MAINSTREAMING INTEGRATION GOVERNANCE

NEW TRENDS IN MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE

Edited by P.W.A. Scholten & I. van Breugel

Mainstreaming Integration Governance

P.W.A. Scholten • I. van Breugel
Editors

Mainstreaming Integration Governance

New Trends in Migrant Integration Policies in Europe

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Peter Scholten
Department of Social Sciences
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland
The Netherlands

I. van Breugel
Department of Social Sciences
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland
The Netherlands

ISBN 978-3-319-59276-3 ISBN 978-3-319-59277-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017946482

Cover illustration: Ralf Hiemisch / getty images.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

PART I

Introduction

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Conceptualizing Mainstreaming in Integration Governance

Peter Scholten and Ilona van Breugel

Background

The context of immigrant integration has changed significantly over the past decades. European societies have become increasingly diverse due to successive waves of immigration, and immigrant integration policies have taken many different forms. On the one hand, the host societies have become increasingly diverse. Some speak of 'superdiversity' (Vertovec 2007) in this regard, referring to the increasing differentiation in gender, country of origin, mode of migration, degree and type of trans-nationality, legal status, socio-economic status, languages and religions (cf. Hollinger 2000 [1995]; Faist 2009). Due to this diversification of the population, it has become difficult to distinguish distinct immigrant groups. On the other hand, the context in which integration policies are developed has changed as well. Countries throughout Europe have experienced what is described as a 'multiculturalism backlash,' which not only reflects the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments and populism, but also more broadly leads

P. Scholten (✉) • I. van Breugel
Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_1

to a resentment with how migration-related diversity has been responded to thus far. As a consequence, the multicultural model of migrant integration has been widely abandoned as a dominant policy strategy (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Freeman 2004: 95; Joppke 2004). Since the mid-1990s a wholesale retreat of multiculturalism as an official policy strategy as well as a dominant theoretical model is visible throughout Europe (Joppke 2004). Initially, various countries in Europe took a more assimilationist turn in their policies (Joppke and Morawska 2003).

At the same time immigrant integration governance[1] is increasingly considered a local concern. The role of local governments in immigrant integration governance has developed from primarily a level of policy implementation to a level of policy development (see e.g., Alexander 2003; Penninx et al. 2004; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Caponio and Borkert 2010). Decentralizations have distributed immigrant integration priorities across players both horizontally (between departments and different (non-)state actors) and vertically (between different levels of government, with an emphasis on the shift towards the local level). Different programmes have been developed to stimulate cooperation between the different levels of government and across departments such as the German National Action Plan on Integration (2010), the UK 'Local Area agreements' and the French 'Local strategic Partnerships' (France) 'Urban Contracts for Social Cohesion (CUCS),' bringing together state and non-state actors in their efforts to improve the neighbourhoods which links back to the earlier examples of area-based targeting.

Against this background a new trend can be observed in immigrant integration policies across Europe. Specifically targeted policies regarding migrant integration are increasingly abandoned and replaced by generic policies that cut across various policy sectors and levels of government. An example of these is the implementation of neighbourhood-oriented approaches, replacing former policies targeted by ethnicity or minority-status, such as the French Neighbourhood priority zones or the UK Health Action Zones and Education Action Zones. A more recent transition in this regard is the shift from ethnic-specific funding to problem-based steering now a common practice in both the British and Dutch educational sector. In these cases targeting by ethnicity or minority status is replaced by targeting on other, more generic, conditions. In other cases (ethnic) diversity in itself has become the central focus of city programmes such as the 'Engage in CPH' (2011) programme, aiming to make Copenhagen the most inclusive European city, or the local 'One

Tower Hamlets' (2014) initiative aiming to bring more cohesion from the city-borough level to London. Other examples are the German intercultural dialogue initiative (2006) and the Baden-Wurttemberg '*Migranten machen Schule*' (2008) programme both aimed at intercultural training in schools (Scholten et al. 2016).

Against the background of (super)diversity, the multicultural backlash, trends of decentralization and a rephrasing of the target groups for immigrant integration policies there is increasingly spoken of 'mainstreaming', referring to similar governance developments in gender-, disability and environmental-governance (see Walby 2005; Verloo 2005; Priestley and Roulstone 2009; Dalal-Clayton and Bass 2009; Nunan et al. 2012). Several countries, such as the Netherlands, have largely abandoned their immigrant integration policies for a generic approach from different, generic, sectors (such as education, housing and labour) (Van Breugel and Scholten 2017). Likewise, the EU has incorporated 'mainstreaming' as one of the European Common Basic Principles of Integration (2004) and one of the major pillars of the European Common Agenda for Integration (2005) and the Second European Handbook on Integration (Niessen and Schibel 2007).

This book critically discusses the trend of mainstreaming in integration governance. It aims to develop a better theoretical and empirical understanding of how, why and to what effect integration is mainstreamed. What does 'mainstreaming' mean in relation to migrant integration governance? Why do authorities choose (not) to 'mainstream' their integration policies? And what are the consequences of this trend of mainstreaming for the governance of integration?

On a theoretical level this book connects the concept of mainstreaming to migration studies. Subsequently, a number of these are explored. Speaking of governance literature, we explore whether mainstreaming is a means to avert degenerative effects of target grouping, and how it can overcome problems of policy coordination. In relation to the literature on superdiversity, we explore whether mainstreaming is an appropriate governance strategy in situations of superdiversity where separate and specifically targeted policies are no longer feasible. Finally, concerning the literature on integration governance, we explore whether mainstreaming requires multi-level governance configurations that involve vertical relations between EU, national, local and in some cases regional governments.

In this introductory chapter we will first conceptualize mainstreaming based in the literature on mainstreaming (e.g., Booth and Bennett

2002), the policy literature on target groups (e.g., Schneider and Ingram 1997; De Zwart 2005) and the literature on migration and diversity (e.g., Vertovec 2007; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). This conceptualization will be leading in our analysis of the mainstreaming of immigrant integration policies in Europe throughout the book. Finally, this chapter concludes with an overview of the further structure of the book which will provide insights in practices of (non-)mainstreaming throughout Europe as well as reflections on the mainstreaming of immigrant integration from other fields.

Conceptualizing Mainstreaming

In the above-mentioned examples mainstreaming refers to an amalgam of efforts to abandon target-group-specific policy measures and to coordinate integration measures as an integral part of generic policies in domains such as education, housing and employment. In this regard, mainstreaming is about the substance of policy as well as about the coordination of those policies. However, in order to be able to fully understand, analyse and compare the mainstreaming of integration governance, a more precise conceptualization of mainstreaming is required. We will build on the definition of mainstreaming as used in the gender literature to critically assess the application of mainstreaming in the field of immigrant integration. We thus do not follow how mainstreaming may be empirically conceptualized in European, national or local integration policy discourses, nor do we refer only to cases where the concept of mainstreaming is used explicitly; rather, our analysis applies to all situations that fit our theoretical conceptualization of mainstreaming.

Mainstreaming in Other Policy Fields

The concept of mainstreaming is mostly known from the field of gender governance, where the policy tool was introduced in 1985, and formally drafted at the United Nations in 1997 as a "strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres to achieve gender equality" (United Nations 1997). Mainstreaming here means that, rather than being treated as a separate and specific policy concern, gender, environmental or disability priorities should be incorporated into

policymaking at all levels and in all departments. Gender mainstreaming as a concept and policy tool has since then been extensively and critically discussed in the literature (see Booth and Bennett 2002; Caglar 2013; Eveline and Bacchi 2005; Lombardo 2005; Stratigaki 2005). The main critiques of mainstreaming concern the vagueness of the concept and its objectives, its limited transformative power and the risk of "becoming everyone's responsibility, yet nobody's at the same time" thereby risking to depoliticize and water down the transformational potential of gender mainstreaming (Caglar 2013: 340). Without a clear operationalization gender mainstreaming becomes "an open signifier that can be filled with both feminist and non-feminist meanings" (Lombardo and Meier 2006: 161) running the risk of reinvigorating old group distinctions and inequalities, instead of overcoming them. Booth and Bennett (2002: 442) therefore stress the need to distinguish between mainstreaming as a strategy to achieve equality and mainstreaming as a set of methods and specific tools to implement the strategy.

The literature on disability mainstreaming focuses on the trade-off between facilitation of special needs of students in the mainstream and the segregation that this separate treatment induces, drawing attention to implications of such institutions to participation and equality in society as a whole (Priestley and Roulstone 2009; Semmel et al. 1979; Madden and Slavin 1983; Bender et al. 1995; Barnes and Mercer 2005). This tension speaks directly to the 'dilemma of recognition' as identified within migration policies (De Zwart 2005, 2012). The literature on environmental mainstreaming centres mostly on the collaboration between different actors on issues of environmental concern. Like in gender mainstreaming there is a strong focus on collaboration, in this case primarily bringing together environmental issues and development assistance. Mainstreaming is considered a "deliberate process", that "should take place across multiple levels of government as well as across central government" (Nunan et al. 2012: 263). Nunan et al. (2012: 274) distinguish between horizontal and vertical coordination, and contradictory roles and expectations, stressing the need for integrated policy solutions.

But why, and if so, how, would governments mainstream their immigrant integration policies? The literature on gender mainstreaming emphasizes the need for incorporating gender equality as an integral dimension of all policy fields, stressing the need for a clear conceptualization of gender equality and the role of mainstreaming. What then, would this entail in the field of immigrant integration governance? To

understand the implications of mainstreaming in the field of immigrant integration governance it is important to connect the concept of mainstreaming to the literature on models of integration, the conceptualization of integration priorities and the associated target groups, and situate these in current developments in the field with the literature on the multicultural backlash, assimilationist turn and superdiversity.

Targeting in Immigrant Integration Governance

Much has been written on classification and categorization in policy- and immigrant-integration literature (see Jeffers 1967; Wilson 1987; Schneider and Ingram 1993; Rogers-Dillon 1995; Sen 1995; Rath 1991; Simon 1998; De Zwart 2005; Yanow and van der Haar 2013). Both discussions focus explicitly on the process of policymaking and underlying patterns of categorization. Targeted policies can be an effective and necessary measure to reduce inequality between groups. The more accurate a policy reaches its target group, the less wastage along the process, maximizing the efficiency in reaching its policy goals (Sen 1995: 11–12). However these processes of categorization also carry significant social and political effects. Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory of the social construction of target populations exposes the social and political effects of (implicit) target grouping. The policy designs "structure opportunities and send varying messages to differently constructed target groups about how government behaves and how they are likely to be treated by government. Both the opportunity structures and the messages impact the political orientations and participation patterns of target populations" (Ingram et al. 2007: 98).

While Schneider and Ingram emphasize the degenerative effects of target grouping, several authors likewise stress the risk of reinforcing inequalities when target groups are not assigned and monitored (cf. Phillimore 2012: 543). The discussion on target grouping also resonates in literature on immigrant integration governance (see Aspinall 2007; Sabbagh 2011; Simon and Piché 2012; Yanow and Van der Haar 2013) and studies on ethnic registration as part of anti-discrimination measures (see Simon 2005, 2012; Grigolo et al. 2011). "Identity politics are not only active in creating ethnic labels (…) the choice not to make ethnicity a salient category in statistics—is also a repertoire in the policy of identity and boundary making" (Simon 2012: 1368–1376). It is argued that in absence of ethnic categories, policies potentially carry the same risk of sustaining or reinforcing the inequalities it intends to overcome (26). Generic policies

and registration leave policymakers no tools to deal with specific problems or inequalities, while the structure perpetuates itself, or potentially works even stronger under generic non-targeted policies or registration "for carrying its meanings in silence" (Yanow and Van der Haar 2013: 251). Can mainstreaming, as a broad and generic policy strategy, serve to avert the degenerative effects of target grouping?

De Zwart elaborates further on this 'dilemma of recognition' (2005), linking the issue of targeting to the field of immigrant integration. He draws particular attention to the so-called replacement strategies (2005) as one of the possible responses to the 'dilemma of recognition'. As mentioned above, targeted policies require "definition, recognition, and even mobilization of the groups concerned, which accentuates caste, ethnic, and racial distinctions" (137). Some governments fear that these side effects will defeat the policy purposes, leaving policymakers with a dilemma between targeted and generic policies and their respective effects. The author describes three possible responses to this dilemma, 'accommodation,' 'denial,' and 'replacement,' linked to their respective models of immigrant integration.

The first policy response, 'accommodation,' also known as the multicultural politics of recognition, runs its redistributive policies according to membership in taken-for-granted groups, accommodating the present group distinctions. The Dutch minority policies until the early 1990s are an example of this policy type, facilitating the maintenance of the immigrants' 'own culture' and redistributive policies specifically targeting the 'cultural minorities' (De Zwart 2005: 138–139). The second policy suggestion, 'denial,' described as the ideal-typical liberal solution, argues against the benefits of redistributive policies. The classification of groups or categories is an inherent dilemma in assimilationism. While problems are often defined in ethnic or cultural terms, the policies addressing them are framed generically instead of specifically because the policies should not invigorate the categories but instead overcome them to integrate the minorities groups in the majority culture of their host country. Instead individual rights are stressed, despite inequality between social and cultural groups and apart from pre-existing structures of society. By emphasizing the costs of accommodation, for example, stigmatization and reinforcing cultural boundaries, the tradition promotes denial as a policy strategy (139). The philosophy of republican citizenship, that officially informs the French colour-blind integration policies, forms a key example of this model.

The final policy response that De Zwart distinguishes is that of 'replacement,' a compromise between denial and accommodation. While pursuing redistribution, the government does so under new social categories: "different in name and usually more inclusive than the folk categories they replace" (De Zwart 2005: 140). This way the official recognition of social divisions, considered the cause of the problem, is avoided, while still allowing for redistribution benefitting disadvantaged groups (140). Favell (1998) argues that despite its republican discourse and assimilative integration policies the French practice until at least the 1980s operated according to such a pragmatic 'hidden agenda': targeting policies along socioeconomic factors, indirectly address(ing) immigrants by targeting neighbourhoods with a high concentration of immigrants, but avoiding the explicit recognition of such groups. Central to the replacement strategy is the "exercise in social construction" (De Zwart 2005: 141) with governments trying to institutionalize categories of their own. When addressing mainstreamed policies at a generic or (where necessary) at a specifically targeted audience, the dilemma of recognition and its consequences should be taken into account very carefully avoiding the negative side effects and promoting the positive effects of target group constructs.

Contemporary Challenges to Immigrant Integration Governance

Immigrant integration governance is a contested policy field, and has over the years taken many different forms, varying in aim and approach. Recent debate on migrant integration in Europe is marked by two major developments. The so-called 'backlash against multiculturalism' (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) led to a rethinking of immigrant integration policies. Besides the public and political renouncement of multiculturalism, the literature on 'superdiversity' (Vertovec 2007) raises questions on how to address increasingly diverse (city) populations. These political and demographic circumstances challenge the (former) national models of integration, and ask for new policy responses. In this context, policymakers increasingly speak of mainstreaming as a new policy strategy to generically address integration issues.

In his article on 'superdiversity', Vertovec (2007) argues that due to long histories of immigration, societies have become so diverse that their diversity has become one of the defining characteristics of these societies. This diversification calls for a multidimensional understanding of diversity,

taking multiple conditions into account that effect migrants in contemporary society, challenging the preoccupation with ethnicity as a dominant category. Vertovec argues that the diversification of the migrant population in terms of inter alia countries of origin, gender, religion and legal status should lead to a reconsideration of diversity, beyond ethnicity as the dominant criterion (see also Hollinger 2000 [1995]). Other authors have drawn attention to the 'time dimension' of diversity, pointing at differences between generations of migrants and within ethnic groups and differences in lifestyle (Crul et al. 2013). The transgression, reproduction and reinvention of boundaries over generations (Alba 2005) have led to what Cantle (2012) calls 'hyphenated or multiple identities'. These identities are a result of the growth of mixed-race relationships and mixed-race children, complemented with "the mixing of characteristics of nationality, country of origin, religion and ethnicity" (Cantle 2012: 22).

In this book we consider superdiversity as a social context of increasing diversification (Meissner 2015: 550) as this directly speaks to the policy implications for immigrant integration governance in terms of targeting and modes of incorporation. Linking the literature on superdiversity to immigrant integration governance, this raises the question how to target policies under these circumstances of diversification. As there are now so many different and heterogeneous migrant groups, singling out specific target groups is considered too complex and ineffective (Crul 2016). The development of superdiversity challenges multicultural and assimilationist models of integration, as both the immigrant target groups as the norm society are harder to distinguish. The focus of immigrant integration policies would thus shift from groups to individuals. Identities have become more dynamic, which requires nation states, communities and individuals to learn to think about their identities in a more nuanced and complex way (Cantle 2012: 32).

Furthermore, the discussion on superdiversity raises attention to the role of diversity in the mainstream, where ethnic- or migration-related diversity should not be considered as a separate element but rather forms (part of) the mainstream. An increasing number of European cities can be described as 'majority-minority' cities (Crul and Schneider 2010; Alba and Nee 2009; Kasinitz et al. 2002) whereby over 50 per cent of the city population is made up of citizens of a migrant background, thus making up a majority of different minorities. Although so far mainly a metropolitan phenomenon, the diversification of the population does have implications on mainstream norms and policies; this speaks directly to the dilemma of recognition.

In addition to the above-mentioned models of multiculturalism and assimilationism, the concept of 'interculturalism' is gaining ground (Wood 2009; Bouchard 2011; Zapata-Barrero 2013, 2015) and is often understood as a possible (policy) response to the complexities raised by superdiversity. The "encouragement of interaction, understanding and respect between different cultures and ethnic groups" (Wood 2009: 11) is a central element of the interculturalist approach. Interculturalism is concerned with the interests of both majority and minority cultures (Bouchard 2011), requiring cultural sensitivity and adaptation from all sides. In contrast to multiculturalism which is primarily focused on the majority accommodating the minority, or assimilation where the minority has to adapt to the culture of the majority, interculturalism is focused on the engagement of all citizens, emphasizing collective responsibility and action (Wood 2009: 11) and a culture of openness (Cantle 2012: 142). Another key element of the model is the capability-based approach and a 'less group-ist' (Meer and Modood 2012) stance towards individuals than in the multicultural model (Zapata-Barrero 2013: 23). The development of a common public culture, more cohesion and a 'sense of loyalty and belonging' for all (idem) is considered the overarching goal of interculturalism. Whether interculturalism indeed provides an answer to the challenges of a superdiverse society, and how this relates to mainstreaming is one of the theses we explore in this book.

Polycentric Governance

The traditional state-centric modes of government increasingly fall short to address the complex nature of contemporary integration challenges. As a result more polycentric approaches of governance have emerged between a range of government actors, as well as semi-public, non-governmental and even private organizations (Rhodes 1997). The polycentric division of responsibilities allows for more flexibility to effectively respond to the policy challenges in different areas or levels of governance. The governance networks are designed in such a way that they can respond to individual challenges rather than imposing one single-government structure (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Within polycentric governance two different dimensions can be distinguished; firstly the horizontal governance of *(de)concentration* and secondly *(de)centralization*, depicting the vertical variations of governance (Petrovic et al. 2012: 3; Scholten et al. 2016).

The '(de)concentration' dimension refers to the continuum between centralized policy coordination by a single government actor, or shared

amongst a broader network of policy actors (Petrovic et al. 2012: 3). A key facet of governance mainstreaming refers to the allocation of policy responsibilities for the coordination of integration policies. As with gender mainstreaming, mainstreaming in this respect means that the responsibility for integration policy is distributed across various stakeholders: different governmental departments and non-state actors. As opposed to more centric governance structures, with a central minister and department or directorate responsible for *all* integration policies. Deconcentrated forms of governance mainstreaming pose a challenge in terms of maintaining policy coherence (cf. Booth and Bennett 2002: 442 on 'strategy and methods'), the big asset on the other hand is that it promotes a general and shared responsibility for immigrant integration rather than a stand-alone policy within a separate department or ministry.

The other dimension of polycentric governance relates to the coordination between multiple levels of governance: particularly the local, national and EU dimension. In addition the regional dimension is relevant in, for example, the case of Spain, and to a lesser extent, France. The policy coordination may shift between centralist and local modes of governance, for example, shifting between centralist, nationally or EU, top-down regulated policies to locally organized bottom-up initiatives. Multi-level governance theories (Marks 1992) describe a "system of continuous negotiation among nested governments" at diverse tiers on a supranational, national and regional level (Marks 1992). Several authors have applied the theory of multi-level governance to the field of migration (Favell and Martiniello 1999; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Scholten 2012, 2013). Immigrant integration policymaking is characterized by the inherently transnational nature of migration, the role of the European Union in the regulation of migration and citizenship, and the local and regional relevance of immigrant-integration policies. When focussing on multilevel governance between the national and local level of policy making: "the divergent dynamics of agenda setting on these diverse levels can result in different ways in framing immigrant integration" (Scholten 2012: 47), challenging the idea of national models of integration. The multi-level dynamics of agenda setting and framing can reinforce each other in ways that can either produce coherent and consistent policies, or induce conflicts between policies on these levels (Scholten 2012: 47). The main challenge for national government is to balance these interconnections into a coherent national model.

Mainstreaming in Immigrant Integration Governance

Building on the literature on mainstreaming, policy targeting, (super) diversity and migration and the literature on polycentric governance we can take some important points for our discussion on the mainstreaming of immigrant integration governance for this book.

With regard to the content or aim of mainstreaming, the gender mainstreaming literature emphasizes the need to effectively incorporate gender equality as an integral dimension of all policy fields (see Booth and Bennett 2002; Caglar 2013; Eveline and Bacchi 2005; Lombardo 2005; Stratigaki 2005), stressing the need for a clear conceptualization of gender equality and the role of mainstreaming therein in order to avoid the risk of reinvigorating old group distinctions and inequalities, instead of overcoming them (Caglar 2013: 340; Lombardo and Meier 2006: 161).

With regard to the field of immigrant integration, contemporary discussions on superdiversity (Vertovec 2007) suggest that there are now so many different and heterogeneous migrant groups that singling out specific target groups for policies has become too complex and ineffective (Hollinger 2000 [1995]; Alba 2005; Faist 2009; Crul et al. 2013). Furthermore, ethnic- or migration-related diversity is no longer considered a separate element, but rather forms (part of) the mainstream. Existing models of integration, such as multiculturalism and assimilation, are thus often believed to have become overly rigid to describe the fluid nature of societies in Europe today. As a result, some experts have turned to a new model for integration—interculturalism (Wood 2009; Cantle 2012; Zapata-Barrero 2013, 2015). Whether interculturalism indeed provides an answer to the challenges of governing a superdiverse society, and how this relates to mainstreaming is one of the theses we aim to address in this book.

When looking at the governance of mainstreaming, the literature on target grouping points to the social and political consequences of the (non-)construction of target grouping. This literature focuses on the 'social construction of policy target groups' (Schneider and Ingram 1997): how policies define, demarcate and attribute social meaning to the groups at whom the policy is to be directed. One of the issues imminent to the formulation of immigrant integration policies is the discussion whether migrant integration is best promoted by generic policies that are colour-blind, or by specific policies that target specific migrant groups. It is a dilemma between risking to sustain or reinforce inequalities in society

when specific problems are not met with targeted policies (see e.g. Simon and Piché 2012; Yanow and van der Haar 2013), and the risk of inadvertently strengthening ethnic and cultural boundaries in society through the mechanisms of targeted policies themselves.

Besides its content, mainstreaming also has an important coordination dimension. One of the expectations running through this book is that a trend towards the mainstreaming of immigrant integration policies also involves a trend from state-centric to multi-actor and multi-level governance. Taking from the literature on polycentric governance, one of the main challenges will be effective coordination between the different actors and levels of governance (Rhodes 1997; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).

Taking from the discussions above we define mainstreaming of immigrant integration as the *generic* and *inclusive* adoption of immigrant integration priorities in generic policy domains. With its generic and inclusive approach the ideal-typical tool of mainstreaming claims to overcome the dilemma of reinforcing (ethnic) boundaries as typical of the multicultural approach and the problematic, stable 'reference population' in assimilationism.

As a process of bringing these priorities into 'the mainstream,' across levels of governance and between different departments, we expect mainstreaming to be linked to a trend of *decentralization* and *deconcentration* in terms of the coordination of integration policy responsibilities.

Outline of the Book

This book brings together unique empirical material on immigrant integration mainstreaming as well as theoretical chapters that connect this material to a number of key theoretical debates in both migration and policy studies. Part I of the book provides empirical studies of integration mainstreaming on the EU level and in a number of countries (the UK, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Poland) as well as cities (Barcelona, London, Bristol, Madrid, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Poznan, Warsaw, Lyon and St. Denis). This involves material from 'new' as well as 'old' immigration countries, and from cities that differ in terms of types of migration-related diversity. The chapters do not bring specific case studies per se, but each provide a comparative analysis of the findings from the cases with a specific focus, such as mainstreaming in the 'new' or the 'old' immigration

countries or rather specific on the local level, as well as chapters that focus specifically on the politics behind mainstreaming or the implementation of mainstreaming at the street level.

As mainstreaming is often associated with a response to the multiculturalism backlash that has taken place in many European countries over the last decade, this part of the book first involves a chapter on a number of 'old' immigration countries in Europe: France, the UK and the Netherlands (Chap. 2 by Patrick Simon and Mélodie Beaujeu). Whereas France has traditionally followed a more generic approach under its 'republicanist' model, both the Netherlands and the UK have in the past been characterized by a multiculturalist approach to integration. In addition, the book brings an analysis of mainstreaming in two prominent 'new' immigration countries in Europe: Poland and Spain (Chap. 3 by Ignacy Jóźwiak, María Sánchez-Domínguez and Daniel Sorando). Without legacies of past integration policies similar to that in 'old' immigration countries, these countries are formulating new integration approaches, potentially inspired by the idea of mainstreaming. Both chapters focus on the national as well as the local city level. For each country, two cities are selected that are dissimilar in terms of their approach to integration as well as in terms of the size and character of the migrant population in order to compare the different contexts in which mainstreaming takes place. Whether the policy history of these countries, for example departing from an assimilationist or multiculturalist tradition, has an effect on the decision to mainstream the immigrant integration policies is one of the questions running through this book.

The local level has become increasingly prominent in immigrant integration policymaking; this applies in particular to the superdiverse setting of some Europe's largest cities. As large cities are often the main recipients of immigrants, an increasing number of European cities can be described in terms of superdiversity, characterized by a proliferation of differences and without straightforward us-them distinctions. In a comparative chapter on these cities we analyse how these conditions of diversity relate to mainstreaming (Chap. 4 by Ole Jensen). Finally, this book also brings an in-depth analysis of the EU approach to migrant integration in relation to mainstreaming. Although integration policies are not as strongly Europeanized as immigration policies, the EU level is important as it incorporated 'mainstreaming' very early into the European Common Basic Principles of Integration (Chap. 5 by Elizabeth Collett, Helen McCarthy and Meghan Benton).

Subsequently, these case studies are brought together in two comparative chapters with the aim of theorizing how, why and to what effect integration policies have been mainstreamed. This includes an analysis of the politics of mainstreaming that focuses on the reasons for (non-)mainstreaming, particularly at the stage of policy development (Chap. 6 by Ilona van Breugel and Peter Scholten), and an analysis of the effects of mainstreaming, at the level of policy implementation (Chap. 7 by Ben Gidley, Peter Scholten and Ilona van Breugel).

Part II of the book connects the empirical findings to specific theoretical debates. In each of the chapters of Part II, an expert from a specific field is brought in to reflect on the empirics on mainstreaming and to examine a specific thesis in relation to mainstreaming. First of all, this includes a chapter on gender mainstreaming by Petra Meier (Chap. 8), addressing how mainstreaming is conceptualized and applied in this area, and how this compares to integration mainstreaming. Secondly, a chapter on interculturalism by Ricard Zapata-Barrero (Chap. 9), positions interculturalism as an alternative in between assimilation and multiculturalism and connects this model for integration to the practices of mainstreaming. Finally, a chapter on superdiversity by Fran Meissner (Chap. 10), reflects on the empirical findings on mainstreaming from a superdiversity lens and critically assesses how superdiversity is operationalized within mainstreaming and discusses in how far mainstreaming is capable to answer the challenges posed by superdiversity.

The contributions in this book are brought together in the conclusion of the book (Chap. 11). The aim of the concluding chapter, building on the conceptual analysis provided at the start of the book, is to develop a theoretical framework of integration mainstreaming. In the afterword, finally, Dvora Yanow reflects on the empirical and theoretical contributions from a policy science perspective, focusing on categorization and language, analysing the use, and (un)necessity of metaphors and categories in the narratives and practices of mainstreaming.

Note

1. By immigrant integration governance we strictly refer to policies (national or local) that deal with the incorporation of citizens with a migrant background in society and vice versa, also known as diversity or immigrant policies. This thus concerns only the topic of policies, but leaves open the underlying models or philosophies of integration and/or assimilation, which are referred to separately.

References

Alba, R.D. 2005. Bright vs. Blurred Boundaries: Second-Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28 (1): 20–49.

Alba, R.D., and V.G. Nee. 2009. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Alexander, M. 2003. Local Policies toward Migrants as an Expression of Host-Stranger Relations: A Proposed Typology. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 29 (3): 411–430.

Aspinall, P.J. 2007. Approaches to Developing an Improved Cross-National Understanding of Concepts and Terms Relating to Ethnicity and Race. *International Sociology* 22 (1): 41–70.

Barnes, C., and G. Mercer. 2005. Disability, Work, and Welfare Challenging the Social Exclusion of Disabled People. *Work, Employment & Society* 19 (3): 527–545.

Bender, W.N., C.O. Vail, and K. Scott. 1995. Teachers Attitudes toward Increased Mainstreaming Implementing Effective Instruction for Students with Learning Disabilities. *Journal of learning disabilities* 28 (2): 87–94.

Booth, C., and C. Bennett. 2002. Gender Mainstreaming in the European Union Towards a New Conception and Practice of Equal Opportunities? *European Journal of Women's Studies* 9 (4): 430–446.

Bouchard, G. 2011. What is Interculturalism? *McGill Law Journal* 56 (2): 435–468.

Caglar, G. 2013. Gender Mainstreaming. *Politics & Gender* 9 (03): 336–344.

Cantle, T. 2012. *Interculturalism. The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Caponio, T., and M. Borkert. 2010. Introduction. In *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking*, ed. T. Caponio and M. Borkert, 9–32. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Crul, M. 2016. Super-Diversity vs. Assimilation: How Complex Diversity in Majority-Minority Cities Challenges the Assumption of Assimilation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42 (1): 54–68.

Crul, M., and J. Schneider. 2010. Comparative Integration Context Theory: Participation and Belonging in New Diverse European Cities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33 (7): 1249–1268.

Crul, M., J. Schneider, and F. Lelie. 2013. *Superdiversity. A New Perspective on Integration*. Amsterdam: VU University Press.

Dalal-Clayton, D.B., and S. Bass. 2009. The Challenges of Environmental Mainstreaming: Experience of Integrating Environment into Development Institutions and Decisions (No. 1). London: IIED.

De Zwart, F. 2005. The Dilemma of Recognition: Administrative Categories and Cultural Diversity. *Theory and Society* 34 (2): 137–169.

———. 2012. Pitfalls of Top-Down Identity Designation: Ethno-Statistics in the Netherlands. *Comparative European Politics* 10 (3): 301–318.

Eveline, J., and C. Bacchi. 2005. What are We Mainstreaming When We Mainstream Gender? *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7 (4): 496–512.

Faist, T. 2009. Diversity—A New Mode of Incorporation? *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32 (1): 171–190.

Favell, A. 1998. *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. London: Macmillan Press.

Favell, A., and M. Martiniello. 1999. *Multi-national, Multi-cultural and Multi-levelled Brussels: National and Ethnic Politics in the Capital of Europe*. Transnational Communities, Online Working Paper Series. http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/favell.pdf

Freeman, G.P. 2004. Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies. *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 945–969.

Grigolo, M., C. Hermanin, and M. Möschel. 2011. Introduction: How Does Race 'Count' in Fighting Discrimination in Europe? *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34 (10): 1635–1647.

Hollinger, D.A. 2000 [1995]. *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism*. New York: Basic Books.

Ingram, H., A.L. Schneider, and P. DeLeon. 2007. Social Construction and Policy Design. *Theories of the Policy Process* 2: 93–126.

Jeffers, C. 1967. *Living Poor: A Participant Observer Study of Priorities and Choices*. Ann Harbor: Ann Harbor Publishers.

Jones, B.D., and F.R. Baumgartner. 2005. *The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Joppke, C. 2004. The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *The British Journal of Sociology* 55 (2): 237–257.

Joppke, C., and E. Morawska, eds. 2003. *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kasinitz, P., J. Mollenkopf, and M.C. Waters. 2002. Becoming American/Becoming New Yorkers: Immigrant Incorporation in a Majority Minority City. *International Migration Review* 36 (4): 1020–1036.

Koopmans, R., and P. Statham. 2000. Migration and Ethnic Relations as a Field of Political Contention: An Opportunity Structure Approach. In *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspective*, ed. R. Koopmans and P. Statham, 13–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lombardo, E. 2005. Integrating or Setting the Agenda? Gender Mainstreaming in the European Constitution-Making Process. *Social Politics* 12 (3): 412–432.

Lombardo, E., and P. Meier. 2006. Gender Mainstreaming in the EU Incorporating a Feminist Reading? *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13 (2): 151–166.

Madden, N.A., and R.E. Slavin. 1983. Mainstreaming Students with Mild Handicaps: Academic and Social Outcomes. *Review of Educational Research* 53 (4): 519–569.

Marks, G. 1992. Structural Policy in the European Community. In *Europolitics. Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community*, ed. A. Sbargia, 191–225. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Meer, N., and T. Modood. 2012. How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism? *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 33 (2): 175–196.

Meissner, F. 2015. Migration in Migration-Related Diversity? The Nexus between Superdiversity and Migration Studies. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (4): 556–567.

Niessen, J., and Y. Schibel. 2007. *Second Handbook on Integration. For Policy-makers and Practitioners*. Italy: European Commission (Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security).

Nunan, F., A. Campbell, and E. Foster. 2012. Environmental Mainstreaming: The Organisational Challenges of Policy Integration. *Public Administration and Development* 32 (3): 262–277.

Penninx, R., K. Kraal, M. Martiniello, and S. Vertovec. 2004. Introduction: European Cities and Their New Residents. In *Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies*, ed. Rinus Penninx, Karen Kraal, Marco Martiniello, and Stephen Vertovec, 3–17. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.

Petrovic, M., E. Collet, and P. Scholten. 2012. *Mainstreaming Integration (Knowledge Exchange): Scoping Study*. Brussels: MPI Europe.

Phillimore, J. 2012. Implementing Integration in the UK: Lessons for Integration Theory, Policy and Practice. *Policy & Politics* 40 (4): 525–545.

Poppelaars, C., and P. Scholten. 2008. Two Worlds Apart. The Divergence of National and Local Immigrant Integration Policies in the Netherlands. *Administration & Society* 40 (4): 335–357.

Priestley, M., and A. Roulstone. 2009. Targeting and Mainstreaming Disability in the 2008–2010 National Reform Programmes for Growth and Jobs. *Academic Network of European Disability Experts, University of Leeds*: 4–5.

Rath, J. 1991. *Minorisering, de sociale constructie van "etnische minderheden"*. Amsterdam: SUA.

Rhodes, R.A. 1997. From Marketization to Diplomacy: It's the Mix that Matters. *Public Policy and Administration* 12 (2): 31–50.

Rogers-Dillon, R. 1995. The Dynamics of Welfare Stigma. *Qualitative Sociology* 18 (4): 439–456.

Sabbagh, D. 2011. The Paradox of De-categorization: De-institutionalizing Race Through Race-Based Affirmative Action in the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34 (10): 1665–1681.

Schneider, A.L., and H. Ingram. 1993. Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy. *The American Political Science Review* 87 (2): 334–347.

———. 1997. *Policy Design for Democracy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Scholten, P. 2012. Beyond National Models of Integration? Rethinking Interconnectedness and Fragmentation in Dutch and French Integration Policies. In *Beyond Fragmentation and Interconnectedness*, ed. H.J.M. Fenger and V.J.J.M. Bekker, 44–58. Amsterdam: IOS Press.

———. 2013. Agenda Dynamics and the Multi-level Governance of Intractable Policy Controversies: The Case of Migrant Integration Policies in the Netherlands. *Policy Sciences* 46 (3): 217–236.

Scholten, P., E. Collett and M. Petrovic. 2016. Mainstreaming Migrant Integration? A Critical Analysis of a New Trend in Integration Governance. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. doi:10.1177/0020852315612902.

Semmel, M.I., J. Gottlieb, and N.M. Robinson. 1979. Mainstreaming: Perspectives on Educating Handicapped Children in the Public School. *Review of Research in Education* 7: 223–279.

Sen, A. 1995. The Political Economy of Targeting. In *Public Spending and The Poor*, ed. D. van de Walle and K. Neads, 11–24. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Simon, P. 1998. Ghettos, Immigrants, and Integration the French Dilemma. *Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment* 13 (1): 41–61.

———. 2005. The Measurement of Racial Discrimination: The Policy Use of Statistics. *International Social Science Journal* 57 (183): 9–25.

———. 2012. Collecting Ethnic Statistics in Europe: A Review. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35 (8): 1366–1391.

Simon, P., and V. Piché. 2012. Accounting for Ethnic and Racial Diversity: The Challenge of Enumeration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35 (8): 1357–1365.

Stratigaki, M. 2005. Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action: An Ongoing Conflict in EU Gender Equality Policy. *European Journal of Women's Studies* 12 (2): 65–186.

United Nations. 1997. Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997. A/52/3.18. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/52/plenary/a52-3.htm

Van Breugel, I., and P. Scholten. 2017. Mainstreaming in Response to Superdiversity? The Governance of Migration-Related Diversity in France, the UK and the Netherlands. *Policy & Politics*. doi:10.1332/030557317X14849132401769.

Verloo, M. 2005. Displacement and Empowerment: Reflections on the Concept and Practice of the Council of Europe Approach to Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Equality. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society* 12 (3): 344–365.

Vertovec, S. 2007. Super-diversity and Its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (6): 1024–1054.

Vertovec, S., and S. Wessendorf. 2010. Introduction: Assessing the Backlash Against Multiculturalism in Europe. In *The Multiculturalism Backlash;*

European Discourses, Policies and Practices, ed. S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf, 1–31. New York: Routledge.
Walby, S. 2005. Gender Mainstreaming: Productive Tensions in Theory and Practice. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society* 12 (3): 321–343.
Wilson, W.J. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wood, P. 2009. *Intercultural Cities: Towards a Model for Intercultural Integration*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
Yanow, D., and M. van der Haar. 2013. People out of Place: Allochthony and Autochthony in the Netherlands' Identity Discourse, Metaphors and Categories in Action. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 16 (2): 227–261.
Zapata-Barrero, R. 2013. The Three Strands of Intercultural Policies: A Comprehensive View; A Critical Review of Bouchard and Cantle Recent Books on Interculturalism. *GRITIM Working Paper Series*, No. 17, Summer 2013.
———., ed. 2015. *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*. Northampton: Edward Elgar.

Peter Scholten is Associate Professor Public Policy & Politics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. His research focuses on themes of intercultural governance, comparative public policy and the relationship between knowledge and power. Scholten is associate director of IMISCOE, Europe's largest academic research network on migration, integration and social cohesion, and coordinator of the interdisciplinary Erasmus Research Cluster on the Governance of Migration and Integration. Furthermore, Scholten is editor-in-chief of the journal *Comparative Migration Studies* and member of the editorial board of the Journal of *Comparative Policy Analysis*.

Ilona van Breugel is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Ilona has a background in legal anthropology. Her current research focuses on local immigrant integration governance, more specifically on target grouping and problem definitions in the construction of integration policies. Previously she co-coordinated the UPSTREAM project on the mainstreaming of integration governance.

PART II

Empirical Chapters

CHAPTER 2

Mainstreaming and Redefining the Immigrant Integration Debate in Old Migration Countries: A Case Study of France, the UK and the Netherlands

Patrick Simon and Mélodie Beaujeu

Introduction

Since the 2000s, the European Union (EU) has tried to stimulate the harmonization of immigrant integration policies among state members by developing various instruments, from setting "common basic principles" (2004) to a "European agenda for the integration of non-EU migrants" (2011) and an "Action plan on the integration of third country nationals" (2016). Parallel to this process, the "old immigration countries in Europe," that is, those where mass labour immigration took place in the 1960s and 1970s, have dramatically redefined their approach of immigrant integration, and more broadly minorities' incorporation, in the course of the last two decades (Garbaye 2010). Multiculturalism has been challenged

P. Simon (✉)
Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques—French Institute for Demographic Studies, Paris, France

M. Beaujeu
Centre d'Etudes Européennes, Sciences Po Paris, Paris, France

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_2

in the UK and the Netherlands, leading to a backlash more severe in the latter than in the former, and on the other side assimilationism has been mitigated with some form of diversity acceptance and reciprocity between the mainstream society (its institutions and core population groups) and ethno-religious minorities. In the aftermath of antidiscrimination EU directives (2000), the development of more proactive non-discrimination policies has contributed to re-organize and channelize integration policies (Bleich 2003; Lieberman 2005; Solanke 2009). However, this restructuring of policies has led to a juxtaposition of framings—generating conflicts of interpretation and implementation—rather than the production of a coherent and integrated approach.

This can be seen in the developments of integration and antidiscrimination policies in Europe. Beyond the discussion of the usefulness of "models" to think about and analyse integration processes and governance (Bertossi and Duyvendack 2012), one should acknowledge the fact that the relative positions of key countries in the system of models have been through fast changes in terms both of framing and policies in the last 10 years. These shifts in policies echo ongoing debates on immigration and integration in ethnically diverse societies. The electoral success of anti-immigrant populist parties has something to do with the turn towards more coercive philosophies of integration (Joppke 2007).[1] A pioneer in this *coercive turn*, the Netherlands has seen a sharp retreat from its multiculturalist tenet to adopt a "hard assimilation" line (close to the French approach in the 1990s). The UK has mitigated its multicultural policy with concerns for "community cohesion" and reaffirmation of Britishness, combined with a retreat of its antidiscrimination policy. France has been through a chaotic succession and juxtaposition of framings, shortly moving away from its integration creed to develop an antidiscrimination paradigm, before reasserting integration as a key public policy with a growing assimilationist tone and ending up to discontinue integration policy per se.

It is against the background of these quite radical changes that the impetus to "mainstream integration" should be understood. How do these new objectives or policy frames change the philosophies of integration in the 'old countries of immigration' of France, the UK and the Netherlands? This chapter replaces this last evolution in the context of fast changing paradigms (1) and address the specific issue of the categorization of the recipients of integration and antidiscrimination policies (2) which is key, we argue, for an efficient implementation of mainstreaming

(so far that we have understood what it was). Speaking of the definition of mainstreaming, it is "the *generic* and *inclusive* adoption of immigrant integration priorities in generic policy domains" as introduced in Chap. 1. The chapter is based on the country reports from the UPSTREAM project.[2]

The Framing of Integration Policies in 'Old Immigration Countries'

The very notion of 'integration policy' has been in currency in France before it became an EU agenda. Defined normatively at the end of the 1980s, integration as a conceptual tool and a paradigm replaced the assimilationist creed in the French republican model and was somehow a pioneer in the market of 'models of incorporation' on this strand. Whereas the European antidiscrimination agenda has been developed in 2000 under the influence of the British Race Relation Act (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004), the European approach of integration was inspired by the French approach, or at least it is reusing some of its key concepts with a rebranding. How influent is the European agenda on integration policies in State members has still to be assessed, but the convergence between European countries with their immigration and integration policies cannot be denied. However, despite these convergences, the national philosophies of integration still shape the different approaches of integration and equality policies (Sacco et al. 2016). This is particularly true for the three countries we are studying in this chapter, namely the UK, France and the Netherlands. Known to be at two poles of the distribution of the models of incorporation, they have adopted part of the elements distinctive of the other models in their own framing. Converging here means more directly juxtaposing paradigms.

The historical process by which the three countries have formulated their philosophies of integration shows some similarities in terms of agenda setting and turning points in policymaking. All three countries have encountered dreadful political murders or terrorist attacks in relation with ethno-religious debates: London bombings in July 2005 and more recently in March 2017; assassination of Pim Fortuyn (2002) and Theo Van Gogh (2004) in the Netherlands; bombings and terrorists' attacks in France (1995, 2015, 2016). Integration and multiculturalist policies in the UK and France have been greatly influenced by series of riots in the 1980s onwards—absent from the social chronicle in the Netherlands—that have

initiated major reforms as a response to social unrest. This events-driven policy making should however not be over-interpreted since there are other structural parameters that can explain the multiculturalist backlash (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Duyvendak and Scholten 2012).

The UK

In the UK, the race relation policy (1976) that was dominating the British approach to minorities inclusion has been associated to a new agenda, *community cohesion*, somehow in contradiction to the canonical equality paradigm. Riots in the early 1980s, in 2001 and in 2011 have led to renewed discussions over the nature and direction of integration policy, as well as the coordination mechanisms across different levels and sectors of government. Accordingly, multiculturalism emerged as part of a policy response to uprisings taking place in Brixton, Bristol and other cities in 1981. Over the next two decades, a policy model evolved that respected and promoted minority cultural identity and difference, thus enabling plural identities and helping "Britain adjust to the presence of minority citizens whose difficult life experience could not […] be adequately contained under the heading 'immigration'" (Gilroy 2006, in Hickman et al. 2012: 32). The Parekh Report, titled *The future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*, aimed to take stock of this development and inform a move from a laissez-faire 'multicultural drift' to a "purposeful process of change" (Parekh 2000: 11). In suggesting a re-imagined, post-national Britain, based on a 'community of communities,' the report distinguished itself from cruder versions of multiculturalism. But it was in its attempts to engage critically with national identity, arguing that "Britishness as much as Englishness has systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations" (Parekh 2000: 38), that the Parekh Report met with serious opposition both in parliament and from a powerful conservative press. The new civil unrest in late 2001, in particular in areas with high proportions of Muslims British Asians, and the resulting 'Report of the Independent Review Team on civic disturbances in Burnley, Bradford and Oldham in 2001' commissioned by Home Secretary, have triggered the gradual process whereby national and local authorities increasingly replaced multiculturalism by community cohesion, promoted stronger bonds and shared values at the local level. The community cohesion umbrella has, however, given rise to a diverse range of local policy responses which exemplify a place-based framing of

the UK social policy, with social problems associated with particular types of localities.

This move towards community cohesion has been referred to as a 'mainstreaming in discourse' (Ali and Gidley 2014). The turn away from multiculturalism in 2001 did not, however, go in a single direction. Elements of the subsequently dominant 'community cohesion' policy paradigm have oscillated between *differentialist, assimilationist* and *interculturalist* modalities at different times and places. The *differentialist* modality is most visible in the policy around faith schools originating under New Labour and the strong articulation of Britain as a multi-faith society under the Coalition. The *assimilationist* modality was present in the emphasis on shared values under Labour Home Secretary David Blunkett and has re-appeared more recently with Conservative ministers emphasizing 'British values'. Finally, the *interculturalist* modality was present in the emphasis on shared spaces, informed by contact theory, promoted by the 2002 Cantle Report and re-emerging in the localist approach to integration under the Coalition. A final episode of unrest was the 'riots' taking place in London and other English cities in August 2011. Though initially triggered by reactions to the police shooting of a Black Caribbean man in North London, in the end ethnicity was not seen as a major driving factor. The anxious debate on segregation and alleged separatism in concentrated neighbourhoods, depicting hostile communities living apart together and threatening the cohesion of the nation, has been heralded by Trevor Phillips, the then chairman of the Commission of Racial Equality when he denounced in 2005 that the UK was 'sleepwalking towards segregation' (Finney and Simpson 2009).

The policy framework for integration in Britain, developed in 2012 by the Department for Communities and Local Government, was entitled 'Creating the conditions for integration'. More than anything, this title signals a re-positioning of the role of the central government, as the document also states: "Instead of large-scale, centrally led and funded programmes, we want to inspire and enable civil society and local areas to take action on integration issues that are important to them" (DCLG 2012: 19). The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) identifies five factors that will contribute to integration: 'Common ground,'[3] 'Responsibility,' 'Social mobility,' 'participation and empowerment,' 'tackling intolerance and extremism'.[4] The language of 'responsibility' and the insistence on shared values—'focusing on what we have in common'—echo the French approach of integration as defined

in the inception report of the High Council for Integration (HCI) in 1991–1993.

France

Integration emerged in France as an important public category in public debates and policies from the 1980s onwards. The failure of policies that aimed in previous years to favouring the return of immigrants to their country of origin, in a context of economic crisis, became obvious, and the objective was then to 'integrate' immigrants and their families into French society (Weil 1991). The High Council for Integration (HCI) has formalized the official definition of integration:

> Integration consists in fostering the active participation, in the society as a whole, of all women and men who will be living permanently on our soil, by accepting without ulterior motives the persistence of specificities, particularly of a cultural nature, but emphasizing the similarities and convergences in the equality of rights and duties, in order to ensure the cohesion of our social fabric […]. It postulates the participation of differences in a common project and not, like assimilation, their elimination, or on the contrary, as with inclusion [French: insertion], the guarantee that will ensure their long-term survival. (HCI 1993)

The HCI has remained deliberately vague about the balance between the rights and duties of "women and men who will be living permanently on our soil", and especially about the changes needed in French society to accommodate newcomers and the degree of tolerance for the public expression of differences.

The dominant view about integration issues from that time to present has referred to the republican tenet of universalism, which prohibits any kind of distinction between French citizens according to race, origins or religion. In this colour-blind context, the principle of equality is interpreted to be efficient by ignoring differences and creating invisibility (by law). Categorization and classification are by themselves perceived as promoting inequalities rather than tools to implement actions for equality. In contrast, multiculturalism, referred to the US and UK experiences and actually poorly understood, has served as a counter-model (Simon and Sala Pala 2009).

The so-called French model of integration (Schnapper 1991) offers a specific form of assimilationism where the 'civic' dimension of integration

(participation in the society and its institutions) is always combined with a deep cultural understanding of the pre-conditions for participation. As in the EU definition and the community cohesion approach in the UK, the adoption of values and societal and cultural norms considered to be at the core of the Nation are crucial in the process of integration. Whether this multi-layered process of adoption of values and norms is compatible with the recognition of cultural specificities and identities of immigrants fuels endless public conversation since the 1990s.

The resources for integration policies have been channelled through territorial based schemes. Socio-urban policies (*Politique de la Ville*) dedicated to a selection of disadvantaged neighbourhoods have been designed to implement the action plans for integration (Escafré-Dublet 2013). The strategy was to target zones where immigrant families were concentrated to address their specific disadvantage without identifying explicitly recipients of policies by their ethnicity. As a consequence, 'neighbourhoods' and 'youth from the neighbourhoods' have replaced ethnic minorities in the French policies' terminology. This can be described as a genuine mainstreaming strategy as the objectives of social cohesion and local developments have been central in the integration policies. However, if the *Politique de la Ville* was, and still is, the main active policy tool for the integration of immigrants, the discursive structure is not so much addressing the contribution of immigrants to social cohesion but rather to move away from the alleged cultural distinctiveness which is perceived as a threat against national identity.

Following the impetus of the European race directives in 2000, a comprehensive legal framework to fight ethnic discrimination has been developed by the left government. This development was also influenced by different stakeholders, including activists, trade-unionists and academics. The equality body—HALDE (The High Authority for the Fight against Discriminations and for Equality)—was created in 2003, with a large mission that includes all types of discrimination (including ethnic discrimination). Its role was to support victims of discrimination through mediation or judicial procedures. It was absorbed in 2011 into a new institution (the 'Défenseur des Droits'), which is also in charge of public liberties, human and children rights. The promotion of 'diversity,' a code word used to refer to 'visible minorities,' has gained more legitimacy in France over the last years, especially spurred by former President Nicolas Sarkozy's rhetoric: the idea was that people of immigrant background (especially the youth) represent a significant fraction of society

and must be better recognized by favouring their access to higher education institutions, to the media scene and to high-level positions in companies and state administrations. The former right government thus developed an ambivalent discourse on integration, insisting both on the duty of immigrants to assimilate and the rights and social promotion of minority groups.

The linkage between immigration and integration of immigrants already settled in France gained momentum in the 2000s. Previously, the connection had been one of the rhetorical arguments to justify closing the borders—that is, restricting entries to secure the residence of immigrants already in France: what was essentially rhetoric has turned into the new Immigration Acts. The 2003 Act required immigrants to demonstrate their 'republican integration' in order to be granted their right of residence. This perceptible shift was confirmed by the 2006 and 2007 Acts. Integration was no longer a goal to be reached in one or more generations, but a prerequisite for obtaining a residence permit (with minimal but explicit criteria). A 'reception and integration contract,' (*Contrat d'Accueil et d'Intégration*) which became compulsory in 2006, is signed when the first residence permit is issued. It includes a commitment to abide by the laws and values of the Republic, a civic education training day, and a language test.

The pendulum between an open conception of integration and a coercive one has not swung back to its progressive side under the socialist's presidency of François Hollande. The emphasis on republican values has gained over the promotion of non-discrimination, while the crystallization of the conversation on Islam and *laïcité* has dominated the political agenda. Old school integration policy has been challenged in an ambitious reform called 're-foundation' of the French integration policy. After a two-year process, the reform was finalized in 2014: a clear cut is now made between policies that address the adaptation of newly arrived immigrants during the first 5 years of settlement in France and the rest of the policies that are mainstreamed in general social policies. The consequence of this revision is that integration policy as it was known has been discontinued, the budget reallocated mainly to the ministry of interior in charge of newcomers (immigrants and their family) and generic policies in education, housing, social welfare etc., have been entitled to address the needs and specific experience of long-established immigrants and second generations. This last step completes the process of mainstreaming, but without any group-based actions and monitor-

ing of the situation of population with an immigrant background as described in Chap. 1.

The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, the shift from group-specific policies to generic policies has been a political priority since at least the 2000s. The Netherlands was also one of the first European countries to experience an assimilationist turn, which strongly relates to the mainstreaming trend in Dutch integration policies. In spite of Dutch policies being internationally renowned for their 'multiculturalist' approach, the issue of mainstreaming has been part of Dutch immigrant integration debates from the very beginning. Already in the 1980s, the defining policy slogan was to have specific policies wherever necessary and generic policies wherever possible, even though Dutch government then pursued many target group specific policies (Scholten 2011).

The 1990s saw a move from 'minority' policies to integration policies, with a focus on citizenship and integration in Dutch society (Memorandum Integration Policy Minorities (1994).[5] The shift indicates a transition from specific approach on the emancipation of minorities to an intensification of generic integration policies (Scholten 2011: 138). Strongly informed by the idea of proportionality, this decade was still characterized by a high degree of specifically targeted policies to increase levels of participation in the fields of education, housing and the labour-market. One example of this is the '*Wet Bevordering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen*' (*Wet BEAA*), an act intended to encourage the equal labour participation of immigrants.

The move towards more generic integration policies entailed a shift from minority policies as a stand-alone field to the first steps of a decentralization of policy responsibilities to colleague-departments and the local level. The Memorandum of 1994 addressed the role of municipalities in "shaping and implementing immigrant integration policies," whilst the national government kept a "regulating and controlling task" (Contourennota 1994). Parallelly, the so-called Big Cities Policy programmes (*Grotestedenbeleid: GSB*) were drafted between 1995 and 1999 and later between 1999 and 2003. The programmes focused on the fieldwork, education, safety, livability and care and the physical, economic and social infrastructure in urbanized areas. Combined in one Ministry of Big City and Integration Policies in 1998, immigrant integration policies

in this period were likewise phrased in broad terms, focusing on 'active citizenship' and the role of the native population in integration policies as well as the high diversities amongst immigrants (Tijdelijke Commissie 2004A: 48). These developments entailed a move in horizontal and vertical policy governance, which can be considered the first cause of mainstreaming in terms of polycentric governance (Maan et al. 2014: 25–26). Additionally non-governmental organizations, such as a selected group of migrant self-organizations, were formally integrated in consultation structures.

The early 2000s mark a turbulent political period in immigrant integration. In an influential opinion piece published in one of the national newspapers, social scientist Paul Scheffer[6] declared the renowned Dutch multicultural model "a tragedy" and "a failure". The opinion piece led to a Parliamentary debate and marked a shift in thinking on immigrant integration and issues of identification. This is reflected in the 2001 Memorandum on Immigrant Integration where it is stated that the interrelations between citizens have become problematic, affecting "the presumed tolerance in our country," hardening the tone of the debate. The strong language of the 'new realist' approach translates into the spectacular rise of Pim Fortuyn and his party LPF in the 2002 elections (Scholten 2011: 177). Fortuyn phrased immigrant integration in assimilationist terms: "[i]n order to preserve Dutch culture and identity and to compensate for the social-cultural deprivation of migrants, Fortuyn argued for a more obligatory approach to integration that also involved adaptation to Dutch norms and values" (Scholten 2011: 196). As part of the Coalition of the Balkenende I Cabinet, immigrant integration is listed high on the political agenda. It is in a sharp and obligatory tone in the Memorandum on Integration, with a strong focus on combatting segregation in a physical, social and mental sense.

