

Samiul Hasan *Editor*

The Muslim World in the 21st Century

Space, Power, and Human Development

 Springer

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BabuPuchchu
Where the hopes are

Preface

Muslims live all over the world, but are in majority in 48 countries, all of which, except one, are in Africa and Asia. Most of these countries seem to be poor, burdened with debts, and are grouped as the least developed countries (LDCs). Except for 12 countries, most with exclusive dependence on oil, all countries with predominantly Muslim population have a low or medium human development index (HDI) ranks. Fifteen out of the forty heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) in the world have a Muslim majority population. Only few countries with Muslim majority have democracies. Why? Many questions but no single volume has the answers.

The idea of a book to deal with the above and many other questions related to Muslims and their countries have been with me for a long time, in particular since the work on my doctoral dissertation on voluntarism and sustainable development planning in resource poor Asia a long time ago at the University of Waterloo, Canada. The resolve increased with the distressing incidences of 9/11.

The idea of this book was crystallized by a documentary by the National Geographic based on *Guns, Germs, and Steel* by Jared Diamond. Still two potential problems thwarted the progress: the availability of the data and the inability to conceive the whole spectrum of issues in all countries where Muslims are dominant. The recent posting of online data by the World Bank boosted my courage, and the enthusiasm from the Springer (especially Teresa M. Krauss—the then editor) and the eagerness of some possible authors to contribute got the ball rolling. I am indebted to Jared Diamond and the National Geographic (for unknowingly helping me to shape the idea and the focus of this work), to the World Bank (for making volumes of data available online), the Springer (especially the editor, Teresa M. Krauss for encouragement), and to all the authors (for contributing pieces to hold the ‘thesis’ together). I am recording my gratitude to all.

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Finally, I record my gratitude to my wife Arifa and my daughters Babu (Afrin Samia) and Puchchu (Fariha Tahsin) for being considerate and enthusiastic.

United Arab Emirates University
18 March 2011

Samiul Hasan

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Part I
The Themes, Premises, and Principles

Chapter 1

The Muslim World and Human Development: An Introduction

Samiul Hasan

The world, with 6.90 billion people (in early 2011), has about 1.57 billion Muslims. Around 500 million of this live as religious minority with more than ten million each in India (160 million), Ethiopia (38 million), Russia (26 million), Tanzania (16 million), and China (26–130 million¹). In addition, there are at least nine countries with 4–10 million Muslims in each,² for example, USA (at least 7 million³), Ivory Coast (7.7 million), Thailand (6 million), Ghana (5 million), Mozambique (5.2 million), Zaire (5 million), Philippines (4.7 million), Uganda (4 million), and France (4 million). There are also 15 countries such as Ghana (3.8 million), Germany (2.8 million), Benin (2.1 million), Kenya (2.7 million), Malawi (2 million), Kosovo (2 million), Sri Lanka (1.7 million), UK (1.6 million), Bosnia (1.5 million), Nepal (1.2 million), Israel (1.1 million), Netherlands (1 million), Argentina (1 million), Bulgaria (1 million), and Spain (1 million) where 1–4 million Muslims in each form a significant minority religious group (Pew Research Center 2009).

All countries with majority Muslim population are represented in the 57-member Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). These 57 members of the OIC include eight countries with around 1–40% Muslim population as well as the occupied

¹ No authentic figure is available on the number of Muslim population in China. Different sources place it between 2 and 10% of the population. With a total population of 1.4 billion (est.) in 2011, Muslim population would be at least 28 million.

² Palestine Territories (Gaza and the West Bank) have at least four million Muslims.

³ The US census data do not include religious affiliation. Further, the Pew Research Centre claims that since 9/11 Muslims tend to avoid religious affiliation while responding to surveys. So Pew Research Centre has done an excellent job in estimating Muslim population worldwide, except for the USA. But different estimates claim it to be around 10 million (about 0.3% of the US population) with an average annual growth rate of 6%. The most conservative estimate is cited here.

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territories of Palestine⁴ and Albania (70% Muslim)—a European country. The other 47 members of the OIC are Muslim majority countries (MMCs) in Africa and Asia.

These 47 MMCs have a combined total population of 1.46 billion, about one billion (i.e., about 68%) of which are Muslim. These MMCs, with different sizes of total population, have different percentages of Muslim population. For example, while Indonesia has about 200 million Muslim population (88% of the total 227 million) or about 20% of the total Muslim population in the MMCs, Maldives has only 300 thousand people—all Muslim. Four other MMCs have less than one million people: Brunei, Comoros, Bahrain, and Djibouti. Number of people in nine MMCs is less than five million each (Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE).⁵ In nine other MMCs, population sizes vary between five and ten million (Azerbaijan, Guinea, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan). Thus 23 MMCs have less than ten million people each. There are seven MMCs where population size is between 10 and 16 million (Burkina Faso, Chad, Kazakhstan, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Tunisia). Seven MMCs in the Arab world (Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen), Afghanistan, Malaysia, and Uzbekistan have a population between 20 and 41 million (Table 1.1). About a half of the total Muslim population in the world (or about 75% of the Muslims in the MMCs) lives in the seven largest MMCs. The list includes Bangladesh (136 million), Egypt (74 million), Indonesia (200 million), Iran (76 million), Nigeria (78 million), Pakistan (178 million), and Turkey (73 million).

The percentages of Muslim population in these MMCs do also widely vary. For example, in five sub-Saharan African MMCs, Muslim majority is only marginal⁶ (50% in Nigeria and Burkina Faso, 51% in Eritrea, 52% in Guinea-Bissau, and 53% in Chad). In five other MMCs, the size of Muslim population is (a half to) less than two-third of the total population. These MMCs (Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Bahrain, and Brunei) have 57%, 60%, 61%, 65%, and 67% Muslim population, respectively. Except for two MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa (Comoros and Somalia), three in South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Maldives), and one in West Africa (Mauritania), the other 13 MMCs with more than 95–100% Muslim population are in North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) and West Asia (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen). The percentage of Muslim population in seven MMCs in Africa (Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal), and four MMCs in Asia (Azerbaijan, Jordan,

⁴ For example, Benin (24%), Cameroon (21%), Cote d'Ivory (40%), Gabon (1%), Guyana (15%), Mozambique (24%), Suriname (29%), and Togo (20%). Percentage of Muslim population is within the parentheses; source: CIA Factbook.

⁵ Worth noting, that the percentage of expatriate working population (including their families) in the six GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) vary from 20% (in Oman and Saudi Arabia) to at least 80–90% in Qatar and the UAE. Thus the number of citizens in these countries is very small.

⁶ See Chap. 7 (for a discussion on the role of the colonial power in this) and Chap. 8 (for a general discussion of political characters) helpful in understanding the related social dynamics in these countries.

Table 1.1 MMCs: Geography and people

Country	Total population (2008)	Muslim population (%)	Density (per km ²)	Latitude
Afghanistan	29,021,099	99	44	33
Algeria	34,373,426	97	14	28
Azerbaijan	8,680,100	93	105	40
Bahrain	775,585	65	1,092	26
Bangladesh	160,000,128	85	1,229	24
Brunei	392,280	67	74	4
Burkina Faso	15,233,884	50	56	13
Chad	10,913,667	53	9	15
Comoros	643,571	95	346	-12
Djibouti	849,245	94	37	11
Egypt	81,527,172	93	82	27
Eritrea	4,926,877	51	49	15
Gambia, The	1,660,200	90	166	13
Guinea	9,833,055	92	40	11
Guinea-Bissau	1,575,446	52	56	12
Indonesia	227,345,082	88	125	-5
Iran	71,956,322	98	44	32
Iraq	30,711,152	96	70	33
Jordan	5,812,000	93	66	31
Kazakhstan	15,674,000	57	6	48
Kuwait	2,728,041	95	153	29
Kyrgyzstan	5,277,900	75	28	41
Lebanon	4,193,758	60	410	34
Libya	6,294,181	97	4	25
Malaysia	27,014,337	60	82	2
Maldives	305,027	100	1,017	3
Mali	12,705,736	90	10	17
Mauritania	3,215,043	99	3	20
Morocco	31,605,616	96	71	32
Niger	14,704,318	90	12	16
Nigeria	151,212,254	50	166	10
Oman	2,785,361	99	9	21
Pakistan	166,111,487	97	215	30
Qatar	1,280,862	99	111	25
Saudi Arabia	24,807,000	100	12	25
Senegal	12,211,181	91	63	14
Sierra Leone	5,559,853	80	78	8
Somalia	8,926,326	99	14	10
Sudan	41,347,723	85	17	15
Syria	20,581,290	87	112	35
Tajikistan	6,836,083	90	49	39
Tunisia	10,327,800	99	66	34
Turkey	73,914,260	98	96	39
Turkmenistan	5,043,618	89	11	40

Table 1.1 (continued)

Country	Total population (2008)	Muslim population (%)	Density (per km ²)	Latitude
UAE	4,484,935	95	54	24
Uzbekistan	27,313,700	88	64	41
Yemen	22,917,485	99	43	15

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) ranges between 90% and 94% of the total. In six MMCs in Asia (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and two in Africa (Sierra Leone and Sudan), Muslim majority ranges from 75 to 89% (Table 1.1).

1.1 The MMCs and Their Level of Human Development

These MMCs gained independence (or self-government) at different times under different conditions, from different colonial (or controlling) powers, had different traditions, and established different forms of government to achieve different levels of human development. The United Nations list of least developed countries (LDCs)⁷ includes 17 of the 47 MMCs (Table 1.2; representing 35% of all LDCs in the world). All MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa except Nigeria, two MMCs in South Asia and one in West Asia are categorized as LDCs (Table 1.2).

The available data also demonstrate that even in the face of depressing effects of globalization on the resource poor countries (Stiglitz 2007), some Asian countries have shown impressive resilience and success in achieving human development. All Asian MMCs have moved up in the Human Development Index (HDI) ladder crossing over to ‘medium human development’ group. Seven oil-dependent countries have very high per capita income ranging from PPP\$22,816 in Oman to PPP\$74,882 in Qatar⁸ (UNDP 2009). Six MMCs also are placed in the high HDI category. The MMCs’ achievements in human development, in general, are comparatively low, worse in the MMCs in Africa. Considering these facts, can religion be seen as a factor in development?

⁷ Least developed countries, measured in three criteria: low-income (<\$750/capita); human resource weakness judged by low access to nutrition, health, education, and adult literacy; and economic vulnerability showing instability of agriculture and exports of goods and services, low share of manufacturing and modern services in GDP, merchandise export concentration, and the handicap of economic smallness. LDCs are to reach the threshold level in all three criteria in three consecutive years to “graduate” out.

⁸ Since the population of these MMCs is made of between 20 and 90% expatriate workers, the per capita income for the citizens in each country is likely to be significantly higher.

Table 1.2 MMCs in different geographic regions and their LDC status

<i>North Africa</i>	<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>	<i>West Asia and Turkey</i>	<i>Central Asia</i>	<i>South and Southeast Asia</i>
Algeria	<i>Burkina Faso</i>	Bahrain	Azerbaijan	Afghanistan
<i>Djibouti</i>	<i>Chad</i>	Iran	Kazakhstan	<i>Bangladesh</i>
Egypt	<i>Comoros</i>	Iraq	Kyrgyzstan	Brunei
<i>Eritrea</i>	<i>Gambia</i>	Jordan	Tajikistan	Indonesia
Libya	<i>Guinea</i>	Kuwait	Turkmenistan	Malaysia
Morocco	<i>Guinea-Bissau</i>	Lebanon	Uzbekistan	<i>Maldives</i>
Tunisia	<i>Mali</i>	Oman		Pakistan
	<i>Mauritania</i>	Qatar		
	<i>Niger</i>	Saudi Arabia		
	Nigeria	Syria		
	<i>Senegal</i>	Turkey		
	<i>Sierra Leone</i>	UAE		
	<i>Somalia</i>	<i>Yemen</i>		
	<i>Sudan</i>			

MMCs in *Italics* are grouped as LDCs (see footnote 7) by the UN representing 35% of all LDCs in the world. All least developed MMCs are in sub-Saharan Africa, two in South Asia, and one in West Asia

1.2 Islam and Human Development in the MMCs

Today Muslims are relatively poor, whether the comparison is done to the world-wide mean at either the individual or national level (cited in Noland 2005). The MMCs have relatively low levels of economic development as measured by the per capita GDP, an observation confirmed in a regression analysis of 132 countries by Kuran (2004). Yet the regression analyses do not yield a robust pattern of coefficients with respect to particular religion, Islam included (Pryor 2007, p. 1815; Platteau 2008, p. 329). Some economic analyses “provide no support for the notion that Islam is a drag on growth”—if anything, the results “reinforce the notion that the impact of Islam is positive” (Noland 2005, p. 1222).

