar commercialism of the Gilded Age would make it impossible for leaders to appeal, as Abraham Lincoln had, to the "better angels of our nature." His call to combine the spirit of patriotism demanded by war with peaceful civic duty probably helped to inspire the progressive thinker William James to write his widely read 1906 essay The Moral Equivalent of War. Just as military conscription provided basic economic security and instilled a sense of duty in men to confront a nation's enemies, so James called for the draft of the "whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against *Nature,*" which would do the rugged jobs required of a peaceful industrial society:

> To coal mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dishwashing, clotheswashing, and windowwashing, to road-building and tunnel building, to foundaries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of skyscrapers, would our gifted youths be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the childishness knocked out of them and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas. (pp. 556–557)

James's proposal for a national service was not as ambitious as the one found in Bellamy's utopian society; moreover, James called for an all-male draft, thus ignoring Bellamy's prescription for a society of greater gender equality that inspired progressive thinkers such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman. But both Bellamy and James expressed the core progressive commitment to moderate the American obsession with individual rights and private property, which they saw as sanctifying a dangerous commercial power inimical to individual freedom. Indeed, progressive presidents like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and even the more effete philosopher John Dewey, strongly supported America's entry into World War I, not only because they believed, with President Wilson, that the country had a duty to "make the world safe for democracy," but also because they acknowledged that there was no moral equivalent for the battlefield. Most progressive reformers held a common belief in civic duty and self-sacrifice; they differed significantly, however, over the meaning of the public interest and how a devotion to something higher than the self could be achieved.

Diversity and Disagreement Within Progressivism

The great diversity of Progressive reformers and the ambiguous meaning of Progressivism have led some to question whether the Progressive movement possessed any intellectual or political coherence. Although many leading political leaders and thinkers joined the Progressive Party, that organization's brief existence (from 1912 to 1916) underscores the movement's powerful centrifugal forces. The party was torn apart by fundamental disagreements among its supporters about the role of the national state in regulating the society and economy. For example, the Progressives' 1912 presidential campaign, with the celebrated former president Theodore Roosevelt as its standard bearer, was deeply divided over whether the reform movement should attack forced segregation in the South—the shame of Jim Crow. In the end, it did not, and accepted the right of states and localities to resolve the matter of race relations. Most Progressives, in fact, called for the "enlightenment," rather than the expansion, of popular sovereignty: Their idea of national community did not include, indeed, was threatened by, African Americans and immigrants. Moreover, because reformers held such divergent views on the meaning of patriotism, Progressives were irrevocably fractured by America's entry into World War I.

More generally, the very notion of progressive democracy is fraught with contradiction, presuming to combine reformers' celebration of "direct democracy" and their hope to achieve more disinterested government—their ambition to create a "modern" state—which would seem to demand a

more powerful and independent bureaucracy. As the acerbic social critic H. L. Mencken argued with respect to the 1912 Progressive Party campaign, Roosevelt only thought he believed in democracy. His "remedy for all the great pangs and longings of existence was not a dispersion of authority, but a hard concentration of authority" (1958, p. 58). Similarly, Bellamy's progressive utopia is governed by a highly centralized administrative state that restricts political participation to those over 45 who have labored for the state long enough to enjoy leisure and the right to vote (1888, xi–xii).

Without denying that the Progressive movement was weakened by a tension between reforms that diminished democracy and those that might make democracy more direct, its central thrust was an attack on the institutions and practices that sustained the decentralized republic of the nineteenth century and posed an obstacle to the creation of a more active, better equipped national state. For all their differences, Progressives shared the hope that democracy and administrative efficiency could be combined and that in this combination, Americans' obsession with self-interest and rights could be tempered by the development of a greater sense of national and international responsibility. For Progressives, public opinion would reach its fulfillment with the formation of a modern executive—famously celebrated by Theodore Roosevelt, as "the steward of the public welfare"—freed from the provincial, special, and corrupt influence of political parties and interest groups.

The Legacy of Progressivism

Although Progressives failed in many respects, it may be argued that "no other generation of Americans has done conspicuously better in addressing the political, economic, and social conditions which it faced" (Link & McCormick, 1983, p. 118). Indeed, no equally comprehensive body of reforms has ever been established in place of the Progressive measures adopted at the dawn of the twentieth century. Many of those features of contemporary politics that often are deemed so new—the distrust of politicians, aspirations for direct democracy, self-styled public interest groups, "culture wars," investigative reporting, and a messianic view of America's role in the world—had a critical start during the Progressive Era.

In the most fundamental sense, Progressivism gave rise to a reform tradition that forced Americans to grapple with the central question of the founding: Is it possible to achieve self-rule on a grand scale? This was the question that had divided the Federalists and Anti-Federalists at the time of the founding. The persistence of local self-government and decentralized political associations through the end of the nineteenth century postponed the question of whether the framers' concept of "We the People" was viable. But with the rise of industrial capitalism, constitutional government entered a new phase. It fell to Progressives to confront the question of whether it was possible to reconcile democracy with an economy of greatly enlarged institutions and a society of growing diversity. As John Dewey argued, the dignity of the democratic individual had to shift from the emotive grounds of local ties "to the cumulative and transmitted intellectual wealth of the community. . . . The Great Community, in the sense of free and full intercommunication," would do "its final work in ordering the relations and enriching the experience of local associations" (1927, p. 109).

To a point, the Progressive Era validated the Anti-Federalist's fears. Despite Progressivism's championing of mass democracy, the mix of attack on political parties and commitment to administrative management conspired to make American politics and government seem more removed from the everyday lives of citizens. Yet Progressive reformers invented institutions and associations that enabled citizens to confront, if not resolve, the new problems that arose during the Industrial Revolution. Many of the political organizations that are central to contemporary American democracy—labor unions, trade groups, professional, civic, and religious associations—were founded during the Progressive Era. Although the assumptions and techniques of Progressivism no longer command the confidence that early twentieth-century Americans had in them, the dilemmas of large-scale democracy with which the Progressives struggled so creatively have continued to challenge Americans since.

Sidney M. Milkis

See also American Pragmatism; Dewey, John; Fabianism; Socialism

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Property

Property is a general term for things such as land or other material resources and goods, the relations between people and those things, the relations between people with respect to those things, or the system of rules that governs these relations. Every society with an interest in avoiding conflict between people over things requires such a system; without it, a civilized common life is impossible. We may distinguish three ideal types of systems that could be used to organize property in a society. Under the first type of system, property is held in common, and all members of the society are free to use it as they choose without spoiling it for others. Under the second type of system, property is held collectively, and society collectively determines its use. Under the third type of system, property is held privately, and those who hold it are free to use it as they choose. Each of these types of systems has been proposed at some time as the best possible system for organizing property in society, and the proponents of each have thought their favored system works the best for many different reasons. Most serious political thinkers have an opinion about property. This entry describes some of the more influential discussions of property in the history of political thought.

The Ancient Greeks on Property: Aristotle and Plato

In his *Politics,* Aristotle asked, what are best arrangements to make about property if a political community is to be as well constituted as possible? Should its members have all things in common, or nothing in common, or some things in common and some not? The second arrangement he considered impossible because living together in a community presupposed having at least some things in common. Thus, the first and the third arrangements were the only practicable alternatives. Aristotle understood Plato to have proposed the first alternative in his *Republic*. *The Republic* was concerned in the first instance with justice as a condition of the human soul but, because Plato assumed that a political community was a replica of the human soul writ large, his conclusions about justice in the soul had some important implications for the character of a just political community. *The Republic* implied that, as a general rule, common or collective ownership should be the governing system of property among the rulers of the community because collective ownership was necessary to promote the common pursuit of the common good. Aristotle argued, against Plato, that collective ownership was injurious to the good of individuals and to the common good, and concluded that, as a rule, it were better that property were private than common, even though it should be used in common.

Aristotle adduced several considerations in support of this conclusion. One consideration was that collective ownership was inefficient: because everyone thought about their own interests more than the common interest, what was held in common was apt to be neglected as everyone left it to others to put it to good use. Another consideration was that conflict between people would increase rather than diminish if there were no clear distinctions in property. More positively, he suggested that individual well-being and virtue were advanced by private ownership. Private ownership encouraged happiness and generosity by enabling people to do services for their friends and companions. At the same time, it allowed people to be independent

of one another and, in that sense, free and equal. Free and equal people enjoyed the status of citizens, a status that stood in contradistinction to that of a slave. A slave was neither free nor equal, not a person but a thing, an item of property to be owned privately but shared freely with one's friends and companions like any other. If Aristotle could not imagine a system in which private ownership went with purely private use, it was because, to his mind, people were by nature political animals that lived together with others for the sake of their common good. Private property was in accordance with nature—as was slavery—and its abolition would be contrary to human nature.

Property in the Roman Law Tradition

A rather different view developed in the Roman law tradition. In this view, private property was not natural—nor was slavery—but a product of convention. In emphasizing the conventionality of private property, the Romans were led to consider, as Aristotle really had not, the modes by which it was acquired. They distinguished several, but all involved action under legal authorization. Earlier Roman writers such as Seneca had asserted that the conventions that established private property stood in contrast to an original dispensation of nature by which all things were made equally available to everyone. The Roman lawyers now suggested that this original freedom and equality existed by a right or law of nature (*jus naturale*), and they distinguished between this state of affairs and current arrangements that derived their authority from the positive law of a particular political community or from the law common to all nations (*lex positiva* and *jus gentium,* respectively). Most of their statements about property dwelled on the second and third of these laws—their interest in the first was slight in comparison. These statements indicated that individuals became entitled to things under the terms of one of these laws: Some things were theirs by natural law, some by civil law, some others by the law of nations. The Roman lawyers used the words *dominium* and, less often, *proprietas* to describe the sum of these legal entitlements to things, and typically ascribed them to the current possessor of the things in question. The recovery of Aristotle's works in the thirteenth century changed matters. Central to these changes was Thomas Aquinas.

Aquinas on Property

Aquinas followed Aristotle in arguing that private property was natural and good. He explained the naturalness of private property by reference to people's entitlement to it under natural law and the jus gentium (which he treated as an adumbration of natural law), and he established its goodness by linking its use to the development of virtue (much as Aristotle had done). But he emphatically subordinated private property to the common good, which trumped the claims of any one person. People had duties to others to use what they had to meet their needs, duties shared by the rulers of the political community. Accordingly, the idea of individual rights to private property figured in his writings, if at all, as entitlements that enabled people to do what was right, whether to develop their own potentialities and those of the community in which they lived, or to succor the needs of their fellow men. Aquinas underscored the moral element in proprietas, a word he used to mean not only possession but also rightfulness, or propriety.

Conceptions of Property in Modern Political Thought

Later commentators on Aquinas elucidated the idea of individual rights but introduced complications by arguing that the jus gentium simply represented an aspect of positive human law rather than natural law. Their arguments conflicted with the naturalness of private property and implied that property rights were merely privileges granted to the members of a political community by its laws, which could be withdrawn without impropriety. This suggested in turn that property, and private property in particular, should be referred to government, a suggestion taken up eagerly in the seventeenth century. The most influential explanation of private property in this period was by Hugo Grotius. Grotius assumed that mankind originally held all things in common and subsequently agreed to partition it, thus producing private property. Samuel von Pufendorf added some refinements but retained the fundamental theory. If this theory implied nothing specific about government, the two came together easily in the idea that only government could enforce a stable partition and so make private property viable. Thus, Thomas Hobbes could argue that

there could be no property, and no distinction between "mine" and "yours," without government. Private property was therefore a creation of government power.

Locke

This way of thinking about property was challenged by John Locke. Locke believed that God had given the world to mankind collectively. The question was how to move from that to private property. Locke explained this move by broadening the scope of property to include not only a person's things—the land or goods to which he was entitled—but also his person. Locke claimed that people had dominium over themselves and their powers of body and mind. These powers he used as the means to private property. By using the labor of their bodies, people could appropriate things from the world and make them their own, effectively extending the natural right they had over themselves into those things. Now, others before him, including Grotius and Pufendorf, had recognized that people could use their own powers to take things from the world, but they had not seen appropriation as an instrument for legitimately acquiring property. Indeed, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau would later observe, a person who takes a piece of the world and calls it his own may be a thief or an imposter.

Locke dealt with this problem by arguing that the world already belonged to God, who had given it to mankind for certain ends. The qualities of body and mind with which He had endowed people were means to be employed to further those ends. God's ends embraced the preservation and increase of the human race in a single great design. Thus, the person who labored in order to sustain life acquired property for himself because he did as God willed with God's creation. His unilateral action gave him a right to property without the need for government. Equally, someone who occupied land without laboring productively on it would have no claim to own it, whereas those in need had claims on the assistance of the propertied and wealthy. Thus with Locke, as with Aquinas, property was connected to virtue and the common good, though the precise character of those connections and their ramifications within his political theory remain moot. In any event, Locke was immensely proud of his account of private property, which proved extremely influential in at least two directions.

Kant and Hegel

In one direction, thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel adopted Locke's view that property went together with personhood but rejected the theological presuppositions in which that view was implicated. Kant elevated human freedom to an end in itself and depicted individual human beings as striving to realize their own freedom on terms that registered the freedom of others. This implied the existence of a system of private property rights, and a political order that protected these rights against the intrusions of others, which enabled people to develop their own freedom, equality, and independence. On his view, people acquired property not by mixing their labor with things but by the transcendental operation of directing their wills on those things. This notion was further developed by Hegel and in time became the standard theory of property among idealist thinkers, from T. H. Green onward. The idealists saw the freedom embodied in property as one stage in human beings' growth toward perfect freedom, which culminated in their membership in a national state as citizens. The property rights they held as individuals were transcended by the claims made on them by the state, which meant in practice that, once the state was established, its positive laws determined property ownership.

Smith and Ricardo

In another direction, thinkers like Adam Smith and David Ricardo transformed Locke's theory of appropriation into a labor theory of value, which made labor alone the source of economic goods and the increase in value that privatization brought. The inference they drew from this theory was not, as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon would later insist, that individuals were entitled to the products of their own labor, but rather that they should be free to sell their labor to any employer they chose. If Smith occasionally acknowledged that in his thinking, it implied that government existed to protect the rich and propertied against the poor; he usually

offered a more optimistic picture in which it appeared that the property thus protected was the result of natural developments, and so just, and served a common interest, if not a common good. Later utilitarian thinkers from Jeremy Bentham to James Mill were more sanguine, contenting themselves with the claim that on balance there was more utility in allowing people to have rights to what they had produced than not (which again presupposed that rights were privileges granted by government).

Marx

Karl Marx disputed the conclusions of both of these lines of thinking. Against the first he argued that, insofar as conditioning private property, the state was conditioned by it. Against the second he argued that in laboring under the conditions hymned by Smith and Ricardo, people did not extend their rights over themselves into things, but imported the characteristics of what they labored on into themselves, becoming in effect servants of the property their own labor had created, a process he famously described as "the fetishism of commodities." Marx projected an image of a future society in which this process had been reversed. First, private property would be abolished and everyone would become an employee of society in a strict equality of wages. Then, people would be free to develop a new kind of appropriation in which they were no longer alienated from their own labor and no longer regarded the world as something there to be utilized. The world would be something to be enjoyed together, a world of potentialities to be realized and possibilities to be explored. These potentialities would be liberated once private ownership ceded to collective ownership and thence to common ownership, and the interests of abstract individuals ceded to the good of all.

Marx's vision of the common ownership of the goods of nature has exerted a persistent imaginative force. His idea that human beings are entitled to a just share of the opportunities open to them, and that society should be refashioned so that they could secure this share, inspired many socialist and egalitarian thinkers in the twentieth century. It continues to inspire today, notwithstanding the hideous failure to implement it in practice by regimes purporting to do so. By the same token, the idea that individuals have rights to the fruits of their labor that, other things equal, no other human being can gainsay, has its own moral force. Aristotle's question—what are the best arrangements to make about property if a state is to be as well constituted as possible—thus remains a central question in modern politics, for every society to confront, theoretically and practically, within a set of wider economic structures that no one society controls.

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See also Grotius, Hugo; Hobbes, Thomas; Locke, John; Marxism; Natural Rights; Rights; Roman Law

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Protagoras (c. 490–420 BCE)

Protagoras of Abdera was the first and greatest of the Greek Sophists. His credited innovations include professing the title "Sophist," charging a fee, and teaching how to speak and win on either side of any question. He traveled widely and spent time at Athens, where Plutarch says he associated with Pericles. In 443 BCE, he wrote laws for Thurii, the new pan-Greek colony that attracted participation from noted intellectuals and experts. His interests were nearly universal but focused on speech and argument (including grammar and

literary interpretation). In his few surviving fragments, his modern interpreters have recognized "the earliest democratic theorist."

Protagoras's *Take-Down Arguments* (an analogy to wrestling) was likely his major and all-inclusive work, as rhetorical as it was philosophical. It famously began: "The human being is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not." Plato and Aristotle criticize this claim extensively, earning it a special place in the history of epistemology. Scholars debate what kind of relativism it implies, and Protagoras's purposes may not have required developing its implications. The apparent emphasis is on bringing the believer and perceiver fundamentally into the equation whenever considering claims of truth: truth is ("democratically") accessible and identified with what seems the case to each individual, who is its "measure." This fits well with Protagoras's other challenges to the standing of expert knowledge (e.g., using perceptual observations to deny geometers' claims). Plato rejected the idea of truth as determined empirically rather than rationally, and philosophers have found the principle contradictory.

Nonetheless, Plato respected Protagoras's ideas and philosophical commitment, and the Sophist's great speech in *Protagoras* seems a sincere representation; used cautiously, it allows insight into his political thought. Protagoras tells a myth about human origins, in which we received, in compensation for our lack of other animal endowments, skill in the various arts, and then the respect and justice necessary to live together and survive in cities. Thus, our capacity for political virtue is original and (as participatory democracy presupposes) universal, and our communal institutions seek to develop it fully in citizens (e.g., by punishment, which in Protagoras's progressive view is educative, as vengeance is a motive more appropriate to beasts). Virtue is teachable, and we are all its teachers (though some, like Protagoras, are better teachers). It is dubious how the pursuit of virtue is reconcilable with the man-measure doctrine. Plato has Protagoras treat "good" and "bad" as appearances relative to the individual believer, yet insist that the wise man can use a (somehow more secure) understanding of what is "beneficial" and make this "seem just" to the citizens.

Later writers report that the Athenians convicted and banished the aged Protagoras for impiety, collecting and burning his books. This is questionable because Plato and Xenophon are silent about the parallel to Socrates' fate (indeed Socrates observes in *Meno* that, if Protagoras corrupted his associates, "all Greece has failed to notice it"). Protagoras's *On the Gods* began, "Concerning gods, I am able to know neither that they are, nor that they are not, nor what kind of form they have. For many are the things that prevent knowing, both the hiddenness from ken and the shortness of human life."

Tarik Wareh

See also Sophists

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PSYCHOANALYSIS

In danger of extinction as a clinical practice, *psychoanalysis* thrives in a number of areas in academic life, almost all connected to political theory: critical literary theory, feminist theory, postcolonial theory, and of course political theory itself. The importance of psychoanalysis, the reason for its lasting influence, stems from the fact that it asks the same question asked by all the great political thinkers. What is the nature of the *psyche,* the Greek term that may be translated as soul or self? What is the best regime, given human nature as we

know it? In one way or another, the study of "psyche-ology" has been the leading concern of all great political theory from Plato to the present.

Sigmund Freud

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), founder of modern psychoanalysis, said that civilization is built on the problem of controlling aggression. Not sex, even if that is the popular reading of Freud, but aggression is the key problem. "Man is the wolf to man," as the classic saying has it, and Freud saw almost all of the institutions of civilization as built to contain this aggression, which he came to call the *Todestrieb,* the drive toward death. In a controversial claim, Freud speculated that in the end, the individual seeks his or her own death, but not before inflicting death and destruction on others. Whether or not people seek their own death, Freud, who wrote most of his social theory in the shadow of World War I, believed that the drive toward destruction was supported by empirical observation alone.

Against the Todestrieb, Freud sets that other great force, *Eros,* the desire to create, build, and foster life, a desire that extends from families to civilization itself. Between these two forces, civilization itself hangs in the balance, which is why so much sexual repression is necessary. Eros, which would ordinarily be channeled into erotic relationships and pair bonding, needs to be repressed and rechanneled into the task of containing aggression. Assuming a hydraulic model of the mind, Freud believed that only a limited amount of psychic energy was available. If Eros was not busy containing *Thanatos* (the term Freud's student, Carl Jung later gave to the Todestrieb), then Thanatos would overpower the individual, and soon enough the world. For Freud, civilization itself was the endless struggle between Eros and death, working itself out in a struggle for the life of humanity. In the end, Freud was not certain which great force would prevail.

A permanent discontent with civilization, a malaise as Freud calls it, is the result of the situation humanity finds itself in. This discontent arises from the sense of guilt civilized men and women feel at the aggression they would unleash against their fellows. Add to this the constant sexual repression necessary to maintain civilization itself, and civilization is not a happy place. It is, however, better than the alternative—the barbarian sack of Rome, perpetual war, massacre, pogrom, and destruction on the one hand, or the totalitarian world as imagined in George Orwell's *1984* on the other.

Freud did not, of course, use all of these images, but the ideas are his: a world of perpetual war and aggression on the one hand, a totalitarian state that might contain it on the other. In *Civilization and Its Discontents* he imagined both. A third alternative he considered unlikely but possible. That some men and women might, through a process of rational self-control (a process he sometimes called sublimation), deny their passions in order to serve a greater cause to which they have devoted their lives. One imagines that Freud included himself in this third category.

Eros and Civilization

The most audacious reception of Freud was that of the cultural Marxists, whose various attempts to blend Marx and Freud would seem an unlikely enterprise. What strange bedfellows they make: Marx, the utopian, who envisioned the possibility of a new socialist man or woman, and Freud, the theorist of a permanently discontent civilization, one in which the abolition of private property would make virtually no difference in the amount of aggression that would have to be repressed. Humans, being who they are, would simply find other things to fight about, or so Freud believed. Evidently Freud's theory would have to be transformed in order to make it useful to the project of cultural revolution.

The greatest transformer of them all was Herbert Marcuse, whose *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud* turns Freud into a utopian theorist by rethinking the origins of repression. For Freud, repression is a psychological category, necessitated by emerging aggression and sexuality. For Marcuse, repression is as much a social as it is a psychological category, designating not just psychological self-restraint, but the restraints on satisfaction imposed by an unjust economic system based on what he calls the "performance principle," the prevailing historical form of the reality principle. Instinct, in turn, Marcuse defines as the primary drives that are subject to historical modification.

If the instincts are subject to historical modification, then the door to utopia is open. Marcuse must demonstrate that repression is essential not to civilization itself, but only to a particularly repressive form of civilization, one based on the performance principle, in which people live to consume, and not the other way around. Marcuse is writing, of course, only about the world's most "advanced" industrial societies. And he was writing at a time (the mid-1950s) in which it seemed possible that the alienation of labor might soon become complete, as he once put it, by which he meant that machines might do the real work, so that humans would be free to play and display themselves. In such a world, repression as Freud wrote about it would become unnecessary; all repression would become surplus, necessitated by an obsolete economic system. In the place of repression, Eros might become self-sublimating, learning how to delay gratification for the sake of more sustained or more satisfying forms of gratification, just as we learn today to postpone some forms of pleasure in order to heighten them. Think, for example, about how waiting for a delicious meal can make it even tastier. But only, of course, if we don't have to wait too long.

Marcuse's argument has been subject to extensive criticism. Perhaps the most interesting is that of Jessica Benjamin, who argues that in other works of his that combine psychoanalysis and utopia, Marcuse seems to idealize the patriarchal bourgeois family—that is, the traditional family, where the father works and is the unchallenged authority figure, while the mother stays home with the children. Marcuse idealized the patriarchal bourgeois family because he believed that the conflict between father and son that was generated by such families often, or at least sometimes, produced unique children with strong identities. People like himself. The trouble with such an account, Benjamin argues, is that it ignores the crucial role of mother in forming the child's self. Freud too neglected the role of the mother in the child's earliest years, from birth to about age 5.

Melanie Klein and the British School

The shift to a focus on the mother came with Melanie Klein and the rise of the so-called British School in psychoanalysis, which flowered during and after World War II. Instead of seeing the three-way Oedipal conflict between father, mother, and son as the central psychological development, Klein and her students, such as D. W. Winnicott, focused on the child's relationship to the mother. For Klein, the father was of secondary importance, especially in the early years, the parent without breasts, as some Kleinians called him.

Both Freud and Klein make aggression central. Though Freud's famous Oedipal conflict is about the young boy's sexual attraction to his mother, it also assumes his desire to kill and replace his father, coupled with the boy's fear that his father will castrate him if he ever finds out. In order to assuage his fear, the young boy, according to Freud, internalizes the father's values, the values of society at large. Here is the origin of conscience, or the superego as Freud called it, in the child's fear of his own aggression, as well as the imagined aggression of his father.

Klein imagines a much earlier and more complex relationship between mother and child, a relationship that differs little depending on whether the child is a boy or a girl. At first, the young child feels terrible anger and aggression at its mother, because the mother must, of necessity, often frustrate the child. No matter how perfect the mother is, she cannot meet the child's every need. At times like these, the child would destroy his or her mother with every weapon at his or her command, from little fists to teeth that bite. At the same time, the child realizes from a young age (as young as 6 months) that the mother he or she hates is also the mother he or she loves. In order to protect mother, and him- or herself, the child psychologically splits the mother in two: the good mother and the bad mother, almost as if they were two separate mothers.

Splitting is a good way to protect those we love from our own hatred and aggression, but splitting has its limits. We see these limits in politics, particularly, where splitting occurs on a large scale. My country is good, your country is bad. My religion is good, your religion is bad. My skin color is good, yours is bad. My country fights for peace, your country fights for war. The most mentally primitive defense, splitting allows us to live safely with those who love us, or who are like us, but at the cost of directing all our hatred, our frustration, our aggression outward, on the "mature" version of the bad mother, such as another country or ethnic group.

The alternative to splitting is ambivalence, the recognition of complexity, above all the complexity of our own feelings. Klein called it the depressive position, because she believed that when the child first comes to recognize that the mother he or she hates is the same mother he or she loves, the result must be a certain depression, a sober recognition that much of the badness in the world resides not in others, but in ourselves. We have hated as well as loved, desired to destroy as much as we have desired to love, foster, and create with our loved ones.

Out of ambivalence and depression comes the desire to make reparation, to help heal the wounds of hatred: wounds that we have inflicted in phantasy (always spelled by Kleinians with a "ph," in order to connote its unconscious dimension), as well as reality, including the wounds others have inflicted. It is the desire to make reparation that leads boys and girls, men and women, to do most of the good things in this world: make peace, care for others, build institutions and societies that will give new opportunities to the next generation. If Freud saw the battle for civilization as a conflict between Eros and Thanatos, then Klein too sees civilization as a conflict between two desires: (1) to split the world into good and bad, cultivating our hatred, and so justifying our endless persecution of the bad; (2) the desire to make reparation for the badness that our own fear and hatred, as well as the fear and hatred of others, has helped create.

The French Connection

Probably the majority of academics, including political theorists, who use psychoanalysis in their work today draw not on Klein or the British School, and only indirectly on Freud, but on the work of Jacques Lacan and those influenced by him. Writing and holding seminars in the 1950s through 1981 in Paris, where he became renowned, Lacan held that the self does not exist, except as a symptom. One of his most influential insights remains his early work on the mirror stage of development, which runs from about 6 months to 2 years. At that time, the young self recognizes itself in the mirror. He or she is impressed by the wholeness of the image, the appearance of definite boundaries, form, and control seen in the mirror. Yet, this wholeness is an illusion. He or she is none of these things. Alienation, from which the child will never recover, stems from the growing realization that his or her reality lies in an imaginary space: the mirror or the mirroring response of other people. In reality, our selves are torn this way and that by our desires.

There is no cure. The best the analyst can do is help the patient organize his menu, by which Lacan means bring some order to one's desires. To do this, however, the patient must recognize that he or she does not exist as a subject, but lives in the position of the dead. One is reminded here of Freud's comment that a successful cure will consist of transforming the patient's hysterical misery into ordinary human unhappiness. Indeed, Lacan saw himself as returning to the original Freud.

While Lacan, and those who attended his seminars, such as Julia Kristeva, a psychoanalyst and literary theorist educated in France, and Luce Irigaray, have been enormously influential, their relevance to political theory is less obvious. Lacan generates a critical theory of reading in which the subject functions much as a sign (such as a word) that will always be out of reach, its meaning forever sliding under the signifier, as Lacan puts it. He means that just as we think we grasp the meaning of a sentence or text, it slips away from us, much as the self does. Like the self, meaning is never stable. The result has been some brilliant rereading of classical texts, showing how they undermine their own claims.

One must look for the political influence of Lacan's thought in untraditional places, such as Irigaray's argument that patriarchy has infiltrated our language so deeply that we do not even know how to think outside its categories, which she calls phallogocentrism. In constructing new ways of thinking about language, in creating a new disruptive form of feminist writing, Irigaray continues the tradition of transforming psychoanalysis into a critical theory of society.

C. Fred Alford

See also Feminism; Freud, Sigmund; Mass Psychology

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Public Choice Theory

Public choice theory is a division of rational choice theory. Some authors do not distinguish between the two. Both import the methodology of economics to political science, and use formal, deductive modes of reasoning. Both assume that political agents are rational in the economist's conventional, thin definition of rationality. Those authors who view public choice theory as a distinct subset of rational choice do so because of its (actual or supposed) ideological bent toward a certain sort of libertarian conservatism, typified by the Chicago and Virginia Schools of economics. Social choice theory is analytically distinct from, but is often grouped with, public choice theory, and is therefore discussed in this entry.

The Toolkit of Rational Choice

Rational choice is analytical and deductive. It applies the tools of economics, especially microeconomics and to a lesser extent welfare and macroeconomics, to the subject matter of political science. Microeconomics is concerned with the activities of rational economic agents and, in particular, with their interactions. At its core lie the concepts of marginalism, expressed most conveniently and clearly using differential calculus. For instance, the elasticity of demand for any good is the rate of change in demand for it per unit change in its price.

Concepts such as elasticity depend on a deliberately thin theory of rationality of economic agents. (Neo)classical economists do not, as often wrongly asserted, assume that all economic agents are selfish. They have been attempting to rebut this misperception since Adam Smith, who wrote extensively about it. To derive predictions and models about the world it is necessary to make some assumptions about human agents, but to make the predictions and models as widely applicable as possible, the assumptions are as meager as possible. In the thinnest conception, rationality is a property (only) of transitivity and completeness of judgment. Transitivity requires that if I prefer a pound of apples to a pound of oranges and a pound of oranges to a pound of pears, then I prefer a pound of apples to a pound of pears. If this were not so, I would be impoverished every time I met a greengrocer. The greengrocer could sell me a pound of apples, then offer me a pound of oranges in exchange (providing that I pay him some more), then a pound of pears in exchange, on the same condition, and so on. Completeness requires that for any *a* and *b* I can say exactly one of three things: *I prefer a to b*; *I prefer b to a*; or *I am indifferent between a and b*.

A slightly thicker assumption is *diminishing marginal utility*. For any pair of goods, it assumes that I would rather have more than less; but for either one, the more of it I already have, the less I value a further increment of it compared to the other. Note that nothing, even in this thicker definition, need imply selfishness. The goods in question could be, for instance, charitable donations. The more I have already given to the volunteer lifeboat service, the less I am inclined to spend my marginal dollar on that and the more on cancer research.

The Virginia School

The Virginia School was founded by James Buchanan (b. 1919; Nobel laureate in economics 1986) and Gordon Tullock (b. 1922). They

observed that economists typically assumed that although economic agents would mostly act from self-interest, political agents, constitutional designers, and regulators would act from the public interest. Notably in public finance, theorists assumed that policy makers would set the optimal tax level that was just sufficient to pay for "the right" amount of public expenditure, while correcting distortions and market failures. Buchanan and Tullock vigorously argued that this was inconsistent, and that political agents should be regarded as selfish to the same extent as economic agents. A well-known Tullock aphorism, although not backed by empirical evidence, is "Everybody is altruistic, 5% of the time." Accordingly, their book, *The Calculus of Consent* (1962), proposes what they regard as the optimal institutions to counter the selfish aims of politicians, voters, and interest groups. They also founded the journal now known as *Public Choice,* which for many years (but less so now) reflected the Virginian ideology that most political agents use the concept of public interest as a cover for their special interests. In the Virginian view, the least plausible statement in politics is "I'm from the government, and I'm here to help you."

The most important Virginian contributions are to restore constitutional design to the central place in political science that it should never have lost and to introduce the concept of rent seeking (credited to Tullock but authored by Anne Krueger in a paper published in 1973).

Constitutional Design

The Calculus of Consent could be regarded as a remake of the Virginian James Madison's essays in *The Federalist* (1788), especially numbers 10 and 45 through 51. In Madison's view, "faction" cannot be suppressed, so it must be controlled. In one version (that of "Federalist 10"), an "extended republic" does most of the work, because it ensures that no local faction is likely to become a tyrannical majority oppressing the minority across the whole land. In the second version (seen especially in "Federalist 51"), the checks and balances of horizontal and vertical federalism do the work. "Ambition must be made to counter ambition," Madison argued (in "Federalist 51," p. 319).

Madison's insights were never forgotten, but their importance was not truly recognized until the 1950s. *The Calculus of Consent* argues that only a constitution unanimously agreed on would fully protect individuals from expropriation. This idea extends the welfare economist's conception of "Pareto-improvement." If a measure makes at least one person better off while making nobody worse off, it may be regarded unambiguously as an improvement. Measures that make some people better off and others worse off can not be so classified. The careful welfare economist says, "I cannot tell you whether or not they should be done; that is a value judgment"; A full-throated Virginian says, "They should not be done unless everyone agrees to them." This would in practice rule out most or all redistributive taxation, which is the basic reason to classify the Virginia School as libertarian conservative.

Two problems are that a constitution that had to be agreed to unanimously would never be agreed on (as Madison himself was well aware), and that Buchanan and Tullock's assumption that political actors are selfishly motivated most of the time leaves no room for altruistic constitution designers such as James Madison.

Rent Seeking

Rent seeking is the search for *economic rent,* by which economists mean the extra return a factor of production makes, compared to the next best available return. In a perfect free market, there are no economic rents because if any activity earns a higher return than others, scarce factors of production will flow to it until the return drops back to normal level. In the real world, there are lots of monopolies (natural and artificial) and information asymmetries that create rent. Tullock's insight was not just that special interests seek economic rent. That has been known since Adam Smith, who, in a prequel to public choice theory, said: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices" (*Wealth of Nations,* 1981, I.X.C.27, p. 145). Public choice writers see conspiracies against the public everywhere. Tullock saw that it pays a lobbyist to use real resources, such as bribes and Washington

dinners, to secure monopolies or tax breaks—but that in aggregate bidders will spend up to the whole value of the monopoly and in some circumstances more in order to secure it. This is what the development economist Jagdish Bhagwati has labeled "directly unproductive activity."

Public Choice Theory in Stanford, Maryland, and Rochester

Not all followers of the Virginia School are Virginians. Among important public choice theorists who neither came from Virginia nor shared the Virginians' libertarian conservative ideology were Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson (1932–1998), and W. H. (Bill) Riker (1920–1993). Downs's *Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) was his Stanford doctoral dissertation. He models politicians as sellers and electors as buyers in the market for policies. His best-known conclusions are (a) that in equilibrium, policy will converge on the issue position of the median voter (a result developed simultaneously by the Scottish economist Duncan Black); and (b, rather in tension with a) that as the probability that an individual voter is decisive is infinitesimal, a rational voter would almost never vote. Much of public choice theory since 1957 is an elaboration and reconciliation of these two results. The median voter theorem is now such a standard tool of empirical analysis that those who use it may not particularly associate it with public choice theory.

Olson and Riker both founded schools of public choice theory, at Maryland and Rochester (NY) respectively. Olson is best known for his first book, *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965), his Harvard dissertation. Potential lobbyists face a collective action problem. What they are seeking, even if it is a restrictive practice or tax break that would yield economic rent, is a public good from the point of view of the (potential) lobbyists. A public good is anything whose benefits are indivisible and nonexcludable, such as clean air, national defense, and an ethanol subsidy. If the group that would benefit from a public good is large, then (as with the Downsian act of voting) it is rational to take a free ride on others' actions and not contribute to the lobby. If the group is small, on the other hand, it is harder to get away with free riding. As there are fewer capitalists than proletarians, one implication is Marxist: Public policy will tend to favor the interests of capital over those of labor. Not all public choice theory has right-wing implications.

Riker had multiple interests, but the one most likely to survive is his program of "heresthetics." From the impossibility results of social choice theory discussed in that section later, he concluded that politics was in chronic disequilibrium. The median voter theorem fails whenever there are two or more dimensions in politics. This is a tragedy for some but an opportunity for those smart enough to practice "heresthetics"—the art and science of political manipulation. By structuring the options and controlling the voting order and the voting system, a heresthetician can get an unexpected outcome in multidimensional space. Riker and his followers have identified a few successful heresthetic ians, such as Gouverneur Morris and Abraham Lincoln in U.S. politics, Robert Peel and David Lloyd George in the United Kingdom, and David Lange and Roger Douglas in New Zealand.

The Chicago School

Where Virginians in their various ways see disequilibrium, the Chicago School sees equilibrium. Chicago economists also tend to be libertarian conservatives, but their distrust of government is typically more than Virginians'. Rather than search in a Madisonian (or Olsonian or Rikerian) way for optimal institutions to control rent seeking, they put a different gloss on the concept of Pareto-improvement. In an efficient political system, all trades and logrolls that make at least one party better off without making either (any) worse off will be done. Therefore, adapting a typical Chicago School title (by Donald Wittman), *Political Institutions Are Efficient* and *Democratic Failure Is a Myth*. Chicago School economists do not deny that politics is full of *economically* inefficient outcomes and institutions, such as tariff protection, which is ruinous to all except those whose output is directly protected. They assert rather that if the gains from moving to a free-trade regime were so great that the winners could bribe the losers to accept it, they would have done it. Therefore, the fact that they have not is used as evidence that a move to free trade would not be efficient. Followers of Olson may object that there

is something circular in this argument: certainly it is hard to test or to set up a counterargument.

Social Choice Theory

Social choice theory concerns the problems of aggregating individual choices (and orderings) to social choices (and orderings). The first known thinkers to understand some of the issues were Ramon Llull (c. 1232–1316) and Nicholas of Cusa (a.k.a. Cusanus; 1401–1464). The "first golden age of social choice" occurred in France between 1770 and 1804, when fundamental discoveries were made by the marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) and J.-C. de Borda (1733–1799). Condorcet proved that when there are at least three voters and at least three options, it is always possible to have a cycle in majority rule such that no option wins a majority against each of the others. This has fundamental implications for democratic theory. Borda proposed the rank-order scoring rule. This was not in itself novel—unknown to Borda, Cusanus had proposed it 350 years earlier—but Borda was the first to axiomatize its properties. The Condorcet winner (the candidate who wins a majority against each of the others) and the Borda winner (the candidate who is on average the highest ranked) are not always the same, and the dispute as to which is the better criterion for majority rule is as open as it was in 1785.

However, all the writings of the golden age were lost and rediscovered only in the mid-twentieth century. The most important new work was Kenneth Arrow's general impossibility theorem of 1951. Arrow proved that no social welfare function could possibly satisfy a set of minimally demanding criteria of fairness and logicality. A social welfare function is a map from a set of individual orderings to a group, or social, ordering. The conditions may be stated, making the anagram "cupid," as:

1. Collective transitivity and completeness (if all individual orderings are transitive and complete, so should be the social ordering)
2. *U*niversal domain (the mapping function yields a unique answer for all possible combinations of individual inputs
3. The weak *P*areto-condition (if all individuals prefer some x to y, the social ordering does not rank y above x)
4. *I*ndependence of irrelevant alternatives (the social ordering of x and y to be a function only of individual orderings of x and y, regardless of individual orderings of other options)
5. Non*d*ictatorship (no individual's preference automatically becomes the group preference regardless of the preferences of other individuals)

The Condorcet rule fails condition *C* (or *U*). The Borda rule fails condition *I*. All conceivable rules, including nondemocratic ones such as "do what has always been done" and "do what the Oracle at Delphi says" must fail at least one of the conditions.

The implications of the Arrow result took some years to sink into political theory, but they now play enormous roles in democratic theory, in the design of electoral systems, and in the subdiscipline of social choice itself. In the 1970s and 1980s, social choice theorists tended to concentrate on the negative—proving that various things were impossible. The trend has now shifted to proving existence results—that things are possible given certain conditions.

Social choice theory carries no distinctive ideological baggage, unlike the Virginia or Chicago Schools of public choice theory. However, it is normatively important. For instance, it destroys the argument that politicians should implement the "will of the people" because the will of the people may be undefinable, and in a complex multidimensional context it almost certainly is.

Iain McLean

See also Condorcet, marquis de; General Will; Neoclassical Economics; Pareto-Optimality; Public Goods; Rational Choice Theory

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Public Goods

A *public good* is a nonexcludable and nondepletable (or "nonrivalrous") good. A good is nonexcludable if one cannot exclude individuals from enjoying its benefits when the good is provided. A good is nondepletable if one individual's enjoyment of the good does not diminish the amount of the good available to others. For example, clean air is (for all practical purposes) a public good, because its use by one individual does not (for all practical purposes) deplete the stock available to other individuals, and there is no way to exclude an individual from consuming it, if it exists. Another common example is national defense, because it is assumed that a nation-state cannot choose to protect just some of its residents from foreign aggression while excluding others from this protection and providing one resident with national defense does not diminish the protection being provided to other residents. A *public bad* is similarly defined to be a "bad" that is nonexcludable and nondepletable. For example, polluted air is a public bad, for the same reasons that clean air is a public good.

Public goods contrast with private goods, which are both excludable and depletable. Food is a straightforward example of a private good: One person's consumption of a piece of food deprives others of consuming it (hence it is depletable), and it is possible to exclude some individuals from consuming it (by assigning enforceable private property rights to food items, for example). Some goods fit neatly into neither category because they are excludable but nondepletable (such as a music concert) or nonexcludable but depletable (such as a public beach, which may become less attractive, or "depleted," as more individuals make use of it).

Public goods (and bads) are textbook examples of goods that the market typically undersupplies (or oversupplies in the case of public bads), relative to Pareto-efficient levels. For example, profit-maximizing firms and self-interested individuals can be expected to choose levels of production and consumption such that the aggregate level of pollution resulting from their activities leaves everyone worse off (according to their own preferences) than if each were somehow prevented from producing or consuming as much as is individually optimal. Commonly suggested solutions to such "market failures" include taxes and subsidies or government intervention.

An important similarity exists between problems involving the provision of public goods and collective action problems, such as voting, public protest, or output restriction in the case of oligopolists, where an individual typically cannot be prevented from benefiting from the achievement of the goal of the collective action, if it is achieved. In such cases, the achievement of this goal can be thought of as a "nonexcludable good." Consequently, it is often thought that an individual may have little incentive to contribute to its achievement—by turning out to vote or participating in a protest—if he or she views the act of contribution as in itself costly and his or her contribution is unlikely to have a significant impact on whether the collective goal is achieved.

Sean Ingham

See also Pareto-Optimality

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Public Reason

Public reason is a moral ideal requiring that political decisions be reasonably justifiable or acceptable from each individual's viewpoint. Given the plurality of moral, ethical, and religious doctrines that characterize liberal democratic societies, public reason represents an attempt to develop a shared framework for our political deliberations that each person can endorse. Some philosophers argue that political regimes or laws that do not meet the standards of public reason are illegitimate or unjust for that reason. Leading contemporary theorists of public reason include John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Gerald F. Gaus. This entry will briefly discuss three aspects of public reason: constituency, scope, and content.

The *constituency* of public reason identifies the relevant set of people to whom we seek to justify a given decision. In one view, the constituency of public reason includes all those people who are governed or otherwise affected by a decision. But this *inclusive* conception poses difficulties—what about irrational, immoral, or otherwise unreasonable people? Some theorists respond to this worry by specifying an *idealized* constituency of people who meet certain epistemic and/or normative standards. A key debate is thus whether the demand for justification applies to people as we find them, or rather to people qua idealized rational and reasonable agents.

The *scope* of public reason delineates the set of issues to which the ideal applies. Some argue that all political power is ultimately coercive, and because it is wrong to coerce others on grounds they cannot reasonably accept, *all* our political decisions must be informed by public reason. Others claim public reason has a more limited scope and regulates only constitutional essentials or those decisions that affect the basic political framework of society. Democratic decisions that take place within that framework are then alleged to be free from the constraints of public reason. A related question is whether public reason should regulate the behavior of all citizens in the political arena, or whether it applies only to public officials, such as judges and legislators.

In considering *content,* theorists largely agree that public reason does not support decisions that can be justified only by appealing to some individual's or group's self-interest, or by appealing to controversial ethical, religious, or metaphysical beliefs. However, theorists disagree about *why* public reason has this content. Some claim public reason is a *procedural* ideal that regulates political discourse among citizens, whereas others insist public reason provides a *substantive* standard that ought to guide our political behavior. In the first view, public reason provides an ideal list of conditions that real political procedures would have to meet in order to ensure decisions are acceptable to each participant (e.g., conditions for inclusion, participation, and decision making). Those who favor the second view, however, argue the content of public reason is, at least in part, settled in advance of any actual discussion. The theorist determines which reasons or principles are publicly justifiable; real political deliberation is then regulated by this substantive standard.

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See also Deliberative Democracy; Habermas, Jürgen; Liberalism; Rawls, John; Social Contract Theory

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Public Sphere

On November 4, 2008, Barack Obama was elected president of the United States. The election was notable for a number of reasons, not least for the fact that Obama was the first African American president. In addition, he was perceived by much of the American electorate and by many elsewhere

in the world as a liberal alternative to the 8 years of neoconservative policy making under his predecessor George W. Bush. But there is another reason why Obama's election is important, one that directly concerns what is explored in this entry. This election opened up public spheres in societies across the world through which individuals debated and discussed the consequences and wider meaning of his victory. These debates were numerous, and the issues discussed varied according to factors such as social class, gender, religion, race and ethnicity, country of origin, media outlet, and so on. Nonetheless, the crucial point is that many people in different ways engaged in dialogue and deliberation about Obama's electoral success. This relatively simple example suggests what is meant by the concept of "the public sphere." This entry elaborates on this initial meaning and looks at some of the debates around what constitutes a public sphere.

Habermas and the Public Sphere

Arguably, the most well-known theorist of the public sphere is the critical social theorist Jürgen Habermas. In his early work, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989), Habermas outlines the rise in eighteenth-century Western Europe of the bourgeois public sphere to its eventual demise in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Habermas, the eighteenth century saw the convergence of several key developments that encouraged the emergence of this particular public sphere. The modern economy required the circulation of information between traders about such factors as the prices of commodities. Subsequently, the market economy also required a reading public who could think in "rational" terms about economic transactions across the globe.

At the same time, Habermas further suggests, the eighteenth century witnessed the rise of the modern patriarchal family. Within this particular social unit, individuals began to express their innermost emotional and personal feelings through the likes of letters, diaries, and novels. Private individuals now shared a platform of psychological intimacy of what was thought to be "human." Urban cities in Western Europe also flourished, and this brought together strangers who would mix in particular public spaces such as *salons* and coffee houses to discuss the issues of the day. "Professional" criticism likewise emerged through a growing national press, which helped to politicize debates in civil society. Indeed, as Habermas observes, it was soon apparent that a growing "public opinion" among the populations of Western Europe could be identified based on the power of the better argument and a morally equipped rationality bent on ascertaining what was just and right.

Habermas's delineation of the bourgeois public sphere is useful because it highlights some of the key attributes of the modern public sphere. However, on closer inspection, Habermas's early exposition of the public sphere is found wanting. First, Habermas argues that the bourgeois public sphere went into terminal decline from the nineteenth century onward due to such factors as the trivialization of debate through the rise of the mass media and the increasing way in which politicians and governments began to manipulate debate through, for example, public opinion polls. But if one accepts Habermas's historical narrative, it becomes difficult to see how the bourgeois public sphere as it existed in the eighteenth century can be productively used to analyze contemporary events if that very same public sphere flourished for only a short period of time.

Second, critics argue that Habermas says very little in *Structural Transformation* about how non-bourgeois public spheres, such as working-class public spheres, were more frequently than not excluded from being fully included in democratic debate and discussion. Such exclusion operated through factors such as government repression, wealth, inequality, power, and so on. A related point here is that Habermas's delineation of the bourgeois public sphere seems to capture the cultural lived experiences of a rather serious and scholarly type of public debate by white, middle-class, male individuals. Yet when we turn our attention either to eighteenth-century European societies or to a modern-day phenomenon like the election of President Obama, we immediately notice that the sort of "rational-critical" discussion evident in the bourgeois public sphere is just one type of debate in society among numerous other populist forms of debate. For example, many would no doubt have discussed Obama's election

campaign in everyday spaces such as a community club, a workplace, Internet discussion forums, local shops, public parks, the gym, a bar, and so on. And it goes without saying that these discussions would themselves be mediated by other factors, such as the region each participant lived in; their own individual, social, and cultural identity; local language styles such as "slang" words; and so on. These attributes convey types of discussion embedded in a popular culture at some distance from the sort of rational-critical bourgeois public sphere celebrated by Habermas.

A Procedural Approach to the Public Sphere

Habermas is of course aware of the criticisms directed at his early conception of the public sphere, and in his later work he consciously seeks to address these problems. Habermas no longer equates the public sphere with the bourgeoisie. Instead, he now seeks to theoretically reconstruct the broader *procedures* required for debate and discussion to be considered as rationally motivated. Accordingly, Habermas argues that there are three validity claims underpinning debates between at least two people: that the propositional content is true and is based on evidence; that the performative content is normatively correct and refers to questions of moral rightness about a subject matter being discussed; and that the intentions expressed are sincere. Such validity claims, Habermas further suggests, conjoin *all* individuals, and not just the bourgeoisie, to accept an argument based on the best reasons put forward by those concerned, rather than by imposing arguments on others through more coercive factors, such as wealth and power.

In *Between Facts and Norms,* Habermas argues that in our increasingly complex global world, it is the steering capacity of law that has the power to establish a robust and "valid" public sphere. For example, law for Habermas has both the power to create sanctions aiming to regulate the behavior of people and to enact laws that individuals have actively participated in creating. This viewpoint enables Habermas to sketch out the procedures that would need to exist for a healthy public sphere to flourish. In his ideal state of affairs, "strong" public spheres such as the state and government would make rules and regulations that a population must follow. "Weak" public spheres, such as those associated with social movements (e.g., environmental groups) or the voluntary sector, would form opinions through debate among their members. In other words, "weak" public spheres have the capacity to articulate their own validity claims based on the beliefs, desires, norms, and morals held by their members. In this way, law acts as a means by which strong public spheres communicate decisions to weak public spheres, while weak public spheres debate the validity of such legal rules in their own public forums and formulate their own validity claims on them. Once debated among their members, these opinions from weak public spheres are then passed back up to strong public spheres. By taking on board opinions from weak public spheres, strong public spheres can amend legal rules as is required.

A Deliberative Approach to the Public Sphere

One notable set of criticisms directed at Habermas's later work suggest that the sort of procedures Habermas maps out will not in themselves guarantee that some participants will engage in ongoing dialogue with others. As James Bohman argues, Habermas's procedural account will not by itself be able to judge the extent to which discussion in a particular context will be publicly acceptable to others. On balance, knowing that one's arguments are "valid" does not necessarily imply that the processes of deliberation will be acceptable to one or more of the parties involved in a respective debate. For example, there may very well be a procedure that stipulates that no public sphere can discriminate on the grounds of gender. However, in actual deliberations, a woman might not raise a question concerning, say, everyday experiences of sexual harassment, because she believes it to be a matter of less seriousness and importance than other issues under consideration in the public sphere at hand. In other words, the quality and public nature of debate cannot be resolved only through a set of procedures. Instead, people will tend to support agreements to the extent to which deliberations themselves, and not merely the procedures, are publicly accountable.

What this means is that procedural devices for the public sphere are a necessary though not sufficient mechanism for people to engage in debate

and discussion. Just as important, some suggest, is the quality of deliberation through which people argue about, and make justifications for, their reasons for adopting a particular standpoint. Accountability in deliberative encounters is therefore just as vital as the amount of consent people show toward procedural devices. After all, according to this deliberative perspective, when one gives an account of their arguments to others, they are forced to take careful note of the public setting in which the discussion is taking place and take note of the various people listening. While certain procedures must obviously be observed by all in such settings, participants are also required to carefully articulate, explain, and justify their reasons in a manner that will resonate with the lived experiences of others in the setting in question. In addition, a deliberative perspective does not merely highlight formal procedures of co-opting participant membership onto organizational forums, as one might expect in Habermas's schema. Rather, deliberative theorists pay closer attention to the inclusion of a variety of "ordinary" people on such forums so that a rich array of voices can be heard.

Although more deliberative approaches illustrate some of the problems evident in Habermas's procedural account, they are not without their own problems. One of the more pressing problems is that deliberative theorists want to restrict coercion to a minimum during the actual moment of deliberation in order to promote equality and mutual respect between participants. However, critics point out that although this is a laudable aim, it is nevertheless somewhat idealistic. For example, many social movements aiming for greater democratic rights obviously use various types of communicative rhetoric to win allies for their respective causes. Yet such movements also use strategic acts of resistance, such as demonstrations, marches, boycotts, disobedience, and so on. These more "coercive" strategies are often just as important for gaining greater rights as are "noncoercive" deliberative acts, but they are strategies that are frequently ignored by deliberative theorists.

A Postmodern Approach to the Public Sphere

It is the recognition that strategic coercion is often required in debate and discussion that has led others to reformulate the concept of the public sphere. In particular, some argue that contemporary societies comprise a plethora of competing voices in the public sphere. These competing voices are structured around diverse identity formations, such as gender, sexuality, race, and by diverse social and political issues, such as environmentalism, global poverty, stop-the-war campaigns, antiglobalization, and so on. In such circumstances, it makes little sense to map out a set of procedures or deliberative conditions that will satisfy all of these competing interests and issues. Rather, one should simply accept the permanency of conflict, or agonism, between different interests in society and encourage the formation of public outlets for these competing interests. In this more postmodern perspective, one does not therefore have to necessarily discover or reach a consensus between relevant participants in the public sphere. Rather, it is quite feasible and legitimate to allow and encourage spaces of agonism to develop and flourish.

This latter point is especially noticeable when one considers the impact of globalization. Recent technological advances in civil society, such as the Internet, have encouraged the formation of global communication networks across territories. As a result, different people from different countries, regions, and localities can engage in debate and discussion across a range of issues and use these discussions in conjunction with, or as a springboard for, other types of activist politics. Take the antiglobalization movements as an example. They were formed by a multitude of groups and alternative media outlets along with a vast array of issue-based politics. However, the various activist networks that feed into the antiglobalization movement are still nevertheless linked together by a critical and often antistatist stance toward the development of globalization. For example, many activists involved in the antiglobalization movement are critical of the policies of Western governments to tackle global poverty. This represents a unique public sphere in the age of global capitalism to the extent that debate and discussion are formed across social and global communicative networks. A particular local social struggle in one area of the world can thereby at the same time be communicated to other local struggles in another part of the world. Such struggles are thus simultaneously local and common, public and private.

Moreover, it is a type of communication in which debate is informed by other ongoing and often coercive strategies, such as demonstrations, protests, leafleting, petitions, computer hacking, and so on.

According to critics, however, a postmodern approach suffers from its own problems in relation to the public sphere. First, a postmodern approach is frequently hampered by lack of coherency. For example, the fact that a social movement such as antiglobalization is composed of so many different groups often leads to internal divisions and rifts between various movement activist networks that make up its core constituency. This in turn means that this movement is not as successful as it could be in presenting a coherent political program to those "ordinary" public spheres inhabited by "ordinary" voters in local communities. Such divisions also open up the opportunity for nation-states and global governance institutions to selectively co-opt social movements within formally sanctioned government public spheres and marginalize other social movements that prove too "antagonistic."

Second, many postmodern approaches are accused of lumping together qualitatively distinct types of protest under rather homogeneous descriptive terms, such as "social movements," "multitude," or "identity politics." The problem appears if we compare public spheres that emerge in working-class communities on local issues and public spheres that emerge in anarchist networks on global issues. Each respective public sphere here is substantially different in both form and content, and it makes little sense to simply relate them together under the same descriptive terms.

Third, many postmodern approaches overestimate the impact that globalization has had on the public sphere. Often preferring to conceptualize debate and discussion at a global level, postmodern approaches sometimes fail to explore in enough detail the role that the nation-state plays in framing issues spoken about in the public sphere. An obvious illustration in this respect is the way in which governments will use immigration as a subject matter to frame part of a nation's political landscape in order to deflect public scrutiny away from other more contentious political issues.

John Michael Roberts

See also Deliberative Democracy; Habermas, Jürgen; Postmodernism

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PUBLIUS

Publius—the pseudonymous voice of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison—is the author of 85 essays urging the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. These essays appeared several times a week in New York City newspapers between October 1787 and August 1788 and were later assembled in book form as *The Federalist*. Although the essays were initially written to defend the Constitution against Anti-Federalist opponents, they also provided a systematic explanation of American constitutionalism. *The Federalist* is, therefore, often considered America's most important work of political theory. A proper understanding of *The Federalist* requires attention to its status as a work both of political polemic and of theoretical reflection on

the principles and organization of republican government.

Publius argued against the decentralization of political authority under the Articles of Confederation, which had created a confederation of 13 sovereign states rather than a central government capable of acting in the national interest. Publius worried, for example, that national commercial interests suffered from intransigent economic conflicts between states, and that federal weakness undermined American diplomatic efforts abroad. Broadly, Publius argued that the government's impotence under the Articles of Confederation obstructed America's emergence as a powerful commercial empire.

Publius was also critical of the power assumed by state legislatures under the Articles of Confederation—and of the questionable character of the men serving in those assemblies. The farmers and artisans who rose to power in postrevolutionary America seemed too beholden to narrow economic and regional interests to serve the broader public good. Of particular concern to Publius were state legislatures passing pro-debtor legislation and paper money laws that threatened creditors' property rights. Although revolutionary Americans typically worried about the conspiracies of the elite few against the liberties of the people, Publius's concern was with tyrannical legislative majorities threatening the rights of propertied minorities. According to Publius, the Articles of Confederation had provided no safeguards against the vices of the people themselves. He argued that the American Revolution's enthusiasm for liberty had diminished popular appreciation for the need for governance. "Excesses of democracy" threatened to corrupt postrevolutionary republican governments and sink them into popular licentiousness and vice. Publius understood the 1786 insurrection of debtor farmers in western Massachusetts—Shays' Rebellion—as a symptom of this broader crisis.

Publius argued for an increase in the "energy" of the federal government to respond to this crisis. However, the national government's increased power would have to be based in republican principles and retain a federal distribution of power; there would be no return to monarchical rule or consolidation of central authority. The task, as Publius stated in Federalist 10, was to find a "republican remedy to the diseases most incident to republican government" (p. 65). *The Federalist*'s new science of politics sought to establish republican government on principles that departed from classical republicanism, to prevent the United States from falling into predicted cycles of decline and regeneration that afflicted past republics. The new federal Constitution promised to break these cycles of decline and establish a more durable and powerful *Novus ordo seclorum*.

There were two essential components of Publius's arguments on this issue: the American states' vast territory and an innovative theory of political representation. The baron de Montesquieu and other influential republican theorists had argued that republican government was possible over only a small territory because free republics depended on a virtuous citizenry that shared interests and values and whose loyalty was engendered through direct participation in public affairs; popular liberties were sustained only by a virtuous citizenry. A large republic's diversity, classical republicans feared, would lead to divisive factional politics that would undermine it. The loyalty of citizens in a large state, moreover, would be achieved by threat of force rather than virtuous commitment to the public good. Publius's Anti-Federalist opponents frequently invoked these theories in their arguments against the Constitution.

Publius rejected this prevailing theory of small republics and argued instead that the American republic's vastness was an advantage. Rather than relying wholly on the citizenry's virtues to prevent factionalism, Publius argued that institutions could be arranged so as to mitigate its harmful effects. Political representation, which Publius called "the great mechanical power in government," was the key. In a large republic, there would be so many different factions, Publius reasoned that no majority faction could win elections and tyrannize over minorities. Instead, these factions would cancel each other out and typically elect representatives capable of an enlarged, refined view of the public good. Although Publius argued that the people were the only legitimate foundation of public authority, *The Federalist* emphasizes that institutions should be organized to obstruct majorities and protect the people from the tyrannical tendencies of their own democratic will.

Publius's emphasis on how institutional organization might "ameliorate popular systems" exemplifies a broader shift in how he understood the strategy of republican governance. In earlier forms of republicanism—including the "Country" republicanism that profoundly influenced American revolutionaries—the power of government was directly opposed to the liberties of the people. Publius, by contrast, argued that the Constitution established an economy of governmental power and popular liberty: Government would rule not by directly limiting the liberties of the people, but would indirectly channel them to prevent harmful excesses.

This institutional strategy of indirect governance is also exemplified in Publius's famous arguments about checking governmental power. Popular accountability through elections was a crucial "external" check, and Publius also argued for the importance of "auxiliary precautions" in the internal organization of the government itself. The separation of powers between the three branches of government would create internal checks and balances within the government to prevent, first, one branch from dominating the others and, second, the general government from overreaching constitutional limits on its power. Whereas earlier republican theories of "mixed government" had associated the separate branches with different social classes, Publius's theory derived the authority of all branches from the people themselves. There was no constitutionally sanctioned division of social classes or estates.

Scholars have contested the place of *The Federalist* within the history of Western political thought. Some have identified it with the end of classical republican politics and with the birth of modern liberalism; others have emphasized the influence of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like David Hume; and yet others have tried to establish the influence on Publius of ancient theories of the virtues. Most agree, however, that Publius offers profound insights into the nature of American politics and, doing so, allows readers to see the goals—and democratic limitations—of modern republicanism more clearly.

Jason Frank

See also American Founding; Constitutionalism; Lawgivers; Representative Democracy; Republicanism; Science of Politics; Separation of Powers

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Pufendorf, Samuel von (1632–1694)

Samuel von Pufendorf is one of the most important intellectuals of the early German Enlightenment. During the seventeenth century, Pufendorf's works were widely read and translated into all major European languages. At least for his own century, his influence on the German and European developments on law and philosophy cannot be easily overrated. His writings have influenced the shaping of ideas formulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Denis Diderot, as well as ideas in John Locke's and William Blackstone's works. His influence, however, is not limited to Europe. Pufendorf also had bearings on the ideas of the American founding fathers and on the formulation of a defense of the right of colonies. But by the end of the eighteenth century, he had become academically marginalized.

During the last two or three decades, Pufendorf's thought has regained scholars' interest. The recent scholarship can be broadly divided into two camps, reflecting the two different trends in the reception of his work during the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Although Pufendorf was read in Europe primarily as a theorist of absolute and religious independent state power, in the New World he stands for a defender of the people's liberty and rights. These two different readings of Pufendorf are mirrored in recent scholarship in a "modern" and a "traditional" interpretation of his works.

Life

One reason for his marginalization can be accounted for in the eclectic nature of his writings. This eclecticism is also reflected in his life and career. Pufendorf was born in the Electorate of Saxony to a Lutheran pastor. Originally, he intended to follow his father's profession and began studying Lutheran theology in Leipzig, Germany. Soon thereafter he became interested in natural sciences and jurisprudence and switched to Jena University. There he studied natural law and moral philosophy. After leaving the university, he served as tutor for Peter Julius Coyet's family, the Swedish minister in Copenhagen. In 1660, he became professor of natural law and law of nations in the faculty of philosophy at Heidelberg University. This was the first chair of this kind in Europe. Later, he held a similar position in the faculty of law at Lund University. He was privy councilor, royal historian, and secretary of state to Charles XI of Sweden; thereafter, he served similar appointments with Frederick I and Frederick III of Prussia. A few months before his death, Charles XI of Sweden ennobled Pufendorf by granting him the title of baron (*Freiherr*). His different occupations and interests are reflected in his work: Although he primarily has a reputation as a natural law theorist, he was interested in the concepts of sovereignty, toleration, federalism, resistance, and theological questions.

Main Ideas

Despite the diversity of his work, most of his ideas are related to and center on the nature of the state and the primacy of the political. One of his major achievements can be located in freeing natural law, the state, and the political from religion. Unlike other theorists of his time, he integrates history into his theoretical analysis. This becomes particularly apparent in *On the Constitution of the German Empire* (1667), a work that is ranked among Pufendorf scholars as his most brilliant. Published under the pseudonym of Severinus de Monzambano, *On the Constitution of the German Empire* refutes the medieval ideology of the *translatio imperii,* an idea, Pufendorf believes, that is only for the papacy's benefit.

Pufendorf's refutation of papal power echoes a number of medieval voices, including Marsilius of Padua. However, it also reveals and highlights one of his main concerns: the struggle for an intellectually sound argument for the independent sphere of the political. His entire political theory is aimed at securing the religious neutrality of the state and the political neutralization of the church. These are the two essential features of his natural law theory. They are closely related to his concept of the state, which emerges out of a transformed Hobbesian original contract.

Although Pufendorf is heavily influenced by Thomas Hobbes's language and ideas, Pufendorf's understanding of the state of nature is not a permanent state of war. He considers it a state of freedom with a number of deficits that can be overcome only in a political community. To transfer from the state of nature to the political, two contracts are required. The first contract is among (future) citizens. They agree on forming a community and decide whether they want a monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic government. In the second contract, the citizens transfer their power to the government. The government and the state in its totality have then the same freedom as each individual in the state of nature. Although it was still common among his contemporaries to consider God as the primary cause for the state, Pufendorf considered God only the mediate cause of the state; natural law and law of nations are the immediate cause. Adopting a slightly transformed version of Jean Bodin's concept of sovereignty allows him to make a further argument for the state's autonomy from any religious authority over the political: Because sovereignty is indivisible and it resembles the original freedom, it possesses unlimited freedoms and can act and judge as it wishes. This concept gives power over religion to the state. In the case of a tyrannical ruler, Pufendorf grants the individual only the right to flee and to seek the protection of a third party that is not under obligation of the ruler. However, if the ruler tyrannizes the entire people, the contract between these two parties becomes invalid. The ruler is considered an enemy and the people have the right of self-defense.

Bettina Koch

See also Bodin, Jean; Hobbes, Thomas; Locke, John; Natural Law; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Sovereignty

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Punishment

One of the central, and revealing, elements of every political system is how it punishes those who break the law. Many different variables provide insight into the working of a regime, including how systems of punishment are administered; which infractions are considered worthy of punishment; what sorts of punishments are demanded; whether punishment is conceived as serving justice, social order, or the combination thereof; and whether those accused of crimes are able to offer a defense. It is important to distinguish the ideas about punishment espoused by a regime from its actual practices, as both are relevant for understanding how punishment and political order are interrelated. Four lenses of analyses have predominated in the political theory of punishment: punishment and right, punishment in relationship to sovereignty, a sociological approach that focuses on how different groups in society are affected by punishment practices, and utilitarian and economic approaches that investigate the role of punishment as a political tool that complements larger social or economic systems.

The integral relationship of punishment to the concepts of rights in Western political thought can be traced back to the common Greek roots of *timê* and *poinê*: the words *honor* and *punish* have a common origin. It is an acknowledgment of human rationality and judgment that creates the need to punish. Today, those who are considered impaired in their judgment, for instance by youth or mental instability, are not held accountable for their actions the same way as those in full control of their faculties. Intentionality in agency is also important; a crime is punished differently depending on whether it is determined to have been premeditated or accidental. Therefore, the liberal tradition in political theory sees punishment as a necessary complement to individual rights. The belief in judgment that grounds individual rights also means that all individuals must be held accountable for the results of their actions. Although we may think of punishment as a way of limiting individual freedom, many thinkers have argued it is actually a recognition of individual freedom and responsibility.

Punishment is also integral to the dictates of sovereignty to deliver order, security, and justice. Social contract theory emphasizes the exclusive right to punish that resides with political authorities once a political order has been established. For Thomas Hobbes, the sovereign punishes in order to create security and justice and to train the subjects of the social contract; whereas for John Locke, the role of the state is to provide impartial adjudication of conflict. Locke argues that impartial judicial procedures and punishments are the best way for the state to limit the eruption of irrationality and anger—the state of war—into the context of a political society. Governments must use punishment in such a way that it promotes the end of political society as a whole: to enlarge the security and stability of individuals, and not to abuse them through the arbitrary exercise of the power of the state to punish. Therefore, punishment is the exclusive right of sovereigns, but also must be bound by larger ideals of law and justice.

The work of Michel Foucault on institutions of punishment, *Discipline and Punish,* argues that modes of punishment reveal what the state desires as a model citizen, and how it goes about reshaping the population according to these norms. He argues that the structure and intent of modern government can be understood through an examination of institutions, such as the prison. More recently, scholars such as David Garland have argued that governments have legitimated themselves and consolidated power by encouraging fear in citizens by replying with increasingly punitive practices. These lines of inquiry suggest that not only is the prerogative to punish exclusive to sovereign powers, it may also be used to both develop and justify the exercise of new forms of political administration.

These ideals reveal much about how individualism, rights, bounded sovereignty, and government accountability are conceived, and punishment practices also create and reveal social and political inequalities. First, those who disagree with a regime can be subject to exile, incarceration, torture, and/or death. Members of religious, ethnic, racial, and sexual minorities can also be subject to severe punishment within a regime. Disproportionate minority confinement, where minorities make up a larger percentage of the prison population than they do in the general population, is a phenomenon in many different countries. Economics has also influenced punitive practices throughout history. Vagrancy laws have penalized the homeless and/or jobless, and forced labor from prisoners known as galley slaves literally powered the early modern exploration of the globe. Later colonial settlement in North America, Africa, and the Pacific was accomplished in part by those convicted of crimes. Punishment has not infrequently been used to reinforce the status of already disenfranchised groups as well as to extract labor from the poor.

Finally, no account of punishment and political theory would be complete without a consideration of how many political prisoners, such as Nelson Mandela and Václav Havel, have become symbols of resistance against unjust regimes and played roles in regime transformation. Institutions such as the Bastille and the Soviet Gulag have invited actions of resistance and outrage from those subject to these regimes. If a sovereign power appears to abuse its exclusive authority to punish, it may become suspect and engender resistance. If the stated ideals of a polity concerning the rights of citizens and the bounded use of power are clearly compromised by its practices of punishment, the legitimacy of a regime can be threatened. Therefore, rather than the brute exercise of force, punishment needs to be understood as a complex negotiation of larger principles, the need for order, the institutional structures of governance, and the evolving relationship between a state and those subject to it.

Keally McBride

See also Force; Governance; Justice, Theories of; Legitimacy; Liberalism; Rule of Law; Sovereignty

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PYTHAGOREANISM

A philosophical school, with characteristics of a mystical cult in its earlier stages, founded in the city of Croton in southern Italy by Pythagoras (c. 570–490 BCE), a seer and sage according to his followers. The flourishing of the school was violently terminated by a revolution against the Pythagoreans, allegedly by aristocrats that were denied admission, that led to Pythagoras's escape and the massacre of some of his followers. Pythagoreanism had a strong impact in classical political thought and contributed to the formulation and development of basic social and political ideals, like the political role of friendship, the meritocratic distribution of political power, and retributive justice.

Our knowledge about Pythagoras's actual teaching is speculative, due to it having been kept secret within the restricted confines of his fellowship. Some of the earlier Pythagorean reports on their political thinking have survived in the form of fragments attributed mainly to Archytas of Tarentum (fl 400–360 BCE), an influential politician and philosopher who held important political offices a couple of generations after Pythagoras. Archytas's friendship with Plato, however, is seen to cast doubt on the authentically Pythagorean nature of his writings, which in turn prompts the question of the degree to which the surviving version of

Pythagoreanism is in fact of Platonic inspiration. Pythagorean influence is evident in the political writing of both Plato and Aristotle, while a neo-Pythagorean tradition of the Hellenistic era combined the central philosophical ideas of that period by presenting them as the heirs of early Pythagoreanism. Several pseudo-Pythagorean political fragments of that time survived in later hagiographies of Pythagorean life, most notably those of Diogenes Laertius (c. 200 CE) and the neo-Platonists Porphyry (c. 234–305 CE) and Iamblichus (c. 245–325 CE). Regardless of its mystical element, Pythagoreanism has been claimed as the antecedent ideology of political classes and parties: Plato (*The Republic* 600A-B) alluded to the affinity to the Pythagorean fellowship of his communist elite of the guardians, and Iamblichus (*The Life of Pythagoras* 6.29) depicted Pythagoreans as coenobites, a distinctive social group that had revived in his time.

Friendship was the cornerstone of the Pythagorean sect, in theory as well as in practice. Allegedly, Pythagoras authored the term and regulated the concept by distinguishing between its different types (Iamblichus's *The Life of Pythagoras* 33.230, 16.70), while the Pythagorean fellowship was depicted as a symbiosis in which the fellow members were treated equally, regardless of their sex or social background, and property was shared among them. Plato (*Laws,* Book 6, 757A5-C6) bears witness to a qualified version of the Pythagorean claim that centers on the "truest and perfect equality" of proportional, instead of arithmetical, equality, which results in a meritocratic, rather than a radical egalitarian, scheme. Still, in all likelihood, the new meritocratic proposal did not have any historical political impact in the cities where Pythagoreans lived or held political power, and it was restricted only within their fellowship. As far as the politics of the city were concerned, the Pythagoreans' political alliances aimed at the preservation of the status quo and the maintenance of civic concord.

Their theoretical commitment to that concord is captured by one of Archytas's few authentic fragments (B3.7–9), which refers to the ability to calculate its social function in promoting concord in the city by equalizing differences. According to this fragment, because identifying the proportional distribution, which results to a concordant community, is the result of calculation, it is open to every rational being, and it is therefore solid ground for accordance. Such a political use of the rational capacity that human beings possess is groundbreaking, because it replaces the arbitrariness of tyrannical degrees with objective and accessible fairness. This proposal was based on the Pythagorean conviction that an underlying harmony unites the whole cosmos, and it was supported by their belief that "mathematization" should be employed to reveal this harmony in every of aspect of human life. By identifying cosmic justice with the proportionality that remains intact insofar as the ratio of its parts lasts, Pythagoreanism could similarly define social justice as a meritocratic allocation.

Pythagorean conservatism was also the basis for their conception of corrective justice. From the thesis that justice should be defined as harmony, they derived a conception of corrective justice that is viewed as the talionic ("eye for an eye") restoration of any violation of the status quo caused by an unjust action. Once more, calculation is crucial for the judge's verdict about the conviction, the compensation, and even the deterrent function of punishment. Although Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics,* Volumes 4–5) criticized what he understood as the monolithic nature of Pythagorean reciprocal justice for failing to take into account intentions and social utility, he could not help but acknowledge the importance of bipolarity between the unjust action and its restoration and to incorporate it in his influential theory of rectificatory justice.

Many of the later Pythagorean political pseudepigrapha are attempts to philosophize on Aristotelian themes in a Pythagorean fashion. Taking the famous Aristotelian thesis for distributive justice as his starting point, Pseudo-Archytas argued in favor of the meritocratic allocation of political offices. Other neo-Pythagoreans carried this idea to its extremes by suggesting that the raison d'être of hierarchical ruling is the emplacement of harmony on the social domain, which will have to be tuned and united with the harmony of the cosmos. Again, starting from another Aristotelian hypothesis for the superlatively virtuous kingship, they proposed a utopian account of the ideal monarch, akin to God, who is animated law and serves as a moral exemplar to his subjects. Neo-Pythagoreans also expanded on the Aristotelian classification of constitutions with reference to whose

interest it is promoted and also proposed a theory of mixed constitution with a notion of separation of powers.

Charilaos Platanakis

See also Aristotle; Community; Justice, Theories of; Kingship; Plato

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QUEER

The term *queer* originates from the German *quer* meaning oblique, cross, adverse, perverse. It was first used in the sixteenth century to describe something generally regarded as strange, odd, or out of keeping with the commonplace. In the nineteenth century it began to be used as a verb, meaning to spoil, to ruin, to jeopardize, and in the early twentieth century it was used, for the first time, as a disparaging term for an effeminate man or a homosexual. In the late twentieth century, in the wake of Gay Pride and other such movements aimed at reclaiming identities previously constituted by mainstream society as aberrant, the term *queer* began to be deployed by gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and other sex- and gender-nonconformists as a positive form of self-identification. This reached its apotheosis in the 1990s with the emergence of direct-action activist groups such as Queer Nation, OutRage, PUSSY (Perverts Undermining State Scrutiny), Transsexual Menace, Lesbian Avengers, and Transgender Nation, to name but a few. Like the individuals who identified with the descriptor "queer," these groups aimed to both reinscribe and celebrate what was represented in the mainstream imaginary as strange, marginal, or aberrant, in particular as this applied to gender and sexuality. Consequently, groups such as Queer Nation envisaged the activist interventions with which they have since become synonymous as queering mainstream or heteronormative values, identities, institutions, and forms of social relations, and thus as constituting a direct attack on the hegemony.

At the same time that queer took on the mantle of an umbrella term applicable to all self-identified sex- or gender-nonconformists alike—and indeed, as some would have it, to anyone who positions themselves as at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant—an academic deployment of the term emerged. Queer theory, as this has come to be known, shares with queer activism a political commitment to queer—that is to challenge and to undermine—heteronormative ideas and structures. However, unlike much queer activism, queer theory has its roots in poststructuralism and deconstruction. Despite their differences, queer theorists share a broad commitment to an epistemological shift in focus from the identity of the individual or group to discursive structures and their institutional settings; from the problem of oppression and liberation to the cultural politics of power/knowledge.

As a result, the challenge queer theory (in all its diversity) poses to heteronormativity includes a troubling of the fundamental tenets of identity politics, and in this, queer theory diverges from much queer activism in significant ways.

Broadly speaking, queer theory could be understood as a form of political intervention designed to queer heteronormative notions of identity rather than simply expanding or reversing their established meanings. This is because queer theory, as a critical response to the limits of identity-based politics, conceives gender, sexuality, and so on, as the historically and culturally specific

truth-effect of systems of power/knowledge, and moreover, sees these aspects of selfhood as necessarily existing in complex, ever-shifting relations with other identity variables and their specific histories. For queer theorists, then, sexuality is not an innate drive that has been repressed by oppressive social forces and is thus in need of liberation. Rather, drawing in particular on the work of Michel Foucault, queer theory offers accounts of the ways in which particular forms of knowledge engender specific modes of being. In other words, queer theory is less concerned with explaining the repression of a homosexual minority than with developing critical analyses of the binary figure of hetero-/homosexuality as the effect of systems of power/knowledge that shape desires, behaviors, social institutions, and social relations. In and through this deconstructive process, queer theory aims to expose the limits and instabilities of binary logic, to reveal that the hetero/homo presuppose each other, that each is elicited by the other, and thus haunted by the other which is integral to it.

On this model, then, the identities that are "reclaimed" and celebrated by some forms of queer activism are, in fact, integral to systems of power/knowledge, rather than simply opposed to them. These different ontologies—the former poststructuralist, the latter closer to what one might think of as liberal humanist—are informed by significantly different conceptions of power. In much queer-identity–based activism, as in liberationist politics more generally, power is presumed to be repressive, negative, and disabling: It is something that hegemonic culture has and that marginalized groups must exert or reclaim by force. Queer theory, on the other hand, queers this top-down model of power, arguing instead that power is, for the most part at least, productive, and that it consists of a vast, complex, constantly shifting network in which we are all enmeshed. Indeed, for queer theorists, there is no space outside of this network and thus no position that is simply counter to it. Given this, queer theorists argue that there can be no single or simple political response that would overturn or blow apart the existing social order.

As queer theory conceives it, resistance is inseparable from power rather than being opposed to it. And because resistance is not, and cannot be, external to systems of power/knowledge, then an oppositional politics that attempts to replace supposedly false, repressive ideologies with nonnormative truths is inherently contradictory. There can be no universally applicable political goals or strategies, only a plurality of heterogeneous and localized practices, the effects of which will never be entirely predictable in advance.

While *queer* continues to be used in both the senses outlined earlier—that is, as an identity and as a critique of identity—the last couple of years has seen the emergence of the term *post-queer*. Like the term *queer,* this term is also deployed in a range of competing and often contradictory ways. Some use it in order to foreground what they see as the spatiotemporal movement of the formation and transformation of subjectivities (as relational), of what is sometimes referred to as (un)becoming. Others have used it to suggest the arrival of a new political milieu in which the aims of queer (however they might be imagined) have been achieved. At the same time, the term *post-queer* has been deployed to signify a move away from the ambiguity, fluidity, open-endedness, and so on, associated with queer theory, and back toward more coherent identity categories such as gay and lesbian.

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See also Becoming; Discourse; Foucault, Michel; Gender; Humanism; Identity; Postmodernism

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R

Race Theory

Race theory involves (a) the definition of race, (b) the determination of policies in response to the definitions at hand, and (c) the viability of thought and justifications for the reasoning dominating race definitions and policies. In more prosaic language, this involves answering the questions: What is race? What is the proper response or policies that should be set with regard to race? And, as Paul C. Taylor has characterized these matters in *Race: A Philosophical Introduction,* what is involved in and what is justifiable or not justifiable in and about race thinking? Echoing a turn in modern thought that focuses on conditions of possibility, this last question also takes the form: How is race possible? These three (and not exclusive) concerns of race theory connect with a variety of other theoretical concerns in modern thought, such as the articulation of human subjects, the directions to which human societies should aim or that for which human societies struggle, and the metatheoretical problem of reflective justification.

Definition of Race

The definition of race has a history that is prototypical and then a full-fledged history or what Taylor calls "self-conscious" race thinking. The prototypical history refers to theories of human difference from ancient to the end of medieval times. The ancient versions in Africa, Asia, and Europe were not explicitly *race* thinking because the concept was not yet developed, but familiar tropes of a centered group of human beings counting as truly human versus those who were not fully human were evident in ancient writings. These accounts of human difference were premised on teleological conceptions of nature, in which the centered group exemplified the direction or purpose of achieved humanness. Although there was variation in the models offered, the ancient Greeks generally thought in terms of a species-form of human achievement. For Plato, these concerns transcended the organic features of embodied human beings, but for Aristotle, the organic fusion of form and matter made concrete the manifestations of human potential in the centered group. This implied a natural limitation on the outside groups that, as he argued in his *Politics,* included barbarians, women, and slaves.

The emergence of Christendom transformed the centered group into one legitimated by a theological naturalism, which framed the outsiders at first as those who rejected the Christianity. In the Iberian Peninsula, this framework took the form of *raza,* which referred to breeds of dogs and horses, and, when referring to human populations, Moors and Jews. As Muslims from North Africa, the Moors, along with the Jews, represented a deviation from Christian normativity. The defeat of the Moors in Iberia was followed by the Inquisition to assess the authenticity of the remaining populations of Moors and Jews who had converted to Christianity, a process that led to demands for demonstrations of "purity of blood" (*limpieza de*

sangre), best exemplified by individuals whose origins were purely Christian. Because all that was natural emanated from the theological center, these groups stood as a prototypical formulation of the anthropology that took a path through *razza* (Italian) to the modern term *race,* as used by Francois Bernier in his 1684 account, *A New Division of the Earth*. The initial period of the expansion of Christendom in the late fifteenth century had led to Christian encounters with populations of people who were neither Moor nor Jew, although there were efforts to interpret them in such terms, as conquistadors had at first thought they were encountering strange mosques and synagogues (when the populations were presumed to have been lost Hebrew tribes) in the New World. The enslavement and near genocide of the native populations of the Americas led to Bartolomé de Las Casas's efforts to save them through appeals to the papal authority and his famous debate with Juan Gines de Sepúlveda on the status and suitability of the native populations for slavery. The Atlantic slave trade emerged in this context.

The emerging secular explanations that developed by the end of the sixteenth century were in no small terms a consequence of meeting people, animals, and fauna not accounted for in the Bible, in addition to the changing worldviews from the emerging new science inaugurated by Nicolaus Copernicus, Galileo Galilei, Johannes Kepler, and Francis Bacon, to name a few. As Ernst Cassirer observed in *An Essay on Man,* this new science demanded explanations without theological causality. The search for causation appealed to the human organism as part of a nexus rooted in nature itself. As David Hume observed in his *Treatise of Human Nature,* his goal was to articulate for man what Newton had achieved in his explanation of the physical world. Of interest in the history of naturalistic accounts of race in this regard was the work of Carolus Linnaeus and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Linnaeus's *Systema Naturae* (1735) offered a classificatory system, premised on hierarchies of being, sometimes referred to as "the great chain of Being," which serves as the basis of classifying living things to this day. Blumenbach devoted his classification interests to divisions within the human species, racial divisions that were correlated with the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, as they tend to be known today. He coined the term *Caucasians* to refer to Europeans. In the nineteenth century, the explanation that eclipsed all discussions up to that point, at least with regard to the understanding of the human being in nature and the development of human differences, was Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection. With regard to the human being and differences in the social world, the theoretical framework that set the stage for the eventual critique of Darwinism was the materialist sociology of Karl Marx. By the end of the nineteenth century, Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytical modes of explaining the psychic meaning behind ascriptions of human difference began to make their mark.

Race Theory as Race Policy

The policy aspects of race theory are connected to an important distinction between race theory and theories of racism. Racism involves the set of commitments and practices averring racial hierarchies. There, the notions of racial superiority and inferiority come to the fore. For some theorists, race and racism are sufficiently independent for the possibility of having the former without the latter. For others, the relationship is so strong that the assertion of the distinction between the two becomes negligible. And for others, the two are necessary consequences of each other: Where there is racism, there is race; where there is race, there is racism. And there are others who argue for different sets of criteria of assessing the legitimacy of either. For instance, one could argue that racism could be consistently rejected while accepting the existence of race, and even more radically understood, one could even reject racism while believing in the notion of racial inequality. The ethics of how to treat supposedly "undeveloped people," for instance, could require the rejection of many racist practices. For those who argue that certain notions cannot be separated, however, the racism may exist in the concepts themselves, in the very notion of undeveloped people, as Sylvia Wynter, among others, has argued. In the main, the definitional question of racism is such that it is possible to offer a theory of racism without defining race, because racism is fundamentally about what is done to races and how, in social terms, various races are perceived, interpreted, and judged.

Modern Meta-Race Theory

The metatheoretical problem brings race and racism together in the critical question of what is involved in race thinking and race theorizing. The origins of this aspect of race theory are in the work of Anton Wilhelm Amo, an African philosopher and professor at the University of Halle in the eighteenth century. Amo wrote critically on the inequality of the blacks in Europe, on Cartesian psychology, and on problems of proper reasoning. The last consideration included his engagement with the philosophy of Christian Wolff, who brought the possibility of reason into focus in his political thought. Amo's questioning of the conditions of reason was later taken up ironically by a critic who dismissed the legitimacy of his thought on the basis of his race: Immanuel Kant. Kant, who was also influenced by Wolff but who inaugurated his influential turn in philosophy through his response to David Hume, offered a comprehensive treatment of the conditions of possibility argument. He later referred to his form of transcendental argumentation as critical philosophy. For Kant, the crucial question to ask about the reasoning that supports theory regarded its conditions of possibility. Subsequent philosophers and theorists in the human sciences were critical of Kant's answers but became his genealogical descendants through in turn offering transcendental conditions of their own. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, for instance, brought up the importance of history, as did Marx with the added element of materiality. Still others offered physical determinism, linguistic considerations, semiotic questions of signs and symbols of meaning and, more recently, those of culture. The legacy of this form of argumentation in race theory is found among those who ask: How is race possible?

The Foundational Works of Anténor Firmin and W. E. B. Du Bois

In the main, race theories examine how race is possible through discussion of *when* the concept emerged. As we have already seen, that period seems to have been in the transition from its prototypical religious beginnings to its modern naturalistic moorings in the sixteenth century. That period should, however, be understood more as the development of race and racist theory than the theory about that development. For the latter, Anténor Firmin and W. E. B. Du Bois, two intellectuals of the African diaspora, offered the foundational works, although it is their white successors who dominated that area of thought until the late twentieth century.

Firmin was a lawyer, anthropologist, historian, and philosopher from Haiti. While serving as ambassador to France, he became a member of the French Ethnological Society. Appalled at the influence of Joseph-Arthur, comte de Gobineau, the influential proponent of modern racist theory, Firmin responded by writing *The Equality of the Human Races* (1885), where he proceeded not only to present counterarguments to Gobineau's misrepresentations of African and Asian peoples but also to point out the methodological flaws in the work offered by the conceptions of anthropology in the thought of Gobineau, his supporters, and their predecessors. He argued, for instance, that Kant and Hegel offered geographical theories more than anthropological ones in their appeals to climates and continents for a determinism of physicality and cultural *value* and, anticipating some of the ideas of Du Bois and much later Michel Foucault, that the study of human beings must take seriously the normative and disciplinary presumptions behind the determinations of human difference. Explanations of racial difference were being formulated and then forced onto people instead of being generated from how people actually were. A republican in his political preferences, Firmin's efforts were designed to shift the civilization arguments from notions embedded in skin color and racial differences to the potential of each group or race of human beings to forge nonarbitrary laws. This latter demonstration required an understanding of history and culture based on actual study, which Firmin referred to as *positivism,* informed by theoretical models devoid of prejudice and circular reasoning. For instance, most notions of the inferiority of blacks at the time were supposedly "proved" by virtue of their not being white.

Firmin's work did not gain influence in European circles, where theoretical work on race for the most part took the form of seeing evidence for models of racial hierarchies of whites at the top with gradations of "yellow," "red," and "brown" in the middle to "black" at the bottom, or by then

presumed the most primitive level. His influence, however, grew among Francophone black intellectuals, and, with the translation of his work into English near the end of the twentieth century, his ideas have achieved renewed influence through contemporary African diasporic race theory.

The situation for Du Bois was markedly different from that of Firmin. Although there were many efforts to marginalize Du Bois, which included limiting his ability to teach in universities in various stages of his career and even incarcerating him as a threat to American national security during the mid–twentieth-century hysteria against Communism, Du Bois's prodigious body of works left a legacy that, among other areas of thought, arguably made him the father of American sociology and race theory. Many of his articles are canonical texts for the study of race. In "The Study of the Negro Problems" (1897), he outlined several major challenges in the study of race. There is at first the presumption that race functions as a descriptive anthropological classification. Du Bois showed, however, that there were normative presuppositions of white normality versus gradations of colored abnormality that dominated the field. Implicit in the study of "Negro problems" was the notion of "Negroes as problems" and, as a correlate, "problem Negroes," instead of "people facing problems." Research on such populations was thus affected in advance by a priori claims about them. Du Bois further argued that there was an absence of social scientific rigor because of the abandoning of basic social scientific practices of theorizing from a shared social world, on one hand, and a failure to interrogate the methodological presuppositions of applicability on the other. As the sociologist Paget Henry recently argued, the social scientific study of populations at the time presupposed the legitimacy of Herbert Spencer's social Darwinian biosociology, where human populations were placed on a hierarchy of "fitness" according to who dominated and who was dominated. In the European context, different schemas had emerged, such as the class analysis of Karl Marx, the typification models of social rationalization offered by Max Weber, and the examination of sacred symbols and social meaning in the work of Émile Durkheim. By way of methods, the expectation of positivism, from the thought of Auguste Comte and the general environment of the expected advancement of natural science, suggested that the scientific method offered much for the development of sociology and, as the followers of Spencer believed, the overall grounding of the study and classification of human populations according to the prevailing scientific models. After Darwin, as Ernst Cassirer observed in his "Essay on Man" (1994), the dominating scientific influence was biology. Among Du Bois's many contributions, Henry argues, was his recognition of how race was central for the formation of American sociology, even though the American scientific communities sought legitimacy through the European models. The result was one in which, although race was nearly a ubiquitous object of concern, its importance was denied in universalistic claims. To study race, in other words, was treated as indulgence in the particular at the expense of studying the universal "man." The prejudices, however, centered the categories of universal man in terms of particularities that excluded racialized people and related ethnic typographies with the result that a particular kind of man became the presumption of *man*. The continued relevance of Du Bois's sociological work, which has outlived the Spencerians of his day, is because of the centrality accorded to race, which is a continued sociological theme and "problem," not only of American social life but across much of the globe. Contemporary studies of global racism attest to the validity of his prophetic claim that the twentieth century was going to be governed by the problem of the color line. Finally, a crucial dimension of Du Bois's early reflections on sociological theory was his bringing the problem of formulating *social problems* to the fore. That task required understanding the role of social institutions, social concepts, and what later structural anthropologists would call "symbols" by which race is understood.

Du Bois's efforts crystallized into the three tropes found throughout race theory, as mentioned at the outset: (1) the meaning of racial concepts, (2) the policy considerations that can be drawn from them, and (3) the critical reflective theoretical tools by which the first two considerations can be assessed. It was clear to Du Bois that discussions of all three were infused with political significance. The policy concerns of Du Bois were resolutely devoted to expanding institutions by which freedom could be made

manifest. Because racial hierarchy also resulted in categories of people who went from a condition of being property to that of struggling for equality and respect as human beings, the political focus for Du Bois eventually took the form of examining the impact of political economy on human classification. In *Black Reconstruction* (1935), for instance, he argued that the thwarted potential of reconstruction after the U.S. Civil War resulted in new forms of servitude rationalized by a system of racial segregation.

Race Theory's Critique of Social Biology

Another pivotal moment in race theory emerged in the work of Franz Boas through an additional conflict with the misreading of Darwinism exemplified by the social Darwinists and sociobiological theories of Herbert Spencer. What the social Darwinians misunderstood about Darwin, Boas claimed, was that he was not arguing that human beings evolved out of chimpanzees, but that from the standpoint of natural selection both species were equally evolved. In other words, every species sharing a particular moment in history has evolved by virtue of the coordination with their environment that enables their survival. They can, in principle, be unsuitable for another environmental development. The misreading of Darwin presumed that there was an inherent progress to evolution, which meant that some groups within a species could be interpreted as living at an earlier stage of development, while another was at a later stage. Thus, the appeal to racial hierarchies took the form of asserting the primitiveness (earlier stage) of one group versus the more developed stage of another racial group. In addition, Boas argued that culture, which the social Darwinists treated as exemplifying an isomorphic relation to biology, was independent of biology. In other words, any human being could be raised in another cultural context in which he or she would acquire the language and other exemplars of the material conditions of that culture. Boas's work, in addition to those of other anthropologists, both physical and cultural, played a central role in the eventual development of the genetic disputation of race as expressed in the *UNESCO Statement on Race* authored by the famed geneticist and anthropologist Ashley Montagu. A revised and embellished version of the UNESCO document was adopted and published in 1996 as an official position of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists under the title "AAPA Statement on Biological Aspects of Race."

A result of the undermining of biological bases for the concept of race has been the domination of the social sciences and humanities as the main sites of work in race theory. This is not to say that research has not continued in the life sciences, such as medicine and genetics, nor is it to suggest that institutions of research closed down. However, it is to say that the main sites of debate, especially those affecting developments in political theory, have been in the more social-oriented and humanistic sciences.

Racial Sociogenesis and Social Structure

Frantz Fanon in 1952 outlined many of the contemporary issues of race theory in his classic short book, *Black Skin, White Masks*. There, he first challenged phylogenetic and ontogenetic positions in the study of human difference and pointed to the additional element of social reality that, he argued, as a generator of meaning also generates the identities by and through which people live. He articulated an important distinction between race and ethnic identities, whereby the latter could be chosen and transformed by individuals within a group, but racial identities are a function of an imposition *on* a group. In a later text, *Sociologie d'une révolution: l'an V de la révolution algérienne* (1959), he formulates the difference this way: Whites created the Negro, but it is the Negro who created Négritude. Fanon argued that social reality required human agency for its existence, which means that it could also be transformed by human agency. But transformation required the negotiation of symbolic and material structures of culture, ranging from language, the psychoanalytical organization of power, and constitutional organizations of psychic life. All these fail in the colonial context, which Fanon regarded as quintessential for the construction of racial ordering, in an asymmetrical semiosis of race: The white constructs the black, but the black does not construct the white. The white functions as agent in both accounts, and in similar kind to other categories of color. With

regard to blacks, however, the racial designation has an additional effect. The slide from racial difference to *racism* pushed the black into a nether realm of subhumanness that led to a disruption of self–other ethical dialectics. The result was a structural model of whites and some colored categories in a relationship of self and others. Below that schema, however, was another set who were neither the self nor others except in a unique set of differing relations in the subschema. The self–other dialectic functioned between each other from below, but the asymmetry of the relationship meant that those above stood as others in relation to the self from below. This structure is a semiotic rearticulation of Du Bois's double consciousness thesis. The blacks can see themselves as seen through the eyes of whites, which means the positing of the white perspective as a possibility. The realization that it is not a reciprocal relationship—the white does not see the self as conditioned by the black but as a point of reference looking onto the black looking back onto the white *as a white perspective*. In other words, the black, as a genuine point of view, is eliminated in the relationship. Fanon's conclusions were twofold. First, he insisted that the structures he analyzed were not *complete,* that there were exceptions to these rules by virtue of the contingency of human existence. Second, he argued that the elimination of these skewed relationships called for *political* instead of individual ethical intervention.

Fanon's analysis comes to the fore in a variety of subsequent approaches in race theory. There has been, for instance, the structuralist approach as formulated by Claude Lévi-Strauss in *Structuralist Anthropology* (1963), where the symbolic ordering of mythic life takes dualistic forms that reassert themselves, even at the metatheoretical levels. Race theory, from this point of view, attempts to make science or sciencelike thinking supervene over mythic race thinking, but fails to appreciate its own mythic practices. This insight is taken up by poststructuralists such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, whose work could be interpreted as bringing the mythic narratives of lawlike determinations into the human sciences, indeed even bringing the human sciences themselves into focus in terms of their investments. These considerations were taken up in literary theory, often through studying the symbolic manifestations of such interests through utilizing the resources of a variety of psychoanalytical approaches.

Race and Reason

Since the 1980s, however, race theory has burgeoned in philosophy and political theory. Although interest in race has been a current of philosophical thought since the dawn of the modern era, it was also often disavowed or denied its due importance at the disciplinary level. This was due in part to the expectation that philosophical work should pertain to universal and abstract phenomena. Kant, for instance, was careful to properly differentiate philosophical matters from anthropological ones. The kinds of arguments offered by Lévi-Strauss and ironically his rival, Jean-Paul Sartre, which focused on the mythic foundations of scientific rationalism in the case of the former and bad faith or self-deceiving conceptions of reason in the case of the latter, opened the door for the kinds of critical work on reason and theoretical work offered by Fanon, Foucault, Derrida, and even the sociological philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, all of whom brought to philosophy the kinds of critique levied against scientific completeness and absoluteness in the study of culture. By the 1970s, a group of philosophers began to write on race armed with the theoretical problematizing of methods offered by the work of Du Bois and Fanon and the metacritique of the human sciences offered by phenomenological, structural, and poststructural accounts of constructed social realities, including that of race.

Racial Eliminativism and Conservationism

The philosophical groups are generally divided into racial eliminativists and racial conservationists, although there is another camp that argues more for analyses of the meaning of racial concepts and practices than for their elimination or preservation. They diverge on the significance of the general scientific dismissal of race. The eliminativists, whose main proponents are K. Anthony Appiah and Naomi Zack, argue that the scientific invalidity of race calls for the rejection of the concept. In addition to its scientific invalidity, Zack also argues that the concept renders mixed race people raceless because of their supposed exclusion from racial binaries. While agreeing with some of

the problems posed by racial mixture, Appiah argues that there is sufficient social significance of the concept for it to be used in the effort to eliminate racism, but that the achievement of the latter would imply the elimination of the former. In sociological theory, Paul Gilroy has offered a more radical eliminativist position in *Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line* (2000), insisting on the invalidity of the concept even if it were to receive scientific support.

Although acknowledging the scientific invalidation of race, the conservationists argue, echoing Fanon, that race is a socially constructed reality whose logic should be understood in social terms. Social constructions, in other words, function according to their own reality. In other words, for biological science to be supervening would mean the subordination of sociology to the point of a positivistic reductionism. Even Marxian historical materialism recognized the materiality of social phenomena. Proponents here include Lucius T. Outlaw, Cornel West, David Theo Goldberg, as well as sociological theorists such as Michael Omi and Howard Winant, whose racial formation theory took political projects into account. The general argument here is that people live not only as individuals in a society but also as groups. Many facets of social life are organized through groups, without which even certain individual claims would cease to have contexts in which they could make sense. We see here a return of the conditions of possibility argument.

Phenomenological Race Theory

Constructivist arguments also find support in the phenomenological philosophical tradition, where there is not as radical a divide between the physical and biological on one hand and the social on the other. The phenomenological tradition of race theory takes the body as a site of signification and bodies as the basis of intersubjective social relations on which symbolic orders are built. Racial concepts are also treated as objects of consciousness, as intended constructions of symbolic life. In this regard, Du Bois's theory of double consciousness and lived understanding of race is phenomenological in character, although he was historically associated with pragmatism because of his relationship with William James during his years at Harvard. Such interpreters overlook his time in Germany, where the towering figure of Max Weber and the intellectual impact of Hegel and Marx were unavoidable.

Sartre and Fanon explicitly advanced the phenomenological approach to the study of racial constructions, as we have seen, and their influence was global. In Africa, their thought influenced Steve Bantu Biko, who brought that approach to his formulations of black consciousness in order to propose an explicitly *political* conception of race. Biko regarded black consciousness as emerging from opposition to a state premised on anti-black racism. Such a state, in order to maintain itself, depends on the repression of blacks as political agents. Thus, the assertion of blackness, by people who would not be regarded as such in other conceptions of race and other forms of race theory, such as the biological one, leads to the identity and identification of blackness not only as a chosen identity but, because of the subjugating efforts of the apartheid government, an imposed one. Biko's thought was most recently taken up by Mabogo Percy More in South Africa to argue for an understanding of black solidarity as a theory of constructive political engagement.

In the United States, Linda Martín Alcoff has also taken up the phenomenological account, which she conjoins with hermeneutics or interpretation theory, to explore the relationship between institutional imposition and biophysical visibility and difference, which she refers to as *visible identities*. She, along with other more phenomenologically oriented race theorists, regards the body as a site of multiple identities. Thus, unlike Naomi Zack, who regards mixed race as racelessness, a position criticized by other mixed-race theorists such as, for example, Rainier Spencer, Alcoff regards mixed race as one among other visible identities; many people, for instance, know what a mixed-race person generally looks like. Phenomenologically oriented race theorists have also offered novel approaches to the study of mixture through explorations of creolization. Alexis Nouss, for instance, has argued that algorithms of human identities do not function as those in the physical sciences because a human being can be 100% more than one thing. The negotiation of the relationship between the different identities manifested in a group or individual is a function of a

society's normative assumptions and asymmetrical semiotic structures: A mixed individual does not suffer from racelessness under this interpretation but from the fundamental asymmetry and teleological difference between her or his shared identities. Whiteness, for instance, stands as the normative standpoint by which other racial identities are compared. Finally, Sara Ahmed has explored problems of deviation from normative centers and phenomenological accounts in general as peculiarly *queer* efforts whose exemplars are precisely those people who have to be squeezed into the theoretical models at hand, as Du Bois argued, as problem people.

The account of philosophical race theory is not here an exhaustive one, and the eliminativist versus constructivist divide is not as neat as it appears. For instance, many constructivists are ultimately eliminativists because their arguments for the preservation of race usually appeal to its importance for the fight against racism. The question of what is to be done if and when racism disappears challenges the insistence of postracist conservation of race. Some scholars, such as Derrick Bell from the critical legal studies camp of race theory, respond by insisting on the permanence of racism, but such an appeal is an a priori assertion that begs for evidence that could not be supported by *social* criteria because those depend on human projects for their creation and maintenance. Others such as Ahmed appeal to the contingency of human communities: There will always be individuals and groups who are outliers simply because without such possibility, human beings would collapse into a preordained necessity or laws of being human. The objection to the adverb "always" as itself a preordained claim would not work because it would only emphasize the paradox of human existence: The necessity of an absence of necessity.

Race Theories of Civil Society

Theoretical reflection on race in political theory emerged on questions of the suitability of certain groups of people for governing and participation in politics; to that end, the concerns tend to take the form of assessing the membership of some groups in civil society and political life. The political theory branch of race theory thus focuses on the impact of race in and on political thought. The anthropological commitments behind political ones have an impact on how race configures in those approaches. For example, liberalism has had difficulty with race because of presumptions of the liberal subject as a color-blind one in search of ideal rules of governing. For republican approaches, the main focus is on nonarbitrary laws, which means that the particularities of the governed populations could be recognized without jeopardizing republican commitments. But for democratic political orders, the notion of self-government requires greater reflection on what participants are supposed to share instead of their differences. The expectation of sharing universal criteria often led to appeals to an ideal subject, which often meant ignoring race theory as a secondary or even tertiary matter. Conservatism, however, often involved taking traditions seriously as a basis of civic life. This often meant a head-on examination of racial difference. Yet liberalism and conservatism often had the same consequence of a normative centering of the dominating population: For conservatism, difference was articulated from a center that was deemed "traditional"; for liberalism, that center was simply the point of neutrality; in modern historic terms, they were invariably white.

Marxism, left-wing nationalisms, and anarchist movements took for granted that the traditions of conservatism and the ideal centrism of liberalism supported institutions of domination. Thus, they devoted considerable effort to identifying populations dominated by such institutions and the levels of failure implicit even in appeals to ideal, value-neutral models of political organization. This meant, for them, the specification of *inequalities* such as enslavement, class exploitation, racial hierarchies, and sexism. Implicit in these latter approaches is an anthropology of human possibility; that however human beings may be traditionally, that is not how human beings have to be. Although rejected when interpreted as a permanent nature of each group, race is reproduced in this model through identities *in the making,* as exemplified in the concluding line of the anthem "The Internationale": "the working class will be the human race."

Race in Ideal and Non-Ideal Political Theory

Recent race theory in political theory has also challenged ways in which political theory presumes the

subjects of theories of justice. The philosopher Charles Mills has argued, for instance, that this leads to a tension between ideal political theory and non-ideal political theory, which he correlates with contractarianism and contractualism. The former is a sober reflection on non-ideal situations that have led to the current, very non-ideal social and political orders. The latter explores the conditions of consent for a better social reality. A problem with the dominant models of American political theory, argues Mills, exemplified in its most influential form by the work of John Rawls, is that it focuses on ideal theory at the expense of being able to address real social injustices because they cannot be identified in the initial conditions that generate the ideal—in Rawls's case, the thought experiment generated by the veil of ignorance, with "ignorance" exemplifying Mills's point. Mills proposes taking contractualism outside of the framework of ideal theory and wedding it to non-ideal theory, in this case the problems raised by contractarianism, to generate non-ideal contractualism, or, simply put, contractualism in the interest of sexual and racial justice. In this regard, race theory in political theory becomes the lobbying for a fusion of non-ideal and ideal theory, or non-ideal contractualism.

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See also Existentialism; Fanon, Frantz; Social Constructivism; Spencer, Herbert; Vitoria, Francisco de; Whiteness

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Radical Democracy

Political theorists have used the term *radical democracy* in different ways. In general, the "radical" of radical democracy refers to a wish to address, and change, the fundamentals of democracy. This should come as no surprise, given the etymological origin of the word "radical," namely the Latin *radix*, meaning root. Thus, radical democrats challenge what is at the root of democracy as we know it. Among radical democrats there are different views of what the basis of democracy should be; indeed, contemporary radical democrats suggest that we should not think of democracy as being rooted in any ground.

Past Radical Democracy

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) was an early radical democrat. He criticized representative democracy and argued for direct and participatory democracy, something that was later taken up by participatory democrats in the late twentieth century. For Rousseau, the ideal is a political community without divisions and where the will of the people is reflected in the laws in an unmediated fashion. This ideal is summed up in the concept of the General Will, which is also why critics have pointed to the potential totalitarian consequences of Rousseauian democracy.

Karl Marx (1818–1883) is another philosopher who has been labeled a radical democrat. Marx thought liberal democracy was superficial because it did not address the root of the ills in capitalist society, namely the exploitation of one class by

another. The alternative communist society was, for Marx, a harmonious society without division. Paradoxically, the outcome of this sort of radical democracy is that there is no need for democratic institutions in the sense that we know them.

Radical Democracy Today

Today, the term *radical democracy* is associated with theorists such as William Connolly, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, Chantal Mouffe, and Ernesto Laclau. These theorists are all inspired by poststructuralism, broadly conceived, and the focus is on these contemporary theories of radical democracy in the following.

Poststructuralism and Radical Democracy

The poststructuralist conception of language, identity, and meaning leads radical democrats to emphasize the contestation of existing norms, institutions, and identities. They reject all forms of essentialism where things—for instance, democracy—have a universal and ahistorical essence. Thus, they are skeptical of Marx's notion of "species being," for instance. Likewise they are critical of Marx's teleological conception of history; instead, they argue, history is contingent and does not proceed according to a necessary logic. Next, radical democrats believe that it is impossible to transcend alienation and inequality, for instance through a revolution. This is not to say that they do not believe that a better world is possible, only that they reject the possibility of a harmonious society, whether Rousseau's society ruled by the General Will or Marx's communist society. Instead, poststructuralist radical democrats argue that there is always conflict. They add that this is not something to regret because it means that norms, institutions, and identities do not become fixed, and this is what distinguishes democracy from totalitarianism. In this context, Claude Lefort's argument about the difference between democracy and totalitarianism has been influential, among other things in the work of Laclau and Mouffe.

Finally, if Rousseau and Marx tried to get rid of alienation by refounding democracy, poststructuralist radical democrats reject foundations. To use Jean-François Lyotard's phrase, contemporary radical democrats are skeptical of grand narratives. For instance, they are skeptical of the Marxist grand narrative of emancipation and its links to essentialism and teleology; and they are skeptical of the Enlightenment's grand narrative of man, for instance, the way it is expressed in the notion of human rights based on human nature. Instead, they propose that we think of democracy without foundations. Thus, to go back to the etymological meaning of radical (*radix,* root), poststructuralist radical democrats aim at the root, or foundation, of democracy. However, they do so not in order to substitute it with an alternative root, as Rousseau and Marx did in their different ways. Rather, radical democrats aim at the root of democracy in order to do away with the attempt to root democracy, for instance in human essence.

Historical Context

Rousseau and Marx put forward their theories of radical democracy against the background of the upheavals of the modern age. Poststructuralist radical democracy is a thing of the late twentieth century. Poststructuralism is often seen as part of "postmodernism," with the latter's emphasis on antiessentialism and the pluralism and relative fluidity of identities.

Poststructuralist radical democracy must also be seen against the background of changes on the (Marxist) left. From the 1960s onward, new social movements and struggles over identity gained increasing importance within mainstream politics. These movements—for instance, the women's movement—all challenged the Marxist emphasis on class as the organizing principle of society and emancipation. Class gradually lost its empirical importance, as well as its theoretical centrality to the diagnosis of, and solution to, the problems of contemporary capitalism. Contemporary society is not a class society in a strict Marxist sense, and it seems unlikely that the working class will be a revolutionary agent. Thus, the question became how to think emancipation without tying it to class. Another problem faced by Marxists at the end of the twentieth century was the absence of the revolution despite the developed character of capitalism in the West. In fact, since the late 1970s, neoliberalism and liberal democracy have become

increasingly hegemonic. Given that the predictions of Marx proved wrong, radical democrats are faced with the question "what is to be done?" without being able to fall back on Marx's analysis of capitalism. On the whole, poststructuralist theories of radical democracy emerged as one response to the question of strategy in the face of neoliberal hegemony and the inadequacy of Marxist analyses and strategies.

Radical Democracy and Contemporary Political Theory

Radical democrats often distinguish their positions through a critique of contemporary alternatives.

Liberalism

Radical democrats criticize liberalism on a number of accounts. They are, first of all, critical of the liberal notion of the subject as an atomistic and rational individual. They criticize this disembedded and disembodied individual, a kind of abstract individual outside historical and socioeconomic context and without a (gendered, racial, etc.) body. And radical democrats argue that the liberal subject is not universal and is only one particular kind of subject, one that is associated with a particular kind of society, namely bourgeois society. The radical democratic critique of the liberal subject is mirrored in a critique of liberal citizenship and democracy. Radical democrats argue that democracy is more than rights and procedures, and that it must contain a democratic ethos too. This is not to say that radical democrats reject liberal rights and institutions, only that they want to extend and deepen these. As a consequence, they challenge the current forms of rights, citizenship, and so on. In short, they politicize them.

Communitarianism

Although radical democrats share the communitarian critique of the disembedded liberal subject, they disagree with communitarians on the nature of communities. For radical democrats, no community is harmonious. There is always conflict and disagreement, and identities are fluid and overlapping, a fact that radical democrats do not lament.

Deliberative Democracy

Finally, radical democrats share some things with deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas. Both are critical of the liberal atomistic individual, and both see the identity and interests of the individual as formed through the political process rather than given prior to it. However, radical democrats disagree with deliberative democrats on a fundamental point, namely, the rationality of deliberative procedures. For radical democrats, no deliberation is completely devoid of power, inequality, or distortion, and it is the task of the theorist to highlight these things. Likewise, radical democrats are skeptical of the deliberative notion of a rational subject. Radical democrats argue that this view of the subject is biased against affect in politics, and that it comes at the expense of silencing certain voices within the deliberative procedures and within the public sphere more generally. Finally, radical democrats are critical of the deliberative emphasis on consensus. Given that conflict and disagreement are permanent, consensus is only possible by suppressing and excluding dissent.

Thus, in different ways, poststructuralist radical democrats seek to politicize rights and institutions, the identities of communities, procedures, and consensus. This goes to the heart of the radical democratic notion of politics as associated with contestation.

Divisions Within Radical Democracy

Having considered contemporary theories of radical democracy as a whole, we now look at two ways of mapping out the differences among radical democrats.

Immanence/Transcendence

Radical democrats can be divided according to whether they believe that a radical democratic alternative must emerge through immanence or through transcendence. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (drawing on Baruch Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze) represent the immanence side, and Laclau (drawing on Jacques Lacan) would represent the transcendence side.

The disagreement between Hardt and Negri and Laclau concerns whether an alternative to the

present liberal-capitalist order will emerge immanently or require a moment of transcendence. For Laclau, we need a moment of transcendence (albeit a "failed" transcendence) understood as hegemony. A particular element within society (a group, a party, etc.) comes to stand in for the whole (say, the emancipation of society as a whole). In this way, a hegemonic consensus is formed, a hegemonic consensus that can oppose and dissolve the current hegemony. Hardt and Negri, on the other hand, believe that countering one hegemony with another reproduces a form of politics historically associated with Lenin and the vanguard (the Communist Party, taking over—but ultimately leaving intact—the state, etc.). For them, change must arise from below, from what they call the multitude, and they find hope in, among other things, the alter globalization movement. Thus, the immanence/transcendence distinction is not merely philosophical, but has important implications for political strategy.

Abundance/Lack

The immanence/transcendence distinction is not unrelated to another division within radical democratic thought, one between abundance and lack. Hardt, Negri, and Connolly are representatives of abundance, while Laclau and Mouffe represent lack.

Inspired by Lacanian psychoanalysis, Laclau and Mouffe argue that any communal identity is marked by a lack, which it may try to project onto an external enemy (e.g., the figure of the Jew or the Islamic terrorist). More generally, any identity is marked by a lack, which sets in motion identifications with objects—a football club, a national symbol, and so on—that are supposed to fill the lack. Yet, although my identity is constituted through these identifications, the latter always fail. It follows that any identity is precarious and constantly renegotiated. This is also how Laclau thinks about hegemony. There is no natural or essential political community; instead, a particular sector of society takes up the task of forming a hegemonic consensus around certain key signifiers such as "freedom" or "solidarity."

For Laclau and Mouffe, radical democracy is one hegemonic project among others. In her work, Mouffe has focused on how a democratic "we" is established. For her, the democratic "we" is established hegemonically, for instance, as a radical democratic "we," but importantly the "we" is not a closed whole because it is marked by internal division and differences. It is, thus, a "we" that is always unstable and in the process of being renegotiated, even if it is also constituted through an antagonistic exclusion of "them."

Connolly, too, is interested in how the democratic "we" is constituted, but he has a different take on it. For Connolly, what is central is whether, and how, existing norms and institutions can be contested and thereby opened up. His focus is on excluded and marginalized constituencies and on how we can relate to these in new ways, thereby including them within the political space. In the process, our own identities and understandings are challenged. In other words, it is a matter of pluralization: contesting communal and individual selves and creating new selves. This is what Connolly has in mind when he talks about "agonistic respect," "critical responsiveness," and a "generous ethos of engagement": An agonistic relation to the other that engages with the identity of the other as well as one's own identity. Hence, for Connolly, we should avoid creating others as antagonistic others (as threats, enemies, etc.).

For Connolly, then, Laclau and Mouffe too readily accept that exclusion is constitutive. The risk is that they take particular exclusions as given and take the hegemonic way of organizing politics as given. Connolly's radical democracy is organized as a rhizome, as a network that connects and reconnects in new ways all the time. He gets this image from Deleuze, and he opposes it to a politics that takes the trunk as its model, for instance, a hegemonic politics where a "we" is established in the center. For Connolly, we should not think of identity in terms of lack, but in terms of abundance: flows of energy, networks of materiality, processes of becoming, and so forth.

Criticisms

Poststructuralist radical democrats have criticized earlier radical democrats like Rousseau and Marx for their essentialism as well as the potential totalitarian consequences of their ideas of society and emancipation.

The main criticism of poststructuralist radical democratic theory is that it does not make a difference. This criticism is leveled at radical democrats from different perspectives. First, at a general level, radical democratic theory is faulted for being just that: theory. That is, theorists of radical democracy have been criticized for not spelling out the practical and institutional consequences of their theories. Second, some deliberative democrats have charged that radical democracy is not that different from deliberative democracy, first because deliberative democracy is more radical than radical democrats allow, and second because radical democracy is only a radicalization of liberal and deliberative principles.

From a different perspective, theorists such as Slavoj Žižek have made a similar charge against radical democracy. Žižek, who is himself sometimes labeled a radical democrat, argues that radical democracy is not really radical. He believes that radical democrats such as Laclau stay within the liberal democratic imaginary and that they do not confront the fundamentals of contemporary justices. The latter are rooted in capitalism and, hence, in the economic sphere about which radical democrats are often silent. Laclau, on the other hand, retorts that Žižek remains trapped in essentialist and foundationalist categories such as class. Thus, we are back at the question of what it means to be radical, that is, what it means to go to the root of democracy.

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See also Marx, Karl; Participatory Democracy; Postmodernism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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Radical Enlightenment

The *radical Enlightenment* was an intellectual and cultural movement that swept across Europe from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century, challenging theologically anchored belief systems and hierarchical conceptions of society. Recent historical and historiographical studies of this movement complicate the standard view of the Enlightenment as an emancipatory project that was advanced by freethinking modernists against traditionalists. In the revised account, the Enlightenment was a three-way struggle among conservatives, moderates, and radicals over the beliefs that then informed an entire gamut of social practices. While the more renowned and moderate mainstream of the Enlightenment sought to reconcile a burgeoning *natural philosophy* with revealed religion and monarchical or aristocratic tradition, proponents of the radical current made stronger claims that reason was the decisive standard for both natural and social-political orders. The radicals in this tradition included, most prominently, Baruch Spinoza, Pierre Bayle, and Denis Diderot, as well as less familiar figures such as Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, Anton van Dale, Balthasar Bekker, Frederik van Leenhof, and others often decried as Spinozists. Their ideas were officially suppressed by authorities everywhere and denounced by dominant mainstream enlighteners and conservatives alike, forcing the radical Enlightenment to develop in large part as a clandestine network.

Research on the genealogy of Enlightenment radicalism has placed particular emphasis on three factors: (1) the importance of Spinoza's philosophy as the original systematic expression of radical thought, (2) the subsequent underground diffusion of Spinozist literature by an international coterie of writers and publicists, and (3) the culmination of this thought in the eighteenth-century works of French philosophes such as the Encyclopedist

Diderot. This historical revision has also prompted some scholars to reassess the political significance of the entire Enlightenment movement, and to cast it as the main cultural transformation responsible for the advent of modern conceptions of equality, democracy, toleration, freedom of expression, and revolution. In essence, the radicalism of the radical Enlightenment is said to reside in its expansive and profoundly secular understanding of philosophy and in its salience as the intellectual vanguard of the Enlightenment as a whole.

The Philosophy of the Radical Enlightenment

In the wake of the religious conflicts of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), philosophy began to reemerge as an autonomous enterprise, neither wholly subordinate to the traditionally superior disciplines of law and medicine nor altogether subject to the regulation of confessional theology. The new philosophy, which was largely inspired by the work of René Descartes, proposed a mechanistic worldview that held mathematical rationality as its sole criterion of truth. This approach sharply contrasted the theologically sanctioned scholastic Aristotelianism that was the prevailing philosophical orthodoxy. At the time, ideas about nature and its metaphysical properties were intimately linked to beliefs about moral and societal order. The radical Enlightenment's philosophical and political impact was intimately related to how it reworked the Cartesian vision of nature.

Until Cartesianism began to make inroads in the middle of the seventeenth century, philosophical explanations of natural phenomena typically followed scholastic Aristotelianism in assuming that all things were constituted of matter and form. Form was thought to be the peculiar nature, principle of development, or essence of any given thing. According to this cosmological framework, bodies acted in particular ways because of inherent or God-given qualities that they were meant to realize. By contrast, Cartesianism explained the movement of bodies in terms of physical properties or forces that were governed by mechanical laws and capable of mathematical measurement. Most advocates of the new mechanistic philosophy believed their accounts of the physical universe to be compatible with fundamental tenets of Christian faith, such as biblical prophecy and the authenticity of miracles. This meant that their philosophy would be capable of lending ideological support to existing institutions of authoritarian government. Descartes himself attempted to create such compatibility by positing an immaterial human mind or soul. His exemption of the mind from the laws of physics supported the claim that matter could be ordered and explained by the power of the human intellect, and it also safeguarded the assumption that the final source of universal motion was a providential God, external to matter.

Despite the Cartesians' intentions to synthesize mathematical reason and Christian belief, the new philosophy was soon employed in service of a more radical naturalism. This strain of philosophy denied the separations of God from nature, and mind from matter. As Spinoza articulated this radical view, the source of all life was internal to the totality of existence, a cause that was immanent in its effects. God and nature were just different names for the same substance, an infinite causal web of which human beings were a constituent but by no means privileged part. Similarly, the emerging Spinozist view held that mental activity could not be strictly separated from matter or the movement of bodies. Rather, thought and extension were different perspectives on the same reality and followed the same laws of cause and effect. This thoroughgoing naturalism thereby excluded from its explanations theological criteria or appeals to supernatural agencies, miracles, divine providence, or creation. An exclusion of such proportion was tantamount to a subversion of contemporary culture in its core beliefs.

The Historical Trajectory of the Radical Enlightenment

In addition to the evolution of mechanistic philosophy, several other developments in the seventeenth century helped to shape the new radical consciousness and to give it an international scope. The most formative political events spanned the continent and included the English Revolution, the French Fronde uprising, and the Neapolitan Massaniello insurrection. These revolutionary experiences created a growing awareness of the power of intellectual dissent and its association with fundamental social change. Meanwhile, a spate of technological and cultural innovations

enabled this nascent strain of radical thought to propagate as a relatively integrated movement. Particularly instrumental in this respect were the evolving media of learned journals, encyclopedias, newspapers, and magazines; new discussion forums such as salons and coffeehouses; and the proliferation of printing presses, publishing houses, and universal libraries.

The Netherlands of the late seventeenth century served as the chief incubator for radical intellectual ferment. Following the revolt against Spanish Habsburg rule, the new Dutch Republic rapidly developed into the leading urban and commercial society in Europe. It was also among the only countries with a republican rather than aristocratic or monarchical form of governance. The relatively fluid, tolerant, and open character of Dutch society encouraged many foreign scholars, intellectuals, and religious refugees to settle there. These included Jews, Catholics, Socinians, dissenting Protestant sects, as well as a large Huguenot population. The French-born Descartes chose to live and spend the bulk of his career in Holland. Another pivotal figure of the radical Enlightenment, the Huguenot Pierre Bayle, emigrated in 1681 to the Dutch Republic, where he spent the rest of his incredibly prolific and conflict-ridden life as a philosopher.

Although civil and ecclesiastical authorities banned or censured the work of Spinoza and Spinozists, radical ideas nonetheless propagated throughout Europe in such a way as to effectively challenge the positions of both the moderate Enlightenment and the conservative counterattack. The two main mechanisms for the penetration of the radical Enlightenment were, on the one hand, a series of pitched intellectual controversies that were widely publicized and reported across Europe, and on the other hand, the international circulation of forbidden manuscripts. The controversies ranged from the uproar that followed Bayle's claim that a society of atheists was possible to disputes over the meaning of Fontenelle and van Dale's treatment of oracles as political imposture; from the outcry over Bekker's immense tome against belief in the devil to the fracas that followed van Leenhof's postulation of a universal philosophical religion.