On the whole all these developments led to public unrest on the effects of immigrant integration policies, eventually leading to a parliamentary Investigative Committee, also known as the Blok Committee[7] that was meant to evaluate the 'causes for failure' of Dutch immigrant integration policies.[8] In the midst of this commotion the 'Integration policy—New Style' was published in September 2003. The Memorandum stresses the importance of unity and sharing, "Shared citizenship for both allochtone as well as autochtone citizens is the aim of the immigrant integration policies" (2003), explicitly challenging "the previous acceptation of differences as a value in itself" (idem). The policies strongly move away

from accommodative and specifically targeted policies. Another notable development is the emphasis on social cohesion and the social-cultural dimension of integration. Moving away from the old slogan 'integration whilst maintaining one's own culture', integration is addressed in terms of 'shared citizenship'. While this partly opens the integration debate to a more generic and dual process, most policy measures seem to be directed at the cultural adaptation of immigrant to the Dutch norms and values. While the early years of 2000 were characterized by a strong focus on commonality and a shared sense of citizenship, emphasizing the necessity to speak Dutch and to have a shared set of values and norms, this discussion opens up a little between 2005 and 2011. A stronger emphasis on the integration obligations of immigrants is visible in the development of civic integration courses in these same years. The Civic Integration Act in 2007, obliging non-EU immigrants to take a civic integration exam before obtaining a residence permit, formalizes the link between immigration and integration further.

The Cabinet explicitly distanced itself from the "relativism enclosed in the concept of the multicultural society" in 2011 (*Integratienota Integratie, binding, burgerschap 2011: 15*), stating that increased pluriformity and diversity do not automatically lead to shared norms, but that this instead requires effort of those who come to settle here. The Integration Agenda (2013) of the current government continues the focus on "Dutch society and its values" (*Aanbiedingsbrief Agenda Integratie 2013*) and strives for equal treatment of all its citizens, working towards a society where people can develop themselves unhindered and independently to contribute to Dutch society.

In terms of policy targeting the increased diversity amongst immigrant groups in 2004 led to the consideration that group-policies in general are not useful, focusing on generic policies in "most areas" instead (*Jaarnota Integratie 2004*), reaffirmed in the more intercultural years of 2007, where specific policies are only applied under "extra-ordinary" circumstances. In 2011, this is taken a step further under the motto "future over descent"; policies are centred around individuals rather than groups, therefore specific problems are from then on "addressed through generic policies only" (Integratienota Integratie, binding, burgerschap 2011). Overall we see a shift in emphasis here from emancipatory specifically targeted policies in the 1980s to the accessibility of generic policies currently. This development is characterized by a move from a multicultural approach to a recognition of increased diversity and individualization of targeting on the

one hand, and general decentralizations in the social sector on the other. Roughly speaking, throughout the years, immigrant integration policies have been limited to civic integration courses and re-migration policies. In the Netherlands, the retreat from the multicultural doxa has paradoxically paved the way to a 'monocultural approach' (Duyvendak 2011) and the imposition of a 'culturism' which has invaded the discourses on integration both in the academia and political strata (Schinkel 2013).

Who Is to Be 'Mainstreamed'? The Issue of Categorization

Behind the philosophies of integration and the practicalities of the implementation of integration policies, the issue of categorization is key to understand the prospects of mainstreaming as a substitute to the group-based policies. In needs-based or area-based generic policies, the condition for their efficiency to address the situation of immigrants, second generations and/or ethnic minorities relies indeed on the capacity to identify these groups as recipients of policy actions. The issue of ethnic monitoring is of course central for implementing mainstreaming as if generic policies should have a positive impact on immigrants and second generations, and more broadly on ethnic minorities, the least that can be done is to assess how far these groups fare in the system. Therefore an intractable consequence of drafting more generic policies is to keep track of their influence on the life chances of designated groups. The three countries do not share the same position in this respect. Republican universalism in France has resulted in colour-blind policies and accordingly colour-blind statistics. Ethnic and racial categories are part of the common and official languages in the UK, and ethnic statistics are collected in the census and administrative forms since 1991. Official categories in the Netherlands refer commonly to non-Western *allochtoons* and data on immigrants and second generations are collected in population registers and administrative files. The three national contexts provide therefore very different support for implementing mainstreaming in terms of categorizations and the production of statistics.

The situation in France is clearly the more problematic. In line with an interpretation of article 1 of the Constitution, any distinction based on race, origin or ethnicity is conceived as infringing the principle of equality. Indeed, article 1 states that "[The Republic] shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion", and

the emphasis in the frame of the republican model is put on the "without distinction", whereas the duty to ensure equality could have entailed a strict monitoring of apparently neutral laws and practices to measure potential disparate impacts based on race and ethnicity. This pragmatic approach has not been developed in France and the 'choice of ignorance' is still prevailing, that is, the deliberate prohibition of ethnic and racial categorizations in laws, policies and any other official classifications.

Stemming from this colour-bind approach, recipients and users of social welfare, public services and education, health or housing systems are categorized mostly by their place of birth and nationality, when this information is collected. Even these basic categories also collected in the census are sometimes considered as sensitive, and a large number of institutional public reports do not provide a breakdown of the population by immigrant origins. This is specifically the case in education where pupils are rarely categorized by citizenship and the rare studies about ethnic concentration in schools have used onomastic classification to identify ethnocultural origins (Felouzis 2005). Our survey in education and housing shows that ethnic markers are used extensively when talking about social issues but are not considered as legitimate categories when it comes to develop actions to support the integration of immigrants, second generations and/or ethnic minorities. The dynamic of racialization in the society has put the issue of race, religion and ethnicity at the forefront of political debates and media attention, but this has not challenged the choice to ignore these categories in statistics (Simon 2008).

The consequences of colour-blindness are manifold when it comes to implement antidiscrimination policies and to mainstream integration. Antidiscrimination policies make an intensive use of statistics to raise awareness, identify disparate impacts, design and evaluate actions, etc. (Simon 2005). The lack of statistics has hindered the implementation of the transposition of the 2000 Race Directive and many European countries are facing limitations in their antidiscrimination strategy because of the choice of not counting by race or ethnicity (Grigolo et al. 2011). The French case is not specific, except for the recurrent debates on the opportunity to collect ethnic statistics that are not observed—or at least with the same intensity—in other European countries (Escafré-Dublet and Simon 2012). The Dutch case is a bit different since data on first and second generation immigrants are collected in population registers and most of administrative and institutional files. However, this large and encompassing system of data collection and the systematic classification of Dutch with an immigrant

background as *allochtoon* have received critics in the academia for its power of stigmatization (see De Zwart 2005, 2012). The use of these statistics for the purpose of antidiscrimination is also limited by the discontinuation of the pro-active schemes (Guiraudon et al. 2005). However, the engineering of ethnicity still plays an important role. While not as explicit as before, this has to do with the Dutch aim of "'evenredigheid,' i.e., proportional participation for comparable groups with or without a migrant background" (Verbeek et al. 2015) as monitored in these yearly studies. In the 2011 Memorandum, the Coalition explicitly addressed the importance of ethnic monitoring under generic policies "to hold a good overview on the process of integration and effects of generic policies", claiming that amidst the cuts in integration-budgets the resources for monitoring would be maintained (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties [BZK], 2011: 12).

While not officially counted as immigrant or '*allochtoon*' the so-called 'third generation' immigrants forms a new group in immigrant integration policies. Officially the definition of '*allochtoon*' limits itself to first and second generation immigrants (by registering country of birth up to one's parents), and 'third generation' therefore should be considered native Dutch. However in 2010 the Ministry of Wellbeing, Health and Culture had a study conducted on the so-called third generation immigrants, in order to gain insight in the processes of integration and to examine the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies on the 'third-generation' (CBS 2010).[9] The diversification of migration groups, in terms of descent, generation and more in general in their levels of social-economic integration and participation raises questions in terms of targeting immigrant integration policies. In 2004 for example standard group-based minority policies were no longer considered appropriate, one of the reasons mentioned is the fact that "within and between minority groups there are big differences in the degree of integration and backlogs" (2004 kabinetsreactie).[10]

In the French case, this statistical tracking of immigrants or minorities is definitely not enforce and the disbanding of the integration policy for generic approaches has led to a complete demise of the institutional supports dedicated to immigrants. Not only do the institutions in education, housing, health, labour market etc. not target groups by immigrant origins, ethnicity or race, but they intentionally frame their actions to target groups on a need-based level without any reference to their position in the ethno-racial hierarchy and their potential limitations or barriers linked to their ethnic background. Even if we consider that generic policies have

a neutral impact as such on the recipients (a hypothesis that is far from being proven), then colour-blind policies reproduce the ethnic penalties that exist in society because of the lack of attention to specific needs or disadvantages.

Colour-blindness is not what characterizes the UK case where ethnic and racial categorizations are commonly used from the colonial experience to the mass migration context. References to race and ethnicity were included in the first antidiscrimination law in Western Europe, the *Race Relation Act* enacted first in 1965, and then replaced by the landmark *Race Relation Act* of 1976 (amended in 2000). However, even in a country where notions of race and ethnicity are not considered as an ontological problem, ethnic statistics were not produced in the census or administration until a vivid debate in the academia and civil society opposed pros and cons (Thompson 2015). The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) stated that collecting data on ethnicity and race in the census is of utmost importance to fulfil its duties[11] and its claim was eventually satisfied with the inclusion of an 'ethnic group' question in the 1991 census. Standards and guidelines were published by the CRE to mainstream data collection with the same templates and categories in administrations, workplace, schools, etc. This 'politics of documentation'—as S. Ahmed calls it (Ahmed 2007)—can be quite invasive and if the critics are less active than in the 1980s against these statistics, concerns about their usefulness pop up from time to time.

The major challenge faced by ethnic categorization is their inability to account for the new migration landscape in the UK. Whereas ethnic groups conflate together recent immigrants and long-established minorities, including third generations of the immigrants who came in the 1950s, there is a need to identify newcomers and second generations separately rather than under their broader ethnic categories. Indeed, the shift towards patterns of mainstreaming in the UK has followed from the demographic diversity itself, as was the shift in the 1960s from assimilation to integration an account that diversity was not simply an issue of immigrants but increasingly of British-born minorities. Resulting from the strong historical links with the Commonwealth, and the British tradition of conferring citizenship by birthplace (jus soli), policymakers have for many decades considered the country's population of migrant origin as ethnic minorities rather than migrants. However, these policy frames operated within a paradigm of 'race relations' that understood Britain's minorities as a patchwork of discrete, homogenous entities arranged

around a White British mainstream. The diversification and intensification of migration in the last decades have fostered a partial turn away from this race relations model, driven by the realization of the fact of super-diversity and by the uneven geography of the new reality: increasingly complex migration-driven demographic change creating new zones of encounter in previously relatively homogenous parts of the country while intensifying and multiplying diversity in the old urban contact zones. In this context, social policies are more and more dedicated to immigrants rather than the old minorities which are the subjects of antidiscrimination and multicultural policies. The backlash against multiculturalism and the securitization of integration problems—with the continued emphasis on Muslim minorities—has meant that the rhetorical mainstreaming of the community cohesion policy frame (and its increasingly assimilationist turn under the rubric of 'British values') paradoxically serves to discursively target Muslim minorities even when the accent is on the mainstream.

In the UK as in the Netherlands and France, the categories of the recipients of integration policies, mainstreamed or not, change over time, places and schemes. Immigrants, second generations, Muslims, ethnic and racial minorities are now part of the picture, even though immigrants are generally easy to frame in all countries, second generations are identified in the Netherlands but not in the UK or France and Muslims or ethno-racial minorities are categorized in statistics only in the UK.[12] As a matter of fact, the pre-conditions for mainstreaming are not completely fulfilled if significant categories do not match the social issues to solve.

Conclusion: Mainstreaming at the Expense of Integration

While maintaining a national style in their philosophies of integration and policy designs, the three 'old immigration countries' studied here share common features like the move towards an increasing focus on national identity, shared values and civic integration rather than ethno-racial-based equality policies. Different paradigms co-exist and contradict each other very often: antidiscrimination and 'hard integration' in France (equality and coercive *laïcité* are also conflicting in contemporary politics); antidiscrimination and community cohesion in the UK; assimilation and remains of multicultural and antidiscrimination policies in the Netherlands. What could be seen as a plurality of paradigms is actually a struggle between forces that try to impose their own agenda to multicultural societies.

Nativism has gained in traction in the three countries, and populist parties are not far from power (Mudde 2012).

The impetus to mainstream integration instead of maintaining group-targeted policies could have been understood as an advanced step in integration: the dissemination of the support to minorities in all domains of public actions, like gender mainstreaming. However, this was not the expectation of the EU commission when promoting mainstreaming. The EU commission does not define precisely the meanings attached to mainstreaming in the case of integration (see Chap. 1) and mainstreaming as such is quoted only once in the latest action plan for integration:

> Actions to support the integration of third-country nationals need not, and should not, be at the expense of measures to benefit other vulnerable or disadvantaged groups or minorities. In fact mainstreaming the integration of third country nationals is and should be an integral part of efforts to modernise and build inclusive social, education, labour market, health and equality policies, in order to offer meaningful opportunities for all to participate in society and the economy.[13]

The invitation to broaden the scope of public actions outside the "integration tool box" should then be considered in the context of a retreat of integration policies which are no more considered as solutions, but as problems by themselves. To put it differently, mainstreaming integration in France, the UK and the Netherlands does not constitute an enlargement of the interest for immigrants or minorities, but rather an attempt to get away from group-based actions which create resentment in the majority population. Rhetorical commitment to mainstreaming can sometimes have the paradoxical effect of hindering the development of effective mainstream policy in practice. In the case of France, colour-blindness clearly jeopardizes the rationale behind mainstreaming. In the UK, the erosion of equality law and the development of mainstreaming have disproportionate effects on migrants and minorities and on their integration processes and outcomes. Governments generally avoid accounting for the effects of policy change on migrants and minorities. For example, changes in the way welfare benefits are paid are bringing large numbers of long-settled migrant women (often with little English) into Job Centres for the first time through the introduction of Universal Credit—but the commitment to universalism means no additional support or guidance is created for these service user.

In the Netherlands, France and the UK, area-based policies have been designed to offer an alternative to the group-based policies, and they have certainly disproportionately benefited migrant and minority populations. This indirect strategy reaches the same limits: not only are not all the inhabitants of targeted zones stigmatized ethnic minorities, there are also sizable victims of deprivation and racial discrimination who do not live in these zones. In the best cases, these minority populations in targeted zones represent less than 30% of the overall population exposed to obstacle in their integration trajectories and discriminations. In any case, a policy which covers only a small proportion of its potential recipients is a failure, unless the coverage was not the purpose of its implementation. A 'smart' approach to mainstreaming would monitor these effects and where necessary seek to adjust them. However, monitoring the effect of policies on minorities requires accurate data that are missing in most cases because they simply do not exist (in France), because they are not used for this purpose (in the Netherlands), or because they are not targeting the proper population groups (in the UK).

Notes

1. Anticipating these changes, Brubaker was talking of a "return of assimilation" already in 2001 (Brubaker, 2001).
2. Bozec and Simon (2014): The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of France; Jensen and Gidley (2014): The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of the United Kingdom; Maan et al. (2014): The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of the Netherlands.
   See http://www.project-upstream.eu/publications/country-reports/275-the-politics-of-mainstreaming-immigrant-integration-policies-case-study-of-spain
3. "Shared aspirations and values, which focuses on what we have in common rather than our differences" (DCLG 2012: 4–5).
4. "A robust response to threats, whether discrimination, extremism or disorder, that deepen division and increase tensions" (DCLG 2012: 4–5).
5. Contourennota.
6. Scheffer, P. (2000, January 29). Het Multiculturele Drama. NRC Handelsblad. http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/scheffer.html
7. Named after Chairman Stef Blok.
8. After an extensive study of immigrant integration policies of the last 30 years the Committee concluded that the *process* of integration for many immi-

grants had been "a total or partial success". The whole process of the research, and particularly its moderate outcome led to strong response in and outside the Parliament, as the Commission's conclusions strongly diverged from the public and political sentiments on immigrant integration.

9. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2010). *Verkenning niet-westerse 3de generatie*. The Hague: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.
10. 2003–2004 TK 26 689 nr. 17 kabinetsreactie rapport bruggen bouwen.
11. Commission for Racial Equality (1980). *1981 Census: Why the Ethnic Question is Vital. A Discussion Document*. London: Commission for Racial Equality.
12. There are statistics on Muslims in the Netherlands, but they are built on geographical information (country of origin for two generations) and not on self-identification in religious categories.
13. EU Commission (2016). "Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals". Brussels, COM(2016) 377 Final (7/6/2016).

References

Ahmed, S. 2007. 'You End Up Doing the Document Rather than Doing the Doing': Diversity, Race Equality and the Politics of Documentation. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (4): 590–609.

Ali, S., and B. Gidley. 2014. *Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in Education and Employment in the United Kingdom*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

Bertossi, C., and J.-W. Duyvendack. 2012. National Models of Immigrant Integration: The Costs for Comparative Research. *Comparative European Research* 10 (3): 237–247.

Bleich, E. 2003. *Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking Since the 1960s*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2001. The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24: 531–548.

Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. 2010. *Verkenning niet-westerse 3de generatie*. The Hague: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.

DCLG. 2012. *Creating the Conditions for Integration*. London: DCLG. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7504/2092103.pdf.

De Zwart, F. 2005. The Dilemma of Recognition: Administrative Categories and Cultural Diversity. *Theory and Society* 34 (2): 137–169.

———. 2012. Pitfalls of Top-Down Identity Designation: Ethno-Statistics in the Netherlands. *Comparative European Politics* 10 (3): 301–318.

Duyvendak, Jan William. 2011. *The Politics of Home: Belonging and Nostalgia in Western Europe and the United States*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Duyvendak, J.W., and P. Scholten. 2012. Deconstructing the Dutch Multicultural Model: A Frame Perspective on Dutch Immigrant Integration Policymaking. *Comparative European Politics* 10 (3): 266–282.

Escafré-Dublet, A. 2013. Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in France. In *Experiences of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration in Europe: Lessons for the Netherlands*, ed. E. Collet, M. Petrovic, and P. Scholten. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

Escafré-Dublet A., and Simon P. 2012. Ethnic Statistics in Europe: The Paradox of Colour-Blindness. In *European Multiculturalisms. Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges*, directed by A. Triandafyllidou, T. Modood, and N. Meer, 213–237. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Felouzis, G. 2005. Ethnic Segregation and Its Effects in Middle School in France. *Revue française de sociologie* 46 (Annual English Issue): 3–35.

Finney, N., and L. Simpson. 2009. *Sleepwalking to Segregation? Challenging Myths About Race and Migration*. Bristol: Policy press.

Garbaye, R. 2010. Towards a European Policy of Integration? Divergence and Convergence of Immigrant Integration Policy in Britain and France. In *Managing Ethnic Diversity after 9/11: Integration, Security, Civil Liberties in Transatlantic Perspective*, ed. S. Reich and A. Chebel d'Appolonia, 165–178. Piscataway: Rutgers University Press.

Geddes, A., and V. Guiraudon. 2004. Britain and France and EU Anti-discrimination Policy: The Emergence of an EU Policy Paradigm. *West European Politics* 27 (2): 334–353.

Grigolo, M., C. Hermanin, and M. Mööschel. 2011. Introduction: How Does Race "Count" in Fighting Discrimination in Europe? *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34 (10): 1635–1647.

Guiraudon, V., K. Phalet, and J. ter Wall. 2005. Monitoring Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands. *International Social Science Journal* 57 (1): 75–87.

Haut Conseil à l'Intégration. 1993. *L'intégration à la française*. Paris: UGE. 10/18.

Hickman, M.J., N. Mai, and H. Crowley. 2012. *Migration and Social Cohesion in the UK*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Joppke, C. 2007. Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. *World Politics* 59 (2): 243–273.

Lieberman, R. 2005. *Shaping Race Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Maan, X., I. van Breugel, and P. Scholten. 2014. *The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of the Netherlands*. Upstream Report.

Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Veiligheid. 2011. *Integratie, Binding en Burgerschap*. The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Veiligheid, Directoraat-Generaal Wonen, Wijken en Integratie.

Mudde, Cas. 2012. *The Relationship Between Immigration and Nativism in Europe and North America*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Parekh, B. 2000. *The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain*. London: Runnymede Trust.

Sacco M., Torrekens, C., and Adam, I. (dir.). 2016. *Circulation des idées et des modèles : les transformations de l'action publique en question: le cas des politiques d'intégration*. Louvain-la-neuve: Academia-L'Harmattan.

Schinkel, W. 2013. The Imagination of "Society" in Measurements of Immigrant Integration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36 (7): 1142–1161.

Schnapper, D. 1991. *La France de l'intégration. Sociologie de la nation en 1990.* Paris: Gallimard.

Scholten, P. 2011. *Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Policy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Simon, P. 2005. The Measurement of Racial Discrimination: The Policy Use of Statistics. *International Social Science Journal* 57 (183): 9–25.

———. 2008. The Choice of Ignorance. The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France. *French Politics, Culture & Society* 1: 7–31.

Simon, P., and V. Sala Pala. 2009. 'We're Not All Multiculturalist Yet': France Swings Between Hard Integration and Soft Antidiscrimination. In *The Multiculturalism Backlash. European Discourses, Practices and Policies*, ed. S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf, 92–110. London: Routledge.

Solanke, I. 2009. *Making Anti-racial Discrimination Law: A Comparative History of Social Action and Anti-racial Discrimination Law*. London: Routledge.

Thompson, D. 2015. The Ethnic Question: Census Politics in Great-Britain. In *Social Statistics and Ethnic Diversity*, ed. P. Simon, V. Piché, and A. Gagnon, 111–139. New York: Springer.

Verbeek, S., H. Entzinger, and P. Scholten. 2015. Research-Policy Dialogues in the Netherlands. In *Integrating Immigrants in Europe: Research-Policy Dialogues*, ed. P. Scholten, H. Entzinger, E. Penninx, and S. Verbeek. Dordrecht: IMISCOE, Springer.

Vertovec, S., and S. Wessendorf. 2010. Introduction: Assessing the Backlash Against Multiculturalism in Europe. In *The Multiculturalism Backlash; European Discourses, Policies and Practices*, ed. S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf, 1–31. New York: Routledge.

Weil, P. 1991. *La France et ses étrangers.* Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

Patrick Simon is Director of Research at INED (Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques—French Institute for Demographic Studies), and is fellow researcher at the Center of European Studies (CEE) at Sciences Po. He is studying

antidiscrimination policies, ethnic classification and the integration of ethnic minorities in European countries. He has chaired the scientific panel "Integration of Immigrants" at the IUSSP (International Union for the Scientific Studies of Population) and was appointed at the Scientific Board of the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Commission in Vienna (2008–2013).

Mélodie Beaujeu has 10 years of experience in the migration field, across practice (with international institutions and non-governmental organizations) and research. Her research interests focus specifically on the links between migration and development policies, by exploring the policy, contest and legitimating role of non-governmental organizations, particularly within European and West-African countries. She also works on integration policies in EU countries. Based on this complementary background, she has developed a set of skills to foster dialogue between scholarship and practice, and outreach activities across the range of stakeholders involved in migration issues: policy organizations, scholarly networks, migrant communities and the wider public.

CHAPTER 3

Mainstreaming by Accident in the New-Migration Countries: The Role of NGOs in Spain and Poland

Ignacy Jóźwiak, María Sánchez-Domínguez, and Daniel Sorando

Introduction

Immigrant integration governance in Poland and Spain is characterized by a polycentric model. With regard to international migrants[1], civil society is a pivotal element within its welfare regime due to the lack of public resources within these countries. In this context, international migrants are in a weak social position as they have limited access both to public goods and to family and neighbourhood networks. Under

Surnames provided in alphabetical order

I. Jóźwiak (✉)
Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

M. Sánchez-Domínguez
Departaento de Ecologia II, Universidad Complutense de Madrid & Grupo de Estudios de Población y Sociedad (GEPS), Madrid, Spain

D. Sorando
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_3

these conditions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) cover some of the needs of international migrants that the state does not meet. Consequently, NGOs become an 'acting state' characterized by a lack of autonomy due to their dependence on external funding. Even though deconcentration involves moves towards more generic policies, mainstreaming in Poland and Spain happens rather 'accidentally'[2] or is born out of a lack of specific immigrant integration priorities targeting immigrants (Brey et al. 2015; Jóźwiak et al. 2014). Therefore, mainstreaming patterns do not necessarily mean that immigrants are fully integrated in both societies. On the contrary, this chapter describes the efficiencies and deficiencies of the mainstreaming of integration policies and practices in this two 'new receiving countries of international migration.'

Spain and Poland share a common way of organizing welfare that largely shapes the current framework in which migrant integration policies have been developed. In short, both countries are characterized by a weak welfare state in which there is a large dependency on civil society to meet social needs of the population. This institutional context is fuelled by the hegemony of the idea of charity as a legitimate means of social solidarity. However, this similarity appears as a result of quite different historical trajectories. On the one hand, the case of Spain refers to the insufficient attempts to build a new welfare state after the end of the fascist dictatorship of Franco. The case of Poland, on the other hand, is a remarkable example of the dismantling of a communist-type (state socialism) welfare state. At present, the neoliberal predominance fuels the weakness of the welfare policies in both countries. This, in turn, strengthens the role of the families and neighbourhood networks, as well as the NGOs.

The chapter starts with a description of international migration trends to contextualize the recent migrant integration policies in both countries. Once this picture is presented, we explain how mainstreaming is, or is not, implemented in the fields of education and social cohesion. Within the field of education, we focus on the situation of immigrants at schools, and the relevancy of language skills among the migrants. Then we immerse in the analysis of the social cohesion, considering public anti-poverty and anti-exclusion programmes. Finally we conclude the chapter by pointing to the fact that mainstreaming practices in both countries do not result from policy priorities but rather from neoliberal forms of governance leading to assimilationist tendencies.

The Impact of International Migration in Poland and Spain

The Spanish and the Polish societies have undergone changes in terms of an increasing influx of international migrants. In a very short span of time, Spain has become one of the main European recipients of international immigration due to the needs of its local markets regarding the expansion of the housing bubble during the 2000s. As a result, the share of foreigners in the Spanish population increased from 2%, at the end of the 1990s, to more than 14% in 2011 (the peak of the immigration process).[3] Thus, Spain can be defined as a 'new international immigration country.' Up to the year 2000, Spain had functioned primarily as a sending country for both North-Western Europe and Latin America. This clearly changed in the year 2000. From then on, Spain became one of the main European destinations for immigrants. The massive influx of immigrants has strongly affected the make-up of its active population and population age structures. The immigrants present in the country come from three main regions. The first two, South America and Morocco, are 'traditional' regions of origin of immigrants in Spain. The third, very recent sending region is Eastern Europe, especially Romania and Bulgaria. However, the financial crisis, which began in 2008, has had two effects. It has slowed the entry of new immigrants and there has been an increase in returns. These trends are evident with the data of the population register, where immigration dropped to 10.7% of the total population in 2014. Nevertheless, the massive migratory flows have given rise in Spain to political, economic and social concerns regarding the ability of society to successfully incorporate newcomers.

On the contrary, in Poland permanent or long-term foreign residents represent less than 1% of the total population, which is one of the lowest rates of immigrants in the EU. This number, however, does not include seasonal and circular migrants, the majority of whom are not regarded as residents although they form the largest group of foreigners working in the country. Most of the immigrants stay for short periods and circulate between Poland and their countries of origin or move further to the West. It is possible due to the simplified procedure (the so-called employer's declaration of intent to hire a foreigner), according to which the citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine are entitled to work for six months in a year in Poland without the need to conduct labour market tests required prior to employing a foreign worker. Around

90% of these migrants come from Ukraine. In 2013, over 235,000 immigrants were registered through this scheme. During the next year, the number nearly reached 400,000, and it has kept increasing, exceeding 1 300 000 temporary workers registered in 2016.[4]

An important factor in achieving effective migrant integration policy is the institutional context of the countries in question. Spain and Poland are characterized as 'familist' welfare regimes in reference to the centrality of the family institution, the neighbourhood networks, and the NGOs in the social structure and social protection mechanisms (Pérez-Díaz et al. 2010). Welfare regimes in these countries have been built around the premise that these social agents are the central institutions in providing care and social protection to the dependent members. The consequence of the familistic bias is a low level of public provision and public expenditure in care, that on top of that has been affected by the current financial crisis, leading to even more vulnerability (Flaquer 2000; Serrano and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015; Krzyżowski 2011; Szukalski 2010). This common way of organizing welfare largely shapes the current frameworks in which migrant integration policies have been developed in both Spain and Poland. In this context, international migrants are in a particularly vulnerable position[5] since they are deprived of their family-support network in the destination country.

In this regard, we find it crucial to link the worldwide emergence of the belief in individualism and individual agency with the neoliberal political project as a fuel for the third sector as an alternative to the welfare-state social integration policies (Harvey 2005). In this scenario, the lack of both social resources (neighbourhood and family networks of mutual support) and public provision has been filled by NGOs. Therefore, the third sector is trying to supply some of the goods and services that the immigrant population needs in a context of crisis. In both countries, NGOs play a crucial role in the development of migrant integration policies as they serve as the main—and in some cases the only—actor in the debate on immigrant integration.

In both countries, the post-authoritarian condition formed a favourable background for the emergence of NGOs.[6] In Spain this did not happen until the late 1980s, when two factors coincided—the creation of public funding systems for NGOs (used to legitimize weak and ineffective welfare policies) and the use of NGOs by the main political actors (such as church, unions, political parties) to control the already weak Spanish civic society (Gómez Gil 2005). The main consequence is the structural

dependency of NGOs on public priorities due to a lack of financial autonomy derived from its weak social base. In Poland, after the 1989 political breakthrough, 'democracy' and 'civil society' have commonly been associated with the free market. In this order, the role of the NGOs was to cushion the social side effects of the state's withdrawal from active social policy (Załęski 2012).

To sum up, international migration has become an increasingly significant social process in both countries in the context of weak welfare regime. Although the intensity of international migration differs between the two countries, their commonalities in organization of welfare produce similar effects on the social integration of international migrants and the significant role played by NGOs. In this context, the following sections assess to what extent mainstreaming can be detected when attention to migrants is concerned, and what are the social effects of its particular development in both countries.

Migrant Integration Policies in Poland and Spain

Due to the different circumstances of immigration in Spain and Poland, we might expect a difference in the development of migrant integration policies in each country. While in Spain, integration policies date back to the beginning of the 1990s, Poland has not yet developed an immigrant integration framework as such. The reason is mainly related to the migratory history of both countries. In Poland, immigration is a recent phenomenon which remains largely invisible, while the Spanish society has been transformed by its new status as a host country of international immigrants, thus putting the integration of immigrants in the public agenda.

The first specific Spanish national integration policy was implemented in 1994 by the central government. It resulted in the establishment of the Permanent Observatory for Immigration and the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants. The Forum is a tripartite consultative body consisting of the representation of public administrations, trade unions, employer's representatives and the third sector. In 2007, the Spanish central government adopted a more ambitious triennial Plan for Citizenship and Integration, the so-called PECI I (2007–2011), continued under PECI II (2011–2014) in its second-term. The main aim was to establish common principles for integration policies and to facilitate budget transfers from the central government to the local and regional authorities responsible for its implementation. As a frame of reference, the PECI

refers to the EU policies, including specific references to the mainstreaming of integration policies. As a result, the basic principles of the PECI I (2007–2010), affirm that integration is a bilateral process, in which all residents are involved and therefore all citizens should be part of it. It also promotes equal opportunities for the whole population, equality of rights, obligations and treatment, non-discrimination; promotion of living together, justice, inclusiveness and common belonging feeling; respect and positive recognition of diversity.

However, in 2012, the budget dedicated to the Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants was cancelled due to the conservative turn of the Spanish central government. Created in 2005, the Fund was the main source of funding for the development of activities aimed at the integration of the immigrants. Given this scenario, NGOs have adopted collaborative strategies with local governments in order to meet the specific and general needs of society with regard to growing inequality and vulnerability associated to the current economic crisis. Although the basic perspective is a generic approach, specific measures are considered additionally necessary since migrants are considered vulnerable, and might thus need specific programmes to overcome the risk of social exclusion.

In Poland, although the immigrant integration policy has not yet been adopted, there are clear signs of the will of the Polish government to create a regulatory framework encompassing integration policies for immigrants. The Migration Policy Unit (within the Ministry of Interior) coordinates activities such as the preparation of Poland's migration policy and makes sure Polish regulations adhere to EU standards. Whereas the Department of Social Assistance and Integration (within the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy) assures that foreigners are included in new projects of legislation on the national level. In January 2005, the Ministry of Social Policy adopted a document entitled *Proposals for actions for creating a complex integration policy for the foreigners in Poland* (Ministry of Social Policy 2005).

The framework of Polish Migration Policy has been drafted in the 2012 document entitled *Migration Policy of Poland—the Current State of Play and the Further Actions.* Importantly, this document focuses rather on reception than integration policies and suggests the possibility of obtaining the EU funds, an access to which allows for the development of "non-governmental sector and institutions engaged in integration issues" (Migration Policy of Poland 2012: 71). In fact, the situation of

foreigners after obtaining legal status is on the agenda of NGOs, which often points to the institutional difficulties the immigrants face when trying to access public services and social welfare. This state of affairs creates a kind of monopoly of the third sector in the area of integration activities such as legal assistance, language assistance or cultural counselling (i.e., short-term actions which cannot be called policies). The organizations dealing with migration and integration issues have well-educated and experienced cadres that are often better prepared for this kind of work than the civil servants. This makes their position stronger. However, working in the project mode and a dependency on external funding (mostly the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals) they not only lack possibility of conducting long-term activities and strategic actions but also face the limits set by the priorities of the grantee, for example addressing only those who stay in Poland for one year at minimum (Lesińska and Stefańska 2015), which again excludes seasonal and circular migrants. As pointed out by Pawlak and Matusz-Protasiewicz (2015), the NGOs' activities are delimited by their financing subjects' priorities and their work is delimited by applying and evaluating the projects. It also affects their recipients who receive assistance designed along with those priorities. It has led to the establishing of a group of experts whose work is fully dependent on the external and migrant/refugee related funds which, in a longer term, may 'reinforce the otherness' in a Polish—almost homogenous society—instead of creating a more inclusive integration policies and integration practices. Passing the responsibility over integration to the NGOs, the state is, in fact, not obliged to meet or fulfil EC recommendations (Stefańska 2015; Lesińska and Stefańska 2015).

Social cohesion in Poland is approached from a macroeconomic, social and strategic perspective. The concept is adopted from the EU definition and applied in, inter alia, the 2009 'Polska 2030' national long-term strategic document which identifies 'the improvement of social cohesion' as one of the challenges to be met. The document states that bearing the Western European experience in mind, the government should not run the risk to exclude immigrants (Polska 2010: 83). Following the Spanish model, immigrants are considered a vital resource in terms of filling labour market niches. Activities aimed at immigrant integration, given the anticipated influx, are expected to be included in a (non-mainstreamed) migration policy. On an operational level, the potential development is related to socio-economic diversity, rather than socio-cultural differences.

Particularly relevant is the fact that Polish integration-related policies distinguish between different categories of migrants. Services for permanent stay-holders, such as social benefits, pensions, social assistance or housing, can be perceived as mainstreamed in terms of access as they are granted on equal terms with the citizens. However, this does not apply to other categories of immigrants, such as 'fixed-period-residents' who, as already stated, form almost half of foreign residents in the country. Circular migrants who do not qualify as residents are not entitled to any services, apart from healthcare, assuming that employers cover their insurance costs as they are obliged to, which in fact excludes them from social and integration policies.

Although on a different scale, Poland and Spain share the experience of attracting foreign low-cost labour force needed to fill the labour market shortages that were related to the housing bubble in Spain, as well as the demand for care work due to an ageing population and emigration in Poland. In this regard both countries follow a common universalistic approach to integration on the state level, either due to budget cutbacks in Spain or to the invisibility of immigrants in Poland. At first sight, both countries could fulfil the main patterns included in the general definition of mainstreaming of immigrant integration. On the coordination side, they share a trend towards multi-actor governance in this field. On the content side, the common lack of widespread specific policies targeting migrant groups seems to strengthen this hypothesis. However, due to the factors explaining these dynamics, this approach to immigrant integration seldom involves "the *generic* and *inclusive* adoption of immigrant integration priorities in generic policy domains" (see Chap. 1). Therefore, this kind of mainstreaming is closer to the logic of *denial*, as this will be explained in the following sections.

Under these conditions, integration initiatives have been linked to the NGOs and their external funding sources, in both Poland and Spain. The NGOs serve as the main actor in the debate on immigrant integration as a whole. During the financial crisis, the state has restrained its role to implement specific policies to support the immigrants. This positioning has forced NGOs, who have not only limited funds but also limited agency to introduce solutions they work out, to employ them. This situation contains contradictions. For example, on the one hand, with regard to the direct, street-level work, the NGOs fill the gap left by the government and the local municipalities. But, on the other hand, when it comes to policy making, NGOs work out recommendations that

the government is not obliged to consider. In these conditions, NGOs became something that can be classified as an 'acting state' dependent on external funding.

The Effects of Dependency on NGOs for Immigrant Integration

Dependency on NGOs in the policy awareness, development and implementation is a common trend in both countries affecting the whole integration process, from the first steps of migrants in their new country of residence to the measures being applied to guarantee their access to the welfare services. The weak state-led approach to migrant integration leads to some common risks in both countries, as integration priorities are not explicit as we shall point out in the following sections where we link immigrant integration and the potential mainstreaming thereof to the fields of education and social cohesion. Key aspects herein are unequal access to services depending on the cultural background, segregation of migrants in some specific services, the main role that schools and NGO's take to satisfy their needs and, finally, the specific vulnerability that migrants face in the current economic crisis.

Consequences of Education

One of the main consequences of international migration has been the growing influx of young children with a migrant background in schools. Both the Spanish and the Polish educational policies are based on the principle of universality: all children of immigrants are entitled to equal access to education. Although compulsory education (early childhood, primary, and secondary) is a mainstream policy area covering all children, it has been identified that migrant children have specific needs in the educational field, such as language learning, that requires specific attention to promote their educational, economic and social success in adult life. To ensure the equality in both Poland and Spain, foreign students are entitled to additional classes.

In Poland, foreign students who do not speak Polish are entitled to additional classes of the language up to the age of 18. Before the students enter the regular Polish classes they are grouped into preparatory classes. Cultural and linguistic assistance in the child's mother tongue can be organized for up to 12 months (Jóźwiak et al. 2014). Language assistance

and additional Polish language classes gather different groups of foreigners (refugees and third-country nationals) as well as children of Polish who have returned to Poland, who have language difficulties after spending time abroad. In Warsaw, schools with a relatively high percentage of foreigners cooperate with local municipalities and the Warsaw Office for Education supplying additional Polish language classes, trainings in cultural diversity for teachers and local cultural initiatives. Similar steps have been undertaken in the cities of Gdańsk and especially in Lublin, which is known for its relatively high number of refugees, international students and labour migrants.

In Spain, at the beginning of the migration boom, many specific education programmes (transitional classes) were promoted by the public administrations in order to meet the needs of the children of immigrants coming from different countries of origin, mainly outside of the EU. These resources, as in Poland, were understood as compensatory education to reduce the aforementioned academic gap among children coming from different education systems. These special-education programmes included foreign students under 16 years of age who are latecomers to the Spanish Educational System. These students receive different educational training designed to facilitate their inclusion at school. This programme acts as a stage of transition in which there is a double objective: to reach the same academic level of the year of studies that corresponds with their age and to learn the vehicular language of the school. As in Poland, the transitional classes partly responded to the logic of *differentialism*, as these involve the recognition and institutionalization of differences. In this model, immigrants are approached through specific and separate policies, stressing their status as distinct national, ethnic or cultural groups (Scholten 2011). Nevertheless, the number of students in these programmes has declined due to budget cutbacks in the education field, especially since 2010. In that sense, this evolution seems to respond to the logic of *denial*, which argues against the benefits of redistributive policies, insisting that despite inequality between social or cultural groups, redistribution policies do not benefit any particular group. This model stresses the individual rights and does not recognize pre-existing structures of society (De Zwart 2005). Following this logic, vulnerable migrant groups are brought 'in the mainstream' without a supportive structure. This situation has been aggravated by the financial crisis. The economic restrictions have led to the reduction of teachers, mainly those working in compensatory education (Observatorio Metropolitano 2013). The reaction of the school centres has been to assign these tasks

to the remaining teachers in the regular classes. The main problem in this regard is the fact that these teachers usually lack the intercultural training they would need to accomplish this task. Also, these centres have begun to open some places for the study of children after the school (i.e., libraries). It leaves teachers overloaded with a very difficult extra work they do in a discretionary way:

> Just imagine a classroom with 30 students, each one coming from their own world. If differences among their educational level are huge, just imagine what a teacher is able to do during the class… It is impossible. I know many teachers do their best, but it is not the same to offer individual support to a group of 5 students as to a classroom of 30 students.[7]

In the case of Poland, it is hard to speak of official, institutionalized micro-level policies aimed at integration, which leaves the 'diversity-awareness' in the interaction with the students up to the individual approach of the teachers, headmasters or school psychologists. This makes the situation similar to the Spanish case, although departing from a different situation. There are few schools, both public and private, that work out their own integration programmes aimed not only at immigrants and refugees but also at Polish youth from vulnerable groups. In these few cases, the practice is to form mixed classes for students of different backgrounds and to organize common integration initiatives, without neglecting the special needs of each group (e.g. linguistic or cultural for the students of foreign background). This approach also makes the majority of students more aware of the problems of minority groups and enables finding possible ways to solve them.

Against this background, the main strategy adopted by Spanish public schools consists in cooperation with NGOs working in the neighbourhoods where the schools are located. This way, orientation services send students with specific needs to the different projects offered by NGOs. These organizations used to apply specific programs that have been replaced by universalistic initiatives through which cultural diversity is mainstreamed:

> We consider what the child needs, wherever he or she comes from, because particularities are so varied. The own dynamic of the NGO promotes interculturalism. Theorists talk to us about a methodology we were already applying in the neighbourhood. We have meetings with social workers but politicians never come. We need to decide which resources have to be universalistic and which ones have to be specific.[8]

This process of deconcentration in terms of coordination shows some problems at the street-level, as the projects developed by NGOs are unstable, due to their dependence on short-term and volatile funding coming both from public and private institutions. In this regard, any budget cutback implies a reduction of the number of children that can be accepted by the NGOs programs. While NGOs offer the education support that the public institution cannot provide due to the budget cutbacks. Stakeholders working at the very local level usually express the feeling that politicians and policy makers fail to appreciate the significance and urgency of issues pertaining to education support to immigrants, producing thereby a widening gap between the formulation of policies and the implementation of actual initiatives in the field. For example, both NGOs and policy documents advocate for interculturalism as a key principle that should be on the basis of mainstreamed integration policies. However, the aforementioned gap leads to contradictions such as the simultaneous promotion of interculturalism in political discourses, on the one hand, and public tolerance with ethnic segregation of students at schools, on the other hand. This is also the case of the distance between the ideas of interculturalism, as it is expressed in plans or policy documents, and the practices of everyday life by street level bureaucrats. Not all of them will incorporate diversity and mainstream as a perspective for work in the same way, as a result of the lack of intercultural education of professionals.

Furthermore, the service provision by NGOs contributes to a relevant segregation dynamic. The specific resources that NGOs provide gather immigrants in very isolated spaces outside schools. As a result, integration of diversity does not occur within the educational system. Therefore, it appears that schools, due to their lack of resources, only outsource the problem. Under these circumstances, universalistic measures following the logic of denial lead to very specific practices:

> Here we have a great parish where millions of Ecuadorian children are doing homework, but Spanish white children do not go; integration is just the opposite. They are associations that give extra help to the children who do not have it at home because the Chinese mother does not know how to write Spanish. They are a patch; you are not doing the work of integration.[9]

An ambiguous kind of mainstreaming thus usually exists in practices, not necessarily for political but rather for economic reasons, as a consequence of budget restrictions. Most education bureaucrats at the level

of implementation take advantage of this 'mainstreaming by accident,' as they prefer universal instead of specific approaches, when attention to children is concerned. However, the question whether the vulnerable groups are missing out when needs are only met through apparent mainstream mechanisms remains, especially when the mechanisms do not incorporate the adoption of immigrant integration priorities. Two relevant aspects should be referred to in this regard.

Firstly, the actual pattern of mainstreaming integration is partly caused by economic reasons. This puts the needs of vulnerable groups at risk due to the lack of resources. In this context, education policies may prioritize other issues (such as Information and Communications Technologies, or English language) over compensatory education and integration of diversity:

> They are interested in another issue. The training of teachers has to do with the second language and new technologies, never with pedagogy. Conflicts are constant; teachers do not know how to handle them. The headmistress is minimizing it continuously. In that scenario, the population about which we speak is not a priority and remains invisible.[10]

One of the main difficulties for children with a migrant background is related to their family situation. This is due to the frequent absence of their parents at home when classes are over; psychological problems associated with reunification processes or to expulsion procedures, as interviewed education agents stated. In the first case, children do not have the support they need to reduce their academic gap in comparison to the average student. In the second one, family conflicts have a huge impact on the educational results of children. In both cases, public schools strongly depend on the resources provided by the NGOs working with these issues. Indeed, as they have been through a change of residence, from the sending to the receiving country, migrants usually suffer from a lack of social and family networks, in comparison to the Spanish population. Thus, they might need more social resources from NGOs.

Services offered by the schools themselves have been badly depleted. We have noticed that many: from the PROA,[11] speech therapists, multiprofessional teams … Now they are overwhelmed. There are fewer resources to teach Spanish language; less compensatory education… They invent anything.[12]

In this regard, NGOs point out that they receive many students with specific needs, but they add that, in this context of economic recession, problems are so severe that they are barely able to reach the minimum level of the compensatory education that was previously developed in the schools by professional teachers.

Secondly, there is an inadequate training of professionals in intercultural education, which is especially relevant in a circumstance where the lack of resources obliges teachers to assume additional tasks such as, for example, the compensatory education of students of foreign origin, and the promotion of interculturalism in the classroom. An inevitable consequence of the lack of intercultural skills is that teachers try to assimilate foreign students to the Spanish students, especially with regard to language and cultural differences. That is, they try to homogenize all students so that they are under the same conditions for optimal learning. The same observation can be made with regards to religious diversity. Both parent associations and professionals working in the NGOs are concerned about the risks involved in this lack of intercultural formation. As a result, these different agents of the civil society put their efforts to reduce a problem, which is strongly located in the heart of the public education system. This is also a relevant trend in Poland, where the needs of the immigrants' children are not recognized in the local policy-documents. Due to such a small scale of the migration phenomenon, each case is treated rather individually. Even at the school level, the teachers' awareness considering their pupils of foreign background is very often low as sometimes they do not even know their nationality for example, confusing Iraq with Iran.

To sum up, budget cutbacks in compensatory education and the lack of intercultural training of professionals are the two main factors producing several problems among the so-called children of the crisis. Children are characterized by both the country where they or their parents come from and the socioeconomic condition of their family. In most deprived neighbourhoods, some children suffer from malnutrition and live in hard family situations. In these cases, the results are several maturing and learning problems. In this scenario, targeted actions are disappearing within a mainstream context driven by economic reasons. In times of recession, targeted actions are politically difficult to justify. The dedication of public funds to specific populations might indirectly promote the xenophobic reaction of some native groups, as many stakeholders working at the very local level point out during the interviews.

Consequences on Social Cohesion

Spatial policies targeting social problems are a widespread pattern in Europe in which Spanish cities are taking an important role. On the contrary, in Poland it is difficult to speak of any local pro-integration activity on the neighbourhood level as even the cities have no official integration programs (Stefańska 2015). However, there have been some attempts to introduce institutionalized micro-level policies aimed at promoting diversity and tolerance. For example, as a reaction to complaints from NGOs about racist, homophobic and anti-Semitic incidents, the Capital City of Warsaw launched a project entitled 'Diverse Warsaw'.[13] It was planned for the years 2011–2013 and aimed at promoting tolerance towards diversity and non-discrimination through financing campaigns and smaller projects in cooperation with NGOs and research institutions. According to the critics, due to financial and organizational issues, the Programme has never been fully operational.[14] In contrast, during the last decade, several area-based initiatives were developed across many Spanish neighbourhoods. The Intercultural Community Intervention Program (ICI) promoted and funded by La Caixa (a relevant bank of Spain) is a clear example. This spatial action synthesizes the key factors defining the politics of mainstreaming.

Firstly, the Intercultural Community Intervention Program is focused on neighbourhoods that are selected according to the percentage of immigrants within its population, although other socioeconomic and sociodemographic factors are also considered. Therefore, ICI projects are a clear example of *replacement* as a policy technique. Regarding the dilemma of recognition, replacement is a compromise between denial and accommodation. While pursuing redistribution benefiting ethnic groups, this project constructs its own social categories. Therefore, targeting policies along socioeconomic factors, indirectly addresses immigrants by targeting neighbourhoods with a high concentration of foreigners, but avoiding the explicit recognition of such groups. Secondly, this initiative supports a *deconcentration* process by which the governance of migrant integration policies involves all stakeholders in the neighbourhood. This is a process, which is valued because it promotes the networking, though most social agents recognize it has been due to the lack of resources. To quote the official introduction of the ICI Program:

> In a society in which the presence and establishment of million people of foreign origin have increased the already intense diversification of our country, we must promote development processes, relationship and integration involving all the principal actors—government, technical resources and citizenship—in building a cohesive society.[15]

Nonetheless, some agents within Spanish urban areas do not collaborate with this strategy of replacement from social group targeting to territorial targeting. They underline difficulties for both a specific perspective and the replacement strategy in this field. Therefore, these professionals support a universalistic approach to social intervention, and they believe migrants should not be considered as a specific target at all (not even by means of replacement techniques). As stated by an Education Support NGO employee, apparently there was nothing wrong with the actual model of coexistence within the neighbourhood this NGO works. As she pointed out, the immigrants are asked to do more than the rest of the population just because there are too many social agents looking after them, not because they need it.

There is general trend in the discourse of the street-level workers towards universalistic measures. Most professionals state that integration is facilitated by bringing groups together around places rather than separating them along with identity or ethnicity. As stated by the director of a social services centre in Spain, "local administration must provide space for meeting and civic participation (…) we do not put the stigma on the immigrant." Nonetheless, many social actors confirm that one of the main reasons to explain the adoption of universalistic policies comes from the controversy around specific measures focused on immigrants. It is especially relevant in the context of economic crisis, to avoid the risk of 'native' neighbours claiming that social resources are always directed towards newcomers. A universal approach would avoid the aforementioned xenophobic discourse threatening to divide neighbourhoods based on ethnic factors. Actually, most of the professionals working in NGOs use age-related criteria to define any social initiative, thus showing a clear practice and discourse of *replacement* of ethnic measures by not only spatial but also age-based policies.

In Poland, immigrants are not perceived as a socially vulnerable group in public discourse, policy documents and opinions shared by most of the experts, as in general the economic situation of immigrants' households is perceived as stable. This approach can serve as an exclusion mechanism

or justification for exclusion along the simplified argumentation that if the 'they' come to work, they can also secure their living This also corresponds with the already mentioned limited welfare system in Poland and the policy approach to short-term residents and circular migrants in particular. To quote one of our respondents:

> I'm not speaking about the dramatic situation of using social assistance, i.e., a possible application for a communal or a social flat. On the one hand, the housing situation in Poland is disastrous and the problem is politically not sexy enough for anybody to work with it. But on the other hand, in case of the refugees, "there is no housing for the Poles either, so what can we do?" Which, in my opinion, is a nightmarish thinking? (…) In case of labour migrants, it is also the way that "Ok, they work so theoretically have their funds to rent a place on the free market." But here, especially the Ukrainians are in a difficult situation (…) People use them by offering them higher prices and imposing additional costs. And second, [the landlords] very often deprive them of legal protection by refusing to sign a rental agreement. Everything is arranged unofficially, which puts them in an unfavourable position as there is a requirement for a legal entitlement to a flat so that one can register.[16]

Once a universalistic perspective is adopted, we shall ask if the policy attention to neighbourhoods translates into attention paid to the specific issues faced by migrants and other vulnerable minorities. Thus, the problem is whether this kind of universalistic perspective does not exclude particular groups. In Poland, this problem particularly applies to the circular and seasonal migrants, whose role seems to be, as we may say, to 'come, earn and leave' and as such do not appear as a subject of reception or integration. This phenomenon in Polish migration and integration policy has been referred to as 'assimilation via abandonment' (Grzymała-Kazłowska and Weinar 2006) where immigrants do not receive systematic, long-term support from the governmental actors while the support provided by NGOs is often not enough. This leads to the situation where the migrants are left by themselves and those "who have managed to integrate owe this success to their own determination and the support of the family or friends" (Grzymała-Kazłowska and Weinar 2006). This notion was worked out before the 2009 outburst of EC-funded project as well as the introduction of the simplified procedures for the employment of Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldovan, Georgian, Armenian and Russian citizens in 2008, which played an important role in increasing the number of

circular and seasonal (that is not included in integration policy and with limited access to social welfare) migrants in Poland. This creates a context in which special measures aimed at immigrants can hardly be considered as a conscious strategy of mainstreaming. We claim this kind of *abandonment* to be the result of both the scale of immigration and the state abandoning its active social policy and passing the welfare functions to the NGOs.

In Spain, there are exceptions to this universalistic approach at least in two areas. The first one is gender violence suffered by foreign women. In this case, migrant associations indicate that specific actions are required to overcome the cultural and legal barriers that separate foreign women to the access of generic services. The second exception includes certain areas of integration. In this case, specific intervention programs should consider the frontiers based on racial or ethnic stereotypes (e.g. access for parents associations or employment services for foreign Roma), or the specific health problems faced by immigrants who do not have a residence permit, as they were excluded of the health primary care by the conservative Spanish government in 2012. In regard to these circumstances:

> It has been necessary to develop specific policies against speech saying that the resources are there and that if minorities do not want to go, it is their problem… The reality is more complex. They do not access, not because they don't want to but because there is a number of obstacles that must be recognized for the equal access and treatment.[17]

A key aspect regarding the mainstreaming of integration governance in Spain is that the coordination dimension is failing due to the characteristics of the process of deconcentration. In Poland this coordination dimension is equally absent not only due to aforementioned weak welfare-state mechanisms as well as their NGO-ization but also due to the very fact that the country never had any migration governance body on the national level (Stefańska 2015). In both cases, as many entities of the third sector are funded for short periods of time, social programmes are rarely complementary to each other. As a result, some social needs are met by various projects whereas others remain uncovered. Besides, long-term interventions and programmes are needed to assure the efficiency of social policies. On the contrary, short-term projects and shortage of experts are harmful to the very objectives of social cohesion. At the same time, it is acknowledged that decentralized governance is a tool for the public administration to overcome the funding shortage. Nevertheless, it is also recognized that

this fragmentation alters long-term processes as NGOs are constrained by their budget weakness, which makes social needs of the population secondary in their activities.

To conclude, common integration practices can be observed in both countries. On the one hand, the move towards generic policies is fuelled by xenophobic threats within an economic crisis scenario. On the other hand, deconcentration of integration policies is a defining pattern of weak welfare regimes where civil society tends to meet social needs uncovered by the state. They are based on economic and political reasons such as austerity measures, as well as on the use of the EU funds and the need to fulfil the donors' requirements. In both cases, a predominant neoliberal approach favours the activities undertaken by the NGOs instead of the active integration policy of the state or municipalities. The example of Madrid is telling in this regard:

> Policies relating to the care of migrants have been built around two axes. The first is the classic dismantling of public budgets in this area, in the 2011 budget of the Community of Madrid these items were reduced by more than 52%. The second is awarding much of the budget items that are still kept for immigration and development aid to different NGOs and foundations which are close to the ultra-Catholic and conservative sectors. (Carmona et al. 2012: 188)

Besides this we can observe a lack of long-term and large-scale planning. In short, the move towards inclusive policies is not the reason for both universalistic and deconcentrated policies. This is particularly relevant as street-level bureaucrats are asking for a clear distinction between those resources which have to be universalistic and those which have to be specific. Under these circumstances, the specific needs that the immigrants have because of their particular position within Spanish and Polish societies remain denied in most of the cases.

Conclusions: Mainstreaming Happens

Migrant integration policies in Spain and Poland are driven by broad historical and political legacies that are more relevant than their status as new immigration countries. On the one hand, dependency on the civil society within weak welfare regime explains the pivotal role of NGOs regarding immigrant integration governance. On the other hand, despite the lack of

legacies of past integration policies, this chapter has revealed that the controversy around specific measures focused on immigrants explains many of the mainstreaming patterns adopted in both countries, especially in the case of the Spanish economic crisis.

The first pattern leads to deconcentration whereas the latter involves empty universalistic measures that derive from budget or fiscal calculation, not from inclusive policymaking. Accordingly, social policies can be considered mainstreamed as they do not tend to target foreigners as a specific group and promote their deconcentration among different agents. However, progressing towards the prominence of NGOs promotes specific programmes aimed at assisting the migrants (and migrants only). For this reason, this kind of approach does not involve the generic and inclusive adoption of immigrant integration priorities in policy domains. On the contrary, practices carrying the characteristics of mainstreaming are linked to the neoliberal approach in political rationale, which strengthens the generic approach on the public and the specific on the non-governmental levels.

Therefore, integration policies and practices appear as a twofold process leading to assimilationist tendencies as migrants are likely to be left alone with their explicit needs. That is so as programmes designed for the migrants remain either underdeveloped, as in case of Poland, or shrunk due to austerity measures, as in case of Spain. In this framework, there is not enough attention paid to migrants who are simply assumed to adjust and participate in policies and programmes designed for the receiving society as a whole. In both countries, immigrants occupy the weakest social position as their access to the family and neighbourhood networks, commonly used by the 'native' population as a substitute of the weak welfare-state instruments, is limited. Therefore, the specific social needs of immigrants have the risk to be missed as they are not considered by integration policies on the public level, whereas the NGOs have limited capacity to intervene.