Apart from economic inequality among people within a country and among countries, gender inequality and its monitoring has been a major part of human development. In the recent past, the UNDP Human Development Report also highlights achievements in Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM).⁹ The GEM dramatically changes the HDI position of many countries in world ranking—some positively and some negatively. For example, the OECD countries such as Ireland, Japan, Korea, or USA move down in the GEM world ranking compared to their respective HDI

⁹ A composite index prepared by considering four factors: the percentage of female members in the parliament, percentage of senior government and business leaders, percentage of female professionals, and the ratio of male/female earned income in each country.

world ranking,¹⁰ while Denmark, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, or South Africa move up in the GEM world ranking compared to their world ranks in the HDI.¹¹ Some MMCs also achieve a dramatic upward shift in world ranking in the GEM index (compared to their respective HDI world ranks). For example, in the GEM, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Yemen, Morocco, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, and Indonesia move up 36, 42, 31, 26, 16, 64, and 15 places respectively in world ranking from their respective HDI rank. On the other hand, the GEM ranking of many MMCs falls quite dramatically behind the respective HDI rankings, for example, 15 points behind in Iran, 55 in Qatar, 57 in Saudi Arabia, and 10 points in the UAE. Thus, there seem to be significant variations in gender relationships among different MMCs (Table 1.3). Thus, religion does not seem to be a factor in GEM inequality, either.

The “Muslim doctrine of economics permits degrees of individual freedom and state’s intervention, but leaves the determination of these degrees to the wisdom and conscience of those involved, who should take current conditions into account.” This flexibility has made “Muslim economies open to alternative options within its framework” (Pryor 2007; p. 1816 from Abdul-Rauf 1979). Many analysts thus argue that the failure in development of the MMCs is “not for religion but for the failure of government in chalking and implementing an Islamic strategy of development by motivating the Believers to convert their self-interest” to ‘public interest’ (*masalih al-mursalah*; follows Chopra 1993; see Chap. 2 in this book). Further, the absence of an Islamic vision of and path to development that promote simple living, belongingness, wellbeing for all, concerns for others, human solidarity, and sharing (within and among the communities) create grievances among Muslims (Mirakhor and Hossein 2010).

The grievances resulting from the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent failure of Arab nationalist and secular governments to deliver economic development reinforced the role of Islam in political change in a range of countries in the second half of the twentieth century¹² (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011) and created an interest in the *Shari’a* law¹³ to weaken the government’s ‘upper hand.’ The establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 helped in the re-emergence of the idea of inseparability of religion and state (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011).

The systems retarding human development in Muslim countries appear to be the result of economic, political, and social forces unrelated to the religion (Pryor 2007, p. 1823). In many of the MMCs, like other countries in Africa and Asia, mod-

¹⁰ Ireland (HDI-5; GEM-22), Japan (HDI-10; GEM-57), Korea (26; GEM-61), or USA (HDI-13; GEM-18), for details see UNDP 2009 (Table K: Gender empowerment measure).

¹¹ Denmark (HDI-15; GEM-4), Finland HDI-12; GEM-3), Germany (HDI-22; GEM-9), New Zealand HDI-20; GEM-10), or South Africa (HDI-129; GEM-26), for details see UNDP 2009 (Table K: Gender empowerment measure).

¹² Cited by Deneulin and Rakodi (2010) from Thomas, S. (2005). *The Global Resurgence of Religion and The Transformation of International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹³ The interest in political Islam in the recent past also has been a reflection of the perceived injustices inflicted on the Palestinians.

Table 1.3 HDI and GEM ranks of the MMCs

Country	Total population	Muslim pop- ulation (%)	Fertility rate	GEM rank	HDI rank	Latitude
Afghanistan	29,021,099	99	6.6			33
Algeria	34,373,426	97	2.36	105	104	28
Azerbaijan	8,680,100	93	2.3	100	86	40
Bahrain	775,585	65	2.27	46	39	26
Bangladesh	160,000,128	85	2.34	108	146	24
Brunei	392,280	67	2.08	–	–	–4
Burkina Faso	15,233,884	50	5.91	–	–	–4
Chad	10,913,667	53	6.16	–	–	15
Comoros	643,571	95	3.95	–	–	–12
Djibouti	849,245	94	3.9	–	–	11
Egypt	81,527,172	93	2.86	107	123	27
Eritrea	4,926,877	51	4.63	–	–	15
Gambia	1,660,200	90	5.05	–	–	13
Guinea	9,833,055	92	5.41	–	–	11
Guinea-Bissau	1,575,446	52	5.71	–	–	12
Indonesia	227,345,082	88	2.17	96	111	–5
Iran	71,956,322	98	1.81	103	88	32
Iraq	30,711,152	96	4.05	–	–	33
Jordan	5,812,000	93	3.49	–	–	31
Kazakhstan	15,674,000	57	2.56	73	82	48
Kuwait	2,728,041	95	2.17	–	–	29
Kyrgyzstan	5,277,900	75	2.7	56	120	41
Lebanon	4,193,758	60	1.85	–	–	34
Libya	6,294,181	97	2.7	–	–	25
Malaysia	27,014,337	60	2.56	68	66	2
Maldives	305,027	100	2.02	90	95	3
Mali	12,705,736	90	6.54	–	–	17
Mauritania	3,215,043	99	4.47	–	–	20
Morocco	31,605,616	96	2.35	104	130	32
Niger	14,704,318	90	7.12	–	–	16
Nigeria	151,212,254	50	5.7	–	–	10
Oman	2,785,361	99	3.05	87	56	21
Pakistan	166,111,487	97	3.96	99	141	30
Qatar	1,280,862	99	2.41	88	33	25
Saudi Arabia	24,807,000	100	3.12	106	59	25
Senegal	12,211,181	91	4.82	–	–	14
Sierra Leone	5,559,853	80	5.2	–	–	8
Somalia	8,926,326	99	6.39	–	–	10
Sudan	41,347,723	85	4.17	–	–	15
Syria	20,581,290	87	3.25	–	–	35
Tajikistan	6,836,083	90	3.41	–	–	39
Tunisia	10,327,800	99	2.06	–	–	34
Turkey	73,914,260	98	2.11	101	79	39
Turkmenistan	5,043,618	89	2.48	–	–	40

Table 1.3 (continued)

Country	Total population	Muslim pop- ulation (%)	Fertility rate	GEM rank	HDI rank	Latitude
UAE	4,484,935	95	1.94	25	35	24
Uzbekistan	27,313,700	88	2.56	–	–	41
Yemen	22,917,485	99	5.22	109	140	15

ern economic institutions were introduced or reinforced by their colonial masters. When the relationships between Islam and development is calculated with a dummy variable for Arab culture, the Islam variable appeared significantly correlated with four economic institutions: a less enterprise training of their workers, a high intensity of product market competition, a tendency to conduct collective bargaining carried out at a higher rather than lower level of the economy, and a lower level of reported tax fraud (Pryor 2007, p. 1823). “What is at issue may be characteristics of Arab culture that are misattributed to Islam” (Noland 2005, p. 1222).

“The Muslim world is also characterized by the lack of democratic political institutions and processes.” In the 47 countries with a Muslim majority, only 23% (11) countries have democratically elected governments (as opposed to the 76% countries in the rest of the world¹⁴). Democracy is not necessarily better for development unless combined with markets and openness creating an efficient, dynamic society to allow “development to thrive” (Bhagwati 2002). The trade-off between democracy and development, or the “cruel dilemma,” is “by no means a compelling necessity,” and “need not be at the expense of the drive for economic development.” (Bhagwati 2002).

In some analyses if other variables, for instance location in sub-Saharan Africa and in the former communist bloc in Europe (plus China), are added the economic, political, and cultural influence in development becomes more robust (Pryor 2007, p. 1823). So a bigger question is—has geography influenced human development in the MMCs? If so, how has it and how much?

1.3 Geography, Colonial History, and Human Development

There has been a general claim that the East–West divide in ‘development’ resulted from differences in topography, resource endowments, culture, attitudes towards science and technology, variation in human evolution as well as of the coalfield’s distance to locations otherwise unsuited for industrial development (Ferguson 2009, pp. 286, 287). Good geographic location from the beginning of civilization has created natural propensity to farming, and thus human living, by providing favorable

¹⁴ Please note these figures are from 2002. For the quotation and facts in this paragraph see Chap. 14 in this book. Chapters 14 and 8 have good discussions on the related matter.

temperature, appropriate precipitation, and wind direction/speed, average annual sunlight, water bodies, and arable soil (Diamond 1997), and has been a part of the economic development debate (Harvey 1969, 1996). Geographic location historically has dictated systems of agriculture, irrigation, and waterways, and ultimately power relationships for space (physical, economic, social) control and the creation of ‘place.’

The geography-centered analyses of ‘development’ does not seem to be a new phenomenon. Ibn Khaldun,¹⁵ in *Al Muqaddima*, wrote in the thirteenth century (CE) that most human activities are concentrated between the Equator and Latitude 63° (North). He added that if this area is equally divided in seven zones¹⁶ (with nine latitudes each), the (old) world civilizations were most developed in ‘Zone 4’ (28° and 36°N) expanding to Zones 3 and 5 (Lacoste 1984), mainly due to the natural potential (sun, soil, water, and wind) for food production in these areas. Jared Diamond (1997, 2005) in his writing has explained the phenomenon further (adding that the ‘phenomenon’ mirrors in the south of the Equator) to answer questions like why some countries excel and why some people/civilizations have experienced a ‘Collapse.’

In the recent past, Jeffrey Sachs and his team has worked on the ‘geographic determinism’ thesis to show that the countries in the geographical tropics are nearly all poor, and that all high-income countries are in the middle and high latitudes. Geography may influence economic productivity influencing the transport costs, human health, agricultural productivity (including animal husbandry), and proximity to and ownership of natural resources (including water, minerals, hydrocarbon deposits, and so forth; Gallup et al. 1998).

Good geographic location has also been a source of animal domestication and the creation of a social structure (e.g., slavery—in the absence of a strong local community) to support successful farming (Diamond 1997). Domesticated animals in and around the Fertile Crescent¹⁷ (except lama; Diamond 1997) transformed the cropping pattern, increased productivity, brought in the division (and specialization) of work, created surplus labor (due to the lessening of time required for food collection or production), widened the variety of produce and size of the surplus forcing the producers increasingly serve the neighbors (near and far). Trading through the desert (with the use of camels, donkeys, or horses), water (by rafts or ocean liners), or air (propelled or jet engine) human beings, with control on the contemporary transport system, have excelled in commerce, production, or service-based eco-

¹⁵ Ibn Khaldun (Abu Zayed Abdu ar-Rahman bin Muhammad bin Khaldun al-Hadrami; 1332–1406 CE), regarded by many as the father of sociology, is best known for his work *Al Muqaddimah* (or the Prolegomena).

