Shuqin Xu

School Leadership, Citizenship Education and Politics in China

Experiences from Junior Secondary Schools in Shanghai

Governance and Citizenship in Asia

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Aims and Scope

This series explores how citizenship is shaped by social, political, cultural and historical contexts and how it may be moulded to serve the nation state in the age of globalization. In these publications we see how governance relates to all aspects of civic life, including politics, public policy, administration, civil society and the economy, as well as the core values of society.

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Through these publications we see that citizenship is an integral part of 'good governance' and that such governance ultimately enriches citizenship. Scholarly investigation and academic dialogue in this series describe the interdependence and mutuality of governance and citizenship.

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Printed on acid-free paper

Foreword

Across the globe, education is recognized as a means of social justice; social justice in and through schooling is minimally about enabling all students to realize their full potential through equal access to the social and cultural capital which schools offer. Citizenship education, both through the academic curriculum and through extracurricular activities, has a key role to play in enabling social justice and inclusion and in preparing youth for living together. In the early twenty-first century, we have witnessed growing interest in citizenship education in diverse contexts (Osler and Starkey 2006; Reid et al. 2009), in schools established democracies, emerging democracies, and authoritarian states. As this book confirms, competing perspectives on citizenship education have sometimes emphasized it as a moral endeavor and at other times as a political endeavor (Osler 2016 in press).

The processes of globalization mean that citizenship education has, in different contexts and to different degrees, increasingly sought to prepare young people not simply for national citizenship but for social and political efficacy at different scales from the local to the global. This demands a cosmopolitan perspective (Nussbaum 2002) and it is what I have characterized as "education for cosmopolitan citizenship" (Osler and Starkey 2003, 2005; Osler 2016). Yet human mobility, as well as highlighting existing diversity, creates societies characterized by increased diversity, and frequently also by increased inequality. As Castles (in press) notes: "Human mobility is an integral part of globalization" and this mobility it is also supported by the social, cultural, and technical conditions of globalization. At the same time, as all regions of the world seek to address the challenges posed by international population movements, many nation-states also encounter the challenges of significant internal migration. In China, for example, the "floating population" of people moving from the agricultural central and western provinces to the newly industrialized east coast was estimated a decade ago to be as at least 100 million, with many internal migrants experiencing legal disadvantage and economic marginalization not unlike that faced by international migrants (Skeldon 2006). The impact of demographic change and consequent social challenges are felt at schools and by teachers on an everyday basis, demanding

creative leadership and innovative solutions. For these reasons, this book, addressing leadership, citizenship education, and politics, is both timely and valuable to a global audience of scholars.

One of the most important and original contributions of this book is its close analysis of the dual-lined leadership in China's schools, which, as Shuqin Xu observes, is an area of school leadership research that has hitherto been neglected. As Xu explains, this dual leadership has existed since the 1949 founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), with each school led by both a school principal and by a school party secretary (SPS). The SPS is assigned by the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) to conduct political work and lead citizenship education. The school principal also has responsibilities for citizenship education with the curriculum. By studying the leadership and implementation of citizenship education at school level, Xu offers us in-depth insights into the micro-politics of school leadership and new perspectives on potential tensions between understandings of citizenship education as a moral or life skills project on the one hand, and citizenship education as a political project on the other.

With her careful analysis and clear examples, Xu also reveals something of the external school politics which school principals in Shanghai must negotiate in their attempts to recruit the highest attaining students; respond to the bureaucratic demands of school inspection; manage the local CPC leadership and powerful interest groups; and respond to parents, many of whom hope to influence the attainment and future career path of their child through offering hospitality and gifts.

This engaging and insightful book provides both school leadership researchers and citizenship education scholars with valuable detail on the ways in which education for citizenship is constructed, power consolidated, and school reputations established. Xu is keenly aware of her international audience and the book provides valuable contextual data on China's twentieth century political and historical development. It shows how school leaders perceive their professional roles; engage in processes of negotiation; make compromises; and work on behalf of their teachers and students. It presents leaders' views of what school leadership looks like "on the ground" and how principals are viewed by SPSs and vice versa. Given the senior position of the principal and author's assessment that in the competition for power, principals usually prevail over SPSs, one interesting insight from school leaders, reflecting prevailing gender relations, is that the relationship between the two parties appears to work best, according to some, when the role of principal is held by a man, and that of SPS, by a woman, rather than vice versa.

This book is timely and noteworthy, since China's engagement in the world economy is placing pressure on educational institutions and actors to respond to changing societal and economic needs. Effectively, globalization has significantly challenged conceptions of education for citizenship which emphasize patriotic pride as a sole or primary goal. Xu provides a dynamic example of the different and often contradictory ways in which local and national political and economic pressures operate both to extend cosmopolitan perspectives and to challenge them. Thus school leaders in Shanghai, regardless of their own professional and political

standpoints, must negotiate a curriculum path which meets the needs of their students and the basic requirements of political elites. Consequently, they work to ensure that citizenship education in Shanghai in our global age incorporates elements which allow students to develop their various identities and prepare themselves to take a full role in adult society. This involves some leaders in working to ensure that the curriculum allows students to fulfill their role as "cosmopolitan citizens" (in response to trading and economic expectations), while at the same time demonstrating the political loyalty of all (teachers and students) to the ruling party, so that the school can pursue its everyday work unimpeded by political criticism which might undermine basic educational goals. In this sense they strive to realize social justice for students, while remaining aware of pragmatic considerations.

Shuqin Xu deals confidently with change, complexity, and contradictions in her analysis. I am very pleased to welcome and commend this engaging book and hope that it will attain the wide readership that it deserves.

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Preface

My interest in exploring issues of school leadership in citizenship education is closely related to my own education experience. The idea for the research that led to this book first came to me when I was Master's student majoring in Educational Leadership at a Chinese University. As a Chinese student who had been educated for 12 years in schools led by school party secretaries (SPSs), I was aware that SPSs held positions of authority, but knew little about their actual leadership. I turned to educational policies and the extant research to learn more about SPSs' leadership, but found little research that specifically focused on SPSs' leadership, though the position had existed in Chinese schools since the 1949 founding of the People's Republic of China. SPSs' leadership thus became a myth—it had existed in and been important to Chinese schools, but was invisible and hidden in research.

I then turned my quest into research in my Ph.D. study, and chose citizenship education as a window to explore SPSs' leadership. SPSs were assigned by the CPC to conduct political work and lead citizenship education in schools. I intended to explore the process of leading citizenship education, and how SPSs, as representatives of the Communist Party of China (CPC) at the school level, exercised leadership in promoting the CPC's political socialization project—citizenship education—by interacting with the CPC-led state and other stakeholders.

After learning more about the complexity of dual-lined (administrative and political) leadership in China's schools, I expanded the scope of my initial research to study the leadership of principals and SPSs (school leaders with equal rank) and their interactions as they lead citizenship education. This dual school leadership structure has engendered a complex working relationship between principals and SPSs, especially as regards leading citizenship education. Their interactions have been complicated by the CPC Central Committee's introduction of the Principal Responsibility System. The complexities of principals' and SPSs' leadership in citizenship education is an under-researched area of study and warrants closer attention.

This book contributes to the literature on political school leadership, curriculum leadership, and citizenship education as a whole, particularly in the context of China. It adopts an interpretive qualitative approach to examine and theorize the dynamics and complexities of leadership in junior secondary schools in Shanghai, China, particularly in regard to citizenship education. It is my hope that the macro- and micro-political theoretical perspective taken in this book will contribute to informed discussions about key curriculum leadership and citizenship education issues facing policy makers. More generally, the research undertaken can also serve as a resource for academic and professional communities, and graduate students interested in the practice and theory of education in China, particular as it relates to school leadership, citizenship education, school micro-politics, and China studies.

This book is based on my Ph.D. thesis, completed in the summer of 2013. Parts of the book were expanded and adapted from a coauthored journal article that was generated from this research and completed during my Ph.D. study. It is "School leadership and citizenship education: The experiences and struggles of school party secretaries in China," *Educational Research for Policy and Practice,* 2015, 14(1), 33–51. Because this paper has its own theme and development of discussion and does not totally fit the structure and flow of discussion in the book, most of the paper was adapted and spread through different parts of the book.

Guangdong, China   Shuqin Xu

Contents

List of Figures

Abbreviations

CE   Citizenship Education
CPC   Communist Party of China
CYL   Communist Youth League
DEB   District Education Bureau
DPCE   Deputy Principal of Citizenship Education
GLF   Great Leap Forward
HCED   Head of Citizenship Education Department
MoE   Ministry of Education
NPC   National People's Congress
PRS   Principal Responsibility System
SMEC   Shanghai Municipal Education Commission
SPO   School Party Organization
SPS   School Party Secretary
YPC   Young Pioneers of China

Chapter 1
Introduction

Despite the strong influence of globalization on various aspects of human life across the world, the nation-state continues to play an active and key role in defining citizenship and citizenship education (CE) (Ambler 1994; Kennedy 2004, 2008; Walford 1996)—both by adding global dimensions to CE, and by continuing to influence citizens' daily life by making decisions about and showing increased involvement in national security issues, such as 9/11 and the 2008 global financial crisis (Kennedy 2010). CE cannot avoid the influences of the nation-state, for three reasons. First, the nation-state has long had the power to concentrate its national forces to influence CE, and is unlikely to give up that power (Law 2011). Second, globalization has driven the nation-state to use CE to cultivate nationalism and defend its legitimacy, and to increase individuals' sense of belonging to the nation-state (Kennedy 2004, 2008). Third, the promotion of CE needs the nation-state's mediation and direction to ensure that some groups' interests are not sacrificed in the pursuit of others' (Ambler 1994; Walford 1996). While multiple perspectives have been adopted to examine the relationship between the nation-state and CE (Banks 2008; Kennedy 2004, 2008, 2010; Osler 2010), and numerous studies have examined different aspects of CE curricula (Grossman et al. 2008)—including principals' role in administrating CE (Remy and Wagstaff 1982; Serriere 2014) and mediating CE values (Dimmock et al. 2014)—few have focused on how school leaders exercise their influence in CE by interacting with diverse interest groups.

While there are some debates as to whether CE, per se, is conducted in the mainland People's Republic of China (hereafter China), some researchers suggest that the courses and programs promoting Chinese students' political socialization, such as political education and moral education, are de facto CE programs (e.g., Fairbrother 2004; Law 2006; Lee 1997; Zhao and Fairbrother 2010). Zeng (1981), deputy minister of China's Ministry of Education (MoE) from 1979 to 1982, also held this viewpoint. CE in China has been promoted through diverse channels,

including CE-specific subjects (e.g., political ideology, ideological morality), other social science subjects (e.g., history, geography), language subjects (e.g., Chinese language and literacy), and various on- and off-campus activities (e.g., celebrating the National Day, visiting patriotic sites), all of which have been included in broad CE curricula.

CE in China, much as in other countries, has been directed and defined by the state in accordance with the wishes of its ruling party, the Communist Party of China (CPC). Since coming to power in 1949, the CPC has striven to indoctrinate Chinese citizens in its version of socialist ideology, so as to consolidate its position as the de facto ruler of a country that is de jure led by its workers and peasants (Miller 2011; Zhao 1998). The CPC exercises its dominance thereof through its central institutions (e.g., the Central Committee of the CPC and its Politburo), as well as through political, administrative, legislative and judicial institutions at all levels of the state, from the national to the local. These institutions in this book are referred as "CPC-led state," as they are designed to perpetuate the CPC's power and interests under the de facto leadership of the Central Committee of CPC and its Politburo (Dreyer 2012). The CPC-led state is the most influential macro-actor in Chinese CE, and controls all aspects of CE, including its goals, topics, strategies, plans, curricula and leadership system (see Chap. 3). Despite being expanded to include global, local and individual levels, CE in China has remained focused on the national level to address the CPC's political and social purposes, cultivate students' nationalism and prepare successors to the current CPC leadership (Law 2006, 2011, 2013; Pan 2011).

To perpetuate the CPC's control over CE, school leadership in CE has been stressed and heads of dual-line school leadership system have been assigned with intertwined responsibilities in CE leadership. The dual-line school leadership is an extension of the CPC's state governance structure. To ensure and enhance its overall political dominance, the CPC Central Committee established a dual-line leadership system—consisting of a political line and an administrative line—in state institutions at all levels to direct, oversee and evaluate political and administrative issues. The relationships between the dual lines and the heads thereof are interconnected. At the school level, the appointed heads of the administrative and political lines are, respectively, school principals and school party secretaries (SPSs). While the relationship between the two is complex, those complexities are institutionalized for the CPC's political consideration. SPSs generally wielded more power than principals until 1985, when the CPC Central Committee decided to gradually re-adopt the Principal Responsibility System (PRS). The PRS designates principals as the chief school decision makers and assigns them full responsibility for school administration; SPSs, as school-level representatives of the CPC, are responsible for school political work and for overseeing the principals' work (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1985). In addition, both principals (CPC members or not) and SPSs are assigned intertwined political and administrative responsibilities. A principal who is a CPC member might also be appointed as deputy SPS, while a SPSs might be named as deputy principal (Organization Department of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee et al. 2010).

The relationship between principals and SPSs in China become more complicated when it comes to leading CE. While principals are assigned primary responsibility for other curriculum areas, responsibility for CE in China is assigned to both principals and SPSs, demonstrating the CPC's emphasis thereon. The division of labor between the two, however, is not clear; principals are in full charge of school CE, but SPSs oversee all school CE affairs (State Education Commission 1995). Moreover, SPSs who are deputy principals are actually deputy principals of CE (DPCE), thus further complicating the relationship between principals and SPSs by creating a working relationship in which the latter is subordinate to the former in leading CE, despite that they are equally ranked school leaders.

As the above introduction has shown, the nation-state still plays a key role in defining CE throughout the world; China is no exception, and the CPC has established a centralized hierarchical leadership system to guide school leadership and leadership in CE and ensure CE perpetuates its ideology. Based on research on CE in and outside of China and China's policies on CE, this book thus considers school leadership and CE in the context of the nation-state. Currently, how school leaders perceive, shape, and exercise their leadership in CE, while mediating and meeting the diverse interests and demands of various stakeholders in school's macro- and micro-political contexts, is under-researched, especially regarding school leadership in CE in China, which involves complicated interactions among the ruling party and equally-ranked school administrative and political leaders.

Adopting CE as a window, this book explores the dynamics and complexities of how principals and SPSs, who are de facto equally ranked school leaders, exercise leadership. Specifically, it examines, from a macro- and micro-political theoretical perspective, the interactions between these two types of school leaders, and how they respond to the demands of various school stakeholders, including macro-political actors (e.g., the CPC-led state) and micro-political actors (e.g., other school leaders, teachers, students and parents), at the school level.

This study chose Shanghai as its case study, for four major interrelated reasons (see more in Chap. 4). First, similar to other cities in China, Shanghai is required to follow the CPC's political orientation, implement national social and educational policies, and adopt the CPC-prescribed dual-line leadership system for government and schools. Second, since the 1840s, Shanghai has frequently interacted with the outside world while struggling to maintain its position as a Chinese city. Third, Shanghai has long been of political and economic significance to China, and to the CPC in particular, and was the birthplace of the CPC in 1921. Fourth, Shanghai has been a pioneer in CE and school leadership reforms. Shanghai's unique characteristics were expected to generate interesting findings on how school leaders mediate diverse stakeholders' interests in CE in a certain social context, and indeed did so.

Despite presenting the dynamics and complexities of school leadership in CE in Shanghai, this qualitative research has no intention to generalize its findings to other school leaders in Shanghai and elsewhere in China, for two reasons. First, operating under the same national policies and requirements, other cities, similar to Shanghai, could also adopt local-specific methods to implement social

and educational policies that highlight and reinforce the CPC's leadership at the municipal level, and make local policies to promote local development, including educational development (see Chap. 4). The search for similarities and differences in dynamics of school leadership in CE between cities in China is beyond the scope of this research, and merits separate study. Second, as this study's findings will show, even within the same city, the power relationships between principals and SPSs, and their responses toward the CPC-led state's policies, can vary depending on school contexts and school leaders' personal characteristics, such as personality, gender, professional ability and experience.

Data was gathered from document analysis, non-participant observation and semi-structured interviews, conducted in 2011, with two Shanghai educational officials and 44 school leaders from 24 Shanghai schools, including: principals; principals who were SPSs; SPSs; SPSs who were DPCEs; DPCEs; and, Heads of CE Departments (HCEDs). The data were analyzed using the software NVivo 8.0, with interpretational analysis and constant comparison. Reliability was enhanced through triangulation, member checks and clarification. Detailed information on methodology can be found in Appendix.

This study demonstrates that school leadership in CE in China involves school leaders' diverse perceptions of and strategies toward their complex and dynamic interactions with a range of macro- and micro-political actors, all of whom have different interests in, expectations of and demands on school leadership and CE. In analyzing school leadership in CE in junior secondary schools in Shanghai, this study finds that school leaders (both principals and SPSs) can facilitate and challenge state policies and requirements, and can also cooperate and compete with each other to exercise political and administrative influence in CE, and to respond to macro- and micro-political actors. The findings reveal that a key issue informing the complexities and dynamics of their relationship is the political actors' diverse and even sometimes contradicting interests regarding school leadership and CE, and their different resources for and influence on school leadership.

The argument I present can be understood within a political exercise theoretical framework. It presents school leadership in CE as a process in which school leaders employ their leadership knowledge, skills and strategies to guide and manage CE by: (a) interacting with actors at the macro- and micro-political levels; (b) navigating their political and administrative responsibilities; (c) addressing and mediating the diverse interests of macro- and micro-political actors and their at-times contradictory demands for civic and academic outcomes; and, (d) balancing these demands against their own desires for professional autonomy and the completion of their prescribed responsibilities and duties.

The framework improves our understanding of school principals' and SPSs' dual-line leadership of schools in China. It contributes to the literature by supplementing studies on CE by examining its leadership. It supplements theories of political leadership in schools and school leaders' perceptions of and strategies for balancing their intertwined dual-line school leadership responsibilities (especially regarding CE), and for responding to the diverse interests and expectations of macro- and micro-political actors (especially regarding leadership in CE).

It contributes to and enriches two aspects of existing research on school leaders' views on and interactions with macro-political actors, and on the micro-politics existing between equally-ranked school leaders. Finally, it supplements extant research on school leadership in CE by revealing its dynamics and complexities in multi-leveled contexts.

Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework guiding this study. It reviews theories of citizenship, CE, school leadership, and curriculum leadership in the global literature. In particular, it examines theoretical models of republican, liberal and global citizenship, as well as nation-state oriented and inclusive CE, to identify the nation-state's role in shaping citizenship and CE. It introduces diverse models of school leadership, reviews issues relating to political leadership in schools, and positions curriculum leadership as a part of school leadership. Then, it reviews the research on China's dual-line school leadership system, the politics facing Chinese school leaders, and curriculum leadership in China. Next, it examines extant studies on Chinese CE, including those discussing the nature and purposes of Chinese CE, the tension between CE and academic instruction, and leadership in CE. On the basis of the literature reviewed, it proposes a theoretical framework to guide this study.

Chapters 3 and 4 provide the macro-political context for this study. Specifically, Chap. 3 focuses on the national political, economic and educational context in China. It reviews how the CPC-led state's macro-politics shape the development of China's society, economy, political construction and education, including CE and school leadership. It examines how China's economic development and political construction has affected its education, CE and school leadership in different historical periods. Chapter 4 introduces the context of Shanghai, where this qualitative study was conducted. It does not rehearse the historical changes in politics, economics and education in Shanghai; instead, it briefly presents the importance of Shanghai in China's politics and economy and Shanghai's efforts in developing its education system, and implementing national CE policies, while still reflecting local imperatives.

Chapters 5–7 focus on the micro-political context of this study, and present and discuss the study's major findings. Specifically, Chaps. 5 and 6 analyze how principals and SPSs, respectively, exercise leadership in CE. Four major scenarios showing school leaders' responses to macro-political actors' policies and requirements are identified that show how principals and SPSs are torn between faithfully executing state policy demands, adapting those demands to suit the specific needs and conditions of their school, pursuing their professional autonomy, and addressing the interests of various micro-political actors. At the micro-political (school) level, principals and SPSs enjoy a complicated working relationship in which they collaborate to fulfill their responsibilities and respond to school macro- and micro-political actors, while simultaneously competing for power over school leadership and CE. Chapter 7 provides possible explanations for the factors affecting principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE, and shows that it is shaped by interrelated factors, including diverse influences in a multi-leveled world, the integration of politics and education, the demands of macro- and micro-political actors, and personal factors.

Chapter 8 concludes this book by re-interpreting school leadership in CE in Shanghai, China. It proposes that school leadership in CE in Shanghai can be understood as a political exercise in which school leaders are expected to mediate between macro- and micro-political actors. The leaders' fulfillment of their political and administrative responsibilities is influenced by China's political system, which contains multiple contexts and involves the interplay of multiple stakeholders.

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Chapter 2
CE and School Leadership: Theoretical Perspectives

Studies on school leadership in CE cannot be separated from theories of CE and school leadership, as the latter includes or influences the former. To understand how school leadership in CE in China is influenced by macro- and micro-political forces, this chapter begins by introducing general theories of citizenship and CE to identify the role of the nation-state in shaping them, and then examines theories of school leadership, particularly political school leadership and curriculum leadership. To clarify the extent to which the general literature can and cannot explain specific Chinese issues, this chapter examines debates on China's dual-line school leadership system, the political realities facing Chinese school leaders, and Chinese curriculum leadership. It then presents the nature of CE in China as a process of political socialization, and the tension between CE and academic instruction and CE leadership, after which a framework for the study is proposed.

Concepts of Citizenship and CE

Citizenship and CE are contentious concepts, as they are connected to historical change and diverse social and cultural backgrounds (Law 2007; Osler and Starkey 2003). Although many theories have attempted to conceptualize it, the concepts cannot be separated from the sovereignty and territory of the nation-state (Dagger 2002; Heater 1999, 2002). The nation-state has historically played the key role in defining and controlling citizenship and CE, and school leadership is fundamental to the regulation of CE. This section reviews theories on citizenship to identify the various relationships between citizenship and the nation-state, and then introduces nation-state-oriented and inclusive models of CE and their relationship to the nation-state, as well as the role of school leadership in the regulation of CE.

Citizenship and the Nation-State

Citizenship generally involves certain rights and obligations, which shape individuals' identity and their awareness of their identity when participating public affairs and accepting public values (Cogan 1998; Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Law 2007, 2010). Citizenship is traditionally bound by the nation-state's borders, and the elements of citizenship offered within those borders vary according to the nation-state's level of development. Marshall (1992) proposed three elements whose gradual inclusion in citizenship indicate that its meaning deepens and broadens as the nation-state develops—civil rights (e.g., freedom of speech), political rights (e.g., the freedom to participate in political and governmental affairs) and social rights (e.g., access to community and state resources and cultural elements).

Concepts of citizenship also vary according to different social and cultural contexts, as can be seen in theories on republican citizenship and liberal citizenship (Heater 1999; Kymlicka and Norman 1994). Republican citizenship limits citizenship to those individuals who take on the responsibilities of public and political participation and who place community and nation-state interests ahead of their own (Dagger 2002). Liberal citizenship, on the other hand, gives primacy to individual citizens' private affairs, including one's right to preserve one's life, property, and liberty (Schuck 2002). Despite taking the individual as its starting point, liberal citizenship relies on the nation-state to regulate behaviors so as to protect and secure individuals' rights, liberties, and freedoms from unwarranted interference (Schuck 2002).

Both republican and liberal models of citizenship are criticized for their emphasis on preserving the nation-state's privilege and homogeneity. First, the rights they propose are exclusive, as political participation tends to be the interest and inclination of those who are well-educated, wealthy, and have access to political affairs (Young 1989). Second, both are homogeneous, requiring all citizens to abide by the same goals, rights, and responsibilities, without regard for the complex and multiple needs of marginalized groups (Banks 2009; Young 1989).

Due to these limitations, republican citizenship and liberal citizenship have both been challenged by globalization and its tendency toward increased communication, capital flow, and global migration (Kubow et al. 1998; Mok 2007; Pike 2008; Torres 2002). In the context of globalization, new trends in citizenship have emerged. First, the nation-state is no longer the sole definer of citizenship; the forces of globalization, cultural groups, and local government now also influence citizenship (Banks 2004; Kubow et al. 1998; Ladson-Billings 2007). Second, global awareness and multiple and inclusive values are increasingly advocated in citizenship (Banks 2008; Kubow et al. 1998). To meet the multiple citizenship needs of diverse groups at different polity levels, more inclusive terms of citizenship have been put forward, including global citizenship (Frey and Whitehead 2009; Stokes 2000) and multicultural citizenship (Banks 2009). Global citizenship emphasizes one's transnational awareness, loyalty, and allegiance, which can be

further expressed as one's awareness of one's global identity and of changes in and improvements to global affairs (Stokes 2000). By comparison, multicultural citizenship emphasizes the promotion of equality among socially and culturally diverse people (Banks 2008, 2009).

Although theories of citizenship have changed in the context of globalization and have been analyzed from diverse perspectives, it is still most directly and significantly affected by domestic actors, particularly the nation-state (Kennedy 2010; Law 2006), and nationalism is tenacious (Banks 2004). The nation-state's role in influencing citizenship is twofold (Law 2006): first, the nation-state has the power to define a common national citizenship; second, it decides which global elements should be introduced and transmitted in national citizenship, and which should be filtered and resisted.

Theories on citizenship help to explain the nation-state's role in defining citizenship, as well as the forces shaping it, and shed light on the relationship between CE and the nation-state.

CE and the Nation-State

CE is a project of socializing students by equipping them with "the knowledge, skills and values" necessary to develop their civic consciousness and agency, so that, in the future, they will function and live as good citizens (Banks 2008, p. 129) and contribute to national economic and political development (Dawson et al. 1977). Various models have been proposed to explain how and in what ways CE responds and accommodates to social changes (such as globalization); these models could generally be classified as nation-state oriented (Banks 2008) and inclusive CE (Law 2011).

Nation-state-oriented CE involves providing students with state-prescribed knowledge, skills, and values that represent the nation-state's ideology (Hanasz 2006). Its goal is to foster good producers, consumers, and patriots who could maintain the social *status quo* and reinforce the unity of the nation-state (Hanasz 2006; Sim and Print 2009). CE is emphasized by the nation-state, due to its role in allocation and political socialization (Meyer and Rubinson 1975). Allocation means the ways in which CE provides individuals with political roles and the opportunity to participate in political life; social levels and roles are allocated to individuals based on their internalization of CE (Meyer and Rubinson 1975). Political socialization broadly "refers to the way society transmits its political culture from generation to generation" (Langton 1969, p. 4). According to Sears (1975), CE can promote political socialization by fostering three characteristics: attachment to the political system; partisan attitudes; and political participation. In the process of political socialization, individuals internalize political qualities and act them out in their lives in the wider society; they then create and expand their roles in society, leading to political development (Meyer and Rubinson 1975).

Nation-state-oriented CE uses exclusion and assimilation as its two main approaches (Castles 2004). Exclusionary CE is provided only to students from within the nation-state, while assimilatory CE tries to transform diverse cultures and languages into the nation-state's homogeneous culture and language. Schooling is seen as an important element of CE in these two approaches for two reasons (Apple 1982; Heater 2002; Sim and Print 2009): first, school is designed to reproduce the dominant class' values and ideologies, maintain the nation-state's dominance and exploitation, and shape students' character and behavior; second, some elements of citizenship, such as political knowledge, duties, responsibilities, attitudes, and skills, are more easily and more effectively transmitted through schooling.

Unlike nation-state-oriented CE, inclusive CE prepares individuals' awareness, identities, knowledge, and skills from the global level to the national, local, and individual levels. Four major types of inclusive CE have been developed: global (Kingwell 2000), cosmopolitan (Osler 2011), multicultural (Banks 2004, 2008), and multidimensional (Kubow et al. 1998). Global CE cultivates students' awareness, loyalty, commitment, and allegiance in the global community, rather than within national boundaries (Kingwell 2000). While emphasizing the fostering of students' common humanity and global commitment, cosmopolitan citizenship also advocates cultivating students' identities at the local, national, regional, and global levels. Multicultural CE tries to balance individuals' attachment to and identities among the cultural, national, and global levels, and enable them to participate into civic activities and produce knowledge favoring a more humane nation and world (Banks 2008). Multidimensional CE involves developing four key dimensions of citizenship—personal, social, spatial, and temporal (Kubow et al. 1998). The personal dimension concerns one's capacity for and commitment to the civic ethos. The social dimension refers to one's ability to interact with people holding different ideas and values. The spatial dimension describes one's multiple memberships in interconnected local, regional, national, and multinational communities. Finally, the temporal dimension indicates that one's citizenship is situated within a specific historical context, and includes awareness of world history and of how current events influence the future.

Even though inclusive CE is proposed in the context of globalization, it cannot free itself from the influence of the nation-state. First, the nation-state remains the main force governing national affairs, and has the ability to concentrate its national forces to affect CE; the nation-state is typically unwilling to cede its ability to define and control CE, and may move to limit the influence that cultural groups or local communities have on CE (Law 2011). Second, the nation-state continues to make use of citizenship to cultivate individuals' national identity and strengthen the conception of the nation-state (Kennedy 2004, 2008). Moreover, individuals' commitment and sense of belonging to the nation-state have been further reinforced, in the global context, by such forces as globalization, supranational governance, and liberalization (Kennedy 2008). Third, CE relies on nation-state-level regulation to ensure that its pursuit of the diverse interests of

multiple cultural groups does not injure those of other groups, and to maintain its own sovereignty (Ambler 1994; Walford 1996). The nation-state can guide and direct CE through policy making, curriculum design, resource allocation and the appointment, and evaluation of school leaders, all of which have a macro-political effect (Buchmann and Hannum 2001). Policies on CE and curriculum design can transmit salient knowledge and values to students and help to develop loyalty and identity, while resources allocation facilitates CE both materially and in terms of human resources (Sim 2008).

School CE is regarded as a curriculum, and numerous scholars (Grossman et al. 2008; Kerr 1999; Pike 2007a) have examined CE curriculum, focusing on such aspects as pedagogy (Kennedy et al. 2013), content (Lee 2004; Prior 2006), strategies (Althof and Berkowitz 2006), and assessment (Pike 2007b). Other research has addressed various groups' perceptions of CE, including teachers (Banks 2001; Osler 2011; Sim and Print 2009; Wang et al. 2006) and students (Fairbrother 2003; Kennedy et al. 2008), or teachers' role in CE (Serriere 2014; Wang and Liu 2008). However, fewer researchers have addressed the topic of school leadership in CE.

School leaders, as Wagstaff et al. (1979) pointed out, are expected to play an important role in CE. Remy and Wagstaff (1982) noted that principals can exercise leadership in CE in three main ways: first, by ensuring teachers devote sufficient time to CE instruction, the development of CE materials, in-service learning, and systematically understanding the goals of CE; second, by creating a school culture that perpetuates accepted behavioral norms, values, beliefs, ceremonies, rituals, and myths among school community members, and that facilitates CE; and third, by establishing and maintaining good relations with the school community, and encouraging teachers to make full use of community resources to further CE. Moreover, Serriere (2014) found that school principals play an active role in fostering students' civic efficacy. Dimmock et al. (2014) pointed out that school leaders of madrasahs (which are primarily intended to deliver religious education) must balance the twin goals of fostering an emerging workforce and nurturing Islamic values and principles, and must therefore have more skill at mediation, modifying curricula, and building up networks among the school's external stakeholders to get resources.

Although these theories help us to understand the importance of CE to the nation-state and the latter's influential role in defining CE, they do not specifically delineate how the CPC-led state uses Chinese CE to strengthen its dominance and consolidate China's socialist political system. In addition, the extant studies on school leadership in CE, though helpful in explaining school leaders' influence over CE and the dilemmas they face in mediating school and CE goals, are not specific enough to explain what, if any, any other factors shape school leadership in CE, and cannot explain the complex relationships and interactions among school leaders and macro- and micro-political actors when implementing CE at the school level. To some extent, these inadequacies can be partly supplemented by theories on school leadership.

Theories of School Leadership

Research on school leadership covers a variety of topics, and has evolved from theories of leadership in business and other areas. To help explain the complexities and dynamics of school leadership in CE, this section begins by examining three theoretical approaches of school leadership—rational, systematic, and political. Particular attention is placed on the political approach, so as to reveal the complexity of coping with school-level macro- and micro-politics (i.e., addressing the diverse demands of various school stakeholders from within and outside of the school). Next, the section reviews the debate on school leaders' role in curriculum leadership, which reflects their complex relationship with other school stakeholders.

School Leadership: Three Major Approaches

The literature on school leadership is an extension of that on business leadership. Leadership is defined as an individual's ability to induce followers to pursue a specific goal that benefits both parties (Blondel 1987; Burns 1978). Leadership can be independent of title or position; that is, it can exist in both formal and informal organizations, and need not reside solely in the top positions in those organizations (Blondel 1987). Rowe (2007) defined leadership derived from positional authority as assigned leadership, and to leadership based on one's ability to get people to do great things as emergent leadership. Blondel (1987) proposed that, although a leader is not necessarily tied to a given position, leadership cannot always be separated from that position, and that one can become a leader based on one's occupying a particular position. In this book, the term "leader" is linked to both position and title, and refers to an individual formally occupying a top position in an organization.

Three main models have been proposed to explain school leadership and its environment: rational school leadership, systematic school leadership, and political school leadership (Blase 1991). The rational perspective regards school leadership in terms of measurable, controllable behaviors, situated in a closed mechanistic system that emphasizes authority, regulation, top-down communication, and obedience. This model emphasizes the individual leader's personality, style, and power, as well as the school's communication structure and rules. School leadership is seen as a series of behaviors that the leader controls among his/her followers to achieve certain goals. This model, however, neglects the influence of and variations in schools' external and internal contexts.

The systematic school leadership model, by contrast, does consider the influence of the social environment on maintaining school function and shaping school goals, structures, activities, and relationships; from a natural system perspective, school is a circulatory system in which the external environment, the school's

internal structure, the individual, and the dominant culture interact to shape school outcomes (Hallinger et al. 1996; Hoy and Miskel 2004). School leadership can therefore be seen as a process through which leaders influence their followers to adopt school goals, by managing the systematic interactions between individual leaders and internal and external factors (Dimmock and Walker 1998; Hallinger and Leithwood 1996). School leadership is affected by school leaders' individual factors, as well as those of the school's internal and external systems (Hoy and Miskel 2004). The former includes personality (e.g., self-confidence, stress tolerance, emotional maturity and integrity), motivation and skills (e.g., technical, interpersonal, conceptual and cognitive skills) (Hoy and Miskel 2004), and gender (Hallinger et al. 1996), while the latter includes school structure and culture, organizational size and hierarchy, as well as subordinates' personality, motivation, ability, and needs (Mawhinney 1999). Three main types of external factors have been identified as affecting school leadership: social culture at the national and local levels (Hallinger and Leithwood 1998); government at all levels (Hopkins and Levin 2000); and, school community (such as the socioeconomic status and geographic location of students and their families, and parents' expectations of schooling) (Hallinger and Muppy 1986).

Different from the systematic leadership perspective, which neglects the system's complexities and dynamics, the third model conceptualizes school leadership as a political arena and emphasizes the system's uncertainty and diversity. Political school leadership refers to school leaders' influence in and strategies for balancing the diverse interests of or conflicts between stakeholders who have the power to allocate scarce resources, make decisions and reach commonly agreed-upon goals (Bolman and Deal 2008; Lashway 2006).

These three approaches center on how school leaders exercise influence on and interact with the organization. These approaches help to provide a general picture of the development of school leadership research. The next subsection will focus on the political approach to school leadership, which, as will be shown later, provides a theoretical framework for understanding how school leaders in China interact with schools' internal and external stakeholders during the process of exercising school leadership in CE.

School Leadership: Its Micro- and Macro-politics

Political school leadership recognizes that, in a school system, stakeholders have divergent interests that may not be in accordance with defined school goals (Bagin 1994; Winkler 2010), and which could exercise dynamic influence on school leaders by taking advantage of the power and resources they possess. Schools leaders thus must regularly address salient public service issues, competition, scarcity of resources, and debates over school values to respond to school politics (Malen 1994). School politics are characterized by the diverse logic of the actions with which stakeholders pursue their interests and attempt to maintain or enhance their

influence over school affairs (Bacharach and Mundell 1993); logic of action is "the implicit (that is, often unstated) relationship between means and goals that is assumed by actors in organizations," which is manifested in the ideology, strategies, and resources people employ (Bacharach and Mundell 1993).

Research on political school leadership focuses on three major issues: addressing macro- and micro-political issues; the role of motive bases and power in political school leadership; and the relationship between macro- and micro-politics at the school level. Macro-politics relates to a school's external environment and its relationships and interactions with macro-political actors—external stakeholders such as political parties, governments, courts, education administration institutions, and teachers' unions at the local and national levels (Blase and Blase 2002; Lashway 2006).[1] These actors impact educational policy making and legislative processes, and compel other external actors to modify their influence on the school (Bacharach and Mundell 1993; Lashway 2006). Macro-political actors influence school leaders through such strategies as professional standards (Liu 2005), training (Bush 1998), and evaluation (Thomas 2000).

Micro-politics refers to internal stakeholders' use of formal and informal powers to advance their interests, purposes, and preferences and to influence organizational affairs (Blase 1991); school-level micro-political actors include school leaders, teachers, students, and parents (Lashway 2006).[2] Winkler (2010) described a model of school leaders' political behavior in the micro-political arena, including the behaviors themselves, the factors affecting them, and their outcomes. School leaders' political behaviors can be affected by factors related to systematic leadership (e.g., individual school leaders' or school's internal and external systems) and targets, and can produce either target outcomes or leader outcomes.

Political school leadership informs three implications (Lashway 2006). First, as governments at all levels can regulate school leadership, school leaders should determine government expectations and how they can be met. Second, leadership styles should be adjusted to suit changing policies and needs. Third, school leaders must be able to mediate macro- and micro-political needs. In response to macro-political forces, school leaders can adopt three strategies: reducing dependency; adapting to the environment; and changing the environment (Goldring 1995). Reducing dependency connotes resistance, and involves decreasing the school's financial dependency on the government by seeking financial support elsewhere, adapting to the environment is accommodative and emphasizes modifying one's actions to reduce macro-political pressures, and changing the environment connotes obedience, by reshaping the school environment as directed by the government.

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[1]This sentence is directly quoted from Xu, S., & Law, W.-W. (2015). School leadership and citizenship education: The experiences and struggles of school party secretaries in China. *Educational Research for Policy and Practice*, 14(1), 33–51. With kind permission from Springer Science+Business Media.

[2]Ibid.

The second major theoretical issue of political school leadership concerns school leaders' motive bases and power, which coexist in political leadership at both the macro- and micro-political levels (Lashway 2006). According to Burns (1978), motive bases include hierarchies of want, need, and aspiration that can be used to mobilize and motivate followers, while power can utilize motive bases. Power in political leadership is manifested in authority and influence (Bacharach and Mundell 1993; Hoyle 1982; Mawhinney 1999). Authority is one's sanctioned right, based on structural position, to make a final decision, while influence is one's self-generated ability (e.g., personality, expertise, and resourcefulness) to guide the decision-making process (Bacharach and Mundell 1993). Micro- and macro-political actors can use power strategies (such as control, negotiation, and coalition) to create collective meaning among organizational members (Bacharach and Mundell 1993; Mawhinney 1999). Researchers show that power is much more than simple control, manipulation, and coercion (power over), and also includes power through (using power to help others) and power with (sharing power with others) (Smeed et al. 2009). Therefore, cooperation and conflicts coexist in the political school leadership process (Blase 1991; Lashway 2006).

Power is of critical importance to school leaders; it gives them a negotiating advantage, helps them to mobilize school members' support, and allows them to suppress opposition voices (Bacharach and Mundell 1993). Although power is a factor in both macro- and micro-politics, researchers place more emphasis on how school leaders use their power in micro-political situations, especially between principals and teachers (Blase and Anderson 1995; Hallinger and Leithwood 1996). Although Smeed et al. (2009) proposed that power over, through and with are all affected by external accountability requirements, most discussions have focused on how they are used in micro-politics.

The third major theoretical issue regarding political school leadership concerns the relationship between macro- and micro-politics. Some researchers (Bacharach and Mundell 1993; Ball 1987; Mawhinney 1999) proposed that the former is framed by the latter, that school micro-politics are affected and shaped by the contests of macro-political actors and the penetration of their diverse logic of actions. School leaders are seen as agents of the government whose function is to accommodate its requirements. School leaders can choose to accommodate macro-political actors for any of three reasons (Clayton 2000): to gain wealth, power, privilege, or superior status; because it is natural for them, as subordinates, to do so; or, because they have no choice but to do so.

Other researchers (Blase 1991; Hoyle 1999; Lashway 2006) have depicted macro- and micro-politics as intertwined, with school micro-politics actively reacting to, rather than being passively framed by, macro-politics. For example, macro-political actors can guide, shape or change individuals' behavior and ideologies, while micro-political actors can create and enact strategies to negotiate with macro-political actors (Bacharach and Mundell 1993; Blase 1991). School leadership thus involves interpreting, implementing, ameliorating, and modifying macro-political directives and influence, and aligning the macro- and micro-political forces at play (Lashway 2006).

The political school leadership model has been used to understand and analyze the micro-political relationships between teachers and principals, other teachers, students, and parents (Blase 1991; Blase and Anderson 1995), and in the promotion of school reform (Datnow 2000), educational change (Bush 2011), instructional improvement (Blase and Blase 2002),[3] policy implementation (Malen 2006), and, particularly, how external organization influences policy implementation in educational institutions (Honig 2009). Accordingly, studies have examined school leadership styles and power strategies in the micro-political context (Blase and Anderson 1995). The framework for macro- and micro-politics in political school leadership is adopted in this book to study the dynamics of school leadership in China because, as will be demonstrated later, it can help to analyze the interactions between the state (as a macro-political actor) and school leaders (as micro-political actors), as well as those among the school principal, SPS, and other staff in the micro-political setting of school. Despite its usefulness, this framework has not previously been applied to analyze leadership in CE, specifically. It is also not specific enough to explain how school leaders in China shape and exercise their leadership in CE through interactions with macro- and micro-political actors; for example, how they cope with the struggles between state control and professional autonomy, between the promotion of CPC-prescribed CE and meeting parents' demands of academic performance, and between cooperation and contention for power in school and CE leadership.

Curriculum Leadership as an Integral Part of School Leadership

Numerous studies have focused on many aspects of school leadership, including school leaders' characteristics and styles (Bush 2007; Hoy and Miskel 2004) and school leadership approaches (e.g., transformational, transactional, and distributed leadership) (Smith and Piele 2006). Many of these leadership studies also addressed how school leaders affect the central activities of schools—curriculum and instruction (Mulford and Johns 2004). Similar to studies on school leadership, there have also been debates on whether curriculum leadership is dominated by an individual actor (e.g., school principal) or shared among multiple stakeholders (Elliott et al. 1999; Ylimaki and Brunner 2011). With regard to curriculum leadership, two major perspectives have been proposed; the first views curriculum leadership as synonymous with instructional leadership (Lee and Dimmock 1999), while the other sees it as having a broader scope (Ylimaki 2012).

The first perspective originated from research on school effectiveness, especially in relation to the academic success of students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Hallinger et al. 1996; Hallinger and Murphy 1983, 1986). It argued

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[3]Ibid.

that, to enhance school effectiveness, curriculum leaders should focus on establishing vision and setting goals, improving pedagogy, reviewing the quality of instruction, building school culture to facilitate teaching and learning, motivating teachers and promoting their professional development, ensuring the order and safety of school, and allocating resources (Hallinger and Muppy 1986; Murphy 1990). This led to a further debate about whom those curriculum leaders should be. Earlier research regarded individual principals as the leaders, while more recent research has proposed a distributed leadership, advocating that principals allocate power to deputy principals, teachers, and other professionals with the ability to improve classroom practices (Gronn 2002). From a distributed leadership perspective, principals should model appropriate behaviors by leading the curriculum (Marks and Printy 2003) and inviting teachers and other professional to exercise their influence to improve teaching and learning (Beycioglu et al. 2012). The focus of curriculum leadership is expanded from improving students' test scores, to cultivating citizens who pursue social justice and equity (Saiti 2007; Zachrisson and Johansson 2010).

Unlike the first perspective, which sees curriculum leadership as a means to improve school effectiveness, the second adopts a broader understanding of curriculum leadership, considering it to be more than instructional leadership in three major aspects. First, curriculum leadership involves the participation of and interactions among diverse actors. Glatthorn and Jailall (2009) pointed out that curriculum leadership is exercised by key stakeholders at the state, school district, school, and classroom levels. Macpherson and Brooker (2000) suggested that research on curriculum leadership should consider broader social structures and examine the readiness and interactions among multiple stakeholders (e.g., teachers, students, and parents).

Second, the perspective sees school curriculum as an important mechanism for transmitting salient knowledge and values to students, and for developing in them the values that can help them survive in society (Sim 2008); the purpose of curriculum leadership is not only to improve the quality of teaching and learning, but also to facilitate students' self-transformation and social transformation (Henderson 2001).

Third, school curriculum leadership comprises a series of political acts, including not only exercising instructional leadership, but also understanding cultural politics and making curricula through negotiations with various curriculum stakeholders (Ylimaki 2012). At the school level, these negotiations are often complex and need to be understood within the school's specific political context (Henderson and Gornik 2007). In these political processes, principals can use their interpretations to respond actively to and interact with other stakeholders in the specific policy and sociocultural context (Ylimaki 2012).