This situation is even more evident due to the consequences of the current economic crisis as, since 2010, fiscal austerity has promoted the extension of the NGOs involvement in social policy. In Spain, public resources for the social integration of the immigrants have been either reduced or cancelled. Apparently, this process has led to the predominance of universalistic measures. However, none of them has been adopted as the result of a complex policy-making. Quite the contrary, they are the consequence of a political and economic process under which social issues

play a minor role. This is what brings us back to the conclusion that the dominant trends in Spain and Poland can be characterized as a 'mainstreaming by accident.' On top of that, in Poland it is accompanied by the absence of the migrant integration on political agenda and in the public discourse in general.[18]

Consequently, specific needs of impoverished immigrant households have been abandoned by either not being provided with significant material aid, as in case of Spain, or not being taken into consideration in terms of overcoming the poverty and receiving social assistance at all, as in case of Poland (especially relevant for circular and seasonal migrants). If we add the lack of intercultural communication trainings for street-level professionals and local civil servants in both countries, we can speak of an empty universalism which leads to accidental mainstreaming.

Notes

1. As well as children who have language difficulties after spending time abroad (returned emigrants), especially in the case of Poland.
2. The concept of mainstreaming by accident was suggested by Joanna Nestorowicz from the University of Warsaw and developed by Jóźwiak et al. (2014) based on evidence from Poland.
3. The source of data comes from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (http://www.ine.es/).
4. http://www.mpips.gov.pl/analizy-i-raporty/cudzoziemcy-pracujacy-w-polsce-statystyki/
5. In Spain, according to the Living Conditions Survey (National Statistics Institute of Spain) in 2014 the rate of population at risk of poverty was much higher among migrants coming from developing countries (55.4%) than that of Spaniards (18.4%). There is no such data for migrants in Poland.
6. Both countries experienced a non-democratic, interventionist and paternalistic regimes, which were followed by the transition to the liberal democracy. This transition was accompanied by an increasing use of the concept of 'civil society'. Among the most notable elements of these, former dictatorship was the role acquired by the Catholic Church. In Spain, the Catholic Church served as the main ideological support of the regime of Franco, thus contributing to establish a conservative model of social solidarity (Casanova 2005). In Poland, as the Catholic Church was tolerated by the communist regime, it became its legal and accessible opposition agent and a legitimate actor during the transition to liberal democracy. In both cases, the cultural hegemony of the Catholic Church entails a charity as a legitimate form of social solidarity.

7. Professional of an orientation service of a secondary school in Spain.
8. Professional of an Education Support NGO in Spain.
9. Member of a parents' association of a primary school in Spain.
10. Ibid.
11. The PROA Plan (Reinforcement, Guidance and Support Programmes) is a cooperation project between the Ministry of Education and the Autonomous Communities, whose aim is to address the needs associated with the socio-cultural environment of students through a set of programmes to support schools.
12. Professional of an Education Support NGO in Spain.
13. http://strategia.um.warszawa.pl/content/warszawa-r%C3%B3%C5%BCnorodna
14. http://warszawa.ngo.pl/wiadomosc/1279783.html
15. The Intercultural Community Intervention Program, La Caixa.
16. Warsaw-based independent researcher and NGO expert.
17. Anti-exclusion programmes and anti-racist strategies and equality monitoring worker in Gypsy Secretariat Foundation in Spain.
18. It shall be noted that this situation has changed in 2015 and 2016 in the face of increased migration from that country, the armed conflict in the Donbas region and expected influx of refugees from this country. It all has led to increased interest in Ukrainian migrants in the media and among the NGOs. The so-called refugee crisis in Europe has also dominated the public debate in autumn and winter 2015. Both issues however go beyond the scope of our study and definitely deserve a separate one.

References

Brey, E., M. Sánchez-Domínguez, and D. Sorando. 2015. *Mainstreaming in Practice: The Efficiencies and Deficiencies of Mainstreaming in Spain*. http://www.project-upstream.eu/publications/country-reports/284-mainstreaming-in-practice-the-efficiencies-and-deficiencies-of-mainstreaming-in-spain

Carmona, P., B. García, and A. Sánchez. 2012. *Spanish Neocon. La revuelta neoconservadora de la derecha española* [Spanish Neocon. The Revolt of the Spanish Neoconservative Right]. Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños.

Casanova, J. 2005. *La iglesia de Franco* [Franco's Church]. Madrid: Crítica.

De Zwart, F. 2005. The Dilemma of Recognition: Administrative Categories and Cultural Diversity. *Theory and Society* 34 (2): 137–169.

Flaquer, L. 2000. *Las políticas familiares en una perspectiva comparada* [Family Policies in a Comparative Perspective]. Barcelona: Fundación La Caixa (Estudios Sociales).

Gómez Gil, C. 2005. *Las ONG en España* [NGOs in Spain]. Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata.

Grzymała-Kazłowska, A., and A. Weinar. 2006. The Polish Approach to Integration. *Canadian. Diversity* 5 (1): 71–75.
Harvey, D. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jóźwiak I., J. Nestorowicz, and M. Lesińska. 2014. *The Politics of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policies. Case Study of Poland*. http://www.eur.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/fsw/Bestuurskunde/onderzoek/upstream/Jozwiak__Nestorowicz_and_Lesinska__2014__The_Politics_of_Mainstreaming__Immigrant_Integration_Policies_-_Case_study_of_Poland.pdf
Krzyżowski, Ł. 2011. In the Trap of Intergenerational Solidarity: Family Care in Poland's Ageing Society. *Polish Sociological Review* 1 (173): 55–78.
Lesińska, M., and R. Stefańska. 2015. Wpływ organizacji pozarządowych na politykę migracyjną Polski i jego uwarunkowania. *Trzeci Sektor* 35 (2): 40–53.
Migration Policy of Poland. 2012. *Polityka migracyjna Polski. Stan obecny i postulowane działania*. Warsaw: Ministry of Interior.
Ministry of Social Policy. 2005. *Propozycje działań w celu stworzenia kompleksowej polityki integracji cudzoziemców w Polsce*. Warsaw: Ministry of Social Policy.
Observatorio Metropolitano. 2013. *La apuesta municipalista* [The Municipalist Bet]. Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños.
Pawlak, M., and P. Matusz-Protasiewicz. 2015. Organizacje pozarządowe wobec cudzoziemców w Polsce – od pomocy doraźnej do upowszechniania europejskiej ramy polityki integracji. *Trzeci Sektor* 35 (2): 11–21.
Pérez-Díaz, Víctor, Elisa Chuliá, Joaquin P. López Novo, and Berta Álvarez-Miranda. 2010. *Catholicism, Social Values and the Welfare System in Spain*. 102b. ASP Research Paper, Madrid. http://asp-research.com/pdf/Asp102.pdf
Polska 2030. 2010. *Polska 2030. Wyzwania Rozwojowe* [Poland 2030. The Development Challanges]. Edited by M. Boni. Warsaw: The Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland.
Scholten, P.W.A. 2011. *Framing Immigrant Integration. Dutch Research-Policy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective*. Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research.
Serrano, I., and M. Sánchez-Domínguez. 2015. *The Spanish Welfare State and the Financial Crisis: A Step Backward for Gender Equality?* http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/03e0bd92-9ff1-409f-8f72-2e0f988a1792.pdf
Stefańska, R. 2015. *Integration Policy and Activities in Poland*. INTERACT Research Report. Sam Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.
Szukalski, P. 2010. Co łączy pokolenia? Więź międzypokoleniowa z perspektywy polityki społecznej. *Polityka Społeczna* 10: 7–12.
Załęski, P. 2012. *Neoliberalizm i społeczeństwo obywatelskie*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika.

Ignacy Jóźwiak is a researcher at the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw. His research interest covers ethnic issues, international migration, state borders and cross-border mobility in Central and Eastern Europe. He has par-

ticipated in several research projects and authored or coauthored articles, book chapters and research reports in these fields.

María Sánchez-Domínguez is a postdoctoral fellow at the School of Political Science and Sociology at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid and Associate Professor at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. She received her PhD in Sociology from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid in 2010. Her research interests centre on international migration, union and family formation among immigrants, social integration, gender, ageing and demography. Her research on those topics has been published in international and national peer-reviewed journals such as *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *Demographic Research*, *Migration Studies*, *The History of the Family* and *Revista Internacional de Sociología*.

Daniel Sorando is a postdoctoral fellow at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain) where he studies, as urban sociologist, the interaction among social structure changes, residential segregation and urban policies, with a particular emphasis on gentrification processes. He is also instructor at NYU Madrid and he was a visiting scholar at the University of Brown. In addition, he has worked in several R&D projects at the Complutense University of Madrid and the Youth Council of Spain. As a result of his research, his works have been published in articles and book chapters in scientific journals and collective works.

CHAPTER 4

Immigrant Integration Mainstreaming at the City Level

Ole Jensen

Introduction

While the two previous chapters have explored discourses and policies of immigrant integration at the national level, the aim of this chapter is to explore central aspects of mainstreaming immigrant integration policies at the city level. This involves an examination of the city level as part of a wider turn towards an increasingly polycentric division of the responsibilities for immigration integration governance. The pursuit of these national–local dynamics leads into an examination of how nationally defined area- and needs-based policy frames become proxy policies at the local level, as targeted areas typically are characterised by large immigrant populations. In doing this, the analysis will draw on material from cities in five countries with very different migration backgrounds: France (Saint-Denis, Lyon), the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam), Poland (Warsaw, Poznan), Spain (Madrid, Barcelona), and the UK (Bristol, and the London Borough of Southwark).

O. Jensen (✉)
Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_4

The demographic make-up of cities across Europe points to an increasing number of 'majority minority' cities where the national majority population no longer constitutes a local majority (Crul and Schneider 2010; Alba and Foner 2015; Crul and Mollenkopf 2012). But the city level ranges from the multi-axial proliferation of differences, referred to as superdiversity and increasingly emblematic of urban areas in 'old' immigration countries (Vertovec 2007), to more straightforward 'us-them' distinctions found in countries with recent experiences of immigration, such as Poland.

Central to this chapter is the evolving role of the diverse, and superdiverse, city in relation to integration policies. Evidently a site of a continuously evolving diversity, the city is also a landscape of differentially constituted diversities, with significant differences between neighbourhoods and districts, as this chapter will demonstrate. At the same time, the vertical decentralisation of immigrant integration policies has resulted in an increasing emphasis on policy development and implementation at the city level. The city thus constitutes the coalface of integration where policy frames confront the lived reality of an increasingly diverse population. This combined increase in migrant numbers *and* increase in the range of origin countries have proved testing to existing models of welfare provision, as new arrivals may not comply with the profile and demands of settled minority populations (Meissner and Vertovec 2015; Phillimore 2010; Vertovec 2007). The central research question is, accordingly: How do the local authorities and service providers adapt the provision of generic services to the demands of an increasing diverse population?

Following on from the previously introduced definition of mainstreaming as 'the generic and inclusive adoption of immigrant integration priorities in generic policy domains' (Chap. 1), emphasis of this chapter is on how the shift towards generic policies involves polycentric forms of governance with increasing emphasis on policy frames and implementation practices developed at the city level (Van Breugel et al. 2015). This is evidenced through a turn towards the local level in all the examined countries—though much more pronounced in some countries, like the UK, than in others, such as France. It is, accordingly, local authorities and service providers that are facing the challenge of adapting generic services to highly diverse populations and neighbourhood contexts that may differ considerably in terms of ethnic composition and level of socio-economic deprivation.

But rather than only viewing the city as another level of policy development and implementation, it is also important to emphasise the role of the city level as the scene of key focus events impacting the development of integration policy in general (Maan et al. 2015: 31). An at times uneasy melting pot, the city constitutes a never-ending urban lab where social problems emerge and take the shape of protests, riots, and local anti-immigration agendas, for example the strong support to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in English towns with very recent experiences of immigration. Accordingly, events at the city level have the potential to impact national policy frames, albeit with very different implications. So whereas the 2001 'riots' in northern English towns led to the community cohesion agenda, the 2005 unrest in French banlieues only furthered the French determination to stick to its path of a mainstreamed approach. This contrasts the widespread debate on the social distance and segregation between immigrants and the majority population in the Netherlands which was triggered by the killing of filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh in 2004. Putting the supposed lack of social cohesion on the national political agenda (Maan et al. 2014: 48–49), this also spurred on city-level policy frames aimed at engendering more inclusive local identities. On the other hand, local arrangements can be totally distinct from national policy frames, for example, being more multicultural than the national model, or the reverse. But because they are more in tune with specific local, multicultural realities on the ground, local policy frames may be more influenced by diversity than the national ones.

The following sections of the chapter will first outline aspects of diversity characterising the respective cities, before addressing the relationship between policy frames at city and national level, with particular emphasis on how generic policy frameworks from the national level emerge as local 'proxy policies', indirectly targeting target immigrants and ethnic minorities. This will be followed by a discussion of local practices around diversity proofing and frontline pragmatism, before eventually, in the conclusion, pulling together the findings in order to contribute to the discussion of the relationship between superdiversity and mainstreaming.

Cities and Diversity

Exploring demographic trends and dynamics of diversity in the ten cities, the main aim of this section is to set the scene for the analyses of national and local policy frames that will be addressed in subsequent sections.

Table 4.1 provides an overview of the cities that this chapter is based on. As discussed in the previous chapters, the main cities of the so-called 'old' immigration countries (France, the Netherlands and the UK) are key destination points. Amsterdam and London have thus over the past 10 years become 'majority minority' cities (Crul and Schneider 2010; Alba and Foner 2015), with the combined minority populations outnumbering the national majority population. Whereas these figures do not in themselves make the cities superdiverse, they do testify to the scale and long-term nature of dynamics of immigration and settlement.

Table 4.1 City demographics

City	*Population*	*Population with migrant background (%)*	*Key characteristics of immigrant and ethnic minority population*
Lyon	500,715	12.6	Mainly from African countries (53%) and Europe (28%)
Saint-Denis	109,343 (2013)	37.8	83% of immigrants from non-EU countries, mainly African countries
Amsterdam	834,713 (2015)	51.6	Surinamese, Antillean, Turkish and Moroccan minority populations are the most significant in both cities
Rotterdam	623,652 (2015)	49.3	
Poznan	552,393 (2012)	1.0	Mainly from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, with Vietnamese as the biggest non-European minority population (in Warsaw)
Warsaw	1,711,000 (2012)	2.5	
Barcelona	1,602,000 (2013)	17.4	Large groups from South America, in particular Ecuador, but also from Italy, Pakistan, Morocco and China
Madrid	3,165,000 (2013)	14.4	Mainly from South America, but Romanians constitute second biggest immigrant group (2014)
Bristol	428,234 (2011)	22.1	Significant increase in migration since 2005, with concentration of Somali immigrants
Southwark	288,300 (2011)	60.4	Long-term destination area, with concentrations of Black and Latin American minority populations

Sources: Jóźwiak (2015) (Poland), Brey (2015) (Spain), INSEE (2013) (France), ONS (2012) (UK), Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2016) (Netherlands)

Whereas Table 4.1 gives a brief insight in the demographics of the selected cities, it does not provide an indication of more recent dynamics. One of these is a significant increase in immigrant numbers in Spain, with Spain's foreign-born population increasing from 4.9% in 2000 to 14.9% in 2010—an increase which is, as always, most pronounced in the major cities, with the foreign population in Barcelona increasing five-fold in the period 2000–2010 (Moren-Alegret et al. 2011). Similarly, though at an altogether more modest scale, the immigrant population in Bristol increased dramatically in the period 2001–2011, with Bristol emerging in 2011 as the UK local authority with the second highest Somali population (ONS 2012),[1] as well as a rapidly increasing Polish population. The inner-city London Borough of Southwark is, by contrast, a long-term destination area, with some neighbourhoods experiencing continuous immigrant settlement since post-WWII. Here, truly superdiverse neighbourhoods have emerged, characterised by a proliferation of differences across ethnicity, generation, migrant status, duration of residence, and so on, thus replacing any fixed us-them distinctions (Jensen et al. 2012).

The data presented in Table 4.1 is, however, biased by the highly diverse methods used for counting immigrants and ethnic minority populations in the different countries. Most significantly, in France the republican tradition has prevented the collection of ethnic statistics, based on the assumption that ethnically specific data will serve to stigmatise, and thus reinforce, the categories that integration and cohesion policies are trying to overcome. In the UK, on the other hand, broad ethnic categories are commonly used. Accordingly, the UK figures in Table 4.1 include both long-established minority populations and more recent immigrants typically categorised on the basis of ethnicity or country of origin. The main implication of these differences is that if all residents with immigrant background were to be included in the Saint-Denis figures,[2] the size of the 'majority population' would be roughly 35%, and the city would also be categorised as a majority minority city—like Amsterdam and Southwark.

Not surprisingly, the Polish cities are the ones with the lowest levels of immigration. So whereas Warsaw is home to 25% of all foreigners in Poland, the immigrant population only constitutes 2.5% of the population in the city. As the main groups of third country nationals are from neighbouring countries, the immigrant population is altogether not very visible—with the exception of the Vietnamese population (concentrated in Warsaw but hardly present in Poznan). Furthermore, the number of long-term immigrants are dwarfed by the estimated 300,000–400,000

circular immigrants who are expected to 'come-earn-leave and don't bother' (Jóźwiak 2015: 15), thus altogether not targeted by any integration policies at national or local level.

There are, additionally, significant socio-economic differences both between and within the cities, and this in turn impacts the policy environment, as observed at an urban policy resource centre in Paris: "The objectives of the local policy are entirely different. Lyon is a rich city with poor districts while Saint-Denis is a poor town with even poorer districts".[3] And whereas the two Dutch cities are characterised by very similar profiles in terms of size and the main immigrant groups, the urban landscapes are very differently configurated, as argued by a respondent: "When analysing Amsterdam (…) consistently a strong dichotomy becomes apparent. That dichotomy is simply coloured, and increasingly geographically as well".[4] Whereas similar dichotomies also can be found in Rotterdam, they are less pronounced, and policy initiatives have been put in place to counter them. As will be discussed in more detail in the next sections, these differences between and within cities have huge significance for the local implementation of area- and needs-based policy frames developed at the national level.

The geographies of diversity are typically different in cities with a long-standing experience of immigration and settlement, where some neighbourhoods have very high concentrations of immigrant and ethnic minority populations. In both Amsterdam and Rotterdam the research focused on neighbourhoods where the population with migrant background constituted a very high percentage of the total population (73.4% in Zuidoost [Amsterdam], 65% in Delfshaven [Rotterdam]).[5] Similarly, the White British population in the Southwark neighbourhood Peckham was in 2011 down to 18.3%. Interestingly, the proportional representation of the two biggest minority populations (Black African and Black Caribbean) also went down in the period 2001–2011. The corresponding increase in composite categories ('White other', 'Black other', 'Mixed' and 'Others') provides an indication of an increasingly multifarious diversity (Jensen 2015).

The picture is somewhat different in the 'new' immigration countries. Overall, immigrant numbers in Poland were so low that they did not impact the demographic profile at neighbourhood level much. But in the Madrid and Barcelona neighbourhoods that were part of this research project, the situation was somewhat different, with immigrants constituting around one-third of the neighbourhood population (Brey et al. 2015: 6).

In summary, the cities represent a range of historical and emerging forms of diversity, with significant differences both within and across countries. Immigrant populations have increased in all ten cities though there are huge disparities in terms of numbers and concentrations. Though the Spanish cities have experienced the most rapidly increasing immigrant population, it is in cities in the 'old' immigrant countries that immigrant concentrations are highest, at both city and neighbourhood levels. But it is also here that the proliferation of differences challenges existing structures of service provision. The next sections will explore how these differences are addressed in local and national policy frames.

National and Local Policy Frames

As outlined in Chap. 1, mainstreaming is associated with a turn towards polycentric modes of integration governance. This has been referred to as respectively horizontal '(de)concentration'—referring to policy coordination between different governmental departments—and vertical (de) centralisation which refers to policy coordination between different governance levels (Collett and Petrovic 2014: 14–16). With focus on the city level, the main concern here is the turn towards decentralisation of immigrant integration policy frames that has been experienced in recent years.

Trends have in almost all cases pointed towards increased multi-level governance.[6] Though decentralisation is a general trend, the specific policy implications are highly varied, contingent on the existing national traditions for de-central policy developments (Maan et al. 2015: 31). The implication is significant discrepancies in integration governance between cities within a country, as well as between the local and the national level, or between neighbourhoods (Maan et al. 2015: 2).

In some countries, for example the UK and Spain, the local level has for a long time been prominent in the development of integration policy frames, with more recent developments constituting a continuation of long-term decentralisation processes. An example is 'Creating the Conditions for Integration', the 2012 policy framework for integration in Britain (DCLG 2012). Launched by the Department for Communities and Local Government, the document stated that 'Instead of large-scale, centrally led and funded programmes, we want to inspire and enable civil society and local areas to take action on integration issues that are important to them' (DCLG 2012: 19). But while the shift from centrally-led programming to local initiatives was in tune with broader Big Society and Social Mobility

policy agendas, it happened against a backdrop of austerity measures that made it difficult for local government authorities to promote their own integration agendas. This very much reflects a wider picture of how austerity measures—albeit to varying degrees—have resulted in a general retrenchment of public sector service provision. So whereas new forms of diversity are emerging, and more responsibilities sit at the local level, the financial resources available to local governments have been reduced severely.

Despite the economic downturn and post-9/11 political upheaval, there has been an increase in the city-level initiatives aimed at fostering more inclusiveness. This is in particular the case in cities with a long history of immigration, where straightforward distinctions between immigrant and native citizen have lost their meaning, leading to more inclusive framing of what 'we' constitutes. An example of this is the comprehensive programme 'We Amsterdammers' (*Wij Amsterdammers*), implemented after the murder on Theo van Gogh in 2004. Aiming to counteract radicalisation by opposing discrimination, the programme has resulted in an emphasis on social cohesion and city level citizenship (Maan et al. 2014: 48–49). In a similar move, signalling openness as well as dissociation from national policy frames, Bristol became a 'City of Sanctuary' in 2011, as part of a national network that by early 2016 numbered 51 towns and cities, all in different ways working towards more openness towards refugee populations (Jensen and Gidley 2014). But not all projects are equally successful. In Warsaw, the project 'Diverse Warsaw' was planned for the years 2011 to 2013, aimed at promoting tolerance towards diversity and non-discrimination through financing campaigns and smaller projects in cooperation with non-governmental organisations and research institutions. In fact, due to financial and organisational issues, the programme has never fully started (Jóźwiak 2015: 4).

In Southwark, long established as an area of immigrant settlement, recent years have seen more policy frames designed around the recognition and celebration of diversity, with the role of the mayor increasingly linked to community cohesion and civic engagement. Recent years has also seen an emphasis on citizenship ceremonies that take place every Saturday in the borough (Jensen and Gidley 2014: 35), as well as annual events at borough and neighbourhood level, aimed at celebrating diversity and inclusion. The biggest of these events is the Black History Month. Celebrated annually in the UK since 1987, and in Southwark since 1993, the Black History Month can, through its focus on one ethnic category, be interpreted as representative of a differentialist cultural perspective. But

the local government in Southwark, where the combined Black minorities constitute 26.8% of the total population, frame the celebration as a recognition 'of the rich cultural diversity of our communities [helping to] celebrate the huge achievements of black people and their lives in Southwark over the centuries' (Southwark Council 2015).

But the historical and contemporary recognition of immigrants as part of the wider community is nowhere more pronounced and deep-rooted than in Saint-Denis where the large presence of immigrants and their descendants historically has been included in collective representations as a basic feature of what is referred to as a 'world city'. This dates back to the local government's post-WWII denunciation of French imperialism and support to the Algerian nationalist cause, agitating for a nationwide expansion of Algerians' social rights, especially with regard to housing, employment, education, and welfare benefits (Byrnes 2013: 7). The municipality has continued to cultivate a particularly close and supportive relationship with North African migrants living in their community. This argument is strengthened in Saint-Denis by the city's communist heritage, which prefers to view social cohesion in terms of inequality and social class, while at the same time recognising the history of immigration to the city and welcoming its diversity.

Additionally, the city is a level of policy and politics where the elected local government or civil society can promote agendas which respond to particular sets of local circumstances, reflecting the agenda of the local government authority, and/or the influence of populist parties in local politics. For example, the 'mainstreaming' of school lunches in some French towns during the summer 2015—scrapping of the pork-free school meal option in some schools—provides an example of how a turn towards generic policies has the potential to stigmatise minority populations (The Guardian 2015). Similarly, the much debated 'burkini ban', introduced in a number of French municipalities during the summer 2016, demonstrate how the imposition of 'mainstream' standards effectively serve to target Muslim women. Against the backdrop of the July 14 Nice bombing and wide-spread anti-Islamic sentiments, the ban initially received widespread support across much of the political spectrum in France. When the ban eventually was suspended, in late August 2016, by Counsil d'Etat, the highest administrative court in France, the high court judges said that the ban "had dealt a serious and clearly illegal blow to fundamental liberties such as the freedom of movement, freedom of conscience and personal liberty" (*Independent* 2016).

Such local incidents clearly feed into wider debates concerning secularism as a principle meant to protect pluralism. It has been argued that '… talking about secularism has become a way to claim a White Christian France where everyone shares the same values and traditions', (Francois Dubet, in The Guardian 2015), thus deliberately stigmatising the Muslim population. This turn towards a coercive approach of *laicité*, where the notion of 'neutrality' is opposed to the free expression of religious beliefs in public space, has occurred at both the national and local levels in France, resulting in contradictions between this 'republican' framing and long-established practices of accommodation to cultural needs.

In summary, there is evidence of processes of multi-level governance and decentralisation, with more emphasis on policy frames developed at the local level. While this is provided for in policy frameworks, for example the British 'Creating the Conditions for Integration', local governments have also embarked on more inclusive identity policies at the city level. But whereas the overall picture is one of the national level establishing wider parameters for policy development at the local level, it remains important to recognise how the broader, global context can trigger local events and resulting policy initiatives which, in turn, impact policy discourse and debate at national level—with the burkini ban debate as a very recent example.

Proxy Strategies

As emphasised in the previous section, the past years have generally been characterised by a move away from state-centric to more polycentric integration governance models, with more emphasis on the local level (Barrero et al. 2017). But it is also at the level of implementation, in cities and neighbourhoods, that 'colour blind' national policy frames, aimed at addressing the needs of particular geographical areas or population groups, become proxy strategies, *de facto* targeting immigrants. So whereas policy frames designed at national level do not refer to immigrants as target groups, the geography of policy implementation at city and neighbourhood levels does de facto target immigrants disproportionately, as many areas with high levels of socio-economic deprivation also often are characterised by concentrations of immigrant and minority populations.

The relationship between area-based measures and the indirect targeting of immigrant groups can in particular be evidenced in relation to the 'old' migration countries. In a French context, it has been argued that,

since their implementation in the 1980s, urban policies were set up partly in order to substitute for the 'ethnic question' in order to comply with the French republican approach (Doytcheva 2007, in Simon and Beaujeu 2015: 66). Starting in 1982, Urban Priority Zones were, accordingly, targeting urban renewal and different schemes of area-based redistribution, in particular in areas with a relatively high concentration of residents from Algerian descent, though identified on the basis of deprivation indicators. While the number of priority districts was reduced from 2300 to 1300 in 2014, the area-based policy frames have remained an integrated part of urban and social policy frames. They have, however, been dissociated from integration policies, as the 'equation' between integration and disadvantage is perceived as stigmatising (Bozec and Simon 2014: 38).

In the Netherlands, generic measures have typically been framed as needs- and area-based replacement strategies (Maan et al. 2015: 70). Specific integration or minority policies have been gradually replaced by generic approaches since the 1990s. Since the 2000s policy frames have been increasingly area-based, with a particular focus on so-called 'problem neighbourhoods'. The interventions are characterised by the polycentric cooperation between local governments, housing cooperation and citizens, without explicitly targeting particular groups. But in the field of education most policies have been replaced by needs-based proxy indicators such as language deprivation. Social cohesion policies, on the other hand, are often area-based, targeted on the basis of social-economic deprivation indicators. While this often overlaps with areas where many migrants live, such as in the case of the integral National Program Rotterdam South, there is no explicit focus on these migrants per se. In some cases, needs- and area-based proxies even overlap, for instance in the distribution of funding for educational purposes to specific neighbourhoods in Rotterdam (Van Breugel et al. 2015: 37). Between Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the latter stands out in its direct and often pioneering role in (area-based) steering and sometimes controversial measures, such as the so-called Rotterdam Act (in Dutch: *Wet Bijzondere Maatregelen Grootstedelijke Problematiek*). Initiated in Rotterdam, this national Act consists of a wide range of far reaching measures to improve liveability and safety in certain, selected, deprived areas, inter alia by regulating the influx of the number of people with a low income in certain city areas.

Similarly, social inclusion rather than integration was the driver of the anti-poverty agenda promoted in the UK under New Labour (1997–2010). As part of a largely neighbourhood-based renewal programme, target

areas (super output areas) were identified on the basis of multiple deprivation indicators, developed around health, housing and income levels. Ethnicity or immigrant status did not figure among these indicators, but as the proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities typically was higher in deprived areas, these immigrant populations would nevertheless be targeted disproportionately. Whereas neighbourhood renewal programmes are not on the agenda of the present UK government, similar targeting, led by socio-economic indicators, is expressed in the allocation of pupil premium funding based on access to free school meals (Jensen and Gidley 2014).

Proxy strategies are much less common in Poland and Spain. In Poland, none of the neighbourhoods with high concentrations of immigrants are among the 'Priority neighbourhoods' listed in the Integrated Programme for Urban Renewal (Jóźwiak 2015: 6), and in Spain national and local policy frames have been impacted by austerity measures. Here, the Intercultural Community Intervention Programme has been rolled out in several cities, funded by a Spanish Bank through its Social Foundation (Obra Social La Caixa), and thus confirming a broader trend towards public-private partnerships as well as a more explicit diversity orientation: "[…]Therefore, 'la Caixa' develops the Intercultural Community Intervention Project (ICI) in neighbourhoods or areas throughout Spain with a significant cultural diversity" (Brey et al. 2015: 35). Furthermore, the initiative supports a de-concentration process by which the governance of migrant integration policies involves all the stakeholders of the neighbourhood.

In summary, there is evidence of proxy strategies at the city level in the 'old migration countries'. Whereas national policy frames do not operate with any explicit targeting on the basis of ethnicity or immigrant status, the overlapping geographies of socio-economic deprivation and immigrant/minority settlement translate into a disproportionate targeting of immigrants. Such geographies are altogether largely absent in Poland, whereas policy frames in Spain are severely affected by austerity measures.

Diversity Proofing

As discussed above, it is through the implementation of national policies at the city level that generic policy frames gain an immigrant integration focus (although sometimes by proxy). But it is also here that local government authorities meet the challenge of 'diversity-proofing'—in other words, ensure that generic public services are fit to serve diverse popula-

tions. This chimes with a central facet of the query into the relationship between integration policy frames and superdiversity. As the proportion of immigrants and their descendants is increasing, and their origins increasingly diverse, actions targeted at this or that group would be useless, as generic actions would de facto mainly benefit immigrants. This logic of superdiversity does, however, hold two challenges to the city-level policy communities. One concerns the necessity of ensuring that service delivery can be adapted to neighbourhood contexts that may differ considerably in terms of ethnic composition and level of socio-economic deprivation. The other challenge is to ensure that all groups are aware of, and in a position to access, the generic services they are entitled to.[7] Furthermore, the austerity context has resulted in changing operational environments characterised by government retrenchment and, not unrelated, a turn towards de-concentration, with a push for increased involvement of non-state actors.

The need to match generic services with a diverse population was most clearly expressed in neighbourhoods and settings where diversity had become mainstream, as Simon and Beaujeu argue in relation to Saint Denis: "…as the proportion of immigrants and their descendants is so high and their origins so diverse that actions targeted at this or that group would be useless, as generic actions would de facto mainly benefit immigrants" (Simon and Beaujeu 2015: 67). Ironically, in Poland the same absence of group-specific measures was referred to as 'mainstreaming by accident' (Jóźwiak 2015: 16). In other words, immigrant numbers were so low that group-specific measures, at least outside the educational sector, usually not were considered. So here generic policies were the result of absent integration policy priorities rather than a conscious choice of policy targeting (Maan et al. 2015).

Central to the matching of generic policies with the specificity of local settings was what can be described 'front-line pragmatism' widely found both at neighbourhood level and in local schools with long-standing experience of provision for a diverse population (see also Chap. 7 for a more in-depth empirical analysis of frontline pragmatism in relation to mainstreaming). Thus referencing practices relating to service delivery rather than policy development, front-line pragmatism concerns the ability of frontline staff to design appropriate solutions within existing policy frameworks. This, in turn, rests on the cultural competences of the staff as well as the operational room for manoeuvre available to them. Evidence of frontline pragmatism was found at neighbourhood level in both

Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Interestingly, however, the 'framing' of such targeted measures differs between both cities. In Rotterdam, the adoption of targeted measures is framed in terms of pragmatic problem solving; adopting the right (temporary) measures where necessary. In Amsterdam, it is framed rather as a response to the superdiverse nature of the city (Van Breugel et al. 2015: 37–38).

The Southwark schools provide another example of frontline pragmatism evolving in response to local needs. Backed by legislation that served to enhance decision-making power and fiscal powers of the school management, it was possible to design student-centred interventions targeting individual needs (Jensen 2015: 11). As staff over time developed intercultural competencies, they increasingly took ownership over support for pupils with English as an Additional Language. Responding to local needs, schools were also seen to develop structures to engage with immigrant parents in need of advice, training or signposting. It was argued that because the parents regarded the school a 'safe place' or a 'comfort zone', the school had a role to play as a broker of relations between parents and the wider society (Jensen 2015: 12–13). Many schools, in both Southwark and Bristol, thus employed dedicated inclusion managers that could facilitate the provision of a wide range of facilities and resources, as expressed at a secondary school in Bristol: "We are not just teachers now. Sometimes you feel like a counsellor, sometimes you feel like a social worker, you have different hats on […] it has changed because funding to other agencies has been cut, without a shadow of doubt".[8]

Significant is also an appreciation of the changing face of frontline pragmatism, with processes of de-concentration at local level resulting in new configurations of policy actors. As explored in more detail in the previous chapter, integration policy initiatives in Poland and Spain have increasingly been taken forward by private organisations underpinned by external funding sources, and at street level NGOs fill the gap left by central government and local municipalities (Jóźwiak et al. 2017). Similarly, community engagement initiatives in both Bristol and Southwark operate with partnerships as a key modality, with the local government in an advisory and facilitating position, rather than, as previously, leading and resourcing policy initiatives (Jensen 2015). Southwark Council has also made a strategic move away from support to forums operating on the basis of ethnicity, religion or sexuality, instead of investing in inclusive governance modalities at neighbourhood level. A similar model is rolled out in Bristol, here known as neighbourhood partnerships, but pursued in tandem with

support to organisations working more targeted with the Somali population in the city.

While recognising and responding to the challenges inherent to the superdiverse context, it is important not to lose sight of the need for practices relating to diversity proofing and frontline pragmatism to be transparent and accountable in order to counter anti-immigrant discourses around favouritism on the basis of foreign origin or categories of vulnerability. This is in particular prevalent in areas where certain amenities are in high demand, for example in the UK where backlash narratives at times have fed on perceptions that some immigrant group were given easier access to social housing. This has, in turn, fed into the political campaigning of far-right parties. Similar sentiments, around the risks associated with perceived favouritism, were voiced by Madrid NGOs involved in educational support: 'It has brought us a problem when lists of scholarships came out and people were saying "either your name is Mohammed or your husband hit you or here you don't get a scholarship". The problems of immigrants for being immigrants are large but specific, whereas the Spanish poor families have conflicts that come from other generations where it costs much more to break the legacy of vulnerability'.[9]

These challenges are, moreover, amplified by the austerity context which makes it very difficult to distinguish between mainstreaming as an ideology or a fiscal necessity. So whereas the rolling back from group-specific to generic services works well from an austerity perspective, local authorities are challenged to allocate sufficient resources to ensure that immigrants can understand and access relevant services. The relationship between diversity proofing and recession-conditioned mainstreaming was in particular prevalent in Spain where the coinciding increase in migrant numbers and the decrease in available resources for support point to massive gap between supply and demand. This was in particular prevalent in relation to the language support offered to immigrant children, typically the remit of local NGOs. Due to the lack of funding for migrant associations, fewer NGOs are offering language training support (Brey et al. 2015: 29).

Another aspect of the 'generic turn' within the context of austerity concerns the capacity of service providers to engage with vulnerable groups. These may include the following groups: New immigrants from 'new origin countries', in particular when arriving in areas with little previous exposure to immigration, and where frontline experience of diversity is less well consolidated; migrants with limited or unclear legal status; 'hidden'

migrant populations who do not access universal services (Gidley 2015: 3). Furthermore, wider urban dynamics were seen to enhance existing vulnerabilities, for example in relation to housing uncertainties among immigrants depending on private renting in Southwark and Bristol.

In summary, diversity proofing concerns the challenges relating to the matching of generic policies with the needs of an increasingly diverse population. Such challenges are best understood and addressed through the skills, practices and culturally specific knowledge referred to as frontline pragmatism. As demonstrated in this section, examples of frontline pragmatism are manifold, in particular in areas characterised by a long history of immigration as well as a high level of cultural competences among service providers. At the same time, austerity holds its own demand for pragmatic solutions, altogether making it difficult to distinguish between, on the one hand, mainstreaming as an ideology and, on the other, a fiscal necessity.

Conclusions

Superdiversity has, in recent research, been operationalised along three key aspects: A descriptive, 'summary' term, encapsulating a range of variables relating to migration patterns; a methodological concern to move beyond the 'ethno-focal lens' of most approaches within migration studies; a policy orientation highlighting the necessity for policy-makers and practitioners to respond to ongoing demographic changes at national and local level (Berg and Sigona 2013; Meissner and Vertovec 2015). The aim of this chapter was to combine descriptive and policy aspects in order to outline how cities respond to the challenges posed by increasingly diverse populations.

Referring back to the question posed in the introduction to this chapter—'How do the local authorities and service providers adapt the provision of generic services to the demands of an increasing diverse population'—the relationship between superdiversity as a descriptive term and mainstreaming as a policy orientation has been pursued throughout the chapter. Evidence from the so-called old immigration countries point to mainstreaming at the city level as a response to superdiversity. The notion of *diversity as mainstream* thus became emblematic of the superdiverse nature of neighbourhoods without a majority population, and impacted by long-standing and continuous experiences of immigration and settlement.

Whereas the turn from specific to generic policy frames thus could be evidenced in most country contexts, this 'logic' of a generic turn in response to superdiversity does, however, hold challenges to city-level policy communities. This concerns the adaptation of service delivery to neighbourhood contexts that may differ considerably in terms of ethnic composition and level of socio-economic deprivation, and the challenge of ensuring that all groups are aware of, and in a position to access, the generic services they are entitled to. The efforts to 'match' generic services with the demands of increasingly diverse populations resulted, in particular in areas with long-standing experiences of immigration, in a wide range of practices, contingent on the skills and cultural competencies of frontline staff, and referred to as frontline pragmatism.

Parts of the policy responses to superdiversity are, however, to do with neither diversity nor city-level policies, but rather with national policy frames developed to address socio-economic deprivation. Accordingly, it is at the local level that 'colour blind' national policy frames, identifying geographical areas on the basis of economic and needs-based indicators, become proxy policies that target immigrants and ethnic minorities disproportionately, due to an above-average proportion of immigrants in deprived areas. Such proxy policies could, in particular, be identified in the 'old' immigration countries—France, the Netherlands and the UK.

Finally, the suggested causality that underpins this discussion—mainstreaming caused by superdiversity—is blurred by the austerity context that has provided an important backdrop to the development of national and local policy frames across Europe in recent years, in this project in particular seen in Spain and the UK. Whereas shifts towards polycentric, generic policies could be identified in several country contexts, emerging policy frames often coincided with national demands for fiscal restraint. Such demands would typically result in budget cuts at local government level. So, can the policy shifts from specific target-group-led measures to generic policies be understood as responses to superdiversity, or are they motivated by fiscal necessity?

Notes

1. The year 2011 being the year of the most recent UK population census. With lack of reliable data for immigrant populations recognised as a significant problem for service providers at the city level (Collett et al. 2015: 5),

the census provides an opportunity to get a more precise picture of in particular more recent immigrant groups.

2. A very high proportion of the population is of North African origin, with estimates indicating that by 2005 about two-thirds of youth living in Saint-Denis are descendants of immigrants, mainly of North African and Sub-Saharan African origins (Tribalat 2009, in Simon and Beaujeu 2015: 43).
3. Head of urban policy resource centre, in Simon and Beaujeu (2015: 64).
4. Former programme director of the *Wij Amsterdammers* Program, Maan et al. (2014: 37).
5. In each city, where Upstream research was carried out, two neighbourhoods were selected for fieldwork. These would typically be one neighbourhood with a long history of immigrant settlement, and one with a more recent experience of immigration.
6. France forms a notable exception here, as the socio-urban policy frames referred to as *politiques de la Ville* are top-down approaches based on policies and content designed at the national level (Epstein 2010, in Bozec and Simon 2014: 15).
7. As argued by Phillimore in her study of diversity and health provision in Birmingham, 'the main problem faced by all new migrants, regardless of status, was understanding "the system"' (Phillimore 2010: 15). Similar concerns were raised in Bristol with reference to the rapidly increasing Somali population. Rather than tailored services, a key concern was communication over the nature and accessibility of existing mainstream services' (Jensen 2015: 19–20).
8. Assistant head teacher, secondary school in Bristol, in Jensen (2015: 12).
9. Education Support NGO in Universidad, Madrid, in Brey et al. (2015: 26).

References

Alba, R., and N. Foner. 2015. *Strangers No More: Immigration and Challenges of Immigration in North America and Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Barrero, Z., T. Caponio, and P. Scholten. 2017. Theorizing the Local Turn in the Governance of Immigrant Policies: A Multi-Level Approach. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 38 (2): 1–19.

Berg, M.L., and N. Sigona. 2013. Ethnography, Diversity and Urban Space. *Identities* 20 (4): 347–360. doi:10.1080/1070289X.2013.822382.

Bozec, G., and P. Simon. 2014. *The Politics of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policies*. Upstream Research Project, WP3 Report. Accessed September 10, 2015. http://www.project-upstream.eu/publications/country-reports/224-the-politics-of-mainstreaming-immigrant-integration-policies-case-study-of-france

Brey, E. 2015. *The Politics of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of Spain*. Upstream Research Project, WP3 Report. Accessed October 16, 2015. http://www.eur.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/fsw/Bestuurskunde/onderzoek/upstream/WP3_Spain.pdf

Brey, E., M. Sánchez-Domínguez, and D. Sorando. 2015. *Mainstreaming in Practice: The Efficiencies and Deficiencies of Mainstreaming in Spain*. Upstream Research Project, WP4 Report. Accessed September 27, 2016. https://projectupstream.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/4-1-case-study-report-spain-brey-sorando-and-sanchez-2015.pdf

Byrnes, M. 2013. Liberating the Land or Absorbing a Community: Managing North African Migration and the *Bidonvilles* in Paris's *Banlieus*. *French Politics, Culture and Society* 31 (3): 1–20.

Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. 2016. *Bevolking; ontwikkelung in gemeenten met 100 000 of meer inwoners*. Accessed September 25, 2016. http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=70748NED&D1=0,2,4,16,18,20,22,24&D2=a&D3=0&D4=a&D5=l&HD=090707-1905&HDR=T&STB=G4,G2,G1,G3

Collett, E., M. Benton, and H. McCarthy. 2015. Into the Mainstream: Re-thinking Public Services for Diverse and Mobile Populations—Policy Brief. *Upstream Policy Brief*, No. 3. https://projectupstream.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/upstream-wp5-policy-brief1.pdf

Collett, E., and M. Petrovic. 2014. *The Future of Immigrant Integration in Europe: Mainstreaming Approaches for Inclusion*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

Crul, M., and J. Mollenkopf, eds. 2012. *The Changing Face of World Cities: Young Adult Children of Immigrants in Europe and the United States*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Crul, M., and J. Schneider. 2010. Comparative Integration Context Theory: Participation and Belonging in New Diverse European Cities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33 (7): 1249–1268.

DCLG. 2012. *Creating the Conditions for Integration*. London: DCLG. Accessed July 14, 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7504/2092103.pdf

Gidley, B. 2015. Mainstream Integration: What Works? *Upstream Policy Brief*, No. 4. Accessed September 27, 2016. http://www.project-upstream.eu/publications/policy-briefs/286-4-mainstreaming-intergration-what-works

Independent. 2016. *Burkini Ban Suspended: French Court Declares Law Forbidding Swimwear Woen by Muslim Women 'Clearly Illegal'*. 26 August 2016. Accessed September 25, 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/burkini-ban-french-france-court-suspends-rule-law-forbidding-swimwear-worn-muslim-women-seriously-a7211396.html

INSEE. 2013. Etrangers-Immigrés en 2013. Available online: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/theme.asp?theme=2

Jensen, O. 2015. *Mainstreaming in Practice: The Efficiencies and Deficiencies of Mainstreaming in the UK*. WP4 Report. http://www.project-upstream.eu/publications/country-reports

Jensen, O., and B. Gidley. 2014. *The Politics of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of the United Kingdom*. Upstream Country Report.

Jensen, O., H. Jayaweera, and B. Gidley. 2012. *Diversity, Cohesion and Change in Two South London Neighbourhoods*. Concordia Discors Final Report, COMPAS, University of Oxford.

Jóźwiak, I. 2015. *Mainstreaming in Practice: The Efficiencies and Deficiencies of Mainstreaming in Poland*. Upstream Research Project, WP4 Report.

Jóźwiak, I., J. Nestorowicz, and M. Lesinska. 2014. *WP3: The Politics of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policies in Poland*. WP3 Report. Accessed October 16, 2015. http://www.project-upstream.eu/publications/country-reports/226-the-politics-of-mainstreaming-immigrant-integration-policies-case-study-of-poland

Jóźwiak, I., M. Sánchez-Domínguez, and D. Sorando. 2017. Migrant's Integration Governance Patterns in the New-Migration Countries: The Role of NGOs in Poland and Spain. This volume (chapter 3).

Maan, X., I. Van Breugel, and P. Scholten. 2014. *The Politics of Mainstreaming Integration Policies: Case Study of the Netherlands*. Upstream Research Project, Country Report.

———. 2015. *The Politics of Mainstreaming: A Comparative Analysis of Migrant Integration Governance in Europe*. Upstream Research Project, Comparative Report.

Meissner, F., and S. Vertovec. 2015. Comparing Super-Diversity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (4): 541–555.

Moren-Alegret, R., D. Wladyka, and A. Maas. 2011. *Concordia Discors: Understanding Conflict and Integration Outcomes of Inter-group Relations and Integration Policies in Selected Neighbourhoods of Five European Cities*. Barcelona Background Report. Accessed October 15, 2015. http://concordiadiscors.fieri.it/assets/BR_Bercelona.pdf

ONS. 2012. 2011 Census: Key Statistics for Local Authorities in England and Wales. Published 11 December 2012. Crown Copyright.

Phillimore, J. 2010. Approaches to Health Provision in the Age of Super-Diversity: Accessing the NHS in Britain's Most Diverse City. *Critical Social Policy* 31 (1): 5–29.

Simon, P., and M. Beaujeu. 2015. *Mainstreaming in Practice: Advantages and Disadvantages of Mainstreaming in France*. Upstream Research Project, WP4 Report.

Southwark Council. 2015. *The History Behind Black History Month*. Website. Accessed February 25, 2016. http://www.southwark.gov.uk/info/200449/black_history_month/2822/the_history_behind_bhm

The Guardian. 2015. Pork or Nothing. *The Guardian*, October 14, G2, 6–8.
Van Breugel, I., X. Mann, and P. Scholten. 2015. *Mainstreaming in Practice: The Efficiencies and Deficiencies of Mainstreaming in the Netherlands.* Upstream Research Project, WP4 Report.
Vertovec, S. 2007. Super-Diversity and Its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (6): 1024–1054.

Ole Jensen is an associate lecturer with The Open University in the UK, though he originally comes from Denmark. He holds a PhD in International Development Studies, but has worked on themes related to diversity and integration since moving to the UK in 2006. Ole was a research officer with the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) 2011–2015, working on a range of EU-funded projects relating to socio-cultural dynamics, inter-group relations and integration at neighbourhood and city level. In early 2017 Ole commenced a 2-year heritage project on football fans, belonging and neighbourhood relations in South London.

CHAPTER 5

Immigrant Integration Mainstreaming at the EU Level

Elizabeth Collett, Helen McCarthy, and Meghan Benton

Introduction

The idea of 'mainstreaming' immigrant integration policy has been embraced at the European Union (EU) level with a commitment made in 2004 in the Council of the European Union's Common Basic Principles (CBPs) on Integration (2004). This commitment has subsequently been reiterated in the European Common Agenda on Integration (2005a), the Second Handbook on Integration (2007), the Integration Indicators (2011a), and the Council Conclusions on integration, under the auspices of the Greek Presidency of the European Council (2014).

However, despite the political commitment to the idea of mainstreaming, the question of how the European institutions can best promote

E. Collett (✉)
Migration Policy Institute Europe, Brussels, Belgium

H. McCarthy
Middlesex University, London, UK

M. Benton
Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, USA

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_5

mainstreaming remains open. With limited competence in the area of integration, the European Commission can encourage mainstreaming through vehicles such as funding, guidance and legislation, but ultimately it is for Member States to bring mainstreaming to fruition. Drawing on research conducted as part of a European Union funded project 'Developing Effective Strategies for the Mainstreaming of Integration Governance' (UPSTREAM) between May 2014 and April 2015, this chapter considers how successfully those limited tools have been deployed to promote mainstreaming and how effectively the Commission has itself mainstreamed integration priorities across its policy portfolios.

This chapter is based on the following: an analysis of policy documents; 18 semi-structured interviews with officials, NGOs and experts; surveys with equality bodies in the UPSTREAM countries (France, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK) and survey responses from National Contact Points responsible for administering EU funding; study visits to the UPSTREAM countries; and two focus group events at which emerging findings were discussed.[1]

Since the research was undertaken, the war in Syria and continuing instability in the region has resulted in large numbers of people arriving in the EU seeking refuge. The initial response to the refugee crisis was somewhat shambolic. The European Commission and several Member States called for mandatory resettlement quotas, but others have been unwilling to accept this solution. At the European level, the European Agenda on Migration published in May 2015 (European Commission 2015a) and subsequent agreements have established the framework for the response. Whilst integration is discussed in the Agenda, its inclusion appears as something of an after-thought.

However, the crisis has begun to spur more comprehensive investment in many EU Member States, and is now catalysing a stronger response at EU level, including first signs of improved cross-government coordination. This has several dimensions from concerns about the costs of, and capacity for, hosting new arrivals, through to new impetus to improve labour market integration for immigrant groups, particularly refugees. In recognition of the looming challenge that integration presents, the Commission published an Action Plan on Integration (European Commission 2016a) focusing on key areas of policy, and outlining how coordination between Member States will be strengthened and how all sources of European funding can be used to support integration. Indeed, while the concept of mainstreaming has been largely accepted, yet little

acted upon, it appears that the refugee crisis has increased the urgency within the European Commission to develop a more coordinated, mainstreamed approach.

The following section will discuss how competences for integration policy are split across the European Commission and how this impacts on the ability to promote a mainstreamed approach. Mainstreaming calls for every area of policy to consider integration priorities as part of the design of their policies, but this is often only effective when there is good coordination. The third section will consider the tools that the European institutions have to promote mainstreaming in Member States, including funding, guidance and legislation. Although each tool could be used to promote mainstreaming, this has not been done systematically, and it seems that none of these tools have resulted in substantial shifts in focus in Member States. The fourth section will briefly discuss the wider impact of the refugee crisis. Finally, the chapter closes with some concluding thoughts on how the EU could continue to build momentum on mainstreaming integration.

Mainstreaming Integration Policy Across the European Commission

The first step towards a common legislative and policy framework on migration, asylum and integration at the European level was taken in 1999 at the Tampere Council (Petrovic and Collett 2014). However, Member States have been wary of ceding sovereignty in this area and the legislative programme on migration has proceeded in a piecemeal fashion. Integration policy is explicitly excluded as a legislative competence of the EU. As a result the EU does not have an explicit mandate on integration and has limited competence in this area. The proposal for an Open Method of Coordination for integration policy in 2000 was rejected by Member States (Acosta Arcarazo 2014). Nevertheless, in 2004 the European Council adopted 11 CBPs on Integration, which was followed by a Common Agenda for Integration which described how the principles would be implemented at the EU level (Petrovic and Collett 2014). It has been argued that the CBPs created a 'quasi-competence' implemented through a patchwork of 'soft' law mechanisms (Velluti 2007). These mechanisms have included the establishment of a network of National Contact Points on Integration (NCPI), the development of indicators and handbooks on integration, and a funding pot to support integration projects.

The concept of 'mainstreaming' describes the 'mobilization of all areas of EU law and policy' to promote a particular aim (Bell 2008) and was included in the tenth CBP as an 'important consideration' in policy development. In the second edition of the Handbook on Integration (2007: 14), mainstreaming is considered to have three components: (1) incorporating an integration perspective in all relevant areas of policy making at all levels; (2) ensuring equal access to services for the whole (diverse) population; (3) adapting generic measures when necessary to target needs of immigrant groups. In terms of how this definition sits with the conceptualisation of mainstreaming developed in this book, it is clear that work at the EU level on integration reflects a decentralised approach (with responsibilities spread vertically across different levels of governance). However, what is less clear is how well the intention to mainstream has led to a deconcentration at the EU level—that is, spreading of integration priorities across the institutions and all policy areas. The European institutions have never articulated a clear strategy for mainstreaming at the EU level. Likewise, no guidance exists on how the different EU vehicles available—funding, guidance, and legislation —could and should be used to further this aim. Efforts to stimulate mainstreaming have therefore been somewhat ad hoc and scattered.

In part, this shortcoming reflects the organisational structure of the Commission. While there is an EU policy framework for integration, which falls under the remit of the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), integration policy was, until recently, not well coordinated across the Commission (Petrovic and Collett 2014). In practice individual policy officials often maintained good contacts across DGs on these issues, but it was only in November 2015 that a formal mechanism for this contact to be sustained was introduced in the form of an inter-service group on integration led by DG HOME (as recommended by the original UPSTREAM final report (Benton et al. 2015). This is a welcome development, yet the effectiveness of the inter-service groups can vary, and it remains to be seen how actively different DGs engage.

A further complication arises from the dichotomy created in EU policy between third-country nationals and mobile EU nationals. This has resulted in different directorates having divergent priorities and budgets in the field of integration (Petrovic and Collett 2014). As a consequence DG HOME has responsibility for third-country nationals and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) has responsibility for EU nationals, including second and third generation immigrants. This

distinction, often articulated in Member States as well, is based on the idea that EU citizenship enshrines equal treatment (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012). As a result mobile EU citizens often cannot access formal integration support on arrival in another EU country, a fact that can cause issues at the local level where these individuals may still have integration needs (Collett 2013). This dichotomy is matched by different language adopted by DGs, from 'inclusion' in DG EMPL to 'integration' in DG HOME.

Below is an overview of some of the key DGs involved and how they have addressed integration.

DG Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). DG HOME has responsibility for the integration of third-country nationals, alongside legal migration, irregular migration and return, the Common European Asylum System and the Schengen system. DG HOME is also responsible for administering the EU's migration funds. Previously named DG Home Affairs, 'migration' was added in autumn 2014, reflecting wide consensus on the need to approach migration in a more cross-cutting fashion (Collett 2014). However, with responsibility for third-country nationals alone, DG HOME still has no mandate to address the integration needs of other groups, including second and third generation migrants and mobile EU citizens.

DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL). DG EMPL monitors the overall situation of employment in Europe as well as the progress of Member States towards Europe 2020 (EU2020) strategic objectives. Migrants are mainstreamed into the Council guidelines for employment policies based on the EU2020 objectives, which suggest Member States should 'promote the labour market participation of […] older workers, young people, people with disabilities and legal migrants' (Council of the European Union 2010). Through the European Social Fund (ESF), DG EMPL also provides funding to support employment programmes in Member States. Although a large part of DG EMPL's work is on employment policy, social affairs have become a more central part of its remit in recent years. One of the EU2020 targets is to support at least 20 million people to move out of poverty. By adopting the category of 'vulnerable people' as a target for social inclusion policies, a term which is often (explicitly or implicitly) meant to include migrants, social inclusion policy could be described as a mainstreamed policy area as it defines people based on need rather than status.

DG Education and Culture (DG EAC). The EU has limited competence in the field of education, thus DG EAC's primary activities are confined to commissioning research, creating expert networks, and providing funding through programmes such as ERASMUS+ (the umbrella name for the EU's education and training programmes). Inclusive education and the needs of migrant learners can be observed across the activities of the DG. 'Migration and ethnic diversity' is listed as one of DG EAC's six main priorities within schools policy on its website. Under this work programme, DG EAC produces reports on current challenges in schools, such as dealing with the realities of multilingual classrooms. DG EAC also plays a role in monitoring integration indicators through the Education and Training Monitor, which measures outcomes such as early school leaving, maths attainment, tertiary education attainment, and participation in early years education by immigration background. Mainstreaming is also reflected in organisational changes within the directorate: there was previously a standalone multilingualism unit, but this is now integrated into the schools unit.

DG Regional Policy (DG REGIO). DG REGIO administers the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which has a focus on deprived areas and development. In recent years, it has been suggested that the EU's regional policy, which aims to reduce inequalities between areas, could play a much greater role in providing support to areas dealing with unexpected migration inflows through a place-based approach (Barca 2009). However, the Directorate only supports immigrant integration indirectly, through issues such as urban poverty reduction, and does not see the topic as central to its work. One interviewee from DG REGIO described how migration is only ever a 'hidden' agenda.