¹⁶ Geographic (location) “zones” in this book refers to the latitudes divided following Ibn Khaldun’s thesis. Latitudes 0–63 have been divided in seven equal zones. So Zone 1 is Latitude 0–9, Zone 2 is Latitude 10–18, and so forth.

¹⁷ A “crescent” shaped fertile area—an extension of Mesopotamia—between the Anatolian hills in the North and Syrian Desert in the South.

conomic activities until the quaternary sector became a source of economic success. Landlocked regions lagged behind, as a natural corollary.

The influence of geography (physical characters, resource availability, as well as the climate) on economic development is evident even in the modern world. Among the 35 countries in the world with the highest per capita income, only two (Brunei due to oil; and Singapore—a city state with very large tertiary and quaternary sectors) are located between the tropics of Cancer (23.5°N) and Capricorn (23.5°S). A direct relationship between geographic location and economic power is also evident in the fact that none of the 34 OECD member countries are located between the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn. Further, coastal economies have generally higher income than the landlocked economies (Gallup et al. 1998), and have higher income than the landlocked counterparts even on the same Latitude except for Botswana (for natural resources) and Switzerland (possibly because of its historical targeting of the tertiary, followed by the quaternary, economic activities). Indeed, outside of Europe, there is not a single high-income landlocked country, though there are 29 non-European landlocked countries (Gallup et al. 1998). In Africa, for example, coastal resource-scarce countries performed significantly better than resource-rich countries whether landlocked or coastal, while the landlocked, resource-scarce economies have been the worst performers¹⁸ (Collier 2010; Moyo 2009).

The ‘geographic determinism’ thesis can also be studied in conjunction with the colonial past of different regions. The far-reaching influence of the characters of the European colonial powers (interested in resources and markets) on the economy and society in Asian countries are demonstrated by the fact that the East Asian tigers (China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) were never colony of Europe. On the other hand, the Asian tragedies such as Cambodia, Laos, and Timore Leste were colonies of the worst colonizers—French and Portuguese (Easterly 2006).

Some scholars argue, though, that “geography and climate are now being brought back towards the center of development economics, in an attempt to find excuses for the misery caused by a premature removal of industrial policy tools” (Reinert 2008, p. 235). Nonetheless, any study on (human) development needs to be comprehensive looking at geography, power relations, ‘industrial policy’ (and its antecedents), resources availability, as well as the existence and structure of the ‘capability’ of using the resources and of targeting the purpose, the process, and the time of its best use.

1.4 Rationale of the Foci and Title of the Book

Only 10 out of the 47 MMCs are in the ‘best geographic location’ (‘Zone 4’; Latitude 28–36°N), and 19 are in the extended ‘best zone’—12 MMCs are in ‘Zone 3’ (Latitude 19–27°N) and 7 are in ‘Zone 5’ (Latitude 36–45°N). The rest (18) of the

¹⁸ This phenomenon add another dimension to the debate—natural resource dependency diminishes overall economic performance (see Chap. 3).

Table 1.4 Muslim countries: Location, colonial past, sources of power

Location	No. of countries	Colonial past	No. of countries	Year of independence	From	Source of power	No. of countries
1:Lat 1–9	7	British	20	<1945	1 (British) 2 (French) 4 (None)	Election	18
2:10–18	11	French	14	1946–1959	4 (British) 4 (French) 1 (Dutch) 1 (Portuguese)	Selection	20
3:19–27	12	Dutch	1	1960–1969	8 (British) 7 (French)	Hereditary	9
4:28–36	10	Portuguese	2	1970–1979	5 (British) 1 (French) 1 (Portuguese)		
5:37–45	7	None	10	1980–1989 1990–2000	1 (British) 1 (British) 6 (Russia)		

MMCs are in the ‘worst geographic location’—Zones 1 and 2 (Latitude 1–18°N/S; Table 1.4). Most of these MMCs (at one point or the other for a short period or long) were subjected to European colonial rule. During the World War II, there were only six independent MMCs in Africa and Asia—Afghanistan¹⁹ (1747), Egypt²⁰ (1922), Iran (no colonial history), Iraq (1932), Saudi Arabia (no colonial history), and Turkey (formed in 1923). All other MMCs became independent states between 1941 (Lebanon) and 1993 (Eritrea) with the largest number gaining independence in the 1960s—16 MMCs in all. Six MMCs in Central Asia, though were not European colonies, became independent at the fall of the USSR in 1991. Eighteen MMCs at present have elected governments, while twenty have (self) selected civilian or military governments, and nine have hereditary governments (e.g., monarchy). It is highly likely that the systems of government in the MMCs are result of other geographic, social, and economic factors, and reasons for the level of human development in each.

No comprehensive work is ever undertaken to analyze all MMCs’ geography, people, colonial and postcolonial power relationships, and their possible impacts on different aspects of human development (economy, education, health, and related urban formation). This book is to fill this gap and offer analyses of relationships between space (the geographic phenomena), power (state and governmental features and political processes—present and past), and human development in the 47

¹⁹ Its foreign relation was controlled by the British for some time during the late nineteenth century CE.

²⁰ Apart from remaining a part of the Ottoman Empire, for a short period, Egypt (between 1882 and 1922) was under British protection, and Libya was under Italian rule (1911–1943). None was “colony.” Thus Egypt and Libya are grouped as British protectorates.

MMCs. It is to deal with questions like what geographic, social, and political factors in the 47 MMCs have influenced their respective human development rank? How and to what extent, if at all, the interaction of space and power has influenced human development in these MMCs? The book is to deal with many other questions (as explained in the respective chapter) to examine the role of other selected variables in shaping the character of the country, people, and human development in the MMCs.

Critics may argue that the term ‘Muslim world’ (in the title) is misleading because the book does not include ‘all’ Muslims in the world. The ‘Muslim World’ is used in the title to keep it simple, but the book is exclusively focused on the 47 MMCs (i.e., sovereign states) in Africa and Asia. These MMCs cannot be called ‘Muslim countries’ because these countries (constitutionally) claim not to be so (except Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia), do not follow exclusive Muslim laws, and have non-Muslim population each (except Maldives and Saudi Arabia). To avoid possible confusion, the first part of this chapter provides a brief of the Muslims living as a religious minority outside of the MMCs emphasizing the fact that this book does not deal with them.

These 47 MMCs, spread over a huge geographic area from Mauritania in the West to Indonesia in the East, are divided in this discussion through their geographic positions (Table 1.2). The MMCs north of the Sahara Desert are grouped under North Africa and those in the south are under ‘sub-Saharan Africa.’ The MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa are also often divided into West Africa and East Africa. In fact, some authors in this book have done so. The Arab countries (of West Asia) do not seem to think “of themselves as Asian,” and are not even represented in the Asian Development Bank²¹ (Emmott 2009, p. 32). Nonetheless, these MMCs, West of Afghanistan extending up to the eastern Mediterranean, are geographically in Asia and are grouped under West Asia (along with Turkey²²). ‘Central Asia’ expands into a large area spreading from the Caspian Sea in the West to China in the East, and is bounded by Russia in the north and Iran in the south. The most important feature of this area is its no access to sea. South Asia and Southeast Asia (often grouped differently) have only seven MMCs in all and are combined together in the discussion. In some chapters, however, because of the previously separated data, these two regions are dealt with separately in the discussion.

1.5 Chapters in the Book

The book is divided into four major parts. The first part (in three chapters including this one) deals with the framework of the book highlighting the characters and principles of Islamic jurisprudence and its relationship to human development, as

²¹ Except for once, may be, in 1947 on Nehru’s invitation, to attend the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi (Emmott 2009, 32)

²² The term “Middle East” is loaded being attached to European colonialism and later American imperialism (Marston et al. 2005, p. 193) and is not being used here.

well as the principles and theories of development from Western and Islamic perspectives.

The second part (in three chapters) identifies the fundamental features, facts, and issues related to geography and resources of the MMCs, provides an understanding of the people in the MMCs. Part III profiles the power relationships in the MMCs starting with the colonial past and ending with the modern foreign intervention through external resources that are likely to influence political and economic power relationships in the MMCs under discussion.

The next part (IV) incorporates the ‘situational analyses’ of some identified factors of human development in the MMCs. It examines economic, trade, urban, education, and health matters in the MMCs to show their interconnectedness and influence on human development in the MMCs. Chapters 14 and 15 (Part V) evaluate certain current democratic, external, and international organizational dynamics of power relationships and human development in the MMCs highlighting issues of political integrity and *ummah* solidarity.

The last part (Part VI in two chapters) endeavors first to theorizing the ‘space, power, and human development nexus’ highlighting the roles of geography in all as major conclusions of the book that may have significant policy implications, and then, in the last chapter (Chap. 17), highlights the issues related to the ‘way forward’ providing some possible suggestions for improving human development in the MMCs in Africa and Asia. A brief on all the chapters and their interrelationships are provided below.

1.5.1 Part I: The Themes, Premises, and Principles

Islamic law has transformed over the years within the basic frames of the Qur’an and the *Sunnah* through analogical deductions, human reasoning, independent judgment, and consensus. Further local customs (*urf*) and *adat* (customary laws) that do not contradict the fundamental principle of the Unity of God (*tawhid*) or any explicit injunctions became parts of Islamic principles of social and economic relationships. *Chapter 2* deals with the important aspects of the growth and formation of Islamic jurisprudence as well as the factors and issues required for understanding and studying human relationships in Islam. The chapter is divided into three important parts dealing with the sources of Islamic jurisprudence that promote flexibility, the traditions in Islamic jurisprudence that create diversity, and the *imams* and other people and their practices that are turning things around (re)defining the Muslims’ relationships to God, the Nature, and fellow human beings. It explains why there ought to be many authentic and acceptable *shari’a* ‘schools’ of human relationships for human development in Islam.

Development is a matter of growth as well as continuity and may have four dimensions: quality, capability, equity, and institutional. The European colonization transformed the natural economic growth pattern in the MMCs, like everywhere else in Africa and Asia, and created a (self-reinforcing) condition of ‘underdevel-

opment' devoid of the 'capability' to develop. *Chapter 3* is divided into two major sections dealing with the approaches of studying human development and some explanations for development differentials among people and countries. It highlights the failure to diversify economic activities or to curb rentier economy and the external influence that often reinforced the misuse of economic and political powers that may explain lower achievements in human development in the MMCs.

1.5.2 Part II: Geography, Resources, and People in the MMCs

Chapter 4 reviews the geographic locations, topographic features, and climate of all 47 MMCs in Africa and Asia. The chapter concludes that variations in geographic features and climate within each region are likely to affect the socioeconomic activities differently in the MMCs—while some MMCs may have good agriculture to ensure food security, others may be dependent on food imports. Both groups, due to varied reasons, may not have achieved much industrial development to attain economic diversity but having been blessed with complementary geographic features to support each other's economic activities, need to examine the matter sincerely.

Chapter 5 analyzes figures and features related to the primary resources (petroleum; natural gas generation, consumption, and import/export), energy (electricity generation, consumption, and import/export), and transportation (railways, roadways, waterways, river/sea ports), and their possible impacts on the economy and human development in the MMCs. The chapter concludes that the diversity of biophysical resources in the MMCs, the availability of a skilled labor force (due to globalization), and technology could lead to a better use of resources in the future. This of course depends on the future strategies in the MMCs for (economic) benefit optimization through the use of resources that will protect the environment balancing the ecosystem to improve the MMCs' standard of living in the present without compromising that of the future generations.

Resources are for people and thus people's history and culture that define their relationship to the 'nature' influence the practice and outcomes of resource use. Thus *Chap. 6* deals with the fundamental resource support system for the Muslims—kinship connections and social organizations. Islam's openness to 'alien' customs and norms facilitated cultural exchange and symbiosis in the Muslim lands. Further, the low impact political expansion of Islam resulted in social consolidation. These three phenomena seem to be essential in understanding the character and structure of Muslim population in the MMCs, and are discussed in the chapter to conclude that the need for protecting the 'pasture,' and an emotional urge for gravitating around the 'pride' throughout the history have enticed Muslims to settle around kinship and social groups within (or even outside) their traditional habitat. Thus the people in the MMCs are likely to be widely different from one another and influence and approach resource use and human development differently.