Studies on school leadership and curriculum leadership are useful for describing, not only the ways in which school leaders exercise their influence, but also the systems in which school leaders are situated, the situations school leaders face, and the dynamics of their leadership. In particular, the debate on curriculum leadership illustrates that curriculum leadership is a major concern of school leaders,

is a dynamic process influenced by the leaders' perception of curriculum and their identity in a certain sociocultural context, and is shaped by the interactions between school leaders and multiple stakeholders, each of whom have different expectations of and influences on school curriculum. However, the literature on curriculum leadership is not specific enough to explain how internal and external factors affect school leadership in CE curricula. Moreover, it does not specifically explain how principals and SPSs affect each other's exercising leadership in CE in Chinese schools, how China's government ensures school leadership aligns with its socialist agenda and CPC leadership expectations, or how Chinese school leaders respond to this sort of political control.

Debates on School Leadership in China

Research on Chinese school leadership covers many topics, as reviewed in the previous section, including theoretical debates on the conceptualization of school leadership and curriculum leadership. This book adopts Lashway's (2006) and Blase's (1991) macro- and micro-political theoretical perspectives to analyze how Chinese principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE is shaped by diverse school-level political actors, and by the interplay between state-level macro-politics and school-level micro-politics among principals, SPSs, and other actors; as such, Chinese school leadership cannot be fully explained by the study of non-Chinese school leadership. To understand specific issues in Chinese school leadership, this section reviews studies on the complexities of China's dual-line school leadership system, and the politics confronting Chinese school leaders and curriculum leadership in China.

Dual-Line Leadership in Chinese Schools

Chinese schools have dual-line leadership system, in which one leader (the principal) is responsible for school administrative affairs and another (the SPS) for school political work. Both are directly answerable to the state (the educational bureau and its Party Committee) at the local district (county) level, and their school administration and political work responsibilities are defined by educational authorities at higher levels.

Despite being theoretically equal in rank, principals and SPSs are not equal in power in school leadership. Rather, their power distribution, as China's history since the 1950s has repeatedly shown, is affected by changes in political climate and CPC policy on education and school leadership (Bao 2004; Huang 2002). When the CPC has, throughout its history, faced political crises or focused on ideological issues, schools have been forced to emphasize political development and SPSs have been given more power; however, when the CPC has chosen to stress the cultivation of talents for economic modernization and development purposes,

schools have been directed to focus on academic development, and principals' power has increased (Xiao 2000a; Zhang 2006).

To improve the efficiency of school leadership and make a clearer division of power and responsibilities between principals and SPSs, the PRS was readopted, in 1985 (Xiao 2000b); principals, under the guidance of higher level educational authorities, are expected to be school decision-makers, to take charge of all administrative affairs on campus and to bear all related legal responsibilities, while SPSs are mainly responsible for school political work, including developing the School Party Organization (SPO) which, as the school's political nucleus, provides political, ideological, and organizational guidance and works with school staff to promote school development, maintain school harmony, implement CPC policies, and direct the Teachers Congress in their school, and improving ideological work (*sixiang gongzuo*) (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1985). The latter is a series of purposive actions, guided by the CPC's political ideology and values, intended to transform and direct school members' political standpoint, political ideology, world view, life view, and morality (Mao 1957).

Principals' concerns are reflected not only in China's educational policy, but also in research on school leadership in China. Although there are two heads in the dual-line school leadership system, the extant research has focused more on principals' leadership than on SPSs'. For example, there were at least 170 papers specifically on principals' leadership and educational reforms between 1998 and 2008 (Walker et al. 2012), covering such topics, according to Walker et al. (2012), as principals' leadership in school improvement and effectiveness, principals' roles, curriculum leadership, relationship with the CPC and government, and factors influencing principals' leadership. Far less research has been done on SPSs' leadership (Cheng 2012), and that has mostly discussed topics of general school leadership or educational leadership (e.g., Bush and Qiang 2000; Law 2009, 2012; Lin 2000; Tao et al. 1988).

While helping to explain China's special school leadership structure and the historical shifts in power relations between principals and SPSs, the extant research is not specific enough to explain how the dual-line leadership system complicates principals' and SPSs' leadership in school and in CE in particular, or how the disparity of power between principals and SPSs affects their ability to fulfill their administrative and political responsibilities. Moreover, few empirical studies have specifically focused on schools' dual-line leadership system or how the dual leaders exercise their influence in CE. These inadequacies, as will be shown in the next section, could partly be supplemented by research on the politics faced by school leaders in China.

Politics and Chinese School Leadership

In the complex Chinese dual-line school leadership system, school leadership in China, like school leadership in the general literature, is affected by individuals

and multileveled contexts (Bush and Qiang 2000; Coleman et al. 1998; Feng 2002; Huang and Cheng 2001; Law 2009, 2012, 2013; Ribbins and Zhang 2006; Wong 1998). Chinese school leadership has three key political actors: the CPC-led state, the principal, and the SPS. The CPC-led state, as will be discussed in Chaps. 3 and 4, is the macro-political actor in China, while the principal and SPS are micro-political actors. Research on Chinese school leadership examines both the macro- and micro-politics with which China's school leaders are confronted. In terms of macro-politics, extant research focuses on how the CPC-led state defines and controls both heads of the school leadership system and their leadership, and how school leaders respond to the control, whereas research on micro-politics between principals and SPSs focuses on cooperation and/or competition in their working relationship.

To explain the complex relationship between school leadership and macro-political actors in China, two major models have been proposed: control/passive obedience, and control/ active response. The control/passive obedience model stresses that school leaders have no power and no space to resist or oppose the CPC-led state, must fully follow and obey the CPC, and must show it full obedience and loyalty through its state-controlled school leadership system (Child 1994). This is because educational authorities control and manage schools for political, social, and economic purposes by appointing and evaluating school leaders and controlling their actions (Ge 2003; Lin 1993). The higher authorities also circumscribe school leaders' power by controlling the recruitment and promotion of teachers, funding, and curriculum (Bush et al. 1998; J. Wang 2012).

The control/active response model points out that, despite being controlled by the CPC-led state, school leaders can still play an active role in analyzing and responding to that control in ways that maximize their and their school's interests. On the one hand, school leaders actively maintain their relationships with the CPC-led state by implementing its requirements and policies, in order to gain more freedom in and resources for school leadership, and to improve their career path (Law 2009). On the other hand, school leaders can actively select values and tasks and adopt strategies for modifying official requirement and policies, rather than being solely influenced by and subject to the CPC-led state's prescriptions (Law 2012). Moreover, to ensure the success of policy metamorphosis, school leaders can cooperate with school internal micro-political actors and some macro-political actors to respond to other macro- and micro-political actors (Ding 2008).

The extant research depicts principals and SPSs as having working relationships that are either cooperative (Tao et al. 1988) or competitive (e.g., Lin 2000; Xiao 2000a). The former view proposes that principals and SPSs are closely connected and must work together; its proponents liken the relationship to that of the human brain and heart—the "brain" can make decisions, but only the "heart" can provide the blood and energy needed to implement them.

The latter (competitive) view holds that, as heads of distinct leadership lines, principals and SPSs have inherent conflicts and institutionalized power struggles. Their supposed power struggle results from their separate responsibilities and the fact that their relative power is not clearly defined in the relevant policies

(Lin 2000; Xiao 2000a). According to the PRS, principals are to take full charge of school administration, while SPSs are to conduct school political work, discuss school key decisions, and supervise principals (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1985); this means that each head can restrict the other's exercise of school leadership (Lin 2000). However, studies on the competitive relationship between principals and SPSs point out that principals have more power and advantages than do SPSs. Bush et al. (1998) showed that, in Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, principals are so powerful that they can reduce the SPSs' influence in school and avoid the SPSs' and Teacher Congresses' constraints; SPSs are even forced to reduce their school political work and focus on instruction (Liu 2008).

However, a number of studies have also shown that, unlike in the political school leadership model reviewed earlier, school leadership in contemporary China has been encumbered with numerous macro-political functions and missions, such as perpetuating CPC leadership (Ge 2003) and acting on behalf of the CPC to guarantee school-level political orientation and carry out political work (Ministry of Education 1978; Xiao 2000a). Both principals and SPSs are expected to ensure that their schools adhere to the CPC's ideological line, principles, and policies and to supervise school members' political ideology, moral character, and working style. In particular, SPSs are required to improve the SPO by recruiting and cultivating CPC members, and to strengthen in-school CPC leadership by coordinating the activities of the Communist Youth League (CYL), Young Pioneers of China (YPC), Students' Union, Work Union and other Party members (Xiao 2000a).

While the extant literature provides some understanding of the macro-politics facing school leaders and the micro-politics between principals and SPSs in school leadership, it cannot show the patterns by which school leaders respond to macro-political actors' policies and requirements, especially in leading CE, and the diverse interactions among school leaders, and the various micro- and macro-political actors. In addition, it cannot reveal, with empirical evidence, how principals and SPSs divide their responsibilities in CE leadership, school leaders' perceptions of their leadership in CE, or through what mechanisms school leaders exercise their leadership in CE.

Curriculum Leadership in Chinese Schools

One of the most important focuses of research on school leadership in China is curriculum leadership, especially since the early 2000s, when the country's new three-level (national, local, school based) curriculum was introduced, and schools were asked to develop school-based curriculum. Similar to the literature on curriculum leadership in non-Chinese contexts, research on curriculum leadership in China is a subset of research into general school leadership, and focuses on two areas: who should lead the curriculum, and what politics are involved.

Research on Chinese curriculum leadership also asks who should be the leader. Although some studies (Li and Ma 2006; Zhang 2010; Zhong 2002, 2006) advocated assigning curriculum leadership responsibilities to mid-level school leaders and teachers, most still focus on principals' leadership. Principals are regarded as the "head" of the school curriculum (Liu 2011), and as critical to its success (Yin 2010; M. Zhang 2005; Zhong 2006). Principals' curriculum leadership is proposed to include establishing an appropriate school environment, setting school goals, making plans for implementing national and local curricula, developing school-level curricula, promoting teachers' development, guiding students' values, and supervising and evaluating curricula (Yang and Wen 2009).

Similar to the extant research on non-Chinese curriculum leadership, research in the Chinese context also points out that curriculum leadership in China is a political action, involving multiple stakeholders with different interests, and influenced by internal and external school factors and principals' individual factors (Walker and Wang 2011; Yang and Wen 2009; Zhong and Yue 2006). Walker and Wang (2011), for example, adopted a political analysis perspective to review literature on curriculum leadership in mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, and suggested curriculum leadership is characterized by dynamic interactions between principals and other organizational stakeholders in a certain cultural context.

The political action is twofold—toward internal school stakeholders and toward external school stakeholders (Zhong and Yue 2006). In the former situation, school curriculum leadership mainly concerns the division of labor and power between principals and teachers. In the latter, it focuses on the interactions between principals and higher authorities. Two major types of interaction have been examined (Li and Ma 2006; Zhong and Yue 2006). One originates from China's extant curriculum leadership situation, in which the CPC-led state centralizes curriculum power at the national level (especially for goal setting and content supervision purposes), even as it claims to empower the local and school levels (Zhong 2006). Principals are regarded as the assistants of and speakers for the higher authority; specifically, they help the higher authority implement its curriculum policies and transmit its values, and administer personnel and other resources to ensure policy implementation. Being controlled by the higher educational authority and having limited power, principals dared not openly oppose the higher authorities (Walker and Wang 2011). The second type of interaction refers to school curriculum leadership, and suggests that, while principals actively develop curriculum to suit school needs and make use of internal and external school stakeholders' resources to facilitate curriculum implementation, they still need to follow the CPC-led state's guidelines (Ke 2011; Yin et al. 2014).

In addition to the politics of school curriculum leadership focusing on the power relationship among school principals, the higher authorities and parents, another further political issue of principals' curriculum leadership in China lies in the dilemma surrounding academic examination results. Although principals would prefer to carry out the policies of National New Curriculum Reform, which began in 2001 and aims at changing examination-centered education, Yin et al. (2014) found principals still regard examinations as a central concern of academic

instruction and the core of their curriculum leadership. This dilemma is intensified by the interactions of macro- and micro-political actors. The MoE, an influential macro-political actor, pursues all-round education development by introducing such new initiatives as school-based curriculum and progressive pedagogy; at the same time, however, it also evaluates schools based on their academic performance (Yin et al. 2014). Parents, as micro-political actors, value the quality of their children's development through schooling, but judge that quality based on the school's ability to prepare their children for a good, higher level education (X. Zhang 2005).

The extant research [especially Walker and Wang (2011)], despite describing principals' importance in curriculum matters and how stakeholders (i.e., government, teachers, parents, and parents) affect principals' curriculum leadership, is not sufficient to explain how the interplay between these stakeholders (in terms of cooperation and conflicts) influences principals. Moreover, the extant studies on curriculum leadership in China focus more on principals' leadership in curriculum reform and students' learning for academic examinations, and are not specific enough to explain curriculum issues in CE. In addition, as it emphasizes principals' leadership, the extant research is not specific enough to explain SPSs' role in the curriculum leadership during interactions with multiple stakeholders, or how principals and SPSs share responsibilities in curriculum leadership, especially in CE. These research gaps could be partly addressed by research on CE in China.

Theoretical Issues of CE in China

CE in China, like that reviewed in the general literature, is closely associated with the nation-state and especially the CPC. Chinese CE is designed to further the construction of the CPC's socialist system. As such, the CPC-led state advocates promoting CE through both formal and informal curriculum strategies. To examine the relationship between Chinese CE, the CPC-led state and school leadership, this section first reviews the nature and purpose of Chinese CE. Next, it discusses the struggles between the promotion of CE and China's emphasis on academic instruction. Finally, it presents the leadership of CE in China, with a particular focus on literature on school CE leadership.

The Nature and Purposes of Chinese CE

The nature and purposes of Chinese CE can be viewed from three perspectives. One perspective argues that there is no CE in China (Zhang 2014). Another points out that Chinese CE is implicitly present in such subjects as social studies (Wang 2007), history (Zhao 2009) and ideo-morality, and politics (Li and Zhong 2002; Sun and Duan 2009), but in quantities insufficient to cultivate modern citizenship, and suggests using CE to transform the function and contents of Chinese political

education and moral education (Li and Zhong 2002). This, according to Wan (2003), is because there are three deficiencies in China's political education and moral education. First, their goals are to cultivate socialist elites who are expected to carry forward the CPC's political ideology and leadership and devote to constructing communism rather than to cultivate citizenship. Second, their contents, which stress political knowledge and social responsibilities, are unattractive and too abstract to understand and practice. Third, their methods, which emphasize knowledge indoctrination and obedience to authority, do not facilitate the cultivation of citizens' attitudes, behaviors, and skills. CE, therefore, is suggested as a means to overcome these defects and to promote students' individual development, by balancing citizens' rights and duties (Li and Zhong 2002; Pan 2002) and enhancing their knowledge, skills, and attitudes as subjective and global citizen with an awareness of equity, democracy, and freedom (Huang 1997), and increasing their competencies for rationality and participation in public affairs (Sun 2007).

The third perspective holds that what the second perspective proposes is, indeed, CE with Chinese characteristics. Zeng (1981) pointed out that political education in China is the equivalent of CE in capitalist country. In addition to "political education," other terms (e.g., ideo-political education, moral education and patriotic education) have also been adopted as alternative term of CE and "have been used to describe the project of political socialization" in school in different periods, (Law 2006, p. 606). These terms are often inseparable and used interchangeably (Tan 2007; Wang and Huang 2008; Zhong and Lee 2008; Zhu 1992). Examination of these terms can help reveal the nature and purpose of Chinese CE.

The terms "political education" and "ideo-political education" were adopted to foster students' support for socialism and CPC leadership during the Mao era (1949–1976), and focused mainly on Marxism–Leninism, CPC general knowledge, China's revolution (including class struggle), and morality (based on the "five loves"; i.e., of the nation, its people, labor, science and public property) (Ministry of Education 1957, 1959). These two terms remained in use in policies until the mid-1980s, years after Mao's death, although the weight given the various topics was readjusted to suit the CPC's new national building strategy (Fairbrother 2003).

In the late 1980s, the confusing term "moral education" began to be used to describe education-based responses to social issues and problems (e.g., extreme individualism) arising from China's market reforms and opening to the world (Cheung and Pan 2006). Different from "moral education" in Western contexts, which generally focuses on fostering morality (Kohlberg 1981), moral education in China includes cultivating students' morality, while still giving priority to guiding students' political orientation through Marxism–Leninism and the thoughts of Chinese political leaders, such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (Ministry of Education 1998). To a large extent, moral education represents the expansion of ideological and political education to include teaching about morality and students' psychological quality (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1988;

He 1992), law education (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1994), citizen ethics (Communist Party of China Central Committee 2001), global concerns (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 2010; Ministry of Education 2001), and cultural identity (Central Commission for Guiding Cultural and Ethical Progress 2006; Ministry of Education 2014).

Despite the different terms, the purposes and nature of these value education programs, as observed by numerous researchers who have adopted the third perspective (Fairbrother 2004; e.g., Law 2006; Lee 1997; Zhao and Fairbrother 2010) are to address the CPC-led state's concerns about and aims of promoting political socialization. The CPC-led state has used these programs as an ideological instrument to transmit political doctrines, positions, and values that encourage students to be patriotic and supportive of their leadership, in order to foster a modern Chinese socialist citizenry and ensure the CPC's continued leadership. That is to say, the value education programs presented above describe the de facto Chinese version of CE (Law 2011). Whatever its name, these programs reflected the ideological, political, moral, and propagandist nature of Chinese CE (Tse and Lee 2008) and sought to transmit CPC ideology to students purposely and systematically, and to cultivate their conformity and loyalty to the Party's leadership (Tse and Lee 2008).

This book adopts the third perspective—i.e., that there is CE in China that aims at cultivating students' identity, belonging, rights, and duties by providing them with knowledge, skills, and attitudes (about politics, economics, law, social life, ecology, and personal development) through formal curricula (e.g., subject of politics) and informal curricula (e.g., political activities, moral education activities).

The extant research on Chinese CE helps to clarify the meaning of CE in China, explain its political nature and function, and describe its relationship with the CPC-led state and the framework it prescribes. Nevertheless, it does not account for how the CPC-led state enacts CE through school leaders ("door-keepers"), gaps between implemented and enacted CE, school leaders' various opinions on CE, how they perceive their role in CE, or in what ways and with what strategies school leaders influence CE, and why.

Tension Between CE and Academic Instruction

In China, the promotion of CE has been confronted by the emphasis on academic instruction to prepare students for public examinations. The relationship between CE and academic instruction has been a concern in both academic research and school practice in China, and three major interrelated patterns have been proposed to describe it: giving CE priority over academic instruction; focusing on academic instruction and ignoring CE; and balancing CE and academic instruction.

The first pattern holds that CE guides students and informs their future development. Prioritizing CE over academic instruction was proposed by Mao Zedong, in the 1950s (Mao 1957), and has been part of educational policies in China ever

since. CE has been called the "first," "primary," and "core" task of school work, as it can ensure students develop in accordance with the CPC's political orientation, become socialist constructors and successors, and do not endanger the society (H. Wang 2012).

The second pattern reveals that, in practice, academic instruction is at the core of school work and consumes the most time and resources, while CE is not emphasized beyond the minimum schools are compel to provide (Wang 2006; You 2011). First, academic instruction is highly valued by parents, school leaders, and teachers, who spend more time on enhancing exam scores than on developing good citizens (Wang 2006). Second, fewer impressive teacher resources are available for CE than for key examination subjects (e.g., Chinese Language, mathematics); CE-specific teachers are seen as inferior to teachers of other subjects in terms of competencies and position, and the latter, though requested to integrate CE into their subjects, cannot spare the time to do so (You 2011). Third, CE activities are not as systematic as instruction for examination subjects. The former are often organized to correspond with inspection tours from higher authorities or to cope with ad hoc student problems, whereas academic instruction has a detailed implementation flow (Luo 2013; You 2011).

Unlike the first two patterns, which point to or argue for the unequal relationship between CE and academic instruction, the third pattern advocates a balanced relationship. Wang (2006) argues that both CE and academic instruction are important for students' development and should play an intertwined function. The former provides an ideological basis for academic instruction, and the latter advances values and attitudes to complement students' knowledge and skills. Li (2006) states that both CE and academic instruction are necessary to and inseparable from school work, and should be united by embedding CE into academic instruction and developing students' knowledge and skills in CE.

While useful for understanding the theoretical and practical relationships between CE and academic instruction, the literature is not specific enough to reveal how school leaders perceive and position CE and academic instruction, to what extent their perception are similar and different, how they mediate macro- and micro-political actors' interests therein, or how they share their responsibilities therein.

Who Should Lead CE in School?

Despite the tension in school work between CE and academic instruction, the CPC-led state still requires school leaders to make CE a leadership priority. A number of studies have explored various topics related to CE in China, including curriculum (Zhu 2006), pedagogy (Zhao and Fairbrother 2010), and CE and social change (Law 2011). However, studies on leadership in CE are rare.

The CPC-led state has placed great emphasis on leadership in general school administration and political work, including CE, as reflected by its establishment

of the dual (administrative and political) leadership system in school. Nevertheless, the roles and responsibilities of principals and SPSs in leading CE have varied with changes in policy. From 1949 to 1978, school leaders were responsible for transforming students' ideology to meet CPC political requirements (State Education Commission 1951), raising students' political awareness (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 1958), directing student organizations (such as CYL, Students' Union and YPC) and cultivating students' ideo-morality (Ministry of Education 1963). The importance of school leadership in CE has been stressed since 1978 (Deng 1978), at which point SPSs were regarded as leaders in successful ideo-political education (Ministry of Education 1978). Since the revision of the PRS in 1985, principals have been given authority over CE, and SPSs restricted to designing CE plans, unifying school organizations to work for CE and cooperating with principals on CE (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1986, 1988; Teng 1988).

Although principals' and SPSs' CE responsibilities are divided, they are still interconnected (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1986; Ministry of Education 1998; State Education Commission 1990, 1995a, b; Teng 1988). First, SPSs supervise principals' CE instruction and the construction of the school's CE environment. Second, both principals and SPSs are responsible for CE activities.

However, current research on leadership in China's CE mainly focuses on its problems (e.g., school principals not paying attention to CE and passing responsibility for implementing CE on to HCEDs and class heads, focusing on students' behavioral norms, and equating CE to activities organized by the CYL and YPC) (Chi 2007). Other research proposes strategies for improving CE effectiveness through school regulations and curriculum (e.g., Chi 2007; Yang and Zhang 2010; Zhang 1997), improving CE activities (Zhao 1989) and improving school environment and culture to nurturing CE (Tan 2007).

While helping to explain the complex CE leadership system, as well as principals' and SPSs' shared responsibility for CE, the research on CE leadership has paid little attention on how principals and SPSs respond to policies regulating their CE responsibilities, work as dual heads to lead CE, and deal with the relationship between CE and academic instruction, or to the factors affecting school leaders' interactions with the CPC-led state and their peer leaders in leading CE.

Theoretical Framework Proposed by This Book

This section introduces the theoretical framework this book proposes to interpret school leadership in CE. It has three parts: first, a summary of the usefulness of extant literature for directing this research; second, an analysis of the limitations of extant literature in explaining this research; and third, the introduction of the theoretical framework itself.

The discussions on citizenship and CE recounted above show that the state is the key factor influencing CE. Research on CE helps to explain why the state

stresses CE, how CE is developed and expanded to respond to social change, and the ways in which school leadership can influence CE. Theories on school leadership identify three major models of school leadership from different organizational perspectives, and present school leadership in a complex and dynamic context involving multiple stakeholders' diverse interests. Theories of political school leadership facilitate an understanding of why and how school leadership is shaped by school macro- and micro-politics, how macro- and micro-politics interact, and how school leadership is exercised in response to the interplay between macro- and micro-politics. Moreover, they also define macro- and micro-politics. In this book, macro-politics refers to interactions between and among, and the influence of, organizations external to the school that have the power to authorize, support, and guide education in a country or area. In China, macro-political actors can be understood as organs of the CPC-led state, because the CPC dominates legislation, the judicatory, and governance at the national and local levels.

This book defines school micro-politics as the use of formal and informal power to arouse dynamic interactions between and among individuals and groups, in order to attain desired goals in school. Micro-political actors, in this research, include principals, SPSs, teachers, students, and parents. Theories of curriculum leadership show dynamics and complexities similar to those in general school leadership. Regarding curriculum leadership specifically, studies show it to be a dynamic process influenced by leaders' perceptions of curriculum and their identities in a certain sociocultural context, and shaped by interactions between school leaders and multiple stakeholders with different expectations and influences on school curricula.

Examining the dual-line school leadership system helps to explain the structure of school leadership in China, historical changes to principals' and SPSs' power and position in school leadership, the CPC-led state's domination of the school leadership system, and the lack of research relating to SPSs' leadership. Rehearsing the politics facing school leaders in China sheds light on the dynamic relationship between the CPC-led state and school leaders, and highlights the working relationships between principals and SPSs in school leadership. Examining political leadership in China's schools exposes its particular nuances, and examining curriculum leadership in China shows principals' importance and multiple stakeholders' diverse interests. The review of CE theories in China shows how CE responds to social development, how it is dominated and utilized by the CPC-led state to promote political socialization, and what CE framework is provided by the CPC-led state. Viewing the theoretical debates on the relationships between CE and academic instruction helps to explain the complex and contradictory position of CE, and indicates that CE's position is influenced by multiple stakeholders with diverse interests. Explaining leadership in CE helps to explain the CPC-led state's key role in defining the CE system and the importance of school leadership in CE in China.

Despite its many positive contributions, however, the extant literature is not specific enough to explain three key aspects of school leadership in CE: (a) school leaders' perceptions of CE; (b) how macro- and micro-political actors affect

school leadership in CE in certain social contexts; and, (c) how school leaders perceive and respond to macro- and micro-political forces in leading CE, and why. Moreover, the extant research is not specific enough to explain the interactions between Chinese school leaders and the CPC-led state, or how it influences school leaders and their leadership over CE. The literature does not specifically examine what micro-politics emerge, as principals and SPSs share their responsibilities of leading school and CE.

This book examines the complex political and administrative responsibilities school leaders are required to fulfill, and explores and explains how and why school leaders can facilitate and challenge the CPC-led state in carrying out its policies on and requirements for school CE. It also examines and explains how and why principals and SPSs, as heads of schools' administrative and political lines, can cooperate with each other to fulfill their CE responsibilities in response to macro- and micro-political actors' expectations, and compete with each other to gain power in school. It seeks to identify the following issues: school leaders' responsibilities; the dynamic and complex interactions between and among school macro-political actors, principals and SPSs, all of whom are school-level micro-political actors; and, the meaning of school leadership in CE, in the specific context of Shanghai. Other micro-political actors (e.g., teachers, students, and parents) could also influence principals' and SPSs' leadership and will be examined as influential factors. These issues can be summarized as the research problem of this book: to determine the complexities and dynamics of how school leaders form and exercise their leadership in CE by handling macro- and micro-politics.

To understand better the research problem, this section has proposed a theoretical framework for interpreting school leadership in CE as a political exercise in which school leaders interact with macro- and micro-political actors to fulfill administrative and political responsibilities in a specific context. School leadership in CE is affected by factors at the international, national, local, school, and individual levels, and the interplay between these factors. The exercise of school leadership is a process of maneuvering and adjusting administrative and political responsibilities, and involves mediating the struggles between macro-political actors' control over school leadership and school leaders' pursuit of professional autonomy, the diverse interests between macro- and micro-political actors, and the micro-politics between school administrative and political leaders.

Summary

This chapter has introduced theories on school leadership and CE beyond and within China's experience, examined their usefulness and inadequacies for understanding the case of Shanghai, and proposed a theoretical framework to interpret the complexities and dynamics of school leadership in CE in Shanghai, China. This chapter has also identified that school leadership in CE involves multiple stakeholders with diverse interests. School leadership in CE in China is guided

and regulated by the CPC-led state and is shared by both principals and SPSs on campus.

Studies on school leadership and CE shed light on the complexities and dynamics of how school leaders perceive and exercise their influence on school. However, the literature is not specific enough to explain how macro- and micro-political forces shape school leadership in CE in Shanghai. To understand this problem more deeply, this book attempts to explore and understand the complex and dynamic interactions between school leaders and school macro-politics exercised by the CPC-led state, as well as the micro-politics between principals and SPSs. Based on the theoretical framework discussed in this Chapter, Chaps. 3 and 4 portray the macro-political context at national and local level in which the leadership provided by school leaders, as micro-political (i.e., school level) actors in China, is shaped and exercised; Chaps. 5 and 6 will present how school leaders cope with macro- and micro-politics. Chapter 7 provides possible explanations for the complex and dynamics of school leadership in CE in China. The methodology upon with the empirical results presented in this book can be found in the Appendix.

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Chapter 3
Social Change, School Leadership, and CE in China: A Historical Review

This chapter traces the development of the macro-political context in the Mao (1949–1976) and post-Mao periods (post-1976) to present the macro-political context at national level that influenced school leadership and CE in China. Although macro-political actors, as defined in Chap. 2, can include the government, courts, political parties, educational authorities, and teachers' unions at the local and national levels (Blase and Blase 2002; Lashway 2006), in China these forces are mainly under CPC leadership and control. Therefore, the chapter will focus on how the CPC, as China's most powerful macro-political actor, shapes the macro-political context of school leadership and CE.

The chapter argues that, since its assumption of power in 1949, the CPC, as China's most powerful macro-political actor, has sought to consolidate and sustain its power and leadership by integrating politics and state governance, directing and regulating economic development, creating a political environment to shape people's thoughts and behaviors at the societal level, and controlling education. Despite differences in emphasis and extent, the CPC-led state has, under different political leadership, used education for nation-building, particularly in terms of political construction and economic development. To this end, the CPC uses various means and strategies to control school leadership in CE. As such, school leaders have become agents of the state who prepare students for economic development and foster among them the CPC's political values and principles.

To present this argument, the chapter first reviews the integration of politics and state governance, and how the CPC has influenced China's economic development and political construction at the societal level since 1949. Second, it examines how macro-politics have affected the development of China's education, including the oscillation of educational tasks between serving the nation's political and economic needs, reforming school leadership in response to changing political and economic contexts, defining school leadership in CE, and thoroughly controlling CE to meet different needs in different contexts,

The CPC as the Most Powerful Macro-political Actor in China

This section traces the development of the CPC as the most powerful macro-political actor influencing state governance, economic development and political construction in China, from 1949 onward. Since its founding in 1949, the CPC-led state established socialism (referred to new democratism in its first seven years) as China's national system and the CPC as the country's sole ruling Party, affording it the highest level of power to govern the state, regulate its economic development and promote its political construction. In the Mao era, the CPC-led state discontinuously used a centrally planned economic model learned from the then Soviet Union, which placed great emphasis on political ideology and class struggle. In the immediate post-Mao period, China, led by Deng Xiaoping and his successors, changed its national focus from class struggle to economic development, the transformation of its economic system and the reform of political work.

This section argues that the CPC-led state has dominated national affairs and consolidated its leadership over the country by controlling and guiding national organization, the economy, and ideo-political work to suit different macro-political needs in different historical contexts. To that end, this section first presents how the CPC-led state has integrated politics with state governance. It then introduces how the CPC has directed and regulated China's economic development in the Mao and post-Mao periods. Finally, it describes the CPC-led state's emphasis on political construction through domination since 1949.

Integrating Politics with State Governance

The CPC's first strategy for boosting its dominance and sustaining its leadership has been the establishment of, as the preeminent macro-political actor at the national and local levels, an intertwined dual-line leadership system, consisting of parallel political and administrative lines through which it could oversee, administer and control national and local affairs (see Fig. 3.1) (National People's Congress 2004; The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 2007). The institutions in the political line develop and publicize the CPC's ideology, monitor political orientation and control personnel at their level and the next lower level, while institutions in the administrative line administer the various affairs within their jurisdiction. The two lines are not separate; rather, they are closely tied, with the political line being the more influential of the two at each level.

According to the 17th National Congress of the CPC (2007), the political line is nominally headed by the National CPC Congress (which is convened every five years), and then by the CPC's key national organs (e.g., the CPC Central Committee and the Central Politburo of CPC), which makes decisions (e.g., appointments to the CPC Central Committee and Central Politburo) on the

Fig. 3.1 The structure of the government of China and the CPC. Drawn based on National People's Congress (2004) and the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (2007)

Congress' behalf when it is not in session; subsequent Congresses are responsible for approving such decisions after the fact. The CPC Central Committee is headed by the General Secretary, who is a member of the Standing Committee and simultaneously holds [since 1989 when President Zemin (1989–2002) was in power] the positions of national president and chairman of CPC Central Military Committee. The CPC Central Committee is directed by the Central Politburo of the CPC and its Standing Committee, both of which are elected by the CPC Central Committee to lead and direct all the CPC's work, including organizing and hosting the National Congress and issuing the CPC's political and administrative policies.

Below the CPC Central Committee lies a series of hierarchical local CPC Congresses and Committees, from the provincial level to the prefectural, county and town (district) levels. Local CPC Congresses are responsible for reviewing the work of the CPC Committee at their level, and (theoretically, at least) for electing its members and candidates; in reality, however, members and candidates are actually decided by the CPC Committee at the next higher level. Each local CPC Committee is headed by its Party secretary, and is responsible for carrying out decisions made by the CPC Congress at the same level, approving advanced and deferred conferences, and nominating members to the CPC Congress at that level (subject to the approval of the next higher CPC Committee).

The National People's Congress (2004) also mandates the existence of the people's government, a part of the administrative line that exists at the national (State Council), provincial, prefectural, county and town (district) levels, and is headed, respectively, by a premier, provincial governor, mayor and county magistrate. Each level of the people's government is composed of many ministries (departments), including MoE. The people's congress and people's government at each level theoretically have the following three kinds of relationships. First, at each level, the people's congress elects the governor and deputy governor of the people's government. Second, the people's government implements the decisions of and the plans passed on by the same-level people's congress and the next higher level people's government. Third, the people's government is monitored by and reports to the same-level people's congress, as well as to the next higher level people's government. People's governments at all levels must follow the leadership of State Council.

In addition to the ad hoc interactions between and among the various political and administrative institutions, the two lines share a complex and intertwined relationship that is dominated by the political line, especially the CPC Committee. First, some leaders in the political line simultaneously hold top positions in the administrative line at the same level. At the national level, for example, some members of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo simultaneously hold top positions in the NPC and State Council; of the nine members of the 17th Standing Committee of the Central Politburo (2007–2012), three were top leaders of the administrative line, including Wu Bangguo (chairman of the NPC Standing Committee), Wen Jiabao (premier of the State Council) and Li Keqiang (deputy premier of the State Council) (Renminwang 2007). This national strategy of assigning an administrator to a position of political leadership extends to local levels as well; for instance, provincial governors are usually also the first deputy secretary of their province's CPC Committee, and most mayors are also the first deputy secretary of their prefecture's CPC Committee. Allowing key Party members to hold political and administrative positions at the same time is a means of expanding the CPC's influence in and power over state governance (Riskin 1987).

Secondly, the CPC-led state establishes political representatives in each government department. Every department head is a CPC member and the secretary of that department's CPC Party organization; this is true of the MoE and local education administration institutions (see more later).

Thirdly, the secretary of each CPC Committee is given more power than the leader of the administrative line at the same level; "placing the cadre under the Party's supervision" has long been a CPC working principle, and a means of ensuring that the CPC Committee is in charge of all political and administrative leaders at the same or next lower level, in terms of their political direction, personnel issues and performance (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1994a). As such, secretaries of CPC Committees are assigned more power than corresponding administrative leaders at the same level and can be promoted from the latter. Moreover, as the deputy secretary of their level's CPC Committee, administrative leaders are effectively subordinate to the Party secretary; their

administration falls under CPC Committee's jurisdiction, and is guided and monitored accordingly. Whatever be the objective reality of the situation, the theoretical division of labor between the political and administrative lines charges the former with providing spiritual and ideological direction on national policies and the latter with executing those policies through its administrative and supervisory efforts (Dreyer 2012).

Directing and Regulating Economic Development

The CPC's second strategy for consolidating and bolstering its leadership involves directing the country's economic development. China's economy, under CPC leadership, has experienced severe reforms in the Mao and post-Mao periods. Generally speaking, in the Mao era (1949–1976), the emphasis was on recovering from the damage wrought by war, and the economy was mainly developed using lessons learned from the Soviet Union's central-planned economy, interrupted by the country's "left-leaning" political reconstruction. In the post-Mao period, the CPC-led state has striven to repair the economic damage caused by the Cultural Revolution, and to develop the national economy by opening China to the world and adopting a market economy. The historical change in China's economy shows that the CPC-led state has been the dominant force in deciding whether, to what extent and how to promote economic development. Its control over economy can be seen in its decision to position economic development in national work, formulate diplomatic policies to develop the economy and establish an economic system to suit the political context.

First, the CPC-led state has decided the position of the economy in national work. Although economic development and political construction were both pursued during the Mao and post-Mao periods [except for several years during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)], the CPC-led state's position fluctuated in both. In the Mao era, China's economy was the best and most quickly developed when the CPC did not emphasize "left-leaning" political construction, which sought the rapid success of socialism and adopted cruel struggles and relentless strikes against those criticized for not having "good class origins" (e.g., being peasants or workers) or for political performance; such actions slowed and even destroyed China's economy.

Specifically, the national economy was restored and well-developed by the end of socialist transformation (1953–1956), during which period the CPC promoted national economic modernization; agricultural production, for example, was 19 % higher in 1956 than in 1949 (Statistics Division of National Bureau of Statistics of China 1984). However, the balance between industry and agriculture was damaged and the productivity of both decreased during the Great Leap Forward (GLF) (1958–1960), which saw class struggle come to the fore (Industrial Goods and Transportation Statistics Division of National Bureau of Statistics of China 1985; Statistics Division of National Bureau of Statistics of China 1984). After the GLF,

the national economy was restored again from 1960 to 1965, during which time the emphasis on class struggle was relaxed, somewhat. By 1965, agricultural production was almost 60 % greater than in 1956 (Statistics Division of National Bureau of Statistics of China 1984). This economic development was then derailed by the Cultural Revolution, during which politics took precedence, factories were forced to close and the people were mobilized to participate politically in the revolution. In 1967, China's gross industrial production was 10 % lower than it had been in 1966, while total national revenues had fallen by 25 % (Industrial Goods and Transportation Statistics Division of National Bureau of Statistics of China 1985).

Unlike in the Mao period, the post-Mao CPC-led state ended its fascination with class struggle and focused instead on economic development, albeit adjusted to suit China's political situation. Following its opening up to the world in 1978, China's economy developed rapidly and people easily found work opportunities, until late 1980s, when inflation and corruption became serious impediments to further growth and stability (Yang 2012). Influenced by the economic situation, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Movement, a student-led popular demonstration (located mainly in Beijing's Tiananmen Square) demanding increased democracy and freedom, drove the CPC-led state to adjust its economic policies from pursuing rapid development, to seeking more measured, but still steady growth (Zheng 1990). After a sharp decline in 1989, China's economy began to revive in 1990, and began to boom again in 1992, following a series of economic liberalizations announced by Deng Xiaoping during his visit to cities in southern parts of China. Later, China's economy, under Jiang's and Zhu Rongji's leadership, sustained an average 8 % annual growth in Gross Domestic Product, the highest rate of *per capita* economic growth in major world economies in 2001 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2002); GDP growth reached 9.2 %, in 2011, under President Hu Jintao's (2002–2012) and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's (2002–2012) leadership (The News Office of National Bureau of Statistics of China and The Data Center of National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012).

Second, the CPC-led state has played a key role in defining the diplomatic policies used to promote economic development. In the Mao period, the state developed its national economy mainly by aping the Soviet Union, because it had adopted a self-contained diplomatic policy that limited its potential trading partners to Soviet bloc countries and resisted official relationships with capitalist countries (Teiwes 2011). The CPC selected and sent Chinese students, technicians and managers to the Soviet Union to learn its technology and skills, and invited experts from the Soviet Union to come to China to provide guidance and instruction. Even though Sino-Soviet amity collapsed in the late 1960s and China's international relationships began to expand in the 1970s, the CPC-led state did not emphasize economic development during that period.

The CPC-led state in the post-Mao period, however, has opened itself to the world and developed its economy by interacting internationally to increase its global presence and competeveness (Ge 1999; Lin et al. 2003). Three major approaches have been used by the state to improve China's economy. The first

approach is "bringing in," and involves attracting foreign investment and learning foreign technology and management techniques to serve the Chinese economy. To that end, the CPC-led state has encouraged foreign trade in Guangdong and Fujian provinces (which had historic connections to Hong Kong and Southeast Asia), established Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong province and Xiamen in Fujian province as special economic zones, opened 14 coastal port cities (including Shanghai), and established coastal economic open zones. In addition to material resources, the CPC-led state encourages and facilitates Chinese students and professionals to visit or study abroad to learn knowledge, technology and skills from foreign countries.

The second approach is "walking out," and includes investing in foreign countries, sending workers and technicians abroad, and bidding on contracts for foreign projects, not only in developed countries, but also in developing ones, such as India, Sudan and Iran. The third approach involves joining international economic organizations and playing active roles therein. China hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in 2001 and 2014, and joined the World Trade Organization in 2002, both of which increased its international political and economic influence. In 2013, under President Xi Jiping's (2012–) leadership, the CPC-led state moved to promote economic integration and provide financial support to infrastructure projects in Asia by establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, an initiative joined by 57 countries, including Britain and France.

Third, the CPC-led state repeatedly has reformed China's economic system to suit different political contexts. In the Mao era, the CPC-led state established a centrally planned economic system based on that of the Soviet Union and reflecting communist dogma about class exploitation and economic egalitarianism (Tse and Lee 2008). The state centrally planned all national economic development and designed a centralized economic management structure to control national and local revenues and expenditures, as well as the distribution and forms of production. People's communes (*renmin gongshe*) became the local basic organization for transmitting central government decisions, and took charge of and distributed local people's basic needs, including food, clothing and labor. People had little freedom in product transactions, and what they could afford to buy was limited. Despite maintaining material equity among Chinese people, the central-planned economy decreased motivation and initiative among both government and individuals, and severely slowed the pace of China's economic development.

Under Deng's leadership, the CPC-led state brought market forces to China and established a socialist market economy, which Deng (1979) suggested would help solve the poverty of socialism. The system differed from the previous centrally planned economy in three ways (Zheng 1990). First of all, the role of the state had changed. Rather than controlling all aspects of the economy, the CPC-led state now focused on making macro-adjustments, and then allowing the market to micro-control the economy in response. Second, economic forms were expanded from the single public economic form established during the Mao era to include both public and private economic structures; to meet market demands, some public

enterprises were forced to reform and were even privatized. Third, existing models of distribution were enriched. Rather than distributing material goods only according to one's labor, the CPC-led state allowed the coexistence of other distribution models, including those based on economic performance, capital, technology and land. The new distribution system was intended to motivate and allow certain areas and people to become rich ahead of others, rather than to maintain strict economic equity, as in Mao's time.

Against the backdrop of opening up to the world and adopting a market economy, post-Mao China's manpower demands have the following three main characteristics. First, there is increased need for human workers with expertise in scientific technology, management and other areas (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1985), the cultivation of which is expected to be accomplished through improving educational quality, and especially by enhancing students' academic performance. Second, the state wants its manpower to be globally competitive (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 2010); Chinese citizens are encouraged to become more exposed to the world and to acquire more foreign knowledge, skills, and technology so as to increase the pace and quality of China's internationalization. Third, the CPC-led state requires workers to be politically qualified (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 2010), in order to filter out foreign values not favorable to the CPC (e.g., individuality and the worship of money and foreign things) and to reduce the domestic conflicts (e.g., growing disparity between rich and poor, and between urban and rural) brought about by the introduction of the market economy. Political construction and political work, as in the Mao period, are still stressed, though their contents have changed somewhat.

Stressing Political Construction

The CPC's third strategy for strengthening and maintaining its dominance and leadership is to mold citizens' values and social behaviors by modifying political construction—its goals, its content, and its means of conduct—to suit different macro-political contexts.

The first method of doing so involves modifying the goals of political work to suit different political contexts. In the Mao period, emphasis was placed on perpetuating socialist ideology and reducing the lingering influence of feudalism, capitalism and the comprador system. Political work in the immediate post-Mao period still included transmitting Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong's thoughts, and emphasized that China was and would remain at a socialist primary stage for the foreseeable future (Deng 1987); however, its goals were also reformed and expanded to include advocating patriotism, maintaining national unity and stability, avoiding repeating the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, providing social order for nation-building, and solving ideological problems (Deng 1980, 1989), so as to avoid the mistakes of the Mao era and prevent the invasion of bourgeois ideology

through the market economy (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 2004). The CPC-led state also stressed guiding and attracting all citizens' commitment, rather than just that of the proletariat. For example, Jiang Zemin proposed "Three Represents" (*sange daibiao*, i.e., advanced productivity, culture and Chinese interests) to embrace the majority of Chinese people, including those who were not proletarian (Dickson 2010). Hu Jintao's approach to constructing a harmonious society was to reduce peoples' dissatisfaction with the CPC's rule (Communist Party of China Central Committee 2006), and to promote individual development and the development of citizens' global consciousness, to reflect China's economic development and opening up to the world.

The second method is to allow the state to decide the content of political construction. As in the Mao period, current political construction contains such values as loving socialism, loving the nation, and perpetuating Marxism–Leninism and the thoughts and theories of influential CPC leaders, including Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. Unlike in Mao era, however, post-Mao political construction dilutes the distinction between socialism and capitalism and allowed for individual development in morality, psychology, behaviors and global consciousness. It also largely reverses earlier attacks on traditional Chinese culture and on Confucianism in particular, in an effort to build social stability and alleviate social problems (e.g., individualism, money worship) (Law 2011). Jiang (2001), for example, proposed governing the nation through virtue (*yide zhiguo*), a principle adapted from Confucianism. Jiang's successor, Hu (2006), used traditional Chinese values to tackle the decline of morality in China, and promoted the "eight honors and eight shames" (*barong bachi*, e.g., taking pride in being honest and trustworthy, and feeling shame for sacrificing ethics for profit) throughout China.