DG Justice and Consumers (DG JUST). DG JUST is responsible for the EU's anti-discrimination legislation that previously fell under DG EMPL's portfolio. The anti-discrimination legislation ensures equality for migrants and minorities by protecting against discrimination on the grounds of ethnic or racial background in access to employment, goods and other services. As responsibility for the legislation has moved from DG EMPL to DG JUST it has potentially become harder to address cross-cutting issues of employment discrimination. While DG JUST usually stays away from integration issues, it commissioned a series of reports on discrimination—including against migrants—in the labour market (e.g. see van Balen et al. 2010; Crowley 2010). DG JUST is also responsible for EU citizenship rights and free movement and thus is interested in ensuring that mobile EU citizens are able to access services and exercise their rights.

Like any bureaucracy, the European Commission suffers from 'silos'—the tendency for each department to address policy problems in isolation and through their own institutional culture and language. While this is a problem for many policy areas, it is arguably more problematic for integration, which cuts across portfolios. Some Directorate-Generals have taken a proactive role to addressing the issue of integration within the work and have adapted internal organisation to reflect this. Others, however, continue to see the issue as outside of their core remit. The 2014 reorganisation of the Commission and the central role played by the vice-presidents, with a mandate to facilitate cooperation across portfolios, set out the intention to drive innovation in integration governance and make migration issues easier to discuss (Juncker 2014). The refugee crisis has added urgency to this aim. As a result, at the time of writing, a number of Directorate-Generals are now seeking to include integration priorities in existing work plans.[2]

Tools to Promote Mainstreaming

The European institutions have three main tools that can be used to promote mainstreaming: funding; guidance—through policy coordination mechanisms as well as through policy networks; and legislation. In the following section we will discuss each of these tools in turn and consider whether mainstreaming has been explicitly pursued as a goal, and to what extent each tool has been effective in promoting mainstreaming (whether explicitly or not).

Funding

Funding is one of the most important mechanisms that the EU can use to influence policy in Member States. There are three mechanisms by which EU funds can influence national policy: leverage (or usage), learning and conditionality (Verschraegen et al. 2011; van Gerven et al. 2014). 'Leverage' describes the way the funds are used by national policymakers for different political priorities and how this can allow space for new priorities to be adopted at different governmental levels. 'Learning' describes how the sharing of models and practices from different regions or countries can lead to a shift in policy. Finally, 'conditionality' refers to the requirements imposed on Member States in their usage of the funds set out in the funding regulation. These set out specific priorities for each fund, influencing both who gets targeted through funding

and what type of policies are prioritised (Verschraegen et al. 2011; van Gerven et al. 2014).[3]

In theory, through these mechanisms, EU funds could provide an opportunity to promote mainstreaming of integration by defining specific funding guidelines (conditionality) or financing for innovative programmes that address migrant needs (leverage) within a whole population approach. EU funding could also allow organisations to overcome the political barriers to addressing the needs of minority communities that exist at the national level. However, as funding is channelled through the national level, and each Member State defines its own Operational Programme (within the remit of the funding regulation and in discussion with the European Commission), Member States still retain significant scope in shaping how funds are spent. In practice, this can hamper the EU's power to employ the funds to drive reform.

The Migration Funds

The Commission has a series of funds available for migration matters which in the past included a dedicated fund for integration, the European Integration Fund (EIF). In the period 2007–2013 the EIF had a budget of €825 million (European Commission 2014d), and compared with other EU funds was much smaller and less influential. The fund could only be spent on integration programmes for third-country nationals in line with the CBPs on Integration (2004). Projects funded by the EIF tended to fall into areas such as host language support, information and advice services, and projects supporting participation (European Commission 2010b).

Since 2014, the EIF has been consolidated along with other migration funds, such as the European Refugee Fund, into the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). For the current period (2014–2020), 3.14 billion has been allocated to the AMIF, which now covers issues including asylum, refugee matters, border security as well as integration. Member States are required to spend at least 20% of their AMIF allocation on promoting integration (European Union 2014 Regulation No. 516/2014). In reality, this means slightly less money, €765 million, has been earmarked for integration in the period 2014–2020 than in the previous period; however, in light of the refugee crisis this is to be reviewed (European Commission 2016a).

As a targeted fund, the EIF did not promote the inclusion of migrants in generic mainstream programmes, as it explicitly targeted migrants. As

Commission officials pointed out in focus group discussions, the EIF was never intended to mainstream: 'the European Commission is committed to mainstreaming, but also to targeted policies; there are a number of different objectives' (European Commission official, education focus group, Brussels, 15 December 2014). For Member States with little or no experience of integration, the EIF was considered an important—and sometimes the only—resource to support an integration programme and corresponding integration policy. For larger Member States, however, the EIF was considered more of an 'extra' in part because the sums involved were relatively small. In fact some chose not use it, as the administrative burden involved was considered too great. One interviewee said that if something was a priority the government would fund it directly from government funds. Nevertheless, the EIF could have supported a mainstreamed approach, had the fund's administrative processes allowed flexibility in terms of complementing existing funding structures such as the ESF. This does not seem to have been the case (European Commission 2011b).

European Social Fund

The ESF is a large structural fund designed to support employment outcomes and is allocated to Member States on the basis of relative wealth and population level. 76 billion euro was allocated to the ESF for the period 2007–2013. In this period, the funding regulation included a specific priority to focus on labour market access for immigrants. However, as the regulation listed multiple priorities, Member States still had discretion in choosing what to focus on. While mainstreaming is explicitly mentioned as a possible strategy for addressing migrant needs,[4] the language used is relatively weak, as a suggestion rather than recommendation (McGregor and Sutherland 2014). Further, there have been no systematic attempts to include ethnic minorities and immigrant groups in decision-making bodies administering the funds.

Unlike the migration funds, the ESF can be used to support anybody, including mobile EU citizens and third-country nationals. As mentioned, attention to migrant communities has largely taken the form of a focus on migrants' labour market integration, reflecting a higher rate of unemployment of third-country nationals in the EU (Council of the European Union 2015). In the language of EU policy documents, 'migrant' usually refers to third-country nationals, but the ESF funding regulations do not even provide definitions of who falls into the category of 'migrant,'

rather this is left to Member States to define target groups and indicators according to national policies. As an example, in France there are no target groups based on ethnicity whereas in the UK, ethnicity rather than migration status is the defining characteristic. In other countries, the term 'migrant' may also be used to refer to the second or even third generation (Monnier et al. 2011). The vagueness of this definition could provide flexibility for mainstreaming; however, it creates difficulties in monitoring and so hampers effective policy responses.

As a result, migrants are likely to be targeted through ESF programmes, but it remains unclear whether at the level of each Member State this is an intentional part of policy (and therefore mainstreamed) or whether the specific needs of migrants are lost. Beyond specific priorities focusing on migrants, spending on 'disadvantaged people' could also reflect the fact that Member States are taking a mainstreamed approach, but could also signal a disappearance of specific target groups. Evidence from the UPSTREAM countries suggested a mix of both as well as variations within country at the regional level. In the Netherlands a mainstreamed approach has been adopted: a large proportion (50–55 million of the 72 million euro) of their yearly ESF allocation is spent on 'active inclusion,' a generic policy that involves ensuring that young people of migrant background are integrated into the labour market. In France, the focus of ESF interventions often tends to be geographical areas of poverty and exclusion, which can act as another proxy for targeting migrant communities. In the UK, certain local level ESF programmes specifically targeted additional barriers to employment including not speaking English as a first language. Due to the variety of approaches, assessing the numbers of migrants reached through the ESF is difficult. Nonetheless, evaluations suggested that 1.19 million people of migrant and minority background (8.7% of the total) had been assisted by ESF programmes between 2007 and 2013 (Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services 2011: 4).

The ESF has also been used to promote social inclusion more broadly and in the current programming cycle (2014–2020), the European Commission has proposed that 20% be used to promote social inclusion and to combat poverty (European Commission 2014c). While social inclusion is still conceptualised as connected to employment, interventions can include addressing non-work related disadvantages in the labour market, such as discrimination. Moreover, guidance for social inclusion priority areas of the ESF suggests taking a needs-based area approach to inclusion (European Commission 2014b: 8). Social inclusion could therefore

arguably be seen as a mainstreamed policy area, in that it involves addressing barriers to work, whatever their source.

Whether social inclusion priorities have facilitated innovative responses to integration challenges is less clear. One study found that the ESF enabled actors to stretch objectives to promote social inclusion, citing a former head of unit within the Commission who claimed that the ESF had created the opportunity to implement an 'under the radar' social inclusion policy (Verschraegen et al. 2011). Similarly, witnesses to a House of Lords inquiry in the UK noted that the ESF was valuable in encouraging equality and social inclusion criteria to be built into projects (House of Lords European Union Committee 2010). However, an evaluation of the impact of the ESF in meeting its social inclusion targets found that assessing the true scale and impact of these interventions is difficult due to data limitations. While 24 billion euro was spent on social inclusion programmes across the 27 Member States between 2006 and 2012, reaching an estimated 1.3 million migrants (McGregor and Sutherland 2012), it is difficult to assess impact, as the overwhelming focus is on 'hard' outcomes such as job offers rather than 'soft' outcomes such as improved confidence or work-readiness. It also appears that the social inclusion priority has not thus far underpinned a shift in focus in countries where it was absent, as only three Member States, Poland, Spain and the UK accounted for the majority of the beneficiaries of social inclusion spending between 2006 and 2012 (McGregor and Sutherland 2012).

More recently and spurred by concerns about the refugee crisis, the European Commission has stated that the ESF should be used to support integration, thus clearly signalling that Member States should include integration priorities in ESF operational planning in a more mainstreamed manner (European Commission 2015a; European Commission 2016a). To support this, officials from DG EMPL have been working with other DGs to improve coordination of different funds and to promote synergies (European Commission 2015c). Particular attention has been paid to improving coordination between the AMIF and the ESF, but work with other funds, particularly the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) is also ongoing (European Commission 2015b). In this context, the European Commission has launched a Transnational Platform with a Thematic Network on Migration which will support coordination and exchange of best practice (European Social Fund 2016).

Since Member States have considerable leeway to design the ESF programme to suit their national and political priorities (Sanchez Salgado 2013),

if the Member State in question is already taking an inclusive or needs-based approach in addressing minority or migrant communities, it is likely to continue this approach through the use of the ESF. Thus far, it does not appear that the ESF has been particularly effective at promoting an inclusive mainstreamed approach where it does not already exist. Nevertheless, the European Commission has sought to draw attention to the needs of immigrant communities by including priorities on migrant labour market integration and social inclusion within ESF funding regulations. The new concerted drive to co-ordinate the use of the ESF with that of the AMIF and the focus on ensuring that the ESF is used to support integration offers hope for more mainstreamed and coordinated approach to funding in the future.

Other Funds

The European Commission has also made a number of smaller funds available some of which have been important for the promotion of integration priorities. Although these often form part of one of the large structural funds, specific programmes with more targeted guidelines focusing on capacity building or cooperation in policymaking may be set up. Some of these have been of particular importance in tackling integration challenges. The EQUAL Community Initiatives was a specific programme financed through the ESF between 2000 and 2006. A fund of €3.27 billion was available for projects that employed innovative approaches to tackling discrimination in the labour market with a focus on partnership working, empowerment, awareness raising and scalable pilot projects. A specific priority under this programme was labour market access for asylum seekers. After 2007, EQUAL was merged into the PROGRESS fund, which supported the development and coordination of EU policy in the areas of employment, social inclusion and social protection, working conditions, anti-discrimination and gender equality (European Commission n.d.). This fund has been particularly important in developing anti-discrimination strategies and building capacity in this area. For example in France, the equality body (*Défenseur des Droits*) has benefitted from PROGRESS funds. In Spain, PROGRESS funds were used to develop a programme of capacity building for state security personnel to recognise and correctly identify hate crimes and xenophobic incidents as part of Spain's broader strategy on anti-discrimination. The project resulted in a handbook for police services and the first annual monitoring report on racist and xenophobic hate crimes, produced in 2014.

Remaining Challenges

A number of issues continue to limit the ability of the funds to support mainstreaming of integration priorities. The complex multi-level governance structures of the funds means that formalised multilevel decision-making channels are minimal. Each fund includes a Partnership Principle, whose objective is to ensure that other actors (including regional/local authorities and civil society) can input into the design of the funds' Operational Programmes. In some countries scholars have found that the Partnership Principle has strengthened regional powers, but not necessarily at the expense of the national level. This also seems to be highly contingent on the existing level of decentralisation within a Member State (Verschraegen et al. 2011). Research indicates that in many Member States, local and regional authorities as well as civil society stakeholders feel that they are unable to adequately influence priorities in the ESF (Department for Business and Skills 2013; European Anti-Poverty Network 2013). A similar complaint was made of the EIF with a report finding that NCPIs were not always effectively communicating with actors at the local or regional level (Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services 2013: 33).

A major concern raised by civil society in a number of countries has been the lack of flexibility in EU funding to adapt to changes in local needs on the ground (Department for Business and Skills 2013; European Anti-Poverty Network 2013). The division of target groups and reporting requirements between the ESF (which targeted everyone) and the EIF (which was only allowed to be spent on recently arrived, non-EU nationals) meant that the two funding pots have been very difficult to combine for mixed population groups. This reflects the dichotomy at the heart of EU policy making of treating EU citizens and non-EU citizens differently (Petrovic and Collett 2014). Civil society groups also complained in focus groups that all EU funding focuses on legally resident migrants, meaning that irregular migrants fall outside of the scope of the funding. Civil society representatives reported that local service providers are unlikely to turn these people away, but are unable to even report on the existence of them for fear of breaching funding guidelines. The lack of flexibility in being able to use funds in a complementary way is exacerbated by the fact that the distribution and management of the EIF and ESF may fall under the responsibility of different bodies within the Member State. For example, the ESF is in some countries allocated on a regional basis while the EIF and now the AMIF tends to be distributed at the national level.

Whilst many civil society interviewees stated that EU funds were very important for local providers, many said that the complex bureaucracy and administration associated with the funds meant that they were inaccessible to smaller organisations, often precisely the organisations that are best placed to reach the most marginalised. Delays in processing (Bieniecki and Pawlak 2012), payment by results (Department for Business and Skills 2013), complex tendering processes (Crisp et al. 2010), and threats of fund clawback (van Gerven et al. 2014) have all been cited as barriers for smaller organisations.

In summary, European funding remains important particularly for smaller Member States or those with less experience of developing or implementing integration policy.[5] Nevertheless, the degree to which these funds have resulted in the mainstreaming of integration priorities across policy areas is questionable. As a targeted fund, the EIF did not promote mainstreaming. The fund's focus on recently arrived third-country nationals and the inability to combine effectively with ESF funding meant that the fund was more often used on smaller projects rather than on larger scale interventions. While the ESF includes a funding priority on social inclusion which arguably captures some integration issues, this remains very much focused on labour market inclusion. There has been no explicit guidance at the EU level on ensuring that, at all levels of ESF delivery, the needs of migrant and minority groups are taken into account. Furthermore there has been no explicit commitment to including these groups in decision-making despite recommendations to do so (Monnier et al. 2011). So while the ESF has more potential to promote mainstreaming of integration policies, through generic programmes delivered at the local level, it relies on national authorities to assure a pluralist approach and ensure that the fund is reaching all groups effectively. Nonetheless, the refugee crisis has spurred action in this area, with a commitment to co-ordinate the funds more effectively, as well as an explicit call to fund integration measures under the ESF's social inclusion priority (European Commission 2015a, 2016a). It remains to be seen whether this results in a shift in programming priorities within Member States.

Guidance

A further tool at the Commission's disposal to promote mainstreaming is guidance and sharing of best practice. In other areas of social policy such as education, this is done through the Open Method of Coordination,

however, the proposal for a formal Open Method of Coordination on integration was not adopted. As a result, the Commission has used other forums to try to promote integration priorities. Two key tools in this respect are the European Semester and the associated Country Specific Recommendations, and the creation of policy learning networks.

European Semester

The European Semester is an annual cycle that monitors and steers progress under the EU2020 strategy goals in the fields of employment, education, climate and energy, poverty, and research, development and innovation. After fact-finding missions and bilateral meetings with Member States, the European Commission produces a report for each country with country-specific recommendations on budgetary, economic and social policies. These recommendations are then negotiated with and agreed to by Member States (European Commission 2016b). However, although the European Commission can issue warnings, these recommendations are not binding.

Integration priorities form part of the Semester, but the European Commission often has to make a complex calculation, which weighs the importance of highlighting certain integration priorities against Member State preferences—which may include an aversion to mentioning migration at all—*and* translate these priorities into vocabulary that will play well with the Member State and result in recommendations being passed. In some cases, integration simply is not a priority because there are too many other problems that merit attention. According to a DG EMPL official, unless countries are facing relatively few big challenges, the European Commission is unlikely to choose this short space to highlight migrant issues, focusing instead on bigger macroeconomic and labour market issues.[6] As such, integration recommendations are more prevalent in northern European countries, as the gaps between migrants and natives are most pronounced when the economy is doing well.

In other cases, the European Commission may address integration indirectly, through the use of proxies, such as 'disadvantaged groups'. Moreover, some countries—such as the Netherlands and the UK—are openly resistant to recommendations that target specific groups. One interviewee, for instance, described how 'vulnerable groups' are always added to council conclusions as a form of tokenism, and explained that the European Commission's 2015 working document on the Netherlands contained no references to minorities because they knew they would

face resistance. Hence recommendations that might be sensible for these countries are unlikely to even make it onto paper, because the European Commission is aware of how the country will respond in the bilateral negotiations. Indeed, according to European Commission officials in focus groups, the process of formulating recommendations aimed at specific groups is an explicitly political one, with debate about how best to compromise and/or mention migrants in a euphemistic fashion. Some recommendations may indirectly support integration outcomes while not mentioning migrants as specific beneficiaries. For instance, recommendations against early tracking or promoting early childhood education and care have had, in part, a mainstreaming rationale because these are policies that are likely to have benefits for disadvantaged groups generally and migrants in particular.

The delicate balancing process described above makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the European Semester in promoting mainstreaming; in fact, mainstreaming takes on a different guise in each country depending on the strategy used. It is clear that officials have tried to use the Semester as a vehicle for promoting integration goals, even if their efforts are not readily apparent. However, it is an open question if the process of toning down or modifying integration recommendations is merely a creative, clever way of slipping integration outcomes past Member States that would otherwise not tolerate them, or a reflection of the near impossibility of getting integration onto the agenda. In either case, a number of challenges may arise in relation to this strategy:

1. Lack of clarity
   Recommendations that include but do not specify people of migrant background (especially if based on a euphemism that all understand to include migrants, such as 'vulnerable groups') are likely to disproportionately benefit migrants. However, there is also a risk that some recommendations become overly vague in the process of being depoliticised and their objectives not understood.
2. Lack of ambition
   There is a notable absence of recommendations that promote structural change to the governance of integration, such as recommendations *to* mainstream, that is, to infuse policy areas with integration objectives or to set up cross-governmental agencies with responsibility for integration. Recommendations that do mention migrants rarely give details about how migrants' needs could be better

addressed, lending them an air of tokenism. Moreover, recommendations to adapt services to diverse populations, outside of employment or education, are rare.

3. Lack of impact
   Perhaps most importantly, the European Semester has also had little *impact*, at least according to the Commission's own metric. Almost all recommendations on disadvantaged groups or migrants in 2014 received an evaluation of 'some' or 'limited' progress, suggesting that the Semester is not effectively highlighting integration as a central policy priority. Other researchers have noted the difficulties in measuring the influence of the Semester, because of the political process that forms the backdrop to developing recommendations (Hallerberg et al. 2011; Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014). For instance, governments are more likely to agree to things they can fulfil, or to lobby for the inclusion of policies that they themselves introduced, so progress towards recommendations is not in itself evidence of influence. All of these factors together explain why our focus group participants suggested that the European Semester has a low profile among stakeholders outside the European Commission, and that it was a fairly weak instrument.

The European Semester is clearly being employed to promote integration objectives, especially in countries which are facing significant integration challenges and are on relatively strong economic footing. However, challenges in overcoming political sensitivities and the risk of creating overly vague recommendations through the use of proxies remains. Moreover, since the Semester has only been used to promote integration in the limited areas of education and employment, and failed to make recommendations on reforming the governance of integration, the tool has not yet lived up to its promise.

Networks

The European institutions fund a number of networks to promote sharing of best practice, learning and dialogue on policy areas. In theory, these could also be opportunities for local stakeholders to offer feedback on implications of policy on the ground and to promote mainstreaming. But the effectiveness of these mechanisms is unclear: these networks often do not explicitly promote mainstreaming; there is little evidence that ethnic minority and immigrant groups are structurally

involved in dialogue, and there is little cross-fertilisation with other policy areas. Networks tend to fall into one of three categories: those that bring together national players; those that bring together local or regional authorities; and those that bring together civil society representatives.

The European Commission convenes meetings of the NCPIs, which consists of officials from each of the EU28 responsible for national integration policies, on a regular basis. Formally instituted in 2003, the network offers countries an opportunity to exchange on new national policy initiatives, and underpinned a series of Ministerial Conferences on Integration, as well as the production of a series of Immigrant Integration Handbooks (European Commission 2005b, 2007, 2010a). The NCPIs have proved useful for national coordination and learning, though meetings have become more formulaic in recent years, and less determinative of EU policy. The NCPIs are also fairly isolated, and rarely come into contact with networks working on similar issues in other portfolios. For example, the European Network of Public Employment Services has prioritised refugee integration in the wake of the crisis, yet this network was until recently unaware of the existence of the NCPIs' own discussions on the same issue. Recently, in an effort to revitalise the work of the NCPIs and in light of current challenges, the Commission has proposed upgrading the Network of NCPIs to a European Integration Network (European Commission 2016a).

Beyond the NCPIs, the European Migration Network (EMN), established in 2008, is a research and reporting network made up of NGOs, international organisations and other experts. The aim of the network is to provide comparable, objective evidence to inform policy-making. Each county appoints National Contact Points (EMN NCPs) who provide up-to-date information to the Commission on matters of migration and integration. Within each Member State, the National Contact Points are expected to liaise with other partners in country, including research academics. The network has focused on third-country nationals and thus has addressed integration issues fairly narrowly. A 2012 evaluation of the EMN was broadly positive, suggesting that certain outputs, such as ad hoc queries, were of particular use. However, the evaluation acknowledged that despite a high profile among the Brussels policy community, policy officials in some Member States were unaware of the network's existence (European Commission 2012).

The main vehicle through which the European Commission engages with civil society stakeholders on migration and integration matters is the European Migration Forum. Previously known as the European Integration Forum, the name was changed in 2014 to reflect its broader scope, a move that suggested that integration had lost particular salience at the EU level prior to the refugee crisis (European Economic and Social Committee n.d.). Meetings take place once a year, with topics for the next forum being agreed through consultation. Civil society members with relevant expertise can apply to attend. The meetings are organised by the European Migration Forum Bureau made up of a representative of the Commission, a representative from the European Economic and Social Committee, and civil society representatives.

The EU also funds networks of local and regional authorities to share information and promising practices. While some focus on migration and integration issues, others are broader networks with migration elements, including networks such as EUROCITIES and Intercultural Cities. Other initiatives have included networks involving local authorities and academics such as Cities for Local Integration Policies for Migrants' (CLIP) Network.

These represent just some of the initiatives in this area that the European Commission supports, but there are a huge number working in the field of migration and integration. The sheer number of these networks signals the importance of integration issues at EU level, and generates many opportunities for learning. However, the proliferation of these networks may also be a problem, especially if it prevents information sharing (with different groups maintaining their own networks rather than engaging with others). One former Commission official suggested that the Commission reinforces existing networks of the usual suspects in the field of integration. The existence of multiple networks operating in the same policy space may also mean that some work is being duplicated (European Commission 2012). There is a risk of creating closed policy networks rather than encouraging new synergies to develop.

Legislation

The role of legislation in promoting integration is complex as the European institutions do not have legislative competence in this area. However, a number of directives in different areas of law affect integration policy. Legislation is the most direct way of influencing Member States, as the

directives must be transposed, and the Commission can monitor implementation and launch infringement proceedings against Member States where the legislation is not being enforced. Nonetheless, ensuring effective implementation is easier said than done, and launching infringement proceedings is often a political process.

Perhaps most obviously European directives on legal migration such as the Family Reunification Directive (Council Directive 2003/86/EC, 22 September 2003) and the Long Term Residents' Directive (Council Directive 2003/109/EC, 25 November 2003) have had an impact on integration policy. These directives lay out a number of rights that migrants with particular statuses are entitled to, with the aim of bringing their entitlements as close as possible to the entitlements of EU citizens (Acosta Arcarazo 2014). However, whether rights should underpin integration or whether rights can be seen as a reward for integration, particularly as regards certain Member States' integration courses and tests, is still in contention in a number of countries. Moreover, it appears that there are still issues with the implementation of the Family Reunification Directive in some Member States (Acosta Arcarazo 2014). In 2014, the Commission published guidelines on implementing the Family Reunification Directive (European Commission 2014a), but as yet, no infringement proceedings have been brought.

Equal treatment is another area of fundamental importance for integration that has been promoted by the European institutions. Between 2000 and 2006, the EU passed four Anti-discrimination Directives. The most significant for integration are the 'Racial Equality Directive' (Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 29 June 2000) which aims to ensure equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, including in the realms of social protection and access to goods and services, and the 'Employment Equality Directive' (Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 27 November 2000) which protects against discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation in the labour market. The two Directives do not include nationality as a basis for discrimination, although 15 Member States extend their national anti-discrimination legislation to cover more than the grounds listed in the Directives (including nationality, language and political opinion) (European Commission 2014e).

While many would agree that these directives have significantly improved the equality framework across the EU, issues in implementation remain. In some cases, Member States have fulfilled the requirements of the directives on paper, without taking the necessary steps

to change on-the-ground processes. According to an official report, awareness of anti-discrimination protection structures is low among the wider public (European Commission 2014c). The Fundamental Rights Agency's 'European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey' (EU-MIDIS) highlighted a serious deficit in knowledge of anti-discrimination protections within several Member States (Fundamental Rights Agency 2010). Since implementation, discrimination court cases have not significantly increased, suggesting either low levels of reporting or of prosecution and some national courts have handed out low levels of sanctions or compensation (European Commission 2014c). Moreover, the directives do not require Member States to collect data on discrimination, even though data-driven analyses would help fight discrimination and promote equality and the lack of information makes it difficult to assess its impact.

Many would agree that European legislation has had a huge impact in terms of ensuring the rights of legally resident immigrants and in supporting the building of a more comprehensive and robust anti-discrimination framework in a number of Member States. However, issues with implementation remain, making continued monitoring and the use of infringement procedures crucial. At the same time, there is little appetite by Member States for further work in these areas and they are unlikely to become priorities. Some EU officials suggested that it was difficult to discuss the outstanding problems surrounding discrimination, since the EU's framework and legislation is already perceived as extensive. These issues may make it difficult to tackle remaining challenges that exist in effective implementation.

The Impact of the Refugee Crisis

The sharp rise in the number of those arriving at Europe's shores in 2015, combined with a concomitant increase in asylum claims across much of the EU has created a cascading set of crises across the continent. These include untenable pressure on asylum reception and processing, chaotic border management and a breakdown in the functioning of core EU immigration systems such as the Dublin Regulation and the Schengen Convention. As a result, the European Commission and national governments have been embroiled in increasingly politicised crisis management, initially causing policies on legal migration and integration to slide down the agenda.

However, as the number of recognised refugees within the EU looks set to continue to rise, policy-makers have begun to turn to the longer-term (and potentially more significant) challenge of integrating this new population into the European society. Emerging concerns about the viability of large-scale integration of new arrivals, particularly into the labour market, has spurred the political leadership of the European Commission to ask all Directorates-General to include the issue in their work plans, thus making a strong, though implicit, statement about the need for mainstreaming on the issue.

As a result, the European Commission has increased its focus on coordination; it has created an inter-service group on integration, bringing relevant officials from a range of portfolios together to discuss how to embed integration in their own policy proposals. Similarly, in September 2015, the European Commission discussed how to best use existing EU funds and measures to support the integration of asylum seekers and refugees, notably the ESF and the FEAD, but also the AMIF, and the ERDF (European Commission 2015b). During this meeting, the European Commission invited Member States to revise their own priorities, and committed to approving amendments to the 2014–2020 Operational Programmes to support the integration of refugees. The Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals, launched in 2016, takes forward this work, setting out policy priorities in pre-departure, education, employment, access to basic services and social inclusion (European Commission 2016a). The plan details how coordination can be improved through upgrading the network of NCPIs to a European Integration Network, and builds on the discussion of using a range of EU funding instruments in a coordinated and strategic way to support integration objectives. Finally, the Action Plan re-iterates the commitment to mainstreaming and encourages all Member States to do the same (European Commission 2016a).

As many of the flagship initiatives put forward by the European Commission to manage the ongoing crisis—notably relocation and humanitarian admission—depend on an enhanced capacity for the reception and successful integration of refugees, it is clear that the imperative has spurred greater coordination within the European Commission itself. However, dealing with the political implications of the refugee influx and reforms to asylum and foreign policy are still the main focus of much of the EU level response. As such whilst the refugee inflow has spurred greater co-ordination and more joined up thinking on integration policy, it is unclear whether this more mainstreamed approach will be sustained in the long term.

Conclusions

Despite the stated commitment to mainstream integration priorities, progress at the EU level has been ad hoc. In contrast to the push for gender mainstreaming which saw guidelines for mainstreaming gender priorities across policy portfolios (Beveridge and Shaw 2002), there are no clear guidelines for national governments or local authorities on how to mainstream integration policies. In some directorates at the European Commission, a mainstreamed approach has been adopted and integration priorities feature across policies, but in other policy areas, the needs of migrants and integration priorities appear to be simply added as an afterthought.

Legislation is perhaps the most effective tool that can be deployed by the European institutions, and various directives have had significant impact in shaping the rights available to immigrants in Member States. However, legislation is only effective when correctly implemented, and the Commission has been wary of initiating infringement proceedings even in situations where there have clearly been issues with implementation. Moreover, legislation can be a fairly blunt tool, and in many ways is not suitable for promoting a truly mainstreamed approach.

Funding has proved to be an influential tool and has the potential to support greater innovation in integration policymaking and programming. However, different funds' focus on different target groups (third-country nationals versus whole population) have made the funds difficult to combine, hampering initiatives at a local level which have taken a mainstreamed, whole population approach. Relaxing target group requirements, easing the administrative burden and allowing funds to be used together more flexibly would support greater innovation and support the principle of mainstreaming integration priorities across policy areas. In the context of the refugee crisis, steps towards greater coordination and creating synergies between the funds have been taken.

Guidance has also been used to promote mainstreaming, both through the European Semester and a range of policy networks. However, due to the political nature by which the European Semester's Country Specific Recommendations are agreed upon, recommendations relating to integration can be vague, and the European Semester remains a relatively weak tool. Despite a proliferation of networks and events discussing migration and integration there is a sense that it is always the same people in the room discussing the same issues. It is important to ensure that there are

more opportunities for three-way discussion between the local/regional, national and EU levels. Once again, the impetus arising from the refugee crisis has spurred more action in this area, but it remains to be seen how effective this coordination is.

The European Commission has begun to approach the issue of integration in a more coordinated and mainstreamed manner, with the creation of an inter-service group on integration. The awareness that recent arrivals of refugees will require long-term support has also spurred integration to become a higher priority across a range of DGs. However, translating this into action, with the commitment of all Member States may prove difficult. Moreover, the European institutions are committed to maintaining a distinction between third-country nationals and EU free movers, despite the fact that on the ground this distinction, as regards integration, can be more and more difficult to discern.

Notes

1. The data include: 18 interviews conducted between May 2014 and December 2014 with European Commission officials, European Economic and Social Committee, the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (the Netherlands), Défenseur des Droits (France), Migration Policy Institute Senior European Policy Fellow, Council members of a Permanent Representation to the European Union, Migration Policy Group Policy Analyst, Social Platform, CCME, Eurocities, Equinet, Solidar.

   Survey responses from National Contact Point on Integration (the Netherlands); National Contact Point (France); National Contact Point (UK); National Contact Point (Spain); Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment (Poland); Institute for Human Rights (Netherlands); Oberaxe Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (Spain).

   Two focus groups held in Brussels on December 15 2014, and study visits to the UK, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland conducted between March and April 2015.
2. An example is DG Research's 2016 announcement that it was revamping the Horizon 2020 research funding programme to incorporate migration issues, including labour market integration. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2604_en.htm
3. Regulations for funds also usually link the spending of funds to other EU instruments. For instance, the European Social Fund is linked to the European Employment Strategy, while the European Integration Fund is linked to the Common Basic Principles on Integration. Scholars have

suggested that requirements of ESF funding to focus on those furthest from labour market and specific groups (such as migrants), as well as ESF focus on policies to prevent long-term unemployment, have influenced policy developments in a number of Member States (see Verschraegen et al. 2011).

4. An informational sheet produced by the European Commission on the topic of migrants and the ESF suggested that Member States should consider a 'two track approach' in their operational programmes: '(1) Mainstreaming: integration of migrants could be a horizontal issue in all ESF programmes ensuring that under all priorities, ranging from increased adaptability to enhanced access to employment, special attention is paid to this target group; (2) Specific action for migrants may at the same time be necessary, in particular through the implementation of operations and projects targeting migrants, in order to achieve progress, for example in terms of increasing the employment rate'. http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/esf/docs/tp_migrants_en.pdf.
5. For instance, Poland reported in its evaluation report of 2012 that 'EIF will surely contribute into the mainstreaming of integration issues into state policy'. See *Mid-Term Evaluation Report on Implementation of Actions Co-Financed by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals: Poland* (Brussels: European Commission, 2010): 49, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/pdf/integration/poland_eif_national_report_2007_2009.pdf. Stakeholders in the Polish study visit described how the new Polish Integration Policy (to be adopted in 2015) had been heavily influenced by Polish Operational Programmes produced for the EIF. As Poland has virtually no national budget for integration activities, integration projects have relied on EIF.
6. However, research indicates that social priorities may be becoming more important in the European Semester see Zeitlin and Vanhercke (2014).

References

Acosta Arcarazo, Diego. 2014. *EU Integration Policy: Between Soft Law and Hard Law*. Milan: KING Project, KING Desk Research Paper and In-depth Study No. 1. Accessed July 15, 2016. http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/AcostaArcarazo_DeskResearchInDepthStudy.pdf

Barca, Fabrizio. 2009. *An Agenda For a Reformed Cohesion Policy: A Place-Based Approach to Meeting European Union Challenges and Expectations*. Brussels: Directorate General for Regional Policy. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/policy/future/pdf/report_barca_v0306.pdf

Bell, Mark. 2008. *Racism and Equality in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Benton, Meghan, Elizabeth Collett, and Helen McCarthy. 2015. *The Practice of Mainstreaming: Immigrant Integration Policies at European Level*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe. http://www.eur.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/fsw/Bestuurskunde/onderzoek/upstream/WP4_MPI-_Eu_report.pdf

Beveridge, Fiona, and Jo Shaw. 2002. Introduction: Mainstreaming Gender in European Public Policy. *Feminist Legal Studies* 10: 209–212.

Bieniecki, Mirosław, and Mikołaj Pawlak. 2012. Practices of Integration: Assessment of Practice and Effectiveness of the European Integration Fund for the Third Country Nationals in Poland Warszawa-Gliwice: Caritas Poland. https://emn.gov.pl/ese/publications/other-publications/9881,Publication-on-Polish-integration-policyissued-by-Caritas-Polska.print

Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES). 2011. *Evaluation of ESF Support for Enhancing Access to the Labour Market and the Social Inclusion of Migrants and Minorities*. Brussels: Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES) for the European Commission. Accessed January 20, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=701&langId=en&internal_pagesId=619&moreDocuments=yes&tableName=INTERNAL_PAGES

———. 2013. *Study on Practices of Integration of Third Country Nationals at Local and Regional Level in the European Union*. Brussels: Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES) for the Committee of the Regions. Accessed February 23, 2016. http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/Documents/survey_integration_3rd_country_nationals/survey_integration_3rd_country_nationals.pdf

Collett, Elizabeth. 2013. *The Integration Needs of Mobile EU Citizens: Impediments and Opportunities*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

———. 2014. An EU Commissioner for Migration? The Devil is in the Details. *MPI Commentary*, July 2014. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/eu-commissioner-migration

Council of the European Union. 2004. 2618th Meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union (Press Release, 19 November 2004). Accessed February 2, 2015. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf

———. 2010. Council Decision 2010/707/EU on guidelines for the Employment Policies of the Member States [2010], OJ L 308/48. Accessed May 25, 2015. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2010:308:FULL&from=EN

———. 2014. Council Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals Legally Residing in the EU. *Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting*, Luxembourg, 5 and 6 June. Accessed February 2, 2015. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/143109.pdf

———. 2015. *Joint Employment Report*. Brussels 7006/15, 9 March.

Crisp, Richard, Chris Dayson, Sarah Pearson, and Ian Wilson. 2010. *The Experience of Third Sector Subcontractors in the European Social Fund 2007–13 Programme*. Sheffield: CRESR. http://www.shu.ac.uk/research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.uk/files/tsen-experience-third-sector.pdf

Crowley, Niall. 2010. Good Practice Exchange on Public Policies Combating Discrimination Based on Racial or Ethnic Origin in Accessing and Progressing in Employment. Report presented at the *Final Seminar of the European Commission's Non-discrimination Government Expert Group in Germany*, October 4–5, 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/sem_race_berlin2010_en.pdf

Department for Business and Skills. 2013. *The Effectiveness of European Social Fund Delivery*. London: UK Government. Accessed April 25, 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/190771/bis-13-788-effectiveness-of-european-social-fund-delivery.pdf

European Anti-Poverty Network. 2013. *Structural Funds 2014–2020: What Room for Social Inclusion and for the Involvement of NGOs?* Brussels: EAPN. Accessed April 28, 2015. http://www.eapn.eu/images/stories/docs/EAPN-position-papers-and-reports/2013-StructuralFunds-2014-2020-mapping-inclusion-participation.pdf

European Commission. 2005a. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union. COM (2005) 389, Brussels, September 2005. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0389:FIN:EN:PDF

———. 2005b. *Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners*. 1st ed. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

———. 2007. *Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners*. 2nd ed. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

———. 2010a. *Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners*. 3rd ed. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

——— 2010b. Synthesis of the Multiannual and Annual Programmes of the Member States: Priorities and Actions for the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. Brussels: European Commission. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/pdf/integration/priorities_and_actions_of_the_eif_2007_2009_final_report_16_7_10.pdf

———. 2011a. *Indicators of Immigrant Integration: A Pilot Study*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

———. 2011b. Synthesis of the National Evaluation Reports on Implementation of Actions Co financed by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals from 2007 to 2009 and Report at European Union Level. Brussels: European Commission. Accessed April 12, 2015. http://ec.europa.

eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/pdf/integration/synthesis_of_the_national_evaluation_reports.pdf

———. 2012. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Development of the European Migration Network. Brussels: European Commission. Accessed May 2, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-isnew/news/pdf/1_en_act_part1_v3_427.pdf

———. 2014a.. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council on Guidance for the Application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the Right to Family Reunification, 3 April 2014. Brussels: European Commission. Accessed July 12, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/legal-migration/family-reunification/docs/guidance_for_application_of_directive_on_the_right_to_family_reunification_en.pdf

———. 2014b. *Draft Thematic Guidance Fiche, Thematic Objective 9: Social Inclusion*, 27 January 2014. Brussels: European Commission. Accessed April 21, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/2014/guidance_social_inclusion.pdf

———. 2014c. European Social Fund 2014–2020. Last Updated September 15, 2014. Accessed July 28, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=62&langId=en

European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs. 2014d. Integration Fund. Last Updated June 20, 2014. Accessed July 14, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/integration-fund/index_en.htm

European Commission. 2014d. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Joint Report on the application of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin ('Racial Equality Directive') and of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation ('Employment Equality Directive'). Brussels: European Commission. Accessed April 21, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/com_2014_2_en.pdf

———. 2015a. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration, COM 240. Brussels: European Commission. Accessed February 2, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf

———. 2015b. Factsheet: EU Support for Better Management of Integration of Asylum Seekers and Refugees. Brussels: European Commission. Accessed March 15, 2016. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5717_en.htm

———. 2015c. Synergies between the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and Other EU Funding Instruments in Relation to Reception and Integration of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants. Brussels, 16 November 2015. Accessed September 9, 2016. http://www.eurodiaconia.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Synergies-between-AMIF-and-other-EU-funds-in-relation-to-Migrants_3.pdf

———. 2016a. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals, COM(2016) 377. Brussels: European Commission. Accessed July 16, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/communication_action_plan_integration_third-country_nationals_en.pdf

———. 2016b. Making it Happen: The European Semester. Last Updated May 31, 2016. Accessed July 22, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/index_en.htm

———. n.d. PROGRESS Programme (2007–2013). Accessed July 22, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=987

European Economic and Social Committee. n.d. European Migration Forum. Accessed January 18, 2016. http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.immigration-and-asylum-european-migration-forum

European Social Fund. 2016. Thematic Networks Complete Their First Round of Meetings. Last updated June 2, 2016. Accessed September 8, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/esf/transnationality/content/thematic-networks-complete-their-first-round-meetings

European Union. 2000a. Council Directive 2000/43/EC Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin (2000), OJ L180/22. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0043:en:HTML

———. 2000b. Council Directive 2000/78/EC Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation (2000), OJ L303/16. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:en:HTML

———. 2003a. Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Right to Family Reunification (2003), OJ L251/12. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:251:0012:0018:EN:PDF

———. 2003b. Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 Concerning the Status of Third-Country Nationals Who are Long-Term Residents (2003), OJ L 16/44. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003L0109&from=EN

———. 2012. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012, O.J. C 326/49. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN

———. 2014. EU Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 Establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, Amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC and Repealing Decisions No 573/2007/EC and No 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decision 2007/435/EC (2014), OJ L150/168. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0516&from=EN

Fundamental Rights Agency. 2010. European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey Data in Focus Report: Rights Awareness and Equality Bodies: Strengthening the Fundamental Rights Architecture in the EU III. Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).

Hallerberg, Mark, Benedicta Marzinotto, Guntram B. Wolff. 2011. How Effective and Legitimate is the European Semester? Increasing the Role of the European Parliament. *Bruegel Working Paper*, No. 2011/09.

House of Lords European Union Committee. 2010. *Making it work: the European Social Fund*. London: The Stationery Office Limited. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/92/92i.pdf

Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2014. Letter from President of the European Commission to Dimitris Avramapoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship. 1 November 2014. Accessed April 21, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/avramopoulos_en.pdf

McGregor, Alan, and Victoria Sutherland. 2012. *Final Report of the ESF Expert Evaluation Network on Social Inclusion*. Glasgow and Vienna: University of Glasgow Training & Employment Research Unit and Metis GmbH. Accessed April 18, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=701&langId=en&internal_pagesId=619&moreDocuments=yes&tableName=INTERNAL_PAGES

———. 2014. *Final Synthesis Report: Main ESF achievements, 2007–2013—ESF Expert Evaluation Network*. Glasgow and Vienna: University of Glasgow Training & Employment Research Unit and Metis GmbH for the European Commission.

Monnier, Eric, Helen Urth, Jan Maarten de Vet, and James Rampton. 2011. *Evaluation of the Capacity of the ESF Delivery Systems to Attract and Support OP Target Groups*. Brussels: European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/social/keyDocuments.jsp?type=0&policyArea=0&subCategory=0&country=0&year=0&advSearchKey=evaluationesf&mode=advancedSubmit&langId=en

Petrovic, Milica, and Elizabeth Collett. 2014. *The Politics of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policies at European Level: Case Study of the EU*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe. http://www.eur.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/fsw/Bestuurskunde/onderzoek/upstream/Petrovic_and_Collett__

2014__The_Politics_of_Mainstreaming__Immigrant_Integration_Policies_-_Case_study_of_the_EU.pdf

Sanchez Salgado, Rosa. 2013. From 'Talking the Talk' to 'Walking the Walk': Implementing the EU Guidelines on Employment through the European Social Fund. *European Integration Online Papers (EIoP)* 17 (Article 2): 1–26. http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2013-002a.htm

Van Balen, Barbara, Ursula Barry, Ronald Holzhacker, Elisabeth Villagomez, and Katrin Wladasch. 2010. Part II—Ethnic Minorities and Employment; Synthesis Report of the Network of Socio-Economic Experts in the Non-discrimination Field. Brussels: European Commission. Accessed February 12, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/sen_synthesisreport2010partii_en.pdf

Van Gerven, Minna, Bart Vanhercke, and Susanna Gürocak. 2014. Policy Learning, Aid Conditionality or Domestic Politics? The Europeanization of Dutch and Spanish Activation Policies through the European Social Fund. *Journal of European Public Policy* 21 (4): 509–527.

Velluti, Samantha. 2007. What European Union Strategy for Integrating Migrants? The Role of the OMC Soft Mechanisms in the Development of an EU Immigration Policy. *European Journal of Migration and Law* 9: 53–82.

Verschraegen, Gert, Bart Vanhercke, and Rika Verpoorten. 2011. The European Social Fund and Domestic Activation Policies: Europeanization Mechanisms. *Journal of European Social Policy* 21 (1): 55–72.

Zeitlin, Jonathan, and Bart Vanhercke. 2014. *Socializing the European Semester? Economic Governance and Social Policy Coordination in Europe 2020.* Report No. 7. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.

Elizabeth Collett is the Founding Director of Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPI). Her work focuses, in particular, on European migration and immigrant integration policy and she has produced dozens of working papers, policy briefs and memos focused on the future of EU immigration and asylum policy, as well as national-level policy developments. Prior to joining MPI, Collett worked at the European Policy Centre, a Brussels-based think tank; the International Organization for Migration in Geneva and for the Institute for the Study of International Migration in Washington, DC.

Helen McCarthy is a doctoral candidate at Middlesex University whose interests include integration, the labour market, and citizenship. McCarthy has previously worked at the Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford; in the Integration and Faith team in the Department for

Communities and Local Government in London; and at Amnesty International in Brussels.

Meghan Benton is a senior policy analyst at the Migration Policy Institute. Her areas of expertise include immigrant integration (especially labour market integration and integration at the local level), citizenship policy, and the role of technological and social innovation in responses to the refugee and migration crisis in Europe. Dr. Benton previously was a Senior Researcher at Nesta, the United Kingdom's innovation body. She has also worked for the Constitution Unit at University College London and for the Institute for Public Policy Research in London.

CHAPTER 6

The Politics of Mainstreaming: The Rationale Behind Mainstreaming

Ilona van Breugel and Peter Scholten

The preceding chapters have conceptualized 'mainstreaming' for the field of integration governance and have examined in what ways integration policies in various European countries and cities have been 'mainstreamed' (or not). This chapter will zoom in on 'how' and 'why' mainstreaming does or does not take place in specific settings. What is the rationale behind mainstreaming and what are the factors that promote or rather inhibit governments to mainstream integration governance?

This chapter focuses on the rationale of mainstreaming, comparing across the local as well as national findings from previous chapters. The key questions guiding this comparison are as follows:

How have these mainstreaming policies come about? What factors have contributed to or obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance?

I. van Breugel (✉) • P. Scholten
Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_6

Why has integration governance been mainstreamed (or not)? What explanations can be found for the mainstreaming of integration governance? How can differences between cases be explained?

The data collection consists of a literature review, complemented with around 20 semi-structured interviews per case. The literature review focused on policy documents, parliamentary and council records, reports of (advisory) research councils and secondary literature. These documents were analysed to search for references to aspects of mainstreaming as conceptualized in Chap. 1. The complementing interviews were conducted at national and city levels with policymakers across different institutions and departments, relevant civil-society stakeholders and experts from research councils. In total, 100 interviews were held.[1] This chapter is based on the country reports from the UPSTREAM project.[2]

Searching for the Rationale Behind Mainstreaming

The two questions 'how' and 'why' mainstreaming takes place structure the comparative analysis of this chapter. In this section, we will develop more specifically what theoretical lens is adopted when addressing these questions.

How? Tracing the Process That Leads to Mainstreaming (or Not)

The first question to be addressed in this chapter concerns 'how' and under what conditions mainstreaming has or has not taken place. In what context have immigrant integration policies been mainstreamed? This question refers primarily to mainstreaming as a policy process, and focuses on the (types of) actors involved in this process, key turning points in this process such as specific incidents, and contextual developments that have an effect on mainstreaming processes.

To answer this question, this chapter will conduct a process tracing analysis. This process tracing is directly connected to the findings of the first part, focusing on 'what' is mainstreamed, and trying to account how these policies and measures have come about. This process tracing focuses on identifying actors that played a role in these processes, policy frames,

key events or developments that may have had an effect on the process. This involves an analysis of the following factors:

- *Actors*: Which key actors played a role in the formulation of these policies? This may, for instance, include ministers, senior policy officials, non-state actors, local governments, certain political entrepreneurs or expert advisory bodies.
- *Policy frames*: What rationale is given for the choice to mainstream integration policies?
- *Decision moments*: What key decision moments can be identified when policies have been formalized or changed?
- *Incidents*: Have there been incidents or relevant problem developments that have contributed to a framing/reframing of policies?

Why? Accounting for Why Mainstreaming Did (or Did Not) Take Place

Finally, this chapter addresses the question why governance bodies either choose to mainstream their integration policies or decide not to do so. What is the underlying political rationale for mainstreaming? To answer this question, a conceptual-theoretical framework was developed based on Kingdon's multiple streams approach (2003 [1984]) to explain policy processes. Kingdon distinguishes three 'families of processes' that, when conjured at specific moments by specific actors or events, can determine policy processes and dynamics. The streams he distinguishes are problem setting, policy context and political setting.

We will address a set of expectations regarding how and why mainstreaming will take place under specific circumstances. This includes expectations on how the problem setting (migration history, diversity and perceived integration issues), policy context (policy history, spin-offs from other areas, crisis or retrenchment) and political setting (politicization, populism and individualization) account for different mainstreaming strategies. Regarding the *problem context* of policies, we expect that a longer migration history leading to an expected increase in diversity both between and within immigrant groups and society as a whole (Hollinger 2000 [1995]; Faist 2009; Vertovec 2007) increases the likelihood of mainstreaming integration policies, in line with the literature on inter alia the multicultural backlash and

superdiversity as discussed in Chap. 1 (Alba and Nee 2005; Bouchard 2011; Cantle 2012; Crul 2016; Faist 2009; Hollinger 2000 [1995]; Joppke 2004; Kymlicka 2010; Vertovec 2007; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Zapata-Barrero 2015). However, this likelihood is reduced when there are explicit and numerous perceived integration problems. Secondly, with respect to the *policy context*, we expect that mainstreaming immigrant integration will be stimulated by the extent of experience with mainstreaming in other policy domains (referring to cross-pollination between departments) and the increasing influence of the crisis and in the wake of governmental retrenchment. On the contrary, countries or departments that have a lot of experience with the use of specific policies may be less likely to switch to mainstreaming. Finally, increasing political and media attention and increasing populism around migration and integration debates make it more and more difficult to justify specific policies (cf. Schneider and Ingram 1997; De Zwart 2005, 2012). Taken from the literature on policy targeting as discussed in Chap. 1 we expect that these elements from the *political context* will also be involved in the decision to mainstream.

In this book, we will compare these expectations to our findings in the various cases and thereby answer to what extent certain developments, incidents, structures or political reasons form the rationale for the switch to mainstreaming immigrant integration as the new policy approach.

Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Across Europe

Chapters 2–5 have primarily addressed the question what forms of mainstreaming can be identified in the various cases. For this chapter, it suffices to very briefly summarize the findings from these chapters in terms of the three key dimensions of mainstreaming as conceptualized in Chap. 1: the *generic* and *inclusive* adoption of immigrant integration priorities in generic policy domains, linked to a trend of *decentralization and deconcentration* in terms of the coordination of integration policy responsibilities.

First of all, the chapters show that what most cases have in common in terms of mainstreaming is a trend away from group-specific policies towards generic policies, and from state-centric to poly-centric modes of governance. In almost all cases, in as far as group-specific measures had been adopted in the past, there was a clear trend towards adopting generic policies and embedding integration measures into generic policy areas such as housing and education. Whereas this may be nothing new for France with its republicanist tradition, this is new for countries like

the Netherlands and the UK with a more multiculturalist policy history. However, we found that new immigration countries (Spain and Poland) are slightly more inclined to adopting specific measures where necessary. In the 'old' immigration countries, such as France, the Netherlands and the UK, this was only done for specific groups of newcomers.

In terms of governance, the chapters show a clear trend away from state-centric modes of governance to more poly-centric governance. This involves an increase of complexity in the field of integration governance, involving a large set of governmental and non-governmental actors in the policy process. In the Netherlands, UK and Spain, the local level has become more prominent in terms of integration governance, sometimes leading to significant discrepancies in integration governance between cities within a specific country, as well as between the local and the national level within one country. The case of France stands out to some extent, as localization is taking place, while at the same time the state-centric model is upheld. The 'local turn' in integration governance clearly underlines the need to look at mainstreaming at both the local and national levels. Furthermore, in Poland and Spain, poly-centric governance involved a growing role of NGOs in integration governance, at both the national and the local levels.

The European Union (EU) seems to play a particular role when it comes to poly-centric governance. On the one hand, national political contestation of migrant integration has limited the space for EU involvement in the field of migrant integration. At the EU level a 'mainstreamed' approach to migrant integration was subsequently developed, as formulated in the European Common Basic Principles of Integration and in the Common Integration Agenda. On the other hand, the EU has played an important role in the diffusion of the idea of mainstreaming, primarily via open methods of coordination. This applies in particular to relations with new member states, where various schemes for mainstreaming integration governance were promoted, and also in relations with the local level such as city networks. For the 'old' immigration countries, this relation applies to a much lesser extent.

However, the chapters also found significant variation in the forms of mainstreaming applied in the different country and city cases. This shows that mainstreaming should not be seen as a monolithic process. This applies in particular to the inclusive dimension of mainstreaming. This diversity orientation appears to be largely absent at the national level (except to some extent in the UK). In contrast, the diversity orientation often forms a more explicit element of mainstreaming efforts at the local level. This applies to cities in both the 'new' and 'old' immigration countries. Furthermore, this diversity orientation is also part of the EU mainstreaming approach, and in

fact plays an important role in European city networks where knowledge and best practices in this regard are being exchanged.

The lack of a diversity orientation in national integration mainstreaming marks an important difference with how mainstreaming is understood in other policy fields such as gender, disability and environment. Gender mainstreaming, for example, focuses on an assessment of the inclusiveness of generic policy fields (see inter alia Booth and Bennett 2002; Eveline and Bacchi 2005; Lombardo 2005; Stratigaki 2005; Squires 2005; Caglar 2013). This seems less the case for integration mainstreaming, at least at the national level. At the local level, integration mainstreaming seems more similar to mainstreaming in those other areas. It is remarkable, however, that no clear references to mainstreaming in those areas were found in any of the cases we examined.

Comparing Mainstreaming Processes

After having assessed what forms of mainstreaming can be identified in the different cases, this section focuses on how these forms of mainstreaming arose. More specifically, it examines the factors that contributed to or obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance. In doing this, it will focus on four overarching factors that may have played a role in mainstreaming as a policy process: policy frames, (key) actors, main decision moments and focus events. The aim of this chapter is to assess if there are general patterns in terms of the (social/policy/political) process of mainstreaming.

Framing: Equality at the National Level, Superdiversity at the Local Level

First of all, we will address the policy frames that are mobilized in the various cases. What stands out from our findings is that an *equality and anti-discrimination* frame is most conducive towards mainstreaming immigrant integration. This frame is prominent in France, but also increasingly recognizable in the UK, the Netherlands and Poland. Needs-based or area-based measures aimed at combating socio-economic inequalities are considered the most appropriate policy tools within this context. The area-based neighbourhood measures are dominant in French policies regarding the *Politique de la Ville* and *Zones d'Éducation Prioritaires*. Area-based policies are increasingly recognizable in the UK (Neighbourhood Renewal Policy

frame) and the Netherlands too, such as the UK Neighbourhood Renewal Policy frame, and subsequently the Dutch *Krachtwijken* approach and the later 'city-citizenship' frames. In all of the countries, needs-based policies are installed, separate from integration policies. Overall, the equality approach is considered less stigmatizing than specific schemes targeting immigrants. In France, these measures exemplify old policy tools that carry greater legitimacy than race-specific policies and the pursuit of equality is considered a universal policy (which consequently legitimizes it). The UK, the Netherlands and also Saint-Denis (France, city level) believe that an equality approach rather than preconceived categories 'puts the money where the need is' and, therefore, these methods are said to be chosen from a pragmatic perspective. Likewise, the EU often implements an equality frame, only 'recognizing' vulnerable groups, while emphasizing that no specific policy should be focused on them. Thus, the equality framework appears to be a strong factor promoting mainstreaming in many countries. By focusing on areas or needs, immigrants may be implicitly (or explicitly) targeted, while not being recognized as an explicit target group.

Another policy frame that emerged in several cases is a frame that emphasizes *individual responsibility* in the context of migrant integration. This frame can be both conducive and obstructive to mainstreaming. Framing language comprehension as a 'duty' (UK), obligatory civic integration courses (NL) or contracts stating the acceptance of the laws and values of the Republic and the intention to attend linguistic and civic courses (CAI, France) are examples of policy measures drawn up from the perspective that immigrant are themselves responsible for their integration. This frame is often used in the assimilationist notion of integration, which is especially recognizable in France, and also in the Netherlands and partially in the UK. In this context, migrants' willingness and efforts are held to be central to their integration, and their adaptation to the host society is perceived as a one-sided effort. Following this perspective, no specific policies are required because the immigrants are responsible themselves for keeping up with the rest of the population. Consequently, policies are mainstreamed in terms of their move away from specific policies, but often lack the other characteristics of inclusiveness. Another approach to this frame is more individualistic, less focused on explicit migrants' responsibilities and emphasizing everyone's responsibility to be able to participate in society. This approach can be recognized in larger social policy frames such as the UK 'Big Society' and the Dutch 'participatory society' framework implying a shifting responsibility towards the individual citizen.