The dissemination of illicit clandestine manuscripts was the chief propaganda method of the radical Enlightenment. This practice particularly flourished in the salons and high society circles of early eighteenth-century France, though these tracts also made their way to farther flung regions, such as Scandinavia and Russia. The *Traité des Trois Imposteurs* ("The Treatise of the Three Impostors") was unparalleled as the definitive heretical manuscript. Its title referred to the three major figures of biblical religion—Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad. The text was eclectic in its philosophical borrowings and generally Spinozist in its thrust, arguing that religion was a political instrument used to dupe the credulous masses and hold them in thrall. In addition to debunking revelation and prophecy, it attacked the doctrines of free will, divinely ordained law, and the absolute nature of good and evil, implying that a revolution—at least initially in thinking—would enable individuals to escape from their servitude.

The philosophical mainstream and the conservative Counter-Enlightenment camps of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries responded differently to the persistence of the radical current. Counter-Enlightenment traditionalists took a virulently antiphilosophical stance in order to defend the virtues of the Christian faith, as well as royal and aristocratic privilege, against reason. Spokesmen of the moderate mainstream Enlightenment frequently replied by portraying the radical ideas as a perversion of philosophy in its true form. Although there were significant differences in the orientation of the mainstream variants across Europe, they converged in the conviction that the radicals made excessive claims for the purview of reason. This influential camp of moderate enlighteners, which included such luminaries as John Locke, Isaac Newton, David Hume, the baron de Montesquieu, and Voltaire, garnered support from governments and liberal clergymen everywhere. It did this by attempting to limit the scope of scientific or philosophical reason so as to secure the integrity of inherited theological orthodoxy and established political orders.

The ascendancy of the mainstream was never assured, however, and the radicals' cause was periodically advanced by several circumstances. For one thing, the coherence of the moderate Enlightenment's synthesis of reason and faith was often hard to maintain when pressed from both sides by the more uncompromising positions of reactionaries and radicals. When compounded

with the mainstream's internal divisions, this sometimes created situations in which the Counter-Enlightenment unwittingly encouraged radical ideas by attacking the compatibility of reason and faith. This happened in France in the several decades following Louis XIV's reign, where a newly liberated society with a relative absence of moderates quickly polarized into extreme positions held by antiphilosophical Jansenists and radical materialist philosophers. Viewed historically, the Enlightenment Era was a complex record of advances and setbacks for these moderate, radical, and conservative ideological blocs.

The Political Legacy of the Radical Enlightenment

The radical Enlightenment was instrumental in shaping an entire menu of values that underpin the self-understanding, if not always the practice, of modern politics. Notions of equality, democracy, and freedom of expression have all been affected by radical Enlightenment thinkers. Just as this movement sought to extend the purview of philosophical reason so that it could scrutinize all aspects of the social and natural world, the radical Enlightenment correspondingly sought to extend the power of reasoning to all members of human society. This aim followed from the radicals' rejection of preordained moral law as a theological and political mystification. If the laws of political society ultimately rested on nothing else but the human capacity to create and sustain these institutions, then the common interest of everyone should serve as the basis for association. While the radicals did not believe that everyone in society wielded an equally effective power of reasoning, these thinkers nevertheless maintained that individuals shared the same basic motivation to preserve and assert themselves. From the perspective of nature, the radical Enlightenment claimed, everyone sought to judge what was good or bad for one's perseverance. The most legitimate basis for political society was that which secured and extended this capacity for all.

For Spinoza and other radical enlighteners, a democratic republic was the form of government that best met such a demand. In this institutional context, individuals submitted to collectively ordained laws while, crucially, maintaining the prerogative to publicly scrutinize legislation and communicate to others their ideas about what is just or good. Spinoza called this participatory exercise of public reason "the freedom to philosophize," and saw it as essential to the mutual development of individual and collective goods. By associating this conception of reasoning with the freedoms of publication, speech, and thought, rather than liberties of conscience and worship, Spinoza argued for a more comprehensive and secular form of political expression than did moderate mainstream pleas for toleration.

For students of political theory, then, the philosophy and historical trajectory of the radical Enlightenment raise important questions about the link between theory and practice, reason and political innovation. An array of evidence, from scholarly literature to popular pamphlets and spanning the late seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century, reveals a broadly held view that a new way of doing philosophy, if not any particular set of doctrines, was revolutionizing human relations. When this cultural phenomenon is studied together with the conceptions of philosophizing that were furthered by the likes of Spinoza, Bayle, and Diderot, the likely result is a renewed appreciation of the impact of the Enlightenment on major political events, including such radical transformations as the French and American Revolutions.

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See also Counter-Enlightenment; Enlightenment; Immanence; Locke, John; Naturalism; Rationality; Revolution; Spinoza, Baruch

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Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory has become a paradigmatic way of analyzing behavior. Three relatively independent fields have evolved with rational choice theory at their core: game theory, social choice theory, and decision theory. Rational choice theory has deep roots in economics and has become the foil for the development of a cognitive theory of choice in psychology. It has made important inroads in political philosophy and in political science as a whole. In a nutshell, rational choice theory is three things at the same time: It is both a normative and an empirical theory of individual behavior, and also a formalized logical structure that serves as the foundation for much theorizing in political science and economics. Essentially, it ties individual choices to preferences, underscoring choice as teleological or purposeful behavior. It claims both that we *ought* to behave purposefully in accordance with our values, and that we *do* behave so, although not all rational choice theories encapsulate all three of these elements. As such, choice is explained by preferences forming an intuitively simple story with both explanatory and normative presumptions and implications.

The entry begins with a short history of rational choice theory and moves to its applications in political theory. A recurring theme throughout is how the status of rational choice theory has evolved as its traditional structure has been morphed by the analysis of data from experimental efforts to test its assumptions. These tests uncovered inherent problems in its assumptions and are leading to fundamental changes in the structure of the theory.

The role of rational choice theory in political theory is built on dual foundational presumptions that explaining individual behavior is the key to understanding the functioning of political institutions and that these behaviors can be aggregated to understand the behavior of the group and its institutions. These presumptions fit well with the ideological justification of democratic political systems and are usually referred to as *methodological individualism*.

A Brief History of Rational Choice

Although the origins of rational choice theory are a bit murky, its modern roots stem from the Age of Reason. Its pivotal intellectual position was secured in Thomas Hobbes's move to explain the foundation of political institutions via individuals' choices. He conjectured choices stemmed from universally held *appetites* and *aversions*. The effort was continued by such illustrious figures as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, and later such utilitarians as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Adam Smith emphasized the social functionality of Hobbes's assumption of self-interest, famously asserting that typically we benefit not from the benevolent but rather from the self-interested transactions that occur in the market. Utilitarians went on to formalize the link between individual choice and social welfare via a reduction of moral content to an interpersonally comparable utility *numéraire* seen as also motivating the individual. At this time, there was less of a divide between normative and positive claims in political economy.

The utilitarian program (often referred to as consequentialism) began to unravel when, by the end of the nineteenth century, preference was stripped of its presumptive interpersonal comparability. By disparaging the notions of interpersonal comparability of satisfaction, or utility, Vilfredo Pareto (followed by virtually everyone, at least in economics) reduced the power of the utilitarian framework in moral matters. Indeed, all that was left of the utilitarian program was Pareto-optimality: If one makes others better off, without hurting anyone, only then is there an indisputable improvement for the group. Disempowered in matters of distribution and redistribution, Pareto-optimality reflects criteria tightly related to both efficiency and unanimity. As such, Pareto-optimality became an almost universally accepted, yet weak, normative standard.

Alfred Marshall, and other economists such as Paul Samuelson, later reduced preferences to a generalized value structure that eventually was defined by its assumed logical properties. These formal properties came to serve as the deductive

engine of microeconomics and game theory, and they define classical preference theory. Rational choice theory (choosing in accordance with one's values or preferences) is that theory that was developed from classical preference theory.

Classical Preference Theory

In classical preference theory, theorems are derived from the assumed formal properties of preferences, and in the eyes of Milton Friedman and many other theorists, the realism of the structure is simply not relevant. Preferences are assumed to have the following properties:

1. *Pairwise*: peoples' preference judgments are made in pairwise comparisons.
2. *Complete*: all alternatives from which one chooses are comparable. And individuals (I refer to generic individuals as *i* and *j*) are capable of, and do form, judgments as to whether one item (I refer to generic items as *x* and *y*) is better than another (usually written *xPi y*) or whether the two are equally good (*xIi y*). When *i* judges two items to be equally good, one says that *i* is indifferent between them. Completeness implies that for any *x* and *y*, either *xPi y*, *yPi x,* or *xIi y*.
3. *Transitive*: allows two pairwise relations to be inherited by a third pair in the following fashion: If the relation is transitive, then if *x* relates to *y*, and *y* relates to *z*, then *x* relates to *z*. Hence both preference and indifference are presumed to be transitive: for example, *xPi y* and, *yPi z*, imply *xPi z*.
4. *Reflexive*: any alternative is as good as itself.

Together, these four properties imply that preferences are a relationship over things that individuals can order. In other words, one checks all alternatives against each other, and forms a complete ranking, rather than just selecting the best from the field. Each of these assumptions can be somewhat relaxed without creating enormous changes in the theoretical conclusions.

These formal properties are related to individual choice by adding three more assumptions:

5. *Maximized*: individuals are presumed to always choose their most preferred alternative.
6. *Stable*: the preference orders are stable over time and scenarios. Of course, if there is no sugar some might choose a cola drink rather than a coffee. Preference stability does not imply behavioral stability: It allows individuals to make variable tradeoffs between valued ends when the costs of those ends vary in differing scenarios.
7. *Unique*: individuals have but one set of preferences.

Together these seven properties imply that we can explain an individual's choice behavior in terms of his or her preferences and the alternative consequences of the choices from which the choice is being made. Nothing else is required. Because preferences of each individual are presumed to be ordered, they can be represented by numbers (although the numbers have only ordinal meaning). The axioms allow preference theory to perform some of the same roles as utility theory did for the utilitarians. But with utility no longer presumed to be interpersonally comparable, it is robbed of most of its moral power.

In the 1930s and 1940s, John von Neumann expanded these properties to cover choices of alternatives associated with probabilistic rewards. Calling such alternatives *gambles* or *lotteries,* he presumed people had preferences over gambles. He then argued that rational choice led to outcomes associated with the highest expected value. In other words, preferences regarding the outcomes plus the probabilities associated with the outcomes were all that was needed to evaluate gambles. To do this von Neumann assumed all the earlier properties and then some. We can best understand his developments as also requiring:

V1. *Reducibility*: the form of the lottery makes no difference: only the probabilities of receiving each of the possible outcomes matters. One would be indifferent between gambles that reduce to the same rewards via the calculus of probability.

V2. *Continuity*: consider a person who prefers *x* to *y* to *z*. Then a lottery can be constructed between *x* and *z* that the person will find of equal value to the sure bet of getting *y*.

V3. *Monotonicity*: a person faced with two gambles that involve the same two alternatives,

except that in one the person has a higher probability of getting the preferred outcome, always prefers the lottery with the higher chance of getting the more preferred outcome.

V4. *Substitutability*: a person is indifferent between any lottery and another that has elements of equal value to the individual were they but there, at the same probability.

Together, these four additional assumptions imply that individuals evaluate lotteries in terms of the expected value of the lottery. Taken together, the assumptions imply that all alternatives can be evaluated in terms of their value equivalent gambles. Further, these then can be ranked in terms of the probability of receiving the best alternative. In other words, people have preferences over outcomes and are risk neutral. They are indifferent to the form of the risks, only caring about the calculable probability of receiving each outcome. For example, were there no decreasing marginal valuation of money (i.e., every dollar is equally valued, regardless of how many dollars one has), a gamble of $100 with a probability of .01 and $0 with a chance of .99 will be found equally good.

These moves by von Neumann made a representation of preferences over all outcomes (sure bets and gambles) possible both in geometric and numeric terms. Geometrically, continuity and decreasing valuation lead to indifference contours and the like. Numerically, it permits one to interpret utility numbers in more than an ordinal fashion. Indeed, the presumptions that permit one to analyze the value of lotteries in terms of their expected value allow one to map utility numbers on an *interval scale* (i.e., scale differences between values are interpretable, but the zero point is fixed arbitrarily). Familiar examples of such scales are Fahrenheit and Celsius temperature scales: equal differences between scale scores, such as temperatures, correspond to equal differences in the attribute being measured, but a difference of 5° does not correspond to the temperature of 5°.

Still, without a positive element, classical utility theory is a bit vacuous. No universal values are left, no interpersonal comparability: leaving the power of the analysis to rest on a simple teleological presumption of maximization in human behavior. Unfortunately for economics as well as for political science and political theory, more was needed. To gain power, self-interest was raised in many theoretical contexts to the status of an axiom. Further, the behavior of a group of individuals was to be understood as the aggregate of the self-interested behaviors of the individuals choosing within the group.

Empirical Testing and New Theories of Rational Choice

As suggested, the classical theory had considerable success and considerable limitations. But its longevity was bound to its empirical accuracy. As the claims of theorists utilizing classical theory increased, its assumed properties were subjected to tests. These tests were often inspired by the failures of extensions of rational choice theory to nonmarket behavior. Tests that demonstrated failures were followed up with detailed examination of what could explain the erroneous predictions, and this has generated an entire field often referred to as *behavioral economics*. Although behavioral economics is a bit far afield for this entry, we must understand a bit about the contributions of experimental tests to understand the directions taken in the new theories of rational choice.

As indicated, classical rational choice theory began to falter, or at least evolve, when tests of behavior in nonmarket situations were examined. Certainly, Samuelson's suggestion that we understand preferences as what is revealed by behavior helped lead to the development of its empirical side. Early experimentalists showed first the smoke and then the fire. Kenneth May, for example, showed through a simple survey of students that a high proportion of people held intransitive preferences. But a whole field of experimental economics was born when Vernon Smith, a young assistant professor arriving at Purdue in 1955, found it useful to use experimental exercises in teaching economics. Subsequent experimental work explored the fit of classical rational choice models with the realities bared in the laboratory. And by the mid 1970s in the psychology laboratories of Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and a few others, a new cognitive theory called prospect theory was taking shape that showed that the problems with preference theory were much wider

than May suggested. The foundation for a broader understanding of rational choice was laid.

While the problems of transitive preferences were being studied, others ran experiments that showed the classic notion of self-interest was suspect and underdefined. And getting past self-interest meant considering what forms of other-regarding behavior could be developed to explain the observations. New forms of preference theory cropped up that involved other aspects of preferences that had been shown to violate the classical view, allowing for inconsistent choice over time, framing effects, probabilistic preferences, and more.

But the most fundamental alternative to the classical model of rational choice was developed by a couple of polymaths working in evolutionary biology and developing game theoretic models: John Maynard Smith and George Price. Worrying about biological outcomes understood as outcomes of a long repetition of a type of interaction, they conjectured that the interactions that were more successful would lead to more *rewards* and a higher probability of offspring survival, thereby generating an evolutionary model of strategic development in a population. For them, choice became probabilistic and adaptable. And the models that were developed, referred to as evolutionary game theory, changed in both form and foundation from what we earlier called classical rational choice theory to what has become the theory of evolutionary games. The introduction of this to political science was carried forward by Robert Axelrod. In his work, evolution took place in the choice of strategies in a repeating two-person prisoner's dilemma game.

Rational Choice and Political Theory

Although there have been interesting contributions of postclassical rational choice theory, most such work is still debating how to develop foundations and has not yet settled down to a consistent theory of political interaction. The classical view of rational choice has, by contrast, spurred numerous contributions to both positive and normative political theory. These have, in turn, led to both further empirical testing and further problems for the theory. In what follows we look at a few examples of seminal contributions of rational choice theory to normative and positive theories of politics. They include improved understandings of:

- Social cooperation through what is usually referred to as the logic of collective action
- The behavior of collective actors (e.g., unions and governments) through what is usually referred to as social choice theory and spatial modeling
- What might constitute a metric of social or collective well-being and hence a yardstick for political performance

Collective Action and the Political Contribution Problem

If shared interests are to be satisfied, and if satisfying them for one member of the group satisfies the others, then why would rational, self-interested individuals work to get their shared interests satisfied? This is a classical puzzle developed more than 200 years ago by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In modern times, Mancur Olson set out to solve the puzzle. What emerged was a somewhat complex but sobering view of how humans solve what is called the collective action problem. Olson's first step was to identify the basic conflict between self-interest and any "natural coming together" of individuals to solve group problems. Russell Hardin then recast Olson's argument as a simple *n*-person prisoner's dilemma game. A prisoner's dilemma game involves a situation where each individual would individually be better off not cooperating, but everyone would be better off if they all did, and therefore even had to, cooperate. This moved the analysis along in two ways. First, it produced rich implications about what to expect in political behavior. Second, the implications permitted experimentalists to develop models they could test.

Key Implications of the Logic of Collective Action

As already pointed out, in a prisoner's dilemma, the individual has a dominant strategy to not contribute. The individual in an unorganized group will not contribute on the basis of the public good alone. This led Olson to note that the incentives that lead one to contribute to the supply of a public good must be both somewhat independent of the good and work in an individualized fashion.

How and why, then, do groups get organized? At least in some fashion, the aggregate value of a public good to its potential consumers is the sum of the values each consumer places on the good. The shortfall of the outcome that occurs in the unorganized or noncooperative group can hence be thought of as the difference in the aggregate values of the cooperative and noncooperative outcomes for the members of the group. This is the maximum gain that the group could get. Or, it is the maximum it could spend on organizing and still have a net benefit from the organizing effort. Or, this net gain is what the group's organizers can tap to improve the state of the group, and, at the same time, reward themselves for the effort.

If nothing else, our analysis to this point gives a solid justification for liberal political orders. Of course, there is no *ought* derived without a normative presumption. But *if* we agree that people should be able to meet their shared needs, then it follows that people ought to have such basic freedoms as press, speech, and assembly. The lessons of the logic of collective action literature imply that people must be given basic civil liberties, otherwise the demand for many valued public goods will neither be manifest nor factored into public decision making. Generally, individuals will not know that they share interests if they do not have the possibility of free communication. For groups to demonstrate the scale of their demands socially and politically, they must be capable of sharing the costs of the political efforts to change the public policies underlying their demands for public goods without undue costs being imposed on them because of their identity. Because a means of sharing the cost of a public good is organizationally difficult for groups of people to meet their shared needs over time, they must have the freedom to organize themselves politically.

The size of the group does not change the behavioral prediction in an *n*-person prisoner dilemma. But, if interests are shared, the value of their achievement increases: the larger the group of individuals who want a particular public good outcome, the bigger is its aggregate value. Hence, if collective action is to be roughly understood as an *n*-person prisoner dilemma, solving the shortfall of a larger group is more valued than that of a similarly situated but smaller group. Or as shown by Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer, organizing a larger group is more profitable than organizing a smaller group. And if political leaders are somewhat oriented toward the private rewards they can gain from such efforts, then politics is potentially more profitable in large groups and political competition will be stiffer in larger groups.

Along the same lines, we can note that the outcomes of elections are public goods, and that at least the instrumental value of voting is likely to be very small because the probability of any one vote making a difference is very small. This conclusion has led to two inferences: First, voters will tend to invest little in acquiring information about political outcomes and alternatives. In the words of Anthony Downs, they will tend to be "rationally ignorant." Second, citizens not given reasons to vote separable from the effect of their vote on the outcome of the elections are likely not to vote. The issue has been somewhat overdrawn in the literature, because many theorists argued as if there were no other reasons to vote. In any case, the fact that many voters do vote, referred to as the voting paradox, has led to both an interesting research frontier and an Achilles' heel in the rational choice theory program. It also helped spur investment in experimental research to discover the precise limitations of the theory.

Key Findings From Tests of the Theory of Collective Action

The findings of empirical tests did not fully confirm the predictions of the prisoner's dilemma games. Finding individuals contribute more than predicted to public good problems, researchers such as Elinor Ostrom and Charles Plott began to explore institutional structures that contributed to success in sustaining common property assets. In a series of experiments, Plott showed that the incentives generated by institutional design determine a great deal about the obtaining of group outcomes. Working on common property problems that Garrett Hardin believed required privatization of publicly possessed assets, Ostrom similarly found that informational and institutional details made all the difference in environmental sustainability. When deviant behaviors were easily monitored, and punishment for noncooperative behavior was possible, groups solved their public good problems.

From these discoveries grew a vast prescriptive literature that has had an enormous impact on institutional and policy design. It has led governments to design policies that use such market institutions as trading and auctions in such diverse problem areas as environmental, transportation, communication, and other policy matters.

Collective Actors, Social Choice, Social Welfare, and the Arrow Problem

The contributions of rational choice theory to institutional design did not begin, or end, with the study of collective action. These contributions began more than 50 years ago with the negative findings of Kenneth Arrow, who wondered which normatively attractive properties one could guarantee by properly crafting a constitution. Arrow's initial answer was astounding: If groups and group behavior are the aggregation of individual choices, and if individuals behave in accordance with rational choice theory, then democratic constitutions cannot be designed to generate rational group choices. Arrow's work also made clear a huge hole in our understanding of social welfare as the aggregate of individual welfare when we are bereft of interpersonal comparability. The problems stem from the difficulty of using a rule to combine reasonable individual choices (or welfare indicators) in a manner that can ensure a reasonable group choice.

We can identify some of the implications of Arrow's work using the problem of group voting cycles. Such cycles undercut any simple assertion that group choice reflects the will of the group or that it is somehow better for the group than alternatives that were rejected. To illustrate a voting cycle, we construct an example: some voters with preferences over a set of alternatives and a defined voting procedure to identify the winner. In this case, the rule is simple majority rule structured so that voters consider their options two at a time. The winner of each contest (the one that gets a majority) survives to compete against the next undefeated option until only one option is left. To show the problem of instability, assume:

> A group of three voters (i, j, and k) considering four options (w, x, y, z) with preferences of the following sort: two of the three, i and k, prefer x to y; two others, k and j, prefer z to x; and finally two (i and j) prefer y to z. Further, let all three voters find z preferable to w. Finally, we presume that w is preferred to x by j and k.

In such a case:

1. The outcomes would cycle: Start with y: x beats y, but w beats x; then z can beat w, but y beats z, and we are back with the initial defeated alternative.
2. There is no stable outcome.
3. Without further information, winning or losing in such a situation carries no normative weight.

With these preferences, each option can lose because there is a majority that prefers some other outcome. And each option can win, including w (even though the voters unanimously prefer z to w) depending on the order of the contest. So the winning motion could be anything. It is determined by which of the possible majorities form a winning coalition in which order. What is chosen would thus be determined by something beyond preference, perhaps the order of the vote or the structure of the agenda: In a legislature this is usually a strategic choice controlled in part by a committee chairperson or a party leader.

Arrow and Impossibility

What Arrow shows is that majority rule is not the problem. Cycles can be avoided only by rules that permit other things we will not like. For example, a dictator can be expected to choose in a manner that does not show this sort of instability, but a dictator has other negative normative qualities. Also, a rule of unanimity does not permit cycles (there being only one winning coalition). More specifically, Arrow shows there are deep conflicts between designing a social choice rule to achieve some minimal normative qualities that also requires avoiding a dictator. So if we insist that (labels for the properties are in parentheses):

1. Any pattern of preferences that the voters have can be aggregated into a decision by the rule (U-universalism).
2. Any side can win if it gets enough support (positive association). And certainly, this means

that if the group is unanimous in preferring *x* over *y,* the group choices *x* (P-Pareto).

3. The choice between any two alternatives should only reflect the preferences of group members over those alternatives (I-independence).
4. The results of the contests should be transitive (which forbids the voting cycle problem previously identified) (O-ordering).

These qualities conflict. The first requirement permits us to choose any set of preferences (such as, for example, the ones specified in the previous example). And the last two then can conflict directly, because, for example, if the group chooses *x* over *y,* and *y* over *z,* then we can imply that with transitivity it should choose *x* over *z*. But as we saw, this can violate the choice that would come from the consideration of only the preferences of group members over the final pair of options (*x, z*). Which of these properties one would want to sacrifice is unclear.

For example, relaxing the ordering requirement does not come cheaply. This is because there is a connection between any notion of good and transitivity. Amartya Sen has shown that virtually any conceivable notion of best, or better, implies some sort of ordering principle, such as transitivity. So when we say that one outcome is better for society than another, and that yet a third is worst, we are implicitly requiring some degree of ranking. Sen considers precisely what such normative terms might minimally require, and no simple solution allows for even loose rankings and independence (property I). Others have shown that if we give up a strict interpretation of I, we gain wiggle room as to what we can get from a choice rule. All this has underlined that we have to think carefully about the normative properties we hope to obtain from constitutions. Further, we must note that the precise designs of political institutions will impact how the preferences of the people are aggregated and how privileged the status quo will be.

Challenging the Noncomparability of Utility and Social Choice

Not all combined preference patterns lead to cycles with any particular rule. And not all decision rules (e.g., unanimity) lead to them either. But those preference aggregation procedures that do not lead to cycles implicitly involve some violation of another of the properties Arrow stipulated. And if we want there to be a connection between the aggregation of individual preferences and some notion of aggregate social welfare, we need some basis of comparison between the preferences of individuals and the aggregate social welfare.

Consider, for example, a comparison of majority rule with another rule: the Borda count. The difference here is the amount of information the voter gives in her vote. Majority rule asks for very little information from the voter: What is your first choice? The link to social welfare with majority rule must come from an assumption that the social welfare value of each person's first choice (in any contest) is the same. With a Borda ballot, the voter is asked to rank all the candidates. A higher rank is worth more points. If there are, say, four candidates, the top rank is given three points, and each subsequent ranked alternative is given one less: a third place vote gives the candidate only one point. The winner is determined by adding up the total points that are given to any candidate. With Borda, the preferences that determine the outcome between any pair will be preferences held over the entire set of alternatives. Borda can perhaps be said to do a better job than majority rule: after all, the voters are giving more information about how the outcomes affect them. But there is still a need to consider how the votes being aggregated relate to aggregate welfare. Now one voter's second place counts equally with that of another's. And so on. This requires distinctive assumptions regarding what interpersonal comparisons must be made to treat the aggregate Borda vote count as a legitimate indicator of social welfare: It does not let us avoid the need for direct comparison.

Spatial Models and Institutional Analysis

Another approach to the problem is to relax Arrow's first assumption (U) and assume that individual preferences have certain commonalities. Specifically, Duncan Black showed that if all voters agree on an underlying ordering of the possible outcomes (e.g., from left to right, or regarding

allocating a fixed budget to, say, either guns or butter) and each voter has an ideal point in that ordering and prefers an outcome closer to her ideal than one farther away, then there is no possibility of a cycle, or Arrow problem. With most forms of simple majority rule, the social choice will turn out to be in agreement with the voter who is in the median position in the set of voters.

But Plott proved that when the dimensionality of political conflict goes beyond 1, the median voter equilibrium breaks down. In more than one dimension, the ideal point of the median voter remains the equilibrium for the group only if that voter's ideal point is a median in all directions. Without that, Richard McKelvey derived a "wildness theorem" demonstrating that, with cycles, the outcome might lead anywhere. This led to considerable interest because as Gordon Tullock noted, democracies do not seem to generate radical instabilities, nor do they seem to lead to randomly selected, inefficient outcomes. Tullock conjectured that there must be some logic to the attraction of the center of the distribution of ideal points, perhaps via the positioning of the intersections of all the median lines (i.e., lines that have a majority of ideal points on both sides of the line when we include those points that are on the line).

Surprisingly, although there may be many issues dividing voters, measuring citizens' preferences often shows that these preferences can be mapped onto only one or two dimensions. So, for example, when there are but two contesting parties for office, voters are often motivated by which of the parties' composite positions they feel closest to. Hence Black's findings have relevance even in some substantially complicated electoral situations. But this was not totally satisfactory because the dimensionality of voters' preferences is not necessarily reflected in the legislatures and cabinets where laws are written.

Three major building blocks have been developed to justify Tullock's conclusion. First, it was shown by Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal that many institutional structures can bring equilibrium to an otherwise chaotic state. For example, many of the checks and balances of the American political system privilege the status quo so that it becomes less likely to be caught in a cycle. But less elaborate arrangements can also generate stability. Second, developments have expanded the notion of commonalities of preferences that preclude cycles. Peter Coughlin and Melvin Hinich established that if the relationship between individual preferences and choices is probabilistic rather than certain, electoral political competitions can lead to centralistic outcomes that are stable and conform to utilitarian conceptions. Frohlich and Oppenheimer show that a consensus on a conception of justice can obviate problems of majoritarian cycles.

But clearly, one of the great advances has been the development of tools to analyze the political dynamics of elections and legislatures when cycles do exist. Here the most important insight was that of George Tsebelis. He argued that we can think of political systems as having veto players (e.g., in the United States, the president, the Congress, and the Supreme Court). Only if all veto players agree, do we move beyond the status quo. Obviously, this entails a notion of unanimity, and hence, within that set of actors, we do not have to worry about Arrow problems. But some of these veto players might be institutional and collective actors, as is, for example, the Senate. For these we must get some solution to the problems of social choice raised by Arrow. Here Tsebelis turned to the work of Nicholas Miller and Richard McKelvey. Miller invented the notion of an uncovered set as the set of points that can be quickly recaptured (via a short cycle). McKelvey proved that its location has been established to be within the yolk: an area 4 radii of the smallest circle that intersects all median lines. This allowed Tsebelis to develop a more generalized understanding of institutional equilibriums. Others such as Norman Schofield made similar advances to deal with such problems as stability in multiple party cabinet formation and multidimensional party conflict situations. The upshot of all these pieces is that Tullock's conjecture is approximately right: There is considerable stability, centrality, and predictability to most democratic procedures. And this has led to increasingly successful modeling of specific political institutions and situations.

Social Welfare and the Evaluation of Governmental Performance

The problem posed by Arrow was so big that it spurred attempts to reconsider the link between

rational choice and aggregate welfare. Indeed, much of the effort of behavioral economists has been to investigate the link between "utility" (traditionally understood as welfare or happiness) and preferences. Rationalist branches of democratic political theory, led by John Rawls, embraced such a substitution (referring to the goods that satisfied such needs as primary goods) even earlier than behavioral economists and social choice theorists. One of the ways that first John Harsanyi and then Rawls moved beyond the consideration of preference was by reinstituting the notion of impartial reasoning in the exploration of individual and social welfare. This deliberate decontextualizing of choice forced its ties to something more basic than preferences. Rethinking the problem of utility and its relation to preferences has led others (David Braybrooke, Gillian Brock, Norman Frohlich, Joe Oppenheimer, and Amartya Sen) to focus on more concrete aspects of preference satisfaction, such as the satisfaction of basic needs.

These shifts from preference to more basic indicators of welfare changed both the presumptions of interpersonal comparability and the properties that one might expect of the individual welfare measures being aggregated into conceptions of social welfare. Shifting to such needs as nutrition, for example, invites the obvious comparison of the welfare of those who are hungry to those who are not. Interpersonal comparability is reintroduced precisely where Pareto denied its possibility.

As Sen conjectured in his Nobel acceptance speech, the difficulty with social welfare identified by Arrow is partially based on the emaciated noncomparability derived from considering preference satisfaction the be-all of individual welfare. Reformulating the epistemology of welfare reopens possibilities for tackling the old problems the utilitarians and others explored. But now, we do so with a fuller understanding of how to consider what ought to be aggregated and what can and cannot be obtained.

The tools of social choice have kept up with these expanded horizons of moral reasoning. And the tools of experimental economics permit the testing of the conjectures as to what are the contours and contents of impartial reasoning. Although there has not been a wholesale rejection of Pareto-optimality as the criterion for governmental performance, there has been a resurgence of an investigation of the link between rational individual choice and social justice.

Joe A. Oppenheimer

See also Bentham, Jeremy; Common Good; Condorcet, Marquis de; Enlightenment; Game Theory; Hobbes, Thomas; Justice, Theories of; Mill, John Stuart; Pareto-Optimality; Positive Theory; Prisoner's Dilemma; Public Choice Theory; Public Goods; Rationality; Rawls, John; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Scottish Enlightenment; Sen, Amartya; Smith, Adam

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RATIONALITY

Rationality means the capacity to exercise reason, to think, infer, and reach conclusions logically. The word *rationality* derives from the Latin noun *ratio,* meaning not only calculation but also method, reason, and order. Some of the most basic questions asked about rationality include how and why we become rational and whether nonhuman animals or artificial intelligences can be rational as well. In addition to these epistemological questions, the human capacity for rationality has prompted questions that bear on political life. Some of the most important of these include: Is rationality a capacity nearly all human beings develop, or something only a few exhibit fully? Must we be rational to be moral, or to be free? How different thinkers answer these questions bears on how they assess the political implications of human rationality.

Claims about who ought to be accorded political rights or exercise political power are often grounded in beliefs about the human capacity for rationality. That is, the claim that certain people are entitled to political rights or should exercise political power is often supported by the claim that these people are rational. Conversely, many arguments to deny certain people political rights and power rely on the claim that those people are not or cannot become rational. Many have based their hopes for a better political life on the further development of our rational capacities. Others have warned against such optimism, whether because they believe that traditional or sacred knowledge withers away in a society that prizes rationality or because they believe that current dominant conceptions of rationality are oppressive. This entry reviews ancient, modern, and contemporary conceptions of rationality and its relevance to political life, concluding with a look at feminist and poststructuralist critiques of rationality.

Ancient Ideas

Though ancient Greek philosophers saw rationality as an essential prerequisite to the exercise of political power, many believed it was not fully developed in most human beings. Though *rationality* is no better than a rough translation of the terms used by Aristotle and Plato, both considered questions similar to those being addressed here.

Of all the well-known ancient Greek philosophers, Plato's Socrates (the figure of Socrates as he appears in the earlier philosophical dialogues of Plato) regards rationality as a nearly universal human capacity. When noting craftsmen's ability to give a clear account of what they know, or demonstrating an illiterate slave boy's ability to understand and apply the principles of geometry, or praising the philosophical instruction he received from a woman, Plato's Socrates asserts that he believes the rational capacity to be more widely distributed than do his fellow male citizens in classical Athens.

By contrast, Plato presents rationality as a much rarer capacity among human beings in his later writings. Unlike contemporary understandings of the term, however, Plato's rationality is part of a complex set of intellectual attainments he believed only a few human beings could master. What we would call rationality is for Plato so closely linked to the capacity for creativity and a facility for mathematical or other forms of abstract thought that it cannot be meaningfully separated from them. Plato argued that only people capable of such thought could design a sound political community; only they could rule it well.

Aristotle also maintains that what he calls the deliberative faculty of the soul reaches its full development in only a small number of human beings. In women, boys, and those Aristotle called slaves by nature, rationality (meaning here the capacity to direct one's own life according to ethical standards) is not fully developed; such people therefore should not be allowed to direct their own lives but must be cared for and ruled by free men. Full participation in political decision making, Aristotle concludes, ought to be granted only to those who are not ruled by others. Only such men who can fully realize their deliberative faculties should be entitled to participate in political rule, rather than being subject to others.

Modern Ideas

The British empiricist John Locke argued that God made human beings capable of rationality and of

moral behavior; people display these capacities when they understand and act in accordance with the laws of nature, the laws God has woven into his creation. Once people become capable of understanding these laws (by means of education and maturation), they enter into a moral community of equals in which all members possess the natural right to property (broadly understood as life, liberty, and material goods). Because Locke believes human rationality is awakened by education and maturation, the subjection of children to adults is justifiable because children are not yet fully rational beings. But if this is the case, then most adults cannot be subject to other adults on the same grounds. Yet Locke does qualify the general presumption that rational adults should not be subject to other rational adults in several important ways.

First, Locke regards marriage and parent–child relations as prepolitical human associations. That is, Locke believes that although political communities may make laws governing some aspects of these associations, marriage and parent–child relations must obey some central natural laws in order to fulfill their purposes. In the case of marriage, one such precept amounts to a decision rule: Because marriage is an association of two people, there must be some rule for making decisions when the two people disagree. Locke's rule gives preference to men based on their greater abilities and physical strength. Therefore, even though Locke does not argue that women are not fully rational, his insistence that they be subject to men in the prepolitical association of marriage denies them full membership in the moral community of equals and, hence, political rights.

Second, Locke considers what should happen to those capable of understanding the laws of nature who nevertheless violate them by initiating an attack on the lives, liberties, and property of others. Because Locke sees such people as deliberately casting aside their ability to act rationally, he insists they should be stripped of all natural and political rights. And because such people have by their actions forfeited their right to their own lives and liberties, they may be justifiably killed or enslaved by others. Though Locke assumes most adults can develop their capacity for rationality fully, he regards the exercise of that capacity as a moral duty and those who neglect it as morally culpable.

Another distinctly modern conception of rationality was developed by the Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Like Locke, Rousseau sees rationality as a potential or capacity realized only under certain conditions. But unlike Locke, Rousseau does not believe that rationality and morality are inextricably linked. Rousseau maintains that people are naturally averse to seeing other sentient beings suffer and that this aversion will most of the time steer people away from harming others. But once the rational capacity awakens, it not only allows people to meet their needs more efficiently but may also spark a potentially poisonous self-regard. This dark side of rationality can overwhelm natural moral impulses, so that people whose rational capacities have come to fruition in a corrupt, hierarchical society are likely to enjoy besting others and to remain unmoved by suffering.

For as pessimistic as Rousseau can be about how rationality is exercised in most social settings, he makes a strong connection between the sound exercise of rationality and human freedom in his later work. Rationality, Rousseau concludes, need not inevitably trigger narrow self-regard; it has the potential to bring about self-awareness too. And rational, self-aware people aspire to direct their own lives according to rules they themselves fashion. When Rousseau defines freedom as living in accordance with the rules one has made for oneself, he does so on the basis of a more optimistic view of rationality. In this view, rationality is the capacity most crucial to realizing human freedom. The connection Rousseau makes between rationality and freedom sparked the German philosopher Immanuel Kant's much more extensive examination of the relation between human rationality and autonomy.

Twentieth-Century and Contemporary Ideas

One of the most influential contemporary conceptions of rationality may be found in rational choice theory (also called public choice, social choice, or decision theory). Rational choice theorists focus on how people use their rational capacities to achieve their goals rather than on whether the goals themselves meet standards for rationality. This conception of rationality applies to the means selected to achieve goals rather than the goals

themselves; it is therefore often referred to as instrumental or purposive rationality. As part of their focus on the means people choose to achieve their ends, rational choice theorists also consider a variety of constraints on human choices: imperfect information, risk and uncertainty, rules and sanctions, and the simultaneous choices of others. For many rational choice theorists, the accounts people give of their own actions are not definitive for how their actions should be analyzed. That is, even if people give other kinds of reasons for their actions, many rational choice theorists maintain that their actions can still be explained as if they were instrumentally rational and self-interested.

An important source for these ideas may be found in late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century utilitarian theory; according to utilitarians, actions are rational when they can be understood as attempts to maximize benefits or utility to the actor. But rather than treat instrumental rationality primarily as a powerful analytical tool, many utilitarians stressed the prescriptive implications of their views. For example, the utilitarians Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill argued that both government policy and social practices ought to be judged according to whether they maximized collective utility or happiness and that any that fell short of doing so ought to be at least reformed or even discarded. While they were not revolutionaries, the first utilitarians justified their commitment to widespread social and political reform by referring to their conception of rationality.

By contrast, most contemporary rational choice theorists do not draw reformist political conclusions from their conception of rationality. Instead, some of the most influential works by rational choice theorists in the United States raise serious questions about ideas central to modern democratic theory, such as the will of the people, collective action, and popular participation. Rational choice theorists have argued that especially in large, stable political communities, it is much more rarely instrumentally rational for a person to participate politically or take part in collective action than democratic theorists have assumed. They have also shown how difficult it is to identify a rational political choice preferred by a majority of voters (i.e., a choice that satisfies a few basic logical criteria, like consistency, transitivity, etc.). Although rational choice theory is regarded by many social scientists today as primarily an analytical tool rather than a normative theory, most of the political conclusions drawn from it have been skeptical of democratic aspirations.

A more optimistic contemporary conception of rationality emphasizes that democratic political values can be rationally justified. John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas are some of its best known advocates. Rawls argues that people who rationally engage in a thought experiment in which they know nothing of their own talents or limitations or of what others in their society value will conclude that several basic principles of justice emphasizing the priority of liberty and equality are rationally warranted. (Rawls calls the situation presented in the thought experiment the original position; the wide-ranging constraints on what parties to the original position know, the veil of ignorance.) In his later work, Rawls portrays these principles of justice as outgrowths of modern Anglo-American ideas about religious toleration, rather than as abstractly valid conclusions. Still, rationality remains central to Rawls's political theory as one of the capacities liberal democratic public officials employ to justify their decisions publicly. Like Rawls, Habermas considers rationality crucial to the human capacity for morality. Habermas argues that human communication depends on certain rationally discernible rules; under ideal conditions, these rules promote agreement and consensus without the need for coercion.

While Rawls and Habermas ground the possibility of a better political community in the human capacity for rationality, the German sociologist Max Weber holds a more cautious view. On the one hand, Weber notes that many human groups before and beyond the modern West display purposive rationality, and that, as an analytical starting point, social scientists should assume that actions they seek to understand are purposively rational. Weber also employs the concept of value rationality to understand what people do to fulfill their commitments to a cause, a religion, or an ideal. On the other hand, Weber believes that as purposive rationality takes deeper root in a society, its members lose access to nonrational ways of knowing, like those based in tradition or religion. Weber regards these as real losses for which the further development of rationality cannot compensate. Though Weber

acknowledges that a society that prizes rational action develops capabilities traditional societies cannot, he insists that the power of traditional or religious knowledge to make the human world meaningful also be recognized.

More recently, a number of theorists have advanced more fundamental critiques of the conceptions of rationality previously summarized. Poststructuralists and feminists are some of the most important of these critics, questioning some claims central to the defense of rationality. Feminist critics focus on the supposed universality of the rational capacity. They argue that current conceptions of rationality should be understood as the historical products of male-dominated social and political orders; as a consequence, conceptions of rationality that purport to be universal should be critically analyzed to uncover the illegitimate generalizations of Western ideals of masculinity they contain. Poststructuralist critics focus on the claim that the exercise of rationality need not depend on the exercise of power. Instead, they argue that power relations are so pervasive that even those ideas that deny their presence must be examined to find their traces. From this perspective, concepts of rationality have important disciplinary functions: They not only present standards for what it means to be rational but also define what it means to be irrational or nonrational, how human communities should enforce these standards, and how they should treat those who fail to meet them.

Emily Hauptmann

See also Aristotle; Autonomy; Disenchantment; Feminism; Foucault, Michel; Habermas, Jürgen; Kant, Immanuel; Liberty; Locke, John; Natural Law; Plato; Rational Choice Theory; Rawls, John; Rights; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Weber, Max

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Rawls, John (1921–2002)

John Rawls was an American philosopher who had a significant impact on postwar political philosophy. He is credited with reviving a form of normative theorizing that had gone into decline in the course of the twentieth century and, more specifically, resuscitating the social contract tradition of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. The focus of his work is justice—more specifically, distributive justice. Accepting that human beings can benefit from coercively enforced social cooperation, he is concerned with the fair distribution of the costs and benefits of such cooperation. Although his most famous book—*A Theory of Justice* (first published in 1971)—is primarily a discussion of justice between individuals under a state, he does address justice between states or people in his last substantively new work, *The Law of Peoples* (1999). Rawls reformulated his project and arguments in response to criticism, and the discussion will follow the development of his work from the publication of *A Theory of Justice,* in which he sets out the method for determining what is a just distribution and defends his "two principles of justice," to his revisions of the theory in *Political Liberalism* (1993) and, finally, to his theory of international justice.

A Theory of Justice

Although he locates himself in the contract tradition, Rawls is not primarily concerned with the legitimacy of the state. He takes for granted that social cooperation must be backed up by sanctions if human beings are to solve the prisoner's dilemma. Rather, his work focuses on the distribution of the benefits and burdens of such coercively enforced social cooperation. A society is just insofar as it is

governed by principles that ensure a fair distribution of those benefits and burdens. This reorientation of the role of the contract away from state authority has, however, generated interpretational problems. While he stresses that he is offering a political conception of justice, rather than a moral one, Rawls's version of the "state of nature"—the original position—owes more to Kant's moral theory than to his political theory. For Kant, an act is moral insofar as it is motivated by a good will, but a "society of devils" can create a state just so long as they get the constitution right. It should be possible for a good person to live under that state, but you do not need good people to create and sustain it. In short, the legitimacy of political institutions is not grounded in human motivation. In contrast, for Rawls the stability of political institutions does appear to depend on human beings having or developing motivations conducive to justice. While this problem recurs in his work, it is clear that Rawls intends his theory to be specifically political in character. The theory applies to the basic structure of society and not to all social relations.

The basic structure consists of those social and political institutions that fundamentally affect a person's life chances, and restricting concern to this area of life has important implications. Rawls draws a distinction between the justice *of* the basic structure, and justice *within* the basic structure. The family illustrates this distinction. Household labor and child-rearing responsibilities, as well as income, are distributed within families as well as between families, and the dynamics of family relations are different from wider social relations, for while families can be dysfunctional, at their best they are held together by ties of affection rather than mutual advantage or civic duty. This difference is significant in at least two ways: It may not be possible to redistribute affection in the same manner as income or freedom is redistributed, and even if it were possible, it would not be desirable to attempt a redistribution.

Although political, the theory is not intended to be applied directly to everyday political questions, but assumes that agents live in a well-ordered society. We are asked hypothetically to choose principles of justice in the knowledge that all will comply fully with the chosen principles. In reality, there exists at best partial compliance, so we need answers to problems created by instances of noncompliance. For example, how do we deal with law breaking? We need a theory of punishment. What is the morally correct response to human rights violations? We require a theory of humanitarian intervention. Rawls does not deny the importance of these issues, and indeed accepts they are at the heart of everyday politics, but argues that a systematic grasp of ideal theory is necessary as a preliminary to dealing with the more urgent problems of nonideal theory.

The Original Position

There are two aspects to Rawls's theory of justice: method and substance. The method by which we determine what is just is a reformulation of the social contract, while what is chosen consists of two principles of justice, the first guaranteeing an equal set of basic liberties, and the second equal opportunity and a minimum of material resources. The original position is the equivalent of the traditional state of nature, although it differs in important ways from the state of nature: It is not a description of an imaginary historical situation, but a thought experiment that can be undertaken by an individual at any time. Furthermore, Rawls takes the existence of the state as a background condition and not the object of hypothetical deliberation. Indeed, he rejects the idea of general political obligation, arguing instead that we have a moral obligation to create and sustain just institutions, rather than a moral obligation to a specific state.

The most important feature of the original position is the denial of knowledge of your identity—you choose principles of justice without knowing what position you occupy in society. Indeed, you do not even know your particular society. While this "veil of ignorance" is its most memorable aspect, the original position has two other important components: primary goods and motivational assumptions. If you are denied knowledge of your ends—that is, those things that you seek to protect or advance or achieve, such as a particular career, relationships with identifiable family and friends, or a set of beliefs about the world—then you need some substitute ends. Given that agents do not know their identities, these ends must be shared by all agents in the original position, and they must be of fundamental importance. Rawls argues that each person desires to maximize his or her share of

the (social) primary goods, which are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and the "bases of self-respect." These goods are all-purpose means to the realization of a multiplicity of different ends. There is an objection to this argument: The primary goods are not equally valued by all people. A hedonist will require a higher share of the goods than an ascetic. To deal with this problem, the primary goods must not be of purely instrumental value: Although the ascetic may require fewer primary goods than the hedonist, both must be capable of imagining being the other, such that while they may not *use* the same amount of primary goods, they recognize it is rational to *have available* the same amount.

The third important aspect of the original position is a set of motivational assumptions. These assumptions are advanced for the purposes of generating principles of justice and are not a description of how real people behave. As well as seeking to maximize his or her share of the primary goods, an agent is nonenvious, disinterested, and willing to live by the chosen principles. To understand the role of motivation in Rawls's theory, it is necessary to distinguish rationality and reasonableness. Rationality entails the successful pursuit of your own interests, whereas reasonableness involves a willingness to see the world from the perspective of another person and act accordingly. Agents in the original position are directly rational and only indirectly reasonable: They are rational insofar as they seek to maximize their own share of the primary goods, but reasonable in that they are willing, and know that other agents are willing, to live by whatever principles are chosen. Critics of Rawls argue that his theory combines the contradictory impulses of self-interest and morality, but this is a misunderstanding, for he makes an analytical distinction between self-interest and morality precisely to motivate people to act morally. Agents in the original position have a formal sense of justice, meaning that they are willing to live by whatever principles of justice are chosen. This contrasts with a substantive moral sense that certain principles are valid. To be motivated, people must see principles of justice as a product of their choice, but to give substance to principles, they need some idea of what interests people have.

At the core of the theory is the idea that procedures validate outcomes, and consequently choice plays a fundamental role in explaining why we are morally bound to a set of political principles. The theory is constructivist. Constructivism has the advantage over alternative methods of justification that the chosen principles can be recognized by agents as (at least, hypothetically) the product of their own actions (choice), and therefore they are more likely to be motivated to respect them.

Principles of Justice

Agents in the original position are free to propose any principles they wish, although, of course, they must achieve unanimous agreement. Given they are identically situated, the unanimity requirement is not onerous. However, determining what they would, in fact, choose is more challenging. Rawls claims they would choose the two principles of justice, but concedes that they might select different principles, hence the distinction between method and substance. To simplify matters, he suggests the following menu of possible principles: free riding; first-person dictatorship; general egoism; classical utilitarianism and average utilitarianism (with or without a guaranteed minimum); perfectionism; intuitionism; and, the democratic conception (the "two principles").

The first three options are excluded by the way the original position is set up: We are all prepared to comply with principles rather than free ride; given ignorance of our identities, it would be irrational to identify a dictator; and egoism would be unstable. The credible alternatives are average utilitarianism with a guaranteed minimum of resources, intuitionism, and Rawls's preferred democratic conception, which consists of two principles:

1. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and

2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle) (Rawls, 2001, pp. 42–43).

There is a lexical relationship between the principles of justice, meaning the first principle must be fully satisfied before the second principle can be applied, and within the second principle equality of opportunity must be respected before the difference principle can become operative. Lexical ordering is intended to avoid problems with the two main philosophical rival theories: intuitionism and utilitarianism. Intuitionists have to make judgments regarding the trade-off between values, such as freedom and equality, without determinate ordering principles to fall back on. Utilitarians settle disputes by appeal to a single principle—that utility be maximized—at the expense of the plurality of values. Lexicality entails the recognition of the plurality of values but gives some precision to their ordering. The danger, however, is that the value that is given the highest priority—in this case, liberty—will, unless defined in a relatively narrow way, trump other values. Rawls acknowledges the need for a "limited application" of higher ranked principles if lower ranked principles are ever going to come into play.

Although the first principle has been criticized, and the above version of the two principles is a late formulation intended to clarify the importance of specific liberties rather than liberty in general, it is the second principle that has generated the most debate. In fact, the second principle has the appearance of two separate principles: equal opportunity and the difference principle. Equal opportunity requires that advantageous positions, such as college places and good jobs, are open to all and that each person has a reasonable chance of acquiring such a position. The difference principle entails maximizing the position of the worst-off representative person.

Rawls argues that rational agents in the original position, recognizing the seriousness of the choice to be made in the original position, will ensure that should they end up in the lowest socioeconomic class, they will be as well-off as possible. The reasoning behind this is termed maximin: *maximum minimorum,* or the maximization of the minimum position. Although he avoids committing himself to any particular view on agents' attitude to risk, only highly risk-averse agents would select the difference principle over average utility, although a further argument is that the justification for average utility relies too much on the empirical claim that given the fact of diminishing marginal utility, extreme inequality will be avoided. Rawls claims to offer a more direct argument for limiting material inequality.

In addition to risk aversion, the motivational assumptions of mutual disinterest and nonenvy are important in the derivation of the difference principle. Mutual disinterest leads individuals narrowly to seek their own advantage and not the advantage of identifiable others, and the fact that agents are not envious of other people renders the pursuit of equality for its own sake irrational. The conclusion of Rawls's argument is that material inequality, in the shape of the difference principle, can be justified from a standpoint of equality—that is, from the original position.

Civil Disobedience

Most of *A Theory of Justice* is concerned with ideal theory; that is, he assumes for the purposes of his argument that people comply strictly with the principles to which they have agreed. He departs from this assumption in one relatively short, but very influential, section of the book—the discussion of civil disobedience. It is only in a society where there is partial, rather than strict, compliance with the principles of justice that civil disobedience has a role. This is because civil disobedience is an appeal to the majority—to its "sense of justice." The majority is being asked to respect principles that it implicitly accepts. In a (fully) just society, there would be no need for civil disobedience; and in an unjust society, there is no sense of justice to which you can appeal. The concepts of majority and minority are central. Although unanimity is required in the original position, once the principles have been selected they need to be institutionalized, and this is possible only through the creation of majoritarian political institutions. But majorities are liable on occasion to disregard the rights of minorities.

The leading idea behind Rawls's theory of civil disobedience is that in breaking the law, the civilly disobedient are addressing, or appealing to, the sense of justice of the majority. All the other points that Rawls makes, including an important distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious refusal, lead back to this idea. He sets out the following conditions for an act to be one of civil

disobedience: The injustice that is the object of civilly disobedient action must be clear. Civil disobedience involves breaking the law, rather than simply testing it, and must be a public act, nonviolent in character, and not threatening. The civilly disobedient must accept the penalties for law breaking. And even if laws are seriously unjust, civil disobedience must not threaten the stability of the political system.

Rawls distinguishes civil disobedience and conscientious refusal. His aim in *A Theory of Justice* was to articulate a morality—a theory of justice—appropriate to the political sphere. That political morality leaves open many other areas of morality. Conscientious refusal may be grounded in that political morality, but it need not be; it may be based on religious or other principles that extend beyond the political. The clearest modern example of conscientious refusal is objection to military service, either for general pacifist reasons or because of opposition to a particular war. Rawls argues that such objections cannot be automatically accepted, for justice requires on occasion that people be prepared to defend—by force of arms—the political system. The danger with conscientious refusal is that it undermines the political order by substituting individual moral judgment for the collective judgment of society.

A significant strand in conscientious refusal is the striving for moral integrity, that is, a feeling that regardless of the consequences, you cannot support a law or policy. Insofar as conscientious refusal is a form of moral purity, it is in tension with civil disobedience, which looks "outward" toward the majority, and appeals to it to change. The idea of moral purity is central to Mohandas Gandhi's *satyagraha,* which means an "insistence on truth," and Rawls's account of civil disobedience is often contrasted with Gandhian civil disobedience.

Political Liberalism

In the 1980s, Rawls began to revise the account of justice that he had presented in his earlier work. Largely unchanged were the substantive principles, but in a series of articles, culminating in the book *Political Liberalism,* he appeared to revise quite significantly the justificatory basis of the theory. He had assumed that in a well-ordered society there was a widely, and deeply, shared moral code. But this belief does not, he now suggests, address the fact of reasonable pluralism: the existence of conflicting, yet reasonably held, conceptions of the good. Rawls does not abandon the idea of the original position, but his interpretation of it undergoes a significant change. It is important to stress that denial of knowledge of one's identity (the veil of ignorance) entails not knowing one's conception of the good—that is, one's conception of what is ultimately valuable. This means that the resulting principles of justice must be compatible with a plurality of such conceptions. Expressed more concretely, Christians, Jews, Muslims, and atheists must all be capable of respecting the principles.

A theory of justice must be political, meaning that its motivational force must derive from a particular, circumscribed sphere of life, and not from a comprehensive moral standpoint, such as Kantian or Millian liberalism. This is not a restatement of the standard liberal argument for the distinction between public and private, whereby individuals enjoy a sphere of freedom in which they can act in ways that others might reasonably disapprove of; rather, the claim is that the basis of justification is itself limited to the political. The distinction between a political and a comprehensive conception of the good in turn affects the motivational basis of the theory. It is important that this distinction is not defined in terms of the political as opposed to the moral, for the political conception is itself a moral conception, but a special one. Somehow, the agent must accept the principles of justice but for the "right reasons," and that means as principles with independent moral force.

Rawls lists a number of features of human interaction that explain why reasonable people can disagree: Evidence is conflicting and complex; different weights can be attached to different considerations; concepts are vague; there are conflicts between different moral considerations, such as duties to family and duties to strangers; no society can contain a full range of values. He then goes on to define a reasonable conception of the good as encompassing both theoretical and practical reasoning, and although a reasonable comprehensive view is not necessarily fixed and unchanging, it normally draws on a tradition of thought and doctrine. It is not subject to sudden and unexplained changes.

From the idea of reasonable pluralism Rawls offers an explanation of how citizens, from a variety of different reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good, can come to respect liberal political institutions. There develops an overlapping consensus: It is for citizens as part of their liberty of conscience individually to work out how liberal values relate to their own comprehensive conceptions, where a "comprehensive conception" could be a religion or a secular philosophy. Each reasonable comprehensive doctrine endorses the political conception from its own standpoint, and individuals work toward liberal principles from what are, at a basic level, mutually incompatible comprehensive perspectives, and respect for those principles is built on the overlap between them.

Rawls does not give concrete examples of how such an overlapping consensus can be achieved, but the position of Muslims in a Western society can be used to illustrate the argument. Various features of Islamic thought that might appear threatening to the liberal democratic order can be reformulated in a way consistent with political liberalism: a long history of toleration of Jews and Christians based on a shared monotheism; adherence to secular law so long as it respects Muslims' right to worship; an interpretation of *jihad* as a spiritual struggle; and submission as a voluntary act. A Muslim cannot endorse comprehensive liberalism but can respect political liberalism. Other citizens—people of different faiths and none—may have other reasons for respecting the principles of justice, but they can, along with Muslims, nonetheless converge on those principles.

The Law of Peoples

Liberal and Nonliberal Societies

In his last substantively new work—*The Law of Peoples*—Rawls turned his attention to international relations. The underlying aim is to outline the just foreign policy of a liberal society: When is intervention in the affairs of another state justified? And what duties do liberal societies have to nonliberal ones? Although that aim is quite narrow, in the course of the book, Rawls does present an argument intended to show that nonliberal, non-Western societies can be stable and thus should be tolerated by liberal ones. Although he does not use these terms with great precision, he makes a distinction between four types of society or people:

1. *Liberal societies,* such as those that (largely) respect human rights conventions and the conventions of war
2. *Decent nonliberal societies,* of which there can be several variants, but the one type Rawls discusses possesses a decent consultation hierarchy
3. *Outlaw states,* which that violate the law of people, by, for example, waging aggressive wars or engaging in serious violations of human rights
4. *Burdened societies,* where poor socioeconomic conditions make respect for international law difficult

Rawls applies the idea of the original position and the veil of ignorance developed in his theory of domestic justice to international law, but there are some significant differences between how these devices are used in Rawls's theory of domestic justice, and in his theory of international justice. Liberal societies agree among themselves on a "law of peoples," and then decent societies endorse those same principles. (Rawls argues that liberal democratic societies, by their nature, will tend to respect the human rights of their own people and the sovereignty of other people.) The law of peoples consists of eight principles:

1. Mutual recognition of each people's independence
2. Honoring of agreements
3. Legal equality of peoples
4. Duty of nonintervention (except in the case of dealing with outlaw states and grave violations of human rights)
5. Right to self-defense
6. Respect for human rights
7. Respect for the rules of war
8. Duty to assist people living under conditions that prevent them from becoming just (liberal) or decent societies

The law requires of liberal societies that they do not seek to change the fundamental character of a decent society.

To understand how a decent society could endorse the law of peoples, and consequently why a liberal society should *tolerate* a decent society, it is necessary to identify the characteristics of the latter. Rawls argues that a decent society is peaceful in that it pursues its interests through trade and diplomacy. The domestic laws of such a society are guided by a "common good conception of justice," meaning that while it may not grant the freedoms to individuals enjoyed in a liberal society, in a fundamental sense all citizens are treated equally. There should exist a "decent consultation hierarchy," which permits the possibility of dissent (the Arab–Islamic concept of *shura* would be one example of a consultation hierarchy). Importantly, the common good conception of justice entails respect for human rights, including the right to life, liberty (freedom from slavery and forced labor), personal property, and equality before the law. Although a decent society may not permit apostasy and proselytization, it must accord a degree of religious freedom to minorities, and because that right is limited, it must also allow citizens the possibility of emigration. Human rights do not depend on a particular conception of the human agent as autonomous, but rather they set a standard for the decency of domestic political institutions. Human rights fulfill three roles: they are a necessary condition of a regime's legitimacy; they determine the limits of sovereignty—the law of peoples prohibits intervention in the affairs of another state except when that state is violating human rights; and, they set a limit on the pluralism among peoples.

Just War

People, Rawls argues, have a right to go to war in self-defense but not, as in traditional accounts of state sovereignty, simply in the rational pursuit of a state's interests. And in a liberal society, conscription into the armed forces is justified only when just institutions are under attack—the need to defend liberty justifies a short-term, but transparent and proportional, interference in an individual's liberty. Because decent hierarchical societies do not share the same conception of domestic justice, they may make further demands on their citizens; however, because both decent and liberal societies fight only defensive wars, they will have no reason to amass armed forces beyond what is necessary to deter aggression.

A war is just if the reasons for waging it are just by reference to the law of peoples, and—importantly—if it is conducted in conformity with certain rules of combat. Well-ordered (decent and liberal) people must carefully distinguish three groups: an outlaw state's leaders and officials, its soldiers, and its civilian population. Because the population is not a *people* in Rawls's sense—it is not consulted in matters of public policy—it cannot be held responsible for the instigation of an aggressive war. For this reason Rawls argues that the fire bombing of Tokyo and other Japanese cities in the spring of 1945 and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were unjustified. Enemy combatants must also be treated with respect because they have human rights and because the possibility of long-term peace—which is one of the aims of a just war—is assisted if the armed forces of an outlaw state are treated with a respect that they themselves may not accord to forces of the well-ordered society.

Global Distributive Justice

Relatively well-ordered societies have a duty to bring burdened societies, along with outlaw societies, into the society of peoples. It does not follow that they must transfer resources to burdened societies in order to achieve this goal. Part of the reasoning is that transfers are indeterminate—we do not know at what point transfers must cease. A second, and more substantial, argument against transfers is that a society with few resources can be well ordered if its political traditions, law, social structure, and culture are capable of sustaining a liberal or decent society. Furthermore, the culture of a society is a significant determinant of the wealth of that society. Following the work of Amartya Sen on international development, Rawls argues that a society's population policy is extremely important and that failure in food distribution, due to a collapse in entitlements, such as wages, rather than food decline, is the cause of most famines.

Rawls rejects the extension of the difference principle to international relations, arguing that the target of distribution is the achievement of a society's political autonomy and consequent on it joining the society of peoples. This argument fits with his rejection of the extension of domestic liberal justice to the international sphere: Peoples are represented in the society of peoples, not individual human beings. A practical result of Rawls's position is that while he has a relatively egalitarian theory of domestic justice, he has a view of international justice that is significantly inegalitarian.

Paul Graham

See also Basic Structure; Civil Disobedience; Egalitarianism; Equality of Opportunity; Global Justice; Human Rights; Justice, Theories of; Just War Theory

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Realism

Realism as a way of interpreting international relations is as old as the conduct of international relations itself, but over the millennia it has taken several forms. Its self-chosen appellation reflects the rhetorical advantage that realists derive from describing themselves as dispassionate observers of the "realities" of international life—as opposed to the unreal hopes of their intellectual opponents, whom they designate "idealists." The premise of this positioning is the belief that there is a "reality" that limits humanity's ability to reform international politics. Constraints on realizing peace and international justice arise not out of failures of imagination or the malign influence of particular ill-intentioned actors, but out of conditioning realities inherent to international relations. Realism counsels recognizing these as limiting conditions, which human beings did not consciously create and which they cannot abolish, and it therefore prescribes a foreign policy that pursues its aims with a respect for these restraining aspects of international politics, rather than seeking to overcome them. Realism is thus both a theory and a policy of accommodation to a harsh, even tragic, side of reality.

Varieties of Realism

Realists discern unchangeable realities of international politics in either of two starting points: the self-aggrandizing nature of human psychology, or the peculiar organization of international politics deriving from the lack of any effective mechanism controlling the competition among sovereign states. One form of realism is thus a universal account of politics as it must be practiced as long as human beings remain what they are; the other is a depiction of a particular kind of politics sharply distinguished from political life as it reveals itself in other institutional settings.

The realism of human nature derives its propositions from a conviction that there is an essence to human beings in their relations to one another in any social setting: It is the desire for power—for control, for mastery of one's fellows. Reinhold Niebuhr, the eminent twentieth-century student of religion and politics, following the example of

Augustine, found the explanation for this desire in original sin. Implanted within each person since the Fall is an insatiable and ineradicable will to make oneself into a kind of god, dictating to others and bending them to one's own purposes. The possession of power allows one (call him or her *A*) to achieve this objective to some extent, while also helping to prevent others from similarly becoming dominant over *A*; and the more power (understood as the means to bring others to do what *A* wishes them to do) possessed, the greater the degree to which both the expansionist goal of dictating to others and the defensive goal of avoiding being dictated to can be realized. Niebuhr's contemporary, Hans Morgenthau, and Augustine's intellectual foe Niccolò Machiavelli reach much the same conclusion without recourse to explicitly religious language, for they too discern in human psychology an *animus dominandi* that makes politics a striving for power, with no limits to the power sought that can be derived from the power-seeking urge itself.

If the basic reality of politics is contestation for power, then international politics is the purest example of politics—what is more or less successfully hidden in the political art as practiced in other arenas of social life (hidden by institutional structures or systems of social norms and beliefs) is in international politics unadorned. Whether because social conventions render the hypocritical claim that one is acting morally less necessary in international affairs than in domestic ones, or because diversity among peoples (due to differences of language, race, and culture, for example) diminishes the effectiveness of those social bonds that mitigate the contest for power in more intimate relationships, international politics come closest to being "pure" politics. Seeking after power is a ubiquitous feature of human life, but politics practiced on the largest scale provides the clearest picture of what this universal drive looks like in practice.

The implication of this standpoint is that the desire for more power cannot be quenched or suppressed by any proposals for international reform. Thus, for example, international organizations such as the United Nations will be turned to the purposes of those who can gain control over them. Seemingly neutral and universally agreed-on principles will likewise be used by those who have the power to do so to harass their enemies and give an aura of disinterestedness to their own lust to gain or retain power, as realists assert that Adolf Hitler did with the slogan of national self-determination in the interwar period and the superpowers with the policy of nuclear nonproliferation in the cold war.

The more far-reaching charge by the realists against idealist opponents, however, is not that they foolishly endanger their nation's power position by failing to see that their well-meaning plans for reform will be turned against them by malevolent, power-hungry governments. Rather, it is that they naively do not recognize that their own actions, even when they claim to be most selfless, usually serve their own nation's interests. That is, human-nature realists attribute so much strength to the innate quest for power that they believe that it subtly prompts international actors who believe themselves to be wholly beneficent to interpret morality in ways that work to their own advantage. Reform projects are taken up, in all sincerity, when they advance the power position of their sponsors, and are discarded when they no longer serve that purpose: Such is the extent of the inescapability of "power politics," even for those who have convinced themselves that they are most free from its influence.

By contrast, a second group of realists locate the most important reality of international politics not at the microlevel of individual human nature, but the macrolevel of the international system. Specifically, the trait of the international system that most impresses these realists is its anarchy, by which they mean not that international politics is marked by constant disorder, but that it contains no authority possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This monopoly, which is held at least in theory within each state by the government of that state, constitutes sovereignty. The sovereignty of states has two aspects: Internally, each state, employing in the last resort its instruments of force, exercises control over other actors (such as local governments or corporations) on its territory; externally, states grant no authority to any international or transnational body to exercise control over them. If a world government did exist, international politics would cease to be anarchical and become instead "hierarchical," and in so doing it would lose its specifically "international" character.

The absence of any global counterpart to national police forces that can enforce national laws means that states, having no superior authority to protect them, must take measures to protect themselves. International relations is a "self-help" system, and states maintain and employ all the instruments of power, including both military force and all the diplomatic arts, to protect what they see as necessary to their well-being. Given that they are responsible for seeing to their own safety, they decline to delegate to any other actor the power to define the means required for their safety—their national interests. Knowing that all other states find themselves under the same pressure of self-reliance, each state exposes itself to the vulnerabilities created by cooperating with others (and therefore becoming to some extent reliant on actors that, in the final analysis, will be guided by their own rather than its interests) only when it believes it will gain more than it will lose by the transaction, creating a constant brake on international collaboration.

International-anarchy realists insist that understanding international rivalry and distrust does not require attributing to all human beings (and indirectly to states, as organizations made up of and controlled by human beings) a universal desire for power. Indeed, they contend that only a few humans, and therefore only a few states, may behave in this aggressive way. Rather, what is decisive is the inability of any state to know for certain what the objectives of any other state may be, or what they may become in the future. In this condition of uncertainty, the self-reliance of each state pushes it to assume the worst of its counterparts and to accumulate as much power as it can to protect itself against potential threats, and there is no logical limit to the amount of power that it might need in some unknown crisis. Without relying on any assumption about what human nature is like, other than granting human beings a rational desire to survive, this group of realists arrives at the same point as the first: a picture of the international system marked by conflict, suspicion, and fear.

Thomas Hobbes, with his picture of the solitary individual trapped in a war of all against all in the state of nature, and his assertion that international politics constitutes the clearest example in actual practice of this intellectual construct, stands as a forebear of the realism of international anarchy. Indeed, Hobbes specifically states that human beings are governed by different motives, including the simple desire to be left alone, but that the structure of any setting in which no government exists and self-help must be practiced drives those within it to assume the worst about their counterparts and to be guided only by what serves their own interests. What Niebuhr and Morgenthau did for Augustine, the French sociologist and political observer Raymond Aron did for Hobbes: restate in the twentieth century the interpretation of international politics set down by an earlier political thinker—in this case, by insisting that what makes international politics "international" is the central role of international anarchy.

Realists who base their picture of international relations on their understanding of human nature advance claims about what is universal, found in all politics and indeed all social relationships (aside perhaps from the most personal ones) at all times and places. Realists who base their portrait of international relations on insights into international anarchy begin with what is particular—with what distinguishes international politics from politics as it is practiced in other settings, and makes it unique in lacking a single ultimate sovereign. The two forms of realism are at one, however, in believing that this foundational reality is not susceptible to conscious control exercised by those who wish to reform or revolutionize international relations. Those who attempt to act as if reality, understood either as human nature or international anarchy, were other than what it is will only penalize their own state, and perhaps endanger its existence.

In both varieties, the currency of international relations is power, pursued either for its own sake or as a means to another end, such as security. It is assumed that those who direct states will be self-regarding rather than other-regarding, and the dominant note of international life competitive. Cooperation, where it exists, will serve, not compromise, vital interests, and it will rest on a deeper competition—as, for example, the cooperation of alliances presupposes conflict with a shared adversary. Because they can never be certain that current allies will not become future opponents, states will be sensitive to falling behind even friendly states in the contest for power, and they will therefore prefer relative gains in the objectives that contribute to overall power, such as wealth, even if they could

make larger absolute gains at the cost of seeing other states gain even more. Intensely conscious of their potential vulnerability in an environment in which, in the end, they have only themselves to rely on, they are willing to compromise their freedom of action and delegate to others power over them only on issues that are marginal and few. On the other hand, precisely because of their intense consciousness of the limits within which even the most powerful states must live, realists of all stripes counsel reliance on diplomacy whenever possible and constant awareness of the risk entailed in rolling the iron dice of war. Neither camp of realists holds out the hope that even a successful war will free statesmen from constraints, and their emphasis is instead on clear-eyed bargaining and accommodation as, most often, the preferred route to international stability and the protection of national interests.

The Evolution of Realism

Although one can find in Thucydides elements that blend the version of realism that begins with human nature and the version of realism that starts from international anarchy, most of those over the succeeding centuries who have been described as progenitors of realism can be placed in one of two categories. First, there are canonical political thinkers who have in scattered writings applied their more general understanding of politics to the particular realm of international politics. International relations in these contexts has frequently been used to illustrate a concept not limited to international life (such as Hobbes's state of nature) or as one of several reasons why political leaders have to make power their lodestar if they wish to survive, politically or even physically (as in Machiavelli's advice to the prince not to be good). But by and large political theorists have not made international affairs their primary subject of concern, and so they have not systematically developed the tenets of an approach to foreign policy and the international system that could be described as a full-blown realist theory.

Second, there are political leaders themselves, in their actions, their state papers, and their memoirs, who have displayed a kind of realism, understood as a pragmatic approach to formulating policy by those who believe themselves to be looking the facts of life in the face. These sources and examples of realism are even more disparate and widely separated than are the writings of the theorists; and from the point of view of the historian of political thought, they carry the additional difficulty of being after the fact and self-justificatory. They have nevertheless supplied evidence for the conviction, held by realists and nonrealists alike, that over the course of history, more practitioners of the political art have been guided by realist assumptions than by any other set of ideas.

Where these two manifestations of realism came together was in the European tradition of raison d'état or Realpolitik, which grew up alongside the sovereign state, first in Italy and later beyond the Alps, as the influence of the supranational church decayed and the figure of the absolutist prince appeared. Both as a way to understand international events of the day, such as patterns of alignment and realignment among princes, and to excuse the moral shortcomings in the actions of those princes, Realpolitik propounded a frank moral dualism: Whatever moral virtues might be appropriate to practitioners of the political art in their private lives, when acting in their public capacity, they ought to be guided by the well-being of the state for which they were responsible. The survival of the state was the highest concern of the statesman, and securing whatever means were necessary to that end was his or her primary duty. Neither personal scruples nor abstract moral principles had a place in the arena of competition for power that was coming to be conceptualized as a separate international sphere of politics. Realism in this guise was consequently associated from the beginning with the state, the states system, and policies that preserved the states system.

Although it contended that conflict was inherent in the interactions of princes, Realpolitik did suggest a set of measures that might produce at least a temporary and tentative peace. These were the policy prescriptions of the balance of power, which held that, while rulers were not selfless, they were rational. A stable balance of power relied on two assumptions: first, that through the use of unemotional reason, leaders could calculate, roughly but accurately enough, the relative power held by each state in the system; and, second, that any leader considering attacking another state would be deterred from doing so if the relative

power of the prospective object of the attack and its allies was so great as to render the likelihood of success too slender to make the action worthwhile. Ideological affinities or ethical hesitations would interfere with the unbiased calculation or the smooth transfer of affiliation among allies; these were matters that should be decided solely according to the rule that alliances ought to be directed against the strongest state, which was, because of its greater power, the player in the system most likely to attempt expansion at the expense of others. Although states naturally rose and fell over time in their relative power, if statesmen were alive to these changes and accurate and agile in identifying and diplomatically isolating the greatest power, general peace might be indefinitely preserved. This Realpolitik analysis gave no assurance, however, that smaller, local wars fought for reasons other than the general systemic balance would not take place. Moreover, it recognized that if a general war was necessary to prevent or undo an excessive concentration of power in the hands of one state or alliance—that is, if a choice had to be made between peace and the international balance—then the rational policy would be to employ war to preserve the balance that underpinned the entire system of independent states and prevented its replacement by a "universal empire."

In its reliance on rational calculation of power and its distrust of overscrupulousness and sentiment, Realpolitik presumed a cadre of diplomatic and strategic professionals who would determine and implement policy free from the influence of a broader public that lacked the expertise and the temperament to make rational decisions. There was, then, an almost automatic tension between Realpolitik and the ideological struggles that convulsed international politics at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, and again through most of the twentieth century, as well as the increasing democratic control over foreign policy. It was in reaction against these forces and the policies they generated that realism first developed as a self-conscious academic school, as opposed to a set of assumptions, drawn from experience, which in a general way guided the actions of those in positions of power.

Although theorizing about international relations in the first four decades of the twentieth century had contained many elements, including some that could be described as realist, those who, in the 1930s and 1940s, adopted the name and set out the tenets of realism argued that a gulf had opened between what they saw as a naive concentration on international law and organization in the universities (largely Anglo-American) in which they worked, and an increasingly dangerous world in which the distribution of power was tilting against those same countries. These realists intended to look behind the formal institutions of international life to reveal the power realities that would either drive these rules and organizations or destroy them. The formulators of mid-twentieth-century realism wished to awaken their societies to the peril in which they found themselves because of their neglect of the factor of power, but they also hoped to tear away what they believed to be the hypocrisy that prevented these societies from seeing the power urges that lay beneath their own actions—to argue, for example, that a seemingly disinterested advocacy of international law and peace could mask the preservation of the international status quo by satisfied powers. In both its polemical and its scholarly sides, then, this realism disputed the tendency to see Realpolitik as a relic of the past that was being replaced by institutionalized and cooperative international action for the common good. On the other hand, the American realists also rejected the insistence of Realpolitik that a successful foreign policy was necessarily amoral. The argument of these realists was instead that only by accepting the existence of the contest for power could any international actor confront and mitigate the self-seeking aims behind its own actions, and only by pursuing policies that protected national interests while also advancing broader international interests could progress toward greater global justice be made. One mark of this camp of realists was its moral anguish at the realities that constrained, though they did not eliminate, ethical action in international relations. It was precisely because they differed from the exponents of Realpolitik in seeing the possibility and obligation of some realization of justice that they painfully delineated the gap between what was ideal and what could practically be accomplished given the characteristics of human nature as they understood them.

This form of "traditional" or "classical" realism became influential and indeed dominant in the

study of international relations, though it was never unchallenged by adherents of various forms of "idealism" in the three decades following World War II. In the 1970s, however, it was confronted by an alternative form of realism. Criticizing traditional realism for its failure to meet the standards of social science, and taking economics as a better model, Kenneth Waltz and others sought to supplant human-nature realism with international-anarchy realism. Their argument was that human nature, being almost impossible to study directly with precision, could be accepted as a constant, while attention focused on the "structure" of international relations: its anarchical lack of a global sovereign, which made the distribution of power among its independent units the determining factor in relations among them. These "structural" realists, or neorealists, contended that hypotheses could be advanced, tested, and confirmed or disconfirmed if one adopted the parsimonious abstraction of international reality that they offered in the place of the philosophical-historical approach of the traditional realists. The debate between traditional and structural realists therefore proceeded on two fronts, one being the fundamental starting point of any interpretation of international politics and the other being the degree to which the study of international relations could be modeled on the natural sciences and those social sciences that had been transformed by the behavioral revolution.

Because they avoided reference to any inherent desire for power found in human nature, neorealists could posit that the common goal of states was not power but security. In a world in which all actors are driven by an unquenchable thirst for more power, the amount that any one of them holds at a given moment can never be considered sufficient, because it could be overtaken in the future by a competitor accumulating yet more power. By contrast, the neorealists argued, the desire for security—only so much power as needed to protect oneself in an anarchical setting in which other actors want no more than the same thing—could be satisfied, and any number of actors could enjoy this degree of security simultaneously. Systemic stability and peace were more likely under the assumption that the goal of most states was simply to defend themselves, and the first neorealists became known as advocates for "defensive realism." A later form of neorealism returned to the assumption of ever more power rather than security as the objective attributed at least to all great powers, bringing it the label "offensive realism."

Meanwhile, the evolution of the "English School" suggested replacing the realist–idealist dichotomy with a more complex tripartite scheme. Beginning with the British scholar Martin Wight and his Australian colleague Hedley Bull, adherents of the English School argued that the theory and practice of international relations should be understood as a centuries-long conversation among three interpretations of international life, those being the rationalists (or Grotians), who saw the most important reality in cooperation and mutually beneficial interchange among states; the revolutionists (or Kantians), who saw relations among states as epiphenomena, shifting above the underlying community among all human beings; and the realists (or Hobbesians). These realists had more in common with exponents of Realpolitik than twentieth-century American realists, some of whom were described as incorporating large elements of rationalism into their thought. Realism, as characterized by the English School, emphasizes conflict among states, based on isolation, fear, insecurity, and contestation for limited resources. A second generation of English School analysts sought to find the true contribution of their school in the development of rationalism, or the elucidation of a synthesis between rationalism and revolutionism, and have thus tended to shunt realism to one side as an element in international life that can be overcome, much in the manner of the American idealists. Whatever their differences, however, all subscribers to the English School have tended to reject both the "scientism" of the neorealists and the single view of human nature held by classical realists, arguing instead that the conversation among realism, rationalism, and revolutionism is propelled precisely by differing interpretations of human sociability and competitiveness.

Realism and International Change

Beginning with the peaceful end of the cold war and continuing through the contemporary process of globalization, critics of realism have questioned the relevance of a body of thought stressing competition and conflict among sovereign states. Exponents of realism have described its insights as

"timeless," but if systemic change is occurring, realism must account for it.

The issue arises most clearly in the current role of the state, and here the two varieties of realism diverge. Realism based on human nature sees the lust for power expressing itself in all—or at least in all collective—realms of human life, as it has done throughout human history, including the great bulk of history that passed before the rise of the sovereign state. Therefore, humans would continue to behave in this way in the future, even after the disappearance of states, which are only the latest in a series of institutions developed by humans to govern themselves. Realists of this stripe would thus expect the contest for power to continue among whatever organizational arrangements might replace territorially defined independent states. For the structural realists who begin with international anarchy, the problem is a different one, for their depiction of the forces governing international politics rests precisely on the existence of a system that in its major elements looks somewhat like the Westphalian ordering of multiple centers of power that ultimately are answerable to no authority beyond themselves, and are hence protected by no one other than themselves. If this anarchical system was replaced by a hierarchical one, structural realism, by its own terms, would cease to describe the incentives operating on the players within it.

While international-anarchy realism is more vulnerable than human-nature realism to the contention that globalization has invalidated its premises, both forms tend to be skeptical of claims that international relations has indeed been transformed in some fundamental way. Both perceive in such claims, not a clear-eyed recognition of radical alteration, but an attempt to escape the uncomfortable lessons of realism—that, in the end, human beings are not especially trustworthy or unselfish, and that the institutional setting of interstate politics tends to exacerbate the conflict into which humans fall when they deal with one another. Both would ask whether accounts of globalization describing it as extensive or unprecedented are correct, and whether, even if they are accurate, such changes will have the effects attributed to them. International-anarchy realism suggests that states have no interest in allowing their effective core of power to be taken from them, and that they will therefore not allow it to happen, whatever role subnational or supranational actors might appear to play; human-nature realism asserts that contest for power is always intrinsic to politics, even a globalized politics. Both types of realism thus continue to see international relations as realism has always seen it: marked more by continuity than by rupture, more by limits than by opportunities.

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See also Augustine; English School; Hobbes, Thomas; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Power; Reason of State; State of Nature; Thucydides

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Reason of State

Reason of state (*ratio status,* raison d'état) denotes a way of thinking about government that emerges at the end of the fifteenth century and remains prevalent until the eighteenth century. It refers to the right of rulers to act in ways that go counter to the dictates of both natural and positive law with the aim of acquiring, preserving, and augmenting the dominion of the state. Reason of state presents politics as a sphere that has rules of its own

that are not reducible to moral principles. These rules concern what must be done when a state of necessity or exception puts at risk the safety of the state. For the doctrine of reason of state, the particular nation-state becomes the main historical actor and the final purpose of all political action.

The term *reason of state* was first coined in 1589 by Giovanni Botero, an Italian Catholic priest active in the Counter-Reformation. But its roots can be traced to late medieval political thought when the kingly estate (*status regis*) begins to claim prerogatives with respect to the other estates composing the commonwealth (*status regni*). At the time, it was argued that the kingly estate had the superior right against the rights of the other estates by reason of its capacity to confront the external or internal threats to the commonwealth posed by foreign invasions or internal rebellions. Machiavelli would later argue that the estate of the prince is always under threat, and it is therefore necessary for rulers to learn how not to be moral in order to maintain their estate, that is, their control over a territory and its population.

Although Machiavelli did not employ the phrase *reason of state,* there is a general consensus that his political thought provides the decisive influence on the development of the doctrine for two main reasons. First, Machiavelli shows that politics is amenable to rules, but these rules are not the same as the rules of everyday morality. Second, he argued that rulers are constantly living in a state of exception or emergency, which necessitates them to engage in actions that would not be condoned if performed by civilians. Reason of state adopts the concepts of necessity and violence as the hallmarks of state action. Necessity and violence come together in a central idea of the doctrine of reason of state, namely, the idea of a coup d'état, first theorized by Gabriel Naudé (see *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'État,* 1639).

But the thinkers of reason of state also tend to distance themselves from Machiavelli. Some argue that Machiavelli is simply concerned with the violent acquisition of power by a prince, rather than with the wise conservation of the state over time. Reason of state focuses more on the preservation of the state than on the person of the prince: It presupposes an impersonal conception of the state that Machiavelli had not as yet recognized. The need to conserve the state requires, according to the doctrine, constant attention on the part of government to matters of economy (mercantilism) and to the manipulation of public opinion by means of keeping secrets of state (*arcana imperii*). Additionally, theorists of reason of state during the Counter-Reformation do not uphold Machiavelli's belief that religion has merely instrumental value to politics. Many of them, like Justus Lipsius, argue that a religion always lies at the foundation of the state. Reason of state may at times excuse rulers from engaging in actions that contravene their religious beliefs, but only if they do so for the sake of preserving the state in its confession.

With the end of the period of religious wars and the new world order established by the Treaty of Westphalia, the doctrine of reason of state focuses on the idea of maintaining an equilibrium of forces between national states. This doctrine of a balance of power allows states to use war as a continuation of diplomacy (Carl von Clausewitz). With regard to internal politics, the requirement to maintain an equilibrium of power gives rise to a science of police (*Polizeiwissenschaft*), whose greatest exponent is Johann H. G. von Justi (see *Grundsätze der Polizeywissenschaft,* 1756). The function of the police is neither to acquire the state nor to conserve it, but rather to increase its power by providing for the felicity of its population. Reason of state becomes a matter of policing: making sure that the numbers of the population increase by providing for the necessities of life, the health of the inhabitants, their productive occupation, and lastly by providing for safety in the circulation and commerce of things and people.

As a way of thinking about government, reason of state begins to enter into crisis with the emergence of civil society as a separate sphere from the state in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The idea of civil society entails the existence of social systems that have "natural" laws of their own and that respond negatively to arbitrary state intervention and regulation. These social systems are those of political economy and of the rule of law (*Rechtsstaat*). In order to govern civil society, a new rationality of government emerges whose formula is that of laissez-faire and that establishes limits to the action of the state on society as a whole. Insofar as liberalism understands good government to acknowledge the limits imposed by law and economics on the state, it can be said that the

advent of liberalism spells the end of the hegemony of reason of state.

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See also Exception; Force; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Power; State

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Rebellion (Medieval)

Medieval European societies were marked by gross socioeconomic inequalities, legitimated through ideologies of hierarchy, and were subject to periods of considerable economic hardship. It has long been argued that, as a consequence, popular rebellions were a natural and recurrent symptom; but also that, as such, they lacked any coherent purpose, were driven only by the harshness of circumstances, and tended toward either millennial fantasies or naive monarchism—the desire, in both cases, for some radical intervention from "on high" to rectify their wrongs. However, historians have more recently demonstrated that some rebellions did have coherent (and potentially achievable) goals, deployed recognizable strategies in their pursuit, and that they were more usually spurred by political aspiration than simply the goad of hunger. In popular uprisings, there is thus the tantalizing possibility of glimpsing some political ideology and praxis at a plebeian level.

Not, of course, that only ordinary people revolted. Various medieval kings experienced rebellions from among their noble classes, something notable particularly in France and England, which, from the twelfth century onward, had the necessary mixture of monarchies that were theoretically central and politically transcendent, but that in practice depended heavily on the support of earls, barons, and the higher nobility for maneuver. When barons revolted, they invariably presented the claim that the king, being led astray by "evil counselors," was in need of rescue by those whose loyalty and responsibilities lay with the wider realm and commonwealth. Sometimes, as with the baronial movement led by Simon de Montfort against Henry III of England in the years 1258 to 1265, the role of those who considered it their duty forcibly to assist the king might formalize themselves via oaths into a communal council. On rare occasion, the established voice of counsel (the parliament in England, most obviously) might judge the king himself as *rex inutilis*—unfit for the job, and hence in need of replacement (as with Richard II, deposed in 1399). Tyranny was, some political theorists argued, another legitimate reason for deposition; though within a monarchical context, this was a claim more rarely sustained.

A form of monarchism thus lay at the heart of baronial revolt. This was sometimes the case also with popular rebellions, though with a rather important different inflection. Large-scale rebellions that sought to appeal to the king have often been seen as politically naive. But such appeals are found most frequently in places where monarchs had long laid claim to strong legal powers of intervention in all disputes; and they can thus be seen as calling on an established political channel, indicating that the underpinning idea was royal law, as a greater force that could override local jurisdictions. It is notable that in the English Rising of 1381, the rhetoric of rebellion played in part with the erasure of all social strata between the king and the people; but the practical measures sought by the rebels were written royal charters of manumission, a rather less abstract goal. Elsewhere, rebels might appeal to kings, princes, or other powers not necessarily in a naive desire for intercession, but as political players who might be tempted into allegiance against a common foe.

Spiritual ideas are also found within some revolts, most recurrently the idea of Christ's liberation of the world from sin, implying the amelioration or erasure of social order. Social hierarchy, and the unequal demands of labor, were explicitly glossed within medieval theology as the price of the expulsion from the Garden of Eden. It is perhaps

then unsurprising that those in rebellion might see Christ's redemption as implying the reversal of this situation—"Christ redeemed and bought us with His precious blood," as the peasants of Swabia declared in 1525. Recurrent also was the idea that the world, being in sin (marked by harsh social inequality and the greed of the higher classes), needed correction; as Paul Freedman has noted, peasants' anger could be presented as God's anger. Religious imagery and religious practice—particularly pilgrimage and collective festal culture—provided both logistical vehicles and a means of legitimation for collective action. Medieval people were practiced at operating collectively, particularly around religious festivals; such activities could be redirected. And confronted with a religious ideology that claimed that social inequality was God-given and immutable, finding a spiritual counterclaim could be a key factor in finding legitimacy and a motivating call to arms. On occasion, issues of religion in themselves constituted a part of the motive for revolt, as perhaps with the radical Taborite fringe of the fifteenth-century Hussites. More usually, though, religion provided a means through which revolt could be framed, expressed, and communicated.

However, as Sam Cohn has demonstrated, it is far from the case that every medieval revolt had a religious element. Contrary to some previous perceptions, almost none of the local or national uprisings were led by, or even had involvement from, priests or other religious figures; John Ball in 1381 is very much the exception rather than the rule. The occasion and ideology for many uprisings was resolutely secular: perhaps most frequently, the resistance of taxation or other impositions, the loss of collective political liberties, and the call for freedom from political oppression. Nor were the participants necessarily those at the very bottom of society: A more typical rebel might be the village or parish office-holding, law-worthy man, who already had a vested interest in the workings of the state (being not infrequently the state's embodiment at a local level), and whose sense of political engagement perhaps always exceeded that expected by his superiors. The most recurrent ideologies here were those of the "common good" and commonwealth, emphasizing again the shared cultural importance of "good government" across all levels of society. In plenty of civic rebellions against external taxation, we find evidence also that revolt was preceded not by a crescendoing wail of incoherent suffering, but by collective debate, widespread communication (including through writing), and organization for action. The predominant sources of medieval history—the chroniclers and commentators—present us with a vision of popular protest as incoherent, undirected, and meaningless. But the reality—found by reading those sources against the grain for what they unwittingly reveal and by supplementing them with other documents like prosecutions and royal pardons—shows something much more complex and more truly political.

John H. Arnold

See also Anarchy; Authority; Civil Disobedience; Hierocratic Arguments; Millenarianism; Revolution

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Reformation

The sixteenth century's tumultuous period of church reform known as the *Reformation* had major

implications for European society, Christianity, and early modern politics and political theory. From Martin Luther (1483–1546) onward, one major question preoccupied Reformation political thought: What should be the nature and extent of the authority of a magistrate over the affairs of the church and the promotion of the faith? This prevalent question was predicated on a long and complex history of the intertwining of secular and church authorities in the middle ages. Reformation political thought was not merely an afterthought to theology; on the contrary, most reformers believed that without their political theories, their efforts to reform the church would quickly fail. But the support of secular authorities became a crucial and often deciding factor whether church reform would gain a foothold in a given territory. Thus, a major effect of the Reformation was the consolidation of secular power and the establishment of territorial and national churches.

Late Medieval Influences

Among the important factors influencing the political theory of the Reformation was the structure of political authority. Though strong monarchies existed, most sovereigns were dependent on the cooperation of subordinate local princes who possessed a considerable degree of autonomy. This relationship was especially true in the Holy Roman Empire, where the Reformation first began; soon thereafter, the reformers relied on the patronage of German princes, who hitherto had a longstanding control over clergy and church property. The medieval debate over ecclesial authority was also a major influence. The church hierarchy jealously guarded secular incursion into what it considered properly ecclesial, such as the appointment of offices; where that line was drawn, however, was contested since the age of Charlemagne. Moreover, since the fourteenth century and the Avignon Papacy, a contentious debate over authority raged within the medieval Western church over authority. The papalists held that the pope had supreme authority, whereas the conciliarists argued that it resided only in a general church council. In the Reformation period, this debate continued in the Roman Catholic Church. Many of the opponents of Martin Luther and the German Reformation were papalists.

Major intellectual currents from the Middle Ages also affected Reformation political thought. Nominalism, a movement against universal categories in late-medieval scholasticism, inspired a contentious debate about the status of human action (including political action) vis-à-vis the grace of God. Because this debate was still alive in the German universities of the sixteenth century, it helped prepare the foundational theological ideas of Luther and the German Reformation. Humanism, here defined as an intellectual movement toward classical liberal studies and education, also influenced the theology and political thought of the reformers. The humanist revival of Hebrew and Greek alone exerted an enormous influence on the political ideas of the Reformation through a renewed emphasis on ancient sources and philological criticism.

Because the focal question of Reformation political thought was about the duties and limits of the secular magistracy, each "confession" from the Reformation period developed answers, though the Lutheran one was seminal. Yet even though these confessional boundaries were distinct and often hostile to one another, one must not assume that this signaled major foundational differences in political theory. Mutual influences and common causes often blurred confessional distinctions in political thought; moreover, battles over political ideas *within* a confession could sometimes be as contentious as any battle between them.

Luther and Lutheranism

Just as the starting point for the Reformation period in general was Martin Luther and the German Reformation, so too was it the starting point of Reformation political thought. Because of the intense opposition from the church hierarchy, Luther and the German reformers discovered that reform was impossible without the committed help of secular authorities. Soon thereafter it also became clear that both the papal hierarchy *and* radical reformers rejected this role for secular authorities; thus German reformers had to theorize over the role of the secular magistracy in the Reformation.

Luther argued that there were *Zwei-Reiche-Lehre* or "Two Kingdoms," each given by God, to which all Christians were subject. The spiritual

realm was ruled by Jesus Christ through his Word; however, the temporal or secular realm was ruled by kings and magistrates through law and coercion. Its proper responsibilities were peace, order, and the protection of life and property. For Luther, secular government was not intrinsically Christian (he would in midcareer praise the political thought of the ancients); but he did argue that the two realms were not only divinely ordered but also biblical. His conception of the two realms came directly from the fact that neither the advice of Paul to submit to secular authority nor the commands of Christ to turn the other cheek could be disregarded. The two realms were two complementary divine gifts through which God directed humanity. In the temporal realm, God ruled indirectly through law and worldly authority and thus demanded obedience to secular power. Luther argued for a strict separation of the kingdoms: Just as popes and priests had no business with human law, secular authorities had no authority in the affairs of the church. However, for Luther exceptions to the limits of secular authority could be made in emergencies, particularly when caused by the recalcitrance of the papal hierarchy. In such times, a secular magistrate could conduct affairs in the spiritual realm as a *Notbischöfe* or "emergency bishop." Due to a magistrate's prominent position as a leader within the priesthood of all believers, he could, in some limited circumstances, direct the church.

Distinguishing their political thought from their leader's, Luther's fellow German reformers generally argued (along with many of the secular rulers themselves) that the secular realm had a duty to ensure that the true religion was established and maintained in a given territory. At the same time, however, they held to some version of Luther's "two kingdoms" and argued that this was not a transgression of their separation. For many of these reformers, the church was seen as an institution that existed in both the spiritual and secular realms; while the Word and the sacraments were part of the spiritual realm, the secular realm included any external measures to ensure good morals, discipline, and the practice of the true faith, including a general oversight of the clergy.

Foremost among the German reformers was Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), whose theory about the secular magistrate became the definitive Lutheran doctrine for generations. In Melanchthon's view, the magistrate was the *praecipuum membrum* of the church and had an obligation, through external discipline, to preserve and maintain a Christian society in all its public observances. Johannes Brenz (1499–1570), a Lutheran reformer in Schwäbisch Hall and Southern Germany, was also a foundational thinker who agreed with Melanchthon that secular government included the obligation to provide and maintain the religion of their territories.

With the positions of Melanchthon and Brenz prevailing, political thought in the German Reformation moved away from Luther's idea that secular government was not necessarily Christian toward the understanding that in its truest form, the duties of secular authorities necessarily demanded maintenance of the true religion in their jurisdictions. However, many problems arose in subsequent generations over the limits of secular authority, particularly since the Peace of Augsburg (1555) gave the German princes the right to determine the religion of their subjects.

Zwingli and Calvin

Humanist, Swiss patriot, and Zurich reformer Huldrych Zwingli's (1484–1531) political thought was more sharply distinguishable from Luther's "two kingdoms" and the *Notbischöfe*. A Christian for Zwingli was not a believer in the spiritual regiment and a subject in the secular one; rather, citizenship and faith were parts of an integrated Christian commonwealth that ought to imitate the ancient covenantal state of Judah. Unlike Luther, Zwingli greatly distrusted monarchy and believed that Zurich would be best served by an aristocracy. Zwingli had no objection to the magistrates' controlling ecclesial affairs (though magisterial control over Swiss dioceses had been established prior to the Reformation), and as *Leutpriester* in Zurich, he actively integrated church and civil affairs in the town council. Zwingli's defense of armed resistance to imperial and Catholic forces also contrasted with Luther's reticence; in fact, his personal willingness to take the battlefield in defense of the reforming cantons cost him his life in 1531.

John Calvin (1509–1564) became one of the sixteenth century's most influential Protestant

theologians, and Geneva, the city he helped form (though not as a citizen), became one of the most revered Reformed centers. However, Calvin was a second-generation reformer; by his rise to leadership in the early 1540s, confessional lines were largely drawn and even entrenched, and many of the theological and political controversies had been refined by the German reformers. Essentially, Calvin's political thought, as seen in his definitive work *Institutes of the Christian Religion,* at least on the question of the role of the magistrate over spiritual affairs, resembled Melanchthon's; Calvin envisioned magistrates who would work in tandem with church elders for the common cause of governing a thoroughly Christian society. The separation of church and secular authority was for Calvin a matter chiefly of tools and resources for the sake of the common end. Therefore for Calvin (against the Anabaptists), church discipline was a matter of political concern. The governing institutions of Geneva reflected Calvin's political thought: the consistory, the council of church elders that policed orthodoxy, would in cases of punishing transgressors have to rely on the authority and assent of the civil magistrates. Like Zwingli, Calvin and his followers were also suspicious of monarchy, despite the (unsuccessful) appeals for support to the French monarchy. Calvinism and the Reformed movement subsequently came to be identified with republicanism, and had an enormous impact on political thought in France, the Low Countries, England, Scotland, and the American colonies.

Anglicanism

After Henry VIII's (r. 1509–1547) establishment of royal supremacy over the Church of England, English political thought revolved around the structure of the state church, while royal supremacy was generally left unchallenged. Yet the role of bishops, who were largely royal agents, was hotly debated. Presbyterians and Congregationalists both sought to dissolve the English episcopacy in the name of Reformed theology and replace it with either national or local governance. During the Tudor dynasty, the shape of the state church depended somewhat on the attitudes of each monarch. Thus, under the young Protestant Edward VI (r. 1547–1553), reformers such as Thomas Cranmer (1489–1556) and continental exiles Martin Bucer (1491–1551) and Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562), pushed for reformation through royal supremacy. But even his Catholic successor Mary (r. 1553–1558) ruled in a Henrician supremacist style through the papal legate Reginald Pole (1500–1558). Protestant exiles from Mary's rule went to Geneva and adopted Calvinist ideas on both church and secular authority. John Knox (c. 1510–1572), one exile who would influence Scottish reform, opposed female rule; thus when Elizabeth (r. 1558–1603) succeeded Mary, he and many former Marian exiles lost their political influence. Tensions arising from Presbyterians, Congregationalists, royal supremacists, parliamentarians, radicals, and Catholics were deftly negotiated under Elizabeth. Her "settlement" found its most intriguing apologist in the Aristotelian and conformist theologian Richard Hooker (1554–1600). But in the seventeenth century, this Elizabethan settlement proved untenable.

The Radical Reformation

Many of Zwingli's original followers split with him over infant baptism; the "Anabaptists," or re-baptizers, as the Swiss Brethren came to be called, were the first of many loosely related radical movements. In general, the radical Reformation strongly objected to the magisterial side of Protestant reform (a notable exception was Balthasar Hubmaier, c. 1480–1528); most radicals envisioned a pure church completely separated from secular power. Many early radical reformers argued that swearing oaths, the use of coercion, and secular authority in general were Satanic. Other radicals counseled rebellion against secular authority in the name of the Gospel, as in the Peasants' War of 1525, or formed a millenarian regime as in the city of Münster (1534–1535). Such experiments were crushed by Protestants and Catholics alike, and the radical Reformation was thereafter considered both politically and theologically subversive. However, Anabaptists like Menno Simons (1496–1561) maintained a renunciation of political aspirations alongside an ethic of nonviolence and strict separation of the church from secular power; this point of view prevailed among radicals in the aftermath of Münster.

Roman Catholicism

Political thought in the Roman Church during the Reformation was extremely diverse, for despite the growth of Protestantism, the remaining church was still a large tent. In fact, Catholic political theories were at least as much continuations of medieval and Renaissance intellectual disputes as they were reactions to Protestantism.

Catholic humanism had its celebrity in Desiderius Erasmus (c. 1469–1536). His influence on Protestantism and the revival of patristic and biblical studies was unrivalled. His political thought was most famously expressed in *The Education of the Christian Prince,* a treatise that sought to prepare the hereditary prince for good rule in a Christian commonwealth. Thomas More (1478–1535) was another such Catholic humanist known for not only his intellectual output (such as the classic work *Utopia*) but also for his political service and martyrdom under Henry VIII for opposing the Act of Supremacy.

During the Reformation, conciliarism and papalism clashed. Partisans of this debate often found major roles in the Reformation; for example, Cardinal Cajetan (c. 1468–1534) became Luther's early foe but was also an authoritative papal theorist and Thomist (follower of Thomism, the belief in the philosophical and theological views of Thomas Aquinas, 1225–1274). Thomism enjoyed a sixteenth-century revival, and thinkers such as Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) were instrumental in Counter-Reformation theology and political thought. When the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) was formed in 1540, papalism and monarchism generally prevailed in their political theories. On the conciliar side, John Mair (1467–1550) was considered a forerunner of "constitutionalism," or theories of limited monarchy that would later grow in and outside the Roman Church.

Conclusion

Reformation political theory was generally occupied with the role and limits of the magistrate in religious affairs. Most thinkers agreed that territories divided by religion could not be governed, and that the magisterial promotion of the true religion benefited peace and order. Hence a major political effect of the Reformation was the consolidation of secular power (particularly in the rule of law) alongside the consolidation of the territorial church. Yet these consolidations had boundaries; for example, justifiable regicide became a common Protestant notion. Finally, all Reformation political thought (radicals excepted) considered secular government a necessary and precious gift of God.

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See also Counter-Reformation; Marsilius of Padua; Scholasticism; Theology; Thomism; William of Ockham

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Regulation Theory

Regulation theory is a Marxist approach to political economy. It examines how particular forms of capitalism achieve a temporary stability. Karl Marx famously argued that capitalism was inherently unstable: It was unstable, first, because it led to capital overaccumulation and so periodic crises, and, second, because it generated an unstable set of social relations that resulted in a class struggle. For Marx, these instabilities would result in a working-class revolution to establish a communist society. *Regulation theory* focuses on the ways in

which material, institutional, policy-driven, and discursive supports allow capitalism to "regulate" its instabilities and thus ward off revolution.

Marx himself had taken different views of the prospects for revolution at different times in his life. Up until the end of World War I, however, Marxists commonly believed that the workers revolution would come soon. By the 1920s, the prospects for revolution looked far bleaker. The call to war had found the workers not uniting to overthrow capitalism but rallying to nationalist causes. Even the Russian Revolution had failed to spark similar uprisings in the more advanced economies of Western Europe.

Much twentieth-century Marxism can be read as an attempt to explain the absence of revolution and the persistence of capitalism. One well-known explanation came from Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist imprisoned under Benito Mussolini. Gramsci argued that the bourgeoisie had established an ideological hegemony; the bourgeoisie had propagated an ideology that dominated throughout society and that lent a spurious legitimacy to the capitalist social order. Although the concept of hegemony certainly offered one way of explaining the persistence of capitalism, it did so by emphasizing the role of culture and ideas in a way that broke somewhat with the more orthodox, economic strands of Marxist thought. Regulation theory tried to explain the persistence of capitalism in terms closer to Marx's economic writings.

The earliest exponents of regulation theory are called the New French School or more commonly the Parisian School. They explained the temporary stability of various types of capitalism primarily in terms of economic institutions. Their emphasis on such institutions explains why their work is often described in relation to other institutionalist challenges to neoclassical economics. Yet, their institutionalism remained firmly located within a Marxist theory according to which capitalism inherently suffered from unstable development (crises of overaccumulation) and social relations (class struggle). Hence, they concentrated on the ways in which institutional arrangements managed to persist in spite of such instabilities.

The main institutional arrangements studied by the Parisian School were regimes of accumulation and regimes of regulation. As a rough rule—but one that oversimplifies—we might say that regimes of accumulation do most to mask the instabilities associated with the overaccumulation of capital, while regimes of regulation do most to mask the instabilities associated with the class struggle. The regime of accumulation refers to the institutions or regularities that facilitate a stable and proportional distribution of capital across departments of production. It includes norms for the organization of work and production, the relationship between branches of the economy, modes of industrial and commercial management, and the norms that govern the division of income between wages, profits, and taxation. The regime of regulation refers to the legal and political institutions that enable capitalist societies, and thus regimes of accumulation, to persist over time. It includes laws, industrial codes, styles of negotiation, state policies, political practices, and patterns of consumption.

Regulation theorists have applied their view most consistently to the broad shift from a Fordist form of capitalism to a post-Fordist or neoliberal one. Fordism refers to the methods of mass production and the rules of management pioneered by Henry Ford in his car factories during the 1920s and 1930s. Regulation theorists use Fordism to refer to the combination of an intensive regime of accumulation with a monopolistic mode of regulation. This combination lies behind the temporary stability of Western capitalism, with its Keynesian welfare state, up until the mid- to late 1970s. The intensive regime of accumulation comprised mass production, the intensification of work, semiskilled labor, a detailed division of tasks, and increasing mechanization. The monopolistic regulation embraced the separation of ownership and control, monopoly pricing, recognition of trade unions, wages being indexed to growth in productivity, the use of Keynesian policies to secure aggregate demand, and standardized consumption of mass-produced commodities. Regulation theorists argue that intensive accumulation and monopolistic regulation created something akin to a virtuous circle. Mass production brought economies of scale and thus rising productivity and increased wages. Rising wages led to increased demand and a fuller utilization of capacity and greater profits. Rising profits then led to the new investment in technologies of mass production that was needed to start the cycle again.

According to regulation theorists, neoliberalism arose as the inherent instabilities of capitalism finally disrupted the temporary stability created by Fordism. They offer several different, if compatible, explanations for the end of Fordism. Some regulation theorists argue that productivity gains declined because of both social limits (e.g., worker resistance) and technical limits (e.g., the difficulties of balancing ever-longer lines of production). Others argue that the expansion of production led to increased global economic flows and thereby undermined the ability of the state to regulate its national economy. Yet others argue that Fordism relied on ever-greater state expenditure, which led to inflation and overload. The demise of Fordism, whatever its cause, entailed a whole social formation; it was the end of mass production, large industrial complexes, blue-collar work, full employment, mass markets for standardized goods, mass political parties, the nation-state, and, crucially for our purposes, centralized and bureaucratic management systems.

Regulation theorists were often reluctant to engage in futurology. They did not claim to be able to predict what regimes of accumulation and regulation would arise in the post-Fordist era. In recent years, however, several regulation theorists have begun to suggest that neoliberalism itself has developed a kind of temporary stability. In this view, a new governance of markets and networks enables the state and other actors collectively to manage capital overaccumulation and the class struggle.

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See also Critical Theory; Gramsci, Antonio; Institutionalism; Keynes, John Maynard; Marx, Karl; Marxism; State; Welfare State

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Renan, Ernest (1823–1892)

Ernest Renan was one of the most widely read French authors of the nineteenth century, which is remarkable given that he was committed to the life of the research scholar. When he did choose to comment on current affairs, his sometimes ambiguous political positions made him an author particularly prone to misinterpretation. Yet it is these very ambiguities that make Renan a significant figure. His interpretation of Christianity, his views on democracy and on the nation-state, among others, give us an important insight into the contradictions of political life in late nineteenth-century France.

Renan and Catholicism

Renan was born in 1823 in Tréguier in Brittany. The most significant event in his early years was his break with Catholicism at age 22. As a successful schoolboy, he had followed the traditional path to priesthood, entering the famous Parisian seminary of Saint-Sulpice in 1843. However, by the end of 1845 he had left, "never again to climb the steps of Saint Sulpice in cassocks," as he put it in his widely read *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse* (*Recollections of Childhood and Youth*) (1883). From then on, he was committed to the life of academia: He completed his doctoral thesis on Averroes in 1852 in Paris, participated in state-sponsored archaeological expeditions to the Holy Land in 1860 to 1861, and was eventually appointed Professor of Hebraic, Chaldean, and Syrian Languages at the Collège de France in 1862.

But the story of Renan's conversion away from Catholicism remains significant. Outside the seminary, Renan had been introduced to Romantic authors such as Victor Hugo and the great French historian Jules Michelet. He had also become increasingly interested in the historical study of language, under the influence of Abbé Le Hir and, later, the noted Orientalist Eugène Burnouf. Finally, he was deeply impressed with German philosophy—especially that of Johann Gottfried von Herder and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Renan's letters throughout the early 1840s testify to his growing skepticism toward the Christian faith. This and his dedication to science—understood in the

mid-nineteenth-century French sense as a commitment to the philosophical principles of empiricism—fatally undermined his faith.

Nevertheless, the influence of religion was to cast a long shadow over Renan's professional life. By far his most famous work was *La Vie de Jésus* (*Life of Jesus*) (1864), a book that attempted to historicize and humanize Jesus. It caused immediate uproar. It went through over 100 printings in 5 years and was translated into over 14 different languages. Renan's text was branded as blasphemous, and he was the target of bitter recriminations: For many orthodox Catholics, the book represented the pernicious creep of anticlericalism.

Renan himself was surprised at the violent responses to his work. Nevertheless, he continued to tackle religious themes in his academic life. *La Vie de Jésus* was only one of seven volumes in his monumental and carefully researched work *Les Origines du Christianisme* (*Origins of Christianity*) (1864–1882), in which he explored the roots of the Christian faith. By the time he finished, he had been elected to the Académie Française (1878) and he extended his project with the *Histoire du peuple d'Israel* (*History of the People of Israel*) (1882–1892), a further five volumes devoted to the history of the Jewish people. Even if Renan had left Catholicism behind in his early twenties, it continued to fascinate him until his death.

Rebuilding France: 1870 and Beyond

Today, Renan is perhaps better remembered for his political texts, in particular his short lecture *Qu'est ce que la nation?* (*What Is a Nation?*) (1882). A member of the "generation of 1848"—that is, those who came of age during the Revolution of 1848—he belonged to the political and intellectual world of contemporaries such as Gustave Flaubert and Hippolyte Taine. Their worldview was defined by France's second, short-lived, republic (1848–1851) and, significantly, the first attempt to implement universal male suffrage. The majority of "the generation of 1848" also lived to see in 1870 to 1871 another traumatic upheaval in French politics: the violent crushing of the Paris Commune and the tragedy of the Franco-Prussian War, in which French forces were roundly defeated. Both events prompted national soul-searching, as French thinkers grappled with the country's perceived decline.

Despite Renan's academic interests, he remained a regular commentator on current affairs. Broadly speaking, we can identify three strands in his political thought. The first is a skepticism toward universal suffrage and democracy on the grounds that the rule of the masses is, at best, problematic and, at worst, dangerous. The second is a consistent belief in science, progress, and the pursuit of wisdom, which led Renan to support the creation and development of an educated, rational elite with liberal inclination. Finally, he believed in the importance of the nation-state, not as an ethnic or territorial category, but as a shared community of historical and cultural values—or what he famously called "an everyday plebiscite."

There is ample (and not always consistent) evidence for these positions in such youthful work as his *L'Avenir de la Science* (*The Future of Science*) (1848, published 1890) or in later and more polemical pamphlets, such as *La réforme intellectuelle et morale de la France* (*The Intellectual and Moral Reform of France*) (1871). Only twice did Renan actually participate actively in politics, standing for election in 1869 and 1878. Both attempts were unsuccessful, but the political programs he proposed highlighted his liberal credentials. In 1869, for instance, he fought on a platform that condemned war as a solution to the Prussian threat and advocated a stable constitutional monarchy or parliamentary democracy.

Nevertheless, the interpretation of Renan's legacy has been hotly contested. For some, Renan was a liberal—in short, an elitist, who was critical of France's violent political history. Others—particularly the leading political figures of the Third Republic (1875–1944)—saw him as a champion of the republican values of anticlericalism and rational enlightenment. Yet others have seen in his thought the harbinger of French fascism; they cite especially Renan's direct influence on right-wing political thinkers of the early twentieth century, such as Maurice Barrès. While contemporary commentators now broadly agree that Renan was a member of France's nineteenth-century liberal elite, his complex legacy shows that he belonged to a France that, like him, was still far from having resolved its contradictions.

Emile Chabal

See also Civic Republicanism; Jacobinism; Liberalism; Romanticism

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Representation

Representation is often taken to mean the making present of something that is in fact absent. Or to use slightly different terms, one thing is taken to stand for or symbolize another thing. This approach to defining representation is problematic in certain ways, but it provides a suitable baseline for comparing a number of different conceptions. Both the idea and the practice of political representation have been crucial, and often controversial, topics for political theorists, practitioners, and activists throughout the early modern and modern periods at least.

The most familiar type of political representation is where a person stands for a geographically defined constituency (or district) in a parliament, council, or other legislative body by virtue of winning an election. In this example, the elected member makes present, in some sense, the absent citizens of his or her constituency in the relevant legislative (or representative) body. He or she may be seen as representing the substantive interests of those absent citizens or standing for them in a more symbolic sense (or indeed both).

The Developing Meanings of Representation

In the early twenty-first century, more countries in the world than at any previous time in history are governed according to the principles of *representative government*. The phrase indicates that governments are drawn from (the votes of) the people and are responsible or accountable to the people. In cases where free and fair elections have become more or less established constitutional practice, the phrase *representative democracy* is also in common use. The latter phrase in particular indicates that representation has become the crucial source of legitimacy or acceptability for modern governments. Indeed, the development of the principles of representation, especially because the crucial innovations in ideas and practices forged in the French and American Revolutions over 220 years ago, can be seen as analogous with the definition, rise, and dominance of the modern idea of democracy.

These seemingly straightforward and factual meanings, however, only scratch the surface of the richness and complexity of the idea of representation. This richness and complexity is evident in contemporary political debates and controversies surrounding representation. But it is also evident in the historical development of the concept. Long before its appearance in the English language (most likely via Old French) in the fourteenth century, the Latin word *repraesentare* meant to make one thing stand for another, but generally in an aesthetic or symbolic sense and mostly involving only inanimate objects. Although the Roman Empire contained institutions and practices that we might think of as representative in today's terms, contemporaries did not use the term in that sense. In English from around the fourteenth century, the term representation meant to symbolize, or even to embody in some mystical manner. Thus, for example, a monarch could be said to represent his realm, but only in the powerful sense that in his divinely sanctioned authority he embodied or symbolized his subjects and his realm.

In Western political thought, the debates around the English Civil War concerning who and what the king or parliament could stand for or represent gave rise to the beginnings of a more modern political sense of the term. From that time, the idea that a leader might claim a legitimate right to represent a body of people became more tightly entwined with the notion of pursuing the interests of the people, and in some sense being answerable or responsive to the people. Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* and John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government,* for example, were crucial classic works defining staging posts in the contentious evolution of the political meanings of representation.

One key aspect of this development is that the modern idea of political representation evolved prior to the modern idea of democracy. For example, at the time of the American and French Revolutions, democracy largely meant what today we could call direct democracy—a system in which the people rule directly, without formal mediation or representation, as in the ancient Athenian democracy that operated through a face-to-face assembly of resident male citizens. In his influential writings, James Madison advocated a republic, or a representative government, *as opposed to* a democracy for the United States of America. It was only over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to simplify greatly, that the ideas of representative government and democracy came together to make up what we call representative democracy today.

The latter part of the twentieth century cemented the idea that one cannot have representative government without democracy, nor democracy without a system of elective (parliamentary or legislative) representation. In political theory, the work of Joseph Schumpeter writing in the 1940s was influential in defining democracy as a competitive system in which teams of would-be representatives (parties, for the most part) competed with each other for the popular vote, with the winner gaining a limited right to rule. Schumpeter's theory dominated postwar American political science thinking about representation and representative democracy—and American thinking in this realm was itself dominant, not least in the cold war context. Postwar American political science for the most part analyzed representation in terms of responsiveness, focusing on the extent to which elected legislators were responsive to the wishes of their constituents. In focusing on responsiveness, they were picking up on one key thread in the most celebrated contemporary work on the theory of representation, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin's *The Concept of Representation,* published in 1967.

It is important to note that aesthetic and cultural tenses of the concept of representation are not wholly separate from this mainstream contemporary political sense of the word. Aesthetic or artistic representation, for example, can refer to representational art, where a landscape painting is taken to be a depiction of a real place, or a portrait of a person is taken to be a reasonable likeness of the actual subject's appearance. But this very same sense of representation is quite political. Consider, for example, increasingly sophisticated photography and film representations of U.S. presidents and the ways in which they are often portrayed as embodying the nation's values. Similarly, cultural representations of members of minority groups in Western media have quite often given rise to accusations that they reinforce stereotypical images of (say) black men or Asian women, in a manner that it is accurate to describe as political.

The Revival of Representation in Political Theory

The topic of representation was not prominent in political theory for most of the postwar period. Pitkin's work in the late 1960s was, rightly or wrongly, perceived to have offered a standard and widely accepted account of the concept. However, since around the turn of the century there has been renewed interest. Real world factors such as globalization encouraged new claims to be representative by actors and bodies that were not elected legislators or governments at the national level. These include, for example, international nongovernmental organizations (such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International), transnational corporations, and international governance bodies (such as the World Trade Organization or the International Atomic Energy Authority). As the environmental agenda has become more prominent, issues such as who, if anyone, can rightly claim to speak for nonhuman nature (e.g., endangered species), or indeed for future human generations, have increased in profile among theorists and practitioners.

Further, there has been growing and widespread disillusion with elective institutions in a number of Western democracies at least, raising questions about the quality of political representation. From a different angle, debates among theorists of democracy over the past 20 to 25 years have centered on deliberative democracy, highlighting questions about the quality of deliberation over issues and policies rather than more formal or quantitative (some would say aggregative) aspects of democracy, such as majority rule or proportional representation. Because inclusion in deliberative forums—from parliaments to new institutions like

citizens' juries—is available to only a small minority of citizens, theorists have renewed their attention to issues such as who gets to participate in deliberative forums, and what sorts of claims can they make to speak for, or represent, those who are not included.

Controversies and Challenges

This renewed wave of political theory interest in representation has involved discussion of a number of challenging issues. Some of these issues have been subject to debate for decades, or even centuries; others are relatively new. All of them are of both theoretical interest and of practical political importance. These issues are all connected in some way to the relation between a thing or person who represents (X), and a thing or person who is represented (Y)—or, to use the basic definition we started with, the way in which some X can make some other Y present in some sense, despite Y's factual absence. In the political sphere, we can ask, for example: Who or what can represent another? What does representing mean—what roles or practices are included within the idea and which ones are not? Where does, and where should, representation happen? And how can we know whether an alleged case of representation really is representation?

Who or what can represent something or someone, in a broadly political sense? As we saw in the earlier discussion, the conventional answer is elected representatives. But this might include indirectly elected as well as directly elected actors or groups—the prime minister of the United Kingdom, for example, is not voted for directly by all voters in the country (only those in his or her specific constituency). Civil servants and other appointed officials, along with guardians of public interest such as ombudsmen, may also be regarded as representatives, speaking or standing for the interests of the public in some sense. A range of unelected actors or groups that may influence government but are formally outside it often claim to be representatives. Amid the Make Poverty History campaign in 2004, the U2 singer and political activist Bono said, "I represent a lot of people [in Africa] who have no voice at all . . . They haven't asked me to represent them. It's cheeky but I hope they're glad I do." In all societies, not least in established democracies, people who are not elected—from interest group leaders and activists to spiritual figures—often claim to be political representatives. Finally, consider the claims of United Nations (UN) bodies, such as the role of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. If representing means to speak for the interests of some larger group—to make that group's interests "present" in some sense—then potentially the range of political representatives begins but does not end with elected representatives to parliaments or councils.

What counts as representation? Hanna Pitkin made an influential distinction between four types of political representation:

1. *Formal representation,* where a representative is either authorized to act or to speak for another, or is accountable to the represented (in both cases, normally via elections or voting), for example a duly elected U.S. president.
2. *Symbolic representation,* where one thing embodies or stands for certain values, for example, the way a monarch might represent a people or how a national flag might stand for a country.
3. *Descriptive representation,* where one person might be said to represent another by virtue of similarity, for example, a black woman might be said to be the best sort of representative of black women generally.
4. *Substantive representation,* where it is the actual interests of the represented that are spoken for by the representative.

One might also ask where representation occurs, or can occur. That a member of parliament represents his or her constituency is a familiar idea. But does a father represent a family—perhaps in substantive, perhaps also in symbolic terms? Can the secretary-general of the United Nations represent all of humanity, in some substantive or symbolic sense?

And how can, or how should, representation be carried out? There is a longstanding debate in political theory between advocates of the view that representatives ought to be *delegates*—they should follow the wishes of their constituents, even if they themselves disagree with those wishes—or *trustees,* who look after the best interests of their

constituents, even if that sometimes means taking a different view from that of the constituents themselves. Sometimes the issues in the delegate versus trustee debate come to revolve around the issue of responsiveness—just how responsive to the actual wishes of his or her constituents should a parliamentary or local representative be?

Underlying a number of those debates is a fundamental difference over how we ought to understand representation. On the one hand, it can be defined as a fact—representation is something that exists in the political world, for example, when a member of parliament is elected in a free and fair vote. On the other hand, it can be viewed as a claim—the elected member claims to be the representative by virtue of the vote, but some minority, perhaps nonvoters, might dispute that claim. Or, Bono might claim to represent certain interests in Africa, but a variety of African governments or other agencies might dispute the claim. In short, there is a debate as to whether representation is best viewed as a set of institutional facts or as a set of dynamic practices and events centered on claim making.

Throughout the modern period, representative democracy was often contrasted with direct democracy—with the latter seen as the more democratic type. Increasingly, today, the distinction is seen to be false. Democracies need representation to promote deliberation and judgment about the public good. But this shift in the status of political representation has also been accompanied by new critical debate about the nature, place, and limits of representation.

Michael Saward

See also Accountability; Deliberative Democracy; Democracy

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Representative Democracy

Representative democracy is a form of government in which the citizens of the state exercise their popular sovereignty through legitimately elected representatives. In a representative democracy, the citizens choose their representatives by voting in elections. Typically, the chosen representatives then congregate in a legislative assembly in which they debate policy and determine legislation. Representative democracy is often contrasted with more participatory forms of democracy in which citizens play an active role in the decision-making process.

The classical theory of representative democracy suggests that the representatives should act in accord with the will or interests of the citizens. Yet, the representatives do not simply act as a proxy for the relevant citizens; rather, they have considerable discretion, and so can adopt the positions that they believe will most benefit their constituents or even the population as a whole. Besides, representative democracies often include political parties, with citizens voting for particular representatives in large part because of the party to which they

belong in a way that arguably requires the representative to adopt the positions to which his or her party was committed at the time of the election.