1.5.3 Part III: Power Relationships and External Influence in the MMCs

The three chapters in this section deal with the European colonization and its impacts on people and power structure in the MMCs, the system of power relationships in the post-World War II era that have influenced resource use and exploitation, and the modern tools of ‘foreign aid’ that may result from and are likely to exert external influence to preserve the above power relationships affecting human development in the MMCs.

Chapter 7 is divided into three main parts dealing with the characters of European colonization, the major processes of European colonization that significantly impacted the colonies, and in turn, human development in the MMCs. The European colonial powers in the MMCs (like anywhere else) had different objectives and approaches to colonization. The effects of the colonial invasion depend on the character of the colonial masters and its approach. The MMCs with no colonial invasion were also subjected to some outside intervention to face economic, political, and social transformations. The chapter concludes that the introduction of economic, social, and political structure and institutions are more important (then their historical analysis) to have a sustained human development, and should be a priority in the MMC human development path because appreciating the past for future development activities will be much better than ‘living’ in the past. The following chapter is thus an analysis of the political structure and institutions in the MMCs.

The MMCs achieved independence at different times under different conditions, from different colonial powers, had different traditions, and established different forms of government. *Chapter 8* analyzes the features, trends, and issues related to governmental systems, conflicts and coercion, competition and imposition, and so forth in the MMCs. The chapter looks at the styles of governments in the MMCs, and highlights how ‘patrimonial’ authoritarian governments in the MMCs promote ‘clientelism’ resulting in ‘syncretic’ politics of coercion and conflicts. The chapter suggests that many MMCs by virtue of their authoritarian (semiauthoritarian or semidemocratic) government style suffer from conflicts between landed aristocracy and rising industrialists, patron-client politics, ‘executive dominance’; and a symbiotic relationship between the military, bureaucracy, and the business elites. These factors, resulting from external influences and relationships, as well as from the built-in institutional difficulties, shape power relationships and governance pattern in the MMCs to hamper human development.

The next chapter deals with foreign aid—a major tool of external influence on countries in Africa and Asia, including the MMCs. *Chapter 9*, in three major sections, deals with the concepts and parameters of studying foreign aid and economic development, facts and issues related to foreign aid and debt servicing in the MMCs, and the issues related to foreign aid and national economic development in the MMCs to show the relationships between aid dependency, debt servicing, and the HDI ranks. It concludes that foreign aid had no or minimal effects on the national development of the recipient countries, and that debt-servicing expense of

many MMCs is higher than the aid receipt and public expenses in education, health or poverty alleviation program. Further, the recent volatility in international financial markets is likely to force many MMCs to foreign loans in the short and medium terms for their national development, to have even higher aid dependency unless the MMCs embark on restructuring their economy to reduce aid dependency.

1.5.4 Part IV: Human Development in the MMCs: Situational Analysis

The Human Development Index highlights the standard of living (GNI per capita in PPP\$), healthy living (life expectancy at birth), and the functioning potential (literacy and educational attainment in terms of enrolment ratio of school children up to Year 3) of the people in each economy. The present globalization era, blessed by information revolution, has created opportunities for efficient forward and backward linkages of economies in the value chain across regional and national borders (for maximizing value and minimizing cost) to increase economic activities and urbanization to influence health and education. This section presents the MMCs' relative achievements in economic activities, economic diversity through international trade, urbanization, and health and education.

Chapter 10 provides a broad socioeconomic development picture of the MMCs, and develops stylized facts to offer some tentative analysis, as appropriate, of underlying factors that might have played a role in these developments. The chapter suggests that there may be a number of factors (like the deficits in education, infrastructure, research and development, or democracy) to contribute to the low socioeconomic progress in many MMCs. The most serious shortfall, given the unity of faith and the contiguity of geography, is the lack of economic integration among the MMCs. The MMCs must harness their complementarities, especially in terms of capital and labor, to accelerate progress.

The next chapter (*Chap. 11*) goes a bit further to portray the achievements in international trade among the MMCs, and provide an overview of the MMCs' trade structure and foreign direct investment (FDI) to conclude that the MMCs' export patterns closely follow their production patterns. These MMCs are not significant receivers of FDI, except those producing oil. Due to the nonavailability of data, the chapter, however, cannot examine intra-Muslim country investment flows. Because of the apparent geographical factors compounded by a general lack of structural transformation, and a poor quality human capital and infrastructure, the MMCs, except for a few oil-producing MMCs, are not very attractive destinations for foreign direct investment. The chapter thus suggests that to overcome these disadvantages, the MMCs should explore complementarities and expand trade and investment links among themselves.

A major impact or a natural outcome of FDI and expanded economic activities is urbanization. In the context of increasing globalization and liberalization of na-

tional economies, every large city offers itself as an important production unit in the international assembly line, and thus requires better infrastructure to be attractive for economic activities to contribute in human development. *Chapter 12* presents descriptive and comparative analyses of current urbanization patterns in the MMCs, and highlights the state of infrastructure in the MMC urban areas. The major discussion in the chapter relates the patterns of urbanization and the infrastructure gap to geography and historical past of the MMCs. It prepares a composite infrastructure access index (IAI) to conclude that the large IAI scores in many countries are likely to eventually neutralize the economic benefits achieved by urban infrastructure. The author at the end suggests that planned measures need to be undertaken in the MMCs for the provision of transportation, water, and sanitation to improve the living conditions both in high-density areas as well as in the low-density areas to stop transmigration between the two and to create better environment for human development through better health and education.

The next chapter (*Chap. 13*) thus is devoted to analyze the health and education status of the MMCs. It claims that religious prejudice seems to be a factor in education and health in the MMCs, and that there is not much relationship between high governmental health expenses and a better level of achievement in education and health. The worst performance of the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa, in general, in almost all criteria for measuring the quality of education and health, and the best performance of the MMCs in the Gulf and Southeast Asia indicate geographical as well as monetary influence on educational and health performances. The chapter suggests that the MMCs, being away from achieving internationally comparable standards in different criteria for education and health, need to rethink their priorities and develop inter-MMC cooperation for sharing resources, skills, and benefits in health and education.

1.5.5 Part V: MMCs: Political Integrity and Umma Solidarity

Highlighting the fact that only 18 of the 47 MMCs have democracy (or ‘semidemocracy’), *Chap. 14* uses three theses (the culturalist thesis, the modernization thesis, and colonial/postcolonial thesis) to explain the phenomenon. It argues that the explanation for democracy and development in the MMCs must take into consideration the legacies of colonialism and the policies adopted by the postcolonial elites in their attempt at state and nation building. The colonial legacies in the forms of ethnic fragmentation and artificial borders have been manipulated by political elites for power position that intensified conflicts to turn to militarization. Transition to democracy in some MMCs was due to the ability of political elites to regulate conflicts, de-emphasize the role of the military and militarization, and full commitment to establishing democracy. The chapter concludes that experiences even from the MMC democracies suggest that the negative effects of colonial legacies could be countered by political elites. The achievement of democracy targeted towards human development is likely to be contingent upon the elite’s commitment to demo-

cratic rule, agreement among themselves in containing conflict and violence, and to establish civilian control and supremacy.

Chapter 15 examines the features and achievements of the three most important international organizations formed by the MMCs—the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Gulf Cooperation Council—in promoting peace and development in the pursuit of human development in the member states. The chapter suggests that Islam’s perspectives on international relations are not contradictory to contemporary international norms, and that all three organizations and the member-states accept the UN Charter, and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. The Arab League, the OIC, and the GCC have come a long way since their inceptions. These MMC-initiated international organizations have achieved different levels of success because, as the chapter argues, these organizations are not ‘supra-national bodies,’ and can only recommend and cannot implement any policy. Nonetheless, more trade among the member states of these organizations may increase the likelihood of economic unity and help improve human development in the MMCs. The chapter argues that a precise vision for the *Ummah* is required for this. The chapter also suggests that since the MMCs are endowed with the necessary human and natural resources, the related international organizations need to have integrated approach and, as appropriate, emulate the GCC because of its success in the areas of economic, political, and security cooperation.

1.5.6 Part VI: Space, Power, and Human Development in the Muslim World: Conclusions and Recommendations

The HDI is not a sound measurement for human development, but one of the best tools available to comprehend and compare development among nations. Nonetheless, it is contextual and needs to be approached and analyzed considering many geography-related factors such as the climate, topography, resources, and so forth. The factors such as the population structure and dependency ratio, the economic structure and income inequality, and the power structure, and its misuse are also crucial. Highlighting these conclusions of the book, *Chap. 16* opines that planned measures for (re)structuring the population (as well as to train and absorb the workforce with effective redistributive systems); the economy (diversifying for increasing productivity and reducing risks); and the power structure (for public benefit) to increase equality through organized cooperation may be of importance for human development in the MMCs.

Following on from the previous discussions, *Chap. 17* attempts to elucidate in philosophical and practical terms the rationality and effectiveness of five possible ‘catalysts’ of enhancing human development in the MMCs: deliberate actions through value creation for economic diversity, distributive justice, community preference internalizing governance, organized cooperation among individuals and states for power enhancement, and ethical practices for sustained capability. The above five ‘catalysts’ have supports in Islamic tenets, are less resource intensive,

and are likely to institutionalize a system to improve human development situation in the MMCs. The chapter concludes that the above five essential ‘catalysts’ of human development will improve the human development status in the MMCs because of a possible increase in highly skilled labor force, productive health, merit-based income to promote savings for investment, manufacturing activities, economic diversity, open and fair market system, and international cooperation (for economic and political security); and a reduction of inequality, and that of dependence on natural resources, external resources, and lower-end foreign workers.

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Chapter 2

Islamic Jurisprudence: Sources and Traditions Creating Diversity in Human Relationships

Samiul Hasan

Islam, a holistic religion, stipulates regulatory frameworks encompassing all aspects of human life: spiritual, social, economic, and political. The Qur'an, among other things, provides guidance about social systems, economic ideologies and systems, governmental responsibility, law of inheritance, family law, equality of people, and social justice. Islam is thus said to be a combination of religion (*din*),¹ culture, tradition, and civilization (Sardar 1991).

Following the examples and codes of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH²), in the Medina Charter,³ for example, Muslim rulers in the new lands created conditions of harmonious and peaceful living for all residents. Islam, due to its flexibility, in the first 200 years reached France in the West and India in the East, being borne by informal missionaries, travelers, or traders; not by the elites or authorized preachers. During its first millennium, Islam became the world's "most powerful engine, agent, and vehicle of globalisation" (Simons 2003, p. 3). In most areas of Muslim

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¹ Arabic word for religion, *Din*, is very comprehensive and implies "the ideas of indebtedness, duty, obedience, judgment, justice, faith, religion, customary rites, etc." (Ali 1938, note 207).

² God's blessings and peace be upon him (PBUH). Muslim readers are supposed to (and reminded of the obligation to) utter the blessings to the Prophet every time they come across his name.

³ Compiled in 622 CE by Prophet Muhammad (regarded by many as the first written constitution of the world), to deal with socio-economic and security issues of all residents of Yathrib (the city of his refuge; renamed Medinat al-Nabawi—the City of the Prophet) to create conditions for a harmonious and peaceful living for all people belonging to different tribes and adhering to different religions. See Arjomand (2009).

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rule, especially in the Mughal India (Eickelman 2002) and Ottoman empires (because of strategic reasons of being acceptable to a vast non-Muslim population), in the Kingdom of Aceh, and the Sultanates of Northern Borneo, Brunei, and Sulu (because of the conversion of the rulers to Islam), local customary laws (*adat*) were allowed to prevail, especially in the countryside. This experience facilitated inter-cultural blend and enriched Islamic values and norms, and allowed for philosophical as well as geographic expansion of Islam.