Thirdly, the frame of *superdiversity* is often mentioned either explicitly or implicitly as an (discursive) explanation for why generic policies are needed. This means that targeted policies would have become increasingly impossible to implement due to the hyphenation of citizens and the large number of characteristics that have to be taken into account. This argument is echoed mostly in the Netherlands (e.g. when introducing the generic city-citizenship framework in Rotterdam and Amsterdam) and the UK (the shift away from the race relations model). However, the superdiversity frame seems to be best applicable at the local level. Cities (or boroughs), such as Southwark (UK), Saint-Denis (FA), Rotterdam and Amsterdam (NL), increasingly emphasize that diversity is perceived as the norm, leading to a situation in which the distinction between immigrant and native citizen has lost its meaning. Finally, official integration policies are increasingly limited to *immigrant reception policies*. Following this demarcation, socio-economic and socio-cultural integration are mainstreamed into other policy fields. This trend is recognizable in all countries, as well as at EU level. At EU level, border management, asylum and the free movement of people have risen on the agenda, whereas immigrant integration has declined as a policy priority. In the UK, the approach to immigrant integration policies is twofold, aiming at equality policies for those within the country, but increasingly enforcing strict borders. Also, many political debates are centred on the 'influx' of migrants into the country. Likewise, the Polish government focuses mostly on regulations concerning residence and work permits. Due to the low percentage of immigrants and narrow range of origins, a general lack of interest in immigrant integration is recognizable especially at the national level, to which immigrant entrance policies seem to be the only exception. Finally, in France and the Netherlands (especially during the assimilationist turn), immigrant reception, such as civic integration courses, is perceived as the main focus and eventually the exclusive dimension of official integration policies. This approach to integration policies does offer an opportunity to implement a mainstreaming approach to the socio-cultural and socio-economic integration of migrants.

What stands out in all these frames is an explicit generic policy approach, consisting mainly of a strong shift away from policies targeted at specific migrant groups. What does not become evident in these frames is if, and how, migration-related diversity would be incorporated 'in the mainstream'.

Actors: EU and National Politics as Driving Actors Behind Mainstreaming

Additionally we examined what types of actors were involved in the process of mainstreaming, either encouraging mainstreaming or advocating alternative policy strategies. Is mainstreaming driven by political actors, or is it a development driven rather by other actors such as policy officials, NGOs or street-level bureaucrats? Is mainstreaming driven by national actors, or has it been spurred rather by local actors or by developments at the EU level?

Overall, we see that political actors were often strongly involved in advocating integration governance mainstreaming. In various cases, developments in the political setting were important incentives for mainstreaming. Elections may play a substantial role in this respect. Clear examples are the 're-foundation' of French immigrant integration policies after the 2012/2013 elections. At the local level in the Netherlands, strong shifts in the coalition formation led to significant changes in policy frames and approaches to immigrant integration. In both the Netherlands and France, politicization of migrant integration seems to have contributed to a demand for more mainstreaming, either in the form of the French republican model or in Dutch retrenchment from integration policies.

Furthermore, in several cases, we found that research institutes or committees had an important role in the process, even though they did not always advocate mainstreaming per se. This applies in particular to the UK and the Netherlands. For example, in the UK, reports such as the Swann Report and Parekh Report led to more multiculturalist policies and the Cantle Report introduced the community cohesion approach in the UK. In the Netherlands, Scheffer's article entitled 'The Multicultural Drama' instigated the multiculturalism backlash at the Dutch national level. On the other hand, many reports that focus on more explicit policies are influential as well, such as the Dutch WRR report regarding the re-framing of early leavers as 'overloaded students' rather than focusing on ethnic categories. However, reports may also lead to political controversies, as happened when a French advisory report suggested abolishing the ban on headscarves, when the Parekh Report stated that 'Britishness as much as Englishness has systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations' (Parekh 2000: 38) and when the Rotterdam Bureau of Statistics published a prognosis of future city demographics that was

interpreted by a politician of Liveable Rotterdam as a disturbing trend that should be interrupted by an 'immigrant-stop' (*allochtonenstop*) or a 'fence around Rotterdam'. Although it seems that research institutes may sometimes be important actors in changing policies, the acceptance of specific reports and the associated proposed policy measures is highly dependent on the match with the current political and policy frame. Reports which do not fit the political frame are more often disregarded, as is the case with the advisory reports on the re-foundation of integration policy in France.

Finally, the EU-member state nexus is of particular interest when discussing actors involved in the mainstreaming of immigrant integration. New immigration countries, such as Poland, experience substantial influence by the EU on their integration policies. As our Polish case analysis shows, incentives provided in a European setting via funding schemes such as the European Integration Fund have been an important driving factor behind Polish policy initiatives. Sometimes even more than domestic problem awareness in Poland itself. Important in the context of this chapter is that this external incentive structure provided by the EU also promotes mainstreaming as one of the EU's common basic principles of integration. The influence of such EU schemes on developments in the 'old' immigration countries like France, the UK and the Netherlands seems more limited. However, here too the EU has been an important engine of exchanging knowledge and best practices in terms of migrant integration at the city level in particular, amongst others in networks such as Eurocities and the European Migration Network.

In return, member states try to influence EU policies regarding immigrant integration. This was made apparent, for example, in the role that the Dutch government played in the formulation of the Common Basic Principles, in which mainstreaming was explicitly framed as *one of* the principles. However, Denmark's and Germany's resistance to the inclusion of mainstreaming as one of the *main* principles was also successful. This example demonstrates that member states may be quite influential at the European level. The political climate in member states also influences the EU's policy options. Increasing politicization and mediatization of the topic of immigrant integration in member states negatively influences the opportunities of the EU to address migrant-specific policies.

Decision Moments: Mainstreaming in the Context of Austerity and Ethnic Data

A third element that we looked at when reconstructing the process of mainstreaming integration governance was whether there were key decision moments at which the choice whether or not to mainstream is taken. In particular, we looked at whether the decision to mainstream coincides with decisions taken in the context of the economic crisis that occurred in Europe in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Furthermore, we looked at the availability of ethnic data and statistics, we expected that the presence of such data might make group-specific issues more visible and consequently raise the urgency to have specific rather than mainstreamed policies.

We indeed found a clear relation between mainstreaming and austerity measures at the national level in the 'old' immigration countries. In the UK and the Netherlands, austerity measures and governmental retrenchment have led to a more poly-centric mode of governance, in which the role of the central and local government is re-positioned from executive partner to facilitator. This role re-positioning is part of broader frames, such as the 'big society' frame in the UK and the 'participatory society' in the Netherlands, which focuses on the empowerment of the voluntary sector, civil society and individuals and entails a withdrawal of the national government. In this context, the reduction of budgets for specific integration departments has often resulted in a decisive step towards mainstreaming, sometimes even long after these frames have changed in favour of generic policies. For example, budgetary cuts have proved to be decisive in the ending of cooperation with migrant organizations (Rotterdam) or think tanks (national level) in the Netherlands. In France, an 'interministerial delegate for integration and republican equality' was installed as part of the 're-foundation' of integration policies. This delegate will not be associated with a specific ministry and will not receive a dedicated budget in order to manage integration policies across all departments. In the context of austerity, it was considered impossible to establish a specific integration institution with a dedicated budget.

Overall, governmental retrenchment and austerity measures appear to be conducive to mainstreaming immigrant integration. This influence is especially apparent with regard to the move towards poly-centric governance and the ending of specific-focused institutions or subsidy relations. However, in a context of austerity and retrenchment, the active

coordination and inclusiveness of immigrant integration policies may be 'lost' in the process, which can turn a process of decentralization into a mere 'letting go' of budgets and integration priorities entirely. A clear case of dismantling can be seen in Rotterdam, where the responsible department only realized that the budget cuts had led to the abolishment of specific policies and departments, without a replacing coordination mechanism following the publication of the 'state of integration' report. This illustrates how statistical data or the monitoring of migrants' achievements may be used as a coordination method.

We did not find a relation between the availability or lack of ethnic data and the decision whether or not to mainstream. In the new immigration countries, hardly any ethnic statistics are available. Among the 'old' immigration countries the republican tradition in France has prevented the collection of ethnic statistics. The idea here is that by collecting ethnic-specific data, governments run the risk of stigmatizing and, therefore, reinforcing the categories that policies are trying to overcome. On the contrary, the EU, particularly the EC and DG Education, regularly invests in and makes use of research, updates and evaluations on the position of children with migrant backgrounds in order to monitor specific performance gaps between migrant and native youth. Equally, statistical monitoring, including ethnic-specific data, is well developed at each governmental level in the Netherlands, and to some extent in the UK. Monitoring is deemed essential in order to maintain a good overview of the integration process and effects of generic policies. However, a decline in publicized ethnic-specific data is recognizable at the national level and in Rotterdam, whereas this initially increased in Amsterdam. This increase may be the result of the more inclusive approach to mainstreaming in Amsterdam, with more attention for migration-related diversity.

So, as mainstreaming has taken place both in cases with and without ethnic data and statistics, we cannot establish a meaningful relation between the availability of ethnic data and mainstreaming. However, collecting migrant-specific data could reinforce the inclusiveness of the mainstreaming approach. This will be examined in more detail in the subsequent parts of this chapter. Does the availability of ethnic statistics perhaps not influence the decision to mainstream, but influence its effectiveness by making explicit the effects that generic policies may have upon specific groups?

Focus Events: Impact on Policy in General But Not on Mainstreaming Per Se

Finally, we examined the role that specific incidents or 'focus events' may have played in the process of mainstreaming. In the context of this chapter, we found several key focus events that impacted the development of migrant integration policy in general. However, we could not identify a clear relation between these events and mainstreaming in particular. The London bombings of 2005, the 2004 bombings in Madrid and the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004 have been particularly important focus events in this sense. The differences in the political and policy responses to these incidents are especially noteworthy from a mainstreaming perspective. Whereas the bombings in the UK have had primarily national-level implications, the murder of Theo van Gogh proved to have particularly local implications. In addition, the UK response, as documented in the 'Preventing Violent Extremism' programme, has resulted in an entanglement of cohesion with homeland security and counter-terrorism policies. Funds were allocated to local authorities with significant Muslim populations and counter-radicalization among Muslim youths was stated as a concrete goal. These measures have led to the stigmatization of certain groups and resulted in an atmosphere of distrust and disengagement. In contrast, the municipality of Amsterdam started a comprehensive programme called 'We Amsterdammers', which aimed to counteract radicalization by opposing discrimination and exclusion, avoiding polarization and mobilizing positive powers. Subsequently, the programme has resulted in a dual emphasis on terrorism on the one hand and on social cohesion, city citizenship, commonality and identification through mostly generic policies on the other hand.

In the UK, local unrest such as the Milltown riots in northern English towns in 2001 also had a strong impact on integration policies in general, but not so much on mainstreaming in particular. These events did, however, trigger the policy change from multiculturalism to community cohesion. The framework of community cohesion focuses on promoting stronger bonds and shared values at the local level and operates through an area-based proxy for integration governance. Similarly in Bristol, a Race Equality and Community Cohesion Plan was developed in order to tackle tensions caused by rapid local population change, after disturbances occurred in the Barton Hill area in the summer of 2003. The plan eventually led to a community cohesion strategy. Triggered by specific attention

to problems of integration or social cohesion, this led to a package of initiatives largely targeting immigrants and minority communities. Eventually, however, this perspective shifted to a focus on the wider community.

However, similar urban unrest in France, the 'banlieues riots' in 2005 but to some extent also the more recent Charlie Hebdo affair, only further strengthened the French resolve to continue its mainstreamed 'republicanist' approach. These incidents were, in the specific French political and societal context, interpreted as signs that the republicanist approach needed to be implemented with more vigour. This seems to support the conclusion that focus events do indeed have a strong effect on integration governance, but that there seems to be no generalizable effect on whether or not mainstreaming is adopted.

Explaining Mainstreaming

After analysing the main patterns of what is mainstreamed and how, this section addresses the 'why' question. It aims to develop an explanation for why under specific circumstances, immigrant integration was or was not mainstreamed. Applying the multiple streams framework developed by Kingdon (2003 [1984]), we will address a set of expectations on how developments in the problem, policy and political setting may trigger or prevent mainstreaming.

Problem Setting: Problem Developments Spur Mainstreaming Only at the Local Level

The first stream to be discussed here is that of problem setting, explaining why issues are recognized as problems and how this leads to policy and political prioritization of mainstreaming in integration governance. The first aspect to be assessed concerns the expectation that a longer *history of immigration*, with different phases and groups of immigrants, increases the likelihood that integration policies will be mainstreamed. Our findings show more variety in some aspects of the expected pattern. When it comes to mainstreaming as a trend from specific to generic policies, we can identify a pattern in our findings that matches this expectation. Distinguishing between France, the Netherlands and the UK as 'old' immigration countries, and Spain and Poland as new immigration countries, we can indeed observe that the 'old' immigration countries are more inclined to adopt generic policies. France has a long history of generic integration policies.

On the other hand, the Netherlands and the UK were both formerly known for their multicultural integration policies, and have since gone through different phases of integration policies. Mainstreaming is now considered the next, perhaps even inevitable, step. This is particularly recognizable at the local level, in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the London borough of Southwark.

For the new immigration countries, there appears to be a slight tendency to adopt more specific policies when addressing immediate immigrant needs. This might be explained by the fact that integration needs are new and more prominent, although the 'young' political context proves to be influential here too, as will be elaborated in the sections below. The pattern between the history of migration and mainstreaming does not emerge when looking at the relation between migration history and the inclusivity of the policy, or state-centric or poly-centric modes of governance (the second and third dimension of mainstreaming).

When it comes to plural and poly-centric forms of mainstreaming, we see diverging patterns amongst the 'old' immigration countries, whereby the UK can be considered more pluralist, particularly when compared to the Netherlands and France. While the long history of immigration seems to be of influence on mainstreaming in terms of targeting in the UK and the Netherlands, it cannot explain the monist or pluralist orientation of policy, or state-centric or poly-centric modes of governance for either the 'old' or the 'new' countries of immigration. Furthermore, the trend towards poly-centric governance can be found in all countries, though to a lesser extent in France. Here too, no relation can be found between migration history and mainstreaming.

A second expectation to be addressed concerns the relation between mainstreaming and the extent of *diversity*, in terms of ethnicity and religion as well as intergenerational or individual diversification within these elements. In this case France, the Netherlands, the UK and Spain can be considered as highly diverse societies, in contrast to Poland which is thus expected to be less likely to mainstream its integration policies. When looking at the first group of countries, this thesis is most clearly illustrated at the local level. On the one hand, the diversity of, for example, London or Amsterdam demographics leads to a trend of generic policies, as mainstreaming is considered 'inevitable' when diversity is literally considered a 'mainstream' topic. Despite their multicultural history of specifically targeted policies, the increased diversity of its population has led to a move away from targeted policies. The increasing diversity within groups has

made targeted policies 'impossible to implement' as Dutch education policies illustrate. Although at the national level this move away from targeted policies in the Netherlands and the UK also seems to be driven by other policy and political influences.

Of all the cases Poland is the least diverse. This lack of diversity indeed seems to decrease the probability of mainstreaming. Even in Warsaw, which is slightly more diverse and attempts to address the issue by programmes such as 'Diverse Warsaw', the emphasis on diversity seems to encourage a targeted response rather than a process of mainstreaming. Therefore, diversity can indeed be considered an important driver for mainstreaming: on the one hand, moving away from specifically targeted policies, while on the other hand addressing diversity within generic policies. Although the local level shows a particularly strong trend in this respect, it cannot explain why this does not translate to more inclusive policies at the national level, particularly in France and the Netherlands. Poland's short history of immigration seems to have a stronger explanatory value than Warsaw's attempts to address diversity.

Finally, we formulated an expectation regarding the extent to which *integration problems* are perceived, especially in relation to specific groups. We expect that when there is a strong perception of specific integration problems, this will decrease the probability of mainstreaming. We expect that when specific problems are perceived, this will trigger specific policy responses. Here we can distinguish roughly between the Netherlands and the UK as countries with a strong perception of specific problems of integration on the one hand, and France, Spain and Poland as their opposites. To a significant extent, this expectation does not fit our findings from these countries. The Netherlands and the UK combine a relatively strong focus on specific integration problems with a shift towards generic policies and poly-centric governance. Since the Dutch backlash against multiculturalism in the early 2000s, migration-related issues in the Netherlands still tend to be framed in group-specific terms. The national integration debate in particular is characterized by strong problem framing, focusing particularly on issues of social-cultural integration and adaptation, and more generically on issues of social cohesion. However, generic policy solutions are proposed, despite the specific problem framing typical of the so-called dilemma of recognition. In the UK, policy developments in the field of integration are partially incident driven, with perceived problems of integration coming to the fore through civil disturbance or incidents. In the UK perceived problems of integration, targeted through a needs-based

proxy, have eventually led to a generic frame of social cohesion intended to 'lift up the entire area', thus stimulating the process of mainstreaming.

On the other hand, integration problems are framed less specifically in France, Spain and Poland. True to its republican tradition, France does not register or monitor problems according to ethnicity or immigrant background, but rather considers all its citizens French alike. According to the hypothesis this would advance the chances for mainstreaming. While France is indeed known for its generic targeting, the lack of attention for specific problems of integration seems to obstruct a move to an inclusive, whole society approach to mainstreaming. In a later stage of mainstreaming, attention for specific problems can in fact lead to more inclusive mainstreaming, and a readjustment of mainstream services to align with the diversity of its society. In Lyon, for example, problems around ethnic discrimination are addressed explicitly, in contrast to the French tradition at the national level. The attention for these perceived problems does not seem to work against the tradition of generic policies, but instead puts emphasis on the inclusiveness of these policies, as evident from advanced monitoring schemes at the level of (Grand) Lyon. Equally in Rotterdam the move towards generic citizenship policies was supplemented by additional programmes on integration, after problems in this domain were addressed in a report on the status of integration in the cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. In Spain and Poland, perceived problems of integration are of little significance in the debate of integration and mainstreaming.

Policy Context: Mainstreaming in the Context of Austerity and Retrenchment

Regarding the policy context, we expected that mainstreaming would be promoted by experiences with mainstreaming in other policy domains (referred to as spin-offs between departments) and the increasing influence of the crisis, austerity and governmental retrenchment across European countries. On the contrary, countries or departments that have a lot of experience with the use of specific policies could be less likely to switch to mainstreaming.

First of all, regarding the potential *path dependency* of specific (or generic) policies from the past, it is clear that the cases under research have different histories of specific or generic policies. The UK and the Netherlands in particular are characterized by their strong tradition of specifically targeted policies. The UK case illustrates that the path dependency

of specifically targeted policies at the local level indeed seems to resist the national spread of mainstreaming, with a strong initial minority focus in generic community cohesion programmes. As explained earlier, this path-dependent specific trend was eventually overcome through the needs-based focus of the programme. The Dutch case shows a similar pattern, although here eventually the legacy of specific policies and the perception that these policies would have had inadvertent negative effects in terms of labelling and reification of ethnic boundaries, contributed to the shift to generic policies rather than preventing it. Spain shows a combined pattern of specific and generic policies coexisting, though these do not seem of particular influence on the move to mainstreaming.

The absence of a tradition of specific policies in France and Poland can be considered as control cases, and are thus expected to stimulate the move to mainstreaming. France has a strong tradition of generic policies, which shows a strong path dependency. However, this generic tradition is based on the republican tradition and leaves little room for a more culturally sensitive whole society approach. Lyon, on the contrary, has more experience with specific policies, particularly in the field of ethnic discrimination. In contrast to the hypothesis this leads to more inclusive mainstreaming. In the case of Poland specific policies in the field of integration are relatively new. Its prior absence can be considered an example of 'accidental' mainstreaming, where generic policies are the result of a simple absence of policy priorities in the field of integration rather than a conscious choice of policy targeting. However, this cannot explain the current divergence in specific and generic policy responses in the field of Polish integration policies. On the one hand, the Polish policies tend to be formulated in a generic sense as there is little attention for specific groups or policy problems; on the other hand, the de-politicized context of immigrant integration issues in Poland leaves room for both specific and inclusive targeting.

So, while at first glance the path dependency of specific policies seems to obstruct a move to generic policies, it is illustrated that they might as well move away from this, or that specific policies can actually lead to more inclusive forms of mainstreaming. The tradition of specific policies might delay the development of mainstreaming, but does not seem to be of decisive influence on any eventual shift towards or away from mainstreaming.

Second, we found a clear relation between mainstreaming and *austerity measures* or government retrenchment. This clearly places the development of mainstreaming within the context of the recent financial and

economic crisis in Europe. Particularly, retrenchment seems to reinforce already existing shifts towards generic policies. Several countries report that it is increasingly difficult to implement specifically targeted policies, due to the political and economic circumstances, which make it harder to defend specific policies for immigrants. In Spain, the economic crisis has had a highly significant impact on government efforts in the domain of migrant integration, contributing to retrenchment. In Poland, retrenchment measures seem to have less influence on integration policies, but retrenchment seems to be stimulating or reinforcing the move towards generic policies. On the other hand, there is a risk of 'decoupling' which can lead to a decrease of the effectiveness of policies when the process of mainstreaming is accelerated or driven by cost reduction. In Rotterdam, retrenchment measures in 2010 had a decisive influence on the citizenship frame that had been set up in 2006 as an important step in the process of mainstreaming its diversity policies. But here the risk of decoupling became apparent after the stringent revision of the citizenship programme funds risked doing away with diversity policies altogether, as diversity responsibilities were not taken up by other departments. Only when integration was put back on the agenda through an evaluation was there more active coordination between departments. However, it is exactly this attention for diversity and inter-departmental cooperation that is under threat with declining budgets.

Finally, an important finding is that, contrary to our expectations, we found no connection between mainstreaming in the field of immigrant integration policies and mainstreaming in *other policy areas* such as disability, gender and climate. This strongly suggests that this is not a case of spillover or 'policy transfer' from one of these areas to integration governance, but that the mainstreaming of integration policies is driven by other influences.

Political Stream: Politicization as a Motor for Mainstreaming at the National Level

Finally, concerning the political stream we expected that increasing political and media attention, as well as populism around migration and integration debates, would make it more difficult to justify group-specific policies. Likewise, we expected increasing individualization to be of influence on the political context of mainstreaming, as here too it will become increasingly difficult to endorse targeted integration policies.

We indeed found a strong relation between increased *political and media attention*, *populism* and a shift to generic policies. The visibility and negative framing of immigrant integration makes it increasingly difficult to explicitly address integration issues or target specific migrant groups. These patterns can be observed in France, the Netherlands, the UK and to a lesser extent in Poland and Spain. In France, the politicization of immigrant integration reinforces the dilemma of recognition: when framing immigrant integration is increasingly problematized and framed in terms of individual responsibility to integrate, this does not lead to specific policies.

Although increasing political and media attention and the (re-)framing of immigrant integration under pressure from the rise of populist parties seem to go hand-in-hand, they have a very different effect on the degree to which policies are framed inclusively for all. When distinguishing between these two it becomes clear that while increased attention makes it more difficult to target specific groups or unpopular themes, on the other hand political and media attention on integration issues can put the issue back on the agenda, thereby advancing a more inclusive whole society approach. In the UK, for example, political and media pressure were important drivers accelerating the move from the integration to the community cohesion frame. In the Netherlands, it was under political and populist pressure in the early 2000s that social cohesion as a generic challenge of integration was put on the map in the first place, leading to a move away from 'beneficial' specific policies. However, if we look at policy developments since then, we see that it was under a subsequent *decrease* in political pressure that integration issues were once more addressed as political and media priorities locally, leading to the next steps in mainstreaming and embracing a whole society approach towards citizenship policies. Thus, while populism might stimulate a move away from specific policies, it also obstructs the next step towards more inclusive generic policies. After sentiments have calmed down, renewed attention for diversity and issues of immigrant integration *can* lead to a more inclusive mainstreaming approach; however, if not addressed explicitly, policies run the risk of diluting the issue of integration altogether.

The influence of the media and politics seems less pressing in the mainstreaming development in Poland and Spain. In Poland, immigration or integration policies have hardly led to any political debate, leaving room for either specifically targeted or inclusive generic policies. What triggers a specific or generic policy response, however, cannot be explained by

the influence of political and media attention. This leaves the Polish case ambiguous in this sense. The Spanish case seems to be in contrast to the expected trend. Decreasing attention for the topic by the current government, in combination with decreasing funds, is actually driving the Spanish integration debate towards the EU discourse of a generic but less inclusive frame.

The EU case shows that politicization on the national level speaks to mainstreaming at the EU level in a very specific way. First of all, political contestation on the national level seems to have made EU member states, such as the Netherlands and France in particular, very reticent when it comes to supporting the development of an EU approach to migrant integration. Furthermore, in as far as an EU approach could develop, this was framed in terms of mainstreamed policies, as a specific approach to migrant integration could not emerge at the EU level due to its limited competence in the field. However, there are very few means to ensure that this mainstreaming strategy is effectively implemented across various directorate generals, such as DG Education, DG Home Affairs and Justice and DG Employment. This carries the risk of diluting migrant integration policies, with mainstreaming being used as an excuse not to have policies on migrant integration.

Lastly, in the political sphere we expected *individualization* to increase the chances of mainstreaming, as it will become harder to justify group-specific policies. Most countries are experiencing an increasing individualization regarding the terms and conditions for integration. This individualization can be connected to an assimilationist frame of integration with an emphasis on individual responsibility for integration and adaptation. While France has a long tradition of this individual republican frame, this frame has developed relatively recently in the UK, the Netherlands and Spain.

In France, the individualized framing of responsibilities for integration leads to two patterns: a generic and monist perspective on integration with an emphasis on the individual's willingness and efforts to integrate, and correspondingly the traditional republican value of equality that is applied to frame anti-discrimination issues. In the UK, increasing individualization is linked to the shift from social inclusion to social mobility, now one of the dominant frames in integration policies. In the Netherlands, the individualized frame with a focus on individual responsibility for integration has likewise become very dominant in recent years, especially at the national level. At the local level a diverging trend of a more collective

citizenship frame has unfolded. We can also observe this diverging trend in Spain, especially between the regional and local level in Madrid, where the former is engaging with a trend towards individualization. Apart from the French case, the frame of individualization seems to be mainly connected to a move towards generic targeting, while obstructing the development of more pluralist and inclusive policies due to the dominance of the individual frame over more collective frames of integration. For the Polish case, individualization seems irrelevant to the development of mainstreaming.

Conclusions

This chapter provides an analysis of the rationale of mainstreaming in integration governance: *how* have mainstreamed integration policies been developed, and *why* did governments decide to mainstream?

Discrepancy Between National and Local Mainstreaming

Our analysis of mainstreaming shows a discrepancy between mainstreaming at the national and local level. The discrepancy between national and local interpretations of mainstreaming is reflected in the frames that are used to legitimate mainstreaming. At the national level, mainstreaming is framed particularly in terms of promoting equality, anti-discrimination and individual responsibility. In contrast, at the local and the EU level, mainstreaming is more often framed in terms of (super)diversity.

Furthermore, at the national level mainstreaming appears driven in particular by political factors, by the need for austerity measures and government retrenchment. The politicization of migrant integration appears to have created a setting, especially in the 'old' immigration countries, where group-specific measures are politically undesirable, confirming our expectations around target grouping (cf. Schneider and Ingram 1997 on the degenerative effect of target groups). Furthermore, the economic crisis has prompted governments to cut integration spending, which might explain why diversity orientation is less manifest at the national level. Mainstreaming may then become a vehicle for decentralization (UK and to some extent France), or retrenchment (the Netherlands). In contrast, at the local level, problem pressure seems to have been a more important engine behind mainstreaming. In some cases this relates to focus events or incidents that revealed the need for a more comprehensive approach to

diversity, while in other cases the recognition of the (super)diverse character of city population provides a more important explanation for why cities choose to mainstream.

What stands out at both levels is the emphasis on generically targeted policies, while often only in a second instance, if at all, leading to an adaption of mainstream policies to migration-related diversity and coordination and monitoring structures to ensure this.

Mainstreaming and Proxy Policies

The discrepancy that we found between the more inclusive forms of mainstreaming, mostly found at the local level, and the more politicized and austerity-driven mainstreaming, at the national level, needs to be nuanced when looking at the widespread formulation of 'proxy policies'. Proxy policies, replacing the former target groups under which policies were formulated, mostly involve needs-based or area-based measures that may still primarily target migrants, albeit indirectly. Especially in the UK and the Netherlands, area-based mainstreaming involves policy strategies targeting neighbourhoods that are often home to a high proportion of migrants, rather than targeting migrant groups per se. Such a strategy can also be uncovered in the French approach to Urban Priority Zones, UK's Neighbourhood Renewal Policy frame, the Dutch approach to *Krachtwijken* and the Spanish approach to Area Renewal Programmes.

Although our analysis shows that such 'proxy policies' are at the heart of the mainstreaming of integration governance, we also found that in many cases we cannot speak of 'replacement strategies' in the pure sense. As conceptualized by De Zwart (2005, 2012), replacement strategies involve the deliberate development of proxy strategies that target migrant groups without mentioning them explicitly. In some cases, especially in the Netherlands and to some extent the UK, we found evidence that proxies were deliberately defined as a replacement for group-specific measures. However, in various cases, the EU case in particular, we did not find evidence that proxy policies were designed with vulnerable migrant groups in mind. Also in France, the presence of migrants does not play an explicit role in the definition of Urban Priority Zones. This may signal that mainstreaming by introducing proxies is ambiguous and can contribute to diluting integration policy preferences. The proxy categories might avoid overt stigmatization and prioritization of particular groups, but subsequently runs the risk of carrying little effective weight. Furthermore,

the one-sided focus on letting go of specifically targeted policies suggests a strategy that avoids to speak about integration rather than efforts to embed this in the mainstream, at the risk of becoming an 'empty signifier' (Lombardo and Meier 2006: 161).

Incomplete Mainstreaming

A key expectation when connecting the migration literature to the literature on mainstreaming is that mainstreaming could form an adequate governance response to the emergent reality of superdiversity as it involves a strategy to embed migration-related diversity in the mainstream. The analysis provided in this chapter nuances this expectation to a considerable extent. Only at the local level do we observe a relationship between superdiversity and mainstreaming. In various cities, we have seen that the importance (in terms of challenges as well as opportunities) of diversity in the urban setting is recognized and combined with a 'whole society' approach aimed at awareness of diversity. This can take different shapes in different cities. Some cities, such as Rotterdam and Saint-Denis, do not make diversity as such explicit but rather focus on what citizens of a city have in common, whereas cities like Bristol, Amsterdam, Barcelona and to some extent also Warsaw and Lyon are more explicit in their diversity orientation. However, when we look at the national level, the thesis that superdiversity is associated with mainstreaming seems to be disqualified. Rather, austerity appears a key driver of mainstreaming at the national level, as well as national-level politicization which provides political incentives against group-specific policies. When looking at the local level, mainstreaming appears associated with various forms of proxy policies that indirectly do involve forms of targeting, however, without speaking of it.

The definition of mainstreaming applied in this book consists of three dimensions: the *generic* and *inclusive* adoption of immigrant integration priorities in generic policy domains, linked to a trend of *decentralization and deconcentration* in terms of the coordination of integration policy responsibilities. Looking back at how and why mainstreaming has, or has not, been applied in the various cases we can thus conclude that the observed developments focus strongly on the first dimension of mainstreaming (generic policies), while the second dimension (inclusive policies) is largely absent at the national level; attempts to formulate more inclusive forms of generic city-citizenship programmes, for example, can be recognized at the local level. Overall, however, the second dimension

of mainstreaming, requiring an adaptation of mainstream policies to migration-related diversity, and the absence of coordination and monitoring mechanisms to facilitate the decentralized and deconcentrated governance of diversity are the weaker components of European mainstreamed immigrant integration policies. This can to a large extent be contributed to the mixed motives for mainstreaming, varying from considerations of (super)diversity, politicization and retrenchment.

The following chapter focuses on the implementation of mainstreamed integration policies, more specifically on street-level bureaucrats at the neighbourhood level, illustrating how the frames and policies we described here are put in practice.

Notes

1. Sixteen interviews for the EU case, 20 in France, 16 in the Netherlands, 10 in Poland, 20 in Spain and 18 in the UK.
2. Brey (2015): The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case study of Spain. Project UPSTREAM; Bozec and Simon (2014): The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case study of France. Project UPSTREAM; Jensen and Gidley (2014): The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case study of the United Kingdom. Project UPSTREAM; Jóźwiak, Nestorowicz and Lesińska (2014): The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case study of Poland. Project UPSTREAM; Maan, van Breugel and Scholten (2014): The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case study of the Netherlands. Project UPSTREAM; Petrovic and Collett (2014): The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case study of the EU. Project UPSTREAM
   See: http://www.project-upstream.eu/publications/country-reports

References

Alba, R.D., and V.G. Nee. 2005. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Booth, C., and C. Bennett. 2002. Gender Mainstreaming in the European Union Towards a New Conception and Practice of Equal Opportunities? *European Journal of Women's Studies* 9 (4): 430–446.

Bouchard, G. 2011. What is Interculturalism? *McGill Law Journal* 56 (2): 435–468.

Bozec, G., and P. Simon. 2015. *The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of France*. Upstream Report.

Brey. 2015. *The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of Spain*.

Caglar, G. 2013. Gender Mainstreaming. *Politics & Gender* 9 (03): 336–344.

Cantle, T. 2012. *Interculturalism. The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Crul, M. 2016. Super-Diversity vs. Assimilation: How Complex Diversity in Majority-Minority Cities Challenges the Assumption of Assimilation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42 (1): 54–68.

De Zwart, F. 2005. The Dilemma of Recognition: Administrative Categories and Cultural Diversity. *Theory and Society* 34 (2): 137–169.

———. 2012. Pitfalls of Top-Down Identity Designation: Ethno-Statistics in the Netherlands. *Comparative European Politics* 10 (3): 301–318.

Eveline, J., and C. Bacchi. 2005. What are We Mainstreaming When We Mainstream Gender? *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7 (4): 496–512.

Faist, T. 2009. Diversity—A New Mode of Incorporation? *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32 (1): 171–190.

Hollinger, D.A. 2000 [1995]. *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism*. New York: Basic Books.

Jensen, O., and B. Gidley. 2014. *The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of the United Kingdom*. Upstream Report.

Joppke, C. 2004. The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *The British Journal of Sociology* 55 (2): 237–257.

Jóźwiak, I., J. Nestorowicz, and M. Lesińska. 2014. *The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of Poland*.

Kingdon, J.W. 2003 [1984]. *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. New York: Longman.

Kymlicka, W. 2010. The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies. In *The Multiculturalism Backlash; European discourses, Policies and Practices*, ed. S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf, 32–49. New York: Routledge.

Lombardo, E. 2005. Integrating or Setting the Agenda? Gender Mainstreaming in the European Constitution-Making Process. *Social Politics* 12 (3): 412–432.

Lombardo, E., and P. Meier. 2006. Gender Mainstreaming in the EU Incorporating a Feminist Reading? *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13 (2): 151–166.

Maan, X., I. van Breugel, and P. Scholten. 2014. *The Politics of Mainstreaming, Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of the Netherlands*. Upstream Report.

Parekh, B.C. 2000. *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*. London: Profile Books.
Schneider, A.L., and H. Ingram. 1997. *Policy Design for Democracy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Squires, J. 2005. Is Mainstreaming Transformative? Theorizing Mainstreaming in the Context of Diversity and Deliberation. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society* 12 (3): 366–388.
Stratigaki, M. 2005. Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action An Ongoing Conflict in EU Gender Equality Policy. *European Journal of Women's Studies* 12 (2): 65–186.
Vertovec, S. 2007. Super-Diversity and its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (6): 1024–1054.
Vertovec, S., and S. Wessendorf, eds. 2010. *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. London and New York: Routledge.
Zapata-Barrero, R., ed. 2015. *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*. Northampton: Edward Elgar.

Ilona van Breugel is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Ilona has a background in legal anthropology. Her current research focuses on local immigrant integration governance, more specifically on target grouping and problem definitions in the construction of integration policies. Previously she co-coordinated the UPSTREAM project on the mainstreaming of integration governance.

Peter Scholten is Associate Professor Public Policy & Politics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. His research focuses on themes of intercultural governance, comparative public policy, and the relationship between knowledge and power. Scholten is associate director of IMISCOE, Europe's largest academic research network on migration, integration and social cohesion, and coordinator of the interdisciplinary Erasmus Research Cluster on the Governance of Migration and Integration. Furthermore, Scholten is editor-in-chief of the journal Comparative Migration Studies (CMS) and member of the editorial board of the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis.

CHAPTER 7

Mainstreaming in Practice: The Efficiencies and Deficiencies of Mainstreaming for Street-Level Bureaucrats

Ben Gidley, Peter Scholten, and Ilona van Breugel

The preceding chapters provided a conceptualisation of mainstreaming and an analysis of why EU, national and local governments choose to mainstream their integration policies. This chapter will delve more into the practice of mainstreaming. It draws upon the local level of mainstreaming in more detail, focusing in particular on the implementation of mainstreaming at the street level. It explores what effects of mainstreaming can be identified in terms of policy coordination, policy practices and policy outcomes, and pays particular attention to how mainstreaming affects vulnerable groups, such as women, the elderly and children.

B. Gidley (✉)
School of Social Science, History and Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK

P. Scholten • I. van Breugel
Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_7

Integration policies often take shape at the local or even the neighbourhood level where front-line workers or 'street-level bureaucrats' implement policy projects and measures. Street-level bureaucrats are in touch with the everyday reality and act not only on the basis of formal policy goals but also on their own (professional) expertise and experiences. The policy officers have a certain degree of policy discretion (Lipsky 1980); this discretion often allows street-level bureaucrats to benefit from their experiences from working with specific groups and the knowledge that they have thus obtained of these groups. Also it allows them to cope with the complexity of everyday policy practices, which often defy the policies 'on paper'. What does mainstreaming mean for the policy discretion of street-level bureaucrats, does it impede the development of knowledge about specific groups or does it rather help them to address the complex needs of migrants more adequately?

Based on the conceptualisation of mainstreaming as described in Chap. 1, this chapter analyses structures of policy coordination and experiences with the implementation of mainstreaming into concrete policy measures, as well as an analysis of the perceived outcomes of mainstreaming. The approach was to develop a rich portrait of case studies, using multiple stakeholder analysis. The chapter is based on empirical fieldwork in several European countries (the UK, the Netherlands, France, Poland and Spain) at the level of front-line workers in the area of integration governance. The aim of this chapter is to develop a better empirical understanding of the practice of mainstreaming at the street-bureaucrat level. We did not seek to evaluate the local authorities' delivery in integration. Instead, we gathered and triangulated the views of different stakeholders ('street-level bureaucrats') who have experienced how these unfold on the ground.

In total, 145 interviews[1] were held. This primarily involved interviews with street-level bureaucrats. Additionally some migrant and minority organisations, civil society organisations and technical experts (e.g. funders and evaluators) at the national level were interviewed. This chapter is based on the country reports from the UPSTREAM project on the implementation of mainstreaming.[2]

Within the cities we focused on specific neighbourhoods. We chose sites that would allow us to see the extent to which different patterns of diversity might affect policy implementation: long-standing arrival quarters and newly diverse areas, areas that are homogeneously working class or where gentrification introduces new axes of socio-economic diversity (and may

reduce ethnic diversity). The research captures experiences in a range of locations. As we will show in this report, the differences between neighbourhoods—and the extent to which neighbourhood-specific factors shape these—are often as or more significant than differences between countries. The following types of neighbourhoods were involved in this study:

Classic arrival quarters now experiencing super-diversity (such as Delfshaven in Rotterdam).
'New contact zones' areas newly experiencing diversity (e.g. Stare Winogrady, Poznań; Ochota, Warsaw; Lockleaze, Bristol).
Sites of gentrification, where new socio-economic axes of difference are opening up alongside migration-driven dynamics (e.g. Pentes Croix Rousse in Lyon; IJselmonde in Rotterdam).
Classic peripheral working-class immigrant quarters (e.g. Allende in St Denis).

Integration Governance at the Street-Bureaucrat Level

In defiance of ideas of 'national models of integration' (Bertossi 2011) or 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), integration policies often take shape within the setting of cities, neighbourhoods or even smaller units. Those are the levels where people, migrants and natives, meet, exchange ideas, go to school, find jobs and do many other things. Therefore, it is important to study how integration policies take shape at this local level, and how mainstreaming may support or obstruct the implementation of integration programmes and measures at the most concrete levels.

This is why it is important to look at the role of street-level bureaucrats in the implementation of integration policies. Street-level bureaucrats are composed of various sorts of actors involved in public service delivery who work in public organisations working on the front line of society (Lipsky 1980; Korsten and Ligthart 1986; Hill and Hupe 2008). On this front line, they are confronted with citizens who request to apply a particular policy programme—often contained in laws and regulations—to their specific situation. In this translation process, an interpretation of policies 'as formulated on paper' takes place. In the decision that follows, the actual content of the policy is determined, especially when standards are (sometimes intentionally) kept vague or conflicting (within the same scheme

or between different schemes), which generates additional uncertainty. This means that street-level bureaucrats often have a certain degree of 'policy discretion' in determining actual policies on the ground. This can have specific advantages as well as disadvantages (Lipsky 1980; Hill and Hupe 2008). Policy discretion is sometimes desirable, because policy programmes must be translated into and refined to the individual situation of a citizen. Customisation can be realised this way. Additionally, policy discretion provides implementers with an opportunity to adjust the policy to changing or unforeseen circumstances or to anticipate this. Potential problems can be avoided this way. Finally, being able to have policy discretion provides street-level bureaucrats with the opportunity to gain experience in the implementation of certain measures, so that the policy can be adjusted based on learning experiences.

Yet there are disadvantages, too, to policy discretion (Hill and Hupe 2008). First, policy discretion can contribute to legal inequality and legal uncertainty. After all, will all similar cases be treated equally and all dissimilar cases unequally? Second, policy discretion can be used to frustrate the objectives of the policy, as discretionary powers often act as a power source for resistance, especially when implementers disagree with the content of the policy to be implemented. Third, the allocation of policy discretion can be used to put off certain sensitive decisions that need to be made in the formation of the policy. This shifts the ball to implementation. For instance, this is the case when the formulation of the policy is based on vague compromises. The way in which a compromise works out in practice is then primarily a puzzle to be solved during implementation.

For integration governance, in particular, the advantage of developing experience with specific migrant groups has been very relevant in many cases. Street-level bureaucrats often have intimate knowledge of the groups that they work with, enabling them to translate policies in a way that reaches the target population more efficiently. As such, street-level bureaucrats are often key to what is described in the literature as 'backward mapping', which involves reinterpretation of policy that begins with the recipients or target groups of the policy, and then raises the question of what actions and measures should be taken to ensure that the characteristics and behaviour of the 'recipients of policy' are taken into account as much as possible. This means that possible bottlenecks and tensions are signalled in advance. This is only possible, however, if consultations and negotiations take place with the 'recipients' of the policy at an

early stage in order to reach an agreement; this also applies to *street-level bureaucrats*, who play an important role in the 'endpoint' of the policy.

This raises the question how mainstreaming works out in practice for the policy discretion of street-level bureaucrats. Does the decentralisation in combination with a generic approach allow for more individual tailor-made measures? Or does mainstreaming deconstruct the actual group-specific knowledge and expertise that is required for working with migrants on the ground?

Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration at the Street-Level

Given the intersectional or deconcentrated character of mainstreaming, referring to the coordination between different policy fields, this chapter focuses on two policy fields related to immigrant integration: education and social cohesion. Within each field, we focused on two subfields: a *generic* issue where (vulnerable) migrants are disproportionately affected, and a *specific* migrant/minority issue. Within social cohesion, the generic subfield is anti-poverty or anti-exclusion programmes that focus on neighbourhoods (given that migrants, and in particular vulnerable migrants, are likely to be concentrated to some extent in priority neighbourhoods); the specific subfield is anti-racist strategies and equality monitoring. Within education, the generic subfield is early childhood education and care, a broad policy area involving all children but where the children of newly arrived migrants are expected to face particular challenges, and the specific subfield is support for children from additional/other language homes, including language testing.

Mainstreaming in Social Cohesion

While in some instances social cohesion policies are directly linked to immigrant integration policies by local policymakers and practitioners, this is not always the case. In France, for instance, immigrant integration policies are explicitly restricted to newcomers. In the UK similarly, cohesion (usually referred to in terms of community cohesion rather than social cohesion) was for a short period associated with integration during the early 2000s, but this has been separated again more recently. Below the implications of mainstreaming are described in two areas of social

cohesion policies: neighbourhood policies on the one hand and equality and anti-racism policies on the other hand.

Anti-Poverty Programmes

For this chapter, we looked at anti-poverty or anti-exclusion programmes that are focused on specific neighbourhoods. As priority neighbourhoods are likely to include high density of social housing (and access to social housing may be a vital issue in determining migrant integration outcomes), key issues here include social housing allocation, migrant access to social housing entitlements, and whether segregation is driven or prevented by social housing policies. *A central question hereby is, to what extent does policy attention on specific neighbourhoods mean that the specific issues facing (vulnerable) migrants and minorities are lost or not.* For example, if local authorities prioritise neighbourhood-based community infrastructure (neighbourhood houses and so on), are migrant and minority needs accommodated by these? Do migrant communities dispersed across districts get left out by neighbourhood-based policies? Or is integration facilitated by bringing groups together around places rather than separating them by identity?

In all the case studies, there is a long tradition of neighbourhood-focused policies in general, often framed in terms of urban renewal, regeneration or community development. However, there was also a trend across the case studies towards neighbourhood policy being used as a *substitute or replacement* for targeting minority or migrant populations, as a way of targeting the specific needs of migrants without doing so explicitly. As is particularly evident in the Dutch case.

This trend illustrates the three dimensions of mainstreaming identified for this project; the *generic* and *inclusive* adoption of immigrant integration priorities in generic policy domains, linked to a trend of *decentralisation and deconcentration* in terms of the coordination of integration policy responsibilities. Based on our data on neighbourhood policies, we can identify some key elements of this trend. Geographic targeting allows for richer and more granular understanding of diversity. This was captured in an interview with one worker in Madrid, who said "diversity is not only about immigrants. We see the coexistence of different cultures, whether native or not: cultural diversity, sexual diversity, religious diversity, social diversity".[3] But we can also identify some key deficiencies. First, the trend to deconcentration often results in a *lack of strategic coordination*, but increasing pressure on the discretion of front-line

bureaucrats. In several case studies, especially in older immigration countries, interviewees spoke about the withdrawal of support, direction and guidance from above—most often from central to local government, but also from local government to its agencies and partners—about achieving integration goals.

Second, *neighbourhood-based initiatives are often short-term*, typically based on 'soft money' regimes such as one-off funding pots from central government, philanthropies or the EU. In this sense, although they are part of the trend to mainstreaming in integration policy, they often fall outside mainstream policy activity, and are under pressure to 'mainstream' their activities as the money runs out. The short-termism in neighbourhood-based initiatives was seen across the case studies to create pressures and risks around the loss of continuity or data (interviewees often spoke of having to 'reinvent the wheel', e.g.) and around sustainability. But a short-term focus also means that vulnerable groups are often missed out.

Equality and Anti-Racism

The specific needs and disadvantages faced by migrant and minority residents can be made visible and addressed through strategies against discrimination, including the monitoring of service delivery and outcomes for migrant and minority background residents. *To what extent is this approach compatible with a mainstream approach?* For example, are anti-racist strategies or discrimination monitoring co-ordinated across the work of a local authority (e.g. in a mayor's or chief executive's office), or are they concentrated in a specific department which targets these groups?

There are some striking examples of promising practices in terms of anti-racism and anti-discrimination across our case studies, including intercultural mediation and conflict resolution as well as city branding work to affirm diversity as an asset. The anti-rumour network developed in Barcelona is recognised as a model of good practice in several European studies, for example. In general, however, the turn to mainstreaming, particularly the generic turn, has been a turn away from equality monitoring and anti-racist strategies. As initiatives are deconcentrated from national to local level or from local government to its partners, the requirement to monitor in terms of equality is often loosened. As one interviewee put it, "Experience has shown that when generic interventions have no objectives or specific indicators for vulnerable groups, then their needs are not met."[4] In several of the case studies, street-level

bureaucrats and migrant interviewees spoke about how the generic turn led to policymakers airbrushing or 'denial' of diversity issues and challenges, or how a 'colour-blind' approach meant that the needs of vulnerable groups were missed.

However, local authorities and neighbourhoods where the ethos of flexible pragmatism described above was stronger, and a stronger diversity orientation or intercultural commitment was demonstrated, operated more in terms of what we might call 'smart' mainstreaming. Several of the cases studies showed how discretion of street-level bureaucrats meant that complex specific needs were prioritised despite not being highlighted in official (generic) targets, such as actions against domestic violence amongst migrants in Spain. Another example are initiatives that conduct outreach work to marginal populations, to actively bring them in to the mainstream, such as *Kansrijk Zuidoost* in Amsterdam or the Community Involvement team in Southwark. These can all be seen as examples of diversity or integration 'proofing' of mainstream policy initiatives, with a diversity orientation to correct for the deficiencies of the deconcentration and generic turns.

In several case studies, different parts of the local authority—or, sometimes, non-state actors—took on more important roles in acting as a hub between mainstream providers and migrant or minority communities. Often because of an accident of history, or a personal interest of a specific worker, particular agencies, desks, departments or even particular officers have become the 'go-to' people for addressing migrant needs—both in terms of mainstream agencies who want to reach out to migrants and in terms of migrants who want to access services. In some cities, this has been formalised—Madrid, for example, has a welcome service—but more often it is not. In line with the weak coordination structures we observed at the policy level, in the implementation too the link between specific needs and generic services remains informal, at risk of instability of the connection as it depends on specific persons. In some of the case studies, we saw the value of 'anchor organisations' in neighbourhoods: neutral spaces, such as community centres, settlement houses, or sometimes libraries or schools, that were not migrant specific but might be migrant friendly. They often host group-specific activities—but of different groups in the same building—therefore, facilitating contact rather than separation. This model of attending to the needs of specific groups within the mainstream is a promising practice in the field of cohesion.

Mainstreaming in Education

In the policy field of education, we explored two areas: early childhood education and care, a broad policy area involving all children but where the children of newly arrived migrants are expected to face particular challenges, and the specific subfield is support for children from additional/other language homes, including language testing.

In most EU countries, the primary responsibility and competency for these issues lie with education providers such as schools rather than with the local or regional authority as such. However, the focus of the project was not on schools as such but on integration practices within them and the governance of this, so we focused in particular on how policy is developed and especially implemented within municipalities rather than actual classroom practice in schools. For instance, is work developed across schools by local authorities, does the local authority require schools to ring-fence budget for particular activities or facilitate the sharing of resources, or are schools completely autonomous?

It has been identified that new migrants, in particular, have specific needs in early education, although it is a mainstream policy area affecting all children. A particular focus was on the extent to which migrant and minority parents and families are engaged in the pre- and early-school system, including whether opportunities for social integration are maximised. Our specific subfield within education was language testing/acquisition/support for children from additional/other language homes. This is a specific issue for migrant children, across the age range. In some places, support is provided in home languages; in others, the emphasis is on rapid language acquisition. *Key questions include the extent to which mainstream mechanisms meet the language needs of migrant children, the extent to which targeted practices exist or not, and how targeted activities relate to mainstream activities. Is there language testing, and if so what does this mean for the integration of migrant children in mainstream education?*

We found that the degree of concentration of migrants in particular schools (versus dispersal across the school system) made a significant difference to how (and how effectively) this was delivered, as did the length of experience of dealing with additional language children and the minority language policies of countries and regions. We also found that in some cases (e.g. in Poland and Catalonia), practices towards migrant children are shaped by practices towards historical national minorities or by the importance of regional language. Experience of working with Roma, for example,

provided a wealth of expertise that could be transferred to migrant children. A strong emphasis on Catalan language provision meant migrant children had strong language support in Barcelona that was missing in Madrid.

In most of our cases, a clear trend from targeted to generic services in the education field was visible. An example of this is language support within mainstream classes, although this often complemented with some forms of targeting and tailoring such as transition classes and language support classes. This was often driven by a combination of political direction from above and the imperatives of fiscal austerity—the forms of 'policy setting' and 'political setting' as discussed in Chap. 6. For example, in Spain the period of rapid migration at the turn of the century was swiftly followed by specific resources from local government to attend to the situation of the children arriving from different countries, in a context when the parents were often unable to speak Spanish and were working long hours and therefore had limited capacity to support their children's learning. These resources were understood as 'compensatory' education to reduce the gap between children coming from different education systems. Since 2010, as arrivals have slowed and public spending has shrunk, these targeted programmes have been withdrawn; the number of teachers with a specific 'compensatory' role. Although the need has been reduced, vulnerable children remain. In contrast, in many countries, most strikingly the UK, education was a field that had seen less severe fiscal retrenchment than other fields. Schools remained better resourced than some other agencies, not least in the most deprived and diverse areas. In this sense, schools are increasingly becoming a hub for migrant-focused activities and increasingly act as a safe space or comfort zone for migrants and minorities, often better trusted than other agencies. Migrant parental involvement in schools is increasingly addressed and stimulated—both as a way of improving migrant children's educational outcomes and as a way of achieving integration outcomes more generally.

There were some examples of tensions between 'mainstreaming from below' and 'mainstreaming from above' in our case studies. For instance, in Madrid, school management was responsive to policy made at a regional level (and therefore followed trends away from targeting), while teachers themselves were more responsive to the needs of children (and therefore were able to target specific needs rather than by broad categories). In the case of Spain, the withdrawal of resources meant that mainstream street-level bureaucrats were in a position of using their discretion about whether to provide additional support, either alongside mainstream tasks in the

classroom or by extending their working day, for example to provide after-school support. This was putting some pressure on the teachers. This kind of scenario was typical across the five countries. The withdrawal of targeted services by the government or schools means that this is increasingly the domain of NGOs rather than schools. This creates risks, for instance in terms of the capacity and professionalism of NGOs, in terms of their accountability, as well as in terms of the sustainability of the work.

The tension between 'mainstreaming from below' and 'mainstreaming from above' is sharpened where municipalities have limited competencies in education. This is the case, for example, in both France and the UK. In the UK, for instance, recent governments have alternated rapidly between prescriptive top-down national government direction over the content of curriculum (e.g. the promotion of 'British values') and a rhetoric of decentralisation and empowerment of schools; both have weakened the ability of local authorities to strategically orient schools towards integration and cohesion goals. Thus, schools with a commitment to diversity have increased freedom—but those with limited experience of diversity are left alone. This meant that those schools who took diversity seriously appeared better equipped to meet the needs of vulnerable families. But this creates quite an uneven picture—within the same neighbourhoods, some schools had far stronger commitment to interculturalism or to engaging parents with others; some retained a very narrow view of the role of the school in relation to integration while others had more progressive, expansive views. Which schools did so often reflected either stronger connections to the municipality (e.g. because they were connected to local authority-led children's centres in the UK) or a longer history of diversity. Where diversity is mainstream, specific needs are better met.

A positive dimension of the shift from targeted to generic provision was that it meant a move from a deficit model of migrant needs to a better understanding of (a) the heterogeneity of migrant populations (including the fact that some migrant children have significantly less need than others) and (b) the sense in which migrant children might be an asset for various reasons. In Southwark, for example, migrant children outperform non-migrant children educationally, and raise the overall attainment level of schools in the area; some specific minority ethnic children similarly outperform those of White British ethnicity, although others do not. Factors other than migration and ethnicity—most obviously socio-economic factors, particularly in a time of economic crisis—might make far more of a difference, and a mainstream approach, with an intercultural,

whole-society, diversity-sensitive orientation, is better able to flexibly address this than multiculturalist targeted approaches. This forces a re-thinking of the deficit model implicit in some targeted approaches to integration, and clearly demonstrates the advantages of some forms of mainstreaming.

In general, education is a policy field where migration-driven diversity has become more commonplace, and street-level bureaucrats have built up experience in dealing with the challenges that come with this. Some schools explicitly address diversity as an asset. However, this is not even. In areas where migration is new, mainstreaming can mean that education providers are not given the support and guidance to transform diversity into an opportunity rather than a problem, whereas in longer diverse areas mainstreaming can provide freedom to target to more specific needs.

Understanding Mainstreaming at the Street-Level

Our analysis makes clear that differences at a national level—between different national political traditions and national models or philosophies of integration, between old and new countries of migration—made a difference to the dynamics of mainstreaming. But more strikingly we saw convergences across them—and that differences between and within cities were often sharper than those between countries. Two factors stand out at all geographical scales as able to make a difference between more or less effective mainstreaming of integration.

First, *length of experience of diversity* makes a fundamental difference. In some agencies (e.g. specific schools or community centres), neighbourhoods or perhaps in some cities, *diversity is mainstream*: a mundane or commonplace fact of life that bureaucrats are used to working with. In these contexts, the possibility was maximised of making mainstream measures work to meet the needs of the most vulnerable. The competences and knowledge of individuals and institutions were calibrated towards meeting these needs. In these settings, diversity was more likely to be seen as a resource rather than a challenge. For instance, the workforce of such institutions was more diverse—although often lagging behind the diversity of the whole population. And ethnic or migration-driven diversity was more likely to be understood intersectionally, i.e. as intersecting with other axes of difference such as gender, sexuality, disability or class. However, in newer migration countries, such as Poland, mainstreaming has often occurred by default without going through a stage of specific, targeted services; here there is a risk that the knowledge and competence built up

during a 'pre-mainstreaming' period is not able to bear fruit in the form of better calibrated, more diversity-proof practice in a mainstreaming period.

Second, *political leadership* matters. The commitment of local political leaders—mayors or other senior politicians, chief executives or other senior officers—seemed to be central in strengthening the diversity dimension of mainstreaming that makes generic and deconcentrated services best able to meet the needs of the most vulnerable. However, this kind of political leadership was vulnerable to several factors, including national-level policy and media debates, which have become increasingly hostile to migrants in almost all of the case study countries in the last few years.