Because the role of the representatives is, at least in part, to act on behalf of their constituents, it is important that the voters have a way of holding the representatives accountable. Accountability has generally been linked here to both transparency and periodic elections on the grounds that transparency enables citizens to keep track of the actions of their representatives, while periodic elections enable citizens to replace their representatives if they are unhappy with their representatives' actions.

As we have seen, the classical theory of representative democracy broadly supposed that elected politicians would act in accord with the will or interests of their constituents. This supposition is challenged by several themes that have become increasingly prominent in political thought since the early twentieth century, including: the dominance of some policy networks by vested interests, the complexity of modern governance, and declining levels of trust and political participation.

Political scientists now often emphasize how business groups become involved with the political process and even come to dominate areas of it. Corporate interests have used their extensive resources to become powerful lobbyists, financiers, and advisors for politicians and, at times, public officials. The worry is that their involvement can lead to political representatives, perhaps intentionally or perhaps unintentionally, acting as the voice of these kinds of elite interests rather than their constituents.

Classical accounts of representative democracy are also threatened by the sheer complexity of modern politics, and especially the rise of nongovernmental nodes of collective decision making. The classic theory of representative democracy suggested that laws (and perhaps public policy) were made by elected representatives in a transparent manner and within a national context. Not much of that account remains. For a start, many nonelected officials clearly make policy and law within administrative agencies, judicial settings, and other such domains. Although the legislature creates statutes, these statutes are generally vague, so typically their interpretation, application, and enforcement all fall to administrative and judicial bodies that have the relevant technical expertise. Much collective decision making thus occurs in contexts where neither citizens nor their elected representatives have much of a presence. In addition, the complexity of the technical issues that are involved in defining, applying, and enforcing laws and policies inevitably entails a certain loss of transparency. Few citizens can grasp the legal language, let alone the scientific knowledge, on which many policies are based. Finally, the growing complexity of intergovernmental and transnational ties means that lives of people within a specific nation-state are increasingly being governed by laws and policies decided on not by their own government, but by transnational decision-making bodies. For example, while rules on environmental regulation, trade treaties, and migration all affect people living inside national borders, they are often made by international organizations that are certainly not directly accountable to the affected constituents in specific countries.

The declining rates of trust and political participation also challenge the classical theory of representative democracy. A representative democracy depends on the regular political participation of citizens: voting is, after all, the way citizens select their representatives. Falling rates of voter turnout undermine the claim that elected politicians adequately represent the voice of their constituents. Much of the public voice remains silent and unheard.

The challenges to representative democracy have lead many of its advocates to worry that their ideal is increasingly out of touch with political realities. Some of them still hope to transform society and politics in accord with the ideal. Others appear to be more interested in redefining the ideal so as to make it less demanding. Perhaps, they suggest, the number of citizens who vote does not matter as long as we have elections. Perhaps, they continue, the complexity of collective decision making does not matter as long as elected representatives are involved at some point. And perhaps, they conclude, policy networks can be seen less as dangerous clusters of vested interests and more as beneficial ways of bringing voices into the decision-making process.

There are also debates about the desirability of representative democracy. Radical, participatory, and deliberative democrats all believe that we should renounce or at least supplement the

representative ideal with other forms of citizen involvement. For some, representative democracy is not very democratic at all. Democracy literally means rule of the people, and radical democrats want the people, not the people's representatives, to rule. Some radical democrats point mainly to worries about self-interest and corruption within representative bodies: The representatives might not act in good faith. Others argue that political freedom consists in active participation within the process of ruling: Much of the value of democracy lies in the experience it affords citizens of collective deliberation and wielding power.

Advocates of representative democracy often counter more radical schemes by arguing that they could not work in the modern world. Radical schemes will not work, they tell us, because of the size of modern states and the complexity of the problems they confront. In this view, direct democracy might have worked in ancient Athens, but Athens was just a single city: If every eligible voter participated directly in a modern democracy, the political process would more or less grind to a halt. Likewise, in this view, modern politics deals with complex issues, including macroeconomics, the environment, and health and safety—issues about which the ordinary voter lacks the technical expertise necessary to make informed decisions. Some advocates of representative democracy have also defended it on the grounds that it might check some illiberal tendencies found in more radical proposals. They argue that radical democratic schemes encourage a tyranny of the majority: The power given to majority choices is liable to lead to repression of minorities. In their view, representative democracy provides a bulwark against such tyranny insofar as representatives are more moderate than the average citizen.

Mark Bevir

See also Accountability; Democracy; Participatory Democracy

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Repressive Tolerance

The concept of *repressive tolerance* was first spelled out by Herbert Marcuse, a critical theorist and an important organic intellectual of the social movements of the 1960s. Marcuse coined the term to differentiate it from its converse, *liberating tolerance*—a form of tolerance that truly houses perspectives that have an added value to social justice. Instead, under the social space of repressive tolerance, multiple views are seemingly embraced. This superficial accommodation of different ideas begets the opposite of genuine tolerance, so that repressive tolerance becomes an effective instrument of repression. Consequently, the essentials of the dominant politico-economic paradigm are reinforced, while at the same time the force of alternative perspectives is effectively enfeebled. In the end, change *of* the system is contained; only inconsequential changes *in* the system are promoted.

Although their ultimate upshots are similar, repressive tolerance and authoritarian politics are not analogous. Under repressive tolerance, resistance against the dominant order is not rejected in toto. Rather, alternatives that do not challenge, to use Antonio Gramsci's term, the essentials of the system are tolerated. By doing so, a system of domination gives the impression that there is freedom of expression and action. People are made to believe that they live in an open society. Yet alternatives that are considered to have sweeping consequences are systematically neutralized. This is in part accomplished through the process of creating conditions that make the genuinely different look outlandish. Groundbreaking alternatives consequently are perceived as eccentric perspectives that, if pursued, bring about chaos or, at least, imbalance in the arrangements of the existing social order. In the end, in the midst of a world of multiplicities in which authentic social change is

discouraged, the qualitatively distinct become one out of many without a significant bearing.

Repressive tolerance, then, is a system of conditions that makes creative collective reactions against the established order difficult by promoting the universalization of false consciousness. The populace, through the cultivation of a "democratic" habitus, is encouraged to see the familiar as legitimate and the unfamiliar as too radical to be taken seriously. To the extent that discourse is flattened, all views are given the same weight: The "pure tolerance of sense and nonsense" takes precedence over opting for a better argument. In this ideological obfuscation, the media play a critical role. By predefining the criteria for what is true or false, or what is right or wrong, or what is beautiful or ugly, those that are considered to be different are excluded from public transcript from the outset. However, subjective factors alone are not responsible for the unhindered reproduction of the dominant social order in spite of its rapport to a state of unfreedom. At the core of repressive tolerance are objective conditions that reinforce institutionalized inequality.

Alem Kebede

See also Emancipation; Hegemony

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Republicanism

The word *republic* derives from the Latin, *res publica* (literally "public thing" or "public matter"), and denotes a state that is filled by a government composed of citizens; the branches of the government—executive, legislative, and judicial—exhaust its store of power and exist independently of one another. Historically, then, republicans are those who opposed unchecked discretionary power of kings by proposing alternative constitutions based on institutionally divided power, each accessible to all.

Civic virtue, understood as a citizen's assiduous cultivation of respect and reverence for the spirit and letter of the republic's law, animates the archetypal patriot who is willing to defend the republic against moral corruption and military invasion. Republicans, looking to encourage civic virtue and explain its cause, commonly harangue political life's intrinsic worth. A human, it is said, is a political animal who needs to participate in politics in order to reach her highest end. Formal equality before the law is thus a necessary presupposition of a republican argument. Republicanism is at once an abstract theory of human flourishing through a particular form of active politics based on legal equality and a politically engaged, reforming doctrine.

Politically engaged not only with contemporaries, republicans are self-conscious of their Roman roots, and the politicized historiography of its republic. Any republican must orient her theory to Roman republican practice and its symbols. Thus, Renaissance-era Florentines sought to rewrite the history of Julius Caesar and Brutus; Niccolò Machiavelli deliberately associated himself with Livy, the chronicler of the republic's glorious freedom; the English Commonwealthmen used Roman legal definitions of freedom; and the American founders suffused their arguments with Roman references and christened their institutions with the nomenclature of Rome's own.

Rome

An aestheticized memory of republican Rome was an important philosophical inspiration and plangent rhetorical device for which the works of the Roman and Greek historians, Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, Cicero, Polybius, and Plutarch, were crucial documents. Roman history, as it was written, was theater at its best. Tarquinius Superbus, Rome's last king, was exiled to Cumae for acts of tyranny whose wickedness was forever symbolized by his son Sextus's infamous rape of Lucretia. The imagery of kingly excess as gluttonous, lascivious, and self-serving could easily be contrasted with the republic's virtue and its justly earned communal bounty.

The Republic's constitution was highly conventional and protean, thus history provides essential documentation of its complex constitutional

odysseys. An important addition to this historical record is the *Corpus Juris Civilis* of 529–534 CE, a compendium of law and legal opinion compiled under the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I. For republicans this is a crucial document of Roman law. The so-called *Pandectae* (Greek), or *Digesta* (Latin), form part of it and include the Roman definition of slavery: A state in which one person is subject to the complete dominion of his master. Because Roman law conceptually divided the population in two, the free and the slaves, freedom was the condition of being under no one's absolute and arbitrary dominion. Contemporary republicans hoping to prove the unbroken history of republican freedom as being fundamentally about nondomination, frequently cite this piece of law from the quintessential republic. This view of freedom, which contrasts with one that emphasizes life lived without interference as freedom's essence, is anathema to any extralegal institution of monarchy, and is thus, strikingly republican.

The historians themselves are also the first philosophers of Roman freedom. Livy, for example, wrote that after the expulsion of Tarquinius Superbus, Rome was free because laws were more powerful than men. This identifies a pillar of republican constitutionalism, Aristotelian rule of law, and associates its presence with freedom, thus establishing republican argument on the force of this principle.

Florence

The Venetian Republic was known as the Most Serene Republic, but it is Florence of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that was the site of influential republican thought. Republican themes were common in the works of political writers (Ptolemy of Lucca, Lorenzo de Monaci, and Giovanni Cavalcanti) of the *Quattrocento*. They identified the sovereign's subjection to the law as the definition of republic and suggested that leaders ought to be chosen by the people. Nor was the shift to republicanism confined to political writers. In Dante's *Inferno* (1321), Brutus, the assassin of Caesar, suffers in the most punitive ninth circle of hell. Dante saw Brutus as a traitor against the glorious Caesar, father of Italy. By the fifteenth century, Renaissance Florentines had crowned Brutus as a hero and Caesar as traitor.

In 1494, the ruling Medici was deposed, and a republic was again established at Florence. Girolamo Savonarola, a Dominican friar and brief leader of the Florentine Republic, influenced the republican constitution of Florence, under which Machiavelli worked. It was Machiavelli, however, whose *Discourses on Livy,* published posthumously in 1531, would become the most influential early modern republican. Interestingly, Machiavelli's writings actually constituted a departure from previous republican thought. His originality lies not just in his shrewd analysis of power and its preservation, but also in his challenging thesis that the frequent civil clashes among Romans, which had always been seen as the cause of the decline of the Roman Republic, were actually signs and sources of its strength. The conflicts between the plebeians and the Roman Senate, for example, served as a check on power, led to compromise, and both exhibited and encouraged civic virtue.

Much of the renewed interest in republicanism resulted in analysis of the curious stability of the Republic of Venice. Machiavelli, the iconoclast, stands apart from the mainstream of this laudatory literature that highlighted Venetian isolation and small size as essential parts of republican functioning. In Venice, Machiavelli thought, political stability was achieved by restricting political rights, and this could buy stability only at the cost of civic virtue and military dynamism. Large republics, with a citizen army, become more secure and honorable as they manifest and foment the growth of civic virtue. Equal liberty to participate in public deliberations under conditions of free speech, the liberty to hold public office, and to attain highest honors, these are the surest ways to the heights of collective achievement and the preservation of liberty.

England

At the end of the sixteenth century, directly preceding the rise of parliamentary discontent with royal prerogative, the works of Tacitus, Livy, and Sallust began to be translated into English. By the opening decades of the seventeenth century, a group of English parliamentarians opposed to the prerogative power of the crown had begun a century-long battle over the essence of liberty and the institutional arrangement of English power. Roughly a century after republican ideas had

changed Florence, the recurring sentiment of freedom as nondomination unseated and beheaded the King of England, Charles I.

In 1628, Charles used the royal prerogative, the epitome of discretionary will, to decree an extra-parliamentary law of taxation. This was opposed by, among others, Sir Edward Coke, a prominent legal scholar and parliamentarian, who drafted the censorious *Petition of Right*. The *Petition* affirmed legislating taxation as the exclusive right of parliament and proposed to limit the royal powers of arbitrary imprisonment. Coke and his colleagues were clear that it was the mere presence of unchecked prerogative powers, and not just their practice, that stripped liberty, and that this was both immoral and unconstitutional. If the crown had the right to arbitrary power, Englishmen have their liberty not by right, but by the king's grace. Such liberty is not worth the name. In the 1770s, John Adams and Patrick Henry used arguments from Coke, whose works were carried to America on the Mayflower, to urge Congress to adopt the Declaration of Independence.

A decade after the *Petition,* neo-Roman arguments again resurfaced in the wake of Charles I's extension of ship money, a tax paid by residents of coastal towns in times of war, into general levy. And this neo-Romanism pervaded the arguments defending the parliament's decision to take up arms in the civil war of the fall of 1642. The charge against Charles I, at his trial, was tyranny, the rule by his will, and the enslavement of England.

The ascendancy of republican ideology and the depredations of civil war urged on Thomas Hobbes, whose antipathy to republicanism was deep and principled. Henry de Bracton's thirteenth-century, republican-tinged, legal work, conspicuously reproduced in 1640, rehearses the Roman *Digesta*'s definition of slavery and freedom, an account that was a crucial piece of the contemporary republican rhetoric to which Hobbes was so opposed. It was this, and the work of James Harrington, John Milton, and Algernon Sidney, the so-called Commonwealthmen, and those whom they succeeded, that established a republican whetstone against which Hobbes sharpened his theory. It was to be against this new blade that republicanism would now have to fight.

Hobbes's freedom as noninterference slowly became the dominant standard of freedom. This powerful philosophy ended up complementing and lending ethical justification to the increasingly commercial society of Europe. Quietly growing in salience and militating against classical republicanism was something later (1819) famously identified by the Swiss-born Benjamin Constant: Commercial society and population diversity and quantity steadily made Roman republicanism impractical, and thus morally impotent.

The Eighteenth Century

The century of enlightenment witnessed the ascendancy of a new version of freedom, and it was Hobbes of Malmesbury's. Hobbes and Locke had brought into currency the concept of a social contract that, among other things, fired the imaginations of eighteenth-century philosophes looking for clinching arguments in favor of radical constitutions. It was this which in short decades would clash with insights from the baron de Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* (1748) and split republican theory in two.

Montesquieu distinguished forms of government in the way Aristotle had, but for him, the salient difference among regimes was not the virtue of the sovereign, but whether or not the sovereign governed by fixed and exhaustive laws. He formalized the scattered practice of the separation of powers into a discernible theory: Each branch is subject to the rule of law, and the power of each checks the power of any. Though these ideas bear some mark of republican freedom, and American republicans were much influenced by them, Montesquieu actually viewed republics as practically inoperable in an age of large commercial society. The tendency to eschew luxury and cultivate virtue in isolated republics was neither practicable nor desirable given the great benefits, moral and practical, that could be attained from commerce. James Madison addressed this difficulty that republican thought was forced to overcome and resolved it in a way far different from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's resolution of the same.

In the summer of 1787, Madison had formed clear intentions for the alteration to the system governing America's 13 colonies, which had been established by the Articles of Confederation (1777). At the Philadelphia Convention, Edmund Randolph presented Madison's Virginia Plan, which embodies

much of the republicanism Madison would come to defend: bicameralism, an independent judiciary, and representative democracy over a large population who were divided into coordinate subunits. In September and October of 1787, letters opposing the new constitution appeared in the *New York Journal* written under the pen names Brutus and Cato, believed to be Robert Yates and George Clinton, respectively. Here was Brutus, risen again to defend republicanism.

Madison was keen to defend this new proposal on republican grounds, thus when Alexander Hamilton asked him, along with John Jay, to write what would become *The Federalist,* Madison was happy to write under the name of Publius Valerius Publicola, a Roman consul in the first year of Rome's Republic. "Federalist 10" addressed the then-prevalent republican quandary: Large republics will succumb to faction, small ones can no longer come to be. Madison granted that faction and internecine conflict could be prevented only by restricting liberty in all ways, or by creating a unanimity of opinions, interests, and passions. The former preventative was worse than the disease, and the latter disregarded the fact that in commercial society a diversity of interests and inequality of faculties of body and mind is the source of its strength and attractiveness. What is needed is simply to dampen the conflict of interest for reasons of both morality and efficiency.

As Madison saw it, the danger in a small democracy was the possibility of legitimizing minatory interests of a majority. The larger and more diverse the *demos* is, the less likely will a tyranny of the majority be. America thus was uniquely poised to apply that maxim. The population was diverse, and its political structures and fortuitous economic development had increased the variety of interest. Madison and the framers proposed to maintain much of the diversity of America through federalism. It was an ingenious combination of careful evolutionary constitutionalism with the eighteenth century's obsession with a constitution based in pure reason. It was also still recognizably republican: antimonarchist, rule of law, and a separation of powers. Interestingly, Immanuel Kant argued that a direct democracy could never be a republic but must always be a despotism because there is no check; there, in a conceptual sense, is only one agent with power. In fact, aristocracies or monarchies are the only possible forms of sovereignty under which a republic is possible, because only there can power be divided and be, thus, law governed. This idea was utterly rejected by the French and American revolutionaries.

In 1749, Rousseau read a question posed by the Academy of Dijon for its essay competition that raised in him the familiar dilemma of commercial society, morality, and republicanism. Over the subsequent decades, Rousseau developed his influential theory of nature and freedom that culminated in a republican political philosophy advocating small agrarian republics. Rousseau emphatically chose the second horn of Madison's dilemma: The people of a republic must have a common interest, shared civil religion, and similar manners and morality. Rousseau believed that commercial society and social stratification necessarily turned human nature against itself. It did not matter whether this could be made stable or secure. For Rousseau, the question for a designer of a constitution was not how to harness the dynamism of competition through delimited freedom under a just republican state, but how to establish a timeless, natural morality under the artifice of a state while allowing each person to remain as free as one ought.

His republic is a radical version of democracy, where the will of the sovereign is not merely the will of the people, determinable by the expression of a voice or the counting of votes, but a will whose existence is knowable simply because it is the necessary product of a life lived under his republic. The legitimacy of the democratic will is guaranteed not by the ethic of majority rule but by the conditions under which the demos live. Rousseau was the first to admit that his was a nearly impossible republic. When he was approached by Count Wielhorski to write constitutional proposals for Poland, he urged caution and the preservation, to the degree possible, of what institutions of government existed.

In France, Rousseau's legacy is closely tied to the revolution and its extreme measures aimed at conditioning a more perfect republic. This is another example of how republicanism's history, that is, its applications, is clearly part of the definition of the ideology itself. It is a highly political ideology whose principles shift relative to its circumstances. Thus, it is best to think of republicanism as its historical

incarnations, as a bundle of concepts whose emphasis and accents change, but always surround the core principle of freedom from arbitrary rule.

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See also American Founding; Civic Humanism; Civic Republicanism; Commonwealthmen; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Neo-Republicanism; Roman Commonwealth; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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REVOLUTION

For the political theorist, it is difficult to be objective in the face of revolutionary phenomena, and this may explain why—to paraphrase Hannah Arendt—the subject has been largely left to the technicians, whose sociological approaches have tended to be largely diagnostic, the objective being to determine scientifically what causes or prevents revolutionary transformation. More often than not, those political theorists who have engaged the subject have been more explicit in their loyalties, but not at the expense of more sociological questions. Rather, the normative questions swirling around the concept of revolution have been placed in dialogue with the frequently paradoxical descriptive issues regarding revolutions and their effect on the institutions of the state.

Conflict and Containment

While many would no doubt consider Plato, author of *The Republic,* a revolutionary of sorts, it is clear that he was deeply preoccupied by political change, or the *metabolē* that marked the shift between political systems or constitutions. In fact, the very notion of *revolution*—derived from astronomy but applied to radical social change—did not emerge until the seventeenth century. Instead, what concerned Plato and Aristotle was the *stasis,* or factional conflict, that led to metabolē, and whose etymological root makes it something of the opposite of our modern notion of revolution.

While Italian theorist Niccolò Machiavelli's emphasis in *The Prince* on regime preservation and stability and his advocacy of mixed government in *The Discourses* certainly have ancient overtones, his work lacks the determinism of Plato's (and Aristotle's) sixfold analysis of regimes and the linear path of their breakdown, and hence their pessimism toward metabolē. Further, if Aristotle's stasis, or violent strife, was perceived as the fundamental cause of regime change, this same assumption did not hold for Machiavelli, as it was precisely the institutionalization of class conflict in the Roman Republic, albeit without factions, that led to its historic greatness.

States and Revolutions

If Machiavelli's radicalism was a result of his incorporation of class conflict within the bounds of institutionality, then Karl Marx's radicalism grows from his insistence that such conflict inevitably surpasses those same bounds, gaining the status of the motor of history itself. However, for Marx, the study of current and past revolutions plays a significant part in determining the direction of the class struggle. Hence, Marx's own experience of the 1848 June Days informed his understanding of the working-class seizure of the bourgeois state, while the 1871 Paris Commune inspired him to correct his earlier analyses in *The Communist Manifesto,* laying greater emphasis on the need to not only seize but also to fundamentally transform the state if revolution is to be more than mere restoration.

The question of the state remained at the center of the revolutionary Marxist tradition well into the twentieth century, but its importance was obscured by the vicissitudes of state power in the Soviet Union. While Vladimir Lenin is often credited as the supreme proponent of a vanguardist understanding of revolution—whereby an intellectual elite bestows on the masses the consciousness

necessary to overthrow the old order—such a view is too often mobilized as a retrospective explanation of the errors of Soviet Communism. Whereas Lenin had formulated his vanguardist thesis in *What Is to Be Done?* (1902), he too was compelled to modify his theory in response to popular rebellion and revolutionary ferment in both 1905 and 1917 Russia. Returning to Marx's own discussion of the commune in his 1917 *State and Revolution,* Lenin formulated the dictatorship of the proletariat as a transitional state prefacing the disintegration of the state entirely, thereby arriving at a more substantive view of revolution than the one with which he is generally credited.

But if Lenin's focus remained on the state, later Marxists would see the need to transform revolutionary theory in order to take into account the broader spheres of social life, whose impact on political life could no longer be ignored. Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, for example, emphasized the strategic importance of the realm of civil society, the conquest of which he considered almost a precondition for the conquest of the state. If the state, as the realm of pure domination, was taken through force, Gramsci argued that civil society was taken through hegemonic struggle, an organized deployment of ideas for which the role of the intellectual—understood broadly as a social organizer—would be paramount.

Revolutionary Restoration

If the progression from Marx to Gramsci represents a growing concern for the question of the state and the danger that revolutionaries might—unwittingly or not—reproduce the very structures they had previously opposed, this concern was of primary concern for another group of thinkers for whom modern revolutions rarely surpassed the conditions from which they emerged. That modern revolutions should stimulate this anxiety, moreover, was far from coincidental, because according to Arendt, modern revolutions differed qualitatively from ancient stasis or metabolē in their aspiration to total change.

As with Edmund Burke, much of this tradition was characterized by the conflict between a positive view of the American Revolution and a critical view of the French Revolution. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, wrote his seminal *Democracy in America* in an effort to determine both the causes for the success of republicanism in the United States and for what he perceived as a failure in France. Whereas the French Revolution nominally sought to oppose the centralizing despotism of the old regime, Tocqueville attempted to show how the revolutionary process had the paradoxical effect of strengthening the state. This view would find theoretical sustenance in Max Weber's pessimistic view of the paradox of the revolutionary process. For Weber, who distinguished traditional, charismatic, and legal-bureaucratic forms of domination, revolutions are more likely to result from charismatic intervention, but the inherent demands for their eventual institutionalization would lead them to strengthen the "iron cage" of state bureaucracy.

If Tocqueville critiqued the traditional Marxist account of revolution as the result of immiseration—arguing instead that radical transformation was as likely in times of improvement in the lives of the masses—Arendt's response to the French Revolution was slightly different. For Arendt, while Marx's account bore some truth, its economism embodied nevertheless all that went wrong in the French Revolution. Whereas the revolution made explicitly political promises, creating the potential for new institutions of deliberation and political action, this political impetus gave way to social demands, and as a consequence the revolution was doomed. In contrast to the French case, Arendt saw some success in the American Revolution but, like Tocqueville, she saw such successes as self-limiting, both guaranteed and stifled by the constitutional arrangements. Ironically, Arendt appealed instead to a council structure like that of the Soviets, a structure that—as Lenin was quick to point out—rarely if ever existed without reference to the social question.

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See also Arendt, Hannah; Bureaucracy; Civil Society; Gramsci, Antonio; Lenin and the Russian Revolution; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Plato; State; Tocqueville, Alexis de; Weber, Max

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RIGHTS

Etymologically connected to *the right,* which is concerned with correct action, the plural concept of *rights* developed in the modern period, primarily as the assertion of the individual's right to private property. But the connection between rights (plural) and right (singular) is not simply etymological but also conceptual, for a particular right must necessarily be located in a wider scheme of rights. The focus of this entry is on the concept of rights rather on justifying particular schemes of rights. After analyzing different kinds of rights—claims, privileges, powers, and immunities—the conceptual unity of those four forms is discussed. Two theories of what holds rights together dominate the conceptual debate: will theory and interest theory. In will theory, to have a right is to be in a position to change your legal position vis-à-vis other rights holders, while benefit theorists hold that having a right involves benefiting from other people acting in certain ways toward you. Although advanced as purely conceptual, the two theories do have normative implications. For will theorists it is difficult to attribute rights to fetuses, animals, or very young children, although they may be protected in other ways. Benefit theorists are better able to accommodate such entities as right holders, but at the price of conceptual clarity.

Hohfeld's Analytical Scheme

In his book, *Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning* (first published 1923), American jurist Wesley Hohfeld argued that there are four forms of right (or rights), but eight fundamental legal conceptions. This is so because rights are relations, and there are two types of relationship: correlation and opposition. The jural opposite of a right is the legal position that is necessarily excluded by having a right, so one cannot, for example, have both a privilege and a duty with regard to the same action. The jural correlative is the legal position that is necessarily imposed on another, such that if, for example, a person has a claim right, then somebody else—an individual or a group—must have a duty. Although Hohfeld talked of eight conceptions, it is easier to think in terms of four rights—claims, privileges, powers, and immunities—each bearing two kinds of relationship, opposition and correlation.

Claims

The jural opposite of a claim is a no claim, and the jural correlative is a duty. To possess a claim is to stand in a position legitimately to demand something from another person (or people). The other person is under a duty to perform the demanded action, and the clearest example is the creation of a claim right as the result of a contract (in a contract we exercise powers in order to create claims). If, for example, you buy an airline ticket, then you have entered into an agreement with the airline company that they will supply you with a seat on a specified flight, and you have a claim against them, such that were they to deny you that seat they will suffer a penalty. However, claims need not be the result of a contract—benefit theorists argue that children, for example, have claims even if they lack powers.

Privileges

The jural opposite of a privilege is a duty, and the jural correlative is a no claim. Privileges are sometimes referred to as liberties (and the correlative *a duty not to interfere*). But this is wrong. If you have a liberty to do X, all that this means is that you are under no obligation not to do X, meaning you could be forced to do X. A world in which only liberties existed would be one of pure conflict: a Hobbesian state of nature. A privilege, however, implies an area of life in which you are free to do something that is generally prohibited.

The freedom to engage in sexual acts in private would be an example of privilege rights, for these things are normally prohibited in public.

Powers

The jural opposite of a power is a disability, and the jural correlative is a liability. A power is one's affirmative control over a given legal relation to another. To be that other is to stand in such a way as to be liable to have your legal position changed. The act of marriage, as a civil legal procedure, involves the (mutual) exercise of powers. The contracting parties, through their actions, alter their legal relationship to one another and also their relationship to those outside the contract. Nobody else can marry one of the parties unless powers of annulment are first used, and the parties gain taxation benefits and so alter their relationship to the state. Although Hohfeld did not make this clear, a power operates on a different level from a claim—this is because it is through the exercise of powers that many claim rights are created and extinguished.

Immunities

The jural opposite of an immunity is a liability, and the jural correlative is a disability. To possess an immunity is to be in a position to resist the powers of others. Immunities exist, most often, where there are different levels of legal authority, such as a legislative authority, which creates and destroys rights, and a judicial authority, which upholds a constitution. The immunities created in a constitution exist to insulate the individual from the powers of the legislature: An immunity disables the legislature from exercising powers. Immunities are often misleadingly referred to as *fundamental liberties,* but must, in fact, be immunities, because liberties are not intrinsically resistant to alteration as a result of legislative action.

Conflicts of Rights

Hohfeld's scheme was analytical, meaning that his aim was to break rights down into specific forms rather than provide a theory of how rights relate to one another. The latter is the focus of *theories of rights,* which will be discussed in the next section. As a preliminary to that discussion, a few further concepts must be explored; these relate specifically to how rights are held and how conflicts between rights can be resolved.

Although claims correlate to duties, it does not follow that all duties correlate to rights. It is possible to have a *duty-based system*—that is, one in which stress is laid on the performance of a duty. For example, it is difficult to couch the right to preserve natural resources in terms of rights. We may have duties to future—that is, not-yet-existing—generations, but those duties cannot correlate to the rights of future individuals because our actions will determine who actually exists in the future. Many ecologists argue that the earth (Gaia) is of ultimate moral significance, but it is problematic to conceptualize the earth as a right holder and human beings as correlate duty bearers.

Rights often presuppose conflict, because to have a right is to be advantaged in relation to another person; but they are also the means by which conflicts are resolved. A system of rights should therefore be *compossible*—that is, there should be rules whereby conflicts of rights are settled. For example, if person A has a right to property x, then person B cannot have a right to the same property. If both A and B have legal title to the same property, then as each exercises the property right, so each violates the right of the other. Although compossibility is easy to grasp in relation to rights to physical space, it is more problematic when less-tangible goods are involved, such as speech or assembly. Certainly, speech requires apportioning time, for not everybody can speak at once, and assembly is possible only if people do not assemble in the same place at the same time. However, the media's right to report on the activities of a politician and that politician's right to have his or her reputation protected generates a conflict that is not easily resolved through the idea of compossibility. There is a conflict between different kinds of rights, rather than between the exercise of the same right by different individuals.

To resolve the conflict between different kinds of rights and also between rights and other political principles, rights may need to be *overridden.* To override a right is not to *violate* it. The former is a justified setting aside of a right, whereas the latter is a failure to fulfill the correlative act. In popular debate it is often said that "no rights are absolute." The assertion that the right to free

speech is absolute is often met with the retort that nobody should be allowed to shout "fire!" in a crowded theater. The implication being that the right to free speech can be overridden by considerations of security. However, while correct, too often this is a rhetorical move, rather than a reasoned response. To resolve the conflict between free speech and security requires moving to another level (or second order), whereby the value of free speech is weighed against other considerations. It is significant that while Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts without qualification that everyone has a right to freedom of opinion and expression, the corresponding Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights sets out a range of limitations on free speech. Although the convention draws its inspiration from the declaration, it is a legally enforceable code and thus requires recourse to mechanisms for overriding particular rights.

An *absolute right* is a right that can never be overridden. It is often asserted that torture should be absolutely prohibited, and it is significant that Article 3 of the European Convention does indeed prohibit torture without qualification. Absoluteness should not be confused with *universality:* A right can be universal but not absolute. There is a logical sense of universal that roughly equates to the claim that like cases should be treated alike: If two people are identical in all relevant respects, they should be treated in the same way. The more colloquial sense of universal in relation to rights is that all humans have attributes that make them equally worthy of respect, regardless of citizenship. It is possible to assert that there are universal rights—human rights—but none of the rights are absolute, meaning that every right can be overridden. What universality would demand is that any overriding of a right is applied consistently. Finally, a right may be *inalienable*. A right is inalienable if the right holder cannot extinguish—make alien—the right. Selling yourself into slavery would be a case of alienation.

Theories of Rights

Hohfeld's study was analytical: He wanted to lay out the different forms of rights. He was not interested in explaining the underlying connections between them (he thought claims were rights proper, but did not justify this). But political theorists are keen to go beyond analysis and explain how the forms come to be bundled together. Take the right to private property: Everybody possesses a power to acquire property, and in exercising that power, a person comes to acquire a claim in a particular piece of property, while in excluding others from the use of that property one enjoys a privilege. If the right to private property is enshrined in a constitution, then you also have an immunity. So the right to private property is in fact a bundle of different kinds of Hohfeldian rights.

A theory of rights attempts to reconstruct rights into a system by finding some core concept that can unify the four Hohfeldian rights. The traditional candidates for this core concept are benefit and will, the former associated with Jeremy Bentham and the latter with H. L. A. Hart (Hart is credited with identifying Bentham as the progenitor of benefit theory). Benefit theory states that to have a right is to benefit from the performance of an enforced duty, or on revised versions, to be intended to benefit. Will theory states that having a right involves being in a position to control the performance of a duty. Expressed in a less dry way, benefit theory takes rights to be the way interests are protected, which is why some theorists prefer the term interest theory. The right holder need not be in a position to assert his or her or its rights. This suggests that nonhuman animals, fetuses, and very young children could have rights, because while they have interests, they need not exercise the rights that are intended to protect those interests. The rights could be exercised on their behalf by their parents or the state; in situations where the parents are the potential violators of their children's rights, the state will exercise those rights against the parents. Will theory, on the other hand, stresses agency: Rights are things we use to control our lives. Consequently, a will theorist would be much more restrictive about who can have rights. It would be too simplistic to associate benefit/interest theory with the political left, and will theory with the political right, but it is the case that those on the left who want to express egalitarian principles in the language of rights will tend to stress interests rather than agency.

Will theory is criticized on the grounds that its conception of what it means to exercise a right is implausible: The theory seems to require that to

have a right, one must be in a position to release the correlative duty holder from the performance of his or her duty. But even mature adults have rights over which they do not have this kind of control vis-à-vis the duty bearer. This may, however, rest on a faulty interpretation of the theory. In will theory, some Hohfeldian rights are first order and others second order: People exercise second-order *powers* in order to create first-order *claims*. For example, in most liberal democracies, all adults, with some exceptions, have the power to marry, and they cannot alienate that right. In getting married, two people mutually exercise their powers to enter into a contract and in the process create claims. People who choose not marry retain their powers but create no claims. What, according to will theory, excludes animals and fetuses from this scheme is their inability to exercise powers. This does not mean that we lack duties toward animals and fetuses, but simply that those duties do not correlate to rights.

Even if the distinction between first-order claims and second-order powers is accepted, it may be argued that there are many claim rights that are not created through the exercise of powers and that cannot be conceptualized as powers. The right to free speech is neither a power nor a product of the exercise of powers, and this is likewise the case with many of the rights set out in the American Bill of Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights. One way around this problem is to distinguish between benefiting from powers and exercising powers. Hillel Steiner suggests that citizens are the third-party beneficiaries of criminal law duties, and the right bearers (more accurately, power bearers) are state officials. The difficulty with this argument is that it does not explain the reality of a constitutional state in which the state is—in Hohfeldian language—disabled, meaning that citizens are immune from have their legal position changed.

Will theory has received sharper criticism than benefit theory in part because it is an easier target. By narrowing the scope of rights—who can have rights and how they are exercised—the theory opens itself up to challenge by reference to intuitively plausible counterexamples of the holding and exercising of rights that do not fit the model of power-created claims. But benefit theory suffers from the converse weakness that it is too broad. Defining rights too widely empties them of any interest. It is likely that any mature legal and political system will be constituted by a plurality of types of principle, and we need to delineate these different principles and show where they conflict or how they might operate together.

Collective Rights, Welfare Rights, and Future Generations

Although there are important normative debates about collective rights (state sovereignty, the right to national self-determination, cultural rights), welfare rights (right to development), and the rights of future generations (intergenerational justice, preservation of resources), there are also some conceptual issues common to all three. Specifically, there are difficulties involved in identifying the appropriate right bearer and the good to which the right holder has an entitlement; and the duty that supposedly correlates to the right is frequently indeterminate. Indeterminacy is a problem because ought implies can: If you ought to act in a certain way—whether that *ought* is legal or moral—then it must be possible so to act. If you do not know what is required of you, then you cannot have a duty.

Collective Rights

Rights can be attributed to collective entities, such as firms or states, as well as individual human beings. In principle, there is no conceptual problem involved in the idea of collective rights. If the right holder and that to which it has a right can be identified, then collectives can have rights. In domestic law there are publicly limited companies, and these are termed *artificial persons,* and in international law there exist states. Difficulties arise when the right holder or the good that the right protects cannot be identified. The demand for national self-determination is often problematic because the precise territory of the putative state is unclear and there are competing groups claiming to speak for that state.

It is also difficult to claim a right to goods that cannot be individuated. If we assume the truth of man-made global warming, then all humanity (all states) will benefit from reductions in carbon

emissions—call this good a *clean environment*—but those who continue to emit will still benefit, such that a clean environment cannot be individuated. A clean environment is therefore a public good, in the sense of a good the enjoyment of which cannot be restricted to those who pay for it. What is possible is to create an internationally enforceable system of permits held by states to emit carbon; such a *right to pollute* implies that a state also has an individuated share in a clean environment.

The requirements for a collective right to exist—identifiable right holder and individuated good—have implications for debates over multiculturalism. Against the charge that a commitment to cultural diversity implies that cultures have rights over their members Will Kymlicka maintains that *rights to cultural membership* are held by individual human beings against the majority culture. Muslims should not be forced by Muslim authorities to observe religious practices, but rather individual Muslims have rights against the non-Muslim majority to practice their religion and for society to be organized in a way that such practice is facilitated so long as it does not carry an unreasonable cost to the majority. But this implies that cultural goods—analogously to a clean environment—can be individuated in the appropriate way. Maybe individual Muslims benefit from the maintenance of Muslim practice even when they choose not to be observant, such that they are free riding on the observance of others. This suggests that the Muslim community, rather than individual Muslims, is the bearer of a right to cultural membership. It should be stressed that this is not an argument for multiculturalism, but purely a conceptual point about the nature of rights.

Welfare Rights

The idea of a right to welfare raises conceptual problems parallel to collective rights: It must be possible to identify the appropriate right holder and for the duty bearer to know when the duty has been fulfilled. In 1969, the United Nations proclaimed the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, which sets out principles and objectives for international development. Defenders of the right to development maintain that there are socioeconomic conditions to the traditional so-called negative rights, such as the right to free speech, freedom of religion, association, marriage, and so on. To assess the conceptual coherence of this claim, we need to locate the holder of the right to development and the correlative duty bearer. It could be that a *state,* or a *community,* possesses the right to a certain level of resources, or that an *individual* has the right. If the individual holds the right (in Hohfeld's language: claim), then who has the corresponding duty: that individual's own state, or rich states, or the international community? If states have the right to development, then that would imply that the only relevant issue of wealth distribution is between states; whereas if individuals have the right, then the distribution of wealth within a particular state is morally relevant. The 1969 UN declaration is opaque on these points. It defines development as a comprehensive economic, social, cultural, and political process aimed at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population, which would imply that the right holder is the state, but it also asserts that individuals should benefit: Development requires the active, free, and meaningful participation of the citizens of a particular community.

The right to development raises a number of further conceptual problems. First, a set of rights must constitute a coherent scheme. The requirements of development may well result in the setting aside of certain fundamental negative rights; for example, a society that wishes to control urban growth may seek to control freedom of movement, choice of occupation, and the decision to have children. This may appear to be a normative question about the relative weighting of rights, but it is conceptual in that no mechanisms are suggested for resolving conflicts of rights. Second, a right to development must be actionable, meaning that a remedy can be obtained when a person complains that his or her rights have been violated, and the duty bearer must be able to determine when the duty has been fulfilled. Although in principle it is possible to draw up a set of material needs, is not easy to conceive of development as an individuated good. Development may be a good, but it is not one best advanced by use of the language of rights. It is significant that many societies have ratified laws on asylum, and largely respect those laws, but those same societies make it clear that they do not accept economic migrants.

Rights of Future Generations

By *future generations* is meant not-yet-existing people. Although some ecologists argue that the case for preserving resources and avoiding further degradation of the planet is a duty owed to posterity that cannot be correlated to any rights, many environmentalists would maintain that we have duties correlating to the rights of future generations. This argument raises similar conceptual problems to welfare rights but in a more radical form. What we do today will affect not only the life prospects of future generations but whether they exist at all.

There is a consensus that population growth is a threat to the quality of life of future generations, and the present generation has a duty to see to it that such growth is checked. But it is difficult to establish to whom that duty is owed. Imagine we have a fixed level of resources, and in future World 1 there are 5 billion people, while in future World 2 there are 20 billion people. Average (per capita) resources will be higher in World 1 and its inhabitants are, therefore, better off than the inhabitants of World 2. Does the present generation have a rights-correlated duty to bring about World 1? The problem is that one consequence of bringing about World 1 is that a large number of people will not exist. The duties of the present generation could correlate to the rights of the 5 billion people in World 1 and the duty is fulfilled by not bringing into existence the extra 15 billion people of World 2, but it is impossible to identify those 5 billion. The alternative is to say that the 15 billion have a right not to be brought into existence, presumably because life in World 2 would be intolerable. This suggests that nonexisting (never-to-exist) people can have rights. Certainly, there have been legal cases involving children who have taken legal action for having been born, thus implying that one can have a right not to be brought into existence. However, these actions have been motivated by parents acting on behalf of severely disabled children against medical authorities who are alleged to have been negligent, with the aim of winning damages.

Right and Rights

It was argued at the beginning of this entry that there is an etymological connection between the singular right and the plural rights. Etymology does not settle conceptual issues because of the genetic fallacy. However, the discussion of compossibility, with the attendant need on occasion to balance and limit rights, suggest that rights form a system, such that there is a connection of right and rights. The relationship between right and rights is important because it may not be possible to express all ethical-political relationships in the language of rights. The problem of defining a right to development or the rights of future generations was illustrative of the limitations of *rights talk*. To do the right thing is not identical to respecting a person's rights.

Natural law theorist John Finnis has argued for an intimate connection between right and rights. The plural rights, he argues, results from asserting the requirements of justice from the point of view of the person or people who benefit from that relationship. Surveying the development of the concept of right from its classical antecedent *jus,* Finnis notes that for Thomas Aquinas jus meant fair or fairness. Relationships of justice—who is owed what—are secondary. By 1610, the Spanish Jesuit writer Francisco Suárez reversed the priority and defined jus in terms of a moral power that each person possesses, and this way of thinking about justice is developed later by Hugo Grotius: *Jus* is essentially something a person has—it is a power. There is a development of rights from right. For Finnis, this takes what he regards as a damaging turn in the work of Hobbes, who argues that a person has rights in the state of nature—that is, a situation in which there is no state, or political authority: Because nobody is compelled to do anything, each is free. The state for Hobbes is the rational outcome of the exercise of these natural rights. But because nobody has any duties in the state of nature—for example, nobody is under a duty not to kill you—then we could, Finnis suggests, just as well say that there are no rights outside the state.

While Finnis accepts the post-Thomist pluralization of rights, he argues that the Hobbesian tradition loses sight of the connection between right and rights. The justification of *human* rights depends on understanding that connection. The limitations on the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights are significant: They demonstrate that rights derive their validity from an underlying structure of right. But for

Finnis, others' rights do not constitute the only limits: There is also reference in the convention to morality, public morality, public health, and public order. These considerations cannot be reduced to the effects on *identifiable* individuals, but are diffuse common benefits. A scheme of human rights, such as the convention, is a way of sketching a common good, which is a umbrella term for the various aspects of individual well-being in a community. What the reference to rights contributes to this sketch is simply a pointed expression of what is implicit in the term *common good,* namely that *each* and everyone's well-being, in each of its basic aspects, must be considered and favored at all times by those responsible for coordinating the common life.

Finnis's argument has implications for human rights. The catalog of rights set out in the universal declaration makes sense only within a specific cultural and legal context. This is not a rejection of universal human rights, for states can choose to bind themselves to such rights and in so doing can acquire or maintain membership in the international community of states. For Finnis, human rights are the name we give to the legal protection of goods that he maintains all cultures (implicitly) value: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, practical reasonableness, sociability, religion (or equivalent secular beliefs about the meaning of life). We do not have to accept this aspect of Finnis's theory to recognize the significance of his broader conceptual point about the connection between right and rights: Rights form a system, such that alongside a catalog of rights we need secondary rules for settling conflicts between rights. Furthermore, the package of rights is just one principle among several, and doing right incorporates more than respecting another person's rights.

Paul Graham

See also Civil Rights; Common Good; Hart, H. L. A.; Human Rights; Natural Rights

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Robespierre, Maximilien (1758–1794)

Maximilien Robespierre was one of the principal political figures of the French Revolution. Today he is known primarily as the instigator of the Jacobin Terror (also known as the Reign of Terror) and the leader of the Committee of Public Safety. His political thought, dispersed in academic essays, pamphlets, newspaper articles, and over 500 speeches delivered in the National Assembly and at the Jacobin Club, represents one of the revolution's most influential intellectual streams.

Life

Robespierre was born in Arras to a family of lawyers. His mother died when he was 6, and his father abandoned him and his siblings, who were raised by their maternal grandparents. Maximilien attended the *collège* Louis-le-grand in Paris, where he distinguished himself in philosophy and law. After graduation he returned to Arras to work as a lawyer, soon becoming known for his altruism and for his defense of the poor and oppressed.

When the revolution broke out in 1789, Robespierre was elected to represent Artois in the National Assembly. From this time until 1793, his

political thought evolved from monarchism toward a natural republicanism that preached establishing republics on the laws of nature. The opinions of the "Incorruptible," as he was nicknamed for his austerity, accordingly changed through time: He at first defended the constitution and later contributed to its suspension, advocated religious tolerance and then sought to unify France under a single cult, began by opposing violence against the revolution's enemies and ended by articulating the ideology of the Reign of Terror. Throughout, however, Robespierre displayed an unflagging commitment to defending the cause of the people—whom he saw as inherently good, patient, and generous—against political players, whose injustice and corruption he considered to be proportional to the people's goodness.

Political Theory

The two principles central to Robespierre's political theory—regeneration and civic religion—derive from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's philosophy. Like Rousseau, Robespierre believes that virtue is not a matter of knowledge, but of sentiment, and that the true republic is made not by law, but with the character of its citizens. *Regeneration* hence implies not only replacing oppressive institutions with freedom-endowing ones, but also purging citizens' passions so that natural virtue may take root in their hearts. The sentiments proper to republican virtue, in turn, are those that the baron de Montesquieu describes as love of the polity and love of equality. Among the people, who extend themselves naturally through virtue, these loves are effortless. Revolutionary France, however, is politically republican but remains morally monarchical because the republic has innumerable counterrevolutionary enemies bent on thwarting national regeneration. For them, Robespierre prescribes terror, because in revolutionary times—by contrast with peaceable times, when virtue suffices—it is only through fear that love can be consistently elicited. Terror is therefore an emanation of virtue. Robespierre allows that this makes the French Republic tyrannical, because fear is the principle of despotic governments, according to Montesquieu. But the despotism of liberty, he argues, must struggle against the despotism of tyranny—Robespierre's twist on Rousseau's famous recommendation that citizens be "forced to be free" in the good republic.

Also like Rousseau, Robespierre believed that society could not be regenerated without religion's succor. He denounced atheism as the accomplice of royalism and the enemy of philosophy, and as a systematic form of selfishness that stripped citizens of everything apt to lift up their hearts. Hence his condemnation of the Hébertists' Cult of Reason as atheism's scandalous apotheosis, and his call for their execution. In lieu of such secular religions, Robespierre preached the Cult of the Supreme Being, based, like Rousseau's civic religion, on belief in the immortality of the soul and in a benevolent God of nature concerned with human affairs. It was Robespierre's hope that this natural religion would stimulate truth to silence the passions, and enable the stifled voice of conscience to finally speak within all. To this end, he urged his colleagues in the National Convention to internalize the divine gaze. Robespierre likewise desired that the Cult of the Supreme Being remove from each citizen everything distinguishing him from the public body—including, eventually, traditional religious beliefs. Thus, while he denounced the dechristianization campaign and aimed to spare religious opinions consecrated by time, he also thought that the Supreme Being, as sole Legislator, wrote only in hearts, and that his code was voiced most faithfully by the individual conscience.

In all, Robespierre's attempt to regenerate France through terror and religion expressed his own personal and political experience. He was sincerely convinced that he himself had achieved freedom from the passions, that he had become entirely available to virtue, and that, in consequence, his cause was one with the people's cause. His speeches intimate that he wished every French citizen to follow his example and deposit himself in society completely, thereby effacing the boundary between the private and the public, the individual will and the general will, in an absolutist consummation of Rousseau's political sentimentalism. The fact that the Festival of the Supreme Being, held on June 8, 1794, at once suspended the Reign of Terror and preceded its unmatched intensification also suggests that Robespierre viewed his new religion both as a justification and as a motor of the method of national regeneration whose excesses would soon bring about his own

downfall. For besides purifying citizens' hearts and uniting France in virtuous self-cleansing, the Cult of the Supreme Being was projected to supply to the executioners and the revolutionary tribunals the moral strength and discernment they needed to implement that "severe, prompt, inflexible justice" that Robespierre defined terror as being.

Carolina Armenteros

See also Absolutism; General Will; Jacobinism; Montesquieu, Baron de; Republicanism; Revolution; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Terrorism

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Roman Commonwealth

> *The form of our government is superior to that of all other states (civitates), because while the latter's commonwealth (res publica) was generally established by individual lawgivers through statutes and institutions, . . . ours was produced not by one, but by many talents, not over one's lifespan, but over several centuries and epochs.*

So allegedly spoke Cato the Elder (died in 149 BCE), as quoted by Scipio Aemilianus (died 129 BCE) and reported by Cicero (died 44 BCE), all three senior politicians and figureheads of the Roman senatorial order. The *Roman commonwealth*—like the Latin *res publica* and Greek *politeia/politeuma,* which it translates, a rather ambiguous term—was a major topic of debate among statesmen and philosophers in the late Republican period and beyond, until modern times. It is a concept drawing from Greek political theory (Plato and Aristotle) and designed to fit the historical development of Roman political institutions from the foundation of Rome to late antiquity. Embodying typical Roman values, the notion of res publica served as an identity marker, a rallying point, and an ideal model to be pursued and defended by the ruling elite during all of Roman history, independently from the nature of the regime in power. Roman civilization dissolved when this notion came to be regarded as no longer relevant, as its essence had been absorbed by different, separate entities, such as the Catholic Church and barbarian kingdoms. The real question is whether the Roman commonwealth had actually ceased to exist before the final dismantlement of the imperial government in the West (476 CE), as many in the fourth or fifth century would have concurred.

Treading in Plato's footsteps (*Republic, Laws, Politicus*), Cicero authored a whole treatise *On the Commonwealth* (*De Republica,* 51 BCE), which survived only fragmentarily, but is supplemented by his later treatises *On Laws* (*De Legibus,* early 40s BCE), also partly preserved, and *On Duties* (*De Officiis,* 44 BCE). Focusing on the good citizen in the best conceivable city, Cicero's definition of the notion of commonwealth can and must be reconstructed from all his writings, but the most relevant text, cited and discussed by later Christian writers such as Lactantius and Augustine, is the following: "The commonwealth is the 'thing' of the people (*res populi*), understood not as any gathering of human beings, but as the willing association of the many based on agreement over the law (*jus*) and a shared vision of the public interest (*utilitas*)." The bonding of individuals is the result of a natural disposition—Aristotle viewed man as a social and political animal—rather than necessity (*imbecillitas*). The "multitude" involved in the commonwealth is instrumental in defining what is beneficial to all, but does not imply a democratic form of government. Participation in the political process can be limited, but the benefit of the commonwealth is universal. The people (*populus*) own and/or control, directly or by delegation, the "thing" (*res*), which includes, in the context of the ancient city-state: a territory; public buildings,

including fortifications and temples; a citizen army; property of all kinds; a population composed of people of various legal, social, and economic conditions; authorities whose legitimacy was based on a "constitution" (not necessarily in a written form); and, last but not least, a purpose, the well-being of all. The purpose of the commonwealth is achieved through appropriate lawgiving, the sound interpretation of the law, the fair administration of justice, the conduct of war, the making of peace, and the protection of the rights and status of individuals. Without the common bond of law, an agreement on justice, and a social union defining the people, there can be no commonwealth because there would be no liberty. Laws and political institutions are meant to secure the happy and honorable life that constitutes the end of social life. The ultimate point of the commonwealth is its endurance, based on stability and a balanced government. It is warranted by the respect owed to those in charge of it, as long as this respect is deserved.

Theoretically, the government of the commonwealth can take several forms, as long as it is representative of the people. This is the case in a monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, or a mix of these regimes. However, each form of government presents, and inevitably develops into, a perverted variety of itself, be it tyranny, oligarchy, or ochlocracy (i.e., mob rule), in which the people lose control of political life and its centrality. Government, whatever its form, must be guided by justice, which is defined by laws, customs, and political institutions, and ultimately derives from the gift of reason and speech granted by nature. The Roman commonwealth is grounded on the principle that "each should be given what he (or she) is entitled to." The government of the commonwealth is comparable to that of a household, where the head (*paterfamilias*/*dominus*) supports and protects family members and maintains and increases its property through the proper management of human and material resources. This idea will be taken over and further developed by Seneca (died in 65 CE) in a famous letter about slavery and the relationship between master and slaves.

While Cicero offers a Roman's view of the commonwealth, combining a philosophical approach with a conventional knowledge of early Roman history, the Greek historian Polybius (wrote in the 150s BCE) looks at the concept from the outside and uses it to explain why the Roman state was able to grow from a regional power to world domination, conquering most of the Mediterranean area, over a little more than half a century, from the time of the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE) to the Roman victory over the Macedonian kingdom in 168 BCE and the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146 BCE. His answer points at the specificity of the Roman Constitution. Polybius regards any form of government as an organic being going through the normal life pattern of birth, rise, peak, decline, and death, the latter resulting in the replacement of one form of government by another. The history of Greek city-states provides plenty of evidence for monarchy degenerating into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and democracy into mob rule. This phenomenon is inevitable and cyclical (*anacyclosis*), leading from initial lawlessness (*anomia*) to periods of stability interrupted by transitional crises. States are thus flourishing at the time of the maturity of the regime and vulnerable at any other times. Polybius finds a solution to such a predicament in the Roman so-called mixed constitution, whereby monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements are active simultaneously. These various elements are embodied by the king—to be replaced by magistrates, and eventually by a *princeps*—the Senate, and the popular assemblies (*comitia*). Though each element is subjected to the natural degenerative process, it follows a different schedule, thus allowing the stability and prosperity of some to compensate for the perversion and decline of others. The complementarity and interdependence of these various elements are intentional, as illustrated by the fable of the stomach and the body limbs, supposedly told by Menenius Agrippa in a time of crisis (the secession of 494 BC) to rekindle and strengthen solidarity between the people (*plebs*) and the government (*patres*).

The history of the Roman commonwealth shows that this combination had existed right from the foundation (753 BCE). For two and a half centuries, the kings established the commonwealth by building its political and religious institutions, with the help of the Council of the Elders (Senate) who acted as their *consilium* and the popular assemblies who bestowed legitimacy on newly appointed kings. When kingship was finally perverted by the tyrannical rule of Tarquinius

Superbus, the regime was toppled by private individuals who restored the commonwealth by introducing a new form of government (509 BCE). The so-called republican constitution deviates from kingship on three major points: the king's powers are transferred to elected magistrates (consuls) and become collegial, limited in time (annual), and nonrenewable, at least not right away. This threefold adjustment was supposed to protect the commonwealth against the corrupting effects of absolute power. A system of checks and balances was established over the next century, whereby the consuls' powers over military affairs, diplomacy, expenditures, and the legislative process were diluted by the appointment of other (censors), mostly minor magistrates (praetors, aediles, quaestors, etc.), some of whom (tribunes) enjoyed veto power over the decisions of even senior magistrates. Meanwhile, an aristocratic Senate composed of former magistrates and representatives of leading families had the final say over war and peace, arbitration between states, and financial matters, and held wide-ranging judicial powers, limited only in capital cases, the preserve of popular assemblies (through *provocatio ad populum*) generally entitled to apportion honors and punishment, besides electing officials, voting statutes, and ratifying treatises. According to Polybius, Rome was not the only state to experiment with a mixed constitution, because Crete, Sparta, and Carthage had trodden the same path before. Three factors explain Rome's success in adjusting its political institutions to the changing landscape and framework brought along by imperialism: the Senate's prominence (*auctoritas*) in deliberations, the legal regulations regarding the acquisition of wealth (bribery), and the adherence to ancestral values, especially religious ones, for the sake of social cohesion. Religion remains part of politics throughout Roman history, as political and legal acts can be performed only on particular days and need prior validation from the gods, who expressed themselves through *auspicia,* or signs to be interpreted by priests, traditionally originating from the upper classes (patricians). The commonwealth rests on the unflinching respect of rulers, laws, institutions, oaths, and good faith (*fides/pistis*), in both public and private matters.

There is no doubt that despite the unifying project underlying the idea of commonwealth, the Roman Constitution, however mixed, did not promote equality before the law. The Servian "constitution" (sixth century BCE) that defined the role of popular assemblies introduced or perpetuated a system whereby the rich carried more political weight than the poor, the country folks, and the city masses. If the commonwealth was the property of its citizens, it can be suggested that the shares were uneven. Besides, a large part of the population had no political or even legal existence: slaves, foreigners, women, minors, and dependents. But the commonwealth had an early history of inclusiveness, repeated later on with the extension of political rights to plebeians, allies, provincial elites, army auxiliary troops, and eventually the whole population of the empire (*Constitutio Antoniniana* of 212 CE). There is little doubt, however, that this apparent generosity and open-mindedness was concealing an urgent need to extend the pool of taxpayers and liturgists. Freedmen on the other hand, who acceded to full citizenship on manumission in earlier times, saw their condition worsen in the Augustan period (*lex Aelia Sentia*, 4 CE), as they were then usually granted only second-class citizen status (*Latini*) or worse (*dediticii*), with some exceptions.

The successful initiators of the change from kingship to republic (509 BCE) and from republic to empire (31 BCE) claimed to have restored the commonwealth, thus underlining its independence from the form of government. During the early imperial period (31 BCE–285 CE), the commonwealth, like one body commanded by one mind, in the words of Tacitus, was represented by a first citizen (*princeps inter pares*), who embodied the law (*nomos empsychos/lex animata*) and who acted as the moderator of the state, warranting civil peace through the concord of the orders, providing for the safety and integrity of the empire, and protecting the dignity (*dignitas*), liberty (*libertas*), and greatness (*maiestas*) of the Roman people. The emperor's powers rested as much on a formal delegation from the people (*imperium proconsulare* and *tribunicia potestas*) as on his own commanding personal aura (*auctoritas*). Imperial succession turned out to be a recurrent problem because no agreement existed on how to decide between competing claims to the latter, whether it was expressed by the dying emperor, his entourage, the Senate, the army, or any other influential

political group. Chosen emperors could subsequently enhance their auctoritas by working on their *clementia, benignitas, beneficentia,* and *humanitas*. On several occasions, the commonwealth was put at risk, and it nearly melted down in the third century CE because the rapid turnover did not allow this to happen. This political problem was compounded by the fact that the religious unity of the commonwealth was constantly challenged by the introduction of foreign religions. The assimilation of some of them, combined with the development of the imperial cult, proved an unsatisfactory response to the appeal of Christianity. While distancing itself from the exclusiveness of Judaism—a commonwealth of its own (*politeuma*) uniquely described as a theocracy by Josephus in the late first century CE, but more akin to a hierocracy—from which it derives, Christianity shared the universalism of cynic and stoic doctrines, and promoted the idea of an all-encompassing commonwealth, within, without, or even, if necessary, against the traditional framework of the Roman state. The latter reacted first with an attempt at repression or suppression (with the large-scale persecutions of the mid-third and early fourth centuries) and finally realized that the survival of the Roman commonwealth had to go through its integration within the church. The latter history of the Roman commonwealth (fourth and fifth centuries CE) is concerned with the question of which entity, the state or the church, represented the people. The eventual victory of the church spelled the demise of the state. The process was facilitated by the political division of the empire into two parts, broadly along language lines, tentative during the Tetrachic period (293–305 BCE), and permanent after 395 BCE. In the early fifth century, one major Latin political thinker, Augustine of Hippo (died in 430 BCE) produced a wide-ranging work *On the City of God,* in which he proposes a powerful alternative model to the traditional one, in which no commonwealth can exist without justice, and no justice without God. The subsequent generations may have missed the implementation of the former, but certainly witnessed the obsolescence of the latter.

Jean-Jacques Aubert

See also Ancient Constitutionalism; Aristocracy; Augustine; Cicero, Marcus Tullius; City-State; Democracy; Lawgivers; Oligarchy; Polybius; Roman Law

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Roman Law

The legal history of the Roman Empire is commonly divided into the following five periods: archaic period (753–250 BCE), preclassical period (250–27 BCE), classical period (27 BCE–284 CE), postclassical period (284–527 CE) and Justinianic period (527–565 CE). These periodizations cut across conventional historical classifications of Roman history, such as republic and empire, but are nonetheless useful in describing changes to Roman law.

Little is known about archaic Roman law. According to Greek and Roman historiographers, the city-state of Rome was ruled by seven kings from its mythical founding in 753 BCE by Romulus and Remus until 510 BCE when the last king, Tarquin the Proud, was expelled by the populace. Almost nothing is known about the law of the monarchy. Pomponius, a jurist of the classical period who wrote a treatise on the origins of law, hypothesized that the seven kings of Rome produced statutes (*leges regiae*) from which the most revered of Rome's political institutions, such as the

Senate, drew their authority. Modern scholars have questioned the historical accuracy of this account and it is widely accepted that Roman law, in as much as it existed during this early period, must have been largely customary and unwritten. It is also generally assumed that the law was not strictly separated from religion. Tarquin the Proud was said to have been expelled on account of his savage treatment of the populace and his moral corruption. Following this popular revolt, the Roman people collectively decided to replace the monarchy with a republic. The power of the king would be divided into two equal parts to be shared by two elected officials, the consuls, who each had the right of veto over the decisions of the other. The consulship, an annually elected office, would be supported in its decision making by the Senate, a council of elders drawn from the foremost citizens in the republic.

The early years of the republic were turbulent. The Roman people were divided into two distinct classes, plebeians and patricians. A common complaint raised by the plebeians during this period was that too much political and religious power resided with the patricians. At the same time, Rome was engaged in many skirmishes with its rivals on the Italian peninsula and the military burden often fell on the plebeians. The plebeians expressed their frustration with this state of affairs through threats to secede from the fledgling Roman state. Matters finally came to a head in the first part of the fifth century BCE when the plebeians demanded that the unwritten law be redacted and publicly displayed. According to the Roman historiographer Livy, a commission of 10 men was chosen to travel to Athens to investigate the Laws of Solon with a view to creating a similar collection for Rome. On their return, the constitution was suspended and these men were given supreme authority to draft the laws. They succeeded in drafting 10 tables of laws before their governance descended into anarchy. The commission was replaced and the task was completed. It is said that the final text of this law, later known as the Twelve Tables, was publicly displayed in the forum for all to see. The text of this law has not been preserved, but many Roman writers of later periods quote passages from it. Modern scholars have therefore been able to reconstruct it, though certain lacunae remain. This reconstruction has led scholars to speculate that the Twelve Tables was not a codification in the sense that it completely replaced all existing customary law. Rather, it was merely a collection of the more controversial areas with a view to provide greater clarity. Much of Roman law continued to be customary. Although (some of) the law was now known to the populace, much of it remained in the hands of the college of pontiffs (priests and custodians of the state religion), one of whom was elected to provide citizens with legal assistance.

It was not until about 150 years after the publication of the Twelve Tables that the monopoly of the pontiffs over legal interpretation was effectively destroyed when a scribe to one of the pontiffs stole information about the different legal processes available to litigants and the days on which the courts were open for business and published this. Within 4 years thereafter (and perhaps as a result of this) an act was passed, the *Lex Ogulnia,* that enabled plebeians to be elected to the college of the pontiffs. This triggered the development of what would in time become known as a class of jurists—a key factor in the development of Roman law. Roughly 26 years before, in the year 326 BCE, an important change in the administration of Roman justice had occurred. According to the traditional account, it was agreed that the administration of justice would be removed from the office of the consul to permit it to deal with larger matters of state. To that end, the office of the praetor was created. Initially, this office had limited effect on legal change, as the system of procedure used in Roman courts did not permit much adaptation. At the same time, following the successful conclusion of the Punic Wars, foreigners started to settle in Roman territories, thereby necessitating the creation of a second praetorship to deal with legal disputes involving foreigners. In time, the streamlined process used in the court of the peregrine praetor became attractive to Roman citizens who still had to use the highly formalistic system of procedure in the court of the urban praetor. This presumably led to forum shopping and eventually led to the enactment of the *Lex Aebutia* in about 150 BCE, which permitted this new form of legal process, the formulary process, to be used by Roman citizens.

During the same period, a class of jurists emerged. At first, the jurists were mostly patricians

who felt it part of their civic duty to provide citizens with legal advice, but toward the end of the republic jurists came from all classes. Another important emerging theme in legal development during the latter part of the republican period is the extent to which the legal activities of the praetor began to shape the law. By virtue of his edict, in a statement of legal principle produced at the start of his term in office, drafted on advice from jurists, the praetor set out rules and formulae that could be used by parties in legal disputes. This had a profound impact on the development of Roman civil law and his edict continued to be the dominant force of legal change until the advent of the principate under Augustus. Before this can be explored, a few words about the end of the republic are required. One of the most personal and intimate accounts of this period may be found in the various works of the great orator, Cicero, whose entanglement in the cut-throat politics of the day eventually cost him his life. Cicero's letters, philosophical works, and written accounts of his most important court appearances also provide modern scholars with a mine of information concerning legal practice in the late republic and the relationship between the professions of the jurist and that of the orator.

The constitutional change brought about by the collapse of the republic does not seem to have had much of an effect on Roman law in the short term, though in two important respects the Roman system of justice came under imperial control. First, Augustus introduced a system of regulation on the profession of the jurists. Certain eminent jurists were granted the right to give public responses (*jus publice respondendi*), which rendered them more authoritative than responses by ordinary jurists and which could be used as persuasive authority in a court of law, especially where the majority concurred. This system of granting licenses continued at least until the reign of Hadrian, after which it seemingly fell into disuse. At the same time, Augustus also introduced tribunal hearings for some of the offices of state endowed with jurisdiction in private law matters. These hearings (*cognitiones*) would in time revolutionize the system of procedure used in Roman civil courts.

The classical period of Roman law, from the reign of Augustus to that of Constantine, is characterized by a number of important legal developments. First, it was the golden age of the jurists, who became the major driving force for legal development. The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, the authority of the praetor to change the law through his edict was slowly eroded by the sheer size of the document brought about by the practice of incorporating the bulk of the predecessor's provisions into the next edict. On the other hand, it is clear that very few new measures were introduced into the praetorian edict by the first century CE. It was eventually enacted as a finite statutory text in 132 CE. Another defining feature of classical Roman law is the level of intellectual abstraction achieved by the jurists. This period witnessed a substantial growth in the quantity and type of juristic writing. By the middle of the classical period, the system of procedure had been replaced by the *cognitio* process. This affected the activities of the jurists and the role of the praetor. Toward the end of the classical period, a recognizable change in the relationship between jurists and the state is visible. It is conventionally agreed that the last of the named classical jurists, Modestinus, flourished during the latter part of the third century CE. This does not mean that the profession of the jurists had ceased to exist by this time. Rather, as the principate transformed into the dominate, jurists increasingly came under imperial control and operated as bureaucrats.

The period between the death of Constantine and the division of the empire into East and West under Diocletian in the fourth century CE is conventionally described in terms of decline. Strict imperial control of the administration of justice combined with an unstable political period led to legal decline. Not much is known about the state of Roman law during this period, apart from references to a number of unofficial "codes" of imperial law. Much of Roman private law must have remained as described in the works of the jurists of the classical period. The final official code of imperial law produced in the Western Empire before its collapse in 476 CE was the Theodosian Code (429–437 CE). This code contains a wealth of information about the legal preoccupations of the ailing Western Empire. Given that Theodosius was planning to produce a separate code of private law (a project that never came to fruition), the Theodosian Code contains surprisingly little about Roman private law apart from the Citations Act,

an imperial rescript setting out the use of the works of the five great classical jurists as authority in a court of law.

The next major event in the development of Roman law occurred after the Western Empire had disbanded into the protomedieval kingdoms of Western Europe. In 527 CE, Justinian became the emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire. He was an ambitious figure who had been, for some time before the death of his uncle Justin I, in effective control of the empire. Justinian formulated two great aims for his reign. The first was to recover the western part of the empire from the "barbarians" and, most notably, to reconquer Italy. Second, he wished to transform the masses of confused Roman law into a system that could be used both for the academic teaching of law and for legal practice. To that end, Justinian instructed a commission to begin reviewing all of the imperial rescripts produced from the time of Emperor Hadrian. These were arranged by subject into titles, and within each title the various applicable rescripts were to be arranged from earliest to latest. The various titles were collected together in 12 books and published as the *Codex*. Justinian thereafter turned his attention to juristic law.

As an important source of legal doctrine, Justinian gave priority to the clarification of juristic law. The commission of 17 men, headed by the minister of justice, Tribonian, was instructed to work through roughly 2,000 books written by 38 prominent jurists of the classical period (first–third centuries CE), all of whom had been awarded the right to give public responses. The content of these books had to be examined and redacted into titles on specific subjects. In each title, snippets from these works were included to form a coherent account of the law on that subject. Each snippet was numbered and the original author and work from which it was taken were included. Titles were arranged into books following the order of the codified praetorian edict and the entire work, consisting of 50 books, was named the *Digesta*/*Pandecta*. The aim of this work was to be an anthology of intellectual thought on Roman law that could be used by both academics and legal practitioners. Although this project was expected to take at least 10 years to complete, the commission completed it in 3 years. Many reasons for this have been proposed, ranging from the existence of a pre-Digest to the use of subcommittees staffed by bureaucrats. The most plausible reason may be that the original works were divided into three groups, and members of the committee dealt with specific groups.

Although Justinian had originally intended the Digest to be used both for legal practice and for academic teaching, it soon became apparent that it was too voluminous and intellectually too advanced for first-year law students. Thus, another commission was instructed to create a textbook of first principles, the Institutes, which could be used for the teaching of law in conjunction with the Digest and the Code. The commission chose to base this textbook on an existing textbook compiled during the mid-second century BCE by a relatively unknown jurist called Gaius. The reasons for this choice remain unclear, but Gaius's textbook had a number of unique selling points. First, Gaius was clearly interested in history, and therefore included in his textbook a great deal of information about the historical development of Roman law. Second, this book, though physically divided into four (unnamed books), was intellectually based on a soon to be famous trichotomy of private law, namely, that all of private law may be divided into people, things, and actions. This taxonomy, known to history as the Institutional Scheme, would in time have a significant impact on the development of law in Western Europe. On its completion, this textbook was given the singular honor of being enacted in law as the official textbook for teaching Roman law at the law schools of the empire. By this time, the *Codex* had become outdated and a commission was instructed to update it. This project was completed within a few years, and the product was officially called the *Codex* (the earlier version was from then on referred to as the old *Codex*). Modern critical editions of Justinian's project of legal reform also include the Novels. These were additional imperial rescripts collected after Justinian's death.

Roman law has had an enduring influence on many aspects of law and society in Western Europe. In the field of law, the significance of Roman law brought about by the rediscovery of Justinian's *Corpus Juris Civilis* in Italy in the eleventh century cannot be denied—first, when all the world was Rome at the height of the Roman Empire, and thereafter, when it provided the building blocks for

the legal systems of Western Europe in the late medieval period.

Paul J. du Plessis

See also Ancestral Tradition (*Mos Maiorum*); Ancient Constitutionalism; Cicero, Marcus Tullius; Civil Law; Consent; Corporation Theory; Jurisprudence; Lawgivers; Roman Commonwealth

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ROMANTICISM

Romanticism was a rich and complex body of philosophy, literature, and art that originated in Europe in the late eighteenth century. Some of its central figures included the English poets and literary theorists, William Wordsworth (1770–1850) and Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834), the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), and the German poets and philosophers, Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), Novalis (1772–1801), and Friedrich von Schiller (1759–1805), among others. Romantic thought had an impact not only on nineteenth-century English and European culture, but also on nineteenth-century American thought through the work of Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862) and especially Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882).

Two of the most influential texts of romanticism were William Wordsworth's "Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*" (1801) and Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (1790). Although Kant was not a romantic in the strict sense but rather the leading philosophical voice of the Enlightenment, this particular text had an enormous influence on romantic thought. It became the basis for thinking about and overcoming, one way or another, various philosophical dichotomies: for example, the dichotomy between subject and object, fact and value, freedom and nature, self and other. Wordsworth's "Preface" to the collection of poems published by himself and Coleridge, *Lyrical Ballads* (1798), took up these same concerns, but cast them as challenges to romantic writing, especially literature, which, when successfully met, would envision a form of expressive freedom that could be realized under conditions of modern life, and through which the limitations of modern life could be overcome.

Resurgent Romanticism?

For most of the recent century, romanticism has been an often maligned and just as often misunderstood philosophical, artistic, and political phenomenon. It has been variously identified with repressive forms of communitarianism and nationalism, with kitsch and cultural conservatism, and with the aestheticization of politics and the depoliticization of art. Antimodern, antidemocratic, quietistic, narcissistic, masculinity—the list of romanticism's various sins can be long indeed. Given its many egregious sins, what can explain the resurgent interest in German and American romanticism today? The complex picture of romanticism (and its unrealized possibilities) that one finds in the work of Stanley Cavell, Charles Taylor, Richard Rory, Dieter Enrich, Manfred Frank, Richard Eldridge, and a number of other important contemporary scholars does not easily conform to the received view of romanticism as an exhausted and suspect set of responses to the modern world.

Perhaps, this resurgent interest in romanticism can be viewed as just another passing academic fashion, in today, out tomorrow. More generously, the resurgent interest in romanticism might signal something else—the decline of confidence in "modernist" modernity, and so indicative of an interest in retrieving long neglected or misunderstood possibilities for living modernity's form of life—living it less rigidly, less destructively. This, of course, was the original impetus of early romanticism when it was channeling the intellectual energies of Rousseau and Kant, and the political energies of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment.

Surely, one could object, we are not now living in a "romantic" age. Whatever might be percolating in the minds of scholars, we are not living in

the 1790s, when even the horrors of the French Revolution could not dampen the radical hopes of the young romantics.

The future, too, is different, dramatically less capable of bearing radical hopes, were any to be articulated convincingly. Is romanticism even possible in a skeptical, doubt-ridden age such as ours? Why not accept that the time for romanticism, for better and for worse, has passed? Why not just let it fade into the sunset, and deal realistically with the world *we* face, making the most of the possibilities *our* historical circumstances allow? What need could romanticism answer today?

As Cavell, Taylor, and others have suggested, a *reinserted* romanticism might provide us with a richer evaluative vocabulary than we now have, one that might make it possible for us to say yes or no to modernity, to the present, to the future, in more complex and nuanced ways. And so the resurgence of interest in romanticism could be construed as part of a growing realization that it may be unwise as well as self-contradictory to live modernity's cultural and political forms of life unromantically. We might also find that we are not so far removed from romanticism as we tend to believe.

Reinserting Romanticism

It can be said that a doubt-ridden, skeptical age such as ours finds it especially difficult to imagine a future different from the past, a future we might wish somehow to realize, to see as responsive to our genuine needs. To imagine the future in this way is, however, to hold on to the possibility of certain forms of cultural and political change that are simply inconceivable apart from our romantic understanding of such change and our romantic need of it. So long as one aspires to a kind of change in which one sees oneself differently, sees the problems one confronts differently, and sees the world differently, then one is bound and answerable to the demands of romanticism. What is demanded, in spite of all the obstacles and constraints, in spite of the improbability and possible futility of it all, is to find and found new ways of looking at things, new ways of speaking and acting, new kinds of practices, and new kinds of institutions. Anyone who thinks such change is as necessary as it is improbable, whatever their view of "romanticism," is undoubtedly a romantic.

A critical vocabulary that thinks it must renounce romantic notions of change and transfiguration will find itself hugely incapacitated, existentially, not just theoretically. Romantics have given us good reason to doubt that justice without transfiguration is possible. Neither justice nor transfiguration can be achieved merely by providing "good arguments," by designing the right normative procedures, or by reforming existing legal and political institutions. Conventional arguments, however "good" they might be, cannot cast our problems in a new light, nor can they adjust the light so that we can see ourselves and the things that matter to us in a new way. By lending themselves to the creation of these necessarily new ways of speaking and acting, political theorists and not just artists and writers respond to, and occasionally meet, the demands of romanticism.

So what *is* romanticism if it is not what we have thought it was? We should see romanticism as a distinctive tradition of thought that originates in, and continues to be informed by, German romanticism and German idealism. But it is broader and more heterogeneous than either of these, encompassing a wider range of concerns and positions, the nature of which makes it difficult to prevent from becoming entangled with one another the questions of political philosophy, aesthetics, ethics, language, and epistemology. It is a tradition that, in the course of its transmission from one generation to the next, is not even passed on as or in the name of romanticism. This is understandable, given what romanticism came to mean. Nonetheless, there are certain defining romantic concerns and preoccupations that link early German romanticism with Emerson and Friedrich Nietzsche, with Martin Heidegger and John Dewey, with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hans-Georg Gaudier, with Michel Foucault, Cavell, and Taylor, to mention only a few of the prominent voices of a distinctive "philosophical romanticism" that belongs to and informs a conception of political theory as practical philosophy.

A Response to Enlightenment Modernity

Most obviously, romanticism is a critical response to the Enlightenment interpretation of modernity, not just by making that interpretation problematic, but also by making modernity itself a

central, if not *the* central, philosophical problem of the age. This means looking at "philosophical" problems as both responding to the problems of modernity and as implicated in them—as responding to and implicated in living modernity's form of life. Under what conditions, and in what form, can the modern ideals of autonomy, reason, critique, and expressive subjectivity be lived successfully–lived, that is, without reproducing the standard list of self-defeating consequences (e.g., fragmentation, anomie, the leveling of meaning, loss of freedom, self-crippling forms of skepticism, etc.)?

In conformity with the concerns of early German romanticism, Stanley Cavell has tried to reformulate these problems as the "aesthetic problems of philosophy. The "unity" of these problems is not to be found in specific theoretical positions or formal procedures, but in the family resemblance each bears to the others. From the other direction, J. M. Bernstein has proposed treating the aesthetic problems of philosophy as the aesthetic problems of modern society. In doing so, we find that what we are ultimately dealing with is philosophy's *and* modernity's suspicious and anxious relation *to* the aesthetic. From the perspective of the latter, calling the problems of modern philosophy and modern society "aesthetic" problems typically provokes the suspicion that romantics are in the grip of some aesthetic ideology that cannot but misrepresent and thereby distort problems whose modernity is such that they cannot possibly be captured in aesthetic categories. This was precisely Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's point in his lectures on aesthetics: The problems of the modern world were sui generis, and certainly too complex to be grasped in aesthetic categories. Modern social life and modern political institutions simply exceeded the conceptual grasp of aesthetic categories, be they of modern or classical provenance.

Nonetheless, romantics emboldened by Kant's compelling articulation of the aesthetic problems of philosophy in the *Critique of Judgment* took them also to reveal the aesthetic problems of modern society, problems that had to be grasped in aesthetic categories, for there were no other categories in which they could be grasped. To grasp them in this way was also to see how the aesthetic has become an urgent but repressed problem for philosophy and modern society.

The Nature of Philosophy

Insofar as it understands itself as responding to the conditions of modernity, romanticism takes the question of what philosophy is or what it should be as a question defined and shaped by those very conditions. So the met philosophical question of what philosophy is or should be is inseparable from what it means to be modern, from the question of what constitutes the modernity of philosophy. In being responsive to the conditions of modernity, philosophy would be seeking to make sense of the conditions of its own possibility. To make sense of those conditions is to make sense of its own calling, and so the obligation to make sense of its own time is internal to the possibility of philosophy. Political theory insofar as it understands itself as a part of political philosophy cannot evade the force of this question, and of its own relation to modernity.

As a protean form of life, open to abrupt, incessant, and apparently uncontrollable processes of change, modernity is also a disorienting form of life. The more responsive political philosophy is to the conditions of its own modernity, the more unsettled its identity will be. The more unsettled its identity, the more pressing the question of the *form* in and through which political philosophy should express itself. Although this kind of self-questioning is seen as one of the preoccupations of "continental" political theory, it is not something that the "analytic" side of the discipline can simply offload to its "continental" cousin, because it must take certain features of Enlightenment modernity uncritically for granted, not least of which is the form of writing and expression appropriate to political theory. Thus, the question of voice, or the search for voice, becomes a central concern.

Once the search for a voice of its own is regarded as internal to the activity of philosophy, it becomes both more difficult and less necessary to defend some pure form of philosophical argument as the proper (and only) "voice" of philosophy. So the line between "narrative" and "apodictic" forms of argument, and between argumentative speech and "world disclosing" speech will be happily and necessarily blurred, allowing the emergence of nonstandard and pluralistic forms of arguments. Transcendental, dialectical, hermeneutic, deconstructive, genealogical, and narrative forms of argument all take the form they

do because what needs saying or showing cannot be said or shown any other way. That is why Emerson, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, among others, "argued" as they did. Ultimately, the purpose of such arguments is to get us to see things in a different light, and that light can shine only when a new perspective is made available to us.

This in turn redefines the task of political theory romantically understood: Its job is not primarily to offer normative justifications for an idealized social order, but to enlarge the cultural conditions of intelligibility and possibility and thereby open the horizon of the future. Because it is especially sensitive to the tendency of the life forms of modernity to become rigid and inflexible, to become unresponsive to the need for new ways of thinking and acting, romanticism thinks philosophy can play a role, albeit a necessarily modest role, in facilitating normative and cultural change. In this sense, to "romanticize" the world is to make room for the new, to make room for new possibilities that would otherwise be foreclosed.

Receptivity

Romanticism's emphasis on the new might provoke the ever-present worry that politics will become indistinguishable from aesthetics, but if one accepts that politics is "aesthetic in principle," then one comes to see the possibilities of political life in a new and richer way. In any case, the new is not something we will, something we can make happen; it is something that we "let" happen. Receptivity, as Emerson, Heidegger, and Cavell have tried to show, is essential to "making" the new possible—receptivity to the present, to the difference between today and yesterday, receptivity to as-yet-undisclosed possibilities.

For philosophical romantics, thinking about receptivity in this way also invites a reconsideration of our inherited conceptions of agency. The more we emphasize the positive role of receptivity, the more we stress the embodied nature of human agency and its historical and cultural dependencies, the less likely are we to make mistake mastery for agency. We will come to see agency as a matter of what we reflectively let ourselves be affected by rather than a matter of exercising control over what we encounter.

Romanticism and the Everyday

Contrary to the popular but erroneous view, romanticism does not take flight from the everyday into some extraordinary dimension; it seeks to reclaim the everyday as the site where the ordinary and extraordinary are at home together, where they animate one another. Romanticism has a special interest in the everyday, not just as it now is, but as it might one day be. Because the everyday is where all that has gone wrong with modernity is most deeply felt, and where its effects are most devastating, the everyday is where the recovery must begin. For such a new world to arise as a world that we can realize, it must first be prefigured in "every-day appearances," attentively perceived and made visible, as William Wordsworth put it in *The Prelude:*

> *Not in Utopia . . .*
> *Or some secreted island, Heaven knows where!*
> *But in the very world, which is the world*
> *Of all of us,—the place where, in the end,*
> *We find our happiness, or not at all!*

That is why romantics from Wordsworth to Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Cavell worry about the threatened state of everyday language and the leveling tendencies of everyday life. And that is why they regarded their tasks as writers as requiring them to bring about a recovery of the everyday by regaining contact with the semantic sources of everyday language and life. Once a writer makes this task her own, she becomes vulnerable to the worry that the semantic sources on which this recovery depends will become depleted before it can even take place. That worry is fueled, of course, by conditions of (capitalist) modernity that promote a flight from the everyday into the "extraordinary," and an experience of the "extraordinary" that is made possible by the narcotic stimulants of consumer culture.

Recovering Nature

As with early romanticism, contemporary romanticism continues to be preoccupied with the problem of how to recover nature as a source of meaning and orientation. That romantic idea, more

than any other perhaps, seems to be completely out of place in a disenchanted universe, governed by physical laws, and devoid of any intrinsic meaning. However, given the now widely recognized threats to the natural world that human intervention has raised to near-catastrophic proportions, a renewed concern with transforming our relation to the natural world and the "nature" within us would bring this long-standing romantic concern back into its proper place within the modern world.

Freedom

While all of these concerns help to individuate romanticism and distinguish it from its more "vulgar" forms, there is one overarching concern that distinguishes this "tradition" from all other traditions of modern thought, and that is the concern with realizing a form of *freedom* that conditions of modernity make possible and thwart at the same time. Reducible neither to negative nor positive freedom, it is not an individualistic form of freedom that aspires to a state in which one is able to recognize one's words and actions as one's own, as *spontaneously* originating from oneself. A lot hangs on how we understand "one's own" and "spontaneously originating from oneself," which is why so much of this philosophical tradition is equally preoccupied with the corresponding and complementary relations of dependence that would make it possible to recognize one's words and actions as one's own (relations of dependence to which the normative ideal of receptivity is closely tied). What kinds of social and political relationships, call them positive dependencies, allow one to recognize one's words and actions as one's own? Can we lead lives that are "self-determining" without being "self-alienating"?

But because this form of freedom must also be spontaneous, capable of initiating a self-determining new beginning, the need for which will be ineliminable, romanticism is just as much preoccupied with the question of what it means to begin anew. In what sense can a new beginning be an expression of freedom and agency? Because the freedom of new beginnings will always be in productive tension with the social relations, cultural practices, and political institutions from which we derive our identities and sense of ourselves as agents, the degree to which we are able to recognize our words and actions as our own will be provisional at best, and the forms of recognition on which we rely are permanently subject to new normative challenges. And that is why romanticism is also sensitive to time and makes attunement to time a prerequisite of understanding freedom and politics.

No matter how carefully attuned we are to the historical conditions under which we think, judge, and act, the fact that such attunement is fleeting and partial means that all our judgments are inescapably time bound and time imprinted. This does not mean that we have to accept Paul de Man's stoic skepticism about the very possibility of historical knowledge, which skepticism must dogmatically presuppose not that history has come to an end, but that it never began. It does mean, however, that we have to temper our urge to speak in the voice of authority about that over which we cannot claim authority. As Emerson wrote in his 1841 essay "Circles" (Essay 9 in *Essays,* first series), "Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth that around this circle another can be drawn."

Emerson's words are meant to temper our desire to speak with authority about that over which we cannot claim authority. They were meant to outline a possible way of life—a way of life in which criticism is compatible with critical uncertainty, with the romantic consciousness of multiple and "infinite" perspectives.

The Critique of Romanticism

Certainly the view of romanticism presented here is not the view of romanticism held by influential political thinkers such as Hegel (1770–1831), Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), and Jürgen Habermas, who, in spite of the differences that divide them philosophically and politically, have made romanticism the object of remarkably similar, vehemently expressed criticisms; criticisms that seek to portray romanticism as something that is incompatible with modern politics, neither with conservative nor liberal-democratic politics. Indeed, they have gone out of their way to do so. Why?

For the controversial German legal scholar and political theorist Carl Schmitt, romanticism is essentially and unavoidably an apolitical phenomenon. It succeeds only in exposing the shallow and rootless subjectivism that is at the basis of modern liberalism. Its only value to the political theorist is

in the perspicuous contrast it provides to what real politics requires, which is precisely what romanticism seeks to avoid and defer at all costs: decisions and actions. For Schmitt, to "romanticize" is to aestheticize, in the most pejorative sense of the term; to turn the whole of culture and the entire sphere of human relationships into an occasion for thrill seeking self-experimentation and vacuous self-creation. The romantic takes pleasure only in the play of surfaces, and leaves social reality just as it is. He or she prefers to remain a detached, ironic observer of the social world, from which he or she withholds any normative commitments and to which he or she denies any binding obligations. Romantic freedom is nothing more than an aestheticized form of negative freedom that exalts the visionary and creative powers of the (typically male) subject.

This critical view of romanticism was first articulated in Hegel's critique of romanticism in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), especially in the discussion of the "beautiful soul," and in the critique of romantic irony in his lectures on aesthetics from the 1820s. In *Political Romanticism*, first published in German in 1919, Carl Schmitt restates this criticism (without any mention of Hegel), in order to say that the romantic subject treats all objects (people, things, circumstances) he encounters as mere "occasions" for expressing his constrained imagination.

Hegel's critique of romantic irony is elaborated vividly and powerfully in Søren Kierkegaard's (1813–1855) depiction of the commitment-averse romantic aesthete in part one of *Either/Or* (1843) who refuses as a matter of principle to acknowledge any demands that arise outside the self. Schmitt argues that romantic aestheticism should be seen for what it truly is: the apotheosis of modern liberalism. Thus for Schmitt, it is a mistake to identify romanticism with conservatism. Rather, its intrinsically apolitical character should be regarded as a symptom of the decay of liberal political culture in general. Romanticism is essentially passive in orientation, refusing commitments, decisions, and constraints of any kind, which therefore makes it politically useless and ineffectual, the antithesis of the political and a threat to it, as well.

In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1987), Habermas produces yet one more iteration of this two-centuries-old critique of romanticism, updating it to encompass its most recent manifestations: poststructuralism and neo-Heideggerianism, as articulated in the work of Jacques Derrida, Cornelius Castoriadis, Foucault, Taylor, and others. Both Schmitt and Habermas believe that the two great errors of romanticism are: (1) the absolutization of the aesthetic sphere, violating the autonomy of the political, and (2) the valorization of the extraordinary at the expense of the everyday. Habermas, for his part, tries not so much to detach romanticism from liberalism as to contain it in its proper sphere—the sphere of autonomous art. Art and politics constitute two independent and autonomous spheres of culture (in Weber's sense), whose integrity depends on respecting each other's independence and autonomy. Thus, Habermas's strategy is intended to secure the proper limits of the aesthetic sphere at the same time as securing the autonomous domain of politics.

In recent years, the limitations of this approach to making sense of modern political life have been exposed by various theorists. For example, Jacques Rancière has suggested that it is a mistake to separate the aesthetic from the political, as though the former is incommensurable with the latter. Moreover, argues Rancière, politics is "aesthetic in principle." The idea that there is a form of speech, call it argument, that is distinctive to politics, and a form of speech, call it "poetic" or "world-disclosing" speech, that is distinctive to aesthetic modes of making and acting, and that these two types of speech define and delimit autonomous domains of action, involves a failure to recognize the interdependence of these forms of speech, on whose interdependence the political depends. For there to be a political dispute about some object, for there to be an argument over its status and its claims, both the object and the "world" in which that object finds or seeks to find a place must be disclosed—that is, opened up as a disputable object, and that requires a form of speech that is prior to the arguments made for or against that object. It requires, "poetic" or "world-disclosing" speech through which, as Hannah Arendt stated in "What Is Freedom?" something is called into being, "which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known."

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See also Counter-Enlightenment; Emerson, Ralph Waldo; Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Nationalism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Schiller, Friedrich; Totality

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Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the author of several major works in political philosophy, including the *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts; The Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality; On the Social Contract,* and *Émile, or On Education.* His gifts, however, were many, and his achievements were not limited to philosophy: Rousseau's opera, *The Village Soothsayer,* delighted the royal court and the public; his romantic novel, *Julie, or the New Héloise,* became an instant and enduring bestseller; and his autobiographical works, particularly the *Confessions and Reveries of the Solitary Walker,* pioneered an entirely new approach to self-revelatory writing. Rousseau's contemporaries regarded him as a man of paradoxes, as he was: a son of the Enlightenment who denied the possibility of moral progress and celebrated the republican heroes of classical antiquity, a playwright and composer who denounced the theater, a lover of virtue who could not live up to the severe moral principles he professed, and a citizen estranged from his city. Nevertheless, he insisted that there was an underlying unity to all his works, and though this claim has been doubted, the preponderance of recent scholarship accepts Rousseau's contention and seeks to demonstrate the intellectual coherence of his social thought.

Early Life and Education

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was born on June 28, 1712, in the city of Geneva, which was then an independent, self-governing republic and the bastion of John Calvin's austere Protestantism. Both of his parents were citizens, a status held by roughly one fifth of the population. Though Rousseau spent most of his life away from Geneva, he took pride in his citizenship and affixed the epithet, "Citizen of Geneva" to the title pages of his major publications. His father, Isaac, was a watchmaker, while his mother, Suzanne Bernard, came from a wealthier family with a fine house in the upper town. Rousseau never knew her, however, because she died from complications related to childbirth.

In his earliest years, Rousseau lived with his father. They read voraciously and indiscriminately, delighting in novels and taking inspiration from Plutarch's lives of noble Greeks and Romans. When Rousseau was 10, his father fled Geneva to avoid punishment in the wake of an altercation with a French captain. Rousseau was entrusted to

the care of his uncle, who apprenticed him first with a notary, who dismissed him, and then to an engraver, from whom he ran away. Leaving Geneva at the age of 15, Rousseau made his way to Annecy in what was then the duchy of Savoy. There he met a Catholic convert named François-Marie de la Tour, baronne de Warens, who induced him to convert to Roman Catholicism and with whom he lived, with interruptions, until 1742.

Although she and Rousseau subsequently became lovers, Madame (Mme) de Warens was much more than a mistress to Rousseau: he called her "*Maman,*" and she called him, "*petit.*" In the *Reveries of the Solitary Walker,* Rousseau claims that his soul was formless until she gave it shape; to her influence he attributes the romantic sensibility, love of solitude, the country, and of contemplation that feature so prominently in his writings. During this period, Rousseau also cultivated his mind, reading widely in history and philosophy, dabbling in experimental chemistry, making some not very successful efforts to learn Latin, and beginning to write poetry and music.

When he was not living in Mme de Warens's household, the youthful Rousseau tried to support himself in a variety of employments, working at times as a valet, music teacher, and household tutor. Even when he found employers who recognized his genius and showed eagerness to advance his career, Rousseau's pride, his extreme love of independence, and a romantic sense of adventure made it impossible for him to serve for any period of time as a responsible employee. His experiences at the bottom of the social order, however, reinforced his democratic sympathies for the poor and humble and sharpened his bitterness against wickedness and incompetence in the powerful.

Rousseau Among the Philosophes in Paris

Displaced in the affections of Mme de Warens and determined to make his fortune, Rousseau moved to Paris in August of 1742. He hoped to win acclaim with a new method of musical notation. The scheme received a respectful hearing, and Rousseau succeeded in getting it published, but it was not adopted. Rousseau devoted himself principally to music and literature, composing an opera, *The Gallant Muses,* and a play, *Narcissus*. During this period, too, he first became intimate with Therese Levasseur, an illiterate washing woman, to whom he remained attached for the rest of his life, though did not marry her until 1768.

At this stage, he shared the belief in science and progress of the philosophes, and he established friendships with such leading lights of the French Enlightenment as Denis Diderot, the abbé Condillac, and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert. When Diderot conceived the project of publishing a comprehensive work to make knowledge of the sciences broadly accessible, Rousseau found himself sufficiently sympathetic to this great Enlightenment project that he contributed several articles to the *Encyclopédie,* primarily on musical subjects.

On a late summer's day in 1749, however, Rousseau experienced a moral and intellectual revolution. Walking from Paris to visit Diderot, then imprisoned at Vincennes, Rousseau read that the Dijon Academy had offered a prize for the best essay in answer to the question: *Has the restoration of the sciences and arts contributed to the purification of morals?* In a flash, the answer came to him: *No!* The insights he attained at that moment stand at the core of all of Rousseau's major works. Stated simply, he perceived that civilization and enlightenment do not necessarily make us happier or morally better; on the contrary, man is naturally good but has been made evil and unhappy by the contradictory influences of society's ill-ordered institutions. In his two *Discourses,* Rousseau deploys these ideas to formulate an incisive critique of the bourgeois social order then emerging within the bosom of the decaying *ancien régime*. In his three great constructive works: *Julie, Émile,* and *The Social Contract,* Rousseau explores alternative ways of remedying or avoiding the ills he had diagnosed in the two *Discourses*.

The Two *Discourses:* Rousseau's Critique of the Bourgeois Social Order

In the *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts,* his first submission for the Dijon Academy's prize, Rousseau maintains that the cultivation of the sciences and arts corrupts morals, subverts republican governments, and paves the way for the emergence of despotism. He concedes that the refined manners of his contemporaries present a pleasing spectacle but argues that they only hide the reality of pervasive depravity. Because it only

masks vice, conventional politeness is no substitute for virtue, which, to Rousseau, means the steadfast determination always to do what one knows, in conscience, to be right. His contemporaries take no heed of their inner moral compass, but are instead slaves of opinion. Publicly, they do what is expected of them by the canons of propriety, but secretly they are willing to do whatever might be necessary to gain wealth, fame, or power, and so triumph in society. Thus, their souls are divided between the morality they profess and the secret ambitions they dare not avow but that truly motivate them.

The highly civilized French are not alone in their corruption, Rousseau argues. On the contrary, all people in their infancy enjoyed a state of rustic simplicity, virtue, and freedom, and all people, in becoming more civilized, have become artificial, corrupt, and servile. Consider the Romans: Under the republic, their virtue conquered the world, but they built no fine buildings and produced no great art or literature. Under the empire, their capital became a city of marble; they could read Ovid and Virgil, but there was no longer public freedom, and the lamentable state of their politics and morals can be read in the histories of Tacitus.

Rousseau's *Discourse* won the Dijon Academy's prize for 1750, and it made an immediate sensation in Paris when it was published during the winter of 1750 to 1751. Rousseau became famous, and his ideas were extensively discussed in the press and in the fashionable salons. Rousseau embraced his rediscovered republican and became to his contemporaries, "the Citizen"; he abjured his youthful ambition to win wealth and fame, vowing instead to dedicate himself only to truth and virtue. Although Rousseau never fully lived up to these lofty ideals, they inspired him to make some real sacrifices. When *The Village Soothsayer* was performed for the royal court in October of 1752, the king was so delighted with Rousseau's opera that he decided to reward him with a pension. Rousseau refused the pension, lest his financial dependence compromise his independence of thought.

Rousseau's next submission to the Dijon Academy's competition did not win the prize, but he did not expect it to. Instead, the *Discourse on Inequality* became a landmark in the history of political philosophy, the first great critical analysis of the bourgeois culture of commercial society. Rousseau began by reframing the Academy's question: *What is the origin of inequality among men, and is it authorized by the law of nature?* The law of nature he dismisses as an oxymoron: A law must be a dictate of reason, directed to the will, but nature speaks to us only in our passions and instincts. What troubles Rousseau is not the *authorization,* but the *foundation* of such forms of social inequality as wealth and poverty, power and powerlessness, nobility and vulgarity. He takes it to be obvious that the distribution of wealth and power in his world are unjustifiable according to any reasonable criterion of morality. The mystery is why people accept it, when the rich, mighty, and titled are always a small minority.

Rousseau's answer begins with a demonstration that nature makes men free and equal. To show this, Rousseau presents the portrait of a man according to nature, whom he envisions as a creature biologically like us, but deprived of all learning or education. Such men are but animals, moved only by the innate passions of self-love and pity. The first inclines them to seek their own well-being; the second is a modest disinclination to witness suffering in others of one's kind. Moved by these passions and having only the simple needs of food, rest, and the occasional mate, Rousseau's solitary and mindless natural men would have had few occasions for conflict and no motive to intend harm to another of their own kind. Hence, Rousseau concludes that man is good by nature and that social inequality is artificial.

Unlike the other animals, however, human beings have a faculty Rousseau calls "perfectibility," the capacity to develop our intellectual powers, and it is to the development of mind that Rousseau attributes the origin and foundations of inequality. To make his case, Rousseau offers a schematic, six-part history of human civilization to identify the key steps in man's mental development and moral decay. The first age of animal ignorance ended when, confronted by obstacles to their survival, our most distant ancestors invented languages, tools, and came to establish settled homes and enduring family relationships. These developments mark the dawn of the second period of Rousseau's history, the state of the "savages" encountered by European explorers.

This second age also marked the birth of a new form of self-love, which Rousseau calls

amour-propre and which is the desire to be esteemed by others for what we value in ourselves. The introduction of amour-propre into his understanding of human nature is one of Rousseau's great innovations, and it distinguishes him both from the philosophes, who viewed men as basically self-interested and rational, and the ancient philosophers, whose understanding of human nature added to reason and self-interest a third passion, *thumos,* or spiritedness, which, in their view, gives rise to pride and anger. As Rousseau conceives it, amour-propre is malleable, and thus accounts for the very different sorts of dominant character produced in different political and social milieus. In societies of marked inequalities of wealth and power, such as eighteenth-century Paris, amour-propre appears as the desire for power and status, which corrupts Rousseau's bourgeois contemporaries. However, in conditions of rough equality and self-sufficiency, such as the savages know, amour-propre manifests itself as the demand for respect as an equal and the desire for the affection of one's beloved, and in the homogeneous, honor-loving ancient city-state such as Rome and Sparta, amour-propre appeared as civic virtue.

In Rousseau's view, the savage stage represents the happiest and best era of human history, because the savages know life's greatest pleasure, love, but do not suffer from the worst evils of civilization: tyranny, exploitation, and war. Rousseau never calls his savages noble, because they have not attained knowledge, wisdom, or virtue. Nevertheless, he expects his readers to see the savage state as superior to their own because the savages are not divided against themselves as modern bourgeois souls are. They may occasionally be violent, but they are not vicious, because they do not find their interests systematically at odds with the interests of others.

With the introduction of the division of labor ends the rough self-sufficiency that characterized the savage state. Exchange and commerce become necessary, and while the clever and fortunate grow rich, others become destitute. But because they are no longer able to provide for their own needs, the poor have no real alternative but to acquire resources in whatever way they can. The rich claim ownership of what they have, the strong claim ownership of what they can seize, and the poor claim ownership of what they need. All desiring power and property, the third era is a war of all against all. Unlike Hobbes, however, Rousseau sees this war not as the natural state of man, but as the product of antecedent intellectual and social developments.

The first political societies emerged, and the fourth age dawned, when men reciprocally agreed to regard ownership as rightful possession. In these first political societies, laws are only the general will of the community that the rights of each person be protected, and there are no specialized magistrates responsible for enforcement. Thus, Rousseau sees the legislative power as both temporally and conceptually prior to the executive; the existence of fundamental laws, grounded in the general will of the members, defines the civil state. The appointment of officials to enforce the laws marks the emergence of government and the beginning of the fifth epoch in Rousseau's history. In his entry "Political Economy" in Diderot's *Encyclopédie,* Rousseau makes clear that legitimate government can endure only so long as the people exhibit civic virtue, which is the determination to follow the general will and respect the rights of others, rather than to follow one's own interest, which typically opposes the interests of others.

Inevitably, however, social inequalities undermine civic virtue, and the people's leaders become its oppressors. The conclusion to the *Discourse on Inequality* is grim: Rousseau teaches that his readers, the "bourgeois" subjects of unequal and oppressive social arrangements, are enchained by a combination of artificial needs and reason-dependent passions, permanently divided against themselves and locked tightly into inegalitarian social and political systems inimical to freedom and destructive of happiness and virtue. Nor does he see any hope for the future. Modern men can no more revive the civic virtue that once animated the Roman Republic than they can return to live among the savages. Even Geneva no longer truly embodied Rousseau's political ideals, if it ever truly had. He dedicated the work to his native town, but to an idealized Geneva that scarcely resembled the oligarchic, bourgeois city it had become. In the summer of 1754, after the completion of the *Discourse* but before its publication, Rousseau traveled to Geneva, where he reaffirmed his Protestant faith and reclaimed his citizenship.

Rousseau's "Solutions": *Julie, Émile,* and the *Social Contract*

Rousseau returned to France, but left Paris in the spring of 1756 to live in the countryside near the forest of Montmorency. The following years were a time of emotional turmoil in Rousseau's life, leading ultimately to the rupture of his friendship with Diderot and most of the philosophes, but they were also his most productive, culminating in the publication of his three great, constructive works: *Julie, Émile,* and *On the Social Contract,* each of which explores a possible alternative to the corrupt, bourgeois social order condemned in the two *Discourses*.

Julie, or the New Héloise

Rousseau's romantic novel, *Julie, or the New Héloise,* was first. Its publication was eagerly anticipated, particularly as it appeared not long after Rousseau had published his *Letter to d'Alembert on the Theater,* denouncing the project of opening a theater in Geneva. He objected that a theater would undermine the traces of civic virtue that still remained among his fellow citizens by importing the manners and values of Paris's glittering upper class. Defending himself against the charge of inconsistency, Rousseau argued that novels, read in the privacy of one's home, do not inflame amour-propre as attendance at the theater does. Besides, Paris is already so corrupt that a novel cannot do any harm, and it might, by inspiring its readers with the love of virtue and the desire to imitate the simple, rustic, and domestic life its protagonists lead, even do some good. Certainly the novel explores the possibility that happiness and wholeness may be found by withdrawing from the whirl of urban life into a private domain of love and friendship, sustained by an optimistic faith in a tolerant and loving God. Its tragic conclusion, however, suggests that so long as human society continues to confront us with duties opposed to our desires, earthly happiness cannot be easily attained or long sustained.

Émile, or On Education

Émile appeared in Paris in May of 1762. It is the work Rousseau himself judged to have been his best and most important, and it presents his most complete and systematic effort to find a cure for, or at least a sort of inoculation against, the corrupting effects of ill-constituted social institutions. In the form of a novel, it is the story of an ordinary boy's extraordinary education. It details its eponymous hero's development from infancy to adulthood, under the care of his governor, Rousseau, who is an idealized version of Rousseau himself.

Rousseau starts from the premise that man is naturally good but corrupted by society. Accordingly, he proposes to tailor Émile's education to match the course of the natural development of his body and soul, making use of the child's innate desire to learn. For the infant, he recommends breast feeding and forbids swaddling clothes, which impede the infant's natural urge to move his limbs. The young child must learn the careful use of his senses and develop his growing body; hence, Rousseau advises games and outdoor activity. In the later years of childhood, from the ages of roughly 12 to 15 (Rousseau supposes adolescence to begin around 16), Émile learns a trade and the rudiments of science. Only at this stage does he read his first book, *Robinson Crusoe*. Imagining himself as Robinson on his island, Émile's favorite game is to discover how he can use his strength and wits to survive.

Émile's early moral education is negative; Rousseau aims only to prevent his charge from contracting any vices. He issues no commands, lest he teach the child to disobey and to lie. Nor does he reason with Émile, because children cannot perceive the human bonds that underpin moral obligation. Because Rousseau maintains that no one rebels against necessity but only against what one views as the intentional actions of another, Émile is confronted only by limitations he perceives as natural rather than willfully imposed. To this end, the tutor totally, but imperceptibly, controls Émile's environment, so that it presents no opportunities for him to do anything wicked. If Émile should do anything wrong, he will not experience punishment as the willful infliction of harm for harm, which would only provoke rebellion; he must, rather, feel any punishment as the natural consequence of his behavior. Such training preserves Émile's natural goodness from the corruption of society.

The onset of adolescence marks a decisive turning point, because it is when amour-propre begins

to be felt. If Émile is to be saved from the corruption of bourgeois society, he must be preserved from learning to ground his self-esteem on wealth, fame, or status. To that end, his tutor guides him to spend his days among the unfortunate, which will make him compassionate. Doing good works for those in need, Émile learns to take pleasure in beneficence. Learning about society by seeking to right wrongs suffered by the oppressed, Émile acquires a sense of justice. In Rousseau's judgment, Émile at this stage is good, because he has no inclination to wrong anyone, but he is not yet virtuous because he has not yet acquired the strength of soul required to resist temptation.

When the potentially disruptive force of sexual desire can no longer be denied, Rousseau reveals to Émile the nature of sexuality, describing for him the joys of marriage and the dangers of libertinage. At the same time, he disclaims all authority, insisting that Émile is old enough to be his own master. Émile responds by begging Rousseau to guide him and promises obedience to his commands; Rousseau accepts. Rather than forbid Émile from tasting the pleasures of sex, he makes Émile want to remain chaste by making him fall in love with the image of an ideal woman, whom he names Sophie. In the fifth and final book of *Émile,* the young man and his tutor seek this Sophie, whose own education Rousseau describes as the preparation for a life of dependence as a wife and mother.

When Émile finds Sophie, he falls immediately in love with her, but she remains wary until he demonstrates to her his wholehearted dedication to the rights of humanity. Once she has agreed to marry, however, the tutor intervenes; he commands Émile to leave Sophie for a time, to travel and learn about politics. Now, for the first time in his life, confronted by a disjunction between his desires and his duty, Émile demonstrates his virtue and proves that he is truly worthy of Sophie's love. Subordinating his immediate pleasure to the just demand that he keep his word, he complies willingly with this first demand ever placed on him. On his travels, he learns to judge governments according to the principles of *The Social Contract* and finds that all fall short. Believing that a man of virtue can live happily wherever he resides, Émile opts to live on a small farm in the countryside of the land where he was born, far from the corrupting influence of Paris. Émile's love of his ideal Sophie takes the place in his soul that philosophy would occupy in that of a wise man, and, as the novel concludes, it appears that Rousseau has succeeded in showing that it is possible for any man, of ordinary intellectual and moral gifts, to lead a life of virtue, happiness, and wholeness.

Scarcely a week after it had been permitted to be sold in Paris, *Émile* was confiscated by the police, condemned, and burned. The authorities in Geneva quickly followed suit. Orders for Rousseau's arrest were issued, and Rousseau fled into exile. What particularly provoked the authorities was the heterodox religious teaching of *Émile,* which Rousseau presents as the profession of faith of a Catholic priest from Savoy. The priest articulates a religion according to nature, and he seeks to demonstrate the basic elements of his faith—the existence of God, freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the happiness of the just—by appealing to sentiment and the inner light of his own soul. The priest dismisses as irrelevant metaphysical and theological speculations, such as those about the nature of the communion sacrament, over which Protestants and Catholics had bitterly quarreled. He holds instead that God loves equally all religions that teach men to love their neighbors and to do justice. Nor do external forms and ritual matter: God heeds only the inner worship of the loving heart.

The Social Contract

Published contemporaneously with *Émile, On the Social Contract,* subtitled *Principles of Political Right,* offers Rousseau's account of a legitimate state, in which the subjects are morally obliged to obey the law and are motivated to comply with its demands. *The Social Contract* begins from the premise that man is born free, that all political communities are, therefore, artificial and grounded in consent. As he had argued earlier, Rousseau teaches in *The Social Contract* that the state comes into being when an aggregation of individuals becomes citizens by agreeing to be directed, not by their individual desires, but by the general will of the community, which aims at the common good of all. In the general will, Rousseau finds a means of reconciling obedience and freedom, which had remained opposed in the teaching of Hobbes and

Locke. They had argued that the establishment of political authority requires the subjects to alienate a portion of their freedom to the commonwealth. By contrast, Rousseau conceives the establishment of a legitimate state as effecting the transformation of man's natural freedom to do whatever pleases him into civil freedom. As subjects, the people of Rousseau's legitimate state are free because they obey only the laws they have, as citizens, prescribed for themselves.

The natural freedom and equality of men implies that no individual can have any right to tell the citizens what they should will for themselves as their law, but, though the people can judge whether or not they are happy, Rousseau believes they lack the wisdom to frame the laws that would make them so. To bring the legitimate state into being, an extraordinary legislator is required to draft the laws, which he must induce the people to embrace without their really understanding why. The legislator will have succeeded in his task only if the people, after living for a time under the laws, willingly and wholeheartedly embrace them. This will only happen, Rousseau supposes, if the laws and customs established by the legislator fundamentally transform the character of the people, so that instead of regarding themselves primarily as independent actors with private and conflicting aims, they see themselves first as citizens, dedicated above all to the common project of their collective welfare. In the republics of antiquity, religion served the state, endowing political obligations with an additional, supernatural sanction. To the displeasure of the orthodox, Rousseau complained that pure Christianity weakens the political bond by teaching that one's true home lies not on this earth but in heaven; to the displeasure of the philosophes, he suggested that a modified Christianity could be made into a civil religion that would serve civic ends.

In the legitimate state, the people are sovereign: Their general will is the law. Rousseau advises that the people must assemble in person at least annually to give or withhold their assent to laws and to elect their own magistrates. The magistrates and the government they constitute are not sovereign but are only its agent, tasked with the responsibility of applying the general will to particular cases. The best form of government, Rousseau argues, is elective aristocracy, where those most capable of faithfully carrying out the general will are entrusted with office. Although he recognizes its oligarchic features, Rousseau nevertheless asserts that the Roman Republic substantially met the conditions specified in his theory: Every citizen was a member of the sovereign assembly, having the right to vote in the *comitia centuriata;* this sovereign body assembled at least annually, and it had the right to enact the laws and the right to select its own magistrates.

Persecution and Exile, Introspection and Self-Justification

Warned of his impending arrest, Rousseau fled and sought refuge in Môtiers, under the sovereignty of Prussia's King Frederick the Great. For a time, Rousseau hoped that his name and his works would be vindicated in Geneva, where a number of citizens supported his cause. The controversy grew heated and threatened to spill over into civil violence. At the height of the conflict, Rousseau's adversaries struck and anonymously published a pamphlet written by Voltaire that made public the details of Rousseau's illicit sexual relationship with Levasseur and accused him of having abandoned the five children he had fathered with her. Though Rousseau's actions were not especially uncommon in eighteenth-century Paris, the revelations were acutely damaging because the reality of Rousseau's conduct contrasted so sharply with the idealizations of romantic love, domestic happiness, and wise paternal guidance depicted in his novels. By February of 1765, it had become clear that Rousseau's cause in Geneva was lost, and he turned his back on his native city, renouncing all further interest in its affairs.

The attacks on his personal character prompted Rousseau to begin composing his *Confessions,* in which he proposes to show himself to the world, faults and all, in the expectation that his readers would recognize the essential goodness of his nature, despite his obvious failure to live with anything like the virtue exhibited by his exemplary characters, Julie and Émile. Driven from his refuge in Môtiers by the stoning of his house, Rousseau stopped for a time on the Isle de Saint Pierre, in the territory of Berne. While there, he amused himself by making botanical observations—a pastime to which he would devote ever more of

his time as he grew older—and sometimes allowing himself simply to fall into sweet daydreams. The Bernese, however, expelled him, and in January of 1766, Rousseau made his way to England, accepting David Hume's offer to help him find refuge there. Rousseau's relationship with Hume deteriorated rapidly, as Rousseau came to suspect Hume of plotting against him.

Returning to France the following year, Rousseau was compelled to live away from the capital and under a pseudonym, Renou. In 1770, he moved back to Parris, where he was permitted to live under his own name, and where he made a meager living as a music copyist. His last years were principally devoted to the composition of autobiographical works, the forensic and self-justificatory *Rousseau Judges Jean-Jacques* and the elegiac *Reveries of a Solitary Walker,* both of which were published posthumously, as was the *Confessions*.

In May of 1778, he accepted the hospitality of marquis Rene de Girardin, and came to live on his beautiful estate in Ermenonville, where the marquis had laid out a garden in the English style, such as Rousseau had celebrated in Julie. But Rousseau did not have long to enjoy this retreat; he died on July 2 and on July 4 was buried on the Isle of Poplars at Ermenonville. Rousseau's tomb became a sort of shrine for his admiring readers, and such luminaries as the ill-fated Marie Antoinette paid their respects to him there.

Rousseau's influence was far reaching and as diverse as his range of intellectual interests. In philosophy, Immanuel Kant proclaimed him "the Newton of the moral world" and confessed that Rousseau had decisively transformed his intellectual outlook, teaching him the unconditional value of humanity and so inspiring him to develop a practical philosophy justifying the rights of man. The central element of Kant's practical philosophy, the idea that autonomy is found in compliance with the categorical imperative, in effect translated into the moral sphere of Rousseau's political idea that citizens can realize freedom through obedience to the general will. In literature, Rousseau's *Julie* and his autobiographical writings contributed to the emergence of Romanticism, with its celebration of feeling and enthusiasm for nature. Rousseau's educational philosophy subsequently inspired the pedagogical reforms of Maria Montessori. In religion, the "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar" articulates the doctrines of a mild and tolerant Christianity that have come to define mainline Protestantism today. And, in politics, such leading figures of the French Revolution as Louis de Saint-Just and Maximilien Robespierre claimed to be acting in his name, though because they mistook their own will for the general will of the French people, their actions did not accord well with the actual content of Rousseau's thought. Nevertheless, the French revolutionary government had his remains transferred, in a theatrically staged procession, to the Pantheon, in Paris.

Joseph Reisert

See also Autonomy; Civil Religion; Democracy; General Will; Hobbes, Thomas; Hume, David; Kant, Immanuel; Legitimacy; Liberty; Philosophes; Robespierre, Maximilien; Romanticism; Social Contract Theory; Sovereignty; Voltaire

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Rule of Law

The *rule of law* refers to a mechanism, process, institution, practice, or norm that secures a particular type of governance. The relevant type of governance is usually defined in opposition to arbitrariness. Arbitrariness is typical of various forms of despotism, absolutism, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism, which are widely thought to be evils that the rule of law is supposed to curb. These include even highly institutionalized forms of rule where atop the apex of a power structure sits some sovereign entity (a king, a junta, a party committee) that can make decisions unconstrained by law when it deems necessary. Ideas about the rule of law have long been central to political and legal thought since at least as early as when Aristotle distinguished "the rule of law" from "that of any individual." In the eighteenth century, the baron de Montesquieu elaborated a doctrine of the rule of law that contrasted the authority of monarchs with the caprice of despots, which underpinned his notion of an independent judiciary (rightly or wrongly with regard to England) and has since profoundly influenced Western liberal thought.

In all, the rule of law implies that the creation of laws, their enforcement, and the relationships among legal rules are themselves legally regulated so that no one—including the most highly placed official—is above the law. The legal constraint on rulers means that the government is subject to existing laws as much as its citizens are. Thus, a closely related notion is the idea of equality before the law, which holds that no "legal" person shall enjoy privileges that are not extended to all and none in particular shall be immune from legal sanctions. In addition, the application and adjudication of legal rules by various governing officials are to be impartial and consistent across equivalent cases, made blindly without taking into consideration the class, status, or relative possession of power among disputants. In order for these ideas to have any real purchase, moreover, there should be in place some legal apparatuses for challenging officials to submit to the law.

Not only does the rule of law entail such basic requirements about how the law should be enacted in society, but it also implies certain qualities about the characteristics and content of the laws themselves. In particular, laws should be open and clear, general in form, universal in application, and knowable to all. Moreover, legal requirements must be such that people are able to be guided by them; they must not place undue cognitive or behavioral demands on people to follow. Thus, the law should be relatively stable, comprised of determinate requirements that people can consult *before* acting, and legal obligations should not be retrospectively established. Furthermore, the law should remain internally consistent, and failing that, should provide for legal ways to resolve contradictions that can be expected to arise.

Despite these basic features, however, the rule of law has not always had a particularly established or even systematic formulation (not for lack of attempts by jurists and political philosophers). The idea that the law should contribute to beneficial ways of channeling and constraining the exercise of public power is a matter of interpretation; that is especially so over time and across different polities. One reason why its meaning continues to be widely contested is that any of the strictly legal or philosophical aspects of the concept points beyond itself also to political and social conditions that are historically and culturally contingent. Another reason for the inherent complexity of the idea is that for whatever empirical particulars are said to fall within the purview of the concept, there is always some larger normative vision about the nature or purpose of law and the legitimate aims and limits of political power that support it that stand to enjoy even less agreement.

Institutional Arrangements and Legal Culture

For these reasons, the rule of law is best seen not as a blueprint for institutional design, but as a value, or cluster of values, that might inform such design, and that can therefore be pursued in a variety of ways. Nonetheless, several rather simple and generalizable institutional insights follow from the idea that those who judge the legality of exercises of power should not be the same as those who exercise it. For instance, a typical rule-of-law state will institutionalize some means of shielding legal officials from interference, political or otherwise, that threaten their independence. Accordingly, the institutional separation of the judiciary from other

branches of government is commonly thought to be an important feature of rule-of-law states. Other measures to ensure fair access to legal institutions may also be important for rule-of-law regimes. In addition, a binding written constitution is an American innovation that is widely believed to aid the rule of law, and has thus been mimicked in other parts of the world.

While certain institutional traditions and conventions as well as written laws may be important to ensure that judicial decisions are grounded within plausible interpretations of existing laws, no single institutional character of a state should be seen as necessary or sufficient to the rule-of-law ideal. The rule of law is tied neither to any one national experience nor to any set of institutions in particular, although it may be thought to be better served in certain nations and more by some institutions than by others. Institutional variety and possibilities are likely to be too rich and complex to identify precise institutional arrangements of the rule of law that could be automatically duplicated or transplanted. Different polities embody their own judgments about how to implement specific rule-of-law ideals given their particular legal and cultural traditions that influence the character of their institutions. Furthermore, the initial sociological condition of the rule of law is simply that most people in a society, including those whose profession it is to administer the law, believe that the law does and should count in the first place. In this regard, political and legal institutions are but one factor among many variables that comprise cultural supports for and means of socialization into the rule of law as a value.

Negative and Positive Forms of the Ideal

The basic idea that the rule of law is at odds with arbitrariness has led most legal theorists to view the rule of law as a purely negative ideal whose value lies mainly in what it shields against. Those who take the view that the rule of law is devoted primarily to "damage control" concentrate especially on the various kinds of damage that might be done at the hands of government. The point of institutionalizing the consolidation of power, then, is to be able to curb it and thereby buttress the citizenry against the potentially intrusive claims of the state. Yet the constant fear that the threat of violence and actual cruelty of those holding a monopoly of power can engender in citizens is not the only perilous alternative to the rule of law. Without the rule of law's promise of fixed and knowable points in the vast field of human interactions that constitute the basis for legitimate expectations and the means of social coordination, the alternative may well be widespread chaos if not paralysis. Hence, many theorists have derived the value of the rule of law by focusing on the disastrous state of affairs that would ensue from the absence of information, security, and legally enforceable obligations that the rule of law provides for ordering and regularizing social relations.

As a solution either to the problem of an all-too-powerful state or the need for order and predictability within modern societies, the rule of law's assurance of constraint by clear legal rules and the establishment of well-defined legal processes is of central importance to a purely negative ideal of the rule of law. As a negative ideal, the rule of law sets out principles of legal efficacy but remains silent on the moral quality or purpose of the law. While it may appear empirically inconsistent for horrific acts to occur under the rule of law, mere formal regularity and procedural justice are quite consistent, in principle, with iniquity in the law's content. Thus, many writers have offered a more affirmative, morally ambitious account of what is required to govern according to the rule of law. A more positive understanding of the rule of law includes some underlying principles of substantive justice and purpose in legal systems in relation to society. In this tradition, formal regularity and attention to process is likewise valued, but they are seen as valuable not merely for their own sake but insofar as they help to secure further goods—such as greater equality and fairness, respect for the dignity and integrity of people or groups. A particular theory about the proper respect for individual rights or a preferred conception of political community and communal goods usually lies at the heart of a more substantive rule-of-law ideal that seeks not only to protect but also to realize specific social goods and human values through the law.

Challenges to the Rule of Law

Anyone who holds that what matters most in politics is having the *right* people in power and not

how power should be constrained will be unconvinced of the value of the rule of law. Neither will anyone who believes that institutions of public power are merely instruments of the ruling class that need more than to be constrained but dismantled. For the majority of modern democratic societies, however, the rule of law's requirement that both rulers and the ruled be accountable to the law is of unquestionable value. To be sure, in the modern world, it is the liberal tradition that values the rule of law most highly. Liberals who are concerned with ways of protecting (and realizing) liberty in some form and averting threats to it view the rule of law as an overarching source of security and value. Be that as it may, there is substantial disagreement even among liberals over what exactly counts as a faithful application of the term and, even when that is pinned down, how it is to be accomplished.