This chapter endeavors to encapsulate important issues related to the growth and formation of Islamic jurisprudence and related Muslim traditions, and the factors and question required for understanding and studying human relationships in the Muslim world highlighting its comprehensive and pluralist character. In order to discuss the above, the rest of the chapter is divided into three sections dealing with the sources of Islamic jurisprudence that promote flexibility, the traditions in Islamic jurisprudence that create diversity, and the *imams* and other people and their practices that are turning things around (re)defining the Muslims' relationships to God, the Nature, and fellow human beings. The chapter concludes that because of the ordained obligations to the community, and the emphasis on pluralism, there ought to be many authentic and acceptable *shari'a* 'schools' of human relationships for human development in Islam.

2.1 Islamic Jurisprudence: The Sources that Promote Flexibility

Islam, having *tawhid* or the Unity of God as its fundamental principle, literally means peace and 'submission' demonstrated in the spirit of worshipping God (completely submitting to His will). The two fundamental sources of Islamic principles and dicta are the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* (pl. *Sunan*)—'usual practice' of Prophet Muhammad. The verses in the Qur'an are divided into two groups: clear or decisive verses and allegorical verses (al-Qur'an 3:7⁴). The Qur'an—a "guidance for mankind"⁵—revealed to Prophet Muhammad between 610–632 CE cover three wide areas: the science of speculative theology (e.g., in comprehending, establishing, and maintaining human beings' relationships with the Creator), ethical principles (e.g., about economic relationships and systems; roles and qualities of the leaders), and rules of human conduct (e.g., law of inheritance, relationships within and across genders, and with the followers of other religions) (Nomani and Rahman 1995). Thus Muhammad Abduh opined that the Qur'an urges people to search and think about the revelation, and is "a Book of freedom of thought", "respect of

⁴ The first digit in this reference refers to Chapter number in the Qur'an; the next one to the verse number. In subsequent references in this chapter only the digits are mentioned. Please note all verses of the Qur'an in this Chapter are taken from the English version by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938).

⁵ "This is the Book; in it is guidance sure, without doubt, to those who fear Allah" (al-Qur'an 2:2).

reason” and for shaping the individuals “through research, knowledge, and the use of reason and reflection”⁶ (Haddad 2005, p. 47).

The second source of Islamic jurisprudence, *Sunnah* (in the form of the Prophet Muhammad’s words, acts, and consents), compiled as the *Hadith* (pl. *ahadith*) literature, offers (social, economic, and political) guidance defining the human beings’ purpose and objectives and their relationships to one another, to God and the Nature. The *Hadith* literature includes what the Prophet said (*Hadith Qawli* or sayings; includes *Hadith Qudsi*—those sayings where Prophet Muhammad referred to Allah), did (*Hadith Faili*; actions), and gave silent consents to (*Hadith Taqriri*; was said and/or performed in front of the Prophet without receiving his disapproval). These *ahadith* are the sources of the *Sunnah* (usual practice) and explain and complement the text of the Qur’an, and are classified as *Sunnah Tashri’ah* (rooted from the word ‘*shari’a*’; legal *Sunnah*) or the Prophet’s activities and instructions as the head of the state and as a judge, and *Sunnah Ghair Tashri’ah* (non-legal *Sunnah*) consisting of the daily activities of the Prophet (eating, sleeping, dressing) that do not form a part of the *Shari’a* (Hannan 2003).

Among all different *hadith* literatures, the Sunni Muslims widely draw on ‘the Authentic Six’ (al-*Sihah al-Sitta*).⁷ These works were compiled about 200 years after the Prophet’s death through a chain of communication.⁸ Further, any Muslim who met the Prophet once (al-*sahabiyy*—‘the Companion’; pl. *sahabah*; fem. *sahabiyah*) and (their) followers (al-*Tabi’un*; pl. al-*Tabi’in* or the Muslims who met a Companion but did not meet the Prophet) were accepted as an ‘authority’ to report or narrate what was heard and seen ‘during the visit’ to the Prophet or the ‘Companions’, respectively. A *sanad* or *isnad* (a chain of narrators of a particular *hadith*), as a part of the *Hadith* literature, helps one understand the authenticity of these *ahadith*.⁹

⁶ Haddad (2005) argues that Muhammad Abduh in his book *Tafsir al-Fatiha* (edited by Rashid Rida, al-Manar Press, Cairo) refers to verses like the following as the Qur’an’s insistence on rationality “Have they not travelled in the land, and have they hearts wherewith to feel and ears wherewith to hear? For indeed it is not the eyes that grow blind, but it is the hearts, which are within the bosoms, that grow blind” (22:46); “See they not how Allah produceth creation, then reproduceth it? Lo! for Allah that is easy” (29:19).

⁷ These are *Sahih Bukhari* (by Imam Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari, d. 870 CE or 256 AH), *Sahih Muslim* (by Imam Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, d. 875 CE), *Sunan al-Nasai* (by Imam Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Nasa’i d. 915 CE), *Sunan Abu Dawood* (by Imam Abu Dawood Sulaiman ibn Ash’ath al-Sijjistani, d. 888 CE), *Jami al-Tirmidhi* (by Imam Muhammad bin Isa al-Tirmidhi, d. 892 CE), *Sunan ibn Majah* (by Imam Muhammad ibn Yazid bin Ibn Majah al-Qazwini, d. 887 CE) compiled about 200 years after the Prophet’s death.

⁸ The fact that all six major compilers of *ahadith* were from Persia reinforces the idea that since Prophet Muhammad, as revealed in *Sahih Muslim*, initially did not allow the writing of *ahadith* (just in case they are mixed up with the Qur’an since the Qur’an was not compiled in the present form during the Prophet’s lifetime) the Arabs did not take major initiatives in compiling the *ahadith* except for some minor *sahifahs* (e.g., *Sahifah Hammam ibn Munabbih*) that were in existence during Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime.

⁹ Most importantly almost 1/3rd of the *Hadith* text in the *Sahih Bukhari* and *Sahih Muslim* (discounting the repetitions through different ‘chains of communication’) is referred to A’ishah—the Prophet’s wife (who was about eighteen years old at the Prophet’s death).

The *Shi'a Muslims* recognize *ahadith*, sourced only to the members of the Prophet's family, compiled by Imam Jafar al-Sadiq (702–765 CE) (Nomani and Rahnema 1995, p. 6), and thus give less importance to the variedly sourced 'Authentic Six' of the Sunni Muslims (who, in return, do not recognize the former collection).

The other sources of the *Shari'a* have only expanded the human relationship issues without infringing the original individual rights. Most religious aspects of an individual's life are "private and non-justiciable", and thus many aspects of the regular prayers, fasting (dawn-to-dusk refraining during the whole ninth month of the Islamic calendar from worldly pleasure including eating and drinking), the *hajj*, and "almost all of what is classified as recommendable (*mandub*), reprehensible (*makruh*), and permissible (*mubah*) 'are not legally enforceable.'" "The private and civil rights of the individual are also immune, by the express injunctions of the *Shar'ia*, against encroachment by others, including the state."¹⁰

To deal with the matters not covered in the Qur'an or the *Sunnah*, there are *ijtihad*¹¹ and *ijma* (consensus *ijtihad*) as the next major sources of Islamic jurisprudence. The *qiyas* (analogical deductions among the Sunni Muslims) and *aql* (human reasons; among the Shi'a Muslims) are also additional methods of Islamic jurisprudence. Personal opinion of the legal experts (*ra'y*), often manifested in the application of *ijtihisan* (juristic preference), in *ijtihad* has played important roles in the adaptation of Islamic law to the changing needs of society.¹² *Ijihisan* is a method of exercising personal opinion (*ra'y*) to avoid rigidity and unfairness that might result from literal application of the law. The decision of Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab, during the famine, to suspend the *hadd* (God ordained corporeal punishments; pl. *hudud*) penalty of amputation of a thief's hand for stealing is an example of *Ijihisan* (Hannan 2003). This personal opinion (*ra'y*) ensuring equity is based on a fundamental principle of Islamic law that forbids imposition of any duty (*taklif*) to anybody without the granting of a corresponding right (*haqq*). Since the term 'duty' also comprises "liability to punishment", "before anyone's hand can be cut off for stealing, the Islamic state must ensure that every citizen, Muslim as well as non-Muslim, has economic, social, and political protection and security." Thus amputation of a thief's hand is applicable only within the context of an already existing, fully functioning social security scheme, and in no other circumstances.¹³

¹⁰ For example, "no government agency, nor even the *Shar'ia* courts, has powers to grant discretionary changes in the private rights and properties of individuals, without the consent of the person concerned". The quotations and the information in this paragraph are from Kamali (2005, p. 282).

¹¹ *Ijtihad*, opposite of *taqlid* or imitation, is a jurist's independent analysis and decision about an issue not covered in the Qur'an or Sunnah.

¹² Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali jurists have accepted, while Shafi'i and Shi'a jurists have rejected *Ijihisan* as a method of '*ijtihad*' (independent analysis).

¹³ These quotations are from Zaman (2002, p. 86) who refers to the commentary in the '*Message of the Qur'an*' by Muhammad Asad. This is also the opinion of Abul Ala Mawdudi who argued that the *hudud* punishment could be implemented only if a society was thoroughly Islamized, see Nasr (2005). Also see, Mawdudi 2007.

Most noteworthy is the fact that the verses in the Qur'an related to *hadd* punishment demands the observation of justice, not retaliation.

Further, if the amputee (of a *hadd* punishment) becomes a burden to the (state) social security system (or even to the family), the state/court should focus on other suggested alternatives. The Qur'an advises the Believers to do righteous things and be away from all types of wrong doings. The amputation of a thief's hand cannot be seen as a regular recourse for a petty crime because it is "a punishment by way of example" (5:38), so the need for being forgiving is always emphasized,¹⁴ just in case. The Believers are required to choose between a penalty by being guilty of doing excess in retaliation or a reward from God for forgiving, because "if any show patience and forgive, that would truly be an exercise of courageous will and resolution in the conduct of affairs" (42:43).

A major aspect of the *Shari'a* is that local customs (*urf*) and *adat* (customary laws) not contradicting the fundamental principle of the Unity of God (*tawhid*) or any explicit injunctions became parts of Islamic principles of social and economic relationships (Hannan 2003),¹⁵ especially among the Sunni Hanafi School.¹⁶ 'Adat' was part of Islamic law since the early history of Islam. So much so that Imam Shafi'i changed many of his legal opinions after settling in Egypt. During the times of conquest, Muslims, coming into contact with peoples of diverse cultures and religions, recognized and tolerated different ritual practices within the *ummah*¹⁷ (Platteau 2008, p. 333).

The Qur'an and the *Hadith* referring to state, its leader, community, individuals and their respective duties and responsibilities, and their inter-relationships are said to be the foundation of the *Shari'a* law (Moosa 1998). In the modern world, scholars like Muhammad Abduh opines "Muslims should not imitate their forebears in interpreting the Qur'an, but must be authentic and true to their own understanding" (Haddad 2005, p. 47) because as Hassan al-Banna contends Islam "offers the only path to happiness and fulfilment" and its general principles are "sufficiently flexible for adaptation to any place or time"¹⁸ (Cummins 2005, p. 134) to create diversity.

¹⁴ "As to the thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands: a retribution for their deed and exemplary punishment from Allah and Allah is Exalted in Power, full of Wisdom (al-Qur'an, 5:38). But if the thief repents after his crime, and amends his conduct, Allah turneth to him in forgiveness; for Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful" (al-Qur'an, 5:39). Forgiving thus may be beneficial to the victims (not knowing if the perpetrator is already forgiven for his/her repentance).

¹⁵ For example, Prophet Muhammad did not mind the people of Medina dancing at festivals because it was their tradition; for more see, Qaradawi (2001).