We identified a number of vulnerable groups often missed in the mainstreaming turn for the reasons described above. These include:

- New migrants, especially from 'new' origin countries (e.g. EU mobile citizens) and especially in areas with less of a migration history
- Migrants with limited or unclear legal status
- 'Hidden' migrant populations, for example, those working long hours (especially in grey economy) and not accessing universal services because of their life course position; older migrants without language skills; and migrants from 'emerging' countries of origin/ethnic groups, i.e. new to service providers.

As we have described throughout this report, two of the main dimensions of mainstreaming come with key risks:

- The risk of the generic turn is missing the vulnerable, and especially the newest, most dispersed and most mobile members of the population.
- The risk of the decentralising turn is a lack of strategic direction and coordination between levels. Deconcentration in practice often entailed a withdrawal of responsibility from the layers of governance with the most resources, leaving local authorities and especially street-level bureaucrats in a position of having to grope along in the dark alone and/or having to navigate the personal and ethical pressures of using discretion to decide how to meet specific needs.

Linked to this is the need for 'smarter' mainstreaming. In the mainstreaming success stories we observed, street-level bureaucrats and agencies had detailed knowledge of the specific needs of their target populations, through both personal experience with vulnerable residents (in the case of

street-level bureaucrats) and fine-grained quantitative data on the profile of populations as a whole.

The qualitative knowledge held by street-level bureaucrats is often not valued within agencies. Quantitative data is much more highly valued; however, the study tells us that this is less likely to be collected, aggregated or analysed during times of austerity. In some countries, the generic turn itself has led to a loss of evidence-based steering, as collecting information by ethnicity or migration background can be seen as violating the 'whole community' approach of mainstreaming. However, both these forms of knowledge can enable more surgically accurate targeting of provision, so local authorities can put limited resources to use more efficiently: cutting the research capacities of public agencies is often a false economy.

In the literature on gender mainstreaming, 'strategies' and 'institutional sets of tools and methods' are distinguished. The combined effort of a mainstreamed framework and concrete policy measures and coordination mechanisms is emphasised in order to overcome the risk of mainstreaming becoming an 'empty signifier' (Booth and Bennett 2002; Lombardo and Meier 2006, see also Chap. 1). The importance of this combination clearly plays out at the level of policy implementation in the field of immigrant integration too.

Conclusions

This chapter provides an empirical analysis of how mainstreaming works out in the practice of integration governance by street-level bureaucrats. On the one hand, we found that mainstreaming helps street-level bureaucrats to make use of their policy discretion to appropriately address the complexity of the situation that migrants face. It allows them to include the 'migration' factor (such as culture, ethnicity and origin) as one amongst many factors. This means that the relation between migration factors and other factors, such as inequality and education, can be addressed intersectionally, as called for within the super-diversity literature (cf. Vertovec 2007). On the other hand, the broad mainstreamed policy frame can also lead to airbrushing or 'denial' of diversity issues and challenges, both at the level of policy making and policy implementation, meaning that the needs of vulnerable groups were often missed too. This was particularly salient in neighbourhoods where there is little experience in working with a diverse population, illustrating the different motivations for 'mainstreaming from above' and 'mainstreaming from below'.

Additionally, we found that mainstreaming may be at odds with the group-specific knowledge that street-level bureaucrats sometimes require to translate and interpret policies to be efficient in practice. This does not so much seem a concern for groups that have been there for a considerable time already, but especially for new groups with whom little experience has been developed yet. Here a mainstreamed approach may lack the knowledge required to implement policies but also the groups themselves may lack the knowledge required to get access to generic public services, such as new migrants, but also migrants with limited or unclear legal status or hidden migrant populations.

Notes

1. Interviews numbered 29 in the UK, 25 in the EU, 19 in France, 35 in the Netherlands, 30 in Spain and 7 in Poland.
2. Brey, Sánchez-Domínguez, and Sorando (2015): Mainstreaming in practice: The efficiencies and deficiencies of mainstreaming in the Spain; Benton, Collett, and McCarthy (2015): Mainstreaming in practice: The efficiencies and deficiencies of mainstreaming in the EU; Jensen (2015): Mainstreaming in practice: The efficiencies and deficiencies of mainstreaming in the UK; Jóźwiak (2015): Mainstreaming in practice: The efficiencies and deficiencies of mainstreaming in Poland; Simon and Beaujeu (2015): Mainstreaming in practice: The efficiencies and deficiencies of mainstreaming in France; Van Breugel, Maan, and Scholten (2015): Mainstreaming in practice: The efficiencies and deficiencies of mainstreaming in the Netherlands. See: http://www.project-upstream.eu/publications/country-reports/284-mainstreaming-in-practice-the-efficiencies-and-deficiencies-of-mainstreaming-in-spain
3. Brey, Sánchez-Domínguez, and Sorando (2015): *Mainstreaming in Practice: The Efficiencies and Deficiencies of Mainstreaming in Spain*.
4. Brey, Sánchez-Domínguez, and Sorando (2015): *Mainstreaming in Practice: The Efficiencies and Deficiencies of Mainstreaming in Spain*.

References

Bertossi, C. 2011. National Models of Integration in Europe: A Comparative and Critical Analysis. *American Behavioral Scientist* 55 (12): 1561–1580. doi:10.1177/0002764211409560.

Booth, C., and C. Bennett. 2002. Gender Mainstreaming in the European Union Towards a New Conception and Practice of Equal Opportunities? *European Journal of Women's Studies* 9 (4): 430–446.

Hill, M., and P. Hupe. 2008. *Implementing Public Policy: An Introduction to the Study of Operational Governance*. London: Sage.
Korsten, A.F.A., and W.J.N. Ligthart. 1986. Beleidsvrijheid, ambtelijk gedrag en beleidsuitvoering. In *Uitvoering van overheidsbeleid. Gemeenten en ambtelijk gedrag belicht*, red. A.F.A. Korsten and W. Derksen, 39–54. Leiden/Antwerpen: Stenfert Kroese.
Lipsky, M. 1980. *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Lombardo, E., and P. Meier. 2006. Gender Mainstreaming in the EU Incorporating a Feminist Reading? *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13 (2): 151–166.
Vertovec, S. 2007. Super-Diversity and Its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (6): 1024–1054.
Vertovec, S., and S. Wessendorf, eds. 2010. *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. London: Routledge.
Wimmer, A., and N. Glick Schiller. 2002. Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation–State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences. *Global Networks* 2: 301–334. doi:10.1111/1471-0374.00043.

Ben Gidley is a senior lecturer at the School of Social Science, History and Philosophy, at Birkbeck University of London. Ben Gidley is a sociologist whose research focuses on diversity and integration in urban contexts, mainly in London and in a comparative context. His latest publication is Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe: A Shared Story? (Palgrave, 2017), edited with James Renton.

Peter Scholten is Associate Professor Public Policy & Politics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. His research focuses on themes of intercultural governance, comparative public policy, and the relationship between knowledge and power. Scholten is associate director of IMISCOE, Europe's largest academic research network on migration, integration and social cohesion, and coordinator of the interdisciplinary Erasmus Research Cluster on the Governance of Migration and Integration. Furthermore, Scholten is editor-in-chief of the journal Comparative Migration Studies (CMS) and member of the editorial board of the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis.

Ilona van Breugel is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Ilona has a background in legal anthropology. Her current research focuses on local immigrant integration governance, more specifically on target grouping and problem definitions in the construction of integration policies. Previously she co-coordinated the UPSTREAM project on the mainstreaming of integration governance.

PART III

Theoretical Reflections

CHAPTER 8

The Dilution of the Ultimate Goal? Lessons from Gender Mainstreaming

Petra Meier

The Genesis of a Policy Approach

Gender mainstreaming came up as a policy approach[1] in the 1980s, more particularly in development policies, with a shift in attention from women in development (WID) to gender in development (GID). Feminist experts in development studies, such as Boserup in her seminal work on the role of women in economic development (Boserup 1970), had pointed at the importance of not solely focusing on men as partners and target groups in development policies. Such policies should also pay attention to women given the important role they play in the social and economic tissue of any society. The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies of the Third UN World Conference on Women, held in Nairobi back in 1985, launched the gender mainstreaming approach in development policies. In combination with specific projects focusing on the improvement of the social position of women, all branches of development policies should pay attention to this goal. This would ultimately improve gender relations, to be read as a more balanced or equal social position of women as compared to that of men.

P. Meier (✉)
Department of Political Science, University of Antwerp, Antwerpen, Belgium

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_8

It took another decade to mainstream gender mainstreaming. The Beijing Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth UN World Conference on Women, not only firmly established the gender mainstreaming approach for development policies (Woodford-Berger 2004), but also extended it to all policy fields of a given country. By the mid-1990s, many Western countries had developed women's policy agencies focusing on women's needs and interests and designed policies and actions so as to improve their social position. However, most of these were sectoral policies, not crosscutting other government actions, and even less designed in interaction with them. The Beijing Platform for Action established the principle that gender equality policies should be conceived horizontally, within the different policy competencies of the government, and not solely as a sector policy in itself. The Minister or State Secretary holding the portfolio of gender equality, at that time often called equal opportunities, women's—or even family—affairs, and her or his cabinet and women's policy agency was to coordinate government action in these matters, thus coordinating the activities developed by all other members of government.

Gender mainstreaming as a policy approach travelled quickly and was proof of an unprecedented diffusion across the world. By the end of the 1990s, more than 100 countries had adopted and put in place some gender mainstreaming approach (Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2009; True and Mintrom 2001). However, as simple as the idea seemed to be, putting it into practice proved to be more difficult over the years. Although there are also positive echoes, such as on the Swedish case (Daly 2005; Rubery et al. 2004), or on the EU (Jacquot 2010), much of the research on gender mainstreaming since its inception is negative about the results booked. This goes for as diverse policy fields as agriculture (Shortall 2015), climate change (Alston 2009; Allwood 2014), development (Debusscher 2010), human resource management in the public administration (Benschop and Verloo 2006), refugee protection (Freedman 2010), research (Mergaert and Lombardo 2014) or spatial planning (Greed 2005). The idea underlying this literature is that the approach of gender mainstreaming does not deliver what it promised.

However, is it an issue of not delivering on formerly made promises? The remainder of this chapter will discuss the causes of such failure put forward by the research on gender mainstreaming, tying each of the causes discussed to the findings on mainstreaming integration policies discussed in the first part of this book. In this chapter, I will focus on four such issues. I will successively look into the prerequisites for gender

mainstreaming, the assumption of social change underlying it, as well as into the understanding of gender equality and that of gender enshrined in the policy approach of gender mainstreaming.

The Prerequisites for Gender Mainstreaming and for Mainstreaming Integration Policies

Research on gender mainstreaming puts forward a number of explanations for the poor performance of the gender mainstreaming approach. One of them is the lack of resources invested so as to meet political, organisational, logistic or technical conditions needed so as to make it succeed (Eveline and Todd 2009; Greed 2005; Meier 2006; Rees 2005; Woodward 2003).

As Hankivsky (2016) underlined in a recent paper, this point has been well covered. There is no need to further investigate how to implement gender mainstreaming; we by now know from earlier research what the prerequisites for a successful gender mainstreaming approach are. It needs support, especially from the highest political level. Such support also involves that gender mainstreaming work needs to be considered as high-value work. The gender mainstreaming approach further needs to be a shared responsibility, not only that of a small understaffed department away from the core of the policy-making process. It further requires financial and human resources. This is an important issue, and to a large extent relies on the former, which shows from the fact that Hankivsky sums it up as one of the dimensions of support gender mainstreaming requires. A successful gender mainstreaming approach, according to her, further requires training and education, not a one-off shot general but continuous training, resonating with and tied to the work of the actors meant to do gender mainstreaming work. There is the need for coordination and communication across policy-making units and departments, so as to exchange knowledge and practices on gender mainstreaming. In many cases, gender mainstreaming further requires improved data collection and reaching out to experts outside the existing policy-making process. A successful gender mainstreaming approach also requires accountability mechanisms, such as sanctions in case of non-compliance, to be enshrined in the necessary legislation. Finally, there is the need for monitoring and evaluation, so as to reflect on the desired goal and outcome of the approach in use.

Much of what Hankivsky (2016) sums up as prerequisites for gender mainstreaming have already been put forward by the early report of the

Council of Europe (1998) on gender mainstreaming. Still as one of the main references on this topic, it foresaw these as stumbling blocks for a successful implementation of gender mainstreaming. While they may not be sufficient prerequisites, there needs to be no doubt about the fact that they are—to a larger or lesser extent—necessary ones. This has been well documented by the scholars mentioned earlier on in this section.

It comes to no surprise then that the same prerequisites are put centre stage in the different chapters of this book. Especially those reporting on empirical experiences with mainstreaming integration policies underline the crucial character of such prerequisites over and again. Political support to the goal, focus and approach of the mainstreaming agenda, resources such as financial means to be dedicated to mainstreaming initiatives, policy processes and tools to develop them and put them into operation, and staff to undertake the necessary actions, are also central to mainstreaming integration policies. While not drawing explicit parallels with the gender mainstreaming literature, the similarities are striking. The experiences with mainstreaming integration policies echo all mayor conclusions of the gender mainstreaming literature on this issue.

Interesting in this respect is the emphasis put on the financial crisis and subsequent austerity policies. While as a topic it is less present in the gender mainstreaming literature, since much interest in gender mainstreaming policies dates from prior to the financial crisis, there is an emphasis on the need for sufficient means to enable gender mainstreaming policies, too. Replacing former sectoral gender equality policies by gender mainstreaming should not be seen as a budget-saving strategy, as was already underlined by the Council of Europe's report on gender mainstreaming (Council of Europe 1998). First, sectoral gender equality policies might still be necessary to address problems not suited for a gender mainstreaming approach. Second, a gender mainstreaming approach also requires the necessary resources, including financial means. The same argument can be found within the chapters describing the course of mainstreaming integration policies. Austerity policies are not the right incentive to opt for mainstreaming integration policies. Several of the empirical chapters in this book point to the importance of the aftermath of the financial crisis as an incentive to turn to generic policies, thus abandoning the more target-group-oriented approach. While in some cases it may still be a conscious and ideologically inspired choice to tackle the increasing diversity of immigrant populations, in others has to do with the crisis, as show the cases of mainstreaming integration policies at the city level. The need for

sufficient means is an important one, which gets lost more easily when a policy goal is spread out across policy fields and departments, where it becomes one among many policy problems to tackle. When integration governance adopts a mainstreaming approach the necessary means need to be scheduled.

Similar to the literature on gender mainstreaming the preceding chapters also put forward the need for the development of knowledge, expertise and skills across the different policy fields and levels to develop and insert mainstreaming integration policies. Lack of such knowledge, especially in combination with a lack of political priority or support attributed to mainstreaming integration policies, are important causes for a watering down or absence of serious initiatives to mainstream integration policies. This issue actually ties back to the need for the necessary means, not only to make mainstreaming policies work, but also to allow for putting them in place. No decent mainstreaming policies can see the light without the means necessary to develop expertise in these matters. This, too, involves financial means so as to train the broad range of actors involved in mainstreaming policies. This emphasis on the broad scope of actors involved in the policy-making and implementation process is another point gender mainstreaming policies and mainstreaming integration policies share—and which they share with other mainstreaming policies as well, for instance disability mainstreaming (Meier et al. 2016a). Mainstreaming policies involve a broader range of actors than sectoral policies. This again means that mainstreaming policies cannot be a cheap variant of sectoral policies. It also implies, and here the literature on gender mainstreaming and mainstreaming integration policies meet again, important efforts to coordinate the different mainstreaming actors. Adopting a mainstreaming approach makes policy making a very complex process. Smart policy processes and tools, including coordination and cooperation mechanisms are therefore of crucial importance.

Mainstreaming policies, and no matter what they mainstream, one could argue, all need the same prerequisites in order to be successful. Indeed, as long as a mainstreaming approach will not be given priority, and will not receive the necessary means to be put into practice, it will not be able to fully deliver. However, this sense of priority to be given to a mainstreaming approach, in combination with the necessary prerequisites to make it work, mainly depends upon political choices. Given this fact, I will rather turn to the policy approach itself and the theoretical assumptions underlying especially gender mainstreaming in the rest of this chapter. This said, two

issues should be kept in mind. First, the need for the prerequisites for a mainstreaming approach to succeed should continuously be underlined. Policy choices are in many cases not an issue of the incapacity to act but of priorities set elsewhere. It is not as if scholars and policy makers would be ignorant on what is required. Second, both policy makers and scholars interested in pursuing with a mainstreaming approach should investigate eventual alternatives so as to circumvent the stumbling blocks of the prerequisites required for genuine policy mainstreaming.

The Assumption of Social Change in Gender Mainstreaming and What It Says About Integration Policies

From the outset, there were high expectations about gender mainstreaming. It was—and still is—considered to have a revolutionary potential (Bustelo 2003; Mazey 2000; Verloo 2001; Woodward 2003). The revolutionary potential of the gender mainstreaming approach is the social change it is assumed to bring about, and that goes beyond the simple improvement of the social position of women as compared to that of men. This led to its qualification as an agenda-setting approach, the opposite of an integrationist approach. While the agenda-setting approach transforms the mainstream, an integrationist approach does not challenge the mainstream itself (Jahan 1995). In the case of gender mainstreaming, it would merely limit itself to adding women to the mainstream, eventually to inserting a gender perspective, without questioning the underlying policy paradigms. The gender mainstreaming approach is supposed to reorient the mainstream political agenda because it fundamentally rearticulates policy paradigms, ends and means from a gender perspective, and it prioritises gender objectives. Feminist scholars and activists started from the assumption that gender mainstreaming is precisely about this challenging and transforming of the mainstream.

The revolutionary potential of the gender mainstreaming approach and the social change it was expected to bring about can, for instance, be seen in the list of indicators Lombardo (2005) developed so as to measure the adoption of a gender mainstreaming approach. She defined five shifts in the policy-making process that at least partly have to occur so as to speak of a gender mainstreaming approach to be implemented. A first shift concerns concepts underlying the policy-making process. Gender mainstreaming

implies a shift to a broad and holistic concept of gender equality, with a focus on gender and not only on women, and the aim of achieving substantive equality as opposed to equal treatment and/or opportunities. Typical of such a shift is a focus on structural causes of the reproduction of inequality, such as an unquestioned masculine or even male standard, the patriarchal system or men's behaviour. A second shift implies the reorientation of the mainstream policy agenda in order to give priority to achieving gender equality. Policy objectives and measures meant to achieve substantive gender equality have to get a relevant place in meaningful policy initiatives and fields. Gender equality objectives and targeted policies of special relevance for women should get priority. A third shift requires that a gender perspective is built into the larger or mainstream political agenda. Policy measures have to be screened regarding their effects on both sexes. Policy ends and means have to be thought through and rearticulated from a gender perspective. A fourth and related shift concerns the institutional and organisational cultures of political decision-making, implying shifts in the policy process, in policy mechanisms and regarding policy actors. This involves acquiring the necessary gender expertise and knowledge on the mechanisms causing and reproducing gender inequality as well as on the necessary remedies. It entails more cooperation among actors of different policy areas and from civil society, as well as the development and use of new policy tools. A fifth and final shift implies parity between men and women in decision-making bodies and processes, hence, a shift towards the inclusion and participation of a higher number of women in political decision-making.

A gender mainstreaming approach is thus more than setting some prerequisites in place. Initiating these five shifts as defined by Lombardo will lead to social change given the extent to which they trigger the putting into question of prevailing paradigms, structures, processes and policies reproducing gender inequality. Gender mainstreaming is meant to lead to a critical review of deeply embedded cultural values and policy frames (Mazey 2000) or practices (Woodward 2003). It requires new perspectives, new expertise and the change of established operating procedures (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000). It actually addresses political, policy and bureaucratic systems and structures themselves (Rees 1998). It implies more complex and broader political action (Bustelo 2003) in order to come to a transformation of the existing policy agenda (Verloo 2001). In the end, gender mainstreaming means that its principles and practices become part of the routine of policy formulation and implementation that they become part of the deeply embedded rules or practices of institutions (Bretherton 2001).

The question is whether the gender mainstreaming approach is about all this. At first sight the most common definition of gender mainstreaming, provided for by the Council of Europe (1998) in its seminal report, allows for such an expectation of social change (Meier 2006). Gender mainstreaming organises, reorganises, improves, develops and evaluates policy processes. It requires a gender equality perspective to be incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages. And it implies that this perspective be adopted and incorporated by the actors normally involved in the making of policies. However, van Eerdewijk and Davids (2014) rightly underline that the social change a gender mainstreaming approach is intended to produce should not be taken for granted. Daly (2005) takes us a step further and argues that we particularly need to think through the problem and predominant understanding of gender inequality when it comes to gender mainstreaming in the articulation of how gender mainstreaming can bring about social change. It is thus not only an issue of disposing of prerequisites and an approach that would stir and upset the existing flow of things, it is also about what is being mainstreamed.

This brings me to the third section of this chapter, but before getting there, it is interesting to note that the literature on mainstreaming integration policies, at least in this manuscript, does not echo such expectations about social change. Accounts on mainstreaming integration policies, on the contrary, seem to contain no expectations about a total remodelling of priorities, thinking and acting by policy makers, with a different society as the outcome. The aim seems to be to respond to the needs of an increasingly diverse immigrant population by mainstreaming integration policies. Mainstreaming integration policies, in this respect, is thus mainly a procedural, logistic or technical issue. Also, as the term says in itself, the issue consists in integrating incoming groups into an existing society. It is not about a total remodelling of that society. Both gender mainstreaming and the mainstreaming of integration policies are about the opening up of society to 'new' social groups. In the case of gender mainstreaming this request stems from the initial overlooking of women as full citizens with their own needs and interests and a very androcentric approach to and in policy making. Gender mainstreaming is a logical step in the long process and recognition of the emancipation of women. In the case of mainstreaming integration policies, this opening up of society to new social groups stems from an influx of citizens from elsewhere. While the host society might open up itself, the aim consists of integrating immigrants. To this end, policies, processes and facilities may be set up to meet their needs,

but the main aim is not to remodel society. It rather consists of integrating the new groups into the existing society. Mainstreaming integration policies, while they may contain an aim of opening up and thereby somehow remodelling society, for instance towards a more multicultural—using this term in the broad sense—one, does not contain the ultimate goal, aim or illusion to completely remodel society. However, mainstreaming integration policies might fare well by more strongly aiming at a remodelling of society. While gender mainstreaming might be understood as standing for a goal that can look illusionist, mainstreaming integration policies might do well by going beyond the aim of simply integrating let alone opening up. It might be an illusion to think that mainstreaming integration policies will be possible without a remodelling of society.

Mainstreaming Gender Equality or Integration and More Emphasis on Prerequisites

Booth and Bennett (2002) argue for a 'three legged equality stool', comprising an equal treatment perspective, a women's perspective and a gender perspective. Gender mainstreaming, they argue, has mainly been associated with the latter, but according to the authors, this is misleading. Gender mainstreaming does not by definition lead to the mainstreaming of a gender perspective. Similarly, Squires (2005) sets out gender mainstreaming against a typology of inclusion, reversal and displacement. The first is associated with equal treatment, the second with positive action, and the third has a truly transformative potential in that it is best suited to respond to the demands of diversity. Squires, too, underlines that while gender mainstreaming will most easily be associated with this transformative approach, it may also contain policy initiatives related to a strategy of inclusion or reversal. The question thus is what a gender mainstreaming approach is mainstreaming.

If we return to the definition of gender mainstreaming provided for by the Council of Europe, we can see that it speaks of a 'gender equality perspective' which is to be mainstreamed (Council of Europe 1998: 15). But what is a gender equality perspective? As described earlier, the concept of gender equality has broadly speaking evolved from a legalistic approach of equal rights, to equal opportunities supported by positive action, to what is called a more substantive understanding of gender equality looking at the actual results achieved. Liebert (2002) argues that a gender mainstreaming approach widens the gender equality frame by expanding

thinking about the structural and institutional causes of inequality. Similarly, Verloo (2001) argues that it stands for the recognition of the impact of gender biases on the reproduction of gender inequality. Rees (1998) goes a step further and underlines that the gender mainstreaming approach implies an underlying model of equality that is based on assigning new standards for gender equality not only for women but also for men. There is thus a tendency to associate gender mainstreaming with a particular—and far reaching—understanding of gender equality, as is also shown in the standards Lombardo (2005) developed for measuring the putting into operation of a gender mainstreaming approach.

However, over the course of the years, scholars have underlined that the approach can be very much an 'empty signifier', which gets meaning in the context in which it is applied, as Alston (2009) shows studying drought policy in Australia. And Bendl and Schmidt (2013: 377) come to the conclusion that gender mainstreaming is 'a nonsensical metaphor for gender equality'. While feminist advocates of a gender mainstreaming approach had a clear understanding of what should be mainstreamed, the fact is that any approach to women or gender or equality, or even no explicit goal at all could be brought into the mainstream. The gender mainstreaming approach tells us more about the flow of the process and the steps to be taken, on how to proceed, than about what should be mainstreamed. Lombardo and Meier (2006) develop how the gender mainstreaming approach focuses on the procedural changes gender mainstreaming involves but does not address what we should understand by a gender equality perspective, what should be mainstreamed. The impact that gender mainstreaming can have on the generation of a more gender-equal society depends on the way in which it is interpreted, and in particular on the extent to which a feminist interpretation of it infiltrates political debates. However, in practice what needs to be mainstreamed tends to get filled with the definition of gender equality prevailing in that specific context, if there is any at all, with one ad hoc elaborated on by the actors involved, or with simply nothing, at least not made explicit. It also needs to be noted that many of the gender equality policies in place when the gender mainstreaming approach came up focused on formal equality, equal opportunities or considering particular needs of women. Few of such policies were based on the understanding of gender equality requiring the tackling of the structural character of gender inequality. It is not surprising, then, that the gender mainstreaming approach did not by definition adopt a feminist understanding of what needed to be mainstreamed.

Verloo (2005) goes a step further in her critical revision of the Council of Europe's 1998 report on gender mainstreaming, and argues that there is an ambivalence in its articulation of the goal of gender equality. According to her, this is problematic given the dual agenda underlying the gender mainstreaming approach. She shows how the absence of a definition of gender equality or goal to be achieved, or the strategic leaving away of it can lead to a loss altogether of any kind of goal synonymous with any form of gender equality. Lombardo et al. (2009) have described such processes as shrinking, stretching and even bending the concept of gender equality. It can be shrunk to a very limited understanding of gender equality, stretched to bring in broader—but not necessarily more far reaching—understandings of it, or bent so as to be filled with a totally different meaning. When in a gender mainstreaming approach the gender equality goal to reach is not defined, such processes easily take over, especially in contexts where gender equality is strongly contested.

Nonetheless, given the procedural focus of the gender mainstreaming approach, it can easily be stripped of its content, even if there is no contestation about it, simply because a deep understanding of gender issues is lacking. In those cases, the gender mainstreaming approach turns into a technocratic or bureaucratic tool, or simply a formal exercise (Daly 2005; Debusscher 2010; Meier and Celis 2011). One can actually say that the gender mainstreaming approach is not so much an empty signifier as an empty process. MacRae (2013) goes as far as to argue that what she calls the gender project needs to be well developed. Otherwise gender mainstreaming approaches are not only to a large extent ineffective but even counterproductive, especially within the current neo-liberal context. This is all the more important since the gender mainstreaming approach tends to replace gender equality policies in place, rather than completing them as was the initial ambition (Alston 2014; Bacchi 2009; Stratigaki 2005). If then the gender mainstreaming approach is stripped of an aim to reach for gender equality, not much is left.

Finally, it also needs to be underlined that even if the goal to be achieved through a gender mainstreaming approach and the content of what needs to be mainstreamed were clearly defined, the undertaking would still not be a one-shot process. Striving for gender equality is a never-ending process. Notwithstanding the fact that a couple of milestones has been reached over the last century, many issues are still on the table and even if they get solved one day, there will be new ones. As society evolves so do gender relations but also the views on them.

Furthermore, these views on how gender relations should look like are diverse, contested and constantly negotiated. Subsequently, the perception of any gender equality policy, including the gender mainstreaming approach, of what to aim for, is also permanently negotiated. In this respect, Roggeband (2014) correctly emphasises that the gender mainstreaming approach is an ongoing struggle.

The chapters on mainstreaming integration policies put forward similar concerns on what understanding and definition of, as well as focus on integration exactly should be mainstreamed. Several chapters echo the danger of a very limited understanding of integration, be it in terms of what is to be understood by integration, on what needs it should address and services it should provide for, or in terms of which segment(s) of the immigrant population to address. Mainstreaming integration policies, it is underlined, sometimes only address the reception of newcomers, only address particular policy fields, such as mastering the language of the host country and the insertion in the labour market, or limit themselves to rules focusing on the assimilation of immigrants to the host country. The same goes for a lack of any definition of what integration means, leaving it open and therefore allowing for this empty signifier to be filled with different and eventually counterproductive understandings of integration. In the end, mainstreaming integration policies can be stigmatising, without this necessarily being the intention.

Similar to the literature on gender mainstreaming, many of these concerns link back to the importance of the right prerequisites for a mainstreaming approach. Of crucial importance in this context are the need for a clear definition of and support for the goal of the mainstreaming approach and the required expertise and knowledge to put it into practice.

The Understanding of Gender or Where Gender Mainstreaming and Mainstreaming Integration Policies Finally Meet

Finally, scholars have put into question the understanding of gender itself. As the concept says, the gender mainstreaming approach stands for the mainstreaming of gender. Similar to the question of what goal is to be achieved, there is the one of what is to be understood by gender. While among feminist scholars prevailed an understanding of a far reaching goal to be reached, the same is not necessarily the case when it comes to the underlying understanding of gender. Gender was often understood as the

social position of one sex as compared to the other. It was understood as a binary construct, whereby the two sexes were furthermore seen as opposites and without any further within group distinction. Such a rather rigid and also limited understanding of gender has also been supported by the emphasis on the need for data on the social position of women. The lack of data on women's social position led from the 1990s onwards to a recurrent plea for data and statistics segregated by sex. The underlying idea was that in the absence of data, no good picture of the problem could be drawn, neither a policy strategy developed so as to solve it. Data segregated by sex were and are also high on the list of prerequisites put forward for the implementation of a gender mainstreaming approach. Gender, in this case, boils down to the socio-demographic variable of sex. While the need for data segregated by sex does not by definition imply a limited understanding of gender, in many cases this is what it came down to.

More recently, scholars have turned to question the concept of gender underlying the gender mainstreaming approach. Two issues are of interest here: the first is a less rigid and limited understanding of gender; the second is its broadening beyond the social category of gender. Rittenhofer and Gatrell (2012) plea for a move away from what they call a stable definition of male and female since it defines men's and women's interests often in contrast to each other. Drawing upon Butler's work, they argue for a more situated approach of male and female. They see the need to rethink the gender mainstreaming approach using a post-structural more fluid interpretation of gender which is to be characterised as situational and performed. Already a number of years ago but without elaborating on it, Woodward (2008) put the idea on the table that the concept of intersectionality may offer interesting new venues to further develop the gender mainstreaming approach. Intersectionality reflects the idea that individuals belong to multiple social categories such as gender, ethnicity, social class or disability. These social categories are intersecting and create opportunities and constraints, where a person can, depending on his or her particular intersection of social categories and social context, experience advantage, disadvantage or both at the same time (Collins 1990). Intersectionality is thus an aspect of social organisation that rejects 'the idea that the effects of interacting social structures can be adequately understood as a function of the autonomous effects of … social categories' (Weldon 2008: 197). Hippert (2011), for instance, is very explicit on the need to integrate the insights from intersectionality theory into a gender mainstreaming approach. She shows how the application of a

gender mainstreaming approach in rural Bolivia did not pay attention to the intersections of gender with ethnicity and class. Consequently, its sole effect on rural women was to actually overburden them in their work. In this respect, the theory of intersectionality allows for a more sophisticated understanding of gender issues. While both the broadening of the understanding of gender away from a rigid oppositional binary construct and the inclusion of its intersection with other social categories of exclusion or marginalisation are very promising, their concrete elaboration within a gender mainstreaming approach still requires further thinking.

It is here that gender mainstreaming and the mainstreaming of integration policies meet most—if we set aside more political, logistic and practical issues. The concern with gender mainstreaming on who to target relies to the question of whether to define categories of people or not when it comes to mainstreaming integration policies. In some of the former chapters, Scholten and van Breugel extensively discuss De Zwart's (2005) distinction of three strategies in this respect. A first policy strategy consists in denying groups, a second in their accommodation. As both show a number of pitfalls, a third strategy of replacement is put forward. In the end, none of these strategies provide for fully satisfying answers when it comes to how to deal with social groups and how to approach and name them. This echoes the crucial issue when it comes to gender mainstreaming of what to understand by gender and how to name it.

Throughout the book there appears an incentive for the mainstreaming of integration policies, which meets the issue of intersectionality in gender mainstreaming. It is the increasing diversity of affluxes of immigrant populations, labelled as, respectively, superdiversity or even hyperdiversity. This increasing diversity of an immigrant population, poses challenges to the limits of target group policies—be they explicit or implicit. The more diverse a policy target group, the more difficult it is to develop tailor made solutions to predominant problems. In a very diverse context, it becomes a sheer impossible undertaking to create subgroups meeting the real composition of the migrant population. Mainstreaming integration policies is put forward as a solution to this problem, or the next logical step in integration governance so as to face the challenges immigrant populations pose in certain cases, because—as the authors argue in the conclusion—'it involves a whole society approach'.

It is interesting to note that both fields put the emphasis on the diversity of the group for which policies should be mainstreamed. While in the case of gender governance the interest in intersectionality is to a large

extent a reaction to the criticism of a very limited understanding of gender, often also biased in terms of race, ethnicity, class and sexuality, in the case of integration governance it is a reaction to an indeed increasingly divergent immigrant population. The need for mainstreaming or for an intersectional focus within mainstreaming is therefore different in the case of integration governance and that of gender governance. Gender mainstreaming policies, on the whole, face a more stable form of diversity of the population for which policies are designed than do mainstreaming integration policies. While the socio-demographic profile of the overall population does not alter very quickly, the socio-demographic composition of immigrant populations undergoes rapid changes, especially at the local level, due to political, economic, environmental and social crises taking place around the globe. Mainstreaming integration policies thus need to integrate a more flexible approach to the target population than do gender mainstreaming initiatives.

Conclusions

However, the question is whether a mainstreaming approach does by definition allow for addressing a very diverse population. The experience of gender mainstreaming shows us that it does not do so. It needs an intersectional focus in order to allow for addressing a diverse group. As the former analyses of equality policies have shown one size does not fit all (Verloo 2006). However, putting an intersectional approach into practice is also difficult (Meier et al. 2016b). Nonetheless, it is probably the biggest challenge for any mainstreaming approach, be it the mainstreaming of gender, of integration policies, of disability, or of any other focus. All policies having targeted specific subgroups of the population in the past have come to the conclusion that, first, only specific sectoral policies for this target group are insufficient so as to book satisfying results in terms of a balanced and inclusive society, and, second, that the target group focused upon by sectoral policies is way more diverse than was initially put forward. Intersectionality is thus more than a buzz word, it is a necessity. Important in this respect might be to reflect upon the putting into practice of an intersectional approach across the various mainstreaming approaches. One of the findings apparent in the previous chapters on mainstreaming integration policies, and which also show in former research on disability mainstreaming (Meier et al. 2016a) is the fact that there are so to speak no exchanges nor any form of cooperation between

different practices and policy cycles of mainstreaming approaches. For instance, disability mainstreaming does not by definition contain a gender perspective in case the same policy level applies a gender mainstreaming approach. This absence of any form of linkages between different mainstreaming approaches might be a heritage from the past, when such policies where sectoral target group policies, and related to the structure and organisation of the field of policy actors and other important players involved. It nonetheless is something to be overcome so as to conceive more fruitful mainstreaming approaches and policies. What will be needed, in the end, is a more comprehensive understanding of the diversity of the population policies target, no matter of whether we speak of integration, of gender or of any other policy focus. The different mainstreaming approaches all tend to see the segment(s) of the population they target as having a secondary status in society. What we need to understand is that many citizens face a secondary or even lesser status. The crucial challenge is to find a way to accommodate for all of these biases and discriminations.

Note

1. In this chapter, I consider gender mainstreaming to be a policy approach. While the early literature on gender mainstreaming much reflected upon whether it was a policy goal, strategy or tool, I treat it as a way of tackling policy problems which is broader than the latter two, but not a goal in itself, even though the move to gender mainstreaming may be defined and experienced as a policy goal in a concrete policy context.

References

Allwood, G. 2014. Gender Mainstreaming and EU Climate Change Policy. *European Integration Online Papers EIOP* 18.

Alston, M. 2009. Drought Policy in Australia: Gender Mainstreaming or Gender Blindness? *Gender, Place and Culture* 16 (2): 139–154.

———. 2014. Gender Mainstreaming and Climate Change. *Women's Studies International Forum* 47: 287–294.

Bacchi, C. 2009. Challenging the Displacement of Affirmative action by Gender Mainstreaming. *Asian Journal of Women's Studies* 15 (4): 7–29.

Bendl, R., and A. Schmidt. 2013. Gender Mainstreaming: An Assessment of Its Conceptual Value for Gender Equality. *Gender, Work and Organization* 20 (4): 364–381.

Benschop, Y., and M. Verloo. 2006. Sisyphus' Sisters: Can Gender Mainstreaming Escape the Genderedness of Organizations? *Journal of Gender Studies* 15 (1): 19–33.

Booth, C., and C. Bennett. 2002. Gender Mainstreaming in the European Union—Towards a New Conception and Practice of Equal Opportunities? *European Journal of Women's Studies* 9 (4): 430–446.

Boserup, E. 1970. *Woman's Role in Economic Development*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Bretherton, C. 2001. Gender Mainstreaming and EU Enlargement: Swimming Against the Tide? *Journal of European Public Policy* 8 (1): 60–81.

Bustelo, M. 2003. Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming. *Evaluation* 9: 383–403.

Collins, P.H. 1990. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and The Politics of Empowerment*. New York: Routledge.

Council of Europe. 1998. *Gender Mainstreaming. Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation of Good Practice*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Daly, M. 2005. Gender Mainstreaming in Theory and Practice. *Social Politics* 12 (3): 433–450.

Debusscher, P. 2010. Gender Mainstreaming in European Commission Development Policy in Asia: A Transformative Tool? *Asian Journal of Women's Studies* 16 (3): 80–111.

De Zwart, F. 2005. The Dilemma of Recognition: Administrative Categories and Cultural Diversity. *Theory and Society* 34 (2): 137–169.

Eveline, J., and P. Todd. 2009. Gender Mainstreaming: The Answer to the Pay Gap? *Gender, Work, and Organization* 16 (5): 536–558.

Freedman, J. 2010. Mainstreaming Gender in Refugee Protection. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23 (4): 589–607.

Greed, C. 2005. An Investigation of the Effectiveness of Gender Mainstreaming as a Means of Integrating the Needs of Women and Men into Spatial Planning in the United Kindgom. *Progress in Planning* 64: 243–321.

Hafner-Burton, E.M., and M.A. Pollack. 2009. Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union: Getting the Incentives Right. *Comparative European Politics* 7 (1): 114–138.

Hankivsky, O. 2016. Is it Time for a Post-Gender Mainstreaming Conversation? Paper presented during the *IPSA RC19 Pre-Congress Workshop on Gender Mainstreaming: Theory and Practice—Research and Teaching*, Poznan, 24/07/2016.

Hippert, C. 2011. Women's Spaces, Gender Mainstreaming, and Development Priorities: Popular Participation as Gendered Work in Rural Bolivia. *Women's Studies International Forum* 34 (6): 498–508.

Jacquot, S. 2010. The Paradox of Gender Mainstreaming: Unanticipated Effects of New Models of Governance in the Gender Equality Domain. *West European Politics* 33 (1): 118–135.

Jahan, R. 1995. *The Elusive Agenda: Mainstreaming Women in Development*. London: Zed Books.

Liebert, U. 2002. Europeanising Gender Mainstreaming: Constraints and Opportunities in the Multilevel Euro-Polity. *Feminist Legal Studies* 10: 241–256.

Lombardo, E. 2005. Mainstreaming Gender Equality in the European Constitution-Making Policy. In *The Making of the European Constitution*, ed. J. Schonlau et al. Houndmills: Macmillan.

Lombardo, E., and P. Meier. 2006. Gender Mainstreaming in the EU: Incorporating a Feminist Reading? *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13 (2): 151–166.

Lombardo, E., P. Meier, and M. Verloo, eds. 2009. *The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality: Stretching, Bending and Policymaking*. Oxford: Routledge.

MacRae, H. 2013. (Re-)Gendering Integration: Unintentional and Unanticipated Gender Outcomes of the European Union policy. *Women's Studies International Forum* 39: 3–11.

Mazey, S. 2000. Introduction: Integrating Gender. Intellectual and 'Real World' Mainstreaming. *Journal of European Public Policy* 7 (3): 333–345.

Meier, P. 2006. Implementing Gender Equality: Gender Mainstreaming or The Gap Between Theory and Practice. In *Women's Citizenship and Political Rights*, ed. S.K. Hellsten, A.M. Holli, and K. Daskalova, 179–198. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Meier, P., and K. Celis. 2011. Sowing the Seeds of Its Own Failure. Implementing the Concept of Gender Mainstreaming. *Social Politics* 18 (4): 469–489.

Meier, P., K. Celis, and H. Huysentruyt. 2016a. Mainstreaming Disability in Policies: The Flemish Experience. *Disability & Society* 31 (9): 1190–1204.

Meier, P., D. Mortelmans, L. Emery, and C. Defever. 2016b. Intersecting Inequalities in the Life of Young Adults: A Reflection on Intersectional Policies. *DiGeSt Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies* 2 (1–2): 57–74.

Mergaert, L., and E. Lombardo. 2014. Resistance to Implementing Gender Mainstreaming in EU Research Policy. *European Integration Online Papers EIOP* 18.

Pollack, M., and E. Hafner-Burton. 2000. Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy* 7: 432–456.

Rees, T. 1998. *Mainstreaming Equality in the European Union: Education, Training, and Labour Market Policies*. New York: Routledge.

———. 2005. Reflections on the Uneven Development of Gender Mainstreaming in Europe. *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7 (4): 555–574.

Rittenhofer, I., and C. Gatrell. 2012. Gender Mainstreaming and Employment in the European Union: A Review and Analysis of Theoretical and Policy Literatures. *International Journal of Management Review* 14 (2): 201–216.

Roggeband, C. 2014. Gender Mainstreaming in Dutch Development Cooperation: The Dialectics of Progress. *Journal of International Development* 26 (3): 332–344.

Rubery, J., et al. 2004. The Ups and Downs of European Gender Equality Policy. *Industrial Relations Journal* 6: 603–628.
Shortall, S. 2015. Gender Mainstreaming and the Common Agricultural Policy. *Gender, Place and Culture* 22 (5): 717–730.
Squires, J. 2005. Is Mainstreaming Transformative? Theorising Mainstreaming in the Context of Diversity and Deliberation. *Social Politics* 12 (3): 366–388.
Stratigaki, M. 2005. Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action: An On-Going Conflict in EU Gender Equality Policy. *European Journal of Women's Studies* 12 (2): 165–186.
True, J., and M. Mintrom. 2001. Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming. *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1): 27–57.
Weldon, L. 2008. Intersectionality. In *Politics, Gender, and Concepts. Theory an Methodology*, ed. A.G. Mazur and G. Goertz, 193–121. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Woodford-Berger, P. 2004. Gender Mainstreaming: What it is (about) and Should We Continue Doing It? *IDS Bulletin* 35 (4): 65–72.
Woodward, A. 2003. European Gender Mainstreaming: Promises and Pitfalls of Transformative Policy Making. *Review of Policy Research* 20 (1): 65–88.
———. 2008. Too Late for Gender Mainstreaming? Taking Stock in Brussels. *Journal of European Social Policy* 18 (3): 289–302.
van Eerdewijk, A., and T. Davids. 2014. Escaping the Mythical Beast: Gender Mainstreaming Reconceptualised. *Journal of International Development* 26 (3): 303–316.
Verloo, M. 2001. Another Velvet Revolution? Gender Mainstreaming and the Politics of Implementation. IWM *Working Paper* No. 5/2001. Vienna: IWM.
———. 2005. Reflections on the Concept and Practice of the Council of Europe Approach to Gender Mainstreaming. *Social Politics* 12 (3): 344–365.
———. 2006. Multiple Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union. *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13 (3): 211–228.

Petra Meier is Full Professor in Politics and chairs the research group Citizenship, Equality & Diversity at the University of Antwerp. Her research focuses on the representation of gender in politics and policies. With respect to policies her work focuses on the gender bias inherent in public policies, including equality policies. She extensively researched how frames and discursive constructions contribute to gender and social inequality, as well as tools to detect and correct a gender bias, in casu gender mainstreaming processes and instruments.

CHAPTER 9

Mainstreaming and Interculturalism's Elective Affinity

Ricard Zapata-Barrero

Introduction: The Intercultural Debate Acquit

The recent debate between multiculturalism and interculturalism probably illustrates that we are witnessing a *process of policy-paradigm change*. A policy paradigm has the role to frame policy-making, and we cannot deny that interculturalism has already attracted many cities and local policy makers from all over Europe and elsewhere (Quebec, most Latin-American countries, Australia, and even now some Asian and Maghreb cities such

Mid-eighteenth century (as elective attraction): originally a technical term for the preferential combination of chemical substances, it was widely used figuratively in the nineteenth century, notably by Goethe (in his novel *Elective Affinities*) and by Weber (in describing the correspondence between aspects of protestantism and capitalism). In its common use 'elective affinity' means: 'A correspondence with, or feeling of sympathy or attraction towards, a particular idea, attitude, or person' English Oxford Living Dictionaries: @OxfordWords https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/elective_affinity

R. Zapata-Barrero (✉)
Social and Political Science Department, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_9

as Tokyo and Tangier).[1] From the point of view of public acceptance, it has even reached a level of consensus between society, policies and politics that does not occur with other paradigms, such as civic nationalism[2] and multiculturalism. As has been argued, the emergence of interculturalism in Europe is directly related to the 'local turn' (see special issue edited by Zapata-Barrero et al. 2017a,b). Namely, there is a common trend in Europe to go from a state-centred to a local-centred approach in diversity policies, where cities are increasingly recognized not only as implementers of policies, but also as new players. This is why it is argued that this local turn produces poly-centric policy-making (Scholten et al. 2016) and can only be understood within the framework of multilevel governance. Interculturalism provides answers for local concerns and this city-based origin is probably one of the factors justifying the adoption of mainstreaming policy strategies (Zapata-Barrero 2017a). By applying the argument in this volume that there are multiple factors explaining the mainstreaming move of diversity policies, I will concentrate on the declining political support for multicultural policies in most European cities (Taras 2012; Lewis 2014).

Mainstreaming's conceptual core refers to incorporating the needs and issues of a particular service into a general area or system and into all aspects of an organization's policy and practice (Chap. 1). Applied to diversity management, it essentially means an overhaul of how we have been doing things in the past and to include a new policy perspective in all that we do. It is here that interculturalism meets the mainstreaming debate of this volume, since its principal aim is to promote *contact zones* among different people in diversity contexts (Zapata-Barrero 2016a: 56). And the dominant policy paradigm of diversity management of 'how we have been doing things in the past' has certainly been multiculturalism.

As a city policy paradigm, one anchor point is its *non-ideological* character, in the sense that the city does not take sides towards a particular ideology from the right-left spectrum. The international network of Intercultural Cities fostered by the Council of Europe[3] has not only shown that it is politically colour-blind, but also that it is resistant to city-government political changes[4] (cf. Chap. 4). It is a fact that interculturalism has more elements of political continuity than multiculturalism, which is not widely accepted by the whole political spectrum and its continuity over time in cities is not fully guaranteed when a change of government occurs. Multicultural policies have always had a certain problem being accepted within the realm of public opinion, even before such policies have been put into action (Crepaz 2006), and interculturalism seems to be

more preventive to negative public opinion (Ludwineck 2015). There is also the technical and administrative argument in justifying that we are beginning a *policy-paradigm formation*, in the sense that interculturalism does not generate immediate social negative effects (such as segregation or separation) that can disturb policy-making plans in the medium or long term (cf. Zapata-Barrero 2017b). It is also a recognized feature in the emerging intercultural literature that one of its limits is that it has a certain, let us say, 'relative conservative' character in the sense that it does not favour radical structural changes that may affect the regular patterns of institutional action on policy. The emerging intercultural policy paradigm does not favour specific structures in society, and focuses on diversity policies on what is common among people from different national and cultural backgrounds, rather than differences. This overall feature which favours some sort of reflective equilibrium between majorities and minorities, paraphrasing G. Bouchard (2015: 58), is sometimes presented with the mainstreaming allegory of a policy lens, a wave with expanding purposes all over the basic structures of society. The only premise required for entering this policy paradigm is the recognition of diversity as an opportunity and as an advantage for the development of the city, as a community asset. This is why diversity-recognition and the diversity-advantage approach are preconditions of interculturalism, as is assumed in scholarly intercultural policy research (cf. Wood 2015; Cantle 2016).

It also belongs to the *intercultural acquit* that this policy paradigm is *sustainable*, both economically and in terms of human resources (Zapata-Barrero 2015b). This basically means that the possibility of implementation is much more a matter of political will and technical motivation (and imagination), than one of human and financial resources. If there is a common guiding thread to all the contributions of this volume, it is the conviction that the financial crisis has forced many governments and administrations to cut the budget originally destined for immigration policies, and forced them to produce immigration policies at zero costs. That mainstreaming is in part a consequence of this context of austerity seems to be a pattern to be considered (see Chaps. 3 and 6).

These *intercultural scholarly acquits* are probably the first point of connection with the emerging mainstreaming debate in migration studies. The current context of an ideological crisis of the multicultural policy paradigm is certainly a contextual factor favouring the *elective affinity* between interculturalism and mainstreaming, to the point that we can say today that mainstreaming is a distinctive feature to the intercultural

policy philosophy. I would even defend the argument that this interface provides interculturalism with a powerful competitive policy tool, solving most of the concerns of policy makers with the multicultural approach. To strengthen this link, I will speak from now about 'Mainstreaming intercultural policy paradigm' as a way to designate a public-policy philosophy that emphasizes both the importance of promoting communication, interpersonal relations and even interactions (the core concept of interculturalism) in all spheres of public life and basic structures of society and for all the components of the diversity dynamics, including nationals and citizens (the core concept of mainstreaming). The logical relationship between them is clear: mainstreaming is one of the core attributes of interculturalism. In practical terms, this means that mainstreaming is the proper policy strategy to achieve interculturalism. Or to put it in the multiculturalism/interculturalism framework of discussion, mainstreaming is the condition of interculturalism and one of its main distinctions in relation to multiculturalism. The way we make visible this relationship is through this concept of 'Mainstreaming intercultural policy' (*MIc* from now onwards).

At this stage of the debate, it is probably difficult, and even adventurous to say what factor(s) provokes the attraction of this policy paradigm, but the fact is that we are in front of two policy trends that coincide in time and space, and even reinforce each other's legitimacy. That is, the interculturalism policy paradigm is justified because it has mainstreaming as its main strategy of implementation, and mainstreaming applied to immigration-related diversity management leads naturally to interculturalism. The affinity between mainstreaming and the intercultural policy paradigm seems then to be self-evident, but probably this needs to be assessed within the theoretical framework of policy-paradigm change. In this scholarly policy debate, *the argument I would like to put forward is that in migration-related diversity management we are in a process of policy-paradigm change, going from a multicultural to an intercultural policy paradigm, and that mainstreaming is a core driver of this process.*

A Process of Policy-Paradigm Change: A Theoretical Framework of Discussion

I propose to follow as a theoretical framework, the emerging literature coming from public-policy studies on *policy-paradigm change*,[5] following the *path-breaking* work of Hall (1993). The generating force of this

literature is that policy paradigms are rather like the scientific paradigms that Th. Kuhn theorized in the last decade. He referred to a series of outcomes that were universally acknowledged by the scientific community that provided them—at least for a while—with patterns of problems and solutions (Kuhn 1962: 14).

The interest in policy paradigms begins with the recognition that ideas are important, and are key to identifying patterns and processes of policy dynamics (Hogan and Howlett 2015: 6). A policy paradigm constitutes a theoretical tool to understand the guiding principles or ideas, to create public policy, to identify the actors involved and to ascertain why they pursue the strategies they do (3). Following Hall (1993) we are in at the start of a third-order change,[6] where the new paradigm is becoming institutionalized by policy makers and politicians, and is being academically legitimated by a great variety of expert scholars. The main theoretical concern of P. Hall was to see whatever paradigm change comes from an interrelation between ideas, discourses and policies. In the case of interculturalism, we can even say that ideas come from practice, since this move of policy paradigm from multiculturalism to interculturalism also illustrates a *pragmatic turn* in diversity studies based on the nuclear idea that contact between different people is politically and socially relevant.[7] A policy paradigm provides some continuity to a policy content and discourse over time, as Hogan and Howlet (2015) remind us. It is a cognitive model shared by a particular community of actors, and which facilitates problem solving. A policy paradigm assumes therefore that ideas are shared by a given community, and it can also be defined as a set of coherent and well-established policy ideas capable of having an impact on the focus and content of a public policy.

Within this theoretical framework, the argument I will put forward, directly related to what P. Hall refers as anomalies from the former paradigm that the new policy paradigm needs to overcome,[8] is that *the mainstreaming approach to immigration policy plays here the role of solving the great part of contested arguments*. This means that the movement from one paradigm to another is likely to involve the accumulation of anomalies, experimentation with new forms of policy, and policy failures that precipitate a shift in the locus of authority over policy and initiate a wider contest between competing paradigms. Adapting Hall's focus on the effect of policy anomalies on policy-paradigm change, as anomalies accumulate, *ad hoc* attempts are generally made to stretch the terms of the paradigm to

cover them, but this gradually undermines the intellectual coherence and precision of the original paradigm. Efforts to deal with such anomalies may also entail experiments to adjust existing lines of policy, but if the paradigm is genuinely incapable of dealing with anomalous developments, these experiments will result in policy failures that gradually undermine the authority of the existing paradigm and its advocates even further. This process will end only when the supporters of a new paradigm secure positions of authority over policy-making and are able to rearrange the organization and standard operating procedures of the policy process so as to institutionalize the new *MIc policy paradigm*.

Framing the Policy-Paradigm Change: Beyond the Immigrant/Citizenship Divide of the Population Narrative Framework—The *Mainstreaming Turn*

In this section, I would like to highlight that the mainstreaming trend in migration policies is driving this policy-paradigm process of change from multiculturalism to interculturalism.

Reviewing the substantial criticisms received by the multicultural policy narrative, it has been accused of being too group-right based and of being the main source of a normative machinery for legitimating specific policies for specific ethnic differences, leaving aside interpersonal relations between people from different backgrounds. The assumption of this policy paradigm has always been that immigrants are cultural bearers of their own countries, and that these distinctions need to be recognized within liberal societies as some form of individual and cultural-group rights. The original focus of Kymlicka (1995) has been the most powerful foundation of this narrative, followed by an explosion of literature within diversity, immigration and citizenship studies.[9] We already know that one of the main efforts of Kymlicka has been to reconcile group-minority cultures with the national group majority, offering a community- or group-based perspective of culture, always taking for granted that culture has a political and social function in fostering the feeling of belonging and even loyalty.[10] Recently, Kymlicka (2016) has also proposed a new framework of discussion linking solidarity and diversity, arguing there is a trend in the debate that says that the increase in immigration, and the multiculturalism policies it often gives rise to, has weakened this sense of national solidarity.

This creates a potential 'progressive's dilemma', forcing a choice between solidarity and diversity. Behind this focus there is the premise called by Banting and Kymlicka as the *corroding effect*, that 'multiculturalism policies are said to erode solidarity because they emphasize differences between citizens, rather than commonalities' (Banting and Kymlicka 2006: 11). B. Turner (2001), from citizenship studies, has also offered a cultural-empowerment, rights-based approach, exemplifying this national-based approach of culture, understood as the capacity to participate effectively and successfully within the national culture.

The epicentre of the debate in Europe is that this multicultural master narrative has neglected the social and political value of the contact hypothesis. The new intercultural policy narrative positions itself in contrast to this (based on substantial insights on the view of ethnicity and collective identity as being self-ascribed, flexible and dynamic) and emphasizes the need for communication. This is why its primary normative force is that it is viewed as a set of arguments sharing one basic idea: that contact among people from different backgrounds matters.

Consequently, interculturalism shares the premise that from a policy point of view, we cannot condemn people by their nationalities and culture of origin to self-identify with a fixed category of cultural identity. Many people simply do not like to be singled out or made to feel an example of their cultural group. This is the most flagrant evidence that the concept of diversity itself is a rather politically constructed category, and is far from neutral. The intercultural narrative expresses the challenge that we need to break this epistemological barrier in part created by the former multicultural narrative. Taking this perspective, we can even say that the multicultural narrative has more in common with civic nationalism (Mouritzen, 2009) and a homogeneous mindset, since it maintains the idea of a primary belonging to one society and a loyalty to just one nation state (Castles 2000: 5). This is why we can state that the multicultural narrative suffers the so-called national methodology that most of the transnational literature denounces (Wimmer and Schiller 2003; Thränhardt and Bommes 2010; Amelina and Faist 2012). civic nationalism and multiculturalism share an interpretative framework of diversity, namely in the way that they categorize attributes such as nationality, race, religion and cultural community in a similar manner. From an intercultural strategy, groups can opt for internal monoculturalism, as the multicultural policy paradigm promotes, or external interculturalism (Fanning 2002). The multicultural narrative to my knowledge has never formulated a critical interpretative

framework regarding the way homogeneous cultural and national states categorize diversity dynamics. The intercultural argument is that we cannot impose the majoritarian understanding of diversity categories on others. Ethnicity is self-ascribed, flexible and cannot be imposed by those with the power to define diversity categories. Ethnicity, understood as national self-identification, concerns the categories of ascription. Ethnic boundaries are also places of social interactions. The intercultural narrative reacts against the process of the political ethnicization of people. This substantial criticism of the multicultural narrative in the domains of ethnicity, nationalism and race is very close to what Brubaker calls 'groupism', namely, 'the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed' (2002: 164), or even 'solitarism' by A. Sen (2006: xii–xiii), criticizing this tendency to reduce people to singular, differentiated identity affiliations, to 'miniaturize' people into one dimension of their multiple identities.