The third method concerns using various means to promote ideological work nationwide. There are three main similarities in the CPC-led state's political construction in the Mao and post-Mao periods. First, both established political and administrative lines from the national to the town (district) levels and in all state-owned institutions to direct political orientations and perpetuate their ideology, and both pursued their goals using similar techniques, including indoctrination, building up examples, posting slogans, organizing activities and education, placing street banners, conducting CPC member study groups, and using social media (Ding 2012). The second similarity involved the monitoring and control of social media, including radio, TV and newspapers (Ding 2012). The third and final similarity stressed the role of education in political construction, as will be discussed more in the following section.

There are also differences in the state's methods in the Mao and post-Mao periods. In the former period, the CPC-led state launched a series of political construction campaigns, including land reform (1950–1953), the suppression of anti-revolutionists (1950–1951), the anti-rightist and rectification movement (1957) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) (Ding 2012; Law 2011). In the latter period, the CPC-led state has taken advantage of and strengthened its control over the Internet, using it both to transmit its political ideology and to block

viewpoints that might not favor the CPC. Those who post and publicize politically suspect or sensitive information can be jailed, although internet space has been gradually broadened (Thornton 2010).

In summary, this section has reviewed social changes in China and how the CPC-led state has acted as a dominant macro-political actor in state governance, economic development and political construction. The CPC-led state has governed through an intertwined political and administrative leadership system, which it has extended to all levels and departments of government, including education administration institutions. Under state direction and regulation, China's economy in the post-Mao period has been reformed from a discontinuously developed and centrally planned version, into socialist market economy open to the world. The CPC-led state, in both the Mao and post-Mao periods, has stressed political construction, and has played a principal role in defining the goals, contents and means thereof. The post-Mao CPC-led state's emphasis on developing education, both for economic and social reasons and to further political construction, will be discussed in the next section.

The Integration of Politics and Education in China

Having presented the organizational, economic and political context of China, this section turns to describe how education, and in particular school leadership and CE, is reformed in such a context. China's education has been led by the CPC to facilitate its dominance since the founding of China in 1949. After taking power, the CPC-led state began to take ownership of education, eventually becoming its major designer and provider, and reformed it to serve its political and economic tasks in different contexts. Thus, education, including school leadership and CE, has been and is a key vehicle in transmitting CPC-prescribed ideology, shaping China's political culture and cultivating a CPC-compliant citizenry. The development of China's education since 1949 has been embedded in a macro-political context dominated by the CPC and used by the CPC-led state to ensure its dominance over other aspects of social life. To understand how macro-politics shape micro-politics at the school level, this section first describes a general picture of the development of China's education in the Mao and post-Mao periods. Then, it traces how China's CE and school leadership have been reformed at various times to meet changing political and economic demands.

The CPC as Manipulator of Education's Oscillating Political and Economic Tasks

The first approach of integrating politics and education in China is to define the political task of education and focus it on serving political construction and

economic development, as revealed by the demands and tensions of the CPC's political/economic base (Hawkins 1983). During those periods in which the CPC-led state was more concerned with economic development, education was given the task of developing students' knowledge and skills; when political construction was of greater concern, education was reformed to emphasize students' class consciousness and to increase their participation in political movements. To ensure education was in accordance with these economic and political tasks, the CPC controlled it in three main ways: defining its goals; adjusting the contents of the two tasks; and establishing a dual educational leadership system to direct and oversee these aspects.

The CPC Central Committee sets educational goals to serve different political and economic needs in different historical periods. In general, the goals, in both the Mao and post-Mao periods, have been two-fold—political and economic— and concerned with cultivating competent, educated people and consolidating the CPC's leadership, as national development and modernization require literate and skilled people who are politically committed and loyal to the CPC and the state (Tsang 2000; Unger 1981). Nevertheless, the specific goals of education in the two eras were not identical.

The three major educational goals in the Mao era emphasized political construction and reflected the changing political situations in three periods of China's history. The first goal emerged at the beginning of the Mao era (1949–1953) and was intended to consolidate the CPC's leadership, cultivate talented people, reduce lingering feudalism, compradorism and capitalism, and further the proletarian dictatorship (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 1949). The second goal emerged during the anti-rightist and rectification movement, and focused on cultivating students' viewpoints on class, labor and dialectical materialism, and on shielding them from the influence of feudalists and the bourgeoisie (Fang et al. 2002). The third goal was proposed during the GLF, and advocated integrating education with proletarian politics and labor production to cultivate "Red and Expert" (*youhong youzhuan*) persons (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 1958)—i.e., "Red" in that they displayed a correct political orientation and advanced political performance, and "Expert" in that they possessed professional knowledge, skills and expertise (Mao 1958). However, in practice, "Red" was far more emphasized than "Expert" (Dreyer 2012), and education stressed cultivating political reliable people with popular mobilization skills (Dickson 2010). The emphasis on "Red" was emphasized even more during the Cultural Revolution, during which students were urged to dedicate themselves to the proletarian revolution by being proletarian laborers, no matter they were literate or not (Cheng 2001). Mao era educational goals emphasized political construction and had two key characteristics: prioritizing political values at the expense of academic learning, and using education to defend proletarian politics.

In addition, there were two main educational goals alternatively proposed during the Mao period to prepare students to serve China's economic development. One emerged at the beginning of China's socialist transformation, and aimed at fully developing students' knowledge, morality, physique and aesthetic so as to

allow them to contribute actively to socialist construction and defend the nation (Ministry of Education 1952). The other goal was developed following the GLF, while China was attempting to restore its damaged economy (1960–1966), and focused on cultivating future laborers for socialist construction (Li and Wang 2000). These two goals stressed serving socialism and emphasized knowledge, skills and competencies that favored economic development.

While education goals in the Mao era oscillated between political and economic tasks, education goal in the post-Mao period have been adjusted continuously to serve economic development (Deng 1982), although political goal have also been stressed, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Movement. The general goal of education in the 1980s were to train Chinese people to be "well-educated, technically skilled and professionally competent" and thus capable of driving China's economic and social progress in the 1990s (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1985, pp. 1, 18). In the 1990s, the goal was again adjusted, this time to suit the needs of China's emerging socialist market economy, i.e., to serve socialist modernization and cultivate "socialist constructors and successors" who were well-developed in terms of morality, knowledge, physique and other aspects, and had the "Four Haves" (*siyou*)—revolutionary ideals, sound morals, good education and a strong sense of discipline (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 1993). This goal subsequently became a part of China's education law (National People's Congress 1995).

Serving economic development through education was further stressed by Jiang (1992), who asserted that education should cultivate laborers who could promote the advancement of scientific technology, economic and social development. Accordingly, the CPC Central Committee and State Council (1995) during Jiang's period advocated "reviving the nation with science, technology and education" (*kejiao xingguo*); that is, developing scientific technology and education to promote national economic revitalization and make the nation more powerful.

Secondly, the CPC-led state's educational administrative institutions have placed different emphases on political learning and academic learning in different domestic contexts and in different periods, though both strategies have been adopted most of the time.

In the Mao era, there were three periods during which political movements were used as a major strategy for achieving education goals; at these times, emphasis was therefore put on political rather than academic learning (Fang et al. 2002; Unger 1981). Students were allowed to participate into political movements in the Mao period, but their political participation was limited to serving and consolidating the CPC's leadership, showing their loyalty to the CPC, and demonstrating their determination to expunge capitalist and feudal thoughts. First, in the PRC's early years, the CPC-led state mobilized students to participate in Land Reform (1950–1953) and in the movement to resist American aggression in Korea (known in the West as the Korean War, 1950–1953). Second, during most of the GLF, China's education mainly consisted of attending work-study programs. Third, during the Cultural Revolution, students devoted their time to a political revolution that abolished the educational system, repudiated intellectuals, criticized school

leaders and teachers, and reformed school leadership, school enrollment and school work. From 1968 onward, the Down to the Countryside Movement (*shangshan xiaxiang*) sent millions of students to work in rural areas to show their loyalty to Mao Zedong. Moreover, students whose family class-origins were those of workers and "poor and lower middle peasants," and who had shown good political performance could easily be recruited to higher level study (Unger 1981).

The Mao era also saw two major periods in which improved academic instruction was emphasized to serve economic development, although political learning remain a part of education (Fang et al. 2002). The first was the period of socialist transformation, which was ushered in 1953, when *People's Education* (*renmin jiaoyu*), a journal the MoE adopted to direct China's education, called for academic instruction to be placed as the center of school work (People's Education 1953). The second period was the years between the end of the GLF and the start of Cultural Revolution (1960–1966), during which time the main task of schools was to provide students with basic knowledge and skills through classroom teaching, supplemented with appropriate labor. Schools were required to spend nine months teaching every year, and forbidden to stop classes at random (Fang et al. 2002). In 1962, to improve the quality of academic instruction, key schools were established (Li and Wang 2000). In these two periods, though students' family class-origin and political performance were examined in their application to higher education, academic performance also became a criterion (Unger 1981).

The CPC-led state in the post-Mao period has not used massive political movements in school education, although it still stresses political learning; rather, it advocates three main methods of improving academic learning to enhance overall educational quality and prepare Chinese manpower for socialist economic development. First, to motivate teachers to improve students' academic performance, the CPC under Deng Xiaoping's leadership repositioned their identity and improved their economic status. Deng (1977) defined teachers as socialist laborers, which contradicted Mao's claim that intellectuals were bourgeois. Second, key universities and schools were restored, in 1978, to cultivate elites with good academic performance and the potential to become world-class scientists (Deng 1978). Though key schools were renamed as demonstration schools in 1996, and theoretically eliminated in 2006, former key schools have been still seen as possessing better resources for improving academic instruction, influencing many aspects of school work, including school choice (Wu 2012). Third, in addition to political performance, students' academic performance has become one of the most important criteria for entering higher level education. Students with good examination results could be recruited by good senior secondary schools and universities. Fourth, policy regarding graduates' employment was reformed to suit the market economy, which expanded parents' and employers' emphasis on students' academic performance. The policy of unified distribution of graduates that had been used before 1985 was transformed, in 1993, to give students and employers employment choices in most districts and major centers (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 1993). This drove students to follow the market's rules and hunt for jobs on their own.

Third, the CPC has established an intertwined dual-line leadership system for education administration to oversee all educational issues stated above from the national to the local levels. This system includes educational administrative institutions at the national, provincial, prefectural and county levels, each of which is attached to the government at the same level (National People's Congress 1995). Political and administrative lines are established in educational administrative institutions at all levels. The former, called the CPC party group, is led by the CPC party committee and represented it in non-Party institutions, including educational administrative institutions; the group is responsible for carrying out the CPC's policies, working on CPC-assigned tasks and making on institutional decisions, leading educational cadres, and maintaining solidarity between CPC and non-CPC members. The head of a given administrative line is also its political leader; for example, the minister of the MoE is also the secretary of its CPC Party group, just as the dean of the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (SMEC) is also the deputy Party Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Education and Hygiene Committee.

Educational administrative institutions at all levels are under multiple leadership. The first kind of leadership comes from higher level educational administrative institutions, all of which are guided by the MoE (called the State Education Committee from 1985 to 1998) at the national level (National People's Congress 1995). The MoE translates the CPC's educational policies, set educational goals, designs educational systems, prescribes curricula, and distributed educational resources. Educational administrative institutions are also led by the same-level people's government and supervised by the same-level people's congress. Last but most important, all educational administrative institutions are ultimately directed and led by the CPC Central Committee at the national and local levels. The MoE studies the documents issued by the CPC Central Committee and forwards these to subordinate institutions, while educational administrative institutions at the local levels study and pass along documents issued by the People's Congress.

The CPC as the Principal Definer of CE

The second approach to integrating politics and education in China concerns the CPC's key role in defining, directing and shaping CE to perpetuate the Party's political ideology, and to further political socialization. In the Mao era, CE emphasized cultivating students' proletarian consciousness, faith in socialism, and loyalty to the CPC and Chairman Mao. Beginning in the late 1970s, Chinese CE became more responsive to changes in China's domestic and global contexts, and was expanded to include the global, national, local, community and individual levels, while still emphasizing students' obedience and loyalty to the CPC and the state (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1988, 1994b; Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 2004; Law 2006). The CPC's key role in defining China's CE can be seen in its efforts to institutionalize CE, reform it

to suit its needs in different periods, place more emphasis on transmitting political values through CE, provide multiple strategies for CE and establish a dual-line leadership to lead CE.

First, the CPC-led state has issued policies to institutionalize CE. The first approach is to permeate CE policies with top CPC leaders' words and ideas. For example, Mao (1957) commanded that CE should be made an educational priority, and the CPC-led state has included this command in its related policies ever since (Fang et al. 2002). The second approach involves the CPC Central Committee, which has, since the 1980s, issued CE-related policies and regulations prescribing CE's curriculum, themes, approaches and leadership system, and emphasizing the necessity of strengthening CE to respond to the negative influences of international communication and globalization; to foster students' patriotism, sense of identification with the CPC and belief in Marxism; and to have top CPC leaders' words accepted as CE principles (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1988, 1994b; Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 2004). These policies thoroughly regulate school CE, and direct the MoE, local educational authorities and schools leaders to promote CE. Following on the second approach, the third involves the MoE's institutionalization of the CE curriculum. Per the CPC Central Committee's policies and requests, the MoE creates teaching plans, syllabus and curriculum standards for CE as a subject, and provides themes and activities for CE's informal curriculum.

Second, the CPC-led state has defined and revised CE topics to match the Party line in different historical periods. In Mao's time, CE included such topics as communist and socialist ideology, materialistic worldview, communist morality, labor work, and opposing capitalism, feudalism and fascism (Government Administration Council 1954). During the GLF, learning Mao's thoughts on and analyses of Chinese social classes, class enemies and the significance of class struggle became CE topics. At the beginning of the post-Mao period, although CE in China remained politics- and Marxism-centered, the emphasis on Mao's thoughts and Chinese revolution decreased, other topics were added, including law education (Fairbrother 2003); seven loves (i.e., of patriotism, socialism, the CPC, the people, labor, science and collectivism, and public property), and socialist morality (e.g., being disciplined, civil, polite, honest, modest, brave, energetic, hard-working, and plain-living) (Lan and Gao 2009). To address new social problems (such as money worship and extreme individualism) and the perceived moral decline brought about by opening China to the world and incorporating capitalist elements into its socialist economy (Cheung and Pan 2006), moral education was introduced as a CE term, referring to such newly added content as discipline, labor, psychology, and interpersonal relationships (Teng 1988). Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square Movement, moral education has been expanded to include modern and contemporary Chinese history and national situation education, and great emphasis has been placed on patriotism (Clerical Office of State Education Commission 1991; General Office of State Education Committee 1991). In the early 2000s, the CPC-led state begins to use the term "citizen" (*gongmin*) and to prescribe a list of citizens' qualities, responsibilities and moralities (Communist Party of China Central Committee 2001).

Third, the CPC-led state, acting as CE's gatekeeper and the definer of its main task, has placed national dimension prior to other dimensions (e.g., individual, local, and global) (Law 2011). Analysis of the CPC Central Committee policies that have guided Chinese CE from the 1980s to the present shows that, although China's CE topics have ranged from the individual level to local, national and global levels (Law 2011), the national dimension, including patriotism, love for the CPC and collectivism, has consistently been given priority over other dimensions; in addition, the national dimension, unlike other CE topics, is clearly detailed in formal CE policies (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1988, 1994b; Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 2004). Moreover, topics promoting students' individual development have been limited within CE's political and legal framework to highlight the socialist nature of the state (Cheung and Pan 2006), and have been used to support the national dimension and facilitate the preparation and recruitment of future CPC members (State Education Commission 1995). For example, the promotion of individual character traits, such as helping others and being brave and diligent, is intended to serve nation-building and related interests (Zhuo 2008).

Fourth, the CPC-led state has provided six strategies for implementing CE. The first involves conducting CE through the formal curriculum using CE and other subjects, using syllabus and curriculum standards established by the MoE and administered by the teaching departments of local educational authorities and schools. The second requests schools to organize CE activities on special days relating to CE's national dimension, including traditional Chinese festivals; the birthdays and death anniversaries of CPC leaders, Chinese heroes and celebrities; the anniversaries of Chinese revolutionary events and the founding of the CPC; recruitment days for the CYL and YPC (student political organizations); and, visiting revolutionary and patriotic education bases during holidays. The third strategy urges schools to organize CE rituals, such as weekly national flag-raising ceremonies, weekly class meetings, and rituals on the specials days listed in the second strategy. The fourth involves organizing academic activities, such as seminars and social investigations or essay, speech or knowledge contests promoting CE. The fifth strategy makes full use of all available on-campus propaganda channels (campus broadcasting studios, TVs and networks, display windows, blackboards, newspapers, corridors and classroom walls) to immerse students in CE knowledge and values, and information about national leaders, heroes and models. The sixth strategy involves improving teachers' professional morality.

Fifth, the CPC-led state has established a powerful and forceful leadership system to support CE and promote political work on campus (Tse and Lee 2008), and requires all political and administrative departments at all levels and within all relevant institutions (especially education administrative institutions) to make and enact policies, direct and monitor propaganda media, and inspect and supervise school-level CE (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1994b). In particular, education administrative institutions are required to support CE by building more CE facilities (e.g., libraries, science museums, art museums), providing more CE-related human resources (e.g., CE experts), designing CE suitable

for local needs, and refining CE work in schools. Local educational authorities respond to these requests in a variety of ways. One provincial-level educational authority, for example, carries out national policies in three general ways: by directly forwarding higher level policies to lower level educational authorities and schools to implement; by issuing local policies on specific measures for implementing national policies; or by making local policies that related to the topics proposed in the national policies. Schools and educational organizations at the bottom of the educational administration hierarchy are also assigned the responsibility of promoting CE, as will be detailed in next subsection.

The CPC as the Macro Designer of School Leadership

The CPC-led state's third approach to integrating politics and education in China has been to control, define and reform school leadership to suit political demands in different contexts, which allows it to oversee and implement its policies on education, and on CE in particular. This subsection presents the historical development of the CPC-led state's influence on school leaders and its impact on the school leadership system. The strategies the CPC-led state adopted include extending the state's governance and education administration structure to the school level by establishing a dual-line school leadership system, forcibly controlling and defining school leaders' power distribution and qualifications, and consistently assigning school leaders primary responsibility for CE.

For most of the PRC's history, the CPC-led state has maintained a dual-line school leadership system that includes both administrative and political lines headed by principals and SPSs, respectively. This school leadership system (see Fig. 3.2) is intended to ensure and enhance CPC leadership of and control over schools, to keep schools aligned with prescribed socialist values, and to cultivate socialist constructors and successors for China's future socio-economic development (Li and Wang 2000). The system, established in the earliest days of the PRC, was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, and then restored in the post-Mao period. The dual system is applied in both government-sponsored and -operated public schools and in private schools, including those operated by non-governmental organizations or individuals; despite being nominally private, the latter are sponsored by district/county education bureaus and led by principals and SPSs that the bureau assigned (Ding 2008).

Principals head the administrative line, which comprises several vice-principal-led administrative departments (teaching, CE, general office, grades and classes), while SPSs head the on-campus SPO. As political leaders, SPSs also lead their school's YPC and CYL, which are organizations that help the CPC recruit and educate students, and important places for students to learn about socialism and the CPC, and to pledge their support for the CPC's leadership. The YPC and the CYL are promoted among students aged 6–14 in primary and junior secondary education, and students aged 14–28 in senior secondary and university education,

Fig. 3.2 School leadership structure in China

respectively (National Congress of China's Communist Youth League 2008; Young Pioneers of China 2005). The YPC is regarded as the preparatory team for developing socialist constructors, and the CYL as the "reserve army" of the CPC.

Moreover, the administrative and political lines are interconnected: a principal can also be an SPS and a principal who is not an SPS must support the SPS, and vice versa (State Education Commission 1990). SPSs must be CPC members; although Party membership is not mandatory for principals, 13 of the 16 principals interviewed in this study were CPC members. The Teacher Congress (under SPS leadership) monitors the principal's work. The YPC, the CYL and the CE department are also interconnected; the former two, though in the political line, are often situated as sub-departments of the CE department, which is in the administrative line. In addition, the CYL is designated by the CPC and SPO to lead the YPC (The Communist Youth League Central Committee 2013).

The power distribution between principals and SPSs is not stable; rather, it has often been adjusted by the CPC-led state in response to changing political contexts. The CPC-led state gives principals more power when economic concerns are at the fore, and SPSs more power during political movements or the first few years of economic restoration periods. In the Mao era, the balance of power between principals and SPSs underwent four changes (Xiao 2000).

From 1949 to 1952, principals were given the power to make decisions on school affairs that had been discussed by the school committee. From 1952 to 1957, the state adopted the PRS, increasing principals' power and responsibilities and allowing them to make decisions on all school administrative affairs, including

instruction; SPSs were less influential, and were limited to guaranteeing schools' political orientation and helping principals improve school instruction (Xiao 2000). That changed with the 1957 advent of the anti-rightist movement, which, with its emphasis on state-led political reconstruction, changed the school leadership structure and put the PRS under the guidance of the SPO; SPSs were then given power over all school affairs, including principals' work (Chen 2003).

Although some power was returned to principals from 1963 to 1966, when the CPC re-emphasized economic development, they had to accept SPSs' guidance and local Party committees' direct leadership. Both school principals' and SPSs' power was reduced during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), during which period schools were led by revolutionary committees and dominated by the CPC.

The CPC-led state further adjusted the power distribution between administrative and political leaders in the post-Mao period. From 1978 to 1984, during a period of economic restoration, SPSs were given the lion's share of power over school instruction, ideo-political education, and school departments in the political lines (Xiao 2000). This did not enhance the efficiency of school administration and instruction, as Party affairs took precedence (Xiao 1984). To rectify this, the CPC Central Committee (1985) reformed the PRS, giving principals full responsibility for their schools and requiring SPSs-headed SPOs, the CPC's organs on campus, to "abandon the practice of monopolizing the management of everything."[1] Despite supervising principals' work, SPSs are mainly responsible for school-level Party affairs, including political, ideological and organizational work (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1985).

The CPC-led state has also periodically changed the emphasis it has placed on school leaders' political and professional qualifications. Over the course of the Mao period, school leaders' political qualifications, political stance and family class-origins were emphasized over their professional qualifications. The majority of school leaders appointed were CPC members, even if they had never worked before in education institutions (State Education Commission 1951). Principals without a Party membership faced contempt and denunciation from school Party members, especially when "Red and Expert" was introduced in the late 1950s. In addition to having CPC membership, Mao era school leaders were expected to serve the proletarian revolution, to understand proletarian class ideology, collectivism, mass viewpoints, and to fight against the bourgeoisie, individualism, and values and behaviors contemptuous of physical laborers (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 1958). This was particularly true during the Cultural Revolution, when most principals and SPSs were criticized as politically unqualified backsliders who promoted revisionism on campus, and were removed from their positions or temporally relieved for examination (Li and Wang 2000).

In the post-Mao period, the CPC-led state has continued to stress political qualifications ahead of professional ones, although principals are expected to be more qualified in administration and SPSs in political work (Communist Party of China

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[1]Ibid.

Central Committee and State Education Commission 1991). The specific qualifications of principals and SPSs will be shown in next Chapter, as the SMEC has provided more specific qualifications for principals and SPSs in its jurisdiction.

The CPC-led state's design for its school leadership system, shifting of principals' and SPSs' power, and emphasis on political qualifications has dual purposes. The first is to ensure school leaders' obedience and contribution to the CPC's leadership in school and the continuation of political work on campus; the second is to adopt school leaders as an agency through which to guide school members to follow the CPC's leadership, and to transmit CE, which is basically political in nature, to students. The CPC-led state requires school leaders to place CE at the forefront of all school affairs, and has designed a CE leadership system that is part of the dual-line school leadership system and comprised of principals, SPSs, principal-led CE departments, and SPS-led students' political organizations (e.g., CYL and YPC). The CPC-led state also thoroughly regulates and prescribes leaders' and departments' responsibilities within the CE leadership system.

The state has established principals and SPSs as the heads of the CE leadership system, and required both to ensure their school's work adhered to the CPC's socialist political direction (Ministry of Education 1998). In the Mao period, principals were mainly responsible for formal CE curriculum (e.g., political lessons), and SPSs for planning, directing and monitoring CE instruction and activities (Ministry of Education 1952). In the post-Mao period, especially since the PRS was re-introduced in 1985, principals not only take charge of the CE formal curriculum but also assume full responsibility for school-level CE, while SPSs cooperate with principals in leading CE (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1988) and comprehensively arrange CE to strengthen the CPC's leadership thereof (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1994b; Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 1993). Both principals and SPSs are tasked with improving teachers' professional morality and shaping their role in CE, particularly class heads' qualifications, training and responsibilities (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 2004).

Second, the CPC-led state has designed a middle-level CE leadership system, comprising the CE department, YPC and CYL, that was to cooperate with principals and SPSs in developing CE. These three sub-organizations, as shown above, are structurally interconnected, and work together to organize CE activities and guide students' values and behaviors. Despite these interconnections, however, they answer to different superiors. The CE department is responsible for carrying out principals' requirements, while the YPC and CYL are guided, inspected and evaluated by SPSs, especially in their efforts at recruiting members, guiding student organizations, and organizing CE activities (Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 2004). Compared to the CE department, the YPC and CYL attach more emphasis to and are given more responsibilities in CE. The CYL Central Committee created separate constitutions for the YPC and CYL, made specific policies strengthening the YPC and its leadership, and got the MoE's endorsement for starting, in 2012, a YPC master program in the top universities of each province (Communist Youth League Central Committee and Young

Pioneer of China National Working Commission 2012). The YPC and CYL are tasked with organizing political activities to attract students, and became the link connecting the SPO to students (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1994b). The added stress on the YPC's and CYL's roles in CE and the clarification of their relationship with the SPO, indicate that the SPSs who head the YPC and CYL have been given additional responsibilities in CE.

Summary

This chapter has shown how economic and educational developments were driven by and largely synchronous with China's political development. The state-designed dual state governance and leadership system, which controls national ideology, ideological work and the economy to disseminate CPC ideology and consolidate its leadership, has been applied to education administration institutions and schools to boost the Party's influence and shape school leadership. The CPC-led state has played a definitive role in reforming China's economy, political construction and education, and especially its school leadership and CE.

The reforms seen in these areas share the following three characteristics. First, when the CPC-led state stressed political construction, education was reformed to cultivate students' political consciousness and competencies to suit the current political movement; moreover, school leaders' political qualifications and backgrounds were stressed and political leaders (SPSs) were given more power. Second, when the CPC-led state emphasized maintaining a well-developed economy, China's education stressed developing students' knowledge and skills to foster economic development, and more emphasis was placed on academic instruction; school leaders' professional qualifications were more highly valued, and more school power was allocated to principals. Third, the CPC-led state has valued and greatly shaped political construction and CE in both the Mao and post-Mao periods, even though it sometimes favored and academic instruction. The analysis in this chapter shows that the integration of politics and education, including school leadership and CE, is a result of the CPC's efforts to maintain and consolidate its monopoly over leadership in China.

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Chapter 4
A General Picture of School Leadership and CE in Shanghai

Having introduced the background of China's social change, school leadership, and CE, this chapter turns to these issues as they specifically apply to Shanghai. This chapter argues that social change and educational development in Shanghai is an active epitome of the CPC-led state. As a municipality directly under the central government, Shanghai could mirror the characteristics of China's political, economic and educational development shown in Chap. 3. Shanghai has adopted the CPC-prescribed leadership system for government and schools, stressed implementing the CPC's policies, and worked out local-specific methods to implement those policies that highlighted and reinforced the CPC's leadership in the municipality. On the other hand, influenced by its history, geography and reform opportunity, Shanghai has played an important part in China's economic development, and a pioneering role in reforming school leadership and CE. Shanghai's leading role in economic and educational development, however, has still been guided by and has benefited from CPC policies, and has closely followed the CPC's political framework.

As the pattern of political, economic and educational development in Shanghai is similar to that of China in general, this chapter will not rehearse these issues. Instead, it will introduce Shanghai-specific contextual information, present Shanghai's CE and school leadership policies to describe the context for this book's findings, show how the local level of the CPC-led state implements CE policies made by the CPC-led state at the national level and directs local CE and school leaders, and provide a policy context for CE and school leadership in CE in Shanghai, to link the findings in Chaps. 5 and 6.

To that end, this chapter first introduces the social and educational context of Shanghai, to show Shanghai's historical development, its role in continuing and reinforcing the CPC's influences, and its strategy of using education to promote local development. Next, it presents Shanghai's policies on CE, to show how Shanghai authorities implement national CE policies, and develop local programs

and strategies that reflect local characteristics while reinforcing CPC policies; it also highlights the consistency between Shanghai and national CE policies, in terms of both content and approach. Third, it introduces the school leadership system in Shanghai by describing Shanghai's pioneering role in reforming school leadership within the CPC-prescribed PRS, and policy-regulated school leaders' qualifications and responsibilities.

Social and Educational Context of Shanghai

Shanghai was one of the earliest cities opened to foreign countries for trade, cultural communication and residence, and has been influenced greatly by China's international and domestic situation. Due to its location (at the mouth of the Yangtze River, midway along the Chinese coast), Shanghai was one of the five Chinese cities forced, by the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, to allow British citizens to establish a residential enclave and to trade and do business freely; Shanghai was later gradually opened to France, America, and other developed countries in a similar manner.

Shanghai has long been of political and economic significance to the CPC. Politically, it was the birthplace of the CPC (in 1921) and the site of the first and second National Congresses of the CPC. Many CPC leaders, including Mao Zedong, lived in Shanghai while directing the Chinese revolution and many famous wars began there. Therefore, the city is home to many revolutionary resources, traditions and historical sites, all of which are used in the city's CE (Wu 1990). When the CPC came to power in 1949, Shanghai became a pioneer city to showcase the CPC's ability to rule China. For instance, it was the site of "the fight of rice and cotton," a crackdown on Shanghai merchants who hoarded rice and cloth to increase prices artificially; to resolve the problem and consolidate its new regime, the CPC-led state flooded the Shanghai market with rice, cotton cloth and yarns from other places in China to force lower prices and break the merchants' monopoly.

In 1949, Shanghai was established as a municipality, directly under CPC Central Committee control; its municipal Party secretaries became key members of the CPC Central Committee or government, and most became leaders in either of the dual-line leadership lines. Moreover, by 2011, six Shanghai Party secretaries had become members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, the most powerful organ of the CPC. Some of these (e.g., Zhang Chunqiao, Zhu Rongji, and Jiang Zemin) became key figures in China's political and economic changes over the years. Zhang Chunqiao was critical in promoting the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Zhu Rongji was one of Deng Xiaoping's supporters in establishing socialist market economy in 1991; during his term as premier of State Council, Zhu greatly reformed China's economic and state-owned intuition system, and grew China's GDP by 7.9 % in the first three quarters of 2002, against the backdrop of a regional financial crisis (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2003). Finally, under the leadership of

Jiang Zemin as secretary of the CPC Central Committee, China managed to establish a socialist market economy.

One of Shanghai's economic development strategies has been to make use of its geographical and transportation advantages to open itself up to the world. This strategy, however, did not work well until Deng Xiaoping introduced his economic reform and opening up to the world policy in the late 1970s. In 1984, Shanghai was named as one of 14 open coastal port cities. After examining Shanghai's geography and history of trade with foreign countries, Deng (1991) pointed out that only by developing Shanghai's economy could China achieve international status in finance. Since then, the city's per capita GDP has risen from about US$1,000 (in 1990) to US$12,784 (in 2011) (Shanghai Municipal Statical Bureau 2012). Even before, and especially since China's 2001 admission to the World Trade Organization, the CPC-led state began developing Shanghai to compete for global capital and become a world-class city, and to host significant international events, such as the Fortune Global Forum, in 1999, and the APEC Forum, in 2001. However, Shanghai's openness in this period was limited by the CPC-led state, and its principle of keeping a foothold in China and absorbing foreign achievements. Shanghai is now identified by the CPC-led state as one of its most important national economic centers and as an international center for finance, trading, shipping and transportation, with aspirations of becoming a modern international metropolis.

To maintain its role as an economic center and become a modern international metropolis, Shanghai's municipal government has stressed reforming and developing education to provide human resources (Shanghai Municipal Party Committee of Science and Education & Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2005b). All education reform and development programs in Shanghai were guided by Shanghai's CPC Committee and its municipal government, and jointly planned and implemented by two levels of educational authorities—SMEC and the district education bureau (DEB) of each district (for simplicity's sake, this book also uses DEB to identify education authorities at the county level, which is effectively the same as the district level). The former planned, directed and coordinated education for the whole municipality, while each of the latter took charge of educational leadership affairs in its specific district.

Since the 1980s, education development in Shanghai has focused on balancing educational development and increasing educational quality, rather than simple quantity expansion. The SMEC's education development strategy focused on providing sufficient and qualified school buildings and facilities and increasing education funding and teachers' salaries, which became DEB and district government responsibilities when education funding was decentralized to district level governments, in 1985. Due to unbalanced development and different geographic advantages, there was inter- and intra-district education disparity, first in terms of quantity and then in terms of quality. Taking educational funding as an example, in 2006, public per student funding for junior secondary schools in Shanghai's urban Huangpu District was 14 times that in suburban Chongming County, because

Huangpu was more economically developed (Shen 2006). Since then, SMEC has stressed balanced educational development (particularly in terms of financial and human resources) in an effort to enhance municipal educational development as a whole; according to official data, Shanghai achieved intra-county educational balance in 2014 (Shen 2014).

Before promoting balanced intra-county compulsory education development, Shanghai had tried to balance resources between the primary and junior secondary school levels. In 2004, to reduce the burden on primary schools, which until then had six grades, SMEC decided to move all primary school students in grade six to junior secondary schools (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2004a). Since then, Shanghai primary schools have had five grades and its junior secondary schools, four grades.

In the early 2000s, junior secondary schools became a key SMEC concern, due to decreases in quality that had, to some extent, resulted from the SMEC's strategy of delinking junior secondary schools from their attached senor ones in the late 1990s. In the early 2000s, the SMEC increased funding to and improved the facilities of junior secondary schools, which impacted school leaders' perceptions of and strategies toward the CPC-led state (Shen 2006). The SMEC also introduced measures to develop school leadership, including updating school administration principles, asking school leaders to promote quality education (*suzhi jiaoyu*) and developing school-specific education characteristics (Shen 2006).

CE in Shanghai

CE in Shanghai has been consistent with national policies on CE, as can be seen in three aspects. First, the SMEC has institutionalized CE to carry out the CPC's CE policies, reinforce the CPC's leadership and highlight local CE characteristics within the CPC's political framework. Second, the content prescribed in SMEC policies is, similar to that in national policies, politics-oriented. Third, the prescribed approaches to CE in Shanghai are based on national policies, and are specific to and favorable for implementing national and local CE policies.

Institutionalization of Shanghai CE

Similar to the CPC Central Committee and MoE, the SMEC institutionalizes CE to implement national policies on CE and direct CE in the local context, using the three strategies adopted by educational authorities in other provinces and presented in Chap. 3. Specifically, the SMEC first forwards the national policies to the relevant DEBs for study and implementation within their districts. Second, it makes local policies with topics similar to those in the national policies; for

example, following national policies on improving juveniles' ideo-morality and behavioral norms, Shanghai revised and enacted its Primary and Secondary School Students' Behavior Norms, and Strengthening Education on Being Honest. Third, the SMEC develops specific measures to implement national policies on CE, including local policies on how to evaluate policy implementation in schools. For instance, regarding the CPC Central Committee's policy on Improving Juveniles' Ideo-morality, the SMEC made a policy detailing how and with what indicators to evaluate relevant school work, as well as a broader policy on evaluating CE, and awarded schools for getting good evaluation results in 2004.

Moreover, the SMEC has initiated local programs to carry out national policies. Based on national policies on juveniles' ideo-morality education and national spirit education, the SMEC created two pragmatic policies regarding the guidance and core tasks of CE in the municipality—schema of national spirit education, and schema of life education (Shanghai Municipal Party Committee of Science and Education & Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2005a, b). To implement the humanistic caring component advocated by the 17th CPC National Congress, the SMEC started, in 2008, a Sweet Classroom Program (*wenxin jiaoshi*) to promote CE and to nurture a school culture and teacher–student relationships that were favorable for CE (Shanghai Municipal Education and Hygiene Committee of Communist Party of China & Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2008). In addition, the SMEC issued annual CE policies regarding year-specific CE topics (e.g., the 90th anniversary of the founding of CPC) and that year's major CE contents and approaches.

Fourth, the SMEC has made its CE policies and developed its CE curriculum in accordance with the CPC's general framework. Since 1985, the SMEC has enjoyed a degree of autonomy over its CE textbook contents, and has been reforming its own curriculum since the 1990s (Lan et al. 2007); using that latitude, Shanghai re-designated ideo-political subjects as civic subjects in the 1980s and rewrote its CE textbook during the first stage of curriculum reform, and then set Shanghai-specific educational goals (such as the cultivation of local, national and global awareness and civic morality) and designed its own CE evaluation approach during the second stage (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2004b). Since 2005, students' ideo-morality subject achievement, though still a part of students' senior higher school entrance examination, has been evaluated in a different way than other subjects (e.g., Chinese language, mathematics) in Shanghai (Shanghai Municipal Educational Examinations Authority 2011); specifically, the former's grades are expressed as levels (e.g., pass, good, and excellent) and are based on an open-book examination, while the latter subjects are assigned numerical scores (e.g., 90, 100). While passing the CE examination is a prerequisite for attending key-point senior secondary schools, the low threshold this policy established reduces the pressure school leaders previously felt to improve students' academic CE scores, and makes recruitment to key schools more dependent on students' scores in other subjects.

Despite having a degree of curriculum autonomy, for political reasons, the CE curriculum in Shanghai has centered on and finally aims at promoting individual development. For example, the SMEC revised its secondary school CE textbooks (i.e., ideo-morality and ideo-politics) to reflect the report of the 17th CPC National Congress. Interviewees (e.g., P3 and P7) explained that transmitting the CPC's CE policies was driven by the state and by China's political culture, in which "educational issues are also political issues." The next two subsections present how CE in Shanghai is politically centered, in both its topics and its strategies.

Politics-Oriented CE Programs in Shanghai

As introduced in the previous subsection, the SMEC started local programs to implement national CE policies. These programs include national spirit education, life education, constructing Sweet Classroom, and students' behavior norms, covering topics mainly at the national and individual dimensions.

The data from document analysis and an interview with an SMEC official show that the SMEC, as part of the CPC-led state at the local level, started these programs to mediate the influences of globalization, nationalization and localization, filter the negative influences of globalization, and enhance students' national identification. The policies informing these programs state that the multiple culture brought to Shanghai by its progress toward becoming an international metropolis have negatively influenced students' values (Shanghai Municipal Education and Hygiene Committee of Communist Party of China & Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2008; Shanghai Municipal Party Committee of Science and Education & Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2005a, b). National spirit education, for example, was started in response to national policies and student problems identified in a local investigation, which showed that junior secondary school students in Shanghai had weak national identification, awareness, confidence and pride, were indifferent to Chinese traditional culture, were lacking in such citizenship characteristics as being honest and hardworking, actively assuming social responsibility, and seeking self-improvement. Shanghai's national spirit education program stressed that "patriotism should be the soul of national spirit education, and national spirit education be the foundation of moral education (a term for CE in China)" (Shanghai Municipal Party Committee of Science and Education & Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2005a).

Each Shanghai local CE program aims at fostering students' sense of identification with the CPC-led state and at cultivating their knowledge, attitudes and skills to serve different dimensions of national development. Specifically, the schema of national spirit education focuses on cultivating students' political awareness, and increasing their national pride and confidence in the global context through three major topics, all related to politics (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission

2005). The first is national awareness, which lauds the CPC's leadership and discusses such issues as national status, national security and national achievements to cultivate students' identification with contemporary China and prepare them to relate their individual interests to nation-building. The second topic involves cultivating students' culture identification by taking a historical approach to China's traditional and revolutionary culture. Finally, the third topic is about fostering specific citizen characters, such as assuming social responsibility, being honest, observing laws, and being cooperative, hardworking, and self-improving (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2005).

Despite addressing topics of health, safety, growth and caring to cultivate students' knowledge of their physiological and psychological development, and values of respecting and caring for life, the SMEC's life education schema is nonetheless situated in the framework of national and local development, and designed primarily to cultivate healthy students with a strong willingness to study for national development, win international competitions and become strong socialist constructors and successors (Shanghai Municipal Party Committee of Science and Education & Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2005b). The Sweet Classroom Program also has the final goal of cultivating socialist constructors and successors, in this case by improving school buildings, student safety and interpersonal relationships (Shanghai Municipal Education and Hygiene Committee of Communist Party of China & Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2008). Guiding students' behavior education by training students' behaviors is proposed as a way of practicing the CPC-prescribed behavior model and cultivating social responsibility (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission & Shanghai Municipal Commission for the Construction of Spiritual Civilization 2012). The Behavior Codes for Secondary School Students prioritizes the Four Loves (of the motherland, the people, socialism and the CPC), and relegates rule related to discipline and collectivity, respectively, to second and third place (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission & Shanghai Municipal Commission for the Construction of Spiritual Civilization Shanghai Municipal Party Committee of Science and Education, & Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2005).

CE Approaches Adopted from National Policies and Added New Ones to Suit for Local Policies

The policy review and interviews with educational officials and school leaders show that approaches to CE in Shanghai included both those prescribed in national policies (shown in Chap. 3) and those developed by the SMEC. Three major local approaches were identified.

The first local approach is to use the curriculum to cover all CE activities and programs. The SMEC requires school leaders to synthesize all formal

school CE curricula (e.g., specific CE subject and other subjects with CE content) and informal CE curricula (e.g., activities, weekly class meetings). All interviewed school leaders claimed that, according to SMEC guidelines, "all school activities are curricular," and so divided their CE into two categories—themed CE and subject CE. Themed CE consists of activities centered on different themes and promoted through weekly class meetings, rituals and school annual festivals (i.e., reading festivals, sports festivals, scientific technology festivals, and art festivals). Subject CE has three forms—specific subject CE (e.g., ideo-morality in junior secondary school), traditional subjects with CE content (e.g., Chinese language, history, geography), and newly begun exploratory subject (*tanjiu ke*) and expanding subject (*tuozhan ke*) CE, both of which have been adopted during the second round of curriculum reform in Shanghai, which began in 1998, are not examination based, thus are used by schools as an important way of teaching CE.

The second approach is to ask school leaders to demonstrate the unique characteristic of their schools. The SMEC expects school leaders to explore their school resources (e.g., school history, school name, school location, community resources, and campus environment) and students' characteristics and then accordingly start branding programs (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission & Education Supervision Department of Shanghai Municipal Government 2005). According to interviews with school leaders, they could develop their schools' unique characteristic in many ways, including developing and implementing a school-based CE curriculum that provided for students' spiral uprising pattern, starting a school-based CE activity, demonstrating school characteristic in art, sports, scientific technology, psychological education and behavior training. Whether the school develops its unique characteristic, however, needs to be evaluated and identified by the SMEC, which awards branding plaques to schools that are identified as having unique characteristics, and/or to model schools with unique characteristics, and then invites the school leaders to share their experience in the municipality.

The third approach stresses teachers' role in CE. Teachers' performance in promoting CE—including teachers' professional morality and responsibility, their professional image and public guidance, and their capability for fostering students' values and improving their own—is an important part of the policy on Inspection and Evaluation Indicators of CE. Teachers who violate rules of professional morality would cost their school the opportunity to apply to be a municipal-level model school, while teachers (including class heads, CE subject teachers, psychology subject teachers, CE subject teaching researchers, HCEDs) who do well in CE could get awards. In addition, the SMEC emphasizes improving class heads' capabilities and skills in CE by starting workshops for outstanding class heads and requiring schools to provide systematic training for class heads every two weeks.

School Leadership System in Shanghai

Like CE in Shanghai, the SMEC, as a part of the CPC-led state, also played a key role in defining the school leadership system and directing school leadership within its jurisdiction, by forwarding policies made by the CPC-led state at the national level and making local policies that followed the framework of those national policies. This book focuses on the latter kind of policies, as they are related to Shanghai's pilot role in reforming school leadership, and defined Shanghai's school leaders' ranks, qualifications and responsibilities, which shaped the complex relationship and micro-politics between principals and SPSs.

Shanghai's Initiative of Reforming School Leadership System

As presented in Chap. 3, the CPC has launched a series of reforms to develop and serve the needs of China's economy, including reforming the education system to enhance schools' ability to cultivate talented people. Shanghai has played a leading role in reforming China's school leadership system since the 1980s.

In 1984, Shanghai was chosen as one of the cities that would pilot the 1985 PRS in its schools (Sun et al. 1988); it later began to gradually introduce the PRS to other schools within the municipality and finally asked all schools to adopt the PRS, in 1999. Moreover, to guide the implementation of the PRS, the SMEC included, in its 1999 local policy on PRS, three sentences from a CPC Central Committee's decision that briefly described PRS (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1985). In 2010, the SMEC updated its local policies on PRS to the "1 + 3" Policies of the Principal Responsibility System in consideration of new CPC Central Committee policies, developments in Shanghai, and the necessity of improving school leadership and enhancing education quality (Organization Department of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee et al. 2010); "1" refers to Direction of the Principal Responsibility System, while "3" stands for three Work Directions for the three departments heading schools including SPOs (headed by SPSs), Principals, and Teacher Congresses. This series of policies aims to clarify the responsibility and power among principals, SPSs and Teacher Congresses. Principals are asked to take charge of teaching and administration on campus, and the SPS-headed SPOs to ensure schools' political direction; Teacher Congresses (as shown in Chap. 3) are placed in the political line, headed by SPSs, and manipulated by principals, thus complicating principals' and SPSs' power relationship.