In and of itself, the rule of law is not a faithful description of any state of affairs, but a complex ideal that is even more complex to realize. Thus, we have reason to be skeptical about whether societies necessarily benefit from all that might be invoked under the term. The independence of the judiciary, for instance, is a murky value at best, and clearly a problem if the independence is misused to foster the sectoral privileges of judicial personnel or to allow unchallenged interpretations of the law. Heavy emphasis on the negative aspects of the rule of law, for example, on formal regularity and procedural justice, may distract from the content and consequences of those laws. Critics of a strictly negative conception of the rule-of-law ideal argue that too much attention to legal process generates significant vices of its own in the form of exaggerated legalism and excessive juridification. The price of excessive veneration of the law and legal procedures may be too high if doing so inhibits independent social assessments of the merits of a given policy proposal or if the official mandate of "blindness" gives legitimacy to actions performed "according to the law," even when most people would oppose such acts. Some writers have charged, moreover, that the increasing domain of judges and lawyers, indeed, their encroachment into areas previously left to politicians and the electorate, entails the loss of much that is politically and democratically valuable.

In short, too much emphasis on procedures for preventing arbitrariness can lead to subverting the doing of justice according to what might otherwise find support in the rule of law, and the legal strictures then become themselves a form of arbitrariness that is no more legitimate. On the other hand, those who defend the negative value of the rule of law object to more substantive understandings of the ideal on the grounds that morally ambitious aspirations about the rule of law threaten to purge the concept of its specificity and usefulness. They argue that to open the concept to a whole host of extralegal considerations about substantive justice and wider societal goals is to conflate ideas about "the rule of law" with notions about "the rule of good law," such that any distinction between the two is reduced to nothing. As a consequence, no separate or practical discussion of the rule of law can take place short of propounding a whole rival social philosophies.

To address further challenges to the ideal, a matter of continuing controversy is whether contemporary law associated with the welfare state is compatible with the rule of law. The regulatory activities of modern governments are frequently neither general nor abstract, but are targeted, detailed, and specific. A matter of even longer dispute is whether such formal equalization counts for much if it merely leaves substantive social and economic inequalities to play themselves out with greater effect. Liberals commonly believe that the existence of social inequalities does not necessarily cancel out the worth of the rule of law, for they maintain that inequalities should not confer advantages before the law even if they do so in the world. Those on the political left disagree and argue that real differences in the world render the blindness or neutrality of the law false, inconsequential, or pernicious.

Therefore, despite widespread consensus in different parts of the world that the rule of law is a good thing, it is neither automatically nor self-evidently so. Like any social value, the rule of law can be a mixed blessing when it conflicts with commitments to other social ideals or because different interpretations of the same ideal or attempts to realize different ideals can require different institutional logics. Where the governing powers of a polity are unconstrained, the negative conception of the rule of law will undoubtedly

hold much salutary promise. Where power is already substantially constrained by law, however, the rule of law might not only tolerate but require that some space be made for wisdom, judgment, particularity, and substantive justice.

Naomi Choi

See also Accountability; Anarchy; Authority; Democracy; Democratization; Equality; Judicial Review; Legitimacy; Liberalism

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S

Schiller, Friedrich (1759–1805)

Friedrich Schiller was a key figure of the late Enlightenment; he made significant contributions to philosophy, poetry, drama, and the study of history. This entry considers three major aspects of Schiller's works—history, philosophy, and drama—as they relate to the politics and political ideas of his time.

Schiller's first historical works focus on the Dutch rebellion against Spain in the sixteenth century and reveal a strong sympathy toward the Netherlands' battle for emancipation from the despotism of Philip II. While, on the one hand, Schiller heralds the victory of freedom over oppression as a product of the people and not of individual heroic leaders, on the other hand, he suggests that there was a lack of unity of purpose among the people that, in part, contributed to their defeat. One of the main topics of these early histories is the question and problem of middle-class freedom. It is an indication of Schiller's desire to be more actively involved in public-political life.

On the basis of both Schiller's literary work and his writings on history, Johann Wolfgang Goethe recommended to Duke Carl August (of Weimar) that Schiller be appointed to a professorship at the university in Jena, Germany (today, the Friedrich Schiller University). Schiller held his inaugural lecture on May 26, 1789, the very week in which the French revolutionary estates were gathering in Versailles to form a National Assembly. The topic of his lecture stemmed from his study of the philosophy of history, "What Is, and to What End Does One Study Universal History?" ("*Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte?*"). In this important essay, Schiller sought to mediate between two approaches to the writing of history, the first of which focused on facts and occurrences of the past, while the second considered the interrelationships between phases of history. With the aid of the philosophy of history, he hoped to establish more universal truths that had arisen out of a close study of the particulars of history. At the same time, he believed that, in consideration of universal history, the individual human being is liberated from the limitations of one's situatedness in the present. The work thus marks a turning point in Schiller's view of history and politics. Along with his later historical works, these formative texts powerfully shaped the conceptions of philosophical history that would dominate the later Hegelian tradition.

Like many of his contemporaries, Schiller focused his attention in the area of philosophy on the work of Immanuel Kant. Schiller's study of the Königsberg philosopher intensified in Jena, where the leading expert on Kant of his time was one of his colleagues, Carl Reinhold. Through a critical engagement with Kant's works, Schiller developed a classical aesthetics of moral autonomy. For Schiller, neither the nature state (*Naturstaat*) nor the state of reason (*Vernunftstaat*) can address the needs of human beings because they are nonmoral, human constructs. It follows that because it is made by human beings, the state must respect the individual and the

leader must not legislate arbitrarily but out of respect for the will of the people.

While Schiller might have been excited about the historical realization of republican democracy with the French Revolution, the aftermath of the revolution and the actions of the Jacobins, in particular Maximilien Robespierre and Georges Danton, led him to the conclusion that only a program of aesthetic education could overcome the potential violence of reason. Although retaining a strong Kantian impetus, Schiller's program of aesthetic education transcended Kant's own conception. Schiller held that only through the attainment of a balance between reason and emotion could a truly efficacious social-political environment of freedom and mutual responsibility be actualized—the sole facilitator of which is art.

As an artist himself, Schiller had considerable interest in Kant's discussions of beauty and the sublime. In his essay "Concerning the Sublime" (1801), Schiller declared that, as an object of history, the world is, at bottom, nothing other than the conflict of the powers of nature both between themselves and with human freedom, the outcome of which is manifest in history. Again, Schiller pins his hope for improvement in the political sphere on the refinement of the sensations through an appreciation of art. While in the process of reforming the individual through art and culture, a socially efficacious state can be established that serves rather than coerces its citizens, for it is culture that enables individuals to assert their freedom and will. This idea would reach an even broader audience in his drama, *Wilhelm Tell.*

Many of Schiller's dramas explore political problems, often in the light of the course of history. His first political drama, *Don Carlos,* a compilation of five manuscripts written between 1785 and 1787, explores the phenomenon of despotism within the family and the political and religious orders. Schiller created one of his most intriguing dramatic characters in the marquis de Posa, who stands not so much for a republic as a constitutional monarchy, or even universal monarchy, in which basic human rights and social well-being are guaranteed. Posa's tragic fall illuminates how autocratic, arbitrary state's governance debilitates human beings, even when they serve the cause of humanity. In fact, in the end, Carlos's father, the king, turns his own son over to the Grand Inquisitor. In *Don Carlos,* the alliance between state and church stands in the way of the realization of a better, humane political order.

Schiller's experience of the French Revolution and its aftermath shaped his later literary-dramatic representations, all of which are political in nature and effect. In the trilogy *Wallenstein,* the hero is defeated not by opposing troops, but by the very government he is supposed to be serving. The plot illuminates the need for a new political order of freedom and justice and implicitly endorses the right of citizens to resist their state, if necessary by force, an issue to which Schiller returned in *Wilhelm Tell* (1803). The hero, Wilhelm Tell, who became a mythical hero for the Swiss, kills a tyrannical, inhumane representative of the state (*Geßler*). In this, Schiller's most revolutionary drama, murder appears as a morally justified act that has positive consequences in the political sphere.

In conclusion, although Schiller was not himself a revolutionary activist, numerous of his ideas and historical, poetic, and dramatic representations were profoundly political. Through his writings, Schiller propounded the cultivation of a moral imperative for the improvement of society that is of political consequence.

Steven D. Martinson

See also Enlightenment; Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Nationalism; Romanticism

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Schmitt, Carl (1888–1985)

Carl Schmitt was a renowned conservative jurist and political theorist in Germany's Weimar Republic who ultimately incurred infamy as an enthusiastic supporter of Hitler's Third Reich. From "exile" in his provincial hometown, Plettenberg, Schmitt exerted a shadowy but extensive influence over postwar social and political philosophy, as well as constitutional and international law. Each of his short and forceful Weimar era books accentuated some deficiency of Enlightenment thought and/or liberal political practice. *Political Theology* (1922) argued that liberal jurisprudence's inattention to legal gaps highlighted the Enlightenment's more general inability to account for "the exception," Schmitt's word for phenomena that cannot be circumscribed or predicted by rationalist systems of thought. This work, along with *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* (1923), insisted that transcendental, extrarational, and supramaterial sources are necessary to ground moral-political authority; and, furthermore, that the revolt against authority, as such, posed by Russian anarchism and communism would destroy Europe and irrevocably degrade humanity. Schmitt's *Crisis of Parliamentarism* (1923) exposed liberal parliamentary government as a sham: Interest-based political parties feign protection of the national good while they actually pursue advantage for their own particularist agendas. Contemporary parliaments, Schmitt averred, were incapable of reconciling democracy, which presupposed political unity, with liberalism, a fundamentally individualist or pluralist doctrine.

Moving out of the ambit of Catholic political thinking in the mid-1920s, Schmitt composed his most influential and impressive works. His magnum opus, *Constitutional Theory* (1927), offered a painstaking analysis of the Weimar Constitution, as well as an astounding account of the principles underlying any "democratic" constitution. In *The Concept of the Political,* composed in 1927 and fully elaborated in 1932, Schmitt defined "the political" as the eternal propensity of human collectivities to identify each other as "enemies"; that is, as concrete embodiments of "different and alien" ways of life, with whom mortal combat is a constant possibility and frequent reality. Schmitt assumed that the zeal of group members to kill and die on the basis of a nonrational faith in the substance binding their collectivities together refutes basic Enlightenment and liberal tenets. Willingness to die for a substantive way of life negates both the pursuit of self-preservation undergirding modern natural rights and the liberal motivation to neutralize deadly conflict that was, in his view, driving modern European history from the sixteenth to the twentieth century.

Schmitt offered several striking interventions, most notably *Legality and Legitimacy* (1932), during Weimar's final, crisis years. In the midst of economic collapse and social conflict bordering on civil war, Schmitt argued that the democratic legitimacy of the republic's president outweighed any limits on his authority legally articulated in the Weimar Constitution. Schmitt advised members of President Hindenburg's circle to bypass the parliament and rule by presidential decree for the duration of the crisis, and potentially beyond it. Once these conservatives were outmaneuvered by Hitler, Schmitt helped legally coordinate the Nazi seizure of power, and, in 1933, he joined the party and was rewarded with the highest judicial post in the new Reich. Despite wholeheartedly endorsing Hitler's liquidation of political adversaries and his promulgation of anti-Jewish policies, Schmitt found himself on the outs with the regime by 1936. He subsequently occupied himself with purportedly academic studies like *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (1936), and international law-based legitimations for an expanding German Empire or "Grossraum." Refusing to be de-Nazified by the Allies (because he insisted that he had never been "Nazified"), Schmitt was banned from teaching after the war, but continued to produce intriguing but often self-exculpating

scholarly works, such as *Ex Captivitate Salus,* and his dazzling philosophical-historical study of international law, *Nomos of the Earth,* both published in 1950.

John P. McCormick

See also Agonism; Counter-Enlightenment; Hobbes, Thomas; Sovereignty; Theology

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SCHOLASTICISM

Scholasticism refers to an intellectual and cultural movement in the Western European Middle Ages characterized by an influx of new knowledge, by the emergence of new institutions of learning, and by new methods of study. This knowledge was transmitted mostly from the Islamic world and included material on many philosophical and scientific areas but not, in any significant way, on politics or political theory.

The "two swords" understanding of religious and secular authority that was developed in the early Middle Ages continued to dominate political thought in Western Europe up to the middle of the thirteenth century. The position of the pope remained central, although Byzantium represented an alternative arrangement of the relationship between bishop and emperor. The roles of emperor and of local kings vis-à-vis the church were developed and expressed through legal instruments, jurisprudence, political actions, and coronation rites.

The tensions inherent in this arrangement were always clear: witness the investiture controversy of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and the ongoing struggles between Frederick II and the papacy in the first half of the thirteenth century. Muslim occupation of the Christian holy places provided an external challenge to unite an otherwise fragmented Europe, a unity seen in the crusades that came to serve other political purposes.

Although in early scholasticism (1100–1250) there is not much political philosophy, the study and practice of canon and civil law ensured the transmission of political values and ideas. Notions such as *right, justice,* and *sovereignty* were enshrined in, and came down from, Roman law. These traditions were collected and codified in the *Corpus juris civilis* (Body of civil law) at the behest of the sixth-century Emperor Justinian. In the twelfth century, collections of canonical legislation begin to be referred to as *Corpus juris canonici* (Body of canon law). The need for lawyers in the developing towns is one of the factors that stimulated the emergence of universities in cities such as Ravenna and Bologna.

Earlier Christian theological controversies contributed to the development of a distinctive understanding of the human person that had great

importance for later political understanding and valuing of the individual. The notion of *person* was given new depth through these controversies, and the call of humanity to eternal life with God founded an understanding of human dignity as inherent rather than originating externally.

John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* may be taken as summarizing the political thought of early scholasticism. John worked at Canterbury, Rheims, and Chartres, and was acquainted with Thomas Becket, Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, and other notable contemporaries. *Policraticus* seeks to gather all knowledge and wisdom about ethics and politics. It considers first virtue and happiness, summarizing the wisdom of the ancient and early medieval worlds about where human happiness is found: supremely in the worship of God and life with God in eternity, in a lesser sense in a practical and active life of charity toward one's neighbor.

John develops the metaphor of the body politic, familiar from ancient sources as well as from its application by Saint Paul to the church. Just as the individual human body is made up of parts that depend on each other, and is healthy and well functioning when these parts know their place and perform their function, so, says John, a political society is made up of parts that depend on each other for the community's flourishing. There are three levels to this body, those who hold authority to govern, those who perform some of the functions of governing, and those who are governed without any involvement in governing. John spells this out: the prince is the head, the senate is the heart, and the church is the soul of this body. Judges and other senior officials are the eyes and mouth, while soldiers and other junior officials are the hands, internal organs, and sides of the body. Those who are governed without governing are the feet of the body.

Although the church is concerned with the higher happiness of eternal life, and the secular power is subordinate to it because its concern is the happiness of this life, still the prince has his power from God and not from the church. Kings tended to be more independent of the papacy than emperors were, and hence the sharper conflicts between pope and emperor in the Middle Ages. Sacred and secular powers ought to work together for the common good, John says, as body and soul do for the good of the individual. The first duty of a prince is to love God, then to love his subjects, be virtuous in his own life, and educate those who govern with him. Senior officials too ought to be virtuous, although John reckons they will need more promise of reward and threat of punishment if they are to remain so. He speaks bitterly, probably from experience, of the role of the flanks of the body, the courtiers (or lobbyists) who control access to those in authority. These are the parts most susceptible to corruption.

The prince himself might become corrupt, and there has been much debate about John's understanding of tyrannicide. It seems that he cautions patience in the first place, allowing time for God to act to remove a tyrant, but accepts that God's action may sometimes be through human hands.

Aristotle is important for twelfth-century thought, and John's other major work, *Metalogicon,* applies Aristotle's logic across the liberal arts curriculum. But access to Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics* provided scholastics of the following century, notably Thomas Aquinas, with radically new resources that made possible the development of a political philosophy properly so called.

Vivian Boland

See also Aquinas, Thomas; Augustine; Body Politic; Byzantine Political Thought; Canon Law; Feudalism; Islamism; Roman Law; Tyrannicide

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SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR (1788–1860)

Arthur Schopenhauer, whose writings established pessimism as a distinct and important philosophical

position, was one of the most influential moral theorists of the nineteenth century. He was born into a wealthy Danzig trading family, and his father intended for him to continue the family business. As a youth, he traveled widely and learned several languages, but his education was oriented largely toward business. After his father's early death, however, Arthur was released to scholarly pursuits and his inheritance ensured that he could live comfortably. He studied at Göttingen and Berlin and received his doctorate from Jena. In 1818, he published *The World as Will and Representation,* which contained the essence of his pessimistic philosophy and which was universally ignored. In 1820, he lectured on philosophy at the University of Berlin and pointedly chose for the time of his class the exact hour at which Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, then at the height of his fame, also spoke. Virtually no one attended and Schopenhauer soon returned permanently to private life. He became well-known only with the publication of *Parerga and Paralipomena* in 1851 and with the appearance of a long appreciation of his works in the English *Westminster Review* in 1853. Thereafter, he enjoyed the literary fame that he had always felt he merited.

Schopenhauer considered himself a metaphysician in the tradition of Immanuel Kant, but he also rejected the optimism found in the most eminent post-Kantians of his day, especially Hegel. To appreciate his moral views, it is necessary to understand their metaphysical presuppositions. Schopenhauer accepted that Kant had refuted brute forms of empiricism according to which our experiences give us direct knowledge of "things-in-themselves"—objects as they are apart from the observing mind. Kant thus denied that we acquire knowledge simply by passively receiving information from the world. He proposed instead that our minds actively organize our perceptions according to certain a priori categories and that genuine knowledge is impossible without this active mental engagement with the world. Kant had identified these a priori categories as the concepts of space, time, and causality. While Schopenhauer never disputed this formulation, he laid greatest stress on the idea that our conception of time does not directly reflect the world as it is but, rather, is a mental fiction.

For Schopenhauer, this assumption of linear temporality had enormous costs for our species—chiefly the anticipation of death and the general experience of the transience and instability of the world—that were not sufficiently compensated for by the benefits of consciousness. Like Rousseau, he contrasted the happiness of animals, which were unaware of past and future, with the unhappiness of modern humans. Temporality created the possibility of hope, anxiety, striving, loss, and disappointment, among other emotions, without any compensatory increase in physical or mental satisfaction.

Moreover, and more importantly, the a priori of time created illusions from which it is nearly impossible to liberate the mind: first, the illusion that we are highly distinctive as individuals and that this distinctiveness is centered in our consciousness; second, the idea that our desires are fueled by material needs and could therefore be satisfied by the achievement of our goals. In fact, Schopenhauer claimed, vain striving is an inherent property of the will in general. When any particular objective is accomplished, it loses its value to the desirer, who inevitably moves on to another object.

Schopenhauer's pessimism, then, did not consist in the idea of a downward historical trajectory, but rather in the idea that the account of human reason as inherently beneficial, cumulative, or progressive was false. The human condition was, instead, essentially static and marked by irremediable suffering. His ideas thus directly challenged the optimistic Hegelian thesis that world history is necessarily rational and progressive.

According to Schopenhauer, the only appropriate response to the predicament created by Kantian a priori is to cultivate an extreme self-denial that limits unhappiness by containing, to the extent possible, the striving that generated it. An attitude of resignation before the vanity of human aspiration might also make room for moments of transcendence, chiefly through contemplation of art and beauty. These provide at least a partial escape from the bonds of temporality and allow a limited encounter with unchanging things-in-themselves. In spite of the ubiquity of unhappiness, however, Schopenhauer opposed suicide as an act of futility.

Schopenhauer's position was largely laid out in his early work, but *Parerga and Paralipomena* (which means roughly "supplements and omissions") recast a complicated metaphysical argument in a brisk aphoristic style, which contrasted

markedly with the academic prose of more prominent German philosophers. Moreover, in his later work, Schopenhauer included sharp observations on a whole range of activities that were not, strictly speaking, required by his philosophy. Despite the overall posture of pessimism, these aphorisms—on, for example, boredom, romance, literature, and religion—are frequently funny and often inspirational.

Both in his own time and since, Schopenhauer's ideas have often been compared with those of Buddhism. Although he claimed to have developed his position independently, he welcomed the comparison; and his later texts are filled with references to Buddhist works and concepts. His ascetic approach to life is also clearly indebted to the Stoicism of late antiquity. Although he considered himself an atheist, he believed that the moral insights of pessimism could also be extracted from the New Testament if one ignored its theology and metaphysics.

Schopenhauer's influence was vast, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. His pessimism found inheritors as varied as Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Martin Heidegger, Albert Camus, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Theodor Adorno. His aphoristic writing style, however, set a standard for German prose that far exceeded the reach of his philosophy.

Joshua Foa Dienstag

See also Buddhist Political Thought; Happiness; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Kant, Immanuel; Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm; Pessimism; Temporality

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SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH (1883–1950)

Often hailed as one of the great economists of the twentieth century, Joseph Schumpeter has exercised considerable influence on political scientists through his *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942). In political theory, he is considered an exponent of a type of democracy variously dubbed competitive, elitist, minimalist, and realist.

Schumpeter was born a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1883 (the same year as John Maynard Keynes) and a member of the dominant German minority in a Czech town in Moravia. His mother's second marriage thrust him into the aristocratic circles of the imperial capital, where he received an elite education culminating in a degree in law and economics at the University of Vienna. After practicing law in Cairo and holding university posts at Czernowitz and Graz, he spent several years in Vienna making abortive ventures into politics and business during and after World War I. An appointment at the University of Bonn in 1925 was followed by his move to the department of economics at Harvard University in 1932, where he stayed until his death in 1950.

The Vienna of Schumpeter's early adulthood was a vibrant place for social research, and he cut a distinctively hybrid figure among historians and mathematicians, Marxists and liberals. He was known as an early advocate of the use of theory and mathematics in economic analysis (and later helped to found the Econometric Society in the United States), yet he remained deeply committed to Weberian historical sociology throughout his career. He embodied what has since come to be known as "interdisciplinary research" and "methodological pluralism."

At this time, a professor was not considered above (or beneath) engaging in political intrigue. During World War I, Schumpeter wrote confidential memoranda for the emperor and members of his court that urged the organization of a conservative political party. Its aims were to preserve the empire by staving off absorption into a German-dominated *Mitteleuropa* ("Middle Europe"), and to align with Western powers whose financial aid would be needed for postwar economic reconstruction. Schumpeter called his politics "tory

democracy" in homage to the British system, which he saw as a model for how the bourgeoisie and progressive elements of the aristocracy should cooperate in managing public opinion in support of enlightened policy. These proposals made little practical impact, but after the defeat and dissolution of the empire, Schumpeter was appointed minister of finance for the new Republic of Austria. He lasted less than a year in the job because he was perceived as an obstruction to the government's policy of socializing major industries and seeking closer ties with Germany, and he vowed never to reenter politics.

Instead Schumpeter returned to his academic research on the history of economic thought, the theory of business cycles, and other topics in economic theory. He always stressed the dynamic nature of capitalist development and the pivotal role of innovation. While his early work emphasized the importance of unleashing the individual entrepreneur, his later work viewed "trustified," monopolistic firms as better able to make the massive investments in research and development that spur innovation. These features of his economic thought were crystallized and carried over into political theory in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*.

The book's main argument was that capitalism would soon be replaced by socialism, but that socialism could in principle serve economic efficiency and political democracy. As ever, Schumpeter distinguished himself as a man without a party: Marxists were wrong about how and when capitalism would fall, and liberals were wrong about what socialism would mean for prosperity and freedom. This was not, as some early readers supposed, a full-throated endorsement of socialism, but rather a basically conservative effort to accommodate unwelcome trends. Schumpeter has remained, for some, a model of a pragmatic counterpoint to Friedrich Hayek's conservatism untethered to a doctrinaire faith in free markets.

Schumpeter's famous critique of democratic theory was part of his case for the compatibility of democracy and socialism. Here he targeted the "classical doctrine" of democracy, an amalgam of nostrums about popular sovereignty and the common good that Schumpeter attributed to no particular author but presumably derived from the likes of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham. To replace this doctrine, Schumpeter defined democracy as nothing more than a method for authorizing decision makers through periodic elections. The essential but often overlooked corollary of this famous formulation is that governments must be allowed to rule with absolute discretion between elections; in turn, elected politicians must be allowed as little interference as possible with the technocrats who manage the economy.

Schumpeter's political theory, then, reflected key elements of his economic thought: The individual economic entrepreneur and the great political leader of his early work gave way to the monopolistic economic firms and the oligopolistic political parties of his later work. What remained constant was an essential elitism: A few superiors should rule and the many inferiors ("subnormals," as he called them later in life) should obey. In other words, his democratic theory was built on classically antidemocratic foundations.

Schumpeter's influence on political science, especially in North America, flows from the elitist assumptions and economic models of *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. The behavioral school openly embraced his vision of electoral competition among elites as the primary (and almost only) criterion of democratic politics, and the rational choice school openly embraced his modeling of political behavior by analogy with the production, consumption, and advertising of markets. Though his value-free pose has provided a large target for deliberative, developmental, and participatory theories of democracy, his characterization of the centrality of electoral politics has gone largely unquestioned on all sides, even if slightly misunderstood. The paradox is that conventional assumptions about democracy today are still Schumpeter's institutionally but not interpretively: many embrace electoral competition but pass over his denial that elites are (or should be) thereby made accountable to the people, and others embrace electoral competition but decry the absence of other channels for popular expression, but few recognize Schumpeter's basic analytic point that elections are a mechanism purely of selection (popular consent) and not of accountability (popular control).

J. S. Maloy

See also Behavioralism; Democracy; Elite Theory; Public Choice Theory; Rational Choice Theory

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Science of Politics

Attempts to develop a *science of politics* in the broadest sense of the term can be traced back to Aristotle. His thought on politics combines an emphasis on empirical analysis of systems of government with a teleological ontology and ethical considerations. While Aristotle's thought regains influence after the recovery of key texts in the Middle Ages and the incorporation of certain aspects of his philosophy into Thomistic cosmology, the predominant Christian worldview is at odds with both the feasibility and the desirability of a science of politics. It is only with the onset of the scientific revolution in the sixteenth century that the project of a science of politics is reenvisioned. However, for most important thinkers of the time from Francis Bacon to Thomas Hobbes, a scientific understanding of the world presupposes a break with the assumptions of Thomistic cosmology and Aristotelian science, both of which view reality as purpose driven, either by divine providence or a telos inherent in things. In contrast, Hobbes's attempt of a scientific treatment of politics in *Leviathan* and other works is deeply influenced by the new empirical sciences. Among these, particularly Newtonian physics, which assumes that the universe is made up of matter in motion to be calculated according to general laws that are derived from experiments, leaves a mark on Hobbes's understanding of politics that relies on a materialist ontology, definitional and conceptual rigor, as well as an emphasis on analytical reasoning over normative judgments.

The notion of a science of politics finds considerable support in many varieties of Enlightenment thought, albeit with differing emphases. This is exemplified by David Hume's hope that "politics may be reduced to science" on the basis of eternal political truths, as well as the belief in the possibility of generalizations regarding political matters found in many passages of *The Federalist* and Jeremy Bentham's meticulous "felicific calculus" that is to guide policy making with scientific precision according to utilitarian principles.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the project regains momentum through the growing institutionalization of the various social sciences. From the very beginning, the budding discipline of political science is traversed by conflicts over its identity as a social science. On the one hand, proponents of a nomothetic understanding of science aspire to develop social sciences like sociology or political science into quasi-natural sciences that would yield lawlike generalizations. Influential exemplars of this naturalist view include Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and, more controversially, Karl Marx. On the other hand, defenders of an ideographic science point to the ontological divide between the respective object domains of natural and social sciences. Given that humans enjoy free will and attribute meaning to their own actions and those of others, the social sciences should not attempt to *explain* occurrences like the natural sciences because they cannot hope to generate equivalents to their lawlike generalizations. Instead, they have to aim at an *understanding* and interpretation of meaning (*Verstehen*). Proponents of this view, originating in Germany, are Wilhelm Dilthey and, with important qualifications, Max Weber, whose agenda of a *Verstehende Soziologie* is located somewhere in the middle of this divide.

While there are sustained attempts to develop a science of politics through a better understanding of history or a refinement of the comparative method to be found throughout the beginning of the twentieth century, World War I, economic depression, the rise of fascism and bolshevism, and the Holocaust eclipse the optimism about science, its achievements, and its promises of progress—particularly in the social sciences. Respective critiques of the (social) sciences are developed from various perspectives ranging from the critical theory of the Frankfurt School to the Heideggerian critiques of modernity developed by Hannah Arendt or Leo Strauss.

It is against this background of reservations and skepticism that the protagonists of the *Behavioral Revolution* of the 1950s try to revive the notion of an ambitious quasi-natural science of politics. Influential scholars like David Easton, Roy Macridis, and David Truman chide the political scientists of the first half of the century alternatively for their legal formalism, parochialism, lack of methodological rigor, or thinly veiled normative biases.

Most, if not all, proponents of a behavioral science of politics subscribe to a positivist ontology and epistemology, that is, that there is an intelligible (social) reality that exhibits regularities, which can be known through methodologically rigorous and, if possible, quantitative research relying on observable actions (i.e., facts). The behavioral revolution thus ushered in a new attempt to develop a nomothetic science of politics. Lasting until the end of the 1960s, the behavioralist era is distinguished by an almost unprecedented confidence and determination with regard to the pursuit of a true science of politics that would simultaneously demarcate political science from other disciplines and establish its authority as science vis-à-vis nonacademic political actors.

The challenge to behavioralism arises from critics both inside and outside the movement engendering a constellation that structures the debate about a science of politics to the present day. Building and expanding on similar approaches developed in economics by Gordon Tullock, James Buchanan (of the Virginia School), and Anthony Downs, the so-called Rochester School, under its leading scholar James Riker, pursues their ideal of science through formal modeling with the help of rigorous deductive reasoning and sophisticated mathematics. These rational/public choice and game theoretical models do not constitute a wholesale departure from behavioralism but rather an internal critique of some of its aspects (e.g., inductive reasoning). In contrast, (post-)structuralist critics like Michel Foucault challenge the fundamental claims of the (social) sciences to truth and objectivity by reexamining their history and stressing the power effects of the "scientific" knowledge generated. In a similar way, these notions are questioned by scholars of feminism, postcolonialism, and neo-Marxism, who expose the particularistic biases of the seemingly universal and impartial claims of science.

Today, despite numerous criticisms, the two dominant approaches of the discipline, formal modeling and quantitative statistical analysis, espouse the desirability and feasibility of a scientific understanding of politics.

Thomas Biebricher

See also Enlightenment; Hobbes, Thomas; Hume, David; Publius; Montesquieu, Baron de

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Scientific Realism

There are, as the philosopher Hilary Putnam has suggested, many "faces" of realism, but most philosophers who subscribe to the label of *scientific realism* argue that scientific theories, including statements about unobservable entities, are basic reality claims and are true or false by virtue of the extent to which they correspond to a mind-independent world, which, they maintain, is more than a regulative ideal. The manner in which realism, in recent years, has found its way into the discourse of political theory and political science is exemplary of a long history of the involvement of these fields with the philosophy of science. This entry examines the impact of logical positivism and logical empiricism on the philosophy of science, the subsequent evolution of scientific realism, and the application of positivist principles to the social sciences.

Logical Positivism and Logical Empiricism

Whether social scientists have wished to embrace or distance themselves from the methods of natural

science, they have characteristically turned to the philosophy of science for an account of the nature of scientific explanation. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, images of science were porously depicted in the literature of both philosophy and social science. By the middle of the twentieth century, however, logical positivism and logical empiricism (LP/E), represented by philosophers such as Carl Hempel and Herbert Feigl, had been transplanted from Europe to the United States, where this school of thought not only contributed to the institutionalization of the philosophy of science as a distinct field of study, but also established a dominant reconstruction of the logic and epistemology of science that became authoritative for disciplines such as political science.

The program of LP/E, formulated in the Vienna Circle during the early part of the twentieth century, was in part a philosophical challenge, in the name of science, to both metaphysics and traditional social and intellectual authority, but it was also a reaction to the decline of Newtonian theory as a definitive description of the world. Nineteenth-century philosophy and science were already wary of speculative thought, and the subsequent crisis in physics contributed to idea that theories were ephemeral and transient. Although LP/E stressed the nomological and deductive character of explanation, it posited factual observation as the foundation of science and as the basis for verifying or falsifying empirical generalizations. Theories were largely construed as somewhat heuristic cognitive instruments for generating descriptive and predictive statements about observable phenomena rather than as claims about the world that could, themselves, be judged as true or false. The exact nature of what was taken to be the "given" and immediately perceivable observational domain was, however, contested and elusive.

At the apex of its influence, the basic tenets of LP/E were challenged by individuals as diverse in some respects as W. V. O. Quine, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Paul Feyerabend. These criticisms, which focused on the character of scientific theory and its relationship to facts and which called into question the "dogmas of empiricism," were deployed by opponents of the behavioral program in mainstream political science. Although the residue of LP/E remained embedded in much of the language of social science, it had, by the last part of the twentieth century, been largely discredited in philosophy, and social scientists, who had taken their cues from the philosophy of science, suffered something of an identity crisis. Questions were raised not only about the unity of scientific method, but about the extent to which the philosophy of science could, in principle, be a resource for the judging and prescribing of the practice of either natural or social science. The collapse of the hegemony of LP/E in philosophy has not been followed by the emergence of another clearly dominant school of thought, but scientific realism is one of the principal contenders in philosophy. Although empiricism, because of its emphasis on observable facts, has sometimes been equated with realism, contemporary scientific realism is defined in part by its rejection of the empiricist account of scientific theory. The LP/E depreciation of the status of theory was, early on, criticized by Vladimir Lenin, who also argued that the focus on sensory experience, as the interface between observers and observed, threatened to devolve into a form of idealism. Realists sometimes claim that their rendition of the logic of science is itself a kind of empirical hypothesis that is supported by the practical success, and progress, of science in explaining, predicting, and controlling natural *events*.

Realism and Antirealism

Philosophical realism is opposed by versions of antirealism that, while also unsympathetic to traditional empiricism, are skeptical of the metaphysical premises of realism as well as the epistemological claim that the truth of scientific theories, and the doctrine of realism itself, is demonstrated by the history and practice of science. Although realists often claim that their account reflects the assumptions embodied in the actual practice of science, antirealists, such as Michael Dummett, argue that much of the conduct of natural science is based on antirealist premises. Antirealists do not revert to the idea that theories are merely tools for economically organizing observable facts, and, like realists, they maintain that theories are often actually about unobservable entities. They claim, however, that the truth value of theories is relative to what is considered to be justified belief in a particular context or, like the "constructive empiricism" of Bas van Fraassen,

that good theories are not necessarily true or at least not literally true.

Kuhn is sometimes categorized, and criticized, as an antirealist because of his argument that factual statements are theoretically constituted, but his position, as well as that of individuals such as Richard Rorty and Nelson Goodman, might be best described as theoretical realism. Kuhn rejected theoretical instrumentalism and maintained that what we mean by the "world" inheres in the theories and paradigms of science, and that it makes little sense to speak of an unrepresented world to which scientific concepts ultimately correspond. While most forms of realism remain tied to the basic premises of representational philosophy that pivoted on the problem of how thought and language make contact with an external world, philosophers as diverse in many ways as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson have rejected such a bifurcation of language and the world.

Although LP/E is now obsolescent, it is difficult to assess exactly where the current weight of opinion resides in the philosophy of science and where the lines are to be drawn as far as parsing the arguments within and between versions of realism and antirealism. The decline of LP/E has, however, prompted a search within the social sciences for a new metatheory. This may be somewhat ironic in view of the fact that, apart from the arguments of Popper, little of the literature in the philosophy of science has been advanced as a metatheoretical foundation for scientific practice. The normative tone of the literature of LP/E may have belied the claim of individuals such as Hempel that their goal was neither to judge nor instruct scientific practice, but, today, most philosophers of science do not present their work as a model for informing practice. In some instances, the advocacy of realism in social science has been in the service of a critique of the residual influence of LP/E, but one of the principal goals has been to establish the explanatory and normative cognitive authority of social science with respect to claims about its subject matter. At the same time, it has been concerned with countering what some believe are the inhibiting relativistic or "constructivist" implications of arguments such as that of Kuhn, which are viewed as undercutting the foundations of metapractical criteria of truth.

Philosophy of Social Sciences

Part of the challenge to positivism in social science emanated from the work of individuals such as Peter Winch, who challenged claims about the unity of science and argued for the logical autonomy of both social phenomena and social scientific inquiry. These arguments, however, like that of Kuhn, called into question, at least implicitly, the epistemic privilege of metapractices such as philosophy and social science. As a response to this contest between what is sometimes referred to as *rationalism* and *relativism,* philosophical realism has been invoked in a number of fields, including social science, ethics, literature, and legal theory. The arguments of the philosopher John Searle are typical of these concerns. Although Searle has advanced a detailed account of the unique character of what he designates as mind-dependent social facts, he has insisted that such facts are constructed on the foundation of a mind-independent reality in terms of which they can be both explained and judged. Two principal, and related, examples of the turn to realism in political inquiry are the work of those who endorse what is often referred to as *critical realism* and those who wish to adopt realism as a metatheory of *international relations*.

Critical Realism

Critical realism arose in opposition to various intellectual currents that seemed to threaten the idea of reality as transcendental datum. So, for example, the term *critical realism* was coined in the early twentieth century by the American philosopher Roy Wood Sellars, whose naturalistic image of science was formulated in opposition to nineteenth-century idealism. The phrase is still used to refer to a general contemporary philosophical argument, but in social theory, "critical realism," in its various incarnations, involves the search for a metatheory devoted to explaining and evaluating social phenomena in terms of the existence of unobservable structures, generative mechanisms, and underlying causal relations. In some cases, this approach builds on the Marxist tradition of structural explanation that, as in the case of Lenin, invoked a realist philosophy of science to underwrite the truth of dialectical materialism, as well as entailed claims about exposing ideological

false consciousness. Although critical realism often seeks support from the literature of scientific realism, much of contemporary critical realism is philosophically eclectic. It is often less a one-dimensional defense of ontological realism than an attempt to reconcile contending postpositivist epistemologies to account for both agency and structure, and yet retains a critical perspective that many believe has been undermined by trends such as postmodernism. Commentators such as Christopher Norris have been adamant in defending realism and the authority of social theory.

One prominent and influential version of critical realism, which has developed into an institutional academic movement, is closely associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar. Stressing the need to take account of both the epistemological and ontological dimensions of social inquiry, he insisted on the ontological independence and reality of the objects of science and their knowability, but also emphasized the contingent and socially situated nature of knowledge. This explanatory project was linked with and informed by a critical and normative goal. Bhaskar has drawn on a wide range of metatheoretical claims, ranging from the philosophy of science to hermeneutics, in order to formulate a program of critical inquiry devoted to a general project of "human emancipation." Although Bhaskar acknowledges the contribution of arguments such as that of Kuhn, which stress the inseparability of scientific concepts and the "world," he criticizes what he claims are its subjectivist and idealist implications and the inability of this approach to adequately explain transformations in science. He defends a form of "metaphysical realism" as a transcendental assumption that would sustain particular claims to knowledge and provide a basis for critical social inquiry.

In political science, and particularly in the study of international relations, the concept of realism often evokes a reference to the work of individuals such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, who have advanced substantive arguments about the nature of politics that have emphasized power, the pursuit of self-interest, the role of the state, and the anarchical character of the international political system. This, however, should not be confused with contemporary efforts to bring the philosophy of scientific realism and critical realism to bear as a metatheory for the study of international politics.

The Study of International Relations

The application of scientific realism to the study of international relations is, in part, devoted to a critique of instrumentalist accounts of theory. Instrumentalist premises informed the common assumption that social scientific theories were basically somewhat arbitrary conceptual frameworks that were, in themselves, neither true or false nor incompatible, but rather tools to be judged by their utility for generating empirical generalizations that could be tested by reference to observational data. In the case of international relations, as in the case of other aspects of political science, instrumentalist assumptions had become deeply embedded in the field and its various research strategies. Proponents of realism argue for assigning an ontological status to political phenomena and stress explanation in terms of theoretically posited structural causes. Some scholars, such as Alexander Wendt, who have attempted to adapt scientific realism to the study of international relations, treat structure and agency as mutually constitutive rather than insisting on the irreducibility and primacy of structure in the production of social relations. Realist arguments, however, are often coupled with an attack on alternative philosophies of science and especially the current popularity of constructivist approaches to the study of politics that are often associated with assumptions related to the work of Kuhn and various forms of postmodernism and poststructuralism. *Constructivism*, however, much like realism itself, whether self-ascribed or pejoratively deployed, is less the name of a definite philosophical position than a categorical designation encompassing claims to the effect that reality is less a given datum than a function of interpretive frames deployed by both social actors and social scientists.

Much of the discussion about the adoption of philosophical realism in the study of international relations distinctly manifests some persistent problems in the relationship between political inquiry and the philosophy of science. There is typically an intellectual lag between what is happening in philosophy and the echo of philosophical debates that reverberates in the discourse of social science. At the very point, for example, at which realism might be construed as reaching its peak in social theory, its popularity is arguably on the wane in philosophy. Even Putnam, formerly a hard-core

realist and representationalist, has, in the course of a generation, gravitated to internal realism, which closely resembled antirealism, and finally to an embrace of Wittgenstein and what Putnam refers to as "natural" or "pragmatic" realism that entails a rejection of the assumption that it is meaningful to speak of a transcendent reality that both constrains and supports the formulations of science. There are also difficulties revolving around the extent to which social scientists adequately interpret the content and purpose of the literature in the philosophy of science and sufficiently discriminate among various positions. Finally, there is the persistent issue of the general relationship between philosophy and scientific practice, as well as that of the application of the philosophy of natural science to social scientific inquiry.

John G. Gunnell

See also Agency; Anti-Foundationalism; Constructivism; Critical Theory; Empiricism; Explanation; Marxism; Ontology; Philosophy of Social Sciences; Positivism; Power; Realism; Science of Politics; Social Constructivism; Structure

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Scottish Enlightenment

Although authors in the eighteenth century never referred to a *Scottish Enlightenment,* this term has been used since at least 1900 to refer to the significant intellectual flourishing that occurred in Scotland from the union with England in 1707 through the end of the eighteenth century. Having given up its independence and remaining among the poorest nations in Western Europe, eighteenth-century Scotland nonetheless produced such important thinkers as David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Thomas Reid, Francis Hutcheson, John Millar, Henry Home (Lord Kames), William Robertson, James Boswell, Robert Burns, James Watt, Joseph Black, and James Hutton. The achievements of natural scientists such as Hutton and Black, engineers such as Watt, and literary figures such as Boswell and Burns are among the most important of the Scottish Enlightenment. Political theory today owes most to the groundbreaking work of eighteenth-century Scottish authors in the broad field then known as "moral philosophy." Smith, Hume, Ferguson, and their contemporaries profoundly shaped not only what is now known as moral philosophy, but also much of what is now known as the social sciences and humanities.

The authors of the Scottish Enlightenment were generally personally acquainted with one another, and often united by ties of friendship. Friendship, however, does not imply intellectual agreement. To the contrary, even close friends such as Hume and Smith had serious divergences, and their disagreements with other Scottish luminaries of their time were even more pronounced. Rather than being identified with a set of substantive conclusions, the moral philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment is better understood as a set of debates on issues of common interest utilizing common methods of inquiry. Universities, gentlemen's clubs, intellectual societies, the Presbyterian Kirk, the legal system, and a vibrant press provided the institutional setting for this intellectual exchange. While related to larger discussions taking place throughout the rest of Britain, continental Europe, and North America, the key moral-philosophical debates of the Scottish Enlightenment retained a number of distinctive characteristics.

The Empirical Method

Sharp disciplinary divisions were unknown in the Scottish Enlightenment, whose leading authors instead took a holistic approach to the broad questions of the day. In order to understand Scottish Enlightenment debates on the topic of moral philosophy, it is therefore necessary to understand Scottish Enlightenment attitudes toward "natural philosophy," or what we would now call natural science. The Scottish moral philosophers explicitly modeled their methods on those of recent natural scientists, most prominently Isaac Newton. They saw their own topics of inquiry as continuous with those of Newton, because broadly moral (i.e., social) phenomena are as much a part of the natural world as physical phenomena and can be examined through analogous empirical methods. The extension of naturalist empiricism to the humanities and social sciences has often been described as the hallmark of the Scottish Enlightenment and contrasted with the aprioristic rationalism that is seen as characteristic of the French and German Enlightenments.

On the title page of his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–1740), Hume introduces his work as "an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects." It is important, however, to avoid two misunderstandings that might arise from this subtitle. First, despite his claim to be "introducing" a new method into moral subjects, Hume makes clear that his approach is not to be understood as wholly original. Instead, he credits John Locke, Anthony Ashley Cooper (Lord Shaftesbury), Bernard Mandeville, and the Reverend Joseph Butler, as well as his Scottish mentor Hutcheson, as the "late philosophers in England who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing" (Hume, 2000, p. 5). Second, it is important not to misunderstand Hume's description of his method as "experimental" because neither Hume nor his predecessors were experimental scientists in a contemporary sense. Rather than thinking of the controlled tests of today's laboratories, Hume instead associates "careful and exact experiments" with the "observation of those particular effects that result from . . . different circumstances and situations" (Hume, p. 5). Because experimentation in general is equated with careful observation, in the case of "moral subjects," experimentation will involve close observation of the broadly moral realm—of the social, psychological, political, economic, as well as narrowly ethical phenomena that make up human life.

Observations of such moral phenomena were often drawn from examination of contemporary societies and introspection into the author's own psyche. Equally, however, they could also be drawn from the full record of human events. Scottish Enlightenment authors thus had a keen interest in historiography as a branch of moral philosophy, producing such monuments of historical scholarship as Hume's *History of England* (1754–1762) and Robertson's *History of Scotland* (1759). On the basis of their observations of social phenomena past and present, Scottish authors generally agreed that one could inductively derive a universally applicable theory of human nature, although the precise contours of this nature were a subject of considerable dispute. Once in possession of an accurate, universally applicable theory of human nature, Enlightenment philosophers believed that they could then move beyond the empirical record to deduce what might have occurred in times and places left undocumented, producing works of what Dugald Stewart called "conjectural history." Examples of such conjectural history included Hume's *Natural History of Religion* (1757) and Smith's "Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages" (published with the third edition of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* in 1767). Some, such as Ferguson, questioned the reliability of much of this conjectural history, but even Ferguson himself included considerable conjectural material alongside the empirical elements of his *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767).

Despite their emphasis on the importance of empirical observation and what may be justifiably conjectured on the basis of this observation, no author of the Scottish Enlightenment limited himself to mere description of social phenomena in the manner of later, value-neutral social scientists. Even Hume—now famous for his sharp distinction between "is" statements and "ought" statements—argued that accurate empirical description must be put in the service of informing normative evaluation and ultimately improving the conditions of society. While their opposition to revolutionary social change has led many to see the Enlightenment Scots as politically conservative when compared to their more radical French contemporaries, few

deny that the Scottish Enlightenment was infused with a commitment to practical reform.

Metaethics and the Moral Sentiments

Despite the broad scope of what was then known as "moral philosophy," many of the authors of the Scottish Enlightenment had a central interest in ethics in the narrower sense as well. Most of the moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment were united in their opposition to Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville's position that morality is the self-interested invention of atomized individuals. Despite their common belief in the natural sociability of humanity, however, the authors of the era were divided on what might now be called questions of metaethics. In keeping with the general empiricist spirit of the Scottish Enlightenment, metaethics was not treated as a branch of a priori metaphysics or the philosophy of language, but primarily as a matter of empirical moral psychology. Rather than seeking a transcendental authority for morality or analyzing the nature of moral language, Scottish Enlightenment philosophers instead sought to determine what power or faculty of the human mind is responsible for our natural sociability and the ethical judgments that this sociability requires. The central metaethical debate of the time revolved around whether moral judgment is an activity of the faculty of reason or whether it is instead the work of some form of moral sense or sentiment.

Given the prominence of moral sentimentalists such as Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith, the Scottish Enlightenment as a whole is often associated with the rejection of moral rationalism. Although they differed among themselves as to how precisely the moral sense or sentiments operate, all three of the most prominent moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment agreed that pure reason alone is powerless to discern moral distinctions or motivate moral conduct. Instead, Hutcheson argued that moral judgment is the work of a special sense akin to sight or hearing. Hume and Smith argued that morality is the product of sentiments that draw on the powers of the human mind as a whole—including not just reason, but also imagination, emotion, and, most importantly, the imaginative sharing of emotion that they call *sympathy*. Hume argues that our sympathetic participation in the welfare of our fellows leads us to approve of character traits that are useful or agreeable as virtues, while disapproving of their opposites. In Smith's variation of this view, it is our sympathetic participation in the warranted feelings of others that leads us to approve of these feelings as virtuous and proper, while our failure to share sympathetically in others' unwarranted feelings leads us to disapprove of them. Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith remain the inspiration for sentimentalist positions in moral philosophy and political theory to this day.

Moral sentimentalism, however, was always a minority view during the Scottish Enlightenment. More popular were forms of moral rationalism, often drawing on the earlier rationalist ethics of English philosophers such as the Cambridge Platonists (most prominently Ralph Cudworth), Samuel Clarke, and William Wollaston. In the wake of the sentimentalist critique of these forms of moral rationalism, Scottish philosophers of the "common sense" school sought to defend the doctrine in a more modest form. Foremost among them was Thomas Reid, who argued that the feelings of moral sentiment are a product of moral judgment rather than an integral element of moral judgment itself. As with his responses to Hume in the fields of metaphysics and epistemology, there are considerable parallels between Reid's responses to moral sentimentalism and the even more influential views of Immanuel Kant.

Normative Political Theory and Natural Jurisprudence

The normative political theories developed in the Scottish Enlightenment represented a sharp break with many of the intellectual traditions that had previously dominated European thought on the topic. Hume's adamant rejection of the concept of a social contract represents one of the few times that the controversial philosopher succeeded in convincing the majority of his contemporaries to join him in his views and remains highly influential to this day. Most authors of the Scottish Enlightenment also joined Hume in rejecting civic republicanism in the Machiavellian mold, seeing neo-Roman politics as incompatible with modern commercial society. Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun had earlier attempted to apply the civic republican tradition to the modern Scottish context in his

Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias (1698), but Fletcher's heated opposition to union with England led him to be marginalized by the pro-union philosophers who followed. Although some civic republican themes remain throughout the normative political theory of the Scottish Enlightenment, perhaps most prominently in Ferguson's work, the greatest influence on Scottish political theory at the time was the modern theory of natural law earlier developed on the continent by Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf. The central political debate of the Scottish Enlightenment thus focused on the question of whether natural jurisprudence in Grotius's sense might yield a naturally authoritative theory of political justice, or whether justice must instead be understood as inherently "artificial."

The debate over whether justice is natural or artificial interacted in complicated ways with the debate as to whether morality is a product of reason or sentiment. The majority who believed reason capable of providing authoritative personal morality generally also believed that reason could legislate universally valid natural laws. The moral sentimentalists, however, were more divided. Hutcheson and Smith, in their different ways, both saw justice as a natural outgrowth of human nature. Hutcheson equated justice with benevolence, which is naturally approved of by our moral sense, while Smith saw our commitment to justice as a natural outgrowth of our sympathy with the warranted resentment felt by victims of injustice. Both then went on to outline distinctively sentimentalist versions of natural jurisprudence. Hume, by contrast, argued that justice could not be the direct product of our moral sentiments, because strict justice often requires behavior that these sentiments are naturally prone to condemn. Justice, in his view, instead involves obedience to artificial social conventions. Yet in contrast to later "social constructivists," who sometimes argue that the artificiality of our practices is reason to doubt their authority, Hume argued that the conventions of justice are to be treated as morally obligatory by virtue of their indispensable utility.

Political Science and Political Economy

Although Hume devoted an influential essay to the question of whether "politics may be reduced to a science," the authors of the Scottish Enlightenment devoted surprisingly few works exclusively to what we would now recognize as descriptive political science. This is not to say that authors of the period were uninterested in the topic. To the contrary, under the influence of the baron de Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* (1748), Scottish authors devoted ever-increasing energy to descriptive political questions. In keeping with the interdisciplinary tenor of the period, however, the empirically observed regularities of political life were woven into larger works on history, ethics, jurisprudence, and, most importantly, political economy. Adam Smith is famous for his centrality to the emergence of the last of these disciplines, but other Scottish Enlightenment authors, such as Hume and Sir James Steuart, played important roles as well.

In contrast to many economists today, the political economists of the Scottish Enlightenment paid considerable attention to the way that markets are embedded within larger sociopolitical structures. Smith and his contemporaries emphasized how the modern commercial economy was the contingent product of broader historical developments, in which universal psychological principles guided human beings through an evolving series of social contexts. Smith influentially argued that there are four primary stages in the development of human societies, each determined by the dominant form of economic activity: first the age of hunters, second the age of shepherds, third the age of agriculture, and fourth the age of commerce. Variations on this stadial theory of development are then found in the works of Ferguson, Millar, and Kames, among many others. Although none of these authors departed from the Scottish Enlightenment consensus that the fundamental psychological principles of human nature are basically constant, all argued that the social, political, and economic generalizations that accurately capture the reality of one stage of human development cannot be applied directly to other, different stages. This aspect of the political economy of the Scottish Enlightenment was to have more influence in the later development of sociology, anthropology, and political science than on that of economics. Yet one would be hard-pressed to find a field across any of the humanities or social sciences today that does

not bear some traces of ideas first developed in eighteenth-century Scotland.

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See also Civil Society; Enlightenment; Ferguson, Adam; Hume, David; Passions; Rationality; Smith, Adam

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Secession

The term *secession* is normally employed to refer to a situation where a community breaks away from its present state and founds its own independent state that then has jurisdiction over the territory that is said to belong to the seceding community. There have been numerous instances of secession. The early 1990s, for example, saw the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia as many national communities seceded to form their own states. Other minority groups in other parts of the world (including some Basques, some Quebecois, and some Scots) continue to make the case for secession. South Ossetia has sought to secede from Georgia, but this has not been recognized by many other states. Of course, further back in history, 11 southern states in the United States attempted to secede from the Union, leading to the American Civil War.

These cases raise the question of whether secession is justified and, if so, when. A number of different arguments have been made for secession.

Some have provided individualist arguments for secession. Harry Beran, for example, starts from a commitment to individual liberty. On his view, people have rights over themselves and it follows from this that they can choose to secede and form a new state. Some find this argument unpersuasive. They agree that liberty is a fundamental value, but they deny that this entails that people may secede. Rather, they hold, it entails that the existing state has a duty to uphold people's individual rights and hence is legitimate insofar as it entrenches liberal rights.

A second type of argument for secession appeals to the ideal of national self-determination. Why should we value national self-determination? The fullest modern defense comes from David Miller in *On Nationality* (1995). Miller argues that for many people, membership of their nation is an important good and hence enabling national self-determination furthers their well-being. He further argues that people value group freedom, and so for this reason they may also value national self-determination. In addition to these two arguments, Miller also argues that political institutions function better where their members have a sense of solidarity with one another and that because nationality provides this sense of solidarity, it is better to have nation-states than multinational states. Now if these arguments are persuasive, then one might argue that the good of national self-determination provides a case for secession.

The first two types of argument have maintained that a community is entitled to secede even if its current state is not treating it an unjust way. A third type of argument for secession takes a different tack and argues that secession can be justified because, and to the extent that, it is the best way of protecting the fundamental rights of a persecuted minority. Some argue, for example, that East Pakistan's secession from Pakistan in 1971 to form Bangladesh can be justified on the grounds that it was needed to protect the rights of those in East Pakistan.

A strong version of this third approach is defended by Allen Buchanan in his important

work on secession and, in particular, in his *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination* (2004). Buchanan's approach has two distinctive and interesting features. First, he argues that secession is justified only if it is needed to prevent one state treating a group within it unjustly. If a state treats its members fairly, then they do not, in Buchanan's view, have a right to secede. Buchanan terms this a "Remedial Right-Only Theory" (2004, p. 350 and following). Buchanan terms the earlier individualist and nationalist arguments "Primary Right Theories" (2004, p. 350 and following) because they, unlike the Remedial Right-Only Theory, affirm a basic right to secede even where there is no current injustice. Second, Buchanan argues that our focus should not be on whether states are morally entitled to secede but rather on whether international law should be constructed so as to allow groups to secede or not.

Many resist the case for secession. A number of different objections are made. First, some object that secession may lead to the unjust treatment of minorities within the newly created state. Nationalist movements that secede, it is argued, often wish to create a strong sense of national unity within their state and this can lead to the unfair or illiberal treatment of new minorities. Second, some object that to allow groups to secede is problematic because it is often hard to define the members of the group in question. Furthermore, they argue, it is hard to specify who should and who should not be included in any democratic decision determining who is entitled to secede. Third, and related to this last point, many argue that allowing secession results in instability and can fuel conflict.

Proponents of secession often respond that while these are forceful concerns, they do not entail a complete repudiation of secession because there will be some secessions that will result in neither injustice nor instability. On this view, the concerns raised are relevant not because they refute the case for secession, but because they should inform our understanding of when secession is justified.

Drawing on this, some argue that secessions can be justified only if they do not lead to persecution and injustice and only if they do not destabilize other legitimate states. Some might add to this that secessions may be permissible only if they do not lead to greater injustice within the original state. Finally, many would add that secession can be permissible only if there is an equitable distribution of resources between the new state and the state from which it is seceding. This raises some thorny questions: Who owns the natural resources contained within the territory of the seceding group? What principles of justice should govern the distribution of the benefits created by their association in the past? Such issues cannot be avoided, and an adequate theory of secession must address them, along with the other conditions.

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See also Global Justice; Multiculturalism; Nationalism

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Sen, Amartya (1933–)

Amartya Sen is one of the most influential contemporary economists. His work spans a range of disciplines, including political and moral philosophy, social choice theory, development studies, and welfare economics. Sen has written on famines, theories of justice, democracy, freedom and liberties,

classical and neoclassical economics, development, identity and conflict, the history of ideas, and many more topics. In 1998, he was awarded the Nobel memorial prize in economics. Outside academia, his ideas have greatly shaped the human development approach, a development paradigm that advocates a shift from a narrow economic definition of development to a focus on all constitutive dimensions of the well-being of human beings.

Sen was born in Santiniketan, India, on November 3, 1933. He spent much of his first formative years at the progressive school of Rabindranath Tagore, the 1913 Nobel Laureate in Literature. As a child, Sen witnessed a deadly case of communal violence, which has had a formative influence on him. He saw how a Muslim daily laborer, who had come to a predominantly Hindu area to look for work, was murdered. This childhood experience has made him aware of the dangers of narrowly defined identities, but also of how extreme poverty can make a person vulnerable in other areas of human freedom, such as those of moving around safely. Although in the first decade of his academic career he would focus more on technical subjects, especially social choice theory, his later work would be devoted primarily to issues of poverty, inequality, development, democratic pluralism, and related topics.

Sen studied economics at Cambridge University. His doctoral dissertation was published in 1960 under the title *Choice of Techniques*. Sen has stayed all his life in academia, and worked at Trinity College in Cambridge, MIT, the Delhi School of Economics, the London School of Economics, Oxford University, and Harvard University, where he currently has appointments in both the economics and the philosophy departments.

The publication of Kenneth Arrow's famous impossibility theorem prompted his interest in social choice theory. Arrow had shown that all possible voting systems will violate some elementary norms of democracy. Sen considered social choice theory to be concerned with fundamental political-philosophical questions, because it tried to answer how, in a society with a wide diversity of views and preferences, collective decision making could be done in a justified and legitimate way. Put slightly more technically, Sen was intrigued by the question how individual preferences could be aggregated into a collective decision, without creating paradoxes or inconsistencies, and thus leading to what social choice theorists call impossibility results. His classical book *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* builds on Arrow's pioneering work and includes an analysis of the conditions under which the majority rule does not lead to indecisive outcomes. For his work in welfare economics, and social choice theory in particular, Sen was awarded the Nobel memorial prize in economics in 1998.

Another important area of Sen's work is the analysis of justice, poverty, and inequality. In this field, Sen has contributed both to the advancement of measurement problems, to philosophical issues, and to empirical research. He proposed a new poverty measure, which was not only taking into account the number of people living below the poverty line, but also how deeply they are living in poverty and the distribution of poverty in the population. He also contributed to the technical literature in welfare economics that is concerned with inequality measures. While most economists limited their poverty and inequality measurement to one-dimensional metrics (like income or expenditures), Sen emphasized the need to rethink the implicit normative assumptions behind these mainstream methods. He argued against the equation of economic inequality with material or income inequality, arguing instead that our focus should be on what people are genuinely able to do and be, which he labeled their "capabilities." In the area of theories of justice, Sen argued that capabilities provide a better metric of justice than the social primary goods that John Rawls proposed. By now Sen's work on the capability approach has become popular among academics across the humanities and social sciences as a framework for inequality, justice, development, and poverty analyses.

In his book *Development as Freedom,* Sen used the capability approach as the general framework to argue for a complex, multidimensional, and noneconomistic approach to development. That view has also been taken up by the United Nations Development Reports, which annually conduct an analysis of the progress made by countries in the world in terms of people's capabilities, rather than just a country's economic growth. The capability approach thus had a major practical impact, through its translation in the human development

approach and the policy research done by the United Nations offices throughout the world.

Already in the 1970s, Sen was a famous and respected economist. He has used his status both within and outside academia to draw attention to causes that he cared much about. One such cause was women's position in society, especially in societies where their position is extremely bad. He estimated that in Asia more than 100 million women are "missing," in the sense that there are at least 100 million fewer females alive than there would be if there were no human bias against women, girls, and female fetuses. Sen has also written about the importance of democracy for development, and has argued against the alleged tension between democracy and economic development. More recently he has written on the politics of identities, whereby he argues for the recognition of the multiple identities that people can have, and for the view that people have considerable choice over their identities. Sen has stated that he knew from early on in his life that he did not believe in the existence of God, and has strongly defended religious tolerance, especially in societies where the government tries to establish one religion in a dominant position.

Justice, human diversity, democratic debates, helping the most vulnerable, and respect for people's liberties and freedoms are just some of the major themes in Sen's work. While he started out as an economist, Sen gradually transformed into a truly all-around scholar whose work stretches across the social sciences and the humanities. At the end of 2008, he celebrated his 75th birthday, announcing that in 2009 he would publish a new book, *The Idea of Justice*.

Ingrid Robeyns

See also Democracy; Development; Justice, Theories of; Liberty; Rawls, John

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Separation of Powers

The *separation of powers* is the principle of political philosophy and constitutionalism that distributes governmental power among branches to limit power and secure liberty, and to promote good government through a division of labor. Its familiar form distinguishes legislative, executive, and judicial branches in liberal democracies. It is related to other Western constitutional principles, including the mixed regime, balanced constitution, and checks and balances. Separation of powers defines *presidential* more than *parliamentary* systems, because the former separate legislative and executive powers while the latter fuse them. However, separation is important even in parliamentary constitutions, which typically include a judiciary and agencies or civil service bodies independent of parliament and cabinet. The view that justice requires prevention of the concentration of power, security for individual and communal liberty, and competence through distributing distinct functions to distinct branches is now basic to many forms of constitutional democracy and free politics. However, the principle faces challenges from the rise of mass democracy, modern parties, and the administrative or bureaucratic state.

The principle of dividing power for both negative reasons (to prevent concentration and abuse) and positive ones (to achieve balance in a complex order and a division of labor) stems from classical and medieval philosophy. Aristotle's *Politics* (fourth century BCE) praises functional separation into the deliberative body (legislative), offices (magistrates), and courts. Polybius, in his *Universal History* (second century BCE), praises Rome's republican constitution for mixing monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy in its array of consuls and magistrates, the senate, and tribunes of the people and popular assemblies. In the medieval era, Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century CE) endorses a mixed constitution, with a monarch balanced by aristocratic offices and courts but with the people

electing all. English common law jurists such as Sir John Fortescue (fifteenth century CE) advocated a royal-and-political constitution in which the monarch rules under law and shares power with other bodies to secure justice and prevent tyranny. During the English Civil War and constitutional conflicts of the seventeenth century, the critics of royal absolutism developed the common law tradition and earlier models by advocating a clear separation of legislature (the commons and lords) and monarch, while some characterized these three bodies as a proper balance of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.

The modern liberal philosophers John Locke and the baron de Montesquieu drew on these ideas when affirming the rule of law, and a constitution organizing distinct offices, as indispensable conditions of a just and limited government. However, their new versions of a distribution of powers emphasize the securing of rights or liberty. Locke's *Second Treatise* (1690) formulates a mostly negative theory that the legislative and executive powers (the latter coupled with a "federative" power for foreign affairs and war) must be separate to prevent concentration of power and threats to individual rights. Locke prescribes a leading role for a unicameral legislature given its root in popular consent, but also emphasizes executive prerogative to address domestic or foreign contingencies outside of stated rules. The inevitable conflict between two such powers, coupled with Locke's principle of a popular right of revolution, does not prize stability and balance as had the ancient, medieval, and common law models.

Montesquieu, in *The Spirit of Laws* (1748), draws on Locke but also earlier Western principles to develop a complex separation of powers that seeks liberty and moderation. This guided the framers of America's constitution and provides the tripartite form familiar today. One of Montesquieu's innovations is an independent judiciary that protects individual liberty by preventing legislative or executive violations of rights. Generally, he argues that if any power exercises another—the legislative by executing its laws or judging cases at law, the executive by making laws or adjudicating them, or judges either making laws or enforcing them—then liberty is threatened, because interest and power would overwhelm rule by law. Human nature is such that even virtue needs limits and even the most qualified must share power. Thus, Montesquieu also introduces legislative bicameralism and federalism to the theory—the latter a vertical separation to complement the horizontal one within a government—and also the partial sharing of powers now called checks and balances (e.g., executive veto of legislation). He nonetheless retains something of the traditional, positive view that distinct functions are better performed if separated, particularly executive and judicial power. He also analyzed parties and factional thinking as consequences of a complex constitution, describing the benefits and perils for both individuals and society of such a system of liberty.

Montesquieu's conception influenced American thought both directly and through the jurist Sir William Blackstone. The latter's *Commentaries* (1765–1769) was the basic authority on law in America through the nineteenth century and cites Montesquieu when declaring liberty the first principle of a just constitutional order, with a complex form its indispensable means. However, the debate over the 1787 Constitution pushed its advocates to develop a fuller theory of separating powers, functions, and office holders. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, in *The Federalist* (1788), elucidate the principle itself ("Federalist 47"–"Federalist 51") by explaining how separation paradoxically requires some sharing of powers (to check and balance), and how separation complements both freedom for factional interests and federalism to produce a complex, contentious system of liberty. Subsequent essays on the senate ("Federalist 62"–"Federalist 66"), executive ("Federalist 67"–"Federalist 77"), and judiciary ("Federalist 78"–"Federalist 83") expound the need for constitutional spaces to foster sober legislating, statesmanlike execution, and professional adjudication. Publius includes the innovation of judicial review in this positive conception, and generally defends the not-so-democratic elements that moderate majority tyranny and short-range, populist policies.

Critics since the late nineteenth century (e.g., Walter Bagehot and Woodrow Wilson) argue that separation of powers produces gridlock and disunity, is unresponsive to democratic opinion and progress, and resists the efficiencies of modern administration. Many political scientists praise the fusion of powers in parliamentary party governments or bureaucracies, or argue

that America's Constitution has been pragmatically but not formally amended to adopt fusions that promote equality and progress. However, Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1835) is widely admired today for its insights into the strengths and pitfalls of modern democracy, and he praises a separated constitution for fostering citizen participation and liberty, a thriving civil society, and protection of individual rights, while he warns against a centralized, efficient state responsive to democratic pressures for equality and progress. Tocqueville does diagnose maladies of the modern liberty promoted by a separated constitutionalism, but recommends moderating these rather than adopting a new order.

Paul O. Carrese

See also American Founding; Common Law; Constitutionalism; Liberty; Locke, John; Montesquieu, Baron de; Publius; Tocqueville, Alexis de

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Shari'a

In literal terms, *Shari'a* translated from the Arabic means "the path to water." In common usage, it is used to denote Islamic jurisprudence or law. However, as recent scholars like Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl have pointed out, there are some central conflations surrounding the definition of the term and its symbolic versus jurisprudential connotations. This entry examines the meaning of Shari'a, its historical development, and current issues in Islamic jurisprudence.

In representative terms, Shari'a is the symbol for the collective effort of Muslims to understand what God wants from human beings. It is this symbolic aspect of Shari'a that is operative in the idea of the Muslim community, or *ummah,* and is envisioned as the glue that draws the faith community together despite its ethnic and national diversity. In jurisprudential terms, Shari'a points to the use of a particular science of jurisprudence *(fiqh)* to arrive at the discernment of Divine Will. Distinguishing between these two aspects of Shari'a is crucial in evading a conflation that has been exploited politically throughout Islamic history in an effort to lend legitimacy to various legal or political systems. The first symbolic aspect of Shari'a requires a consensus in the belief by all Muslims. The second aspect, however, the particular application of the *fiqh* and the determination of matters using both human and divine sources, has always been a point of contention among Muslims and is reflected in the plurality of jurisprudential methods and opinion.

In jurisprudential terms, Shari'a differs from Western systems of law in that pronouncements made through the application of Islamic jurisprudential method have both a transcendent and an empirical significance. While there are disagreements on the specifics of rulings, Islamic legal scholars agree that the edicts of Shari'a are generally believed to be binding on all Muslims. In this sense, the pronouncements of the Muslim jurist represent the interface between the eternal and the temporal.

Within the framework of Islamic law, the divine sources of Shari'a are the Qur'an and the Sunnah, the latter being the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. *Ijma,* or scholarly consensus regarding these sources, was a corollary to these divine sources. Human sources of Shari'a include *qiyas,* or analogical reasoning, and *ijtihad,* or individual intellectual effort. In addition to these human sources, the role of local custom, or *urf,* is varyingly acknowledged by various Islamic scholars as a basis of legal decision making when it does not contravene principles available through the other sources.

History of Islamic Jurisprudence

Records of the development of Islamic legal history have not generally been developed in tandem with

the social and political contexts in which they developed, owing perhaps to the conceptualization of Shari'a as an amorphous metaphysical ideal existing independently of the historical context. In the early Medinite Caliphate, most disputes were resolved by the Prophet Muhammad himself. Following his death, in the time of Caliphs Abu-Bakr, Umar, Usman, and Ali, most disputes were again resolved by the ruler, a task that was made possible both by the proximity of the Caliphs to the revelations of the Qur'an and to the Prophet and the small size of the Muslim community itself. During this time, if Qur'anic injunctions on a matter did not exist, customary law was used to fill in the chasm. In some cases, even when Qur'anic injunctions did exist, principles of equity were applied by the caliph when he felt the contextual rules specified in the Qur'an did not apply. The Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE) was the first to establish actual administrators or Qazis for dispute resolution as the expanding Islamic Empire, including Persian and other non-Arab subjects, required greater administrative governance. The Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258 CE) saw even more territorial expansion, resulting in the systematization of Islamic law in response to the growing needs of a global empire and the diversity of its subjects. The four Sunni schools of thought, Maliki, Hanafi, Shafii, and Hanbali, were named after the four eminent jurists around whose work they developed. Also emerging during this time were the Shi'a schools of jurisprudence and the Jafari and Zaidi schools, which achieved the most prominence.

During the Abbasid Caliphate and extending later into the Ottoman Empire, Islamic jurisprudence saw the development of an independent jurist class that both legitimized and served as a check on executive power. However, with the official end of the caliphate in 1924 and the arrival of colonial powers in most Muslim lands, the power and intellectual vibrancy of this class was severely eroded. Over the years that followed, many Muslim countries opted for secular, Western-style legal systems leading to the stagnation of Islamic law and the devolution of the jurist class as an independent cadre to check executive power.

Contemporary Developments

In recent history, many postcolonial states such as Pakistan, Sudan, and Somalia declared themselves to be Islamic states. Islamic jurisprudence or Shari'a was thus put to the service of a variety of nationalistic and political causes. The use of Shari'a as a means of legitimizing political power with an emaciated jurist class led in turn to the subordination of jurisprudence to political power. Of particular note have been efforts of fundamentalist groups to present Shari'a as an antimodern system, devoid of method and plurality and based only on literal application of Qur'anic injunctions. These efforts have been challenged by emerging Islamic scholars who recognize the need for reinvigorating the intellectual diversity and methodological acuity of Islamic jurisprudence.

Muslim communities around the world are currently engaged in varied debate regarding the role of Shari'a within the state and its implications for democratic systems of governance. Of particular interest to theorists are intersections where ideas and theories of multiculturalism meet with claims for accommodation of Shari'a tribunals in the United Kingdom and Canada. The work of Muslim female scholars to interpret Shari'a in a way that retains the legitimizing methodology of tradition while renouncing the patriarchal influences of culture is another area worthy of further study for political theorists.

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See also Colonialism; Common Law; Comparative Political Theory; Islamism; Multiculturalism

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Sidgwick, Henry (1838–1900)

Henry Sidgwick was a Victorian-era British philosopher, political economist, parapsychologist, and educational reformer who played a seminal role in both the academic organization of Cambridge University and the growth of modern academic ethical and political theory, particularly utilitarian ethical and political theory. He has been widely credited with enhancing the professionalism of academic higher education and with opening up educational opportunities for women. He has also been widely credited with providing the philosophy of classical utilitarianism—the ethical and political philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill, which made the normative bottom line the greatest happiness of the greatest number—with a sophisticated, comprehensive, and academically satisfying statement, especially in his major work, *The Methods of Ethics* (1974). Highly influential political philosophers of recent decades, notably John Rawls and Peter Singer, have, for all their disagreements, agreed on taking Sidgwick's classic work as a touchstone for their own projects, which can often be helpfully classified by how they either continue or oppose the positions set out in Sidgwick's *Methods*.

Foundational Questions

Sidgwick was clearly a brilliant, skeptical, and ethically scrupulous individual, and these traits are evident in his major works and many essays and reviews. He had a markedly successful education at Rugby and Trinity College in Cambridge, where he excelled in both classics and mathematics, joined the famous discussion society known as the "Apostles" and early on became a Fellow and Lecturer, though his career trajectory suffered a certain temporary inconvenience when he resigned his Fellowship in protest over the requirement that he take an oath accepting the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. By the early 1860s, he had grown profoundly skeptical of the orthodox Christianity that he had imbibed from his first mentor (and brother-in-law), E. W. Benson, who would become Archbishop of Canterbury. Cambridge University devised ways to harbor Sidgwick while he harbored his doubts, and in due course, as the times caught up with him, he was made Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy.

Still, Sidgwick's religious skepticism would prove to be painful to him in the extreme, and most of his deepest intellectual and scholarly commitments were at least in part attempts to address such skepticism and the future decline in religious culture that it suggested.

Thus, the *Methods,* although cast as an impartial, dispassionate, scholarly inquiry into the comparative merits of the leading ethical approaches, or "methods," by which people reason about how they ought to act (common-sense or intuitional morality, egoism, and utilitarianism), was also, to Sidgwick's mind, an important effort to discover compelling secular rational grounds for morality, acceptable to reason independently of religious orientation. Deeply impressed with the successes of science from Isaac Newton to Charles Darwin, Sidgwick hoped that philosophical inquiry might adopt something more akin to the scientific outlook, with a greater commitment to impartial search, as opposed to the promulgation of standing moral and religious positions—something that he rightly regarded as hampering the growth of philosophy as an academic discipline. But he also hoped that such impartial inquiry would produce some compelling results, foundations to replace the crumbling religious ones. In this he was disappointed.

It is in fact one of the great paradoxes of Sidgwick's *Methods* that, although he personally identified himself as a utilitarian, and although the description of utilitarianism in Book 4 of that work is commonly taken as the best statement of the position ever, Sidgwick did not think or claim that he had succeeded in providing his favored view with the needed epistemological or rational defense. To his satisfaction, his impartial inquiry had demonstrated how the utilitarian position could absorb and explain the precepts of common-sense or intuitional morality: such familiar prohibitions as "don't steal," "don't lie," and "don't murder" obviously have great utilitarian value. The way to realize the greatest happiness in society would often be indirect, with the bulk of the people in most circumstances deploying decision procedures involving the common-sense precepts, rather than trying to calculate the consequences in each case for the greatest happiness. The more fundamental

utilitarian principle was needed for—and its deeper justification made evident by—problem cases or dilemmas involving conflicts between such precepts, conflicts that, to Sidgwick's mind, pointed to how most people are unconscious utilitarians, ready to adopt that principle at the more fundamental level. But, to his consternation, he could not persuade himself that any of his arguments could defeat the rational egoist. After all, why is it always and only rational to promote, directly or indirectly, the greatest happiness of all, instead of one's own greatest happiness? Why take "the point of view of the Universe," in which one is just one source of value in addition to all the others with equal claim?

The *Methods* is a work that details the most basic principles or candidate axioms for all of these seemingly rival views with remarkable care. Unlike Bentham or the Mills, Sidgwick adopted the epistemology of utilitarianism's common-sense or intuitional rivals, seeking to find the key axioms embedded in each "method" that, by virtue of being clear and distinct, coherent with other justified axioms, and capable of producing consensus among rational inquirers, might make a plausible claim to self-evidence, or at least apparent self-evidence. Sidgwick's epistemological intuitionism is somewhat unusual in finding a place for the type of fallibilism more characteristic of empiricist approaches, allowing that even claims to self-evident truth for an ethical axiom needed to be regarded as tentative and subject to revision. His complex and original views on moral epistemology have proved to be fertile ground for conflicting interpretations of his work, with some commentators playing up the foundationalism of his rational intuitionism and others, notably John Rawls and J. B. Schneewind, emphasizing the similarity to a search for "reflective equilibrium," an ongoing critical effort to balance general principles and particular cases in a satisfactory way.

However, many other sides of the *Methods* have also yielded rich harvests of controversy. Sidgwick's detailed account of utilitarianism provided most of the material for future philosophical debates over the meaning and viability of any such view, articulating such key topics as total versus average utility (made conspicuous by the problem of calculating the happiness of future generations and optimal population growth), direct versus indirect approaches (or the utility of acts versus rules versus decision procedures versus attitudes, etc.), and hedonistic versus nonhedonistic value theory. Like Jeremy Bentham, Sidgwick favored a form of hedonism as the best interpretation of the "good" or "welfare," arguing that the best account of ultimate value, the thing utilitarianism should be maximizing, is pleasure or pleasurable/desirable states of consciousness. But unlike Bentham, Sidgwick recognized the force of the criticisms of hedonism coming from ideal or "objective" accounts of the good or welfare, from views such as those of his friend T. H. Green, an early British idealist deeply influenced by German philosophy from Immanuel Kant to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. If Sidgwick was doubtful about how secure the foundations of utilitarianism in general were, with its call to maximize good, he was even more doubtful about how secure the foundations of its value theory were, with its claim that the good was pleasure. And, again unlike Bentham, these doubts were heightened by an acute awareness of the falsity of psychological egoism, or the view that people just did, as a matter of fact, seek to maximize their own pleasure, and of the inadequacies of either invisible or visible hand mechanisms, the market or government, for happily reconciling the conflicts between individual and general happiness. One could say that Sidgwick succeeded in laying bare the fundamental and inescapable normative conflict between pursuing one's own happiness and pursuing the happiness of all, and the confusions swirling around the whole notion of happiness or ultimate value in the first place. He was not happy with his achievement.

Parapsychology

Sidgwick dealt with his most fundamental ethical and religious doubts in a rich array of ingenious ways. He hoped to use the forces of science against science itself, or at least against the more materialistic, antireligious side of science that became prominent in the Darwinian era. Thus, believing that there were grounds for thinking that scientific methods of inquiry might vindicate the reality of telepathy and personal survival of bodily death, he devoted an extraordinary amount of time and energy to parapsychology, or "psychical research,"

in due course becoming a cofounder and founding president of the British Society for Psychical Research. But, despite endless hours spent investigating claims about ghosts, premonitions, and other paranormal phenomena, his skeptical intellect ended up concluding, after many ups and downs, that the evidence was not yet there and that this possible route for reconciling the individual and collective good in the happy hereafter was not as promising as he had at first thought. But historically speaking, it can justifiably be said that whatever intellectual respectability parapsychology has ever had is in significant measure due to Sidgwick and his wife, Eleanor Mildred Balfour (the sister of the future prime minister, Arthur Balfour).

Educational Reform

The Sidgwicks, especially as a couple, were rather more successful with efforts at educational reform. Although Henry did a great deal on his own to improve the Cambridge curriculum, reorganize its structure, and professionalize the academic/professorial role, his crowning achievement as a reformer was the result of his collaboration with his wife in the cause of higher education for women. Continuing the work of one of their great heroes, John Stuart Mill, in challenging the "subjection of women," the Sidgwicks ultimately succeeded in becoming cofounders of Newnham College Cambridge, one of the earliest institutions of higher education for women in England. They devoted time, energy, and their own funds and resources to this institution, which continues to flourish today. With Sidgwick, however, educational reform, like parapsychology, was always done with an eye on the deepest problems that troubled him. Education, after all, might afford another vehicle for independently supporting the ethical life in the future, when the influence of religion declined. Like their friend, George Eliot, the Sidgwicks sought to make the cultivated forms of happiness marking the ethical life attractive in their own right. Significantly, Newnham College was built without a chapel.

Politics and Economics

Sidgwick's secular educational reformism, if not his parapsychology, linked him to his classical utilitarian predecessors, who were also ardent reformers. Moreover, like Bentham and the Mills, but unlike his own students Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, Sidgwick was an ethical and political theorist who was also a first-rate political economist and political scientist, with Alfred Marshall a cofounder of the Cambridge School of Economics. His other major works, which have always been overshadowed by the *Methods,* were *The Principles of Political Economy* (1883) and *The Elements of Politics* (1891), though he also published a concise little primer on the *Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers* (1886) and a collection of essays on *Practical Ethics* (1898), featuring some of his contributions to the ethical culture movement. He also published many essays and reviews, and a number of his works appeared posthumously.

Given his foundational doubts about the meaning and defense of utilitarianism, combined with his own personal commitment to that view, it is perhaps not surprising that the normative side of the *Principles* and the *Elements* does not address such matters but rather simply assumes the utilitarian position from the start. Sidgwick's aim in these works, especially the *Elements,* is mainly to spell out the implications of the utilitarian view for the evaluation and design of political and economic institutions. He does not seriously address these issues from the perspective of the committed rational egoist, though he is keenly aware of the conflicts between individual and general happiness and sharply critical of overly sanguine attempts to ignore the potential for such conflict, even in the best of institutional arrangements. After all, no market society or any other has ever contrived to eliminate, for example, the need for individual sacrifice in time of war. Welfare economics, in the form given it by Edgeworth and Pigou, was very much a reflection of Sidgwick's influence.

Both works in fact share a certain intellectual structure, taking the principle of laissez-faire or free market/individual liberty as an intermediate principle needing a utilitarian defense. But the defense invariably ends up qualifying this form of antipaternalistic individual liberty in a host of ways. Sidgwick appears to have been intimately familiar with the many (now familiar) forms of market failure, from monopoly and oligopoly to negative externalities to collective action problems.

But he was also articulate on the deeper failures of such programs—their failure to recognize their limited applicability to educational and socialization processes or other cases where individuals are scarcely in a position to recognize or pursue their good, their failure to protect vulnerable populations like children, animals, or future generations, and their failure to appreciate the attractions of "ethical socialism," which would have one motivated to work out of a concern to do one's bit for the common good, as part of a cooperative enterprise. He took a high-minded approach to the educative functions of liberal democratic society, thinking that the state could helpfully promote morality via certain educational programs.

Although Sidgwick, in his major works, invariably took great care to distinguish his normative from his descriptive claims, he also made it abundantly clear that the "facts" about human nature and society did not, contrary to ideologues of both left and right, go very far to limit the options for humanity, especially in the future. He was highly skeptical of the generalizations being promoted by the new discipline of sociology, which was spawning wildly ambitious accounts of the laws of human evolution and history. He did think, however, that there was some evidence for a continuing evolution toward greater federation and parliamentary or constitutional democracy, and strongly favored the growth of a cosmopolitan international morality with appropriate standards and institutions for reducing the risk of war. For Sidgwick, utilitarianism meant opposition to Machiavellianism in any form, whether in personal relations or international relations. If he worried intensely about a future bereft of religious comfort and motivation, he also labored assiduously to shape human nature in a way that would maximize the potential for happiness under such circumstances. The leading champions of utilitarianism today continue to invoke his example in defense of everything from animal liberation to economic redistribution to global justice to justice for future generations.

Sidgwick's economic and political work has been subject to widely varying interpretations. He has been called a conservative or Tory elitist, an early part of the progressive media that produced pragmatism, an architect of British imperialism, a champion of classical liberalism, a critic of classical liberalism who helped usher in the welfare state, and more. But the diversity of interpretation surely reflects the complexity of argument. Sidgwick was the type of philosopher and intellectual whose critical intellect was so insistent on seeing all possible sides of every argument that his heart scarcely ever had the opportunity to override his head.

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See also Bentham, Jeremy; British Idealism; Liberalism; Mill, John Stuart; Rawls, John

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Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1748–1836)

Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, known as Abbé Sieyès, was one of the leading propagandists and constitutional theorists of the French Revolution.

Life and Work

Born in southern France in 1748, he was placed by his father (a government official) in a religious career. He enrolled in the Sorbonne in Paris in 1765, where he would remain for the next decade. In 1772, he was ordained a priest and in 1775 was attached as a secretary to a bishop in Brittany. In the 1780s, though lacking a true religious calling, Sieyès made his way up the administrative ladder, becoming a vicar-general in Chartres, a canon of its cathedral (1783), a councilor in the sovereign church chamber (1786), representative of the clergy in the Provincial Assembly of Orléans (1787), and a chancellor in the cathedral chapter of Chartres (1788).

Until he was 40, Sieyès published nothing but read widely and left voluminous manuscripts that have only recently been studied by scholars. Then,

with the country near bankruptcy and the first Estates-General in nearly two centuries looming, he suddenly burst on the scene with three important pamphlets. His anonymous *Essay on Privileges* (August 1788) attacked the French system of statutory privilege and especially the position of the nobility within it. His *Views of the Executive Means Available to the Representatives of France in 1789* (January 1789, most likely), also anonymous, offered a far-reaching argument for the legislative, as opposed to merely consultative, power of the upcoming Estates-General. But it was *What Is the Third Estate?* (January 1789) that made his reputation. Sometimes compared with Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* for its galvanizing effect on the course of events, *What Is the Third Estate?* is both a call to action and a work of theory. It opened a career for Sieyès as a revolutionary constitutional theorist.

Sieyès was elected a member of the Third Estate for the city of Paris in January 1789. In May and June, he presented motions that successfully sought to rename the Estates-General the National Assembly, symbolizing the transformation in the conception of sovereignty that he had done so much to bring about in the first days of the revolution. Also in those early days, he was instrumental in the process of drafting a constitution, in articulating a Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (especially Article 7 on arbitrary arrests), and in replacing the ancient system of provinces and regions with a streamlined territorial division of France.

As the revolution grew more radical, Sieyès took his distance (1791). But in September 1792, he was elected to the National Convention and voted the death penalty for the deposed King Louis XVI in January 1793. With the ascendancy of Maximilien Robespierre and the Reign of Terror (1793–1794), Sieyès retired in dismay from revolutionary activity. After the fall of Robespierre, he returned to government as a member of the Council of 500 under the Directory in 1795, surviving an attempt on his life in 1796. In June 1799, he was made the President of the Directory. But he then collaborated with Napoleon in a coup that overthrew the Directory a few months later, though he was quickly outmaneuvered and became a generally inactive member of the new Senate; Napoleon made him a count under his new hierarchical system in 1808, but by then his career as a constitutional expert was mainly over. Sieyès lived on until 1836 but was not active throughout most of his later years.

Political Theory

What Is the Third Estate? was a robust and frontal attack on the functionalistic theory of the social and political order that had prevailed in most European countries in one form or another from the Middle Ages up to 1789. According to the French version of that theory, society was divided into three groups: those who pray, those who fight, and those who work. These functions defined the social categories that were represented in the national assemblies called "estates general" that the kings convoked from time to time in order to levy taxes and secure support for the wars that were among the principal activities of premodern governments. Those who pray were the clergy or first "estate," those who fight were the nobility or second estate, and those who work were the third estate, more numerous but with less status and dignity than the other two. That theory had seemed increasingly threadbare to commentators throughout the eighteenth century, with the growth in size and complexity of an increasingly commercial and industrial society. Reform proposals of the period had come to focus on more utilitarian and egalitarian considerations of property ownership, rather than on the discharging of these traditional functions, as the proper basis for distributing political power and representation.

But Sieyès took this standard eighteenth-century argument much further. For him, the key fault line in contemporary society was between idle privilege and unprivileged labor. He argued provocatively that the third estate was "everything," and that the privileged orders were entitled to no representation at all. He depicted the nobility as an *imperium in imperii* (a state within a state), and famously invited them to return to the Franconian forests whence they had come. He made an exception for the first estate, to which he belonged, and has accordingly been accused, in his own time and since, of special pleading and hypocrisy on that account. His answer was that there were four legitimate public functions—army, church, law, and government—and that because the clergy fulfilled one of these, their status should be considered

different from that of the nobility. By arguing that the private laws adopted by nobles had effectively removed them from the social contract altogether, his pamphlet was an inspiration for some of the later revolutionary legislation excluding the nobility from the possibility of citizenship. Some commentators have thus blamed him in part for a later revolutionary tradition of "totalitarian democracy," resting on the systematic purging of "social parasites" or "class enemies." Other commentators, however, see Sieyès as the proponent of a kind of "rational liberalism" that is different from both totalitarian democracy and the Anglo-Saxon tradition of cautiously empirical liberalism.

For Sieyès, the nation was rightfully the constituting power, and the Estates-General, called by the king for May 1789, was an opportunity for it to reclaim the role played by an original contract in Sieyès's theory. He envisioned a two-stage process. Individuals come together and agree to create a nation. Then they separately create a political order. Against Hobbesianism, Sieyès asserts that the people do not contract with their government. They contract with each other and vest their united powers in the government they create. Conversely, Sieyès rejected the baron de Montesquieu's notion of the constitution as a description of the inherited rights and duties of a complex and historically evolving polity, preferring something closer to Rousseau's notion of the will of the people. It is for this reason that one of his highest priorities in 1789 was to turn the Estates-General from a representative of inherited interests, whose members were solemnly bound to vote according to the specific instructions of an "imperative mandate," into a new and assertive body that would represent all the French people as individuals—the National Assembly.

It was also Sieyès, more than anyone, who was responsible for replacing the historical legacy of ancient provinces, regions, and communities—each with its unique array of special privileges and agreements with the sovereign power in Versailles—with a streamlined territorial division of France into the system of departments (83, at present) that still exist today. During the turbulent decade of revolution, in fact, he offered a number of different plans on territorial division. Sometimes his emphasis was on achieving electoral balance from the most local level up to the most national, by which each elector would have a uniform share of power relative to the local, regional, and national levels of authority. Sometimes the emphasis was on administrative uniformity, especially in times of upheaval such as the summer of 1789, when the old municipal institutions were breaking down. But always the concern was to provide equal individuals with moderate-sized intermediary bodies between themselves and the government of the nation as a whole. Thus, Sieyès was no Jacobin; he drew a sharp contrast between an excessive concern to unify the country—such as the Jacobins would promote when they came to power in 1793—and his more carefully calibrated attempt at adunation (a term meaning union whose French equivalent he coined).

Relatedly, one of the key ideas associated with the name of Sieyès was the distinction between active and passive citizens. Active citizens were those resident adult males who paid taxes and an annual civic contribution, as a guarantee of their adequate public engagement. This property qualification, though controversial in his time and since, was similar to many reform proposals in the eighteenth century and was not dissimilar to much of liberal theory and practice, chastened as it was by the experience of revolutionary democracy under Robespierre, in the nineteenth century. In addition, Sieyès envisioned liberalizing changes to these requirements with the advance of education and civic experience—especially for suffrage, somewhat less so for eligibility to office.

Perhaps the key novelty in Sieyès's political theory lay in his concept of representation. Here he applied the market-based economic theory of the physiocrats and Adam Smith, whom he had read closely, to a political setting where it had not previously been employed so forcefully. As society grows more complex through time, he argued, men's basic needs come to be met increasingly by a division of labor. That division of labor is only able to develop through exchange. It was Sieyès's novel idea that exchange itself involved a kind of representation, in which the grower of wheat, for example, pays the maker of shoes to represent him in the provision of shoes. Government in an advanced commercial society, on this account, then becomes merely another activity calling for specialized skills, for which there are customers willing to pay to be represented.

In his July 1791 debate with Tom Paine over the latter's claim that republicanism was the only legitimate form of government, he took issue with Paine's definition of republicanism as simply "Government by Representation." Instead, he insisted on his broader conception of representation, asserting that "every social constitution of which representation is not the essence, is a false constitution." His dichotomy was between "representatives and masters, between despotism and a legitimate Government" (Sonenscher, 2003, pp. 165, 168). In his contribution to the drafting of the Constitution of 1791, too, he made clear that the assembly and the king alike perform a representative function under the French system.

By emphasizing in this way the role of exchange, and by seeing liberty itself largely as the capacity to apply means to needs, Sieyès offered a view of the transition from the natural to the civil state that was quite different from that of Locke. Where Locke saw an original contract among men as a sacrifice of some portion of natural liberty in exchange for the more secure enjoyment of the remainder of that liberty, with the state fulfilling the minimal function of ensuring the latter, Sieyès saw the state in more positive terms. For him, the fulfillment of needs can only flourish in society, and both man's rights and his capacity to fulfill his needs are greatly augmented by conditions in which exchange can occur peacefully and efficiently, conditions that can only be guaranteed by the state. Thus, human rights are not abstracted from and set against the powers of the state, but are only brought to fruition within the framework of the rule of law that the state makes possible.

Later in the revolution, during the Reign of Terror in particular, Sieyès became more emphatic about the defense of individual liberty. The purpose of public institutions, he said in one 1794 speech, is individual liberty. For unlike Jean-Jacques Rousseau, there was never in Sieyès a full alienation of individual rights into the hands of the political community. His final major effort, the constitutional proposal of 1799, returned to his earlier preoccupation with the balance of liberty and sovereignty through careful constitutional machinery, as it attempted to put an end to the revolutionary upheavals once and for all. The sovereign people would choose those eligible for selection to the various assemblies. A Grand Elector, named for life, would choose two consuls from a national list, who would themselves choose the government ministers from lists of notables to form the executive branch. As for the legislative branch, it would consist of a Tribunate (with one deputy per department) that would initiate and debate the laws but not vote on them, as well as a legislative body that would vote on the laws but not debate them. A third body, the College of Conservators, would watch over the constitution and name the tribunes, legislators, and Grand Elector. Some scholars see this five-stage arrangement as an unacknowledged adaptation of ideas that appeared in Baruch Spinoza's *Political Tractate*. This plan was adopted with minor revisions, but was fairly quickly rendered moot by the maneuvers of Napoleon.

Henry C. Clark

See also Burke, Edmund; Citizenship; Condorcet, Marquis de; Constant, Benjamin; Constitutionalism; Natural Rights; Natural Law; Paine, Thomas; Representation; Republicanism; Revolution; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Separation of Powers; Sovereignty

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Simmel, Georg (1858–1918)

Georg Simmel was one of the founding figures of sociology. He received his doctorate from the University of Berlin and lectured there, without a full-time academic appointment, for most of his career. Simmel produced an array of publications devoted primarily to understanding (a) the essence, origin, and future of cultural forms (e.g., music, painting, religion); (b) the origins and structures of various social forms (e.g., exchange, conflict, sociability); and (c) the central features of realized personalities (in studies, e.g., of Goethe, Michelangelo, and Rembrandt). Though Simmel did not write a treatise on politics, his seminal *Sociology* (1908) contains a long discussion of domination as a form of association, offering many critical insights to political theorists.

Like exchange, conflict, sociability, and urbanity, domination as a form of interaction possesses for Simmel certain features that can be abstracted from any of its contents. Wherever and whenever domination occurs, similar forms of interaction emerge. These forms vary depending on whether domination involves subordination to an individual, to a plurality, or to a principle.

Simmel argues that groups subordinated under a single individual tend to become tightly unified, though dissociation is possible as well. Unification may occur in two forms: On the one hand, a superordinate (god, ruler, etc.) can provide a unitary expression for a group's will. This unity can express preexisting commonalities rooted in kinship or territory or be created through common service to a deity or leader. On the other hand, a group may become unified in opposition to its leader. Subordination under a single individual provides a common enemy against which all aspects of society may combine or a common reference point for internal conflict.

Subordination under a plurality generates a variety of interactional forms. Plural superordinates, such as councils or triumvirates, tend to downplay individual subjectivity in favor of legality, impartiality, and objectivity. Subordinates to pluralities may expect less tenderness, altruism, and special favors attuned to unique situations. Nevertheless, plural rulers may undertake extremely violent actions, as no single individual can be held accountable. Special forms of domination also arise when groups are subordinated under mutually opposed or stratified superordinates.

Subordination under a principle, as in the rule of law, depersonalizes domination. Spontaneity between ruler and ruled declines, though new forms of liberty emerge. Family cooks, for example, Simmel notes, are subordinated in all aspects of their personalities; contracted cooks are subordinated to legal principles, and so retain a sphere of personal dignity apart from their employer's will.

Students of political theory may find other aspects of Simmel's work of interest as well. In *Sociology*, for example, Simmel analyzes the social development of voting, from unanimity requirements to majoritarian principles, first as proxies for intragroup conflict and later as expressions of the general will. And in his later work, Simmel identifies key points of tension within modern culture, stressing the modern tendency to restlessly undermine any determinate social and cultural forms and the challenges moderns face in rendering personally meaningful the masses of cultural objects available to them.

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See also Weber, Max

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Singularity

Singularity is a concept usually identified with postmodern, poststructural, early Frankfurt School, or vaguely continental approaches to philosophy and political theory. It is difficult to identify any core meaning of the concept, or even a family resemblance among its meanings, as the term has been used by such a wide range of thinkers, drawing on different traditions, in different contexts, to address distinct dilemmas. The term is used quite loosely, often interchangeably with

terms like particularity, the Other, alterity, difference, finitude, plurality, and contingency. In extreme cases, the range of use is so wide that the term can take on mutually exclusive or contradictory meanings. Given the indeterminacy of the concept, it is perhaps best understood as a *negative* concept, an idea most often used in *opposition* or resistance to other concepts, such as universality, generality, totality, the Absolute, identity, and the Same. As a negative concept, singularity usually stands in for the unrepresentable, the unsubsumable, the irreducible, the indomitable, the inexplicable, the discontinuous, or the irreplaceable. Singularity can be thought of as that aspect of reality or a situation that eludes, exceeds, or disrupts traditional philosophical attempts to grasp reality by means of conceptual, categorical, representational, or logical thinking. Conventional forms of thinking operate with *general or abstract* concepts and categories that are inadequate for grasping the unique singularities of reality. The idea of singularity has many implications for both ethics and political theory. In ethics, the idea functions critically against predominant Kantian rule-based approaches to moral reasoning and as a basis for alternative forms of ethics. In political theory, the idea of singularity has both been appropriated by mainstream approaches to political theory and has provided resources for a radical critique and rethinking of prevailing forms of political theory.

Historical Contexts and Traditions

The term singularity can be partially understood by situating it in the historical context(s) from which it emerged, and the traditions within which the concept is used. Without too much violence, we can identify two relevant historical contexts that gave rise to thinking about singularity. In response to the various horrors of national socialism, totalitarianism, fascism, and Stalinist communism, beginning in the 1940s, a group of thinkers known as Western Marxists deployed notions of singularity. Similarly, French intellectuals beginning in the mid-1960s, but especially after 1968, made widespread use of the concept. In both contexts, the idea of singularity was introduced to criticize prevailing forms of social relations and modes of thought, but proceeded mostly by way of appropriating existing traditions and works of canonical authors. Thus, singularity should also be situated within the traditions that the concept was deployed.

Singularity is a term used within the Marxist tradition to oppose the concept of totality. Many earlier Marxists thought that there was a total perspective from which the whole of historical reality could be known, and that one could speak for, or represent, the whole of a society from that perspective. In opposition to scientistic, deterministic, and structuralist varieties of Marxism that were committed to the idea of totality, a group of Western Marxists after World War II (early Frankfurt School, Theodor Adorno) deployed the idea of singularity. Marxist proponents of singularity argued that history cannot be subsumed under an all-encompassing materialist logic, that the revolution was not inevitable, and that Marxist analysis had to be more sensitive to historical particularities. In so doing, they resurrected notions of contingency, agency, and an open-ended account of history.

Within a Hegelian tradition, singularity was used, often by the same group of Western Marxists, in opposition to the concept of the Absolute. Many Hegelians held the belief that history had a dialectical or development logic to it that proceeded automatically behind the back of historical agents, culminating in an absolute perspective from which the total movement could be grasped as rational. By contrast, some Hegelians deployed the concept of singularity to argue that aspects of reality eluded the historical movement of reason, that the historical movement was contingent, and that the attempts to make history conform to reductivist forms of reason resulted in the totalitarian, fascist, and communist horrors of the twentieth century.

The second historical context in which thinking about singularity emerged was among French intellectuals of the late 1960s (until present). Thinkers as diverse as Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Alain Badiou, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Jean-Luc Nancy all made use of the concept of singularity. These thinkers all shared the belief that conceptual, representational, and logical forms of thought were inadequate to grasping reality and that such thinking was a danger to be resisted. Unfortunately in this French context, the idea of singularity gets run together with

related ideas, such as difference, alterity, and the Other, making it difficult to discern a stable meaning for the concept. Much French philosophy from this period on can be understood as competing attempts to conceive of, and valorize, the idea of singularity or difference. These French thinkers incorporate many of the Frankfurt School reworkings of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, but mostly deploy singularity in ways that can be understood as appropriations of ideas from the German philosophers Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Heidegger and Singularity

The work of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger is one of the two primary sources for the French thinkers who resurrected notions of singularity. Heidegger's thought points to at least three different sorts of singularity, all of which have been taken up in the French context. First, Heidegger developed an ontology, and an idea known as ontological difference, which was hugely influential. Much of Heidegger's work is an attempt to show that "what is" cannot be reduced to the entities that are grasped by conceptual or categorical thought. There is an ontological difference; "What is" exceeds, eludes, and disrupts conceptual or representational thought. Second, Heidegger developed a concept of authenticity, or a way of being, in which an individual might become a singular somebody, as opposed to a generic nobody. He grounded this notion of authenticity in the singularity of our death. Finally, later Heidegger introduced the idea that being has a history, that how things show up to conceptual, representational, and logical thinking depends on the singular historical epoch within which such thinking operates. Heidegger thought that this history of being was one of radical discontinuity, in which singular events, *happenings,* or works of art constituted entirely new worlds and ways of conceptualizing, categorizing, and representing that historical world. Conventional forms of thinking were appropriate to, and relative to, historically discontinuous singular worlds. All three of these notions of singularity have been widely influential in the works of recent French thinkers. For example, Derrida has taken up the idea of ontological difference, Foucault the history of being, Badiou the notion of the singular event, and Lévinas the singularity of death.

Nietzsche and Singularity

The other major source for French thinkers of singularity was Friedrich Nietzsche. At least three aspects of Nietzsche's thought point toward something like singularity. First, Nietzsche's ontology was one that rejected the existence of stable discrete entities graspable by conceptual, categorical, or representational thought. Nietzsche was either a nominalist of sorts, believing that everything that exists is a unique singular particular, or he held the view that being is always becoming, that there are no stable entities for conceptual thought to grasp. In either case, Nietzsche held the view that conceptual thought, language, and logic are never adequate to reality. Second, Nietzsche rejected all attempts to grasp reality from a total all-encompassing perspective. Instead, he defended a form of perspectivalism in which there are multiplicities of singular perspectives on the world, but no all-encompassing perspective. Finally, Nietzsche too seemed to embrace a heroic ethic of authenticity, glorifying the singular individual with a strong will and the courage for honest thinking. All three senses of singularity were influential in the twentieth-century French context. Thinkers descending from both the Western Marxist and post-1968 French traditions have brought the concept of singularity to bear on contemporary issues in moral philosophy and political theory.

Singularity and Ethics

In ethics, the idea of singularity has functioned to undermine predominant neo-Kantian, rule-based approaches to ethics, and to open up alternative approaches to ethics. Kantian rule-based forms of ethics tend to conceive of ethical judgment and ethical action as a matter of subsuming a particular case under a universalizable rule. Ethics becomes a matter of having justified principles and applying them consistently and appropriately to the particular case at hand. The idea of singularity has been used to undermine this approach to ethics by showing that ethical rules are always abstractions from irreducibly singular cases, and that the application of rules to particular cases always requires

a form of judgment that is irreducible to rule following. According to some proponents of singularity, ethics is more a matter of relating to radically particular singular situations without recourse to rules. This critique of prevailing Kantian ethics has opened up space for exploring alternative ethics based on different conceptions of singularity.

Some liberals have appropriated singularity, namely the singularity of each individual, as the basis of a rights-based ethics. Others committed to singularity have proposed an ethics of tolerance, responsiveness, and openness to the unique singularity, or difference, of the Other (individual or society). Still others have advocated for an ethics of authenticity, based on the capacity for individuals to take responsibility for themselves, to potentially become singular individuals. Some have returned to Aristotelian notions of phronesis and practical judgment in singular contexts. Kantians themselves have taken up the idea of singularity and returned to Kant of the critique of judgment, and his notion of reflective aesthetic judgment, as a basis for a form of practical reasoning sensitive to contexts and particularity.

Singularity and Politics

The concept of singularity has also been taken up in political theory. We might distinguish at least four conceptions of singularity, and four corresponding uses of singularity in political theory. First, we might conceive of singularity as the given, or already existing, irreplaceability of an individual or a community. We might then ask: What would a politics responsive to existing singularities look like? Conventional forms of liberalism and communitarianism have appropriated this idea of singularity. Liberals use the singularity of individuals as a new basis for the dignity of human rights and social orders dedicated to securing such rights. Communitarians appropriate the idea of the singular historical community as a basis for protecting and promoting existing historical communities. Second, but closely related, we might think of singularity as the irreplaceability of an individual or community, but understand such singularity as a project or process to be achieved. Thus, we might ask what a politics that attempts to achieve the singularity of individuals or the singularity of a historical community would look like? Cornelius Castoriadis has approached this problematic and frames the issue as one of thinking the relationship of the singular individual to the singular community, both understood as processes and projects. Third, we might conceive of singularity as that which eludes the grasp of existing forms of thought and social ordering. We might then ask what a politics responsive to this elusive unrepresentable dimension would look like. Jacques Derrida has pursued this question, elaborating a form of democracy "to come," a social order always open to difference and alterity. Similarly, Hannah Arendt's conception of a politics open to natality, birth, and newness could be read in this context as well. Finally, we might conceive of singularity as an openness to the singular world transformative *event, happening,* or *revolution.* The work of Alain Badiou and his notion of a politics of truth, and fidelity to an event, is representative of this approach.

Most generally, the idea of singularity confronts political theorists with the problem of thinking through how and which forms of social relations could be responsive to singularity, however conceived. As one thinker asks, how can we be singular plural? The problem is exacerbated under conditions of modern social organization. How can individuals or communities respect or achieve singularity when the means of organizing social relations are the impersonal mechanisms of positive law, the administrative bureaucratic state, and the market economy?

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See also Arendt, Hannah; Aristotle; Becoming; Bureaucracy; Commercial Society; Community; Constructivism; Equity; Genealogy; Hegelians; Human Rights; Market; Marxism; Multiplicity; Negative Dialectics; Neo-Kantianism; Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm; Ontology; Other; Pluralism; Postmodernism; Revolution; Rule of Law; Social Constructivism; Structuralism; Toleration; Universality

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Slavery in Greek and Early Christian Thought

Ancient Greeks and Romans depended on slavery as a principle of social and economic organization. Theoretical discussions of slavery are found in works on politics, ethics, agriculture, law, and religion. Within a broader range of archaeological, historical, and literary source material, analyses of ancient slavery must be temporally and geographically specific—fourth-century Athens differs greatly from first-century Rome, for instance. Yet in the theoretical realm, the following observations may be useful to distinguish slavery in the classical world from other slave systems: the structures of classical slavery are rooted in and bound up with other social structures; a binary distinction between free and unfree cannot be applied to the complex hierarchies of status in the ancient world; the relationship between master and slave is negotiated in moral and personal terms just as much as (if not more than) it is in legal and economic ones. Few primary sources are devoted exclusively to issues of slavery. We may survey various philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Paul, Augustine—but even within this limited group, the moral and metaphorical slavery of individuals is more urgent than the practices and problems of legal slavery. It is not surprising, then, that Aristotle's theory of natural slavery in *The Politics* is so prominent in the theoretical evaluation of ancient slavery.

To contextualize such philosophical discussions, we must sift through texts in which slavery is mentioned briefly, often as example or analogy. In spite of Aristotle, ancient writers seem troubled by the idea of natural slavery. All Mediterranean societies had some experience of slavery; the historical enslavements of one population by another (such as the Messenians by the Spartans) could support the idea of ethnic superiority while also exposing the fortuitous nature of slavery. Slavery was an institution sanctioned by the law of nations (*jus gentium*). Legally, slaves are categorized not as people but as property. Aristotle's definition of a slave as an animate (or ensouled) tool (*empsychon organon*) is echoed by the Roman agricultural writer Varro, who classifies slaves as articulate instruments. Despite these and numerous other assimilations of slaves to animals or objects, the fact of their humanity persists in practical situations. Various writers discourage both indulgent and heavy-handed treatment of slaves, arguing that a system of proper discipline and punishment serves the moral and practical needs of the master and slave alike. The management of domestic slaves serves the common analogy between household and state. Ancient writers regularly juxtapose discussions of slavery with familial, political, or human–divine relationships, envisioning an ideal that meets the interests of all, but there is no perfect analogy for the master–slave relationship. Such comparisons instead enable a focus on moral and metaphorical slavery, often without questioning the existence and practice of legal slavery. Advice for the benefit of masters is a common feature of all the following philosophical schools. Consideration of the slaves themselves is rare.

Plato

There is nothing like a comprehensive theory of slavery to be found in Plato's works, but slavery's importance as a social institution among different people is acknowledged, particularly in *The Laws*. *The Laws* assigns a number of slaves to each citizen but draws attention to the unique problems of slaves among other kinds of property. Different masters will treat their slaves differently, but neither extreme cruelty nor jovial indulgence is desirable. Slaves themselves can be so useful and devoted as to be preferable to blood relations, yet ultimately their souls are corrupt and thus they cannot be trusted. Several solutions for the common problem of controlling of slaves are proposed: A master should avoid having slaves with common origins and common language, because they are more likely to band together and revolt. Furthermore, mere admonishment is counterproductive; masters should not speak or joke with slaves in the same way they do with free people. The scant mention of slaves in *The Republic* has prompted much debate. It has been argued that

Plato's ideal city does not include slaves and that his tripartite soul admits of no slavish quantity. It is contrariwise possible that Plato envisions no radical changes from the status quo regarding slaves: In the ideal city Kallipolis, they continue to do hard labor as in Plato's own society, lacking the tripartite soul of free citizens.

Aristotle

In Book 1 of *The Politics,* Aristotle attempts to justify the enslavement of certain people on moral grounds. Aristotle's theory of natural slavery has a long and knotty afterlife in political philosophy. The conclusion runs as follows: "it is clear, then, that in some cases some are free by nature and others slaves, for whom slavery is both beneficial and just" (*The Politics,* 1255a1–3). Aristotle distinguishes slaves from other domestic subordinates, women and children, by claiming that slaves lack the faculty of deliberation, that they are able to perceive and have a share in reason (*logos*) without fully possessing it. This formulation is notoriously problematic.

Aristotle posits the master–slave relationship as one of the three fundamental relationships—along with husband–wife and father–children—in a self-sufficient household, the essential unit comprising his city. Aristotle identifies two schools of thought: those who believe that the mastery of running a household and controlling slaves is a kind of political science, and those who believe that slavery is contrary to nature (*physis*), and only a matter of convention (*nomos*). Because slavery depends on violence, it cannot be just. (We have little external evidence of the larger debate Aristotle represents here, so it is difficult to evaluate Aristotle's position among others.) Aristotle argues that slaves are animate tools and property, belonging fully to their masters, almost as an extension of them, and assisting their activities. Like domestic animals, they are primarily fit for physical labor, and it is as instruments that they best fulfill their function. They are capable of productivity (*poiēsis*) but not true activity (*praxis*). While acknowledging that not all legal slaves are natural slaves, Aristotle argues that some are fit to rule and others fit to be ruled, and that the good of both depends on the proper fulfillment of these roles. It is not clear how non-natural slaves would function in Aristotle's household.

The virtues of slaves are limited to those that enable them to fulfill their instrumental function; they cannot participate in the moral virtues of citizens. There could not be a *polis* of slaves, but in Aristotle's ideal city, their labor—particularly in agricultural tasks—is essential. A treatise attributed to Aristotle's school divides slaves into supervisors and laborers. Supervisory slaves should be educated and treated with respect; laboring slaves should be fed well. The best slaves are ones who are neither too courageous nor too cowardly. Importantly, the treatise advocates the hope of freedom, in clear and definite terms, as an essential motivator in getting slaves to work.

Objections to Aristotle's arguments on moral and logical grounds are numerous. Aristotle himself offers ample evidence against his charge that slaves lack reason. There is no great skill in managing slaves, Aristotle says, and a rich man will leave such a task to a slave steward in order to pursue philosophy or politics. This statement shows not only how the pursuit of Aristotle's goals of autarky and the contemplative life depend on the labor of others, but also the impossibility of wholly denying to slaves the capabilities of reason and deliberation. Aristotle prefers to frame dependence in moral, not economic terms; the slave depends on the master as the body depends on the soul.

Further inconsistencies have been observed. For example, in *The Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle compares the master-slave relationship to a kind of tyranny and disallows the possibility of friendship between a slave and a master, because they have nothing in common. In *The Politics,* by contrast, Aristotle states that the master and slave do share a community of interest and friendship. Attempts to resolve such issues and to disentangle Aristotle's theory from its troubling afterlife result in a more circumspect understanding of Aristotle's logic and rhetoric, but even the most charitable analyses fail to make Aristotle's theory of natural slavery fully palatable. It is noteworthy that few subsequent philosophers until Aquinas engage with Aristotle on these points.

Stoicism

Stoic philosophers seem indifferent to conventional slavery. (The picture might be different were more Stoic political writings extant.) Diogenes, a

forerunner to the Stoics and a self-declared citizen of the cosmos, was captured by pirates and sold into slavery. On the auction block, Diogenes advertised himself as a master in search of a slave. The reversal in this anecdote exemplifies the Stoic attitude toward slavery: Diogenes proclaimed his inalienable moral freedom against the slavery of his legal master to his passions. The Stoics address slavery as the moral quality of an individual more than as a legal institution; the former is within a person's control, the latter is not. "Only the wise man is free, but the bad are slaves" summarizes this concern with individual morality; this Stoic paradox is explicated in detail by Cicero and by Philo of Alexandria. The yoke of slavery for the Stoics is comprised of the passions: desire, fear, pleasure, and grief. Epictetus, a former slave, makes surprisingly few arguments explicitly concerned with conventional slavery. He values a slave above an ox or dog but below a citizen or magistrate. Epictetus argues for the impossibility of physical autonomy and advocates treating the body like a poor overladen donkey, a fitting metaphor for a slave. The Stoic belief in human capacity for virtue may be cited against Aristotle's theory of natural slavery, though the Stoic belief in the natural separation of things into superior and inferior may support it. The Roman philosopher Seneca, who had plenty of practical experience with slaves, encourages masters to be fair by appealing to their common humanity; slaves have the capacity to be moral agents regardless of their status.

A lecture by Dio Chrysostom representing a debate between a slave and a citizen addresses the question of natural slavery with examples from history and literature. Whereas reversals of fortune—the idea that anyone could be a slave is also found in Seneca—complicate the semantic applications of *slave,* the speech affirms the Stoic concern with moral slavery, concluding that *slave* is most applicable to the common and base man regardless of social status.

Paul

Philo of Alexandria and the Apostle Paul inherited from the Stoics the concern with the enslavement of the soul to the passions. Philo disassociates himself from conventional slavery, dismissing quibbles over different categories of slaves in favor of the truly free man, much like the Stoics and Diogenes. This is Paul's primary concern as well. Legal slaves, however, are addressed in Paul's letters, but in a conservative way. Those who endure slavery in this world should accept it without resentment or resistance. Service to earthly masters substitutes for service to Christ, the master of all; and both masters and slaves will find just rewards in the next life. Thus, Paul's eschatology introduces a specific motivation for slaves to obey. Slaves and masters alike are encouraged to be slaves of God, not slaves to sin. In early letters, Paul collapses various status distinctions in order to emphasize the unity of the community, but in later letters he retreats to a more modest and pragmatic position in which Christian norms can be implemented without threatening existing social structures.

Augustine

The fourth-century Christian apologist Lactantius produced a vision of equality in heaven: Divine justice makes all people equal. Yet this radical justice does not affect existing human institutions: Lactantius reiterates the division of body and spirit and stresses the importance of the latter. This dichotomy is also found in Augustine, who both defends legal slavery as sanctioned by divine authority and produces a new formulation of slavery in a theological context.

Like Paul, Augustine advocates the acceptance of conventional slavery. The master-slave power relationship is a household commonplace to which Augustine frequently refers. The structures of Augustine's City of God reproduce those of the household. Stability depends on a harmonious relationship between the master and his subordinates. The duty of the former is to guide, that of the latter, to obey. There are good and bad masters, good and bad slaves. But slavery to sin is by far more damaging than legal slavery.

According to Augustine, in God's creation no man is a slave to another or to sin. But through the righteous judgment of God, one man may be enslaved to another. This is an unprecedented explanation that accounts for both spiritual and bodily slavery. The fall of Adam renders all humans inherently sinful and deserving of God's punishment, and slavery is one form that this punishment can take. Individual sins may result in

enslavement; it is the sin on one side or the other that leads to the enslavement of war captives. But even slavery that may seem unjust in every way can be explained by sin.

Ancient Greek and Roman philosophy is completely devoid of ideas that might be called abolitionist. Utopian fantasies do away with slaves by envisioning responsive and animate objects and food items, eliminating the anxieties of slave dependence without sacrificing the benefits of service. Very few thinkers felt compelled even to touch on the moral legitimacy of slavery as Aristotle did. Instead, they took slavery for granted as an essential component of real and imaginary *poleis* or empires, and further capitalized on the ubiquity of the rhetoric regarding slavery to examine moral slavery in the individual soul.

Sonia Sabnis

See also Aristotle; Augustine; Barbarians; Household; Plato

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Slavery in the United States

John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau confronted slavery as an intellectual problem; Thomas Jefferson, John C. Calhoun, and Frederick Douglass lived it. This is what led C. L. R. James to say that what Europeans faced as a philosophical question, the Americans faced as an empirical one. Slavery was the defining issue of American politics in the nineteenth century. Its legacies—segregation, civil rights, and racial discrimination—have profoundly shaped its twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Slavery's influence on American political thought has been no less profound, though not always recognized. Louis Hartz (1955) famously argued that slavery had little impact on American political thought due to the pervasiveness of liberal and egalitarian views. The ubiquity of liberal ideas and the absence of feudal institutions reduced class conflict and produced a common, almost unconscious, political philosophy among Americans that emphasizes moral and political equality, individual liberty, and private property. Given this climate, the elitist views of the slaveholders could have no lasting influence. Hartz was right to an extent: The early United States was indeed distinguished by a relative lack of social differentiation, which produced a common American spirit defined by "freedom, initiative, adventure, [and] self-expression, in pursuit of trade and industry" (James, 1993, p. 44). Yet the absence of sharp class stratification in the United States was largely due to slavery. The enslavement of Africans helped to entrench liberal egalitarian views among whites across social classes. While earlier scholars such as Hartz believed that slavery had little to do with American democracy, most scholars today argue that slavery, race, and freedom were intimately connected in American history. This paradoxical relationship has profoundly shaped American political theory.

Slavery and the Racial Order

American slavery was a struggle between masters' attempts to impose "social death" on the slave and slaves' efforts to seek freedom and build a community. Orlando Patterson (1982) argues that slavery is a system in which the master seeks to strip the slave of all kinship ties and social standing so that the slave is physically alive (and therefore able to labor for the master) but socially dead, belonging to no recognized community and possessing no legitimate genealogy. Slaves resisted this social death in three ways. First, they sought freedom, by purchasing it, suing for it, running away, or rebelling. Second, they sought to make the terms of labor more favorable, through work slowdowns, attempts to shorten the working day, subterfuge, sabotage, maintaining their own livestock or garden plots, participating in markets, or hiring out their labor and keeping a portion of their wages (Berlin, 1998). Third, they created

their own families and their own culture. While masters sought to impose their rule from sunup to sundown, from sundown to sunup slaves created a community that denied the authority of the master and defied social death. Slaves shaped their own customs, religion, dialect, music, economy, and political perspectives, merging African, indigenous, and European practices into a uniquely and truly American culture. This conflict between "sunup to sundown" and "sundown to sunup," or between social death and the resistance of the black community, is one of the fundamental experiences of the American political tradition.

It also produced the racial order. Europeans sat at the top and Africans the bottom of the social hierarchy throughout the Americas. Further, African slavery was the dominant form of labor exploitation in the hemisphere because it was economically cheaper than importing European indentured servants or enslaving the indigenous population, since African slaves were plentiful, cheap, and politically powerless, possessing no "rights of Englishmen" or membership in indigenous communities to appeal to for protection. But slavery in the United States differed from the rest of the hemisphere in the form of social control involved. In the West Indies and Brazil, for example, slaves were controlled by an intermediate "buffer control stratum" of creoles that stood between them and the planters (Allen, 1994, 1997). (Members of this group were generally referred to as mulatto or colored.) But in the 13 colonies, poor European colonists were the buffer between master and slave. Their interests and those of the planters converged as poor Europeans demanded—and received—sundry economic, political, and psychological advantages, such as the right to own property (including human property), immunity from enslavement, access to public accommodations, and the right to participate in public affairs. In exchange, poor whites gave their tacit or active acceptance to the slave system (Du Bois, 1992; Roediger, 1991). This cross-class alliance created a "white" racial category, a group distinguished from slaves and those eligible for slavery (generally referred to as Negroes) and that enjoyed a remarkable degree of freedom and equality while enduring relatively little class conflict (Olson, 2004). The paradox of American history is that the ideals of liberty, equality, and democracy were built on racial slavery. The subordination of some provided the foundation for the freedom of others. The symbiosis of race and democracy forged by slavery has shaped the American political experience to this day.

Slavery in the New Republic

Slavery dominated the political debates of its era. The revolutionary generation's relation to slavery was complex and conflicted regarding its morality and necessity. The struggle for independence made many patriots aware of a contradiction between their demand for liberty and their ownership of slaves. After the revolution, George Washington privately expressed support for the gradual abolition of slavery and freed some of his slaves on his death. Thomas Jefferson had moral objections to slavery as well, though he was also one of the first people to suggest that black people are by nature inferior to whites. James Madison, like Jefferson, favored gradual abolition followed by colonization of black people to Africa.

Despite their moral qualms, the revolutionary generation built slavery into the founding documents. Jefferson's original draft of the Declaration of Independence contained a paragraph condemning the slave trade, decrying King George for waging a "cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life & liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him," but Southern delegates excised it from the final version. The 1787 Constitution is careful to never mention slavery by name but it clearly protects it in several clauses, including the infamous "three-fifths clause" in Article I.2, which stipulates that the population of a state shall be determined by counting all "free persons" in addition to three-fifths of "all other Persons." This clause augmented the South's representation in Congress and their apportionment of taxes and implicitly sanctioned slavery. Other clauses protected the slave trade until 1808 (Article I.8), guaranteed federal support to masters in capturing fugitive slaves (Article IV.2), and guaranteed federal protection against slave insurrections (Article IV.4). Debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the Constitution barely touched on slavery, suggesting that both sides took its existence for granted.

The invention of the cotton gin in 1793 wiped out any moral objections masters had regarding

slavery. In 1800, 11% of the slave labor force worked on the cotton crop. By 1850, two thirds of them did, as Southern plantations supplied the raw material devoured by the hungry machines of the Industrial Revolution. By 1860, over 90% of Britain's cotton came from the U.S. South. The rise of "king cotton" transformed slaveholders' ambivalence about slavery into an obdurate defense. Whereas many planters in the revolutionary generation lamented slavery as a necessary evil, antebellum slaveholders argued that it was a positive social good. James Henry Hammond (1858), for example, argued that all civilizations require a "mudsill" class to perform its menial labor. The genius of Southern civilization is that it has found an "inferior race" to do this work. By compelling one race to perform labor "naturally" fitted to it, slavery eliminates class conflict within the other race and thereby produces free political institutions.

Slavery not only sustains republicanism, John C. Calhoun insisted; it also civilizes Africans. Africans are savages who practice cannibalism, worship satanic spirits, and are sexually licentious. Slavery, Calhoun argued, has saved the black race from this barbaric origin. "Never before has the black race of Central Africa . . . attained a condition so civilized and so improved, not only physically, but morally and intellectually . . . This . . . is conclusive proof of the general happiness of the race, in spite of all the exaggerated tales to the contrary" (McKitrick, 1963, pp. 12–13).