This leads me to mention what I call the 'immigrant/citizenship divide' that has dominated the diversity debate in migration studies. What interests me from this divide is the consequence of always reproducing a certain discourse where 'we' citizens are not the object of diversity policies. That is, the fact that in the policy-making process, the division of the population between citizens and non-citizens, nationals and non-nationals, immigrants and citizens has always had the assumption of reproducing a certain power relation between the majority citizen and a minority ethnic. Instead of creating bridges among these two sets of people, this division actually consolidates separation in the same category of diversity and the same policy, which has been mainly aimed at one part of the population: be it immigrants, non-nationals, ethnic minorities or whatever depending on countries and contexts.

The multicultural-based diversity narrative has contributed to reinforcing this division of the population. And we know from migration studies that what is really specific to immigration are basically three main stages of the migratory process: admission policies, reception policies and citizenship policies. The other policies, basically those that manage diversity accommodation, settlement and incorporation of immigrants into the main public sectors have been treated specifically but belong to policies that are also targeting citizens. So if there is some justification to the targeting of citizens with specific policies, it is because there are discriminatory reasons or reasons due to diversity (basically, language, religion, culture, physical differences having a social meaning). The specific has been centred on

differences within the diversity framework, and not the specific related to the concrete situations that an immigrant will encounter in his/her process of incorporation. The fact that the immigrant does not have political rights is specific to immigrants and has nothing to do with diversity. The idea that diversity must be based on the competences of immigrants and also on the context is what drives the concept of super-diversity, which is quite different from the concept of diversity as has been understood from multiculturalism. Mainstreaming policy directly breaks this narrative framework differentiating immigrants from citizens, and incorporating all the population as an object of policy. This is so substantial to the point that maybe we need to leave aside the name of immigration policy as a policy only aimed at migrants, and speak rather on mainstreaming policy, which has the feature of including all into the scope of diversity policies.

These trends therefore frame the policy-paradigm formation of *MIc* in cities. But as I have already explained, behind a policy paradigm there is a determinate way to identify what Hall called 'anomalies'. It is towards this philosophy that I now direct the reader.

MIc Policy-Paradigm Main Philosophy: Problem-Solving Approach and the Pragmatic Turn on Diversity Management

In targeting the broad population and incorporating diversity concerns within the general public-policy focus, the intercultural approach features the main dimensions of a mainstreaming policy and also seeks to be incorporated into policy-making at all city levels and in all departments (see Chap. 1). Let us say it has a mainstreaming purpose. The final goal is to create public services that are attuned to the needs of the whole population, regardless of their background. It has also been recently defined as an effort to reach people with a migration background through needs-based social programming and policies that also target the general population (Collet and Petrovic 2014: 2).

It is in this sense that we may say that *MIc* becomes a new policy paradigm, since it frames the focus of several public policies, and even all basic pillars of the structure of local societies, both through *mainstreaming public discourse* which explicitly incorporates intercultural priorities into other goals, such as social inclusion, cohesion, tradition and political stability narratives, and through *mainstreaming governance* involving coordinating

a range of public and civil society actors participating in the policy-making, either horizontally (by involving other policy departments at the same level) or vertically (by distributing responsibilities across multiple territorial levels of government). As a policy paradigm, *MIc* refers then to the adaptations of general policies that incorporate intercultural priorities. This policy adaptation is designed to better serve the diverse populations that benefit from public policies by responding to their specific needs rather than preconceptions of the needs of national cultural groups.

If we take, for instance, the categories indexing intercultural cities (ICC),[11] we see that it has both an integral dimension and an expansive scope in all the main spheres of the society (from media, to governance, public spheres, mediators and other city realms). Interculturalism features this mainstreaming approach in the sense that it does not legitimize any specific policy justified in ethnic and whatever cultural-group terms. As Cantle (2012) insists, interculturalism seeks to go beyond any racial specific claim. Interculturalism as a mainstreaming policy is then a departure from ethnicity-based diversity paradigms, which are also blind to the internal diversity and stratification of ethnic groups and fail to address the key challenge of integration of second generations through social mobility and full citizenship.

This policy paradigm has also been named *intercultural integration* (Guidikova 2015) and can be the basis of the Intercultural citizenship approach (Zapata-Barrero 2016a). This dimension is important. The accommodation of diversity and incorporation of immigrants has been thought of as always connecting the immigrant with the general pattern of the society, through reception policies at the beginning and throughout different public sectors. Now the fact that interculturalism becomes a policy paradigm also means for current integration policies' debates, that it assumes the premise that integration is better performed by fostering communication and interactions among people from different backgrounds. Integration is not done in a unique way or through a set of public sector avenues, but through a network of many avenues placing people in the public sphere and the web of relations in everyday life (Wood 2015). This further assumes another hypothesis, that mainstreaming interculturalism helps to achieve social integration.

By placing our view within this interplay, we can also state that *MIc* illustrates a certain *pragmatic turn* in how to deal with diversity dynamics. The public philosophy behind this rejects any presocial categorization of people into whatever cultural and ethnic attributes. Furthermore, it refuses to take group differences as a criterion for policy design. It

focuses on differences rather than on what is common among people. Consequently, this approach leaves autonomy to people to choose their own cultural identities and rank their multiple (transnational) identities. It is in this sense that *MIc* has to be interpreted as the most pragmatic answer to concrete diversity-based concerns. It is within this pragmatic logic that we can incorporate socio-economic inequality constraints as well. Here, we may find some limits to this new policy-paradigm formation. A major challenge across European cities is precisely the lack of physical contact between different groups, and it is hard to draw a sharp line between class and ethnic/immigrant status as determining social disadvantage. Poor national and immigrant-origin citizens typically cohabit the least attractive housing areas; this points to some degree of 'interaction' in these kinds of dwellings. Thus, we could legitimately ask, why would interaction necessarily lead to better relationships, especially in times of financial crisis and increased competition over jobs? Despite having argued that promoting interpersonal contact is important, it is also crucial to problematize this question and the significance of the context in which these relations would take place (what we may call *contact zones*). This is a significant point, since it highlights that *MIc* is a proximate policy, always performance oriented, with the aim of inverting diversity's negative impact and of promoting a view of diversity as an opportunity and advantage for personal and social development as a community asset.

According to the policy-paradigm change debate, the problem-solving dimension is an essential feature. It is in the very nature of *MIc* formation to follow this approach. This is the case, for instance, of G. Bouchard himself, who recognizes that his last book (2015) summarizes his own position after the much-discussed practical and public debate of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). Cantle, meanwhile, has been a key player in policy orientations surrounding the British government's concern for local social disturbances in northern towns in August 2011. These events directly linked social conflicts with the failure of British multicultural policy. His book *Community Cohesion* (2008), based on a first approach presented in a previous report (the so-called Cantle Report 2001), proposes reducing tension in local communities by promoting cross-cultural contact and by developing support for diversity and promoting unity. This work has had a direct influence on changing state behaviour and policy focus in Britain. Ph. Wood (2004) and other interculturalists connected, to different degrees, to the Intercultural Cities Programme (Council of Europe 2008) are policy-oriented practitioners,

coming from urban and management studies, as well as sociology, anthropology and political science. To my knowledge, multiculturalism has not shown such policy-oriented attractiveness at the city level in such a relatively short time. There is empirical evidence that we are seeing an interculturalist wave, but we cannot say that there is a multiculturalist wave in cities. I would even contend that cities opting for the intercultural approach are aware, as has been so brilliantly illustrated by one of the foundational documents of the Intercultural Cities Programme of the Council of Europe, that 'one of the defining factors that will determine, over coming years, which cities flourish and which decline will be the extent to which they allow their diversity to be their asset, or their handicap. Whilst national and supra-national bodies will continue to wield an influence it will increasingly be the choices that cities themselves make which will seal their future' (Council of Europe 2008: 22).

MIc is a More Appropriate Framework for Dealing with the Complexity of Current Super-Diverse Societies and Transnational Minds[12]

Until now, we have examined this policy-paradigm change as a reaction against a former multicultural policy paradigm. It is now time to stop looking in the rear-view mirror and look forward. At this stage, I would like to highlight that most of the former features are process-dependent on current social and political dynamics, and can be considered as the outcome of the rising awareness that any diversity category also needs to be incorporated into the mainstreaming public culture. As I said earlier, without this precondition of diversity-recognition and diversity-advantage awareness, interculturalism will have difficulties to gain authority as a policy paradigm.

As is argued in this volume, there is certainly a link between the emergent interest on mainstreaming and super-diversity literature (Chap. 6), in the sense that mainstreaming is an appropriate policy strategy in situations where specific policies are no longer feasible. I here state that this new contextual diagnosis is also shared by interculturalism, which incorporates the fact of transnationalism, or the evidence that people could have different national identities without being willing to rank them, even if certain contexts force them to decide which is preferable to activate. We know that although there is a pending debate between transnationalism

and multiculturalism, there is also a positive relation ('affinity' in my own terms) between interculturalism and transnationalism. If the rough idea of transnationalism is to live with at least two identities, to have a bicultural mind, then this internal dialogue of transnational people is by itself an intercultural internal dialogue. This is why there is probably a link between transnational minds and intercultural minds that need to be explored empirically. The hypothesis of course is that transnational people tend to be more intercultural, and that transnational people tend to favour mainstreaming intercultural policies.

With regard to the field of immigrant integration, contemporary discussions on super-diversity (Vertovec 2007) suggest that there are now so many different and heterogeneous migrant groups that single out specific target groups for policies that it has become too complex and ineffective (Chap. 6). This is connected to the framing of the globalization process, as Cantle (2012) rightly views it. The fact is that there is no universal ranking of identities. Identities arise in given practices and according to determinate contexts. If I go to see a football match, my identity as a supporter will come first, but in other contexts, other identities would emerge first. To rank identities without taking context into account is what certain multiculturalists seem to promote, as if there were primary identities that are permanently active in any given context. In the same vein, a diversity of loyalties amidst growing global mobility and increasing cross-border human movement is becoming the rule. The new debate on super-diversity also belongs to this track of incorporating complexity into diversity studies (Vertovec 2014), as does the literature on network societies arising from the seminal work of Castells (2010), showing that the question of personal identity is much more connected to how people relate to each other, rather than the traditional 'Who am I?' based on where I was born (territory) or who my parents are (descent). We can even add some generational arguments of intercultural conflict. People already socialized into diverse societies are facing the challenge of reconciling national and city identities on the one hand, with different cultural strands and multiple identities in everyday social life on the other (Crul et al. 2012). The multicultural policy-paradigm debate has difficulties here to incorporate the practical implications of these new trends that were first academically articulated by sociologists and demographers.

From the above section, it follows that the multicultural policy paradigm is becoming out of tune with complex new diversity dynamics that demand a focus on interpersonal relations, rather than on agents seen as

cultural bearers of their own national origin. It follows that *MIc* is a better tool for dealing with the complexity of our super-diverse societies, with transnational and multiple identities and cultural affiliations. It has a much more dynamic view of ethnicity and assumes the interactive nature of culture, instead of a simplistic, ready-made view of current diverse societies, as multiculturalists illustrate. Culture is interactive, following again Brubaker's (2002: 167) statement: 'Ethnicity, race and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals—as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded and enduring "groups" encourages us to do—but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms.' This also means that a category of diversity does not entail a group. A category of diversity, such as religion, language and so on, can be a potential basis for group formation or 'groupness', but it must be initially treated from above as a set of individuals, without any entailed generalization. For instance, a Moroccan person is not necessarily a Muslim. In essence, the multicultural policy-paradigm paradox is that it tends to view groups in terms of nationality, and from there assumes a culture and a religion, without asking people about personal religious or cultural experiences in their everyday lives in a context that has not been constructed with this assumption. *MIc* is about asking first how people sense their identities, and it then respects their self-identification. Its premise is that we cannot impose our ethnic categories onto others. This also includes a respect for the diversity of identities within the same national cultural category. I am thinking, for instance, that even if Morocco does not recognize cultural diversity among their own nationals (for instance, Amazigh or Berber culture), the multicultural policy paradigm followed by certain societies contributes to this homogenization of Moroccan culture by being too national-dependent in ascribing the cultural identities of people of Moroccan origin. Reality seems again to contradict some assumptions of the multicultural policy paradigm. It is here that the policy-anomaly identification plays a role in analysing policy-paradigm change from multiculturalism to interculturalism.

Conclusions: The Advantages of *MIc*

The debate of *policy-paradigm change* is neither only centred on the changing features of a policy focus, nor only interested in identifying the explanatory factors and patterns that give light to the reasons of

this change, but also on the benefits, which play an important role for definitively consolidating the policy-paradigm formation. The debate on the benefits of interculturalism is maybe consubstantial to its same emergence, since one of the key dimensions is to consider diversity as an opportunity and a community asset. It is certainly here that the descriptive meaning of interculturalism leaves room in the normative sense. The descriptive sense tells us that interculturalism is a policy that basically seeks to favour contact zones and to foster contact among people from different backgrounds. There can be different degrees of contact, from a simple circumstantial encounter, to a dialogue and communication, exchange, collaboration and interdependent relations and even inter-actions (involving sharing a common project of action). The normative drivers of interculturalism are multifaceted: the most important one is certainly the social hypothesis which says that interculturalism fosters more inclusion and cohesion in diverse societies, and the political hypothesis emphasizing more the fact that interculturalism contributes to stability and the formation of a shared common public culture and tradition (see Zapata-Barrero 2015a).

The diversity-advantage approach of interculturalism (Wood and Landry 2008)[13] certainly emerges assuming the *economic development hypothesis* leading the debate, surely due because this approach has been imported to intercultural studies from economics and business. This line of discussion fits very well with other existing migration studies following the classical view on the economic benefits of immigration (Borjas 1995). The argument that the intercultural policy paradigm contributes to cities' economic development is really a powerful hypothesis which is still in the process of producing more case studies and comparative research.[14] But this economic development hypothesis is maybe less connected to the mainstreaming dimension of the intercultural policy paradigm.

This is why I think there is a need to further research on a less explored field of research: the *xenophobia-reduction hypothesis*. Roughly speaking, the argument is that *MIc* can contribute to reducing the space of anti-immigration populism and be a tool for anti-racism policies.[15]

It is maybe in this hypothesis that the argument I defend in this chapter also becomes prominent. The key idea here is that mainstreaming contributes not only to the process of policy change from multiculturalism to interculturalism, but also reinforces the *xenophobia-reduction hypothesis*,

namely reducing ethno-national narratives, racism, prejudice, false stereotypes and negative public opinions, which restricts reasons for contact between people from different backgrounds. It is here that many programmes, which are aimed at fighting rumours, prejudices and negative perceptions towards diversity are in expansion in Europe (see Antirumours Networks for Diversity, http://pjp-eu.coe.int/en/web/c4i). This hypothesis is related to a line of thought seeking the conditions for reducing spaces of xenophobia and racism. The non-ideological feature of this policy paradigm, and hence its potential for neutrality, also reinforces it, as I pointed out at the beginning. We can also say that even if mainstreaming and interculturalism is a strategic non-neutral decision it has impartiality as its main justification in not favouring any specific ethnic circumstances.

The operationalization of this hypothesis is still to be done, and can take different levels of analysis. From a political party point of view, the hypothesis can mean that intercultural cities tend to leave no place for political parties with clear national xenophobic narratives. From a public opinion perspective, it can also mean that once the intercultural policy has been put in place, the negative attitudes towards diversity tend to reduce also. In addition, we know that some of the main discursive frameworks of xenophobia are social welfare, identity and security (Helbling 2012), which raise the question that multiculturalism, as it generates specific policies, contributes to in-group monoculturalism and could also be at the forefront of prejudices and rumours related to immigration that are directly hyper-emphasized by xenophobic parties. So probably the main argument that can consolidate these emerging trends of mainstreaming and interculturalism is that universal policies can contribute to reducing the two main drivers of xenophobic narrative: specific policies increase (a) public budgets for (b) a privileged cultural-differentiated group of people. The near future of course needs to do further research on strengthening this dimension, namely that *MIc* is a strategic anti-racist tool.[16] It even becomes more prominent today to explore this link given the context of rising radicalization in most xenophobic narratives. So, even if it is a newcomer in the debates over diversity management, *MIc* certainly needs to show its power of seduction for policy makers ('authority power' in Hall's terms), who basically understand that this approach contributes to reducing the main factors of negative public opinion, the rise of xenophobia and anti-immigrant discourses (Zapata-Barrero 2011). *MIc* can be considered as a tool for the main concern in

European countries today: extremism: political and social xenophobia on the one hand and terrorist attacks and Islamism on the other hand. The consolidation of this evidence will also certainly consolidate *MIc* as an appropriate policy paradigm for managing post-urban super-diverse societies.

Notes

1. For instance, the intercultural cities network promoted by the Council of Europe counts on more than 100 cities, without including national networks in Spain, Italy, Norway, Ukraine, Portugal, and Morocco.
2. On civic nationalism, see Joppke (2004, 2007), Baubock & Joppke (2010), Meer et al. (2015); Mouritzen (2008, 2011); Zapata-Barrero (2009).
3. See the website: http://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/home.
4. Most intercultural cities have passed the test of elections and changing leadership, as I. Guidikova (2015) and Zapata-Barrero (2016b) have indicated, among others.
5. See, among the seminal ones, J. Hogan and M. Howlett eds. 2015; Baumgartner, 2013; Daigneault, 2014, M. Wilder and M. Howlett, 2014:, Carson, Burns, Calvo, 2009.
6. P. Hall (1993) distinguished three orders of policy change: first-order change affecting instruments settings, second-order change affecting policy instruments and goals hierarchy, and third-order change affecting simultaneously settings, instruments and goals hierarchy.
7. The relevant dimensions stressing commonalities and differences are the basic focus of N. Meer, T. Modood and R. Zapata-Barrero, eds. 2016. See also R. Zapata-Barrero contribution in this volume, 2016.
8. P. Hall (1993) highlights, like scientific paradigms, a policy paradigm can be threatened by the appearance of anomalies, namely by developments of outcomes (such as segregation in our case taking the multicultural policy paradigm) that are not fully comprehensible, even as puzzles, within the terms of the paradigm.
9. See, for instance, B. Parekh (2000), B. Barry (2001), N. Stevenson (ed. 2001) and E.F. Isin and B.S. Turner (eds. 2002), T. Modood, A. Triandafyllidou, and R. Zapata-Barrero (eds. 2006), A. Phillips (2007), T. Modood (2007), S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf (eds. 2010), R. Taras (2012), G. Crowder (2013), V. Uberoi and T. Modood (eds. 2015).
10. See, for instance, a summary of his focus in Kymlicka (2012). With some variants we can also mention J. Carens (2000) and B. Parekh (2000), and even T. Modood (2007), falling also within this broad perspective of culture that is national based.

11. See http://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/about-the-index.
12. I update some of the findings in intercultural citizenship chapter. See R. Zapata-Barrero (2016).
13. The concept of diversity advantage has been introduced by the UK think tank Comedia directed by Ph. Wood (see), mainly inspired by G.P. Zachary's (2003) seminal work.
14. See, among others, A. Alesina and E. LaFerrara (2005), M. Janssens et al. (eds. 2009), E. Bellini et al. (2009), Bakbasel (2011), K. Khovanova-Rubicondo and D. Pinelli (2012), A. Wagner (2015).
15. The first time I defended this argument was in a discussion paper. See R. Zapata-Barrero (2011).
16. The anti-racist dimension of interculturalism has been examined in depth by education studies. P.J.S Gundara (2000) incorporates, for instance, the argument that intercultural education is a remedy against racism, xenophobia and anti-immigration rhetoric (see his chap. 5, 105–144), and that interculturalism is a strategy to build a common and shared value system (chap. 7, 145–160). See also Gundara (2005). It is also applied in the policy studies only recently (R. Pinxten and M. Cornelis, 2002; B. Ravinder, 2012; J. Carr, 2016) and as a key strategic line by some national plans, such as the debated Irish one (B. Fanning, 2002), which seeks to foster positive local interculturalism to inform place-based anti-racism interventions.

References

Alesina, A., and E. LaFerrara. 2005. Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance. *Journal of Economic Literature* 43: 762–800.

Amelina, A., and T. Faist. 2012. De-Naturalizing the National in Research Methodologies: Key Concepts of Transnational Studies in Migration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35 (10): 1707–1724.

Bakbasel. 2011. *Correlation Study between the Intercultural City Index and Other Data*. Basel. http://www.coe.int

Banting, K., and W. Kymlicka. 2006. Introduction: Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Setting the Context. In *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*, ed. K. Banting and W. Kymlicka, 1–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barry, B. 2001. *Culture and Identity: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bauböck, R., and C. Joppke., eds. 2010. How Liberal are Citizenship Tests? *EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/41*. Florence, Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, European University Institute.

Baumgartner, F. 2013. Ideas and Policy Change. *Governance* 26 (2): 239–258.

Bellini, E., G.I.P. Ottaviano, D. Pinelli, and G. Prarolo. 2009. Diversity, Cities and Economic Development. In *Sustainable Cities. Diversity, Economic Growth, Social Cohesion*, ed. Janssens M.D. Pinelli, D.C. Reymen, and S. Wallman. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Borjas, G. 1995. The Economic Benefits of Immigration. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9: 3–22.

Bouchard, G. 2015. *Interculturalism: A View from Quebec*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Bouchard, G., and Ch. Taylor. 2008. *Building the Future, a Time for Reconciliation: Abridged Report*. Québec: Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accomodement reliées aux différences culturelles.

Brubaker, R. 2002. Ethnicity Without Groups. *European Journal of Sociology* 43 (2): 163–189.

Cantle, T. 2016. The Case for Interculturalism, Plural Identities and Cohesion. In *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines*, ed. N. Meer, T. Modood, and R. Zapata-Barrero, 133–157. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Carens, J. 2000. *Culture, Citizenship, and Community*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Carson, M., T.R. Burns, and D. Calvo. 2009. *Public Policy Paradigms: Theory and Practice of Paradigm Shifts in the European Union*. Frankfurt and New York: Peter Lang.

Carr, J. 2016. *Experiences of Islamophobia: Living with Racism in the Neoliberal Era*. Oxon and New York: Routledge.

Castles, S. 2000. *Ethnicity and Globalization: From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen*. London: Sage.

Castells, M. 2010. *The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*, vol. I, 2nd ed., with a New Preface. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Collet, E., and M. Petrovic. 2014. *The Future of Immigrant Integration in Europe: Mainstreaming Approaches for Inclusion*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute.

Council of Europe. 2008. *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue "Living Together As Equals in Dignity"*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Crepaz, M. 2006. If You Are My Brother, I May Give You a Dime! Public Opinion on Multiculturalism, Trust and the Welfare State. In *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*, ed. K. Banting and W. Kymlicka, 90–120. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crowder, G. 2013. *Theories of Multiculturalism: An Introduction*. Oxford: Politics.

Crul, M., J. Schneider, and F. Lelie. 2012. *The European Second Generation Compared Does the Integration Context Matter?* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Daigneault, P.-M. 2014. Reassessing the Concept of Policy Paradigm: Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Policy Studies. *Journal of European Public Policy* 21 (3): 453–469.

Fanning, B. 2002. *Racism and Social Change in the Republic of Ireland*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Guidikova, I. 2015. Intercultural Integration: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity as an Advantage. In *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*, ed. R. Zapata-Barrero, 136–151. Cheltenham: Edward-Elgar Publishing.

Gundara, P.J.S. 2000. *Interculturalism, Education and Inclusion*. London: Sage Publications.

Gundara, J.S. 2005. Racism and Intercultural Issues in Urban Europe. In *Racism in Metropolitan Areas*, ed. R. Pinxten and E. Preckler, 113–126. New York and London: Berghahn Books.

Hall, P. 1993. Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain. *Comparative Politics* 25 (3): 275–296.

Helbling, M., ed. 2012. *Islamophobia in Western Europe and North America*. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis.

Hogan, J., and M. Howlett, eds. 2015. *Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice: Discourses, Ideas and Anomalies in Public Policy Dynamics*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian.

Intercultural Cities Program (ICC Index): http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/culture-heritage/culture/Cities/Default_en.asp

Isin, E.F., and B.S. Turner, eds. 2002. *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*. London: Sage.

Janssens, M., D. Pinelli, D.C. Reymen, and S. Wallman, eds. 2009. *Sustainable Cities. Diversity, Economic Growth, Social Cohesion*. London, UK: Edward Elgar.

Joppke, C. 2004. The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *British Journal of Sociology* 55: 237–257.

———. 2007. Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics* 30 (1): 1–22.

Khovanova-Rubicondo, K., and D. Pinelli. 2012. Evidence of the Economic and Social Advantages of Intercultural Cities Approach. Paper, March. https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/Source/Cities/Review.doc

Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. 1st ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kymlicka, W. 1995. *Multiculturalism: A Liberal View of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2012. Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future. Migration Policy Institute, February. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM-Multiculturalism-Web.pdf

———. 2016. Solidarity in Diverse Societies: Beyond Neoliberal Multiculturalism and Welfare Chauvinism. *Comparative Migration Studies* 3 (17): 2–19. doi:10.1186/s40878-015-0017-4.

Lewis, R. 2014. The 'Death' of State Multiculturalism: Examining Political Discourse in Post-2010 Europe. In *Identities and Borders: Interculturalism, the Construction of Identity*, ed. R. Blake and N. Walthrust-Jones, 3–19. Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press.

Ludwineck, A. 2015. European Intercultural Mindset—What Can the Attitudes and Perceptions of Europeans on Intercultural Dialogue, Integration and Discrimination Tell the Local Policymakers. In *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*, ed. R. Zapata-Barrero, 97–114. Cheltenham: Edward-Elgar Publishing.

Meer, N., P. Mouritsen, D. Faas, and N. de Witte. 2015. Examining 'Postmulticultural' and Civic Turns in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, and Denmark. *American Behavioural Scientist*. doi:10.1177/0002764214566496.

Meer, N., T. Modood, and R. Zapata-Barrero, eds. 2016. *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Modood, T. 2007. *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Modood, T., A. Triandafyllidou, and R. Zapata-Barrero, eds. 2006. *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach*. London: Routledge.

Mouritsen, P. 2008. Political Responses to Cultural Conflict: Reflections on the Ambiguities of the Civic Turn. In *Constituting Communities: Political Solutions to Cultural Conflict*, ed. P. Mouritsen and K.E. Jørgensen, 1–30. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2011. Beyond Post-national Citizenship. Access, Consequence, Conditionality. In *European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges*, ed. A. Triandafyllidou, T. Modood, and N. Meer, 88–115. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press.

———. 2013. The Resilience of Citizenship Traditions: Civic Integration in Germany, Great Britain and Denmark. *Ethnicities* 13 (1): 86–109.

Mouritzen, P. 2009. The Culture of Citizenship. A Reflection on Civic Integration in Europe. In *Citizenship Policies in the Age of Diversity: Europe at the Crossroads*, ed. R. Zapata-Barrero, 23–35. Barcelona: CIDOB Edicions. Accessed May 2017. http://dcpis.upf.edu/~ricard-zapata/~ricardzapata/gritim_cidob_monograph_2008.pdf

Parekh, B. 2000. *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Phillips, A. 2007. *Multiculturalism without Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pinxten, R., and M. Cornelis. 2002. What Interculturalism Could Bring a Solution to Racism? In *Europe's New Racism: Causes, Manifestations, and Solutions*, ed. Evens Foundation, 211–232. New York and London: Berghahn Books.

Ravinder, B. 2012. Interculturalism in Europe: Fact, Fad or Fiction—the Deconstruction of a Theoretical Idea. In *Unedited Workshop Proceedings: Debating Multiculturalism 1* (Conference Papers): Dialogue Society Publication. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277952735

Scholten, P., E. Collett, and M. Petrovic. 2016, March. Mainstreaming Migrant Integration? A Critical Analysis of a New Trend in Integration Governance. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. doi:10.1177/0020852315612902.

Sen, A. 2006. *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, Issues of Our Time. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Stevenson, N. 2001. *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions*. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, McGraw-Hill.

Taras, R. 2012. *Challenging Multiculturalism: European Models of Diversity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Thränhardt, D., and M. Bommes, eds. 2010. *National Paradigms of Migration Research*. Osnabrück: IMIS.

Turner, B. 2001. Outline of a General Theory of Citizenship. In *Culture and Citizenship*, ed. N. Stevenson, 11–32. London: Sage.

Uberoi, V., and T. Modood, eds. 2015. *Multiculturalism Rethought: Interpretations, Dilemmas and New Directions*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Vertovec, S. 2007. Super-Diversity and Its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (6): 1024–1054.

———., ed. 2014. *Migration and Diversity*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Vertovec, S., and S. Wessendorf, eds. 2010. *Backlash Against Multiculturalism in Europe: Public Discourse, Policies and Practices*. London: Routledge.

Wagner, A. 2015. Measuring Intercultural Policies: The Example of the Intercultural Cities Index. In *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*, ed. R. Zapata-Barrero, 115–135. Cheltenham: Edward-Elgar Publishing.

Wilder, M., and M. Howlett. 2014. The Politics of Policy Anomalies: Bricolage and the Hermeneutics of Paradigms. *Critical Policy Studies* 8 (2): 183–202.

Wimmer, A., and N.G. Schiller. 2003. Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology. *International Migration Review* 37 (3): 576–610.

Wood, P. 2004. *The Intercultural City Reader*. Stroud: Comedia.

———. 2015. Meet Me on the Corner? Shaping the Conditions for Cross-Cultural Interaction in Urban Public Space. In *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*, ed. R. Zapata-Barrero. Cheltenham: Edward-Elgar Publishing.

Wood, P., and C. Landry. 2008. *The Intercultural City: Planning for Diversity Advantage*. London: Earthscan.

Zachary, P. 2003. *The Diversity Advantage: Multicultural Identity in the New World Economy*. Boulder: Westview.

Zapata-Barrero, R. 2009. *Citizenship Policies in the Age of Diversity: Europe at the Crossroads*. Barcelona: CIDOB Edicions.

———. 2011. Anti-immigration Populism: Can Local Intercultural Policies Close the Space? *Discussion Paper, Policy Network*, London. http://dcpis.upf.edu/~ricard-zapata/~ricardzapata/Policynetwork. interculturalism.discussion.paper-1.pdf

———. 2015a. Interculturalism: Main Hypothesis, Theories and Strands. In *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*, ed. R. Zapata-Barrero, 3–19. Cheltenham: Edward-Elgar Publishing.

———. 2015b. Conclusions: Three Building Blocks for Taking Interculturalism Seriously. In *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*, ed. R. Zapata-Barrero, 185–196. Cheltenham: Edward-Elgar Publishing.

———. 2016b. Intercultural Governance Index: An Exploratory Study on Spanish Cities. In *Mondi Migranti: Rivista di studi e ricerche sulle migrazioni internazionali*, Issue 2. Milano: FrancoAngeli.

———. 2017a. Multi-level Intercultural Governance in Barcelona: Mainstreaming Comprehensive Approach. In *Symposium on Theorizing 'The Local Turn' in the Governance of Immigrant Policies: A Multi-level Approach*, ed. R. Zapata-Barrero, T. Caponio and P. Scholten. *International Review of Administrative Sciences (IRAS)* 83 (2). doi:10.1177/0020852315592962.

———. 2017b. The Intercultural Turn in Europe: Process of Policy Paradigm Change and Formation. In *The Promise and Challenge of Intercultural Dialogue: From Theory to Policy and Practice*, ed. F. Mansouri, Chap. 4, 169–193. Paris: UNESCO Publishers.

Zapata-Barrero, R., Caponio, T., and P. Scholten. 2017a. Introduction: Theorizing the 'Local Turn' in a Multilevel Governance Framework of Analysis. A Case Study in Immigrant Policies. In *Symposium on Theorizing 'The Local Turn' in the Governance of Immigrant Policies: A Multilevel Approach*, ed. R. Zapata-Barrero, T. Caponio, and P. Scholten. *International Review of Administrative Sciences (IRAS)* 83 (2).

———., eds. 2017b. Symposium on Theorizing 'The Local Turn' in the Governance of Immigrant Policies: A Multi-level Approach. *International Review of Administrative Sciences (IRAS)* 83 (2).

Ricard Zapata-Barrero is a professor at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, *Universitat Pompeu Fabra* (Barcelona-Spain). His main lines of research deal with contemporary issues of liberal democracy in contexts of diversity, especially the relationship between democracy, citizenship and immigration. He is Director of GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration) and has the master's in Migration Studies from UPF. He is an expert for the Intercultural Cities Programme of the Council of Europe.

CHAPTER 10

Mainstreaming and Superdiversity: Beyond More Integration

Fran Meissner

The emergent literature on mainstreaming immigrant integration frequently references the term 'superdiversity'. The diversification of migration is put forward as one rationale for implementing measures to support immigrant integration across policy fields and across levels of policy making. Research into superdiversity has successfully increased the recognition and study of the complex webs of multiple differentiations that international migration entails and inscribes in local diversities. Superdiversity offers an alternative to equating migration-related diversity with a multiplicity of putatively cohesive origin or ethnic groups—indeed it helps move beyond category-focused approaches to making sense of migration-driven and migrant-led diversity (Meissner 2016; Ye 2016a).

Thinking through a superdiversity lens assists in accounting for contemporary configurations of urban and increasingly also rural population dynamics by going beyond cultural difference as a focal concern. Not directly targeting any putative group and choosing to make migration-related

F. Meissner (✉)
Institute for Urban Development, University of Kassel, Kassel, Germany

Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment OTB, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_10

diversity a concern across areas and levels of policy making is promising. As this book documents, in practice it is not an easy feat. In this chapter and against the backdrop of the aforegone empirical work, I ask how else, beyond being a rationale for mainstreaming, thinking about superdiversity might add to the presented debates. I primarily advance the argument that a superdiversity lens is uniquely placed to critically examine whether the goal of mainstreaming should be integration.

I start the chapter with a brief introduction to superdiversity. I emphasise that the term is not synonymous with more diversity and that the notion instead challenges presumptions about more diversity requiring more integration work. In the second section, I reflect on the conclusions of the book's empirical chapters to highlight a number of fault lines at odds with seeing mainstreaming integration—the way it is currently implemented—as an adequate response to the emergence of superdiversity. I here come to the conclusion that efforts to mainstream integration rarely respond to ideas about complex interconnections of difference—a central facet of superdiversity. Instead what integration means is left vague and the goal of integrating migrants becomes a maxim and a putatively necessary characteristic of a good post-migration society.

In the third section, I discuss why mainstreaming practices may suffer from the murkiness of what integration in superdiverse contexts is or ought to be—it neglects the continued stigma associated to the term and the effectiveness of invoking and measuring integration. I thus shift the discussion's focus to the connection between superdiversity and integration. Should it be a given that the goals of mainstreamed policies are framed in terms of integration? I propose that a superdiversity lens can also challenge us to consider the merits of alternative prerogatives such as what I term convivial disintegration. I briefly explore how this might better suit the way everyday diversity is practised. I conclude the chapter by summarising the main points to highlight the multiple ways in which linking superdiversity with mainstreaming practices can go beyond thinking about more diversity needing more integration.

Superdiversity—Terminological Clarifications

In this book superdiversity is primarily used to describe 'a context of increasing diversification' (Scholten and van Breugel, Chap. 1). In my previous work I have delineated three main ways of using superdiversity in applied research. One, as a way to critically choose sets of variables and

focal aspects included in investigations. These have to go beyond commonly used categories of migrants. Two, superdiversity as a context in which those variables are at play and, finally, superdiversity as a malleable social scientific concept that can account for less static conceptions of migration-related diversity (Meissner 2015). Vertovec (2016) has recently expanded and updated this survey of uses and amongst others adds that a superdiversity lens compels innovative thinking about 'the social organisation of difference'. Keeping those multiple applications of the term in mind, it is useful to consider what a diversification of diversity entails, if it is thought about through a superdiversity lens (cf. Vertovec 2015b).

Assertions of increasing diversification often leave implicit what it is that is increased and how. A very simplistic rationale for mainstreaming integration might be that there is more migration and thus more diversity and that this in turn also requires more integration work. This simple link however should be avoided as it is at odds with the themes and research challenges superdiversity research points to. At a global level Czika and de Haas (2014) point out that the world has not become more migratory since the 1960s. Instead migration has concentrated with people moving from more places to fewer destinations. As a result, in the European context, an increasing number of cities are inching their way to becoming minority-majority cities, a process that has been noted both for larger cities and smaller urban municipalities. At the same time there are many urban centres that have seen an increase in their share of foreign born, but that remain far from becoming majority-minority cities. Local diversification trends are variable, and to be a useful concept superdiversity has to account for this.

In many national statistics, the number of foreign-born residents and their offspring has increased over the past decades although often not with the same magnitude as reported from different city contexts. The introduction of superdiversity was motivated by those empirical shifts (Vertovec 2007). However, the analytical focus of the term is on changing and complex patterns rather than on continuously increasing levels of diversity. A diversification of origins and an increase in the count of resident migrants went hand in hand with other stratifications of migrant populations. One superdiversity thesis, subject to empirical verification, is that the latter altered the dynamics of diversity. Central factors include shifting legal provisions directed at migrants, different settlement and moving on patterns, demographic differences in migrant cohorts and how those cohorts engage differently in the labour market, in local social

networks and in transnational networks which all link ever more variegated physically distant and close localities. With its focus on the interplay of board and detailed aspects of migration-related differentiations, superdiversity research is often concerned with processes through which migration-related differences become habitual in everyday socialites (Wise and Velayutham 2009; Vertovec 2015a; Wessendorf 2014).

Superdiversity is a useful lens beyond examining contexts that have experienced exceptional increases in the numbers of foreign born. Whether there are moderate levels or a lot of new migration, superdiversity highlights the notable entanglement of many differentiations that both constrain and provide opportunities for migrants to participate in local social, economic and political structures. As a concept the notion is also useful to consider the social organisation of difference in contexts of moderate or long-standing diversities. Comparative approaches expose how international migration is part of multiple registers of social, cultural and regulatory complexity. Complexity the way it is used in this chapter is about considering more variables but it is not about a larger taxonomic dictionary of diversity, or about counting categories. Instead complexities considered are about the dynamic ways in which often less category-focused differentiations—such as those deriving from the interplay between the restrictiveness of immigration rules and movement dynamics—can be thought about as being both co-dependent and as having an accumulated history in contemporary configurations of diversity. This history derives from consecutive changes in how migration and the possible ways through which migration alters social settings gained situational social relevance (Mitchell 1987). It is in considering the simultaneity of multiple differentiations that we get to the heart of superdiversity research.

Defining and talking about superdiversity entails paying attention to complexities in contexts where the sum of differences cannot explain the social dynamics that international migration entails. It is often a fear of small numbers that is framed in terms of large threats and heightened levels of diversity (Appadurai 2006)—so long as this continues difference will also continue to be eyed as disruptive and socially destabilising—as a threat to integration. Yet at points more diversity may entail less antagonistic differences than if relatively clear and contested cleavages dominate in social settings (Brubaker 2008). Considering multidimensional differentiations poses new challenges for addressing and understanding the implications of international migration in local contexts. How those interconnections and their appropriation by migrants produce sometimes unexpected and

hard to predict feedback loops is important for changes in how diversity is perceived and how it is dealt with (Blommaert 2013). It has been noted how remarkably well cities work despite their evident accumulation of difference (Magnusson 2011).

More migrants and categories applied to those migrants is a clear implication of the emergence of superdiversity, but it does not constitute what is at stake in thinking about the term. Considering the multidimensionality of diversifications and how those differentiations co-evolve and change over time is closer to what superdiversity can conceptually capture and add to debates (Meissner 2016)—thus if superdiversity is used as a rationale for mainstreaming policies it is important to ask whether those complexities are considered in innovating approaches for dealing with the implications of international migration.

Importantly superdiversity was 'proposed as a "summary term" to encapsulate a range of […] changing variables surrounding migration patterns—and, significantly, their interlinkages—which amount to *a recognition of complexities that supersede previous patterns and perceptions* of migration-driven diversity' (Meissner and Vertovec 2015, 542, emphasis added). With reference to changing approaches to governing diversity, superdiversity thought about in this way—more as a concept than as a context—makes it difficult to consider policy shifts as responding to superdiversity. In fact, the very changes in policies discussed in the empirical chapters of this book directly impact on the complexities of superdiversity. Mainstreaming integration and thereby implementing sets of policy tools more broadly and at multiple levels of government and through new governance structures is itself a driver of superdiversity. At the same time following this definition, it is a valid and important question to ask, whether *changed perceptions* of diversity altered strategies for addressing the implications of migration and in extension whether those changes are passable. The book's empirical chapters offer insights here and highlight a number of fault lines at odds with seeing mainstreaming integration—the way it is currently implemented—as an adequate response to the emergence of superdiversity.

Superdiversity and Its Link to Mainstreaming Integration—Reflecting on Empirical Chapters

How diversity is perceived and imagined (Vertovec 2012) is of particular importance for integration policies, which arguably, like migration policies, have to satisfy related and sometimes contradictory standards of legitimacy

(Boswell 2007; Jong 2015). As we have just noted, superdiversity research aims to shift ideas about diversity away from thinking about more diversity towards thinking about the complexities of diversity. Mainstreaming integration efforts involves changes across different levels of government (cf. Scholten and van Breugel, Chap. 1), and if the superdiversity talk was a rationale for mainstreaming integration, it is reasonable to assume that there has to be some recognition of those complexities also across levels of policy making. There is little evidence that this is the case. The empirical work in this book shows instead that we find a clear scalar shift in how much importance can be attributed to the recognition of superdiversity in making the implications of migration a broad policy concern and shifting who or what is targeted by policy initiatives.

At the urban level ideas about (super)diversity have been used to justify and implement mainstreamed approaches to immigrant integration, bringing on board more stakeholders and a more varied portfolio of policy areas (cf. Jóźwiak et al., Chap. 3; Jensen, Chap. 4). At the same time similar trends at the national level are not framed in terms of the complexities of diversity—instead here a clear shift towards generic often socio-economically focused policy concerns are found to be of increasing importance. Justifications for generic policy frames at the national level are promoted by pointing to austerity and cost-effectiveness. As McCarthy et al. (Chap. 5) show, at the EU level the commitment to using available instruments to promote mainstreaming tools has been limited. Migration and its implications remain a relevant topic at this level, however little in the analysis of Chap. 5 suggests that this is because of the complexities of migration-driven diversity. Pressure to facilitate sufficient adaptability of policy tools is paramount to ensure that implementation in different national contexts and across different policy fields is made possible at all.

The evident hierarchy of importance attributed to superdiversity is not surprising, as Jensen et al. point out in their analysis: "the city […] constitutes the coalface of integration where policy frames confront the lived reality of an increasingly diverse population" (Chap. 4, p. 72). Entanglements of multiple migration-related differentiations noted in local contexts disappear in the abstractions of higher-level frameworks. Whether mainstreaming happens in response to the recognition of superdiversity would thus necessarily depend on how close those developing and implementing efforts are to the practical needs that those integration efforts are supposed to address. The chapter by Gidley et al. (Chap. 7), highlighting the crucial role of street-level bureaucrats in implementing mainstreamed

policies, offers a good example of the complexities that these actors can and have to accommodate. It is clearly shown that many street-level bureaucrats by necessity cannot disregard the co-relevance of multiple registers of diversity (social diversity, sexual diversity etc.) which likely also involves recognising intricacies within those registers (however also see Boccagni 2014). The alluded-to hierarchy has the interesting side effect that generic policy frames developed at the national level end up having an immigrant integration focus at the local level (cf. Chap. 4). Considering the types of initiatives described by Jensen et al. as well as by Jóźwiak et al. in reviewing how mainstreaming is evident in city contexts, it is important to caution that even if policy approaches are responsive to ideas about altered and heightened diversity, this is not always due to a recognition of the multidimensionality of superdiversity. Regardless of whether diversity is presented as an opportunity to be harnessed or as a challenge that needs to be addressed, central concerns often remain with questions of multi-ethnicity rather than with incorporating additional stratifications of difference. Efforts in multiple European cities described by Jensen show that mainstreaming in local contexts, while not targeting any specific origin group, often remains based on the idea that the disintegrative potential of international migration is caused by insufficient contact and understanding between people of different origin groups (cf. Schönwälder 2016). Where migrants are from and their ethno-cultural differences remain central in community cohesion and intercultural approaches even if the debates are shifted away from directly targeting specific origin groups.

Ethnic and cultural differences play an important part in understanding and making sense of post-migration societies, and superdiverse contexts are often marked by the everydayness of this type of diversity (Wessendorf 2014). A recognition of the simultaneous stratifications along other migration-related differentiations however is rarely subject of relevant policies. One example that serves to support this is the fact that few city governments are aware of, or actively seek to understand, the spatial distribution of migrants who moved through different immigration channels. This is surprising given the connection between legal status and the socio-economic outcomes of migrants (Söhn 2013). Recent increases in refugee migrations and imminent questions about where in cities new residents will find more sustainable housing have increased sensitivities in this area (Bolzoni et al. 2015). To date these mostly fail to address how refugee migrations together with other migrations add to multiple speeds of change in local diversity configurations and in how diversity is differently

experienced and conflict prone in those uniquely configured contexts (for two exceptions see: Phillimore 2013; Biehl 2014).

What types of policies then are considered as examples of mainstreaming integration? The Polish and Spanish comparison representing the empirical case of mainstreaming in new-migration contexts (Chap. 3) presents examples where practices are changed in light of heightened diversity but not necessarily in response to superdiversity. Observed adaptations in approaches towards migrant integration and how more actors, particularly NGOs, take on mainstreamed integration responsibilities exclusively respond to the presence of more migrants and changes in ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity. The authors show that while those changed approaches to dealing with the implications of international migration can be described as 'mainstreaming by accident', they also show, in analysing the Polish case, that this may lead to exclusionary practices as particular migrants, such as seasonal workers are not targeted by the described initiatives. This reflects that short-term but also intra-EU migrants are often not considered as part of the integration paradigm (Collet 2013). Which is why some advocate that to more fully take advantage of mainstreaming integration concerns, it is necessary to pay attention to 'mobility proofing' and 'diversity proofing' policies (Benton et al. 2015).

To be clear, addressing questions about language competences especially in school contexts is important—empirical work suggests that language acquisition is highly relevant for navigating destination contexts (e.g. Hoehne and Michalowski 2016). The example of language support used in the Polish case study is however useful to explain why there is a mismatch between responding to more immigration and responding to superdiversity. What is mainstreamed in practice—the acquisition of the host-country's language and ideas about mono- and bi-lingualism—disregards and maybe even discounts the increasing importance of polylanguaging and how degrees of fluency and situational mobilisation and creolisation of language have strong integrative and simultaneously disintegrative potential. A rapidly growing literature on linguistic superdiversity would certainly point us in this direction (Arnaut et al. 2016; Silverstein 2015; Hogan-Brun 2012). Those tendencies however may simply be outside of the reach of clear and easy to explain policy interventions that can be provided by scarcely funded actors (Boccagni 2014). In thinking about the transformation of generic policy frames in terms of integration, it is a non-negligible risk that what is mainstreamed are tools that were developed with older ideas about dealing with difference in mind. These often

respond only to smoothing over singular differences rather than engaging with the co-relevance of multiple and intricately linked differentiations.

It is thus not entirely clear whether presented practices of mainstreaming integration do respond to a need for whole society approaches, at least not, if we presume that addressing everyone also has to be sensitive to the everyday complexities of diversity. This is also relevant for discussing the argument that to mainstream integration policies it is necessary to pay attention to the 'dilemma of recognition' which was introduced in the first chapter of this book. Doing so in theory demands that mainstreaming entails a vigilant attention to both more generic as well as (non-group) targeted approaches. We can note that efforts described as building on this prerogative are not necessarily successful. With the presented empirical examples, the interconnectedness of multiple differentiations and how they play out in specific contexts appears poorly addressed in making decisions about when, who or what to target. Simone et al. (Chap. 2) show that shifting policies to area- or needs-based targets is not in and of itself a solid strategy to counter pre-existing stigma and structural barriers faced by different migrants. In terms of superdiversity, the relevant question might be in how far mainstreamed and devolved policy approaches can be successful if other policies push exclusionary agendas (Gebhardt 2015).

Area-based targeting is not performed in a policy vacuum and approaches that result in proxy-targeting putative groups are likely to not respond to the complexities of superdiversity. As the empirical analysis indicates, a lack of sensitivity for how policy is calibrated risks developing tools that poorly benefit anyone. Such practices carry the added danger of further reducing openness towards needed redistributive efforts, which are linked to attitudes towards migration in general (Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Bauböck and Scholten 2016). This would reinforce the interlinkages of differentiations and how migrants contribute to social change and why I suggested that considering mainstreaming as a driver of superdiversity may be more useful than to see superdiversity as a rationale for mainstreaming. The French case offers the most alarming example of why cautiousness about the effectiveness of shifting from ethnic groups to other putative categories via proxy targets is in order (Bozec and Simon 2014).

Needs-based proxies face similar difficulties, as forecasting where policies have to steer their focus requires high levels of flexibility that may still not bridge the gap between experienced and presumed needs (Phillimore 2015a). Changes in patterns of diversity often result in previously not

considered scenarios—uncertainty is a core element of complex social configurations. It is this uncertainty that ideally needs to become part of mainstreaming efforts if they are to adequately respond to superdiversity. Based on the empirical materials, it is not entirely clear if this is feasible or if the needed flexibility poses new and different challenges for dealing with diversity. There are evident difficulties in devising policies that are general enough to work across levels of government and areas of policy making but that at the same time can respond to the specificities of superdiverse contexts. Further, proxy approaches expose the importance of highlighting that anti-discrimination measures and measures designed to foster equality and support in emergent and variegated arrival structures do not always sit easily together under the umbrella term 'integration' (Bozec and Simon 2014). The danger of dilution of problems is then another non-negligible issue.

Beyond these concerns what is interesting in reviewing the researched policy shifts is that, at each level considered, there appears to be consensus that if there is something that needs to be done in response to international migration and heightened levels of diversity, it has to be integration. This suggests that integration as a goal has become a maxim, a leitmotiv, in what needs to be done to counter the inequities migration entails and to foster a good post-migration society. Some—but certainly not all—of the migration-linked differentiations that a superdiversity lens points to are subject to and product of policy tools framed in terms of migrant integration (cf. MIPEX). The link between superdiversity and integration debates is thus not surprising—yet given the observations that mainstreaming in practice is so far not necessarily an adequate response to dynamically changing configurations of diversity, it is important to question whether those dynamics can be made compatible with the far from unproblematic notion of integration.

Integration as a Maxim?

As Scholten and van Breugel note in their introduction to this book, there have been shifts in how integration policies are framed and implemented. Not least as multicultural approaches have widely fallen out of favour (cf. Banting and Kymlicka 2013) and ideas about assimilation have proven to be too one sided (Crul 2016). A turn towards new understandings of integration and what it should entail (cf. Gidley 2012) offers considerable extensions to earlier more rigid ideas that saw integration responsibilities

to rest exclusively with non-nationals. However, as the example of mainstreaming integration at the EU level shows—what is mainstreamed may purposively be left open for interpretation in different national and local contexts. Migrant integration even if dispersed through multiple levels of policy making is subject to different policy frames that are applied in local contexts (Caponio et al. 2015). This vagueness is relevant for what types of policy interventions are thought of as mainstreaming integration and which goals they should achieve in light of altered perceptions about diversity.

As I suggested at the end of the last section, integration stands somewhat as a maxim in many debates which makes it prone to the dilution of policy priorities criticised at various points in this book. Particularly in the popular debate it is common that perceived or actual increases in migration go hand in hand with debates about how best to integrate new migrants. Here integration stands as a goal that if reached is the beacon of a good post-migration society. This preoccupation with integration can be explained by considering how previous strategies for dealing with new migrants often precluded meaningful participation and resulted in sometimes devastating differences that disproportionally left many (but by no means all) non-nationals in socially and economically disadvantaged positions. Emphasising integration, both of settled and new or short-term migrants, then emphasises predictability by addressing and not repeating the same mistakes. That some of the inequities pointed to in calling for more integration may already be embedded in other policy realms—particularly those of regulating migration—too easily disappears from debates if a unified goal of integration dominates agendas.

Integration as a goal and maxim is certainly not equivalent with the many ways of thinking about what challenges and dynamic changes in social configurations international migration entails. Integration is then seen as a process with many neglected dimensions (Catney et al. 2011) or as having to be expanded beyond policies targeting people, directly or by proxy, to embedding integration by generating change in institutions charged with mainstreamed policy interventions (Phillimore 2015b; Benton et al. 2015). The latter efforts, which have the most promise for substantially altering how integration 'is done' (also compare Chap. 7), however remain mostly the exception rather than the rule. Instead ideas about integration are often built on a rhetoric of a two-way processes in which 'the degree of change is almost always unequal, much greater on the immigrant side' (Alba and Foner 2016, 7).

In light of superdiversity this highlights at least two problems. First, integration as a goal perpetuates the reproduction of an image of society where some are thought about as needing to be integrated and others as doing the integrating (Schinkel 2013). It is not surprising that this unhelpfully stirs animosities both for those who never feel integrated regardless of the efforts invested and for those who do feel that they have reached the integration threshold but who neglect that the circumstances and contexts of, for instance, learning the language or participating in the labour market are vastly different for different migrants. The integration dichotomy has divisive characteristics. Secondly but relatedly the goal of integration is difficult to align with uncertainties about how the complex interconnections of difference play out in superdiverse contexts. As I noted integration debates tend to be driven by suggesting certainties and the ability to control the implications of international migration in local and supra-local settings. Thinking about superdiversity however is not least about presuming that different contexts subject to similar policy interventions can still diverge in their outcomes as often a condition of 'ceteris paribus' (of all else being equal) cannot account for the local complexities of diversity. Complexity is not least about an inability to trace initial conditions. By implementing integration as a maxim it becomes possible to disregard this very central aspect of complexity which consequently also does not find recognition in the precision of policy goals—rendering them virtually unchallengeable even if their content is relatively unclear.

With those two concerns in mind we may ask whether mainstreaming as a strategy for mobility and diversity proofing policies should be framed in terms of integration at all. Can we be as bold as to say that thinking about mainstreaming in light of superdiversity challenges us to consider alternatives? Should integration be a beacon of what identifies a good post-migration society or is a degree of disintegration permissible—maybe even desirable? Let us think about the example of mobility proofing services and 'adapting to the realities of high population turn-over' (Benton et al. 2015, 10). Strictly speaking this is at odds with integration as a maxim because relevant socialites are reconfigured constantly. This arguably means that what was there before is, to a degree, disintegrated and reassembled constantly and that this happens in light of the multidimensional differentiations that are emblematic of superdiverse contexts. Even if those contexts can be marked by a familiarity with difference, where at times new strangers are perceived as familiar strangers (Ye 2016b), it is clear

that high mobility always entails at least minute changes which make it difficult to clearly define when and how integration as a goal is reached to everyone's satisfaction.

Measuring integration by the presence or absence of certain policies may say something about intentions but not least because of the multiscale adaptations of policies it does not necessarily say much about contextual outcomes. Processes of disintegration do not have to go hand in hand with the perpetuation of inequities or with conflict prone social settings—indeed disintegration may provide the disruptive spaces needed to find convivial solutions and define inclusive goals. If what was there before is reconfigured constantly and sometimes in bursts, this may also lead to what I here term 'convivial disintegration'. Considering research into superdiversity with a focus on when diversity works we will note that this is by no means a rare occurrence (e.g. Amin 2010; Wise and Velayutham 2009; Wessendorf 2014).

The idea of conviviality is frequently emphasised in the literature that alludes to superdiversity (e.g. Nowicka and Vertovec 2014; Wise and Noble 2016; Padilla et al. 2015). Whilst often linked to the writings of Gilroy (2009), Wise and Noble (2016, 423) have recently suggested that conviviality 'is part of an older and broader concern with the ongoing question of how communities/cultures/societies/nations "stick together"'. While they argue that thinking about conviviality moves concern over cultural difference into the centre of analysis (Wise and Noble 2016, 424)—I would suggest that from a superdiversity perspective it is precisely the co-relevance of cultural aspects and other social, economic and regulatory differences and importantly their simultaneity, which is moved into focus and highlights complexities in contexts of diversified diversity (Hannerz 1992). Conviviality is no longer thought of as a concept that can only account for positive encounters but in its multiple uses is giving room to conflictual negotiations of difference and tensions that may persist or ebb and flow in their intensity (Heil 2015). Some also link the notion to ideas about de-growth and thus a critical appraisal of the objectives of policies more generally (Les Convivialistes 2014). In relation to the analysis in this book those possibilities get to the heart of why non-targeting might not exclusively be what is at stake and why unclear policy goals are perpetuated by an emphasis on integration as a maxim without viable alternatives.