In addition, to carry out the Ministry of Personnel's policies of delinking position and administrative rank and contracting with leaders of state-owned institutions (schools included), in 1993 Shanghai became the first city to pilot the Principals' Professional Ranking System (*xiaozhang zhijizhi*), which delinked

principals' ranks from those of government officials and tied them directly to their professional qualifications, to reduce the role of principals as officials and enhance their professional capabilities (Yang 1998); Shanghai fully implemented this system in all of its schools in 2001 (Jin 2001), and in 2003 introduced similar changes concerning SPSs' rankings and aimed at motivating SPSs and equalizing principals' and SPSs' positional rank (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2003). This system, according to Yang (1999), motivated SPSs to cooperate with principals in leading the school and enhanced their political role. In 2012, the MoE adopted Shanghai's professional ranking model for principals across China (Jiao 2012).

This subsection has shown that school leadership in Shanghai is defined and guided by the CPC-led state at the local level—the SMEC—whose initiatives and efforts at making local policies on school leadership indicate that there are complex issues surrounding principals' and SPSs' division of responsibilities, the relationship between school leaders and the CPC-led state, and power sharing between principals and SPSs. These complex issues will be presented in the next subsections.

Shanghai Principals' and SPSs' Dual Qualifications

Both principals' and SPSs' political and professional qualifications are defined by CPC-led state policies; both parties' political qualifications are placed ahead of their professional ones, although principals are expected to be more qualified in administration and SPSs in political work. This section presents principals' and SPSs' political and professional qualifications, respectively, as described in the "1 + 3" Policies of Principal Responsibility System (Organization Department of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee et al. 2010) and in interviews with school principals and SPSs.

The items regulating principals' political qualifications are almost identical to those regulating their professional qualifications, but are given priority over the latter. Politically, principals, even non-CPC members, are expected to adhere to, exalt and promote the CPC's political orientation, and be well-versed in CPC-advocated ideologies (i.e., Marxism–Leninism and the thoughts of such top CPC leaders as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao). Moreover, they must display an ability to incorporate those ideologies into their leadership practice as an epistemological and methodological framework for analyzing and solving school problems, faithfully carry out CPC policies and requirements, follow such CPC work principles as democratic work-style (*zuofeng minzhu*) and uniting the comrades (*tuanjie tongzhi*), and readily accept the criticism and supervision of SPOs and the masses.

Professionally, principals must be qualified in leading and promoting school development, and in teaching and learning in particular, as are school principals in other countries. Principals in Shanghai must first meet the SMEC's professional

experience requirements, which include having (at a minimum) a bachelor's degree and relevant intermediate professional certifications, and at least two years' experience as a school middle-level (or above) leader. In addition, principals must show their ability to generate new leadership ideas, lead and administer instruction and research, and perform excellent teaching.

Unlike for principals, whose mandated qualifications requirements are fairly evenly distributed between political and professional qualifications in the policies, SPSs' requirements emphasize their political qualifications more than their professional qualifications, indicating that SPSs are expected to assume more political responsibilities that principals (as will be shown later) and that the CPC-led state will choose SPSs who are best qualified to do so. Similar to principals, SPSs are expected to understand CPC-advocated ideologies carry out CPC policies, particularly educational policies, and work using CPC-prescribed work styles. However, SPSs are required to be more politically qualified than their peer principals, and are expected to play a leading role in transmitting CPC ideology and carrying out CPC policies; principals need only do the latter. In addition, SPSs prescribed political qualifications exceed those of principals, and include being loyal to communist ideals, firmly believing in socialism with Chinese characteristics, being passionate about the CPC's political work, understanding and interpreting the CPC's policies, being good at ideo-political work, and gaining higher authority among CPC members and the masses on campus.

SPSs' professional qualifications as school administrators are of less importance, and SPSs need only show some measurable ability to be school administrators. For SPSs in secondary schools, this includes having school-level teaching and administrative experiences, having at least a bachelor's degree, and having a senior professional title.

The policies on principals' and SPSs' qualifications show, from the standpoint of policymakers, that both principals and SPSs must be both politically and administratively qualified. However, principals should still be more competent at school administration than school political work, and more competent than their SPSs in school administration, while SPSs must be more capable at school political work than at school administration and more capable than their principals in school political work. As will be discussed in the next subsection, the CPC-led state uses these expected qualifications to define principals' and SPSs' responsibilities.

Shanghai Principals' and SPSs' Dual and Intertwined Responsibilities

The CPC-led state has assigned principals and SPSs, as putatively equal heads of their schools' dual-line leadership system, with administrative and political responsibilities, respectively (although both assume aspects of both), and has extended these intertwined responsibilities to include CE. Their responsibilities in

general school and CE leadership are interconnected and cannot be separated. As principals' and SPSs' responsibilities in CE are a subset of their administrative and political responsibilities for general school leadership, this section first presents the two parities' general responsibilities and characteristics, before introducing their CE responsibilities.

The first characteristic is that both principals and SPSs have political and administrative responsibilities. According to the document review and interviews with school leaders in Shanghai, principals take charge of and have decision-making power over all administrative work on campus, which can be categorized into the following four major types. The first involves planning school development and maintaining basic school operations, including promoting school reform, making school plans and policies, leading school departments, keeping school order and safety, gathering and allocating resources, taking charge of student' enrollment and graduation, and personnel issues. The second centers on exercising leadership in schools' hidden and formal curricula, including beautifying the physical environment on campus, designing school anthems and mottos, organizing activities celebrating traditional festivals and special national or school days, and monitoring and utilizing school internet to create a "green-information campus." The third includes developing school-based curricula, mediating school, local and national curricula, allocating sufficient teaching time for each subject, and improving teaching and learning. Finally, the fourth type of principals' administrative responsibilities concerns building internal and external relationships.

Principals' political responsibilities are twofold. On the one hand, they are asked to implementing the CPC's political requirements at the school level by transmitting the CPC-led state's macro-politics, administering their school in accordance with CPC principles and ideologies, and implementing political routines that consolidate the CPC's leadership and confirm its service to and reliance on the masses. On the other hand, they are asked to cooperate with SPS-led SPOs, the CPC's school-level extending organization, by serving the SPO and relying on it wholeheartedly, respecting the SPO's role as the school's political core, and supporting and facilitating the work of SPSs and SPS-led school organizations (e.g., SPO, CYL, and YPC). Principals are expected to accept monitoring by the SPO, and to discuss key school decisions with SPSs and seek their endorsement before taking action. In addition, principals who are also CPC members should simultaneously take the position of SPS or deputy SPS, to conduct or assist in conducting school political work.

Similar to their principals, SPSs are also assigned political and administrative responsibilities. Three major intertwined types of SPSs' political responsibilities were identified through interviews and the document review (Organization Department of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee et al. 2010; Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2003), all of which showed SPSs as mediators between the CPC-led state and schools. First, SPSs must transmit CPC macro-politics and ensure that school education is consistent therewith. Second, they must ensure their schools have the correct political orientation, respect CPC-prescribed political ideologies (such as Marxism–Leninism and top CPC leaders' political

thoughts), remain politically stability, and propagandize and carry out the CPC-led state's policies and requirements. Third, they must construct and develop school cadres, cultivate future school middle leaders, and provide ideological and political education to teachers through various political study programs to consolidate the CPC's leadership, as can be seen in two types of regulated political responsibilities—strengthening on-campus party work (e.g., leading and developing the SPO, CYL, and YPC and their members, collaborating with SPOs in other institutions and at higher levels, etc.), and conducting ideo-political work with school members.

SPSs are also assigned three key administrative responsibilities. The first involves discussing key decisions with school Party members and principals, including updating school positions, appointing middle-level leaders, recommending students to higher level schools, conducting international communications, and discussing school plans (e.g., for annual and semester work, culture building, teaching group improvement, teacher pay and evaluation, school safety, school planning, personnel and school finance). SPSs' second administrative responsibility (promoting school development) involves improving school instructional quality and maintaining school order, while the third relates to supporting and monitoring all aspects of principals' work by communicating with and motivating school staff, monitoring the principals, and guiding the Teacher Congress.

Despite both having both political and administrative responsibilities, principals and SPSs differ in terms of their influence over school administration and political work, with principals bearing primary responsibility for the former, and SPSs for the latter. Principals' political responsibilities are less stressed than their professional responsibilities in school administration. According to P3 and P7, principals' political responsibilities were less important than SPSs'. As such, principals who are also SPSs tended to focus more on administration than on political work.

By contrast, SPSs' responsibilities require more political qualifications, because (according to SPS14) SPSs mainly focus on school political work, are expected to assume more political responsibilities than principals, and are expected to be politically qualified to meet the higher demands of their political work. SPSs' administrative responsibilities are less important than their political responsibilities. SPSs' administrative responsibilities focus mainly on discussing decisions and school key plans and, as SPS7 and SPS19 noted, assisting, supporting and monitoring principals' administrative work.

Despite these differences, principals' and SPSs' dual responsibilities are intertwined (Fig. 4.1), which is reflected in three ways. First, both parties' political responsibilities are interconnected with and take precedence over their administrative responsibilities. SPSs participate in school decision-making and monitor principals to ensure they "carry out the higher authorities' educational policies" and "follow the CPC's political orientation" (SPS2). Principals' administrative responsibilities serve a political purpose; the interviewed principals (e.g., P1, P5, and P7) noted that education in China was intended to cultivate socialist constructors and successors, while P1 added that all school administrative duties should bear the prefix, "socialist." Both parties' were responsible for guiding their schools'

Fig. 4.1 Principals' and SPSs' intertwined responsibilities

political orientation, transmitting CPC-defined policies, and guiding the school administration to develop in ways prescribed by the CPC-led state. P7 noted that "only [if we] followed the political orientation could we adopt the appropriate ideas and strategies in leading CE" (P7). The efficacy of the overall school administration was judged by how successfully the two parties ensure the school's political orientation.

Second, principals and SPSs have some overlapping responsibilities, in that both are required to ensure school political orientation, maintain school daily operation, promote school development, exercise curriculum leadership, promote teachers' professional development, and build up external relationships. In addition, SPSs' responsibilities for cultivating, selecting and appointing cadres are also part of principals' responsibilities regarding school personnel.

Third, principals and SPSs can become involved in each other's responsibilities. Principals are asked to support SPSs' work on SPOs, and to accept SPSs' monitoring of and participation in school key decisions. SPSs are responsible for organizing political activities for principals who are CPC members, discussing key school decisions with principals and using school political work to facilitate principals' decisions and administration by decreasing disadvantages created by macro- and micro-political school actors. In addition, both principals and SPSs often simultaneously take political and administrative positions, requiring them to integrate their dual responsibilities. The respondent principals who were also CPC members usually acted as SPSs or deputy SPSs to conduct school political work or to assist their SPSs' school political work, while most of the interviewed SPSs were simultaneously principals or DPCEs in the school administrative line. Of the 11 interviewed SPSs who were not principals, 10 were DPCEs.

CE is an area reflecting the complexity of principals' and SPSs' intertwined responsibilities, in that both are assigned responsibilities for leading CE. CE is integrated as a part of, and is influenced by, principals' and SPSs' administrative and political responsibilities. Both principals' and SPSs' responsibilities for ensuring school political orientation are intended to ensure CE follows the right course. CE, as a curriculum item, is included in principals' general school administrative responsibility for school planning, curriculum leadership, and improving teaching and learning. CE is also a part of SPSs' extended political responsibility to conduct different types of political education, and their administrative responsibility to participate in making key school decisions. In addition, both principals and SPSs exercise leadership in CE, specifically. Principals set CE goals and direct CE development in accordance with the CPC's political orientation, lead specific formal and informal CE curricula, allocate human and material resources for CE, manage daily CE issues, and build up relationships with internal and external school actors to facilitate CE. SPSs are required to ensure CE follows the CPC's political orientation, establish a correct ideological environment that is peaceful, green and harmonious (Hu 2010), participate in developing and implementing formal and informal CE curricula, direct school political organizations (e.g., CYL and YPC) and conduct ideological work to mobilize teachers, CE leaders, parents and community members to contribute to CE. It is worth noting that SPSs are not assigned curriculum leadership responsibility for any subject other than CE; that is to say, SPSs exercise more influence on CE than on other curriculum subjects, which are mainly in the charge of principals.

Moreover, principals' and SPSs' CE responsibilities are not clearly divided; all the interviewed principals and SPSs (e.g., P8 and SPS7) agreed that there was no clear division of labor or boundaries between principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE. Principals have full responsibility for implementing CE, while SPSs take charge of its overall planning (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1994). Therefore, principals wield administrative power over the CYL and YPC, even though they are under the direct leadership of their SPSs; these political units are administered by the head of the CE department (which fell under the principal's purview) and are thus part of the schools' political and administrative lines. Interviewed SPSs (both those who are DPCEs and those who are not) expressed concerns about CE, because they "had worked in this field for years before [becoming] SPSs," and sought to lead CE in their capacity as school political leaders.

The unclear CE leadership responsibilities are further reflected in principals' and SPSs' leadership roles. Principals are required to act as administrators and decision makers, while SPSs, as representatives of China's dominant party, the CPC, are expected to support and monitor principals' administration and decisions.

Despite not dividing principals' and SPSs' CE leadership roles clearly, the SMEC (and DEB in particular) have established strategies to guide school leadership in CE. One involves providing guidance for both principals and SPSs. DEBs require principals to attend a CE work meeting at the beginning of each term, and provides hands-on guidance for SPSs' work on CE on special or significant topics;

for example, the DEB in SPS4's district regularly required SPSs to report on their work during the study period for the Scientific Outlook on Development, in 2008. The guidance, SPS4 noted, was intended to provide advice on organizing activities and to force SPSs to carry out the policies as intended. Another of SMEC strategy for guiding education development was to issue policies. P5, an interviewed principal, recounted that the SMEC issued more than three hundred policies and requirements relating to basic education (including CE) every year, while other interviewed principals (e.g., P5 and P11) felt "lost in policies" that they were "too busy to fully understand and implement"; moreover, each policy implemented cost "plenty of time and energy" (P4). In addition, to implement its local polices on CE (e.g., national spirit education, life education and Sweet Classroom), the SMEC stressed the importance of SPSs' leadership in providing political assurances, calling it the primary responsibility of school leaders in CE. The SMEC required SPSs to bridge the YPC and CYL in the junior secondary schools, improve their quality, and direct them to organize students' activities and political studies.

Summary

This chapter has introduced the closer macro-political context of school leadership in CE by introducing Shanghai's social, political and economic position in China, and presenting the SMEC's active role in developing CE and school leadership. This chapter has shown that, despite being famous for having opened up to international society before 1949 and again in the late 1970s, Shanghai has been politically and economically important to the CPC-led state since 1949. Shanghai, as the local level of the CPC-led state, has all the characteristics of social development in the CPC-led state shown in Chap. 3, and has developed consistently with the CPC's policies to serve the CPC's political, and especially economic needs.

Shanghai has also been an active proponent of developing education to suit its status as an economic center, and has pioneered educational reform in China. Despite having a degree of autonomy over local education, Shanghai has kept its education development within the CPC's political framework, and developed and reformed CE to serve its local needs and highlight the CPC's influences; similar strategies were also applied in CE and school leadership. The SMEC has institutionalized CE in Shanghai by forwarding national policies, developing local policies for specific measures implementing national policies, revising textbooks and reforming curricula to propaganda the CPC Central Committee's needs. The SMEC applied CE contents and approaches prescribed in national policies to Shanghai, while also developing local programs to strengthen the CPC's political values. While Shanghai has played a leading role in reforming the school leadership system and making local policies on school leadership, its reforms and policies are based on national requirements and policies, and are more Shanghai-specific. Shanghai thus can be a window onto school leadership in CE in CPC-led China.

Both principals and SPSs are required to be politically and administratively qualified to execute their intertwined political and administrative responsibilities. As heads of schools' administrative and political lines, respectively, the two parties' responsibilities are interconnected and even overlap, but differ in their focus—principals on school administration and SPSs on school political work. The dual-line leadership structure and school leaders' dual responsibilities could not only satisfy the CPC-led state's need to consolidate its political leadership in schools, it could also be more advantageous to CE than to other school subjects, as both principals and SPSs can influence, administratively and politically, CE's formal and informal curricula. On the other hand, it raises problems of power competition and unclear labor-division between principals and SPSs, as will be presented in Chaps. 5 and 6. To address the policy implementation issues present in the interaction between school leaders (as school micro-political actors) and the CPC-led state (as a macro-political actor), the next chapter will focus on how principals and SPSs respond to the CPC-led state's policies and requirements on CE.

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Chapter 5
School Leaders' Perceptions and Responses to the CPC-Led State's Policies and Requirements: Four Major Scenarios

This chapter identifies principals' and SPSs' views of and responses to the CPC-led state's policies and requirements regulating their responsibilities in, and affecting their perceptions of and strategies for leadership in school and in CE. It argues that school leaders can take advantage of their knowledge and multiple strategies to lead their school to meet the state's preliminary requirements, while simultaneously pursuing their own professional interests and autonomy, despite being tightly monitored. On the one hand, school leaders can facilitate the CPC-led state's implementation requirements, regulations and guidelines on CE by passively accepting its guidance; on the other, they can also adjust the CPC's policies on school leadership and CE to meet school leaders' preferences and judgment. To present this argument, this section discusses four scenarios for school leaders' perceptions of and responses to the CPC-led state's policies and requirements: active acceptance; passive acceptance; supportive modification; and, unsupportive modification.

Scenario I: Active Acceptance

The first scenario involves actively accepting certain CPC policies and requirements; in other words, school leaders fully implementing those policies and requirements with which they agreed and identified.

Principals' Active Acceptance of CE Policies and Regulations

Based on their dual responsibilities, the school principals interviewed actively accepted the policies and requirements that were politically important and key to the evaluation of their administration, including those related to ensuring CE's

political orientation, constructing a favorable CE environment, improving staff's competencies for teaching and nurturing CE, and enhancing their morality so that they might be examples to their students.

The first kind of policies and requirements principals in Shanghai actively accepted relate to ensuring the political orientation of CE through school administration. The interviewed principals expressed that they, as principals serving in CPC-administered schools, must "do nothing violating the CPC's socialist orientation" (e.g., P1, P6, P11 and P15), and must subjugate their own values and beliefs to the CPC's political ideology (e.g., P3). Moreover, the principals asserted that it was particularly important that they guide CE in accordance with the CPC's political orientation. For instance, P1 asserted that Chinese principals must clearly understand that Chinese CE is associated with the CPC's political needs and directed by its political orientation:

> Chinese CE is led and directed by the CPC's socialist core values, aims at cultivating socialists, greatly emphasizes students' values on loving motherland, loving CPC and loving socialist, and there cannot be any information of opposing CPC and socialism in Chinese CE.

The principals' adherence to the CPC's political orientation can be seen in their efforts at monitoring school members' (including students') words and behaviors and preventing them from publicizing or taking part in anti-Party or anti-socialism activities. The principals were also required to highlight their support of the CPC regime in their school CE goal-setting. For instance, P7, who positioned his CE goals as nationalism and international understanding, said (in a meeting on sharing experience and a subsequent interview) that "nationalism is stressed more than international understanding in his school."

Third, the principals imbued CE with the CPC's guiding value of serving its leadership. For example, during a flag-raising ceremony at School 2, P2 voiced her expectation that students should devote themselves to the government:

> You know that our new campus was funded by our government. It is our government' generous financing that we can have the advanced facilities, green campus and spacious classroom. You should give thanks to the government and work hard to pay back the government's expense on education. Especially, the grade-nine students should learn to assume the responsibilities of serving for the [CPC-led] state.

Guiding students' political values during assemblies was, according to P7, effective because "[propagandizing] principals' thoughts to a wide population" could "easily mobilize the students".

The second kind of policies and requirements Shanghai principals actively accepted involved providing a favorable campus environment for CE, specifically, one permeated with the CPC's influence. Environment, the interviewed principals noted, could help establish a school culture that would implicitly influence students' values and behaviors. The interviewed principals constructed their respective school environments using two major strategies: decorating the campus, classrooms and corridors with school slogans, posters and digests showcasing the CPC's top leaders' thoughts, as a form of hidden curriculum; and, encouraging

school members to implement the SMEC's "Sweet Classroom Program," and construct a favorable physical environment and teacher–student relationships that foster students' values.

The interviewed principals frequently noted that establishing a safe school created another form of favorable environment, by preventing teachers from corporally punishing students, protecting students from being hurt by school facilities and external forces and caring for injured students. The principals agreed with policies on and requirements for creating this kind environment not only to ensure students' safety, but also to implement one of the SMEC's key CE programs—life education; it was the principals' responsibility to protect students' safety, which was directly related to school and social stability, as well as to the schools' and principals' respective evaluation results. The principals adopted different measures in response to different campus safety issues, such as directing teachers on how to avoid corporally punishing students, or handling such cases themselves. For instance, P1, who received a complaint (forwarded by the DEB) that a teacher in School 1 had hurt a student's ear, investigated the teachers and students involved in the punishment process, disciplined the teacher as needed and reported his actions and results to the DEB. Some principals (e.g., P2 and P15) personally inspected school facilities, such as school canteens and laboratories, to see whether they were safe for students. The interviews and observations show that none of the interviewed principals allowed external visitors to enter their school during school hours without appropriate steps being taken, such as the visitor being catechized by the gatekeeper and vouched for by school staff. Finally, principals developed emergency response mechanisms for responding quickly to student accidents or injuries; any staff member who found an injured student was required to report immediately to the class head or another school leader, who must, in turn, contact the student's parents and send the student to the nearest hospital, or one chosen by the parents.

Principals in Shanghai who were in charge of school personnel and teaching also actively accepted policies and regulations promoting teachers' professional development, on the basis that they enhanced teacher quality. Teacher quality, according to P9 of School 9, "had [a] decisive influence on students' quality" (P9). The interviewed principals stressed three areas of teacher development. One type concerned teachers' skills for teaching CE, either directly or indirectly. The respondent principals, five of whom also taught CE themselves, reported asking teachers who taught other subjects to integrate CE into their teaching. Regarding CE subject teachers, although CE scores had little impact on students' ability to enter a key-point senior secondary school, every interviewed principal reported having helped these teachers improve their CE subject teaching, either by directing their instructional flow, through individual communication and class observation, by offering training opportunities, or by evaluating, analyzing and providing feedback on their teaching. Based on my personal observations, half of every weekly school staff meeting concerned motivating teachers and guiding their professional skills, including their CE skills.

Another concern surrounding teachers' professional development involved improving their professional morality, including their professional norms, ability to serve as student models, and their affection for and values about teaching (P1 and P9). As the interviewed principals noted, improving teachers' professional morality benefitted CE by "guiding students to be accepted by the society" (P17), "facilitating the cultivation of students' morality." Improving teachers' professional morality also benefited school leadership by "pushing teachers to conscientiously fulfill their duty in the environment that lacked of monitoring" (P9), and "promoting cooperation among different departments and individuals" (P10).

The interviewed principals attempted to improve teachers' professional morality by guiding teachers' behaviors through rules and training and by holding related training seminars; P17, for example, gave seminars on how to analyze social problems, and asked teachers to reflect on how to maintain professional morality in unfavorable social contexts. In School 8, as P8 expressed, the rules banned wearing slippers, tank tops and other clothing deemed inappropriate or too revealing, while teacher training in School 4, according to P4, focused on "directing teachers to be graceful in words, behaviors and appearance". A third method involved modeling appropriate behavior for teachers to emulate; for example, P15 and P17 noted that principals should "come to school earlier and leave later than teachers", and show decent [behavior] in front of teachers and students." Modeling good behavior was not limited to on-campus interactions; P7, for instance, organized extracurricular activities "searching for teachers who were morally advanced in School 7."

The third type of policies and requirements related to CE leaders' administrative capabilities. In the interviews, the interviewed principals stressed improving HCEDs' and class heads' competencies in leading CE, as they are in the school administrative line and directly responsible for students' CE training. Cultivating competent HCEDs, P4 and P15 explained, could "effectively implement the principals' requirements," "reduce principals' work-load" and "guide the class heads." To improve class heads, principals arranged for them to attend meetings organized by the HCED to train teachers, share experiences and assign work, and to guide them on and off campus. To improve HCEDs' competencies, the interviewed principals, guided and directed them regarding how to make plans, organize activities, develop school-based curriculum and communicate with other stakeholders, participate in and comment on CE activities organized by other HCEDs, and observe and comment on class heads' training sessions.

SPSs' Active Acceptance of CE Policies and Regulations

The policies and requirements that SPSs actively accepted had some similarities to and differences from those accepted by the principals. Similar to principals, the interviewed SPSs also accepted and faithfully perpetuated the CPC's political orientation, shaped the school environment to make it safe, and promoted teachers'

professional development. However, SPSs provided different reasons for ensuring schools' political orientation; maintaining campus safety and promoting teachers' professional development were, as the SPSs put it, their political responsibilities, even though principals viewed them as administrative responsibilities.

The interviewed SPSs indicated that all the policies and requirements they actively accepted centered on their political work on campus. According to the interviews, SPSs in Shanghai regarded conducting political work as "the core responsibility of their position" (SPS6 and SPS14) and expressed their eagerness for "focusing on school political work," and "working better at it" (SPS1 and SPS13). CE, as reflected in the policies and SPSs' interviews, was part of SPSs' political work and was influenced by other parts of the SPSs' political work. Moreover, political work, according to SPS8, facilitated CE, because having more teachers with Party memberships ensured its more complete development. The interviewed SPSs actively supported the following four types of policies and requirements influencing school political work and specifically CE.

The first type was to ensure the political orientation of CE. Similar to their principals, SPSs also held that ensuring school political orientation was the preliminary requirement of CE; they followed the CPC's political orientation on campus was because they were "under the CPC's leadership" (SPS6), and because only by "following the CPC's political orientation could they develop school correctly" (SPS7). As for CE's political orientation specifically, the SPSs were responsible for monitoring consistency among CE's "national development goal" (SPS1) and the "socialist core value system" (SPS6), and for following state directives to publicize the CPC's political orientation among students, both indirectly and directly (e.g., by using personal communications, media and school events, including flag-raising ceremonies).

The second type of policies and requirements involved ensuring campus safety, both political and physical. With regard to the former, the interviewed SPSs kept a "close eye on school members' words and behaviors to prevent them disseminating information [disadvantageous] to the CPC and defaming the CPC's leadership" (SPS2). For example, to prevent the spread of reactionary statements during World Expo 2010, SPSs in Shanghai were observed to redesign the campus computer network to prevent teachers from posting freely. Moreover, SPSs used other available channels to steer school members away from political aggression. Though SPSs do not bear primary responsibility for students' physical safety, they are nonetheless one of two campus safety group leaders, the other being the principal (Shanghai schools adopted this campus safety leadership structure as part of the "One Position with Two Leaders (*yigang shuangzhi*) policy)". The respondent SPSs, especially those who were also DPCEs (e.g., SPS3, SPS13), organized rehearsals for escaping from accidents, and checked school facilities. Due to principals' and SPSs' active acceptance of policies ensuring students' safety, inspections were conducted in Shanghai at the district and municipal levels that showed campus safety to be satisfactory and revealed no hidden dangers (Shanghai Educational Inspection Office 2010).

The third type of policies and requirements actively accepted by SPSs related to organizing different kinds of political studies and activities for school leaders and teachers at different levels to ensure their ideology and behaviors had the correct political orientation. SPSs designed and organized political studies and activities by following "higher authorities' prescription" (SPS6), as this met "the needs of the situation… [and] the CPC." The interviewed SPSs organized political studies and activities for teachers and school leaders to ensure the education they provided helped implement the CPC's guidance at the school level. The political studies and activities included weekly center group studies (*zhongxinzu xuexi*) for school senior leaders, bi-weekly SPO activities (*zuzhi shenghuo*) for all CPC members on campus, and ideo-political education for teachers, and centered on ad hoc CPC events or topics prescribed by higher level CPC Committees [e.g., Hu Jintao's *Scientific Outlook on Development* (from 2008 to 2010) and the CPC's history (in 2011)], voluntary activities on and off campus, and communications between young teachers with CYL membership and the SPO.

The respondent SPSs directed their CE activities to help students inherit the CPC's political values and grow up to be "socialist constructors and successors" by motivating them to love the CPC and socialism, and to be patriotic and "dedicative," with the latter being particularly emphasized by the respondent SPSs (e.g., SPS1, SPS12, SPS13, and SPS19). According to the SPSs, being "dedicative" was a CPC-advocated character that involved "sacrificing self-interests for public interests" to "establish citizenship consciousness" (SPS13). To show students the nature of dedication, Shanghai SPSs encouraged them to emulate Lei Feng, a model of dedication appointed by Mao, and do charity work and donate each March.

The fourth type of policies and requirements concerned constructing school political organizations, which in turn shaped the school political environment for CE. The SPSs constructed SPOs to show "the CPC's advance" and "to set an example for and promote the construction of CYL for teachers and students (*dangjian dai tuanjian*)" (SPS14), such as by rehearsed the organization's "democratic" nature (e.g., SPS1 and SPS14). Another approach was to promote the development of teachers with CPC membership to show students and other teachers the inherent excellence of CPC members. Unlike principals, who could use "hard" administrative strategies (e.g., establishing mechanisms, skills training, and offering guidance) to promote the development of school teachers with and without CPC membership, SPSs adopted "soft" strategies (e.g., ideological work and motivation) and focused more on the development of teachers with CPC membership. The SPSs praised outstanding teachers with CPC membership for the excellence of their work, motivated school CPC members to devote themselves actively to the school's and students' development, and urged CPC members to be role models for other teachers, such as by donating to disaster relief initiatives, to show that the CPC members, due to the influence of the CPC, were superior to non-CPC members.

Second, the interviewed SPSs attempted to enhance solidarity and harmony among school members and further provide a favorable school environment for

implementing the CPC's policies, including policies on CE. For instance, SPS13 provided the following working principles to the Chairman of the school Work Union: cooperating with school leaders; protecting teachers' interests; and, passing plans at Teacher Congresses. Also, SPSs (e.g., SPS4) whose schools had Democratic Party Organizations united them by attending their activities and inviting their heads to attend SPO activities. Last but not least, SPSs (e.g., SPS1, SPS6, and SPS13) helped teachers to maintain their sense of belongings to the school by visiting teachers, especially new teachers, every year to "show [them] school leaders and the CPC care about them." In addition, SPSs were observed to organize weekly ideo-political education sessions for all school staff to guide them to follow the SPSs' political direction and school leaders' guidance, and to facilitate CE and school administration, all of which they were required to do by policies. Ideo-political education could be conducted on a daily basis through SPSs' model behavior and personal communications, at school staff meetings, in expertled seminars on school political work and by watching videos of advanced CPC members.

Thirdly, the SPSs also took care of on-campus student organizations (e.g., CYL, YPC, and student societies). As all students in Shanghai junior secondary schools are YPC members, the SPSs first directed the CYL to require the class heads to appoint "the most outstanding YPC members aged 14 or above (usually students in grade 8 or above)" to become CYL members (SPS13). Then, the SPSs indoctrinated and trained the new student CYL members to be student leaders and "models for other students." The student CYL members were instructed to judge arguments in class solve class problems, help other students who had difficulties in learning and daily life, behave well, and sacrifice their self-interest for the public good. SPS13 claimed that "the student CYL members must be student models, or could demonstrate the CYL's advances." Next, the SPSs had class heads mobilize final-year junior secondary school students to become CYL members and directed their political values. Finally, the SPSs constructed a department of student organizations, which included the heads of the CYL and YPC and collaborated with the CE department to co-lead the organizations.

Comparison of Principals' and SPSs' Active Acceptance

This section has shown that both principals and SPSs actively accepted parts of the CPC-led state's policies and requirements. Their responses demonstrated two major characteristics, which reflect similarities and differences in principals' and SPSs' perceptions and strategies in active acceptance.

First, all of the policies and requirements that principals actively accepted were also accepted by SPSs, for similar reasons. Their reasons for ensuring the political orientation of CE centered on the fact that, as school leaders, it was their basic and core responsibility to guide the school in accordance with the CPC's political orientation; ensuring CE's political orientation was important to CE and cultivated

students' faith in serving for the nation. With regard to improving teachers' professional morality, both principals and SPSs held that improving teachers' professional morality was important for facilitating school administration and promoting CE; SPSs added that doing so was also politically important, as it encouraged teachers to follow the CPC's political orientation. Principals and SPSs also both identified with establishing a safe environment for students, ensuring students' physical and political safety, and immersing students in CE values.

Second, despite identifying with similar policies for similar reasons, principals and SPSs implemented them using different strategies; principals led CE through their administrative efforts, while SPSs promoted CE by conducting political work. To ensure CE's political orientation, principals stressed such administrative strategies as setting political goals and organizing school assemblies to impart necessary political orientation; SPSs instead examined the consistency between CE goals and other school or education goals, and supplemented it by assigning ideo-political work to school leaders, teachers and students.

Despite adopting similar strategies (i.e., being teachers' models, making speeches, organizing seminars, providing individual-based direction and offering examples) to improve teachers' professional morality, principals and SPSs did so by employing different power bases and resources. Principals used these strategies by exercising their influence as the school's most powerful leader and administrator, educating mainly teachers and CE leaders; by contrast, SPSs based their strategies on political work, by educating school leaders and teachers and constructing and uniting school organizations.

Scenario II: Passive Acceptance

The second scenario involved passive acceptance, meaning school leaders implemented, as instructed, state policies and requirements with which they did not agree, particularly those that imposed additional controls and burdens or were troublesome.

Principals' Passive Acceptance of Policies and Requirements

The interviewed principals implemented but did not agree with the state's policies and requirements on leading CE through regulation. Such policies and requirements mainly related to school administration—including school policies, school inspection, funding, and personnel—and relevant CE areas.

All the visited schools created CE policies in two main ways. The first involved adding CE to existing school general policies and regulations mandated by higher authorities' (e.g., school leaders', students' and teachers' handbooks, defining departmental responsibilities, instructions on using school facilities, three-year,

annual, semester and department plans, etc.), all of which included content relating to leading or promoting CE. School general plans even included an independent section for CE, whereas no section was specifically provided for other curriculum subjects. The second approach involved making specific documents for CE. All the visited schools made various plans and regulations for CE, including semester, annual, mid- and long-term plans and Daily Behavior Routines (*yiri changgui*).

Nevertheless, the respondent principals stated that they did not agree with the requirements on and (especially) the state's tight control of CE policy making. The principals needed to make their school policies align with the state's and submit them for DEB endorsement; however, except for those regulating teachers' and students' behaviors (P9), they did not think most of the policies were useful in guiding their work. P7, from School 7, admitted (in an observed meeting on sharing experiences and in his subsequent interview) he did "not care about the written policies and never read [them] thoroughly," as they were "prepared for DEB's inspection and the visitors' references rather than for school members."

Moreover, the respondent principals did not agree with the requirement for frequent inspections. There were annual and triennial school inspections conducted that included CE as an independent part, as well as specific inspections of CE. In addition, the interviewed principals had to prepare for many other inspections from different higher level government departments and party committees. The interviewed principals had four major complaints regarding school inspections: there were too many of them, which caused a lot of troubles and disturbed their work; the inspections focused more on "academic teaching and learning rather than students' development from CE" (P6 and P10); they could "decorate" their schools in order to get a good inspection report, even though this could "destroy their authority among students" and was "not good for students' integrity" (P6); and, principals' policy implementation might not be in strict accordance with inspection requirements. As P10 noted:

> Our implementation of the policies is based on the interpretation of policies and requirements. However, the interpretations are distorted from municipal to district and school level, because they are provided by different people who have different knowledge and experience. Moreover, the interpretations provided by officials from DEB and SMEC are far away from our practice, and are just from their own imagination. As principals, we have to work from school reality, and sometimes could not be in accordance with the official imaged situation.

Despite their complaints, all the respondent principals prepared for the inspections and welcomed the inspectors by posting slogans and hanging banners.

Third, the respondent principals did not agree with but nonetheless implemented policies and requirements that constrained school funding, which inhibited them from putting their ideas of CE into practice. In China, it is the government's responsibility to finance public schools, including paying for staff salaries, school buildings and facilities. Although officials 1 and 2 both reported that the SMEC "allocated enough money for running schools," the interviewed principals disagreed with the officials in two key regards. First, government funding only covered

basic school expenses (e.g., electricity and water), not "the expense of developing school uniqueness which has been stressed by the educational authorities" (P2 and P18). Second, principals lacked autonomy in spending school money; for instance, according to P5, if principals in his district wanted to use 'teachers' tourism' to motivate teachers and expose them to different models for nurturing students, they had to select a travel agency prescribed by the DEB rather than one they themselves preferred, because "the DEB could get a commission from the selected agency". Not accepting DEB's constraints risked having school funding limited, or even reduced in the future.

Finally, the interviewed principals did not agree with, but nonetheless accepted, the CPC-led state's requirements regarding school personnel. P2 and P8 complained that their DEB controlled "how many school positions could be provided" and "who could be recruited"; despite having identified desirable candidates, principals had to submit their selected applicants to the DEB personnel department for endorsement. Principals in good schools (e.g., P15 and P17) faced the "dilemma of refusing some applicants who are not qualified in teaching, but have relationships with officials in the higher authority." According to P15, if they recruited those non-qualified teachers, the school quality might be decreased, but if they refused them, the principals might offend the official at higher authority.

Moreover, the respondent principals did not agree with the DEB's control over whether ineligible teachers were dismissed, which indirectly impacted teachers of CE. Most ineligible teachers, according to the interviewed principals' criteria, were those who could not help students get high exam scores, or were CE subject teachers who had a lower examination burden but were important to CE teaching. The interviewed principals were seldom able to dismiss unqualified teachers, and instead had to transfer them to less important positions, such as teaching CE. P9, for instance, transferred such teachers to teach exploratory and expanding subjects relating to CE; she complained that she was reluctant to do so, but was pushed into it by the DEB, which wanted to "avoid trouble" and was concerned that dismissed teachers might complain or threaten to "commit suicide." With the DEB's tacit connivance, teachers facing dismissal could "mobilize other teachers to struggle with school leaders to greatly interrupt school work" (P17). In fact, P17 and P9 reported that the principal and SPS of School 9 was forced by the DEB to leave that school after teachers complained about having been dismissed.

SPSs' Passive Acceptance of Policies and Regulations

Despite carrying out state policies and requirements, SPSs did not agree with all of them, including those related to the abundance of written work, and higher authorities' frequent inspections; while generally about SPSs' overall school leadership work, these policies nonetheless included their activities related to CE.

SPSs passively accepted the prescribed written work, including making plans and writing reports, although they did not agree with the policies and requirements

for two reasons. Firstly, the responsibilities were time-consuming, due to the large number of DEB departments demanding reports. Since the CPC-led state advocated and requested authorities at each level and in each department to support and hold CE activities, they, without discussion between departments and levels, transferred the tasks to schools and then evaluated those schools based on how efficiently they conducted such activities. SPSs, especially those who were DPCEs, were in charge of organizing the activities and writing reports that were forwarded, with photos of the activities, to higher authorities. Moreover, school political work was also paperwork-intensive, and required reports on studying top CPC leaders' speeches, developing school organizations, and recommending outstanding school CPC members.

Second, SPSs complained that so much writing distracted them from their school political work. SPS7 noted that paperwork took up too much of her time and disrupted her responsibilities for "promoting the development of SPO and highlighting CPC's advancement." However, despite disagreeing with the requirements, the interviewed SPSs nonetheless complied.

Third, the interviewed SPSs responsible for monitoring CE planning or for making CE plans themselves (SPSs who were DPCEs) expressed that the process, although mandated by policies and regulations, was monotonous and useless. In SPS12's opinion, "using the semester and annual plan to guide work is not realistic"; she explained that, "as a practitioner, I know that the plans are supposititious and are not practical, as there will be many changes and new ideas coming out after the plan-making." Again, however, SPSs complied with requirements and made CE plans, despite their misgivings.

Nor did SPSs in Shanghai agree with the DEB's need for frequent on-site inspections, for three reasons. First, like their principal peers, SPSs thought that inspections took up too much of their time and disrupted their regular work. Second, as some Shanghai SPSs noted, some inspections served the needs of higher authorities rather than those of the school development; as SPS8 explained:

> The higher authorities also need to write report but lack first-hand data. What we do is actually providing data for them. For example, we were just informed that leaders of the department of discipline inspection and supervision would come to our schools to check our document materials on how we carry out the higher authorities' policies and requirements. They will come and take away the documents for examination and our reports, and then write reports based on ours.

Thus, the SPSs felt that they were being "forcibly utilized by the higher authorities" (SPS6). Finally, the SPSs' third reason for not welcoming inspections was that they did not reflect the reality of the school. As SPS19, a female SPS, explained:

> The facet we presented to the higher authorities is better than the daily status of our schools. Even though we are shabby, we put on a beautiful "gown" when the leaders come to our school. We hide the holes and patches under the gown, and show our "beauty" to them and earn their praise. That is to say, the leaders of the higher Party organization gather the information of our best side and collect the mendacious data.

The interviewed SPSs (e.g., SPS1 and SPS19) admitted that the situation placed them in a dilemma and that they felt "conflicted" by responding to the DEB's inspections. On the one hand, as educators, they should be a moral example to students, and should neither "cheat" others nor ask students to help by fibbing to higher authorities. On the other hand, as subordinates, the SPSs had to exaggerate and beautify their work to get higher authorities' recognition. Although the SPSs did not agree with the required school inspections, they, like their principals, welcomed the DEB, prepared documents for inspection, and guided school members to respond to DEB's questions and investigations.

Comparison of Principals' and SPSs' Passive Acceptance

This section has presented that both principals and SPSs passively accepted some CPC policies and requirements. Both implemented policies and requirements regarding completing written work and preparing for frequent inspections—policies and requirements that concerned CE leadership—despite agreeing with none of them, albeit occasionally in different ways. Principals talked more about the work related to their responsibilities as school administrators, such as making school and CE plans, while SPSs resented written tasks relating to their political work, such as reports on SPO and CE activities. Compared to SPSs, principals did not agree with but nonetheless accepted and implemented more types of policies and requirements that related to their administrative responsibilities, were tightly controlled and easily inspected by the state, and could influence CE.

Second, principals and SPSs had both similar and different reasons for disagreeing with and implementing similar categories of CPC policies and requirements. Principals did not agree with the policies and requirements on written work, because they reflected higher authorities' needs rather than those of the principals, while SPSs did so because the policy was a troublesome, time-consuming interruption of their political work on campus. Although principals and SPSs shared similar reasons for passive acceptance of policies requiring frequent school inspections (i.e., they took up too much of their time, distracted them from their administrative/political responsibilities, and would not yield useful or accurate information about the school), their reasons were derived from their administrative and political responsibilities, respectively. Principals objected for two additional reasons—the inspections' superficiality, and the existence of gaps between principals' and higher authorities' interpretations of policies, which could affect inspection results. For their part, SPSs' additional reasons for not agreeing with the inspection policy revolved around having to provide the raw data on which the DEB would base its own reports, an inherent conflict of interest.

To sum up, both principals and SPSs passively accepted similar state policies and requirements, albeit occasionally for different reasons. The two line heads both passively accepted policies that favored either their career path or their work. This subsection has also shown that, compared with their SPS counterparts,

principals passively accepted more policies and requirements that restricted their autonomy in school leadership. Their responses also show that they would like more freedom from state control, but are nonetheless confined within it.

Scenario III: Supportive Modification

The school leaders' third response scenario involved supportive modification, meaning school leaders modified some state policies and requirements, despite claiming to support their underlying purpose, importance and necessity.

Principals' Supportive Modification of CE Policies and Requirements

The respondent principals supported the importance of transmitting the CPC's political values and conducting CE in school, but modified the manner in which they did so. This scenario also reflects principals' conceptions of CE.

Principals modified policies on the importance of transmitting the CPC's political values in CE. According to the interviewed principals, transmitting such prescribed political values as loving the CPC, patriotism, collectivism and dedication was important to "serving the CPC's leadership" (P6) and "socializing students" (P1 and P7), and was necessary in CE; moreover, "naïve" junior secondary school students could be "easily indoctrinated" with political values (P1). Nevertheless, the principals advocated using CE to promote students' individual development, rather than for primarily transmitting political values.

Promoting individual development centered on preparing students to be good and moral people who evinced appropriate behaviors (e.g., dressed properly, behaved gently, and were strictly disciplined), publicly acceptable morality and characteristics (e.g., excellence, competitiveness, and bravery), and skills in which they should be trained in school, but not in the area of CE, such as foreign languages and modern technology. P7, from School 7, for instance, argued that though political values were important, students' knowledge and skills development could help them earn a living, and were thus more important.

> All the citizens are subjectively for self, and objectively for the society. No one would like to work for the communism at the beginning. Maslow's hierarchy of needs tells us that he/she cannot be lofty unless his/her basic needs (e.g., eating) are satisfied. Poverty is not socialism and spiritual enhancement is not all-powerful. I advocate helping students get rich in both material and spiritual aspects. It is nothing if you just have the ideal of devotion but have no ability and material. We had better not ask students' devotion when they have no material basis. (P7)

Like P7, most principals stressed refocusing CE from political values to individual development, to prepare students for their future life. Even P6, who claimed

to serve the CPC with "absolute sincerity," expected students to know "how to lead a meaningful life that based on well-developed competency and interests."

Among the elements of students' development, training students' behaviors was most valued by principals; as P4 explained, "students' social behaviors are the basis of their ideal, beliefs and morality"; the principals, according to P10, often "treated CE as activities of regulating students' social behaviors." Students' social behaviors were trained from the beginning to the end of their junior secondary school studies; P17, for example, required new students to attend a workshop on behavior training before they officially registered, and trained their behaviors at various school times (e.g., during classes, class breaks, assemblies); students' behaviors were evaluated by student leaders, class heads and HCEDs.