Scientific Racism

The emergence of scientific racism arose in tandem with the intensification of slavery. In the eighteenth century, whites tended to view African Americans as alien and unassimilable but believed that the natural and social environment was the cause of black inferiority. But with the rise of king cotton, theories of Africans' innate, biological inferiority began to hold sway (Fredrickson, 1971). The eighteenth-century notion of slaves as childlike (thus implying the ability to "mature") gave way to the notion of Africans as subhuman. Scientists conducted various experiments and measurements, such as measuring skull size, evaluating the quality of earwax, and measuring the angle of facial profiles, to determine the biological capabilities of the various races. Unsurprisingly, nearly all of these experiments concluded that Caucausoids were intellectually and physically superior to Negroids, Mongoloids, and other supposed racial categories. Some of the theorists of scientific racism in this era, most notably Joseph-Arthur, comte de Gobineau (1915), would influence Nazi philosophy.

The Antislavery Movement

Prior to the 1830s, most antislavery organizations urged a slow, gradual end to slavery, and many of them supported the colonization of freed slaves to Africa. But in 1831, a slave rebellion led by Nat Turner struck fear into the heart of the South, weakening much of that sort of antislavery sentiment. And earlier that year, William Lloyd Garrison began publishing *The Liberator,* which would become the leading newspaper for a new brand of abolitionism. Turner and Garrison led the shift from a Southern-based, white, conciliatory and gradualist abolitionism to a Northern-based, biracial, militant movement. Many of the leaders of this new movement were upper-class whites, but its support (financial and political) came from the grass roots, particularly free black communities and white communities in New England and in then Western states like Ohio. Considered alongside the efforts of slaves themselves, this new abolitionism was a black freedom movement with biracial participation.

Garrison provided much of the intellectual framework for this movement. He argued that slavery was a sin and that slaves should be freed immediately and unconditionally, without compensation to slaveholders. *Immediatism* became the touchstone of the modern abolitionist movement. Garrison and his followers employed a strategy of "moral suasion" to end slavery. They believed that slavery had so corrupted the entire political system that seeking to overthrow it through electoral politics would only end up compromising abolitionism. Slavery was a sin that damned the nation and required repentance. Moral suasion, or the transformation of public opinion, was the means by which abolitionists would persuade their fellow citizens of the evils of slavery and the need to abolish it.

The Garrisonians also railed against racial prejudice. The constitution of the New England Anti-Slavery Society (founded by Garrison in 1832), for

example, declared that "a mere difference of complexion is no reason why any man should be deprived of any of his natural rights, or subjected to any political disability" (Ruchames, 1963). Garrisonians argued that eradicating racial prejudice was essential to creating an egalitarian society freed of sin. This principle, however, was held unevenly among white abolitionists. Indeed, antislavery sentiment in the North was often also violently anti-black. "Death to Slavery! / Down with the Slaveholders! / Away with the Negroes!" went one popular slogan in 1861 (quoted in Fredrickson, 1971, p. 189). Even as they opposed the slave power, many whites feared that racial equality would threaten their privileged standing. And even Garrison occasionally acted paternally toward black people (who were nevertheless fervently devoted to him). Regardless, racial equality was a central tenet of radical abolitionist political thought from Garrison to Frederick Douglass to John Brown.

American abolitionists quickly embraced immediatism, but the strategy of moral suasion sat uncomfortably with some of them, and in 1840 the movement split. The catalyst for the split was a debate over the participation of women in the movement: The Garrisonians welcomed anyone's participation so long as one shared a commitment to immediate, unconditional emancipation. Reformist abolitionists, however, insisted on following norms of decorum in political deliberation—such as prohibitions on women's participation in public affairs—so as not to offend public sentiment and distract attention from the antislavery cause. Unlike the Garrisonians, who argued that slavery was but the worst of many sins in the United States, reformist abolitionists held that American society was fundamentally moral and just, except for slavery, and advocated an electoral strategy for abolition. After the split, they formed their own party, the Liberty Party, which pulled some support away from Democrats and Whigs but fared poorly overall and folded into the Free Soil Party in 1848. Meanwhile, abolitionists such as Gerrit Smith, James McCune Smith, and the later Frederick Douglass shared the radicalism of the Garrisonians but also supported the Constitution and electoral participation. In the 1850s, several of them would support John Brown's raid on a federal arsenal in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in a plan to free and arm slaves throughout the South.

The Garrisonians became even more radical after the split. They urged disunion, calling for the North to secede from the South because, they argued, slavery depended on federal support; the removal of such support would lead to slavery's collapse. Garrison attacked the Constitution as "a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell" for protecting the slaveholders' interests, while Wendell Phillips called for Northerners to break up "the whole merciless conspiracy of 1787." Stephen Foster and Parker Pillsbury disrupted church services in congregations that refused to oppose slavery. Garrisonians' speeches, newspapers, and the slave narratives they published aroused opposition to slavery through shame, anger, guilt, and pity, as well as rational argument. The Garrisonians explicitly distinguished their more zealous approach to antislavery from those of politicians such as Abraham Lincoln, who was personally opposed to slavery but at first did little to abolish it because for him preserving the Union came before all else. Garrisonians castigated this perspective. It perpetuates slavery, they maintained, because placing priority on preserving the Union requires making compromises with slaveholders, which ultimately strengthens their power. The Garrisonians adamantly rejected any sort of compromise or moderation regarding slavery.

This fanatical, uncompromising dedication to freedom and equality is the radical abolitionists' distinctive contribution to American political thought. Their focus on individualism, inalienable rights, political equality, and self-reliance have led some to see them as the highest expression of bourgeois liberalism in an emerging industrialized nation (e.g., Hartz, 1955). Yet there was a deeply radical character to the abolitionists that spilled over the boundaries of liberalism. The Garrisonians, in particular, were not afraid to follow their principles to their radical conclusions. Their belief in individual liberty led them to struggle for free speech and a radical democracy in which all people have the right to participate in public affairs. As Martin Delany put it, "No people can be free who themselves do not constitute an essential part of the *ruling element* of the country in which they live" (Foner, 1998, p. 88). Their belief that all people are created equal led them to fight racial prejudice, advocate women's emancipation, and support the labor movement. Their demand for

immediate emancipation led them to attack the church for its complicity with slavery, condemn the Constitution as a proslavery document, call for the breakup of the United States, and welcome civil war. Their openness to new ideas led many of them to radical social and personal experimentation, including vegetarianism, alternative medicine, and nudism. They challenged patriarchal relations in the private and public spheres, and they crafted new forms of religious worship. In short, the abolitionists' radical views regarding slavery and racial equality led them to reimagine the American ideals of freedom, equality, and democracy.

Indeed, the radical abolitionists were revolutionaries, for their politics threatened the stability of the nation. Unlike trade unionism, prison reform, temperance, or other reform movements of the time, abolitionists' demand for unconditional emancipation with no compensation to slaveholders threatened the entire structure of the American political economy. As James argues, immediatism meant "to tear up by the roots the foundation of the Southern economy and society, wreck Northern commerce, and disrupt the union irretrievably" (1993, p. 89). By attacking slavery, abolitionists undid the arrangements that kept the Union together. As the brief but suggestive history of radical reconstruction indicates, this unraveling made possible not just a liberal society, but perhaps also a radically democratic one (Du Bois, 1992).

Slavery and Contemporary Political Thought

Hartz wrote that the curious thing about slaveholder thought is that it had virtually no impact on American political thought. Equally curious is the uneven impact slavery has had on mainstream contemporary political theory. Slavery is in the background of nearly all black political thought in the United States, influencing its work on power, identity, solidarity, political strategy, gender, and more (e.g., Dawson, 2001). Yet outside this field there is surprisingly little on slavery in the study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political thought. (Exceptions include Charles Mills's [1997] analysis of race and the social contract tradition and a cottage industry on Alexis de Tocqueville's views on race.) Slavery and abolition are even less contemplated in contemporary political theory. Few democratic theorists, for example, read the abolitionists (or the slaveholders) to think through debates in the discipline such as between recognition and redistribution, liberalism and communitarianism, deliberative and agonistic democracy, the nature of power, or the role and value of postmodernism. The uneven influence of slavery in contemporary political thought—and the continued contortions of a democratic nation that has not completely let go of its past—suggest that there is much work to be done on slavery in the United States and its relation to political theory.

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See also Liberalism; Slavery in Greek and Early Christian Thought

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Smith, Adam (1723–1790)

Adam Smith was a Scottish moral philosopher and political economist and a participant in a movement of intellectual flourishing in eighteenth-century Scotland known as the Scottish Enlightenment, which included such figures as Frances Hutcheson (1694–1746), David Hume (1711–1776), Thomas Reid (1710–1796), and Adam Ferguson (1723–1816). Smith was also the author of two influential books: one on moral theory, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and one on political economy, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776). The first book brought Smith immediate fame as a man of letters, inside and outside of Scotland, but the second book was largely responsible for Smith's lasting international influence, launching his renown as the father of classical political economy, a school that over centuries included such thinkers as David Ricardo (1772–1823), Thomas Malthus (1776–1834), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), Karl Marx (1818–1883), John Maynard Keynes (1887–1982), and Milton Friedman (1912–2006).

Smith was born in Kirkcaldy, Scotland, the only child of Margaret Douglas and Adam Smith, a civil servant who died shortly before his birth. He was educated at the Burgh School of Kirkcaldy, then the University of Glasgow under the guidance of Francis Hutcheson, whose views on Newtonian natural philosophy impressed him deeply, and whose theory of "moral sense" would set a standard against which he would come to define his own contribution to moral philosophy; and later as a Snell exhibitioner at Balliol College, Oxford, an educational experience he found deeply disappointing. He reported later that "in the university of Oxford, the greater part of the publick [*sic.*] professors have, for these many years, given up altogether even the pretence of teaching" (Smith, 1981–1987, p. 761). Nevertheless, quite independently, Smith immersed himself in the study of the natural sciences, and English, French, Greek, and Latin languages and literatures, and in 1748, after 6 years in Oxford, was invited to Edinburgh by Lord Kames (1696–1782) to deliver a series of lectures on rhetoric and literature, published posthumously as *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*. In Edinburgh, Smith met the philosopher and historian David Hume, 10 years his senior, who would become his closest friend and intellectual companion until Hume's death in 1776, though he would never fully digest Hume's utilitarianism, his skepticism, or his atheism. Smith thrived in Edinburgh, and in 1750 was appointed to the chair of logic and then to the prestigious chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, delivering lectures over the next 14 years on natural religion, ethics, jurisprudence, and political economy.

Smith left Glasgow in 1764 to serve as personal tutor to Henry Scott, the third Duke of Buccleuch, which paid well and enabled him to travel to the continent with his charge and meet many of the most influential philosophes of the French Enlightenment, including Voltaire (1694–1778), Denis Diderot (1713–1784), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). Smith's encounters with François Quesnay (1694–1774), Jacques Turgot (1727–1781), and the so-called *physiocrats* corroborated some of his earliest thoughts on political economy, stimulated some new ones, and ultimately influenced the evolution of his free market arguments in *The Wealth of Nations* against the mercantile system, the early modern variant of protectionism in which governments use tariffs to manipulate trade. Smith returned to Kirkcaldy in 1767 to complete work on *The Wealth of Nations,* which was published in 1776.

During this period, Smith spent considerable time in London and participated in various intellectual clubs and societies with such friends and acquaintances as Edmund Burke (1729–1797), Dr. Samuel Johnson (1709–1784), Edward Gibbon (1737–1794), William Pitt, the younger (1759–1806), Lord North (1732–1792), and Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), who spent several years in London before he returned to revolutionary America to serve on the Continental Congress. Smith became something of a hero to the American founders for his devastating critique of European imperialism, and particularly of British conquest in

North America. In *The Wealth of Nations,* Smith argued that colonial conquest was a disastrous enterprise for both conqueror and conquered, in political, economic, and moral terms, challenging a popular perception encouraged by monopolist companies that profited most from European exploits that empire was central to British power and wealth, and that it was the main vehicle for spreading modern liberty rather than imposing tyranny. *The Wealth of Nations* and its free market challenge to the mercantilist protection of monopolies was receiving wide acclaim, hailed as the coming of a new economic dawn, and had a profound influence on the political economy of the American founders. Franklin, George Washington (1732–1799), Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), Thomas Paine (1737–1809), and many other Americans read *The Wealth of Nations* with great interest.

On the reputation of his economic treatise, Smith was appointed commissioner of customs and moved to Edinburgh in 1777, charged somewhat ironically with enforcing the very sort of tariffs he railed against in theory. At this time, Smith was also at work on an extensive new "account of the general principles of law and government" (Smith, 1981–1987, p. 342), which he never lived to complete. His last public appointment was as rector of the University of Glasgow in 1787. Smith died in 1790, at the age of 67, one week after having consigned 16 volumes of his unpublished manuscripts to the flames, among them, surely, his manuscript on law and government.

Smith is closely associated today with the idea of laissez-faire individualism, though he never used that formulation to describe his own project. There has been a tendency among libertarians and advocates of free markets, as well as Marxists and other left critics of capitalism, to caricature Smith's thought as an extreme defense of free market capitalism and supply-side economic principles, in which self-interest is the essence of human motivation, and in which the public good emerges as if by an "invisible hand"—that is, spontaneously from the unfettered pursuit of individual self-interest in an environment of free market competition where government has little positive function beyond maintaining a stable understructure. Surely there is much in Smith's thought to substantiate such a caricature, as we shall see. And critics are not altogether inaccurate when they observe that Smith had largely transformed classical political discourse into the terms of economics and sociology. But this story about "economic man" and the cold, utilitarian society in which he prospers is a distortion of Smith's overall philosophical project, a product of ideology and selective reading, and sorely anachronistic from the perspective of intellectual history. The words *economist* and *capitalism* were not even in English usage in Smith's day, let alone the ideas of "supply-side" and "trickle-down," which are regularly attributed to him. Smith understood himself primarily as a moral philosopher, and like all eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophers, tended to situate his thoughts about economics and politics within a much broader framework of ethics and jurisprudence.

The Wealth of Nations

One of Smith's earliest essays, published posthumously in 1795 among other miscellaneous essays on philosophical subjects as "History of Astronomy," initiated his life-long fascination with Newtonian physics. Much of Smith's later work on ethics and economics demonstrates a propensity to apply methods in the natural and physical sciences to moral and social phenomena. Indeed, Smith would eventually argue in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) that the economic sphere was governed by a natural order, an "invisible hand," whose autonomous, self-regulating qualities greatly resembled the natural order of the physical world. Accordingly, the economic system understood in free market terms was not chaotic, as traditionalist critics feared, but tended to order itself and bring about both wealth and social cohesiveness without human intervention. This way of thinking is diffused throughout Smith's description of the market. Self-interest was not a vice like greed or gluttony, to be condemned for dissolving our sense of moral and political responsibility toward our fellows. On the contrary, Smith argued that self-interest would contain its own excesses in a free market system and promote the public good without intending to do so. Additionally, the division of labor would dramatically increase productivity and generate a better standard of living for all; even the poor would be clothed and fed without planned redistribution. The prices of goods and services would be regulated by supply and demand; trade would balance

itself while opening new markets for surplus goods and supplying cheaper goods from abroad. Ultimately the world would become a freer, less bellicose, more prosperous place.

The Wealth of Nations (1776) is a 900-page assault on mercantilism, which Smith condemned for its faulty assumptions about the nature and causes of national wealth. While mercantilists believed that national wealth consisted in the accumulation of precious metals, achieved by manipulating the balance of trade through protectionist policies and punitive tariffs, Smith located national wealth in the annual flow of goods and services, which was stimulated most effectively under conditions of free trade. He described this as a "system of natural liberty and perfect justice" in which the proper function of government was to stabilize market conditions, primarily by maintaining a standing army to defend the society from invasion and by maintaining a system of justice, understood commutatively as the protection of property, rather than distributively and beneficently as the provision of goods and services. For this reason, Smith has often been described as a champion of small states.

Smith's arguments in *The Wealth of Nations* were substantiated by robust historical examples, which he deployed to great rhetorical effect. Smith's historical sensibility is perhaps best illustrated in his *Lectures on Jurisprudence,* a series of lectures he delivered in Glasgow, published posthumously from student lecture notes by Edwin Cannan in 1896. There Smith employed a historical technique that his biographer Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) called "conjectural" history, a method of thinking about history when one does not have solid empirical evidence, that was initiated by David Hume and became increasingly common among Scottish thinkers. In the *Lectures,* Smith reflected on law and government in anthropological terms as unfolding progressively through four general stages, each determined by its mode of subsistence. Humans began as hunters, Smith conjectured, with little sociality among them and no permanent settlement, gathering subsistence through chance encounters with animals. This evolved into pastoral society, in which men were a bit more social and cooperative, gathering what they needed as they wandered together in groups in search of subsistence. In the agricultural stage, humans began settling down to cultivate crops. During this stage, simple ideas of property developed; humans began to bond into permanent communal groups with shared moralities and feelings of communal responsibility. Honor was a primary value in this stage, provoking the natural evolution of armies to protect the group and its property from foreign invasion. The fourth and final stage is commercial society, or what Smith sometimes called civil society, in which human relations are regulated through commercial exchange in the marketplace, and where subsistence is provided through the money that one makes engaging in labor. Smith argued that commercial society best provides the conditions necessary for human liberty, which he conceived in negative terms that resonate with classical liberal thought today: The ability to pursue one's ends without impediment or injury under the rule of law.

Smith celebrated civilization, refinement, and the triumph of the arts and sciences, moral equality, autonomy, tolerance, and self-sufficiency; and he believed that a neutral state with a standing army was the best guarantee for modern freedom and general well-being. Insofar as we might characterize the Enlightenment as a unified movement, Smith seems to have supported every one of its aims. And yet he never claimed that civilizational progress was an unqualified good. For one thing, he never embraced the pursuit of wealth uncritically. Despite what history has made of him, Smith was never a flat-footed optimist about the effects of commercialism on the texture of human life. He did believe that a free market economy, supplemented by appropriate political and social institutions and policies, was modernity's best hope for general well-being. He was committed to reducing human poverty and misery and promoting human equality, and had great faith in the trajectory of history in this sense, leaving him justly susceptible to charges of woeful shortsightedness, well-intentioned as it may have been. But he also elaborated on the dangers of commercial culture in detail and intensity rivaled only by Karl Marx himself. In this sense, Jean-Jacques Rousseau had a profound influence on Smith's thought. As early as 1756, Smith was reading Rousseau's work, and was sufficiently prompted to compose a letter to the *Edinburgh Review* engaging Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men* (1755). Though

they disagreed rather dramatically in terms of political vision, and in their ultimate views of modernity in general, Rousseau and Smith shared a keen sense of the corrupting moral effects of commercial life on modern individuals. Echoing Rousseau's Counter-Enlightenment themes about the hypocrisies of modern happiness, Smith agreed that modern commercial life rested on a pervasive self-deception about our needs and our happiness and that it tended to corrupt our moral sentiments by promoting vanity and conspicuous greed. Smith encouraged commercial people to cultivate habits of personal thrift and to resist emulating the superfluities of the rich, which would lead to perpetual disappointment at best, failure and poverty at worst. Moreover, even at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, he observed that the division of labor dehumanized its participants through "mental mutilation," rendering them dependent, enervated, and stupid. To combat the mental and spiritual by-products of commercial productivity, Smith charged the government with the duty of public education.

Indeed, Smith understood that the government had affirmative duties, what he called "expenses," in a free market system to perform functions necessary to the public good that private institutions were ill-suited to perform, such as the building and maintenance of public works and institutions, like roads, bridges and communications; institutions necessary to protect trade routes from piracy and freebooting; the public education of children; the containment of public disease (he singled out leprosy); and the dignified upkeep of the sovereign's expenses that were to be supported by public revenue through taxation and the collection of customs. He also observed that the expenses of government would become more substantial as a government becomes more opulent. He remained ever wary of proposals that rested too heavily on taxation, but he insisted that government was the only body capable of harnessing many of the most harmful tendencies of commercial society. Another essential component of sovereignty, what Smith called "the science of the legislator," is to stimulate a sense of magnanimity and public spiritedness within modern commercial populations susceptible to becoming too narrowly focused on private interest, or atomized by their specialized functions in the division of labor. Here Smith gave voice to classical republican themes that still dwelled more or less overtly in Scottish Enlightenment thought, despite the diminished appeal of republican sentiment for moderns elsewhere. Though he was fully committed to commerce as the engine of historical progress, something of the Scottish highlanders remained in him. Their emphasis on stoic austerity, independence, and civic virtue resonated in Smith's sensibility. In this sense, among others surely, Smith's modernity was articulated in a distinctively Scottish key.

Smith never wrote a text devoted explicitly to the subject of politics, and he was a notorious critic of "men of system," who attempt to work out in advance the details of ideal political arrangements. His allergy to political idealism intensified in his later writings, as events in France and America escalated and revolutionary violence seemed inevitable. Smith tended to associate ambitious political projects with the fomentation of fanaticism and faction, the great destabilizers of prosperity. Yet it would be a mistake to underestimate Smith's contributions to modern political thought, which are obscured when his ethics and politics are marginalized and his overall project is articulated in the narrow key of economics.

George Stigler, the 1982 Nobel Laureate in Economics, gave voice to a dominant perception about Smith's thought when he suggested that *The Wealth of Nations* is a "stupendous palace erected upon the granite of self-interest" (1971, p. 265). Clearly self-interest is the engine of commercial prosperity for Smith, and a central dimension of human motivation. But self-interest takes its place within a far richer motivational complex, marked as much by passion and imagination as by interest and reason. As we shall see in the next section, Smith rejected the utilitarian, rational-choice, "economic man" assumptions that posterity has attributed to him. He insisted that we impoverish our understanding of human nature when we reduce human motivation to selfishness.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments

From Smith's pupil, John Millar (1735–1801), we know that Smith's Glasgow lectures on moral philosophy were divided into four tracks: natural religion, ethics, jurisprudence, and political economy. The second track later provided the basis for Smith's first book, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,*

published in 1759; the third was published posthumously as *Lectures on Jurisprudence;* and the fourth became the core of *The Wealth of Nations*. From a mere outline of Smith's lectures, one observes that political economy takes its place within a far broader philosophical project. This sense of a richer, more textured outlook on human morals and motivations is confirmed when one beholds the famous opening sentence of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments:*

> How selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. (Smith, 1981–1987, p. 9)

The Theory of Moral Sentiments was deployed as a challenge to more individualistic accounts of society and politics, which Smith identified with Thomas Hobbes (1588–1689) and his disciples, Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) and Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733). In this well-known passage, Smith rejected not only the claim that men were purely selfish beings without social impulses and needs, but also the corollary Mandevillean claim, embraced by many of his eighteenth-century contemporaries, and still frequently attributed to Smith's economic thought today, that any society or good will to be found among them was the by-product of enlightened selfishness. In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,* Smith focused instead on the natural principle of "sympathy." For this reason, *The Moral Sentiments* is often casually mistaken as a normative treatise about morality, as if Smith was advocating benevolent action over selfishness, rather than providing a rich description of human nature and society, typical of Scottish moral philosophy. Such misinterpretations are responsible for fueling a long-standing debate, which began in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century, about deep tensions between the conceptions of human nature offered in Smith's two central texts. The so-called *Das Adam Smith Problem,* coined by German economist August Oncken (1844–1911), turned on whether one can reconcile Smith's emphasis on "self-interest" in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) with his ethical emphasis on "sympathy" in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759). Economists long resolved the "problem" in the direction of self-interest, with *The Wealth of Nations* rising triumphant as the motivating center of Smith's thought, and *The Moral Sentiments* set aside as puerile and academic. Others equally faulty have argued that sympathy triumphed. But the contours of this debate are putatively artificial. While Smith rejected moral pessimism, however it presented itself, and was eager to condemn the egoistic assumptions of Hobbesism so prominent in his day, he did not posit the idea of sympathy as a straightforward counter-principle to selfishness. He never believed the two were incompatible or worked in a zero-sum fashion.

On Smith's account, sympathy was not an innate benevolent disposition that discharges mindlessly and spontaneously like the "pitie" of Rousseau or the *moral sense* of Hutcheson; nor was it a rational end like the natural law of John Locke (1632–1704) or the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). For Smith, sympathy was a principle of moral judgment to be valued by moderns for its unifying function in complex commercial societies freed from feudal certainties. According to Smith, we all naturally desire sympathetic concord with our fellows. He observed that this leads us to speculate how others will judge us, and that we learn to adjust our actions to a pitch, a "point of propriety," that will obtain the sympathy we desire. Sympathy, in this sense, brings about an affective moderation in the individual and a "concord" of sentiments in society. Central to Smith's theory of moral development, however, is his claim that moral maturity consists of cultivating independence in one's judgments, in weaning oneself from the childish need for social praise. As a moral agent matures over time, she comes to need society's actual judgments less and less to motivate propriety in her actions. The repetition of sympathetic interactions with others over time cultivates in the breast of every individual a higher standard of judgment that Smith calls "conscience," or the "impartial spectator," which the individual comes to consult more frequently when judging herself and others. In this sense, there are significant similarities between Smith's "impartial spectator" and Sigmund Freud's idea of a "superego" a century later.

But sympathy amounts to more than an account of how selves are socialized for Smith. It is also a

highly original anthropological account of how moral cultures arise and are perpetuated. For Smith, society is like a vast mirror into which we all gaze, from earliest childhood, to discover who we are and what we value. As Smith described it, sympathy is the process through which we learn to "accommodate and to assimilate, as much as we can, our own sentiments, principles, and feelings, to those which we see fixed and rooted in the persons who we are obliged to live and converse a great deal with" (Smith, 1981–1987, p. 224). When compounded over time, sympathetic experiences with others near us progressively constrain our understanding of ourselves, of others, and of the world, and condition the criteria that we draw on when we judge ourselves and others. In other words, sympathy is the very process through which the self learns the etiquette, tastes, and values of the people with whom it interacts, becomes a member of that particular moral culture, and then passes that culture on to others. Moral culture is thus passed from each generation to the next through the infinite repetition of sympathetic contacts.

An important political implication of the sympathy mechanism, thus, is its capacity to socialize modern individuals into the group, to marginalize or sublimate difference, without traditional forms of coercion. By focusing on the unifying power of sympathy, Smith had posed a serious challenge to preachy critics of progress and modernity who insisted that wealth and virtue were incompatible ends, and that properly functioning societies require that men be perpetually subjected to traditional moral prohibitions enforced by absolute rulers, a punitive clergy and a vengeful God. In *The Moral Sentiments,* Smith described a lighter, freer, self-regulating method of social coordination that would operate in modern commercial societies without kings, priests, and teachers. Another interesting insight from the perspective of political theory is that Smith's system also functioned without transcendent truths supplied by religion or philosophy, which were always deeply contentious, and responsible for the intractable and bloody wars that moderns sought to bequeath to a barbarous history. Smith frequently invoked "God" as the "Author of Nature" who had arranged things to maximize human happiness, which complemented his Newtonian description of spontaneous social order as an "invisible hand," but there is broad consensus among scholars that Smith's God was deistic, and did not ground or determine man's moral faculties. In *The Moral Sentiments* Smith located the source of man's moral faculties in human nature as it unfolds in society. He described the actual practices through which modern people in their daily encounters and conversations learn to live together and achieve consensus spontaneously, and without ideological foundations, on a wide range of issues.

Smith agreed with David Hume about many things. But in his view of the social origins of morality, he believed he had departed from Hume's well-known claim that "utility" is the "foundation of the chief part of morals" (Hume, 1998, 5.4) Smith argued that considerations of utility might contribute to the beauty or deformity of a thing, but he resisted the idea that utility should be conflated with virtue, or that it should be seen as the primary reason why we tend to approve or disapprove of something. There has been much debate among scholars on the extent to which Hume's utilitarianism is ultimately incompatible with Smith's claims about the social nature of morality.

The Moral Sentiments earned praise as a profound work in moral philosophy from such venerable contemporaries as Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant. Sophie de Grouchy (1764–1822), wife of the marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794), translated the treatise into French in 1798, along with Smith's 1761 essay "Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages." Smith revised *The Moral Sentiments* five times between 1759 and 1790, the second and the sixth editions substantially. In the final edition in 1790, Smith added an entirely new part in which he attempted a comprehensive history of moral philosophy.

Smith's methodological and disciplinary commitments elude simple categorization. As was common among members of the Scottish literati, Smith was broadly educated in the arts and sciences, a genuine polymath, and felt no hesitation crossing methodological and substantive barriers into the natural and physical sciences, philosophy, religion, history, politics, law, economics, anthropology, sociology, psychology, literature, and linguistics. He is most commonly categorized as a political economist, but his rightful place as a moral philosopher of canonical stature has been reestablished in

recent decades among philosophers and intellectual historians. And yet, Smith did not use his texts to advance strong normative ethical or economic positions. Surely there are moments throughout his work when he advocated certain actions and policies over others for their utility or their intrinsic moral worth; but in the empirical tradition of Scottish moral philosophy, Smith was engaged primarily in a far more descriptive activity: He wanted to describe the origin of morals, and the origin of national wealth. For the most part, *The Moral Sentiments* reads like a rich investigation into human nature, presented by an individual exquisitely attuned to the social phenomena he observed in the world around him. And *The Wealth of Nations* reads like an institutional description of the origins of national wealth, grounded in a trenchant sense of history. Indeed, those today who draw sharp lines between facts and values, between what is and what ought to be, may be inclined to characterize Smith's empirical investigations in both books as thoroughly scientific and not philosophical at all. The point to remember is that so rigid a division of intellectual labor did not yet exist in Smith's day. Smith moved rather freely between fact and value, between the actual and the ideal, and was inescapably guided by a variety of normative impulses, acknowledged or not. The positive/normative distinction that drives contemporary social science is inappropriate for characterizing a "theory" like Smith's that sought to provide an empirical account of morals in the nebulous terms of "human nature," and that sought to provide an empirical and historical account of wealth in the nebulous terms of "natural liberty."

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See also Classical Political Economy; Commercial Society; Hume, David; Scottish Enlightenment

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SOCIABILITY

Distinct from an altruistic other-regardingness, *sociability* may be best and most generally understood as a natural and rational desire for human community and fellowship that has played an ontological and foundational role in accounts of political society. It is often depicted as a feature of human nature, a normative command of god or of reason and as a corollary of self-love. In general, sociability may be understood as the desire of individuals to live peacefully in society with one another and to take a general interest in the well-being of others As such, sociability played an important role in discussions of human nature

and the nature and constitution of political communities in both stoicism and modern natural jurisprudence.

Sociability in Greek and Roman Thought

The concept emerged originally among the Greek and Roman stoics (for example, by Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Porphyry, among many others), who sought to bring the Aristotelian category of the *politikon zoon* to bear on a world in which empire had come to replace the polis. The concept of *oikeiosis* or *appetitus socialitas* was part of the apparatus used by the stoic philosophers to ground the notion of the universal community of mankind. The stoics saw sociability or fellowship as an integral element of human nature that was intimately connected to the rational life and the fulfillment of the human telos. The rational man observes his own desire for human fellowship and pursues this connection with other people as an expression of his rational and sociable nature. The end result of this conception of sociability is the acknowledgment of the universal community of mankind and a subsequent moral relationship with all other human beings.

Further, sociability provided the stoics with an alternate basis for political life than necessity or force. Rather than grounding political community and obligation in material necessity or coercion, the stoics used sociability as a way of describing these entanglements as voluntary expressions of a rational and universal human appetite. Cicero, for instance, in his *De Officio,* explicitly uses sociability as a way of distinguishing the political from the necessary, while at the same time using sociability as a justification for property (justice). In this usage, sociability is the feature of human nature that allows political life to be informed by a moral or ethical dimension: It becomes possible for justice and obligation to be grounded in natural human sociability rather than expedience or force.

Sociability in the Modern Natural Law Tradition

This latter conception of sociability regained popularity in the early modern tradition of natural law and natural rights. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, natural lawyers turned to the stoic language of sociability in order to provide a foundation for their natural jurisprudence. The uses of sociability as a constitutive category are quite diverse but, generally, sociability comes to stand less as the prepolitical impetus for human society and more as the precondition for rights and moral equality. More particularly, the claim that human nature is characterized by a kind of sociability enabled the natural lawyers to argue that individuals possess reciprocal rights and obligations in the state of nature that retain their force even in political society.

For example, Hugo Grotius, in the *Prolegomena* to his *Rights of War and Peace,* draws explicitly on the stoic notion of oikeiosis to undermine the skeptical claim that justice and right are based solely on expedience and force. Rather, he argues that there is a sociable dimension of human nature, connected to reason, that makes individuals capable of recognizing natural law and natural justice and desirous of living in society with one another. This is an explicitly stoic rendering of sociability that comes to play an important constitutive role in Grotius's theory of natural law and natural right. By contrast, in the natural law writing of Samuel von Pufendorf, sociableness becomes the chief law of nature, divinely mandated to make human social life possible. In both cases, sociability is deployed in order to moderate the aggressiveness and solipsism of self-love and self-interest.

Despite its importance for thinkers like Grotius, Pufendorf, Jean Barbeyrac, and others, natural law sociability was contested from the outset. Hobbes, for instance, explicitly rejects the idea of any kind of sociable other-regardingness as a dimension of the human psychology and precondition for politics. Generally, however, in the early modern era, sociability works as the category through which political theorists and natural lawyers are able to conceive of individuals as capable and desirous of assuming rights and duties toward others. This means that sociability plays an important role, at least rhetorically, in the movement from a state of nature to political society. In the effort to explain why rights-bearing individuals would move into civil society, sociability becomes a way of explaining the desire to move into political society and a way of characterizing the restraints on individual rights and freedoms—again without having to

limit political obligations to necessity or coercion. In its early modern usage, sociability comes to occupy a gray space in descriptions of human nature; sociability works, generally speaking, as a category that moderates, informs, and restrains self-love in order to make political society and political obligations possible.

While Rousseau's notion of natural pity can be seen as a way of decoupling human sentiment from a sociable drive toward political society, the greater challenge to sociability came from its gradual merger with egoism and self-love. In the Scottish Enlightenment, sociability retained significance as *sentiment* or *benevolence*—a natural moral inclination toward shared goods. However, whereas thinkers like Grotius and Pufendorf saw sociability as a facet of human nature distinct from self-love, thinkers like Hutcheson, Smith, and Ferguson, among others, began to blur this distinction. In this tradition, sociability ultimately comes to be an organic feature of human psychology that is difficult to distinguish from a well-regulated self-love. The tension between sociability and self-interest can be said to have reached its apex with Kant's "asocial sociability"—a concept that merged the two historically antagonistic concepts and thereby effectively undermined the possibility of designing political institutions to encourage sociability at the expense of pathological self-love.

The role of sociability in early modern natural law theories has been the subject of much debate in recent years. Scholars argue about the degree to which this sociability was a genuinely constitutive ingredient of political and social obligation and to what extent sociability is merely a rhetorical device for making liberal political authority possible. In any case, despite its importance to the foundations of early modern natural law theory, after the eighteenth century, the language of sociability all but completely disappears from political theory. As natural law theory declined in importance and as philosophers sought to establish firmer secular bases for political obligation, depictions of human nature came to be overwhelmingly focused on self-love and self-interest. Consequently, institutional rather than ontological constraints on this egoism came to characterize the concerns of political theory and natural rights.

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See also Cicero; Cosmopolitanism; Ferguson, Adam; Grotius, Hugo; Kant, Immanuel; Natural Law; Pufendorf, Samuel von; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Smith, Adam; Vitoria, Francisco de

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Social Capital

Social capital is defined by the conjunction of its two terms. *Social* refers to institutions, organizations and networks through which individuals interact to achieve common goals. *Capital* refers to the aspects of these interactions that can be used to achieve common goals and political gains. Hence, *social capital* includes all interactions that develop bonds and trust between community members and that thereby increase the capacity of citizens to influence the political process.

Social capital can grow out of almost any everyday human interaction. Yet, while all kinds of interactions are important, some feed more directly into governance than do others. Again, while all kinds of governing institutions might foster trust, social scientists often suggest that local governing groups, such as city councils and school boards, are of particular value to the creation of a cohesive society.

To simplify matters, we might think of the institutions that foster social capital as being either private or state ones. Private groups, such as nonprofits and local networks, can help to develop social capital outside of the state. Even when social capital develops outside of the state, it often helps

to give people access to particular state resources, such as funding for schools or the repair of local roads. Here social capital fosters trust and communication within local communities, thereby enabling people to cooperate so as to interact more effectively with government. Equally, of course, such social capital can enable people to act collectively to pursue interests and concerns in ways that simply bypass the state. One example would be a local voluntary group that protects and cleans a park or other zone.

Social capital can arise, secondly, from government institutions. State agencies can stimulate communication, trust, and understanding between community members. A dramatic recent example of governmental interest in stimulating social capital is the White Paper on European Governance published by the Commission of the European Communities in 2001. The White Paper explicitly aimed to develop means to connect the European Union more closely to its citizens and to increase participation in governmental affairs. These aims are unpacked in terms of five principles: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence. These principles then inspire proposals for change under four headings: better involvement in shaping and implementing policy, better policies and better delivery of policies, contributions to global governance, and refocused institutions and policies. The big idea is to expand democratic participation by opening up the policy-making process through a shift in the role of governing institutions from command and control in hierarchies to facilitation and negotiation in networks. Governance in and through networks thus gets invoked as a means of building social capital.

The European Union and other governments might be increasingly convinced of the importance of building social capital, but by no means does everyone agree with them. Some social scientists think that the concept of social capital is sheer nonsense. Others debate about how to define it, or its role in society, governance, and democracies.

Consider the definition of social capital. Some people define it as an omnipresent resource arising out of each and every interaction. Others associate it more narrowly with only those social interactions that produce norms of trust and reciprocity. While these definitions overlap, they often lead to different analyses of the relationship between social capital to society and to governance.

Do high levels of social capital sustain communities in a way that leads to a strong and inclusive civil society? On the one hand, we might suggest that some forms of social capital actually hinder wider trust and cooperation. Close-knit social groups often exclude other members of society with different identities or concerns: Wealthy gated neighborhoods might express the common concerns of their residents for privacy and security, but they also physically remove their residents from the greater community. What is more, close-knit groups can restrict the effective freedom of their members by imposing draconian rules or norms. Yet, on the other hand, some social scientists strongly argue that even exclusive or repressive groups entail interactions that generate social capital. In this view, even if such groups make it harder to develop broader forms of trust and cooperation, they nonetheless increase the capacity of their members to engage in governance and influence the state.

The effect of social capital on the state is, however, also a matter of debate. The dominant view is that social capital stimulates the state to respond to its citizens. When citizens develop trust and cooperation, they are better able to get the state to respond to their demands. Yet, we might suggest that social capital sometimes encourages the state to divest from communities. Perhaps, for example, if local community groups and nonprofits tackle problems, state actors will come to believe that they need not do so. In the absence of successful community cooperation, the state itself might address the relevant issues.

Another debate concerns the relationship between social capital and democracy. Social capital is, it seems, weak in authoritarian states. Some political scientists thus argue that democracy depends on the presence of certain levels of social capital within civil society and independent of the state. Social capital in civil society serves to check abuses of power and prevents government corruption. However, other political scientists argue that democracy does not presuppose social capital as much as create it. Democracy encourages the state to pay more attention to public opinion, thereby giving social actors more reason to interact and organize themselves. Authoritarian

states, in contrast, often restrict free speech and free organization, thereby undermining the growth of social capital.

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See also Civil Society; Culture; Institutionalism; Organization Theory; Participatory Democracy

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Social Constructivism

Constructivists argue that social reality is constructed out of human knowledge, beliefs, or meanings. Typically, they add that human knowledge too is constructed. Such constructivism stands in stark contrast to accounts of our knowledge as resting directly on the facts of the matter. It denies that our knowledge can derive from pure experiences of an independent reality. To the contrary, it emphasizes the positive role played by social traditions and cultural conventions in determining the content of our experiences. Hence, constructivism often acts as a form of critique. It suggests that ideas that might appear to be inherently rational or natural are in fact the artifacts of particular traditions or cultures. Likewise, it implies that our social and political practices are not the result of natural or social laws; they are the product of choices informed by contingent meanings and beliefs.

Social constructivism has been applied to a range of concepts. Perhaps the most controversial in philosophical terms are concepts such as truth and reality. The most controversial in social terms have perhaps been race, sexuality, and gender, all of which might be thought to have a basis in given facts about our bodies. Constructivism has also been applied to social and political institutions, including nations, corporations, agencies, and governments. This constructivist view of institutions challenges many of the leading approaches to social science and also related approaches to public policy. Constructivist theories of politics stress the role of tradition, discourse, and culture in constructing patterns of rule. They thereby highlight the contingency and contestability of political life in contrast to those who see it as inevitable, rational, or explicable by reference to natural or social processes. They suggest that political life is a social construction. It arises out of particular traditions or particular regimes of knowledge.

Varieties of Constructivism

All forms of social constructivism emphasize the constructed nature of the social world. However, there are different ways of unpacking constructivism, and we should distinguish between them. Although it is tempting to think of each type of constructivism as an account of society as a whole, each of them might apply to some (but not all) of our concepts.

A general version of constructivism insists that we make parts of the social world by our intentional actions. People act for reasons that they adopt in the light of beliefs and tacit knowledge that they acquire in part through processes of socialization. For example, when shopkeepers price goods, they make an aspect of the social world in accord with their beliefs about how to make a profit, and their perhaps tacit concepts of market economics and fair exchange. Other aspects of the social world then arise as the unintended consequences of such intentional actions. For example, if a shopkeeper prices her goods higher than her competitors, and if potential customers buy goods at the lower prices available elsewhere, she will go broke irrespective of whether or not anybody intended or foresaw that outcome.

All kinds of social scientists allow that we make the world through our intentional actions. Often they seek to explain actions in terms of allegedly social or natural facts about, say, institutions, social class, gender, or a universal human rationality. In contrast, constructivists usually argue that the intentions of actors derive in part from traditions, discourses, or systems of knowledge that are also social constructs. This linguistic social constructivism implies not only that we make the social world by acting on certain beliefs and meanings, but also that we make the very beliefs and meanings on which we act. In this view, our concepts are contingent products of particular discourses and practices; they are not natural or inevitable ways of conceiving and classifying objects. Again, our concepts are the artificial inventions of a particular language, culture, and society; they are not a universal vocabulary that picks out natural kinds in the world. Constructivism thus implies that varied traditions or cultures can categorize objects differently. For example, it is a commonplace that Eskimos have many words for different types of "snow," or that the people of the Kalahari Desert have words that pick out various shades of "red." Linguistic social constructivism consists, therefore, of what is called "anti-essentialism." It asserts that our concepts do not refer to essences: Our concepts do not pick out core, intrinsic properties that are common to all the things to which we might apply them and that also explain the other facets and behavior of those things. It is certainly possible that none of our social concepts refer to essences, especially if we define a social concept as one that cannot be unpacked solely in terms of our bodies, their movements, and their reactions. However, to say that our social concepts do not refer to essences is not to say that they do not refer to anything at all. We should distinguish here between pragmatic, critical, and antirealist forms of constructivism.

Linguistic social constructivism implies an anti-essentialism according to which concepts do not have objective boundaries but rather are determined by social factors. Sometimes this anti-essentialism inspires a pragmatic account of social concepts. In this view, social concepts are vague; they capture family resemblances; they are conventional ways of dividing up continuums, rather than terms for discrete chunks of experience. But although pragmatic concepts do not refer to essences, they do refer to groups of objects, properties, or events—often groups that have vague boundaries. Social factors determine pragmatic concepts because there are innumerable ways in which we can classify things, and because it is our purposes and our histories that lead us to adopt some classifications and not others. Nonetheless, the role of social factors in determining pragmatic concepts does not mean that these concepts have no basis in the world. To the contrary, we might justify adopting the particular pragmatic concepts we do by arguing that they best serve our purposes, whether these purposes are descriptive, explanatory, or normative. We might justify a pragmatic concept such as the "new public management" on the grounds that its content derives from family resemblances between recent public sector reforms. We also might defend ascribing particular content to concepts such as neoliberalism on the grounds that doing so best explains the resemblances between public sector reforms. And we might adopt a particular concept of democratic accountability on the grounds that it best captures those patterns of rule that we should regard as legitimate given our normative commitments.

Critical constructivism arises when we want to suggest a concept is invalid. In such cases, we might argue that the concept is determined by social factors and that it fails to capture even a group. For example, we might reject the concept "new public management" as unfounded, especially if it is meant to refer to a global trend. We might argue that different states introduced different reforms with widely varying results. And we might add that the reforms drew on, and resembled, each state's traditions of administration far more than they did a common neoliberal blueprint. In such cases, we dismiss concepts as unfounded by arguing that there is no fact of the matter—neither an essence nor a group—that they accurately pick out.

Some antirealists have adopted a kind of global critical constructivism, applying it to all of our concepts. Typically, these antirealists argue that the role of prior theories and traditions in constructing our experiences precludes our taking these experiences to be accurate of a world independent of us. They argue that we only have access to our world (things as we experience them),

rather than some world as it is independent of us (things in themselves). And they then conclude that this means that we have no basis on which to treat our concepts as true to the world. In their view, there is no outside the text, and so no world outside our linguistic constructions.

Constructivist Approaches to Politics

Different types of social constructivism might inspire different approaches to politics. Whatever the merits of antirealism as a global theory, it is important to say that there is nothing incoherent about an antirealist or critical account of any particular aspect of politics. Consider, for example, the idea that there is a new governance defined in terms of the hollowing out of the state: The state is said to have lost the ability to impose its will, and to have come to rely instead on negotiations with other organizations with which it forms networks and partnerships. In contrast, we might suggest that the state never had the ability to impose its will; the state always had to operate with and through organizations in civil society; it always has been plural and dispersed. Hence, we might conclude that there is no fact of the matter that can be accurately picked out by the concept "the new governance."

Even if we took an antirealist stance toward "the new governance," we still might be interested in abstract questions about governance or politics conceived as an account of features of all patterns of rule. The general and pragmatic versions of social constructivism are most relevant to these abstract questions. Because constructivists argue that we make the social world by acting on contingent sets of meanings, they generally analyze changing patterns of rule in terms of competing traditions and bodies of knowledge. They favor the interpretive approaches to politics that concentrate on elucidating the meanings that make possible any particular pattern of rule. Similarly, because constructivists emphasize the contingency of traditions, they sometimes highlight the diversity of traditions at play within a pattern of rule and the contests between these traditions. They favor bottom-up approaches to the study of politics that explore how meanings are created, sustained, contested, and transformed by human activity within practices saturated with relations of power. Finally, when constructivists emphasize the contingent and diverse nature of traditions, they offer critical genealogies of alternative accounts of patterns of rule. They reject any suggestion that a natural or social logic determines the content or the development of any given political system. They argue that political scientists efface the contingency of social life when they attempt to ground their theories in apparently given facts about human rationality, the path dependence of institutions, or the inexorability of social developments.

Although constructivists typically favor interpretive, bottom-up, and critical approaches to the study of politics, they disagree among themselves about the details of such approaches. The main disagreements seem to distinguish governmentality and decentered theory. These two forms of constructivism appear to embody different views of meaning. Governmentality theorists often imply that meanings exist as quasi-structures in that their content derives from their relationship to one another within discourses: individuals are just the passive supports or constructs of such discourses. In contrast, decentered theorists take meanings to arise from the use individuals make of language to express their beliefs; discourses are just clusters of intersubjective beliefs adopted against the background of similar traditions.

Constructivists adopt different views of meaning largely because they hold different views of the individual. Governmentality and decentered theory alike reject the idea of an autonomous individual. They insist that individuals are inherently located within social contexts that influence them. Governmentality theorists appear also to want to reject the very idea of human agency. Many of them concentrate exclusively on the ways in which social contexts or discourses give individuals their intentions and beliefs—their very identities. Decentered theorists want to defend the idea of situated agency even as they reject that of autonomy. They argue that individuals can reason and act in novel ways, albeit that they can do so only against the background of inherited traditions that influence them. Although people always set out against the background of a discourse or tradition, they are agents who can act and reason in novel ways so as to modify this background. Hence, they conclude that although a linguistic context forms the background to people's statements, and a

social context forms the background to their actions and practices, the content of statements and actions does not come directly from these contexts, but rather from the ways in which people replicate, use, or respond to these contexts in accord with their intentions.

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See also Collingwood, Robin George; Culture; Discourse; Foucault, Michel; Historical Understanding; Interpretive Theory; Symbolic, The

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Social Contract Theory

Social contract theory is an approach to questions of political legitimacy and obligation that seeks to ground claims to sovereignty on an agreement among people to form a political community. Social contract theory was the dominant approach to such questions in early modern Europe, and numbered among its proponents many of the major political theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. As it is a theory of popular sovereignty, social contract theory was originally in opposition to theories such as that of the divine right of kings that grounded political authority on a putative mandate from God. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, social contract theory came under sustained attack from Edmund Burke, David Hume, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. As a result of these attacks, it fell out of favor in both the Anglophone and the continental European traditions of political theory until, in 1971, John Rawls sought to revive it. Since then, important contemporary variants on social contract theory have been developed by Rawls and by such figures as Robert Nozick, T. M. Scanlon, Charles Beitz, and Ronald Dworkin. This entry focuses on the social contract theory of early modern Europe. Its contemporary revival is discussed in the entry on Contractualism and other related entries in this encyclopedia.

Although all social contract theorists share an appeal to an original covenant that is the foundation of political society, and hence all ground sovereign authority on popular agreement, each major figure in the tradition developed a distinctive variant of the social contract. For example, Hobbes's social contract ushers in an absolute sovereign that, in its powers, is more similar to the figure envisaged by divine right theorists such as Robert Filmer than to the limited government of Locke's theory. This entry thus begins with an overview of the versions of the social contract offered by the figures previously listed, before turning to an account of the major themes that unite social contract theorists—such as their individualistic premises, the positing of a state of nature, and the appeal to natural law—and of the criticisms that beset contract theory after the Enlightenment. It concludes with a comparison with contemporary contractualism.

Hugo Grotius

Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) is not strictly speaking a social contract theorist, because he does not posit political society as arising out of an original agreement, or social contract. However, in developing a political theory based on the natural rights of individual human beings, he is an important precursor of later natural law theorists who would go on to develop the idea of a social contract. In *De Indis,* (*On the Indies*) Grotius based his argument that his country—the Netherlands—was justified in capturing Spanish and Portuguese merchant ships during war on natural principles of justice. He later developed this position in *Mare Liberum*

(*The Free Sea*) by arguing that the sea belonged to no nation and could be used by any. The idea that something that is the property of no one can be used by anyone was to be a significant theme in the writings of later contract theorists. Finally, in *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (*The Rights of War and Peace*), his magnum opus, Grotius systematized a set of purportedly natural laws that applied to all nations, arguing that nations were bound by a common law both in times of peace and when at war. In arguing that certain laws might be natural, Grotius laid the foundation for social contract theory, with its use of the trope of the state of nature. Furthermore, Grotius also defended a notion of natural rights, thus developing a consent-based theory. In his view, people have the right to govern themselves unless they divest themselves of this right. Given the subsequent writings of Hobbes and others, this argument was, to say the least, a pregnant one.

Thomas Hobbes

It is in the writings of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) that the notion of the social contract—or as Hobbes frequently calls it, the social compact—is fully developed for the first time. Hobbes uses the notion of the state of nature to justify sovereign authority. In his argument, as developed most famously in *Leviathan,* but also in *De Cive* (*On the Citizen*) and in *The Elements of Law,* human beings existing outside of political society would have to rely on themselves to ensure their preservation, as they could not rely on anyone else to protect them. Postulating that our primary desire is to avoid violent death, Hobbes ascribes to human beings a right of nature, which is to do whatever they must to preserve themselves. As, outside of political society, there is no arbiter of what is necessary for someone's preservation, Hobbes argues that it follows that, in such a state, each person has a right to whatever he or she deems necessary. As each person has this right, he concludes that in a state of nature everyone has a right to all things.

In what is probably Hobbes's most famous argument, he advances the claim that life in a state of nature will be "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes, part 1, chap. 13 of *Leviathan*). That is not, as is commonly believed, because human nature is necessarily aggressive, but because we are compelled by fear, by competition, or by vainglory to seek to enhance our power at all times. Even if our neighbors do not actually wish us ill, we cannot know this, and so our desire for self-preservation means that we must assume the worst and take steps to protect ourselves from them. The result is a war of all against all, which does not mean constant fighting but the constant threat of fighting. Not only will our lives by lonely and brief, but we will have little scientific or artistic development and few of the commodities of modern life, because development of such things requires a level of trust that is, in Hobbes's view, absent from the state of nature. As a result of the inconveniences of the state of nature, we will sign a social contract that will establish a leviathan, an absolute sovereign authority, over us and protect us from the constant threat of violent death. Hobbes also postulates laws of nature that ensure that we sign the social contract, the most important of which are that we should do whatever we can to establish peace and that, when necessary for procuring of peace, we be willing to lay down our right to all things and transfer it to a sovereign.

So, in Hobbes, as in later writers, the social contract is a means of escaping the state of nature. Hobbes is in many respects an unusual social contract theorist, however, for he defends a form of political absolutism. The Hobbesian Leviathan is not a signatory to the compact, which is signed only by the subjects, and gains almost unlimited power over the signatories to the contract. For example, Hobbes holds that one of the most pernicious things that can happen in a social state is for the sovereign to lose control over the expression of public doctrines or religious expression. From the contemporary perspective, contract theories seem to be a branch of liberal political theory, but it is always worth remembering that the original proponent of the social contract was in many ways far from being a political liberal, despite his individualistic premises. Subsequent contract theorists were to defend things such as the separation of powers that were a long way from the thought of Thomas Hobbes.

Samuel von Pufendorf

One of the earliest commentators on Hobbes was Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), a German in

the service of the Swedish crown. In *De Jure Naturae et Gentium* (The Law of Nature and Nations) and in *De Officio Hominis et Civis* (On the Duty of Man and Citizen), Pufendorf offered a critique of Hobbes's conception of the state of nature, while retaining the basic structure of Hobbes's theory, namely, its basis in natural law and its adherence to a notion of popular sovereignty. In Pufendorf's view, Hobbes seriously underestimates the extent to which human nature is marked by a sense of sociality and not just by diffidence. As a result, he concludes that the Hobbesian account of the state of nature is far too pessimistic. Pufendorf argues that the state of nature might for long periods be peaceful and that social organization would develop within it prior to the establishment of a political state. However, Pufendorf claims that the instability of the state of nature would lead its inhabitants to sign a social contract and, in doing so, to form a political society. In this respect, Pufendorf is a precursor of the similar arguments of his contemporary, John Locke, who also objected to Hobbes's account of the state of nature and sought to distinguish between it and a state of war.

For much of the eighteenth century, Pufendorf was one of the most influential figures in European political thought, thanks to the commentary on his work of Jean Barbeyrac. In his notion of state will, Pufendorf can also be seen as an influence on Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For Pufendorf, positive law was a creation of the will of the legislators and the will of the state was simply the will of all those who made it up.

John Locke

Although John Locke (1632–1704) is now most famous for his revision of Hobbes's theory of the social contract, it is important to remember that he saw himself responding at least as much to Sir Robert Filmer as to Hobbes, and devoted the first of his *Two Treatises of Government* to a critique of Filmer's account of the origins of political sovereignty as being in divine mandate. Locke followed Hobbes and Pufendorf in insisting that sovereignty could only originate in an agreement made by the people to whom it was to apply. However, he sided with Pufendorf and against Hobbes on the question of the nature of that contract, and his disagreement with Hobbes stemmed in large part from a different conception of the state of nature.

According to Locke, the state of nature need by no means be warlike. In many ways, the picture of primitive communism that Locke draws seems idyllic. In his view, the state of nature is one of liberty to do as one pleases, but is not one of license. Rather, the state of nature is governed by a law of nature that can be applied by anyone in cases of breaches of it. Anyone who breaches the law of nature places himself or herself into a state of war with the victims of their transgression and may rightly be punished. The upshot is that, for all its promise, the state of nature depicted by Locke is ultimately unstable in much the same way as is that of Pufendorf. One of the reasons that Locke provides for inhabitants of a state of nature to sign a social contract taking them out of that state is to avoid the danger of slipping into a state of war.

Locke also differs from Hobbes on the question of the right to own property in the state of nature. As previously noted, Hobbes argued that everyone in the state of nature has a right to all things; as a result, it does not make sense to talk of prepolitical property rights. Nobody would be prepared to cede perpetual possession of an object to someone else, in case that object might later be needed in her or his defense. For Locke, on the other hand, property is a feature of the state of nature. The world was left to human beings in common and each person has a right to take out of the common stock whatever is needed to ensure that person's survival, to mix their labor with it, and to call it their own. In Locke's view, the natural resources of the earth are sufficiently abundant that people can claim as possessions whatever they need without endangering anyone else's supply of such resources, so long as people do not take more than they need and allow things to go to waste. With the advent of money, however, hoarding became possible. People could have an infinite amount of money without the threat of waste, as money, unlike natural resources, is durable. The emergence of non-natural forms of property, such as money, brought a new source of insecurity to the state of nature. When people's possessions include only food and the like, there is less incentive to steal what other people have than there is once money has been introduced. So, the second reason why the social

contract is signed, according to Locke, is to protect property.

These differences in the conceptions of the state of nature and the consequent differences in the reasons behind the signing of the social contract lead Locke to develop a theory of government that differs markedly from that of Hobbes. As the contract has been signed to protect preexisting property rights, signatories to the contract do not wish merely to gain security but to maintain what they already have. Hobbes had argued that there could be no absolute property rights held against the sovereign, but Locke argued that government could not simply dispose of people's property as it saw fit. Likewise, the more benevolent account of the state of nature led Locke to grant greater scope for resistance to governmental power—and, on certain interpretations of his theory, even for revolution—than does Hobbes. As the state of nature is not necessarily one of war, avoiding slipping back into it is not as crucial as it was for Hobbes, who argued that the contract required obedience until the sovereign was no longer capable of protecting the subjects (although he did allow a subject to resist if the sovereign were to try to put him or her to death). According to Locke, tyrannical or usurping governments were illegitimate and could be resisted.

In short, the reasons for which the social contract was signed play a significant role in the account of the nature of government and the rights of the governed in the theories of Hobbes and Locke. Many of the differences between the two theories stem from the rationale for the social contract, which itself stems from the conceptions of the state of nature of the two men.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Writing in the century after the previous theorists, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) insisted in his *Discourse on Inequality* that no previous writer had drawn an accurate picture of the state of nature, because they had imputed to natural human beings character traits that were in reality the product of society. As a result, their "natural man" was in fact not natural, and their states of nature represented what would happen if modern Europeans were taken out of civil society rather than what human beings would have been like before the creation of political commonwealths. Drawing on the arguments of, inter alia, the baron de Montesquieu, Rousseau developed a conception of the state of nature in which human beings originally had little contact with each other, then lived in harmonious "primitive" villages, and only later became enmeshed in a state of war after the development of agriculture and metallurgy led to inequalities that were hitherto impossible. Rousseau concludes that contemporary civil society is not in accord with the laws of nature because it is characterized by a degree of inequality vastly at odds with that which human nature would mandate.

As a result of his radical redrawing of the state of nature, Rousseau was led in *The Social Contract* to undertake an equally radical revision of the agreement by which polities can legitimately be founded. So influential has his argument been that the task that Rousseau sets himself in *The Social Contract* is often seen as setting the research agenda for much of contemporary political theory, at least in the liberal tradition. *The Social Contract* famously starts with the sentence, "Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains" (Rousseau, 1997b, p. 41). Although in the *Discourse on Inequality,* Rousseau had provided a conjectural account of the process by which natural freedom gave way to social enslavement, in *The Social Contract* he admits that he does not know how that might have happened and turns instead to the question of how that change, which is presumably irreversible, might be made legitimate. For earlier contract theorists, the social contract was a heuristic device by which the transition from prepolitical to political society was explained and justified. For Rousseau, and for many contemporary contractualists, the question of whether political authority is legitimate is held radically in question. Only a social contract of a particular kind—namely, one in which the parties to the contract continue to obey only themselves—is justifiable.

Rousseau is a famously paradoxical writer, and his argument as to how members of a political society can be seen as obeying only themselves has always been controversial, as it involves the notion of the general will. Rousseau argued that sovereignty resided in the people as a whole and was to be expressed by the general will, which was determined by a collective decision of all members of the commonwealth. Each citizen was to vote in accordance with what they felt to be the general

interest. In this way, Rousseau was able to distinguish between the general will and the will of all, the latter being what emerged through an agglomeration of self-interested wills on the part of the citizens. So, Rousseau claims, if the general will is followed then, insofar as she is a member of the sovereign body, each individual is free and follows only her own voice, but qua subject of that body, everyone must subordinate his will to that of the sovereign. We escape our chains only by seeing ourselves as inseparable from the community of which we are a part; so long as there is not this identification, then civil society cannot avoid becoming tyrannical. So it is that the extreme solipsism of Rousseau's depiction of the state of nature is transformed into the strongest sense of communal identification found among any of the major social contract theorists. When laws are made in accordance with the general will, each citizen can see himself or herself as the author of the law and thus as autonomous.

On Rousseau's account, the social contract must also draw a sharp differentiation between the sovereign and the government. The sovereign, which serves to express the general will, must deal only with general laws and not execute particular actions, which are to be the preserve of the government. As a result, Rousseau's version of the contract differs from that of both Hobbes and Locke in important ways. While, with Hobbes, he argues that sovereignty must be indivisible and inalienable, he departs from both theorists in his critique of representative democracy, most succinctly expressed in his famous remarks about the English people being mistaken in thinking that they are free at any time other than during an election campaign. Rousseau advocated an assembly of all the citizens as the appropriate law-making arena and thus expressed a marked preference for smaller bodies politic.

Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is better known as a moral philosopher than as a political theorist, although in the last 15 years of his life he did produce such works as *Perpetual Peace,* which advocated grounding the law of nations on a confederation among free, republican states. In both that work and in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and his *Critique of Practical Reason,* Kant was strongly influenced by Rousseau's quest to find a way in which people can see themselves as self-governing beings, even when bound by the laws of political society over which they may not have had much say. Through his response to these questions, Kant has in turn been a major influence on such contemporary contractualists as Rawls and Scanlon.

On Kant's account, we are free so long as we act independently of both external coercion and pure sensuous impulse. When fully worked out, this was to resolve into the argument that freedom meant acting in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, through which our actions should be able to form the basis of universal laws and should treat other people as means in themselves rather than as means to our—or any other person's—ends. Thus, Kantian ethics has a similar structure to Rousseau's version of social contract theory in that it defines free, and right, action as that which applies generally rather than to specific individuals.

Social Contract Theory and Its Critics

For all their differences, there are certain unifying features in the thought of the major contract theorists previously reviewed. First, each of them posits the notion of a state of nature. In some cases, the state of nature is supposed to be purely conjectural: this is so, certainly, for the early stages in Rousseau's account in the *Discourse on Inequality.* In others, it is part conjecture and part history, as when Hobbes and Locke refer to American Indians as living in something akin to a state of nature. At any event, the state of nature is a heuristic device that demonstrates the purpose that the social contract is supposed to serve, namely, to legitimate political authority. In the arguments of Hobbes, Locke, and Pufendorf, the fact that inhabitants of a state of nature would choose to make a social contract so as to escape the inconveniences of their state suggests that sovereigns are legitimate so long as they serve the purpose of avoiding those inconveniences. In the case of Rousseau, the social contract is supposed to ensure each citizen a share in the sovereign power and avoid the illegitimate inequality of the Europe of his day.

Hand-in-hand with the state of nature goes the appeal to natural law. In each version of his

political theory, Hobbes sets out a list of natural laws of which there are nearly 20, depending on the book in question. The most important are the first three: namely, that everyone should endeavor peace, that they should give up their right to all things in order to achieve peace, and that justice is nothing but the keeping of contracts. These laws are not binding until the creation of a civil state, but for Locke the state of nature itself is governed by a natural law that makes attacks on the person of another unjust and legitimates the punishment of transgressors. Grotius, Pufendorf, and Rousseau also rely on the concept of natural law at various points in their theories, as for example in Rousseau's claim that inequality is manifestly against the law of nature unless it is in correspondence with natural inequalities between people. The appeal to natural law is closely linked to the argument in favor of the existence of natural rights, be it, as in Hobbes's case, the right to all things, or, as in Locke's, the right to remove what is needed from the common stock of humanity so long as enough is left over for others. The result of the reliance on the notion of natural law is that social contract theorists tended to be prepared to advocate political systems vastly different from those under which they lived and in accord with a more or less universal set of criteria.

As the eighteenth century progressed, the notion of the social contract came under heavy attack from writers in both England and continental Europe. David Hume and Edmund Burke both argued that radical change of a political constitution was misguided because it involved a departure from custom, which was the appropriate guide to the allocation of sovereign power. Hume also pointed out the artificiality of notions of justice and the fact that they are reliant on convention. Hobbes had also argued that justice has no place outside of civil society, but nonetheless claimed that certain laws were natural. It is worth noting that Hume was not a thoroughgoing critic of social contract theory and in fact offered an account of the development of human society that could be seen as contractarian, namely that justice arose out of a need to remedy the inconveniences of a lawless society.

The rise of utilitarian political theory in the work of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill provided a more radical critique of contract theory. Bentham famously likened the notion of a natural right to nonsense on stilts and argued that legitimacy must depend on the promotion of happiness and not the hypothetical consent of the governed in the form of a contract that never actually took place. Meanwhile, philosophers in the Hegelian tradition emphasized the individualism of contract theory with its appeal to presocial bearers of rights and its failure to recognize the ways in which human nature could not be separated from the state or society of the human in question. Bentham and Burke made similar arguments when claiming that rights emerge only through, respectively, either positive law or tradition. In the nineteenth century, social contract theory came to be seen as neglecting the historicity of human beings even if, as in the work of Pufendorf, it respected their sociality. Rather than appealing to a state of nature for the account of the creation and legitimacy of sovereign power, the thought was that we should look back to the traditions of the society governed by that particular sovereign. The universalism that Rousseau and Kant, in particular, had emphasized thus fell out of fashion.

Social Contract Theory Today

Although few contemporary political theorists make use of the heuristic device of the state of nature, there can be no doubt that many contemporary liberals deploy a set of assumptions that are rightly seen as social contract theory's answer to utilitarianism and its other critics. This is made manifest by the rise of contemporary contractualism. In particular, John Rawls's notion of the veil of ignorance is a clear descendant of the state of nature, and Rawls acknowledges as much when he claims at the start of his *A Theory of Justice* that he intends to revive the contract theory of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant by carrying it to a higher level of abstraction. That level is reached by the use of the veil of ignorance, behind which people decide on the principles of justice that are to govern their society. The veil of ignorance shields the parties to what Rawls calls the original position from knowledge of their particular interests and abilities and seeks to ensure that the generality and impartiality advocated by Rousseau and Kant can be achieved.

Since Rawls published his book in 1971, contractualists have worked hard in seeking to

determine a set of constitutional principles that would fulfill the objective of Rousseau's social contract: namely, to ensure that citizens can be regarded as autonomous even though they are compelled to obey state law. As mentioned earlier, Rawls, Scanlon, and others often see themselves as working on the question posed by Rousseau as to how to justify the chains that we are in everywhere. Locke is also a major influence on many contemporary political theorists, in particular on libertarians such as Robert Nozick. Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* argues, against anarchists, that government is legitimate, and against those who advocate redistribution by following Locke in claiming that the purpose of government is to ensure life, liberty, and property. To be sure, not all social contract theorists see the defense of private property as a key governmental responsibility; indeed, Hobbes argued that there could be no absolute property rights held against the sovereign, and Rousseau claimed that the advent of property was what led to the unjust societies of his day. Nonetheless, in following Locke by seeing defense of property as the raison d'être of government, Nozick develops a distinctly contractarian argument.

For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, social contract theory was out of fashion. Although it no longer has the status afforded it in early modern Europe, it would be a mistake to think that we have seen the last of contractarian arguments.

Toby Reiner

See also Contractualism; Divine Right of Kings; Hobbes, Thomas; Locke, John; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Sovereignty

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Social Darwinism

Social Darwinism is most simply described as the application of Charles Darwin's evolutionary ideas to society and politics. There have been a myriad of such applications, largely based on concepts of competition, struggle, and "survival of the fittest," key elements in Darwin's theory of natural selection. The most common historical usage is probably the identification of social Darwinism as a justifying doctrine for a ruthlessly competitive

capitalism. Thinkers cited in this tradition include William Graham Sumner and Herbert Spencer (although closer analysis of their writings reveals greater complexity than often suggested).

Darwin broke down older religious and humanist assumptions by locating humanity in the animal world and subject to the same laws of nature. Violent, bloody, and cruel mechanisms brought about evolution by means of natural selection. Harsh economic doctrines based on unregulated economic individualism, and harsh social doctrines celebrating war, expansionist empires and the superiority of dominant white races flowed from such biology. Humans were seen as motivated by innate primal instincts that were pugnacious and territorial, and the genetic improvement of humans seemed to rely on incessant travail. Welfarism was decried as one of the causes of late nineteenth century "degeneration." A eugenics movement, founded at the time by Francis Galton, warned that human interference was thwarting natural selection, and advocated systematic control of human reproduction to improve "the human stock." This culminated in draconian policies, such as sexual sterilization of "unfit" types (like mental defectives) and "unfit" races (such as Jews and Gypsies), taken to monstrous extremes in the genocidal Nazi race hygiene project but also evident in the United States in assaults against the disadvantaged and blacks.

However, there was another side of Darwin's theory that encouraged more optimistic spin-offs. In the *Origin of Species* (1859), Darwin spoke of "the web of life" in describing the natural world, and he emphasized the interdependence of animals. In the *Descent of Man* (1871), he argued that cooperation between individuals and groups and altruistic behavior in humans had contributed to their successful evolution, and he predicted a human future in which we would live in a more peaceful, compassionate, and ethical world. This message was taken up by leftist and "reform" Darwinists. Peter Kropotkin expanded Darwin's cooperative ideas to justify anarchism in his book *Mutual Aid* (1902). Social Darwinism came to encompass socialism, liberal reformism, pacifism, anti-imperialism, and anti-racism, as well as more belligerent and racist social doctrines. People in fact used Darwinian ideas to support a spectacular galaxy of causes and agendas.

Conservatives could take heart from the fact that evolution had taken place over eons of time and largely as the result of selective pressures acting on a multitude of small variations, rather than in great leaps or "revolutionary" changes. This could be used to justify "gradualist" rather than systematically planned or violent politics. The "radical right" focused on hereditary factors as a barrier to reform, arguing that the innate inferiority of poorer groups would undermine all efforts at improvement. However, social reformers held that human capacities were the product of complex interactions between genes and environment; and they fastened on Darwin's theory of cultural evolution to envisage humans using their "exalted powers" of reason and ethicality to make a better future. Racists placed the yellow and black races lower on the evolutionary ladder than whites, supposedly representing earlier stages of evolution. Anti-racists cited Darwin's classification of *Homo sapiens* as a single species and drew the conclusion from his work that racial success depended more on cultural efficiency than physical factors. Eugenics was more variegated than its popular image suggests. It had its idealistic dimension, appealed historically across political lines (there were leftist and reform eugenists as well as "mainline" or reactionary eugenists), and has continued to be surprisingly resilient, for example in Scandinavia, Latin America, and Asia. Following the Human Genome Project, critics allege, it has been resurrected in bioengineering.

Historians have often exaggerated the influence of social Darwinism. It was in reality essentially marginal to serious theoretical debate in major discourses, being deployed as lightweight rhetoric to bolster other positions. Apologetics for capitalism were much more reliant on classical laissez-faire theory than on any naturalistic survivor ethics taken from Darwinism. Militarism, even in Germany prior to World War I, depended more on nationalistic and Realpolitik reasoning and emotions than on biological justifications. Similarly, rationales for imperial expansionism depended mainly on geopolitical, strategic, economic, and nationalistic factors. In liberal cultures, and even beyond them, there was great resistance to starkly survivalist doctrines. They were condemned on the basis of traditional mores, theodicies, and ideals of social obligation.

It is possible to discern two major interpretive traditions regarding social Darwinism. One takes a macro approach, emphasizing the rich variety of concepts that Darwin used and the kaleidoscope of social and ideological implications that could flow from them. It is a vital and inclusive approach but has the disadvantage that it can draw in notions that are problematically Darwinian, or classify as social Darwinists anybody who uses phrases and slogans like "survival of the fittest." The second tradition restricts the usage to social theory that systematically employs central Darwinian concepts, such as natural selection or differential reproduction. Recent work (such as that of Mike Hawkins) has taken a middle approach, accepting the multivalent nature of social Darwinism, but seeing it as a network of interlinked ideas and assumptions about nature, time, humanity, and selective pressures.

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See also Eugenics; Evolution; Imperialism; Race Theory; Spencer, Herbert

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Socialism

Socialism as an organized political movement began in earnest in Europe in the 1870s, and reached its zenith in the social democratic Second International. World War I exposed the weakness of these movements, when most European parties—though not every individual socialist, Russian, or Italian party—supported the state. During the war, these parties lost much of their oppositional character, and the rise of Soviet Russia further mythologized socialism as a philosophy for oppressive regimes in the minds of most Westerners. With the rise of Fascism, socialism was dealt another crippling blow. Social Democracy rebounded after World War II, with parties in Germany, England, and Sweden all enjoying periods of exclusive rule and rule in coalition in France and Italy. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, moreover, variants of socialism remain a major force in the third world.

Historical and Philosophical Influences

Socialism is not an entirely modern concept. Early Christianity, for example, required egalitarian conduct and a united social existence. Early Christians living in Rome, indeed, existed in a pseudo-communistic state of cooperation. Utopian visions stretch as far back in political philosophy as Plato's *Republic*. Modern socialism is a distinct evolution beyond these older ideas. Socialism is secular and claims to be based squarely on human rationality and not empty idealism. Socialism is now understood as a political force primarily concerned with liberation and comes from the belief that humans are in a state of unfulfilled potential restrained by the historical context in which they exist. Socialism's followers have historically come from the working class, where collective interests were gradually uncovered, strength was found in sociopolitical solidarity, and it was demonstrated that only collective action could mitigate or topple oppressive orders.

Socialist ideas are anticipated as far back as antiquity and can be discerned especially in Aristotle's political thought, but it was during the Enlightenment that the socialist tradition came into its own. Above all, the Enlightenment contributed a belief in science and progress necessary to the development of socialism. Heavily influenced by the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau especially, socialists framed the past as an irrational, though necessary, stage to be overcome. Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men* (1754), held that social ills were tied to private property, and his position—expressed in *The Social Contract* (1762) that men must sometimes be forced to be free—foreshadowed the view, popular among later socialists, that capitalist, commercial society must be overthrown because it is toxic for all humans, members of the bourgeoisie included. His rebellion against much of Enlightenment thought provided an early model for the socialist thinkers, including many in the Romantic tradition.

In the late eighteenth century, several bourgeois-democratic revolutions broke out in European countries. These revolutions radicalized large numbers of people and popularized the idea of a right to revolt against social, political, and economic injustices. The French Revolution was of particular significance in this regard. The revolution produced genuinely protosocialist radicalism on the part of peasants who burned deeds and declared land the property of all. By 1793, revolutionary agitators known as *les Enragés* were preaching class warfare and the use of violence to attain social justice. These agitators were not workers and simply called for the fair distribution of property.

The Industrial Revolution, the birth and rapid expansion of modern factory systems and technologies, displaced peasants who were driven into cities as part of an expanding working class. These workers often faced crippling poverty and appalling living conditions. Their grievances fueled the socialist critique of capitalism as a systematic obstacle to the realization of human freedom.

Early and Utopian Socialism

Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, François Noel Babeuf in France, and William Godwin in England were among several influential forerunners of later socialist thought and practice. Both Mably and Babeuf emphasized the need to abolish private property. Babeuf attempted to put some of these ideas into practice and formed the Conspiracy of Equals during the reign of the Directory in France, with the aim of forcing a return to the Constitution of 1793. He deployed tactics adopted by future socialists, including the use of leaflets and agitators in lower-class areas. The conspiracy was discovered, and Babeuf was executed on May 27, 1797, thus becoming the first martyr to the cause of socialist revolution. Godwin's thought influenced socialism in a different direction, emphasizing not so much the mechanics of revolutionary change as a vision of anarchical liberation from the shackles of law, morality, and religion.

By the first three decades of the nineteenth century, a clear tradition of socialist thought is clearly discernible, especially in the work of a group of writers often described as the *utopian socialists*. These thinkers looked backward to a pretechnological era of simplicity even as they looked forward to a better future. Charles Fourier, for example, rejected industrialism and emphasized that genuine fulfillment could only occur in an organized society bound together by emotional solidarity. He was an advocate of sexual liberation and a radical feminist who proposed that women's emancipation is the true measure of overall emancipation. His theory looks back to agrarian society in which the community sees to all needs, but Fourier concretely inspired only several failed utopian communities. He was not an egalitarian, but was committed to the abolition of exploitation. His critique of existing society contributed to socialism by exposing the moral corruption of bourgeois society.

Robert Owen was an English entrepreneur and philanthropist. He managed a textile factory at New Lanark, Scotland, where he instituted shorter hours, safer conditions, education, recreations, improved housing, health insurance, and the end of child labor while still turning a profit. He rejected Christianity and established custom, and this led to his exile from polite society. Despite his reforms, he still felt conditions at any factory remained essentially exploitative. In 1824, he set out for America, where he established New Harmony, Indiana, as a village of cooperation based on his view that rational planning and harmonious social engagement were capable of bringing about happiness. By 1828, the experiment failed and he returned to Britain where he continued his transition from conscientious capitalist to full-fledged socialist. By the 1830s, Owenism was the dominant form of socialism in Britain. Owen adopted the teaching of the materialists and held that man's character is largely the product of the sociopolitical environment in which he lives—thus, he felt that character could be reshaped by healthier social conditions.

Claude Henri de Saint-Simon was not himself a socialist but influenced many later socialist writers. An accomplished and astute businessman, Saint-Simon welcomed growth, but worried about the evils of unfettered individualism. He celebrated productivity, efficiency, and organization, but lamented free markets and envisioned a social order led by *les industriels*. Saint-Simon encouraged the equality of opportunity, but not equality of outcome. By the 1830s, some of his followers turned to socialism, emphasizing mutual dependence and his rejection of selfishness. They called

for the end of the exploitation of man by man, and the redistribution of wealth according to contribution. They began to question the institution of private property via inheritance, and eventually advocated that the state should hold all inheritances in a common pool to be distributed to citizens. He moved socialism away from the utopian idealism of Fourier and toward a focus on the just distribution of income and opportunity.

The Emergence of Socialist Movements

Socialism calls for a dual economic and political revolution. After the period of utopian socialism, socialist thinkers, organizers, and agitators turned toward dynamic means of garnering the popular support of the masses and thus sowed the first seeds of socialism as an international movement.

Etienne Cabet rose to fame with his utopian novel *The Voyage to Icaria* (1840), which envisioned an ideal state of basic but equal subsistence. Cabet assembled a mass "communist" movement with 100,000–200,000 followers in the 1840s. He used the press to communicate his claims and expand his following. His articles were designed to speak to proletarians through clear wording and uncomplicated arguments. His basic position of private property as source of woes and communism as the simple and sufficient solution, however, made workers feel as if quick answers existed for complicated problems.

Auguste Blanqui was active in every major French revolutionary effort in his adult lifetime. He saw violence as unavoidable in class conflict. He was not an egalitarian and denied that the oppressed could easily recognize their own interests in the class struggle. He therefore insisted on the need for an elite revolutionary leadership and concentrated on techniques for seizing power. He never turned his attention to building a revolutionary consciousness in the minds of the people. As a result, Blanquism has ever since been associated with revolutionary movements that lack mass support. This seeming oversight was corrected in the thought of Louis Blanc and William Weitling, both of whom understood that revolutionary socialism required a transformation in the attitudes of the popular classes, not merely astute tactics deployed by revolutionary elites. Not all socialists of the period believed that revolutionary change must be violent, however. For example, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the first thinker to call himself an anarchist, accepted many socialist goals, but denied that violence was required to achieve them.

British Chartism was the first large-scale, working-class movement and began in 1838 as a reaction against unfavorable reform legislation that disadvantaged the lower classes. The movement demanded universal suffrage of all men over 21, fairly drawn electoral districts, confidential voting, the abolition of the property qualification for parliament, and annual parliamentary elections. Despite gathering millions of signatures on their petition for a new social charter, the staging of mass demonstrations and threats of a general strike, the movement died out without success in 1848.

The Emergence of Marxism

Karl Marx created a new vision of socialism as a science based on the synthesis of German idealist philosophy, romanticism, English political economy, and French socialist theory. Friedrich Engels, who would support and collaborate with Marx, had already produced his classic *Conditions of the Working Class in England* (1845), which investigated the shocking conditions endured by proletarians, and was active in socialist circles. The pair soon became involved in the covert League of the Just, and founded a workers union in London. Marx soon became known as a genius in socialist circles, and came to have a measure of influence. It was thus that when the more democratic Communist League was formed out of the League of the Just in 1848, Marx and Engels were called on to compose the group's manifesto. They thereby produced the *Communist Manifesto* and reshaped socialism forever. The *Manifesto* begins with the claim that all history is the history of class struggle. In so doing, they articulated a definitive socialist statement that pegged the roots of the exploitative nature of capitalism in the mode of production supported by the bourgeoisie. They were thus able to issue a clear revolutionary demand for the demolition of the capitalist mode of production and the fulfillment of human potential through socialism. Marx and Engels dismissed utopian socialism as unsophisticated and urged workers to unite as communists and the revolutionary class capable of producing a just state. They enhanced this demand by claiming

that capitalism alienates worker from nature, labor, product, skill, family, class, and humanity for the gain of the few and in the service of capital. As Marx's thought developed, it turned increasingly toward economic analysis, as laid out in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) and *Capital* (1867), which is Marx's fullest exposition of scientific socialism. The *Manifesto* brought workers into revolution, but it is *Capital* that provided the rationale for Marxist movements. However, while both Marx and Engels continued to advocate violent revolution, they left the specification of appropriate political tactics dangerously vague and failed to provide a clear picture of the ideal socialist order at which the revolution aims.

First International

The First International, or International Workingmen's Association, was formed in 1864 and was fraught by disagreement from the start. The tension between socialists and anarchists, in particular, was central to its eventual failure. Still, the International spawned a large movement with intense solidarity, locally and internationally. During the brief life of the International, workers sent mutual aid to foreign proletarians in need and, in England, bravely refused to unload Southern cotton during the American Civil War. Marx was not very successful in weaning others in the International away from their respective doctrines, but did gain political influence. The Franco-Prussian War (1870) and Paris Commune (1871) accelerated the decline of the International by putting a strain on internationalism. Marx dissolved the organization in 1872.

The International was hard hit by the crisis emerging during and after the Paris Commune. When forces under Adolphe Thiers retook the capital, Paris lost 20,000 radicals to execution and many more to prison and exile. Marx was one of few within the International to support, although not unequivocally, the Communards. To Marx, the Commune was the first example of a dictatorship of the proletariat. But its failure led him to conclude that a movement must not only seize state power, but must completely smash it.

Mikhail Bakunin advocated collectivist anarchism, and was Marx's great rival within the International. The rivalry with Marx developed primarily over the desirability of socialist involvement with the capitalist state. Marx argued for parliamentary participation and held that the exercise of democratic rights was a necessity, but Bakunin, who rejected all government, argued against the plan. Marx's inability to manage his rivalry with Bakunin led to the collapse of the International.

The Second International

The Second International, formed in Paris on July 14, 1889, also quickly ran into trouble as a result of internal disagreement. This time, the disagreements were sharpened by the success of socialist parties within the separate countries involved. By 1914, many national parties had large parliamentary delegations, influential daily newspapers, and strong trade unions. As a result, socialists found themselves disagreeing over two issues: first, whether socialism should aim for gradual political reform or continue to demand revolution; and second, whether socialist parties should be authoritarian, vanguard organizations, or whether they should aspire to be mass parties, acting from below.

The history of the social democratic party in Germany (SPD) exemplifies this trend away from revolutionary action and toward more gradualist political reform through the institutions of representative democracy. Ferdinand Lassalle organized the first workers' party on the European continent, the General German Workers' Party (ADAV), in 1863. Lassalle was no Marxist and retained an admiration for the Prussian State, envisioning a role for it once it had been democratically won over to the worker's cause. The direct goal was to gain direct suffrage for the workers. August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht formed a rival Marxist party called the Social Democratic Labor Party at Eisenach in 1869. In 1875, the two parties united under the Gotha Program, which retained a Lassallean influence, much to Marx's frustration. The new party, the SPD, was banned from 1878 to 1890, after which the party adopted a broadly Marxist program at Erfurt in 1891.

Major Theorists

Karl Kautsky was the chief theorist of the Second International. His contribution was to

adapt Marxism to fit a new time without rendering it irrelevant. For Kautsky, revolution is the conquest of power by the working class *as a political party*. Kautsky consistently advanced his conception of a state dictatorship of the proletariat to be established by free elections, with respect for liberties and the use of parliament for socialist ends, but maintained that the SPD must not substitute itself for people. The party's function was to take advantage of revolution, not to make it: before the revolution, the party is simply a democratic means of gaining power for the proletariat. For Kautsky, the irresistible force of social democracy could make peaceable revolution possible by democratic means. Parliament was indispensable as an instrument of government for Kautsky, who argued that proletarian presence can fundamentally alter the institution. His insistence on progress toward a parliamentary majority always maintained parliament as a tool and not an end. He put party organization above spontaneous mass action, because he held that until a revolutionary situation was reached, proletarian consciousness could not match party design. By exercising democratic rights, however, proletarians become more capable of bearing the great political responsibilities of revolution and freedom.

Eduard Bernstein was the chief advocate of revisionism and reform in the Second International. His work *The Preconditions of Socialism* (1899) is often regarded as the revisionist manifesto. He argued that for social democracy to succeed, it was necessary to abandon the idea that if capitalism survived, all prospects for socialism were doomed. Only in a democratic republic, Bernstein argued, can workers make actual progress, as he felt Marx's predictions were flawed and workers could not count on an impending revolution. He revised Marx's materialist assumptions, claiming that materialism binds the worker to a revolutionary cause in a kind of predestination, and that the way to socialism is the improvement, and not the immiseration, of the proletariat. Bernstein sought to show that the resilience of capital had spawned new conditions and needed new responses. Bernstein thus had a higher regard for parliamentary process and legislative ends and for, collaboration with nonsocialist parties, and believed that the modern proletariat must dispense with utopias. Bernstein's socialism accepts a much larger role for ethical ideals (notions of justice and equality) than Marx could have countenanced (Marx regarded all such moralized notions as suspect artifacts of capitalist ideology). Bernstein also emphasized the ongoing political education of workers, as a political education is necessary in democratic action. Bernstein's views were repudiated by the SPD, but still became quite influential in the right wing of the socialist movement.

Rosa Luxemburg was the most articulate defender of the revolutionary alternative in the Second International. Her vision was of a mass oppositional party, seeking to expose, agitate, and use revolutionary and, if necessary, violent means against the capitalist state until a worker's government was achieved. She maintained that the theorists and organizers in the party should have a backstage role, thus enabling workers to forge class consciousness through spontaneous revolutionary action. She regarded the mass strike as a critical weapon in the socialist arsenal. She had no fear of police repression and was jailed several times before being assassinated in 1919. She distrusted the use of parliamentary means and emphasized that only a revolution could enable meaningful change. She opposed Bernstein's revisionism: In her work "Socialism or Reform?" she accuses Bernstein of abandoning worker power for scanty protections from capitalist exploitation and degrading workers by offering them meaningless palliatives.

Historical Challenges

The Second International faced great challenges in the early twentieth century with the growing arms race of European powers, labor struggles, the rise of imperialism, and several ominous challenges to peace. The 1905 Russian Revolution sparked a great debate across Europe. Although the revolution was universally hailed as a sign of progress, it was questioned whether the lessons of that revolution should be imposed on Western parties. Kautsky expected a revolution in Germany, and wanted to keep the mass strike as option—but argued the military must be weakened first. Luxemburg wanted to put the lessons of Russia into practice and immediately begin the use of the mass strike. This debate is axiomatic: The question of the mass strike exacerbated the existing elite-mass tensions in Western socialist parties. In 1907, these tensions

were again heightened when the SPD suffered an overwhelming defeat at the polls after running on a platform of democratic reforms and anticolonialism. Even Kautsky was forced to admit the "spellbinding" forces of colonialism and nationalism. This setback restructured socialist parties across Europe, as they increasingly saw the need to make concessions to nationalist consciousness.

The damage done by the qualifications placed on the mass strike and the need to bow before nationalism became evident with the outbreak of World War I. Resistance to any war other than one of national defense was the official policy of the Second International. Vladimir Lenin and Luxemburg had twice passed statements pledging socialists to strive to prevent war and to attempt to end any war that did break out. Luxemburg argued that workers should respond with a general mass strike and attempt to end the war at all costs. Centrists, like Kautsky, felt that socialists must oppose, but could not stop, the war and should utilize it to hasten the coming revolution. The assassination of the French antiwar leader Jean Jaures on July 31, 1914, in Paris symbolized the death of resistance in the Second International and foretold the coming abdication of international socialism. Although major theorists like Kautsky, Luxemburg, Bernstein, and Lenin all lined up against the war, national parties—following the lead of the SPD, which voted for war credits on August 4, 1914—almost all raced to support their nation in an imperialist war. The failure to oppose the war marked the death of both internationalism and the Second International.

The Soviet Revolution

In March 1917, mass spontaneous food riots broke out in Petrograd, and the tsar was forced to abdicate when his armed forces refused to take action against the rioters. A provisional government was established, and socialists began to cooperate in rule. Lenin refused compromise with other factions—even socialist factions—from the moment he arrived in Petrograd. He quickly issued his "April Theses," which urged Soviets to take power over the provisional government, end the war, and end the toleration of moderates. Leon Trotsky, joining the Bolshevik faction, was made chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, which he radicalized and developed as an armed base for the Bolshevik Party. The November 7th Soviet Revolution succeeded with little opposition.

Lenin immediately faced serious challenges, and did not think Russian socialism could survive without aid and industrial support from other socialist states. For Lenin, therefore, revolution must be international. In Lenin's view only a union of the peasantry and proletariat could oversee the arduous task of effective bourgeois revolution. With Western aid, proletarians and peasants could telescope the bourgeois stage of economic development and begin to develop the infrastructure to support a socialist mode of production. Lenin drew on Trotsky's notion of *permanent revolution.* Trotsky argued there was no correlation between the number of proletarians and the revolutionary potential of the class, and that that potential was properly measured by class consciousness and existence of opportunities for power. In 1918, despite Luxemburg's fear that the Bolsheviks would come to dominate any association, Lenin founded the Third International. His predictions of international revolutions, however, failed. Germany—which seemed the ripest for revolution—saw only a failed uprising by the Sparticist group that led to the murders of Luxemburg and her associate Karl Liebknecht. As other revolutionary efforts similarly petered out, Lenin came to assert—as Luxemburg had feared—that the Bolsheviks should be studied as the model of revolution, and that the party was the only reliable interpreter of revolutionary principles. Parties were hence to be set up everywhere following the Soviet model. By March 1921, with the repression of the Kronstadt uprising and the proclamation of the New Economic Policy (which restored some aspects of capitalism), the Soviet Revolution had reached its Thermidor.

Twentieth-Century Fragmentation

After World War II, the socialist project was pursued in several sharply contrasting forms. The Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe continued to adopt a state-centered and strongly authoritarian approach. In this it was followed in 1949 by the People's Republic of China, led initially by Mao Zedong and with increasing fervor during the cultural revolution in the decade after 1966. In the West, socialism assumed a more

moderate form under the banner of social democracy. The horrors of World War II, and memories of the economic depression that preceded it, propelled parties with (often radical) socialist platforms into the seat of power. The British Labour Party—under the leadership of Willy Brandt—and the Swedish SDP and SPD all became ruling parties for significant periods. The French Socialist Party and PSI both gained limited ruling experience in coalitions. In Western Europe, the model of a mixed economy, which emphasizes social reform through the nationalization of selected means of production and the transfer of wealth through taxation and state programs meant to narrow inequality, has worked efficiently to create successful social democratic welfare states. This was particularly true in Britain and Scandinavia. Not only did management by social democratic parties and the diffusion of socialist ideas enable the achievement of effective welfare distribution, it also served to strengthen democratic processes. In Britain, for example, the Labour Party came to power under Clement Attlee in 1945 and shortly provided free health care to the population through the National Health Service, nationalized the Bank of England and most natural resource–based industries, improved infrastructure, and provided many education programs, from funding elementary school programs to college grants.

Only in the United States—where socialism had reached its low high tide under Eugene Debs in the first decade of the twentieth century—did socialists and communists remain out of power, restricted to fringes of movements. The American Socialist Party, indeed, died after the war, leaving only isolated individuals like Michael Harrington and Norman Thomas to continue to advocate social democracy in the American context. In the 1960s, antiwar movements sparked the New Left, but the movement had diverse adherents without little cohesion and mass appeal. With the rise of conservatism and the spread of neoliberalism in the 1980s, most dramatically seen in the election of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, welfare states faced intense internal attacks and were frequently dismantled piece by piece. The social democratic parties that emerged from this period of conservative ascendancy have generally been more committed to free market principles than their forebears. For many commentators, this crisis in moderate Western forms of social democracy was of a piece with the more dramatic collapse of command socialism in the Eastern Bloc during the late 1980s and in the Soviet Union in 1991. Although the Chinese Communist Party has remained in power, and is still officially committed to socialism, many would see its dramatic recent concessions to capitalist arrangements as part of the same repudiation of socialist ideas. Certainly, many earlier socialist thinkers would be extremely uncomfortable with recent trends in Chinese economic policy. Socialist ideas retain much appeal in large parts of the third world, thanks in part to the influence of Frantz Fanon, whose *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961) powerfully linked the socialist agenda with resistance to colonial domination by the capitalist West. Even here, however, the socialist agenda faces increasing pressure from the forces of global capitalism. These developments have led many to speculate that the present period represents the end of the socialist experiment; but the ethical impetus behind the socialist movement will doubtless endure.

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See also African Socialism; Analytical Marxism; Anarchism; Emancipation; Enlightenment; Equality; Exploitation; Fabianism; Fanon, Frantz; Gramsci, Antonio; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hegelians; Humanism; Kautsky, Karl; Latin American Marxism; Lenin and the Russian Revolution; Maoism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; New Left; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Utopianism

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Social Movements

Social movements are collective, sustained challenges to state and nonstate systems of political, economic, or cultural governance. Prominent examples include the civil rights, peace, environmental, and antiglobalization movements. Social movement scholars examine why individuals join social movements; under which conditions movements emerge, flourish, and dissolve; how movements mobilize and use material, organizational, symbolic, and tactical resources; and what impact movements have on participants, public policies, and society at large. Although most social movement studies have focused on domestic struggles in Western Europe and North America, analyses of transnational movements and movements in developing and transition countries are increasingly common.

The study of social movements bears relevance for political theory because social movements around the world have influenced political developments in important ways for several centuries. Recent local-to-global political transformations and the emergence of new modes of governance have wide-ranging consequences for the ways social movements operate. In response to global economic integration, for instance, social movements have successfully adopted transnational participants and practices during the last 15 years. At the same time, social movements play an increasingly influential role in shaping today's political dynamics. Recent phenomena, such as corporate social responsibility, have in large part emerged as a result of pressure from social movements.

Until the 1960s, social movement studies largely focused on extremism and violence. From their examination of communism, fascism, and other mass movements, early social movement scholars concluded that contentious, collective behavior of crowds was irregular and irrational, the result of individual frustration and aggression. Later collective behavior theorists, including Neil Smelser and Ted Gurr, advanced a more structural perspective and explained the emergence of movements as a normal response to social strain and relative deprivation associated with socioeconomic transformations, rather than individual psychological factors.

The advent of the 1960s student, peace, and civil rights movements, combined with a new theoretical understanding of collective action, fundamentally transformed prevailing hypotheses about social movements. Two distinct schools emerged as a result. First, the growing importance of economics and its view of humans as rational individuals gave rise to resource mobilization theory. Drawing on Mancur Olson, scholars such as John McCarthy and Mayer Zald argued that a movement's principal challenge was to mobilize financial and organizational resources in order to attract participants and sustain collective action. Their analyses thus sought to associate the degree of movement success with variation in the distribution of resources, strategic capabilities, and organizational sophistication.

The second variant to emerge from the 1960s movements did not reject the rational outlook of movement organizers and participants but instead emphasized the historical and political environment in which mobilization takes place. The resulting political process perspective centered on political opportunities, including access to decision-making processes, political realignment among key actors, appearance of influential allies, emerging splits among the elite, and decline in state repression. In contrast to resource mobilization, which primarily flourished in North America, political process views of social movements have incorporated European traditions of social thought, particularly in reference to the importance of broad social, demographic, economic, and political processes, such as industrialization, urbanization, and bureaucratization. Promoted by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Doug McAdam, the political process

model of social movement behavior remains the dominant perspective today.

As successful as political process approaches have been, they have also attracted criticism. European scholars examining the 1970s environmental, women's, and peace movements, for instance, have rejected their rationalist and state-centered emphasis. Alberto Melucci and others have noted that affluence, postmaterial values, and the intrusion of the welfare state into new domains of public interest have led to a politicization of private spheres. In response, new social movements mobilize collective identities around the defense of cultural codes and practices.

The emphasis on culture in the new social movements literature echoes a larger, cross-cutting concern with the marginalization of culture in social movement research. Critics of resource mobilization and political process perspectives have long pointed out that a rationalist view of movement organizers and participants fails to explain how such concepts as interests, resources, and identities can vary across cultural contexts. Some scholars, including David Snow and Robert Benford, have accounted for cultural dimensions by focusing on framing (that is, the conscious packaging of movement messages) in ways that best resonate with audience views of a social problem's origins, causal dynamics, and locus of responsibility. Others, like Francesca Polletta, have found that framing itself needs to be viewed in terms of the cultural environment in which framing is pursued. Drawing on new institutionalist theory, they argue that different arenas of mobilization are governed by different logics. These logics influence the legitimacy of actors, claims, and strategies, but are in turn shaped by the mutual interactions between challengers and their targets.

The recent emergence of nonstate modes of governance has had a significant influence on social movement theorizing. Most prominently, views of the state as the primary target of social movement challenges have given way to more differentiated perspectives on movement targets, tactics, and goals. As a result, political process theories have increasingly been criticized for their limited scope of real world movement phenomena. An emerging view of social movements thus emphasizes the multi-institutional nature of modern societies. In this model, Elizabeth Clemens and Mary Bernstein argue, movements may target a wide variety of institutions, which are considered dialectical outcomes of material and symbolic meaning systems and practices.

The study of social movements has been characterized by significant theoretical developments as well as methodological innovations. In the same way that social movement actors have embraced modern information and communications technologies, social movement scholars have increasingly used computer-assisted methods for data collection, manipulation, and analysis. Although the in-depth case study remains the dominant method in social movement research, an increasing number of studies draws on large-scale event data sets that are sometimes automatically generated from electronically available sources. These types of studies are providing systematic insights into the nature of, and relationships between, movement actors, claims, strategies, targets, and impacts. The results confirm the emerging view of social movement dynamics as contextual, historically contingent phenomena.

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See also Civil Disobedience; Civil Rights; Civil Society; Dissent; Environmentalism; Global Civil Society; Global Justice

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Sophists

The term *sophist* is most commonly used in the history of ancient philosophy to designate a group

of practitioners of wisdom in the mid-fifth to early fourth century BCE Greece; they are also referred to as the Old or Early Sophists. They feature in many of Plato's dialogues, where they engage in a range of philosophical discussions with Socrates. The Greek word for sophist, *sophistês,* was originally used to describe people distinguished for wisdom (*sophia*), such as lawgivers, poets, religious experts, and early philosophers. It is in Plato's writings that the word is first restricted to a specific type of sage. Outside of Plato, however, the word sophistês continued to be used to refer to a wide variety of practitioners of wisdom. It is questionable how apt the category of sophist is to describe a specific set of individuals, given how dependent this grouping and its characterization are on the influential testimony of Plato. For the sake of comprehensibility, this entry will follow the traditional grouping.

The most well-known of the Sophists were Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus, and Antiphon, though some 25 others are known to us by name. Many scholars would also include Socrates among the Sophists, but his inclusion in this group is controversial. On the one hand, Plato goes out of his way to distinguish Socrates from the Sophists, yet on the other hand, the comic playwright Aristophanes clearly portrays Socrates as a Sophist in his play of 423 BCE the *Clouds*. The term *sophist* can also be used to refer to members of the so-called Second Sophistic, an intellectual current in Greek-speaking parts of the Roman empire from circa 60 to 230 CE—a movement chronicled by Philostratus in his *Lives of the Sophists*. This entry deals only with the Old Sophists.

The Sophists are traditionally celebrated for their contribution to rhetoric—exemplified by their notorious claim of being able to make the weaker argument the stronger, as well as for their popularization of relativism as a viable intellectual position: Protagoras' dictum "Man is the measure of all things." But this description is too narrow and fails to take into account the variety of the Sophists' intellectual pursuits. It also incorrectly assumes that the Sophists shared a unified intellectual outlook and pursued similar intellectual activities. Though there certainly were intellectual overlaps among the Sophists, they need to be treated individually. Today, sophist, sophistic, and sophistry are used almost exclusively as pejorative terms and imply a person or argument that is logically inconsistent, often for the sake of deception.

Almost no writings of the Sophists have been preserved, so we have to base our judgment of them and their intellectual contributions on two sets of secondary sources: Plato's characterization of them in his dialogues, and short paraphrases or quotations from their works in later ancient authors. In addition to this scarcity of primary sources, Plato, our most detailed source, is a hostile witness who offers an unflattering portrait of the Sophists as philosophical lightweights and as Socrates' intellectual inferiors. This characterization was later followed by Aristotle.

Possibly because of this critical treatment, the Sophists elicited little scholarly interest in antiquity. Although the fragmentary state of the evidence regarding the pre-Socratic philosophers (the Sophists' predecessors and contemporaries) such as Heraclitus is slightly better than that of the Sophists, we are still better equipped to understand their works because of a vivid scholarly interest in them in antiquity. This interest led to commentaries and attempts at explaining their writings, as well as the history and development of their thought. But no such tradition developed in regard to the Sophists. Owing to the dearth of primary sources and the problematic nature of the secondary accounts, any treatment of them will be necessarily tentative.

Many modern scholars have been inclined to accept Plato's negative verdict of the Sophists, especially his assertion they should not be considered philosophers, on the grounds that he was in a better position to evaluate their ideas than are modern interpreters. But others believe that Plato's polemical portrait of them is inevitably distorted. Today, the trend is to see the Sophists in a more positive light and to situate them firmly in the Greek philosophical tradition.

The Sophists were not an intellectually homogenous group, nor did they all subscribe to relativism and teach rhetoric. What, then, makes them distinct as a group? Plato suggests that, in sharp distinction to his own mentor Socrates, they taught for money and traveled the Greek world in pursuit of potential customers. Many practitioners of wisdom traveled extensively in ancient Greece, such as Xenophanes, Solon, Pythagoras, and Empedocles, to mention just a few. The Sophists' itinerant lifestyle thus seems more in line with the practices of

their predecessors and contemporaries in Greek intellectual life generally, than a trait unique to them. As for the familiar criticism that they charged fees for their services, it is difficult to interpret the language of monetary transactions in antiquity, especially because Plato, who is so critical of the Sophists, is our main witness. Plato is not interested in what moderns would recognize as economic life. It is certainly possible that the Sophists were first to teach for pay and that they introduced this habit to Greece. But it is also possible that the charge of teaching for pay is an accusation levied against the Sophists in an attempt to undermine their position as authorities in wisdom by implying that their motivations were driven by greed. Given our lack of knowledge about the historical realities regarding this issue, it is impossible to know for certain what the Sophists' actual practices and attitudes to teaching for pay were.

One area in which many of them shared a strong intellectual interest is the workings of language, an interest that ranged from rhetoric, philosophy of language, and linguistic theory to literary criticism. Gorgias, for example, in his *Encomium of Helen,* one of the few preserved Sophistic texts, raises questions about the persuasive nature of speech (*logos*) and asserts that persuasion can take the form of necessity, and that the effect of speech on the soul is comparable to that of drugs on the body. In the hands of a skillful speaker, Gorgias argues, persuasion can even overturn truth. He posits a stark discrepancy between language and reality and questions the relationship between the two. Given the limitations of human knowledge of the world, men often rely on opinion (*doxa*), which is particularly vulnerable to the power of speech and persuasion. Language, then, far from describing an objective reality, is at best a slippery medium, and its application and proper use is of the utmost importance. Similar concerns about the relationship between language and reality are raised in Gorgias' treaty *On Not Being,* where he argues three theses: (1) nothing exists; (2) even if it did, we human beings could not grasp or understand it; and (3) even if we could, we would not be able to communicate it to anyone else. Here, too, language has become a problem, and its ability to convey an accurate description of reality is put in doubt.

Protagoras is credited with stating for the first time that on every question there are two opposing arguments, and he wrote a work called *Contradictory Arguments* (*Antilogiai*). This work is lost, but an anonymous treatise called *Twofold Arguments* (*Dissoi Logoi*) has survived, which seems to be representative of Protagoras's way of arguing. This treatise begins with the sentence: "Twofold arguments are spoken in Greece by those who philosophize regarding the good and the bad." It goes on to present antithetical arguments regarding the nature of such issues as the just and the unjust, and the true and the false. Another example of opposed speeches is found in Antiphon's *Tetralogies,* which are rhetorical showpieces that argue both sides on imaginary legal cases. The presentation of opposing arguments was a practice particularly affiliated with the Sophists and was ridiculed as such in Aristophanes' *Clouds*.

The distinction between "convention" or "norm" (*nomos*) and "nature" (*physis*) is also common in Sophistic works. This was a productive dichotomy used in a variety of contexts to explore different intellectual positions, especially in the areas of ethics, justice, and the nature of society. Antiphon, for example, states that the most advantageous application of justice involves obeying the laws not only when witnesses are present, but obeying nature when they are absent. For the laws, he explains, are imposed, but nature is necessary. He uses the same dichotomy, as does Hippias, to argue that the distinctions between Greeks and barbarians are not based on nature, but convention. For we all breathe air, cry when sad, and laugh when happy. The anonymous Sophistic treatise *Anonymus Iamblichi,* on the other hand, espouses the view that human beings are not self-sufficient by nature but require sustained training and education to live up to our potential. As can be seen from these examples, the *nomos-physis* antithesis does not entail a consistent philosophical position but, just like opposed speeches, offers a productive contrast that can be used for different intellectual purposes.

Other areas of Sophistic interest in language focused on its correct application. Protagoras and Prodicus are said to have written treatises on "correct diction" (*orthoepeia*). Prodicus also wrote a work on the "correctness of words" (*orthotês onomatôn*), and Hippias on the "correctness of letters" (*orthotês grammatôn*). We are not sure what

the scope of these works was, but much of the subject matter should probably fall under the heading of grammar. Protagoras, for example, is said to have divided words into three genders: masculine, feminine, and neuter; and Aristotle mentions that he disputed the gender of the Greek words for "wrath" and "helmet," which are feminine, arguing instead that they ought to be masculine. He is also said to have differentiated discourse into separate modes, such as wish, question, answer, and command. Prodicus, on the other hand, is frequently portrayed in Plato as an expert in defining and differentiating the meaning of synonyms and in establishing the unique linguistic range of each word. As for literary criticism, in Plato's dialogue *Protagoras,* Socrates, Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias engage in interpreting a poem by the Greek poet Simonides. In the same dialogue, Protagoras also claims that any educated person should have the ability to assess the quality of poetry.

Why, we might ask, do we find this intense focus on language among the Sophists, and how new to Greek thought was it? Though many of them exhibited a strong interest in this area, it was by no means limited to their number. Both Parmenides and Heraclitus had been concerned with the relationship between the world of appearances and being, and the extent and limits of language's ability to convey reality. Democritus is credited with writing a work on correct diction, and Plato devoted the dialogue *Cratylus* to the exploration of the correctness of names. The practice of presenting opposing speeches was as old as Homer, and this feature also abounds in the Greek historian Thucydides and Greek tragedy. Still, despite these traditional elements, it is undeniable that the focus on language intensified in the fifth century BCE. Some scholars attribute this trend to the political development—mainly in Athens—of democracy and its emphasis on the participation of the citizens in public life. According to this explanation, it was the demands of the two fundamental institutions of democracy—the assembly and the law courts—that provided the impetus for the development of instruction in rhetoric, to enable individuals to participate in an effective way in these new political venues.

Other scholars emphasize the importance of understanding the new intellectual developments against the backdrop of the philosophical expressions of earlier practitioners of wisdom. From this point of view, the new Sophistic interest in language is to be seen as a logical and organic development arising out of the intellectual accomplishments of the pre-Socratic philosophers and as a process primarily internal to the philosophical field. This explanation tends to put less stress on the political developments associated with democracy.

Another way of looking at the new intellectual focus on language is to note that it coincided with important cultural transformations in fifth-century Greek society, such as the gradual shift away from poetry to prose as the dominant medium for intellectual communication. We see this shift especially in the fields of philosophy, history, and medical writing. Greek society was also moving away from a traditional oral culture to the eventual adoption of literacy. It is important to note that these transformations were gradual, and that there continued to exist significant overlaps; neither poetry and prose nor orality and literacy should be seen as absolute dichotomies. But they might be used as interpretive vehicles through which to understand the higher degree of reflection on language that occurred in the fifth century. Perhaps the best way to account for this new centrality of language in the works of the Sophists is to draw on elements from each of the three explanations previously presented.

We should be mindful, however, that the Sophists had many other interests besides language. This is perhaps best exemplified in the figure of Hippias, who is said to have expertise in, among other things, music, geometry, astronomy, mathematics, sculpture, genealogy, and history. Hippias was also the first systematic historian of philosophy, and both Plato and Aristotle drew on his work in their accounts of the beginning and development of Greek philosophy. We also have good evidence that some of the other Sophists showed a strong interest in physical matters and mathematics: Gorgias, Prodicus, and Antiphon are all reported to have actively pursued work in natural philosophy, while Antiphon is attested to have been an accomplished mathematician.

Håkan Tell

See also Plato; Protagoras

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Sorel, Georges (1847–1922)

An oft-maligned figure in French political thought, George Sorel would find himself dismissed as a "notorious muddle-head" by Vladimir Lenin and a "fascist" by Jean-Paul Sartre. Nevertheless, his theories of class warfare and the creative effects of violence have come to have a lasting, if subtle, impact on later thinkers.

Origins

Born in Normandy, trained in Paris, and dispatched to the provinces, Sorel was not a traditional philosopher by any means. While well-educated in a technical sense—Sorel was trained as a civil engineer—as a philosopher he was for the most part an autodidact and actively sought to erase all traces of his prior education. Sorel's early conservatism would mark his later development of a nonorthodox, Proudhonian Marxism, and this was especially true of his anti-Jacobinism. From Sorel's earliest works like *The Trial of Socrates* (1889), the thinker's antipathy to revolutions as rationalist, intellectually driven enterprises seeking to impose their views on the blank slate of human material would lead him to oppose what he saw as the "cult of the state" in the French Revolution.

Dreyfus and Revisionism

No single event was of greater impact on Sorel's development—both negative and positive—than France's Dreyfus Affair. The rabid anti-Semitism of the anti-Dreyfusards would initially drive Sorel into the arms of the various social-democratic forces aligned under the Dreyfusard banner. However, when the Dreyfusards came to power, Sorel would see their policies—and especially their retributive attacks on the church and military—as exhibiting the worst elements of Jacobin excess.

This disillusion with the Dreyfusards coincided with the intra-Marxist debate over revisionism, in which Sorel would adopt a characteristically peculiar position. Rather than siding clearly with either the reformist revisionism of Eduard Bernstein or the catastrophist orthodoxy of Karl Kautsky, Sorel took what was ostensibly a revisionist position but turned it toward more radical ends, asserting the centrality of working-class identity and struggle.

Reflections on Violence

Sorel is best known for his *Reflections on Violence* (1908), which first appeared as a series of articles during the upswing of French syndicalism of the 1906 strikes. In *Reflections,* Sorel further concretized his theory of the productive and generative character of working-class violence. Sorel argued that, given the importance of ideology, the capitalist simplification of society into two opposing classes was far from inevitable, and that only

proletarian "violence" could ensure that division, thereby restoring objectivity to the Marxist framework. For Sorel, this violence was categorically distinct from the "force" of the bourgeoisie: where force strengthened the bourgeois state as a structure of inequality and minority rule, violence worked toward the destruction of that same state.

Influence and Controversy

Perhaps the most noteworthy fact regarding Sorel's reception and eventual influence is that his own France seemed to be the least receptive to his theories. Throughout Sorel's life and after his death, his greatest degree of influence would come in Italy (through his close association with Antonio Labriola and Bendetto Croce and influence on Antonio Gramsci), Latin America (through mystical-spiritual Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui), and in the anticolonial thought of Frantz Fanon.

Sorel's posthumous critics have sought above all to associate him with the later development of fascism, a claim that has been developed most extensively by Zeev Sternhell. Others, like Hannah Arendt, dismiss Sorel's violence as the antithesis of political speech and action. Both claims, however, run into difficulty when faced with Sorel's opposition to all notions of unity (including the national) and the generative and political nature of violence as Sorel defines it.

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See also Class; Fanon, Frantz; Force; Gramsci, Antonio; Ideology; Jacobinism; Latin American Marxism; Marxism; Violence

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SOVEREIGNTY

The concept of *sovereignty* is conventionally used to connote supreme authority within a given polity. In practice, however, sovereignty is one of the most contested concepts in political theory. The meanings of sovereignty vary widely depending on the context in which this concept is used, as well as on its inferential connections to other political concepts. Although crucial to modern political science and international relations, the concept of sovereignty is notoriously ambiguous and thus hard to define with any precision.

Issues of Definition

The proper *source, locus,* and *scope* of political authority have been subjected to constant debate in the history of political thought. From where does such authority derive its legitimacy? With whom should it reside? What are the proper limits of its exercise? While these are some of the questions that any account of political authority must confront, most modern definitions of sovereignty imply that such authority—quite irrespective of the sources of its legitimacy and its exact locus—must be both *indivisible* and *absolute* in order to qualify as properly sovereign and nothing else. While being indivisible implies that it must—at least in theory—reside with a single agent in a given polity, being absolute entails that this agent either is sovereign or not, but nothing in between. These formal characteristics distinguish sovereignty from related concepts, such as autonomy and independence, both of which are thought to be matters of degree. Insofar as sovereignty is defined in terms of authority, it is also thereby distinguished from mere power, because this latter concept does not normally carry the same connotations of acceptance, obligation, or obedience among subjects and citizens as does authority. Taken together, these defining characteristics have raised the question of whether sovereignty is best understood as a *rule* or *principle,* or as an empirical fact. In an analogy with grammatical rules, we could say that the concept of sovereignty contains both descriptive and prescriptive elements. Sovereignty thus not only refers to a state of affairs, but also implies that this state of affairs constitutes a norm

to which political life should conform in order to be intelligible. Finally, there is a performative dimension to the concept of sovereignty, insofar as it is frequently used by various agents to raise claims to possess supreme authority in different contexts. Hence, sovereignty is very much what you make of it through practices of definition and its actual usage in political discourse.

Modern theories of sovereignty frequently distinguish between the *internal* and *external* aspects of sovereignty. In modern times, internal sovereignty is attributed to the governmental institutions of a state by virtue of fulfilling some or all of the previous criteria, while external sovereignty is attributed to the state as a whole by virtue of being recognized as such by other states. Because the terms of recognition are dependent on the internal features of sovereignty, the requirements of external sovereignty have varied considerably over time, and have also proven negotiable during each historical period. Such recognition has been granted on different grounds throughout history, from principles of dynastic succession, via national self-determination and territorial integrity, to requirements that stipulate that a state has to be governed according to democratic principles to merit international recognition.

An important corollary of state sovereignty is international *anarchy,* because sovereignty implies a denial of any authority over and above that of the individual state. When three or more states raise and mutually recognize their claims to sovereignty, they thereby form an international society or system devoid of overarching authority. Hence, by constituting the domestic and the international realm as two contrasting but mutually implicating spheres of political activity, sovereignty is the main organizing principle of modern political order.

Historical Evolution

Although quintessentially a modern concept, the history of sovereignty can be traced back at least to the political theology and feudal practices of the late Middle Ages. At that point in time, supreme authority was vested in the person of the prince, who derived his authority both from liturgical sources as well as from his relative ability to protect his subjects from internal and external enemies. The subsequent articulation of modern conceptions of sovereignty followed several cumulative steps, catering to problems of political order peculiar to different periods in European history.

A first important step toward the articulation of a recognizably modern conception of sovereignty was taken when claims to supreme authority were *territorialized,* that is, delimited to a bounded territory. This took place in sharp contrast to prevailing views of imperial authority, which emphasized its universal and boundless character. While the idea of imperial authority implied no restriction on the scope of temporal power, rulers who contested such imperial claims during the thirteenth century did so by asserting that individual kings ought to enjoy the same political and legal status within their inherited domain as did the emperor within the Holy Roman Empire. Hence, during a formative episode, the rulers of the medieval kingdoms of France and Naples refused to recognize the authority of the Emperor Henry VII over matters considered internal. In support of their claims, they could draw on the doctrines of jurists such as Andreas de Isernia and Bartolus of Sassoferrato, who argued that temporal authority ought to be territorially delimited. Summarized into the widespread dictum *rex in regno suo est imperator,* this legal doctrine legitimized a territorial subdivision of political authority, and therefore also brought a gradual disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire.

A second and largely simultaneous step toward a modern conception of sovereignty came with the gradual *depersonalization* of political authority in medieval political theology. During the Middle Ages, authority had often been conferred to the physical person of the prince through anointment and other acts of liturgy that established his divine right to rule. While this practice had the advantage of endowing medieval kingship with religious legitimacy, it posed severe problems of spatiotemporal continuity in cases of death or absence. Depersonalization meant that supreme authority first was relocated to the fictitious person of the crown, and then symbolically transferred to the royal domain or to the body politic as a whole. This transition culminated in the invention of an abstract conception of the state—presumably existing independently of rulers as well as of those ruled—during the seventeenth century, to which sovereignty now could be attributed independently

of the physical person of the prince. Rather than being a mystical property embodied in the person of the king, sovereignty thereby became associated with the political institutions of the early modern state.

A third and decisive step toward a modern understanding of sovereignty was taken when the sovereign authority of the state was defined in terms of *indivisibility* and *absoluteness*. In response to the widespread and lasting religious warfare in Europe, legal theorists like Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Hobbes argued that sovereign authority ought not to be divided within one and the same polity, and that it should be understood as absolute in the sense that it is either attributable to a given agent or not. The cumulative consequence of these conceptual mutations was that the concept of sovereignty came to connote supreme, indivisible, and absolute authority within a given territory, while the questions of its proper locus and scope within each state were left to succeeding generations to handle. This implied that the very identity and integrity of the early modern state, along with that of an emergent international society or system of states in Europe, became dependent on the existence of such sovereign authority and its recognition by others.

The fourth and final step toward a fully modern conception of sovereignty was taken when sovereignty was *popularized,* by being relocated from kings to the people. From Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the French Revolutionaries onward, the will of the people was turned into the source of legitimate authority in the polity. Yet the rise of popular sovereignty did little to challenge the underlying requirements of territorial boundedness, which left modern political theory with the problem of accounting how the sovereignty of the people could be justified in democratic terms. The solution was to introduce the concept of the nation as the ultimate source of legitimacy. The final outcome of this transition was the modern nation-state, governed according to the principles of popular sovereignty. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, that peculiar construct came to constitute the main object of inquiry for modern historiography and political science.

During the twentieth century, the concept of sovereignty became increasingly controversial within political science. Whereas many *pluralists* argued that the concept of sovereignty was theoretically redundant and empirically obsolete in order to understand how modern democratic societies are governed, *Marxists* argued that sovereignty was but a fiction designed to justify and divert attention from the uneven distribution of power and wealth between classes in capitalist societies. Still others argued that the concept of sovereignty should be banished from the vocabulary of the social sciences because of its inherent opacity and ambiguity.

The Contemporary Debate

More recently, the usefulness of the concept of sovereignty has been contested on other grounds, however. At the heart of this debate we find the question whether sovereignty is a permanent or necessary condition of political order, or whether it is likely to be replaced by other organizing principles in the near future. The recent contestation of sovereignty is inspired partly by the belief that the political world has changed, partly by changes in philosophical outlook within the social sciences themselves.

Thus, many political scientists today dispute whether it is meaningful to speak of political authority as being absolute and indivisible any longer, because the processes of European integration and globalization have brought relocations of political authority to levels below as well as above that of the state. Authority appears both relative and divisible. As a consequence, many political scientists argue that the concept of sovereignty either has to be stripped of some of its traditional connotations and redefined to fit present conditions better, or, more radically, abandoned altogether in favor of other concepts such as autonomy and power. Others have contested sovereignty on more philosophical grounds, questioning the ontological status of this concept along with its ideological functions in justifying domestic abuses of power and international warfare. Many of these critics have argued that sovereignty has been unduly reified by modern political science and international relations theory, to the point that sovereignty has become taken for granted. Rather than simply referring to a legal norm or an empirical fact, *constructivists* and *poststructuralists* have argued that the concept of sovereignty instead is

constitutive of modern political order through its usage in academic and political discourse. By implication, sovereignty is believed to be historically contingent and profoundly mutable, rather than a necessary condition of domestic and international political order.

Such a diagnosis of course begs the question of alternative principles of order. But like many earlier attempts to contest sovereignty, the recent criticism of sovereignty tends to presuppose exactly what it sets out to criticize, namely, that there is, or at least has been, something like indivisible and absolute political authority out there in the first place. Thus, the concept of sovereignty, along with all its traditional core connotations of supremacy, territoriality, indivisibility, and absoluteness, nevertheless continues to exercise a powerful influence on contemporary political imagination, to the point that alternatives either seem totally out of reach, or, when inspected more closely, carry features similar to that of the good old sovereign state.

As some recent scholarship has suggested, much of the endurance of sovereignty as an organizing principle of modern political life depends as much on claims to sovereignty being raised by various agents as it does on such claims being perpetually contested by others. From this point of view, the concept of sovereignty derives its meaning from being used to legitimize claims to supreme authority in various contexts. But even if we accept that the meaning of sovereignty is a matter of usage, this implies that its normative import depends on the acceptance of those conventions governing its usage by those audiences recognizing or rejecting such sovereignty claims.

Something similar goes for attempts to relocate sovereignty to the global level, which despite their aspirations often remain premised on the notion that political authority needs to be both bounded and centralized in order for a political community to be possible. Hence, and symptomatically, the present contestation of sovereignty seems to be exactly what keeps this concept very much alive within political science and international relations theory. But by focusing squarely on sovereignty and the question of its endurance, recent critics have left some more basic questions of political authority—questions that the concept of sovereignty once was invented to address—unanswered. To be able to answer these questions without presupposing that political authority needs to be territorial, or that communities have to be bounded, remains one of the main challenges to political science and academic international relations today.

Jens Bartelson

See also Anarchy; Authority; Autonomy; Legitimacy; Power; Rule of Law; State

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Sparta

The ancient Greek city-state (*polis*) of Sparta has been regarded by many thinkers since antiquity as an ideal state, embodying both political and social virtues. In antiquity writers suggested Sparta was an exceptional polis, ascribing its political supremacy to its social order. This image proved influential in the Renaissance, and especially the Enlightenment, when Sparta repeatedly emerged as a sociopolitical model.

François Ollier coined the term *mirage spartiate* (Spartan mirage) to describe the semimythical aura surrounding Sparta, actively promoted by the Spartans themselves, which continues to hamper historical studies of the city. The political and social arrangements of Sparta were attributed to the semilegendary lawgiver Lycurgus, although even ancient authorities were skeptical about his existence.

General opinion places the reforms that underlie the Spartan system in the period of expansion in the sixth century BCE, which established Sparta as the dominant polis in the Peloponnese, and one of the leading powers in Greece. During this expansion, the Spartans enslaved conquered peoples as *helots,* or forced them into dependent communities, known as *perioikoi,* literally dwellers-around. The existence of these groups allowed the Spartan citizens freedom from agriculture and skilled labor, as the helots worked land on behalf of the citizens, and the perioikic communities supplied craftsmen. Thus, they were free to dedicate their lives to the community, engendering a lifestyle eulogized by ancient observers, most notably Xenophon and Plutarch.