¹⁶ The Malikis used a similar principle, called *athar* (shortened for 'athar al-Madinah').

¹⁷ Literally meaning 'community' or 'nation'. Though the Medina Charter of Prophet Muhammad regarded all residents of Medina (including the Jews) as the 'ummah', the later use of the term tends to refer to Muslim fraternity.

¹⁸ Thus al-Banna was critical of the *ulama* of the al-Azhar as "men anchored to irrelevant interpretations of Islam, steeped in the concerns and methods of a bygone age" (Cummins 2005, p. 134). Also see, al-Banna, 2007.

2.2 Islamic Jurisprudence: The Traditions that Create Diversity

Islam approves different forms of doing things¹⁹ because the emphasis is on the intentions and philosophical reasons (not on the ritualistic details). Pluralism, within the basic frame, resulting from this diversity in Islam, is further reinforced by the fact that there is no world body and only very limited governmental authority. Thus different Islamic communities are allowed to maneuver different practices within the basic principles of pluralism in Islam.

Pluralism in Islam relates to its political divisions—Sunni²⁰ and Shi'a (a short form of *Shi'atu* Ali meaning the 'faction of Ali' often anglicized as the 'Shiites') Muslims (Shi'a in short). Sunnis accept the first four Caliphs of Islam (including Ali ibn Abi Talib) as the 'Rightly-Guided Caliphs'. The Shi'a Muslims consider the fourth Caliph (of the Sunnis), Ali ibn Abi Talib (a cousin of prophet Muhammad and husband of Fatima, a daughter of Prophet Muhammad from his first wife Bibi Khadija) the first leader (*imam*) after the Prophet,²¹ and disregards the first three Caliphs.²²

There are two major divisions in the Shi'a Islam: the twelvers (*Ithna Ashariyya*), who follow the first twelve imams including Ali ibn Abi Talib, and the Seveners (the Ismailis²³), who follow the first seven (Fig. 2.1). In Shi'a Islam, two major *fuqaha* (pl. of *faqih*; Muslim jurists) are Imam Muhammad Baqir (677–733 CE) and Imam Jafar al-Sadiq (702–765 CE). About 10% of the followers of Islam now are Shi'a Muslims, who are mostly in Iran. Shi'a Islam has been popular in Iran for the last five hundred years, becoming the state religion of Persia (Iran) under the Safavid dynasty in the sixteenth century CE, and has some followers in Pakistan, Iraq, and Turkey.

Sunni Muslims follow four *madhabs* (Schools) of Islamic jurisprudence. These are the Hanafi School (Imam Abu Hanifa alias Nu'man ibn Thaabit ibn Zuti, 699–767 CE or 150 AH originally from Khorasan born in Kufa); Maliki School (Imam Malik ibn Anas al-Asbahi, 715–795 CE or 179 AH of Medina); Shafi'i School (Imam Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i, 767–820 CE or 204 AH of Gaza), and Han-

¹⁹ See al-Qur'an, 2:177 and an explanation of the verse in Ali (1938).

²⁰ Taken from the root word *Sunnah* to claim to be its 'true follower' (unlike the Shi'a Muslims).

²¹ Sunnis, however, believe that the selection was nothing to do with the family relations, rather the trust and belief of the then Muslims, *muhajirs* (the Muslims who moved to Medina from Mecca) as well as the *ansars* (the Muslims of Yathrib who offered refuge to the *muhajirs*), as to the ability of the individual who would be best able to carry the 'Torch'. In any event, however, the Sunnis add that the first two Caliphs were the Prophet's fathers-in-law and the next two were his sons-in-law.

²² The fourth Caliph Ali himself took the majority decision of making Abu Bakr the first Caliph of Islam in the spirit of unity of the Muslim *ummah*, and became the fourth Caliph. His followers, the 'shi'a' or 'faction' of Ali, however, created the confusion by calling him the first *imam*, and not a Caliph (to be different from the Sunni system), to perpetuate the division.

²³ Those who regarded Ismail, the oldest son, the rightful heir of Imam Jafar al-Sadiq; the others accepted al-Sadiq's designation of the younger son as the next *imam* (Esposito 2010, p. 44).




Fig. 2.1 Islam: major divisions, schools, and approaches

Shafi'i School (Imam Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hanbal, 780–855 CE or 241 AH of Khorasan).

The Hanafi School is the most liberal of the four Sunni Schools because it provides importance to ‘public interest’ (*masalih al-mursalah*) test for the jurisprudence and similar importance to *ijma-i-sukuti* (agreement among some of the jurists) and *ijma-i-haqiqi* (agreement among all the participating jurists). The Maliki School “gives equal importance to public interest (*masalih al-mursalah*), analogy (*qiyas*), and the juristic preference (*ijtihad*)”²⁴ (Table 2.1), but regards *ijma* (consensus) of the people of Medina as the third most important source of Islamic law (after the Qur’an and the Hadith;) (Table 2.1). The Shafi’i School strikes a balance between reason (*qiyas*—regarding it as the third most important source) and authority, and combines dogmatism with practical requirements (Table 2.1),²⁵ preferring *ahadith* with the best ‘chain’ (*sanad* or *isnad*—a chain of narrators of a particular *hadith*). The Hanbali School emphasizes puritanical aspects of Islam and adheres to orthodoxy and accepts *qiyas* (analogical deduction) as the last resort.²⁶ A well known group of followers of Hanbali School are the *Salafis* (the pious ancestors)²⁷

²⁴ Maliki School is still followed, mainly in North Africa, and to some extent in sub-Saharan Africa, and the Gulf states (Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia east).

²⁵ The followers of Imam Shafi’i are in parts of Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Syria.

²⁶ The Hanbali School is followed by Muslims, mainly in: Qatar, Saudi Arabia (north, west), and Yemen.

²⁷ Created by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–1792 CE) who, calling for a return to the ‘pure beliefs’, condemned ‘worshipping’ of the Prophet Muhammad. Being led by Abdul Aziz

Table 2.1 Four Sunni *Madhabs* (Schools) and their respective sources of jurisprudence

Sources (With Preference)	Hanafi ^a 699–767 CE	Maleki 715–795 CE	Shafi'i 767–820 CE	Hanbali 780–855 CE	Remarks
The Qur'an	✓	✓ ^b	✓	✓	Imam Shafi'i considered the Qur'an and the Sunnah as equal in formulating legislation
Sunnah Tashri'ah or legal Sunnah (not Sunnah Ghair Tashri'ah)	✓		✓ That is handed down by trustworthy persons	✓	
A Hadith	✓	✓	✓ Preference to the best 'chain'	✓ Preference to an authentic <i>hadith</i> over other sources listed below	No other sources consulted; preference to the closest of the apparent meanings (Imam Shafi'i; Imam Hanbal)
<i>Ijma</i> (consensus)	✓	✓	✓ The third after Qur'an and <i>Hadith</i> (if agreed upon by people in Medina)	✓	To Imam Shafi'i and Imam Hanbal it is more authoritative than or preferred to a single person transmitted Hadith, who reject Maliki position
<i>Ijtihad</i> (independent judgment)	✓	✓	✓ High emphasis	✓	Only where the ranks of a <i>hadith</i> are broken.
<i>Qiyas</i> (analogical deduction, only for social and financial matters)	✓	✓	✓ Public benefit, and practice of Medina	✓	For Imam Shafi'i same as <i>ijihad</i> which must also be based on reasoning
<i>Ra'y</i> (personal opinion of the jurists)	✓		✓ Third after the Qur'an and Sunnah ^c based on public interest	✓	Imam Shafi'i did not accept; Imam Malik criticised; Imam Hanbal rejected
Acted upon obligatory commands	✓				Unless constrained from acting upon
Definitive and categorical expressions	✓	✓			Both with equal implications

Table 2.1 (continued)

Sources (With Preference)	Hanafi ^a 699–767 CE	Maleki 715–795 CE	Shafi'i 767–820 CE	Hanbali 780–855 CE	Remarks
<i>Ijtihisan</i> (Juristic preference)	✓	✓ Preference of public interests		✓	Abandoning analogy, if needed. Rejected by Imam Shafi'i
<i>Ijtihshab</i> (juristic equity)		✓			That ensures continuity of the proven
Narration-action congruence	✓				Accepting the practice if it is different from the narration
Practice of People of Medinah		✓			Rejected by Imam Shafi'i
Public interest tested (<i>masalih al mursalah</i> ; <i>ijtislah</i>)	✓	✓		✓	Traditions transmitted by a single person (Imam Abu Hamifa); Rejected by Imam Shafi'i
Statement of the Companions	✓	✓		✓ Fourth important	In case of variation the closest to the Qur'an irrespective of the 'chain'
<i>Urf</i> (Respecting the tradition)	✓	✓		✓	Accepting some pre-Islamic laws
Variant practice of a Companion	✓				Only as specific evidence

Imam Abu Hamifa (Persia)—Rationalist; Imam Malik (Medina)—Traditionalist; Imam Shafi'i (Palestine or Yemen)—Moderate; Imam Hanbal (Khorasan)—Fundamentalist, extremist. They differed on some substantive points of law, and also “on the principles of legal reasoning (*usul al-fiqh*), and in particular on the place of *Hadith* and the legitimacy, limits, and methods of *ijtihad*.” (Hourani 2005, p. 69)

^a For Imam Abu Hamifa: Quantity does not affect validity; No consideration of a general proposition with a condition or qualification; No acceptance for a single person transmitted tradition that may harm public welfare;

^b Reliance on the unequivocal verbatim text of the Qur'an; Reliance on the clear or manifest meaning when it is general; Validation of evidence from the Qur'an of a divergent meaning (*mafهوم al mukhaalafah*); Validation of a harmonious meaning (*mafهوم al muwafaqah*); Reliance on the Qur'an's warnings or cautioning as the effective reason for avoiding anything which is an abomination or is immoral.

^c Analogy from a principle which has already been deduced from a previous principle is not admissible
Based on: al-Awani (1993); Nomani and Rahnema (1995); Hourani (2005), pp. 67–69; Zakaria (1988)

(or *ahl-e-Hadith*; or the Wahhabis) who condemns innovations (*bidah*) or any deviation from the Qur'anic injunctions and thus strictly adhere to the Scripture (even for the allegorical matters, as interpreted by themselves²⁸) (Fig. 2.1; Table 2.1; Esposito 2002).

In South Asia, where about 45% Muslims of the Muslim majority countries (MMCs; the focus of this Volume) and about 30% of the world Muslims live, the Hanafi School has three major divisions: the Deobandis (followers of the Deoband Madrasa), *Brelwis* (or *Barelvis*; followers of Rida or Riza Khan of Bareilly), and *ahl al-Hadith* (spelled '*ahle hadees*' in South Asia; do not follow any of the Sunni Schools, discussed above). The Deobandis are affiliated with or do adhere to the Deoband Madrasa, established in 1867 (in Deoband near Delhi), to offset the influence of the 'modernist and rationalist approach to Islam',²⁹ believe in *taqlid* or blind following (desisting *ijtihad* or independent analysis) of the old interpretations and rulings (cf. Rahnama 2005).³⁰ The *da'wa*³¹ movement (the 'oralists'—promoters of script-less interpretation-free transmission of the tradition of the Prophet because of the low level of literacy of the Muslims; commonly known as *Tablig Jamat*³²) of South Asia also have been helpful in spreading the Deobandi influence in the region and beyond (to a certain extent). The *Brelwis* (or *Barelvis*) emerged as an opposition to the modernist movement (of Sir Syed, fn. 29) and to the emphasis of *taqleed* of the Deobandis and *Ahl al-Hadith* intended to preserve Islam "as it had

bin Baz, this group named themselves al-Jama'a al-Salafiya al-Muhtasiba (the Salafi Group that Commands Right and Forbids Wrong) in 1965 (Lacey 2009, pp. 10, 11). The *salafis* (pious ancestors), due to their claimed adherence to the teachings only of the Prophet Muhammad and the *Sahabas* (first generation of Muslims who were Companions of the Prophet) are also called the *Ahl-e-Hadith* or the people of *Hadith* (Esposito 2002). In common parlance, they are only known as the Wahhabis.