In addition to training students' behaviors, principals also emphasized nurturing students' morality, indoctrinating students in moral values through public speeches, e.g., at school flag-raising ceremonies. They also proposed that DPCEs and HCED used activities to immerse students in moral behaviors and values, such as giving thanks on Mother's Day and Father's Day, and learning from and reflecting on positive and negative examples. P15, for example, asked her HCED to introduce students to morally advanced people, while P3 asked them to have students reflect on the monetary value of a professor who tells his students that they must earn 4 million Yuan before turning 40. A third strategy was to raise slogans nurturing morality; P5, for example, designed such slogans as "be proud of me, not ashamed of me" to encourage students to observe behavioral norms, and hung the slogans about the campus.

Moreover, the principals modified higher authority's requirements that mandated "combining all CE activities with school-based curriculum" (P10) to facilitate national spirit education. Despite agreeing that this approach helped to systemize CE activities, particularly political education activities, and "[provided] a platform for students to consistently experience the joy of CE" (P9), the principals converted the political education activities into activities promoting students' individual development. For instance, P4 directed geography teachers to design an activity that used the school-based curriculum element, loving the motherland, to cultivate students' leadership so as "to bridge the abstract and broad values with school activities and students' cognitive level."

In addition, principals could direct informal CE curricula that facilitated political education, but combine them with activities emphasizing students' individual development. For instance, to celebrate the CPC's 90th anniversary, in 2011, P4 organized a student visit of the sites of the CPC's first and second National Congresses, but combined the trip with activities intended to "cultivate students' competencies in appreciating artistic works [displayed] there." Promoting a school-based CE curriculum emphasizing students' individual development could "help schools overcome weakness (e.g., low instructional quality)" (P4), "make the school famous" (P17), "make school CE unique" (P3), and also benefit principals by helping them "escape from national ideology and put their ideas into practice" (P3).

The respondent principals, however, needed to balance transmitting political values with promoting students' individual development. They claimed the latter fell within the CPC's political framework and that "the cultivation of individual morality must follow the socialist routine" (P5). P11, from School 11, expressed that the purpose of guiding "students to properly behave in their lives and hold right attitudes toward parents, teachers and classmates [is to] cultivate their values toward the broad society and abstract 'state'."

The second type of CE policies and requirements principals supported but modified involved the primacy of CE. The interviewed principals all stressed the importance of CE, calling it "the core task of school," "the spirit of school culture," and an "effective tool for reordering the school and solving school problems" (P1, P11, and P15); they also proposed that "being a good citizen is more important than getting high score." Most of the interviewed principals held, as P7 did, that:

> Students who have bad performance in academic instruction are like inferior-quality goods that could still function; students who have bad physique quality are a waste; while students who have bad performance in CE are dangerous, for they could do harm to other people or the society.

The principals used this analogy to highlight the importance of CE to students' life and social stability, and to show that CE should be more important than academic instruction.

Despite acknowledging CE's importance, the respondent principals placed it behind school academic instruction in terms of importance, complaining that it was "difficult" and "unrealistic" to maintain CE's core position, given that all stakeholders prioritized high exam scores (e.g., P4 and P15). Moreover, the principals asserted that CE "must not interrupt instruction" (e.g. P4 and P17), and should be used to "serve instruction" (e.g. P9) by training students' behaviors. P10, for instance, expressed that principals in schools with lower academic quality and higher levels of conflict usually start their leadership by improving CE, especially as it relates to students' social behavior, because well-disciplined students are easier to engage in academic learning and facilitate a CE-friendly atmosphere.

Three main strategies were used by Shanghai principals to reduce CE's interruption of academic instruction: not allowing final-year students (who would preparing take high-school entrance examinations) to spend time on CE; assigning teachers who were not qualified to teach examination preparation subjects to teach CE; and, combining CE activities to ensure sufficient time for academic instruction. In 2011, for example, most of the respondent schools combined Children's Day, and school artistic festival and celebrating the CPC's 90th anniversary into a single activity by having students sing Red songs, tell Red stories, recite Red Poems and compete in Red speech competitions, all of which are all about praising the CPC, the revolution and the socialist motherland.

In addition, principals could use their power as school decision makers to allocate more time and resources to academic instruction than to CE, and to mobilize human resources for academic instruction. The interviews with school leaders

showed that principals adopted three strategies to advance academic instruction over CE. First, principals could evaluate CE leaders (especially class heads) based on students' academic performance, allot time for CE and academic instruction, limit the number of CE activities before mid- and end-of-term examinations, and require academic teachers to provide additional classes for students who attend CE activities. Moreover, principals could use their authority to exhort teachers to contribute more to their academic instruction, through such strategies as providing additional examination preparation classes after school. Finally, principals, as will be shown in the next chapter, could persuade SPSs, especially those who were also DPCEs, to help them develop CE in a manner that allowed for additional academic instruction.

SPSs' Supportive Modification of CE Policies and Requirements

Similar to the respondent principals, the interviewed SPSs also supportively modified policies and regulations emphasizing political values in CE, placing CE ahead of academic instruction, and for developing school-based CE curricula.

All of the interviewed SPSs reported that the CPC's political values in CE included following Marxism, loving socialism and the CPC, patriotism, inheriting and promoting China's glorious history and culture, uniting all Chinese nationalities, and fostering dedication to the nation and one's fellow citizens. The respondent SPSs held that these values were "the goal and core of CE" (SPS19), and should be stressed in CE by guiding students to "pay back to and serve national needs and national development, [and] defend national dignity and independence" (SPS13).[1]

Nonetheless, like the principals, the SPSs asserted that CE should first foster students' individual development before gradually expanding to address more abstract political values. They pointed out that abstract political values, such as Marxism, were different from school life, and that even for SPSs, Marxism was "so distant from school life that it could not be used to solve school problems, not to mention for students". Many interviewed SPSs (e.g., SPS5, SPS11 and SPS13) stated that CE should focus on morality (e.g., love, humane behavior, hard work, respect, and consideration), competency (e.g., information technology and English language skills, and creative thinking) and social behaviors[2]; SPS7, who was in P7's school, saw the latter as the core of school CE, and noted that only well-developed individuals could comprehend and realize political values. For instance, rather than cultivating students' love of the CPC and the state, SPS7, SPS8 and SPS12 emphasized the primacy of fostering students' feelings for their classmates, teachers and parents.

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid.

The SPSs adopted three major strategies to modify the state's demands for the promotion of political values and to promote students' individual development. First, they hewed to the CPC's "bottom line" when cultivating students' competencies, morality and behavioral norms, by insisting that school CE reflect "CPC- and government-prescribed values". Second, with the permission of their principals, SPSs adapted government strategies for publicizing political ideology and promoting student development; for example, using school flag-raising ceremonies to exhort students to behave better in school and to treat their classmates and teachers with respect, rather than focusing on "boring political ideologies" (SPS7). SPS13 and SPS7 referred to this as "bridging the higher authorities' requirements with students' cognitive level."[3] Third, the SPSs allowed developing and carrying out school-based curricula to help students gain more knowledge and skills and exercise their spirit.

SPSs also supportively modified the primary position of CE. In line with the pronouncements of higher authorities, the respondent SPSs claimed that CE was school's most important task; according to SPS7 and SPS9, CE provided a basis for students' life-long development, brought peace to society, and created a sound environment for instruction.

Despite this, the interviewed SPSs admitted focusing less on CE than on academic performance, which was, as SPS14 put it, the "school's life blood." As SPS1 and SPS8 noted, their work on CE mainly centered on how to improve students' academic performance, even though this was mainly the principals' responsibility.[4] To that end, SPSs emphasized training students' behaviors through their CE leadership, since, as SPS9 explained, good behaviors helped to create a sound instructional environment:

> If the students cannot keep quiet and discipline themselves in classrooms, and cannot finish assignments earnestly and punctually, teachers' efforts in enhancing students' academic achievements will produce less effect. But if students can behave themselves well, they will take in all the knowledge that the teachers instructed. That is to say, CE helps students to follow teachers' requirements readily.

In addition, the respondent SPSs allowed and directed their subordinates to adopt several strategies to minimize CE's disruption of academic instruction, such as having students take turns participating into extracurricular CE activities,[5] encouraging upper level students to focus on academic learning by mainly conducting CE at lower grade levels, and allowing less urgent government requirements to be implemented during teachers' free time, rather than in class; as SPS6 explained, the latter method afforded teachers more time for instruction, while still satisfying government demands.

SPSs also supportively modified policies and regulations on school-based CE curriculum. SPSs in Shanghai agreed that developing school-based CE curriculum

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[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

helped school leaders highlight the advantages of CE, enhance its appropriateness and effectiveness, make it more systemized, and promote students' value development. Nonetheless, the development and implementation of school-based CE curricula were not in accordance with higher authorities' policies and regulations regarding SPSs' leadership, including certain SPSs' monitoring of and direct involvement in developing school-based curricula. First, the respondent SPSs modified policies calling for unique school-based CE curricula to reflect similarities between schools; for example, Schools 8, 15 and 19 all treated responsibility education as their schools' unique program. Moreover, the search for uniqueness, SPS12 pointed out, led them to ignore improving schools' basic needs, such as maintaining a clean campus.

Second, while the interviewed SPSs followed policies by providing a school-based curriculum containing different CE topics for students at different grade levels, they neglected the consistency of curriculum topics. For instance, SPS8 provided a single topic to students in a single grade, rather than, as required by higher authorities, integrating it with topics from other grades; specifically, instead of providing life education to all the students, as required by the SMEC, she offered life education to students in grade eight only, as she felt they faced more significant and immediate life problems. Third, SPSs also facilitated developing CE curriculum as a big basket containing all work relating to CE. SPS7, who was also a DPCE, designed a CE curriculum that include on- and off-campus activities organized by students' organizations and school leaders, class meetings, specific and integrated instruction of CE, and other activities irrelevant to academic scores.

Even though the respondent SPSs stressed, as mandated by the SMEC, that the CE curriculum took the form of a state-prescribed formal curriculum, activities in the informal curriculum and school-based formal curriculum, they had the stereotypical view of CE as a series of activities. In an interview, SPS19 expressed that CE in China was "mainly in the form of activities, as activities could impress students." According to SPS6, SPS8 and SPS13, SPSs in Shanghai led their schools to organize various CE activities of two types—fixed activities that were required every year on a specific day or during a specific period (such as the CPC's Foundation Day, which was always celebrated on and before July 1st of each year), and ad hoc activities to publicize or serve a current situation (such as on- and off-campus activities related to the 2010 Shanghai World Expo).

Comparison of Principals' and SPSs' Supportive Modification

Despite agreeing with certain CPC policies and requirements on such topics as primarily transmitting political values through CE, the primacy of CE, and developing school-based CE curricula through school work, and both principals and SPSs insisted on supportively modifying them during their implementation, for similar reasons and using similar strategies.

Both agreed that transmitting CPC' political values was central to CE and would help students follow and serve the CPC, but felt it was secondary to promoting students' individual development in morality and, especially, behavior norms, as political values were too abstract for most junior secondary students to grasp, and only well-developed students could apprehend them. They thus designed more school activities centering on promoting students' individual development, and even modified activities for permeating political values to train students' behaviors. Both principals' and SPSs' repositioning of political values education in CE, however, was in accordance with the CPC's overall ideological orientation.

Both principals and SPSs also supportively modified CPC policy placing CE ahead of academic school work. While agreeing that CE must be at the forefront of school tasks in theory, principals and SPSs also admitted that micro-political forces demanded they emphasize academic instruction in practice; as such, they adopted strategies to maximize academic instruction time, including not requiring senior students to participate in CE, allowing students to take turns participating in CE, and adjusting CE to ensure enough time for academic instruction. Despite adopting similar tactics in mediating between academic instruction and CE, principals were more powerful than SPSs in doing so.

Principals and SPSs also supportively modified policies and regulations regarding the development of school-based curricula for CE, albeit for different reasons. Principals stressed that school-based CE curriculum was important for attracting students' interest, helping schools build their reputations, and putting principals' ideas into practice. SPSs, for their part, felt that school-based curriculum improved CE by helping school leaders reflect on and discover the positive characteristics of CE, develop them to suit students' interests and cognitive levels, and improve its effects. Despite their different views of the policy's benefits, both used similar strategies to modify it, such as turning uniqueness into similarity, changing the consistency of school-based curriculum, and reducing contents and the number of tasks.

Scenario IV: Unsupportive Modification

The fourth school leaders' response scenario involved unsupportive modification, in which, despite generally following government directives and seldom resisting government policies, respondent school leaders purposively modified those policies and regulations they did not support.

Principals' Unsupportive Modification of CE Policies and Requirements

In this scenario, principals did not support or agree with policies and requirements that were not in accordance with their or their schools' interests—mainly

policies on student enrollment and catchment areas and reducing students' academic burden—and so implemented them in ways that were different from the prescribed. These policies were not directly related to CE, but had impacts on CE.

Policies on student enrollment and catchment areas required public primary and junior secondary schools to recruit only those students who resided in specific catchment areas, regardless of the student's family background or academic achievements. Nine of the interviewed public school principals, whose schools were not the top ones in the district, complained that this prevented them from recruiting good students. Principals from better schools (e.g., P7, P15 and P17) stated that they received some students who resided outside the catchment area but had "rich or powerful parents," excellent academic performance or outstanding artistic performance. P15 claimed that "more than 300 non-counterpart students" wanted to attend School 15 in 2011. These principals suggested that they modified admissions policies for three main reasons: because they dared not offend parents with political or economic power; because it allowed them to access rich social resources from their parents; and, because recruiting better students could enhance schools' academic and artistic performance quality which, as the principals reported, was related to CE.

Principals also unsupportively modified state policies on reducing students' workload by forbidding additional classes out of school time. Some principals (e.g., P18 and P6) did not support this stance, explaining that, without additional class, they could not ensure their students' academic performance, which was still an identified goal of higher authorities. Moreover, the principals also complained that their regular academic instruction was often interrupted by higher authorities' CE activities, and they thus needed to find additional time to complete instruction. P17 held similar views and provided additional classes, saying:

> It is not realistic to provide no additional examination exercise. I encourage providing one month of additional class time before each examination [mid-term and terminal examination]. During this month, I ask teachers who teach examination subjects to add one-hour class for students to do the examination exercises.

Other interviewed principals (e.g., P1 and P15) allowed and even advocated additional class at weekends or outside of regular school hours. Some even allowed teachers to offer classes for money, although warning them not to charge their own students.

SPSs' Unsupportive Modification of CE Policies and Requirements

SPSs modified policies and requirements that were time-consuming and useless (e.g., attending meetings on school political work). Policies that were too abstract (e.g., policies on converting the CPC's Party ideology into CE activities) were also modified.

All respondent SPSs unsupportively modified the state's policies and requirements on attending political work meetings, in part because there were too many meetings on too many topics organized by too many authorities at too many levels that took up too much of their time. For example, SPS12 had three meetings in the afternoon of our interview, while SPS13 had four meetings in the week of our interview; both complained that most meetings were "a waste of school leaders' time," because they took up at least "half a day" and did not aid them in their work. In fact, according to SPS12, who taught six classes per week, most meetings actually made her a less effective teacher, as they disrupted her instruction and forced her to "adjust teaching time" to the extent that she sometimes had to teach "three classes in one subject in a half day." As such, some interviewed SPSs avoided attending what they saw as unimportant meetings through such strategies as pulling out and alteration; SPS12, for example, offered excuses for not attending (pulling out), while SPS13 asked others (e.g., principals, the HCED, the secretary of the CYL) to attend on her behalf and to sign her name to the attendance sheet (alteration).

The interviewed SPSs also unsupportively modified policies and requirements on turning abstract political ideology into school CE activities. While it was SPSs' responsibility to transmit the CPC's political values to students, the interviewed SPSs in Shanghai (e.g., SPS12, a young female SPS) thought the policy of "uniting ideology and strengthening Party construction" was too abstract to carry out, and modified it to reflect school demands:

> I transformed it into a series of CE activities to cultivate students' belonging to the school. These activities were titled "I study the history of CPC and comprehend our current life today", "I discuss on how to be a student of School 12", and "I provide an idea for School 12".

Comparison of Principals' and SPSs' Unsupportive Modification

The policies and requirements principals in Shanghai unsupportively modified were those that, if followed, could deny their schools certain benefits, and that were not seriously examined by the DEB or supported by it or other higher authorities. They were largely related to school administration, but could have influences on CE, including students' enrollment in catchment areas and the provision of additional academic classes for exam preparation. Some of the interviewed principals complained that policies limiting their enrollment options inhibited their choice of good students, while others told that they faced a complex situation with parents and higher authorities when deciding whether to accept students beyond their formal catchment areas. Moreover, the principals encouraged and allowed teachers to provide additional classes to students for examination preparation purposes, as both higher authorities and other stakeholders continued to demand high student academic performance levels.

SPSs unsupportively modified policies and requirements that threatened to create troubles in or were too abstract for their political work, such as those requiring them to attend time-consuming and disruptive meetings about trivial political matters. They also did not support transmitting abstract political policies, and modified them to make them more acceptable to students. Despite their unsupportive modification, SPSs rationalized their alternative strategies so as not to appear to be publicly against the state.

Summary

This chapter has shown that both principals' and SPSs' perceptions and responses reflected four distinct scenarios: active acceptance; passive acceptance; supportive modification; and unsupportive modification. The first and second scenarios indicate that principals and SPSs in Shanghai implemented some school and CE leadership policies and requirements as intended by the state, regardless of whether they saw them as important and necessary (first scenario) or overly demanding and unnecessary (second scenario). The third and fourth scenarios, by contrast, reveal that both parties modified versions of other policies and requirements, again regardless of their perceived importance and utility (third scenario) or lack thereof (fourth scenario).

The four scenarios reflect principals' and SPSs' different focuses on school leadership in China. As school administrators, principals might well be expected to promote whole school development, including CE and academic instruction. As school political leaders, SPSs regarded the ideo-political education of students as an element of CE and a major part of their political work. Accordingly, principals tended to be concerned with those CE policies and requirements that related to their administrative responsibilities, while SPSs were more inclined to mention those related to their political responsibilities. Moreover, principals were more influential in responding to the CPC-led state and exercising influence on shared responsibilities.

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Chapter 6
Complicated Working Relationship Between Principals and SPSs: Coexistence of Cooperation and Contention

This chapter focuses on school leaders' interactions with school-level micro-political actors, especially principals' and SPSs' working relationship and shared responsibilities. Principals are the head of the whole school leadership system under the PRS, while SPSs—as representatives of the CPC, the most powerful force in China—are their nominal superiors. Principals' and SPSs' relationship with the CPC, together with their complex positional power relationship at the school level, complicates their school leadership relationship, especially as regards CE, for which both have political and administrative responsibilities. This chapter argues that principals' interactions with SPSs in Shanghai are dynamic and changed with different issues and in different situations. As equally ranked heads of schools' administrative and political lines, respectively, principals and SPSs could cooperate to fulfill their responsibilities and respond to school macro- and micro-political actors, or they could compete for power in school leadership and to fulfill their own responsibilities. To that end, this chapter first presents how and in what ways school leaders (i.e., principals and SPSs) cooperate with each other, before describing how they compete with each other for power in school leadership and CE.

The Cooperation Between Principals and SPSs

The four scenarios for school leaders' responses toward higher authority, discussed in the previous chapter, show how principals and SPSs cooperated. Principals worked together with their SPSs on CE, by reminding teachers that "every staff is a CE educator", making supportive school policies, developing school-based curricula, and designing CE activities. In addition, they collaborated to modify state policies on prioritizing political values over students' individual development and giving CE precedence over academic instruction.

One result of principals' and SPSs' cooperation was that some policies and requirements were accepted, whereas others were modified. As shown in Chaps. 3 and 4, principals were school decision makers while the SPSs headed SPOs to discuss and monitor principals' decisions. No matter how the decisions were made, principals' and SPSs' actions and strategies regarding accepting and modifying higher authorities' policies and requirements demonstrated that they had finally achieved collaboration, even though some of it was achieved by one party's compromise. Rather than tracing how principals and SPSs cooperated with each other to accept and modify higher authorities' policies and requirements, this section presents findings (from observations and interviews) on how principals and SPSs perceived their cooperation and in what areas and with what strategies they cooperated.

Principals and SPS both advertised their own willingness to cooperate, noting that "the principal and SPS of a school must be partners", and should adopt the principle of "shared responsibilities and work collaboratively for the same goal (*fengong bu fenjia*)". In other words, principals and SPSs had a division of labor (i.e., principals focused on school administration and SPSs on school political work), but worked together to achieve school goals; their labor was "combined together and difficult to divide" as each worked on their main responsibilities while still helping the other. They described their working relationship as a form of partnership, and both tried to cooperate in their interactions with macro- and micro-political school actors. SPS1 also expressed that principals' and SPSs' "speaking out in one voice on school key decisions" was important for maintaining school unity, and resulted in decisions on any given issue being spoken with one voice.

Principals' cooperation with SPSs on school political work directly and indirectly influenced CE, as did SPSs' reciprocal collaboration on administrative work relating CE and CE. Each, however, emphasized different areas of cooperation and used different strategies to effect this cooperation.

Cooperation Between Principals and SPSs: The Principals' Perspective

The interviewed principals said little about how and in what ways they cooperated with their SPSs, except that they worked together with SPSs to ensure their school's political orientation and facilitate SPSs' political work. According to P1, P7 and P8, SPSs were "mainly responsible for ensuring school direction was not deviating from the CPC's political orientation and implementing the CPC's policies", with which efforts the principals collaborated. In addition, the respondent principals could facilitate their SPSs' political work by providing school facilities and resources. Moreover, principals who were deputy SPSs could "assist their SPSs' political work, especially in ensuring school political orientation" (P3).

By contrast, the respondent principals mainly acknowledged their SPSs' cooperation in using their ideological work to facilitate and smooth principals' interaction with other political actors, and to serve school administration by establishing "a sound ideological environment for school administration", and persuading and mobilizing subordinates (P1 and P7). Specifically, SPSs could impress on subordinates the importance of solving "trivial problems" (P2), help them "release their dissatisfaction and get their support in implementing school decisions" (P12) and "improve teachers' professional morality" (P8). P17, for instance, stated:

> If the SPS does not well prepare and comfort teachers, I have difficulties in carrying out my administrative work. Because the SPS has the responsibility to show the school's concern for the teachers' reason, needs and demands, and direct them to serve the school's and students' development. If the teachers do not have the determination to work for a common goal, they might not be willing to do as I request.

The principals noted that the SPSs' ideological work placed them in the role of mediator between principals and teachers, and helped make the former's tough decisions more acceptable to the latter, which helped principals "establish authority among teachers" (P7). Moreover, the SPSs' ideological work helped principals (e.g., P17) gather more information from teachers and could provide life-skills-related input to help them make decisions.

Principals and SPSs cooperated on CE, but claimed a different division of labor in response to other stakeholders. P3 illustrated that this division enabled the parties to solve problems in school leadership by assuming their respective administrative and political responsibilities, using the example of a student jumping from a building

> If a student jumps from a building on campus, principals must make decisions on how to deal with this issue which could be called "public crisis". Guided by the principal's decision, the DPCE drafts a plan to direct the HCED to work on it. In this case, the SPS makes use of their power in monitoring the procedure of the response and criticizing the inappropriateness, and directs teachers' professional morality in the future ideo-political education.

Some interviewed principals (e.g., P17) communicated with their SPSs to gain their cooperation, reduce the inherent tension between the two lines, and to guide the latter's work to serve the goals of school administration

> I told my SPS that school administration was not my own responsibility but our shared responsibility, so we should work together to establish a collaborative and facilitative environment. I guided the SPS that you had to keep your mental balance, or you could not do anything. You had better be complacent/ painful when you got/ lost what you wanted. Focusing on what you should work on, please do not care about whether you would be rewarded or not. Next semester, I will communicate with the SPS on how to create an environment of caring every student and how to direct teachers to care about them, how to protect teachers' rights, especially rights of professional development.

The principals' strategy of guiding SPSs' collaboration showed that the former were powerful enough to subordinate the latter to school administrative goals.

In addition, principals sought SPSs' cooperation so as to share responsibility for principal—made mistakes concerning school critical decisions, as P8 reported

> To avoid corruption, our DEB regulated that the school should pay teachers their year-end bonus in cash. Nevertheless, a principal in our district did not observe the regulation, and provided teachers with a set of cookware, instead. There were teachers who suspected the principal got a kickback for buying the cookware and complained about the principal to the DEB. This should not have happened if the SPS had supervised principal by reminding him that the year-end bonus could only be paid with cash, when they discussed this issue at the school board meeting. Although the SPS was not involved in the purchase of the cookware, she should also be held accountable for not doing her duty.

Principals in Shanghai usually expected to exercise their leadership as a school head should, and did not like being supervised by their SPSs. Therefore, they advocated appointing principals who were also SPSs, so that they could avoid the SPSs' awkward supervision. However, in the above case, the principals welcomed the SPSs' supervision as a way to keep from being punished for violating regulations, or to share that punishment with the SPSs.

Cooperation Between Principals and SPSs: The SPSs' Perspective

Based on SPSs' interviews, principals collaboratively provided resources to allow SPSs to conduct their political work, as well as supporting school political work in other ways; for instance, SPS2 noted that his principal (P2) did not schedule classes on Tuesday mornings for teachers with Party membership, so as to allow these teachers to attend Party branch meetings.

For their part, the SPSs promoted cooperation through their political and ideological work, and SPSs who are also DPCEs further cooperated with their principals by fulfilling administrative responsibilities. SPSs cooperated with their principals in three major areas related to leading CE: facilitating principals' decisions by reducing tensions among school micro-political actors; making the school and its teachers better known; and, motivating teachers to improve instructional quality.

SPSs who were also DPCEs cooperated more with their principals in CE than their peer SPSs who were not DPCEs. Despite mentioned their efforts at teamwork in leading CE—including making plans, developing formal and informal curricula, evaluating teacher and student performance, and establishing school climate—SPSs who were not DPCEs mainly cooperated with principals by establishing a favorable ideological environment for CE, whether through flag-raisings and singing the national anthem, or by broadcasting political values in showcase windows, corridors, and classrooms. Establishing an appropriate school environment, SPS1 stressed, encouraged students to behave as expected, thus "liberating principals from trivial school work" and allowing them to focus on "keeping the school in line with the CPC's socialist direction". SPSs who were also DPCEs

were responsible for administering CE by supervising HCEDs and heads of class and organizing activities to improve CE administrators' and teachers' competencies, and played a major role in seeking and providing resources.

SPSs claimed their ideological and political work helped principals promote school development in two major ways. First, SPSs mediated between principals and teachers to reduce tensions, and mobilize teachers to facilitate principals' administration. As SPS8 explained, principals, as heads of school, had to "regulate and evaluate" teachers to ensure school order and promote school development, whereas teachers resented being regulated and sought greater "freedom and power". The SPSs played a quasi-parental role, listening to teachers' complaints, interests and expectations, and then gently reminding them that they would benefit from smooth school development, and persuading them to accept the regulations their principals proposed to facilitate that (SPS8 & SPS19). The SPSs also acted as a "buffer" between the principals and other school staff (e.g., SPS1, SPS19), comforting teachers who objected to their principals' decisions and persuading them to accept them. SPS19 explained their role as buffer using a personnel adjustment example

> If the principal does not allow a teacher to take the post he/she wants to, he/she might hate the principal, so that the principal had better not discuss this decision with the teacher. In such situation, the SPS must play the role of buffer between the principal and the teacher. Before informing the teacher of the decision, the SPS goes to the teacher several times and reminds her/him that family is important, so she/he had better put more emphasis on family than on work, noting the school leaders have observed her/his efforts and diligence in work. The SPSs' communication with the teacher could prepare him/her for being informed of the principal's decision and reduce the principal's trouble in implementing the decision.

SPS19 explained that being a buffer could "reduce teachers' indignation toward principals" and "facilitate the implementation of decisions". Besides easing the process of implementing principal's decisions, it was also "important" to SPSs (e.g., SPS13) that they help their principals "perfect their decisions (*bu tai*)" during the implementation. According to SPS13, her principal sometimes insisted on making problematic decisions with which she did not fully agree. Despite her discomfort with these "arbitrary" decisions, she had to think about how to supplement and revise them to "make them reasonable and favor school development".

SPSs also cooperated with principals to make their schools and teachers better known and to improve school quality, by promoting their colleagues and school leaders to higher authorities. For instance, SPS8, whose school was not well known, provided opportunities for and helped teachers with Party memberships to participate in Party activities organized by Party Committees at higher levels, claiming it was "a good opportunity for showing teachers [to] the public and [earning] honors for themselves and our school".

In addition, SPSs, through their school ideo-political work, encouraged and motivated teachers to improve academic instruction, which fell into the principals' area of responsibility. SPS8, who was in the same school as P8, explained that school political work was positively correlated to academic instruction, and

that "the more advanced the teachers with Party membership were, the better their instructional quality would be". Three main methods of political work were used in improving school academic instruction, the first of which involved motivating teachers through ideo-political education. For example, SPS1, who was in the same school as P1, designed school ideological work (as observed in a staff meeting) so as to enhance teachers' teaching enthusiasm, and to encourage students to make progress in their studies, while SPS8 showed teachers with Party memberships documentaries on other Party members' advanced devotion to work.

SPSs also selected and shared examples of teachers who did well in their teaching so that other teachers could learn from their examples. On Teachers' Day, SPS8 highlighted teachers' good deeds in teaching to motivate them to be examples to other teachers; SPSs especially urged teachers with Party memberships to model good teaching practices for non-Party members. SPS7, for example, persuaded the teachers with CPC membership in P7's school to participate actively in public lessons (i.e., lessons opened not only to students, but also to teachers from the same subject in and out of the school). Last, although "joining the CPC was not popular nowadays" (SPS6), SPSs (e.g., SPS2) still recruited outstanding teachers to become Party members as a reward "to confirm their achievements in instruction", as Party membership is generally reserved for those who are advanced in their work.

To cooperate with their principals, respondent SPSs attempted to comport themselves with consideration and respect. SPS7 shared that, within the framework of promoting school development, it was important that SPSs "respect, give way and compromise" with school principals, and not struggle to be the "top leader" (*yi ba shou*); therefore, SPSs should "practice… more tolerance". SPS19, for example, communicated and consulted with her principal on school Party work because, as DPCE, she was the principal's subordinate and therefore required to follow the principal's instructions; when seeking her principal's (P8) input, SPS8 would typically provide several strategies from which P8 could choose, arguing that "providing strategies for principals [reduced] the principals' pressure and troubles".

This was reflected in SPSs efforts to highlight principals' role as the chief school CE leader.[1] SPS 8 and SPS13, for instance, consulted with their principals on CE, even though both SPSs were experienced and confident in their own ability to lead CE. SPS12 stressed that concession was not an effort to "cater to the principals", but to show respect, reduce principals' troubles, maintain a harmonious working relationship, and get support for their school political work.

Comparison of Cooperation Between Principals and SPSs

This section has demonstrated three characteristics of principals' and SPSs' cooperation in school CE leadership. First, both principals and SPSs claimed to be

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[1]Ibid.

cooperative with each other, and likened the nature of their cooperation to "family members who had [a] different labor-division but [were] coherent as a family". But both parties were confused as to the extent to which to divide their labor, especially regarding shared responsibilities, e.g., CE.

Second, both principals and SPSs asserted that the former cooperated with the latter's political work by allotting time and facilities to enable their SPSs to conduct their political studies for teachers with CPC membership. In addition, principals who were also Party members attended regular Party meetings organized by SPSs, and offered suggestions for improving their conduct.

Third, both parties stressed SPSs' willingness to assist principals in their administrative work, work with principals to publicize their school and enhance its reputation, help principals carry out their decisions, and solve school problems. Each area of cooperation involved interactions with macro- and/or micro-political school actors. In terms of administrative work, SPSs' assistance (through political work) in academic instruction was mentioned by principals and SPSs both. CE was an area in which all interviewed SPSs cooperated with their principals.

Even though principals and SPSs were equally ranked and held similar views on cooperation, they adopted different strategies. Principals praised SPSs for supporting and facilitating their administration, and comforted them on their less advantageous position in the school hierarchy. SPSs' cooperated with principals largely by being considerate and showing respect; SPSs tried not to trouble their principals, and respected their greater positional power, strong personality, and professional experience.

The Competition Between Principals and SPSs

As shown in Chap. 3, principals sometimes simultaneously held the position of SPS (*yi jian tiao*), while in other cases there were separate leaders in each position. In the latter case, although there was cooperation between principals and SPSs where possible, both parties acknowledged that their working relationship contained elements of competition for power, and both indicated that principals were the more powerful of the two. Both parties used their power to defend their position as heads of their respective school lines and to exercise greater influence within the school. Internal conflict (*woli dou*) was unavoidable, according to some interviewed school leaders (e.g., P15 and SPS19), as both parties competed for who should be the school head, who should have more power and who should have to follow the other's commands. At the same time, both also tried to maintain and increase their relative power in school and to gain the support of other micro-political actors; the former related to their perceptions and the latter to their overall strategy. Principals and SPSs held different views on their power status, and they had different success in gaining the support of other political actors.

Contending with SPSs for Power

Although the respondent principals' position gave them greater power and influence over school and CE leadership than SPSs enjoyed, they still had to compete with their SPSs to defend that power. Their working relationship with their SPSs was "subtle", but featured both "explicit and implicit conflicts and contentions" (P15). The subtleness mainly resulted from the two parties' competition for power in the PRS which, as shown in Chap. 3, defined principals as decision makers responsible for the school; however, the PRS also required them to discuss school decisions with their SPSs, and asked SPSs to monitor their principals. Principals (e.g., P6 and P7) complained that discussing every decision with SPSs was not realistic, as it took up much time better spent on school administration; however, if they did not discuss their decisions, their SPSs would complain to the DEB.

Despite this dilemma, the interviewed principals still managed to exercise supreme influence in their schools; they celebrated being the "most powerful and influential leaders in school" and used the saying, "a good principal makes a good school" (P7, P11) to justify the whole school being under their control and guided by their administrative efforts. P1 and P7 stressed that "it is [the principal] who makes decisions on school important issues", and who could therefore motivate teachers by working with them, posting inspiring articles, or accommodating their personal needs (e.g., to accompany their child to their high school or university entrance examination), thus making teachers feel "honored" (P10, P11 and P15), and "cared about" (P9).

As school decision makers and school heads with power over such key school areas as personnel and finance, principals' superiority was strengthened by schools' internal and external actors. P17 noted that principals had the power to decide promotions, recruitment and other issues relating to staff interests, and could easily get the support of their subordinates, who understood whose words mattered and whom they should follow. Interviews with HCEDs and DPCEs, who characterized principals as "the master of school" and "the most influential leader in the school hierarchy", triangulated the principals' views. HCED2 (from P2's school), HCED4 (from P4's school), and HCED11 and HCED15 all thought highly of their principals' leadership, saying they expanded their vision, motivated their passion for CE and smoothed the process of CE by providing resources, and by organizing and coordinating school staff to work on it. HCED5 noted that she had learned a lot from her principal's assertion that teachers and students should "walk the right road, have good characters and be well-behaved", noting that her students' academic performance and social behaviors [have] changed a lot since P5 was appointed as principal.

Principals admitted that their identity as top school leader provided them more resources and opportunities to build up relationships with external school stakeholders. Principals could "comfort and move parents" and other stakeholders (P15), and encourage them "to approach officials, higher authorities and external experts, and provide principals with resources to build up relationships with other

schools in the district" (P15 and P2). For instance, P2, who developed a joint psychological education project with other schools, explained that it would have been "impossible for the DPCE (the DPCE in her school was the SPS) to develop the program", as the latter did not have the power to approve the expenditure.

As school leaders with the power to make decisions regarding school service and infrastructure contracts, and the recruitment of students from beyond school catchment areas, principals also attracted external actors' attention. According to P12 and P17, external actors who wanted principals' endorsements or to show their gratitude to principals would offer them free trips or treat them to meals, but SPSs were not always invited. Due to school external stakeholder's unequal treatment of principals and SPSs, SPSs usually "feel uncomfortable" and would complain that "positional power brought principals more benefits" (P17).

The interviewed principals claimed that they deserved the power they had; P9, for instance, stated, "[t]he more power I have, the more pressure I have to cope with", noting that she envied her SPS, who faced "less worries and pressure". P15 added that "principals are very tired and under high pressure. We seem thread on the eggs, because we need to care about and be responsible for everything on campus".

The interviewed principals described school political work and their influences thereon as less important than their administrative work. Even principals who were also SPSs (e.g., P11 and P15) emphasized school administration above their political duties, saying the latter was "just [directing] some regular political work on campus", such as recruiting new Party members and organizing compulsory Party activities, and seldom involved political work requiring more energy and time, such as hosting external seminars for CPC members. They placed less emphasis on school political work because, as P15 explained, "administrative work is more important than political work", and paying less attention to the latter "would not result in a great decline in the quality of school political work, but would decrease that of the administrative work including academic instruction".

The principals could also use their power to interfere in and restrict their SPSs' work. P8, for example, argued that principals should work both in and beyond their areas of responsibility, so that they could take responsibility for all school affairs and "not leave any place untended"; in other words, it was normal and beneficial for principals to interfere in SPSs' work. Some interviewed principals (e.g., P9 and P15) asserted that principals could even use their power to prevent SPSs and SPS-led Teacher Congresses from monitoring school administration and restrict them to school political work, such as recruiting new Party members, reading higher authorities' policies and expounding on political theories. Experienced principals or those who had worked for several years in their school, P12 asserted, could choose not to let SPSs and teacher representatives in the Teacher Congress discuss school plans.

Moreover, principals manipulated SPSs' leadership in CE. To facilitate and strengthen the Party's leadership in CE, most of the interviewed SPSs (nine of the 11 SPSs who were not principals) in Shanghai were appointed as DPCEs, mainly at their principals' behest. The principals could then de-emphasize CE to

marginalize SPSs. The first type of contention arose when principals were promoted from the instructional line, and appointed SPSs to be DPCEs and assigned them the responsibility of leading CE.

The second type of contention arose when principals had rich experience in CE (e.g., P2 and P4) and, despite having appointed SPSs as DPCEs, stripped them of their main CE responsibilities and reassigned them to trivial aspects of CE, such as keeping school order. P2, for instance, explained that she was "familiar with CE, thus should still be concerned about it and raise more ideas"; she also noted that, based on her past experience, SPS2 (who was also a DPCE) "ceded his power in CE". She assumed responsibilities for creating CE ideas and rules, guiding the HCED to design CE activities, inspecting and evaluating her work, and working with other schools to organize CE activities; P2 simply presented SPS2 with the designed activities as a *fait accompli*. Like P2, P4 took on the DPCE's main responsibilities, and hosted regular meetings with mid-level school leaders (i.e., the HCED and head of instructional department) and grade heads to discuss CE, but seldom invited SPS4, the titular DPCE, to attend.

No matter whether they had ceded their leadership responsibilities to SPSs, the interviewed principals showed they were more influential than their SPSs. P17, for instance, demonstrated that no one would emphasize CE on campus unless the principal attached importance to it; as P4 explained, principals could highlight DPCE's and HCED's importance and change their weak positions in school, as well as motivate internal school stakeholders to participate in CE. For instance, P16 organized mid-level and senior school leaders to discuss plans for singing Red Songs on Children's Day, while P7 met with school leaders after the earthquake and tsunami struck Japan in March, 2011, assigned a leader to help Japanese teachers and students learn whether their families were safe, organized a flag-raising to express sorrow over the disaster, and asked school members to write blessing cards for the disaster area and hold a jumble sale to raise disaster relief funds. Given their power and influence, it was easy for principals to form "cliques and factions" with other school members and thus decreased SPSs' power (P5 and P15).

Contending with Principals for Power

Even though the subject SPSs cooperated with and made concessions to their principals, they also struggled with them for power in school leadership and CE. These struggles centered on the power to lead CE, both conceptually and in practice.

While acknowledging their and their principals' cooperation, all the interviewed SPSs expressed having difficulty handling their relationship with their principals. SPS 12, for example, said that it was hard to "decide to what extent and in what ways (*na nie*) the SPSs should exercise their leadership". According to SPS19, if SPSs were to show more aggressiveness, they would break their harmonious relationship with their principals; if SPSs were weaker than their principals, they would not earn the latter's respect or be able to work with them effectively.

Regarding their complex and subtle relationship with principals, the interviewed SPSs (e.g., SPS6) suggested that it was better to appoint principals simultaneously as SPSs, as this kind of positional arrangement could bring more advantages to school leadership by "avoiding many troubles concerning interpersonal and power relationship between principals and SPSs", and enhancing the efficiency of school leadership.

Despite being head of school political line and the CPC's representatives at the school level, SPSs' power was less than that of their principals, who were seen by staff as the "real" head of the school. Five SPSs felt their position was lower than their principals'; SPS14 described principals' leadership as the roof of a house, and SPSs' efforts and duties as the beams that supported it. Administratively, SPSs, especially those who were DPCEs, answered directly to their principals and had to follow the directions of, assist, and even make concessions to, their principals.

The SPSs complained that the PRS allocated far more power to principals than to SPSs, and rendering the position of SPS, in the eyes of school stakeholders, a "nominal post" (*xu zhi*) or window dressing (*bai she*). One of the SPSs' key responsibilities was promoting school development; SPS6, however, expressed the PRS gave them "have no voice" on this issue, as it was more the principals' responsibility; moreover, any credit for successful school development would accrue to principals, while failures would be ascribed to such problems as unqualified teacher, inferior students, and insufficient funding. SPSs (e.g., SPS2, SPS7 and SPS19) expressed that principals' positional power afforded them "more opportunities and resources" to build up relationships with external school actors (e.g., parents and higher authorities), and to gather the support of subordinates by dispensing rewards, resources, and opportunities. Therefore, as SPS19 pointed, if they were to be given a choice, "most school leaders would choose to be [a] principal rather than [an] SPS".

If forced to confront more powerful principals, SPSs reported, they would not be able to fulfill their school leadership responsibilities. First, SPSs' power and strategies for leading CE were defined by their principals. SPS6, who was not a DPCE, complained of having less power than his female principal to direct subordinates in CE, while SPS2 (who was in the same school as P2) felt his power to conduct CE had been usurped by his female principal (P2), who compelled him to assist her in such "trivial" matters as school safety and student order,[2] despite his being a DPCE; his principal took on the DPCE's responsibilities herself.

Moreover, SPSs' political work could also be meddled with by principals, as SPSs needed to consult with their principals (who were CPC members) and get their endorsement on key SPO decisions. SPS12 described a case in which she wanted to recruit a class head, who had done an excellent job carrying out CE in her class, to become a CPC member, and discussed the issue at the school party meeting; however, her recommendation was not approved, because P12 denied it on the basis that the class head was "not mature".

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[2]Ibid.

SPSs were often disappointed by school staff's responses to their political work and the apparent contempt they felt for the SPSs themselves. The interviewed SPSs (e.g., SPS2, SPS6, and SPS19) complained that teachers were interested only in academic instruction, and not ideo-political education, although they could "mark the examination paper and students' assignments during the political study" (SPS19). The interviewed HCEDs (e.g., HCED1 and HCED2) acknowledged that they could have benefited from SPSs' ideo-political education, but noted that that kind of education was "boring" and "utilitarian". HCED1, for instance, expressed that ideo-political education was a kind of "brainwashing" that aimed to eliminate all thoughts deviating from the CPC's and draw teachers close to the CPC.

Finally, the complex power relationship rendered SPSs unable to fulfill their responsibility of monitoring their principals. Because of the sensible relationship between principals and SPSs, it was "not good" for the latter to comment on principals' work or to attempt to direct them when their decisions were problematic (SPS8). SPS19 commented that, if the SPSs' monitoring exposed the principals' problem, it was OK; otherwise it would "undermine the relationship between principals and their SPSs", which was not good for either the leaders or their schools.

SPSs could monitor their principals by participating in school key decisions-makings, as outlined in the $1 + 3$ policies for the Principal Responsibility System, but the extent to which SPSs could participate was minimal, as SPSs had no chance to voice their opinions, but participated by sitting, listening to and echoing the words of others. SPS2 and SPS6 both complained that their principals could autocratically develop, assign or reduce other school leaders' leadership responsibilities without discussing the decision, which further reduced the SPSs' ability to monitor their principals. Even when allowed to discuss their principals' decisions, the SPSs ideas' were not valued, and thus could not function as monitoring. In fact, principals could avoid SPSs' monitoring by having them transmit the principals' ideas. For instance, P15 (formerly SPS15) expressed that, when she was an SPS, her principal restricted her monitoring power by having her draft school plans reflecting the principals' ideas, effectively co-opting her and making it difficult for her to voice any alternatives.

In addition, SPSs who did not have as much positional and administrative power as their principals found it more difficult to attract subordinates' support. In the PRS, SPSs had no power over administrative areas such as finances and personnel, and thus found it was difficult to organize activities that were sufficiently interesting and diverse to attract teachers with CPC party membership to participate. Due to the "poverty" of SPOs, SPSs' ideo-political activities were "less attractive" than those organized by Teacher Congresses. Without SPOs being able to stage activities benefiting and attracting teachers, SPSs had difficulties getting their subordinates' support.

On the other hand, the SPSs lacked the power and resources needed to meet teachers' concerns about professional advancement and salary, which made it more difficult for them to motivate teachers to concentrate on ideo-political education or the CPC-led state's position on collectivism and sacrificing individual interests for the public good, let alone having them transmit the ideology to CE

(SPS2). To some extent, the SPSs' political work conflicted with teachers' needs. The teachers wanted in-serving teaching training to improve their teaching and give them better evaluation results and future promotions; they did not want the "additional burden" of ideo-political education (SPS19). To teachers, SPSs were more like "listeners" and "comforters" with no power to influence the issues teachers cared about (SPS7, SPS8). For their part, the SPSs had to comfort teachers who came to "tell their grievances" and "release their complaints… even though the issues that made teachers emotional are trivial" (SPS8).