Key to the Lycurgan system was the balance of political and social measures, designed to promote equality among the citizen body and thereby prevent the civil strife engulfing most *poleis* in the sixth century. Lycurgus reputedly identified inequalities of wealth as the greatest threat to social harmony, and thus outlawed gold and silver money. Most radical, however, was his alleged redistribution of land into 9,000 equal plots. The ancient evidence is problematic; but the principle of such equality was integral to the Spartan system. This egalitarianism was reinforced by education and lifestyle. Spartan male citizens underwent a rigorous program of public education, sometimes known as the *agoge,* from the ages of 7 to 18; thereafter, until the age of 30, they would live and dine in a *syssition.* The barrack lifestyle fostered an intense community spirit and allowed the development of an unrivaled military. The precise balance between civic and military concerns in Sparta remains a matter of great debate among modern scholars, with it recently being suggested that the Spartans were professional citizens, rather than merely professional soldiers.

The political arrangements attributed to Lycurgus attempted to promote stability while allowing close participation by the citizen body. A dual kingship, probably a relic from a fusion of earlier communities, continued throughout the classical period. Yet the two kings—one from the Agiad royal house, and one from the Eurypontid house—ruled concurrently but were greatly restricted in their powers, performing religious functions and serving as generals on campaign. Power centered in the several different institutions that formed the Spartan Constitution: the *gerousia,* a council of elders, consisted of the 2 kings and a further 28 citizens over the age of 60, elected by the whole citizen body, but drawn from a limited circle of aristocratic families; the *apella,* an assembly consisting of the entire citizen body, which voted on, but could not debate, laws and public policy; and the *ephors,* 5 annually elected magistrates, drawn from the entire community. These various elements formed what admirers considered a perfectly balanced constitution, combining the "simple" constitutional forms identified by Aristotle, thereby enjoying the virtues and negating the vices of each.

To ancient admirers, the Spartan system exhibited a perfect balance, the citizens enjoying *eunomia,* the good life. Integral to this was the belief that the Spartan *eunomia* created citizens and soldiers—which were essentially inextricable roles—second to none. The Spartan *mirage* was deliberately fostered by the Spartans themselves, enforced by a strict secrecy, and involving periodic expulsions of foreigners, in order to maintain their status in Greek intercity relations. Thus, many aspects of Spartan life, such as the exposure of unhealthy infants, the encouragement of theft among youths, and the notorious *krypteia*—select groups of young men sent out to the countryside kill helots—remain obscure to ancient and modern observers alike.

Even during its period of supremacy in Greek affairs, Sparta provided an appealing model to Greeks of other states, usually aristocratic, who were disenchanted with their own cities. The decline of Sparta after the defeat by Thebes in 371 BCE only served to foster the legend of a golden age of Spartan excellence; and for much of antiquity, Sparta was imagined as an ideal polity. Ancient writers maintained and developed the mirage the Spartans themselves had strived to create. The contributions of Plato and Aristotle, while both limited in their praise and aware of her deficiencies, were best remembered for their positive remarks. Xenophon, who knew Sparta well, gave substance to the legends. Polybius suggested the comparison with Rome, and in his model of mixed government enshrined Lycurgus as a lawgiver without peer. Finally, Plutarch, drawing on a range of material, combined myth with history to present the most fully formed legend of Sparta.

While Latin writers did not share the Greek enthusiasm for Sparta, it remained a significant topic for discussion and comparison. With the decline of classical learning, interest in Sparta also inevitably waned; but in the Middle Ages Sparta continued to attract interest, its heroes mentioned in various medieval chronicles, and by the fifteenth century, the political system of Lycurgus was relevant enough for Laurent de Premierfait to insist that his laws could not compare with those of Jesus. The Renaissance saw a sudden growth of interest, republican thinkers seeing much to discuss, and even admire, in Sparta's political arrangements, with the thought of Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas More heavily influenced by Plato, Xenophon, and Plutarch. Yet it was in the Enlightenment that Sparta would come most to the fore. James Harrington's choice of Sparta as one of his models for his idealized commonwealth helped to generate a growing interest in and admiration of Spartan institutions. The emergence of the first narrative histories of Greece in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the growing presence of antiquity in a series of contemporary philosophical and political debates, served to foster these interests. Thus, the eighteenth century saw a string of thinkers, including Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Ferguson, and Claude-Adrien Helvétius, use Sparta in various ways, and many prominent protagonists in both the American and French Revolutions used Sparta as a model rhetorically, and perhaps even literally. The associations of Sparta were essentially radical, with some considering Sparta to be democratic and the most effective realization of the general will, and a potentially subversive assault on the notion of property. For these thinkers, Sparta emerged as a model for radical change, the ultimate challenge to the status quo. More moderate thinkers interpreted Sparta as the model of the mixed constitution, embodying virtues such as a separation of powers. In all these debates, the history of Sparta—imagined or not—served to make it a powerful model, and it was usually considered comparatively—be it with Rome, Athens, the New World, or modern Europe. While many were highly critical, Sparta was not seriously discredited as a political model until its supposed association with the Jacobins was highlighted by François-René de Chateaubriand and Benjamin Constant.

In the nineteenth century, interest in Sparta declined as liberals turned increasingly to Athens, and Sparta became the antithesis to modern liberalism. Although some radicals continued to see Sparta as a prototype of egalitarian socialism, Karl Marx expressed little interest in Sparta, and with the rise of nationalistic philosophies, Sparta became a model of militaristic patriotism. While Sparta would not again attain the levels of interest of the eighteenth century, it proved a point of reference for Nazism. The later twentieth century tended to reject the Spartan model, following the nineteenth-century notion of Sparta as a purely militaristic state, and the antithesis to modernity. However increasingly sympathetic analyses in scholarship, and a surge of popular interest, has made Sparta once again a relevant topic in twenty-first century political discourse.

Ian Macgregor Morris

See also Ancient Constitutionalism; Aristotle; Plato; Polybius; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903)

Herbert Spencer's name is associated with a general theory of evolutionary change that covered moral beliefs and social and political institutions, winning him a worldwide reputation in the second half of the nineteenth century, a reputation that waned, however, in the twentieth century, but is now undergoing a reappraisal.

Spencer was born in Derby, England, on April 27, 1820. His father was a noted teacher and secretary of the town's science-minded philosophical society. His parents shared nonconformism in religion; his mother's impact on his childhood was dwarfed by his father's passion for the causes of things and radical questioning of authority.

In 1833, responsibility for Spencer's education passed to his evangelical uncle Thomas, a Cambridge graduate and perpetual curate of Hinton Charterhouse, Somerset. Spencer initially absconded, but an enduring bond developed with his uncle while at Hinton. Mathematics and science appealed more than languages and history. He assisted with his uncle's pamphlets on religion and the *Report on the Poor Law of 1834*. These fused political economics and natural theology, yielding pathways to material and moral advance for individuals. In his parish, and as chairman of the Bath board of guardians, Thomas curtailed outdoor relief to the able-bodied in the interests of rewarding virtue and punishing vice. Spencer joined in with his own early article in the *Bath and West of England Magazine* of 1836.

Formal education completed, family contacts helped Spencer launch two related careers. He worked on railway engineering tasks and the negotiation of parliamentary approval for lines, and he undertook radical political journalism, notably in association with Charles Miall and the Complete Suffrage Union. A series of letters to *The Nonconformist,* "very good remedies for Tyranny and Toryism" he described them, were reissued in 1843 as *The Proper Sphere of Government.* Governments should protect people and property, and prevent the aggressions of the rich on the weak; in other words, administer *justice.* Given justice, the self-adjusting *laws of society* keep elements in equilibrium. Wider legislative provisions produce effects the opposite of those desired and distract governments from their proper duty, the prompt and free administration of justice for citizens.

Fame and fortune unforthcoming, a letter from Thomas secured appointment in 1848 as a subeditor with *The Economist* in London. *Social Statics,* dated 1851, went beyond *The Proper Sphere* by adopting the Lamarckian mechanism of adaptation to circumstances together with the inheritance of acquired characteristics as the key to *all* organic change, and argued that it ensured progressive *social* change. Under social, cooperative conditions, *justice* evolved as a master principle: "Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man." Other government intervention compromised beneficial adaptation. Private property contravened the necessary *co-heirship* of men to the soil, and women were entitled to equal rights.

In London, his cultural experience expanded rapidly. G. H. Lewes, Marion Evans (later George Eliot), T. H. Huxley, and John Stuart Mill were new friends. Later, election to the Athenaeum made the group a focus. Thomas's death in 1853 brought the resources to concentrate on writing. The next decade was Spencer's intellectual zenith. Prospects of marriage, however, receded: Evans, who had formed a rather one-sided attachment to Spencer, he found deficient in beauty. Essays appeared on the implications of adaptation as an explanation of various facets of progressive development. His *Principles of Psychology* (1855) presented a dynamic version of associationism in which physical and psychical phenomena adaptively developed in parallel through all life up to human life at its most social. He rejected freedom of the will, attracting criticism from St. George Jackson Mivart and John Elliott Cairnes, and, later, idealists. No scope remained for eliciting a direct change of heart in an agent; exhortations belonged to an *environment* to which adaptations slowly and naturally arise.

Although often in poor health, by 1857 he had an all-embracing theory of (directional) evolution, a movement to heterogeneity caused by physical principles and, in organic life, by the compatible Lamarckian mechanism. *First Principles* (1862) and subsequent volumes on biology, psychology (reworking the 1855 study), sociology (including "Political Institutions" as a part), and ethics

elaborated the theory. This 10-volume "System of Synthetic Philosophy" was finished in 1896. Separate was his critique of contemporary politics, *The Man versus the State* (1884).

Spencer became well known and widely translated. His American visit in 1882 cemented his reputation there beyond his admirers, E. L. Youmans and Andrew Carnegie. To the philosopher of evolution was attributed a scientific basis for liberalism that censured law-making that infringed justice. In "Political Institutions" he contrasted peaceful and voluntaristic industrial social forms with aggressive and coerced militant forms. He also promoted the Anti-Aggression League, and opposed both Governor Eyre's brutalism in Jamaica and the Boer War.

In 1859, Charles Darwin had argued for *natural selection* as a major factor in biological change, whereby out of (genetic) variations only some were *selected* to survive in an inevitable struggle for existence. Spencer accepted natural selection, renaming it the "survival of the fittest" (in 1864), but also retained his Lamarckianism. Spencer's pre-Darwinian approach, often described as orthogenetic and epigenetic, led to misunderstandings over how Darwin's distinctive, nondirectional theory might relate to social life. By the 1890s, evidence told against the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and there was a decline in Spencer's reputation. Spencer's advocacy of altruism—the free administration of justice, beneficence, and small-scale, nonbureaucratic charities—represented a pluralistic vision of *social welfare,* but his depiction of social legislation as interfering with nature was arbitrary and contrary to the competing conceptualization of the state as enabling people to achieve their aims, not merely protecting them from injustice. Spencer viewed these developments as illiberal, and regressive rather than evolutionary, though they became the core of *new liberalism*. Poignantly, they lured Beatrice Webb, whom Spencer knew well as a close friend's daughter.

Society, conceptualized as an emergent reality rather than a collection of individuals, was central to idealist social thought (and to the sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies and Émile Durkheim). For Bernard Bosanquet, for example, the *social organism* was taken to be a spiritual whole that a wise state advanced, by tapping into the general will. Spencer judged this a dangerous misunderstanding of his social organism analogy, which construed individuals as fundamentally autonomous though social, moral governance was coercive and antiprogressive. However, Spencer's political thought remained appealing to liberals such as John Morley and Auberon Herbert, and to libertarian pressure groups.

Today there is renewed interest in Spencer's place in intellectual history, accompanied by reappraisal of the structure of his theory of evolution and constructive reworkings of his objections to government action in direct pursuit of *positive freedom.*

Spencer died on December 8, 1903. At his cremation the former Liberal Member of Parliament, Leonard Courtney gave the oration, in place of Morley, who was abroad. His ashes are in Highgate cemetery.

John Offer

See also Evolution; Functionalism; Social Darwinism; Science of Politics; Structure; Systems Theory

Spinoza, Baruch (1632–1677)

Baruch Spinoza scandalized the Western European world and his own Jewish community as his naturalist metaphysics drew accusations of heresy and atheism. His two political treatises and his *magnum opus,* the *Ethics,* comprise a rich treatment of politics grounded in his naturalism. Just as he insisted that one ought to investigate scripture like any other thing in nature, he examines human psychology, social relations, the state, and civil organization as natural forces that operate according to necessary relationships of cause and effect.

Spinoza was born into a time replete with religious and political strife. Of Portuguese Sephardic descent, Spinoza's ancestors were forced to flee their homeland during the inquisition. They found relative shelter in Holland, where Baruch Spinoza was born and spent the entirety of his brief life. He was an exceptionally bright yeshiva student, but was banished from the Jewish community (the *cherem*) in 1656, perhaps for his views on God and for questioning of the divine origin of the

Pentateuch. He changed his name to its Latin equivalent, Benedict, and dedicated the remainder of his life to philosophy and lens grinding. He enjoyed some reputation as a philosopher during his lifetime and was offered a position as a professor in Heidelberg. He refused on the grounds that it would undermine his freedom to philosophize. His rejection of institutions that would constrain his thought and action reflects the basic principles of his political theory. Whether one can think and live well is not a matter of volition or self-discipline. Rather, one's abilities depend on the quality of the institutions and relationships one enjoys.

Natural Right

Some scholars have argued that Spinoza's metaphysics is indistinguishable from a political philosophy, because he conceives of the entirety of existence in terms of power. To exist is to have power and, therefore, God (nature) names the infinite power to be and to act. The things we perceive in the world, including human beings, are different ways in which this infinite power of nature exists. Spinoza's naturalism entails the following: God is an impersonal, vital force rather than a king or legislator who commands obedience; nothing transcends or violates the natural order of cause and effect; and, existence itself is a complex web of power relationships, where power names the forces that enable and constrain actions. This metaphysical basis underlies Spinoza's doctrine of natural right, in which he insists that everything follows necessarily from nature's right to exist, where right is coextensive with power.

Spinoza's notion of natural right engenders both a theological and a political heresy. Just as God has no existence outside of nature, right neither precedes nor measures particular acts. Spinoza's view undermines the basis for natural law, according to which there is a standard inscribed in the cosmic order that dictates how things ought to be, independent of human convention. Right here does not designate a normative standard by which to judge either human behavior or the legitimacy of regimes. Our actions simply reflect the concrete, natural limits of our power. Thus, fools and madmen act according to the order of nature no less than the wise and virtuous. A sovereign republic whose only guide is the welfare of the people as a whole acts according to the same right as a brutal tyrant.

Spinoza's doctrine of natural right is often paraphrased as the notion that "might makes right." This is a misunderstanding. Spinoza's treatment of natural right does not function to justify or constrain any form of authority or behavior. For Thomas Hobbes, in contrast, natural right corresponds to acting in accordance with "right reason," and thus does not extend to anything that someone might do. Right simply names the power to exist and act of any natural being and is thereby purely descriptive rather than normative. It functions (a) to affirm that there is no transcendent standard that reason might discover to guide human action and (b) to assess regimes and actors in terms of the concrete practices and ways of life they make possible. Right does not designate any formal set of entitlements that citizens may or may not be able to exercise.

Although Spinoza does not condemn tyranny on the basis that it violates the natural order of things, or the given dignity of human life, he does argue that tyrannical governments exercise less right insofar as they give their constituents cause for resentment and revolt. Similarly, ignorance and enmity follow naturally from the tendencies of human psychology, but rationality and friendship reflect more enabling relationships and engender greater right. Nevertheless, as he notes in the *Political Treatise,* doing something by right is not equivalent to doing something in the best way. Spinoza distinguishes himself from other philosophers by examining the character of regimes and social organization only in terms of natural right without reference to an ideal regime. According to Spinoza, even Hobbes, famous for his realism, abandoned the perspective of natural right by imagining that individuals can formally and irrevocably transfer their power to the sovereign. State power is always a matter of the practical dynamic among the many, rather than any formal agreement.

The *Theological-Political Treatise*

Spinoza's *Theological-Political Treatise* is considered a founding document of modern democratic theory. It promotes democracy as the most natural (i.e., most powerful) form of commonwealth and outlines a kind of social contract as the basis of the

state. This treatise served as a direct intervention into theological-political controversies occurring in the United Provinces during Spinoza's day. The text includes his notorious treatment of scripture and miracles as thoroughly natural phenomena, governed by knowable relationships of cause and effect. Much of the book ascertains the origin and decline of the Hebrew state as an example of a democratic agreement between Jews and God, mediated by the earthly sovereignty of Moses. He published the *Theological-Political Treatise* anonymously in 1670, and was met with horror and threats to his life. The remainder of his work would have to be guarded by his friends and published after his death.

Among the several arguments in this complicated text, Spinoza contends that there is no conflict between religious and civil authority, because "true religion" commands only that one should love God and one's neighbors and obey the law of one's earthly sovereign. Similarly, theology does not conflict with philosophy, because its essential teachings inspire obedience and charity rather than knowledge. Spinoza's arguments aimed, at the same time, to carve out an autonomous space for philosophy to treat speculative questions and to mitigate disputes over whether the church or the state has greater authority over public life. Spinoza achieves his aim, to the dissatisfaction of many, only by proscribing the domain of religion to moral cultivation. For Spinoza, the state has the right, understood as effective power, to determine the role and scope of ecclesiastical power. Moreover, the argument that speculation about the ultimate character of reality remains in a separate domain from either religion or politics undermines the ability of either institution to claim that piety and law reflect the cosmic order rather than particular conventions and needs.

Without an eternal standard of right and wrong, justice becomes an expression of particular institutions of authority and ways of life. In the *Theological-Political Treatise,* Spinoza represents the local, conventional character of justice with the device of a "pact," or what has come to be called a "social contract." Spinoza shares with Hobbes the notion that justice reflects an agreement and has no existence prior to a pact. Yet Spinoza's portrait of the civil pact is somewhat different from typical social contract theories. While the contract usually functions to represent how a state's legitimacy and authority can be grounded in the volition of the people, Spinoza's rejection of free will in the *Ethics* and his treatment of natural right and the passions in his political writings alter how one should understand the basis of any pact.

First, Spinoza's rigorous naturalism makes it inappropriate to think of the commonwealth as an artifice erected over and against the natural tendencies of man, as Hobbes suggests. Rather, collective life and its forms of authority are entirely natural phenomena that issue from our basic psychological tendencies and physical needs. Second, a civil pact expresses the psychological fact that a group of humans apprehend a given arrangement of power as conducive to their self-preservation and well-being. While obedience may not genuinely be in the interest of most individuals, the right (power) of the state is entirely contingent on the perception that one will benefit by conforming to the state's demands. Obedience thereby issues from the majority's desire to preserve and enhance their lives, rather than from the unconditioned will of rational subjects. Third, rather than being a formal transfer of rights, obligation rests on perceived utility alone. Political authority endures only as long as the passionate dynamic persists in which the majority find that their well-being is furthered by yielding to the law.

Spinoza does not base his argument for democracy on its superior ability to formally recognize each individual's claim to liberty and dignity. Rather, democracy is the best way to coordinate the mutual striving toward self-preservation of the state and its constituents. As natural beings, individuals as well as institutions aim to preserve and enhance their existence. A democracy with large deliberative assemblies and ample opportunity for participation (at least for propertied males) is the best means to unify the power of many diverse individuals and, in so doing, to solidify the state. Thus, Spinoza claims in the *Theological-Political Treatise* that the purpose of the state is nothing other than freedom. Given that Spinoza rejects free will, freedom should be understood as the power by which one exists and enhances one's life. Humans strive not only for longevity, but also to be able to think and to communicate our capabilities to others. Democratic institutions support our efforts to express our views and publicize our activities, even as they inevitably come into dangerous conflict with one another. Spinoza contends that establishing various outlets

for the expression of our differences leads to more enabling social relations than trying to suppress them. Efforts to render human passions, tastes, and opinions uniform are, as Spinoza affirms in the *Political Treatise,* tantamount to trying to force a table to eat grass.

The *Political Treatise*

Whereas the *Theological-Political Treatise* entered into the debates of its time and place, Spinoza's *Political Treatise* comprises a general theoretical outline of the foundations of political power. Missing from the *Political Treatise* is a theory of the contract, any significant discussion of religion or theocracy, and a rhetorical emphasis on freedom. While the *Political Treatise* remains consistent with Spinoza's naturalism in the *Ethics* and the *Theological-Political Treatise,* it presents itself as a general account of how each form of state—be it monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy—might be organized so as to be as *absolute* as possible. The notion of *absoluteness* seems to replace freedom as the organizing principle and raison d'être of the commonwealth. While this may appear to be a retreat from his democratic commitments and even a turn toward authoritarianism, one should understand that, being a natural thing, a commonwealth aims to be absolute in the same sense that nature, or God, is absolute. To be absolute is to be self-determined, in control of one's right or power, rather than given shape by external forces. In the terms of Niccolò Machiavelli, to whom Spinoza pays homage in the *Political Treatise,* to be absolute is to rely exclusively on one's own forces.

One can therefore read the *Political Treatise* as a translation of the republican language of freedom into a more naturalistic, philosophical idiom of power and its limits. Moreover, Spinoza's continued commitment to democracy is visible (even though he died after composing only three paragraphs of the chapter on democracy) in his affirmation of democracy as the "completely absolute" state. Democracy continues to name the most self-determined, most powerful, and thus the freest form of government.

Spinoza begins the *Political Treatise* with an outline of his naturalist principles and refers his reader to the *Ethics* for further elaboration. He declares his aim to produce a political theory that will be useful in practice, avoiding the philosophical tendency to idealize either the role of the state or the character of men. He describes human beings, whether they be merchants, statesmen, or members of the crowd, as governed primarily by their passions and motivated by their idiosyncratic perception of their interest. Because most of us are led by passions rather than reason, social life invariably involves a great deal of conflict. Spinoza thus proposes institutions that take for granted the passionate and nonharmonious motivations of human beings, but which aim to channel such passions toward the general welfare and maintenance of peace. Given an optimum organization of institutions, statesmen can be induced to act in support of the common good, regardless of whether they subjectively recognize it.

Spinoza defines *peace* not as an absence of conflict or compelled obedience to the law, but as a union, or harmony, of minds. Whether the state is monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic, its foundation is best secured, and its right approaches absoluteness, to the extent that its institutions conduce toward a mental unity among the state's constituents. Many of his recommendations highlight the importance of large deliberative assemblies that include representatives from as many different interest groups as possible. He likewise advocates transparency on the part of the state, suggesting that, whereas secrecy vulgarizes the masses, a political education has a rationalizing effect on the population as a whole. He makes recommendations for decentralizing power, rendering political posts available to as many as possible given the state form, and for encouraging mercantile relationships among the people. Giving our passions public, institutional outlets provides a kind of theater of interaction in which we might find ways to collaborate, link our strivings for self-preservation and well-being, and thereby generate complementary interests. Regardless of the state form, Spinoza suggests that democratizing tendencies fortify any organization of power. Peace names the psychophysical harmony at which state organization aims, which is also, for Spinoza, the foundation of reason.

Spinoza's political theory can be discovered throughout his philosophy. It focuses on the concrete means of producing peace and reason (still other names for freedom) among a passionate body

of men. Spinoza's political theory has particular resonance today for several reasons. Most obviously, it directly addresses persistent conflicts between competing values and theological worldviews. Perhaps less obviously, Spinoza's solutions do not lie in greater formal recognition of abstract rights and duties. Rather, his philosophy provides the tools for a political analysis of the particular relations of power that operate between institutions and individuals. He highlights the force of the passions that circulate throughout the social body and animate or undermine the practical exercise of right, or power. Spinoza's political theory examines not what laws and institutions declare, but rather what they do.

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See also Hobbes, Thomas; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Natural Rights; Naturalism; Passions; Power

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Standing Armies

Standing armies are permanent, professional militaries maintained both in war and in peacetime. There is considerable debate over how and why large standing armies emerged in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some have pointed to the gradual pacification of significant areas of society underwritten by the monopolization of military power by sovereign states after 1648. Proponents of the military revolution thesis point toward technological, tactical, and strategic developments in Western Europe during the 1500s. Others suggest that new forms of finance and administration led to the development of a fiscal-military state supporting ever-larger standing armies.

The advent of standing armies prompted a series of debates in British political thought, mirrored to some extent in the American colonies, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One of these debates originated in King William III's desire to maintain a standing army in Britain following the Peace of Ryswick (1697). Opponents of this scheme were animated by memories of the large parliamentary standing army of the 1640s and 1650s, and also feared that William's use of nebulous sources of credit managed by the new Bank of England would become an instrument of arbitrary power exercised against the traditional liberties of the landed elite. According to J. G. A. Pocock, the specter of new finance and a standing army fuelled fears of military government prompting some to argue for a balanced constitution incorporating a citizen's militia. In doing so, they revived the Machiavellian and republican insistence on the need for citizen soldiers schooled in virtue, while asserting the military strengths of the long established English militia. Critics of such arguments maintained that the nature and scale of modern warfare made militias obsolete.

This debate was revived by Prime Minister Pitt's Militia Bill (1757), which excluded a Scots militia due to fears that it would become an instrument of Jacobite rebellion. Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), however, saw a militia as a desirable means of national defense, and an indispensable bulwark of public virtue. Adam Smith (1723–1790) disagreed, maintaining that the division of labor made professional, standing armies necessary because war had become a science. The Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1745 and the brutally efficient suppression of the latter by professional troops at Culloden (April 16, 1746) reinforced the obsolescence of the militia.

Bruce Buchan

See also Ferguson, Adam; Machiavelli, Niccoló; Republicanism; Smith, Adam; Sovereignty; State

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STATE

A *state* is a particular form of political organization of a society, one where power is highly concentrated and where government is intolerant of rivals to its rule. It is often said that states possess or claim an exclusive right to control the use of coercion or force. How exactly to characterize the state is a matter of some controversy. The state is obviously central to the concerns of most modern and contemporary political theorists; some have even said that it is the subject matter of political theory. There are different ways of characterizing the notion, some narrower than others, and there are many controversies associated with the analysis of the concept.

Broad and Narrow Accounts

The general characterization previously offered is a good starting point, but it is insufficiently detailed for many purposes. We should first distinguish between broad and narrow characterizations of the state. For some purposes—for instance, the investigations of anthropologists and archeologists—broad characterizations are appropriate. States here contrast with decentralized anarchic communities (e.g., tribes without rulers). Early humans lived in comparatively egalitarian communities that were segmentary or acephalous (without rulers). Kinship relations determined obligations between members. The emergence of chiefdoms, with rulers who possessed a right to command and to tribute, is a significant development. Power is concentrated and political hierarchy introduced. To investigate these transitions, we need only a general or broad characterization of the state, something like that previously expressed. Most political theorists, however, are interested in questions about the conditions of contemporary political societies and focus their attention on modern times. To understand our world requires understanding the state, that is, the modern state. For this, a narrower and more detailed characterization is needed.

Our world is a world of states. The state is being challenged from many directions, and our world may be changing. Still, it is a remarkable fact that virtually every piece of land on the globe today is the territory of a state. That was not the case 100 years ago, though even then most European polities were states (at least after 1918). Equally remarkable is that the state dominates our political imagination. We worry whether the United Nations (UN) or the European Union (EU) will become a giant state (as opposed to something different); we categorize the Vatican as a state (rather than the seat of a once-powerful Christian Empire) and do not know what to do with other remnants of a world left-behind—for instance, Monaco (a principality), San Marino (a republic), or Andorra (under the joint suzerainty of the President of France and the Bishop of Urgel, Spain). Secessionists want a state of their own. Our world is one of states, and few can think of alternative ways of organizing political societies. And the questions that preoccupy political theorists—questions about justice, obligation to obey the law, the scope or limits of government, or citizenship, nationality, and multiculturalism—take this context for granted, though this is starting to change.

The modern state emerged first in Western Europe. There the victory of kings and other political actors over their rivals—the church and the Holy Roman Empire on the one side, the nobility and the independent towns on the other—led to the development of institutions and practices that give us our states. The political organization of medieval Europe was quite different from that of our world. Medieval Europe consisted of complex, crosscutting jurisdictions of towns, lords, kings, emperors, popes, and bishops, without clear hierarchies of political authority or unitary systems of law. Governance tended to be indirect or mediated. No single person or agency had power to

control most people outside of a small area. In fact, no agency even knew how many people there were in a realm, much less where exactly the borders were. Without statistics or maps, or the bureaucracies necessary, rulers could not do very much. Equally important, political rule was characteristically personal, consisting in relations between individual kings, princes, lords, vassals, and others. There was no clear distinction between a ruler's realm and his property. Rule over subjects and land could be acquired by purchase, conquest, marriage, or inheritance. People's rights and obligations depended on their place in complex relations with others, and not on their location in a particular territory. What is distinctive about the modern state is most apparent when one concentrates on the features of late medieval and early modern Europe from which it emerges. Thus it is worth highlighting some of these.

Medieval Europe, of course, bore some traces of the political institutions of classical Greece and of Rome. But it is primarily the contrasting features of political life in the Middle Ages that need to be recalled. Simplifying considerably, there are several important features of medieval political organization that must be noted. First, most people were governed by rulers whose practices and institutions were not likely to survive their deaths or that of their sons. The realms governed by these rulers would not have precise boundaries, and the lands in their possession often would not be contiguous. The general contours of their realms would change quite frequently, often with marriage or death. Second, their rule was largely personal; the allegiance of their subjects was owed to their person, not to them qua holder of an office. Thus, with their demise, some of their subjects might have to take new oaths to a new ruler. Some of these rulers might have attendants who assisted them in the little activity of governance that they performed, but their departure would leave behind no officials or institutions to speak of. The church and some of the self-governing towns were exceptions here. Third, in addition to being personal, rule was largely indirect or mediated. A lord might have specific obligations of allegiance to a king—for instance, to provide a specific number of knights in the event of a conflict with a neighboring monarch or prince—which might be fulfilled by parties unknown to the king. And a king's rule over peasants would be mediated by several classes of individuals. Rule for the most part would be light, compared to the centuries that follow, even if the burdens of the peasantry were heavy.

Fourth, people might find themselves the subject of several different rulers or systems of rule. The authority of kings competed with that of lords and princes, independent towns, popes and bishops, and emperor. And one could not easily make the distinction familiar in our world between the "internal" and "external affairs" of a realm or rule. Last, a person's allegiance or loyalty to a ruler would not exclude similar allegiance to others. And there might be no settled view as to whose word would take precedence in a conflict. These are some of the most important distinguishing features of the world from which the modern state emerged.

By contrast, governance in the modern state is relatively centralized, unified, uniform, hierarchical, direct, impersonal, and territorial. The state is distinct from the government, and the former becomes a corporate agent, distinct from the rulers, with a legally recognized personality. The modern state is a relatively new and complex form of political organization. We may think of the state in terms of a number of interrelated features:

1. *Continuity in time and space.* (a) The modern state is a form of political organization whose institutions endure over time; in particular, they survive changes in leadership or government. (b) It is the form of political organization of a definite and distinct *territory,* normally contiguous.

2. *Transcendence.* The modern state is a particular form of political organization that constitutes a unitary public order distinct from and superior to both ruled and rulers; one capable of agency. It is a corporate being, and its rule is impersonal. The institutions that are associated with modern states—in particular, the government, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, standing armies—do not themselves constitute the state; they are its agents.

3. *Political organization.* The institutions through which the state acts—in particular, the government, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the police—are differentiated from other political

organizations and associations; they are formally coordinated one with another, and they are relatively centralized. Relations of authority are hierarchical. Rule is *territorial;* that is, the state's directives apply primarily to all people who find themselves in its territory. Rule is *direct;* and it is relatively pervasive and penetrates society legally and administratively.

4. *Authority.* The state is *sovereign,* that is, the ultimate source of political authority in its territory; and it claims a monopoly on the use of legitimate force within its territory. The jurisdiction of its institutions extends directly to all members of the state or residents of its territory. In its relations to other public orders, the state is autonomous.

5. *Allegiance.* The state expects and receives the loyalty of its members and of the permanent inhabitants of its territory. The loyalty that it typically expects and receives assumes precedence over that loyalty formerly owed to family, clan, commune, lord, bishop, pope, or emperor. Members of a state are the primary subjects of its laws and have a general obligation to obey by virtue of their membership.

Modern states, then, are distinctive territorial forms of political organization that claim sovereignty over their realms and independence from other states.

Coercion and Force

It is widely believed and often said that the state is necessarily coercive, and that its distinguishing feature is its claimed monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion and force. Unless we want a broad characterization of states, a monopoly of the use of coercion cannot be sufficient for something to be a state. If it were, the Mafia and other criminal gangs would be deemed states. There are reasons to want a broad characterization when studying the development of early human communities, but it is peculiar when studying modern forms of political organization not to want to distinguish between criminal organizations and states. The more interesting questions are whether the state is necessarily coercive or whether coercion is in some ways distinctive of the state.

States certainly are quite coercive. They also use force as well as violence, especially in war but also "internally." There is little controversy here (even if critics often do not carefully distinguish between coercion, force, and violence). However, *must* they be coercive? It is possible to imagine a state that is not. Suppose that a particular state is as just as we could hope for, and that its subjects (genuinely) consent to its rule and support it. Suppose, in addition, that they are virtually always motivated to obey the laws. Then it may be that such a state would not have to use coercion, much less force, on any of its subjects. If so, states would not *necessarily* be coercive. States like this one exist only in our imaginations. In our world, states are quite coercive and use force with some frequency. But a political society might not cease being a state by ceasing to be coercive.

Are coercion and force in some ways distinctive or characteristic of states? Modern states have emerged from war and conquest. At different times in their development, all states came to develop institutions and personnel for the control of their subject populations (e.g., police, intelligence services, prisons). These were made necessary by the increasing size of their populations, their urbanization, and by the increasing demands states placed on their members (especially taxation and military conscription). Coercion and force are part of these activities of states, and one would have to say that they are quite characteristic of them. It may be expected, however, that states need less coercion and force to the extent that they are just and their rule is legitimate, or to the extent that their behavior elicits the voluntary support of their subjects.

Do states claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion and force? They seem to. They may not possess a complete monopoly; for instance, we may threaten our young children with deprivations if they do not do as they are told (coercion), and we may well be acting permissibly if we use force to defend ourselves, even if not authorized by the state. There is some controversy here. But it seems clear that states at least do *claim* a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion.

Authority

The emphasis on the state's coerciveness can lead one not to notice a more significant characteristic,

namely the authority that it claims. States claim to be able to *authorize* other people and institutions to carry out certain tasks. This is a power that states claim, a power that enables them to give others permission and a right to act in certain ways. But authority is something different, even if related. Authority in the relevant sense is the power to direct agents to act in certain ways. If the authority is genuine, then the recipient of an authoritative directive (or law) is required to conform. Authorities can make certain courses of action, once optional, required. Now the nature of this power is controversial. One analysis, which seems to be that of some of the early theorists of the modern state, as well as of many jurists, is that an authoritative directive *obligates* its recipient to conform and is a *reason* to conform. Authoritative directives are thus meant to be *action-guiding*. So if one disregards a genuine authoritative directive that applies to one, one is making a mistake. Theorists who think that laws always have sanctions attached to them will often not notice this feature of states. Not all laws do have sanctions attached to them (e.g., the obligation of high officials to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities, laws establishing powers), even if most do. Sanctions, however, are penalties applied for doing something one should not have done; they are meant to be supplementary motivation for those who fail to do as they are required. Many who are skeptical of the authority claimed by states may fail to see the point. The thought is that the authority claimed by states is intended to guide our behavior by obligating us and giving us reasons for action and that this fact is important.

The state's claim to authority is striking in two respects. The first is its claimed power to create obligations and reasons at will, by making law. The second is the fact that it is remarkably sweeping. No medieval authority and virtually no earlier authority claimed the sweeping authority sought by modern states, namely sovereignty. Sovereignty here is a particular form of political authority. Something is sovereign (in this sense) if it is the ultimate source of political authority within a realm. This is the power that early modern monarchs claimed in their quarrels with popes and princes. Not only were their realms theirs, to be shared with no one else, their rule was not to be challenged or constrained. They were *sovereign*. The key to the notion lies in the idea of ultimate authority. Imagine a political society with multiple political authorities. If one could rank them and the result were a strict ordering, then the last one would be the highest authority. It would have authority over all the others, exactly the authority claimed by the state (or the law). Not only does the state claim to be able to establish the law for all in its territory, to determine what they are required to do, but it claims the power to regulate all other authorities (e.g., church, conscience, clan). Early modern statements of this extraordinary power said that the state's sovereignty was indivisible and unlimited. Later many theorists, jurists, and statesmen came to think that the sovereignty of states could be divided (e.g., the divided government of most constitutional democracies) and limited (e.g., by bills of rights or international law). But even limited states are reluctant to delegate the power to interpret the limits on their authority and to adjudicate disputes about these.

Attention focused on the coerciveness of states often distracts our attention from the remarkable authority that they claim. It may be argued that states are forms of political organization that *necessarily* claim sovereignty. It is hard to imagine a state that claimed authority but admitted that other institutions also had authority, and that when the two conflicted, its own authority did not have precedence.

Legitimacy

States claim legitimacy. There is considerable controversy as to what this might entail. The law is the principal mode of action for states. In virtually all states now, laws in principle constrain both ruled and rulers, even if in practice there are many exceptions to the generalization. Acts or procedures that are in conformity with the laws of a state are usually deemed "legitimate." Legality eliminates one kind of injustice, but it does not exhaust what we mean when we ascribe legitimacy to a state.

In international circles, it is sometimes thought that legitimacy is conferred by recognition by other states. For instance, if a region breaks away from a state to form a state of its own and manages to secure the recognition of many other states, then it is often considered a legitimate state. This

is puzzling, as it is not clear how recognition could confer legitimacy. Recognition might convey that the new state has been accepted as a member of the club of states, and membership may confer some rights and powers (and duties). This would be a natural way for international lawyers to understand legitimacy. But even if a state is recognized by other states, we might still be reluctant to attribute it legitimacy in other, more important, senses.

What might be called *sociological* accounts of legitimacy are quite popular. These will ascribe legitimacy to states to the extent that their subjects think them legitimate. That formulation is unfortunate as it is circular, and the view is better expressed differently. A state is legitimate to the extent that its subjects find it acceptable, just, or something of the kind. On this view, to say that a state is legitimate is to say something about the supportive attitudes of its subjects. States losing their legitimacy in this sense are less stable. But nasty states may be legitimate in this sense. If subjects are ill-informed and manipulated, their state may have considerable "legitimacy." This may mean that it is relatively stable (until people are better informed). But often when we ask about legitimacy, our interests are in something else.

Claims to legitimacy often seem to be normative in intent. A legitimate state is one that has a certain status, one that rules by right. At the least it does no wrong by existing or even has a right to exist. Some states are denied this by their enemies (e.g., Israel). In addition, states claim they have a specific right to rule. It is not mere power that enables them to make law and to require their subjects to act in certain ways; they have a right to govern. That is, they have a right to make laws, to adjudicate disputes, to enforce their decisions, to institute programs of various kinds (e.g., education, transportation, public health). The right to rule is traditionally interpreted as entailing an obligation on the part of the governed to obey the law. Trivially, one always has an obligation to obey the law. What is usually meant here is more substantive: if a state has the right to rule, then subjects have a genuine obligation to obey. For some theorists, this means a moral obligation, for others, an obligation that is a serious reason for action. There are considerable controversies here, some spilling over into moral philosophy and the theory of practical reason. The main idea is that the right to rule entails serious obligations to obey.

There are lots of examples of laws where we might reasonably think we do not have a serious obligation to obey. At the least, we often disregard parking laws (when we think we are unlikely to be apprehended), and we may not obey traffic laws scrupulously when driving in the deserted countryside. We often disobey stupid laws and, more importantly, unjust laws. In these cases, we seem to believe we lack a serious obligation to obey. Agents of the state—judges and other officers of the law in particular—will remind us that it is not our position to question the wisdom of laws, and that we have an obligation to obey them even when we think they are in error (even when we are correct in thinking them mistaken).

Suppose legitimacy confers a right to rule, in addition to a right to exist, and that the subjects of a legitimate state have a serious obligation to obey each and every law that applies to them, except when the state permits them not to. What is necessary for legitimacy in this sense? It is widely believed that "the consent of the governed" would confer legitimacy on a state. This view is not universally accepted, but it is plausible at first glance. It is also clear what the implications of this position would be: virtually no state is legitimate. Consent of the kind that could bind one as extensively as seems to be the case here would normally have to be free (or noncoerced), informed, actual (as opposed to hypothetical), and explicit (as opposed to implicit or tacit). Just as we would not count two people as agreeing to marriage or to a business contract merely by waving at one another, so walking on a public street or voting in an election does not constitute the requisite kind of consent. Very few people have given their free, informed, actual, and explicit consent to their state. Most officials may have, and many naturalized citizens have as well. But certainly the bulk of the population has not. Thus, most states can claim legitimacy from the consent of the governed.

Consent in this sense is to be distinguished from consensus or agreement. The latter consists in agreement in belief or other attitudes. Thinking that consensus in this sense contributes to legitimacy may yield an account similar to the sociological theories previously discussed. And the

question there was why mere agreement in belief could confer anything more than stability.

There are other accounts of legitimacy that do not rely on consent. There is a large family of accounts that would have legitimacy follow from the provision of certain goods and services. Suppose a state provides security for its subjects, secures justice, provides those public goods that we think are important, and the like. Then we may think that it is thereby legitimate. But there will invariably be occasions where conscientious obedience to law will not be necessary to secure the goods of good government. Perhaps by refraining to pay one's share of the costs for public schooling and by contributing the money saved to education reform or to a neglected school district one may help the cause more. If so, it is not clear that this account will show that we have an obligation to obey every valid law, and thus that reasonably just and efficient states will have the right to rule as previously characterized.

The conclusion may well be that states do not have the legitimacy they claim. This is the view held by many contemporary political philosophers who accept "philosophical anarchism." This is the position that states are not legitimate in the sense that they entail the right to rule and correlate obligation to obey. By contrast, political anarchists think that we ought to dismantle our states and that most of us would fare better in their absence—there would be fewer wars, especially major ones; we would be more prosperous. These matters are quite controversial. Many people think that reasonably just states are legitimate (in the relevant sense), and there are many puzzles here.

Society and Nation

States are forms of political organization of societies. They are often called nation-states or even nations. The world organization of states—only states can be members—is called the United Nations. The term *nation* can be used to refer to societies (or states), such as the United States or France. And it can also be used to refer to large social groups, the members of which share certain properties (e.g., language, history, customs, ethnicity, religion) and are relatively conscious of this shared condition. National groups in this sense are cultural. Modern states as they have been treated here are sometimes called nation-states. If we think of nations as cultural groups, this term would be a misnomer. While Japan and Germany to some extent may be thought of as nation-states—as states of a single nation—the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, and the People's Republic of China are all multinational states, as they are each made up of several different nationalities.

There are many interesting questions about the nature of nations and nationalism, about whether national groups are entitled to a state of their own, or about whether it is desirable that states and nations be congruent. Clearly it is not necessary for a state to be a nation-state, that is, the state of a single nation. Most states today are multinational. But there are tremendous advantages in raising the national consciousness of a large national group or in making the members of a state believe that they are a single national group. Early in the nineteenth century, heads of state saw the power that could come from rallying their populations. Napoleon's armies impressed the world and changed the way wars were fought. In addition to building large and ferocious armies, national solidarity could also supplement motivations to obey the law.

It is worth noting in this context the distinct tendency of many multinational states to develop *national cultures* that underpin the patriotic allegiances of members. The cases of France and the United States are especially interesting in this regard, both multinational states. Both share an Enlightenment tradition hostile to nationalism and were shaped by eighteenth-century revolutions fought in the name of universal principles. Yet both have national cultures, easily recognizable to outsiders, and their members identify for the most part with their country.

The Decline of the State?

Several features of modern states are striking: their great power, their territoriality, and the large number of tasks and functions they take on. But increasingly these features are under significant pressure. The tasks and functions of states are in many ways being scaled down. Since the end of World War II, states everywhere have shed public corporations, nowhere so strikingly as in the formerly communist world. Most of the welfare state

services provided by government, especially after World War II, have been scaled back, in no small part due to expense and shrinking budgets. In many states, the military and police are supplemented by private services, paid for by the state or by private parties. A variety of nonstate judicial services are increasingly used by businesses. Especially in countries like the United States, private educational institutions are important, and an increasing part of the budget of American institutions of higher education is coming from nonstate sources. Compared with a century or two ago, our states are very active; compared to the postwar period, they have cut back extensively.

In the middle of the last century most mid-size or large states could set their own economic policies, regulate their currencies, and impose much of the control on trade with other countries. Those powers have largely been diminished, even for the strongest states. A variety of organizations, many nongovernmental, now besiege all states, pressuring them to reduce some activity or increase others (e.g., imprisonment or execution of political dissidents, environmental protection, restructuring of institutions, free trade). Some private organizations or individuals, wealthier than many countries, can initiate development or aid programs that few governments would think of undertaking. A variety of new players, neither states nor agents of states, are increasingly challenging the traditional competencies of governments. They are also threatening the state's dominance.

In one respect, these nonstate entities are like states: They are corporate beings, with lives that extend beyond those of their members or employees. In another respect, they are quite different: Unlike territorial states, these agencies are not linked to territories and usually have no jurisdiction and make no law. They pressure and facilitate, and they sustain larger movements of individual people. They are often more nimble and effective than state agents. Especially noteworthy here are those organizations that are able to support and organize guerilla wars and terrorist attacks on major states.

Add to these developments increasing bodies of international law, still in its infancy, and myriad treaties and multinational and international organizations, such as the EU, NATO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the world of states is undergoing important transformations. It is hard for philosophers and political theorists to predict the shape of things to come. But it seems that the modern state is being transformed. War has built the state, and the conflicts of the start of the twenty-first century may reinforce the state, especially the large ones. But in the long term, it seems that the dominant form of political organization of our time, created in early modern Europe, may be transformed.

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See also Absolutism; Anarchy; Authority; Empire; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hobbes, Thomas; Legitimacy; Nationalism; Sovereignty

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State of Nature

The *state of nature* refers to a hypothesized natural human condition, before or outside political community. It is a standard feature of social contract theories, used in order to illustrate that which is distinctive and created about the state. The differences among conceptions of the state of nature correspond to important differences among social contract theories. While *nature* and *naturalness* are among the oldest categories in political theory, the idea of the state of nature is ordinarily associated with the distinctively early modern development of social contract theory. The state of nature is humanity's prepolitical state, the condition in

which relations of political and legal authority and obedience have not yet been established. Rejecting the Aristotelian doctrine that man is naturally political, contractarians treated nature as a *contrast* to political and civil society. The state of nature was sometimes understood as a real moment in the past; sometimes as the condition of being outside the law whenever that might be located in time; often as the condition of much of the non-European world and the condition of international society, so long as there is no global state; and sometimes as a hypothetical condition or thought experiment, the unreality of which didn't interfere with its heuristic usefulness as a way to understand political and legal obligations.

The idea had obvious echoes of the Eden story, and Christian political thinkers before early modernity did sometimes analyze the Edenic state of innocence in ways analytically similar to the state of nature in social contract theory. In general, however, the idea of the state of nature is understood as an early modern break with the main ideas of medieval political thought. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the traditional Aristotelian and Thomist understanding of natural politics came under pressure from a number of different directions. One was the general move away from Aristotelian teleology as an account of nature in the sciences. The scientific revolution of Nicolaus Copernicus, Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, and René Descartes encouraged investigation into *efficient causes,* causes that push from behind like one domino falling into another, rather than *final causes,* purposes that are fulfilled as things or people develop toward their goals. In other words, the idea of what was "natural" shifted away from the idea of what was purposive and in the future: It is natural for humans to live in political societies because they are well-suited for it. Discussions of naturalness moved toward the idea of that which was original and, in some sense, in the past. A second was the crystallization of the state system during the Wars of Religion, and the emerging idea that international politics was perpetually (not just anomalously) made up of equal self-governing bodies that had no juristic superior. Neither the Holy Roman Empire nor the pope could any longer purport to represent a legal order that underlay all of Europe; and the idea of an anarchistic and lawless condition as politically foundational took form. And a third was the European encounter with the world beyond Europe and the Middle East during the sixteenth century. The forms of social organization found in the Americas and Africa—sometimes without agriculture, sometimes without territorial forms of government, and so on—seemed to contradict the idea that the political life as Europeans knew it was inevitable. These encounters encouraged speculation that the Americas and Africa represented something more natural, in the sense of being more primitive or closer to mere physical nature, and that Eurasia represented societies that had been *made* by human will, reason, or decision.

The idea of the state of nature was often closely tied to the ideas of natural law and natural rights. The state of nature is the condition in which humanity is governed only by natural law, not by positive law; it is the condition in which the only rights are natural rights. It thus offers a baseline against which the civil or political condition of life in a state or society may be judged.

The States of Nature in Social Contract Theories

While there are interesting variations in the theories developed by other contractarians, including Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf, by far the most prominent discussions of the state of nature were offered by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Hobbes's natural condition of mankind, without positive laws or a sovereign that could keep the peace, was famously a condition of perpetual violent conflict, in which the life of man is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short," with no possibility for agriculture, science, commerce, or any of the other arts through which humans improve their existence. Conflict is generated through three mechanisms: competition over material goods; the imperative to strike preemptively given uncertainty about others' intentions and "diffidence" about one's ability to defend against an attack; and vainglory, the drive of each of us to be acknowledged as superior by the others. The state of nature is thus a state of war; even if there is a moment without violence, the violence is a permanent possibility.

The conflictual character of the state of nature both stems from and highlights humans' natural

equality, another rejection of the Aristotelian conception of nature. Where Aristotle emphasized humans' inequality in their ability to reach the highest purposes of reasoning and excellence, Hobbes emphasized the equality of mortality: each of us can die, and among normally functioning healthy adults, each of us can kill any other, even if only in the other's sleep. This equality denies us any natural hierarchy that might be agreed on by consensus, and so those who wish to be thought better than others must fight for the status. And it denies us any certainty of our ability to defend ourselves or our possessions, driving us into violent conflict over goods and safety. While humans are governed by a kind of natural law in the state of nature, it is a natural law the first command of which is to preserve oneself. Only by exiting the state of nature and creating the artificial bonds of sovereignty and law can humans hope to live in peace.

Locke's state of nature is only sometimes a state of war. He holds that there is a moral natural law that binds even in the absence of government, and that it is (imperfectly) knowable and enforceable even in the state of nature. Natural law commands respect for the lives, liberty, and property of other people; and offenders against that law may be justly punished. Whereas Hobbes holds that in the state of nature everyone has a right to every thing in the world (including other people!), because mutually exclusive rights must wait for the creation of the state, Locke maintains that the natural law ordains rights over person and property such that my right excludes yours.

A rights violator initiates a (temporary, local) state of war. Following restitution and just punishment, the state of war is exited. This does not necessarily put him at descriptive odds with Hobbes; Hobbes does not think that violence is constant in the state of nature, and Locke makes no particular claim about its frequency. Rather, the two differ on how to morally characterize the default condition in the state of nature. For Hobbes, it is a state of war even without actual combat, for there is no guarantee of peace, and each person may legitimately strike at any other at any time, for fear of the other's future actions. For Locke, it is a state of peace that may be disrupted but then may also be restored, when all are in possession of what is rightfully theirs. There are inconveniences associated with the state of nature that drive people out of it and into a civil condition; but the state of nature is not so catastrophic a condition that it is unthinkable to return to it. So, quite unlike Hobbes, Locke countenances a people reclaiming its natural liberty from a government that has come to violate natural rights.

Rousseau, in his *Second Discourse,* criticizes past social contractarians for populating their states of nature with people as they are in civil society. (The criticism is rhetorically effective but perhaps not well-founded, as will be discussed in the next section.) His depiction of natural man begins with a prelinguistic, presocial, radically solitary creature, living freely in primordial woods. While this account earned Rousseau a reputation as a theorist of the "noble savage," it is not his primary interest. Rather, his moral account centers on early social man, before the advent of agriculture, metallurgy, the division of labor, or private property. Humanity in that condition was honest and authentic, characterized by natural inequalities of strength, skill, and beauty, but not the inequalities of power and wealth we see in corrupt modern societies. Throughout the rest of the *Second Discourse* and the later *Social Contract,* it is from this happy condition that Rousseau thinks departures need to be justified and typically aren't. Unlike Locke's state of nature, it lacks law, property rights, and ideas of justice, rights, or punishment. Unlike Hobbes's state, it is a peaceful world, unmarred by the *desires* for goods or physical power possessed by modern Europeans.

When and Where

Rousseau places the state of nature in the unimaginably distant past. He maintains that it is a hypothetical past (apparently in an attempt to avoid direct conflict with the story of the creation in Genesis), but he offers an account of what we would now recognize as a kind of evolution. Moreover, he defends it through empirical claims about the anthropology of ostensibly primitive non-European people; the state of nature is distant from modern Europeans either by time (it is far in the past) or by space (it is far across the ocean). And once lost, it cannot be regained.

Hobbes portrays a state of nature that is always just around the corner. While the narrative of *Leviathan* proceeds from the state of nature to the

state, the work is centrally concerned with the possibility of state breakdown *into* the state of nature in the future. When sovereignty ceases to be unified and effective, a civil war breaks out, and the juridical state of nature is restored, because there is no sovereign who can definitively establish relations of justice. Hobbes's claim that the international order is a state of nature also suggests that the condition is pervasively present; potential war is always with us. The state of nature is nearby in both time and space; it is either always with us, in the international order, or always potentially with us, in the event that politics within our society goes badly. He thus would likely have found Rousseau's charge of anachronism beside the point.

Locke's sense of when and where to locate the state of nature sits sometimes uncomfortably between the other two. Like Hobbes, he is interested in the state of nature that might arrive in the future, when a government creates a state of war against its citizens by violating their rights, or when the people reclaim their natural liberty. Like Rousseau, however, Locke builds a state of nature that has an evolution and history within it, one that goes from ownership of hunted and gathered food to ownership of land to the creation of money. He moreover makes use of ideas of primitive non-Europeanness; "in the beginning," he writes, "all the world was America," (*Second Treatise on Government,* chap. 5, section 49,) that is, the America of indigenous Americans who ostensibly failed to cultivate land and establish ownership of it.

The Scottish Enlightenment theorist Adam Ferguson argued that there was no binary division between a static natural condition and an artificial legal and social condition; it is natural for humanity to be social, and even art and artifice themselves are natural. Ferguson analyzed a multistage development of human social, economic, and political organization, but that required doing away with the one-time transition between nature and society. "Of all the terms that we employ in human affairs," he wrote, "*natural* and *unnatural* are the least determinate in their meaning;" and:

> If we ask, therefore, where the state of nature is to be found? we may answer, It is here; and it matters not whether we are understood to speak in the island of Great Britain, at the Cape of Good Hope, or the Straits of Magellan. (*An Essay on the History of Civil Society,* part 1, section 1)

The state of nature is everywhere and always, and so not usefully contrasted with political society. At about the same time, David Hume offered a withering critique of the whig social contract theory typical in post-Lockean Britain, a critique that was afterward taken as devastating to social contractarianism as a whole.

State of nature analysis was not abandoned entirely; Lockean models figure prominently in the writings of American revolutionary figures including Thomas Paine, and the Hobbesian idea of international society as a state of nature remains in use even today. Nonetheless, by the late eighteenth century they faded from view. The last major social contract theorist of early modernity, Immanuel Kant, treated the state of nature as a wholly moral and legal condition, not a historical one. It was the lawlessness of international politics and the hypothetical lawlessness that contrasts with the everywhere real civil condition. Neither anthropology nor history was relevant to its analysis, and there was no pretense of equating the idea of the state of nature with empirically natural (i.e., primitive) man. By the time Jeremy Bentham famously derided Lockean natural rights as "nonsense upon stilts," the construct of the state of nature was in little use. The growth of knowledge of anthropology undermined any idea that humans who did not live in European-style territorial states necessarily lived in a condition of anarchy; and the economic, technological, and political changes in Europe since the seventeenth century undermined the idea that there was some uniform civil condition entered into once and for all by deliberate choice. The idea of a series of stages of development introduced by Ferguson and Adam Smith was built into new systems of thought by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, and the bifurcation between a natural and a civil condition was used less and less often.

When, in the twentieth century, John Rawls sought to resurrect social contract theory, he substituted the openly imaginary "original position" for the traditional state of nature, to emphasize its hypothetical character. The decision structure in the original position is a deliberately artificial one, and Rawls did not treat it as either original in fact

or as a desirable fulfilling of basic human purposes. Robert Nozick's resuscitation of the Lockean state of nature was likewise hypothetical, a heuristic device to show how the state could be legitimate.

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See also Grotius, Hugo; Hobbes, Thomas; Locke, John; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Social Contract Theory; State of Nature

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Strauss, Leo (1899–1973)

Leo Strauss was an influential political theorist often associated with neoconservative ideas and their impact on U.S. politics. His parents were fairly conservative Jews, and his father ran a farming and livestock business. Strauss served in the German army at the end of World War I, before pursuing a doctorate at the University of Hamburg under the supervision of Ernst Cassirer. In 1932, he obtained a Rockefeller Fellowship that took him to Paris, where he married Miriam Bernshoh. With the rise of the Nazis, Strauss and his wife decided not to return to Germany, but to travel instead to Britain and then in 1937 on to the United States. Strauss worked at the New School for a decade. Then, in 1948, he took up a post as a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, where he remained until just before his retirement.

Today, Strauss is often discussed in terms of his alleged influence on American neoconservatism, notably the foreign policy of George W. Bush's administration. Yet, political theorists increasingly recognize Strauss as a far more sophisticated and original philosopher than hostile assessments of his influence are wont to suggest. To understand Strauss's political philosophy, we need to grasp his account of modernity within the history of philosophy.

Critique of Modernity

Strauss's critique of modernity revolves around the quarrel between ancients and moderns. Ancient philosophy reflects a necessary conflict between the city (or state) and philosophy. The city has to rely on people accepting whatever opinions peacefully unite them; it requires acceptance of conventional morality and religion. Philosophy, in contrast, studies universal truths as they are given by an impersonal nature; it requires the questioning of all ancestral conventions and local pieties. The conflict between the city and philosophy led the ancients to defend a teleological order and natural right. Natural right required that philosophy be kept apart from social life because its truths would undermine the local idols on which civic life depends. Strauss even argues that the ancients tried to keep philosophy apart from the city by writing esoterically, thus hiding their philosophical beliefs beneath a superficial surface.

Modern philosophers neglect the wisdom of natural right. In Strauss's view, the moderns foolishly believe that if we come to know ourselves as we are, and if we make this knowledge public, we still can construct a city. They think that knowledge enables us to conquer fortune, make nature serve human ends, and even coordinate private interests for the public good.

Strauss generally points to Thomas Hobbes as inaugurating modernity. Hobbes tried to reconcile philosophy and the city by appealing to an unprincipled political hedonism. He openly argued that individual virtue is irrelevant: people can be immoral—they can concentrate on the pursuit of personal pleasure—and still sustain a good and stable society. The first wave of modernity gave rise to the idea that the city could be based on a modern ideal of enlightened self-interest, rather than the ancient ideal of public virtue. Although Strauss acknowledges that there were hedonists before Hobbes, he argues that it was Hobbes who turned hedonism into a political doctrine. Hobbes first gave voice to the quintessentially modern doctrine that political order can arise out of mastery of nature as opposed to mastery of self. Strauss

added here that Hobbes's political hedonism led to political atheism. Because Hobbes denied that individual virtue is necessary for the city, he saw no need for religion to sustain individual virtue. Hobbes was thus the first to make atheism a political doctrine, for no earlier atheist had doubted that social life required worship of gods.

According to Strauss, political hedonism is bound to fail. It has to recommend antisocial behavior when there is little chance of being caught. And it cannot cope, in a philosophical sense, with threats to one's life or with war.

The inevitable failure of political hedonism gave rise to a second wave of modernity. The second wave of modernity, which Strauss associates with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, attempted to reconcile philosophy and the city by appealing to self-rule. Rousseau rejected Hobbes's unprincipled hedonism: He recognized that only public virtue and religion (not enlightened self-interest) can sustain the city. But, Rousseau did not return to the ancient wisdom. Rather, he adopted an even more radical version of the modern project. He argued that public virtue could arise out of individual freedom in a democratic community. Rousseau believed that philosophy should be made public so that individuals can become free by ruling themselves for the common good in accord with knowledge.

According to Strauss, however, Rousseau's vision failed just as inevitably as did Hobbes's. It was too broad a guide to apply to practical action. And, much more importantly, if we try to base morality on self-legislation, we are led inexorably to historicism, positivism, and nihilism.

For Strauss, the third wave of modernity consists of the working out of this inexorable path to nihilism. Historicism and relativism arose because the collapse of natural right, along with the failings of Hobbes and Rousseau, leaves us without any absolute concepts. When Hobbes and Rousseau rejected classic natural right with its basis in a natural order, once they turned to the human ability to manipulate nature according to will, there was no longer any reason to ascribe to morality any kind of foundation beyond human life. Again, once morality is thought to be a purely human construct, it soon comes to be seen as relative to time and to place. Hence, Strauss concludes, the modern project leads inexorably to historicism (as in Edmund Burke and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel) and positivist relativism (as in Max Weber and social science). Historicism and relativism give up on absolute concepts of right in a way that implies we have no grounds for selecting one morality over another. They leave us with only the study of different values that have been adopted by different societies.

Yet, Strauss continues, historicism and positivism remain authentic—and unsustainable—forms of nihilism. They try to deny the relativism that they entail by pretending that their own perspective is true, not relative. Friedrich Nietzsche, it is true, reveals the nihilism that lies at the heart of modernity. Nonetheless, for Strauss, our times are characterized by the inauthentic nihilism of historicism and positivism. We are no longer convinced of our own views. We are unsure of our purpose. We have lost faith in ourselves. Above all, we think our values and purposes are relative to us.

Is there any way out of such inauthentic relativism? Strauss seems to think that the role of political philosophy is to resolve the crisis of our times by devising a new and usable version of the ancient wisdom. Equally, however, he sometimes seems to acknowledge that modem natural science has rendered impossible the old teleological view of the universe in a way that precludes a simple return to ancient philosophy. Perhaps Strauss wanted philosophers indirectly to recover the ancient wisdom by first making possible something akin to a teleological view of humanity and then defending a form of natural right.

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See also Historicism; Hobbes, Thomas; Natural Law; Nihilism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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STRUCTURALISM

Structuralism names, in the first instance, a movement of thought briefly dominant in Europe, especially France, in the mid-twentieth century. It traced its origins in part to the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), who, in his *Course in General Linguistics,* put forward a view of language as a synchronic structure—that is, a set of relations between signifying sounds (or marks) on the one hand, and signified concepts on the other, and between the signs thus defined, holding simultaneously for a population of speakers and hearers (or writers and readers) at a given moment in time. Saussure's basic insight, on which his importance to the structuralist movement rested, is that the differential relations that distinguish one sign from another and thus make language possible are *constitutive*. He already saw that while the concept of difference generally assumes previously existing positive terms, basic linguistic differences do not—the positive terms are a function of the differences, not the other way around. A sign is not a sign at all until it is differentiated from another sign.

Saussure does not in fact use the term *structure* in what came to be its structuralist sense; he has been called "the structuralist without knowing it." The term is obviously embedded in ordinary discourse, as referring to any complex object whose parts stand in defined relations to one another. Buildings are often called "structures" in this sense, having foundations that support walls, with windows cut into them. But we also say that a building *has* a structure, putting the emphasis not on the material object and its parts but on their relatedness. The same relations could be realized in different materials—wood, stone, glass, and so on. The structure can, as it were, be detached from the object whose structure it is. We may then say that the structure is characteristic of a *kind* of object. In this informal way, the term is frequently used in political science, as referring to formal arrangements in one or another political unit, without any suggestion of structuralist doctrine.

Building on Saussure's insights, a number of prominent workers in other fields—Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) in anthropology, Jacques Lacan (1901–1961) in psychoanalysis, Roland Barthes (1915–1980) in literary criticism, Michel Foucault (1926–1984) in the history of ideas, and Louis Althusser (1918–1990) in Marxist studies—extended the reach of structuralism to mythology, kinship systems, mental states, works of literature, intellectual disciplines, and political institutions. The appeal of structuralism in these contexts was as a methodology. It suggested a search for relations (binary oppositions, negations, etc.) that could be discerned in the objects or situations being studied so as to show similarities of structure across diverse cases and throw light on some of them as structural parallels or transforms of others. The material content might change, or the signs or tropes be inverted or distorted, while revealing a constant underlying structure. Lévi-Strauss, for example, claimed to have identified the basic structural unit out of which higher-order kinship structures are built in the triad of mother / son / maternal uncle. He did something of the same sort for myth, arguing that the cycle of myths in a given culture constitutes a set of structural transforms in which male / female, human / animal, raw / cooked operate as variables that generate a body of lore that is practically limitless. He sometimes suggested that such basic similarities of structure detected in different social or discursive contexts reflected the structure of the human mind.

Structuralism and the Philosophy of the Human and Social Sciences

The theoretical discourses to which structuralism are most philosophically appropriate are commonly called the "human sciences." The objects of the human sciences are just those that have been introduced into the world by human intention (in the ordinary-language sense of purpose) and intentionality (in the more technical phenomenological sense of apprehending what is before the mind), as contrasted with objects that are found in the world having no human intentions among their causal antecedents, which are therefore properly objects for the natural sciences. The concepts of *structure,*

construction, instruction, and *deconstruction* define the preoccupations of structuralism, and while the first two terms also have applicability to objects in the natural world, structuralism in that setting does no work of its own. All physical objects with parts can be said to have structure, but that is a derivative fact about them that throws no light on particular cases; the objects of the human sciences, on the other hand, have structure constitutively.

Knowing subjects "have" the structures of the objects they know. They internalize the relations that constitute the structures and make use of them to work out inferences, convey information to others, and so on. But the basis for the acquisition of these structures, by a process of instruction (*instruction,* the structuring of the inner) is different, in principle, though not always in practice, in the case of the objects of the natural sciences on the one hand, and objects of the human sciences on the other: through perception and experiment, in the first case, but through language and cultural example, in the second. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between the physical or perceptual objects of the natural sciences and the intentional objects of the human sciences. What have traditionally been called the "social sciences" straddle this gap—their empirical and behavioral content allies them with the natural sciences, while their theoretical and intentional content allies them with the human sciences.

The intentional character of the objects under study is frequently left unclear in a variety of discourses in the humanities and social sciences, which often casually assume the existence of a domain of social and intellectual objects whose properties and interrelations form the *dramatis personae* of their narratives or explanations: genres, prices, political parties, communities, races, currencies, exchange rates, hierarchies, offices, treaties, families, genders, religions, styles, nations, borders, institutions, languages themselves, and so on. Some of these things do take on an apparently entrenched solidity that rivals the objectivity of concrete entities in a physical world. What tends to be overlooked—because of their long histories and the very large numbers of people who sustain the relevant practices and disciplines—is their essential and continuing dependence on the mental activities of individual knowers and agents. The conflation of physical with cultural objects (or cointentional objects) in the minds of most unsuspecting people arises in part from educational practice; history and economics and literature are taught alongside biology and physics and chemistry, and the radically different ontological status of their objects is not usually pointed out.

In addition to its historical and methodological sense, then, "structuralism" also names a philosophical position that emerged only slowly from the structuralist movement, and provides an alternative to positivism and doctrinaire Marxism. No longer just a methodology, structuralism becomes a metaphysics, or more exactly an ontology. Instead of asking what structures the objects of the social sciences *share,* a structuralism of this sort will ask what structures they *are:* the relations that *constitute* them, and not only the relations into which they enter. It turns out that for an important class of objects—a very large class, comprising most of the things (other than merely material ones) with which human beings are concerned—entities are constituted wholly out of relations.

A basic question here concerns the nature of relations themselves. One view of relations takes them to hold between separate, preexisting objects: If I place one chair to the left of another, the chairs exist independently of and prior to the relation "to the left of," which holds only when I have placed them in this way, and only for an observer situated as I am. But some objects come into being as the objects they are only when their relations to other objects are brought into the picture. Parents come into being as parents only when they have children. They are essentially relational beings, and the same could be said of almost all roles and positions in the social and political domain. How do these relations subsist? Not, as in the case of the chairs or other material objects, in physical space and subject to causal interactions, but rather as apprehended (or "intended") by conscious subjects to whom they are intelligible and significant.

In the formulation of this contrast, it will be noticed that the term *subject* occurs twice, with sharply different meanings. A subject is literally something "thrown down," in contradistinction to an object as something "thrown over against"; both derivations stress the contingency of the situation. A subject can be *subjected to* external powers (discipline, oppression, etc.), or it can be the

subject of its own experiences (speech, desire, etc.). The first of these senses is prominent in the later work of Michel Foucault, who after an early structuralist period (vehemently disavowed by him) in which he followed the structures of biology, economics, and linguistics from the Renaissance to modernity, came to concentrate on the structures of coercion represented by censorship, imprisonment, and the like. Foucault analyzed power relationships as permeating the structure of the social, coming in multiple, separate strands from below rather than in dominant influences from above, but the intertwined influences of knowledge and power, or "power-knowledge," still tended to subordinate the subject rather than empowering it.

Problem and Potential in Structuralism: For an Empowering Intentional Structuralism

Even in his avowedly poststructuralist phase, Foucault thus continued to fall prey to a problematic temptation of structuralism. This was the common, if far from necessary, temptation of structuralists to assume that there existed a determining superstructure that had a life of its own, of which human minds were the unwitting carriers. Hence, structuralist claims to the effect that "myths think themselves through us" or that "we do not write, we are written." In this view, structures appeared to be impersonal and autonomous and to exist objectively; the individual knowing subject was elided in favor of a mere placeholder in a network of structural relations. What was not clear in this interpretation was the nature of the carrier for these relations and the structures that embodied them.

The subject who is the agent of his or her own intentional life, rather than a being subjected to overarching structures of dominating power, represents a more positive and hopeful potential face of structuralism. The decline in structuralism's influence after its heyday in the 1960s might be accounted for by a failure of the structuralists themselves and of their followers to take seriously the ontological force of individually sustained intentional relations. There was a turn toward semiotics as the focus of inquiry, which once again seemed to confer an independent objectivity on linguistic structures, even though some structuralists (notably Julia Kristeva, following on the work of Jacques Lacan) sought to preserve the primacy of the speaking subject. To bring out the significance of this more active structuralism, it will be helpful to go back to the history (or protohistory) of the movement even before the advent of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, and highlight the potential for a more empowering intentional structuralism already evident in Karl Marx's *Capital*.

Marx deals in elementary structures and their transformations, as, for example, when in *Capital* he shows the structure and transformation of the elements of exchange:

- *Commodities–money–commodities*: where it is obviously desirable for the commodities in the second group to differ from those in the first, is transformed (by a mere shifting of attention to an adjacent segment in the chain of exchanges) into the structural element:
- *Money–commodities–money*: where it is similarly (but less innocently) desirable for the second quantity of money to be greater than the first. What arises out of this simple move is the whole complex of economic and political relations that stretches from labor and theft to surplus value and exploitation and ideological dominance and institutional entrenchment and revolution.

It is characteristic of Marx that he reformulates what look at first like relations between things as relations between people. For example, private property is not just a relation of owners to their possessions, but a relation of possessors to the dispossessed; private property for some and deprivation for others go hand in hand. The basic characteristics of a historical order are the relations of production; the totality of these relations constitutes the economic structure of society, while law and politics are built on the economic foundation as a superstructure. This totality is a totality of individual cases, as Marx continually reminds us in the vignettes of the working class he provides in *Capital*. He does not arrive at the notion of the individual as an intending subject sustaining the reality of the social, but he does react against the transindividual abstractions of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Althusser considers the early Marx to be a structural transform of Hegel and the late Marx as a structural transform of the early

one. But Althusser's is still a grand or superstructural structuralism (what Roberto Unger has called "metastructuralism"). A more compelling view considers political structures to be cointentional, that is, the convergent result of mutual instruction and mutual criticism among and between particular knowing and intending subjects.

This structuralism of distributed cointended structures has yet to appear as a movement in political science. But there are interesting adumbrations of it. To repeat—structures have to be apprehended and intended by individual subjects, they do not have the objectivity of real objects in a common world. Large abstractions must be rooted in small intentions. In this light, an unexpected ally of structuralism in politics is Lewis Namier, who grounds the argument of *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* in the ambitions of individual parliamentarians. In a similar way, the *Annales* school reads political history through particular *mentalités*, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe stress what they call "particularisms," and Jacques Rancière insists on the real equality of individuals not subsumed under dominant structures. Teasing out the difference between an intentional structuralism on such bases and a repressive metastructuralism will take a lot of work. But this is the route the human sciences need to follow.

Peter Caws

See also Difference Theories; Foucault, Michel; Marx, Karl; Myths; Philosophy of Social Sciences; Structure; Subject

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STRUCTURE

Structure is perhaps the most difficult concept to define in social theory; indeed, a recent trend has been to reject the idea altogether. Maintaining an idea of social structure often implies that the theorist believes that the social world can be studied in a similar way to the natural world (naturalism). Some interpretivist critics would claim that while it might be possible to identify structures in the natural world—atoms, gravity, biological species—the social world differs from the natural world in being conceptual, ideational, and normatively laden, and hence not open to this sort of classification.

Definition of Structure

The most general understanding of *structure* is simply an arrangement of different elements that have a particular and enduring pattern. This raises a question as to whether, in this notion, structure is anything more than just the sum of its parts; in other words, are structures more than simply aggregates? Critics of this definition would argue for a conception of structure as something deeper or underlying. In linguistics, for example, we see this in the idea of deep rules of grammar (as opposed to the surface expression of speech). This understanding of structure as something deeper than and underlying social events can go in two directions. A hermeneutic direction would reject what critics regard as positivistic conceptions of structure as reducible to objective laws or patterns of observable behavior and insist instead on the

importance of symbolic meaning and understanding, showing that the social world is constituted by meaningful human activities that rely on such things as language, culture, and shared beliefs. A more materialist direction, as might be found in various schools of Marxism, would emphasize the importance of things like mode of production and economic system as providing the basis of social life. A specifically structuralist school of Marxism would, however, be wary of giving economic structures too great an emphasis and would extend its analysis to talk of the autonomy of various other social structures that are cultural, political, or ideological. However, these materialist approaches, and structural Marxism in particular, are criticized for emphasizing structure at the expense of social agents and actors.

Structure and Agency

Indeed, in talking of social structure one must inevitably talk about social agents. The structure-agency question is one of the oldest issues in social science, and one that is destined never to reach a satisfactory conclusion. The three contending positions here are: (1) that structure largely determines agency, (2) that agents constitute structures, and (3) that structure and agency are mutually constitutive. The first view is characteristic of different schools of structuralism, ranging from the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure to the anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss to the Marxism of Louis Althusser, as well as some functionalist approaches. The second view is found among interpretivists, phenomenologists, symbolic interactionists, and ethnomethodologists. They essentially believe that individual actors construct their social environment through their activities and understandings.

The third view that emphasizes the importance of both structure and agency might be found among less individualistic constructivists, for example, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. One of the most influential approaches is Anthony Giddens's structuration approach that, seeing structure and agency as mutually constitutive, lays importance on human practices, rules, and meanings. Indeed, rather than define structure as the properties of a social system, the emphasis here is on shared rules. For Giddens, it is rules and resources that structure our social relationships. A somewhat different answer to the structure-agency problem is provided by Pierre Bourdieu in developing the concept of habitus. Here, he tries to explain how social conditions are internalized into dispositions that allow us to engage in meaningful social practices across the social field. Habitus, as a set of dispositions, is not necessarily a conscious thing, but a durable set of classifications that organize our choices.

Functionalist Approaches

The early idea of structure, as with sociology in general at that time, was influenced by biological ideas, thus seeing it as akin to an organism made up of various specialized functions (Herbert Spencer). Émile Durkheim sees structures as collective relationships again similar to different organs of the body. But alongside these relationships he also recognizes collective representations like beliefs and ideas that create a social consciousness. For Durkheim, this combination of relations and representations gives society its enduring structure. This approach in turn influences the North American functionalist school of sociology. Talcott Parsons develops this approach by focusing on social norms. For Jose Lopez and John Scott (2000, pp. 19–42), this is an institutional approach to structure that sees such institutions as normative patterns of social relations. These normative patterns are carried in people's minds, but have their own separate existence, acting on individuals to create expected modes of action. This normative approach was most tellingly taken up by Robert Merton in his work on deviance and the way that people are socialized into certain social or cultural norms that guide our actions. Indeed, this sociological tradition tends to place much of its emphasis on social cohesion and consensus.

Marxist Approaches

In contrast to institutional structure with its strong normative aspect, Lopez and Scott point to a more relational understanding of structure. A good example is a Marxist approach that looks at people's relationship to the means of production. Marxism at its simplest posits a base-superstructure model of society. Grounded in material conditions, it is argued that these help to explain social

consciousness. The account presented in Karl Marx's *1859 Preface* argues that people enter into relations of production that are independent of their will. The economic structure of society constitutes a foundation on which arises a legal and political *superstructure*. This model is widely criticized for its economic determinism, although Marx and Friedrich Engels themselves criticized such a position. Another way of interpreting Marx's work is to suggest that while all societies are conditioned by their mode of production, the idea of mode of production is itself much broader than simply economic structure. Indeed, for economic relations to exist, it is necessary to have in place a legal structure that defines what these relations are (for example what constitutes private property), as well as a political structure (the state) that defends these relations and enforces the law. In this sense, legal and political relations are as much constitutive of economic relations as they are determined by them.

Another way out of the economic determinism present in some interpretations of Marx is the structural Marxist route put forward by Althusser, who argues for the relative autonomy of political, cultural, and ideological structures. For Althusser, the economy is only determinant "in the last instance" and society is complexly "overdetermined" by the interplay of various structural levels. However, as we have mentioned, this approach is criticized, if not for its economic determinism, then for its structural determinism and the claims that agents are mere *bearers* of social structures and that history is a process without a subject. It was challenged by various humanist approaches to Marxism, be they historical (E. P. Thompson) or praxis oriented (drawing on the earlier arguments of Antonio Gramsci, György Lukács, and Jean-Paul Sartre). But perhaps the best response is to recognize the dialectical interplay of structure and agency present in Marx's own comments from *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* that people make their own history, but that they do so under conditions not of their own choosing.

Philosophical Realism

Although there are clearly problems deciding how best to interpret the Marxist approach, it is nevertheless the best example of what Douglas Porpora (1989) considers a philosophical realist view of structure that defines it as systems of human relationships among social positions (class positions would clearly be given prominence by Marxists). Structures are said to have properties and causal effects in their own right, often expressed as tendencies that may be exercised under particular conditions but which might encounter countertendencies. This emphasis on structural tendencies that have to be understood in the open context of the conjuncture of different conditions goes against the positivist search for lawlike connections among social facts.

Porpora criticizes the constructivist approach for reducing structure to an epiphenomenon of human behavior. Whereas for Giddens and structuration theory, structure refers to an organizing principle, the realist approach refers to the actual organization of society. Realist approaches such as the Marxist one see these relations as real and out there, whereas for Giddens, these relations are intersubjective and hence culturally or symbolically shared through norms, rules, and ideas, rather than material relationships. The effect is to reduce structures to social practices denying structures properties of their own. This is apparent in Giddens's "duality of structure" argument that the structure does not exist separately from the knowledge of the agent, and that the structure is instantiated through the agents' activity. Margaret Archer's (morphogenesis) approach challenges this by arguing that structural conditions preexist the activities of particular agents and shape and condition the way they can behave. Following this first stage is a second stage of social interaction and a third stage of structural elaboration. Giddens's error, for Archer, is to conflate these temporally distinct stages by suggesting that structures be understood as the activities of agents.

Structure in International Relations Theory

We will now take some of these arguments and see how they are applied in political analysis, or more specifically, international relations (IR) theory. There is no doubt that the dominant view of structure is influenced by positivist approaches that seek to make lawlike statements and define structure in terms of regular patterns of behavior (hence the description of this position as behavioralist). These

relations are stable, repetitious, and hence predictable. Kenneth Waltz is the best known of the structural realism or neorealists in IR. To understand the international system, we have to look at the distribution of capabilities (among states) under the ordering principle (anarchy). However, if for Waltz the world system is characterized by anarchy (in contrast to domestic societies that are characterized by hierarchy), then for constructivists like Alexander Wendt, "anarchy is what states make of it." That is to say, the self-interested, competitive model of anarchy, influenced by the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, and an analogy with market behavior, is only one of a range of possible structural outcomes. For Wendt, a more contractual (Lockean) or cosmopolitan (Kantian) system is also possible. However, constructivists in IR are themselves divided between system-level constructivists like Wendt, and unit level constructivists, who place more emphasis on the actors rather than structures, or those like Nicholas Onuf, who question the idea of structure altogether and emphasize practice and language games instead. However, none of these positions really engages with the more sociological understanding of structure found in Porpora and Archer. Further, the structure-agency issue is often conflated with the somewhat different argument about systems, units, and levels of analysis (domestic and international).

Problems might arise in relation to just how abstract the notion of structure is and the extent to which it is a metaphor or something real. The positivist position that influences much of the mainstream usually takes an instrumental stance. In Waltz's work, for example, the idea of structure is used as a theoretical model to explain the pattern of international relations and the behavior of states. But the concept of structure is used as an explanatory tool, rather than as pointing to something that actually exists. Philosophical realists, by contrast, would clearly want to say that structures are not merely theoretical constructs, but exist in the real world. But what, then, are these things if they are said to have an abstract and underlying nature?

We might suggest the obvious examples, like the family or kinship relations or the state. But then it might be suggested that these are institutions rather than structures, and that the idea of structure gets at something deeper than this. But if this is so, then it becomes almost impossible to give a concrete example of a structure because a structure is now by definition something abstract that is unobservable and underlying. Then again, we might try to get out of this dilemma by distinguishing between the more abstract notion of the process of structuring and the concrete thing that is structured. The concrete thing we call a family is a structured entity, whereas that which gives a particular form to a particular thing is a more abstract structure or indeed set of structures (such as economic relations or patriarchy). Clearly there are dangers of rendering the concept of structure virtually meaningless, and these dangers lie in both directions, making the concept either too concrete or too abstract.

Recent sociology has challenged the idea of social structure, suggesting either that the idea belongs to an outdated form of social theorizing or that structure itself has changed in the real world. The most influential of these critiques are those that argue that social structure has either changed into, or been replaced by, new types of social relations, namely networks and flows. These networks are seen as open systems made up of nodes that add themselves to the network and interact with one another. Whereas structure implies hierarchy, a center of power and vertical integration, the idea of networks implies mutually supportive nodes arranged in a more flexible and adaptable way, and reaching across greater spatial (or even virtual) distances.

Such a view (associated with scholars like Manuel Castells, Scott Lash, and John Urry) links in with the argument that capitalism has a new globalized nature that is driven by revolutions in communication, information, and technology that are fragmenting and restructuring traditional social relations like the workplace, the family, and the firm. Tying in with arguments raised by Giddens and Ulrich Beck, it is suggested that social life is increasingly marked by the destruction of traditional social structures through a process of individualization, which in turn forces social agents to become increasingly reflexive and self-responsible. Along with these developments, a new set of agents emerge. Castells's arguments about opposition movements see these as located, not in traditional social structures characteristic of the old industrial society (like class and nation), but in new networks

that produce new cultural (rather than social) identities.

Critics would say that these are still very much structural arguments, and deterministic ones at that. Driven by technological developments or, in the case of globalization, an unstoppable economic logic, these approaches are overly deterministic on the one hand, yet have too contingent a view of social relations on the other. Critics suggest that these arguments are overly influenced by developments at the top level of business, focusing on those who have access to this new information and technology. In fact, the reason why some people have access to these resources and others do not requires a deeper structural explanation similar to the social positions argument put forward by realists.

Jonathan Joseph

See also Agency; Functionalism; Marxism; Network; Realism; Structuralism

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SUBALTERN

The *subaltern* as a concept within political theory gained momentum through the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. His conception of the subaltern has been reworked by Indian scholars such as Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Spivak and is now a fundamental concept in postcolonial studies. Subalternity refers to diminished political voice, organization, and representation on the part of nonelite social groups, their relative invisibility in historical documentation, and their non- or extrahegemonic subjection to the power of elites. For Gramsci, these groups include peasants, slaves, women, religious groups, different races, and the proletariat in Southern Italy; Guha includes all groups in South Asia subordinated by class, caste, age, gender, and office, or any other modality; for Spivak, a paradigmatic figure is the gendered and racialized peasant or subproletarian of the global division of labor. For all three, the subaltern is unpossessed by the state and outside the purview of state hegemony; theoretical consideration of the subaltern is based on a political concern with radical social transformation at multiple levels. Conceptually, subalternity has been significant to the field of political theory in its challenge to the prevalent categories of (sovereign) subjectivity, agency, political representation, and (rigid definitions of) class.

Marcus Green states that most readings of Gramsci's conception of the subaltern are incomplete and misrepresented due to the exclusions of comprehensive notes to Notebook 25, "On the Margins of History (The History of Subaltern Social Groups)" in established translations of Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*. Gramsci gradually refines the category of the subaltern to mean marginalized social groups that exhibit varying levels of autonomy, political organization, consciousness, and initiative; he adopts an historical materialist approach based on a philosophy of praxis.

Subaltern Studies, a series initiated by Guha and his colleagues in 1982 of currently 12 edited collections, drew (minimally) on Gramsci's understanding of the subaltern to investigate various aspects of subalternity in relation to hegemony—from subaltern consciousness and agency, to the notion of the subaltern as a discursive effect; the approaches of Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and Jacques Derrida became increasingly influential throughout the series. Spivak's celebrated notion of subaltern silence emphasized the impossibility of retrieving a subaltern speaking position given the inescapability of its epistemic and political mediation by power and ideology.

Directly inspired by the Subaltern Studies Group, the Latin America Subaltern Studies Group emerged in 1993 and existed for several years. Founding members included Walter Mignolo and John Beverley. The journal *Nepantla: Views from the South* was established in part to explore the dynamics of subalternity in Latin social formations in the Americas.

Nalini Persram

See also Gramsci, Antonio; Hegemony; Indian Political Thought; Marx, Karl; Postcolonialism

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SUBJECT

The term *subject* has a long and convoluted history that takes in both philosophical and political meanings. Indeed the two are extremely difficult to untangle, which is why any contemporary understanding of the term must pay at least some attention to its conceptual history. In most current political uses the term *subject* is opposed to the term *sovereign*. For example, in Britain, it is still common practice in law to refer to "Her Majesty's Subjects." However, in its earliest usage in philosophy, the subject was that which "lay under," and was that to which predicates could be applied (the logical subject) or to which accidents could happen (the physical subject). This understanding of the term is operative as far back as the philosophy of Aristotle. Many philosophers and political theorists have played on the myriad meanings of the word, opposing the term at various times to *object* or *predicate,* as well as understanding the term subject in either an active way (the thinking subject, for example) or passive way (the subject of an investigation, for example). The subject also has a complicated relationship to number. It can be used to refer to the individual experiencing subject, but also to a large collection of individuals in their anonymity—the political subject, for example. The rise and fall of notions of the subject in philosophical and political thought over the past few centuries, but particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth when the notion came under siege from a variety of different angles, is as complicated as the history of philosophy and politics itself.

Philosophical Background

Between Aristotle and the middle ages, the term subject (*hupokeimenon* in the Greek, which roughly translates as "substrate") underwent a series of transformations that changed its meaning from that which subsists or is constant in matter to that which subsists or is constant in the human subject. This is the primary way we have come to understand the concept of subject, particularly in the wake of a certain understanding of René Descartes. The "I" becomes that which can be depended on in the face of metaphysical uncertainty. Although there are disputes over the extent to which Descartes intended it to be understood in such central terms, the Cartesian subject is often argued to inaugurate a modern understanding of the subject. This subject is understood as a perceiving, reflecting being, possessed of consciousness and the capacity to represent ideas to itself. When referring to *the subject,* contemporary philosophy generally takes its cue from this reading of Descartes, whether it poses the question as a problem of subjectivity or as a question of how we are to understand ourselves as conscious beings. This understanding of the subject taken from Descartes emphasizes the individual nature of consciousness and also gives rise to a series of questions concerning the existence of other consciousness and the problem of solipsism: How can we be sure that other human beings are not just complicated machines, given that we only have access to our own consciousness?

A great deal of modern European philosophy consists of debates concerning the nature, status, and origin of the subject. Following Descartes, Immanuel Kant developed an entire philosophical approach that oriented philosophy away from debates either about the world as it is itself or from scholastic system building, and started by looking at the cognizing subject itself. By beginning with the experiencing subject, Kant's critical project aimed to provide an answer to the question of how we know what we know. Kant compared himself to Nicolaus Copernicus, who transformed science by starting not from the assumption of the Earth's centrality, but of the sun's. Kant's Copernican revolution was to begin not from assuming the

reality of the external world, but that of the subject perceiving it. Kant's subject-oriented philosophy was to prove extremely influential, both on thinkers who immediately followed him, such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and on entire schools of thought, such as the phenomenologists, who take subjective experience of the world as it appears to us at the starting point for their investigations into the structure of human cognition. Immediately after Kant's philosophy appeared, German idealism attempted in different ways to conceive of a wholly self-grounding subject, such that the subject would generate itself without need for external support. However, Kant was clear that there could be no subject without a relation to an external world, just that we couldn't understand this world as it was in itself. It is in these post-Kantian traditions that the opposition between subject and object comes to be central, even though many of the philosophies attempt to reconcile or overcome this opposition (for example, in Hegel, the subject and the object cannot be understood outside of the movement that both characterizes and contains them). There are important implications in Kant and post-Kantian thought for our thinking of moral philosophy. If the subject is an autonomous being, it must also be held responsible for its actions, as the very idea of the subject is predicated on a certain notion of freedom.

Political Developments

Parallel, and often crossing into, these philosophical developments are changes in the political meaning of the term subject. One of the implications of the Cartesian use of the term is that what we are referring to is an individual being. This in turn implies that the Cartesian subject is also a person, which is a term whose legal implications are vast. If the modern subject is also a legal person, or a citizen, we have yet another dimension of the term. Just as the philosophical subject is free, autonomous to some degree, and capable of reflection, the legal subject or person is held to be responsible for his or her actions. But the history of the term is even more complicated than this. To be subject to a sovereign or to a legal decision is to be in a position of submission to an authority (indeed, the term *subjection* carries this implication to this day). Yet this meaning, in the wake of philosophical developments, once more gets transformed. In the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) the subject and the sovereign for the first time coincide. In Rousseau's concept of the general will, the individual is both comprised of the will of everyone and the freedom granted to each. It is thus both sovereign and subject at the same time. Rousseau's importance in this period is reflected in the French *Declaration of The Rights of Man* (1789), which describes the law as being the expression of the general will. It is at this point in philosophical and political history that the term subject crosses over from a passive notion to an active one, more in keeping with the Cartesian conscious subject that we inherit from philosophy of the seventeenth century. Philosophy and politics in this period play a curious game of catch up around the term subject, each moving from passive notions of the subject to more active ones, with implications for both how we conceive the modern mind and how we understand contemporary politics.

In the wake of Rousseau's double-sided conception of the term and the implications for related terms such as *citizen* and *mankind* in the wake of the French Revolution, the notion of the political subject as an active being gets taken up by left-wing and Marxist thinkers. Most exemplary in this case is György Lukács (1885–1971) who, in *History and Class Consciousness,* seeks to combine Hegelian and Marxist notions of the subject with a political claim about the material of this subject. Lukács argues that although the proletariat under capitalism is alienated and thus is treated (and treats itself) as an object, it is, in the end, the true subject of history. Although Lukács would later criticize his own conception of the proletariat as subject of history, his project represents the logical outcome of a certain kind of thinking about the active political subject, where the activity of the masses comes to stand in for the truth of history as a whole.

Attacks on the Subject

However, within both philosophy and politics there have been many criticisms of notions of the subject. After Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) launched a devastating attack on both the metaphysical and moral dimensions of philosophy's claims about the subject. For Nietzsche, it is a trick of grammar to think that there is a "doer

behind the deed," and that Christianity and "slave morality" are responsible for constructing notions of conscience and interiority. The subject is thus the outcome of a long and vicious process of the taming of human beings by certain ideas, not the truth of consciousness as such. Furthermore, to think of the subject as a unified entity is to misunderstand the play of forces and perspectives that constitute human existence, and to presuppose that static being is more important than fluid becoming.

Nietzsche's highly suspicious approach to the certainties of philosophy on the question of the subject proved to be significant. Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was strongly influenced by Nietzsche in his account of those aspects of human psychic life that weren't immediately available to consciousness. What is revealed in slips of language and dreams are the unconscious forces that comprise our mental existence. These dimensions of human existence cannot be captured by assuming that the subject is fully in control of his or her mental activity. If our hidden inner life reveals more about us than active conscious reflection, are we really entitled to think of ourselves as autonomous, rational subjects? Are we not, in fact, determined by things beyond our control? This has significance for our self-conception as moral beings, if an element of our responsibility is taken away from our conscious control.

Michel Foucault (1926–1984) discusses the disappearance of the subject from philosophical and historical enquiry, once it is admitted that the subject is a construct and not a necessary fact about human beings. Indeed, Foucault and other critics of the subject make the critique of the self-composed, autonomous conscious subject part of a larger attack on the pretensions of humanism. Foucault's famous hypothesis of the "death of man" was enormously influential for both philosophy and politics, as it provided a way of trying to think beyond Enlightenment narratives of progress, the transparency of thought, and the centrality of human beings in the universe. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was similarly engaged in a critique of philosophical notions of the subject, arguing that notions of the subject already presupposed the nature of such a being, and that philosophy should think more fundamentally about the nature of being before it begins to make claims about human nature or subjectivity. Some feminist philosophers have also attacked notions of the Cartesian subject, arguing that it presupposes a certain model of individuality that cannot account for the way pregnancy complicates our understanding of the self as unified and singular.

More recent philosophical approaches have tried to displace the subject less through critique than through reconfiguring the focus of discussion. Object-oriented philosophy, such as that found in the work of Bruno Latour and Graham Harman, attempts to return to the objects themselves and their relations, rather than start with the conscious human subject, as Kant did. The aim is to think about objects in relations to networks in which the human subject would merely be one thing among other entities. Many insights of modern science have further displaced the centrality of the human subject, emphasizing the role of genes and other nonconscious aspects of our being.

In politics too, the notion of the subject has developed some serious criticism. Many have argued that notions of the political subject as a mass entity (the proletariat, for example) are now historically obsolete and ineffectual ways of conceiving of the complexity of societal organization. The idea of talking about the subject as a collective came under attack along with any position that saw a necessary end point or progression to human history.

Returns of the Subject

Today, however, some philosophers writing about politics, in particular Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou, have reintroduced the notion of a political subject into contemporary discussions. In a break with earlier Marxist and determinist theories of the role of the subject, however, they are careful to state that the emergence of the political subject is rare and should be understood as an event, rather than as a necessary outcome of the contradictions of political life. One of the central features of this contemporary turn to rethinking the subject is how it pays attention to the complicated relationship between the political and philosophical history of the word outlined here. If contemporary

conceptions of the subject understand the historical transformations in the word, then we can rethink the term without making assumptions as to its nature or essence. One reason for wanting to return to notions of the collective subject in particular is to try to take account of the way in which political formations come about, why people suddenly and seemingly spontaneously protest or overthrow governments, for example. One overlooked text in the history of this philosophical-political attempt to understand group behavior is Jean-Paul Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960), in which Sartre tried to present a rigorously abstract framework for the emergence of groups defined by their common political purpose from out of what he calls everyday *seriality,* where every individual regards himself or herself in opposition to every other. Sartre's text is important for Badiou's later conception of the political subject, which is also defined by its shared fidelity to a political event. What happens in the political event is that the collective subject realizes its shared commitment to a cause and its universal dimension. Unlike earlier Marxist conceptions of the self-realization of the proletariat and its supposed escape from alienation, this later conception of the subject presupposes no necessity to its emergence, and its appearance on the scene is not the result of identifiable historical causes. The death of the subject predicted by some twentieth-century thinkers has not yet quite taken place, either in philosophy or in politics.

Nina Power

See also Alienation; Event; Humanism; Universality

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Sustainable Development

Sustainable development is a central, yet complex and contested term within green politics and debates about the relationship between human societies and their economies and the natural world. The essence of sustainable development is that it integrates a concern for the environment and environmental protection with obligations to present and future human generations. In terms of its most famous definition, contained in the Brundtland Report, *Our Common Future:*

> Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts:—the concept of "needs," in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation in the environment's ability to meet present and future needs. (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 43)

Sustainable development is thus development that is ecologically sustainable, that is, development that is consistent with external, natural ecological constraints and limits and living within our environmental means. A shorthand definition of sustainable development would be *one planet living* (i.e., living within the equitably shared ecological and limited means—energy and resources—of the planet). Thus, sustainable development has at its heart both scientific and ethical dimensions, and its focus on *limits* means its normative center is a concern about distributive justice—as outlined further in this entry.

Sustainable development is not simply concerned with purely *ecological* concerns, but in terms of the popular *triple bottom line* view of sustainable development, sustainable development is concerned about the balance and relationship between the ecological, economic, and social dimensions of human social progress. Complementing this, sustainable development also outlines the role and relationship between the

	Ecological	*Economic*	*Social*
State			
Market			
Community			

three dominant institutions of modern life—namely: the state (including supra- and substate levels), the market (local, national, and global); and community or civil society.

Thus, sustainable development can be schematically represented as the table above.

Using this schema, different conceptions of sustainable development will be constituted by different emphases on which institution (state, market, or community) relates to, or is the dominant institution in relation to, ecological, social, or economic policy. For example, dominant green conceptualizations of sustainable development have a *nested* configuration across both dimensions. That is, greens would prioritize the community dimension and view the market as something that a democratic and decentralized state should regulate and ensure is as local in focus as possible, while prioritizing the social dimension in terms of well-being, social inclusion, and equality, and view the economic as subservient to these social objectives, nested within the limits of ecological thresholds. Thus, green accounts of sustainable development are characterized by strong community focus and an emphasis on one planet living and rejecting the stress on orthodox economic growth one finds in dominant accounts of "development" and "progress" within liberal, socialist, or conservative political and economic thinking.

From the point of view of political theory, sustainable development can be interpreted as extending ethical concern (including those of justice) in at least three dimensions—time, space, and the species barrier—as well as giving a new twist to conventional debates about socioeconomic justice and equality within societies.

The temporal frame of sustainable development is future oriented in that its concern for the future and future generations—the impact of development decisions (both sustainable and unsustainable) in terms of intergenerational justice and what the present generation owes future generations. Sustainable development is attentive to the brute fact that ecological problems do not respect national or cultural boundaries. Pollution problems, such as climate change, are transnational and global in scope. Equally, the social effects (in terms of injustice, harm, and inequality, for instance) of unsustainable development patterns of trade, exchange, and economic activity also are not confined to national boundaries. Thus, sustainable development and its associated politics and policies must also be transnational and global in scope and approach. Here, sustainable development can be seen as intimately related to debates around global justice and injustice.

Perhaps most contentious of all, sustainable development also raises the question of the justifiability of anthropocentrism that is limiting debate and concern to humanity. Given that sustainable development highlights the ineliminable *metabolic relationship* between humanity and the natural world, its normative concerns raise questions as to how we ought to view and treat the nonhuman world. Here, debates about sustainable development range over those who claim that given we cannot not use the natural world, the question then becomes one about establishing an *ethic of use* based on respect for the nonhuman world, and establishing symbiotic rather than parasitic ethical and metabolic relations to the nonhuman world. Others, such as deep ecologists, hold that we need to develop a nonanthropocentric or ecocentric worldview so that we may "walk lighter on the earth" and live simply so that human and nonhuman others may simply live.

In summary, sustainable development acknowledges:

- Human dependence on the natural environment (i.e., that the human economy is a subset of ecological systems, and relatedly, i.e., humans are not above or separate from nature)
- The existence of external natural limits on human economic activity
- The detrimental effect of certain human, collective activities on local and global environments
- The fragility of local and global environments to human collective action and the vulnerability of human societies to ecological thresholds and natural phenomena

- That one cannot talk about *development* without also linking it to the environmental preconditions for development and its social impacts
- Development decisions now may have consequences for present and future generations, those living in other parts of the world and the nonhuman world

In this way, sustainable development brings political theorizing about humanity "back to earth" given the ineliminable "ecological embeddedness" and "biological embodiedness" of human beings (Barry, 2007). As such, political theorizing, which is ignorant of the multiple concerns of sustainable development, is not just incomplete and immature but potentially misleading and dangerous as a guide to action.

John Barry

See also Climate Change; Global Justice; Green Political Theory

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Symbolic, The

The symbolic is a category in Lacanian psychoanalysis. It is used to designate one of three basic registers of human experience (alongside the imaginary and the real). In the second half of last century, the symbolic was brought to political theory by authors such as Louis Althusser, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Slavoj Žižek. This entry introduces the history and content of the symbolic in Lacanian theory. It then examines how the symbolic has been applied in political theory, principally in Slavoj Žižek's work.

Lacan's notion of the symbolic (or the symbolic order) is indebted as much to twentieth-century French sociology as to Sigmund Freud. The symbolic order of a society represents the collective representations it uses to understand itself and the world. Each new generation learns these representations, along with their mother tongue, in the first years of life. Lacan emphasizes how the symbolic order is always rule bound or normative. Each natural language is governed by a set of grammatical and lexical rules for the meaningful combination of words. More decisively, every culture is founded on the dual prohibitions of incest and murder that Freud's *Totem and Taboo* hypothesized to be the beginnings of human civilization. These prohibitions are impressed on subjects with the resolution of the Oedipus complex in the fifth to sixth year of life. At this point, the father should intervene to proscribe the child's ambition to monopolize its mother's attentions. The child at this point instead identifies with the norms of its society, or takes on the "name of the father" (for example, it is no longer only "little Johnnie," for example, but "John Smith"). Lacan's claim is that social order, kinship exchange, and subjects' sexual normality depends on the mediation of the symbolic between subjects. At a very basic level, we can only understand each other through language. Lacan's specifically psychoanalytic claim is that our sexual and social identities are overdetermined, at an unconscious level, by the places we hold in our societies' symbolic orders. The price of individuals' not successfully acceding to the symbolic is neuroses, perversions, or psychoses.

French Marxist Louis Althusser was decisive in bringing Lacanian psychoanalysis to political theory. Althusser's notion of how individuals are "interpellated" (roughly, "named") by political ideologies, backed by "ideological state apparatuses" (schools, churches, bureaucracies, media) is indebted to Lacan's theory of the "mirror stage." In this stage of their development, infants first anticipate their unified identity by seeing their own image in a mirror. Yet later, Lacanian political theorists have seen "ideological interpellation" as the process whereby subjects enter into a society's predominant symbolic order—a kind of political equivalent of the child's initial identification with the name of the father.

Lacan's emphasis on the importance of symbolic paternal authority in shaping subjectivity can take a conservative interpretation, as feminists have noted. However, particularly in the work of Slavoj

Žižek and his students, the symbolic has been put to use in the service of a revised, post-Marxian critique of ideology. Lacan's emphasis on how fundamentally our identifications within the symbolic order shape who we are is read as a powerful device in understanding the force of law. It is used to unmask just how deeply a society's dominant political beliefs and practices shape political subjects, and so why the radical change hoped for by the Marxian left has not occurred. The symbolic, for example, plays a key role in Žižek's celebrated analysis of the "ideological cynicism" of contemporary consumerist subjects. Their conscious sense of being rebellious, "resisting subjects" (promoted by advertising and postmodernist theory) misrecognises the unconscious hold of the symbolic order on them—a hold attested by how they mostly work 9 to 5 and worry about social acceptance and their careers in highly conformist fashion, while professing a cool cynicism about these commitments.

Lacanian political theorists hold that at the center of any society's symbolic order are "master signifiers" whose functional prototype is the "name of the father" in children's socialization. These are signifiers with which subjects identify particularly strongly. They undergird subjects' understandings of their societies and politics. Examples are *freedom* in the liberal West, or *the people* in the former Soviet Bloc. Laclau and Mouffe, and then Žižek, contend that the ideas and ideals of any society's symbolic order are for the most part politically unstable. Each can be signified in several different ways. The word *democracy*, for example, takes on different meanings if it is prefixed by *liberal* or *socialist*. The master signifiers in any society's symbolic order "quilt" or stabilize the meanings of all the other political signifiers. For example, if communism is our master signifier, democracy is quilted as meaning real versus formal, bourgeois democracy (a front for capitalism); feminism will be read as a response to the particularly intense exploitation of women under capitalist conditions; ecologism demands the overcoming of the profit motive if a more balanced approach to the environment is to emerge. If liberalism is our master signifier, by contrast, different interpretations of each of these terms emerge.

In this way, embrace of the Lacanian notion of the symbolic has led theorists like Žižek to a post-Gramscian emphasis on the politics of culture, or in the right's language: culture wars. Political struggle concerns which key master signifiers will shape a society's dominant (self-)understanding. Because these master signifiers are experienced by subjects as self-evident or natural, Žižek, for instance, argues that unless their hold on individuals is challenged, significant reform of a symbolic-ideological system is impossible. The work of political criticism hence becomes to show how a dominant symbolic order's (self-)understanding is always based on "ideological fantasies" about their societies' origins and ends that are self-contradictory, and in this way false.

Matthew Sharpe

See also Ideology; Imaginary, The

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Systems Theory

The concept of a system is abstract. It can often be little more than a metaphor used to describe any complex set of parts that forms a larger whole. At its most abstract, the concept of a system is thus just a way of thinking about macrostructures in terms of the relations among their units; it analyzes objects in terms of their parts and the relations between these parts in an attempt to facilitate problem solving. This concept of a system appears in diverse academic subjects, including biology, chemistry, and engineering, as well as political theory. For example, some biologists think of human beings as a system composed of subsystems (such as the vital organs), each of which performs a process essential to the maintenance of the system as a whole.

Systems theorists typically conceive of politics, and especially the state or governance, as a system composed of a series of subsystems operating within specific environments. A system consists of a set of subsystems or processes that are coordinated to accomplish defined goals. Each system or subsystem operates within an environment that is defined by fixed factors that constrain that system. Governance is the product of a complex network of interdependent systems. Many systems theorists also argue that systems are capable of regulating themselves so as to ensure that they evolve in a way that keeps their subsystems in harmonious relations with one another. Indeed, they often suggest that the self-organizing nature of systems makes the theory peculiarly appropriate to new forms of governance based on markets and networks, as opposed to bureaucratic hierarchies. In the absence of a dominant center or sovereign entity capable of guiding the whole, governance appears to resemble a self-organizing set of networks or subsystems.

Systems Analysis

How are we to analyze government networks conceived as systems and subsystems? Systems theorists have distinguished five different dimensions to such analysis. The dimensions are: the objective of the system, the environment that contains the system, the system's resources, the system's subsystems and their respective goals, and the management of the system.

1. The objective of a system is not always readily apparent: It can be concealed by the complexities of the system. Social scientists often identify the objective of a system by asking: For what ends does the system actually sacrifice external goals?
2. The system's environment consists of fixed external factors that define its operating parameters. So conceived, the environment does not include everything that surrounds the system but only static factors.
3. A resource is anything that enables a system to fulfill its functions. A system may vary its resources depending on the circumstances. Systems often contain internal mechanisms that periodically increase resource levels. An example of such a mechanism would be a production improvement within a firm. The firm's technological improvement may increase the amount of labor that can be utilized in the production process, and thus increase the resources within the system.
4. The actions of a system are often performed by coordinated subsystems. An analysis of the subsystems allows social scientists to consider their respective value to the system as a whole. In addition, they can consider which processes are critical and which might safely be removed.
5. System management ensures that the system's infrastructure is maintained and that the system is meeting its objectives. As long as these two conditions are met, the system will continue to exist.

Systems Management

How can the state (or other policy actors) manage the systems in which they participate? The application of systems theory to the study of politics has inspired two rather different approaches to system management. First, the autopoetic approach suggests that any system that persists over time will be self-regulating. In this view, all systems steer themselves, and they do so through closed, self-referential processes. The autopoetic approach thus leads to pessimism over possibility of the state (as a subsystem) steering society. Second, the interactionist approach identifies governance as a product of interactions within the system. This approach highlights the impact of relationships between governors and those being governed, between public and private actors, and between institutions and the social forces they regulate. All these interactions offer sites at which the state, and also societal actors, might intervene, so as to steer self-governing systems. In this view, recognition of the importance of interactions helps us to understand how steering becomes possible.

Problems and Prospects

Systems theorists debate the implications of the theory for governance and the possibility of consciously steering networks. Yet, these debates

already assume that the theory has a defined and valid content. In fact, systems theory is, as we have seen, often little more than a metaphor. Hence, there are arguably more important debates about the content and compatibility of different types of systems thinking.

More general debates about systems theory often concern the rival merits and compatibility of distinct variants. Schematically, we might distinguish at least four types of systems thinking: hard systems, organismic systems, soft systems, and critical systems. First, hard systems thinking arose in operations research methods and engineering design, where it is used to solve physical problems within clearly defined limits. Engineers break processes down into systems and subsystems in order to work on individual components in an efficient, organized manner. Second, organismic systems thinking arose in the biosciences. Organisms or their environments appear here as whole units or systems that in turn are composed of subsystems that possess varied characteristics. Organismic systems thinking leads to a more holistic approach than does hard systems thinking, with its focus on breaking down a problem into small parts. Third, social scientists devised soft systems thinking by drawing on organismic systems thinking in order to examine social problems. Many other social scientists had adopted atomistic approaches that broke society or social phenomena down into smaller and smaller institutions, groups, and the like. In contrast, soft systems thinking tried to grasp the nature of the whole before looking at the place of each component part within that whole. Finally, critical systems theory improves system design by bringing a greater awareness of human needs and actions to other types of systems thinking.

To conclude, we might note that these different types of systems thinking often use the concept "system" to describe different objects and to champion different ways of studying these "objects." If systems theory is to be more than a metaphor flowing uncritically from one type of object to another, it is necessary to examine more critically the differences between these objects or macrostructures and thus the different forms of analysis and explanation appropriate to them.

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See also Empirical Theory; Functionalism; Governance; Spencer, Herbert

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TACITUS (C. 56/7 CE–C. 117 CE OR LATER)

Publius Cornelius Tacitus (born c. 56/7 CE) was a Roman politician, orator, and historian. A member of the senatorial order at Rome under the early Roman Empire, he lived under a succession of emperors stretching from Nero through to the anti-senatorial Domitian before becoming consul—the highest political office—in 97 CE. Having held the governorship of the important province of "Asia" (Western Anatolia), he died either toward the end of the Emperor Trajan's reign (c. 117 CE) or sometime afterward under Hadrian. Tacitus is known primarily for four historical works, two written in 98 CE: the life of *Agricola* (*de vita Julii Agricolae*) and the *Germania* (*de origine et situ Germanorum*), followed later by the more celebrated *Histories* (*historiae*) and *Annals* (*ab excessu divi Augusti*). He was also the author of an extant *Dialogus de oratoribus* (Dialogue on Oratory), dedicated to a Roman consul of 102 CE.

The *Histories* and *Annals,* Tacitus's major works, survive today only in partial form—they covered the history of the early principate from the death of the first Emperor Augustus to the end of the reign of Domitian (14–96 CE). Written within a particular Roman historiographical ("annalistic") tradition, in which he was preceded, among others, by Sallust and Livy, the narrative of the *Histories* and *Annals* is a fundamental literary source for the political history of the early empire. Tacitus, however, was more than a historian—he was also a political actor and a political theorist. All of his works, in different forms, are concerned with exploring politics as a realm of elite decision making and performative action. Identifying himself strongly with a "traditional" senatorial culture of public virtues that had dominated the Roman state during the republic, Tacitus set out in his writing to dissect the nature and morality of political power itself.

That structures of power and institutional cultures of morality are liable to change, and sometimes rapidly, is a point that underscores the Tacitean approach to political theory:

> When there was democracy, it was necessary to understand the character of the masses and how to control them. When the senate was in power, those who best knew its mind—the mind of the oligarchs—were considered the wisest experts on contemporary events. Similarly, now that Rome has virtually been transformed into an autocracy, the investigation and record of these details concerning the autocrat may prove useful. Indeed it is from such studies—from the experience of others—that most men learn to distinguish right and wrong, advantage and disadvantage. Few can tell them apart instinctively. (*Annals,* IV. 33, trans. Grant).

Thus an important strand of the Tacitean tradition of political theory, from the Renaissance onward, is concerned with how language and rhetoric can "make realities" in any given system

of political control. Suffering under an age dominated by an (increasingly empty) rhetoric of imperial expansionism, Tacitus identified a causal link between autocratic rule and moral degeneracy. As well as providing an impetus to subsequent critiques of tyrannical power, Tacitus's insistence on the theatricality of political life under oppressive regimes, the necessity of acting out stage-managed roles, also influenced later Machiavellian theories of Realpolitik: to play the roles assigned to us, but to seek—when we can—to write the script ourselves.

Caroline Humfress

See also Ancestral Tradition (*Mos Maiorum*); Aristocracy; Empire; Historical Understanding; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Roman Commonwealth; Tyranny

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Taoist Political Thought

Taoism (*Tao-chiao*) is a Chinese religious tradition valuing personal integration with the unseen forces of the universe. Most Westerners are acquainted with only one "Taoist" text: the *Tao te ching* (or *Lao-tzu*). Even scholars seldom know the ideas found in the thousands of later Taoist writings. Contrary to modern narratives, Taoism evolved among China's most educated classes, specifically fifth-century aristocrats who interwove varied earlier traditions into an inclusive framework to preserve China's indigenous heritage from being altogether overthrown by Buddhism (a recent arrival). Taoist writings articulate nuanced models of spiritual practice designed for rulers and intellectuals, as well as ritual programs that provided a political matrix through which Taoism adapted to changing times. But Taoists apparently developed few new intellectual models concerning political power or practice.

Earlier, in "classical China," anonymous writers had contemplated life's issues and proposed teachings by which society could harmonize with life's deeper, more spiritual realities. The most famous example is the *Tao te ching,* completed circa 285 BCE by an unknown intellectual who repackaged earlier behavioral ideals into a sociopolitical program. Though such minds worked independently and formed no self-aware school, it remains common to label them "Taoists."

Contrary to the modern misconceptions, Taoists have generally agreed with Confucians: Both urge individuals to develop themselves in ways morally, in order to enhance society's well-being. Unlike the Legalists, who urged aggrandizing state power above all other values, for Confucians and Taoists, the individual is never to become a slavish follower of external authority but rather a thoughtful practitioner of meaningful ideals that constitute the true basis of a healthy society. Both presupposed that the world should have a human ruler. One classical text, the *Chuang-tzu,* scorns notions of serving in government, but advocated apathy, not anarchy, and teaches us only that classical Taoists, like Confucians, never denounced monarchy or would have embraced alternative systems like democracy or socialism.

What distinguishes Taoist thought is that Taoists have never placed great faith in humans' conceit that careful thought and action by any group or individual can be expected to improve life in our world. But while some intellectuals today imagine the *Chuang-tzu* as "proto-postmodern," the more representative Taoist position appears in centuries of writings that, like the *Tao te ching,* urge individuals to bring the sociopolitical order into accord with life's deeper, spiritual realities through practicing self-restraint and cultivating those realities—all vaguely denominated "Tao."

Later Taoist political thought emerged from the imperial court. In 221 BCE, the ruthless Ch'in regime established a totalitarian state. Thinkers of the subsequent Han dynasty saw the imperial order as an effective political system, provided it could be ripped from its Legalist moorings and instilled with more humane values. They questioned neither the value of the imperial system nor the propriety of hereditary rule. As throughout imperial times, Chinese thinkers axiomatically agreed that moral principles are essential for effective government, though idealism alone is not a sound basis for government. So—like their counterparts in China today, equally deprived of freedom to express independent political ideas—they sought not to devise new political systems but rather to discover the most solid theoretical foundation for the system they had inherited.

Some Han thinkers argued that the universe is not a field of self-contained natural processes, but a dynamically correlative cosmos, in which human actions stimulate responses on other levels; the ruler, having been instituted by "Heaven" (*T'ien*—the world's semipersonal ruling force), has a decisive degree of such power. That vision of an interactive union of cosmos and polity inspired other Han dynasty officials to produce a different kind of text, which reveals the basic framework of virtually all Taoist political thought: the *T'ai-p'ing ching* (Scripture of Grand Tranquility). Echoing the *Tao te ching,* the *T'ai-p'ing ching* declares that antiquity's rulers had achieved Grand Tranquility by practicing *wu-wei* ("nonaction"—the ideal of trusting to the world's natural processes, rather than to one's own initiatives or collective action). The *T'ai-p'ing ching* maintains that Grand Tranquility was disrupted when rulers began meddling with the world. These ideas recur throughout later Taoist political thought.

Throughout imperial times, Taoist leaders served China's rulers as legitimatory aides: They served a functional role, providing effective legitimatory paradigms, comparable to European kings' "divine right." Some Taoist leaders were viewed as protectors of the realm, whereas others were embraced as "the sagely counselor," whose mere presence elevates his sovereign to mythical heights. The emperor, the Taoist master, and the divine realities of the universe were seen as co-participants in the same process: unifying the world—"all under Heaven" (*t'ien-hsia*)—in a state of "Great Tranquility" (*t'ai-p'ing*). Centuries of emperors decreed that Taoist priests should perform liturgical ceremonies to prolong the life of the emperor, ward off natural disasters, and ensure stability in the empire. Though modern minds discount such beliefs, traditional East Asian minds esteemed Taoist leaders as essential aides for rulers' reactualization of the halcyon utopia—*T'ai-p'ing*.

From the thirteenth century, China was often ruled by non-Chinese, like the Mongols and the Manchus. Such late-imperial dynasts suppressed all expressions of independent political thought. In response, Taoists integrated public virtues like "loyalty" into their more traditional ideals. Such "gentry Taoism" evolved into the organization still dominant in twenty-first–century China—Complete Perfection (*Ch'üan-chen*) Taoism, headquartered in Beijing. Late-imperial Taoist discourse continued among men and women of all segments of society, but Ch'üan-chen practices inspire neither nationalistic fervor nor individualized theoretical expressions. Authoritarian rulers—unhindered by independent legislature, press, or other countervailing social forces—have prevented intellectuals from articulating nontraditional Taoist models of or for political life.

Russell Kirkland

See also Chinese Legalism; Confucianism

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TEMPORALITY

Temporality refers to the nature or structure of time, in terms of its objective existence, its subjective experience, or both, and particularly with

respect to the relations among its dimensions (past, present, and future) and the way in which it passes. It can also include time's relation to eternity and to history. This entry reviews concepts of time in Western thought and describes their elaboration in political theory.

The nature of time has always been an important topic in Western philosophy, although time has often been relegated to a subordinate status. Examples of this subordination include Plato's view of time as a moving image or copy of unchanging eternity, Aristotle's treatment of it as the number or measure of movement and change, and Augustine's contention that time cannot actually exist because past and future have no reality except in the mind's experiences of memory and expectation. Premodern conceptions of time are also frequently divided into circular models and providential or eschatological ones, neither of which grants any novelty or creativity to time or to the events occurring in it. However, despite many denials in both modern philosophy and science of its independent reality, time has been elevated to a primary position in many forms of modern and contemporary thought. Immanuel Kant, for example, holds time to be the a priori intuition that conditions all internal and external experience. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who defines time as the negation of what is given (i.e., what exists here and now), sees history as the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute in philosophy, religion, and the state, whereas Karl Marx sees it in terms of the dialectical development toward the emancipation and reconciliation of human species-being. Friedrich Nietzsche declares his discovery the eternal return as time's structure to be the highpoint of his thinking. And Martin Heidegger, who directly or indirectly influences most subsequent theories of temporality, holds time to be the horizon of our understanding of being.

Temporality has become important in many critical strands of political theory, including hermeneutic, historicist, and poststructuralist approaches, which reject universalist theories that appeal to ahistorical concepts of rationality, subjectivity, or truth. Stressing the way human beings are immersed in time and history, these critical approaches also reject the simple model of "clock time," which treats time as a linear continuum of past, present, and future, and as an empty medium in which events occur. Some theorists in the hermeneutic tradition analyze how temporal relations play a constitutive role in our understanding of events and of the past: Our present-day prejudgments, for example, circumscribe our interpretation of the past, while our dialogue with the past can help illuminate and modify our current prejudgments in both their distorting and their enabling roles. Others who practice conceptual history explore how temporality is experienced in different historical periods and how the modern experience of temporality—which includes our self-understanding of being historical, of our identity being delineated by history—underpins the concepts and social reality of the age. Still others maintain that the very structure of time constitutes the active force that propels changes that unfold in a linear, chronological way. Some recent theorists, drawing on Henri Bergson's philosophy of duration, hold that the past and memory remain embedded in the present in such a way as to drive the creation of new futures. Others, frequently influenced by Heidegger, stress that the future is not simply "ahead" of us but overhangs the present in the form of anxiety about death, and that in this way the future structures the present in both its relation to the past and its movement forward.

Many theories of temporality that focus on the structure of time as a force of change conceive of the event as a break in the continuity of time itself rather than a change that simply occurs in time. These theories argue that while an event may have a time and place that locate the site of its appearance, it also has an "untimely" aspect, a fourth dimension, so to speak, which does not allow it to be reduced to the effect of preceding causes in a linear order of past, present, and future. A political revolution would be considered an example of such an event, if it is held that prior economic and social conditions cannot explain its emergence or its effects. On this view, a historical account that explains the event after the fact, in terms of the events and context that preceded it and the new reality whose creation is attributed to it, is unable fully to explain the event's sense—there is a way in which the event is necessarily out of sync with the time and place of its eruption, which is precisely why it confronts us with the emergence of something new into history. Many theorists who emphasize the temporal structure of events therefore hold

that these events must be approached not through historical analysis but through an alternative that aims to grasp their temporal structure, such as the genealogical approach of Nietzsche or Michel Foucault. Genealogy aims to discern both the discontinuities of the event and the power relations that suppress these discontinuities in order to make history appear as an orderly and, in some cases, a progressive or teleological succession.

Nathan Widder

See also Becoming; Event; Genealogy; Hermeneutics; Historical Understanding; Historicism; Ontology

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Terrorism

Terrorism is a highly contested concept with dozens of definitions, none of which are definitive. There is to date no globally agreed, unambiguous definition or description of terrorism. Indeed, recently, prominent legal scholars have questioned whether we ought to spend time worrying about precise definitional issues at all, except for specific legal purposes. Notwithstanding the hardships involved in pursuing a canonical definition of such a politically contested concept as terrorism, if we are to fruitfully pursue the timely moral, political, and legal issues regarding the changing character of modern warfare, we must first reach some understanding of what terrorism is.

The various conflicting academic definitions of terrorism fall roughly into two categories. One large group of contemporary definitions seeks to highlight a specific aspect of terrorism that is said to single it out as a particularly fiendish and condemnable practice. In contrast, a second group of definitions aims to blur the distinction between terrorism and other violent acts, suggesting that terrorism is no worse than many forms of state-employed violence. Each type of understanding, clearly, has its respective normative implications.

The former, stringent, type definition singles out terrorism distinctly from all other forms of political violence. On such narrow accounts, terrorism is, roughly, the intentional random murder of defenseless noncombatants, with the intent of instilling fear of mortal danger amid a civilian population as a strategy designed to advance political ends. This narrow understanding of terrorism, distinguishing it from all other forms of violence and describing it derogatively as the ideologically motivated random targeting of civilian objectives, violating civilian immunity, for political purposes, originates in Michael Walzer's classic *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977), and it is echoed in many other modern works. Most theorists agree that terrorist strategy necessarily involves instilling widespread fear among a civilian population (as implied by the term *terror* itself) in order to achieve the desired political ends.

This basic understanding of terrorism (which admittedly allows for some variation) as the intentional and intimidating random murder of civilians for political purposes has become the term of reference for practically every debate on the nature of modern terrorism, whether concurring or criticizing it. On this prevalent account of terrorism, the intentional murder of random civilians in direct defiance of noncombatant immunity sets terrorism apart (for the worse) not only from conventional warfare but also from other forms of revolutionary violence, such as guerrilla tactics aimed at armies and political assassination aimed at particular state officials.

In opposition to this understanding, wider inclusive definitions of irregular warfare deliberately refrain from defining terrorism independently of political violence in general, and regard it as synonymous or interchangeable with terms such as *guerrilla warfare* or *freedom fighting*. Quite

obviously, many acts of conventional warfare can also equally be described as violent and intimidating for political purposes and often incur civilian casualties, however incidentally they claim to do so. Consequently, it is argued, there is no justification for singling out and denouncing terrorism distinctly on the basis of its harm to civilians or causing fear. Several modern-day theorists therefore adopt a variety of inclusive accounts of terrorism that blur the distinction between terrorism and other forms of political violence, or altogether deconstruct the distinct notion of terrorism. Many theorists believe that the very concept of terrorism as distinct from other forms of belligerence, or at least its current usage as a derogatory term, has been sinisterly molded in order to serve the political interests of the stronger powers within the international community. This type of inclusive definition of terrorism/political violence, taken together, aims to obliterate the distinction between terrorism and other violent acts, with the clear implication that terrorism is, in and of itself, no worse than many other practiced forms of violence in the course of war, some of which are internationally sanctioned.