²⁸ Often fortified by tribal customs and biases (cf. an enlightening sub-editorial piece by Tariq A. al-Ma'ena, a Saudi commentator, in the *Gulf News* 24 October 2010).

²⁹ In particular the establishment of Scientific Society by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan to reform Islam by integrating Western education and re-opening *ijtihad* (independent analysis; opposite of *taqlid*). Please see Rahnama (2005) and Malik (1999) for good discussions.

³⁰ This group is now politicized and are organized as Jam'iyyat al Ulama e-Hind (in India) and Jami'yyat-e Ulama-e Islam (in Pakistan), but also has a mystical order represented in the Naqsh-bandiyyah (Malik 1999) and is believed to have been followed by 15% of the Sunni Muslims in the region.

³¹ '*Da'wa*' (literally meaning invitation) to Islam is now organized in many countries under the auspices of the government (e.g., Malaysia, Saudi Arabia). But the Deobandi off-shoot has a unique feature that can be called 'bare-foot' Islam inviting the Muslims to the 'right path' through the words of mouth. It has spread all over South Asia with the largest center in Dhaka, Bangladesh where the annual *ijtima* (gathering) claim to attract at least two million Muslims making it the largest gathering of Muslims in the world after the Hajj pilgrimage.

³² Started in 1926 (opposing the Khilafat Movement as well as the modern educational system for Muslims spearheaded by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, please see note 29) by a teacher in the Deoband Seminary who wanted to promote Islam through oral transmission because most Muslims in the (British) India were illiterate.

evolved to the present”, including the traditions and ritual practices of Sufi Muslims (cf. Malik 1999).

The *Sufi* or the mystic philosophy in Islam also has significant influence in the growth and shaping of the contemporary expression of Islam. The followers of mysticism, Sufism, in Islam, the *Sufis*³³ emphasize on inner self and philosophical reckoning in comprehending God by subjugating and praying to him through the minds. The mystical philosophy “owes its origin to the esoteric significance attached by an important section of Muslims to the words of the” Qur’an. Sufis, like Imam al-Ghazzali, are the preachers of “inward light” in Islam emphasizing that “the intuitive knowledge of God is inherent in the Faith” (see Ali 1964, pp. 455–478). The Sufi path is a “way of purification (*tasawwuf*), a discipline of mind and body whose goal is to directly experience the ultimate reality” (Esposito 2010, p. 101). Sufism with its greater spiritual appeal, because of its individualist philosophical striving for the union of God (as opposed to the rigid rituals), was seen as a threat since the establishment’s doctrine lost its vitality and ability to develop (cf. Abun-Nasr 1987) and faced oppression (e.g., Syed Nursi, 1878–1960 CE, a major force of Sufism in Turkey suffered humiliation and exile).

Sufism became controversial because of certain order/tradition’s belief that bliss in the Hereafter and well being in this world can be attained through the *Baraka* (grace) derived from *awliya* (sing. *Wali*, favorite of God), upon whom God bestows spiritual powers for no merits of their own (Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 23), especially the Chisti Order in South Asia (initiated by a Syrian Abu Ishaq Shami in the tenth century CE in Chest in Afghanistan) that strives to evoke divine presence through songs (*qawwali*) or the Mawlawi or Mevlawi order of Jalal al-Din Muhammad Balkhi (or Jalal al-Din Muhammad Rumi of the eleventh century CE) in Turkey who seeks divine union through dance (whirling *dervish* or *darweesh*).

Nonetheless, since Islam emphasizes philosophy and intentions behind ritual practices, different interpretations of Islamic principles and practice are equally accepted³⁴ and none is claimed to be superior to the other, because they all accept the basic principles of Islam and differ in the ways of implementation and detail aspects of its practice.³⁵ Muslim scholars like Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328 CE) asserted the middle path adding that since the Prophet said a Muslim is a brother of another Muslim “how then can it be permitted to the community of Muhammad to divide itself into such diverse opinions that a man join one group and hate another simply on the basis of presumptions or personal caprices, without any proof coming from God?” (Hourani 2005, p. 180). Thus for many Muslims these differences may not

³³ The term may have originated from a root word ‘*suf*’ meaning ‘wool’ used in the cloaks worn by the early adheres; or ‘*safa*’ meaning pure or clean; or both.

³⁴ For an interesting and enlightening discussion on the sources of jurisprudence in each of these Schools and related differences and issues, see Abdelkader (2000), especially pages 39–61 where the author deals with the matter very diligently.

³⁵ This paragraph is based on Malik (1999, pp. 4–7); and Rahnema (2005, pp. xxx–xxxvi).

be reasons for conflicts, and the *shari'a* could become divergent with varied systems and policies (Nomani and Rahnema 1995).³⁶

For historical reasons and other recent developments, as discussed above, Islam has diverse manifestations tolerated, in general, by all creating pluralism in practice.³⁷ The acceptance of many forms of 'doing things' are acceptance and encouragement of pluralism in Islam. The problem is though the basic philosophy, teachings, and practice of Islam, as discussed above, are opposed to the zero-sum approach, in practice, however, "truth tends to be seen as a zero-sum game, and those find themselves in disagreement are prone to call each other infidels" (Cook 2003, p. 6) creating problems within the Muslim communities. For example, following a recent fatwa justifying the killing of Shi'a Muslims as apostates (*murtad*), sectarian violence resulting in deaths has exponentially increased in Pakistan. Even among the Sunnis in South Asia, the *Brelwis* call the *Deobandis* unbelievers (*kafir*) because of the latter's rejection of the post-Prophet Islamic practices; while the Deobandis are critical of certain practices of the *Brelwis* (e.g., celebration of the anniversaries of the saints—*dervish* or *darweesh* and *sufis*; and offerings at graves).³⁸ It seems the 'champions' of one or the other ritual practices of Islam and self-proclaimed defender of the religion forgets a major warning in the Qur'an of not judging the goodness of another man; only God can do it. A 'bad' man in a Believer's judgment can be a good person in God's judgment,³⁹ because God knows what is in people's heart and human beings do not (49:11; 2:235). At the end, only a clear and submissive heart that matters to God which is likely to create diversity in the religion and achieve peace through mutual respect leaving the rest to God.

Irrespective, the fact remains that since there is no central authority or priesthood in Islam, owing to their adherence to one or the other methods of practicing Islam, Muslims define human relationships differently. Bearing in mind this fact and its possible impact, it is most important in understanding the differences in human relationships in Islam which is influenced by (and do influence) the relationships among state, the religion, and people.

³⁶ Many Muslims, however, do not follow any particular School. For example, since the state constitution of Perlis, Malaysia, specifies that Perlis people follow the Qur'an and *Sunnah* and not a particular *Madhab*, Muslims there do not follow any *Madhab* nor do the followers and members of the Muhammadiyah Organization in Indonesia (Hasan 2007).

³⁷ For an excellent work on unity and diversity in the Muslim world, please see von Grunebaum (1955).

³⁸ Information available in the Wikipedia under these topics.

³⁹ "O ye who believe! Let not a folk deride a folk who may be better than they (are) (al-Qur'an, 45:11)" because "... Allah knoweth what is in your minds, so beware of Him; and know that Allah is Forgiving," Clement (al-Qur'an, 2:235) and about 90 other verses.

2.3 Islamic Jurisprudence: Imams⁴⁰ who are Turning Things Around

Islam recognizes no mediation between the Believers and God. According to Muhammad Abduh, there is no such thing as ‘religious authority’ in Islam because human beings are invited to develop direct relationship to God through informal submission to His will, and formal adherence to the five pillars.⁴¹ Each soul has the physical ability and Divine approval to rise to its Creator without the intervention of a priest, thus each human being is allowed to be his/her own priest (Ali 1964, p. 165), and is responsible directly to God for his/her actions. The elimination of the power of religious authority, according to Muhammad Abduh, sets the Believers “free from any supervision” (Haddad 2005, pp. 38–43).

Throughout history, Muslims all over the world have endeavored to deal with this informal and decentralized character of Islam (the absence of a central ‘religious authority’), primarily based on the traditions of the land, the previous practices, or through the new ruler’s authorization (which often was purposive). Due to different categories of knowledge dealing with different aspects of Islam, different types of knowledgeable people in Muslim communities have been grouped under one term—*alim* (one who has acquired knowledge, *ilm* about Islam; pl. *ulama* or *ulema*). An *alim* may be an ‘[I]mam’ of Shi’a Islam⁴² (also known as *Mullah*; who assumes a pivotal position among contemporary Shi’a religious scholars and enjoy some theological leadership position); a *qadi* (judge; with acquired proficiency in Islamic law and its application); a *faqih*—an expert of Islamic *fiqh* or jurisprudence; a *mufasssir*—an expert of exegesis of the Qur’an; a *muhaddith*—expert of *al-hadith* and its *isnad*; and the (recent) *mufti*—one who is authorized to issue *fatwa* (rulings on contemporary issues not covered in the literature or by others before).⁴³ Often a formal title, *Maulana*⁴⁴ (var. *moulana*; master or a higher position holder), is ascribed to people receiving formal education from *madrassa* (in South Asia, in particular). An [*i*]mam (a prayer leader) has a different meaning and is not required to have any of the above expertise, especially in poor communities in Africa and Asia

⁴⁰ Please see the second paragraph in this section for an implied explanation of using this term instead of any other.

⁴¹ Declaration of faith (on the Unity of God, His Messenger, all other prophets, their Books, the Angels, and the Hereafter), Prayer, Purification, and growth (*zakat*; philanthropy), Fasting and the Hajj (if financially able with own money). Shi’a Muslims also add the guardianship (*imamate*), and personal struggle (*jihad*) in the list of ‘pillars’.

⁴² The champions of four respective *madhabs* (schools) in Sunni Islam are also known as *imam* (discussed earlier).

⁴³ The term, *alim*, is not used for a *hafiz* (var. *hafeez*—literally a ‘guardian’ or protector of the Qur’an because of the memorization of the complete text), often acquired also by many children before their tenth birthday (memorizing for six years from the age of four); some acquire it in less time, of course; or a *qari*’ (one who can recite the Qur’an following the proper rules).

⁴⁴ In Turkey a similar title, *Mevlana*, is exclusively used to refer to Jalal al-Din Muhammad Balkhi (or Jalal al-Din Muhammad Rumi) of the eleventh century CE with reverence, who is credited for the *Mawlawi* or *Mevlawi* order of Sufism.

(where most Muslims live). In the MMCs, the *imams*, in about 2 million mosques,⁴⁵ are the most numerous and are in a position to significantly influence local (low/not enlightened) people's minds and behavior.

The repositioning of the Muslim power center to Damascus (from Medina) at the beginning of the Umayyad period (661–750 CE), witnessed an endeavor to separate the rulers from the *ulema*, and the latter became a separate group. The rulers, however, endeavored to influence the latter to get religious rulings always favoring themselves (the rulers) or for legitimizing their actions often through torture and intimidation. For example, Shi'a Imam Jafar al-Sadik, Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik, Imam Hanbal, in the early years of Islam, suffered different types of humiliation, intimidation, or torture at different levels for not supporting or following the establishment's line. The intimidation did not spare scholars in the thirteenth century (ibn Taymiya) or in the twentieth century (Syed Qutb).