Although restricted by and less competitive than their principals, the subject SPSs refused to admit being inferior to them, and pursued four strategies to exercise power in school and CE, and to establish their equality with principals. The first was to look for opportunities to monitor their principals. For example, SPS1, attempted to monitor P1's interpretation of higher authorities' policies and worked out a school-based plan, and eventually discussed and revised it twelve times before bringing it to the Teacher Congress. Some strong SPSs (e.g., SPS19) united with other SPSs to gain power in school leadership, arguing that SPSs "should strive for and strengthen our power in confining and overseeing principals and their decisions".

The second strategy involved enhancing SPSs' influence in the school, and incorporated four main approaches. First, the SPSs built up informal organizations with members whose interests were similar to their own (which was not uncommon in schools with autocratic principals), in order to inhibit principals' power and block the implementation of principals' decisions (SPS19). Second, the respondent SPSs (e.g., SPS1 and SPS12) publicized their work and achievements to school members through all available means, including school websites, so as to "be recognized by school staff". Still other SPSs, as SPS19 relayed, disrupted their principals' decision-making by proposing different and less useful opinions at meetings.

The third strategy was to agitate, as co-leaders ranked equally with principals. SPS19, for example, argued with and persuaded her principal to accept her suggestions, while P15 was still an SPS and not yet a principal, also argued with her principal for additional CE instructional time and resources, because

> The principal thought administrative work was much more important and urgent than CE, and requested the activities of CE to give way to her work. The principal also said that the specific politics class was enough for CE, and it was not necessary to develop school-based CE curriculum and set other classes for it.

The fourth strategy involved interacting with both higher authorities and subordinates to gain advantages in their power competition. SPS1, SPS2, and SPS7, for example, used their government-assigned power to oversee their principals, and relied on the government to restrict their principals' actions through policies that specified principals' duties and limited their power; a principal who breached policy would be reported to higher education authorities. In addition, SPSs made use of SPS-led Teacher Congresses to force principals to take note of their subordinates' opinions.[3]

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[3]Ibid.

The interviewed SPSs had three main methods of attracting subordinates' support. The first was to build themselves up in their subordinates' eyes; SPS19, a female SPS with rich leadership experience, did so by demonstrating assertiveness and giving the impression that she was as powerful as the principal; showing teachers that she had sufficient resources to facilitate their work and development; and gathering teachers' work and life information to the greatest degree possible, in the belief that the more teacher information she had, "the more teachers admired and obeyed [her]". The second method involved enticing followers to leave the principals' camp by providing them more resources and guidance, while the third was to isolate principals' supporters, by claiming, for example, their relationship with the principal meant they were "too busy to care about [their] work", and "seldom sought help from [their] SPS".

The Comparison of Principals' and SPSs' Competition

As heads of the dual school lines, principals and SPSs competed with each other for power in school leadership in general and CE leadership in particular. Given their positional power, principals had more advantages in terms of gathering resources, mobilizing subordinates' support and gaining support from parents and higher authorities.

Moreover, principals and SPSs viewed their power status differently. Principals tended to see themselves as the most powerful school leaders, while SPSs were dissatisfied with their situation. The interviewed SPSs complained that principals were so powerful they could dictate school administration matters with little concern for the opinions of their SPSs. SPSs complained they had little influence over school decision-making, monitoring their principals and leading CE, and could not put their ideas of running school into practice, but had to follow their principals' lead.

In addition, principals and SPSs also viewed their reasons for seeking power differently. For principals, having power allowed them to consolidate and defend their position in school; they argued that they deserved more power than their SPSs because they had more responsibilities and were under more pressure. Regarding CE, most principals assertively claimed that they could use their power to maintain its core position and develop additional CE programs, activities, and curriculum. SPSs, on the other hand, vied with principals to gain power, actively seizing opportunities to demonstrate their *de jure* parity with principals, and trying to interact with principals as equals.

Principals and SPSs both sought the support of macro- and micro-political actors in their competition for power in leading CE, although both felt principals were more successful in doing so. By contrast, SPSs needed to work harder to establish their authority among school subordinates and to entice them to offer their support.

Summary

Principals and SPSs collaborated with each other on leading CE, but the cooperation was mainly characterized by SPSs' assisting the more dominant principals in their administrative efforts. The cooperation between principals and their SPSs was dominated by principals and was mainly done to serve school administrative purposes or to respond to the demands of external and internal school stakeholders. The interviewed Shanghai SPSs could take advantage of their political responsibilities to cooperate with their principals in school administrative work and respond to macro- and micro-political actors, while principals made use of their position as school decision maker and their school administration responsibilities to support SPSs' political work. Regarding CE, SPSs cooperated with their principals in the whole process of its leadership; those SPSs who were also DPCEs cooperated more widely and deeply, even though the cooperation might come at the cost of concessions to the principal.

Despite claims about their cooperation, principals and SPSs competed for power in school leadership, and had different views of their power and their reasons for pursuing it. Their different viewpoints suggest that principals had more power over school leadership than did SPSs, and enjoyed more advantages when trying to gain the support of macro- and micro-political school actors in their power competition with SPSs. Despite being inhibited by their principals in school leadership, SPSs actively attempted to gain power by enhancing their authority and gaining the support of external and internal school stakeholders.

This chapter offers some possible explanations for the complexities of principals' and SPSs' leadership in school and in CE. The explanations, grounded in data from interviews and documentary analysis and supplemented by observation data, are specifically related to school leaders' responsibilities, and their perceptions of and strategies for responding to macro-political actor's (the CPC-led state's) policies and requirements on CE, their interactions with micro-political actors (parallel school leaders, subordinates, and parents). The dynamics and complexities of principals' interactions with macro- and micro-political actors in fulfilling their responsibilities can be seen as resulting from the interplay of macro- and micro-political actors diverse demands on CE—the influences of multi-leveled contexts (international, national, and local), the integration of politics and education, challenges confronting principals and SPSs, and school leaders' individual factors. The following subsections analyze in what aspects which these factors affected principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE, and how.

Chapter 7
Factors Shaping School Leadership in CE

This chapter offers some possible explanations for the complexities of principals' and SPSs' leadership in school and in CE. The explanations, grounded in data from interviews and documentary analysis and supplemented by observation data, are specifically related to school leaders' responsibilities, and their perceptions of and strategies for responding to macro-political actor's (the CPC-led state's) policies and requirements on CE, their interactions with micro-political actors (parallel school leaders, subordinates and parents). The dynamics and complexities of principals' interactions with macro- and micro-political actors in fulfilling their responsibilities can be seen as resulting from the interplay of macro- and micropolitical actors diverse demands on CE—the influences of multi-levelled contexts (international, national, and local), the integration of politics and education, challenges confronting principals and SPSs, and school leaders' individual factors. The following subsections analyze in what aspects these factors affected principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE, and how.

Influence of Contextual Factors at Multiple Levels

The first factor affecting principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE relates to the social context at multiple levels, ranging from the international to the local, and affecting different aspects of school leadership in CE in different ways. This subsection analyzes these contexts and how they shaped principals' and SPSs' leadership, especially their perceptions of school leadership concerns, what should be promoted in CE and how, as well as their attitudes toward and strategies for responding to macro-political actors in leading CE.

Since China's opening up to the world in the late 1970s, international forces have exerted more influence on Chinese school leaders' leadership concerns,

and strategies (Feng 2002; Huang and Cheng 2001). With reference to Shanghai, this study found that international forces impacted school leaders' perceptions of school leadership and CE, and their related strategies in three main ways. The first way concerned school leaders' self-acquired international knowledge, which the interviewed school leaders (e.g., P1, P3, P5, P11, and SPS6) noted they could gain from education journals, books, videos, and the Internet. The second way involved school leaders' training; respondent school leaders (e.g., P11, P15, P16, and SPS19) commented that they had been exposed to Western school leadership theories during their pre- and in-service professional training sessions, and had been further influenced by visiting schools in such countries as Britain, America, Australia, Canada, and Japan (e.g., P1, P4, P5, and SPS13). The third way was through their collaboration with foreign schools; some subject schools (e.g., School 1, School 4, School 7, and School 17) had partnership arrangements with schools outside of China, which the principals and SPSs were responsible for maintaining and developing. School leaders (e.g., P1, P5, P11, P15, SPS7, and SPS19) shared that international interactions helped them update their leadership strategies and renewed their sense of power. They also claimed that they had learned from their international experiences to promote students' individual development in CE, and to arm students with the values, knowledge, and skills needed in a global world.

While admitting the positive influence of international exposure on their leadership and concepts, school leaders (e.g., P7, P17, SPS13, and SPS19) also criticized international forces for negatively influencing CE and CE leadership, in two ways. First, through the proliferation of negative Western values (e.g., individualism and money worship) that deviated from the mainstream Chinese values (e.g., collectivism, morality) advocated in school. Second, by negatively influencing students' patriotism and pride in their Chinese culture by aggrandizing Western values. School leaders worried that students' zeal for Western products, music, food, and clothes might decrease their patriotism and limit their contact with and knowledge of traditional Chinese culture and heritage. This resistance to negative international influences could partly explain why school leaders placed national spirit ahead of international understanding in CE and agreed to carry out the CPC's requirements on indoctrinating patriotism, albeit with modifications.

Second, contextual factors at the national level, including Chinese culture (e.g., adoring authority, and the concepts of self and the society), CPC policies on economic development and educational reform possibly affected the principals' and SPSs' three scenarios for responding to state policies and requirements (active acceptance; passive acceptance; supportive modification), their perceptions of CE, and their strategies for carrying it out.

Adoration of authority has been utilized and developed by the CPC-led state to guide Chinese school leaders' concerns and strategies in their interactions with higher authorities and subordinates (e.g., Bush and Qiang 2000; Law 2009; Ribbins and Zhang 2006). Its impact is twofold in Chinese schools: school leaders had to obey the authority of governments at higher levels, while school staff had to respect and follow school leaders' authority (Law 2009; Zeng and Yuan 2008). This can partly explain why principals and SPSs still implemented some state policies and

requirements, despite not supporting them. As SPS19 said, regarding the government's call for more frequent inspections, "I did not want to, but have to, because it is the government's requirement." At school level, despite SPSs' efforts to establish authority using their own resources, principals could more easily build up their authority among their subordinates due to their positional power. The adoration of school leaders' authority can help to explain why principals have comparatively more advantages when mobilizing subordinates in their competition for power with SPSs.

In addition, the Chinese tradition of gradually extending the self into the broader fabric of Chinese society could affect principals' and SPSs' views on CE. The relationship between self and society is illustrated in "The Great Learning (*Da xue*)," which restates the Confucian principle that one must first cultivate one's self, then put their family in order, and then run their country well, before finally advocating and enhancing the untarnished human heart to make it known to the world (*xiushen*, *qijia*, *zhiguo*, *pingtianxia*) (He and He 1992). Traditional Chinese values of self and society have also been utilized by the CPC-led state, which introduced the concept of "self" into CE in the 1980s, and proposed a multileveled CE covering self, local, national, and global aspects in its curriculum reforms of the early 2000s (Law 2006). Despite being criticized during Mao's time, the relationship between self and the nation proposed by Confucianism permeates Chinese and school leaders' values as deeply embedded thoughts (Bush and Qiang 2000), which have been provoked when the CPC-led state advocated valuing China's traditional cultural heritage as a means of national building (Law 2011). School leaders therefore held that CE should start with students' individual development, and that the love education promoted in CE should "first cultivate students' love for themselves, then their classmates, teachers and parents, peer citizens and, finally, people around the world" (P15).

The second national possibly factor affecting principals' and SPSs' views on and strategies for placing CE involve the CPC-led state's guidelines for cultivating "Red and Expert" students. Students in China have been expected to show their "Red" nature by getting rid of selfness and firmly adhering to the CPC's leadership and ideology, and their "Expert" nature by learning academic knowledge and skills, participating in nation-building and updating their capabilities to suit the CPC's changing needs (Chen 1969; Mao 1958). As shown in Chap. 3, the balance between Red and Expert has been upset at different times in China's history. In the post-Mao era, while emphasizing students' political performance (which falls in the Red area), the CPC-led state has also stressed the importance of developing students' knowledge and skills to develop socialist constructors who are accommodative to the CPC's economic development goals and could enhance its global competiveness (which clearly falls in the Expert area). The extent to which students' knowledge and skills have been developed is evaluated by examining their academic performance, which has also become a key standard for evaluating school leaders and ranking schools. Although school rankings were officially canceled, they persist, unofficially; for instance, school leaders whose students have good academic performances bill their schools as "famous" schools. According to P6 and SPS14, the principals of these "famous schools" felt they

were entitled to be referred to as "famous principals," which not only showed their superiority, but also afforded them more opportunities for building their social and professional networks.

Third, there are two broad local contextual factors possibly affecting school leadership in CE in Shanghai. The first is the tradition of interplay between local culture and national politics in Shanghai. On the one hand, Shanghai has had a tradition of being open to and attracted by foreign cultures. Since the 1840s, due to the geographic advantages of Shanghai in international trade and Shanghainese's acceptance of foreign cultures, foreigners began to do business, rent land, and build up foreign settlements in Shanghai. The advanced foreign lifestyle attracted Shanghainese and drove them to learn Western ideas and culture (Le 1998). Its history of foreign concessions before the 1949 founding of the PRC meant that Shanghai consistently attracted more foreign visitors and traders, and was more closely in touch with Western culture than was any other city in China (Teng 2007). By 1845, most foreign visitors to China lived in Shanghai (Zhu 1998); from 1883 to 1949, Shanghai was the place where Chinese interacted with foreigners and foreigners interacted with each other (Zhu 1998), and was the most Westernized city in China (Hayhoe 1988).

Despite being influenced by Western culture from its foreign concessions, Shanghai residents were contemptuous of (and held in contempt by) foreigners, and their latent nationalism began to be aroused in the early 1900s (Ye 1998). Headed by local merchants and intellectuals, Shanghainese began to resist and fight foreigners by, for example, boycotting the foreign-owned businesses, such as the British-built Shanghai-Wusong railway (Ye 1998). The collision and integration of Chinese and Western culture led to the formation of a unique Shanghainese culture, which was characterized as open, comprehensive, pragmatic, flexible and diverse, and which integrated Chinese traditional culture with advanced Western science, technology, culture, and lifestyles (Teng 2007).

This history of the interplay of learning from and defending against foreign countries continued after the founding of the PRC, especially when the PRC adopted its opening-up policies. Despite being more culturally and economically open to foreign countries than other cities in China, Shanghai has always been under the CPC's tight political control. Shanghai was the first city established as municipality directly under the central government's leadership, which made it effectively equal in status to a province of the PRC. The organizational structure of Shanghai's municipal government and of its districts follows the structure of the central government, including the establishment of dual (political and administrative) leadership lines. Moreover, since the late 1980s, many Shanghai leaders have become national leaders in China, including Jiang Zemin (General Secretary of CPC Central Committee, 1989–2004), Zhu Rongji, Wu Bangguo, Zeng Qinghong and Huangju, who together formed the influential "Faction of Shanghai". In addition, the economic development of Shanghai has been a pet project of, and defined by the CPC Central Committee. All of Shanghai's education reforms have included the CPC's political framework, so as to implement and reinforce CPC policies. The interplay between Shanghai's culture of active exposure to the world

and the limits of its domestic political context could partly explain why principals and SPSs wished to have the sort of leadership autonomy emphasized in Western countries—despite holding closely to the CPC's political orientation and carrying out CPC policies with which they did not identify—and why they placed students' individual development ahead of transmitting political values.

The other type of local factor possibly affecting school leaders' perceptions of and strategies for developing CE is the community, which is a two-edged sword for school leadership, and especially leadership in CE. On the one hand, the community, according to school leaders (e.g., P1, P3, SPS13), could provide resources for CE and facilitate the development of different informal and school-based formal CE curricula. On the other hand, it could also negatively influence CE (P10, P11, P15, SPS3, and SPS12); for instance, SPS2 and SPS12 noted that it was difficult to train students' behaviors in a chaotic community environment, and SPS12 expressed that "our school community is very dirty, which decreases the effectiveness of our instruction on not throwing rubbish randomly, because in such environment, students could take throwing rubbish randomly for granted." Another community challenge confronting school leaders, according to P2, P7 and P19, was the diverse social values emerging in students' lives, particularly negative social phenomena that discounted or offset the effects of school CE and resulted in students' adoption of values that conflicted with those advocated in CE, or exposed them to ideas and concepts that did not favor value development (P2, P7, and P19). The third community challenge was uncontrolled violence; after several bloody incidents caused by external forces in 2010 and 2011, campus safety became a paramount concern for school leaders, as well as national and local governments (Zong 2010). Against this context, society, parents, and the government all demanded that school leaders direct students' values and train their behaviors. School leaders thus had to "be sensitive and wise in guiding teachers' and students' values" (P17) and take the community context into consideration when designing CE programs.

In summary, there are multiple factors—ranging from the international to the local community level—influencing school micro-politics and affecting principals' and SPSs' perceptions of CE, and their conflicting but reasonable dilemmas when responding to the CPC-led state's policies and requirements on CE, including between their hopes of gaining professional autonomy and the reality of being controlled by the CPC-led state, their desires of implementing their ideas for leading CE and being obedient to the CPC's authority, and their struggles with transmitting advanced political values through CE.

The Integration of Politics and Education

The dynamics in and complexities of school leaders' responses to state macro-politics, and their perceptions of and strategies for dealing with school micro-politics, partially account to by the CPC's strategy of integrating politics and

education. The CPC-led state at all levels has directed and controlled school leadership in general and CE leadership in particular to perpetuate its political values and preferences and to serve its political purposes. This integration can be seen in the CPC's macro-political control over two main aspects of school leadership—organizational control and controlling school leaders' career paths (i.e., through appointments, training, and evaluation).

The integration of politics and education to a large extent shape school leaders' dual responsibilities, their dilemma between satisfying political requirements and exercising their own professional autonomy, their views on leadership in CE, and the cooperation and competition between principals and SPSs. This section examines how the CPC-led state's control of school organization and school leaders' career path shape the subject principals' and SPSs' perceptions of and responses to school political actors in leading CE.

The State's Regulations on School Organization

The first element of the structural integration of education and politics is the CPC-led state's careful regulation on the nature, leadership system and tasks of the school organizations in which school leaders are situated and school leaders exercise power. The CPC-led state defines public schools as Work Units (*dan wei*), so as to centrally control them through a hierarchical structure that extends the state's leadership system to schools and ensures the CPC's ongoing influence therein. The CPC-led state's control over school organization not only influences school leaders' active and passive acceptance of CPC policies and regulations, but also impacts their perception of their leadership relationship, and their collaborative modification of macro-political actors' policies and requirements to meet interests of school and school members, and power competition between principals and SPSs.

China's school leadership has been embedded in a centralized "Work Unit". The Work Unit is a type of national public institution adopted by the CPC-led state as a means of taking the whole nation into its charge, and of centrally and forcibly collecting and redistributing its limited national resources. The central government of the CPC-led state divides the national institutions into different Work Units and constitute them in a large bureaucratic network, and then group most citizens (especially urban citizens) into different Work Units (He and Lv 2007; Zhao 1997). The Work Unit is responsible for providing almost everything necessary for its members' work, residence, and social intercourse, and for establishing rituals and guidance for its members political learning (Liu 2000; Teiwes 2011). To limit the number of citizens who can enjoy the privilege of Unit membership, the recruitment of new Unit members needs to be authorized by a higher level Work Unit; thus, for schools, teacher recruitment quotas are decided by educational authorities at the next higher level. In addition, the Work Unit approach allows the state to control schools' direction and leadership, and to ensure schools respond to the state's political and economic needs (J. Wang 2012).

To strengthen further the amalgamation of the CPC's administration and politics, the CPC-led state defines school Work Unit leaders' power to lead their schools. For instance, the PRS (introduced by the CPC Central Committee in 1985) affords principals and SPSs the same de jure rank, although principals are de facto the most powerful people in directing school development, distributing resources, carrying out punishments, and providing rewards and promotion opportunities. By contrast, SPSs are given less power over school administration and instead focus on school political work and on supporting and monitoring their principals' work. The interviewed SPSs were challenged by their lack of clear professional identity and by not sharing the same leadership status as their principals in school. Underlying the complex relationships between SPSs and principals was the fact that, to various extents, all of the interviewed SPSs felt uncomfortable with their professional identity in the complicated PRS, except for those SPSs who were also principals (e.g., P5, P11 and P15).

As heads of school Work Units, schools leaders in China play dual agency roles. On the one hand, they are regarded as "national cadres" who have a nominal official rank, follow and obey the CPC's leadership, enjoy CPC-prescribed privileges, and represent the CPC in carrying out its policies, propagandizing its ideology, and uniting with other members within its jurisdictional organization (H. Wang 2012). On the other hand, school leaders also play the role of "parents" to gain political, economic and social resources and opportunities for members of the larger family—the school Work Unit. School leaders thus struggle between explicit obedience and implicit resistance; they have to g*et al*ong with higher authorities to get more resources for their Work Units, while simultaneously adopting strategies to respond to higher authorities' requirements that conflicted with that Work Unit's needs (H. Wang 2012).

As national cadres, school leaders', and especially principals' autonomy in promoting school development and gaining resources for school members has been restricted by the CPC-led state, even though China's nascent market economy (which encourages schools to be self-developing and provides diverse income sources for school staff) has slightly diluted the schools' Work Unit status. The interviewed principals (e.g., P5 and P11) complained that their power over school leadership was far less than was suggested in state policies, and that they were dissatisfied about having to create new ideas for school administration but being restricted from using them; instead, the DEB dictated how they might spend school funds and who might be employed and promoted. P5, a male principal from a suburban Shanghai school, complained of being closely monitored by higher educational authorities, and of having "limited power to legally and independently run the school"; P3 pointed out that the extant school leadership system was actually a "CPC-led principal responsibility system" in which principals were the school's "responsible person" rather than its leader. At the same time, however, they searched for policy loopholes that would allow them to assert their professional autonomy. Similarly, the interviewed Shanghai SPSs spoke about state control over school administrative affairs (e.g., personnel, finance, and practicing school leaders' ideas), and suggested that principals endured more government

control. By contrast, the interviews showed that Shanghai SPSs complained less about the CPC's control of their political work, except for regulations that, according to SPS12, could be used to conduct ideo-political work.

Despite being constrained in terms of their professional autonomy in the Work Unit, the traditional notion of equating school leaders with national cadres has its inertia, and school leaders value their "national cadres" status. For example, the SMEC Professional Ranking System delinked principals' and SPSs' positions from national administrative ranks in all schools of Shanghai in 2001 and 2003, respectively; however, SPS19 indicated that she was proud of moving from principal of a non-key point junior secondary school to SPS of a municipal-level key point secondary school, as the latter was two levels higher than in the former in the national cadre rankings. HCED14, who was in the same district as SPS19, also mentioned SPS19's case and clarified that it was a promotion, despite the fact that principals were seen, within schools, as being more powerful than SPSs. Moreover, despite claiming to be professionals and complaining of their lack of professional autonomy, the school leaders wished to maintain their relationship with higher authorities, as the national cadre in the Work Unit should. As DEB appointee P7 expressed, "we are fed by the state, so we must fulfill our responsibilities." The tradition and stereotype of working in a Work Unit results in school leaders' role conflicts between being professional school leaders and being national cadres. Hu's (2015) investigation showed that 89.8 % of school principals agreed that principals should be professional, but only 16.5 % wanted to delink their position from their national cadre's rank.

The State's Control Over School Leaders' Appointment

The second element of the structural integration of education and politics involves controlling school leaders' appointment. As shown in the previous subsection, school leaders working in the Work Unit are regarded as national cadres, but are inhibited by the CPC-led state in terms of their power. This subsection describes how the CPC-led state not only controls key school leadership issues such as finance and personnel to direct what school leaders could do, but also school leaders' appointment to ensure they follow direction and as a way of recognizing candidates' capabilities. This could help to explain why school leaders implemented CPC-prescribed policies, and why there were power struggles between principals and SPSs.

Educational authorities from all levels are involved in school leaders' appointment. Specifically, the MoE prescribes macro requirements outlining minimum qualifications for principals, the SMEC makes more specific requirements regarding principals' political and administrative qualifications, and the DEB directly controls the selection and appointment of principals for public junior schools and oversee the selection and appointment of SPSs to ensure they are suited school political needs.

Principals and SPSs are appointed in three (slightly different) ways, with DEBs having the final say over their appointment. First, principals could be appointed through public recruitment, although P6 called this a sham, as DEBs pre-identified their preferred candidates and merely "adopted this mechanism to appear fair and meritocratic". Second, principals can be transferred from one school to another within the district; seven of the 16 interviewed principals were appointed in this way. As P9, who was transferred from School 15 to School 9, expressed, her transfer was "very simple," because the DEB did not seek her opinion before transferring her. Third, the DEB can promote reserved cadres (usually the deputy principal) or SPSs with outstanding teaching and administrative experience; seven of the 16 interviewed principals were promoted from deputy principal or SPS positions.

The first way of appointing SPSs is to elect them from reserve cadres from the next higher level who have been selected and reviewed by the DEB's Party Committee; although SPSs can be elected by school staff who are also CPC members, the DEB has the final say on the appointment. Second, SPSs can be directly appointed without an election (a fairly common exercise) by, for example, appointing a retiring principal to the position; as the DEB cannot forcibly retire old or incompetent principals, it instead reassigns them as SPSs and appoints young and competent principals in their place. The third way of appointing SPSs is by allocating the position to a principal; three of the respondent SPSs were recruited in this way. The DEB's promotion of SPSs to principals and appointment of retiring principals as SPS again demonstrates that principals are considered more important and capable than SPSs.

Being appointed as principal is both a recognition and a reward. Some of the interviewed principals were proud to have been appointed to their position, and expressed (e.g., P17) that "the CPC-led state's appointment makes principals [act as] national cadres". P9, though noting that being appointed to School 9 interfered with her plan of retiring in the school in which she had previously served, was proud that the DEB thought highly of her leadership and believed she could help develop School 9, which was "a disorder[ly] school."

By contrast, the interviewed SPSs in Shanghai complained about the DEB's autocratic appointment methods. Some pointed out that the DEB did not examine SPS candidates' professional experience, interests and personal desires, and thus failed to maximize the candidates' advantages. For example, SPS12 was good at teaching and applied the position of Deputy Principal of Teaching, but was appointed to the position of SPS, which she did not like and was not good at. She complained that having to take a position with which she was unfamiliar was a challenge and, as an inexperienced SPS, she had to make concessions to her principal, who was far more experienced than she.

Second, the respondent SPSs complained that the DEB's autocratic appointment methods restricted SPSs' freedom to choose the principals with whom they were to work. SPS12 described the pairing-up of SPSs and principals as a "forced match (*la lang pei*)", because the DEB did not consider whether the two could work well together before appointing them. SPS19 criticized that the DEB did not

contact school leader candidates, but only read their CVs, and thus knew little of their personality, leading to more conflicts than cooperation between SPSs and their principals, to the detriment of school development.

Third, some SPSs (e.g., SPS6 and SPS9) complained about the CPC-led state's policies for appointing SPSs as DPECs, arguing that simultaneously taking a political line position and a deputy position in the administrative line complicated the power balance and division of labor between SPSs and their principals; working alone, SPSs could inhibit principals' actions, but serving as DPCEs made SPSs into the principals' subordinates and limited their influence.

The State's Forcible Requirement for School Leaders' Professional and Political Trainings

The third element of the structural integration of education and politics concerns requiring principals and SPSs to attend pre- and in-service political training seminars except in a few special cases. Training in the pre-service period is general— i.e., no specific training for the role of principal or SPS—as the reserve cadre's future position (as principal, SPSs or permanent reserve cadre) has not yet been decided. In their in-service periods, however, candidates are asked to attend training sessions at and above the district level for at least seven days each year. Both their pre- and in-service training include ideo-political studies and professional training, and attendance is one criterion used by DEBs to appraise school leaders. The training, to some extent, could partly explain why school leaders actively accepted the CPC's policy on schools' political direction; why school principals identified with and implement policies on school safety and teachers' professional development in CE, while SPSs stressed constructing SPOs; why school leaders were familiar with the CPC's political orientation and requirements for transmitting political values in CE; why principals and SPSs were able to cooperate in school administration, political work and CE in particular; and why SPSs were disappointed with teachers' unwillingness to attend political education sessions.

Four levels of administration training have been established for principals and SPSs at the junior secondary school level in China (including Shanghai)— the MoE's National Education Administration College and Secondary School Principals Training Center at the national level, and educational colleges and normal universities (*shifan daxue*) at the provincial, municipal and county/district levels. The higher the training provider's level, the more prestigious its training is deemed to be. Principals' and SPSs' pre-service training is mainly provided by training centers at the county/district level, while their in-service training could be provided by training centers at higher levels, at the discretion of the DEB.

Principals' and SPSs' pre- and in-service political training is similar, except that the content of SPSs' in-service political training is deeper. Political training is organized on the district basis, and aims at cultivating school leaders' political

awareness and sensitivities, as well as their loyalty and devotion to the CPC-led state, and at making them CPC followers and contributors. According to school leaders, political training topics cover national situations, the CPC's history and work style, the behavioral standards of model CPC members, and newly issued national and local policies. For example, the Twelfth National Five-year Plan (2011) and the Medium and Long Term Education Plans of China and Shanghai (2010) were hot-button policies for Shanghai school leaders in 2011. Trainings are conducted using three major approaches—ideological indoctrination through seminars, criticism and self-criticism, and military training.

Although some interviewed school leaders considered their political training to be boring, hard to remember, and a form of "brainwashing (*xi nao*)" (P16), others regarded it as a way of learning more about the CPC's policies. P6, a female principal born in the 1950s and a CPC member, praised the section on the CPC's history in her political training, and advocated adding it to general teachers' training, as she was worried that young teachers were not capable of strengthening the CPC's leadership, or of cultivating students' communist faith. SPS6 and SPS14 noted that they supplemented the organized training by learning about CPC policies from newspapers and journals.

As principal and SPS candidates' pre-service professional training seminars are not position driven, they are largely similar. The training, which the interviewees generally deemed suitable, included such general topics as basic knowledge of school finances, strategies for building interpersonal relationships, and methods of dealing with perverse teachers, and is conducted through theoretical seminars, by shadowing experienced principals and through internships.

Principals' and SPSs' in-service professional training have different focuses. The former's is on school administration, including curriculum development skills, information technology, administrative tactics, CE, educational research, and logistics. SPSs' in-service professional training is similar to their political training, and aims at cultivating SPSs' competencies for developing their SPO, helping the CPC and its members become influential on campus, and leading other on-campus political organizations (e.g., CYL, YPC); in SPS7's opinion, SPSs' "professional and political training are closely related". The methods used in principals' and SPSs' in-service training are similar, and include attending meetings on policy interpretation, seminars given by educational experts and experienced principals, and visiting famous schools in Shanghai, other cities of China, or abroad. For example, SPS13 was offered the opportunity to visit some schools in Britain, Canada, Shandong Province and Hong Kong, while SPS6, having attended many professional training seminars, stated that the training provided opportunities to learn about the situation at home and abroad, strategies for guiding teachers, and ways of developing SPOs and conducting ideological work, but did not meet SPSs' need to know how to conduct political work effectively (e.g., recruiting Party members and uniting with non-CPC members) in the context of a diverse and utilitarian culture, and how to improve their leadership.

The State's Close Inspection of School Leaders' Work

The fourth structural integration element concerns the DEB's close inspection of principals' and SPSs' leadership using multiple DEB-appointed examiners. As shown in Chap. 3, one way in which Shanghai local educational authorities (the SMEC and DEB) implements national policies is through their evaluation policies for inspecting schools; CE, as a priority education project, is a key inspection area. The state's close inspection could help to explain why school leaders accepted policies and requirements with which they did not identify (especially written work requirements), why school leaders emphasized CE activities in designing school-based curriculum, and why school leaders promoted CE, when academic instruction was more emphasized by the community.

CE inspection in Shanghai is conducted mainly by inspecting specific CE programs, such as those on adolescents' ideo-morality, by evaluating school projects to award honors, and by inspecting general CE. These inspections, according to the interviewed SMEC official, focused on how school leaders' CE leadership. CE-specific inspections evaluated how school leaders exercised leadership in the three areas. The first area is planning, including making specific and consistent CE goals, establishing a CE leadership system and assigned each department CE responsibilities. The second area is implementing and administering, and covers making school-level CE regulations, organizing CE activities, improving the quality of CE subject teaching, organizing social services, organizing CYL and YPC activities, and enhancing teachers' professional morality. The third area concerns the effectiveness of school CE.

In addition to CE-specific inspections, the DEBs also conduct ad hoc school inspections without prior notification; during my visit to School 15, for example, the DEB suddenly arrived to inspect school discipline. In addition, the DEB, as mentioned by P15, also secretly inspected school discipline by observing how orderly students and the school administration were in the morning, as they came to school.

Another method of CE inspection in Shanghai is conducted through schools' annual and triennial general inspections, of which CE is an integral part. General school inspections have two parts. One involves inspecting how and to what extent the school leaders has maintained the school's daily operation, and includes examining how school leadership has been exercised, based on instructional flows, students' behavioral norms, school environment, teaching, and other work related to school administration. The second part addresses to what extent and with what strategies school leaders have developed the school and school-specific characteristics. Both parts have elements of CE inspection. For example, in SPS1's district, the DEB's triennial inspection on SPSs' work covered four areas based on the $1 + 3$ Policies of the Principal Responsibility System: assurance and supervision; group construction; ideological work (including CE); and constructing spiritual civilization. Although SPSs are inspected on their work in CE and most of the interviewed SPSs were DPCEs, it is worth noting that, SPS13 told it was the principals, rather than the SPSs, who took primary responsibility for CE during these inspections, because "being a DPCE is not an SPS's main responsibility".

Both types of inspection are led by inspection groups composed of educational officials, experienced teachers and experts, and are conducted using five triangulated approaches. The first involves reading two types of documents—school records (e.g., policies, budget and expenditure, students' academic and citizenship records, teachers' records of preparing classes), and principals' and SPSs' self-reported performance reports. Using DEB-provided templates, principals and SPSs primarily report on how they have demonstrated the CPC's political requirements and performed their professional morality (*de*), how they have led and developed the school (*zheng*), how much time they have spent on their work (*qin*), their achievements (*ji*), and whether they have integrity. The other four approaches are: listening to principals' and SPSs' oral reports on their work; observing the school's environment and facilities (e.g., classes, teachers' and students' activities, interviewing teachers and students); and administering a questionnaire survey to determine how teachers perceive their school work and school leadership.

Both types of CE inspections center on checking and evaluating what could be seen and calculated, including school policies made and activities organized, how the activities are organized, and what honors the school had been awarded for organizing them. Because, as DPCE3 explained, it was very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of CE, the DEB usually required schools to provide photos of required activities to ensure the school had actually organized and conducted them. Inspection content primarily emphasizes following the CPC's political requirements and promoting political education through CE.

The results of CE inspections are used as references when evaluating the school, school leaders, and teachers. A school that receives a good CE inspection report could be honored as "model school" and/or "school with unique characteristics," depending on the inspection program. School leaders and teachers who wish to apply for an outstanding CE educator award are primarily required to demonstrate their achievements in promoting socialist civilization, patriotism, and national spirit education (Shanghai Municipal Commission for Scientific Technology Education & Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2004). CE inspection results are also helpful when deciding school leaders' promotions. Principals, who are responsible mainly for school administration, are generally promoted based on their administrative achievements, but can also be promoted to a higher principal rank if they have excellent achievements in promoting political education through CE (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2003).

The Stakeholders' Challenges Confronting Both Principals and SPSs

Challenges from macro- and micro-political actors shape, to a large extent, how and to what extent principals and SPSs cooperate in response to those challenges, their views on CE, and their emphasis on promoting individual development through CE, placing academic instruction ahead of CE, and promoting teachers'

professional development. These challenges include social demands regarding student morality and behavior, parents' attitudes about their children, the interplay of multiple stakeholders' demands for high student academic performance, and challenges from schools' internal stakeholders.

Multiple Stakeholders' Demands on Students' Values and Behaviors

The interviews with school leaders showed that both principals and SPSs in Shanghai faced similar social demands to cultivate students' social morality and behaviors, though principals were the main persons in charge thereof. Stakeholders, including students' parents, other citizens and the government, expected schools to correct students' existing moral and behavioral problems, and often criticized school leaders for failing to do so, especially when violent crimes or antisocial behaviors occurred. For example, in the first half of 2011, principals and SPSs were asked to reexamine their CE offerings after a university student from Xi' an (in Shaanxi Province), Yao Jiaxin, drove his car over a woman, then stabbed her to death in an effort to evade responsibility for his actions. After this incident, schools were accused of cultivating cold-hearted and cruel students, and of having neglected their duty to foster prosocial behaviors.

   Among the multiple stakeholders, parents were regarded as the main source of challenges involving students' individual development. Parents passed the buck for fostering their children's value to schools, while principals and SPSs both criticized parents for not cooperating with schools by providing positive guidance to their children. P15, P17 and SPS13, for instance, complained that some students' parents could not provide a good family environment because they were addicted to drugs, ran pornographic businesses, or were divorced; such parents, the school leaders argued, could "ignore their child's disabilities," "neglect to educate them," or "direct them in a way contrary to school education" (P15, P17 and SPS13), and most probably negatively affected the students' values system. On the other hand, most families in Shanghai, the interviewed school leaders asserted, had only one child and tended to spoil that child, which decreased the effectiveness of schooling and placed added pressure on educators. P17, for instance, noted that, to make their child happy and prevent them from becoming tired, some parents asked that their child be excused from schools' morning runs and similar exercises aimed at improving students' physical condition; P17 had to negotiate with and persuade parents to allow their child to exercise. Other school leaders (P10 and SPS9) spent more time and energy seeking parent approved strategies to promote students' individual development, and on influencing how parents educated their single child. P10 developed "a program… to deal with the poor condition of the students' family background and qualification," while P11, working with the larger community, organized a series of "fashion family" activities to show parents how to care for their child and improve the parent–child relationship.

Interviews with principals and SPSs showed that parents, the community and higher authorities all saw student morality and behavior as indicative of school quality and school leadership, which affected not only schools' images, but also school leaders' personal careers. Multiple stakeholders' demands for students' individual development could help to explain why promoting students' moral standards and social behaviors norms became school leaders' common concern, and why they consistently placed them ahead of transmitting political values.

The Interplay of Diverse Stakeholders' Demands on High Student Academic Performance

The second challenge confronting the subject principals and SPSs in Shanghai is the interplay among employers', parents' and the CPC-led state's demands for good academic performance, by which measure they evaluate schools' and school leaders' performance. These multiple demands could help to explain the similarities in principals' and SPSs' reasons and strategies for modifying policies and requirements placing CE ahead of academic instruction, as well as the differences in their abilities to do so.

Employer, parental and governmental demands surrounding students' academic performance, especially examination scores, were interconnected and mutually affective; P17 briefly explained the interplay of multiple stakeholders' interests in CE:

> Having only one child, parents want him (her) to get high score to win the competition of higher-level education and employment. If the only child fails in their examination, the parents usually feel disappointed. To satisfy parents' requirement and maintain the harmonious society, the educational administrative authorities force school to enhance students' score. If the educational administrative authorities do not require too much on score, I would also lower my requirement.

P17 attributed the responsibility for emphasizing examination scores mainly to parents. However, this study, by examining the literature and analyzing data from interviews, shows that the CPC-led state has been the most important actor exercising influence and exerting pressure on school leadership in pursuit of improved academic performance.

The CPC-led state has, since the 1980s, consistently enacted policies to improve students' academic performance to serve its nation-building goals. As shown in Chap. 3, the CPC-led state restored the key point school program in the early 1980s to recruit students with good examination scores. Moreover, it designed the examinations and examination system to emphasize student scores, and utilized China's traditional examination culture to advertise and demonstrate that those who were successful in the examination system were outstanding individuals. Building on this, in the late 1980s the CPC-led state introduced a policy requiring graduates to apply for jobs themselves, rather than be allocated to a state-designated organization and position. The three strategies provide employers and the labor market with solid indicators of potential employees' qualities and

focus parents' attention on cultivating their child's academic success. The inter-viewed principals complained that stakeholders' common concerns about students' academic performance were transferred to school leaders, who made a priority in their leadership.

The CPC-led state regarded school academic performance, especially examination scores, as a key consideration in evaluating schools and school leaders (principals in particular), chiefly because educational authorities and all levels of government saw examination scores as clear, concrete, and (most important) easily and quickly processed (P1, P3, SPS6 and SPS8). As such, principals competed with each other over students' scores, striving to surpass their rivals (even if only by a "trivial gap"), and over the number of students who entered municipal and district key point schools. They also, as P10 admitted, made efforts to enhance exam scores.

All the interviewed school leaders confessed that enhancing students' academic performance favored not only the school, but also the school leaders' and teachers' professional development. Consistently ensuring their students achieved high academic scores could result in a school being publicly recognized as a good school. Good schools not only had access to much richer DEB resources, they also attracted better students and students with high socioeconomic status. Thus, a good reputation could launch a school onto a positive development cycle, particularly after school choice began to be implicitly allowed in Shanghai, in 2011.

Moreover, students' good academic performance provided instant feedback, honor and promotion opportunities to school leaders and teachers. For instance, P1 reported that the major reason the DEB promoted him to principal, was that he had quickly enhanced students' examination scores when he was deputy principal of instruction in School 1. In another interview, P3 noted that "it is common in China that teachers who have outstanding teaching records tend to be promote to school leaders and then (sometimes) educational officials (*jiao er you ze shi*)."

The CPC-led state's emphasis on academic performance is intensified by parental expectations and the market, including employers' recruitment criteria, which focus on students' educational experience—e.g., their obtained degree, the institution from which they graduated, and the major they studied. Although many factors impacted student employment, it is generally thought that those who graduate from 'hot' majors at good universities enjoy a job-hunting advantage. Moreover, as the quality of students' educational experience is assessed largely based on their school examination record [particularly their examination scores for entering higher level education, such as the university entrance examination (*gao kao*)], parents increasingly rely on schools to ensure their child has a good educational experience and promising job opportunities.

Situating in the examination and evaluation system, school leaders told they had no choice but to play within the rules of game. According to P17,

> This system is like a running train, and principals are passengers on the train. If the train does not stop, principals dare not get off, or they would die. Therefore, what principals could do is following the rules of train and do what they can do on it.

While ensuring and enhancing students' academic performance are mainly principals' responsibilities, SPSs also face demands that they help students to perform well academically. As SPS13 explained, many parents "value academic performance above the cultivation of healthy values". SPS12 noted that some parents even asked her school to teach their children examination skills and techniques for getting higher scores on internal and public examinations,[1] while the government, as SPS6, SPS7, SPS8, and SPS19 related, required SPSs to "serve academic instruction." Examination scores, SPS19 further noted, were used by parents, the public and higher authorities to assess school performance and that of school leaders, including SPSs. In other words, improving student examination performance, SPS7 and SPS11 explained, could produce "quick effects" that benefited both the school and its leaders,[2] and SPSs (e.g., SPS2 and SPS3) were more than willing to assist and cooperate with their principals on this aspect.

Challenges from School Internal Stakeholders

The third challenge confronting the subject Shanghai principals and SPSs is their micro-political interactions with subordinates. The interviews showed that their subordinates' micro-politics impressed principals and SPSs in different ways. Principals expressed their concern about teachers' knowledge and attitudes when interacting with students, while SPSs focused on their relationships with their subordinates, especially HCEDs. This could partly explains why principals actively supported higher authorities' policies and requirements promoting teacher development, why school leaders stressed students' individual development, and why principals and SPSs vied for their subordinates' support in their power competition.

The interviewed principals criticized teachers for not being competent or knowledgeable enough to carry out their instructions for fostering students. P6 lamented that her teachers, despite being motivated by inspiring words, could not put those words into action, as they did not know how. Moreover, most of the interviewed principals complained that teachers lacked sufficient knowledge of psychology to understand and resolve students' problems. According to P17, both old teachers (those born in or before the 1970s) and single-child teachers (born in the 1980s)[3] had problems communicating with students; the former often owned values and viewpoints quite different from their students', while the latter tended to be spoiled and self-centered, did not care about their students' psychological

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid.

[3]To control the growth of population, the CPC Central Committee advocated that one couple can give birth only one child in 1980, and then forcibly carried out this "single-child policy" particularly in urban area of China. When the fieldwork of this research was conducted in 2011, the single-child who were born in 1980s got their degree of working in secondary schools.

needs, and did not know how to communicate with students and their parents. Principals, therefore, had to take a more direct role in promoting students' individual development and guiding teachers' attitudes toward their students.

The respondent principals also complained that teachers' characters and values were not sufficient for promoting students' individual development. P6, P8 and P17, for example, complained that most young, single-child teachers were "selfish and bad tempered," and cared more about "their own happiness" than students' needs and troubles. Moreover, teachers were utilitarian, in that they emphasized academic instruction more than CE, because the former could bring them honors, awards and promotion. P10 and many other interviewed principals noted that the teachers who were not class heads taught only the subject content, and "care little about CE."

Despite complaining about teachers' ignorance of CE, the interviewed principals showed understanding of and sympathized with teachers' emphasis on their own happiness and academic achievement. P7, for example, pointed out that "teachers' lives in China are far worse than [imagined in] Marx's Communism, in which people are rich and have full leisure time to develop themselves," and explained that "if there is no economic richness, there would be no dignity," because teachers are "also human beings, could not do anything nobler than their need level." To supplement teachers' insufficiencies, principals tried to use professional development programs to guide teachers' professional conduct and communications with students, and to instruct them on how to conduct CE.

The respondent SPSs were disturbed that their subordinates neither valued SPSs' political work nor saw SPSs as influential leaders in school administration, which subordinates saw as more important. The interviewed SPSs (e.g., SPS5 and SPS7) noted, with disappointment, that only one-third of teachers in their schools were CPC members, and the remainder were reluctant to join. SPS4 and SPS13 were unhappy that teachers marked students' work and examination papers during SPSs-run training seminars, but could not criticize them, as academic performance and scores were important to school.