Convivial disintegration is marked by a layering of differences and posits concerns over how, when and where these take on salience. A superdiversity lens may thus—as I already suggested in the introduction—point

us towards considering the merits of thinking less about integration as a goal and more about notions such as convivial disintegration. Keeping the omnipresence of calls for integration in mind, finding new ways to define what it is that needs to be mainstreamed seems sensible as it is out of the question that concerns over the implications of international migration have developed to be broadly relevant rather than marginal concerns. Thinking about convivial disintegration allows for incorporating uncertainties and contextual specificities in making the case for a boarder adoption of concerns with those implications, both across levels of policy making and across policy portfolios. From this perspective, it may be possible to seek innovation in what it is that is mainstreamed without losing sight of the specificities and tensions in local contexts and without resorting to the dichotomous distinction between integrated and not integrated.

This does not mean losing sight of fostering a good post-migration society but it does leave room for recognising that there is no one-size-fits-all solution, even in light of parallel processes of diversification. It is clear that little is won in replacing one term with a combination of two others and more theorising will be necessary to fully develop the notion of convivial disintegration. Yet in briefly introducing it here, I am proposing it as something else that a superdiversity lens can add to the debates in this book—precisely a reflexiveness about what it is that is being mainstreamed.

Conclusion

As I discussed in this chapter, beyond equating superdiversity with more diversity and calling for mainstreamed approaches to handle those increases, there are two arguments that in a more nuanced way link a recognition of superdiversity with mainstreaming prerogatives. Firstly, if migration-related diversity is something that increasingly defines social configurations in destination contexts—a thesis often associated with thinking about superdiversity—then clearly approaches are needed that account for the fact the migration-related diversities are relevant for all of society. This tends to be expressed in policy initiatives that for example evoke city-citizenship to bring various local stakeholders to the same table (e.g. Amsterdam and Rotterdam two of the UPSTREAM Cities). Secondly, channelling integration efforts by targeting origin groups is no longer viable. This aligns with the post-ethnocentric positioning of superdiversity research. Policy measures that are supposed to avert the presumed socially destabilising effects of migration thus have to be addressed through other foci.

In the previous sections, I first demonstrated why superdiversity is indeed incompatible with ideas about more diversity requiring more integration and secondly explored how those two latter points match mainstreaming integration prerogatives in practice. In doing so I identified some mismatch between mainstreaming integration and thinking about superdiversity. Based on this evaluation, I thirdly elaborated on why I see the crux of the mismatch in the presumption that what needs to be mainstreamed are integration efforts, at least so long as it is not clear how integration is defined and used.

If we assume that the continued change and interplay of multiple differentiations—both of which I presented as central to thinking about superdiversity—also inevitably mean social rearrangements that entail some disintegration through the introduction of novelty and newness (Phillimore 2015a) then, so my final argument went, we should think more about processes of disintegration and in particular consider that everyday diversity may be better served by exploring modes of convivial disintegration. Generally, it seems sensible to promote more openness to finding workable solutions to remove barriers to convivial modes of sociality. In part this may be facilitated by asking what the interlinked differentiations at stake are, and by recognising the dual possibility of both the integrating and simultaneously disintegrating potential of most measures applied. The question this raises is whether this presents simply a call for reflexiveness about what is mainstreamed or whether there is more to be learned in thinking convivial disintegration further—I have a hunch that the latter is the case.

References

Alba, Richard, and Nancy Foner. 2016. Integration's Challenges and Opportunities in the Wealthy West. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42 (1): 3–22. doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2015.1083770.

Appadurai, Arjun. 2006. *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger*, Public Planet Books. Durham: Duke University Press.

Arnaut, Karel, Jan Blommaert, Ben Rampton, and Massimiliano Spotti, eds. 2016. *Language and Superdiversity*. New York: Routledge.

Banting, Keith, and Will Kymlicka. 2013. Is There Really a Retreat from Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index. *Comparative European Politics* 11 (5): 577–598. doi:10.1057/cep.2013.12.

Biehl, Kristen S. 2014. Spatializing Diversities, Diversifying Spaces: Housing Experiences and Home Space Perceptions in a Migrant Hub of Istanbul. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (4): 596–607. doi:10.1080/01419870.2015.980293.

Blommaert, Jan. 2013. *Ethnography, Superdiversity and Linguistic Landscapes: Chronicles of Complexity*, Critical Language and Literacy Studies 18. Bristol: Multilingual Matters.

Boccagni, Paolo. 2014. (Super)diversity and the Migration–Social Work Nexus: A New Lens on the Field of Access and Inclusion? *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (4): 608–620. doi:10.1080/01419870.2015.980291.

Bolzoni, Magda, Enrico Gargiulo, and Michele Manocchi. 2015. The Social Consequences of the Denied Access to Housing for Refugees in Urban Settings: The Case of Turin, Italy. *International Journal of Housing Policy* 15 (4): 400–417. doi:10.1080/14616718.2015.1053337.

Boswell, Christina. 2007. Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way? *International Migration Review* 41 (1): 75–100. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00057.x.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2008. *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*. [Pbk ed.]. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Caponio, Tiziana, Olga Jubany Baucells, and Berta Güell. 2015. Civic Integration Policies from Below: Accounting for Processes of Convergence and Divergence in Four European Cities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39 (5): 878–895. doi:10.1080/01419870.2015.1080379.

Catney, Gemma, Nissa Finney, and Liz Twigg. 2011. Diversity and the Complexities of Ethnic Integration in the UK: Guest Editors' Introduction. *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 32 (2): 107–114. doi:10.1080/07256868.2011.547171.

Crul, Maurice. 2016. Super-Diversity vs. Assimilation: How Complex Diversity In Majority–Minority Cities Challenges the Assumptions of Assimilation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42 (1): 54–68. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2015.1061425.

Czaika, Mathias, and Hein de Haas. 2014. The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory? *International Migration Review* 48 (2): 283–323. doi:10.1111/imre.12095.

Dancygier, Rafaela M., and Michael J. Donnelly. 2013. Sectoral Economies, Economic Contexts, and Attitudes Toward Immigration. *The Journal of Politics* 75 (1): 17–35. doi:10.1017/S0022381612000849.

Gebhardt, Dirk. 2015. When the State Takes Over: Civic Integration Programmes and the Role of Cities in Immigrant Integration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42 (5): 742–758. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2015.1111132.

Gidley, Ben. 2012. Five Principles of Integration: Policies and Inclusion. Accessed September 15, 2016. http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2012/five-principles-of-integration-policies-and-inclusion/

Gilroy, Paul. 2009. *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* Repr. Abingdon: Routledge.

Hannerz, Ulf. 1992. *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Heil, Tilmann. 2015. Conviviality: (Re)negotiating Minimal Consensus. In *Routledge International Handbook of Diversity Studies*, Routledge International Handbooks, ed. Steven Vertovec, 317–324. New York: Routledge.

Hoehne, Jutta, and Ines Michalowski. 2016. Long-Term Effects of Language Course Timing on Language Acquisition and Social Contacts: Turkish and Moroccan Immigrants in Western Europe. *International Migration Review* 50 (1): 133–162. doi:10.1111/imre.12130.

Hogan-Brun, Gabrielle. 2012. Language Planning in Urban Spaces. *Current Issues in Language Planning* 13 (3): 145–147. doi:10.1080/14664208.2012.722378.

de Jong, Sara. 2015. Converging Logics? Managing Migration and Managing Diversity. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42 (3): 341–358. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2015.1074857.

Les Convivialistes. 2014. Das konvivialistische Manifest: Für eine neue Kunst des Zusammenlebens. In *X-Texte zu Kultur und Gesellschaft*, ed. Frank Adloff and Claus Leggewie. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Magnusson, Warren. 2011. *Politics of Urbanism: Seeing like a City*, Interventions. London: Taylor & Francis Routledge.

Meissner, Fran. 2015. Migration in Migration-Related Diversity? The Nexus between Superdiversity and Migration Studies. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (4): 556–567. doi:10.1080/01419870.2015.970209.

———. 2016. *Socialising with Diversity: Relational Diversity Through a Superdiversity Lens*, Global Diversities. 1st ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Meissner, Fran, and Steven Vertovec. 2015. Comparing Super-Diversity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (4): 541–555. doi:10.1080/01419870.2015.980295.

Padilla, Beatriz, Joana Azevedo, and Antonia Olmos-Alcaraz. 2015. Superdiversity and Conviviality: Exploring Frameworks for Doing Ethnography in Southern European Intercultural Cities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (4): 621–635. doi:10.1080/01419870.2015.980294.

Phillimore, Jenny. 2013. Housing, Home and Neighbourhood Renewal in the Era of Superdiversity: Some Lessons from the West Midlands. *Housing Studies* 28 (5): 682–700. doi:10.1080/02673037.2013.758242.

———. 2015a. Delivering Maternity Services in an Era of Superdiversity: The Challenges of Novelty and Newness. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (4): 568–582. doi:10.1080/01419870.2015.980288.

———. 2015b. Embedded Integration and Organisational Change in Housing Providers in the UK. *Social Policy & Society* 16 (1): 1–14. doi:10.1017/S1474746415000639.

Schinkel, Willem. 2013. The Imagination of 'Society' in Measurements of Immigrant Integration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36 (7): 1142–1161. doi:10.1080/01419870.2013.783709.

Schönwälder, Karen. 2016. *Diversity and Contact: Immigration and Social Interaction in German Cities*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Silverstein, Michael. 2015. How Language Communities Intersect: Is "Superdiversity" an Incremental or Transformative Condition? *Language & Communication* 44: 7–18.
Söhn, Janina. 2013. Unequal Welcome and Unequal Life Chances: How the State Shapes Integration Opportunities of Immigrants. *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie. European Journal of Sociology* 54 (02): 295–326. doi:10.1017/S0003975613000155.
Vertovec, Steven. 2007. Super-Diversity and Its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (6): 1024–1054. doi:10.1080/01419870701599465.
———. 2012. "Diversity" and the Social Imaginary. *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie. European Journal of Sociology* 53 (03): 287–312. doi:10.1017/S000397561200015X.
———, ed. 2015a. *Diversities Old and New*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
———. 2015b. Introduction: Migration, Cities, Diversities 'Old' and 'New'. In *Diversities Old and New*, ed. Steven Vertovec, 1–22. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
———. 2016. Super-Diversity as Concept and Approach: Whence It Came, Where It's At, and Whither It's Going. *Super-Diversity: A Transatlantic Conversation*, New York. Accessed April 4. http://www.mmg.mpg.de/online-media/online-lectures/2016/steven-vertovec-mpi-mmg-super-diversity-as-concept-and-approach-whence-it-came-where-its-at-and-whither-its-going/
Wessendorf, Susanne. 2014. *Commonplace Diversity: Social Relations in a Super-Diverse Context: Social Relations in a Super-Diverse Context*, Global Diversities. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wise, Amanda, and Greg Noble. 2016. Convivialities: An Orientation. *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 37 (5): 423–431. doi:10.1080/07256868.2016.1213786.
Wise, Amanda, and Selvaraj Velayutham. 2009. *Everyday Multiculturalism*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ye, Junjia. 2016a. Spatialising the Politics of Coexistence: Gui ju (规矩) in Singapore. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 41 (1): 91–103. doi:10.1111/tran.12107.
———. 2016b. The Ambivalence of Familiarity: Understanding Breathable Diversity Through Fleeting Encounters in Singapore's Jurong West. *Area* 48 (1): 77–83. doi:10.1111/area.12237.

Fran Meissner is a research group leader at the University of Kassel and will soon commence work as a Marie-Sklodowska-Curie research fellow in the Neighbourhood Change and Housing research group at the TU Delft. Her main

research interest is with urban diversity dynamics and future diversities. Meissner is the author of *Socialising with Diversity: Relational Diversity through a Superdiversity Lens* (Palgrave 2016). She also co-edited and contributed to a widely read special issue: 'Comparing Superdiversity' (2015, *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies*).

PART IV

Conclusion

CHAPTER 11

Conclusions

Peter Scholten and Ilona van Breugel

Mainstreaming marks only the most recent episode in a much older debate in academia and policy on the issue of targeting and categorization in migrant integration. As Frank De Zwart (2005) aptly described it, any policy aimed at (migrant) integration inevitably faces a 'dilemma of recognition': are the policy goals best achieved by targeted or non-targeted policies, or do the respective benefits outweigh the burdens of (non-)targeting? In various European countries and cities as well as at the EU level mainstreaming has been framed as a response to such dilemmas in migrant integration policies. Rather than targeting migrant groups per se, a mainstream approach would target the whole diverse population with generic rather than specific policies.

The contributions in this book adopt either a theoretical lens on the notion of mainstreaming or offer a critical empirical analysis of mainstreaming in practice. While recognizing that mainstreaming is increasingly used as a concept in policy discourses, we chose to extrapolate a theoretical definition of integration mainstreaming from the literature on mainstreaming in other areas, particularly gender (see also Chap. 8 by

P. Scholten (✉) • I. van Breugel
Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_11

Meier). This led us to define mainstreaming as the *generic* and *inclusive* adoption of immigrant integration priorities in generic policy domains, linked to a trend of *decentralization and deconcentration* in terms of the coordination of integration policy responsibilities.

By bringing together unique empirical research on mainstreaming in the UK, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Poland, and theoretical reflections from various perspectives on the notion of mainstreaming, including a perspectives from gender, policy studies, anti-discrimination and sociology of migration, this book aims at contributing to the empirical and theoretical understanding of mainstreaming. In the conclusions to this book, we will reflect on these contributions and will come back to some of the expectations that were formulated at the beginning of this book.

'Incomplete Mainstreaming'

One key finding that stands from various chapters in this book is that when we follow the definition of mainstreaming as described above, we can only speak of 'incomplete mainstreaming' in the area of migrant integration. We did clearly find a trend towards a *generic approach* to migrant integration, where former specifically targeted policies were often dismissed. This applies in particular to the national level. Throughout Europe such generic policies are manifest for instance in the UK 'Community Cohesion' approach, the abandoning of the Dutch group-specific Minorities Policy and, of course, the French Republicanist model. In relatively 'new' immigration countries too, such as Poland and Spain, we found that migrant integration was furthered in particular from already established policies; evidently, most 'new' immigration countries also did not have a history with more target-group-specific policies such as in the UK or the Netherlands.

Additionally, we found that migrant integration has increasingly become an issue of *poly-centric governance*. This involves both the involvement of different policy levels as well as the involvement of different types of actors in policies at different levels. Differences persist however between countries like the UK that has always been rather decentral in its approach to migrant incorporation, and France, with traditionally a more state-centric approach. Our book does not support the idea that we are witnessing the rise of effective multilevel governance in this area; in fact, as we will

discuss more in detail later, we witnessed various occasions where there were sharp contradictions between policies at different levels (as the EU, national and local chapters in this book show). Furthermore, the cases show a lack of political leadership and coordination of integration priorities between policy departments (horizontally), while the literature on gender mainstreaming clearly shows that this is a central requirement for effective mainstreaming (Caglar 2013; Lombardo and Meier 2006; see also Chap. 8 by Meier).

We found very little evidence of an explicit orientation at raising general awareness of migration-related diversity as part of the mainstreaming strategy. As also observed by Meier in this book (Chap. 8), this marks a clear difference with gender mainstreaming, where such generic awareness is key. In fact, as Simon and Beaujeu (Chap. 2) argue, mainstreaming can also be interpreted as a strategy to not attribute any special attention to migrant integration at all, but rather to ignore the problems and challenges that migrants may face. The example of the French case shows much more evidence of colour-blindness than of mainstreaming. Also in the Dutch case, our book presents evidence of reports of declining consciousness of migrant integration concerns, as a consequence of mainstreaming. Only in some cases, such as Barcelona and London (see Chap. 4), we saw evidence of more emphasis on intercultural awareness as part of mainstreaming.

Thus, in spite of the conceptual parallel with 'gender mainstreaming', the material presented in this book suggests that in the case of immigrant integration governance we can only speak of incomplete mainstreaming, given the uneven emphasis on (the move) to generic policies, while leaving 'mainstreamed attention for migration diversity' unattended. This finding seems to apply to both 'old' and 'new' immigration countries. As the chapters by Simon and Beaujeu (Chap. 2) and Jóźwiak, Sánchez-Domínguez and Sorando (Chap. 3) illustrate, the country cases presented in this book interpret 'incomplete mainstreaming' as 'empty universalism' (Spain, Poland), 'government retrenchment' (the Netherlands) or 'colour-blindness' (France).

Different Interpretations of Mainstreaming from a Multilevel Perspective

However, from a multilevel perspective, our book reveals a different picture. At the national level, mainstreaming appears to be incomplete because of a general lack of a diversity orientation. However, a different

situation emerges at the EU as well as the local level. At the EU level, mainstreaming has been explicitly and firmly embraced as a cornerstone of the EU's approach to migrant integration. It has been part of the EU's approach ever since the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration of 2004 (Chap. 5).

There is little body to this EU mainstreaming approach as the EU has very limited competencies in the area of migrant integration. In fact, it could be argued that precisely because the EU does not have competences for a specific approach to migrant integration, it is by implication obliged to target migrant integration from the generic policy areas where it does have some competences. As Collett McCarthy and Benton (Chap. 5) argue in this book, the recent refugee crisis has further fed the EU's efforts to mainstream migrant integration particularly within its generic social policies. This is manifested in the establishment of various forms of cross-DG cooperation around specific migrant integration concerns, including an inter-group service on integration.

As Jensen shows in this book (Chap. 4), experiencing the complex reality of superdiversity, cities seem more driven towards mainstreaming than policies at the national level. This often includes the diversity orientation that our research showed to be lacking at the national level, such as the 'diversity-proofing' of generic policies or explicit diversity approached. Examples of the latter are the attempts of London and Amsterdam to create a new shared sense of belonging to bond their diverse population.

Finally, the chapter by Gidley, Scholten and van Breugel (Chap. 7) showed the differences between mainstreaming at the level of implementation and at the national and local policy level. It is perhaps at this level of implementation in diverse neighbourhoods that the potential of mainstreaming comes out best, as it proves to allow street-level bureaucrats to make use of their policy discretion to appropriately address the complexity of the situation that migrants face, coming closest to what can be described as an intersectional approach, as called for within the superdiversity literature (cf. Vertovec 2007, see also Chap. 10 by Meissner). Although at this level too, a mainstreamed approach to migration or diversity-related integration proves vulnerable to policy dilution, as without any policy support from above the 'diversity proofing' relies solely on the street-level bureaucrat and his or her previous experience in working with migration diversity.

Mainstreaming and the Use of Proxy Strategies

Another key finding emerging from this book is the prominence of various sorts of 'proxy-strategies' that can be considered indirect forms of targeting. Even, or precisely, in the ideologically driven French colour-blind approach, we found a widespread use of proxy strategies. In this case, in particular area-based proxies, the targeting of areas where specific socio-economic issues are particularly pertinent, such as educational deprivation, but which in reality often involve relatively high proportions of migrants. The French urban priority zones or the Dutch approach to *Krachtwijken* are clear illustrations of such area-based proxies that in reality often to a great extent target migrant populations. Also, needs-based proxies have been identified in various cases, where policies formerly targeted at migrants have been replaced by policies targeted by, for example, language needs or level of education of the parents.

The use of such proxies shows that mainstreaming does not immediately solve the contested theoretical and practical dilemmas regarding to categorization and targeting. In practice there continues to be a demand to target migration-related concerns wherever relevant. As van Breugel and Scholten show (Chap. 6), rather than driven by an effort to overcome the dilemma of recognition, mainstreaming seems to be applied to avoid and replace the targeting of migrants or addressing diversity in the mainstream.

A risk involved in these proxy strategies is that it may be very difficult to reconstruct whether they indeed help to address concerns or problems amongst specific migrant groups. It is hard to verify whether the proxies indeed work. On the one hand, it is assumed by many policy practitioners that using proxies also prevents some of the stigmatizing effects that targeted policies may inadvertently generate. On the other hand, proxies may also cloud the view on specific concerns that groups or vulnerable categories might have; it leads to what we would describe as 'blind mainstreaming'. This seems to apply in particular to France where the absence of data on the position of migrant groups ('ethnic statistics'). Also, the front-line workers indicate that this seems to be particularly pertinent for new and vulnerable groups on which there is a relative lack of experience in working with these groups. In the Netherlands, the presence of data on migrant groups allows for a check on whether proxies or generic policies actually manage to address the concerns of specific groups or categories. So, somewhat paradoxically we could conclude that 'ethnic statistics'

help to make sure that mainstreamed 'proxies' work. Although it must be remarked that in the Netherlands, contrary to this finding, the collection of these data is actually restricted under mainstreaming efforts.

Theorizing Integration Mainstreaming

On a more theoretical level, these findings speak to some of the expectations that have been raised in the literature, and discussed in the introduction to this book, on how and why integration would be mainstreamed.

Mainstreaming in a Superdiverse Context

One of these comes from the literature on 'superdiversity' (e.g., Vertovec 2007; Crul 2016; Meissner's chapter (Chap. 10) in this book), expecting that it is particularly in a superdiverse context that an ethnic lens would become infeasible and instead a more generic and intersectional approach to diversity would become more fitting. The findings in this book do provide some support to this connection between superdiversity and mainstreaming, but only to a specific extent. The superdiversity thesis does explain why especially in local superdiverse settings we did see relatively 'complete' forms of mainstreaming, mostly involving mainstreaming including a diversity orientation.

However, as Meissner discusses in detail (Chap. 10), much more work is required to fully understand the relation between superdiversity and mainstreaming. Meissner sees a mismatch in particular between focus on the mainstreaming of integration efforts per se and the complex social reality of superdiverse societies. It is questionable whether integration is still the right term to refer to how superdiverse societies are to be held together, as in the context of superdiversity it is particularly hard to define 'in what' integration should take place. Rather, a mainstreaming that is more fitting for superdiversity is what Jensen describes as the diversity proofing of existing public services, not necessarily to promote integration in a particular context, but rather to make sure that those services are adapted to the social reality of superdiversity. In fact, as Meissner argues, superdiversity might rather be associated with forms of 'convivial disintegration'.

Another strand of literature that speaks to the concept of mainstreaming, and that is used throughout this book, is the literature on interculturalism (Bouchard 2011; Zapata-Barrero 2015; Zapata-Barrero's chapter

(Chap. 9) in this book). Interculturalism is here understood as policy paradigm aimed at promoting intercultural contact between groups with different backgrounds, rather than focusing on backgrounds of these groups per se. This interculturalist approach, or model for integration, therefore speaks to the 'generic and diversity oriented' approach of mainstreaming. Theoretically, mainstreaming would then be a fitting policy strategy for achieving interculturalism, or 'intercultural integration'.

However, as we have seen throughout the book, empirically there is little support for exactly the inclusive or diversity oriented dimension of the mainstreaming approach. Rather than focusing on the promotion of intercultural awareness, we have seen that in several countries the mainstreaming of integration rather leads to dilution or even a deconstruction of integration as a policy priority. Perhaps, as mentioned above, at the local level the interculturalist thesis does apply to some extent, especially in those cities that explicitly reveal their superdiverse character. In this sense, as Zapata-Barrero also recognizes in the chapter in this book (Chap. 9), there is not only 'elective affinity' between interculturalism and mainstreaming, but also between superdiversity and interculturalism.

Explaining Incomplete Mainstreaming

Speaking of the broader literature on superdiversity and interculturalism, it has helped us to explain why mainstreaming works in particular in urban settings. However, it does not explain incomplete mainstreaming at the national level. If superdiversity is not experienced at all at the national level, what would then drive the aspects of mainstreaming that we did find on the national level, however 'incomplete'?

Van Breugel and Scholten (Chap. 6) describe two key factors that have emerged throughout the book that account for incomplete mainstreaming. First, various chapters refer to *austerity* as an important context factor that seems to trigger mainstreaming at the national level. Especially in the UK and the Netherlands, specific measures promoting the integration of migrant groups became subject to the economic crisis and government retrenchment. Also in the new immigration countries Poland and Spain, we found a relation between austerity and the reliance on generic measures to address migrant integration. Rather than a strategy to target the whole diverse population, mainstreaming proves to be applied for retrenchment and government withdrawal, with a one-sided focus on letting go of former specifically targeted integration policies, without bringing diversity in the mainstream.

Secondly, the *politicization* of migrant integration and in some cases the rise of populist or anti-immigrant sentiments appears to have been a trigger for mainstreaming as well in various cases. Both in the Netherlands and the UK, politicization was an important driver of abandoning policy frames that involved a more targeted or group-specific approach, such as the Race Relations approach or the Minorities Policy. Especially when politicization involves the rise of populism, as is currently the case in many European countries (and beyond), providing active support to the integration of migrants tends to become more contested; it is seen as a way of privileging migrants over native deserving-poor. Again, this plays out most explicitly at the national level, although not absent at the local level either as, for example, the Rotterdam case shows (see Chaps. 4 and 6).

The Dilemma of Recognition and the Revolutionary Potential of Mainstreaming

Returning to the broader theoretical debate on categorization and targeting in migration policies, or 'dilemma of recognition' (De Zwart 2005), what does our in-depth study of integration mainstreaming teach us: does mainstreaming offer a solution to this ancient dilemma?

Instead of bringing migration-related diversity 'in the mainstream', as indicated for gender equality priorities in the case of gender mainstreaming for example, the 'mainstreamed' policies that are described in this book rather avert from talking about integration priorities altogether, either by diverting from former (specific) integration policies or replacing these by proxy policies, targeting roughly the same group under a different header. Although these proxy policies could be understood as a 'replacement strategy', described by De Zwart (2005: 140) as "a compromise between denial and accommodation: a government pursues redistribution that benefits caste, ethnic, or racial groups, but constructs its own social categories, different in name and usually more inclusive than the folk categories they replace." While needs- or area-based target groups are potentially more inclusive indeed, speaking to a wider crowd of low-income families for example, the second condition of the replacement strategy is not met. De Zwart continues to describe that "[t]he purpose of these constructs is to avoid official recognition of social divisions thought to cause the problem, yet permit redistribution that benefits disadvantaged groups." The crux is in the latter, as the forms of immigrant integration mainstreaming that are described in this book lack an orientation or monitoring mechanisms

to assure that benefits are redistributed to disadvantaged groups. When mainstreaming away from former integration policies without bringing diversity into the mainstream the redistributive mechanisms are not so much replaced but rather dismissed.

This also means that the potential 'degenerative effects' of policy targeting, as theorized by Schneider and Ingram (1997), are not necessarily overcome by mainstreaming. As Yanow also argues in the epilogue to this book (Chap. 12), the choice not to target a specific group is also a targeting decision. It means not only that the 'whole population' will be targeted, it reflects also a belief that it would not be desirable or relevant to target a group specifically. This decision is obviously political of nature and can have precisely the same 'degenerative effects' that Schneider and Ingram refer to. Such a form of 'benign neglect' can inadvertently sustain or reify cleavages in society and the deprivation experienced by migrants (cf. Aspinall 2007; Simon and Piché 2012; Yanow and Van der Haar 2013).

Ultimately, what is missing in the practices of immigrant integration mainstreaming as described in this book, is the question 'what is mainstreamed?' In the chapter on gender mainstreaming (Chap. 8), Meier compares the goal, or 'revolutionary potential' for gender and integration mainstreaming, and comes to the conclusion that the potential for social change that mainstreaming is intended to bring about in terms of (gender) equality is absent in the accounts of integration mainstreaming. Rather than leading to a remodelling of society as a whole as called for in the gender mainstreaming literature, as well as the superdiversity and interculturalism literature, mainstreamed integration policies remain focused on the adaption of migrants to their host societies, although in implicit (proxy) terms. Meissner (Chap. 10) likewise concludes that rather than leading to a remodelling of society, policy goals are diluted 'rendering them virtually unchallengeable' and claims that the perpetuation of this one-sided focus on the integration dichotomy disregards the complexity as central in the superdiversity literature, and questions the presumed link between mainstreaming and integration. Instead she calls for a multidimensional or intersectional approach (see also Chaps. 8 and 12 by Meier and Yanow) to what identifies a post-migration society that accounts for 'the fact the migration-related diversities are relevant for all of society'. All in all, apart from a few promising examples, particularly at the local level, the second dimension of mainstreaming, namely 'the inclusive adoption of immigrant integration priorities', is virtually absent in the empirical cases described. To do justice to the inclusive dimension of mainstreaming, clear goals

should be spelled out and monitoring mechanisms should be installed in order to overcome the dilution of diversity or integration priorities, and miss out on the revolutionary potential of mainstreaming for the society as a whole.

References

Aspinall, P.J. 2007. Approaches to Developing an Improved Cross-National Understanding of Concepts and Terms Relating to Ethnicity and Race. *International Sociology* 22 (1): 41–70.

Bouchard, G. 2011. What is Interculturalism? *McGill Law Journal* 56 (2): 435–468.

Caglar, G. 2013. Gender Mainstreaming. *Politics & Gender* 9 (03): 336–344.

Crul, M. 2016. Super-Diversity vs. Assimilation: How Complex Diversity in Majority-Minority Cities Challenges the Assumption of Assimilation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42 (1): 54–68.

De Zwart, F. 2005. The Dilemma of Recognition: Administrative Categories and Cultural Diversity. *Theory and Society* 34 (2): 137–169.

Lombardo, E., and P. Meier. 2006. Gender Mainstreaming in the EU Incorporating a Feminist Reading? *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13 (2): 151–166.

Schneider, A.L., and H. Ingram. 1997. *Policy Design for Democracy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Simon, P., and V. Piché. 2012. Accounting for Ethnic and Racial Diversity: The Challenge of Enumeration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35 (8): 1357–1365.

Vertovec, S. 2007. Super-Diversity and Its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (6): 1024–1054.

Yanow, D., and M. van der Haar. 2013. People Out of Place: Allochthony and Autochthony in the Netherlands' Identity Discourse, Metaphors and Categories in Action. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 16 (2): 227–261.

Zapata-Barrero, R., ed. 2015. *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*. Northampton: Edward Elgar.

Peter Scholten is Associate Professor of Public Policy and Politics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. His research focuses on themes of intercultural governance, comparative public policy and the relationship between knowledge and power. Scholten is Associate Director of IMISCOE, Europe's largest academic research network on migration, integration and social cohesion, and coordinator of the interdisciplinary Erasmus Research Cluster on the Governance of Migration and Integration. Furthermore, Scholten is Editor-in-Chief of the journal *Comparative Migration Studies* (CMS) and member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*.

Ilona van Breugel is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Ilona has a background in legal anthropology. Her current research focuses on local immigrant integration governance, more specifically on target grouping and problem definitions in the construction of integration policies. Previously she co-coordinated the UPSTREAM project on the mainstreaming of integration governance.

CHAPTER 12

Afterword: Mainstreaming, Classification, and Language

Dvora Yanow

As I write this, I find myself caught between two events, each bringing its own emotional response. On November 1, 2016, The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (*Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid*, WRR) and Statistics Netherlands (*Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek*, CBS) announced, jointly, that they would drop the two key categories, *allochtoon* and *autochtoon*, used since the 1970s in national-level immigration and other policy arenas and in public discourse especially in the last two decades to designate 'foreigners' and 'natives'. (The English equivalents, allochthon and autochthon, have roots in geology; see Yanow and van der Haar 2013 for a discussion of the etymology.) Allochtoon had increasingly developed negative connotations, especially following its 1999 subdivision by the CBS into 'Western' and 'non-Western'. As my research over the previous decade had shown the deleterious effects of these categories, I was pleased to see the announcement. And then on November 8, US voters elected a president whose regime has opened the door to a

D. Yanow (✉)
Sub-department Communication, Philosophy, & Technology, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0_12

surge of anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, racist and anti-Semitic, misogynist, and other deplorable sentiments and physical attacks. These events joined others across Europe: the UK's Brexit, the discussion of which also gave voice to anti-immigrant sentiment and racist language and acts and prompted at least one murder (of Labour MP Jo Cox, who opposed the proposal); the resurgent right-wing parties in France, Germany, Hungary, The Netherlands, and other European states; and the tremendous logistical and other challenges prompted by waves of Syrian refugees and economic and political migrants from elsewhere, increasingly blurring conceptual-theoretical and political-legal boundaries between 'migrants' and 'refugees'. It is into this morass—in which integrating mobile populations into existing state cultures finds its place—that this book falls, its chapter authors contemplating the possibilities for improving said integration in the face of policy implementation challenges across multiple layers of governments and governance. Can the idea of mainstreaming help resolve implementation problems and achieve integration goals? Can successful mainstreaming resolve the conundrum that population-naming categories which were created for social justice purposes in the end undermine those very purposes?

Reflecting on 'Mainstreaming' as Metaphor

The difficulties entailed in implementing programs across multiple levels of government and coordinating efforts across multiple agencies at any given level are well known in the policy implementation literature, which developed initially in response to the anti-poverty programs of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the US (see, e.g., Pressman and Wildavsky 1984/1973, whose subtitle tells it all). Social service coordination and evaluation research became their own subfields of study. As one critical assessment noted over two decades ago,

> An ongoing problem in most social service delivery involves coordination of services across and even within agencies. This problem has been clear to evaluation researchers and to program managers ever since the start of the [Johnson administration] Great Society programs, and even before. …The problem of coordinating services is well known to most policy sectors as an obstacle to achievement of desired client outcomes. (Schuh and Leviton 1991: 533, 534)

Complexities of this sort have also been noted more recently in non-social policy sectors. Consider analyses that map climate change problems across national borders, whose regulation involves not only individual states and the United Nations, but also both environmental and non-environmentally-related NGOs and other organizations (e.g., Zelli and van Asselt 2013; see Fig. 1 there). And now this book, and especially its empirical chapters, shows us that the same difficulties are at play in immigrant integration policies. 'It comes [as] no surprise', as Petra Meier writes (Chap. 8), looking at the implementation problems that have faced the policy domain from which the 'mainstreaming' concept has been borrowed, that *integration* mainstreaming should founder on the same shoals as *gender* mainstreaming: analyses of the latter pointed to the same desiderata that are identified in this book with respect to the former. As Mary Hawkesworth (2012: 238) put it, 'By declaring every unit of governance responsible for equality measures, [gender mainstreaming policies] created a situation in which equality was everyone's responsibility but no one's job.' One might also note that these same criteria for implementation success were already documented in the policy implementation literature from the 1970s to the 1980s—among them leadership support, shared responsibility, financial resources, human resources, coordination and communication, accountability mechanisms, monitoring, and evaluation, to draw several from Meier's exhaustive list (Chap. 8; see, e.g., Bardach 1977; Brigham and Brown 1980; Bunker 1972; Edwards 1980; Elmore 1978; Ingram and Mann 1980; Lazin 1980; Lipsky 1978; Nakamura and Smallwood 1980; Palumbo and Calista 1990).

But I think we might usefully engage a different question. Bracketing recognized implementation problems, which are common across policy domains, is 'mainstreaming' itself the best conceptualization of the integration problem for helping to surmount them? Is its seeming failure, as judged from these chapters, 'simply' an inherent part of policy implementation systems, or is the problem also, at least in part, conceptual? Such a question is in keeping with an approach to policy analysis that shifts the analytic focus from the failures of policy programs to the ways in which the problem has been presented, that is, to the very definition and framing of the perceived problem (Rein and Schön 1977; see van Hulst and Yanow 2016)—what Carol Bacchi (2009) has called the 'What's the problem represented to be?' approach. When a term is clearly 'borrowed' from one domain for use in another—here, importing mainstreaming from the arena of gender-focused or gender-related policies—we are in the definitional

realm of metaphor, and the term's analysis as such might be productive for understanding mainstreaming's advantages and limitations.

Metaphors—which also work as framing devices—can be defined as 'the juxtaposition of two superficially unlike elements in a single context, where the separately understood meanings of both interact to create a new perception of each, and especially of the focus of the metaphor. Subjected to analysis, the surface unlikeness [of the metaphor's meaning in its source domain and that in its target] yields a set of criteria which both metaphoric vehicle and focus share' (Yanow 2012/1992: 125). Once a metaphor has been identified (or is suspected) in policy discourse, analysis proceeds by asking:

- what is the source domain of the metaphor—its more commonplace or 'natural' usage setting?
- what are its entailments in that source? and
- what are the implications of those entailments for the metaphor's target—its new usage setting?

What ideas or meanings, in other words, are riding in on the back of the suspected metaphor which are likely to be shaping how it frames understanding of the topic that is its target? This analytic approach rests on the assumptions of cognitive linguistics that language, including metaphors, has the ability not only to express prior thought, but also to shape ensuing action.[1] As Lakoff and Johnson (1987: 79) put it, 'Metaphor is not a harmless exercise in naming. It is one of the principal means by which we understand our experience and reason on the basis of that understanding. To the extent that we act on our reasoning, metaphor plays a role in the creation of reality.'

Does the concept of mainstreaming have a source domain? Dictionaries can be useful for such discovery; and dictionary.com gives these as the first two definitions of 'mainstream'[2]:

> '1. the principal or dominant course, tendency, or trend: the mainstream of American culture.
> '2. a river having tributaries' (Random House Dictionary 2016)

To be in the mainstream, or to put something there, means that it is no longer at the margins of activity, but at the very center. Those are the entailments of the metaphor in its natural language source. In this light, it

makes sense to think about 'mainstreaming gender'—with gender used in a policy context as a synonym for women—or 'mainstreaming disability' because the people who fall within those two categories are, in many societies today, still relegated to the margins of many areas of socio-political life (e.g., the labor market, corporate boards, party politics). The intent of public policy is to move them toward the center, out from the tributaries to the main river, to a position where they will become normalized rather than 'marked' identities.[3] Those are the implications of the metaphor's entailments for its targets.

But what is the character of 'integration' as the target of mainstreaming? Integration itself is neither a population category nor an identity term, such that moving integration from the margins to the center—in keeping with the sense of the metaphor—makes less sense than in mainstreaming's policy usage source, gender. Integration is an activity. Is it the sense of the metaphor that integration policies and programs have been marginalized and are in need of being moved to center stage? I think not: the intention of those using the metaphor seems, instead, to be to recognize that existing integration activities unfold across a range of governmental departments, agencies, and programs, and to point to problems that arise when either that multiplicity is not recognized or, when it is, that the lack of coordination across those multiple organizations impedes the policies' implementation. It is the immigrant who is in need of mainstreaming—of integration by being brought into socio-cultural-political centers from the margins. Focusing on the metaphoric usage of mainstreaming brings to light a mismatch of concepts, between 'mainstreaming' and 'integration'. This is a conceptual problem with implications for the ensuing action such framing puts in place, and this problematic framing may explain, in part, the implementation difficulties.

To test this idea it might be useful to consider, if 'mainstreaming' is as problematic a concept—from definition to implementation—as these chapters suggest, whether some other term might be more conceptually useful. Reading about 'socio-economic' integration and 'socio-cultural' integration—one might equally as well add 'socio-political'—being 'mainstreamed into other policy fields' (Chap. 6) rather than being isolated in a single immigration or even integration ministry or department or program, I found myself thinking (long before finding the idea in Meier's chapter) that what is being described in these chapters is a kind of intersectionality. That is, we understand today that people's identities are 'intersectional'—not only as Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) meant that term

with respect to gender, race, ethnicity, and other 'demographic' dimensions of individual lives, but also in terms of the attributes that enable immigrants to be integrated into their new homelands. Integration rests on a range of personal aptitudes, as well as family, social, collegial, organizational, neighborhood, and other supports. Integration into an educational system requires language and other 'mental' and social abilities; integration into a workplace requires various kinds of work-focused skills and knowledge and perhaps social and emotional intelligence (Goleman 1995, 2006); integration into a neighborhood requires social capital, and so on. This list does not even begin to touch on the various national and sub-national or 'ethnic' origins with which its attributes 'intersect' and which render different people, well, different. As someone in Madrid told the authors of Chap. 7, '[D]iversity is not only about immigrants. We see the coexistence of different cultures, whether native or not: cultural diversity, sexual diversity, religious diversity, social diversity' (Chap. 7).

The complexity of multiple attributes suggests why attention from more than one governmental agency or program is likely to be needed for purposes of integrating immigrants. But not just that. From an intersectional perspective, it makes little sense to treat immigrant status as the sole driver of educational attainment and other markers of 'successful' integration, especially as generational distance from the date of immigration grows. Shifting the focus from *the act of integration* as needing mainstreaming—which I suspect is a holdover from previous decades, in 'older' immigration states, of struggling with the challenges of incorporating people who appeared more of the 'stranger' than those who had preceded them—to the 'intersectional' character of *individual migrants* might bring a new angle to the problematic being addressed (although it does not resolve the social service coordination problem). Moreover, inspired by Meier's astute political assessment of gender mainstreaming in Chap. 8, we might ask, from a symbolic-interpretive perspective, whether the focus on mainstreaming *integration* rather than on mainstreaming *immigrants* and their concerns or needs has not been a kind of policy myth (Bliesemann de Guevara 2016; Yanow 1992) that works to block engagement with the political dimensions of the problem. As Meier notes, there is little recognition that moving immigrants to the center of a coordinated policy process entails social changes (Chap. 10). Social and *political* changes of this sort include a reorientation of power relations between newcomers and 'oldcomers' as societies take on new forms and open up to groups of people who often look, speak, and do things

differently—at least until the second generation comes along, whose dress, speech, and acts are designed to make them fit in.

No term is value free, and intersectionality applied to integration policies likely has its own limitations, but it escapes the conceptual stretching of 'mainstreaming', to which the empirical chapters and Meier's analysis point. I will leave developing the metaphor analysis more fully for a later time or another analyst and turn to my second theme, one of the central features of evaluating integration policies: the need for categories and their limitations.

Reflecting on Mainstreaming and Categories

'Mainstreaming' does some very good conceptual work: it suggests that immigrants, as groups and as individuals, are here to stay; they are neither guest workers who will return home nor migrants who have alighted in a particular state momentarily, only to move along come Spring; and integrating them into the state and its society and into everyday life is not a task to be sequestered in an 'Integration Ministry', but instead is a responsibility shared among all state agencies and societal institutions, not to mention individual residents and their neighborhood and other groups. But let us be practical: we did not need a Brexit or a Le Pen or an Orbán (or a Trump) to tell us that state institutions and citizens are not always welcoming of newcomers. And so for a state or the EU to commit to integration, it is normal to want to assess the success of the policies and programs intended to achieve that integration, whatever the policy arena—education or employment, health care or welfare support.

Keeping tabs on its population has been a mark of the modern state since the early nineteenth century, drawing on the eighteenth-century development of local-regional censuses (initially designed to itemize bodies for potential military service, labor, and taxation) and descriptive statistics to serve state purposes. Here is where we founder on the logic that inheres in contemporary state practices of categorizing for assessing integration, much of which is linked to social justice goals (e.g., fighting discrimination in employment, schooling, and so on). In order to measure progress toward those goals, states need to be able to count things. That statement may seem simplistic, but it entails deciding what to assess and how to define and operationalize those elements in ways that are measurable. In terms of this book's concern, states, usually through their statisticians, need to decide what good, or useful, indicators of integration

are—educational achievement, for instance (see, e.g., Chap. 3)—and what range of attributes should be counted (e.g., the successful completion of six years of schooling, secondary school, post-secondary/vocational school, post-secondary/university, and so on). That is, counting requires measurable concepts, usually rendered as categories, and these require being named and defined.

The minute these category-making and categorizing practices are in place, problems arise, some of which are mentioned or alluded to in these chapters. For instance, measurement of progress in achieving policy ends needs to be carried out over time, and so the indicators—the concepts and categories, including their definitions—need to be stable. But empirical research shows that this is not the case (Proctor et al. 2011; Yanow 2003; Yanow et al. 2016). Moreover, the need for categories that for comparative purposes are stable over time freezes immigrants in that transitory status, quite aside from the definitions-in-use of 'immigrant', 'race', and 'ethnicity' which do the same. The challenges include the following:

- When does one cease to be considered an immigrant and become a 'native' or native-like? i.e., how far back in time—for how many generations—should states continue to consider the 'immigration background' of those it counts?
- Do the various attributes according to which their integration will be judged affect all group members in the same way? Too often, 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) is enacted, conceptually, in the form of 'methodological group-ism', in which all 'Turks' (in Germany), all 'Muslims' (in Switzerland), all 'Black Caribbeans' (the UK), all 'white Netherlanders' (The Netherlands), and so on are assumed to manifest the same behavioral, attitudinal, and cultural traits—regardless of any other, 'intersectional' characteristics—and to experience and pose the selfsame problems for integration.
- In tabulating 'under-achievement' within broader population categories, which dimension is to be used—e.g., to establish budgets for programs to raise achievement levels—to create sub-categories: geographic lines ('Western', 'non-Western', as has been the practice in the Netherlands since 1999, though possibly changing soon)? race-ethnic lines (the currency of the UK, whose taxonomy includes White-Irish and White-Scottish, Black British–Caribbean and Black British–African, Asian British–Pakistani and Asian British–

> Bangladeshi)? nationality lines (a common surrogate for racial designations; see Yanow and van der Haar 2013; Yanow et al. 2016)? Or some other dimension?

Furthermore, something changes, gradually, over time. Categories that were created to achieve social justice purposes by measuring degrees of discrimination take on a pejorative character. In the US, hyphenated identities—Irish-American, Polish-American—became the 'punishing hyphen', the mark of a lesser form of American, as noted a century ago by both then-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt and President Woodrow Wilson (Yanow and van der Haar 2013: 252, n. 2). In the Netherlands, 'allochtoon', especially 'non-Western allochtoon', became the mark of a lesser citizen, as the WRR and CBS observed. This is part of the conundrum of state-created categories in discrimination-remedying policy arenas.

No category set is perfect; all states seem to face that same conundrum, whereby categories introduced to remedy injustices end up instantiating them; to date, no state or researcher in my awareness has found a way around it. Moreover, categories created for statistical measurement appear to take on the political neutrality that attaches to statistics in the eyes of many. As Professor of the Sociology of Public Opinion Fermín Bouza was reported to have said, 'Surveys and statistics are merely a tool and as such are neutral' (quoted in Güell 2009; but see Yanow et al. 2016 for a contrary view). Part of the analysis of state-created categories from a methodological position that challenges this putative neutrality entails interrogating their political character: what power dimensions are embedded in category creation, as well as in their use? The choices pointed to in the three questions above are not objectively neutral, but are instead infused with particular ways of seeing and their concomitant interests and power relationships.

Does the idea of mainstreaming enable us to circumvent these various issues and problems? Sadly, I conclude, along with at least some of this book's chapter authors, that the answer is 'no'. Consider, as one example, Chap. 5 and its examination of funding. Authors Elizabeth Collett, Helen McCarthy, and Meghan Benton clearly lay out what is at stake. Funding, they write, 'is one of the most important mechanisms that the European Union can use to influence policy in Member States' (Chap. 5, p. 99). Immediately, we are in the midst of a classic policy implementation situation, in which policy is made at a central level of government, passed down to the state or regional level, and in turn comes to rest on

local governments (for an analysis of the same set of federated governance issues in the US, see Yanow 1996, Chap. 1). This means that even before states can do the category work of naming and defining the groups whose members might need additional resources for social justice/integration goals, policy implementation has foundered on the shoals of collaboration and cooperation across organizational silos, especially when some do not see integration programs as part of their policy remit. Then, situations develop such as the 'decision-making bodies administering the funds' of at least one grant-making agency—the European Social Fund—neither making 'systematic attempts to include ethnic minorities and immigrant groups' (Chap. 5, p. 101) nor having their funding regulations 'provide definitions of who falls into the category of "migrant"', including how far into the past that definition should extend (p. 101–102). Such inclusions and definitions require categories, and critical reflection on the perceived need for categories opens the question as to the basis for counting migrants, leading to the monitoring difficulties and less effective policy responses noted by Chap. 5's authors [idem.]. Or take Chap. 6, where Ilona van Breugel and Peter Scholten make this point: unless the city collects data on policy outcomes, it will remain unclear whether generic policies are also addressing the specific needs of immigrants (Chap. 6). We are back, once again, in the realm of identity categories, whether the terminology used is racial, ethnic or national.

Concluding Thoughts

We cannot escape language and the work it does, not in our everyday worlds, not in the policy world. It is through language that we communicate with each other, certainly; but language also shapes how we act in the world, if the arguments of the cognitive linguists are right. For the World Bank to drop the concept of 'developing country' from its 2016 World Development Indicators (Bracho 2016), for example, is significant for the ways in which policy makers think about the world, from 'global south' to 'global north', and for actions at the level of international relations, aid, and the integration (sic!) of less developed and more developed states. The WRR Report released in the Netherlands on November 1, 2016 (Bovens et al. 2016) noted that hyphenated identities, such as Moroccan-Netherlander, might be one alternative to the use of allochtoon. In the US context, as I have argued elsewhere (Yanow 2003), the

once-punishing hyphen has become the mark of a 'good' American, who is both 'American' (so-designated on the right side of the hyphen) and from some other place in space or time (as designated on its left). That hyphen has evolved into a way in which Americans tell a national origins story, national identity stories, and group identity stories. In Chap. 6, however, van Breugel and Scholten suggest that such hyphenation makes integration (and other) policies targeted at specific groups impossible to implement.

The concern in integration mainstreaming circles is that using categories to eradicate discrimination and bias ends up not only instantiating such population divisions, but also sustaining the differences they were intended to combat. This is analogous to the debate over the use of 'race' in the US: is it possible to eradicate racism, which is based on a socially constructed sense of what 'race' means, without using the very word that thereby imputes an objective reality to it? The answer to that, so far, has been 'no'. But I think there is another path to take in the policy world that may mitigate these problems and concerns, at least somewhat. Once states create population categories of this sort, they take on not only an objective reality and an essentialism, but a durability that goes along with both of those. States do not often revisit their taxonomies to see if the categories are still useful for the policy ends for which they were created. And over time, those categories—which may have started off with a neutral emotional charge—seem increasingly to grow pejorative overtones, if not explicitly becoming negative labels, as in the Pygmalion classroom experiment (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968). Two conceptual solutions, then, might be engaged (Yanow, forthcoming). One is to recognize that a single set of categories may not be useful for all policy arenas. What works for assessing educational attainment may not work in criminal justice policies. That calls for investigating, for each policy arena, the relationship between policy goals and the most useful categories for achieving them. The second, and more to the point here, would be to institute what in US policy-making is called a sunset clause: to revisit the categories periodically, examine the state of their negative labeling, and if they are more punitive than they are enabling, to change them. This is what happened with the US Office of Management and Budget's affirmative action reporting categories between their establishment in 1977 and their redefinition in 1997 (Yanow 2003); it is also what appears to be taking place today in the Netherlands. Yes, this takes

time and thought, but states need to weigh those costs against the costs of negatively marking a portion of their citizens.

Even so, a challenge remains. The Netherlands 2016 WRR Report points to a possible new category structure: adopting the language of 'residents with a migration background' and 'residents with a Netherlands background' (*inwoners met een migratieachtergrond*, *inwoners met een Nederlandse achtergrond*). Germany has been using the former since 2005 (*Personen mit Migrationshintergrund*), although it is not clear if that shift has achieved its intended goal. What is clear, however, is that such language does not escape marking distinctions between 'natives' and 'foreigners'. And if the purpose of integration policies—whether via mainstreaming or more 'old-fashioned' sequestration by policy arena—is to bring newcomers to a point where they know their new home society and feel at home in it, then this new nomenclature is doomed, alas, also to fail as it takes on the pejorative coloration of 'othering' those it wishes to draw near. In short, I fear that mainstreaming, in the end, does not—and cannot, given what we want integration policies to accomplish—get us closer to the successful integration of newcomers as long as they are marked by language that distances them, and does so not only today, but for generations to come.

Acknowledgments My thanks to Fred Schaffer and Peri Schwartz-Shea for comments on previous drafts. This essay was written during my term as senior fellow at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research in Duisburg, Germany, and I am most grateful for their support.

Notes

1. See also Schön (1993/1979) on metaphors as both 'models of' prior thought and 'models for' subsequent action.
2. I use the noun form as 'mainstreaming' is a gerund functioning as a noun in the phrases gender mainstreaming and integration mainstreaming.
3. The idea of marking comes from linguistics or linguistic anthropology. A 'normal' term—'doctor', say, or 'professor'—is marked when an adjective accompanies it: 'Nigerian' doctor, 'woman' professor. The marking of a term treats the person so designated as other than the norm, outside of the area under the bell curve of a normal statistical distribution. In many societies, such marking renders the marked person lesser than the normal case.

References

Bacchi, Carol. 2009. *Analysing Policy: What's the Problem Represented To Be?* Frenchs Forest: Pearson Education.

Bardach, Eugene. 1977. *The Implementation Game*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit, ed. 2016. *Myth and Narrative in International Politics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bovens, Mark, Meike Bokhorst, Roel Jennissen, and Godfried Engbersen. 2016. *Migratie en classificatie: naar een meervoudig migratie-idioom* [Migration and Classification: Toward a Plural Migration-Idiom]. WRR Verkenning Report No. 34. Den Haag: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid. Accessed November 1, 2016. www.wrr.nl/publicaties/publicatie/article/migratie-en-classificatie-naar-een-meervoudig-migratieidioom-34/

Bracho, Gerardo. 2016. Emerging Donors: The Rise and Unravelling of the Development Aid System. Presented at the *Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research Seminar*, Duisburg, Germany, November 8.

Brigham, John, and Don W. Brown. 1980. *Policy Implementation: Penalties or Incentives?* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Bunker, D.R. 1972. Policy Sciences Perspectives on Implementation Processes. *Policy Sciences* 3: 71–80.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1991. Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color. *Stanford Law Review* 43 (6): 1241–1299.

Edwards, George C. III. 1980. *Implementing Public Policy*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Elmore, Richard F. 1978. Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation. *Public Policy* 26 (2): 185–228.

Goleman, Daniel. 1995. *Emotional Intelligence*. New York: Bantam.

———. 2006. *Social Intelligence*. New York: Bantam.

Güell, Orion. 2009. Luz estadística sí, censo étnico no. *El Pais*, 1 April. Accessed January 26, 2017. http://elpais.com/diario/2009/04/01/sociedad/1238536801_850215.html

Hawkesworth, Mary. 2012. *Political Worlds of Women: Activism, Advocacy, and Governance in the Twenty-First Century*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Ingram, Helen M., and Dean E. Mann, eds. 1980. *Why Policies Succeed or Fail*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1987. The Metaphorical Logic of Rape. *Metaphor and Symbol* 2: 73–79.

Lazin, Fred. 1980. The Effects of Administrative Linkages on Implementation. *Policy Sciences* 12: 193–214.

Lipsky, Michael. 1978. Standing the Study of Public Policy Implementation on Its Head. In *American Politics and Public Policy*, ed. Walter Dean Burnham and Martha W. Weinberg, 391–402. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Nakamura, Robert T., and Frank Smallwood. 1980. *The Politics of Policy Implementation*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Palumbo, Dennis J., and Donald J. Calista, eds. 1990. *Implementation and the Policy Process: Opening Up the Black Box*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Pressman, Jeffery L. and Wildavsky, Aaron. 1984/1973. *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work At All, this Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who See to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes*, 3rd ed. (expanded). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Proctor, Alana, Anja Krumeich, and Agnes Meershoek. 2011. Making a Difference: The Construction of Ethnicity in HIV and STI Epidemiological Research by the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). *Social Science & Medicine* 72 (11): 1838–1845.

Random House Dictionary. 2016. Accessed November 21, 2016. www.dictionary.com/browse/mainstreaming

Rein, Martin, and Donald A. Schön. 1977. Problem Setting in Policy Research. In *Using Social Research in Public Policy Making*, ed. Carol H. Weiss, 235–251. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Rosenthal, Robert, and Lenore Jacobson. 1968. *Pygmalion in the Classroom*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Schön, Donald A. 1993/1979. Generative Metaphor. In *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed., 137–163. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schuh, Russell G., and Laura C. Leviton. 1991. Evaluating Referral and Agency Coordination with a Computerized Client-Tracking System. *Evaluation Review* 15 (5): 533–554.

van Hulst, Merlijn and Dvora, Yanow. 2016. From Policy 'Frames' to 'Framing': Theorizing a More Dynamic, Political Approach. *American Review of Public Administration* 46 (1): 92–112 (online May 2014).

Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2003. Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration. *International Migration Review* 37 (3): 576–610.

Yanow, Dvora. 1992. Silences in Public Policy Discourse: Policy and Organizational Myths. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 2 (4): 399–423.

———. 1996. *How Does a Policy Mean? Interpreting Policy and Organizational Actions*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

———. 2003. *Constructing "Race" and "Ethnicity" in America: Category-making in Public Policy and Administration*. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe.

———. 2012/1992. Supermarkets and Culture Clash: The Epistemological Role of Metaphors in Administrative Practice. In *Case Study Methods in Business Research*, ed. Albert J. Mills and Gabrielle Durepos, vol. 3, 123–142. London: Sage.

———. Forthcoming. *The Treachery of Categories: Counting, Immigrant Integration, and the State*. Manuscript in progress.

Yanow, Dvora, and Marleen van der Haar. 2013. People Out of Place: Allochthony and Autochthony in Netherlands Identity Discourse—Metaphors and Categories in Action. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 16 (2): 227–261.

Yanow, Dvora, Marleen van der Haar, and Karlijn Völke. 2016. Troubled Taxonomies and the Calculating State: "Everyday" Categorizing and "Race-Ethnicity"—The Netherlands Case. *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 1 (2): 187–226.

Zelli, Fariborz, and Harro van Asselt. 2013. The Institutional Fragmentation of Global Environmental Governance: Causes, Consequences, and Responses. *Global Environmental Politics* 13 (3): 1–13.

Dvora Yanow is Guest Professor in the Communication, Philosophy, and Technology Sub-Department at Wageningen University. Her teaching and research take up the generation and communication of knowing and meaning in policy and organizational settings. A political/policy/organizational ethnographer and interpretive methodologist, she is currently exploring state-created categories for race-ethnic identity, immigrant integration policies, and citizen-making practices; research ethics and regulation policies; practice studies; and science/technology museums and the idea of science. *Interpretive Research Design* (2012), with Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, launched their co-edited *Routledge Series on Interpretive Methods*. Their co-edited *Interpretation and Method* has been published in a second edition.

Index

Peter Scholten, I. van Breugel (eds.), *Mainstreaming Integration Governance*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59277-0