There is much controversy regarding the relative merits of these two conflicting types of definitions, as well as on the possibility of justifying modern terrorism under certain circumstances. The latter, more inclusive definitions allegedly aspire to neutrality with regard to the moral appraisal of terrorism. In fact, they go a long way toward endorsing it as an alternative form of warfare, a weapon of the weak, and a possibly legitimate last resort option in emergency situations. In contrast, the stringent definitions intentionally single out the objectionable traits that characterize terrorism as a distinct condemnable strategy. It is perhaps the strength of the narrow definitions, rather than their weakness, that they do so, as terrorism is commonly employed, at least in everyday political speech, as a derogatory term. The stringent definitions that tie terrorism to the intentionally intimidating violation of civilian immunity are helpful in accounting for and explaining the prima facie wrongfulness usually associated with this tactic, whatever the ultimate judgment of its use in particular incidents may be.

Tamar Meisels

See also Dissent; Domination; Exploitation; Violence

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Theater: Antiquity and Middle Ages

Throughout Greek and Roman antiquity and the European Middle Ages, the theater was a central part of civic life and a collective experience. Shows were put on in accordance with civic and religious calendars and played an important role in creating a sense of community identity. The economic organization of the theater, however, varied greatly across these periods, as did the relationship between performers, audiences, and patrons.

Classical Athens

The Greek world in the classical period (fifth and fourth centuries BCE) was dominated by the city of Athens, where theatrical performance was an integral part of several religious festivals. As such, it was a collective experience, in which citizens played active roles as performers, spectators, and organizers, and the theater served as a vehicle for the city's self-presentation and self-examination.

The most important of these festivals was the Great or City Dionysia in the spring of each year, when tragedies and comedies were performed over a period of several days, along with choral songs (*dithyrambs*) celebrating the god Dionysus. These festivals were political and religious occasions, opening with processions, sacrifices, and public ceremonies in the theater during which public honors were announced and, at the height of Athenian power, the tribute paid by the city's

allies was displayed. The dithyrambic performances alone involved 20 choruses of 50 members, 2 from each of the 10 tribes that represented one of the basic units of democratic organization. It has been calculated that 1,200 individuals were involved in performing at each City Dionysia.

Though the origins of Athenian drama predated the beginnings of democracy at the end of the sixth century, the theater came to be closely intertwined with Athenian democracy in its themes and organization. All performers were Athenian citizens, and the dithyrambic choruses made visible on stage the structure of the democratic system. Along with the courts and the assembly, the theater was one of the mass meeting places of citizens; a special fund, attributed to Pericles, enabled the poorest to attend. Women, however, were probably excluded from the theater, as they were excluded from the political decision making of the Assembly and from the law courts. On stage, female roles were played by male performers.

The performances themselves were competitive events in which the three poets who had passed a preliminary selection each presented a single comedy or a trilogy of tragedies, followed by a comic satyr-play. Of the many plays presented each year, only a handful have survived in their entirety. These are by the three fifth-century tragedians, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the comic poet Aristophanes. The work of the fourth-century comic poet, Menander, is known from substantial fragments.

The main cost of funding dramatic performances was born by wealthy citizens. One sponsor (*choregos*) was assigned to each poet and to each dithyrambic chorus and was expected to finance and organize the training of the chorus and to bear other expenses involved in the production. In return the choregos won prestige, underlined by his prominent role in the ceremonial, and an association with a winning play could bring political advantages. Rivalry between competing choregoi was intense.

The vast majority of tragedies presented traditional mythological subjects. (One attempt to depict a recent catastrophe in the early fifth century is said to have resulted in a fine for the poet, Phrynichus, for presenting distressing material.) Tragedy used many distancing effects, such as masks and stylized diction and gesture, but its stories of legendary figures served as a vehicle for direct and indirect commentary on contemporary politics and society. The city of Athens and its institutions are often depicted in a positive light, as is the Athenian hero Theseus, and the presence of the chorus ensured that the actions of legendary kings were placed in the context of a community. The plays can be read as explorations of tensions and contradictions inherent in relationships between men and gods, in the nature of power (as in Aeschylus's *Prometheus Bound*), the competing demands of loyalty to state and family (as in Aeschylus's *Eumenides* or Sophocles' *Antigone*) or the role of women in society (as in Aeschylus's *Agamemnon* or Euripides' *Medea*). War and its devastating effects were a frequent subject, particularly for Euripides whose depictions of the suffering of the defeated, like *Trojan Women, Andromache,* or *Hecuba,* were produced against the background of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE). In his blustering leaders and their cynical maneuvers (*Hecuba, Iphigeneia in Aulis*) we may see a critique of contemporary politicians and of their misuse of language.

Fifth-century comedy (or "Old Comedy") played a minor role in the City Dionysia but was important in other festivals such as the Lenaia, when no foreigners were present. Known mainly through the plays of Aristophanes, Old Comedy offered a direct commentary on social realities by depicting contemporary citizens operating within the city of Athens. Typical plots showed the common man struggling against the odds, often against the background of the war. Known individuals were also satirized, notably the prowar politician Cleon in *The Knights* and the philosopher Socrates in *The Clouds,* as were aspects of contemporary society like the Athenian enthusiasm for courtroom battles (in *The Wasps*). Comedy had the power to shape, as well as reflect, public opinion if we are to believe Plato's suggestions that Aristophanes' portrayal of Socrates contributed to the public hostility that led to the philosopher's execution.

Plato also excluded drama (as well as epic) from his ideal state, as outlined in *The Republic,* partly on account of its emotional impact on the spectators, a criticism that was answered by Aristotle with his theory of *katharsis* in *The Poetics.*

Several institutional changes occurred during the classical period, including the introduction of prizes for actors in the mid-fifth century, which led to the development of acting as a profession. In the

second decade of the fourth century, competition in revivals of old tragedies was added to the program of the City Dionysia, followed by old comedies in 339. The concept of plays as "classic" texts to be read rather than pure performances was given further impetus when Lycurgus required authoritative scripts of the three great tragedians of the fifth century to be archived in Athens.

The Hellenistic World

The tumultuous events of the fourth century ended in the destabilization and weakening of democracy in Athens and the hegemony of the Macedonian dynasty of Philip and Alexander in the Greek world. The Athenian New Comedy of the late fourth-century Athens is represented by the plays of Menander (active 321–289), which show family dramas revolving around marriage and forbidden affairs, acted out by a range of typical characters. The chorus no longer had a role to play in the plot but instead performed interludes. The plays reflect a new interest in the individual. However, the family situations can also be seen as a microcosm of society, in which the union of citizens perpetuates Athenian democratic traditions despite threats from outside forces.

Outside Athens, Greek culture was spread throughout the eastern Mediterranean by the conquests of Alexander and the establishment of successor kingdoms in the region after his death in 323 BCE. The prestige of Athenian language and culture ensured that the texts of plays continued to be copied, read, and performed for centuries throughout this area. The creation of new festivals was another means of disseminating Hellenic culture and establishing the importance of local dignitaries. One sign of this flourishing theatrical culture is the professionalization of acting and the creation of a professional guild, the Artists of Dionysos. Another is the increasing theatricalization of public life and ceremonial.

Rome

In Rome, ritual dances had been part of Roman cult celebrations from the fourth century BCE (under Etruscan influence), but the first dramas in the Latin language were staged in the mid-third century; these reflected the growing influence of Greek culture. From then on, drama was integrated into the games (*ludi*) organized and financed by the state in honor of various divinities. These festive periods were strictly demarcated, with no public business being carried out. Entertainment of various kinds—chariot-racing, gladiatorial shows, drama, juggling, and acrobatics—was presented during the games and was understood as a gift to the people from their rulers. Seating arrangements replicated social structure, with the front rows of seats being reserved for members of the upper orders. Under the republic, the magistrates responsible for organizing the games supplemented the state funding from their own pockets in the hope of acquiring popularity and votes. The importance of the games was not lost on the emperors from Augustus onward, who continued this tradition as noted in Juvenal's remark about the role of "bread and circuses" (*Satire,* 10.81) in preserving the political status quo.

Roman actors and playwrights were considered to be hired laborers and, in the republican period, were often slaves of Greek origin. Actors, with a few exceptions, suffered from an array of legal disabilities, which excluded them from public life and from marriage with members of the aristocracy, even after they had retired from the stage. Such exclusions may reflect the desire to maintain a conceptual divide between politics and performance as well as the ambivalent position of the performer as a "gift" to the people who is an agent in his own right. Actors' degraded social status was in marked contrast to the adulation and rich rewards enjoyed by some and this paradox sums up the ambivalence of Roman attitudes to the theater.

Little remains of Roman tragedy, despite its immense importance and popularity, and it is not certain that the tragedies that do survive, by the first-century CE Stoic philosopher, Seneca, were performed. Roman comedies, known from the plays of Plautus (active 204–184 BCE) and Terence (active 166–159 BCE), were inspired by Greek New Comedy. These plays explore conflicts between the generations and often depict inversions of the social order, through the figure of the wily slave.

From the age of Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE) Roman theater was increasingly dominated by two types of performance art, both originally Greek: mime and pantomime. In the mime, a type of semi-improvised farce involving verbal wit, song,

dance, and physical comedy, actors appeared unmasked and women appeared on stage. The fluidity of mime made it an ideal genre for commenting on current scandals and reacting to tensions in society. Minority groups, like Jews, Christians, and various "Barbarian" peoples, were a target for crude satire in the mimes' skits. The mime was notorious for its depiction of adulterous liaisons; these and other transgressions can be read as attempts to challenge the established order and to subvert social convention staged within the ludic context of the festival.

The more prestigious pantomime was a solo mimetic dance form in which the mute and masked dancer (usually male) embodied a series of characters, male and female, human and divine, against a musical accompaniment. It reached its canonical form in Rome in the reign of Augustus and came to dominate theatrical performance throughout the empire for several centuries (its gestural language was particularly suited to a multilingual Roman Empire).

The Roman domination of Western Europe and the Mediterranean from the first century onward allowed the theater to flourish. Festivals, in which drama often played a part, continued to provide a means for local communities to express their sense of identity and local dignitaries were keen to fund them. Traditional Roman religious festivals, like the Rosalia and the Calends, and imperial festivals in honor of the emperor and his family were absorbed into local calendars throughout the empire. Artists traveled great distances to compete in the most important festivals. Tragedy and comedy (both new plays, of which no examples have survived, and "classics") continued to feature in dramatic competitions in the Greek-speaking world, but appear to have died out during the third century, with the exception of sung excerpts from tragedy performed by specialist singers or *tragoedi*. New competitions in pantomime and mime were introduced in the second and early third centuries, reflecting the importance of these new forms.

Political disruption and inflation in the third century appear to have diminished the festivals and thus the opportunities for employment. By the fourth century CE, theatrical entertainment was concentrated in large urban centers like Rome, Carthage, Alexandria, Antioch, and the new capital of Constantinople (founded in 324 CE). The fifth century saw considerable disruption of civic life, and therefore the theater, in the western part of the empire due to Barbarian invasions (though shows continued to be held in the city of Rome into the sixth century). In the cities of the eastern empire, theatrical shows continued, but their organization was gradually taken over by the four "factions" (Blues, Greens, Reds, and Whites) that had originally controlled and organized chariot-racing teams in Rome. This development relieved patrons of the practical burden of arranging shows and ensured that the vital element of competition was preserved.

During late antiquity, performances provided an important point of contact between citizens and their rulers (provincial governors, e.g.). The shows were themselves a display of power of wealth by patrons, most notably at the New Year festival of the Calends when the new consul sponsored entertainment. The auditorium offered a picture of society with spectators seated according to age, rank, occupation, or religious or faction affiliations. Audiences made their own grievances known at these events, and shows of all kinds often led to violent disturbances that resulted in several temporary bans on performances.

From the reign of Constantine onward, theatrical performance took place in an increasingly Christian empire. Performers were refused baptism unless they left the profession, and church leaders attacked traditional entertainments of all kinds on religious, moral, and economic grounds. These critiques also reveal an acute awareness of the role of the theater in creating a sense of civic identity, which threatened the creation of a Christian society, as well as concerns about the competition between church and theater for resources and for the attention of the people. Though they were to prove influential in later periods, the church fathers' tirades had little practical impact in their day: Theatrical and other shows were so much part of the fabric of civic life in the later empire that Christian emperors were careful to protect them and to ensure that funding continued as long as possible.

The Middle Ages

Pantomime and tragedy did not survive the Barbarian invasions of the West and the disruption

in the East caused by the Arab invasions of major centers like Antioch and Alexandria in the seventh century. The humble mime may well have survived, as it was a far more flexible art form that could be presented in the street or in the private houses of the wealthy. There are points of contact between Roman mime and the medieval jester or even the Commedia dell'Arte, though direct links are difficult to establish. Byzantine writers certainly seem to have been familiar with a type of satire of ethnic types that may well have roots in the Roman mime, although continuity is again hard to establish. There is little evidence for formal theatrical performance in Byzantium, though many sermons and speeches have dramatic elements and the ceremonial of church and empire can be defined as a type of spectacle. The Eastern Orthodox Church continued to reject theatrical representation and did not develop religious drama.

There is also little evidence for theatrical performances in the medieval West before the tenth century. After then, plays on Christian themes were performed in churches by clergy as part of the liturgy, possibly developing out of ritual reenactments of gospel stories (particularly the events of Easter week) and dramatic dialogues, making the boundary between "ritual" and "theater" difficult to establish. Other religious dramas were performed by members of the community, sometimes by members of trade guilds, using the vernacular instead of Latin. By the fifteenth century, secular farces and morality plays were also common. Overall, the medieval theater shows a great variety of types of performance, context, and organization, with the impetus sometimes coming from the citizens themselves or from overlords.

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See also *Antigone;* Aristotle; Performativity; Plato

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THEOLOGY

Within the context of political theory, theology might appear to be at the margin. The vocabularies of modern political thought are framed in opposition to theological world views; political theory begins where theology ends. At least this is the usual secular narrative. However, as pointed out by various perspectives within contemporary political theory, such as those associated with the work of William E. Connolly, Hent de Vries, and Charles Taylor, the relationship between theology and political theory is not necessarily so clear-cut. Some theologies articulate fully developed political theories or they have a political program; some political theories include theological imaginations or they have theological origins; and theologies and political theories compete over the political significance of their ontological assumptions and ethical guidelines.

When considering the canon of political thought, several theologians appear; among them are the church father Augustine (354–430) and his distinction between the City of God and the City of Man and the founder of the Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther (1483–1546), and his doctrine of two kingdoms: The heavenly and spiritual kingdom ruled through the gospel and the earthly kingdom ruled through secular government, that is, by means of laws. Augustine and Luther articulate their political theory as a subfield of their theology. As such, they demarcate the scope of politics from the point of view of theology as a sphere

subordinated to theology. In other words, within the work of Augustine and Luther, theology also operates as political theory.

The opposite is the case for political theory from early modern times and onward, where political regimes are conceived as being man-made and human experience and rationality the point of departure for political knowledge, as, for example, in the works of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), and John Locke (1632–1704). In various different ways, the aim of the early modern political thought is to establish a secular political order capable of settling the wars of religion, stopping the persecution of religious minorities and heretics, and guaranteeing the natural rights and liberties of every man and citizen. The political ideals of a secular political order that constitutes a common ground independent of religious doctrines and affiliations include liberty and toleration, equality and impartiality, neutrality and universality. Furthermore, the establishment of a secular political order presupposes the rationality of every man to be able to authorize and legitimize the common secular ground regardless of their religious points of view. Another aspect of this focus on human rationality is the priority of knowledge over faith and the ability to diagnose and criticize the misuse of power in the name of religion, that is, in the name of a Christian religious community. This foregrounds the Enlightenment critique of religion. In other words, in early modern political thinking, theology is subordinated to political theory framed as a new political science, and the sphere of religion is subordinated to the sphere of politics.

This opposition between theology and political theory is reflected, for example, in the diagnoses of contemporary world politics as a clash of civilizations; or more specifically, a cultural war between religion and secularism. The implicit theoretical assumptions of such diagnoses are, however, questioned by the various perspectives of contemporary political theory mentioned earlier. Rather than assuming any clear-cut opposition and differentiation of distinct religious and political spheres and their essential origins in different civilizations, theorists who allow for a more integrated view point out various dimensions of interchange and interdependence between religion and politics, theology and political theory. In doing so, such theorists take up several points of reference in the history of theological thinking and the history of political thought, such as the distinction between natural theology (*theologia naturalis*) and political theology *(theologia civilis*), first formulated by Marcus Terrentius Varro (116–27 BCE), or Jean-Jacques Rousseau's notion of civil religion. Among this group of political theorists, the claim is that both theology and political theory reflect upon the authoritative processes of setting the boundaries between religion and politics and the normative sources of legitimating the established relationship between religion and politics. Theology is thus political theory.

One crucial point of reference for the debate in contemporary political theory is the German interwar dialogues on political theology among figures such as Walter Benjamin, Franz Rosenzweig, Carl Schmitt, Gershom Scholem, and Leo Strauss. Three aspects of the German interwar dialogues play a vital role in the contemporary political thinking of religion and politics.

The first is that which Strauss has named the theologico-political problem, which emphasizes theology and political philosophy as distinct forms of knowledge and spheres of authority. On the one hand, one distinguishes and establishes a hierarchy between religion and politics, revelation and reason, faith and knowledge; on the other hand, one emphasizes that either theology or political philosophy is able to conceive the proper source of political authority, God or man, due to their modus operandi, revelation or reason. This is the political existential situation of choice one is placed in. The Straussian conception of the theologico-political problem has been rearticulated in the recent work of Mark Lilla and Heinrich Meier. For example, Lilla applies the identification of the theologico-political problem to the contemporary situation of decision framed as an either/or: either religious or secular worldviews. Within this political struggle, the theology component constitutes a permanent opposite pole and serious existential threat to the secular point of view that Lilla defends. Focusing on the permanence of the theologico-political, one could include French philosopher Claude Lefort. From Lefort's point of view, the permanence of the theologico-political refers to the symbolic principles of organizing society that

operate irrespective of the type of political regime and not only in absolutist regimes with an explicit political theology. In a modern democracy, the organizing principles assume the form of an empty space of power to be filled out in ongoing political struggles of symbolic representation, for example, when the people or the nation is identified as the last point of reference in constituting political authority. Even in a modern democracy, in other words, the theologico-political forms the constitutive principles of politics. Such an understanding of the permanence of the theologico-political also plays a role in the second aspect.

This aspect relates to the contested reception of Schmitt's political theology and especially his notion of sovereignty and the state of exception—"sovereign is he who decides over the exception" (Schmitt, 2005, p. 5)—and his conceptual sociology —"all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts" (p. 36). The latter expresses the Schmittian understanding of the permanence of the theologico-political. In his terms, there is a structural analogy between, on the one hand, ancient and medieval theological concepts and, on the other, modern political concepts emphasizing both the theological origins of political concepts and the theologico-political horizon of politics. This leads to the first crucial element of Schmitt's political theology: his notion of sovereignty. The sovereign is the one who decides that there is a state of exception and makes decisions within this state of exception. The sovereign is both outside and inside this situation of choice—both higher than and involved in as sovereign power. Sovereignty is a boundary concept, both operating at the boundary and setting boundaries. In that sense, sovereignty is a theologico-political concept constitutive of modern politics, and the decision of the sovereign is the political act par excellence, setting the relationship between friend and enemy. Schmitt's conception of political theology plays a crucial role in, for example, the recent work of Giorgio Agamben and William E. Scheuerman, both of whom analyze the use of sovereign power in actual emergency laws and states of exception aspects of the so-called war against terror. However, this conception of political theology has become criticized by people emphasizing the need for normative restrictions on the sovereign use of power, which points to the third aspect of the German interwar dialogues on political theology and their revitalization in contemporary political theory.

The third aspect involves the various interpretations of the debate on messianism among Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Scholem, and others. The Jewish notion of messianism implies a temporal imagination of the Messiah to come and justice to be fulfilled in the world. In other words, the source of the ethical and political guidelines of how one is to organize and live one's life in common with others is a divine force outside this world that is expected to become part of the world. The debates on messianism in interwar Germany took their point of departure in the question how to speak of the divine in a world where the divine is almost absent. They focused on the weakness and fallibility of human beings in relation to forces outside the human, but without ascribing these forces any kind of determination. Within this frame, the theologico-political figure takes another character than the Schmittian one in the sense that it creates imaginations of ethical cultivation in response to the messianic call rather than consisting of the brute use of sovereign power only. The question is, however, whether messianism indicates the philosophical reflections upon ethical and political conditions of possibility or a call for political action justified by a divine force beyond politics. For example, Agamben—and later Jacques Derrida—reflect upon this question in their respective analyses of the dilemmas of messianism as both an ethical source of inspiration in political and legal matters and a point of reference for justifying political actions, including violent actions that annihilate the ethical relationship to others. Derrida frames this paradox of the theologico-political in terms of the coexisting conditions of possibility and impossibility of ethics and politics. This is the case with his notion of a hope for a democracy to come as an ongoing political struggle for the better without any articulated ethical criteria and determinate actions, which at the same time implies that one must take the risks of subversive elements within the processes.

These debates in contemporary political theory on the relationship between theology and political theory emphasize the processes of reflecting and setting the boundaries between religion and politics—especially the various forms of interchange and interdependence between the

theological and religious sphere, on the one hand, and the political, on the other. A point of view that is common among the various perspectives is the focus on the paradoxical situation that emerges when secular political theory repudiates theology and excludes the religious sphere from politics, thereby reproducing the authority that theology and religion formerly had, in a negative or positive sense. In other words, it is impossible not to include theological imaginations in thinking of a secular political order that is supposed to be independent of religion. Furthermore, the debates point out the circumstance that it is not that simple to establish an exclusively secular normative point of view for justifying political obligations and restrictions in the use of power without also including ethical points of view put forward by various theological doctrines. In the present post-secular situation, it is often claimed—for example, in the recent work of Jürgen Habermas—that the secular state must take theology seriously, both as a distinct form of knowledge and an academic discipline and as a religious authority constitutive of religious communities. This represents a necessary shift in the secularist self-understanding of the state in order to live up to the secular, democratic ideals of liberty and toleration, equality and impartiality, neutrality and universality.

In that sense, the debates in contemporary political theory addressing the boundaries between religion and politics point to the critical potential of theology and political theology with respect to the blind spots of secular political theory and secular political regimes. In general, this implies a critique of liberal democracy and its focus on formal procedures, rights, and liberties and especially the implied assumptions of the institutional separation of church and state neglecting the various existing and possible combinations of religion and politics and the founding of political orders in substantial social imaginations, religious or political. At the same time, the various perspectives in contemporary political theory reflect upon the societal disintegrative aspects of religious communities and the democratic dangers of political theologies for modern democratic societies.

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See also Augustine; Enlightenment; Reformation; Schmitt, Carl; Strauss, Leo; Toleration

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Theories of Justice

See Justice, Theories of

Thomism

The term *Thomism* may be understood in two senses. In one it refers to the school of Thomas Aquinas, an unbroken tradition since 1274 in

which people study, teach, and promote the thought of Aquinas. In the other sense it seeks to identify the doctrines that distinguish adherents of this school. These distinctive doctrines are, in the first place, metaphysical and theological rather than political, although it can be argued that a distinctive political philosophy emerges from the application of Thomist doctrines to questions of government.

In this entry, Thomism is treated in both senses. In the first it requires identifying the important personalities and significant events in the history of the school of Thomas Aquinas. In the second it means considering the philosophical and theological teachings of Aquinas that are relevant to political philosophy, in particular his understandings of natural law, of the distinction between nature and grace, of the human person, and of that in which human flourishing consists.

A School in History

Early Followers

Aquinas did not gather a group of disciples to promote his thought, and it is clear that he never intended to found a "school." His secretaries and pupils finished some of the works left incomplete at his death. Reginald of Piperno wrote the remainder of the *Summa theologiae* using earlier writings of Aquinas and edited some of his Scripture commentaries. Two of Aquinas's main political works were incomplete and their subsequent editions were much interfered with, his commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* was finished by Peter of Auvergne, and his *De regno ad regem Cypri* (On Government to the King of Cyprus, also known as *De regimine principum*), was finished by Ptolemy of Lucca.

Although Aquinas nowhere presents a complete political philosophy, some distinctions introduced by him begin to be used with effect in early fourteenth-century treatises on government. The distinction between church and state, for example, is placed on a new footing on the basis of Aquinas's distinction between grace and nature, as is also a distinction between royal (*regimen regale*) and political government (*regimen politicum*), something he learns from Aristotle. Royal government belongs with what Walter Ullmann calls the descending theory of government (sovereignty from above), whereas political government opens the door for the ascending theory (sovereignty from below). There is a practical political wisdom in Aquinas's preference for a monarchy ruling in collaboration with an aristocracy chosen by the people. His familiarity with the practical realities came through his family's involvement in the struggles between the pope and the emperor, as well as through his contacts with those directly involved in government both ecclesiastical and secular. Nor should the particular form of government enjoyed by the Dominicans be overlooked: Many, though by no means all, Thomists have been Dominicans, members of the same order as Aquinas, and thus shared his experience of its democratic, representative, and capitular form of government.

Dante Alighieri may be regarded as an early follower. Although Aquinas was not canonized until 1323, Dante's *Paradiso,* written 2 years earlier, already places Aquinas in a privileged place in heaven. Likewise, Dante's work on government, *De monarchia,* has been described as Thomism in practice. The idea of state sovereignty begins to take hold in Dante, in other writings of the period, and in the papal decree *Pastoralis cura* of 1313. To what extent Aquinas and his followers reflect movements inspired from elsewhere and to what extent they contributed to instigating or strengthening those movements are matters for debate.

One of the early Thomists to write on royal and papal power was John of Paris (John Quidort), who drew Thomist principles to their logical conclusion, arguing for the autonomy of the state as a natural political community in which the king is chosen by the will of the people. John was suspected of heresy on other matters, but he died before action could be taken against him.

Renaissance and Early Modern Thomists

A school of Thomists in northern Italy before the Reformation shared the general interest of Thomists elsewhere in the central concerns of Aquinas's philosophy and theology, but some of them were particularly interested in the practical and moral aspects of his thought. This no doubt reflects also the particular political constitutions and concerns of the city-states from which they came. Aquinas's acceptance of Aristotle meant a theory was available for what was already observed in practice in many places. From the perspective of

moral and political philosophy, the most important of these early Renaissance Thomists is Saint Antoninus, archbishop of Florence, who wrote much on questions of justice, law, and economics.

Although their own form of government was democratic and based on representative chapters of friars, Dominicans tended to support the supremacy of the pope against conciliarist ideas. At the same time Thomists made important contributions to the development of international law in the sixteenth century. Francisco de Vitoria and his colleagues at Salamanca, supported by Cajetan, especially when he was Master of the Order in Rome, rejected the idea that the emperor or even the pope had a universal right to wage war and appropriate the goods of other political communities. They replaced the medieval notion of a universal jurisdiction of the church with natural law as a universal *lex gentium* (law of nations). Vitoria spoke of a global commonwealth, or *res publica,* which could enact the law of nations. The customs, treaties, and agreements that make up this law are binding on individuals and come close to what natural law requires. In fact natural law had developed in relation to, and informed by, such ideas of a *lex gentium.* Though they continued to think of a state properly speaking as something less than a world community, their thought defended the rights of Muslim and pagan states, for example, against unjust aggression on the part of Christian states.

Domingo de Soto is another key figure among the Salamancan Thomists. His work *On Justice and Right* was the most often printed and widely distributed book of legal and political theology in the sixteenth century. He said that he could not see where Spain's "right" to its colonies in the new world came from. He developed Vitoria's notion of natural right, adding to it a notion of personal liberty. The question of balancing individual rights and liberties with the requirements of the common good moved to the center of political philosophy. Early modern Thomism is marked by a tension between the priority to be given to the common good (a prioritization that makes politics the highest practical science) and the fact that each individual exists not purely for the political community but for his or her own sake (*propter seipsum,* the antitotalitarian principle). The latter side of this tension is seen, for example, in the rejection by all Thomist theologians of the use of force in the process of evangelization: To enforce conversion to Christianity, Soto says, would be "against the natural right of freedom."

Under the influence of Aquinas's appropriation of Aristotle's thought, these sixteenth-century Thomists replaced another medieval political conception—rule by persons with a divine mandate—with a modern one—an international rule of law based on the natural law to which all human beings have access and which recognizes individual human beings as bearers of rights and duties. It may seem paradoxical that this understanding that undoes all theocracy is itself theologically founded, based ultimately on the conviction that every human being is created in the image and likeness of God. Although they move beyond Aquinas, their work is based on the principles of his political thought. They developed what they had received particularly (a) in speaking of subjective rights or freedoms complementary to objective right and (b) in giving a universal scope to notions of right and liberty which apply to everyone "by nature" (see Roger Ruston).

The humanizing influence of Aquinas's thought is seen in another important Thomist of this period, Cardinal Thomas de Vio, known as Cajetan. His views on slavery stand out as enlightened for his time. In response to Spanish actions in the New World, he said that what was going on amounted to robbery on a grand scale. The lords of these new lands, in place before the Europeans arrived, although they are unbelievers, are lawful lords, he said. Slavery is the continuous affliction on a living human being of personal violence and the enslavement of the people of the New World is unjust and immoral.

Another key figure of the period is Bartolomé de las Casas, conquistador turned Dominican friar and later bishop of Chiapas in Mexico. With the support of Cajetan and others, his agitation and writings eventually gained the response of Pope Paul III's encyclical *Sublimis Deus* (1537), one of the milestone statements in the process of weakening the acceptance of slavery by Christian rulers. Not that it brought disagreement to an end: Even in 1550 and 1551 de las Casas was obliged to debate with the Jesuit Sepulveda on the question of the full humanity, and therefore of the rights and liberties, of the native peoples of the Americas.

Thomism in Decline

Although Aquinas continued to be recognized as an important figure, later thinkers, even while regarding themselves as Thomist, departed significantly from some of the characteristic principles of Aquinas's thought. Thus Francisco Suárez, an original thinker in the philosophy of law, developed it in an un-Thomistic direction, locating the essence of law in the legislator's will rather than in an ordinance of reason. Two difficulties explain this move: (1) the fact that intellect and will are both involved in the explanation of law and their relationship can be taken in different ways and (2) the fact that Aquinas's account of natural law leaves the origin of obligation unclear. Thinkers of the post-Reformation period wanted clearer answers to questions about will and obligation, and Suárez's account of natural law can be understood as an admirable attempt to provide such answers. However, he concedes so much to new ideas—developing a modern understanding of freedom as active indifference, for example—as to make his fidelity to Thomism questionable.

Protestant thinkers struggled with the same questions. "Keeping God in" seemed now to require a voluntaristic understanding of natural law so that when Hugo Grotius came to reject such an understanding of law, he felt able to take a further step and regard natural law as something self-standing, having its meaning and force "even if there is not God." But the question of obligation remained unanswered, a gap Immanuel Kant sought to fill with his categorical imperative.

Richard Hooker is the most important of the Anglican Thomists. In his *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* he acknowledges his debt to medieval political philosophy, accepts Thomist ideas of natural law and of power deriving from the community, and adapts the notion of universal harmony to the nation-state. John Locke acknowledges Hooker's work in his *Second Treatise on Civil Government* although on natural law Locke is more influenced by Samuel von Pufendorf.

Locke set limits to the claims of absolute monarchy and showed that government is responsible to the people it governed. This is what Aquinas taught also, though Locke's basis for it was different. Beginning with the idea that every man (the term is deliberate here) is endowed with the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and estate, the function of government became for Locke that of giving effect to and preserving these rights. In practice the focus moved to property, which then came to be regarded as an absolute right and the basis for other civil rights (so only men of property were entitled to representation in parliament). Lockean government moved in the direction of an oligarchy of the propertied classes. Aquinas warned about the possibility of any form of constitution becoming tyrannical, including the aristocracy that becomes oligarchic, as well as offering a more profound reflection on the basis of the right to private property, a right that for him is relative and not absolute.

The differences that had by now emerged between Aquinas's presentation of natural law and those found in modern political philosophy are connected with voluntarism, with the idea of a state of nature prior to the political order and with an understanding of law as setting limits to conflict rather than explaining the positive contribution of the human creature within a theological, cosmic harmony. Thomist ideas carried little weight in this new perspective: The highest good is no longer a matter of concern, the common good is simply the sum of individual interests rather than a qualitatively different good, and the human group is inherently problematic rather than naturally collaborative. In modernity, then, the distinction Aquinas made between the natural and supernatural orders becomes a full-blown separation and even opposition between a sacred order and a secular order, the implications of which continue to be worked out in contemporary political struggles and philosophy.

The Irish political philosopher Edmund Burke is another example of an Anglican whose political philosophy may well have been informed by Aquinas's thought, by however circuitous a route (he would have known Hooker at least). Burke appeals to principles that are obviously congenial to the thought of Aquinas, notably in impeaching Warren Hastings (for his treatment of Indians) "in the name and by virtue of those eternal laws of justice which he has violated" and "in the name of human nature itself, which he has cruelly outraged, injured, and oppressed."

Thomism After the French Revolution

There is a revival of Thomism from 1879 with the publication of Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni*

Patris, which argued that a return to scholasticism, in particular to the thought of Aquinas, was the best response to nineteenth-century philosophical difficulties about faith and reason. This Leonine Thomism, as it is sometimes called, reached its fullest development by the mid-twentieth century.

The French philosopher Jacques Maritain is the most important Thomist political philosopher of this revival. In fact it was politics that led to conflict with his mentor, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Maritain wrote in many areas of Thomistic philosophy, particularly epistemology and metaphysics, but with important ventures into the philosophy of education and political philosophy. Garrigou-Lagrange taught in the areas of metaphysics, dogmatic theology, and spirituality, and his extensive account of Thomism in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* has nothing to say about political philosophy. In the 1920s Garrigou-Lagrange organized Thomistic circles that were attended by the young Maritain. They collaborated with other French medievalists, philosophers, and theologians in the development of new approaches to Aquinas but fell out over the Spanish Civil War and Vichy. This history shows that Aquinas's political philosophy, schematic as it is, is not one that falls on either side of the right-wing/left-wing divide in modern politics but is concerned with more fundamental questions that inform political practice leaning in either direction.

Maritain advocated what he called an open Thomism, which would be conservative and yet progressive, faithful to the teaching of Aquinas and yet capable of assimilating the insights of modern philosophers and scientists. He was convinced that in Thomism were to be found the principles for a realistic and existentialist metaphysics which alone, he believed, could provide the basis of a political and ethical philosophy that would do justice to the dignity of the human being and his or her relationship with God. Maritain sought then to present a philosophy of being, of society, and of politics that would be open also to the gospel's message of love.

His many works in political philosophy include *True Humanism, Man and the State, Freedom in the Modern World, Christianity and Democracy, Moral Philosophy,* and *The Rights of Man and Natural Law*. He developed a Christian social philosophy of what he called "integral humanism," a valuing of the human person that was also theological, that called for a brotherhood of all peoples and that respected human dignity and rights. In the ideological turmoil of the twentieth century Maritain said that a new Christendom could only be established by a humanism that was heroic. He is without doubt a democrat, and he redefines the basic political concepts of Thomism—the body politic, the state, the people, and sovereignty—so as to make them serviceable for the defense of democracy. Freedom becomes a central concept in Maritain's political philosophy.

Yves Simon is another important twentieth-century political philosopher who, with Maritain, sought to move the axis of Thomist social and political theory toward liberal democracy (John P. Hittinger). Simon sees in Aquinas's view that law is properly enacted only by one who has care of a whole community, the seed of the transfer or transmission theory of power, explicitly proposed by the Jesuit Thomists Suárez and Robert Bellarmine. This theory regards government as legitimately established through a transmission whereby the people transfer power to the rulers and this provides the basis for democratic authority.

Maritain's personalist democracy was criticized by Aurel Kolnai, whose alternative political philosophy, the metaphysics of political conservatism, also appeals to Aquinas and to the importance for him, as for all medieval thinkers, of the notions of hierarchy, privilege (grace), and liberty. Kolnai's work is in response to any tendency to regard political life as capable of concerning itself with the fullness of human flourishing. The higher realms of human experience in art, philosophy, and spirituality reach far beyond the concerns of politics, he says.

Maritain was the first Thomist to contribute significantly to thinking about questions of authority and freedom in the context of modern pluralistic societies. A fundamental question is whether the modern nation-state coincides, and to what extent, with what Aristotle and Aquinas meant by the state. The Catholic philosopher and theologian Robert Sokolowski thinks that these two conceptions of the state are irreconcilable, the modern Hobbesian *Leviathan* being, appropriately, a totalitarian monster where Aristotle's *polis* is a humane community of persons in which reason can be exercised, prudence decide what

forms and constitutions are required as circumstances change, and prepolitical communities (or civil society) be respected.

Sokolowski makes no mention of Aquinas and argues that political philosophy has been shortchanged by Leonine Thomism. Maritain and Simon stand out as exceptions, he says, in a school for which political philosophy practically disappeared, with just a few questions such as just war and capital punishment being treated, and then as part of ethics rather than in a political philosophy as such. As a philosopher, Sokolowski is a phenomenologist rather than a Thomist, but his work is interesting in showing how a Catholic understanding of the (Aristotelian) state, critical of the Hobbesian alternative and dependent on the crucial notion of the person, can be developed without any Thomist mediation.

To be noted also is the extensive involvement of Dominicans in issues of social justice. Dominique Pire won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1958 for his work on behalf of displaced persons after World War II, and he is just the most distinguished of a large group of thinkers and activists from many parts of the world, all of them educated in the school of Aquinas. Francesco Compagnoni and Helen Alford have edited a substantial, but by no means comprehensive, record of Dominican involvement in such work.

Distinctive Doctrines

Distinctive doctrines of Thomism are, in the first place, philosophical, even metaphysical, understandings of being and of the knowledge of being. Thomism is a moderate realism with a commonsense confidence in the ability of human beings to come to know their world and appreciate to some extent how they ought to live if they are to flourish within it. The natural philosophy, metaphysics, and moral philosophy that characterize Thomism are closely dependent on Aristotle. Thomists have always regarded themselves as Aristotelians, keeping abreast of expanding knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy even when it came to be seen that Aquinas's knowledge of it was limited. One of the significant movements in Thomism through the twentieth century has been a fresh realization of Aquinas's indebtedness to neo-Platonism for important aspects of his philosophical theology.

In the early twentieth century the Roman Catholic Church identified 24 theses in Thomistic philosophy that were to be subscribed to by all Catholics as essential foundations for the theological teachings of the church. This was a controversial position, even within the church, and did not last long. Other attempts to identify the doctrines of Thomism have been made, but it is striking that political doctrines tend not to feature in these lists. That of James A. Weisheipl is an exception. Beginning with the distinction between nature and the supernatural, he lists 10 principles of Thomistic philosophy and 10 of Thomistic theology. The sixth philosophical principle reads:

> By nature man [*sic*] has the right to cooperate with other men in society in the pursuit of personal happiness in the common good; this pursuit of happiness is guided by conscience, laws both natural and positive, and virtues both private and public.

Thomistic doctrines that are most important from the point of view of political philosophy, then, are natural law, the distinction between nature and the supernatural, happiness, the virtues, and the notion of person.

Natural Law

For Aquinas natural law is the human being's participation in the eternal law. Such participation is intelligent and responsible, making the human being a participant in providence and not simply a passive object of it. All law is an ordinance of reason enacted by one who has responsibility for a community and has made that known to that community. The right to legislate positively, which belongs to those who have such responsibility, is part of natural law even if the natural law does not determine in advance the particular ways in which such laws should be enacted or what their specific content should be. The state, and so political authority, is natural for Aquinas as it was for Aristotle. There is no state of nature that precedes the political community. Natural law establishes the need for certain elements and values—for example, possession of property by citizens, government in some form—but there is still room for contractual agreement about the ways in which these elements and values are to be pursued within

a particular community. Thomist understandings of natural law bring together many strands of earlier philosophical thought, Roman jurisprudence, and canon law. Such strands of thought also included important considerations of notions such as right, person, and sovereignty.

Nature and the Supernatural

Although the order of grace transcends the order of nature, it does not replace that order but perfects and fulfills it, bringing nature to a fulfillment beyond its inherent capacities but still in the direction of its natural inclinations to happiness. The most important implication of this for political philosophy was a clearer distinction between sacred and secular. Thus the person under grace is more than the natural human being. This has two important consequences. The human being who is a subject in the church is at the same time a citizen in the state: There is autonomy of the natural created order within the overall economy of grace. Thus Aquinas acknowledges that there is true virtue among pagans (*Summa theologiae,* I.II 65,2). But he believes also that true human fulfillment is found only in the order of grace so that the human person is always more than the citizen.

The state is a relatively ultimate end in the line of the natural human instinct toward community. It is concerned with "the highest good," Aristotle says, and Aquinas follows him in this. Although it is not the absolutely ultimate end—which is eternal life with God, or the society of the heavenly kingdom—at the same time how can it be disentangled altogether from human seeking of that ultimate end? The state is not just for the management of evil tendencies but also for the promotion of good ones, for the encouragement of virtue.

This distinction of the good citizen and the good human being thus sets the scene for modern times. Some fear that Aquinas's distinction contained the seeds of a disjunction between the natural and the supernatural that led eventually to secularization, the cutting of any link between nature and God. Aquinas himself did not do this, and his followers would not want to. It happens rather with Marsilius of Padua, in the early fourteenth century, for whom the link between nature and God becomes a matter of faith. Aquinas's understanding of natural law remained essentially theological, and in this he belongs more straightforwardly than does Marsilius to the traditions coming down from the ancient Greeks and Romans.

Happiness and the Virtues

For Aquinas full human flourishing requires the body—not just the physical body but also the body politic of a human community. The human being does not flourish alone. Such a life would be beastly, says Aristotle, though for Aquinas it is perhaps divine in the case of some unusual saints. It is for the well-being of our beatitude (our complete happiness) that we are bodily, Aquinas says, and our flourishing is enhanced by the companionship of friends. Life in community requires the development of dispositions or virtues if it is to be established and sustained. As the human being needs to be temperate and confident if he or she is to be mature in personal affairs, so he or she must develop especially the virtues of justice and prudence in order to participate effectively in political life, the pursuit of common goods.

The Notion of Person

One of the central questions raised by Thomism is whether the notion of "person" presupposes a theological understanding of human nature and destiny. Theological controversies in the early centuries of Christianity helped to refine the meaning of "person" and "humanity. "These notions are central in Maritain's political philosophy, which is an important influence on the Roman Catholic Church's acceptance of the language of human rights. Recent popes have been happy to use this terminology, beginning with John XXIII in his encyclical *Pacem in terris* (1963). Paul VI was also significantly influenced by Maritain's work and made his notion of "integral humanism" central to the encyclical *Populorum progressio* (1967). John Paul II's social encyclicals likewise emphasize the dignity of the human person and the centrality of human rights. Although he pursued doctoral studies with Garrigou-Lagrange in Rome and was much influenced by Maritain, John Paul II was not simply a Thomist. His thinking about political questions is significantly shaped also by his lived experience of Marxist-Leninism as well as by Max Scheler's theory of value.

Contemporary Thomism

Contemporary Thomists appeal to Aquinas from different perspectives. Some have sought to show that his political views are compatible with forms of liberal democracy and that his understanding of natural law is not so dependent on theological beliefs that liberal critics must reject it out of hand. On the other side are efforts to show that Aquinas is misinterpreted if he is interpreted as liberal or as liberal-compatible; these Thomists argue instead that his political views support the kind of radical critique of which liberal democracy stands in need and that his (theological-philosophical) understanding of natural law offers one of the few credible alternatives to the dominant philosophy of culture. Thomists of various shades are important contributors to contemporary debates about the meaning and purposes of education, for example, and they also participate in debates about war, bioethics, and environmental ethics.

In the works of American students of Aquinas, such as Robert P. George and Peter Augustine Lawler, Germain Grisez, Ralph McInerny, and Jean Porter, and of non-Americans influential on the American scene such as John Finnis and Alasdair MacIntyre, is to be found a range of interpretations of natural law, a variety of uses of Thomist ideas, and telling contributions to contemporary political, social, and cultural debates. John Courtney Murray believed American Thomism's most important contribution was to defend a realist epistemology, to ground the genuine human goods to which people aspire, and to order freedom so that those goods might be affirmed as genuine. Thomism's strength continues to be in affirming the naturalness of social and political life while underlining that the secular is not ultimate for human beings. On the one hand emphasizing the importance of reason and freedom, Thomist approaches seek to ensure that the state does not become totalitarian (which can happen in religious, sacred dress also of course). The tension between freedom and truth, identified so clearly by John Paul II in *Veritatis splendor* (1993), has its roots not in 1960s libertarianism but much earlier, in the developments from Marsilius of Padua to Thomas Hobbes and beyond to the French Revolution, a tension that has grown ever stronger between a voluntarist idea of law as will and natural law as an intellectualist idea. So Thomism, in Mark Guerra's words, can praise the virtues of liberal democracy while moderating its dehumanizing excesses.

Vivian Boland

See also Aquinas, Thomas; Aristotelianism; Common Good; Community; Happiness; Law of Nations; Natural Law; Theology; Virtue; Vitoria, Francisco de

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Thoreau, Henry David (1817–1862)

Henry David Thoreau was an antebellum essayist and naturalist whose work later inspired nonviolence activists, environmentalists, and advocates of counterculture.

Civil Disobedience

Like other members of the so-called Transcendentalist school, Thoreau believed that we are all born with a moral sense we can cultivate and that this moral sense allows us to distinguish right from wrong. In a democratic society, where policies are pursued in the name of the population as a whole, this moral common sense brings with it a duty to resist unprincipled government policies. There are always means at hand to take up this responsibility because exemplary acts of resistance to unprincipled governmental action (Thoreau was particularly incensed by the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law and by the Mexican–American war) can awaken the moral sense of the population even when the political system is at a stalemate and moral appeals fall on deaf ears. Thoreau believed that only moral suasion and the ethical cultivation of the hearts and minds of the population will bring about lasting change in the nation because political mobilization without ethical cultivation simply empowers and gives voice to an unprincipled population. In *Walden,* "Civil Disobedience," and "A Plea for Captain John Brown," Thoreau thus calls on the moral heroism of individual citizens as a spur to change public opinion and government policy.

Critics question the existence of the common moral sense to which Thoreau has such constant recourse, as well as his belief that ordinary citizens can make politico-ethical judgments for themselves; a position that strikes many as potentially leading to anarchy. Nonetheless, Leo Tolstoy, Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and the leaders of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee all credited Thoreau with showing the ethical and prudential advantages of nonviolent resistance to government policy.

Counterculture

Thoreau believed that one of the main reasons Americans colluded with unprincipled government policies was that many Americans were obsessed with anxieties about survival and success. In such a situation constant work seems the only viable life choice. Not only does this make a mockery of the supposed "liberty" offered by the United States, it also erodes the leisure necessary for individual self-development. Thoreau's autobiography *Walden* responds to this danger by spelling out an alternative form of individual economics and time management that would give everybody (even poor people) opportunities for self-cultivation. Via such new cultural pathways, ordinary people might deepen their experience of freedom and gain more resources for self-development. This kind of richness in poverty is possible because we live amid wild systems that serve as free resources for contemplation and individual self-ballasting.

Thoreau's attempt to build up a new repertoire of pathways and customs in order to remove America's cultural unidimensionality (i.e., its focus on survival and success) later inspired hippies, environmental activists, and other advocates of counterculture.

Brian Walker

See also Citizenship; Civil Disobedience; Environmentalism; Household; Liberty; Natural Law; Nonviolence

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Thucydides (c. 470–396 BCE)

Thucydides was an Athenian historian who lived in the second half of the fifth century BCE. He wrote only one work: a narrative history of the Peloponnesian War (432–404 BCE), fought between competing Greek city-states. He tells us that he started his history at the outbreak of the war, foreseeing its significance. He includes an account of the end of the war, though the narrative itself breaks off abruptly in the twenty-first year (411 BCE). Biographers in antiquity speculate that he died a sudden and violent death and that this accounts for the unfinished style of his work. Thucydides made a significant contribution to

political theory in his formulation of the principle of political realism in international relations.

Pamphila (first century CE) says Thucydides was age 40 at the start of the war, and this is a good estimate. Thucydides tells us he was elected as a general by the Athenians for a campaign fought in Thrace in 424 BCE but was exiled for 20 years after having failed to relieve the city of Amphipolis before it fell. This shows he was an active politician as well as a man with military experience and standing in the community. He also reveals that that he held the rights to gold mines in the Thraceward area and was a man of influence in that region. He fell ill with the plague that struck Athens (430–426 BCE) and described its symptoms and effects on Athens in great detail.

The name of his father, Olorus, reveals he was related to a king of Thrace whose daughter, Hegesipyle, married Miltiades, who led Athens to victory against the Persians in the battle of Marathon (490 BCE). Late sources tell us that Thucydides' mother was also called Hegesipyle and his tomb was in the Athenian suburb *Koile Meletides,* next to those of Miltiades and his daughter Elpinice. Thus Thucydides was a member of an important aristocratic family that included such influential political figures as Miltiades' son, Cimon (c. 510–450 BCE), and Thucydides son of Melesias (most influential in the 440s BCE).

Thucydides structured his work chronologically, organizing each year's events by summer and winter. The modern division into eight books was formulated in Hellenistic times. Book 1 narrates the events leading up to the outbreak of the war. In this book Thucydides formulates a division between immediate and underlying causation. Book 1 also includes the *Archaeology,* an outline of Greek history down to the Persian Wars and the *Pentecontaetia,* an outline of events in the period between the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War: Thucydides avoids retelling the Persian Wars, the subject of Herodotus's history. In books 2 through 4 he describes the first ten years of the war—the Archidamian War. In book 5 significant events include the Peace of Nicias, the Mantinean War, and the Melian Dialogue. Books 6 and 7 describe an invasion of Sicily by the Athenians and the resumption of hostilities against the Peloponnesians. Book 8 is unfinished. It records hostilities in the Ionian War and the revolt of many allies of Athens.

Thucydides concentrates his narrative on two key issues: politics and war. Yet this narrow narrative focus is not his only subject. In describing political decisions and their ramifications, he allows his characters, both individual politicians and the generalized citizen body of various city-states (especially the Athenians), to reveal their own characters. Thucydides thus allows his narrative of the particular to explore the nature of government and political decision making within a democracy like Athens. He finds key forces, such as self-interest and the drive for the strong to rule the weak, as natural in relations among people and key factors in the development of empire and as causes of war. His focus on human decision making leaves no room for the divine: Explanations look to the rational rather than the irrational.

Thucydides' work features political speeches given by key named political figures as well as unnamed representatives of various city-states. These dramatize for the reader real political debates that occurred in a democratic city like Athens and show how the political issues were dealt with in the *ecclesia* (political assembly). Although some scholars see the speeches as Thucydides' own compositions, Thucydides says that the speeches are based on the gist of what was actually said on each occasion, claiming that he or an informant heard them delivered, while nevertheless admitting that he has made each speaker say what he thought that speaker ought to have said.

Thucydides is a significant political historian, not least for his contribution to thinking about relations between city-states. He created a political model in which city-states react as a generalized political body. War is the inevitable result of the competing interests of the states involved. His philosophy of history sees in the record of the past a significance beyond the events themselves, and he declares that he has composed his history to be a possession for all time, not for the enjoyment of an immediate audience. He argues for the utility of history: that human nature is a constant and so human actions will be repeated; thus knowledge of the past can help in understanding future events.

Ian Plant

See also Ancient Democracy; City-State; Herodotus; Sparta

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Tocqueville, Alexis de (1805–1859)

Alexis de Tocqueville was a French political thinker whose reflections on the nature of modern democracy are still considered prescient and comprehensive. Born into the French aristocracy, Tocqueville studied law in Paris and was appointed in 1827 to serve as a junior magistrate at the Versailles court. In 1831 at the age of 26, Tocqueville took a leave of absence from the court to embark on an extended tour of the United States with friend and fellow magistrate Gustave de Beaumont. The acknowledged "pretext" for their trip was a study of American efforts at penal reform, though their actual object of inquiry was much larger and more ambitious: the democratic way of life in America. Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* appeared in two volumes—the first in 1835 and the second in 1840—and earned its author virtually immediate election to the Académie française.

Although he is best known for his political writings and analysis, Tocqueville was not simply a detached observer of politics but played an active, if unspectacular, role in French political life. He served in the French Parliament from 1839 to 1851, a period that spanned the latter days of Louis-Philippe's July Monarchy and the entirety of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte's Second Republic. During the Second Republic, Tocqueville also served for 5 months as minister of foreign affairs. Following Louis-Napoléon's coup d'état in December 1851, he resigned from parliament in protest and retreated from public life. He spent a good portion of his final years writing *The Old Regime and the Revolution,* published in 1856.

The central theme of Tocqueville's political thought is the advent of modern democracy, which he understands primarily as a "social state" rather than as a particular set of institutional arrangements and procedures. The characteristic feature of the democratic social state is the "equality of conditions" among men, an unprecedented condition that Tocqueville sees as requiring a "new political science" suited specifically to the analysis of modern democracy. In the course of conducting such an analysis, Tocqueville makes recommendations for how societies might work toward and maintain an enlightened democracy, or one in which equality is reconciled with freedom. His picture of modern democracy—its character, possibilities, and limitations—emerges from an intensive study of particular regimes, most notably those of America and France.

The Essence of Modern Democracy

Tocqueville's political thought revolves around a distinction between the old world of aristocracy and social inequality and the new, emerging world of democracy and social equality. Since the eleventh century, he argues, a democratic revolution has been gradually unfolding among the Christian peoples of the West. Through a diverse and apparently uncoordinated set of developments, the aristocratic principle of inequality has steadily lost ground to the democratic idea of equality. The aristocracy's power had depended upon the concentration of landed property in the hands of a few families and the relatively uninterrupted transmission of that property over the course of many generations. However, the rise of commerce, the democratic constitution of the clergy, and the

spread of enlightenment afforded alternative channels for gaining access to power through the application of one's industry and intelligence. Moreover, mutual antagonism between European kings and aristocratic nobles often redounded to the benefit of the commoner, whose role in politics increased as the Crown and nobility sought to hold one another in check. The eclipse of aristocracy by democracy is, Tocqueville insists, permanent and irreversible, a progression he typically attributes to the workings of Providence.

The "New Political Science"

According to Tocqueville, the novelty of a world tending toward equality requires that one consider anew how to approach the study of society and politics. His response to this dilemma is the development of a method he designates the "new political science." The new political science first attempts to apprehend and describe the modern democratic world by examining in detail particular political regimes. From this study of individual cases, Tocqueville develops a general view of the nature of modern democracy as well as a sense of how different cultures adapt and adjust to the arrival of democracy. Second, he uses this knowledge to offer suggestions for how one might improve democracy and counteract what he takes to be its natural shortcomings. Foremost among these shortcomings is democratic peoples' tendency to privilege the principle of equality while giving little thought to the importance of individual freedom. Because democratic citizens are enamored of equality as a matter of course, Tocqueville identifies strategies for inspiring in them a love and respect for freedom as well. Although Tocqueville's political thought owes much to the traditional analyses of regimes conducted by Aristotle and Montesquieu, several scholars have noted that his approach is distinct insofar as it assumes that historical circumstances have confined human choice to one regime—democracy—rather than several.

Tocqueville develops his general view of modern democracy primarily from the American case, for it was in America that the democratic revolution had reached its most advanced stage. Unlike the French, the Americans did not have the burden of an aristocratic, feudal past to overcome in order to establish democracy; since the Puritan settlement of 1620, democracy had existed there virtually unmixed with aristocratic elements. Based on his observations of and reflections on democracy in America, Tocqueville concludes that the quintessential feature of modern democracy is the "equality of conditions," a social state peculiar to modernity.

Equality of Conditions

For Tocqueville, a democratic social state or the equality of conditions obtains when individuals regard one another as sufficiently alike and equal to hold that no one has an inherent right to rule another. Although this understanding of the equality of conditions neither implies nor requires that individuals resemble one another in all respects, Tocqueville acknowledges that shared circumstances and interests promote sentiments of equality. He also observes that certain aspects of democratic life make actual differences among individuals appear less pronounced and even inconsequential, thereby reinforcing the idea of equality. For example, Americans are not strictly equal in terms of either material circumstances or intelligence, yet Tocqueville argues that they are in effect remarkably equal with respect to both. Although Americans will always possess disparately sized property holdings, they are all equally subject to rapid reversals in fortune that would have been inconceivable under an aristocratic order. Furthermore, because most Americans must labor both to acquire and to guard their fortunes, all attain a certain, general level of enlightenment, but few have the leisure to pursue knowledge for its own sake or cultivate any superior intellectual gifts.

The effects of the equality of conditions are pervasive, transforming the individual's self-understanding and, in turn, all human relationships. When the democratic citizen surveys the social world, he finds few great characters and certainly no great class—only others like himself. Confronted with a sea of equals and few superiors, one conceives of no reason to defer to the moral influence or authority of another individual. Instead, one proudly claims to evaluate all matters of public concern solely on the basis of one's own reason. Tocqueville identifies this assertion as a pretension, for no individual has the ability, time, or

effort to render such judgment. Reluctant to acknowledge the superior wisdom of another individual, democratic citizens readily concede that wisdom lies in numbers or is to be found in mass or majority opinion. The democratic citizen's reliance on mass opinion threatens individual freedoms in two ways, both of which are captured by Tocqueville's phrase the "tyranny of the majority." First, the majority might make decisions that directly violate the rights and freedoms of citizens. Secondly, the majority might tyrannize over individuals in a more subtle fashion. By exerting social pressure on individuals to conform their thoughts and behavior to its standards, the majority inhibits creativity and free thought or ensures that neither has an audience.

Democratic Government

The equality of conditions inevitably gives rise to democratic government, which may assume many forms. However, Tocqueville elucidates the spectrum of possibilities by identifying the best and worst alternatives. The best allows for the reconciliation of equality and freedom. Animated by a proper pride in their status as equal citizens, men actively and energetically participate in political life and in the formation of majority opinion. Though often inefficient and inattentive to minority rights, democratic government of this sort requires the cooperation of alert and engaged citizens. Moreover, it enables citizens to experience the value of freedom and empowers them to find political solutions for the problem of majority tyranny. In so doing, democracy creates a space for the recognition of individuality and difference.

Tocqueville fears, however, that individuals will prefer a less demanding form of government he describes as a "democratic despotism." Democratic despotism originates in a sentiment Tocqueville calls "individualism," or the inclination of democratic citizens to turn to the private and abandon the public realm. Unwilling to contest publicly the will of the majority or to shoulder the burdens of self-government, the individual withdraws from public life and retreats into the private sphere of friends and family. There, he anxiously strives for material gain and personal fulfillment; as a rule, his ambitions are narrow and vulgar. The responsibilities of governing he gladly relinquishes to a benign, centralized administration that assumes the task of methodically ordering the social and political world on his behalf. Because little is asked or expected of the individual under such conditions, Tocqueville argues that he will experience a declining sense of personal and political efficacy. Having lost his will if not his formal rights, the individual exists in a state of existential servitude and becomes increasingly incapable of judiciously exercising his political rights.

The Maintenance of Democracy: America and France

Along the spectrum of better and worse alternatives, American democracy tends to be healthier than that of France, largely because Americans have found ways to preserve a space for freedom and personal independence under conditions of equality. America's relative success is partly owing to the fortuitous circumstances surrounding the initial Puritan settlement and partly due to the wisdom and skill of more recent political actors. Tocqueville cites many factors that contribute to the health and maintenance of American democracy, but among the most significant are administrative decentralization, associational life, and religiosity. First, since the inception of the New England township, Americans have been accustomed to participating in the administration of their own affairs, a practice reflected in, and reinforced by, constitutional federalism. Multiplying opportunities for political engagement, a decentralized administrative structure helps stem the tide of individualism by furnishing citizens with opportunities to observe the close connection between their private affairs and those of the broader community. Second, Americans habitually form and join civil and political associations. By associating with other likeminded citizens, the otherwise isolated democratic individual feels his own strength and, acting in concert with his associates, can better resist the tyranny of majority opinion. As a host of associations organize to assert their respective, particular rights, democratic citizens are reminded that individuality and particularity need not be sacrificed to the principle of equality. Finally, the Americans were from the outset a religious people, and Tocqueville argues that religion is indispensable for the maintenance of democracy. More

specifically, the basic tenets of Christianity discourage individualism by mitigating the democratic man's obsession with material goods and orienting him toward a concern for his fellows.

On Tocqueville's view, the French struggled to combine equality with freedom and stable government in the wake of the French Revolution precisely because they lacked the Americans' experience with self-government and intermediate institutions. Despite the fact that the various prerevolutionary social classes shared more common interests than at any previous point in French history, they were nevertheless ill prepared to cooperate in the joint venture of constructing a free and stable postrevolutionary government. This, Tocqueville argues, was the fault of the late monarchy, which prepared the French not for self-government but for overdependence upon a central state.

Under the late monarchy, the effects of the democratic revolution were palpable throughout French society, particularly on the level of material circumstances. Forced to sell much of its land in order to maintain its standard of living, the nobility was significantly poorer than it had been in centuries past. At the same time, the bourgeoisie was economically and socially ascendant, and even the peasants had begun to acquire land. The march of equality was afoot.

According to Tocqueville, the French monarchy's efforts to weaken its rivals and consolidate power had the unintended consequence of loosening the social bond among individuals and classes just as society as a whole was becoming more homogenous. Since the Middle Ages, the classes had been distinct yet were not completely isolated from one another. They had interacted in the Estates-General and in other assemblies, and the nobles had generally accepted responsibility for the welfare of the lower orders within their domains. However, in an effort to diminish other loci of authority, the late monarchy had ceased to convene the Estates-General and divested municipalities and provincial bodies of any meaningful control over local affairs. Tocqueville maintains that this centralization was lethal to common feeling among the classes, for it deprived them of both the opportunity and the incentive to associate with one another. As a result, the classes were more isolated than during medieval times, when their common interests had been much less apparent. By assuming the functions once performed by local and intermediate institutions, the monarchy created a situation in which the Frenchman was constantly forced to turn to the central government alone for assistance, advice, and permission.

The French Revolution did succeed in eliminating what remained of aristocratic and feudal privileges—the most visible and reviled aspects of the old regime. However, lacking in practical experience with self-government, the French were compelled to adopt in modified form the principal feature of the old regime—its central administration. The state was perceived as the only entity capable of calming the furor unleashed by the revolution and restoring peace, prosperity, and order. Though present before and during the revolutionary moment, the desire for freedom could not sustain itself in the absence of free institutions and a citizenry accustomed to making use of them.

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See also Ancien Régime; Aristocracy; Democracy; Equality; Federalism; Liberty; Montesquieu, Baron de

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Toleration

Toleration denotes a refusal to impose punitive sanctions for dissent from prevailing norms or policies, a deliberate choice not to interfere with behavior of which one disapproves. As such, toleration may be exhibited by individuals, communities, or governments, and for a variety of reasons, although this entry confines itself largely to toleration as a *political* concept practiced (or not) by governments. One can find examples of toleration throughout history, but scholars generally locate its modern roots in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century struggles of religious minorities to achieve the right to worship free from state persecution. As such, toleration has long been considered a cardinal virtue of liberal political theory and practice, endorsed by such important thinkers as John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls; and it continues to speak to a variety of contemporary political and legal debates, including issues of race, gender, and sexual orientation. This entry provides a brief overview of the definition of toleration and its status as a "negative" liberty; explores religious toleration in the early modern world and extensions of toleration to new arenas of social and political life; and examines some criticisms of toleration as both a concept and a political practice.

Toleration as Negative Liberty

The term *toleration* is derived from the Latin verb *tolerare*—to endure, or to bear with—and involves a two-step process comprising disapproval and permission: One judges a group, practice, or belief negatively, yet makes a conscious decision not to interfere with or suppress it. For instance, ruling elites might view an unconventional religion as fundamentally erroneous, and its doctrines utterly misguided, while nonetheless endorsing the rights of its adherents to profess it free of legal penalties. In a similar vein, one who disapproves of homosexuality might support legislation outlawing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, on the grounds of liberty or equality. The achievement of toleration in any given realm of society, then, involves a willingness on the part of individuals or governments to provide protections for unpopular groups, even groups they themselves might consider deeply mistaken.

Compared with more expansive terms like *recognition* or *acceptance*, then, toleration is fairly minimal. As a species of what Isaiah Berlin has called "negative liberty"—characterized by noninterference, or the absence of external constraints on individual action—toleration has historically tended to fall somewhere between persecution on the one hand and full liberty and equality on the other. And yet this minimal, negative term has played a key role in the protracted struggle on behalf of broader understandings of political rights for unpopular minorities. Tolerationist politics seeks to provide a sort of foothold for such groups, as they carve out a protected social space for themselves; it represents an acknowledgment of both the reality and the permanence of diversity within contemporary societies. (In this sense, a minimal term like *toleration* may require extensive government action to safeguard unpopular minorities from violence at the hands of their fellow citizens or other actors in civil society.) It often, though by no means always, serves as a springboard toward efforts at more far-reaching protections.

Across time and place, reasons for tolerating can and have varied widely. In some cases, prudential, strategic, or instrumental considerations—including weariness of the social costs of continued persecution—lead elites to support rights for members of unpopular groups. At other points in history, religious convictions about the importance of free assent in matters of faith, such as we find in the thought of Locke, have advanced the tolerationist cause. Epistemological skepticism, moral relativism, and philosophical commitments to autonomy as a fundamental human value have grounded tolerationist thought and practice as well. In other words, the *practice* of toleration (by individuals or governments) may or may not reflect a *virtue* or ethic of "tolerance"; it may rather express far more concrete and particular judgments about specific situations. Historians of political thought have explored the emergence of arguments that either support or oppose policies of toleration, whereas scholars conducting empirical studies have focused on the dynamics that lead citizens to support or suppress the civil and political rights of unpopular minorities. The structure of toleration as a concept, and debates regarding

which unpopular positions may be tolerated safely and which strike at the heart of social life (especially in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks and the rise of religious extremism around the world), will no doubt continue to occupy the attention of political theorists for years to come.

Liberalism and Toleration: Religion and Beyond

Historically, toleration has most often been associated with matters of religion, as marginalized or minority religious groups seek the right to follow their consciences unmolested. Scholars trace the roots of modern toleration to the wars of religion in early modern Europe and to seventeenth-century England, where religious issues were intimately connected with political disputes that led to the beheading of one king (Charles I) and the abdication of another (James II). Such historical eras witnessed the coalescence of a host of arguments (philosophical, political, psychological, theological, epistemological, economic) supporting religious toleration and the victory of tolerationist forces in France under the Edict of Nantes, in England during the mid- and late-seventeenth century, and across the Continent. At the same time, tolerationist systems of various sorts had existed under the Roman Empire, in the Ottoman millet system, and in the work of medieval thinkers who envisioned adherents of diverse religions coexisting peacefully. Scholars have also located tolerationist sentiments outside the Western tradition entirely, in such important figures as Emperor Ashoka of India (third century BCE) and in certain core concepts in the Islamic tradition.

Such historical resources notwithstanding, however, it is the liberal tradition that has most powerfully articulated the grounds, significance, and potential of the tolerationist ideal in recent years. Modern liberal theory has built its approach to social difference and diversity generally upon the cornerstone of toleration as a blueprint for addressing socially divisive phenomena. John Milton's *Areopagitica* (1644), with its plea for freedom of the press, also functioned as a defense of the rights of religious minorities, since the censorship Milton denounced was often directed at unconventional religious treatises. Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1690) is generally considered the most important liberal defense of religious toleration, yet the significance of Locke's formulation lies not so much in its originality but rather in the way that Locke synthesized over a century's worth of European tolerationist arguments, many of them deeply Christian in nature. Lockean toleration, in turn, entered the American tradition due to its influence on Thomas Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia," first drafted in 1779 but not passed until 1786.

But important as he was to the American case, Locke was just one of many important early modern figures (along with Michel de Montaigne, Pierre Bayle, Baruch Spinoza, and Sebastian Castellio, to name just a few) who contributed to the spread of tolerationist ideas in Europe. Works by important French and German Enlightenment thinkers—for example, Voltaire's *Treatise on Toleration* (1779) and Immanuel Kant's "What Is Enlightenment?" (1784)—embraced the cause of toleration in matters of religion and provided a template for the broader Enlightenment championing of free inquiry and freedom of thought and speech. Still later, Mill's *On Liberty* (1859) broadened the liberal defense of conscience and speech into a theory championing the rights of individuals to *act* on their deepest beliefs in matters that did not harm others and to be free not only from political and legal sanctions but also from the tyranny of majority opinion.

Toleration has been as important in practice as it has in theory, as a conceptual foundation for such basic liberal practices as the separation of church and state and constitutional efforts to protect individuals' ability to act in accordance with their deepest convictions. Protection for conscience and religion is enshrined in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and such rights ground a host of wider protections: In the words of David A. J. Richards, toleration lies "at the very moral heart of the dignity of constitutional law" (1986, p. x). Rawls famously (and controversially) claimed that his system completes and extends the struggle for toleration that began in early modern Europe.

But questions of toleration extend beyond religion into other areas of social and political life, wherever unpopular or controversial groups face a hostile environment and stand in need of protection

from state interference or their enemies in civil society. Over time, tolerationist arguments have been employed in attempts to protect groups marginalized on account of race, gender, and political views. In the twenty-first century, matters of sexual orientation continue to engage the attention of legal and political theorists as they probe the nature and limits of toleration. What would toleration look like in the area of gay and lesbian rights? If toleration simply requires decriminalization of homosexual conduct, then the U.S. Supreme Court's decision (in *Lawrence v. Texas* [2005]) striking down anti-sodomy laws would seem to have accomplished this task. But *Lawrence,* and rulings like it in courts around the world, has only opened new avenues of debate. Does toleration require legislation outlawing discrimination in the economic sphere on the basis of sexual orientation? Does anything short of extending the full benefits of marriage to same-sex couples (either de jure or de facto) fail the test of toleration? Many scholars self-consciously analogize campaigns for gay and lesbian marriage with those of early modern religious minorities and seek to bring the full power of the tolerationist tradition, from the early modern period down to our own day, to bear on such contested questions.

Toleration: Critical Perspectives

Like any other central political concept, toleration has always had its detractors. Early modern critics viewed defending religious orthodoxy as an integral responsibility of legitimate government. On this understanding, religious toleration threatened to undermine one of the key ingredients of social solidarity and to weaken the state, perhaps fatally. More recently, critical theorists—most notably, Herbert Marcuse, in his noted essay "Repressive Tolerance"—have objected to the fact that toleration's emphasis on maximizing individual choice leaves in place powerful social disparities. Marxist-informed critics aim to uncover the ways in which structures of power influence, often in deeply hidden ways, the very bases of what it means to form religious or political beliefs, a process that seems to be overlooked by toleration's acceptance of individual preferences as sacrosanct. Postmodernists, multicultural theorists, and those seeking a more positive celebration of difference often criticize toleration as insufficient and grudging, unable to provide authentic respect for the diversity that lies at the heart of contemporary social life. (Toleration, on this view, grants permission for difference but does not praise or affirm it.) And those who rank social unity, religious truth, or collective values more highly than individual autonomy continue to object to, or at least to question, toleration's decoupling of political society from overarching views of the good life.

Such critiques possess a degree of truth. Yet toleration's achievements—the cessation of armed conflict between groups with long histories of violence, the extension of basic political and institutional protections to unpopular groups, the fixing of some minimal bounds of integrity around individuals acting on their most deeply held beliefs—remain significant nonetheless. Toleration, in whatever sphere of social or political life one examines, represents a necessary though not always sufficient political achievement. Surely toleration—as an ideal, if not a concrete and fixed goal—recognizes the significance of the gradual, often halting, and always contested nature of progress in achieving civil and political rights, and the tradition of toleration continues to play a central role in ongoing struggles for human freedom and dignity.

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See also Autonomy; Berlin, Isaiah; Constitutionalism; Dissent; Enlightenment; Islamic Political Philosophy; Liberalism, Contemporary; Liberty; Locke, John; Mill, John Stuart; Multiculturalism; Rawls, John; Repressive Tolerance

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Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936)

Ferdinand Tönnies was a German social philosopher and intellectual historian. Today Tönnies is known as one of the founders of classical sociology. The son of a farmer, he was born in the rural area of Schleswig-Holstein (then under Danish rule). He studied in a number of German universities, becoming a *Privatdozent* at Kiel University in 1881. While visiting England in 1878, he discovered several original manuscripts of Thomas Hobbes, leading him to eventually publish the authoritative edition of Hobbes's *Elements of Law* and *Leviathan.* Tönnies's publications were pivotal in reviving the scholarly interest in Hobbes. In 1909 he cofounded the German Society for Sociology and served as its president until 1933, when he was ousted by the Nazis. He obtained full professorship at Kiel University only in 1913. (His academic promotion was slow partly because of his socialist leanings.) During World War I, like many other German intellectuals of that time, he took part in the propaganda effort, justifying the German cause. In the final years of the Weimar Republic, he joined the Social Democratic Party, becoming a vocal critic of National Socialism.

Tönnies's main ideas and convictions cannot be easily categorized. His political views were progressive and even social-democratic, yet they were based on a strong conservative sentiment. He was a pessimistic critic of modern industrial society, yet he did not believe that the clock of history could be turned back. A German patriot, he believed in the ideal of world peace and democracy. Criticizing modern rationalism, which subjected the natural process of life to the logic of goal-oriented calculation, he also professed faith in the principle of scientific objectivity. Although he held strong communitarian sympathies, he based his theory of social life on individualistic presuppositions.

This theory was elaborated in his book *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887). Though famous today mainly for its distinction between community and society, this treatise was more than just a work in social theory. It was, in fact, a philosophical-historical volume that attempted to present a comprehensive vision of human nature and its projection into various forms of social interaction and their historical expression in the development of European legal arrangements. Influenced by Hobbes, Tönnies built his theory on an individualistic premise that human will lies at the basis of every human association. There are, however, two very different kinds of human will, he claimed: *Wesenwille* (essential will) and *Kürwille* (arbitrary will). *Wesenwille* is an organic drive of every creature toward preservation and development. This kind of will includes thought (as every will is necessarily a thought) but is not dominated by it. Thought here is part of the natural flow of living activity. In *Kürwille,* on the other hand, thought gains autonomy and imposes itself on the organism. Conduct here is purpose-oriented and driven by cold calculation toward a premeditated goal.

These two kinds of will correspond to two kinds of association—*Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society). Gemeinschaft is a natural, "organic" association, which exists for the sake of itself and is based on the mutual sympathy of its members. Gesellschaft is an artificial, "mechanical" association consisting of purposive individuals, who are united by agreement in the view of achieving a certain purpose.

These two kinds of human will (and of human association) are ideal types. Neither exists in reality in a pure form. Yet human beings and associations

can be distinguished, depending on which ideal type seems to be more prevalent in them. Thus young people, women, inhabitants of rural areas, and artists are likely to possess a stronger element of *Wesenwille,* just as villages, small towns, guilds, and the church are mainly Gemeinschaft-type associations. By contrast, older people, men, urban dwellers and scientists have a more salient presence of *Kürwille,* just as cities, modern economic corporations, and the state are generally Gesellschaft-type associations.

In his subsequent works, Tönnies elaborated on this basic structure. He distinguished between three different but mutually supporting forms of sociology: pure, applied, and empirical. *Pure* sociology constructs an abstract conceptual apparatus employed to understand society. The theoretical argument, outlined earlier, belongs to this type of sociology.

Applied sociology aims at grasping the logic of historical development. For Tönnies, because the development of civilization is generally characterized by strengthening the Gesellschaft element of social life at the expense of Gemeinschaft, his writings in "applied sociology" are mainly dedicated to exemplifying and explaining this thesis. Thus, in his work, *Die Sitte* (1909), Tönnies described custom as an expression of social Wesenwille, arguing that the force of custom is seriously erased in the condition of modern Gesellschaft. "Public opinion," on the contrary, is an expression of rationalistic collective judgment based on Kürwille and is thus a necessary factor for maintaining modern society (see *Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung* [1922]).

The task of *empirical* sociology is to conduct inductive research on a given social phenomenon. Here, too, Tönnies's scholarship was on the whole determined by his general sociophilosophical concerns and served to buttress his general theory. For example, in his statistical research on criminals in the area of Schleswig-Holstein, Tönnies distinguished between those who are likely to be predominantly Wesenwille-types (e.g., native-born and rural-born), and those likely to be Kürwille-types (e.g., nonnative, urban-born), arguing that these two types of criminals tend to commit crimes of a different kind. Wesenwille-types tend to perpetrate crimes of passion (such as murder or arson), whereas Kürwille-types tend to commit crimes of deliberation (theft or fraud).

Personally, Tönnies felt more sympathy for Gemeinschaft, which he regarded as the only truly satisfying form of human association that corresponds to human nature in its entirety and not only to an artificially detached element of rational deliberation. At the same time, he did not reject modernity altogether, hoping to find resources for the revival of some form of communal life within the framework of modern democratic society.

Efraim Podoksik

See also Communitarianism; Hobbes, Thomas; Ideal Type; Pessimism; Rationality

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TOTALITARIANISM

Totalitarianism is a term used to denote contemporary forms of tyranny that involve genocide or large-scale human suffering at the hands of ideologically motivated dictators. It is also a politically charged term redolent of the cold war, when the easy equation of communism with Hitler's National Socialist regime (and fascism more generally) held obvious attractions for liberal and conservative commentary. It has never been entirely clear whether the term has a use beyond being a "boo word" that could, as Frederic Fleron memorably put it, be applied to "boo regimes." Nonetheless, as is clear from a brief survey of the

term, many political theorists have deployed the term in various ways that in turn highlight their own normative and philosophical commitments. An evaluation of the concept of totalitarianism thus provides a useful insight into the preoccupations of some of the key thinkers of recent decades.

In terms of mapping the various meanings and uses of the term, it is useful to focus on three quite distinct ways in which theorists have explored totalitarianism: as a way of understanding the rise of Nazism and communism, as a term for use in comparative political analysis, and as a way of analyzing the pathologies of modernity. This entry focuses on these three dominant usages labeling each in turn genetic, structural and modernizing theories. The entry concludes with a brief account of *post-totalitarianism*, a term coined by Václav Havel to describe late communist regimes.

Genetic Theories

Given the concurrent emergence of Stalinism and Nazism, it is hardly surprising to find that numerous theorists were concerned with documenting the common origins of the regimes that emerged out of them, despite obvious differences between these regimes in ideological terms. The classic work on the subject, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) by Hannah Arendt, speaks to this form of inquiry. Her view is that totalitarianism is the product of nineteenth-century political phenomena, specifically colonialism and the emergence of mass society. Both undermined the distinctiveness of the individual in favor of the group, whether that group be racial, ethnic, or national in essence. *Origins* documents the disintegration of the body politic and the querying of liberal values in favor of motion, expansion, and the advancement of the group, in turn preparing the ground for a new kind of fanatical politics based on perpetual movement and the obliteration of the distinction between public and private, and between individual and collective. Thus although communism and Nazism might not have shared a common end or vision, they both gave rise to a relentless expansionist politics and war against outsiders. Totalitarianism should thus be read as the product of a unique constellation of factors that together combined to normalize the most extraordinary inhumanity.

Variants on Arendt's inquiries into the causal antecedents of totalitarianism are provided by Friedrich von Hayek (*The Road to Serfdom* [1944]) and Karl Popper (*The Open Society and Its Enemies* [1945]), both of whom had provided analyses of the "totalitarian threat" by the end of World War II. To Hayek communism and Nazism were extreme examples of the "collectivism" that saw the birth of the welfare state in Britain and Europe. As for Arendt, so for Hayek, the sacrifice of the individual to the larger aggregate prepared the way for a utilitarian politics in which the needs and interests of the group are paramount. The difference is that Hayek focused in on the deleterious effect of economic planning, a demand of both socialist and social democratic ideologies in the interwar years. Planning involves second-guessing individual needs, wants, and desires, which in turn gives massive impetus to bureaucracies in their search for "social justice." As a market economist Hayek was convinced that planning was irrational and impossible to achieve without the imposition of central controls over all aspects of social life.

Popper shared many of these concerns but focused, in his *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* on the corrosive effect of group psychology on the driving forces of a progressive society. As with John Stuart Mill, Popper's concern is with freedom of thought and action, which both believe to be essential to progress and a flourishing culture. Totalitarianism is the product of a herd mentality that is uneasy with the consequences of liberty, of uncertainty, experimentation, and newness. What links ideologies such as Nazism and communism is thus the promise of certainty, of redemption, and comfort for the group. That such qualities were formerly associated with organized religion should not in this sense be overlooked. As essentially secular faiths, ideologies such as communism and Nazism fill the gap that was once provided by faith in God. Far from being modern, totalitarianism in this sense can be read as a form of pathological nostalgia for a lost world of prophets and oracles.

Structural Theories

Whereas genetic theories focus on what are perceived to be the shared origins of different totalitarian

movements and systems, structural theories seek to show that these differences are less marked than the similarities. The most important statement of this approach is that of Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* set the template for a great deal of the comparative discussion to come. In their view regimes such as those of Hitler, Stalin, and, to a more questionable extent, Mussolini observed the same "syndrome" of traits and characteristics. The traits are a "totalizing ideology," a single mass party led by one man, a system of terror operated by an extensive secret police apparatus, and monopolies on mass communications, the use of force and economic activity via a controlled and directed economy. Debate subsequently concentrated on whether and to what extent any regime displayed all traits simultaneously. Others debated the degree to which any syndrome of this kind did not display a liberal bias against particular kinds of system that seemed to depart from the free market and the "open society" as defined by theorists such as Popper.

Largely in response to these criticisms Leonard Schapiro, a noted historian of the Soviet Union, criticized Friedrich and Brzezinski in his *Totalitarianism* for confusing features of the system (or "contours") with the "pillars of control," which he argued clearly distinguished the Nazi and Soviet regimes from other kinds of dictatorship. Schapiro argued that the contours are "the leader; the subjugation of the legal order; control over private morality; continual mobilisation; and legitimacy based mass support." The pillars, however, are the party, the police, and the ideology without which this particular form of rule would cease to be distinctive. However Schapiro's own analysis is questionable on its own terms. Why, for example, the party should be regarded as a "pillar" when respectively the Nazi and communist parties were emasculated under Hitler's and Stalin's rule is not made clear. Nor is it clear how Schapiro escapes the largely descriptive approach taken by Friedrich and Brzezinki, which leaves the key question posed by Arendt (Why did totalitarianism emerge?) unanswered.

A rather more persuasive "structural" account is offered by Arendt as part of her more general analysis of the origins of totalitarianism summarized earlier. In her view any viable account of totalitarianism needed to focus on terror and the use of concentration camps or gulags as the key instrument of social control. Without terror, power becomes routinized and totalitarian regimes become a mere instance of tyranny or dictatorship as opposed to the radically distinct systems she believed them to be. Tyrannies are marked by clear hierarchies and a sense of stability underpinned by regularized norms or practices. Totalitarian regimes, on the other hand, are marked by the obliteration of hierarchy in favor of an "onion structure" with the leader at the center progressively enveloped by layers of functionaries and followers. The effect of the onion is to insulate those nearer the center from the real world and to necessitate a war on truth, facts, and reality at all levels of society. Uncertainty, suspicion, and perpetual motion are the hallmarks of totalitarian regimes. Arendt's account thus accentuates the sense in which such regimes are novel departures from traditional autocratic or dictatorial systems. It also captures in analytic terms the features that have interested authors such as Yevgeny Zamyatin and George Orwell, who attempted to capture in their respective novels *We* and *1984* the distinctive character of twentieth-century despotisms and the dystopias to come.

Modernization Theories

As the previous analyses suggest, there is often a barely concealed subtext contained in the analyses of totalitarianism: that totalitarianism represents an extension of logic contained in the process of modernization and thus that all modern societies contain certain pathologies that may, if unchecked, develop into full-blown totalitarianism. A notable inspiration for such analyses is Max Weber, who described the construction of the "iron cage of modernity," by which he meant the growing constraint on individual flourishing caused by our subjection to "instrumental" processes necessitated by modernization. The most noteworthy successors to Weber are the members of the Frankfurt School, formed in the 1930s to offer critical analyses of the trends and tendencies of modern society. The School produced two highly influential analyses of totalitarianism: *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944) by Theodor

Adorno and Max Horkheimer and *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) by Herbert Marcuse.

Like Weber, Adorno and Horkheimer were convinced that what thinkers from Blaise Pascal and Denis Diderot to Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx took to be the chief virtue of modernity—the growing predominance of a secular, rational, and instrumental basis for social life—was its chief vice. In subjecting nature, the body, and individuality to rational calculation, the Enlightenment set in motion a way of conceiving the world that was utterly at odds with the aesthetic, the sensual and distinctive. Uniformity and subordination to calculus becomes the norm with the effect that individuals come to be seen as, in the language of Kant, "mere means" for the pursuit of ends which are themselves unquestioned. The world comes to appear as a mere "resource" for utopian schemas, whether they be collectivist or individualist in design. People are reduced to passive consumers of "mass culture" and subject to a totalitarian logic of instrumental reason, calculation, and dumbing down in the name of the efficient control and manipulation of society. In Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis the factory methods of mass entertainment thus derive from the same logic that generated the factory methods of genocide and human destruction. Each manifests a cynical detachment from the human, broadly conceived, in favor of mechanistic or inhuman efficiency.

Marcuse's analysis is similarly pessimistic but was written at a point in time (the early 1960s) when there was a larger audience for an analysis of this kind. Marcuse similarly identified the emergence of instrumental reason or "one-dimensional" thought as the common thread uniting various otherwise distinct regimes from the USSR to the United States, only in his view it was the latter that demonstrated the more advanced form of domination. State violence was, from this point of view, a mark of the failure of a system of control rather than its success, as earlier theorists such as Arendt had argued. To Marcuse, modernity equated to an unquestioned logic of economic growth, to the subordination of social life to the bottom line and thus the necessity for increased consumption, built-in obsolescence, and the generation of false or artificial needs. He thus repeated Marx's early humanist critique of capitalism but augmented this considerably in his analysis of the methods used by elites to generate compliance—principally through inducing forms of thought and behaviour that are utterly compliant or "positive"—as opposed to "negative" behavior, which queries the status quo. In a mirror of the analyses of commentators such as Friedrich and Brzezinski, he documented how the methods associated with schooling and socialization in Nazi Germany and the USSR were actually more developed in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, though better disguised as "normal" or "natural."

A self-consciously provocative work, *One-Dimensional Man* went on to become a best seller in the "post-materialist" markets of those very countries Marcuse agitated against. It also chimed with various forms of social critique offered in the run-up to the rebellious days of 1968 by figures such as Raoul Vaneigem, Guy Debord, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Jean Beaudrillard. Indeed Marcuse's work spawned the critique of "neo-totalitarianism," now associated with the work of a diverse range of theorists such as Giorgio Agamben, Slavoj Žižek, and Noam Chomsky, all of whom equate political passivity with the processes documented by Marcuse. His work might also be seen as the inspiration for the exploration of "totalitarianism" as an artistic genre. *The Matrix* series has an obviously Marcusean flavor, as do dystopian films such as *Rollerball, Logan's Run, The Island,* and *Sleeper,* all of which document the "air conditioned" comfort of near-future totalitarian oppression.

Post-Totalitarianism

One remaining twist in the saga of the concept of totalitarianism has yet to be documented, and this is the notable contribution of Václav Havel. Writing as a dissident member of Charter 77 in communist Czechoslovakia, Havel's 'The Power of the Powerless" (1978) offered a compelling analysis of what he termed *post-totalitarianism*. In an echo of Marcuse, he documented how power in the Eastern and Central Europe of the 1970s and 1980s had transmuted from an overt, violent impositional kind of rule to one that rested on the acquiescence of self-consciously subject populations. Havel gave the example of a greengrocer who displays the slogan "All Power to the

Workers!" in the window of his shop. As he analyzes it, the slogan is less evidence of the success of the regime in instilling the required ethic in a subject population and more a sign of the quiet capitulation of ordinary individuals confronted with impossible odds. Better to hang a slogan in the window, live the lie, and survive than bring suspicion upon oneself by not going along with what is expected of citizens.

The importance of Havel's analysis is that it highlights the shortcomings of mainstream approaches to totalitarian regimes that rest on the binary of terror and consent to highlight the difference between totalitarian and nontotalitarian regimes. In Havel's view one has to interrogate the nature of the "consent" elicited under contemporary conditions. As his plays (*Audience, Private View*) document, this applied not just to communist regimes but to any kind of contemporary society where power and influence are located at the level of elites as opposed to the social. In this sense Havel anticipates the analysis of what is sometimes termed *micro-power*, or the way in which power operates at the capillary level to produce an outward image of conformity in a subject population. It thus anticipated the study of everyday struggles and resistance associated with critical sociology and anthropology such as the work of James Scott, Detlev Peukert, and Stephen Kotkin, all of whom have in their own way undermined the stock of assumptions associated with the classic studies of totalitarianism.

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See also Arendt, Hannah; Domination; Exploitation

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TOTALITY

Depending on whether it is understood as an ontological, epistemological, or axiological (normative) concept, "totality" has various, but interrelated, meanings. The concept has had political relevance since its inception in ancient Greece, where it occurs in reflections on the nature of the universe and of the state; its contemporary, use, however, is most closely related to classical German philosophy and Marxism.

While the tendency to understand the essence of the world according to an a priori schema was already present in René Descartes, conspicuous in Baruch Spinoza's holism, and called into question by David Hume, it was Immanuel Kant who first radically problematized totality in modern philosophy. In *Critique of Pure Reason,* he denied the possibility of knowing the totality but claimed that the *concept* of totality is methodologically necessary for knowledge. However, he claimed that as a concept, it necessarily leads speculative, and thereby practical, reason into irresolvable contradictions.

G. W. F. Hegel responded with the affirmation of dialectical reason, guided by the principle of the synthesis of contradictions. For Hegel, contradiction is not a mere illusion of human thinking, as it is for Kant, but a necessary aspect of all of reality, one that makes totality possible. It is through creating and abolishing, or overcoming, contradictions that totality realizes itself, both in thought and in being. Accordingly, every result, state, or event is only but part of a universal process and thus relative in relationship to it: The place, role, and significance of each part is determined only in its relationship to the whole. In turn, only the whole—the final result *and* the entire historical movement of its dialectical becoming—is, according to Hegel, true. In fact, Hegel held that he stood at this crucial point in history (or at the end of it) and that his philosophy—and any genuine philosophy from then on—would be but a reflection of the path traversed. According to Hegel, this path, and thus totality itself, was nothing but self-realization of what he called "world spirit."

Hegel's closed speculative (and spiritual) totality was rejected by Marx. Such a system was, according to him, not only mystical but also reactionary, because it hypostasized totality and thus

denied the possibility of any essentially new, different, future. Marx agreed that totality is a dialectical process, that it is not merely a methodological category but an ontological one as well, that all facts are meaningless unless considered within a dialectical whole, and that the whole has a teleological aspect to it. However, the only meaningful totality, according to Marx, is human history—that is, the history of human material and cultural self-production, of human purposive activity. As such, totality is for Marx an open-ended totality, a process of totalization.

This process, however, has not always and everywhere been to the benefit of humanity. In fact, despite the great achievements of science, industry, and art, human history has been, according to Marx, a history of man's alienation from his latent dispositions for free, creative, versatile, and genuinely communal existence. Taking up the Renaissance idea of *uomo universale,* Marx held that the objective historical conditions had been created for the realization of the "total man," one whose life would not be physically and spiritually crippled by existing social relations. According to Marx, only a class of people thinking and acting from the standpoint of universal human interests would be able to carry out this project.

These ideas have been further elaborated within twentieth-century Marxism, especially by Georg Lukács, and criticized by postmodernists.

Miloš Petrović

See also Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Marx, Karl; Postmodernism; Singularity

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Transitional Justice

Transitional justice refers to institutions or practices that define and address injustices committed under a prior regime as part of a process of political change. Contemporary debates on transitional justice took shape during democratizing transitions of the 1980s and 1990s as successor regimes in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa considered the problem of how to address political violence and repression committed under prior regimes. More recently, transitional justice debates have expanded to encompass the role of responses to past abuses beyond the context of regime change in processes of conflict resolution and more general political reforms. These debates center on the meaning and role of justice in the aftermath of widespread forms of political violence with a focus on specific strategies or practices, such as prosecution, truth commissions, reparations, administrative purges, amnesties, apologies, and forgiveness.

It might be argued that all justice is transitional justice, given that the political realm is always undergoing change in some form, however slowly. Transitional justice is generally distinguished from ordinary criminal justice in two ways. First, transitional justice addresses violence that was authorized or legitimated by political authorities, which means that it cannot necessarily rely on established laws or traditions. Instead, it entails the reclassification of practices once considered appropriate or even patriotic as unjust, criminal, and abusive. Second, transitional justice addresses widespread and systematic abuses. Whereas criminal justice is commonly designed to address actions that deviate from the norm, transitional justice addresses abuses that could not have been carried out without the active involvement and tacit complicity of a significant portion of the population.

In the context of a liberalizing or democratizing transition, these features give rise to a common set of dilemmas. The central goal of criminalizing violence authorized under a prior regime is in tension with procedural standards for establishing the integrity of law, such as the prohibition of retroactive punishment. The sheer number of those implicated in political violence would overwhelm even a well-functioning judicial system, but transitional justice implies a context where the judicial system is itself undergoing transformation. The process of condemning actions that were widespread or authorized by political leaders is controversial and potentially destabilizing. The question as to how such challenges ought to be addressed has become the subject of a rapidly growing body of scholarship in the fields of human rights, international relations, comparative politics, and political theory.

One set of theoretical debates associated with transitional justice concerns the relationship between measures to address *past* injustices and the pursuit of a just *future*. Theoretical debates on transitional justice in the 1980s through the mid-1990s commonly centered on the question of how to negotiate among perceived trade-offs between backward-looking and forward-looking approaches to justice, or between principle and pragmatism. Human rights advocates played an important role in framing such debates and commonly associated justice with individual criminal prosecution in accordance with evolving principles of international human rights law. Critics argued that human rights prosecutions would undermine the pursuit of a just or democratic future by destabilizing newly democratizing countries, draining scarce resources from other reconstruction efforts, or simply by opening "old wounds." Similarly, scholars have argued that reparations might undermine national unity or political and economic support for forward-looking social justice projects by shifting resources and attention to past divisions. Administrative purges might be seen as a desirable form of retribution, as well as a basis for advancing political change, but they may also be destabilizing or rely on questionable information. The earliest truth commission to receive widespread attention was established in Argentina as a pragmatic compromise between the demand for prosecution and the demand for impunity. Truth commissions investigate and report on patterns of political violence but do not prosecute or punish individuals.

South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission challenged the perception of truth commissions as a pragmatic, "second best" alternative to prosecution by arguing that truth commissions could advance restorative justice in lieu of retribution. Restorative justice is an informal, responsive approach that draws on communitarian theory and indigenous practices. In contrast with the legalistic focus on impartial procedures and enforcement, restorative justice is defined in relation to the goals of healing, mediation, and social repair. South African leaders, along with a number of scholars, have argued that restorative justice bridges backward-looking responses to the past with the forward-looking pursuit of political reconciliation. They also proposed that truth commissions might contribute to restorative justice by fostering support for forgiveness, reparations, and a common understanding of the past. South Africa's truth commission generated new theoretical debates on the role of truth commissions, amnesties, and political forgiveness as approaches to transitional justice. The proliferation of truth commissions since the mid-1990s has also informed theoretical debates on the political role of human rights investigations and public remembrance. Scholars engaged in these themes have been influenced by earlier debates on the German process of "dealing with the past" or *Vergangenheitsbewaltigung,* in the aftermath of the Nazi era and the "historian's debate" over the role of myth and memory in nation-building projects.

In recent years, increased international involvement in promoting transitional justice has generated new theoretical debates over the relationship between local and global responses to political violence. A defining aspiration of the human rights movement was to expose and condemn state-sponsored violence by establishing mechanisms for international oversight. However, a number of scholars have argued that international responses to political violence will lack legitimacy unless they are integrated with local traditions and practices. The expansion of international involvement has also generated critical theoretical interpretations of transitional justice as a discourse of human rights and state legitimation. Instead of evaluating transitional justice in relation to legal or moral criteria, these scholars have examined how transitional justice debates are framed. Although transitional justice institutions purport to challenge repression and denial, such scholars have countered that an emerging discourse of transitional justice has more complicated political implications and may establish new political mythologies that function to displace or undermine alternative ways of defining political and social change.

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See also Human Rights; Justice, Theories of; Terrorism; Violence

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TYRANNICIDE

Tyrannicide, the act of killing a tyrant (also, the killer of a tyrant), was not an abstract concept in antiquity. Some classical states legislated to exempt those who killed a tyrant or would-be tyrant from prosecution, and some tyrants met violent ends at the hands of self-styled liberators. But as in all areas of political life, definitions proved more difficult in practice than in theory, and ancient philosophers devoted much thought to the question of precisely what constituted tyranny and under what circumstances it was justifiable to kill a tyrant.

The archetypal tyrannicides were Harmodius and Aristogeiton of Athens, who in 514 BCE planned to murder the tyrant Hippias, son of Pisistratus. They succeeded only in killing the tyrant's brother Hipparchus before being killed themselves, but they nevertheless received great posthumous honors from the Athenian populace. Harmodius and Aristogeiton's deed did not end the Pisistratid tyranny—Hippias ruled for 3 more years, and their act was, furthermore, personally motivated, a response to an insult by Hippias (according to Herodotus) rather than the product of political conviction. But they became known in popular tradition as a symbol of resistance to tyranny.

The laws on tyrannicide passed in the classical period make the idea appear uncomplicated: If anyone aims at tyranny or succeeds in becoming a tyrant, he or she can be killed with impunity. In practice, however, the motives of tyrannicides were rarely politically pure. In many cases the term was used to justify an unedifying cycle of political murders, as would-be rulers declared their rival to be a tyrant and murdered him. Only among philosophers do we find disinterested motives: Under the influence of Plato's condemnation of tyranny, some students of philosophy chose to risk their lives against tyrants. Clearchus, tyrant of Heracleia on the Black Sea, for instance, was killed in 352 BCE by a group led by his court philosopher Chion. The tyranny did not fall—Clearchus was succeeded by his brother—but the tyrannicides appear to have acted from political conviction.

The image of the paranoid tyrant who fears assassination at every moment derives principally from the works of Cicero. In *De Officiis* Cicero suggests that all tyrants inevitably meet death at an assassin's hand and that killing a tyrant is not morally wrong. Cicero emphasized these ideas as a means of justifying the act of tyrannicide in his own time, and the conspirators against Julius Caesar in 44 BCE presented their deed as both the overthrow of a tyrant and the restoration of the republic, reaching back into history for precedent to Brutus who drove out the last of the Roman kings, and to Harmodius and Aristogeiton themselves. In the early Roman Empire conspiracies against the emperor were common, but although the conspirators usually claimed to be removing a tyrant and restoring the republic, in general they aimed simply at replacing the ruler. From this point on, arguments about tyrannicide came to center on the ethical nature of rulership—the point at which constitutional rule became tyrannical—and the legitimacy of opposition to it. Yet antiquity continued to provide a fertile source of inspiration for would-be tyrannicides of all kinds.

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See also Monarchomachs; Plato; Tyranny; Violence

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Tyranny

In modern times the term *tyrant* has come to mean the worst kind of ruler—someone who exploits his or her power for personal ends, irrespective of the law. For the ancient Greeks, however, a tyrant was not necessarily a bad ruler; in its original form (*tyrannos*) the word was used to describe a man or woman who held absolute and personal power within a state, distinct from a king whose rule was bound by constitution and law. Some were usurpers who came to power by their own efforts, others were elected to rule, and yet others were imposed by intervention from outside. Certain rulers, such as Phalaris, tyrant of Akragas in Sicily, who burned his enemies alive in a brazen bull, were bywords for uncontrolled cruelty and self-indulgence, but others, such as Pittakos at Mytilene, were remembered favorably in later sources as wise and moderate rulers who brought prosperity and peace to their city. Later on in classical history, however, the word gradually acquired more of its modern flavor, implying a ruler whose sole motivation was power and personal gain, and as a result its use in public life became controversial. The idea of tyranny has thus been at the center of debate about legitimacy in rulership and the balance of power between ruler and people; from Roman times onward philosophers have argued for the moral right of the citizen to overthrow a tyrant whatever the law, and have debated the point at which monarchic rule becomes tyrannical. This entry discusses the changing definition of tyranny in classical antiquity and tyranny in its Greek and Roman contexts.

Definitions

The best-known definition of tyranny comes from Aristotle's *Politics:* "Any sole ruler, who is not required to give an account of himself, and who rules over subjects all equal or superior to himself to suit his own interest and not theirs, can only be exercising a tyranny" (1295a, pp. 19–23). Aristotle presents tyranny in a very negative light, as a form of monarchy which has deviated from the ideal, and by listing the characteristics of the tyrant—he comes to power by force, has a bodyguard of foreigners to protect him, and rules over unwilling subjects—Aristotle suggests that a tyrant was always a violent usurper. Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens, is a classic example; he made three attempts to seize power, finally succeeding in a military coup in 546 using forces from outside, and ruled for 30 years. But it is more complex than Aristotle implies: Pisistratus did not dismantle the structure of government, and assemblies of the people continued to be held and magistrates to be appointed under his rule. Most notably he was succeeded by his two sons, Hippias and Hipparchos, turning the rule into a hereditary one. Some tyrants had power conferred on them by the state, such as Clearchus at Heracleia on the Black Sea, who was appointed in 364 BCE to resolve a civil conflict, whereas others, like Mausolus and Artemisia of Halicarnassus (creators of the Mausoleum, one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World), ruled with tyrannical power but were in constitutional terms *satraps* (governors) within the Persian Empire.

But even if there was no simple definition of a tyrant, there were classical rulers who, for a long or short period of time, dominated a state and had the ability to do whatever they wanted—found cities, move populations, wage war, create new citizens, build monuments, or accumulate money. These rulers had certain fundamental features in common: They were sole rulers with direct and personal power over the state, unconstrained by political institutions. Their power was dependent not on a right to rule but on their own ability to command and retain control. Perhaps because of the insecurity of their position, tyrannical rulers tended to have grand ambitions: They were empire builders, colonizers, conquerors, and constructors. Aristotle says rather cynically that tyrants' building projects, such as temples and public fountains (and indeed the Egyptian pyramids), were intended to keep the people poor and prevent them from plotting revolution (*Politics,* 1313b, pp. 18–25), but in fact tyrants were best placed to implement large-scale projects

for public benefit. All tyrants aimed to hand power on within their family, and some succeeded in establishing a rule lasting many generations.

Although few surviving classical authors have anything good to say of tyrants, they were generally successful in government, bringing economic prosperity and expansion to their cities. The Aristotelian view suggests that tyrants were inevitably unpopular, ruling a cowed citizenry who feared and hated them and wished only to be free. But as we have seen, some tyrants were chosen by the state to rule with a specific purpose: to put an end to civil war, to impose a new code of law, or to offer leadership in a time of danger. Indeed it was often proposed that a sole ruler with overall control of military and political affairs was the best option in wartime. Though opposed to monarchy on principle, the Romans in times of threat would appoint a dictator, one individual who was granted complete control over the army and state for a period of 6 months, a position described by the historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus as an "elective tyranny" (*Roman Antiquities,* 5.73). Philosophers, too, saw tyranny of a certain kind as a positive: The philosophers of the fourth century constructed their designs for the ideal state around an enlightened and self-controlled monarch, the "philosopher king," who would live a virtuous life himself and could impose the best constitution on his subjects.

Greek Tyrants

Greek attitudes toward tyranny, as already noted, changed over time, shaped by external events. In the beginning the tyrant figures in the poetic sources as an enviable status, something to which an aristocrat might aspire. In the early stages of the Greek *polis* (city-state) the hereditary aristocracy held all political power and ruled as a group, with the mass of citizens excluded from political life. Tyrants first appear in this milieu in the mid-seventh century BCE, and there is controversy about precisely how. One view sees rivalry between aristocratic families who vied to take all power into their own hands; the other suggests that tyrants were representative of a newly politically conscious *dêmos* (people) who supported their rise in the hope of improving their position within the state. Although the idea of any political consciousness on the part of the *dêmos* in the seventh century is optimistic, it is true that early tyrants tended to have popular support: Figures such as Cypselus at Corinth and Cleisthenes at Sicyon offered an alternative to exploitation by the aristocrats, and certainly tyrants introduced reforms intended to please the *dêmos,* codifying the laws and establishing justice—Pisistratus in Athens set up traveling courts—and gathering resources for public projects, such as fountains to supply water and grand temples.

The tyrants of the archaic age, then—Cypselus, Cleisthenes, Pisistratus, and Polycrates—were popular, presiding as they did over an era of prosperity and expansion. But these attitudes shifted in the course of the fifth century, under the influence of the Persian invasions of Greece in 480/479 BCE. Most sources for Greek history are Athenian, and for them the defining moments of the Athenian state were the establishment of the democracy in 510 and the Greeks' astonishing defeat of Persia in the next generation. The outcome of the Persian War was interpreted as the success of the free and democratic Greeks against the autocratic and tyrannical Persian king; consequently in Athenian writing after 480, tyranny became the hated opposite of democracy. This colored attitudes toward tyranny in the past as well; rulership that had previously seemed positive and acceptable was condemned as oppressive and self-serving. In Herodotus's *Histories* the Corinthian Sosicles says, circa 500 BCE, that "there is nothing more unjust or bloodthirsty among men than tyranny" (5.92a). The drama of the fifth century takes the contest between tyranny and law as one of its central themes: Plays such as Sophocles' *Antigone* dramatize the confrontation of the tyrannical ruler and the upholder of natural law.

The idea that tyranny vanished in 510, however, is a false one. One of the most successful tyrant dynasties ruled in Sicily between 406 and 367, that of Dionysius the Elder and his sons, and tyrants reappeared in numbers in the fourth century BCE. In part this reflects a genuine change in political circumstances: Impoverishment and an increase in foreign interference meant that constitutions tended to become unstable, and hence many of these classical tyrants came to power on a platform of economic reform to benefit the lower classes, offering the cancellation of debts and redistribution of land. But the reappearance of tyranny also owed something to the growing interest among philosophers

in the consideration of political forms. Thinkers such as Aristotle and Plato led an intellectual movement in favor of enlightened ("philosophical") monarchy, which opened up debates about the role of the ruler, because they believed that neither democracy nor oligarchy represented the ideal form of the state. Only an all-powerful ruler could bring about the changes necessary to ensure that the state was run in ways that promoted virtues, and in the service of this idea, figures from the past such as Cyrus the Great of Persia were presented as "ideal kings." Plato went so far as to put his scheme into practice, visiting the court of Dionysius the Younger at Syracuse in 359 in an attempt to win the young tyrant over to philosophical rule, believing that he would then be in a position to impose ideal laws upon his citizens. Dionysius proved less than amenable and Plato was lucky to escape, but his pupils were not deterred by this failure and several went on to try to influence other tyrants or to set up their own tyrannies, such as Clearchus at Heracleia (364–352 BCE).

By the end of the fourth century Philip of Macedon had conquered the Greek states and put an end to their political freedom, and under Alexander the Great, a huge Macedonian empire was created. This in turn spawned new tyrannies and monarchies. At first, dependent governments were set up under Macedonian rule. After Alexander's death, independent kingdoms were established by his successors and imitators. The third century saw the creation of new tyrannies that were less and less distinguishable from hereditary monarchies, such as the rule of Hieron II in Syracuse. Under these circumstances the idea of tyranny changed from a constitutional issue to an ethical one, and *tyrannos,* rather than indicating a ruler who was not a king, came to be used to describe a particular type of king: one who put his or her own interests before those of the citizens and acted without restraint by the law.

Tyranny in Rome

Roman attitudes toward tyranny were clear. Early in their history Romans had been governed by kings, but the true beginning of the Roman state was the foundation of the republic in 509 BCE. Kingship, according to Roman historians, could all too easily turn into tyranny, and the later kings are depicted as tyrants of the negative type—cruel, exploitative, and self-indulgent—so under the republic, the Romans set their faces against monarchy of any kind. Clear limits were set to the amount of power any one individual could command. The dictatorship existed as an emergency measure whereby one man could be appointed to overall power in the state, but it could be held for 6 months at most. Much Roman history, however, was written several hundred years later, in the first century BCE, and betrays a very contemporary concern with the problem of tyranny. By 133 BCE the growth of the empire had changed Rome from a small city-state to a global power, and the conquest of Italy and the Mediterranean had created the conditions for individual generals to gain both enormous wealth through conquest and a huge following among their soldiers, paving the way for them to seek personal power through military force. Generals began to use the dictatorship unconstitutionally to achieve domination. Sulla was the first to bring his army to Rome in 82 BCE after fighting a civil war and was elected to an indefinite dictatorship by a cowed Senate. He chose to lay down the role and returned to private life, but his example was noted by Julius Caesar. In 46 BCE Caesar also brought an army into Italy and was made dictator first for 10 years, then 2 years later dictator for life. This made him effectively a king, superior to all other magistrates and not subject to their veto or appeal, and in this context the idea of tyranny began to be discussed by historians and philosophers. Thinkers such as Cicero adopted the language of Greek tyranny to describe Caesar's position and debated the moral justification for tyrannicide. The assassins of Caesar presented themselves as overthrowing a tyranny, but the removal of one man could not prevent the drift to monarchic power in Rome, and Caesar's heir Augustus took control as the first emperor.

At several points under the early emperors conspiracies were formed to remove the ruler and restore the republic on the grounds that the imperial power was unconstitutional and therefore illegal, but they failed due to lack of support by the people (who strongly favored monarchic rule) and the individual ambitions of the conspirators. Soon the imperial rule was established as constitutional, and the language of tyranny again became ethical in application rather than political.

Accusations of tyranny came to refer to the quality of rule rather than its legitimacy: An emperor who abused his power or used it for personal ends was seen as despotic, although it took a brave man to say so in public.

Conclusion

The most significant change in the conception of tyranny from the ancient world to the modern lies in the role of the people under a tyrant. In ancient times tyrants tended to be popular because the people saw them as upholding their interests. It is striking, for instance, that whereas Augustus avoided holding the dictatorship, hoping to differentiate himself from his adoptive father Caesar, the Roman people clamored for him to accept it on several occasions. Tyrants often introduced measures to improve the economic and social status of the poor; it was the aristocracy who wrote the histories who tended to oppose tyranny, because, in bypassing the constitution, tyranny threatened their traditional privileges. But as absolute rule became established in the Roman Empire the terms of debate shifted, focusing on the question of when monarchic power became tyrannical in nature. From this springs the idea of tyranny in its modern sense: a situation in which the power of the ruler outweighs that of the ruled. This definition allows even a representative government to be labeled a tyranny.

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See also *Antigone*; Cicero; Herodotus; Kingship; Lawgivers; Philosopher King; Plato; Tyrannicide

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U

Universality

Political theory has conventionally proceeded on the basis that its insights are applicable universally. The universal applicability of political theory is now far less self-evident, due to challenges to the idea of universality from a number of quarters, including communitarianism, feminism, and postmodernism. These challenges have led some to abandon the ideal of universality, while leading others to rethink and reinterpret the notion of universality.

Accounts of the debate over the utility of universality within political theory have generally proceeded through delineating the oppositional relationship of liberal and communitarian theory. Liberalism is cast as adhering to the value of universality, in its insistence on the necessity for neutral universal norms derived by abstracting people from their particular situation. Communitarianism disputes liberalism's elevation of abstract individualism. Instead, it emphasizes the priority of community over individuality and conceives of normative principles as embedded in communal practices. Rather than abstracting people from their social context in order to distill universally applicable normative principles, communitarianism suggests that such values derive from localized social and cultural traditions.

The liberal/communitarian opposition does not exhaust the range of debate over universality. Rather, it overlaps with numerous other contests over the necessity of universality in political theory. The notion of universal personhood has been strongly challenged by feminism, which argues that the characteristics of this abstract *man* are, rather than universally shared, in fact valorized attributes of masculinity—rational, unencumbered, self-knowing—against which femininity has been defined and excluded. Further, universal norms have been challenged by postcolonial critics, who discern in them an insidious cultural imperialism. Such critics argue that those—usually privileged, Western voices—who have enumerated universal values have done so by generalizing their own values across many incommensurable moral frameworks. Enlightenment notions of truth, justice, and equality are criticized for their reliance on a framework deeply imbricated with Western society, a framework that has been summarily imposed on other cultures.

The other major challenge to universality comes from postmodern theory, which challenges the "grand narratives" of universality and truth on the basis that these grand narratives totalize and systematize a complex and competing set of smaller or local narratives.

Questioning the validity of universal theory has attracted vehement critics, who have insisted that to turn away from the idea of universality entails relinquishing any possibility of making cross-culturally applicable normative pronouncements, and thus withdrawing from effective political action. On this view, critiques of universality are considered to engender moral relativism and to enable only narrow particularist claims.

However, rather than wholly rejecting universality, the concern of much recent theory has been

with critically rethinking the notion of the universal. Some theorists have reinterpreted the idea of universality by considering more closely its relationship to politics. Whereas the status of claims to universality as claims to eternal or transcendent truths may once have meant that universality stood outside the fray of political contest, more recent approaches associated with radical democracy see the definition of universality as an eminently political question. On this view, the universal becomes the site of continual contestation and revision of its meaning and limits. This struggle over the definition of universality is not something we should strive to resolve, but rather an essential ingredient in ensuring that the universal remains open to challenge, contestation, and redefinition.

The increased interest in the concept of cosmopolitanism—the notion that we are in some way citizens of the world—provides another instance of a reinterpretation of universality. In the past, cosmopolitanism has been straightforwardly equated with abstract universalism. Its perspective was that of the unattached world traveler. In contrast, newer approaches to cosmopolitanism tend to pose the relationship of globality and locality as a central question for research. This attention to the relationship between universality and particularity is marked in the terminology used by theorists of cosmopolitanism—by focusing on cosmopolitanisms, for instance, or by qualifying the term cosmopolitanism, as in the notion of *cosmopolitan patriotism*.

The other major area of political theory where the status of universality is at issue is work on human rights. Recent work on rights has been concerned with whether, and to what extent, the notion of human rights can operate in the face of challenges to the universal status of humanity that have come from those emphasizing the significance of difference—in particular, sexual and cultural difference. These reworkings of the notion of human rights renounce claims to universality based on their eternal and transcultural "truth" and instead tend to focus on the historical emergence and cultural locatedness of the idea of human rights.

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See also Communitarianism; Cosmopolitanism; Feminism; Human Rights; Liberalism; Postmodernism; Radical Democracy

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Universal Monarchy

Universal monarchy is a doctrine that had its origin in the Roman Empire, but its best-known form is in Dante Alighieri's *De monarchia,* completed some time after 1310. Dante's argument concerns the proper location for temporal authority. The logic of Book 1 of *De monarchia,* which takes up the question of whether there should be one temporal ruler over all, is derived from Aristotle by way of Aquinas. All human beings have ends, which must be coordinated for any social institution to work. The indispensable condition for human beings to work out their ends is peace, which means finally universal peace. Following Aristotle, he argues that each social grouping works to the extent it has one person placed over it to coordinate its activities, to ensure that all ends come together harmoniously. Nor is this a task that can be left to kings over particular territories: because kingdoms may disagree with each other, one authority must be placed over all of them. This is the universal monarch.

The question had great significance in Dante's time because of a long-standing conflict between emperors and popes concerning who had supreme temporal authority. These conflicts had become acute in the century leading up to Dante, especially in the Pontificate of Innocent III, who claimed authority to give the empire to whomever he desired, and to withhold it as well, keeping in the meantime supreme temporal authority for himself. Dante's argument is a rebuttal to this concept of papal authority.

The argument is fleshed out in Books 2 and 3 of *De monarchia*. Book 2 argues that the Roman Empire, established independently of the church and existing in full power at the time of Christ's birth, is the true repository of temporal power, to be preserved in its way exactly like the power of the church. Book 3 rejects the two primary arguments given for the papacy's power, the Donation of Constantine, in which the emperor supposedly gave control of the empire to the pope, and the status of the pope as vicar of Christ, who has power over heaven and earth. No argument presented up to Dante's time can justify the intrusion of the church on public life, in part because no such justification can be given. Each functions best when their roles are separated.

Universal monarchy regains importance as a concept during the reign of Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor. His Grand Chancellor, Mercurino Gattinara, was an admirer of Dante and encouraged Charles to think of himself as a new Charlemagne, remaking juristic law and opposing the temporal aspirations of the pope in Italy and elsewhere. It is later taken up by subsequent Holy Roman Emperors to attempt to reconquer nations that had left the Catholic Church. It receives its last major expression in European thought with Napoleon, who aspires to universal control of Europe and takes Charlemagne as a model. The term changes its meaning after Charles V; instead of being a term of approbation, it becomes a means to abuse those with aspirations of empire. The baron de Montesquieu and English political theorists use the term to deride figures like Louis XIV and Napoleon.

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See also Cosmopolitanism; Dante Alighieri; Empire

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UTOPIANISM

Theodore Adorno, the German philosopher and sociologist in *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) talks about the existence of an "anti-utopia complex" in some individuals that literally makes them afraid of utopias. True or not, Adorno's observation is suggestive of the powerful resonances of the utopian. Utopia is such a deeply contested concept, to some it represents mental space in a confining world, to others the height of human folly. While the Irish dramatist Oscar Wilde (1854–1900) maintained that a map of the world that didn't contain utopia was not worth looking at, Thomas Macauley (1800–1859), the great whig historian, declared that he would much prefer an acre in Middlesex to a whole principality in utopia. That the concept emerged and developed in early modern Europe is perhaps not surprising, given that this was a period that saw the beginnings of massive social, economic, and political change. The construction of utopias was a way in which those who welcomed change could explore further possibilities, while to those who feared such change, or were concerned about the actual or proposed direction of change, the term *utopian* suitably colored could be a powerful weapon in their rhetorical struggle.

Definitions

The word *utopia* was coined by the English lawyer, politician, and writer Thomas More as the name of an imaginary commonwealth in *Utopia* (1516). The text is full of enigmas, and scholars have long pondered on the author's intentions; More's term *utopia* itself has an inbuilt double meaning, one that anticipates the later usage of the term. Although the book was written in Latin, utopia is a pun in ancient Greek in which the first syllable simultaneously denotes *eu*-topia—good place—and *ou*-topia—no place. The word thus lent itself to very different forms of deployment: on the one hand to various attempts to visualize the good society, but on the other as a critical term to castigate the search for the better or the best society or to reject specific plans for change, where "no place" is conceived as the unrealistic. This latter negative usage became so entrenched in popular and political usage that advocates of the good society were reluctant to use the term utopian to describe their own projects, and indeed would use the word themselves to denigrate alternative conceptions of social felicity. It is only since the end of

the nineteenth century that one finds theorists and activists in any number who self-consciously use the term utopian to signify in a positive manner their political hopes and aspirations.

Given its early modern coinage and its recurrent negative usage, the term *utopian* when used as a category of historical analysis is usually a retrospective judgment rather than a registering of the explicit self-identification of historical actors. Thus, the term has been used to characterize writings such as Plato's *Republic* (c. 380 BCE), which clearly predates More, as well as a variety of post-More writers who did not describe their works or projects as utopian. Inevitably, as the various histories of utopia demonstrate, given the differing definitions of utopia there is a good deal of disagreement as to what historically qualifies as a utopia. Furthermore, given the emergence of utopia as a Western category, there has been debate about the relevance of the term to non-Western societies, some arguing that it has little or no applicative value in such societies, others that the term has a sufficiently universal character to lend itself to global deployment, with a concomitant growing scholarly literature on, for example, Chinese and Japanese utopianism.

Turning to the "topia" aspect of the word, from the Greek *topos* (place), in More's case this had a spatial referent. Written in the time of the "Voyages of Discovery," Utopia was a newly discovered island, and the account of its institutions and people takes the form of a traveler's tale, as it does in the later *New Atlantis* (1627) of Francis Bacon. The spatial utopia, while not dying out (later there were lost valleys and forests and, of course, outer space in science fiction), increasingly gave way to the temporal utopia. Partly this was due to the so-called opening up of the globe, which rendered the notion of unknown lands implausible to Western eyes, but also because the temporal utopia—the good society lying in the future—was in tune with the linear progressivism to be found in first liberalism and then socialism. Indeed, it is possible to conceive of these ideologies as themselves embodying strong utopian impulses with their goals of the "free" or "equal" society to come; political opponents certainly saw these movements as dangerously utopian. The forward glance could also be accompanied, or even helpfully concealed, by the backward glance. A supposed glorious past, be it ancient Greece and Rome or earlier, itself heavily utopianized in the telling (for there was usually a strong element of the enhanced colors of a "golden age" in these supposedly objective accounts), could be a way of talking about a desired future without admitting to utopianism, as in strongly anti-utopian ideologies, such as Marxism (where discussion of the period of alleged prehistoric "primitive communism" was a way of talking about the communism that would be delivered by the "objective" processes of proletarian revolution), or could furnish resources for outlining a society of the future, critiqued in Karl Marx's account of the liberal need to dress up in the garb of classical antiquity.

The adjective "utopian" has certainly been used in many different ways. There is a range of what one might term *negative* usages, where the term is used as a synonym for unrealistic or impossible. Thus, conservatives have wielded the term in asserting their imperfectionist view of human nature against what they take to be radical perfectionism of liberalism and socialism; many twentieth-century liberals, such as Karl Popper (1902–1993), viewed the phenomena of Fascism and Soviet Communism as the poisonous fruit of a utopian cast of mind; while Marx and Friedrich Engels called some of their socialist predecessors and competitors "utopian socialists" on the grounds that they reduced socialism to a personal, unrealizable fantasy. In the case of those who wish to use the term in a more neutral analytical sense or a more positive political sense, what constitutes the utopian is a moot point. There is a spectrum from exclusive to inclusive definitions of the utopian. At the exclusive end, some analysts wish to confine the term to a form of imaginative literature initiated by Thomas More and reject any attempts to expand the concept to describe premodern literary forms or modern forms of political radicalism—a utopia is simply a modern literary genre. At the inclusive end, there are those who wish to characterize a great range of hopes, aspirations, and desires as utopian. It is probably true to say that in the main, the term *utopian* has become more inclusive over time. A spur to this has undoubtedly been the work of the German utopian Marxist, Ernst Bloch. In a series of influential texts, notably *The Spirit of Utopia* (1918) and *The Principle of Hope* (1938–1947), Bloch embraced the utopian and sought to anatomize the dream world of humanity from the

simplest of daydreams through to the sophisticated yearnings of culture and religion, finding articulations of hope at all levels of human endeavor and in all spheres of life, whether it be architecture, technology, fashion, travel, or the other areas explored in his encyclopedic *The Principle of Hope*.

As an analytical category, therefore, utopian can be used, and has been used, to designate a range of phenomena. There are the huge number of literary utopias with their various models of alternative societies—works such as William Morris's *News From Nowhere* (1890), Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1888), and H. G. Wells's *A Modern Utopia* (1905). There are the utopian aspirations and visions to be found in social and political thinking over the centuries, be they in individual thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Marx, or in broader ideological movements, such as anarchism and socialism. Not that utopianism is confined to the so-called progressive ideologies, for it makes sense to categorize the visions at the heart of Fascism and racially exclusive nationalism as utopian—though one need not subscribe to Popper's understanding of the utopian in relation to these ideologies. Then there are the various forms of community building—the various Owenite socialist communities set up in the first half of the nineteenth century, for example, or the Israeli Kibbutzim, or the various New Age communities established in many parts of the globe. Or, following Bloch, one might speak of a host of utopian traces to be found glistening at every level of social reality—little intimations of a better world sensed in a song, or a favorite place, or in the texture of a fabric.

Better and Best

But what is the "good" in the good society? Because historically utopia became associated with the notion of the best or perfect society, radicals of various persuasions could claim that their projects, because they merely aimed at a *better* state of affairs, were not utopian. In contemporary inclusive usages of the term *utopian,* where a much wider range of political visions are included in the category—some relatively modest in scope—there has been a strong tendency to conceive of the utopian in terms a search for a *better* society. It is possible that the gravitational pull of the negative definition of utopia is at work here; that the claim that the utopian was about pipe dreams, based on unsustainable claims about human potential, and therefore needing oppressive totalitarian structures did hit home. Whether or not this is the case, it is certainly true that there is a tendency to stress that utopians aspire to a *better* society, and the word *best* has rather dropped out of the definition. To use a phrase to be found in the later work of John Rawls (1921–2002), the aim is to be "realistically utopian." The better can of course be *radically* better, so this stance is not necessarily a sign of a lack of political and social ambition, or of a willingness to compromise key values, but it can be accompanied by a feeling that talk of perfection will deeply compromise the utopian. Others, however, from a different perspective, while acknowledging the necessary role for a realistic utopianism, fear that a reluctance to consider the best is to rob the utopian of one of its vital dimensions, radical fantasy, as in the dreams of the French "utopian socialist" Charles Fourier, where planets copulated with one another and the oceans turned to lemonade, or in the sublime words of God to Job in the Old Testament: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth…When the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy?"