The SPSs' dissatisfaction with subordinates was reinforced by their subordinates' perceptions of principals' and SPSs' roles and functions in school leadership. Subordinates who directly assisted SPSs in CE (e.g., HCED1, DPCE10, and DPCE20) regarded their SPSs as their principals' "assistants" or "strategists", and therefore as less important.[4] In practice, according to HCED2, she often "sought advice… [about their] work on CE from the principal than from the SPS."[5] According to SPS2, subordinates' support for principals was a result of principals' power to determine promotions; for that reason, SPSs tried to match their perceived leadership status with their professional ranking in school, so as to solicit support from higher authorities and compete for power with their principals, even in the formal CE curriculum, which was mainly in the latter's portfolio. To varying

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[4]This sentence is directly quoted from Xu and Law (2015).
[5]Ibid.

extents, these challenges shaped SPSs' responses to leadership concerns and behaviors when dealing with school micro-politics, affected SPSs' working relationships with micro-political school actors, and informed how they perceived their professional identity and leadership status.

The Impact of Principals' and SPSs' Individual Factors

The third type of factor affecting the subject principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE is the school leaders' individual characteristics. The dynamic interactions between principals and SPSs in leading school and CE are affected by each party's personality, gender and leadership experience, the interplay among which shaped their attitudes, strategies, and power distribution.

First, principals' and SPSs' personalities could impact how they share responsibilities. SPS19 emphasized that how well the two heads' personalities meshed largely "determine[d] whether they could work and unite closely" and therefore could have "great impacts on the overall strength of the school leadership." She further observed that "more conflicts between the principal and SPS would arise" if either felt "they are better than their partner." Most of the interviewed SPSs (e.g., SPS6, SPS8, and P15) agreed that it was easier to cooperate with a principal if their personalities were "complementary", particularly if the SPS were "modest" and the principal "strong". As SPS8 explained, modesty could help SPSs "reduce conflicts with principals" and "gain [the] trust and support" (*jiao xin*) of the teaching staff, while strength—such as being resolute and dominant—could help principals "establish their authority as school decision-maker" and "facilitate the implementation of their decisions."[6]

Moreover, the gender stereotypes embodied in the masculine–feminine paradigm could also impact principals' and SPSs' cooperation and power competition in school and CE leadership. Similar to Law's (2013) finding, the interviewed principals and SPSs in this study, though demonstrating some cross-gender characteristics, held the stereotypical view that male school leaders could be strong, rational and aggressive, while female school leaders tended to be weak, intuitive and caring. In this study, there were three major types of principal/ SPS gender pairings. The first type featured a male principal and a female SPS (e.g., Schools 1, 3, and 7).[7] This gender combination, according to two female school leaders (P15 and SPS19), facilitated a "more cooperative [leadership] partnership" than other gender combinations, because the two could "cooperate by playing the roles of mother and father in a family, respectively,"[8] fathers tended to have more authority and be more rigid, while mothers were more inclined to be gentle and

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[6]Except the first sentence, this paragraph is directly quoted from Xu and Law (2015).

[7]Except the first two sentence, this paragraph is directly quoted from Xu and Law (2015).

[8]This sentence is directly quoted from Xu and Law (2015).

considerate. Principals' quasi-paternal role could "inspire them to assume responsibility for developing the school and protecting its staff and students, much as a father manages his family and cares for its members" (SPS1). The SPSs' role as mother, P15 noted, might help them to understand school members' ideological tendencies and create a buffer between principals and teachers, much as a mother gets along with both her children and their father. This view was shared by other female SPS respondents (e.g., SPS1, SPS12, and SPS13), all of whom "highly respected" the leadership of their male principals, and praised their principals' authority and competencies.

In a second gender combination, both the principal and SPS were female (e.g., Schools 4 and 9) and tended to compete with each other for dominance. In her interview, P15, who was also a SPS, reflected on the level of cooperation she had experienced with female ex-principals in the past, and shared that she, P15, felt the need to "struggle for more power" in such areas as the allocation of resources to CE.[9] In separate interviews, SPS4 and P4 recounted competing to have their contributions recognized and to establish leadership over CE; similar situation was described by SPS9 and P9, again in separate interviews.[10]

The third kind of gender combination concerned a female principal and a male SPS (e.g., Schools 2 and 6). SPS2 and SPS6 explicitly complained about the strong leadership exercised by their female principals and criticized them for "having the most power" over CE and political work on campus.[11] Their female principals also made more efforts to decrease their male SPSs' power, through such tactics as reducing their responsibilities in CE.

Lastly, the working relationships and power distribution between principals and SPSs could be further complicated by their different levels of leadership ability and professional experience in three major and related ways. First, SPSs who had served longer than their principals at a given school might be afforded more respect by the latter. For instance, SPS8 and SPS13 had worked, respectively, 6 and 8 years longer at their schools than had their principals; as a result, their principals often asked their "advice" and relied on their "support" in decision making, because they knew "more about [the] school situation" and had "stronger interpersonal relationship[s] with other staff."[12]

Second, SPSs who had CE leadership experience (as HCEDs or DPCEs) prior to being promoted might have "more say" on school CE policy-making and decisions than SPSs without such experience, as P2 indirectly admitted when interviewed.[13]

Third, differences in principals' and SPSs' overall professional experience could influence the support each received from their subordinates and affect their

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[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

leadership in CE. SPSs, according to SPS19, could garner more staff support if they fostered stronger relationships with higher authorities (e.g., by inviting education officials to visit their schools) or if they had more or stronger professional experience (such as having conducted school-based research and/or published academic papers, both criteria for teacher promotion). Moreover, some interviewed school leaders (e.g., SPS8 and P16) asserted that teachers more often listened to and obeyed principals than SPSs, who were seen as "less competent" or as having less "knowledge, skill and vision of teaching, and leadership in school administration and CE." They further shared that teachers tended to seek advice from principals, rather than SPSs, even on CE matters. Schools 2 and 4 (P2 and P4) provided useful examples of how principals made use of their passion for and expertise in their leadership areas to develop school-based CE curricula—P2 established an in-school psychological education center and integrated its activities with CE, while P4 focused the school's CE curriculum on artistic and aesthetic themes.[14]

Summary

By analyzing data from literature review, interviews and observation, this book has demonstrated that principals' and SPSs' cooperation, competition and responses toward the CPC-led state's policies and requirements in four scenarios (active acceptance, passive acceptance, supportive modification, and unsupportive modification) are shaped by multiple factors in a dynamic system comprising contextual factors ranging from the international to the local community level, and involving macro- and micro-political actors. This chapter has shown that these contextual factors possibly impact school leaders' perceptions of leadership, their strategies for responding to macro- and micro-political actors, and situate school leaders in a series of dilemmas between their desire to learn from the world against their mission to uphold the CPC's principles of CE, between their eagerness to gain professional autonomy and their obedience to the CPC-led state, and between their service to the CPC-led state and the demands of their community.

The dynamics of the system can be reflected in two ways. First, the main macro-political actor—the CPC-led state from the national to the local level—is the key director of school leaders' choice of CE content and position and strategies for leading CE, and the dominant actor driving the labor market's and micro-political actors' (parents, teachers, and school leaders) different expectations of school education and CE. The reason why school leaders actively and passively accepted the CPC-led state's policies and requirements, and why they mediated between those requirements, the needs of school development and their own pursuit of professional autonomy and power, can partly be explained by the CPC-led state's strategy of integrating politics and education, and its requirements for cultivating "Expert" citizens by improving students' academic performance. The

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[14]Except the last half sentence, the whole paragraph is directly quoted from Xu and Law (2015).

integration of politics and education controls school organization, school leaders' career paths, and defines school leaders' roles in and relationship with the state.

School leadership in CE in the case schools was also influenced by the interplay between macro- and micro-political actors. The CPC-led state's emphasis on student academic performance and related policies interacted with parents and employers' concerns, resulting in school leaders' supportive modification of CPC-led state policies prioritizing CE over academic instruction. To balance and mediate macro- and micro-politial actors' interests in CE, school leaders emphasized students' individual development (within the CPC's political framework) and stressed CE activities in the CE curriculum.

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Chapter 8
Discussion and Conclusion: School Leadership in CE as a Political Exercise

This book has explored how school leadership in CE in China has been shaped by contexts ranging from the international to the school level, and by interactions between and among actors within that multi-leveled context. To address this issue, the study selected Shanghai as a case and adopted a macro- and micro-political theoretical perspective on political school leadership as its guiding framework (e.g., Blase 1991; Blase and Anderson 1995), as explained in Chap. 2. Chapters 3 and 4 provides the macro-political context at the national and local levels for the study, by describing how the CPC Central Committee employs a dual-line hierarchical leadership system to control and direct national political, economic and educational (including CE and school leadership) change, as well as explaining how the local-level CPC-led state, by following the CPC's direction and adapting to social changes, make local policies on education, school leadership and CE, and what the policies were. Chapters 5–7 presents the empirical findings on how school principals and SPSs in Shanghai, as micro-political actors, perceived and responded to the demands of the CPC-led state (China's most powerful macro-political actor), how they interacted with each other and with other micro-political actors to fulfill their responsibilities and meet the various demands of school and CE leadership, and what factors affected them.

This book has also identified how the leadership of Shanghai school leaders in CE is shaped, exercised, and constrained. The case study of Shanghai's school leaders gives rise to the concept of school leadership as a political exercise, which lends understanding to the meaning of school leadership, state–school relationships, and the roles of school leaders in mediating between macro- and micro-political actors.

This chapter begins by reviewing the meaning of school leadership in CE in the context of Shanghai, China. Next, it explains the concept of school leadership as a "political exercise" to explain the dynamics and complexities in CE, and the role of school leaders in conducting CE. Finally, it discusses the theoretical

contributions of this book, by revisiting extant theories on CE, political school leadership, school micro-politics and CE leadership.

The Meaning of School Leadership in CE in Shanghai

The process of leading CE observed in this study is complex and dynamic, and involved fulfilling school leaders' administrative and political responsibilities and responding to school macro- and micro-politics, and the intertwined influence thereof. A key issue informing the process of interacting with macro- and micro-political actors in leading CE, involves multiple stakeholders' diverse interests in the dual-line school leadership system, which is established and directed by the CPC-led state as an extension of its state governance structure. In this system, two equally ranked heads—the principal and the SPS—bear primary responsibility for school administrative and political work, respectively, in addition to having intertwined responsibilities within both fields. The principals and SPSs experienced both cooperation and competition in their interactions with each other, and with the CPC-led state, in pursuing their political and administrative responsibilities.

As shown in Chap. 4, the CPC-led state assigns principals and SPSs various intertwined administrative and political responsibilities. In Shanghai schools, principals are mainly in charge of administrative areas, such as overseeing and making decisions on school administrative affairs, development, daily maintenance, and curriculum. In addition, principals are assigned such political responsibilities as directing and monitoring school political orientation, collaborating with SPSs and the SPO, and accepting SPO monitoring.

Similar to principals, SPSs are also assigned both political and administrative responsibilities, but mainly the former. SPSs have five main political responsibilities: monitoring school political orientation; strengthening school political work; cultivating and promoting school cadres; maintaining school unity; and leading students' CE. SPSs' administrative responsibilities include discussing and monitoring school decision making, guiding the Teacher Congress, supporting and monitoring principals' work, and motivating other school staff. In addition, SPSs are expected to serve the school administration through their political work, participate in school administration as a political leader, and simultaneously occupy administrative and political positions. SPSs are in charge of CE's political orientation, exercise influence in its curriculum, create school climate, evaluate teachers' and students' performance, and direct the CYL and YPC.

Even though principals' and SPSs' responsibilities have major differences, in that principals are the key leaders in administrative areas and SPSs the key leaders in school political areas, their responsibilities are intertwined in three major ways: interconnections between their political and administrative responsibilities; overlapping responsibilities; and involvement in each other's responsibilities.

Principals' and SPSs' responsibilities are further complicated by the fact that SPSs could concurrently occupy administrative positions, such as principal or

DPCE, and that principals who were Party members could also be deputy SPSs. The complexities of their intertwined responsibilities are reflected in their leadership of CE. Principals take full charge of CE, although SPSs regarded it as part of their political work; there is no clear division of labor between the two.

To ensure school leaders fulfilled their CE leadership responsibilities, the CPC-led state, as shown in Chaps. 3–7, controls them through three main strategies. The first is to establish a centralized dual-line educational leadership system and extend it to school level, and adopting a Work Unit approach to centrally direct and confine school leaders and allocate their resources. The second strategy involves defining principals' and SPSs' political and administrative qualifications as secondary to their political qualifications (e.g., adhering to the CPC's political ideology, supporting its leadership and carrying out its policies). The third strategy is to control school leaders' career paths through appointment, training, inspection and evaluation.

Despite being tightly controlled by the state, principals and SPSs could facilitate and even challenge their responsibilities, as defined in national and local policies, in four ways: active acceptance; passive acceptance; supportive modification; and unsupportive modification. The first two scenarios are related to school leaders' facilitation of the responsibilities assigned them by the state in the manner prescribed by the state; the latter two scenarios are about school leaders' challenges of those responsibilities. Chapter 5 has shown that there were similarities and differences in the policies and requirements the principals and SPSs implemented, and in their views of and strategies for those policies and requirements.

In Scenario I—active acceptance—both principals and SPSs agreed with and implemented as designed policies and requirements relating to the CPC's political orientation of CE, providing a safe school environment, and promoting teachers' professional development. Principals and SPSs offered similar reasons for ensuring the political orientation of CE; however, their reasons for agreeing and their implementing strategies differed. For example, principals agreed with policies and requirements on providing a safe campus and promoting teachers' professional development for largely administrative reasons, and used their administrative authority to implement them; SPSs, however, approved of the policies for political reasons and implemented them as part of their ongoing school political work.

Scenario II, passive acceptance, refers to carrying out state policy as mandated, despite not agreeing with its goals and/or methods. Both principals and SPSs took this approach to policies and requirements on such topics as the need for large amounts of written work and the need for frequent school inspections. Principals tended to see such policies as ill-advisedly increasing CPC control over school administrative areas, while SPSs mostly objected to the increased workload, although both resisted school inspections on the basis that they were work disruptions and yielded inaccurate data. Principals also did not identify with the DEB's control over school funding and personnel matters, which impacted CE and limited principals' professional autonomy.

In supportive modification scenarios, principals and SPSs agreed with the intent of CE policies and regulations, but modified the ways in which they were

implemented, for various strategic reasons. Such policies and requirements included making the transmission of political values in CE a priority, establishing the primacy of CE over school work and pursuing the development of school-based CE curricula. Principals were more influential than SPSs in modifying these policies.

Finally, in unsupportive modification scenarios, principals and SPSs did not support policies and requirements that did not benefit them, and thus chose to modify their implementation. Principals tended to do so through policies and requirements relating to their administrative responsibilities, while SPSs did so through policies affecting their political responsibilities and CE.

Principals' and SPSs' views on CE, as shown in Chap. 5, can be seen in the dilemmas they faced. The first dilemma was between giving priority to transmitting the CPC's political values and promoting students' individual development. Both principals and SPSs agreed on the importance of transmitting political values in CE, but emphasized promoting students' individual development in morality, social behaviors and life skills, claiming that only well-developed students could accept and facilitate the transmission of political values. A second dilemma concerned how to position CE. Both principals and SPSs, as shown in Chap. 5, saw CE as a basis for school work and students' individual development, but could not place it ahead of academic instruction for macro- and micro-political reasons.

As for sharing responsibilities in CE, Chap. 6 has shown that principals and SPSs both cooperated and competed with each other, and extended their cooperation and competition from CE to school general leadership. Their cooperation was reflected in principals' and SPSs' similar responses in modifying the emphasis placed on CE, the relative positioning of CE and academic instruction, and the development of school-based CE curriculum. In addition, principals made use of SPSs' political work to facilitate school administration, deal with macro- and micro-politics, support SPSs' political work, and collaborate with SPSs in CE. SPSs cooperated with principals' administrative efforts, which at times required SPSs to make concessions. Principals competed with SPSs to expand their power in school and consolidate their position as school decision-maker by reducing SPSs' influence in, or excluding them from, school decision making. SPSs primarily competed to gain power in school decision making. Principals, due to their positional power, had more opportunities to enhance their authority and get support from subordinates. Principals' and SPSs' power competition was most fierce in CE, as both had responsibilities therein. Principals could use their power and experience to inhibit SPSs' involvement in CE; SPSs thus fought to exercise influence in CE.

As shown in Chap. 7, certain intertwined factors affected principals' and SPSs' perceptions of their leadership in CE, and their strategies for interacting with macro- and micro-political actors, including: multi-leveled contexts, from the international to the school level; the state's integration of politics and education; the challenges and demands facing principals and SPSs from multiple political actors; and, principals' individual factors, including their personality, gender and work experience.

In summary, school leadership in CE in Shanghai can be understood as a process in which school leaders interacted with multiple actors to balance diverse

interests and fulfill administrative and political responsibilities. Principals and SPSs interacted with different actors using different strategies. Principals and SPSs hewed to the CPC's political bottom line in implementing its policies and requirements in school; however, they also adjusted several policies and regulations to reflect their administrative and political responsibilities and facilitate proper school administration. Working as equally ranked school leaders, principals and SPSs could collaboratively respond to macro- and micro-political school actors' interests, cooperate with each other to meet their own responsibilities, or compete for power in school. Principals' and SPSs' influence in and strategies for CE during the interactions with different actors suggests that school leadership in CE can best be understood as a "political exercise", as discussed in the next section.

School Leadership in CE as a Political Exercise

From its analysis of school leaders' interactions with macro- and micro-political school actors in Shanghai, this book suggests that the concept of school leadership in CE in Shanghai can best be viewed as a political exercise—a process in which school leaders employ their leadership knowledge, skills, and strategies to guide and manage CE by: (a) interacting with actors at the macro- and micro-political levels; (b) maneuvering their political and administrative responsibilities; and (c) addressing and mediating the diverse interests of macro- and micro-political actors, competing demands for civic and academic outcomes, and the dilemma between exercising their professional autonomy and completing their prescribed responsibilities and duties. In the process, school leaders actively maneuver their responsibilities and multiple actors' diverse interests within the state-permitted political framework.

Conceptualizing school leadership in CE as a political exercise differs from rational leadership theory, which describes school leadership as a hierarchical activity that aims at achieving organizational goals through close monitoring, strict procedures and rules, a clear division of labor, impersonal orientation, and career orientation. Rational theory enumerates some characteristics of modern schools, but is, as this book has demonstrated, too simplistic to explain the dynamics and complexities of the school leadership process. Despite controlling school leadership with a dual-line system, the CPC-led state could not ensure that school leaders fully agreed with and used prescribed strategies to implement its policies and requirements to achieve intended goals. Even though there was a division of labor among school leaders, this book has shown that it is neither clear nor rigid; school leaders are assigned intertwined political and administrative responsibilities that are difficult to separate.

This book challenges rational leadership theory's view that school leadership activities are independent from the school environment and the political actors in that environment; instead, it asserts that school leaders interact with macro- and micro-political school actors through different strategies and for different reasons.

In this case specifically, school leaders motivated their subordinates through resources and interpersonal relationships, united school staff, conducted ideo-political work to strengthen their sense of belonging and to mobilize them, sat-isfied macro- and micro-political school actors' expectations and demands, and gained their support in their power competition, rather than merely exerting school leadership through impersonal orientation and career orientation. As such, the con-cept of rational leadership is not appropriate for understanding school leadership in CE, especially in the Chinese context.

Conceptualizing school leadership in CE as a political exercise also differs from systematic leadership theory, which views school as a social system that receives from and contributes to the whole context, and as an structural organiza-tion characterized by goal consensus (Hoy and Miskel 2005). This theory, while acknowledging that there are micro-politics within schools, does not examine the dynamic and complex interactions between school macro- and micro-politics, how different actors in the system shape leadership in CE, or how school leaders respond to those influences. These insufficiencies are supplemented by this book, which has presented the state's various strategies for influencing school leadership and CE, school leaders' perceptions of and responses to the state, and the complex interactions between school leaders and other micro-political actors.

Conceptualizing school leadership in CE as a political exercise also disputes the idea that school leadership in China is fully controlled by the state. Child (1994) proposed that Chinese school leaders are passive representatives under the CPC-led state's full control, with no freedom or autonomy in developing school and no intention to gain any. Child's concept ignores school leaders' efforts to gain autonomy through their contentions with the state; it also neglects the influence of school members, parents and community, and of the multi-leveled contexts in which they are situated, on school leadership and school leaders' relationships with the state. The case of Shanghai has shown that school leaders are not neces-sarily passive actors in CE; on the contrary, they can interact with the CPC-led state and other actors, responding to, meeting or mediating their diverse interests.

In other words, this book demonstrates that, in the process of leading CE, school leaders actively and continually respond to and mediate the diverse inter-ests of macro- and micro-political actors through various political strategies. The following sections present, in detail, the characteristics of the concept of school leadership in CE as a political exercise.

Political Exercise as Intertwined Interactions of Political Actors in Multi-leveled Contexts

The first characteristic is that school leadership in CE is influenced by contexts ranging from the international level to the national, local and school levels, and by the interplays between political actors in those multi-leveled contexts. This section discusses how these forces influence school leadership in CE in different ways.

The first contextual factor shaping school leadership in CE is international forces. As shown in Chap. 7, to school leaders, international forces are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they can motivate school leaders to adapt to international trends when choosing their concerns about and strategies of leading CE, through such means as school leaders' self-learning, training and partnerships with schools in other countries. On the other hand, the negative influences and values inherent in international forces could disrupt school leaders' efforts to transmit mainstream Chinese values (e.g., nationalism, loving China's cultural inheritance) to students. School leaders thus need to filter negative factors or reduce their influence in order to cultivate students' national identity and promote their individual development within the CPC's macro-politics.

The second contextual factor shaping school leadership in CE concerns factors at the Chinese national level. As introduced in Chap. 3, this study found that state macro-politics have shaped and directed state governance, economic development, political construction, and education, including school leadership and CE. The CPC-led state has adjusted economic policies according to its political needs, and introduced numerous policies focusing on China's economic development and market economy. Accordingly, the CPC-led state has reformed education and redefined school leadership and CE to serve its economic and political development in different periods, but still tightly controlled both. In addition to CPC-issued policies, Chap. 7 has shown that such Chinese cultural elements as respect for authority, extending the self to the broader society, and being "Red and Expert" have been utilized by the CPC-led state to guide school leaders, shape the micro-politics between school leaders and teachers, and guide school leaders' perceptions of CE and strategies of leading CE, including positioning CE and academic performance. Chapter 7 has also discussed that, in periods of economic development, the CPC-led state introduced policies—such as the restoration of key schools, the reform of employment and the expansion of education—that drive school leaders to emphasize academic performance.

The third contextual factor is the local context of Shanghai and the community in which the schools are situated. Shanghai's culture of active learning from international sources and the advantages that learning bestowed have influenced school leaders to update their leadership strategies, gain professional autonomy, and emphasize students' individual development. Shanghai school leaders, however, needed to mediate international influences and national demands, filtering the negative aspects of the former and prioritizing the latter. In addition to municipal factors, other local community factors could also affect school leadership and CE, whether by providing additional resources for CE or by deteriorating the environment in which it was situated and causing troubles for school leaders.

In addition to contextual factors, various micro-political factors also influence school and CE leadership, including parents, principals' and SPSs' subordinates (e.g., other school leaders, teachers and students), and individual principals and SPSs. Principals and SPSs had to respond to, among other factors: single-child parents' tendency to spoil their child, disinterest in their child's value development, and expectations of their child's academic performance and individual development; issues relating to teachers' professional qualifications and morality; and their own interpersonal relationships with school leaders.

These factors are not independent of but interplay with each other to affect principals' and SPSs' responsibilities in CE, as well as their strategies for sharing responsibilities and leading CE. The CPC-led state's policy of opening up to the world exposed school leaders to international norms and ideas and to the possibility of actively learning from foreign developed countries, while its policy of ensuring school follow its leadership and approaches to integrating politics and education placed limits on school leaders' autonomy. The national traditional culture and the local culture, to some extent, both shape school leaders' attitudes toward the CPC-led state and their subordinates, and create dilemmas for school leaders following the national culture (especially political culture) and demonstrating the characteristic of the local culture. The CPC-led state's proposed "Red and Expert" culture directs school leaders' responsibilities, and places them in a dilemma by forcing them to choose how to distribute their efforts between CE and academic performance, as the state evaluates schools based on academic performance, but requires school leaders to prioritize CE. The dilemma is reinforced when parents', employers' and fellow citizens' demands regarding students' academic performance and individual development drive principals and SPSs to improve collaboratively their subordinates' qualifications in these two areas.

Other micro-political actors' attitudes toward principals and SPSs also affected their working relationship, and both principals and SPSs vied for the support of other micro-political actors so as to gain an advantage in their competition for school power. School leaders' individual characteristics, such as personality, gender and professional experience, also affected their behaviors, attitudes and the source of their authority (Winkler 2010), as well as their strategies for and influence when sharing responsibilities.

In summary, international forces could drive school leaders to update their perspectives on and strategies for CE, but could also introduce negative influences school leaders needed to filter. Factors at the national level shape school leaders' perceptions of school leadership and CE, their responsibilities and strategies therein, and their interactions with macro- and micro-political actors. At the local level, Shanghai's political, economic and educational contexts affect areas of school leadership also influenced by national factors. The local community could bring advantages and disadvantages to school leadership. The interplay among micro-political stakeholders drive school leaders to meet their diverse interests during the course of fulfilling their own responsibilities, and affect school leaders' perceptions of and strategies for sharing responsibilities.

Political Exercise as Maneuvering Political and Administrative Responsibilities

The second characteristic of school leadership in CE as a political exercise is that school leaders exercise their leadership by maneuvering their assigned political and administrative responsibilities while interacting with macro- and

micro-political school actors. In the case of China, the school leadership system, as shown in Chap. 3, is an extension of the national dual-line governance system, with principals and SPSs appointed as equally ranked heads of its administrative and political lines, respectively, and bearing primary responsibilities for all school administrative and political work. Despite this structural distinction, it is difficult, as shown in Chaps. 4–6, to define clearly principals' and SPSs' responsibilities in relation to school leadership, and especially in leadership in CE. The two parties' political and administrative responsibilities are intertwined and even overlapped. Moreover, they are also required to participate in each other's leadership by supporting each other's efforts to fulfill their responsibilities, or by simultaneously holding positions in both lines [i.e., principals serving as (deputy) SPSs, and SPSs serving as DPCEs]. Principals' and SPSs' intertwined responsibilities drove them to use their power to maneuver their political and administrative responsibilities in three major ways—by cooperating with each other to fulfill their specific responsibilities, by competing to show their relative importance, or by emphasizing school administration.

The first aspect is that principals and SPSs promoted CE by fulfilling their intertwined administrative and political responsibilities. As school leaders with political responsibilities, principals and SPSs guided the political direction of CE by copying higher authorities' policies and preventing reactionary activities on campus, and stressed the importance of transmitting the CPC's political values in CE. Principals collaborated with their SPSs' political work, as school administrators, school decision makers, and Party members. As school leaders, principals put aside time in the school timetable for teachers with CPC Party membership to participate in Party activities organized by their SPS, and provided material resources (such as rooms and equipment) for Party activities. Moreover, principals with CPC membership attended school Party activities and discussed school Party affairs with their SPSs; some even served as deputy SPSs. Meanwhile SPSs cooperated with principals by fulfilling their own political responsibilities. SPSs could support principals' decisions on CE by conducting school political work to disseminate the principals' ideas to micro-political actors and motivate them to carry out principals' decisions. In dealing with a given CE issue, SPSs could cooperate with principals, who acted as strong decision-makers, by playing the supplemental role of comforter. From the perspective of fulfilling administrative responsibilities, SPSs monitored principals' work and participated in making key school decisions. In addition, SPSs who were DPCEs also acted as principals' subordinates to carry out principals' decisions.

The second aspect is that principals and SPSs are mainly concerned with their own major responsibilities, and competed to fulfill these. Chapter 5 showed that principals cared more about policies and requirements relating to school administration, while SPSs gave more attention to school political work and their responsibilities therein. This can be seen in their response scenarios to state policies and requirements. Principals most often actively accepted CE policies and requirements related to school administration (e.g., maintaining school safety and enhancing teachers' professional skills) and implemented them through

administrative strategies such as providing resources, organizing and coordinating, while SPSs actively accepted with those policies related to school political work (e.g., conducting ideological work). Principals did not identify with policies increasing the volume of CE paperwork associated with their administrative role, and SPSs did not identify with those relating to their political work, yet both implemented those policies. Similarly, neither identified with policies dictating their responsibilities for school administration and political work, but both implemented them, albeit with certain modifications.

During the process of fulfilling their dual responsibilities, principals stressed that their administrative responsibilities were more important than their (and their SPSs') political responsibilities, despised SPSs' political work, and demonstrated their supremacy on directing CE, while SPSs defended the importance of their political work in maintaining school stability and the necessity of promoting CE. Principals who were experienced in CE regarded it as part of their administrative responsibility and rejected SPSs' role in it; by contrast, principals who did not work specifically on CE, pushed it onto SPSs, and were reluctant to provide resources or time to facilitate SPSs' leadership thereof.

The third aspect is that, despite competing for fulfilling their main responsibilities, both principals and SPSs tended to place more emphasis on school administration than on political work on campus. Principals who were also SPSs spent more of their time and energy on improving and optimizing school administration than on school political work. In addition, principals who were not SPSs persuaded SPSs to serve school administration through their political work, and to serve academic instruction through CE. Other SPSs, as shown in Chap. 5, helped principals to fulfill administrative responsibility by "sacrificing" their political work and reducing their monitoring principals to implement CPC policies. The SPSs cooperated with principals to advance the position of academic instruction and revise school-based curricula, both of which were principals' responsibilities, and to prioritize individual development (a school stakeholder expectation) over political education (an SPS task). Chapter 6 also showed that SPSs helped their principals establish school order, built up relationships with other micro-political actors to reduce barriers to the principals' work, and led CE in a manner that served academic instruction.

To summarize, this subsection has discussed principals' and SPSs' cooperation and competition in fulfilling their dual-line leadership responsibilities in school and in CE, their interests in their own major responsibilities, and their tendency to emphasize school administration over school political work. Principals' and SPSs' maneuvering of their political and administrative responsibilities shows their diverse responses toward the CPC-led state and their complex interactions with each other.

Political Exercise as Mediation of Different Actors' Diverse Interests

The third characteristic of school leadership in CE as political exercise is that school leaders mediated their and other political actors' diverse interests in leading CE. The multi-leveled contexts and multiple actors introduced above could influence school leadership, and school leaders in Shanghai thus needed to mediate these actors' interests to achieve commonly agreed-upon goals for leadership in CE. This book found that principals and SPSs in Shanghai mediated interests between the CPC-led state's control and school leaders' professional autonomy; between the CPC-led state's and micro-political actors' (e.g., principals, SPSs, and parents) diverse demands and expectations; and between principals' and their SPSs' interests in school administrative and political work.

Mediating the CPC-led State' Control and School Leaders' Professional Autonomy

The first major group of interests principals and SPSs mediated concerned higher authorities' control and school leaders' professional autonomy. The CPC-led state directs both principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE (Chaps. 3–5) and controls their three-stage career path (i.e., appointment, training, and evaluation) and their school resources (Chap. 7). Principals and SPSs in Shanghai actively responded to the CPC-led state by mediating between state control and their own professional autonomy through four scenarios—active acceptance; passive acceptance; supportive modification; and unsupportive modification—that both facilitated and challenged the CPC-led state's policies and requirements.

This facilitation was reflected in principals' and SPSs' implementation of state policies and requirements. Policies that the school leaders actively accepted helped the state to ensure proper political orientation in CE, promote ideological work and professional moral education among teachers, and to fulfill basic political and administrative responsibilities relating to CE. In the passive acceptance scenario, school leaders, albeit unwillingly and under tight state control, completed their assigned written work and prepared for frequent school inspections, despite not being satisfied with either initiative. This showed that, for the most part, they chose to compromise, rather than destroy their careers and court punishment.

Principals and SPSs did challenge state policies and requirements at times, however, as reflected in the supportive and unsupportive modification scenarios, and showed that school leaders in Shanghai could exercise a certain degree of autonomy, despite tight state control. The scenario of supportive modification showed that, as the state appointed school cadres with political and administrative responsibilities, principals, and SPSs identified with some state policies and requirements regarding their responsibilities in school political work and CE, but modified the specifics thereof to suit school requirements. This allowed them to

gain autonomy by balancing the diverse interests among macro- and micro-political actors.

The unsupportive modification scenario showed that both principals and SPSs in Shanghai sought opportunities and space from the CPC-led state's tight control to lead their schools using approaches best suited to school interests, and to avoid troublesome, time-consuming and difficult tasks prescribed by the CPC-led state.

Mediating the Macro- and Micro-political Actors' Interests in CE

The second major group of interests principals and SPSs mediated involved macro- and micro-political actors' conflicting interests in CE. Although both macro- and micro-political actors considered transmitting political values and promoting students' individual development to be necessary for CE, China's macro-political actors demonstrated a passion for the former (Chaps. 3 and 4), while micro-political actors were more interested in the latter (Chaps. 5 and 7).

Principals and SPSs in Shanghai, as shown in Chap. 5, adjusted the state's emphasis on CE's political function, promoting students' individual development ahead of transmitting political values. This was to mediate between the preferences and needs of the CPC and those of parents and school leaders. This mediation, as shown in Chap. 5, took the form of modifying CPC-prescribed political education strategies and developing specific programs to promote students' individual development.

Nevertheless, principals and SPSs, as shown in Chap. 5, maintained the CPC-led state's general political direction by emphasizing individuals' personal development as a means of maintaining the CPC's "bottom-line"—guaranteeing the political orientation of CE. This included leading CE according to CPC guidelines, publicizing the CPC's political ideology and tasks to school members on formal and informal occasions, designing school culture to highlight CPC-advocated values, and filtering negative international and societal influences not in accordance with CPC political ideology.

The second area of macro- and micro-political actors' conflict concerned what should be the most important aspect of school leadership. Both macro- and micro-political actors held that school education should promote students' civic and academic development, but each emphasized these two aspects differently, as shown in Chaps. 3–7. The CPC-led state mandated placing CE ahead of academic instruction, but paradoxically placed more emphasis on academic performance than on CE during school inspections. Influenced by the CPC-led state' ambiguous requirements, micro-political actors preferred to attach more emphasis to academic instruction than to CE. To satisfy multiple stakeholders' diverse interests, principals and SPSs in Shanghai positioned academic instruction as the main work of school education, explored possible teaching and learning methods to enhance students' examination scores, and prevented CE-related interruptions of academic instruction.

Principals and SPSs developed CE through formal and informal curricula, but mediated the relationship between CE and academic instruction using two main strategies. The first was to reduce the disruptive influence of CE on academic instruction. The development of CE had preconditions that stated it must not take time away from academic instruction or disrupt instructional order; to that end, principals and SPSs involved fewer students in CE activities, did not require students preparing for graduation examinations to participate in CE activities, and ensured teachers had sufficient academic instruction time by deferring implementing the higher authorities' requirements. The second strategy involved using CE knowledge to consolidate students' academic knowledge in examination subjects, and regulating students to facilitate academic instruction.

In addition, when interacting with other micro-political actors (e.g., parents and teachers) principals and SPSs showed self-contradictory tendencies regarding the positioning of academic instruction and CE. Principals and SPSs who believed academic instruction to be more important than CE criticized parents for being concerned about academic instruction rather than CE, and regarded parents as promoters of academic instruction. Despite trying possible approaches to help teachers improve academic instruction, both principals and SPSs were not satisfied with those teachers who appeared passionate about improving students' academic performance but indifferent to their moral and behavioral development. Principals and SPSs extended their understanding to teachers, but also guided them to be CE educators, as required by the CPC-led state.

Mediating Power in School Leadership

Principals and SPSs also mediated their administrative and political responsibilities, cooperating and competing with each other to fulfill their political and administrative responsibilities in general, and their CE responsibilities in particular. Yet, there were disparities in their contributions to and power in their cooperation, and in the influences on their competition for power. Principals and SPSs, however, mediated these disparities and showed their solidarity, especially when responding to macro- and other micro-political actors.

First, the cooperation between principals and SPSs was a process of mediation. Generally, principals' cooperation on political work was less influential than SPSs' cooperation on administrative work. Principals who were CPC members, even though they could also be SPSs or deputy SPSs, focused more on administrative than political work. The realization of this unbalanced cooperation demonstrated that it was a process of mediating power and resources between principals and SPSs. This process showed that principals were generally more influential than SPSs, which could be viewed from two perspectives. On the one hand, principals played a dominant role in achieving cooperation, as reflected by the strategies they adopted. As presented in Chap. 7, principals could encourage and motivate SPSs to cooperate with them, and could attract SPSs' cooperation through their personality and work experience. Despite being de jure equally ranked with their

principals, SPSs cooperated with their principals by being considerate to and showing respect for principals as their de facto superiors. On the other hand, principals had more power to promote cooperation; even though principals and SPSs identified with placing academic instruction prior to CE, principals had more power to do so.

Second, principals and SPSs mediated their political interactions with other political actors during their power competition. As shown in Chap. 6, principals demonstrated they were the more powerful school leader and asserted that they deserved and needed to have the most power, while SPSs complained that they were constrained in CE by their principals, and tried to regain sufficient power to improve their position. On the one hand, both principals and SPSs sought help from macro- and other micro-political actors to compete for power. During the power competition, principals, due in part to having more positional advantages, had opportunities to interact with and get support from macro- and micro-political actors, and also had more resources and influences to attract other micro-political actors' support. SPSs strove to demonstrate their achievements to macro- and micro-political actors to win recognition, built up allies, and used available resources to attract subordinates to compete with principals. On the other hand, most principals and SPSs limited their competition for the sake of school stability and tried to show solidarity when responding to political actors who could affect school interests. They described their work relationship as a partnership, and cooperated to manage other political actors, when not fulfilling their political and administrative responsibilities.

In summary, to respond to political actors, principals and SPSs alternately facilitated and challenged state policies and requirements to show their obedience to the CPC-led state and pursue their professional autonomy. They balanced macro- and micro-political actors' diverse interests as to what should be the focus of school leadership and what was of importance in CE by modifying state policies and requirements to satisfy micro-political actors' expectations and interests. They showed their cooperation and unity by mediating the contribution and power disparities in their ongoing cooperation and competition. This subsection demonstrates that mediation was carried out to meet school actors' diverse interests and expectations regarding principals' and SPSs' administrative and political work, and to favor their school and themselves.

School Leaders' Role in Political Exercise

With specific reference to Shanghai, this subsection identifies the role played by school leaders in CE while being influenced by and interacting with diverse actors in multi-leveled contexts. This book has presented the macro-political context of Shanghai school leadership in Chaps. 3 and 4, and has shown, in Chaps. 5–7, Shanghai school leaders' active responses to the diversities and dynamics brought by their responsibilities and by other actors exerting influence in schools, and

especially in CE. School leaders can be understood in terms of their perceptions of and strategies toward their administrative and political responsibilities, and their mediation of the interests of macro- and micro-political school actors in leading school and CE in a multi-leveled context. The specific roles school leaders played included those of facilitator, adjuster, cooperator, and contender.

School leaders acted as facilitators in that their implementation of the CPC-led state's assigned political and administrative responsibilities helped to transmit CPC-prescribed educational and political orientation and values, maintain and consolidate the CPC's influence and leadership in CE, and serve the preparation of future human resources for the development of the CPC-led state. In addition to ensuring the CPC's political orientation in CE, and conducting ideo-political education to staff and students, principals facilitated the CPC's CE goals through school administration, while SPSs facilitated conducting CPC-assigned political work that influencing on CE on campus. This facilitation, as shown in Chap. 7, was mainly driven by the CPC's structural integration of politics and education, its dual-line school leadership system, and its control over school leaders' career path and their work in CE.

The second role school leaders played in leading CE was that of adjuster, which involved adapting CPC-prescribed political and administrative responsibilities to meet and balance the needs and expectations of school leaders and other micro-political actors. School leaders, as revealed in Chap. 5, did not completely support and faithfully carry out all state policies and requirements regulating principals' and SPSs' responsibilities, but actively adapted them to balance macro- and micro-political school actors' diverse needs and promote school development. The adjustments were conducted through both supportive and unsupportive modification, as described above. School leaders in Shanghai were torn between acceding to state demands and meeting macro- and micro-political actors' expectations on the one hand, and schools' developmental needs and school leaders' interests on the other. The resulting adjustments included taking time from political work to do school administrative work, promoting individual development over transmitting political values, and placing academic instruction ahead of CE. School leaders' role as adjuster was shaped by factors at multiple levels and by challenges brought by diverse political actors.

It should be noted that Shanghai school leaders' adjustment of CPC policies did not constitute a rejection of the CPC-led state, nor an attempt to destroy or reduce the CPC's dominant position in China. On the contrary, school leaders' adjustments and even their complaints were well within the scope of the CPC's macro-politics and acceptable to the CPC-led state. School leaders' purposes in adjusting the policies and requirements were to gain a degree of professional autonomy in school political and administrative work, balance macro- and micro-political actors' demands regarding CE, and put school leaders' (especially principals') ideas of school leadership and CE into practice. More to the point, their adjustments were in keeping with the CPC's overarching goals of ensuring schools' correct political orientation and developing human resources capable of competing in a global economy.

The third role was that of cooperator, and saw principals and SPSs in Shanghai working together to fulfill their responsibilities and respond to other political actors. Chapter 6 showed how principals and SPSs in Shanghai collaborated in school administration and political work, especially in CE. Principals supported SPSs' political work with administrative resources, and SPSs shaped their ideo-political work to assist principals' administration. They collaboratively ensured school CE political orientation, promoted teachers' professional morality, worked on school administration, and responded to the diverse needs of macro- and micro-political actors. Principals and SPSs cooperatively promoted students' individual development ahead of transmitting political ideology, and developed CE to serve academic instruction. Their role as cooperator showed that principals and SPSs could both collaboratively facilitate CPC policies and requirements, and also adjust them to suit macro- and micro-political actors' interests.

The fourth role school leaders played was that of contender, and referred to how they struggled to defend their own responsibilities and to gain power over CE. Chapter 6 showed that, in addition to responding to similar policies and requirements, principals tended to compete to fulfill their administrative responsibilities, while SPSs were concerned more about their responsibilities for school political work and CE. In terms of power competition, principals showed and defended their power, and even deprived SPSs of some of their power to monitor school leadership and discuss school key decisions, power that SPSs strove to get back. Both principals and SPSs tried to gain the support of higher authorities and micro-political actors in their power competition; given their positional power, principals had more advantages, and more success in this. The role of contender, as presented in Chap. 7, was partly a result of the unclear division of principals' and SPSs' responsibility, the disparity in their positions and power, and the incompatibility of their personalities, gender, and work experience.

School leaders' four roles were intertwined and varied in interactions with different political actors. First, their facilitator role sometimes required principals and SPSs to act as cooperators by fulfilling their responsibilities, and was sometimes used to get support from higher authorities and to gain an advantage in their school power competition. Second, the role as adjuster could also involve collaboration, and integrate principals' and SPSs' competition to fulfill their respective political and administrative responsibilities. The roles of cooperator and competitor reflected principals' and SPSs' multiple identities. As national cadres, they should carry out state policies and requirements and support the CPC leadership; as school leaders, they should promote school development, strive for professional autonomy and balance diverse political stakeholders' multiple interests. The interconnection of Shanghai school leaders' four roles suggests that cooperation and contention coexist in the interaction between macro- and micro-political actors. The four roles played by principals and SPSs present the complexities and dynamics of school leadership in CE as a political exercise influenced by diverse factors and responding to multiple stakeholders' various interests and demands.

Based on the concept that school leadership in CE is a political exercise, this subsection has demonstrated that school leaders played different roles when

interacted with macro- and micro-political school actors to fulfill their political and administrative responsibilities. Principals and SPSs could act as facilitators and adjusters in responding to the CPC-led state and its policies and requirements, and as cooperators and contenders when interacting with their SPSs/principals. These four roles were intertwined and interacted with each other.

Theoretical Implications of the Book

This book makes several contributions to extant theories on and practices of CE and school leadership. This section first discusses this book's four major theoretical contributions by revisiting and offering a critique of and supplements to extant theories of CE, political school leadership and school micro-politics, before revisiting the theories of leadership in CE.

Revisiting Theories of CE

The first theoretical contribution of this book is to support and supplement extant theories of CE. This book has demonstrated that school leadership in CE, in the case of Shanghai, was shaped by and responded to multi-leveled factors at the international, national, local and school levels, and the interplay between school macro-political and micro-political actors' diverse interests. The CPC-led state has been the key macro-political actor in reforming CE and directing school leadership to be an important mechanism for integrating politics and CE. This book thus supports extant theories of CE in two areas, and fills a research gap regarding the complexities of school leadership in CE.

The findings of this book support the multidimensional (Kubow et al. 1998), multicultural (Banks 2008) and cosmopolitan (Osler and Starkey 2003) CE models, which examine and adjust CE in response to the influence of forces at the international, national and local and individual levels. These forces, as shown in Chaps. 3 and 4, also affected CE in Shanghai to be more responsive and accommodative, and drove CE reforms by incorporating global concerns, by stressing concerns about and contributions to national and local stability and development, and by providing content for students' individual development.

Second, this book supports the viewpoints that the nation–state plays a key role in defining CE (Althof and Berkowitz 2006; Kennedy 2010; Meyer and Rubinson 1975). The nation–state shapes CE with the aim of transmitting state-advocated knowledge, skills and values (Hanasz 2006). This book has shown, in Chaps. 3 and 4, that the CPC-led state plays a key role in developing CE and in filtering other forces' impacts on CE in China. CPC leaders have used CE as an ideological instrument to transmit political doctrine, positions and values encouraging students to be patriotic and supportive of their leadership, in order to foster a modern

Chinese socialist citizenry and ensure the CPC's continued leadership (Law 2006; Wan 2004; Zhao and Fairbrother 2010). The state has greatly stressed CE in its educational policies, placed it at the forefront of schooling since 1957, prescribed topics and themes for CE, and required the development of CE through formal and informal curricula with CPC-prescribed strategies. In addition, the CPC-led state has established a nationwide CE leadership system in which education administration institutions at all levels take charge of CE and establish a specific department to work on it. This system is extended to schools, in which principals and SPSs, who mainly took care of school administration and political work respectively, are placed in charge of CE's formal and informal curricula. Principals' and SPSs' power and responsibilities in CE have shifted with changes in political and economic climate and state policies on education and school leadership.

Third, this book supplements existing theories with empirical evidence demonstrating that school leaders are important in CE. In the case of Shanghai, as shown in Chap. 5, school leaders could exercise influence on CE in four main ways: by directing the political orientation of CE in accordance with the CPC-prescribed orientation; by defining the position of CE in school teaching and learning; by developing school-based CE curricula and selecting the major contents of CE; and, by establishing a school leadership system for CE, promoting teachers' professional development and professional responsibilities of CE, coordinating and gathering resources for CE. All of these aspects involved negotiating with multiple political actors and mediating their diverse interests.

Revisiting Theories of Political School Leadership

The second theoretical contribution of this book is in criticizing and supplementing extant theories of political school leadership examining school leaders' purposes and strategies in balancing multiple actors' interests to achieve commonly accepted goals, and analyzing school leaders' administration and responsibilities (Lashway 2006). These theories are not specific enough to explain the dynamics and complexities of fulfilling multiple responsibilities of CE while interacting with diverse stakeholders, as school leaders in China assume intertwined responsibilities—political responsibilities for preparing future citizens and administrative responsibilities for serving for economic development. In addition, extant theories of political school leadership are not sufficient to explain how school leaders respond to politics in leading CE. This book thus supplements these theories in the following three ways.

Firstly, its empirical findings supplement theories of political leadership by analyzing school leaders' concurrent administrative and political responsibilities. The latter is assigned by the macro-political actor to boost the CPC's macro-political presence in school. This book has shown (in Chap. 4) that principals in Shanghai take care of school administrative work, such as finances, personnel and instruction, as well as political work, such as adhering to the CPC's

political lines and orientation, implementing its policies and supporting school political work. In addition to principals, China's schools feature a specific political position; SPSs are equally ranked with their principals and mainly take care of CPC-assigned political work, but are also involved in school administration. SPSs' political responsibilities include obeying the CPC's political leadership and conducting school political work in developing SPOs, recruiting CPC Party members, leading the CYL and YPC, and conducting ideo-political work with school members. SPSs' administrative responsibilities involve assisting and monitoring principals' work, and participating in makings key school decisions, including decisions on CE.

Secondly, this empirical research has supplemented theories of political leadership by showing that principals and SPSs fulfill their intertwined political and administrative responsibilities through both cooperation and competition. Principals and SPSs can concurrently hold positions in their schools' political and administrative lines; principals with CPC membership are usually appointed as (deputy) SPSs, and most SPSs simultaneously hold the administrative position of DPCE. The close connection between principals' and SPSs' administration and political responsibilities are reflected in how the parties support and participate with each other when their responsibilities overlap. Principals provided resources and spared time for SPSs' political work, and SPSs mobilized school Party members to assist principals' administrative work. Moreover, although Lin (2000) regarded principals' and SPSs' responsibilities, and power for fulfilling those responsibilities, as well-defined, this book has shown that principals' and SPSs' power and responsibilities cannot be clearly divided. Both parties sought to take some power from the latter, but were challenged from both within and outside of the school, and by differences in individual factors, such as personality, gender and professional experiences.

Thirdly, this empirical study can supplement theories of political school leadership by specifically examining the dynamics and complexities of leadership in CE. This book first demonstrates that school leadership in CE involves school leaders' struggles to balance diverse demands as to what dimension(s) should be important in CE. The case of Shanghai has shown that the cultivation of students' global consciousness, national and local identity and commitment, as well as their individual development, were all emphasized in CE. The CPC-led state advocates focusing CE to foster students' sense of belonging to and love for the CPC and the motherland, while school micro-political actors stressed promoting students' development, mainly in terms of their skills, social morality and behaviors. School leaders thus mediated the macro- and micro-political actors' different expectations.

This book has also demonstrated that school leadership in CE entails a contention between enhancing academic and civic outcomes. Both principals and SPSs in Shanghai had to satisfy the CPC-led state's twin (but conflicting) expectations of improving academic quality to serve economic needs, and developing CE to contribute to the CPC's political objects. School leaders therefore struggled to decide which of these tasks should be given priority.

Next, this book has demonstrated that school leadership in CE involved adjusting strategies to suit mediated contents. The findings of this book reveal that school leaders in Shanghai are provided with some strategies for CE, including highlighting school characteristics, developing school-based curricula, and organizing activities. The school leaders, however, could adjust strategies related to transmitting political values to foster students' morality and behaviors.

Revisiting Theories of School Micro-politics

The third theoretical contribution of this book is that it supports and supplements theories of school micro-politics that view school as a political arena, in which individuals and groups pursue their diverse and even conflicting interests through power, cooperation, competition and various strategies (Bacharach and Mundell 1993; Hoyle 1982). Moreover, this book shows that school micro-politics are not independent from macro-politics, but are framed by and actively respond thereto (Bacharach and Mundell 1993; Ball 1987; Honig 2009; Hoyle 1982; Mawhinney 1999).

These findings support the view that cooperation and conflicts coexist in school leadership (Blase 1991), which differs from the finding, in other China studies, that the relationship between principals and SPSs is characterized either by consensus and cooperation (Tao et al. 1988) or by power struggles (Lin 2000). As this book has demonstrated, with empirical evidence, SPSs could cooperate with principals when both were aligned against the government, or could take the government's side and solicit subordinates' support to constrain their principals' power. In other words, similar to theories on micro-politics in general school leadership (Bacharach and Mundell 1993), cooperation and conflict over school leadership coexist between different actors to varying extents, depending on the chemistry of their interests and the availability of power (Blase and Anderson 1995).

This book has demonstrated that, when implementing macro-political policies on CE, principals and SPSs in Shanghai could cooperate over leadership in CE and balance conflicts of interest among school actors; collaboratively modify macro-political policies and requirements that do not benefit their school and leadership; and collaborate to respond to and mediate between macro- and micro-political actors to facilitate school administration. As individual school leaders, however, principals and SPSs strove to gain more power and influence in leading CE. In their power competition, both were influenced by macro- and micro-political actors, and sought their support to gain advantages.

Next, this book supplements the extant research on school micro-politics, which focus on the politics between principals and teachers, teachers and teachers, and teachers and students during school changes and reforms (Blase and Anderson 1995), but are not specific enough to explain how macro-politics affect the micro-politics of CE leadership, how school leaders responded to macro-politics, or the micro-politics between equally ranked school leaders. These three inadequacies can be supplemented by the empirical findings of this book.

Regarding how macro-political actors shape school micro-politics in leading school and CE; in the case of Shanghai this was mainly accomplished by integrating politics and education. First, the CPC-led state, as China's main macro-political actor, has established a dual-line school leadership system in which principals and SPSs are equally ranked leaders of schools' administration and political work, respectively; however, their responsibilities in these areas are intertwined, and their power for leading CE is unequal. The dual-line leadership system thus results in complex cooperation and competition between principals and SPSs. Second, the CPC-led state controls both principals and SPSs' three-stage (appointment, training and evaluation) career paths, impelling the school leaders to be obedient to the state, especially in ensuring proper school political orientation. Third, the CPC-led state prescribes CE, requiring principals and SPSs to take charge of it and allowing SPSs to concurrently serve as DPCEs, which further complicates the division of labor and power between the two parties. Moreover, the CPC-led state prescribes topics and strategies for CE, gives CE precedence over other school work and makes the transmission of CPC political values the primary goal of CE.

This book further supplements theories of school micro-politics as they relate to school leaders' responses to macro-political actors in school leadership and CE. As presented in Chap. 5, school leaders could support or challenge macro-political actors, despite being impelled to serve the CPC-led state's educational, political and economic development. School leaders were not necessarily passive actors in leading CE; on the contrary, they could and did interact with other actors, responding to, meeting or mediating their diverse interests. In this case, school leaders' responses to the CPC-led state fall into four scenarios—active acceptance, passive acceptance, supportive modification and unsupportive modification—that show their ability to facilitate the CPC-led state as a macro-political actor by guiding the school to follow its directions, implementing its policies and requirements, publicizing its political ideologies in school and cultivating students to become its socialist constructors and successors. Despite this, the two heads of school could still challenge the CPC-led state by mediating between it and micro-political actors, and could exercise professional autonomy to adapt government policies to suit their school's conditions and needs, or modify them to satisfy school-level micro-political actors. For instance, school leaders' efforts to meet parental demands for enhancing school academic quality could garner parents' support for their responses to macro-political actors' requirements regarding academic instruction and CE.

This book also supplements theories of micro-politics by analyzing the micro-politics between two equally ranked heads of school in China's dual-line leadership system. Its findings demonstrate that, unlike research in other countries which describe school micro-politics as existing between principals, teachers, parents and students, school micro-politics in Chinese also involve those between principals and SPSs. The micro-politics between principals and SPSs—who have intertwined political and administrative responsibilities, but unequal power—are complex and dynamic. First, in the case of Shanghai, principals and SPSs cooperated with each other to mediate their responsibilities in CE. Principals provided

support for SPSs' political work, and SPSs supported principals' administration. Second, principals' and SPSs' levels of influence in their collaboration were different, with SPSs providing more assistance for principals' administrative work than principals for SPSs' school political work. Principals could act as superior leaders to encourage and motivate SPSs to cooperate with them, while some SPSs tried to show respect and consideration for their principals. Third, principals and SPSs competed for power in school leadership and CE, with principals defending their position as the most powerful school leader, and SPSs trying to gain sufficient power to match them. Fourth, the micro-politics between principals and SPSs were shaped by multiple political actors and factors; principals and SPSs could work together to mediate the demands and expectations of macro- and micro-political actors, or try to enlist their support in their power competition.

Revisiting Theories of Leadership in CE

The fourth theoretical contribution of this book is to supplement and criticize theories of leadership in CE. This book supports Serriere's (2014) viewpoint that principals can exercise active influences in CE, and Dimmock et al.'s (2014) claim that school leaders are expected to mediate CE contents. However, these two studies are neither specific nor sufficient enough to describe the complexity of school leadership in CE. This book suggests that school leadership in CE in Shanghai exhibite a pattern that supplements Remy and Wagstaff's (1982) theory on school leadership in CE, which proposes that school principals improve their leadership strategies in leading CE by ensuring the time devoted to and the quality of its tuition, motivating and cultivating teachers to improve CE curriculum, creating an environment of equality and empowerment, building up relationships within the community and making use of resources (Remy and Wagstaff 1982). This theory is useful for understanding Shanghai school leaders' responsibilities in creating an environment for CE and involving school micro-political actors in CE; however, it overestimates principals' initiatives and influence in mobilizing other actors in CE, and is not sufficiently specific to answer how school leaders balance their multiple responsibilities in respond to macro- and micro-political actors' diverse interests in the process of leading CE. These insufficiencies show that Remy and Wagstaff (1982) adopted an instructional leadership perspective on CE curriculum leadership that can be supplemented by Ylimaki's (2012) curriculum leadership theory, which advocates examining the dynamics among different stakeholders with different interests in curricula in a certain social contexts. However, Ylimaki's (2012) theory is not specific about CE curriculum leadership. All these gaps are, to some extent, supplemented by this book.

First, it criticizes Remy and Wagstaff's (1982) theory of principals' leadership in CE for underestimating the incentives and challenges brought by macro- and micro-political school actors in multi-leveled contexts, and supplements Ylimaki's (2012) theory on the dynamics of curriculum leadership and school

leaders' mediation of different stakeholders' values during leadership by examining CE curriculum leadership. In the case of Shanghai, principals' leadership in CE was affected by multi-leveled contexts ranging from the international to the school level, and by many actors at each of these levels, such as the CPC-led state, actors at the community level and school members. Contextual factors affected actors' political expectations of and demands on school leadership and CE, and the resources available to them. The CPC-led state impelled school leaders to transmit its political ideology and influences through CE and to improve school academic quality. The parents in the community emphasized cultivating students' individual morality and behaviors through CE and stressed students' academic performance. School leaders, influenced by the CPC-led state, forces at the community level and their own professional preferences, assumed responsibility for political education, promoting individual development and enhancing school academic quality.

Second, the empirical evidence in this book criticizes Remy and Wagstaff's (1982) theory of principals' leadership in CE for neglecting the dynamics and complexities caused by multiple political actors in the process of fulfilling political and administrative responsibilities, and supplements other viewpoints on leadership in CE and theories on curriculum leadership. The findings of this book show that school leadership in CE was, in the case of Shanghai, a process of balancing multiple political actors' interests and expectations. On the one hand, principals and SPSs in Shanghai needed to mediate their power and responsibilities in CE. While both were assigned responsibilities in CE, principals took overall charge, and usually appointed their SPSs as DPCEs to administer CE directly; in that way, principals who were experienced in CE could limit their SPSs' leadership thereof. Principals who had more interest in school administration and academic instruction, however, tended to ignore and marginalize CE, making it necessary for SPSs to argue with their principals for time and resources for CE.

On the other hand, principals and SPSs in Shanghai also mediated macro- and micro-political actors' expectations and interests in regard to CE. The main macro-political actor in China—the CPC-led state—emphasized publicizing its political ideology and leadership through CE, and placed CE ahead of other school work. The micro-political actors (e.g., principals, SPSs and parents), however, emphasized promoting students' individual development and academic performance. Principal and SPSs in Shanghai therefore sought to balance macro- and micro-political actors' different CE-related interests by organizing activities to transmit political values, while still developing students' knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviors, serving academic instruction through CE, and allowing some students not to attend CE activities.

Conclusion

With specific reference to Shanghai, this book has explored the dynamics and complexities of the roles played by school leaders in leading CE. To understand this issue, this book presented and discussed how principals and SPSs perceived

and exercised their leadership in CE when interacting with multiple actors in a specific political and educational context.

The book offers three major findings on principals'/SPSs' leadership in CE. First, that principals and SPSs have intertwined administrative and political responsibilities in the dual-line school leadership system. Though principals are mandated to oversee school administration and SPSs school political work, both have administrative and political responsibilities, and most simultaneously hold administrative and political positions. Moreover, principals' and SPSs' responsibilities in school administration and political work are intertwined, as the CPC-led state controls school leaders to fulfill their responsibilities mainly through the integration of politics and education.

Second, principals and SPSs were facilitators and adapters of the CPC-led state's policies. Neither passively obeyed nor followed the CPC-led state and its policies, but used various strategies to mediate between the CPC-led state and school, within the political framework prescribed by the CPC. Both accepted and modified the CPC-led state's policies on CE, regardless of whether they supported them. While adhering to the CPC's political orientation, principals tended to adopt administrative strategies to implement those policies and requirements that favored them and their administration and to modify those that did not, while SPSs usually used political work strategies to implement those policies and requirements benefiting them and their political work and modify those that could not.

Third, as equally-ranked school leaders, principals and SPSs both cooperated and competed with each other. Their cooperation was reflected in their interactions with macro- and micro-political actors leading CE, but was mainly to serve school administration, which was dominated by principals. Their competition was for power, with principals defending their power so as to maintain their positions atop the school, and SPSs trying to gain sufficient power to match them. Both used strategies to enlist macro- and other micro-political actors' support, but principals had comparatively more advantages in and success at doing so.

This book provides an understanding of school leadership in CE as a political exercise in the context of Shanghai, China. It suggests that school leaders' fulfillment of their political and administrative responsibilities in CE involves employing their leadership knowledge, skills, and strategies to interact with macro- and micro-actors, and balance their diverse interests. This book interprets school leadership in CE as a political exercise and discusses the influence of multiple contexts, and of multiple actors within those contexts, on school leadership, leadership in CE, and school leaders' intertwined responsibilities and various political strategies.

The findings and discussions in this book have identified that school leaders take an active role in responding to macro- and micro-political school actors to balance their diverse interests, and in the dynamic interaction between those actors. School leaders responded by playing different roles when interacting with different political actors—they could be facilitators serving macro-political actors' political and economic development, adjusters adapting the macro-political actor's policies and requirements, cooperators meeting the conflicting expectations of

macro- and micro-political actors, or contenders struggling to advance their own interests in schools.

Despite its contributions to and supplementing of the theory of CE, political school leadership, micro-politics, the leadership of CE and curriculum leadership in the context of Shanghai, China, this qualitative case study has three major limitations. First, the small number of subject school leaders, schools and cities might affect its representativeness in Shanghai and elsewhere in China. Second, this book focuses on school leadership in junior secondary schools only, and cannot be used to explain the situations on primary and senior secondary schools, which have different cultural and leadership tasks. Third, the interviewees in this study self-reporting what they thought and perceived, supplemented by my own observations on what I observed and perceived during my fieldwork. As such, the findings in this book do not necessarily reflect complete daily leadership concerns and practices. Because of these limitations, this book has no intention to generalize its findings to other school leaders in Shanghai or elsewhere in China.

This book suggests possible methodological and theoretical directions for future research. First, research could be done to shadow school leaders, so as to provide a more holistic description of school leaders' interactions with macro- and micro-political actors in leading CE. Second, more empirical studies could be done in junior secondary schools in other areas of China to explore school leaders' perceptions of and strategies in leading CE during the course of interacting with multiple political actors. Third, more research could be done in primary and senior secondary schools in China to examine the dynamics and complexities of school leadership in CE. Fourth, more empirical research into comparative and international education could be done to study how micro- and macro-political actors in different countries, cities and schools shape school leadership in CE. In terms of theoretical directions, future scholars could conduct specific research into such areas as the identity of SPSs in school leadership and CE, and the role of CE in regulating students' and teachers' behaviors.

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Appendix
Methodology

This appendix presents the research methodology used to develop a database to address this book's research questions. The first section introduces how the study's research questions were formulated and why a case study was selected as the most appropriate method for answering them. The second section analyzes the reasons for choosing multiple data collection methods, the data collection methods themselves and how these methods were used. The third section explores the methods of analyzing data, while the fourth and final section presents methods for enhancing research reliability.

Preliminary Methodological Consideration

This section introduces the research questions generated from the literature review, and describes the research method chosen for this book.

Research Questions

Chapter 2 shows that CE is mainly shaped by the nation-state and influenced by the school leadership, which is involved in dynamic interactions with macro- and micro-political actors in a certain context. Based on the literature review, the research problem of this book is to explore how school leaders perceive, shape, and exercise their leadership in CE, while interacting with macro- and micro-political actors. Specifically, this book explores the following research questions:

1. What responsibilities does the CPC-led state require principals and SPSs to assume school leadership in general, and CE in particular? By what methods does the state influence these leaders to carry out their tasks?

2. How do principals and SPSs perceive and respond to the responsibilities assigned to them?
3. In what ways and by what means do principals and SPSs lead and manage CE? Why do they act as they do?
4. How do they share responsibilities and work with each other in leading CE, and why they adopt these strategies?
5. What are the similarities and differences between principals' and SPSs' responsibilities, perceptions of and responses toward the CPC-led state's policies and requirements, views on and strategies in sharing responsibilities in leading CE? Why do these similarities and differences exist?

Selection of Research Method

Based on the research problem and questions, this study adopted case study as its research method. Gall et al. (2007) defined case study research as "the in-depth study of one or more instance of a phenomenon in its real-life context that reflects the perspective of the participants involved in the phenomenon" (p. 447). According to Merriam (1998), qualitative case studies have three major defining characteristics. First, they "focus on a particular situation, event, program or phenomenon," which can make the research more concentrated (p. 29). Second, they deeply and roundly describe under-researched incidents and individuals to extract rich data. Third, they can provide a picture of complex relations to enhance readers' experiences and understanding of the phenomenon under study.

Case study is suitable for this research for three main reasons. First, a case study approach allows this research to focus on school leadership and CE within a particular local policy and social background; although many educational policies are formulated by the CPC Central Committee, MoE and other central institutions, local governments, and party committees can make macro-policies to suit local needs or experiment with some policies within the CPC framework. Local political, economic and educational contexts also shape school leadership in CE. Second, case study could be useful to explore the complexities of and dynamics in school leaders' perceptions and interactions with macro- and micro-political actors. Third, case study can elicit deep information on principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE, by eliminating extraneous background factors; people of a given social context, while owning some individual differences, preserve a pattern similar to that of other people within a given context.

This study chose Shanghai as the case in which to investigate the dynamics and complexities of school leadership in CE. The reasons for choosing Shanghai as a case were its political and economic importance to China, and its pioneer role in reforming school leadership and CE, which is examined in Chap. 4. Within the context of Shanghai, this study chose junior secondary schools as venues in which to explore in-school CE, as junior secondary schools could provide informative

data in the following two major aspects. First, unlike primary schools, whose students face relatively less examination pressure regarding their entry to junior secondary school, school leaders in Shanghai's junior and senior secondary schools faced the dilemma of carrying out CE while simultaneously improving academic instruction. Second, the reconstruction of junior secondary schools was stressed by the Shanghai municipal government. During the late 1990s, the SMEC gradually detached Shanghai's junior secondary schools from the senior secondary schools to which they had until then been bound, thus decreasing the material and teacher resources available to and in junior secondary schools. In the early years of twenty-first century, the SMEC began to put more emphasis on helping and developing junior secondary schools, including their school leadership (Shen 2006). These policies increased school funding and improved school facilities, which impacted school leaders' perceptions of and strategies toward the CPC-led state (Shen 2006).

Data Collection Methods and Process

This section introduces the concept of data and the advantages of using multiple data collection methods, and then introduces the data collection methods used in this study.

Qualitative research data often takes the form of words and pictures, including "direct quotations from people about their experiences, opinions, feelings, and knowledge" that are obtained through interviews; "detailed descriptions of people's activities, behaviors, actions" recorded in observations; and "excerpts, quotations, or entire passages" that are extracted from various types of documents (Merriam 1998; Patton 1990). As data is collected for specific purposes, the collection techniques used must be carefully selected, according to the purpose of the research and the usefulness and adequacy of the methods (Merriam 1998). As there is no one perfect method, it is better to adopt multiple, complementary methods. In this study, using multiple data collection methods yielded at least two advantages: first, it was useful for collecting comprehensive and deep data; second, it facilitated the use of triangulation to check the reliability and validity of data.

To answer the research questions, this research needed to gather data on at least five things: (a) principals' and SPSs' tasks in general school leadership and CE; (b) the relationships among principals, SPSs and the CPC-led state; (c) principals' and SPSs' conceptions of and leadership in CE; (d) principals' and SPSs' strategies and mechanisms for leading CE; and (e) factors affecting school leadership in CE. These five types of data were collected by document review, observation and interviews. Adopting three data collection methods compensated for the innate deficiencies in each method and allowed for triangulation. In the following sections, the specific reasons for choosing these data collection methods will be introduced, as will the data collection process.

Collection and Review of Documents

Documents include "a wide range of written, visual and physical material relevant to the study," of which "public records, personal documents and physical material" are the three main types (Merriam 1998). Collecting and reviewing documents helps to collect historical data about things that can no longer be observed or informants who are not available to be interviewed (Klenke 2008); depict historical changes in policies and practices (Klenke 2008); and gather information from different sources (Merriam 1998). In addition, documents gathered from different institutions and through different methods are useful for triangulating data.

Documents in this book were helpful in the following three main ways. First, they described the development of the CPC-led state's dominance of China's society, education, school leadership and CE. Second, they showed how policies and requirements at the national and local levels and in the context of Shanghai could influence school leadership and CE. Third, they provided information on how school leaders' perceptions of and strategies toward the CPC-led state were similar to and different from the policies regulated, and triangulated perceptions of principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE.

Three types of documents helped to provide these kinds of information. The first was state documents, including national educational laws, guidelines, directives, notices and other regulations, educational yearbooks, educational reports to the NPC, and speeches made by national leaders and leaders of the MoE. This type of documents was accessed through edited policy publications, including the *Important Educational Documents in People's Republic of China*, and through official websites, such as web site of the MoE.

The second type of documents included Shanghai-specific educational policies, educational yearbooks and evaluation forms for three-year supervision, as well as educational reports and speeches made by leaders of the SMEC and educational leaders at district level. The information was accessed through edited policy books, Shanghai archive records, the SMEC's official web site, the visited districts' educational web sites, and from the interviewees.

The third type of documents included school regulations, school and CE plans, school brochures, CE activity plans, school journal, and newspaper articles related to CE and school leadership and school photos, as well as school leaders' records, self-evaluation reports and articles. These documents were mainly provided by the informants, and accessed from school web sites. Some first-hand school photos were taken by the researcher, with the school leaders' permission.

Despite providing important contextual and triangulated information on school leadership in school general affairs and specifically in CE, the data from documents alone were not sufficient to reveal school leaders' perceptions of their leadership, CE, and their leadership in CE. Neither were they specific enough to answer how different factors, including political actors, affected school leadership, how principals and SPSs understood and responded to them, and why they acted as they did. To find answers to these "how" and "why" questions, this book supplemented the data generated from documents with observations and interviews.

Observation

The study adopted observation as its second data collection method to provide a more comprehensive understanding of school leadership and allow more informed judgments on it, and especially their actions in school leadership. Observation is "a purposeful and selective way of watching and listening to" a phenomenon or an interaction as it takes place (Kumar 1999). According to Merriam (1998), observation has three key strengths. First, it allows the researcher to record events as they happen and to interpret what is being observed based on their direct knowledge and experience. Second, it can provide contextual knowledge of specific incidents and behaviors for reference in future interviews. Third, observation is applicable in situations in which the participants are not able to describe their behaviors accurately, completely, or objectively. For the purposes of this book, observation was used to gain information on how school leaders communicated with each other and with people from high-level education administration departments, and how they played their role in CE during their daily work experiences.

Observation can be divided into two types—participant observation and non-participant observation (Cohen 2007). Participant observation means that the observer acts as a member of the group and engages in the activities under observation; non-participant observation means that the observer acts as an outsider when investigating the activities (Cohen 2007). Both types of observation have advantages and disadvantages. Participant observation that offers easy access is less disruptive for the informants, and allows the researcher to become more familiar with the culture. On the other hand, participation makes it difficult to record data and is time-consuming and stressful for both the observer and the participant and may fail to uncover factors important to a thorough understanding of the research problems. Given the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two types of observation and that non-participant observation can compensate for the disadvantages of participant observation, I mainly used non-participant observation in this research.

This study observed school leaders on different occasions and in different situations. With the subjects' permission, the observation mainly focused on the school environment, school leaders' activities in the office, at weekly, mandatory all-school staff meetings, during school extra-curricular activities, and teaching and research activities at the school, block and district level, and communication activities on school administration experiences. In total, I attended three all-school staff meetings, four extra-curricular activities, three teaching and research activities, and two communication activities on school administrational experiences. As demonstrated in Chaps. 5 and 6, data from these observations helped to show how principals and SPSs interacted with each other and with other people while carrying out policies and leading CE.

To gather as much observation information as possible, the observations were recorded using descriptive field notes and photos (guided by observation protocols) and a field diary of reflective notes. According to Cohen (2007), descriptive

field notes describe people, their behaviors and activities, while reflective field notes contain the researcher's thoughts on methods and phenomena. Descriptive field notes were used to record the school environment and the words and behaviors of school leaders in their offices, at meetings, in activities and when interacting with other people. The notes provided key information on the general environment of the school, the background of the communicating activities, and school leaders' behavior when interacting with district educational officials, other school leaders and teachers, including what they talked about, who initiated the conversation, what they expressed and how they expressed it. I also took some photos of school showcases, banners, and activities. In addition, I wrote in my field diary after returning from each school to systematically record my field notes, provide a complete background for my school visits, record critical information observed in interview, and reflect on what I had observed.

Observation provided first-hand evidence about how school leaders responded to macro- and micro-political actors in exercising their leadership in CE. The data from observation could also help triangulate that gleaned from interviews, such as what school leaders did in their daily work and how school leaders translated policy requirements into practice. However, these data were not enough to reveal school leaders' perceptions of their leadership in CE, their relationship with macro- and micro-political school actors, and the influence of contextual factors on their leadership.

Interview

The third data collection method adopted in this study was interview. An interview is a purposive conversation between humans (Merriam 1998), and is one of the ways in which researchers and informants can "discuss their interpretations of the world in which they live and express" their viewpoints on the investigated situation (Cohen 2007). The main purpose and characteristic of an interview is to gather people's understandings, feelings and interpretations as they relate to the research problem (Klenke 2008). Interviews were helpful to this study in four major ways. First, they allowed the researcher to collect rich and nuanced data on individuals' perceptions of principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE. Second, interviews were an efficient means of gathering school leaders' and educational officials' interpretations of governmental guidance and directives, and of understanding how and why school leaders responded to the guidance and directives. Third, they allowed principals and SPSs to make clear their perceptions and strategies for dividing their labor and handling conflicts in exercising influence in CE in particular. Lastly, interviews allowed the researcher to triangulate the data mined from observation and document reviews, such as how school leaders' perceptions and viewpoints on their leadership in CE were reflected in their daily work, to what extent school leaders implemented the CPC-led state's policies and requirements.

Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Merriam 1998). In a structured interview, the sequence and wording of the questions are predetermined and standardized, and the interviewer has little space to modify them (Cohen 2007). Structured interview was not used in this research, as predetermined and standardized questions were unlikely to lead to a greater and deeper understanding of the research questions. Unstructured interviews, on the other hand, are flexible and explorative and have no predetermined set of questions; the researcher is guided by the research topic to formulate ad hoc questions (Merriam 1998). While useful for probing complex issues and for addressing unplanned topics, unstructured interviews were not good enough to explore the specific topics of school leadership in CE.

Accordingly, semi-structured interviews were used in this study. A semi-structured interview is an open-ended process that combines structure and flexibility, and that allows the interviewer to stray from his or her prepared questions to ask the informant to elaborate on their responses or to explore unanticipated topics or comments (Merriam 1998). In the context of this study, semi-structured interviews enabled the researcher to gain more and deeper insights into the informants' attitudes, understandings and interpretations, and to clarify their diverse responses, while still ensuring there were sufficient guidelines to keep the interview on topic. Despite their usefulness, semi-structured interviews have disadvantages in terms of interviewees' bias and subjectivity. To mitigate these deficiencies, this study cross-checked the information provided by different interviewees; for example, some interview questions for principals were designed to allow the researcher to compare their responses directly to the answers given by SPSs, in order to see whether the two were in accord. This study used the data from observation and documents, in addition to data from different interview stages, for triangulation.

Construction of Interview Questions

This section introduces the seven major types of interviewees chosen and how the information gathered from each can help to answer the research questions.

The interviewees were from both inside schools and out, and included: (a) principals; (b) principals who were also SPSs; (c) SPSs; (d) SPSs who were DPCEs; (e) DPCEs; (f) HCEDs; and (g) education officials from the SMEC and DEBs (i.e., the departments of moral education and supervision). Principals, SPSs and DPCEs are senior school leaders, while HCEDs are mid-level school leaders.

The interview questions were constructed based on the research questions and the extant international and Chinese research literature on CE and school leadership. Four basic types of interview questions were asked to, respectively: (a) identify the state's influence on school leadership, especially on leadership in CE; (b) interpret principals' and SPSs' perceptions of and responses toward the state; (c) present perceptions of principals' and SPSs' responsibility sharing in school leadership and CE, and their strategies for doing so; and, (d) reveal factors affecting principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE.

Interview questions fell into two major categories—general questions to be asked of all informants, and specific questions to be asked of informants based on their post. The latter group provided diverse information on principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE, from their perspective and that of other informants. The general questions asked of all interviewees elicited different responses to the same questions from different types of interviewees. These questions addressed (a) their professional experiences; (b) the concurrent holding of political and administrative positions; and (c) the factors affecting school leadership. The responses to the general questions shed light on the second, fourth and fifth research questions, which dealt, in part, with interviewees' perceptions of how the CPC-led state controls school leaders in leading CE, how school leaders responded to that control, how principals and SPSs shared responsibilities in CE, and why they acted as they did.

Specific interview questions for principals who were not SPSs and for SPSs who were not principals were similar. These similar questions were helpful in gathering information on the two groups' perceptions of and viewpoints on CE, how they interacted with macro- and micro-political actors in exercising leadership in CE, and the similarities in and differences between the dual heads' perceptions and strategies. These questions addressed both their leadership in CE, as well as their: (a) interpretations of their responsibilities in school leadership and CE; (b) views on and responses to the CPC-led state's policies and requirements; (c) perceptions of CE and their leadership therein; and, (d) their strategies for dividing responsibilities and cooperating with each other. Data gained from these questions contributed to all research questions.

Specific interview questions for principals who were also SPSs were similar to those for principals who were not SPSs, and gathered interviewees': (a) interpretations of their responsibilities in school leadership and in CE in particular; (b) views on and responses to state policies and requirements; and, (c) perceptions of CE and their leadership therein. In addition, the specific interview questions for this group addressed how they, as heads of school administrative and political lines both, divided their responsibilities for school political and administrative work.

Interviews with HCEDs and DPCEs who were not SPSs gauged how school members perceived principals' and SPSs' leadership and roles. The questions addressed how they perceived: (a) their views on the division of labor between principals and SPSs; and, (b) their labor division with principals and SPSs in CE. These responses were helpful in answering the second and third research questions.

Interviews with educational officials were designed to gather information, from an external authority perspective, on what aspects of school leadership and CE the government controlled, and how. Specific questions for these government officials addressed: (a) the situation of CE and school leadership in Shanghai; (b) their opinions on formulating the currently influential policies on CE and school leadership; and, (c) the division of labor between principals and SPSs in CE. Responses here helped to answer the first and fourth research questions.

Sampling and Methods for Finding Interviewees

As the school system and school leadership in Shanghai are complex matters, this study used purposive sampling to select those informants who could be most helpful in answering the research questions. Purposive sampling involves selecting informants who have certain characteristics and reflect the maximum variety (Gall et al. 2007), and helped this study to: examine a wide range of diverse conditions of leadership in CE; explore factors affecting school leadership; and identify common characteristics and variations among school leaders. Before conducting my field work in Shanghai (from March to June, 2011), I set criteria for recruiting informants. First, they must work in junior secondary schools or in schools with a junior secondary section. Second, they must include participants who occupied all of the types of position listed above, including principals, SPSs, principals who were also SPSs, and SPSs who were also DPCEs.

During the field work, I conducted a total of 46 semi-structured interviews on an individual basis. The interviewees included two Shanghai educational officials and 44 Shanghai school leaders from 24 public schools—13 principals, three principals who were also SPSs, two SPSs, nine SPSs who were also DPCEs, five DPCEs who were not SPSs, and 12 HCEDs (see Table 1). I also interviewed two teachers who were neither senior nor mid-level school leaders, but found their interview data were not useful to the study, partly because this study focuses on the perceptions and views of school leaders, particularly principals and SPSs, and partly because the two interviewed teachers had little direct contact with their school leaders, and so knew very little about their leadership.

Nine of the interviewed principals (including those who were also SPSs) were female and seven were male. Of the SPSs (including SPSs who were also DPCEs) eight were female and three were male. Three DPCEs were female and two were male, while all HCEDs but one were female. Four of the interviewed principals (including principals who were also SPSs) had been principals for fewer than five

Table 1 Summary of interviewees' information

Position	Total no. of interviewees' on each position	Gender		Years on the position		
		Female	Male	Less than 5 years	5–10 years	More than 10 years
Principal	13	7	6	3	6	4
Principal and SPS	3	2	1	1	2	0
SPSP	2	0	2	2	0	0
SPS and DPCE	9	8	1	4	3	2
DPCE	5	3	2	3	2	0
HCED	12	11	1	6	5	1
Official	2	1	1	1	1	0
Total	46					

years (as of 2011)—eight for between five and ten years, and four more than ten years. The years of experience for interviewed SPSs (including SPSs who were DPCEs) were six, three and two, respectively; for DPCES, three, two, and zero; and for HCEDs, six, five, and one.

Three methods were used to contact and recruit interviewees. The first method involved contacting potential schools of which I had no prior personal knowledge. I first visited the school web sites and DEB websites to identify potential schools and to gather contact information; although school information disclosure has been advocated in Shanghai, not all schools' contact information was available online. I next sent emails to the schools, explaining the topic and purpose of the research and asking whether they would be willing to participate; only one school agreed to participate. There are three reasons explaining the lack of positive response to my request: first, school leaders are frequently unwilling to participate in strangers' research; second, email is not an effective way of contacting prospective interviewees, as it might be neglected or automatically filtered in to the trash; and third, the office dean, who is responsible for helping the principal deal with such documentary and daily work as replying to emails, might not forward the email to the school leaders.

The second recruitment method adopted involved seeking the help of acquaintances in Shanghai. I earned my master's degree at a Normal University in Shanghai that collaborated with local schools, and had cultivated many connections among educational researchers, both at that university and at other educational institutions (such as district educational colleges), and among school leaders. This gave me the opportunity to get help from three types of acquaintances. The first type was experts from the local university who had good, long-term collaborative relationships with local junior secondary schools; through these experts, I contacted four schools and interviewed nine school leaders. The second type was my alumni, who were now school leaders and who had friendships and/or had collaborated with other school leaders; 15 schools and two additional officials were contacted in this way.

The third method involved asking those who had agreed to be interviewed to help me find additional people who fitted the research profile and who could provide pertinent information. Some were intra-school recommendations; when contacting a school leader (usually a principal or SPS) for interview purposes, I would ask whether other leaders were available and whether he/she was willing to introduce me to them. Inter-school recommendations were generated by asking interviewees to put me in touch with school leaders from other schools; four additional schools were contacted in this manner.

Conducting Interviews

The interviews were conducted in Putonghua, which was the national common oral language of both the interviewees and interviewer, and which best facilitated communication and the sharing of in-depth information. The duration of the

interviews varied depending on interviewees' availability and the nature of their responses, with most being around 60 min.

The interviews were scheduled by the interviewees, at their convenience. During the interviews, I kept the guiding questions in my mind to ensure the interview remained on topic and progressed towards answering the research questions. At the beginning of each interview, I briefly introduced my research and reviewed any ethical issues. I then asked the interviewee's permission to record the interview on micro-recorder. If the interviewee was hesitant or preferred not to be recorded, I instead took notes (again, with their permission), then recalled and recorded additional details, as accurately and completely as possible, after the interviews. Of the 46 interviews, 43 (93.5 %) were audio recorded. Notes were also taken during the audio-recorded interviews on issues and concepts that merited further inquiry, to note non-verbal information, and to record instant perceptions for later analysis.

Specifically, the interviews involved a process of constant adjustment. After conducting pilot interviews, I transcribed the recordings and analyzed the data yielded. Based on that initial analysis, I made some questions more specific and added others. During the field work, I also transcribed some records with rich information to adjust the questions asked and to see what questions could be added in subsequent interviews. In addition, I reflected on the gathered information and tracked it back to my primary conceptual framework and research questions, to ensure it was rich enough to answer the research questions and to determine what additional deep information could be added.

Data Analysis

Data analysis of qualitative research is a systematic process of examining and sorting collected interview transcripts, field notes and other materials used to record the researcher's findings (Bogdan 2003). Guided by the macro- and micro-politics theoretical perspective, this study analyzed data gathered from government documents, academic publications, school documents, field observation notes and interview transcripts. The original text was imported into NVivo data analysis software, which helped me to code and categorize the data and to identify emerging themes.

This study used two methods of analyzing data. One method was interpretational analysis, a process for analyzing case study data to find and identify "constructs, themes and patterns that can be used to describe and explain the phenomenon being studied" (Tesch 1990, p. 466). The other method was constant comparison, an inductive way of developing theory through categorizing, delineating categories and connecting them to find similarities and differences of answers to a group (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Glaser (1965) proposed four stages of constant comparison: comparing incidents applicable to each category; integrating categories and their properties; delimiting the theory; and writing the theory. The two methods of data analysis were simultaneously used in this book.

Tesch's (1990) suggestions on interpretational data analysis were followed in five steps. The first step was to import soft copies of the data into NVivo, and group them. The documentary data were categorized into four major groups, based on whether they were issued at the national, municipal, district or school level. In each group, the documents were then divided into those on education in general, those on CE, and those on school leadership. The interview transcripts and notes were grouped according the interviewees' position.

The second step involved coding data into meaningful units relating to the macro-political context of school leadership in China; principals' and SPSs' responsibilities in CE leadership; how they responded to their state-assigned responsibilities; how they perceived and exercised their influence in CE leadership in particular; how they shared responsibilities with each other; how they perceived their work relationship; and what factors affected their leadership, and how.

The third step was to develop categories for dividing and encompassing meaningful units. A category is a set of similar phenomena, and may include sub-categories. The categories are related to China's macro-political context included state governance; economic development and political construction; education; school leadership; and CE in the Mao and post-Mao periods. The developed categories are related to principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE included political responsibilities; administrative responsibilities; recruitment; making school policies; school political work; CE curriculum; CE and the CPC-led state; CE and individual development; CE and academic instruction; and principals' and SPSs' cooperation on CE and teacher development.

In the fourth step, the diverse categories were brought together to identify and extract recurring themes. The themes thus generated included China's state governance; economic development; political construction; education; and school and CE leadership. Themes regarding school leaders' responsibilities were also found, including four scenarios of how principals (SPSs) responded to their responsibilities, as specified in the CPC's policies: active acceptance; passive acceptance; supportive modification; and unsupportive modification. The determinations that policies and requirements had or had not been modified were generated by the interviewees' self-reporting and my triangulations of those responses with documents, observations, and other interviewees' answers. Whether school leaders identified policies and requirements or not was mainly determined based on their self-reporting, as it related to the interviewees' perceptions. Two additional major themes concerned how principals and SPSs shared responsibilities—cooperation and competition. The fifth and final step involved drawing conclusions from the data.

Glaser's (1965) constant comparison technique was used in the interpretational analysis process. Regarding the macro-political context of China, constant comparison was used to analyze continuities and changes in China's economic development, political construction and education, particularly as regards school leadership and CE in the Mao and post-Mao periods.

For the data on principals' and SPSs' leadership in CE, constant comparison was used (starting from the third interpretational analysis step) to compare categories and find themes within each group (e.g., principals, principals who were SPSs, SPSs, and SPSs who were DPCEs, DPCEs, HCEDs and educational officials).

Next, it was used to compare the themes generated from school leaders from similar positions (i.e., comparing the themes found in groups between principals and principals who were SPSs, or between SPSs and SPSs who were DPCEs) to find similarities and differences in each group. The themes compared included each group of school leaders' responsibilities, four scenarios for responding to state policies and requirements regulating their responsibilities, their views on school leadership and CE, and their views on and responses to their working relationships. The categories within each theme in each group of school leaders' data were also compared to find similarities and differences in the interviewees' perceptions and strategies.

Third, constant comparison compared all the themes and categories generated from the two major groups of school leaders—principals (including principals who were SPSs) and SPSs (including who were DPCEs) to seek out the similarities and differences in their leadership in CE, and to delimit theory.

To protect the interviewees' identity and confidentiality, anonymous codes were used in the presentation and analysis of the study's findings. The code for each interviewee reflects their school and position. For example, P1 stands for the principal of School 1; SPS6 refers to the SPS of School 6; DPCE10 is a deputy school principal in School 10; and HCED22 represents the head of the CE department in School 22. Interviewees holding principal's and SPS's positions concurrently (such as P5, who was the principal and the SPS of School 5) were coded based on their administrative position, but their concurrent appointment is mentioned when they are cited in the book. The two interviewed officials are coded as Official 1 and Official 2.

This section has introduced the methods used in analyzing the data of this book, the steps at which they were used, and the purposes of each step. The anonymous codes assigned to schools and school leaders were introduced.

Reliability of this book

Given that qualitative data collection is conducted in a natural setting and that the dynamic and diverse nature of human perception, the technique often confronts problems of reliability. Reliability refers to the extent to which the research data findings capture reality (Krefting 1991) and is based, in the case of this study, on whether the data on school leadership in CE accurately reveals school leaders daily practices, and on whether the analysis was directly generated from the data collected through document analysis, observation and interviews. As reality, in the context of qualitative research, is holistic, multiple, and ever-changing, the assessment of reality in qualitative research needs to be clarified. Merriam (1998) pointed out that reality in qualitative research is what the researchers have no doubts about and accept at that moment.

To enhance the reliability of this study, I adopted three suggested strategies (Denzin and Lincoln 2008; Lincoln and Guba 1985). The first was triangulation, the use of multiple methods to collect data and confirm emerging findings (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). This study adopted three data collection methods—document

analysis, observation, and interviews with diverse informants—to ensure that sources and responses could be cross-checked. Observation data, for example, were used to check whether policy requirements identified during document analysis were actually translated into practices, and whether related interview data were consistent with the informants' actions. Conducting interviews with multiple informants was another way to explore the reality of the data.

The second strategy was member checks, which is the process of inviting the original informants to confirm the accuracy of the data collected (Lincoln and Guba 1985). During the interview process, for example, I repeated the information given by the interviewees to them for their confirmation, and shared my findings to allow them to clarify their responses and/or correct my interpretations.

The third strategy was clarification. Merriam (1998) pointed out that it is necessary for qualitative research to clarify its conceptualizations and its ways of collecting, analyzing and interpreting data and presenting findings. I therefore produced a thick and rich description of the research context (i.e., the background of China and Shanghai), process (including how I accessed the interviewees and observation schools, conducted the investigation and analyzed the data) and conclusions, so that other researchers and readers could determine whether my findings can be applicable to their situations.

Taken together, these measures increased the reliability of this qualitative research project.

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