Change and Continuity

The producers of utopias face a challenge to which many of them fail to rise—the problem of making goodness compelling. The passage from Job, just quoted, is gripping because it can legitimately be termed sublime, and the sublime, as Edmund Burke (1729–1797) reminds us, contains an element of dread, it is truly *terrible*. Historically, few utopias have attempted the sublime. The more usual portrayals of quotidian contentedness always run the risk of a certain emotional and political one-dimensionality, and the odor of a sermon. But imaginative writers and thinkers have been aware of this fact and have sought to reconstruct the way utopias are created.

In two influential books, Tom Moylan has sought to identify ways in which contemporary utopian authors have sought to overcome these problems. Although his focus is on literary texts,

the analysis has broader application to the issue of the utopian. In *Demand the Impossible* (1986), he proposed the concept of the "critical utopia"—a form that is not simply critical of existing society, but critical of the traditional elements of closure in so many utopian texts. This type of utopia identifies defects in the utopian world, highlights fundamental controversies, gives dissident voices a hearing, and avoids authorial omniscience; one example he examines is Marge Piercy's *Woman on the Edge of Time*. In a later work, *Scraps of the Untainted Sky* (2000) his starting point, following Lyman Tower Sargent, is the concept of the "anti-utopian"—the belief that utopianism is an inherently dangerous activity that will inevitably lead to despotism and human degradation. In "dystopian" form, anti-utopianism issues forth in depictions of societies ravaged by the ignorance and hubris of utopian experiments. Utopians also have gravitated to the dystopian form, but unlike the anti-utopians, have adapted the form to keep hopes alive. Thus, we have the "critical dystopia," equipped with all the appurtenances of the bad society, but containing, in both form and content, a destabilizing element of dogged hope; Marge Piercy is again mentioned as an exemplar, this time with *He, She and It*.

These developments testify to the resilience of the utopian. Whether or not one subscribes to the notion of a utopian impulse in humans, the sheer weight of social dreaming over the centuries and across cultures suggests that it meets some fairly basic human needs. It shares with normative political philosophy a concern with fundamental values, but moves beyond the abstract in its attempt to think through or imagine what the embodiment of such values would look like in an actual society. This gives it an immediacy and a connectedness to human concerns and experience that it shares with imaginative literature. It is also a potent form of critique with the absences of specific negative features in its alternative society throwing their presence in existing society into high relief. In this sense, utopias are potent thought experiments grappling with what is essential and nonessential in social relationships. They can also be a form of serious playfulness, a speculative turning of the world upside down to see what might happen. Above all, it seems to partake of the human need to daydream, to imagine oneself and others in different positions and relations, undergoing different, more exciting, more fulfilling experiences. Even those with an acre in Middlesex will occasionally scan the map for that far-off utopian principality.

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See also Apocalyptic Ideas; Desire; Emancipation; Happiness; Ideology; Imaginary, The; Liberalism; Socialism

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V

Value-Free Social Science

Much of the modern debate about value freedom in social science has taken place within a framework articulated, in the early twentieth century, by the sociologist Max Weber. In his discussions of objectivity and ethical neutrality in social science, Weber made a sharp distinction between the "vocations" of science and politics on the basis of what he insisted was a fundamental logical difference between a claim about what "is" and a claim about what "ought" to be. The latter included value judgments, ideals, and interests, which were assumed to be expressions of choice and decision whose validity was largely a matter of faith rather than factual or empirical demonstration. Weber, however, stressed the interaction between these spheres. He noted that because values inevitably inform empirical inquiry through the perspective, commitments, and presuppositions of the investigator, there could be no absolutely objective analysis of social phenomena, but he also argued that factual knowledge could in various and important ways influence and guide value judgments in areas such as public policy. He maintained that despite the subjective element inherent in the point of view of the investigator as well as in the values embedded in political and social phenomena themselves, empirical and causal claims in social science could be judged by universally valid and objective standards of factual and logical truth.

Some have interpreted Weber's analysis as the paradigm case of the position that social science can never be truly objective and scientific, while others have characterized him as the principal exponent of the idea that social science can and should be value free. Most commentators, however, have failed to recognize the practical intention of Weber's formulation. His primary reason for distinguishing between science and politics, or fact and value, was to establish the independent cognitive authority of social science, and this same purpose, both before and after Weber, has been central to the history of the social sciences in both Europe and the United States. Lacking any inherent political authority, the hope for social scientific intervention in social and political matters was predicated on transcending ideology and grounding its claims on scientific objectivity.

This was even true of the philosophy of logical positivism which, after Weber, created the terms of much of the subsequent discussion of the issue of value freedom. During the early years of the twentieth century, positivism emerged in Europe as a liberal, and sometimes radical, challenge, in the name of science, to traditional intellectual and political authority. The original impetus was not unlike that which informed the creation of organizations such as the American Political Science Association (APSA, in 1903). Although the APSA perpetuated the practical aspirations of nineteenth century political science, it was founded not only on a different ideological agenda but on the assumption that those aspirations could only be achieved by embracing the basic methodology of natural science. Positivism, and its elaboration in the philosophy of logical empiricism, whose

principal representatives had, by the 1950s, immigrated to the United States, increasingly became the source of the image of science embraced by social scientists. In both cases, however, the pursuit of scientism eventually became detached from its political origins.

The positivists famously argued that there were three basic and mutually exclusive forms of language and human judgment: logical, factual, and evaluative. While empirical or factual judgments could be verified or falsified by reference to observable phenomena and were thus the foundation of science, value judgments, as well as metaphysical ethical claims, were, strictly conceived, meaningless and noncognitive. For many social scientists, this suggested that value words, and evaluative and prescriptive claims, must be excluded from social science, and it also implied that much of political theory and political philosophy was questionable as a cogent endeavor. Although for early twentieth-century political scientists such as Charles Merriam, science was clearly a means to the end of speaking truth to power, the succeeding generation of political scientists, who were the founders of the behavioral movement, sublimated practical concerns in the pursuit of emulating the methodology of the natural sciences. This methodology was understood as entailing not only a belief in the logical and epistemological unity of science but the necessity of value freedom. Following the lead of philosophers such as Ernest Nagel and Carl Hempel, political scientists such as Robert Dahl and David Easton stressed the heterogeneity of values and facts. They argued that if the discipline was to be value free, it must distinguish between the value concerns of political philosophy or normative political theory and empirical political science. In their view, this could be achieved in large measure by eliminating value terms from the vocabulary of political science. By the 1950s, some commentators, such as Peter Laslett, despairingly concluded that because political philosophy was largely an extension of ethics, the triumph of positivism entailed that political philosophy and normative political theory was, in effect, dead. Political theorists such as Leo Strauss, Isaiah Berlin, and Charles Taylor, however, advanced arguments to the effect that it was impossible to separate the language of values from descriptive claims and that an evaluative perspective was inherent in any social scientific investigation.

Vestiges of this basic controversy continue to reverberate in the discourse of political theory and political science. The terms of controversy about a value-free social science, as well as the distinction between normative and empirical theory, were still bound by the Weberian and positivist frameworks. Today, however, positivism is, at most, an obsolescent philosophy, and, consequently, the traditional formulation of the issue has become questionable. Philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and Stephen Toulmin have stressed the limitations of the fact-value dichotomy as an account of language, forms of reasoning, and, in general, "what we do with words"; and other philosophers, such as Thomas Kuhn, have pointed to the paucity of the positivist image of the logic and epistemology of natural science. Similarly, the distinction between empirical and normative inquiry is seldom any longer viewed as exhaustive.

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See also Behavioralism; Berlin, Isaiah; Dahl, Robert; Empirical Theory; Explanation; Positivism; Science of Politics; Strauss, Leo; Weber, Max

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VIOLENCE

While the question of violence in general is daunting, when considered from the perspective of political theory, it immediately becomes more manageable through a focus on the relationship between *violence* and *politics*. In the history of

political theory, this relationship has been formulated in different ways by three groups of thinkers. The first, which traditionally includes thinkers as varied as Niccolò Machiavelli, Max Weber, and Vladimir Lenin, is thought to have identified politics—or more precisely, political power—with force, domination, coercion, in short, violence. Hannah Arendt is emblematic of a second group of thinkers who share the definition of violence proposed by this first group while emphatically rejecting its association with political power. Arendt also rejects a third group of thinkers—whose clearest representatives are Georges Sorel and Frantz Fanon—with whom she disagrees on the definition of violence itself. However, something is lost in this conceptual incongruence, as this third group can be seen to propose an understanding of violence that is in many ways compatible with Arendt's formulation of politics.

Violence and the State

Machiavelli is frequently seen as the earliest and least apologetic of political thinkers with regard to the association between violence and politics. Credited with an unsurpassed realism by admirers and considered the very embodiment of evil by detractors, notably Leo Strauss, Machiavelli is seen as the ultimate proponent of might-makes-right political instrumentalism. Such a view relies on chapter 18 of *The Prince,* in which many have claimed Machiavelli insisted that, in politics, the ends justify the means. Peter Bondanella and John Musa, however, insist that this is a translation error and that the author is merely noting the absence of impartial judges and the need to take the end result into account when judging an action.

Indeed, the traditional view of Machiavelli as purveyor of bare Realpolitik would need to reckon with several other enigmatic moments in the same chapter, in which he associates law with man and force with beasts and further distinguishes between sly beasts like the fox and powerful and violent beasts like the lion. But not all men can shun the beastly parts of their nature, and given Machiavelli's notably critical view of human nature, it remains true that he never excludes the need to resort to beastly measures of any stripe to counter the self-interest of others. The difficulties of navigating the human world lead Machiavelli to distinguish valuable quantities like glory and skill (*virtù*) from the ambivalences of violence and power, as in his critique of Agathocles the Sicilian in chapter 8.

In fact, the further one moves from the frequently cited chapter 18 of *The Prince,* the less conventionally instrumental Machiavelli's understanding of violence appears. For if his positive evaluation of Romulus may initially appear to endorse the claim that means justify ends, it serves equally to introduce a qualitative distinction between different kinds of violence: It is not the same, for Machiavelli, to turn violence toward destruction as it is to turn violence toward restoration. Constructive violence can here be read in relation to Machiavelli's innovative view of the productive and generative effects of conflict that would lead him, with the example of the Roman Republic, to defend republicanism as a form of government against those contemporary critics who dismissed it as unstable and anarchic. This defense of republicanism then adds another twist to *The Prince,* turning Machiavelli's earlier emphasis on military strength as the basis for good laws (chap. 12) toward a view in which proper military organization—specifically, a militia structure—itself has a politically generative effect that transcends brute domination and points toward more democratic forms of organization.

Much of the instrumental understanding of violence generally attributed to Machiavelli is arguably better located in German sociologist Max Weber (notwithstanding the claim by Reinhard Bendix that both thinkers share a view of society as an object of governance). Unlike Machiavelli, whose objects of analysis oscillated between power and glory, Weber set out more directly from the conundrum of the state, and it is in responding to the question of the preconditions for the very existence of the state that he turns to violence. In so doing, Weber explicitly distinguishes means from ends, insisting in his seminal lecture "Politics as a Vocation" that given the multiplicity of ends toward which states can direct their energies, these cannot define the state as such. Rather, citing Leon Trotsky's similar declaration, the state can only be defined by the *means* that it employs and that is specific to it: physical force or violence (*Gewaltsamkeit*). Having set out from the state, Weber defines politics in those same terms, as a

struggle over the distribution of power within or between states. However, given Weber's early critique of what he deemed "Sultanism," he was acutely aware that this brute force that defines state power was insufficient as an understanding of the operation of subjection. Violence toward the populace invoked fear, which for Weber as for Machiavelli was a weak foundation on which to build lasting power: What was missing was the process through which this violence from above was met with consent from below.

It is at this intersection that Weber's concept of *Herrschaft*—translated alternately as "domination" and "authority"—is central. Historically, Weber identifies three pure types of domination, each of which involves its own form of encouraging legitimation or consent from below: *traditional* domination indicates a relationship between masters and followers on the basis of an unquestioned and perpetual rule, operating largely through personal relationships; *charismatic* domination, in which individual leadership qualities are prized over traditional ones; and *legal* domination, in which consent is granted through administrative mechanisms to laws rather than individuals. It is precisely on the basis of the development of this last form of *Herrschaft* that Weber is able to argue that the specifically modern state, rather than merely deploying force, instead enjoys a monopoly on its *legitimate* use. But legitimacy here should not be interpreted as a term of endorsement, as Weber himself would turn to charismatic domination as a potential counterweight to the "iron cage" of modern bureaucracy.

While Lenin insisted in *State and Revolution* that the ends toward which state violence is directed do matter, he nevertheless agreed with Weber's sociological approach whereby the state is defined in such a way as to accommodate distinct ends (i.e., bourgeois or proletarian). But in so doing, Lenin implicitly rejects the formal universalism of Weber's modern state, in which citizens have come to replace subjects or followers, opting instead for an understanding of the modern state as class rule operating through the same military (monopoly of legitimate force) and bureaucratic (legal domination) institutions that Weber had identified.

Arguing simultaneously against opportunists, for whom the bourgeois state could be seized ready-made, and anarchists, for whom no state could justifiably be seized at all, Lenin argued that bourgeois and proletarian states fundamentally differ even though both qualify as instruments of class domination: The former represent domination of the poor by the rich and the latter the opposite. Hence, the applicability of the concept is maintained without the universalism: To have a proletarian state is still to have a state, but the inversion of domination that it represents clears the way for the second stage, the withering away of the state itself (and violence more generally) through the replacement—on the model of the Paris Commune—of the bureaucratic and military elements of the modern state with a directly democratic and armed communal structure. Hence, although Lenin continues to view violence as pertaining to the state, he nevertheless creates a space, like Machiavelli, for a consideration of qualitatively different types of violence.

Arendt's "Mute" Violence

In both *The Human Condition* (1958) and *On Revolution* (1963), Arendt's distaste for violence is clear. In an effort to redefine and reclaim politics, she self-consciously adopts the formulations of Aristotle, which see man as both a political being (*zōon politikon*) and a speaking being (*zōon logon ekhon*), thereby tying the political intimately to the phenomenon of speech. If Arendt's understanding of the political is determined both in terms of its location (the *polis*) and its content (*logos*), then the same can be said of violence, which is not excluded from her theory but merely relegated to the private sphere of the household (*oikos*)—the site of labor as opposed to action—and dismissed as the opposite of speech, as silence. Violence, she tells her readers in *On Revolution,* cannot speak and must therefore be banished from the political realm and left to technicians.

If violence is condemned in the public sphere as the antithesis of politics, Arendt tacitly justifies the function of violence in the private, or household, sphere. For Arendt, the household realm is closely associated with labor, that cyclical, immediate, and inescapable process of fulfilling one's physical necessities. The violence of the ancient household was directly associated with the effort to escape necessity: It was only through enslaving others that one's own necessities could be fulfilled by another,

thereby allowing escape from the private world of necessity and entry into the public world of politics. But if the association of violence with labor and necessity is clear in Arendt's work and contributes to her central project of distinguishing the public from the private, the same cannot be said for the concept of work, whose violence is less clearly distinguishable from her understanding of the political.

As the process that creates the durable human world, work necessarily involves an element of violation, an exhilarating violence toward the world in the process of dominating it. Hence, the violence involved in labor and work are not qualitatively different, but merely have different victims and objects: We bind *others* to the necessity of nature to free ourselves from labor, whereas to engage in work entails a more direct domination of nature. But because work and the relative permanence that characterizes its artifacts—the epitome of which is the work of art, consciously placed beyond usage—transcends the merely private realm of necessity and consumption and enters the public realm of political action, so too does its domineering violence. Thus, if violence in the political realm was categorically condemned, it was indirectly justified in other realms through the exceedingly high premium Arendt would place on politics. This then gives rise to a second reason why she opposes political violence: Not only is it essentially antipolitical in its silence, but it also frequently represents—as in the case of the French Revolution—the violation of the division between public and private that Arendt hopes to preserve, the forced entry of necessity into politics that she so dreads.

While Arendt was heavily influenced by Weber, she disagreed with him on this point, not due to his definition of violence—which they in fact shared—but rather for his association of that violence, through the nexus of the state, with the political realm. Her position toward Machiavelli was equally complex, occasionally dismissing his instrumental view of politics—instrumentality, for Arendt, being a characteristic of work, not action—but occasionally attempting to see in his appeal to leadership (something to be found as well in Weber's appeal to charisma) something more closely related to her own view of the political. This ambiguity toward Machiavelli points us toward a third category of thinkers that Arendt would spare no ink in critiquing. These thinkers differ with Arendt not—as did Weber—on the question of the political, but rather on the question of violence itself, which they see in terms more compatible with Arendt's notion of politics: as a generative force characterized by its capacity to speak.

A Violence That Speaks

French syndicalist Georges Sorel is perhaps the best-known thinker to focus his attention directly on the phenomenon of violence, but it is important not to be misled by what he means by the term. Toward the end of his *Reflections on Violence*, Sorel observes that his central task was the establishment of a distinction between two phenomena: force and violence. *Force* indicates the repression of the majority for the benefit of a politically dominant minority embodied in the institutions of the state, whereas *violence* properly understood represents the liberatory power of the proletariat aimed at destroying that state. Here we have, not an inversion of Machiavelli's discussion of destructive versus reparative violence, but rather continuity under redefined terms: For Sorel, the state is institutionalized destruction, whereas it is proletarian violence that "mends." Violence, for Sorel, is therefore determined less by its form (i.e., Weber's "physical force") than by its proletarian content, and this distinction places Sorel in tension with both the realist Weberian tradition that associates politics with violence and the Arendtian tradition that holds them in opposition.

In practice, Sorel's concept of violence functions toward the consolidation of class identity. In the absence of objective class categories and in the face of an increasingly powerful ideology of harmony, Sorel formulated violence—in the form of the general strike—as an intervention capable of rescuing the working class from incorporation into the social totality. Through the violent assertion of social antagonism, the working class would be empowered, the bourgeoisie provoked and scandalized, and the existence of social classes would become more generally salient. The world-historical function of this violence would then, for Sorel, become apparent: By restoring the class division of society in all its purity, the objectivity of Marxist science would also be restored.

It is likely that Fanon read Sorel, despite never citing him. Indeed, Sorel's importance for Francophone discussions of violence was so great that Jean-Paul Sartre—in his preface to Fanon's analysis of violence in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961)—went out of his way to dismiss Sorel's relevance entirely. The importance of violence for Fanon's framework is clearly visible in his 1952 work *Black Skin, White Masks*. In this earlier work, however, Fanon formulates a violence that is almost entirely symbolic, consisting of the violent assertion of one's own existence in the face of ontological disqualification. Speaking in Hegelian terms, Fanon insisted that racialized subjects were perceived as nonbeings, and that the only way to create the basis for a Hegelian structure of recognition was through violent appearance. This focus on the symbolic and ontological elements of violence continued throughout Fanon's later work and his relocation to the Algerian context, but the overwhelming and concrete violence of the colonial structure forced him to focus on the violence of the state in a way more reminiscent of Sorel. Against the violence of colonialism, the colonized was to reply with a qualitatively distinct violence that maintains the ontological function of *Black Skin, White Masks*. If Sorel's violence sought the reestablishment of class identity, Fanon's was oriented toward the construction of national consciousness.

Both Sorel and Fanon celebrate *violence* in a manner that Arendt finds unacceptable, but what she fails to recognize is the importance of the distinction that both introduce into the term. In her short book *On Violence,* published at the height of the 1960s tumult, Arendt maintains her assessment of violence as instrumental, while blurring her own categories by recognizing that it is also a form of action. While this might seem like a step toward Sorel and Fanon—as violence is drawn closer to the political—Arendt sees it as even more foreboding than muteness: the unpredictability and irreversibility of action make violence all the more threatening. This is because, if she tacitly recognizes the capacity of violence to speak, it remains monolingual. What Sorel and Fanon embrace is a liberatory violence that operates in much the same way—as noninstrumental, open-ended, transformative, communicative, and creative action—as Arendt's own understanding of politics. But this liberatory violence is held in constant tension with the repressive state violence or force that characterizes more traditional, Weberian accounts of politics. If, for Arendt, ancient slaves were deemed "slavish" in nature for their refusal to resist their own enslavement and fight for their liberty, then nothing could appear less "slavish" than the resignification of violence offered by Sorel and Fanon. And would not her tacit justification of the violence that subdues necessity also lend support to those whose needs have still not been met today?

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See also Arendt, Hannah; Aristotle; Authority; Domination; Fanon, Frantz; Force; Lenin and the Russian Revolution; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Marxism; Power; Race Theory; Revolution; Sorel, Georges; State; Weber, Max

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VIRTUAL

In common parlance, to classify or describe something as virtual is to contrast it with what is real. The real is characterized by physical, tangible qualities that can be observed empirically. The *virtual* represents—re-presents, copies, simulates—the

real. Consider, for example, the concept of copresence: two or more people sharing the same space at the same time. Real copresence is most obviously registered through the senses: the capacity to see, hear, touch, and smell those whose presence one is sharing. In contrast, virtual copresence describes the sense of sharing time and space, even though one has indirect and limited access to those who appear to be present, while quite possibly being far away, asleep, unaware of you, or doing something else. A telephone call suggests a virtual copresence of voices, but not of sight, touch, or smell. A videoconference offers an opportunity to see and hear others, almost as if they were present, and yet they remain physically untouchable and environmentally dislocated.

The virtual is sometimes spoken of as a degraded form of the real or original. It is argued that even though virtual entities, events, and communications may at times offer a convenient substitute for the real, they can never convey the multidimensionality of actuality. From this perspective, the inevitable failure of mimetic correspondence between the virtual and the real dooms the former to epistemological and aesthetic impoverishment.

In complete contrast to the previous perspective, others argue that virtuality serves to supplement the original. While the real can only ever be an approximation of its ideal, the virtual can be designed to correspond to ideal qualities. An avatar, for example, can be revised and refined until it conforms to an aesthetic ideal. Or, in a virtual economic model, actors can be designed to behave in accordance with economic laws rather than in the less predictable ways that characterize real market behavior. In this sense, virtuality is seen as a way of resolving the incompleteness of reality; in Jean Baudrillard's terms, it constitutes a form of hyper-reality.

A third notion of the virtual sees it neither as degradation nor supplement of the real, but a playful space of counterfactuality in which alternative realities can be imagined, designed, or acted out. In this sense, the virtual should not be evaluated in terms of whether it adequately reproduces the original, but regarded as a utopian or ludic counterreality. For example, Second Life should not be judged on the basis of whether it replicates the real world; it is supposed to be an alternative *real world,* appealing precisely because it is unaffected by many of the physical and cultural constraints of known historical reality.

Two examples of the political use of the term *virtual* will help to illustrate the different ways in which it has been employed and understood. In British elections in the eighteenth century, only a minority of the population had the right to vote. They claimed to be voting not only for themselves, but on behalf of "the most poor, illiterate and uninformed creatures upon earth" (notes Edmund Burke in a letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe in 1792) whom they believed lacked the ability to make political decisions for themselves. This act of disenfranchisement was known at the time as virtual representation. The suggestion here was that, while most people were disqualified from voting, their interests were being taken into account by an elite who understood them better than they did themselves. In this sense, virtuality was intended to imply that the majority of British people, though physically absent from the electoral process, were somehow made present through the actions of others. Virtuality was used as a rationale for political exclusion, much like being offered a *virtual tour* of a building one would be unwelcome to enter physically.

A more recent use of the term has been to describe the Internet as a potential public sphere. Building on John B. Thompson's theoretical account of mediatization as a process whereby "the exchange of symbolic forms is no longer restricted primarily to the contexts of face-to-face interaction, but is extensively and increasingly mediated by the institutions and mechanisms of mass communication" (1990, p. 15), some scholars have argued that citizenship is increasingly taking a virtual form, for example, in online social movements, online communities, and e-enabled relationships between governments and citizens. In the 1990s, the notion of the "Netizen," as a virtual citizen, became fashionable, as did ideas of virtual politics and virtual democracy. Unlike virtual representation, which sought to justify the absence of people from power by characterizing them as virtually spoken for, Internet-related virtuality has tended to be employed as a way of enhancing representation and participation. For example, by diminishing social cues that might lead to some people being ignored in the physical world, or allowing ideas to move globally without entailing the costs of international travel,

virtual communication broadens the possible range of democratic inclusion.

It is unwise to think of virtuality in a politically deterministic way. That is to say, being virtual neither empowers nor weakens citizens; it neither broadens nor constrains public spheres. Being virtual is historically contingent: In some situations, it allows people to engage in more meaningful communications that strengthen opportunities for consequential collective action; in other situations virtual interaction might be a poor substitute for physical intercourse. It is equally unwise to think of the virtual as being wholly decoupled from the real or physical; in most cases, acting virtually—such as sending an e-mail, taking a photograph, or joining a global movement—leads to social activities in the real world. Although some virtual experiences (such as online gaming) are fairly self-contained, most are not.

Being virtual can be seen as an extension of time-space distanciation, whereby relations between social actors have become increasingly disembedded from physical presence. This is one of the most conspicuous characteristics of modernity, giving rise to a range of highly significant social reconfigurations, most notably globalization, with its virtual flows of finance, knowledge, and power.

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See also Agency; Imaginary, The; Representation

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VIRTUE

In political theory, the word *virtue* usually refers to the disposition or character traits appropriate to a citizen. Someone who takes the responsibilities of citizenship seriously, to the point of putting the common good ahead of his or her personal interests, is thus said to display *civic virtue.* Political theorists have frequently warned that such virtue cannot be taken for granted, however, and many of them have urged that steps be taken to promote or foster civic virtue. This concern for the fragility of civic virtue is a clear theme in ancient (or classical) political thought, but it has also played an important part in modern and contemporary political theory.

The Concept of Virtue

The English word virtue derives from the Latin *virtus,* but scholars typically trace the concept of virtue to the Greek idea of *aretē,* which may be translated as either "virtue" or "excellence." To ancient thinkers, virtue was not so much a matter of holding and following the right beliefs as it was a matter of outstanding ability—that is, of excellence. A great warrior, such as Achilles in Homer's *Iliad,* would exhibit the virtues of courage and strength; a great philosopher, such as Socrates, would exemplify the virtues of wisdom and justice. But virtue was not something confined to human beings. Anything that was excellent in the appropriate way, including animals and tools, would be virtuous. Traces of this way of thinking are still with us, as when someone speaks of the virtue of a watch being its accurate time keeping, or of a knife that has the virtue of cutting cleanly. Such usages, though, are likely to seem quaint, and perhaps even archaic, in a time when virtue is usually regarded as *moral* goodness.

Ancient philosophers and poets concerned themselves more with the virtues of people than with those of animals and implements, of course, and in this regard it is important to note the connection between the Latin words *virtus* and *vir,* or man. Women could be excellent in their own way, but for the Romans virtue largely consisted in the kinds of excellence expected of men. In Virgil's *Aeneid,* for example, the hero Aeneas is a leader of men, a mighty warrior, and a model of piety who shows proper reverence for both his father and the gods—a paragon of all that a man should be. Aeneas also put his love of country and devotion to duty above his own happiness and pleasure, and in doing so he served as an exemplar of *civic* virtue.

This connection between virtue and manliness persisted into modern history, as the next section will indicate, but the rise of Christianity presented a powerful challenge. For ancient philosophers, the cardinal virtues were courage, wisdom, temperance (or prudence), and justice. These are not exclusively military or "manly" excellences, to be sure, but it was easy to think of them as being more appropriate to men than to women, who were largely confined to domestic life. To these classical virtues, however, Christians added the "theological virtues" of faith, hope, and love (*agapē* in Greek, *caritas* in Latin)—virtues that are neither martial nor particularly manly, in the classical view.

The growing emphasis on the theological or Christian virtues in late antiquity may also have contributed to the tendency to think of virtue as a matter of moral goodness rather than excellence or outstanding ability. This tendency is reflected in the distinction that we have come to draw, at least implicitly, between a *virtuoso* and a virtuous person. A virtuoso is someone who possesses and displays outstanding ability of some sort—usually outstanding musical ability—but there is no reason to think that a virtuoso will also be a virtuous, or *morally* admirable, person. In this respect, the modern conception of virtue is quite different from the ancient.

Civic Virtue in Ancient Political Thought

For the classical political philosophers of the ancient world, civic or political virtue was largely a matter of putting aside private desires and personal interests in order to do what is best for the public at large. In his *Republic,* for example, the Greek philosopher Plato (427–347 BCE) argues that ruling, or statesmanship, is a craft that aims at what is best not for the ruler, but for those who are ruled. Plato's student Aristotle (384–322 BCE) went on to say, in his *Politics,* that the citizen is someone who both rules and is ruled—that is, someone who has a say in determining what policies and laws should be enacted, but who also has a responsibility to obey those policies and laws. For Aristotle, the conditions that foster a virtuous life, including the life of the virtuous citizen, are those of the middle class, for the people in this class are neither so rich as to be spoiled by a life of luxury nor so poor as to be ground down by poverty. Those in the middle class are prosperous enough to be able to devote some time to politics, and to think and speak independently when they do, but not so wealthy as to lose respect for the value of work and thrift. The most fortunate political society, then, is the one in which people of middling means dominate, for there civic virtue is most likely to thrive. For Plato and Aristotle, moreover, education is of fundamental concern, for the proper education will cultivate the proper dispositions and traits among those young people who are to become citizens.

Similar attitudes prevailed among Roman political thinkers, especially Cicero (106–43 BCE) and other champions of the republic. As its derivation from the Latin *res publica* indicates, the republic is the "public thing," or the public business of all citizens. The good citizen, therefore, will be the one who distinguishes himself—and citizens were exclusively men—by his devotion to the good of the republic. Civic virtue, in other words, was *republican* virtue, and the most virtuous were those who would bear arms or otherwise risk life and fortune to preserve the republic. One celebrated model of the republican citizen was the general Cincinnatus, who left his farm to lead the Roman army in the fifth century BCE, only to relinquish his command and return to farming once victory had secured the survival of the republic.

Civic Virtue in Modern Political Thought

Virtue has remained an important concern of modern political theorists, and nowhere more plainly so than in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), a citizen of Florence. Machiavelli wrote in Italian rather than Latin, but his frequent references to *virtù* indicate that virtue remained for him very much a manly and martial quality. In his most famous book, *The Prince,* he finds virtue not only in those who are bold and brave, but also in those who are deceitful and cruel, at least when deceit and cruelty will help to preserve the state. In his *Discourses on Livy* and other writings, moreover, Machiavelli praises republican virtue and advocates a militia composed of arms-bearing citizens, which he took to be a better safeguard of the citizens' liberty than reliance on mercenaries or a standing army of professional soldiers.

Like other republicans, Machiavelli tended to think of *corruption* as the enemy of civic virtue. If civic virtue is the disposition to put the public good ahead of one's own, then corruption is what ensues when people think first and foremost of their private or personal interests. In order to promote and sustain civic virtue, then, it is necessary to be on guard against ambition, avarice, and luxury—that is, against the love of power, of money, and of the soft, easy life. Establishing a citizen militia would be one way to cultivate devotion to the common good while combating corruption.

This opposition of virtue to corruption continued to play an important part in modern political theory, but less obviously so as virtue came to be associated as much with commerce—in the form of such bourgeois virtues as thrift, industry, and far-sightedness—as it was with citizenship or piety. This desire to promote both commercial and civic virtues appears, for example, in the works of the French philosopher the baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755) and some of the founding fathers of the United States.

Montesquieu placed so much emphasis on virtue as love of one's country and "love of equality" in his *The Spirit of the Laws* that he found it necessary, in a foreword to the second edition, to assure church authorities that his concern was with "political" rather than "moral" or "Christian" virtue. For Montesquieu, political or civic virtue is the "principle"—that is, the mainspring or motivating force—of republican governments. What moves people to act in a monarchy, he said, is the love of honor; in a despotic regime, it is fear; and in a republic, it is virtue, understood as love of a country where the citizens are equal under the law. The problem is how to preserve this political virtue in an increasingly commercial, profit-driven world.

One answer to this question is to design political institutions in such a way as to make reliance on virtuous citizens less necessary, if not altogether unnecessary. Montesquieu thought that the British had hit on one way of doing this by the separation of powers in their government, with executive power vested in the crown, legislative power in the parliament, and judicial power in the courts. By separating power in this way, self-interested or ambitious attempts to advance private interests would be frustrated by their inability to gain control of all the branches of government. To this device other political thinkers added the checks and balances that enable those who control one branch of government to thwart the designs of those in the other branches.

Separation of powers and checks and balances are key features of the U.S. Constitution, and there is no doubt that the framers of the Constitution intended these devices as safeguards against ambition, avarice, and other vices. As James Madison wrote in *The Federalist,* number 51, the need for government is itself a reflection on human nature; and just as government must control the governed, so must it also control itself. That is why "[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition" in a system of checks and balances. Yet Madison also held, in *The Federalist*, number 57, that every constitution ought to aim first at placing power in the hands of those who possess "most virtue to pursue, the common good of society," and then aim at "keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust." Like the ancient philosophers, Madison and other early modern thinkers remained convinced of both the importance and the fragility of civic virtue.

A similar concern seems to have led Alexis de Tocqueville (1804–1859) to warn in his *Democracy in America* against the threat of "individualism," which he took to be a withdrawal from public life in favor of life in the narrow circle of family and friends. Part of the remedy, Tocqueville said, is to educate people to see that self-interest properly understood requires them to bear a share of the responsibility for democratic government. His English contemporary, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), went on to argue against the secret ballot on the grounds that voting is not a right but a public trust—a trust that is best fulfilled by casting one's vote openly. Mill seldom spoke explicitly of civic virtue, however, and in that regard he seems typical of political theorists throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century.

The reasons for this neglect are no doubt manifold and complicated. According to some scholars, the emphasis that social-contract theorists and others gave to natural rights and individual liberties drew attention away from civic duty and virtue—and perhaps fostered the kind of individualism that Tocqueville deplored. Virtue may also have seemed unimportant to thinkers who believed that

a proper grasp of human nature or history would provide the key to the proper arrangement of political society. For the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), for example, the knowledge that desire for pleasure and aversion to pain govern our actions leads quickly to the conclusion that the business of government is to promote social happiness by punishing those who cause pain and rewarding those who give pleasure. This was a step, moreover, that required no attention to civic virtue. For Karl Marx (1818–1883) and many other socialists, virtue and other moralistic terms were ideological vestiges that would be left behind once class conflict and technological growth had brought about a new historical epoch in which every individual will be equally free to develop his or her potential. To the extent that it still carried aristocratic connotations as a celebration of excellence, virtue may also have seemed hostile to the egalitarian ethos that motivated not only socialists but all advocates of democracy.

Civic Virtue Today

Whatever the reasons for its neglect in the nineteenth century, political theorists' interest in civic virtue clearly began to revive late in the twentieth century. This revival is likely related to the renewed interest in "virtue theory," with its long look backward to Aristotle, on the part of moral philosophers. Another contributing factor is the growing sense that liberal democracy requires some significant degree of virtue among its citizens if it is to survive. As societies have become more populous, the state or government seems to be more remote from the citizen; and as societies have become more diverse ethnically and culturally, the bonds that draw citizens together seem to be weaker than in decades past. In conditions such as these, a virtuous citizenry cannot be taken for granted; nor is it clear that institutional arrangements and incentives can sustain liberal democracy in the absence of civic virtue. As a consequence, many political theorists are once again asking how this fragile virtue can be fostered and protected. One result is a renewed interest in civic education; another is increased attention to the question of what it means to be a citizen in a multicultural society and an increasingly cosmopolitan world. Yet another is the question of whether the concept of civic virtue is irretrievably tied to the idea of the arms-bearing male citizen, or whether it is capacious enough to accommodate women.

How these questions are or ought to be answered is the subject of lively debate in the early twenty-first century. The fact that the debate goes on, however, and that it is so lively, testifies to the continuing importance of virtue to political theory.

Richard Dagger

See also American Founding; Aristotle; Bentham, Jeremy; Cicero; Citizenship; Civic Humanism; Civic Republicanism; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Marx, Karl; Mill, John Stuart; Montesquieu, Baron de; Plato; Republicanism; Roman Commonwealth; Socialism; Standing Armies; Tocqueville, Alexis de

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Vitoria, Francisco de (1485–1546)

Francisco de Vitoria was the leading figure in the School of Salamanca, which revived scholastic

theology and the natural law philosophy of Thomas Aquinas in sixteenth-century Spain. Like Aquinas, Vitoria entered the Dominican order at a young age and studied at the University of Paris. As a professor of theology at Valladolid and Salamanca, he helped to spread the use of Aquinas's framework as the primary source for university training in theology. However, one would be mistaken to assume that Vitoria's work is a restatement of Thomistic theology. He drew on many kinds of sources and perspectives, including classical philosophy and rhetoric, patristic theology, civil and canon law, and conciliar theory. His commentaries reveal him to be focused on the moral and political problems of his own time. Vitoria's surviving works are of two kinds: lectures on Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* and on Peter Lombard's *Sentences,* and a series of annual *relectiones* or rereadings. This entry on Vitoria's contributions to political theory will be informed by his reflections and will focus on his conception of civil association and his contribution to the theory of natural rights and to the emergent modern law of nations.

Vitoria argued that the end of the civil association or commonwealth is a natural necessity, not just in terms of the material requirements of human life but in terms of the development of the moral and intellectual capacity of the members. In this, his views are similar to Aristotle and Aquinas. He identified God as the efficient cause of the commonwealth. Because the material cause of the commonwealth is the people, he concludes that civil authority is delegated from the people to the rulers. The actual ordering of offices in the commonwealth is a matter of human law and custom. Vitoria defended monarchy as the best kind of rule and went far beyond Aquinas, arguing that royal power as distinct from civil power in general is granted by God directly to the king.

The political role of the church and the papacy in Vitoria's time complicate his concept of civil association. Vitoria was determined to oppose Protestant understandings of the church by insisting that the royal power of the papacy was granted by Christ to Peter and the other apostles, and consequently that ecclesial authority was limited to the ordained clergy. Nevertheless, he was also interested in explaining the civil authority of the papacy as being limited and subject to resistance when abused. The concept of *dominium* (lordship) became central to Vitoria's solutions to the problems of religion and politics that he faced, not only in his confrontation with the teachings of the Protestant Reformers but also in his writings about the New World.

Vitoria understood dominium to be the intellectual capacity of human beings to order their own acts, to own and use material goods, and to exercise legal jurisdiction. According to Vitoria, all human beings have true dominium by nature. This led him to conclude that the "barbarians" of the New World were true owners and true rulers of their lands, and not natural slaves as some of his contemporaries had argued. Because no principle of natural law exists whereby one person could claim dominium over the entire world, there could be no actual papal or imperial claim to authority over the world. Consequently, papal bulls granting Spain the right to preach the Gospel in the New World were not justification for conquering and dispossessing the indigenous peoples. To put this directly, the peoples of the New World and other non-Christians had natural rights to property and self-government. Still, Vitoria and his fellow Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas never directly opposed the imperial interests of the Spanish crown in the Americas.

Vitoria's treatment of dominium as a natural right recognized the legal authority of non-Christian rulers and supported his refutation of the view that spiritual and civil lordship is based on grace, a view he attributed to John Wyclif and the Waldensians. Vitoria argued that unbelief does not undo the natural and human law, and because dominium derives from natural and human law, it is not forfeit due to lack of faith. Thus, natural reason persists in fallen nature, and the divine law of grace comes to perfect natural reason, not to nullify it. This stands in contrast to the view of fallen nature and civil association held by Martin Luther, John Calvin, and the other early reformers.

Vitoria and his Dominican and Jesuit successors developed an approach to international politics based on the existence of a community of independent commonwealths within a moral order. His defense of the rights of the indigenous peoples of the New World and his theory of just war are central to this approach. Vitoria argued

that war was only justified to repel an attack or respond to harm caused by an aggressor. His treatment of war retains a medieval emphasis on the loss of wealth and the need for retributive justice, emphasizing that one should only seek to regain what had been lost. He even accepted the practice of plundering the enemy and ransoming captives. The work concludes with three rules of warfare: civil rulers should strive to avoid the causes of war; once war breaks out, one should pursue justice and peace rather than the destruction of the enemy; and having won a victory, one should behave with moderation and Christian humility.

Paul Joseph Cornish

See also Aquinas, Thomas; Aristotle; Barbarians; Canon Law; Cicero; Colonialism; Conciliarism; Counter-Reformation; Empire; Imperialism; Just War Theory; Law of Nations; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Reformation; Roman Law; Scholasticism; Slavery in Greek and Early Christian Thought; Slavery in the United States; Thomism; Wyclif, John

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VOLTAIRE (1694–1778)

François-Marie Arouet (1694–1778), better known under his adopted pseudonym of Voltaire, was one of the major figures in the French Enlightenment and arguably his country's most important philosopher of the eighteenth century. Best known for philosophical tales such as *Candide*—the best-selling book in the Europe of its day—Voltaire was also a significant political thinker whose views were later to influence both the American and the French Revolutionaries. His body, like that of his long-time rival Jean-Jacques Rousseau, was transferred to the Pantheon in 1791.

Although Voltaire focused less on politics than did Rousseau, the *Philosophical Dictionary* and *The A B C, or Dialogues between A B C* contain important critiques of social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and Hugo Grotius, as well as of the categorization of political constitutions of the baron de Montesquieu, and the account of the noble savage offered by Rousseau. In many of his works, Voltaire satirized religious intolerance and defended social reform and civil liberties. Voltaire is famously reputed to be responsible for the saying, "I hate what you say, but will defend to the death your right to say it." Although apocryphal, the statement is an apposite summary of Voltaire's defense of freedom and toleration. Voltaire's dispute with Rousseau centered on the latter's critique of the Enlightenment and valorization of nature. Voltaire was an unabashed believer in progress, improvement, and refinement. He famously satirized Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality,* in which the author argues that the latter stages of the state of nature were something of a golden age for humanity, as being a "book against the human race."

Candide and the Philosophical Tale

Candide, or Optimism was published in 1759 when Voltaire was 65. It exemplifies his use of the philosophical fable, as well as his opposition to philosophical system building on the grounds that the complexities of life could not be made to accord with any one philosophical system. Influenced by John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* Voltaire adopted an approach to the discovery of knowledge that was empirical rather than deductive and that sought to be plain—or candid—rather than based on preconceived notions of truth. In *Candide,* as in other tales such as *Micromegas* and *Zadig,* Voltaire bases his narrative on the journey of an innocent observer until each arrives at something like wisdom. Candide has to overcome the optimistic rationalism of his childhood philosophy tutor

Dr. Pangloss, who insists, in spite of any evidence to the contrary, that this is the best of all possible worlds, and the Manichaean principles of the scholar Martin, who incorrectly insists that Candide's faithful servant Cacambo will ultimately betray him, and learn to keep an open mind. Although Candide comes to see the optimism of Pangloss as blind to the reality of human existence, he does not conclude that cynicism must take its place; rather he determines on a life of practical activity, which he describes as tending our gardens.

Although it takes the form of a parody of chivalric romances, *Candide* uses satire to comment directly on the political events of the day, notably in its description of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, which was to become one of the battlegrounds in Voltaire's war of words with Rousseau. In having Pangloss pontificate in vain on the sufficient causes of the earthquake and suggest that the harbor was created just so that their friend Jacques would drown in it, Voltaire ridicules the Leibnizian idea that disasters will ultimately prove beneficial. Other philosophical tales adopt similar satirical devices to make their points: for example, in *The Ingenu,* Voltaire parodies Rousseau's account of the noble savage so as to suggest that society does not adversely affect our natural goodness, while in *The White Bull,* the Old Testament is presented as a series of fables akin to those of Ovid so as to oppose religious intolerance. Voltaire valued the philosophical tale precisely because it enabled him to satirize the pretensions of any systematic philosophy.

Philosophical Dictionary and Other Political Writings

Voltaire conceived his *Philosophical Dictionary* as a supplement to the *Encyclopédie* that Denis Diderot had edited for many years, and the later *Questions on the Encyclopedia* had the same purpose. Many of the entries in both books address political questions, such as the nature of democracy, laws, government, and war. Combined with *The A B C,* and other works, such as the commentary on Cesare Beccaria's *On Crimes and Punishments,* they allowed Voltaire to develop substantial political platforms on many of the issues at debate in the French Enlightenment. Notable in this regard is his dispute with Montesquieu on the powers that should be granted to the parlements, which are discussed later. Voltaire used historical writing to advance political argument. This is most notable in his *The Age of Louis XIV,* which tied together the ideas of progress and of Enlightened Absolutism.

Voltaire's political thought was inspired by a sojourn in England in the 1720s, and the country remained an inspiration in his writings. However, he was not an advocate of revolution. Moreover, Voltaire rejected Montesquieu's dichotomy between republics and monarchies and argued against any further extension of power to the French parlements. Montesquieu not only advocated granting power to the parlements, but was at one stage a leader of them. Voltaire, on the other hand, placed his trust in the central monarchy. In the context of eighteenth-century France, their dispute was as much political as it was typological. In Voltaire's view, an absolute monarch whose power was kept in check by respect for the law and by tolerance—something akin to the enlightened despots of the eighteenth century—would be the ideal ruler. For this reason, Voltaire briefly formed an association with Frederick the Great of Prussia. Although he recognized that many individual monarchs had not proven to be wise sovereigns, he thought that both monarchies and republics could only work once humanity had become more enlightened.

Despite this ambiguity, Voltaire remained a determined advocate of political freedom throughout his life, including the freedom to own property, which was a central plank of his critique of Rousseau. For Voltaire, the right to own property helped to hold society together. In the 1760s, Voltaire took his advocacy of religious freedom into the political arena, by defending numerous victims of church power. The major problem, in Voltaire's view, was the involvement of the papacy in the government of Catholic countries, which led to both intolerance and civil unrest. In his commentary on Beccaria, Voltaire again insisted on the importance of excluding the church from the definition of a crime and argued that crimes were strictly secular acts.

Voltaire died on May 30, 1778, during the celebrations of his tragedy *Irene,* little more than a month before the death of his arch-nemesis Rousseau.

Toby Reiner

See also *Encyclopédie*; Enlightenment; Grotius, Hugo; Liberalism; Locke, John; Montesquieu, Baron de; Philosophes; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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WEBER, MAX (1864–1920)

Max Weber was a German legal scholar, economist, and sociologist whose contributions to theory still reverberate in modern social thought. His name is associated with a wide range of concepts and pieces of theory. The former include, for instance, ideal type, status, social closure, legitimate domination, charisma, bureaucracy, rationalization, and the famous typology distinguishing instrumentally rational, value rational, traditional and affectual types of social action. Equally famous are his analyses of the Protestant ethic and its relation to the spirit of capitalism, his discussion of nations, ethnicity, and nationalism, his notion of "monopoly on the legitimate use of violence" as a defining characteristic of the state, his definition of power as "the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance," and his insistence on value-free social science.

Although these traces of Max Weber's thought in contemporary social science are impressive, the list is nevertheless the product of a selective reception process. Weber's elevation to the status of a sociological classic began in the United States in the late 1930s, with the publication of Talcott Parsons's *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), and with a series of English translations appearing in the years after World War II. This first wave of Anglophone translations and commentaries significantly shaped the reception of Weber. The concepts and arguments previously alluded to are all contained in the corpus thus defined: *Economy and Society,* some of the methodological essays, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (translated by Parsons already in 1930), parts of the sociology of religion, and the twin lectures *Politics as a Vocation* and *Science as a Vocation*. As a point of comparison, the edition of Weber's collected works, the *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe,* is estimated to comprise over 40 volumes.

Max Weber was a celebrated scholar and public intellectual in Germany in his own time. Many of the works that established his reputation fall outside the canon. In what follows, the objective is to facilitate an understanding of Weberian arguments and concepts that students of social and political theory are likely to encounter. But we shall proceed by relating this universe of widely circulating notions to the less familiar edifice of which they form a part. The next section provides a brief overview of Max Weber's academic career and writings. That sketch offers the starting point for a discussion of the formative impact of Weber's background in jurisprudence and transition to economics on his theoretical and methodological stance. The concluding section draws on this discussion to provide an interpretive key to a set of central Weberian concepts and arguments.

Academic Background and Writings

Max Weber received a doctorate in law in 1889, with a dissertation on the "Development of the Principle of Joint Liability and a Separate Fund of

the General Partnership out of the Household Communities and Commercial Association in Italian Cities." The thesis was published the same year as a chapter in a larger study on the "History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages." He two years later produced a study of Roman agrarian history and its importance to public and civil law (1891).

Parallel to his highly specialized legal studies, Weber became involved in associations oriented to the practice and study of social reform, the *Evangelisch-Soziale Kongreß* and the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (the latter also serving as professional organization for German academic economists). Both associations were to involve him in research on the so-called agricultural labor question. For the Verein für Sozialpolitik, Weber conducted a survey of the conditions of rural laborers east of the Elbe, published in book form in 1892. That book, and a series of related articles and speeches, earned him a reputation as an expert on rural labor issues. It also paved the way for a career shift.

In 1894, Weber was offered—and accepted—a professorial chair in economics in Freiburg. His change of discipline was less peculiar than it might seem to a modern observer. In Germany of the 1890s, both jurisprudence and economics had for a long time been dominated by historical schools. (Marginal utility theory was on the rise, but it still belonged to the heterodoxy.) Because the mainstream of both disciplines was historically oriented, the hurdles separating them were not forbiddingly high.

Max Weber's transfer to economics therefore occasioned no sudden shift in research interests. His inaugural lecture in 1894, on "the nation state and economic policy," related directly to his studies of the conditions of rural laborers east of the Elbe. He continued to make contributions in that area. His research on antiquity likewise saw a continuation in several essays in the years to come, and Weber's writings about the stock exchange, published between 1894 and 1897, belong to jurisprudence as much as they do to economics.

Weber left Freiburg for Heidelberg in 1897 for another post in economics. Shortly thereafter he suffered a serious mental breakdown, rendering him incapable of fulfilling his duties as an academic professor. In 1903, he was finally relieved from his duties. It would take another 15 years before Weber once again held a teaching position at a university, first in Vienna (1918) and then in Munich (1919) until his death in June 1920. During this 15-year absence, Weber was nevertheless very much a part of academic life. He still took active part in the Verein für Sozialpolitik, and was deeply involved in the founding of the German Sociological Association in 1910. He was coeditor, along with Werner Sombart and Edgar Jaffé, of the economics journal *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,* and was entrusted by the publishing company J. C. B. Mohr to organize and edit a multivolume, state-of-the-art handbook in economics, the *Grundriß der Sozialökonomik*. Above all, and intertwined with these activities, he published and conducted an extensive amount of research.

Thus, in 1903, when Weber had just been relieved of his academic duties, he resumed his publication activities. He wrote a methodological critique of the founders of the historical school of economics, an essay on "objectivity" of knowledge in social science and social policy (published in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* as the new editor's declaration of intent), the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (also published in the *Archiv*), and critiques of the methodological views held by historian of antiquity Eduard Meyer and legal scholar Rudolf Stammler. Through the Verein für Sozialpolitik, he became involved in a research project on the psychophysics of industrial work, and his famous essay on ethical neutrality in economics and sociology emerged in response to a debate in the Verein on the place of values in academic teaching and science. As to the planned *Grundriß der Sozialökonomik,* Weber's own contribution to it did not see completion during his lifetime. It was published, unfinished, after his death as *Economy and Society*. In addition, Max Weber's scholarly productions after his recovery include, among other things, several volumes on the economic ethic of the world religions, an essay on socialism, and the general economic history (assembled after his death from student lecture notes).

During his entire life, Max Weber was intensely preoccupied with politics. Weber's insistence on a separation between the worlds of politics and science was, at least partly, grounded in a concern for the *autonomy* of the political. He thought it a dangerous illusion that a science, however construed,

could settle political and other value questions, for it deprives the individual of the responsibility of deciding for herself what ultimate values to believe in. Fact and value (whether political, ethical, or aesthetic) belong in different spheres. While science can teach us techniques for prolonging life, it cannot decide whether it is desirable to do so.

Yet Weber recognized that a discipline dealing with economic relations has, and must have, multifarious relations to politics. As he expressed it in his inaugural lecture, "the science of economics is a *political* science." One task of his methodological writings was to identify these relations, examine their meanings and limitations, and weed out transgressions. This was an urgent matter for Weber. Already his early works on the conditions of the rural laborers east of the Elbe and on the stock exchange put him in the midst of a highly charged political force field: the political legacy of Bismarck, the class interests and political power of the east German estate owners (*Junker*), the social effects of the rapid transformation of rural labor from patriarchy to the soft violence of the free market, and the power-political implications of a decreasing proportion of Germans in West Prussia. Weber held strong political beliefs—a version of "economic nationalism," in Weber's own words—and he had good reason to think through the logical relations between empirical analysis and valuation.

From Jurisprudence to Economics

J. P. Mayer once remarked of Max Weber, in a classic monograph on his political sociology, that "a predominantly legal training has formed the style and mould of his thought." This section is designed to indicate some ways in which Weber's background in law shaped his thinking, and links this account to a discussion of the intellectual consequences of his transition to economics.

The first formative aspect of Max Weber's legal background is that it exposed him to two contrasting types of analysis. The exams in law school prepared him for the study of law as, in Weber's words, a *dogmatic* discipline; his dissertation, on the other hand, was an *empirical* historical investigation of developments in commercial law. Weber was acutely aware that the jurist and the historian of law regard the same event from different points of view, that those aspects of the event that are legally significant may be irrelevant to the historian, and vice versa. Related to this, he was also vigilant about tendencies to assume that an actual course of events must conform to what would have been the legally (or mathematically or logically) correct procedure. What matters to the historian is how people actually acted. If they acted on subjective beliefs that are incompatible with the "objective" rules of mathematics, law, or logic, then the empirical scientist must take that into account. It is useful, Weber would later say, to treat the logically, mathematically, or legally typical ("correct") procedure as elements in an ideal type, but it is vital not to conflate it with reality. The different points of view of the jurist and the historian likewise had implications for concept formation. When the historian compares legal constructs over time and between nations, Weber held, he must be careful not to conflate his own concept of the "state" from the corresponding *legal* concept. In particular, he must avoid projecting legally or administratively defined constructs, peculiar to a political unit and time, onto political units and times where they do not apply. This concern is evident, for example, in the somewhat tortuous terminological deliberations in *Economy and Society*.

Second, Max Weber's dissertation in law exhibits a particular style of argument, which he transposed to economics and which echoes, in some form, in most of his writings. One important feature is how he constructed the *explanandum* of the inquiry. He wished to explain the emergence of two types of commercial partnership, the general partnership and the limited partnership, both of which were found in the German commercial law code in Weber's day. He proceeds by contrasting "general liability" in modern law with the Roman law of Societas, so that the point-by-point comparison yields a list of characteristics peculiar to the modern legal construct, and the question to be answered is, somewhat simplified, how we got there. The list of characteristics thus arrived at forms a configuration—a *historical individual,* as Weber would call it—and that configuration serves as explanandum. But the argument Weber made is configurational also in another sense. "Joint liability," one of the characteristics that make up the explanandum, is explained by the conjunction of a set of factors relating to the household communities in medieval Italian cities. "Solidary

liability," a second characteristic in the explanandum, emerges via a different path. This style of argument, cast as a bundle of separate historical causal chains coalescing in the historical individual to be explained, can be found throughout Max Weber's work.

Third, Max Weber's background in law furnished him with a tool to address an analytical issue related to the style of argument previously depicted. That issue was not brought to the fore, however, until after his transfer to economics. A few preliminaries are needed before we can see what this tool helped him to do.

We noted earlier that the barriers between law and economics in Germany were far from insuperable, partly because they had both long been dominated by historical schools. But Weber entered a discipline where this dominant strand was increasingly challenged in the German-speaking world by the Austrian marginal utility school. Max Weber characterized the situation by recounting the reaction of a Viennese student who was bewildered to find "*two* sciences of economics." In the 1880s, the two contending schools had clashed in the so-called *Methodenstreit,* and thereafter they continued side by side. Weber thought that this debate had resulted in confusion.

Although the style of argument in Max Weber's works was of a distinctly historical brand, it fitted poorly into either position in the debate over method. Gustav Schmoller, the main proponent of the historical school in the Methodenstreit complained, for instance, that they had been falsely accused of only striving to portray reality in narratives and not to gain general knowledge of the laws governing economic life. They too, Schmoller said, were in the business of finding scientific laws, only they did so inductively rather than deductively. But where would that leave Max Weber? Consider first his dissertation on the historical emergence of the general and the limited partnership. Weber was not interested in these particular legal forms because they were instances under some generic concept, and he was not interested in those characteristics that they shared with every other specimen falling under such a concept. In the terminology Weber would later use—borrowing an argument from philosopher Heinrich Rickert—the scientific significance of these constructs lay instead in their cultural significance. And what makes an event culturally significant is often that it exhibits a unique, or at least rare, combination of traits. So while Max Weber's style of argument would posit a highly individualized explanandum, the procedure proposed for the historical school of economics ruled out individual contingencies in the interest of inductively constructing the laws of economic life.

The other party in the Methodenstreit, the marginal utility theorist Carl Menger, came closer to describing what Weber had in mind. He distinguished between *theoretical* and *historical* economics. A theoretical science—the preferred point of view of marginal utility theory—directs our scientific interest toward phenomenal forms that always recur in the flux of concrete phenomena (i.e., toward that which is *general*). A historical science, by contrast, aims at attaining knowledge of the *unique and individual.* But because the response from the historical school was to deny that they were pursuing economics as a science of the unique and individual, both schools huddled on the generalizing side of Menger's distinction. The individualizing side was left vacant.

In the essay on "'objectivity' of knowledge in social science and social policy," Max Weber declared that the social science he wished to pursue aims at an "understanding of the *uniqueness* [*Eigenart*] of the lived reality within which we are placed." On the one hand, he continued, we wish to understand "the context and cultural significance of individual phenomena in this lived reality," and on the other, "the reasons for their being historically so and not otherwise." This declaration of intent fits the description already of Weber's dissertation in law. It also places him firmly on the individualizing side of Menger's distinction.

Max Weber had thus entered a divided discipline. And what is more, his empirical studies represented, in his own mind, a position that had been vacated by both contending parties. Hence, he had to clarify, to himself and to his fellow economists, what he was doing. If the aim is to explain particular individual phenomena, which in some way or other have cultural significance to us, certain analytical issues crop up.

How, one may ask, is the *causal explanation* of an *individual* fact at all possible? Even complete knowledge of psychological or other laws would not solve that question, for the task is to understand

how they combine in a particular context to produce a concrete individual phenomenon. None of the participants in the Methodenstreit addressed this issue. But there were other models close at hand: jurists, especially those specializing in penal law, have long had to grapple with the issue whether a certain concrete individual action is responsible for bringing about a concrete individual result. Max Weber therefore borrowed a theory of causality currently in use in German law, the *adequate cause* theory, to deal with causal attribution in historical studies of the economy.

Adequate cause theory is a probabilistic theory, elaborated to distinguish causes from mere conditions, or adequate from coincidental causes, in the infinite causal chain leading up to an event. To qualify as an adequate cause, a factor must (a) be a sine qua non and (b) sufficiently increase the probability ("objective possibility"), of the resulting event. This is why Weber's works—particularly *Economy and Society*—contain so many references to the terms *adequacy* and *probability* (and *chance* or *objective possibility*). But there is an additional reason to bring up the theory of adequate causation. Max Weber conceived of his research in economics as individualizing, but other economists of his day perceived their task to be that of establishing the laws of economic life. He had to get to grips with what *they* were doing, particularly the theoretical economics practiced by the marginalists. What sort of concept was "economic man," "the law of marginal utility," or "Gresham's law"? Max Weber suggested that they were *ideal types*. As we shall see in the last section, where the aim is to provide an interpretive key to more familiar concepts and arguments, adequate cause also plays a role in Max Weber's conception of ideal types.

A Guide to Understanding Weberian Concepts and Arguments

In the beginning of this entry, we listed a series of concepts associated with Max Weber. They stem mainly from *Economy and Society,* Max Weber's unfinished contribution to the handbook *Grundriß der Sozialökonomik*.

Let us begin, however, with *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. The outline of Weber's argument in this work conforms to the pattern established in his earliest publications. He is interested in the historical origins of the "spirit" of capitalism (i.e., with the rise of a mode of conduct "adequate" to modern capitalism). This "spirit" is conceived by Weber "as an historical individual, i.e. a complex of elements associated in historical reality which we unite into a conceptual whole from the standpoint of their cultural significance."

As in the case of the investigation of the origin of joint and limited partnerships, the traits assembled to form the explanandum are here selected because of their contemporary value relevance. They describe a methodical mode of conduct to which, he thought, modern economic subjects have to conform lest they be eliminated from the market. Formulated in maxims, the "spirit" of capitalism is made up of a nexus of imperatives: remember that time is money and that credit is money, be punctual in the repayment of loans and debts, be vigilant in keeping accounts, be frugal in consumption, do not let money lie idle but reinvest it. In modern times, the forces of economic selection ensure that the economic world is populated with agents who meet this description. But whence did this "spirit" come from? How did it first emerge as a mode of conduct carried by entire groups of people?

Max Weber argued that the roots of the "spirit" of capitalism were to be found in the history of puritan Protestantism. Martin Luther's bible translation played a key role, for in his hands, the concept of "calling" fused "calling to God" with innerworldly work. But Lutheranism, according to Weber's argument, did not foster the mode of conduct he wished to explain. It was produced, rather, by the peculiar innerworldly asceticism of neo-Calvinist sects.

John Calvin taught a doctrine of predestination. Your destiny beyond the grave is determined beforehand, and there is nothing you can do to influence it. You can, however, observe signs of whether or not you are among the chosen ones. If God permits you to lead your life in accordance with his will, this is an indication that you are among the *electi*. And God wished that man lived his life frugally and prudently, devoted to working in his calling, and refraining from luxuries and frivolous pleasures. The doctrine of predestination combined with these commands to lend the conduct of the puritan a highly methodical streak:

A lapse from proper conduct could not be compensated for by good deeds, but would instead remain a lasting and disturbing sign of exclusion from grace.

Weber's argument here gives some important clues for how to read his other works. It illustrates the notion of "heteronomy of ends," for the rise of a mode of conduct adequate to modern capitalism is the unintended product of religious, hence value-rational, beliefs. Economics, in Weber's view, must deal not only with economic phenomena but also with how noneconomic factors influence the economy and with the impact of economic on noneconomic processes.

It also provides an illustration of a central Weberian concept, for the "Protestant ethic" previously described is construed as an *ideal type.* In the introduction to *Economy and Society,* Weber declared that whenever he refers to "typical cases," the term should be understood as meaning ideal (or pure) types. *Economy and Society* is replete with types and typical cases. He also noted that ideal types are "always constructed with a view to adequacy on the level of meaning." What does that mean? Consider how Weber pieced together elements to form the ideal type of the "Protestant ethic" from the beliefs of a number of neo-Calvinist sects. There is a sense of logical integration to the conjunction of predestination, a perpetual search for signs, and a concept of calling that lends religious significance to work and renounces frivolity and unnecessary spending. What accounts for this sense of logical integration is that, purely on the level of meaning, such a combination of beliefs would appear causally adequate for the mode of conduct Weber wished to explain.

To recapitulate, then, an ideal (or pure) type is a conceptual construct characterized by "the highest possible degree of logical integration by virtue of their complete adequacy on the level of meaning." By implication, the ideal type is therefore a heuristic device, for the task remains to determine to what extent concrete empirical instances approximate or deviate from it. Another implication is that an ideal type is construed in relation to some specific explanandum. Because Weberian explananda are composed with an eye to their contemporary value relevance, their selected traits can and will vary over time (thus potentially rendering old ideal types obsolete).

For this reason, the traits that go into a particular ideal type (e.g., capitalism, feudalism, or market situation) may highlight aspects of the phenomenon that may seem alien to common usage. This is arguably the case with Weber's ideal type "sects." He juxtaposed "sect" to "church," emphasizing that membership is mandatory in a church but depends in a sect on election by those who are already members. This trait was of singular importance for Weber because the type was first construed in relation to an argument about the economic effects of Protestant sect membership in North America. In order to be admitted into these sects, an aspiring member had to gain acceptance, and this in turn entailed a careful scrutiny of his or her moral character. Weber's argument is that the qualities under scrutiny coincided with the virtues you seek in a business partner. In this way, sect membership signaled reliability. It became a generalized trust mechanism: the unintended—or occasionally, on a more cynical note, intended—consequence of belonging to a sect was to promote member businesses. When Weber included this ideal type "sect" in *Economy and Society,* he was careful to point out that a concept of sect could be construed differently, as indeed it can. The fact that he kept to it indicates that, here too, he was interested in the differential effects of mandatory and varieties of voluntary membership.

What has previously been said could be translated into a reading guide to *Economy and Society;* we offer one such argument sequence as illustration. Weber's use of the probabilistic adequate cause theory is signaled in his definition of power as "the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance . . . regardless of the basis on which this probability rests," and, as a special case, of "domination" as "the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons." The concept of domination is thus kept highly abstract and allows a variety of reasons why commands are obeyed, ranging from the threat of violence to a belief in the legitimacy of the order within which the command is issued. Max Weber then went on to distinguish three pure types of legitimate domination—legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic—according to the respective grounds on which the validity of their claims to legitimacy

are based. And if they are conceived as ideal types, the reader should look for how they are construed "with a view to their adequacy on the level of meaning," and hence how they are related to some explanandum.

To bring this out, it is instructive to juxtapose traditional with charismatic authority. Traditional domination rests on a belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them. Charismatic authority, on the other hand, is vested in an individual person, relying on the belief that he or she is endowed with extraordinary powers, and granting the charismatic the right to make the rules. The contrast is neatly captured in the Sermon on the Mount, where "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time" is followed by "but I say unto you." But charismatic authority is unstable—not only in the sense that, if he fails to perform, the bearer of charisma is liable to be disposed of, but also in terms of generational shifts. When a charismatic dies, he can either be replaced by a new charismatic (who may impose very different rules) or his followers can record his words and deeds and live by his example. The latter case involves a shift from charismatic to traditional domination, suggesting a causal relation between the two types.

The third pure type of legitimate domination—legal-rational domination—is the distinctly modern form. It rests on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. The organizational form corresponding to this type is *bureaucracy*. Bureaucracy, too, is formulated as an ideal type, made up of a configuration of elements in a manner similar to his earliest publications: a bureaucracy (a) covers a fixed area of activity, which is governed by rules; (b) is organized as a hierarchy; (c) is where action that is undertaken is based on written documents (preserved as files); (d) is where expert training is needed, especially for some; (e) has an official who devotes his or her full activity to his or her work; and (f) is where the management of the office follows general rules that can be learned.

Weber had a dual interest in bureaucracy as a phenomenon. On the one hand, he wished to explain how legal-rational domination and the modern bureaucracy emerged from organizational forms associated with traditional domination (patriarchalism, patrimonialism). On the other hand, he was concerned with the influence of bureaucratic rule on other aspects of modern life, notably the economy but also, for example, political parties. An apparently omnipresent element of modern society, bureaucracy both had a distinct value relevance and a derived significance due to its economic effects and causes. For it should be remembered that even though *Economy and Society* can be read as a general social science treatise, it was intended as part of a huge handbook in economics, alongside treatises on banking, theoretical economics, the history of economics, and so on. Weber had taken it on himself to write that part of the handbook that dealt with the relations between economy and society, including the influence of noneconomic factors on the economy and the impact of economic on noneconomic processes. This, too, provides a useful hint to those who wish to pursue other argument sequences in *Economy and Society* than those dealt with here.

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See also Authority; Explanation; Ideal Type; Legitimacy; Methodological Individualism; Value-Free Social Science

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Weil, Simone (1909–1943)

Simone Weil was a teacher, a labor activist, a public intellectual, and a political theorist with deep and varied religious and mystical sensibilities. She

was born in Paris to an assimilated bourgeois Jewish household, and studied at the Ecole Normale Supérieure where she earned the nickname "Red Virgin" for her enthrallment with asceticism and the mystique of labor, combined with a militant commitment to trade union activities. A teacher in the French lycée system, Weil's real interests lay in working-class and left-international politics, particularly against the tides of war, fascism, and Stalinism in the 1930s. She took on a year of factory work in Paris (1934–1935), which left her in permanent ill health, and joined the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War (1936), an adventure cut short by an injury sustained in camp. In 1940, the family fled the German occupation of Paris, first to Vichy and then Marseilles, where Weil's attraction to Christianity and mysticism intensified. The final years of her life were spent in New York (1942) and London (1942–1943), where she worked for the Free French on proposals for the reconstruction of France, while attempting to return there. The cause of Weil's untimely death was officially listed as tuberculosis; but it resulted from a refusal of food and inability to eat, probably linked to anorexia nervosa.

Weil's writing can be appreciated in light of three powerful themes that characterize her political concerns. The first addresses disenchantments of modernity, particularly as they appear in the alienation of labor and the diminishment of collectivities epitomized by the factory work and the assembly line. "Reflections on the Causes of Liberty and Social Oppression" (1934) identifies permanently destabilizing forces in human affairs that dehumanize individuals and substitute means for ends, evident in both communist and capitalist regimes. To counter the effects of oppression, Weil introduces the notion of "methodical thinking" (*pénsee méthodique*) as a kind of regulative principle for understanding liberty in terms of the reunification of knowing and doing, and imagines new forms of labor organized through small working collectivities.

The second theme involves the ethics of self and subjectivity, understood in terms of finitude, gravity (*pesanteur*), the love of God, and affliction. Weil formulates a counter to gravity's law as "sovereign on earth" in a spiritual disposition of "attention" (*attention*) that requires a stripping away of the "I" (*dépouillement*) and a "waiting for" God. Although attention is presented as a capacity that is simultaneously interiorizing and denunciatory of the self, it also harbors a mode of loving the "other" as "neighbor," where it assumes a form of human engagement through the recognition of suffering.

The third theme attends to the death and destruction wrought on all sides by the harrowing consequences of war. *The Iliad or, The Poem of Force* (1940) reads Homer's epic as an exemplary act of impartiality and tenderness that figures both victor and vanquished together, under the domain of force. *The Need for Roots* (1943), Weil's final work, reflects on the consequences of rootlessness (*déracinement*) and proposes for France a new patriotism, reconciling spiritual values (compassion, attention, righteousness, and truth) with love of country, and a need for political belonging that disavows both nationalist visions of greatness and the desire to exact revenge.

Mary G. Dietz

See also Liberty; Nationalism

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Welfare State

The *welfare state* is a distinct form of governance established by Western capitalist societies during the 1930s and 1940s that combines the taxation of the wealthy with public investment in education, safety net entitlements, old age pensions, and the regulation of the market economy. For political theory, the welfare state raises questions about the relationship between the state, economy, and society, and about distributive justice.

The classic liberals Robert Malthus and David Ricardo deviated sharply from their eighteenth-century forebears in the political economy field by displacing morally based policy prescriptions with

visions of the market as a self-regulating sphere of instrumentalist profit seeking. Malthus held that the church and the government should not interfere with the "natural" trends in the "autonomous" labor market by providing "excessive" aid to the poor. In both Britain and the United States, relief for the needy during the nineteenth century was provided almost exclusively through the poorhouse: a sadistic institution that usefully reminded the working class outside that the decline into pauperism was so devastating that they had to accept the harsh labor market conditions.

Karl Polanyi convincingly argued that the classical liberal perspective is misleading. The market sphere can never be self-contained and self-regulating; the modern Western state has always attempted to manage inflation, prevent labor unrest through the measured provision of aid, and safeguard the population from food shortages. Even the business leaders themselves call for the government to step up its already influential role in the economy whenever some degree of public investment, business regulation, tariffs, and central bank intervention in the credit market would serve their interests.

Writing in the mid-1930s, John Maynard Keynes argued that market economies typically settled at points of equilibrium that were far below the full employment rate. The classic liberal paradigm and its contemporary advocates, Friedrich von Hayek and the neoliberals, teach that taxing the wealthy tends to restrict growth by discouraging savings and investment among high-income individuals. Keynes held that the collection of revenues through the taxation of the wealthy can be favorable to capital growth insofar as the state properly devotes itself to the stimulation of demand through sound public investment. In the British and American cases, the government's provision of immediate relief, combined with public education programs, infrastructural development, the provision of old age pensions, and military spending, did much to resolve the economic crisis. The Keynesian monetary initiatives—the establishment of a regulated banking system and the furnishing of low-interest credit for moderate income home buyers—also played a significant role in the recovery.

The neoliberal followers of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan reject the Keynesian view and hold that social spending ought to be kept at an absolute minimum. Neoliberalism has become a global phenomenon, thanks in large part to International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality: the provision of desperately needed foreign aid and debt forgiveness to developing countries only insofar as they agree to slash social spending and to open their markets to the goods produced in the developed countries.

On the other end of the political spectrum, social democrats and progressives agree with the Keynesians that the unregulated capitalist market gives rise to severe inequalities that are ultimately dysfunctional. Where some entrepreneurs really do serve society by engaging in useful innovation, they could be motivated by much more modest rewards than the bloated windfall profits that are doled out by the unregulated market. However, the social democrats and progressives also believe that Keynesianism illegitimately preserves the decision-making power of private corporations over key decisions about production and fails to respond adequately to the capitalist market's wastefulness and environmental destruction. These critics believe that instead of delivering social justice, Keynesianism merely protects workers from the worst effects of the capitalist market. Their vision of just welfare policies includes a much greater degree of redistribution, that is, the egalitarian sharing of wealth, such that the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots" would be greatly reduced.

The legitimacy of redistribution is hotly debated. John Rawls argued that if a group of rational individuals occupied a hypothetical "original position," in which each of them did not know what his or her socioeconomic status would be and what natural talents he or she would possess, they would choose a moderate version of the welfare state, that is, a society in which basic rights and duties would be equally shared, and the only forms of inequality that would be allowed to exist would be the ones that benefited society as a whole, and that particularly benefited the least endowed. Robert Nozick, by contrast, contended that our obedience to the state is justified only insofar as the latter remains absolutely minimal in form. For Nozick, welfare policies, such as redistributive taxation and the regulation of private business, illegitimately encroach on the individual's liberty.

In Amartya Sen's terms, the redistribution of a significant amount of profit from the wealthy to

the poor is indispensable to economic development that is both sustainable and morally defensible. In conditions of severe inequality, the poor are deprived of the capacity to pursue their life projects and cannot participate in public discourse as respected fellow citizens. T. H. Marshall understood the welfare state's empowerment of the citizen as the establishment of social rights. Against the neoliberals, Marshall held that social rights are fully compatible with liberal democracy, and that the welfare state's recognition of social rights represents the third phase in the unfolding of liberal democratic citizenship, following the previous recognition of civil and political rights.

For their part, feminist advocates have a complex relationship to the welfare state: On the one hand, they are critical of the ways in which many welfare programs have privileged the needs of male wage earners over those of women, in spite of the fact that women perform the greatest share of unpaid childrearing labor in the home. On the other hand, feminists call for a gender-sensitive redefinition of the welfare state such that the unpaid caregivers—the individuals who voluntarily assume intimate obligations as parents and caregivers for the ill, disabled, and elderly—would receive a generous entitlement in exchange for their essential contributions to society.

Anna Marie Smith

See also Basic Structure; Equality; Fabianism; Market; Marshall, T. H.; New Liberalism; Rawls, John; Sen, Amartya; Socialism

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WHITENESS

Whiteness is a social and historical construction that functions both as a basis of identity and as a criterion for the distribution of various forms of social, cultural, political, human, and financial capital. It does not refer to a biological essence or natural kind and thus is not dependent on biology to establish its semantic legitimacy. Rather, it is best understood as a theoretical/metaphorical construction amenable to multiple strategies of utilization. This entry examines the nature of whiteness as a construct, through an analysis of its metaphorical use as a normative category in social, civic, and legal contests, as an economic metaphor, and as a psychological metaphor.

Adopting this constructivist/historicist approach in which whiteness is a sociocultural concept does not entail construing it as unreal or as a fiction, and downplaying the biological approach to whiteness is not to deny the significance of color *or other phenotypical features* in sustaining notions of whiteness. The term *whiteness* is not an empty and meaningless semantic term, contrary to arguments made from the perspective of dogmatic realism/positivism. The best theoretical approach to whiteness, consistent with constructivism, is dynamic nominalism, as formulated by Ian Hacking. Nominalism is a metaphysical view that denies the existence of universals and abstract objects. Only general or abstract terms, according to nominalism, exist. For example, individual red things exist, but there is no universal essence called redness that exists; only the general term *redness* exists. Hacking calls his position dynamic nominalism because he connects nominalism with our interaction with, and description of, the world. Hence, he maintains that categories of people come into being at the same time as the people falling under those categories and that there is a reciprocal relation between these processes. Applying the insights of dynamic nominalism, we can infer that people's racial identities do not exist independent of socially constructed categories such as whiteness, or that people who consider themselves as sharing characteristics create a racial category to name them.

Hence, racial identification with whiteness was, among other things, contingent on the constitutional construction of the category of whiteness. Indeed,

Theodore Allen has argued that constitutional decree, meaning that legal creation of categories of people for various political, social, and economic purposes, has more to do with the creation of race and whiteness than it does with biology.

Whiteness as a Trope/Metaphor

Viewing whiteness as a trope/metaphor that is utilized in different contexts and sites of contestation explains its ontological role as a basis of identity and as a criterion for the distribution of various forms of social, cultural, human, and financial capital. Consequently, understanding whiteness requires a search for the multiple metaphors of whiteness, the various styles of thinking that make whiteness possible, and the metaphors structuring its intelligibility.

Whiteness and Normativity

Whiteness masquerades as various forms of normativity—social, civic, and legal. Whiteness as *social normativity* defines social acceptability or the paradigm of humanity. Whiteness as *civic normativity* functions as a form of consciousness beyond race. Here, whiteness functions as normativity only because predominantly white institutions are seen as racially neutral institutions, grounded on rational Enlightenment principles of equality, rationality, and objectivity. Third, whiteness functions as legal normativity. Critical race theorists expose the law as complicit in maintaining hegemony through cultural practices and beliefs that reinforce exploitative social and political structures that are partial to whiteness. For example, whiteness may function as legal normativity when whites appeal to progressive liberal values of equality and impartiality in opposing policies such as affirmative action that target the victims of racial discrimination. These formal appeals favor whites to the extent that the structural inequalities that benefit whites are not addressed but are made to appear as the fair outcome of natural competition.

Whiteness as an Economic Metaphor

Another role of the concept of whiteness is its mediation within economic metaphors. Cheryl Harris has analyzed whiteness as property to underscore the extent to which the dominant understanding of the notions of rights, property, race, and even affirmative action have been skewed by the historical coding of the metaphor of whiteness as property. Whiteness is both something valuable to possess, as well as a precondition for the right to own property. George Lipsitz has also used economic metaphors to frame whiteness as "possessive investment." Lipsitz shows whiteness to be a construction connected to the distribution and accumulation of power and wealth, regulated mainly in terms of the social reality of whiteness.

Whiteness as a Psychological Metaphor

A third category of the metaphorical analysis of whiteness concerns psychological metaphors, which center on strategies of denial. It may seem contradictory to claim that whiteness is both affirmed and denied by whites. However, there is a difference between the affirmation of whiteness in the sense of conjuring whiteness (i.e., making the world white as a phenomenon of historical facticity) and affirming whiteness by pretending not to be conjuring whiteness but still succeeding in allowing the world to remain white. The world was made white through the invention of a modern style of thinking based on race. But, once the world became white (i.e., once whiteness entitled an individual to social status tied to economic and political privileges), it made rational economic sense to invest in whiteness, to keep the world white. However, the investment in whiteness now takes the form of denouncing all notions of race in precisely those ways that reinforce the privileges of whiteness. Hence, when rejecting affirmative action by claiming that whites are unfortunate victims of reverse racial discrimination, whites are conjuring up a world in which whiteness is a harmed ethnicity. Whiteness's true state of being is obscured when viewed as victimized.

The psychological dimensions of whiteness were also obvious to W. E. B. Du Bois, who described white workers as refusing to pursue any meaningful conception of working class solidarity with blacks. Instead, they chose to mobilize along lines of white supremacy, indicating that protecting whiteness (i.e., being white and free) is better than associating with blacks. But, in so choosing a white identity, white workers, according to Du Bois, settled for the "public and psychological wages" of whiteness.

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See also Colonialism; Essentialism; Identity; Liberalism; Ontology; Race Theory; Slavery in the United States; Social Constructivism

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William of Ockham (c. 1285–1347)

The Franciscan theologian and Oxford philosopher William of Ockham is one of the giants in late medieval scholasticism. Ockham's political theory is characterized by an elaborate theory of heresy and dissent, the separation of temporal and spiritual powers, and an emphasis on individual rights and liberties. His literary output is bifurcated by his summoning to the Avignon papacy in 1324: before that year, Ockham devoted himself, mainly at Oxford, to purely theological and philosophical works. These writings contain little that can be discernibly classified as political. After 1324, however, he produced a series of antipapal polemical works, which contain rich and complex political ideas.

Ockham's involvement in polemics coincided with his sojourn in Avignon in 1324 to 1328. Ockham was asked by Michael of Cesena, the minister general of the Franciscan order, to examine some papal bulls issued by Pope John XXII. An examination of the bulls, which condemned the Franciscan doctrine of evangelical poverty, convinced Ockham that the pope had fallen into heresy. Thus, he took refuge in Munich, the power base of Ludwig of Bavaria, whose claim for the imperial crown had been rejected by Pope John XXII, and devoted the following two decades to antipapal polemical activities until his death in exile.

Ockham's first polemical work, *The Work of Ninety Days* (*Opus nonaginta dierum*), was a defense of the Franciscan position on poverty from papal attack. The theological dispute over the nature of Christ' poverty gained a legal dimension when the Franciscans, including Ockham, attempted to demonstrate that the Friars Minor can and do renounce all positive rights including the right of use, which were sharply distinguished from inalienable natural rights. The idea of natural rights, which had been discussed in canonist literature since the twelfth century, thus entered the political lexicon for public controversies.

Despite his passionate defense of the Franciscan doctrine, it is probably inaccurate to describe Ockham as a Franciscan ideologue because he considered the poverty dispute to be the result of an unjust intervention in doctrinal matters by canonists. John XXII, a distinguished canonist, was, for Ockham, ignorant of theology. Ockham's later polemical works are permeated by an ideological hostility toward canonists on the basis of the superiority of theology to canon law. Thus, Ockham shifted his polemical focus from the defense of the Franciscan doctrine to the demonstration that the pope was a heretic.

For this purpose, Ockham examined the idea of heresy from a theological perspective. In his gigantic *Dialogue* (*Dialogus*), Ockham rejected the canonist view that heresy is dissent from ecclesiastical (especially papal) authority and asserted that heresy is the contradiction of the sources of Christian doctrine, thereby reducing heresy to an interpretative, not an institutional, category. This redefinition of heresy entailed significant implications for the problem of papal heresy. Because heresy is not seen as disobedience to church authority but as incorrect reading of doctrinal sources, correction of doctrinal errors does not require institutional office. Hence, anyone who reads scripture correctly can legitimately correct the error made by the pope. This volte-face of the hierarchical theory, which would be read widely among conciliarists in the fifteenth century, justified Ockham's dissent from John XXII and his successor Benedict XII.

From 1337 onward, however, Ockham shifted his polemical concerns from papal heresy to the nature of papal power, motivated by Benedict XII's claim for papal monopolization of doctrinal decision making in his bull *Redemptor noster*. Ockham thus turned his critique to the erroneous doctrine of papal "plenitude of power." Ockham rejected the view that papal "plenitude of power" enabled a pope to do anything in both the spiritual and temporal spheres, as long as it does not contradict divine or natural law. Ockham's logical reading of scriptural verses led him to the conclusion that papal power must be exercised to create an environment where every individual is able to pursue the moral life freely. Every human, Christian or non-Christian, is given "rights and liberties by God and nature." Human beings cannot be virtuous unless they are free to choose moral actions. The erroneous doctrine of papal "plenitude of power" deprives Christians and non-Christians of such "rights and liberties."

Thus, Ockham attributed great freedom to the individuals. The reverse side of this is that Ockham did not subscribe to an Aristotelian educational understanding of political rule. Ockham's individuals are sufficiently rational to maintain peace and order. What concerned him was how to deal with the crisis created by the malfunctioning of ruling institution, particularly in the case of the church due to such contingencies as papal heresy. Ockham's political program is in this respect a theory of crisis management. This is why he did not propose any radical reform in both ecclesiastical and temporal orders: Unlike Marsilius of Padua, Ockham did not subsume the church in a civil polity. Ockham proposed that the spiritual and secular orders should operate separately until the self-corrective process within one order breaks down; only then can the other order intervene.

Ockham's political thought, then, may be described as a theory of political judgment in one respect and as a defense of human liberty in another. Ockham explored human cognitive abilities in the judgment of public issues by questioning the pope's orthodoxy. He called for action to rescue the necessary conditions for the moral life by dissenting from heretical popes and criticizing the erroneous definition of papal power. The antipapal polemics that persisted for two decades were driven by a passionate devotion to the common good: that is, the preservation of orthodox faith and the protection of "rights and liberties given by God and nature." Ockham's political thought is often categorized as belonging to the tradition of constitutionalism and liberalism. Situated in context, however, Ockham's political thought is rich and complex enough to defy such schematic categorization.

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See also Canon Law; Conciliarism; Liberty; Marsilius of Padua; Natural Rights; Scholasticism; Tyranny

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Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)

Mary Wollstonecraft is widely recognized as the most important early feminist thinker. While she

lived at a time when no women's movement existed, she articulated themes that would prove both inspirational and foundational for successive waves of feminist thinkers and activists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, political theorists have only come to pay serious attention to Wollstonecraft in the past twenty years.

Life and Works

Wollstonecraft was born in London in 1759 to a family wracked by her wastrel father's domestic violence and alcoholism. She was largely self-taught but, remarkably, before she was yet 30 she had committed herself to becoming a writer, and already produced a book on young women's education, a book of children's stories, and a novel and was reviewing large numbers of texts for her publisher Joseph Johnson's new periodical, the *Analytical Review*. She also mixed socially and professionally with many leading Enlightenment figures, including Richard Price, Joseph Priestley, William Blake, and Thomas Paine. In 1790, she wrote the first published reply, entitled *A Vindication of the Rights of Men,* to the great conservative thinker Edmund Burke's enormously influential *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. She followed this up in 1792 with the work which is considered the touchstone of modern feminism, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. She traveled thereafter to France, staying through the violent period of the Reign of Terror, when many of her friends and political compatriots were executed or fled. During this period, she wrote an extraordinary book, *An Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution* (1794), and also gave birth to a daughter whose father, Gilbert Imlay, would subsequently abandon them both. She returned to London in 1795 where, depressed, she twice attempted suicide, yet continued to write. In 1796 to 1797, she met and eventually married the British political philosopher William Godwin. Wollstonecraft died as a result of complications from childbirth in September of 1797, but her second daughter, Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin (Shelley) lived, and would later go on to write the famous novel *Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus*.

Immediately after her death, Godwin published intimate details of Wollstonecraft's private life and unconventional relationships that effectively scandalized her reputation for posterity. Because she was a woman, Wollstonecraft's work and ideas were eclipsed by her biography, a fate that seldom if ever befalls male political theorists, even when they memorialize their highly unconventional personal lives in graphic detail, as Wollstonecraft's sometime theoretical ally Jean-Jacques Rousseau did in his *Confessions*. Complicating matters, when Wollstonecraft's ideas were finally rediscovered by scholars much later, she was initially described as a "liberal feminist," a term that contemporary scholarship has shown fails to capture the depth of her radical theoretical project, and thus misses the most crucial aspects of the first moment in modern feminism.

Political Theory

In order to understand Wollstonecraft's political theory, we need to focus on her three most directly political works, the two *Vindications* and her history of the French Revolution. In the first, entitled *A Vindication of the Rights of Men,* Wollstonecraft set about dismantling Burke's moral theory and the historical arguments he had used to justify it, focusing particularly on his defense of the church and nobility. She attacked Burke's reliance on the moral intuitionism of common sense, sympathy, and sensibility, and stressed instead the socially constructed nature of modes of social interaction, or morals and manners. Against Burke's attempt to naturalize and reify the status quo, Wollstonecraft argued that the ancien régime's system of manners was developed in a hierarchical institutional context that stunted and warped the development of reasonable and virtuous character. In *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman,* Wollstonecraft specifically addressed how this European system of manners had affected women. She presented women's oppression as the result of an aristocracy of sex, the product of a hierarchical world in which men dominated the church, the nobility, the family, the military, and economic and educational institutions of all sorts. To change this world fundamentally, she urged what she called a revolution in female manners as part of the broader goals of the French Revolution. Far from being a simple extension of public sphere rights to women, Wollstonecraft's revolution required the democratization of all

political, economic, and social as well as gender relations, because all of these contributed to character formation in ways that were necessarily entwined for both women *and* men. Wollstonecraft argued that individual and collective self-government required an understanding of the mutually reinforcing relationship between the public and the private spheres, and necessitated the simultaneous radical egalitarian transformation of both.

Wollstonecraft would subsequently rely on the arguments at the heart of her two *Vindications* in order to explain the revolution's violent turn in her *Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution,* a brilliant and still largely underappreciated text. Therein, she reiterated that equality was the necessary prerequisite for developing the distinctively human capacity for reason sufficient to achieve virtuous character. While refusing to justify the revolution's violence, Wollstonecraft consequently sought to explain it as the predictable consequence of malformed character, itself the necessary concomitant of the ancien régime's multiple artificial hierarchies, which its supporters had refused to change. However, the tragedy of the Reign of Terror notwithstanding, she remained hopeful that intellectual and technological progress could help reshape simultaneously both the public and private spheres. For these reasons, Mary Wollstonecraft presents perhaps the most theoretically consistent commitment to human equality in the canon of the history of Western political thought.

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See also Ancien Régime; Burke, Edmund; Democracy; Enlightenment; Feminism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

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Women's Suffrage

Women's suffrage refers to the right of women to participate in democratic processes through voting on the same basis as men. In the medieval and early modern periods in Europe, the right to vote was typically severely limited for all people by factors such as age, ownership of property, and gender. The development of the modern democratic state has been characterized internationally by the erosion of these various limitations following periods of collective struggle. Women's suffrage has been achieved as part of this process of modernization at different times in different national contexts, although very few nations granted women the right to vote in national elections before the twentieth century. This entry presents the arguments for women's suffrage that have been proposed and considers the forms of political campaigning that have led to the achievement of women's suffrage internationally since the late nineteenth century.

In medieval Europe, it was not uncommon for women to be allowed to vote in municipal elections if they were heads of household (either unmarried or widowed). But it was not until the late eighteenth century in Europe that more general philosophical arguments were made for women's political rights. Thus in 1791, Olympe de Gouges, French playwright, political activist, and advocate of human rights, published *Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of the Female Citizen,* which argued that women should be given the same political rights as men, including the right to vote, while Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* of 1792 painted a powerful picture of the social and moral benefits of educating women to allow their full participation in a social and political order founded on reason.

Political agitation for extension of the franchise for men throughout the nineteenth century was often accompanied by specific requests for the

extension of voting rights also to women. The People's Charter, for example, which was drafted by the London Working Men's Association in the 1830s to demand the extension of the vote to all men over 21, initially included a clause advocating the extension of the franchise to women. The clause was withdrawn because of anxiety that this demand would weaken the chances of success of the campaign as a whole, but the Chartist movement did provide the opportunity for many women to participate in political campaigning and generated a culture of strong involvement in the political process for thousands of women.

The extension of the franchise to women commonly built on such grassroots political agitation, drew on philosophical texts that argued the case for equality, and also depended on the active support of prominent parliamentarians or political leaders. For example, the first convention held to campaign for women's rights in the United States was held at Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848. Many of those attending, including Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, had been actively involved in antislavery campaigning, and drew their political and philosophical arguments for equality from the United States Declaration of Independence's articulation of inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. By the end of the nineteenth century, a number of states, including Wyoming and Utah, had granted women the right to vote in State elections, but it was not until 1920, and with the support of President Woodrow Wilson, that the Nineteenth Amendment, which prohibited gender-based exclusions from voting at all state and federal levels, was ratified and women's suffrage was achieved.

Similarly, in the United Kingdom there was a mixture of parliamentary and extraparliamentary activism from the mid-nineteenth century until women were eventually granted the vote on the same basis as men in 1928. In 1865, the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill was elected to parliament and agreed to present a petition in favor of women's right to vote. Following the failure of his attempt to amend the 1867 Reform Act to allow women's suffrage, a number of regional women's suffrage societies were established, culminating in the creation of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies in 1897. In 1903, Emmeline Pankhurst and others broke away from the National Union and established the Women's Social and Political Union, the "suffragettes," who deployed much more confrontational forms of political campaigning, including demonstrations, hunger strikes, and vandalism of property. In 1918, after World War I, women over 30 were granted the vote in national elections, and in the Representation of the People Act of 1928, women in the United Kingdom were finally granted the vote on the same terms as men.

New Zealand has some claim to be the first nation to grant women the right to vote on an equal basis to men; having done so in 1893, it was ahead of all presently existing independent countries. Australia followed closely behind, establishing women's suffrage in 1902, while Finland granted women the right to vote in 1905. Throughout the twentieth century, women across the globe gradually gained access to the right to vote: in Albania in 1920, in Brazil in 1932, in Cameroon in 1946, in Egypt in 1956, in Malawi in 1961, in Switzerland in 1971, in Namibia in 1989, in Samoa in 1990, and in Oman in 2003.

The length and intensity of campaigns to secure women's right to vote across this period indicates something of the strength of resistance to women's suffrage. The reasons for this are many and varied. The most extreme resistance to women's rights to vote has come from those who believe that women are constitutionally ill suited (by nature or by virtue of their limited education) to form rational judgments or to bear the responsibility of democratic decision making. Others have argued that while it might be reasonable for women to vote in local or municipal elections, which typically deal with housing, education, or the care of children, national elections are concerned with matters of state, and in particular with war, which are not women's domain. Resistance to women's suffrage has also come from political activists who believed that women are inherently conservative, and thus that the extension of the franchise to women would inhibit broader progressive social and political reforms, or from those who argue that women's political authority would be contrary to core religious or social values.

Despite such resistance, women's suffrage has become an increasingly established principle of international law over the past 50 years. The United Nations' *Declaration of Human Rights* of 1948

asserts in Articles 2 and 21 both that everyone is entitled to the rights it sets forth, regardless of race, color, or sex, and also that the right to participate in elections run on the basis of universal and equal suffrage is fundamental. A further *Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women* was adopted by the United Nations in 1979, and entrenched the right of women to participate on an equal basis in all aspects of democratic government. This international consensus has been tested on many occasions, and there are still a number of states where women are not granted the right to vote, or at least not granted it on an equal basis with men. The establishment and the preservation of women's suffrage thus remains an active focus of political activism across the globe.

Morag Shiach

See also Class; Feminism; Gender; Human Rights; Mill, John Stuart

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World-Systems Theory

The title of this entry, while certainly capturing a common phrase in the world of international analysis, is a bit of a misnomer. World-systems theory is in reality a broad "approach," which has only been deemed a "theory" against the hopes of some of its central proponents. The world-systems approach seeks fundamentally to broaden the frameworks of analysis generally deployed in the social sciences in two directions: geographically, through the transcendence of the nation-state in favor of the "system," and historically through an emphasis on the "long duration." While most closely associated with sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein and the Fernand Braudel Center he founded at State University of New York at Binghamton, world-systems theory draws on many tributaries and has given rise to a broad variety of occasionally contrasting perspectives.

Origins and Tributaries

World-systems theory finds its most direct predecessor in the theories of dependency developed by scholars in underdeveloped nations as a theoretical and political response to so-called modernization theory, according to which individual nations progressed along a linear and universal path from traditional to modern societies. In the work of proponents like Walter Rostow, modernization theory served both to conceal and legitimate the privileged positions enjoyed by already wealthy nations, most of which had been colonial superpowers.

Where modernization theory insisted on a national focus—thereby blaming or crediting the individual nation in question for its relative "development" or "backwardness"—dependency theory would respond with a fiercely international focus. Argentine economist and head of the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) Raúl Prebisch is widely credited with founding dependency theory in 1950, with the argument that, against modernization theory, the wealth of wealthy nations is not endogenously derived, but instead a result of their economic exploitation of other countries. Countries could be analytically divided, according to Prebisch, between "core" and "periphery," with the latter providing both raw goods and potential markets for the former, creating a circuit through which peripheral countries are systematically impoverished and locked into underdevelopment. As a result, while modernization theory was often associated with advocating economic liberalization and free trade, dependency theory would insist that, for the most part, structures of international dependence meant that more economic contact would result not in development, but its opposite, and dependency theorists came to advocate some form of import-substitution industrialization or endogenous development scheme.

While the establishment of world-systems theory proper represented a modification and development

on dependency theory, it was not limited to this. The nominal founder of the approach, Immanuel Wallerstein, has his intellectual origins in the discipline of sociology, and specifically as an Africanist. While his many influences would eventually include Frantz Fanon, Ilya Prigogine, Marc Bloch, and Paul Sweezy as well as Prebisch, the two central elements of Wallerstein's analysis are constituted by what Carlos Aguirre Rojas has termed the "double-helix" of Karl Marx and Fernand Braudel.

From Nation-State to Historical System

While on the surface, world-systems theory may seem to be fundamentally an intervention in political economy or geography, for Wallerstein, it was always indistinguishable from a series of epistemological questions he confronted in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While his studies of Africa drew heavily on neo-Marxist development theories like the dependency school—specifically, such concepts as unequal exchange, the general core-periphery framework, and the rejection of traditional claims of third world "feudalism"—Wallerstein found these approaches lacking in some clear aspects. Most evidently, the dependency school could not deal adequately with a historical conjuncture marked by the creeping crisis of both the socialist camp and the United States itself, as well as the unprecedented rise of the so called "Asian Tigers," which were no longer to be clearly relegated to peripheral status.

For Wallerstein, the theoretical tools offered by the French historian Fernand Braudel and his Annales School offered an escape from this quandary. While dependency theory had in a way globalized our understanding of power relations through the concept of unequal exchange—whereby a cycle of dependency is established between core and peripheral countries, with the latter providing raw materials for industrial production in the core, only to then be resold these products at a premium—it had nevertheless done so without breaking with the nation-state as its primary unit of analysis. While much of dependency theory was therefore still a theory of unequal *international* exchange, Wallerstein would draw on Braudel's work to reconceptualize international economic relations as a truly global *system.*

This notion of system, moreover, would be elaborated in both its spatial and temporal aspects. Inspired by Braudel's epic work on "The Mediterranean"—which paid little heed to actual geographical boundaries, focusing instead on the internal dynamics of the system constituted around the Mediterranean commercial circuit—Wallerstein would come to theorize the global structure as a "world-system." But drawing again from Braudel's theorization of the various levels of time, Wallerstein would also grant this system a peculiarly historic character. According to Alvin So, this peculiar fusion of dependency theory with Marxism and Braudelian concepts was originally conceived as a fivefold, epistemological "protest" against the existing structure of the social sciences.

An Epistemological Intervention

First, world-systems theory represents a critique of the disciplinary structure of the social sciences, which it historicizes as an expression of the development of liberal ideology, arguing instead for a unidisciplinary historical science capable of grasping not merely the state, the economy, or even "society," but instead the broader historical system within which these are embedded.

Second, world-systems theory addresses and undermines a further distinction among the social sciences: that between what Wallerstein terms the nomothetic approach, seeking universally valid laws, and the idiographic, which focuses its sights more on the identification and mapping of particularities, with no universal pretensions. To the traditional transposition of these two objectives onto the realms of social science and history, respectively, world-systems theory responds again with an insistent refocusing of the unit of analysis. According to Wallerstein, the unit of analysis needs to be one that situates the historical-social scientist between the nomothetic and the idiographic. It must be substantial enough to be law governed but restricted enough to be finite and particular.

Third, it is the Braudelian concept of system that best suits this methodological demand, and the historical-social scientist is one who analyzes the *general laws of particular systems,* as well as the historical relationship between these systems. To attempt a nomothetic analysis on

the basis of the traditional unit of analysis—the state or society—would be to grant universal pretensions to what are in reality much more historically particular and situated units. Wallerstein identifies three general types of historical systems, each governed by their own internal logic and generally located in a specific historical period: before 8000 BCE, "mini-systems" oriented around a logic of reciprocity predominated; later, and until approximately 1500 CE, these were supplanted in many areas by "world-empires," whose logical mode was extractive; and finally, in the post-1500 period, "world-economies" based on a logic of capital accumulation. Historically, the last of these would expand, replacing the other systemic forms and establishing, by the late-1800s, a single historical system the world over (a claim that would be disputed by many working within the world-systems approach). This single, historical system—the modern, capitalist world system, the first and only world system to date—is Wallerstein's own central object of analysis, to which he has devoted three seminal volumes of *The Modern World System* published between 1974 and 1989, focusing respectively on the sixteenth century, the first half of the seventeenth century, and the turn of the nineteenth century.

It is this capitalist world system that replaces the dependency school's formulation of unequal exchange, a substitution that entails two further, interrelated epistemological critiques. Dependency theory had long questioned the claim that underdeveloped countries remained "feudal"—that is, situated in capitalism's historical past—insisting, however tentatively, that feudal relations were frequently buttressed by interaction with purportedly capitalist countries. But once Wallerstein had broken with the nation-state as unit of analysis, two further elements became clear. First, what we deem "capitalism" is more often than not modeled on the English model of free-labor transaction, but once capitalism is viewed as a world system, the so-called *feudal* relations predominant in the periphery become internal to it, and capitalism as a historical system can only be seen as one that combines free labor and unfree labor within a stratified global system. Such a view, second, breaks in no uncertain terms with the linear, progressive, narrative characteristic of modernization theory, and Wallerstein would later make even more radical claims against deterministic views of progress, under the influence of the physicist Ilya Prigogine and the theory of "historical bifurcation."

Beyond Bimodal Analysis: The Semi-Periphery

It was as a result of Wallerstein's turn to the Braudelian concept of the system that he would make his most important structural contribution to dependency theory. As long as dependency theorists maintained an emphasis on the nation-state, the simplistic relationship of unequal exchange between nation-states could be understood as a binary one: Core countries extracted primary resources from peripheral ones, manufactured intermediate goods, and exported these back to the same peripheral countries, locking the latter in an unbreakable cycle of dependency.

For Wallerstein, however, such a view failed to grasp the multiplicity of relations within the global system or that system's internal dynamics. From the perspective of a system and its organizational logic, bipolarity is not a stable or organically sustainable situation. Furthermore, in practice, this bipolarity lacked explanatory value, permitting no movement from periphery to core and vice-versa, and thereby objectively excluding, for example, the Asian Tigers. Wallerstein responded by adding a third conceptual category: that of the "semiperiphery." Semiperipheral nations or areas constitute a middle stratum—functioning simultaneously as exploited and exploiters—which plays a fundamental role in the stability and maintenance of the system as a whole, a role that is both ideological and economic. From an economic perspective, the semiperiphery can provide a necessary escape valve during a profit squeeze in the core, as we see today in the phenomenon of outsourcing production to lower-wage areas and countries. Ideologically, the existence of semiperipheral states conceals the hierarchy of the system, a function revealed in the assault on dependency theory itself, as the Asian Tigers were and continue to be held up—however dishonestly—as examples of modernization theory in practice.

The addition of the category of semiperiphery goes a long way to explain the reality, however difficult, of mobility within the world system. Peripheral countries, according to Wallerstein, could rise to semiperipheral status by one of three

means: taking advantage of momentary systemic or core weakness, through invitation by core countries (as in the case of the Asian Tigers), or through developing endogenous economic institutions. A further promotion to membership in the core itself often has to do historically with cornering and developing the domestic market through a variety of protectionist or Keynesian measures. It is worth noting that, in his effort to grapple with the difficulty that the Asian Tigers posed for a rigidly binary dependency theory, Wallerstein's own explanation of the phenomenon—emphasizing invitation by the core as well as state intervention—surpasses even that provided by the free-market claims of the many modernization theorists who hold up Asian development as exemplary.

The "Long Twentieth Century"

Alongside this critical-historical analysis of the various long centuries, Wallerstein has also developed an analysis of the "long 20th century," with specific importance granted to the symbolic year of 1968. The idea of a "long" century is another Braudelian legacy that, like that of the system, has to do with a problem-oriented approach, whereby unit of analysis is adapted to suit the questions at hand. So in contrast to those who think in terms of a "short" twentieth century—defined in terms of state socialism and the cold war, and as a result limited to the period between 1917 and 1989—Wallerstein instead emphasizes the centrality of the consolidation of U.S. hegemony, a process beginning around 1870 and which, while in its terminal stages, still has yet to conclude. 1968 represents precisely the turning point in this process, beginning the decline of liberal hegemony. It is on the basis of this recent history that Wallerstein has also turned his attention to the present moment and immediate prospects for systemic transformation, for which he has received no small amount of criticism. Here, capitalism—and not merely U.S. hegemony—is seen to enter terminal crisis, a crisis that is equally economic (determined by the intersection of Kondratiev "long waves"), political-cultural (the post-1968 crisis of liberal hegemony), and environmental (the limits to growth posed by the impending environmental crisis).

Other Variants

While scholars across a broad variety of disciplines have been influenced by some element or another of the world-systems approach, several groups of scholars from within the approach have also sought to lead it in contrasting directions. For example, Andre Gunder Frank—an early proponent of dependency theory—has argued that a sinocentric world-system predated the establishment of the capitalist world system by many millennia. Others, like Aníbal Quijano and Ramón Grosfoguel, have attempted to complicate the very concept of world system itself through the addition of qualifiers such as "modern," "colonial," and "patriarchal" as defining features of the predominant world system. Quijano has further sought to group these elements under a different conceptual umbrella: that of what he deems "coloniality," and which was established on a global scale with the conquest of the Americas.

Current Implications

If some variants of dependency theory were associated with national strategies in less developed countries such as import-substitution industrialization, delinking, or autarky, world-systems theory has contributed to a more recent wave of resistance to global capital that has explicitly sought to transcend the nation-state as unit of analysis. For example, in Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution, former dependency theorists like Oswaldo Sunkel have contributed to a theory of "endogenous development," or development of industrial capacity from within, without sacrificing an understanding of global capital as a stratified system. As a result, President Hugo Chávez has emphasized the concept of "regional integration," drawing on the historic example of Simón Bolívar's "Gran Colombia," a nation comprising what is today Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama. In practice, this "regional integration" has involved a strengthening of regional economic ties through South-South free trade and assistance agreements such as Mercosur and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), and diversifying import and export markets to reduce traditional dependency on the United States.

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See also Colonialism; Dependency Theory; Development; Imperialism; Marxism

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Wyclif, John (c. 1327–1384)

John Wyclif (c. 1327–1384) was an Oxford theologian and philosopher whose political theory is characterized by a radical alternative to traditional medieval ecclesiology and the vindication of the royal power over church reform. While Wyclif pursed his academic career, culminating in his doctorate in theology in 1372, he also had a somewhat tumultuous life as an ordained priest. None of his theological and philosophical works written before 1373 include any ideas directly relevant to contemporary politics.

The circumstance that prompted Wyclif to turn to political issues was probably the national financial crisis, which was triggered by the Hundred Years War. Wyclif was directly involved in politics when he was among a delegation sent by King Edward III to Bruges in 1374 in order to negotiate a settlement with papal legates in connection with papal provision to English benefices, taxation of the clergy, and the rights of clergy to appeal to papal courts. The secular magnates, John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster in particular, were increasingly critical of the English church's wealth. Wyclif played a significant part as a polemicist in this dispute between the English crown and church. Following *On Divine Dominion* (*De Dominio Divino*) (1373–1374), Wyclif produced *Summa Theologiae* (1375–1381), which consists of many treatises including *On Civil Dominion* (*De Civili Dominio*), *On the Church* (*De Ecclesia*), *On the Duty of the King* (*De Officio Regis*), and *On the Power of the Pope* (*De Potestate Papae*).

The predominant theme that permeates these works is ecclesiastical wealth and the authority of temporal rulers over the church. The church's corruption as Wyclif saw it stemmed partly from his Augustinian notion of history: the history of humanity was progressing from the time of the Old Testament, culminating in the time of Christ and the apostles. However, the Donation of Constantine, which confused the distinction between temporal and spiritual authority, marked the beginning of a decline; the rise of papal monarchy in the thirteenth century was the symptom of further downturn, and the late fourteenth century was "the age of Antichrist." Wyclif, however, was convinced that his time was ripe for reform that would bring the church back to its pristine state. Further, Wyclif's aggressive attack on the church also derived from his criticism of the contemporary derogation of the Bible. At the heart of Wyclif's call for ecclesiastical reform was his desire to restore scripture to the place of the only, supreme, and infallible authority. Accordingly, he asserted the superiority of theology over canon law, thereby opposing legalism that underpinned contemporary church government.

From these standpoints, Wyclif expounded a distinctively theocentric ecclesiology. According to him, the church was a congregation of all who are predestinate. No ecclesiastical office or institution

can constitute the true membership of the church. The doctrine of predestination effectively declared that the sacramental power of the ecclesiastical office was null and void. Christ, not the pope, is the single head of the *corpus mysticum*.

The doctrine of predestination renders to God alone all the power that determines eternal salvation or damnation. No believer can know that he or she is predestinate. Nor should anyone assert that he or she is predestinate; such an assertion would be utterly blasphemous. Nonetheless, Wyclif did not regard the institutional church as irrelevant; he stressed the importance of individual belief in God's grace and the ecclesiastical duty of mutual aid among believers. He also imposed a heavy duty of preaching and biblical studies to the clergy. However, he maintained that the corruption of the church was so serious that it could no longer be rectified through the institutional mechanism of the church itself.

Identifying kingship with the remedial means for church reform was central to Wyclif's conception of kingship. Wyclif argued that the king should provide the optimal environment for the spiritual well-being of Christians through the divestment of ecclesiastical wealth. This reform program was couched in his theological idea of dominion (*dominium*). Divine dominion determines the very existence of any created being. At the heart of Wyclif's metaphysics was the idea that the power exercised by any individual was grounded in, and causally dependent on, divine dominion. Human beings enjoyed true dominion before the Fall; Original sin, however, deprived human beings of what Wyclif called natural dominion. Natural dominion was thus replaced by human dominion that presumed human selfishness in desiring exclusive property ownership. One such human dominion, civil dominion, is exclusive property ownership or dominative relations instituted and required by sinful human beings. It can only be exercised by a secular lord who has received divine grace and hence acts as God's steward, because property and jurisdictional power were merely loaned by the Lord; the king—not the pope—is Christ's vicar.

However, Wyclif did not glorify kingship; nor was his reform program exclusively entrusted to the king. The king is required to consult theological experts in order to conform to Christ's law in his government. Theological knowledge underpins the legitimate rule of the king not only in his reform of the church but also in his governance of the realm. The rigorous conformity to Christ's law, Wyclif contends, should dissuade temporal rulers from waging war, however just it may seem, thus promoting Christian pacifism. Wyclif envisaged a community of the clergy who aspire to apostolic ideals and believers who thirst for biblical knowledge under the rule of a king who willingly and justly bears the burden of civil dominion as a steward of God. In this vision, only God is glorified. Wyclif's ecclesiology and political thought were translated into action by his followers, such as the Lollards in England and the Hussites in Bohemia.

Takashi Shogimen

See also Canon Law; Kingship; Pacifism; Scholasticism; Theology; Wyclifism

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WYCLIFISM

Wyclifism refers primarily to the theological views of the followers of late-fourteenth-century English theologian, John Wyclif. In terms of political theory, Wyclifism assumed not only an intellectual form but also popular forms in movements such as the Lollards and the Hussites. These heretics attempted to translate the Wyclifite program of church reform into action.

The Lollard Movement

Wyclif did not instigate any "movement" to disseminate his theological teachings; however, his idiosyncratic views found a number of loyal heirs among his students at the University of Oxford. Wyclif's English followers are collectively called

the Lollards, a term of abuse that originally meant mumblers. The first Lollards included Philip Repington, an Austin canon in Leicester; Nicholas of Hereford, who contributed to the translation of the Bible into Middle English; and William Smith and William Swinderby, both lay preachers in Leicester. The archbishop of Canterbury, William Courtenay's condemnation of Wyclifite teachings at Oxford during the 1380s met with opposition from the university chancellor, Robert Rigg, but it resulted in the Wyclifite intellectuals' recantation of their errors after Wyclif had retired in Lutterworth and subsequently died in 1384. By the late 1380s, intellectual Wyclifism was largely suppressed; however, Wyclifism took root among the laity and continued to develop as a popular movement throughout England from the 1390s to the 1410s. The clandestine movement supported by a variety of lay people generated a great volume of vernacular Lollard literature. The revolt of Sir John Oldcastle in 1414, which ended in his execution in 1417, marked the decline of the Lollard movement. The movement invited polemical responses from church apologists such as the Carmelite Thomas Netter (c. 1370–1430) and the theologian Reginald Pecock (c. 1393–1461).

Lollardy was primarily an ecclesiastical and spiritual reform movement inspired by Wyclif's theological views including his distinctive Eucharistic doctrine, which rejected the substantial or corporeal existence of Christ's body in the host and accepted the substantial resonance of the bread and wine after consecration. However, the Lollards also played a decisive role in the popular dissemination of Wyclif's ecclesiological and political ideas in late medieval England. They inherited the Wyclifite idea of the church as the congregation of predestined; therefore, the Lollards denied that one was bound to believe the "bishop of Rome" to be a member of the church. Like Wyclif, they asserted the primacy of scripture and attacked the church's legalism by expressing an abhorrence of canon law. The Lollards also rejected the inalienability of ecclesiastical property and, like Wyclif, demanded the disendowment of the church. The duty of the clergy should be characterized by poverty and the preaching and the study of the Bible. The Lollards not only deplored the Great Schism; they also saw it as vindication of their view on the contemporary state of the church. The Lollards thus endorsed the king's instrumentality in church reform. Because the Lollards were more concerned about the corruption of the church than about secular tyranny, their militant opposition to the church was markedly contrasted by their reluctance in resisting a secular tyrant.

John Hus and the Hussite Movement

The influence of Wyclifism was not limited to England. The Hussites in early fifteenth century Bohemia exemplify another reform movement inspired by Wyclif's thought. The migration of Wyclifism to Bohemia is due in part to its closer relationship with England through the marriage of Anne, sister of King Wenceslas, to Richard II. The leader of the Hussite movement was the theologian John Hus (c. 1372–1415). Hus emerged as a spearhead of the Wyclifite movement in the dispute over the question of papal obedience in the Great Schism. The Council of Pisa failed to depose the competing popes, Gregory XII and Benedict XIII; rather, it added a third pope, Alexander V. The University of Prague, whose rector was then Hus, rendered support to the new pope. Zbyněk Zajíc, Archbishop of Prague, who remained loyal to Gregory, charged Hus with heresy and excommunicated him. This dispute was followed by another controversy fuelled by Pope John XXIII's call for a crusade against King Ladislas of Naples. The dispute over the church's right to wage war and the controversy over indulgences between Hus and his opponents, including Stanislav of Znojmo and Stephen Páleč, paved the way to the official condemnation of Wyclif, Hus, and his fellow theologian Jerome of Prague. Jerome defended Wyclif's and Hus's ecclesiological views at the Council of Constance (1414–1418), which aimed at the extermination of heresy.

The investigation conducted by leading theologians, including Pierre d'Ailly, Jean Gerson, and Franciscus Zabarella, revealed that Hus's heresies were ecclesiological. While he was not Wyclifite in terms of metaphysical and speculative doctrines, as he accepted transubstantiation, for example, Hus assimilated Wyclifite ecclesiology. He argued in his treatise, *On the Church* (*De ecclesia*), that the church is the congregation of the elect. Christ is the only head of the true church and membership of the church does not depend on ecclesiastical

institution. This effectively amounted to a rejection of the infallibility of general councils: A position deemed to be heretical from the viewpoint of conciliarism as was declared in the decree *Sacrosancta* (1415). Hus also rejected blind obedience to ecclesiastical authorities, examining the circumstances in which Christians ought to withdraw obedience, thereby asserting the superiority of individual conscience to hierarchical authority.

The execution of Hus in 1415 did not silence his supporters; on the contrary, the Hussite movement developed into a national revolt (the Hussite wars) led by John Žižka and, after his death in 1424, Procopius the Bald. Describing the Hussite movement as the manifestation of Czech nationalism may be misleading because Czech nationalists were not always Hussite and the Hussites included Germans. The Hussite movement was rather the turning point from a popular heretical faction to the creation of an independent church: the precursor of the Protestant Reformation.

Takashi Shogimen

See also Canon Law; Kingship; Pacifism; Rebellion (Medieval); Reformation; Scholasticism; Theology; Wyclif, John

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Appendix A: Chronology of Political Theory

Dates BCE	
650	Approximate date of rise of Sparta to prominence
510	Establishment of Athenian democracy by Cleisthenes following the tyranny of Hippias
510	Approximate date of the expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome and the foundation of the Roman Republic
490–420	Protagoras
484–425	Herodotus
460–395	Thucydides
431	Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War
428–348	Plato
404	The Peloponnesian War ends with victory for Sparta, resulting in the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens and the suspension of democracy
399	Trial and execution of Socrates
384–322	Aristotle
264	Start of the First Punic War between Rome and Carthage
241	End of the First Punic War with Rome triumphant
218	Start of the Second Punic War with Hannibal's march into Spain
211	Hannibal forced to retreat after defeat in the Second Battle of Capua
203–120	Polybius
201	Roman victory in the Second Punic War, leaving Carthage as little more than a client state
149–146	Third Punic War results in Carthage being razed
148	Romans defeat the Macedonians at the Second Battle of Pydna
146	Rome destroys Corinth, resulting in its conquest of Greece
106–43	Cicero
59	Formation of First Triumvirate between Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus
44	Assassination of Caesar by Brutus, Cassius, and other Roman senators fearful of his ambition
43	Formation of Second Triumvirate between Octavian, Mark Antony, and Lepidus dedicated to defeating the assassins of Caesar
27	Octavian becomes the first Roman emperor and renames himself Augustus Caesar; end of the Roman Republic

Dates CE	
56–117	Tacitus
354–430	Augustine
410	Rome sacked by Alaric, king of the Visigoths
476	Collapse of the Roman Empire in the west
872–951	Abu Nasr Al-Farabi
1095	The First Crusade launched by Pope Urban II
1147–49	The Second Crusade
1189–92	The Third Crusade
1199–04	The Fourth Crusade
1225–1274	Thomas Aquinas
1265–1321	Dante Alighieri
1275–1342	Marsilius of Padua
1288–1348	William of Ockham
1325–1384	Wyclif
1363–1434	Christine de Pizan
1469–1527	Niccolò Machiavelli

1480–1546	Francisco de Vitoria
1492	Discovery of America and expulsion of the Jews from Spain
1517	Publication of Martin Luther's 95 Theses, beginning of Protestant Reformation
1530–1596	Jean Bodin
1543	Copernicus and Andreas Vesalius spark revolutions in astronomy and anatomy with the publication of their work
1568–1645	Hugo Grotius
1588–1679	Thomas Hobbes
1611	King James Bible is published
1618–1648	Thirty Years War
1632–1704	John Locke
1632–1694	Samuel von Pufendorf
1632–1677	Baruch Spinoza
1633	Galileo warned by the Catholic Inquisition
1642–1651	English Civil War
1648	The Peace of Westphalia
1670–1733	Bernard de Mandeville
1687	Publication of Sir Isaac Newton's *Principia Mathematica*
1688	Glorious Revolution in England
1689–1755	baron de Montesquieu
1694–1778	Voltaire
1711–1776	David Hume
1712–1778	Jean-Jacques Rousseau
1723–1816	Adam Ferguson
1723–1790	Adam Smith
1724–1804	Immanuel Kant
1729–1797	Edmund Burke
1737–1809	Thomas Paine
1738–1794	Cesare Beccaria
1748–1832	Jeremy Bentham
1748–1836	Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes
1751–1766	*Encyclopédie*: most material edited by Diderot
1752–1788	Gaetano Filangieri
1753–1821	Joseph Marie de Maistre
1758–1794	Maximilien Robespierre
1759–1805	Friedrich Schiller
1762–1814	Johann Gottlieb Fichte
1767–1830	Benjamin Constant
1767–1835	Wilhelm von Humboldt
1770–1831	Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
1775–1783	American Revolutionary War
1780–1831	Carl von Clausewitz
1782–1850	John Caldwell Calhoun
1787	Constitutional Convention (U.S.)
1788–1860	Arthur Schopenhauer
1789	French Revolution begins
1799	Napoleon Bonaparte rises to power (France)
1803–1882	Ralph Waldo Emerson
1805–1859	Alexis de Tocqueville
1805–1872	Giuseppe Mazzini
1806–1873	John Stuart Mill
1809–1865	Abraham Lincoln
1813–1855	Søren Kierkegaard
1814	Congress of Vienna
1817–1862	Henry David Thoreau
1818–1883	Karl Marx
1818–1895	Frederick Douglass
1820–1903	Herbert Spencer
1822–1888	Maine, Henry Sumner
1823–1892	Ernest Renan
1830	July Revolution (France)
1832	Reform Act (Britain)
1835–1922	Albert Venn Dicey
1838–1900	Henry Sidgwick
1844–1900	Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche
1847–1922	Georges Sorel
1848	Revolutions in Europe
1848–1923	Vilfredo Pareto
1854–1938	Karl Kautsky
1855–1936	Ferdinand Tönnies
1856–1939	Sigmund Freud
1858–1917	Émile Durkheim
1858–1918	Georg Simmel
1859–1952	John Dewey
1859	Unification of Italy
1861–65	American Civil War
1863–1931	George Herbert Mead
1864–1920	Max Weber
1864–1929	Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse
1865	Abolition of U.S. slavery; Abraham Lincoln assassinated
1870	French Third Republic established
1870–1924	Vladimir Ilich Lenin
1871	Unification of Germany; Paris Commune
1883–1946	John Maynard Keynes
1888–1985	Carl Schmitt
1889–1943	Robin George Collingwood

1891–1937	Antonio Gramsci
1909–1943	Simone Weil
1914–18	World War I
1917	Russian Revolution
1922	Fascism rises to power in Italy
1929	Great Depression begins
1933	Nazism rises to power in Germany
1939–1945	World War II
1945–1990	Cold War
2001	September 11, 2001

Appendix B: Web Resources

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

http://plato.stanford.edu

The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* is an online encyclopedia on a wide variety of philosophical topics and authors.

Wikipedia

http://www.wikipedia.org

Wikipedia offers an online compendium of various topics in several languages.

EpistemeLinks

http://www.epistemelinks.com/index.aspx

EpistemeLinks is a set of comprehensive resources for philosophers, which dedicates a great deal of attention to political theory and ethics.

Answers.com

http://www.answers.com

Answers.com offers brief overviews of the periods in question as well as of the thought of the significant thinkers. Readers can post their own questions.

Electronic Enlightenment

http://e-enlightenment.com

Electronic Enlightenment is a project of the University of Oxford's Humanities Division, available online via Oxford University Press. This subscription resource offers online access to correspondence from the long eighteenth century.

Early Modern Resources

http://www.earlymodernweb.org.uk/emr

Early Modern Resources is a gateway for all those interested in finding electronic resources relating to the early modern period in history.

Early Modern Texts

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com

Early Modern Texts is an effort to make classic works of early modern political thought more accessible to students and researchers. Texts have been translated and posted as .pdf files.

Marxists

http://www.marxists.org

The most complete database of Marxism. Includes a collection of texts by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and several dozen other Marxist and socialist thinkers.

Utilitarianism

http://www.utilitarian.net

Comprehensive Web site on utilitarianism, including an exhaustive collection of writings by and about utilitarian thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick.

Social Theory

http://www.sociosite.net/topics/sociologists.php

Links to resources on a large number of social theorists ranging from Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Alexis de Tocqueville to Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Antonio Gramsci.

German Philosophy

http://www.wcas.northwestern.edu/germanphil/resources.html

Links to resources on German philosophers.

History of Economic Thought

http://cepa.newschool.edu/het

Extensive resources on the history of economic thought. Includes biographies, surveys of schools of thought, links to other Web resources.

American Philosophy

http://www.american-philosophy.org/resources.htm

Links to resources on American thinkers.

American Political Thought

http://www.geocities.com/Heartland/Fields/9206/welcome.html

A wealth of primary and secondary sources on American political thought.

Hegel

http://www.gwfhegel.org

A Web site devoted to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, including primary and secondary sources and useful links.

Modern Political Thought

http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/thought.htm

Links to Web resources on a wide, eclectic variety of topics in modern political thought, from Friedrich Nietzsche and Émile Durkheim to Marxism and Fascism.

Liberal Theory

http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=191&Itemid=258

Resources on liberal thought, especially Anglo-American.

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Entry titles and entry page numbers are in **bold.**