From the thirteenth century CE the rulers of the Maghreb did not seek legitimacy as the leaders of the reform movements, rather brought "the *ulama* into the orbit of the state as counselors and associates" (Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 21) like the Ottomans, and later the Mughals. The rulers created a new position of *mufti*⁴⁶ (to issue *fatwa* on questions of human actions not covered in the classical literature or by the previous Muslim scholars) often to use for reinforcing the former's grips on power and assert control over religious matters creating new relationships between the state and the religion. The *ulama* were not (or could not be) in control of the rulers (nor could the state become a theocracy) because the rulers used to deal with the *ulama* as individuals (not as a corporate body like the Christian Church). So in the relations between *ulama* and the rulers, the latter had the 'upper hand' and could replace the former at a whim⁴⁷ (Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 21).

This relationship in some countries was revised for the creation of a new political authority. For example, the establishment of the Saudi political system is a result of a strategic pact concluded in 1733 CE between Muhammad ibn Saud (eager to extend authority from the Arab/Persian Gulf to the Red Sea to rule the 'lands and

⁴⁵ On an average one mosque for every 500–600 people (as evident in South Asia) may add up to at least 1.6 million mosques in the MMCs (for about 1 billion Muslims); and at least a quarter of that in other Muslim communities with much lower density (for about 500 million Muslims). The figure is in contrast to about 700,000 Catholic priests worldwide. Further, most *imams* are not subject to any common code; the priests are (nationmaster.com).

⁴⁶ Introduced by the Ottomans (following Christian examples), having "a hierarchy of *muftis* culminating in the Chief Mufti of Istanbul". After the fall of the Ottomans, the practice continued in the Ottoman successor states in West Asia, where governments appointed functionaries with the title of Chief (or Grand) Mufti exercising religious and ecclesiastical jurisdiction over a city.

⁴⁷ The Muslim jurists of the Umayyad and Abbasid times stayed away from the establishment, but the later day clerics, as individuals or as a group, were always interested to remain in the good books of the rulers because the latter used to appoint the favored '*ulama*' to prestigious posts, or grant them tax exemption, funds for mosques, *madrassa*, *ahbas* (pl. of *habus* or religious foundations to provide salary and other expenses of the '*ulamas*', and maintenance expenses of the respective institutions) (Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 21). For more on 'cosy' or mutually supporting relationships between the *ulamas* and the rulers through the management of *waqf* (for many worldly benefits), please see Hasan (2007).

men') and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (who promised to supply the former with 'glory and power' in exchange for championing his puritanic message of 'going back to the basics')⁴⁸ (Lacey 2009, pp. 10, 11). Further, the grievances resulting from the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent failure of the Arab nationalists and secular governments to deliver economic development reinforced the role of Islam in political change in a range of countries in the second half of the twentieth century⁴⁹ (Deneulin and Rakodi 2010) and created an interest in the *Shari'a* law to weaken the government's 'upper hand'. The establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 helped in the re-emergence of the idea of inseparability of religion and state (Deneulin and Rakodi 2010).

The application of the *shari'a* law in many MMCs, however, mostly relates to monitoring the individual's behavior within the context of certain code of conduct, and not in achieving good governance or as an overall framework for regulating the government, its members, and its relationship with the 'governed'. For example, in the present form, in many MMCs, the moral principles of the national or local leaders are never questioned or made subject to scrutiny. Autocratic rulers in countries like Nigeria, Pakistan, or Sudan in order to consolidate power tend to play the *shari'a* card by introducing Islamic laws in a piecemeal fashion arbitrarily as it serves their intended (political) purpose. In many MMCs, the process of filling in the gap in Islamic scholarship is often used to serve a social or political need (more than a religious need). For example, in exchange for enlisting the beneficiaries' support, the government of Pakistan offered official positions (of defining and defending Islamic law) to ill-educated (or trained) 'mullahs' by recognizing their short training as post-graduate degrees.⁵⁰ These people then purposively help to perpetuate the misuse of *Shari'a* law. There are some recent instances where the *muftis* are challenging the state authority, as in Saudi Arabia, to assert the former's position in influencing people's economic and social behavior.⁵¹

This purposive misuse of the *Shari'a* law by the political (as well as religious) elites is often intended to divert the people's mind from the existing broader and more important things not approved by Islam. This value-based and selective (or purposive) application of the *Shari'a* seems to give rise to two sets of problems. Its application can be discriminatory, and the failure to apply it at the macro level is

⁴⁸ That was reinforced once in 1932 by Abdul Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman al-Saud (a great-great-great grandson of Muhammad ibn Saud), and again in 1965 by Abdul Aziz bin Baz (no relation with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab; Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia 1993–1999).

⁴⁹ Cited by Deneulin and Rakodi (2010). *The Global Resurgence of Religion and The Transformation of International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁵⁰ For example, in Faisalabad (in the Punjab province of Pakistan), General Zia ul Haq, facing opposition from the heartland of Muslim League, in exchange of the support from the clerics, recognized a six-week *madrassa* training, offered to local *mullahs*, as a master degree (Platteau 2008, p. 344).

⁵¹ In a fatwa on 31 August 2010, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and six of his colleagues, mentioned that the action of the government to employ women as cashiers in the retail business (who are already banned from working as sales girls) is "not permissible" because that will result in the women "mixing with unrelated men" (*Gulf News* 3 November 2010, p. 10).

bound to result in weak outcome and lack universal credibility. The Muslims, in general, have developed a ‘*shari’a*-phobia’ due to its misuse and lopsided application.

The irony is on the one hand, religious institutions seem to be barren or ill equipped (manned) to create great thinkers or learned individuals (*ulama*),⁵² on the other hand Islamic revivalism seems to be reactive (as a response to the Western onslaught on traditional Islamic values), and as such is greatly influenced by the Western political thoughts.⁵³ For example, among the six most influential Sunni scholars of the last hundred years or so Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838–1897 CE of Afghan ancestry), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905 CE; Egyptian), Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903–1979 CE; Indian/Pakistani), Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966 CE; Egyptian), Rashid Rida (1865–1935 CE; Syrian), and Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949 CE; Egypt) and two Shi’a scholars, Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Moosavi Khomeini (1900–1989 CE; of Kashmiri ancestry educated in Iran) and Ali Shariati (1933–1977 CE; Iranian), only three⁵⁴ had any formal education in Islamic jurisprudence or studies. In Muslim societies “both traditional and modern elites have failed to provide a new synthesis that clearly offers some continuity between tradition and modernity”. As Esposito (2010, p. 297, 298) thinks, scholars in Muslim societies ought to combine modern disciplines with the “true awareness of their tradition necessary to make changes that are sensitive to the history and values of their cultural milieu” (instead of uncritically adopting western assumptions and models as the case with most Muslim elites “trained in Western-oriented secular schools”).

The situation is aggravated for four reasons. First, in the absence of a religious (or civil) central authority to monitor the quality of the local *imams*, the management committee (often too political) arbitrarily hire the former through kinship or ethnic connections to suit their purpose. Second, the local *imams* are then used (or enticed) to establish (or protect) the mosque committee members’ position in the society (often by identifying ‘faults’ in the oppositions’ behavior, dress, eating habit, etc.) and eventually start issuing judgments about health, family and private matters (encroaching the areas of family relationships—not a subject matter of the *Shari’a*). Third, the general public, a large number of whom is deterministic, being ignorant about the basic tenets of the religion (because of a lack of good literature in vernacular) or the *imam’s* role in one’s life, seek suggestions on trivial private matters (e.g., if the children can be sent to the local school where the classmates eat pork). Further, being warned by the local *imams* (who are eager to reinforce their position with fictitious claims) about the risks for the individuals of attracting divine wrath by forming any independent judgment or for using rational thinking on matters related to living in modern societies (e.g., ‘permissibility’ of work in a

⁵² As Esposito (2010, pp. 297–298) observes, the graduates of religious schools were “ill prepared to understand and response to the demands of modernity”.

⁵³ For a detail understanding of this contention, the readers may look at Volumes like Rahnema (2005).

⁵⁴ Muhammad Abduh and Hassan al-Banna, both educated at the al-Azhar; and Imam Khomeini educated in Iran.

commercial bank or under a non-Muslim supervisor). These *imams* ignore the fact that most religious aspects of an individual's life are "private and non-justiciable", and that 'moral police' is an innovation because the Qur'an does not prescribe any worldly punishment for these nor does it authorize the state authority for any punitive actions (Kamali 2005). In the process, the imams have created conflicts with some Muslim communities, confused some others, alienated some, and radicalized the rest in matters of human relationship influencing human development in the MMCs.

2.4 Conclusion

Islamic law has transformed over the years within the basic frames of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* through analogical deductions, human reasoning, independent analyses and judgment, consensus, and local customs. Thus Islam has created a world civilization that is "poly-ethnic, multi-racial, and international" (Moten 2005, p. 236). Based mainly on the Qur'an, the *Hadith* literature, and other secondary sources of information, the chapter highlights the contention that Islamic law is primarily normative rather than prescriptive and is designed mostly for moral education (Zaman 2002), and does not encourage rigidity except for the concept of the Unity of God, and its basic principles, and in turn promotes plurality.

Islam approves actions not contradictory to the Unity of God or explicitly forbidden in the Qur'an, and emphasizes 'public interest' (*masalih al-mursalah*) as well as *ijtihad* (juristic preference) in the interpretation and application of laws. The acceptance of varied approaches to many Islamic practices, of the *urf* (local customs) and the *adat* (customary laws) as sources of Islamic law, and of individual responsibility in such practices (in the form of *ijtihad*) highlights a moderate philosophy and promotes pluralism in Islam.

Many historical incidences have shaped the characters of Islamic jurisprudence as well as its essence. Throughout the ages, the fear of intimidation on the one hand, and the humiliation of being seen as a pet '*faqih*' (jurist) on the other, forced many Muslim jurists to stay away from dealing with contentious economic, political, or social issues. The 'gap' has been filled by some opportunists in the government and in the society to impose their religious prejudices or preferences on others. In the process, many confused Muslims (claiming to have authority) intentionally or ignorantly tend to blur the distinctions between *Sunnah Tashri'ah* (legal *Sunnah* a part of the *Shari'a*) and *Sunnah Ghair Tashri'ah* (non-legal *Sunnah* and thus not part of the *Shari'a*) as well as to snub the universality clause or social justice requirements (*haqq*) of the *Shari'a* often colluding with the respective government (eager to have supports of the *imams* or the so called *muftis* to stay in power).

A law is not an independent entity; every law is the law of a group, a community, or an individual who subscribes to it. It is more so in Muslim communities because there is no central 'religious authority' to impose uniformity even in the *Shari'a*

matters. A great feature of Islam (flexibility) has become its drawback because of intentional misuse by some individuals (in and outside the governments). There are, however, scholars who appreciate and defend pluralism in Islam adhering to the God given rights of the Believers in defining and undertaking actions, in particular in human relationships, within the fundamental parameters of *tawhid*, to protect peace, public interest, and social justice. The observance of the Islamic principles (of economic, political, and social relationships) is thus context dependent. It is worth noting that scholars as prominent as Ibn Taymiya (d. 1328) held the view that one global rule is not necessary for the Muslim community because the unity of Islam is far more fundamental than the unity of government—the latter being a means and not an end (Rahman 1982).

Muslims are widely scattered in the world living under diverse systems of governance, differently practicing many rituals adhering to the basic tenet—‘peace’ by ‘submitting to the will’ of God. Every MMC is different and creates different political relationships with the religion and people because Islamic *shari’a* supports plurality. The social, economic, and historical contexts and the unique political environment influencing the character of Islamic jurisprudence need to be understood to comprehend human relationships in Islam. There cannot be a policy or theory of human relationship or of human development in Islam that could be applied to all times and places because of the subjectivity of different Islamic jurists, the existence in the primary sources of disparate or even contradictory positions (and a tendency among Muslims of selectively using sources to support one’s position) on important issues, and the prevalence of secondary literature that can reinforce all (contradictory) positions.

This Volume is set to explore this varied world of human development in all 47 MMCs in Africa and Asia. The question, however, is what human development is and how differently the Western and Islamic literatures deal with the subject matter? The next chapter analyzes the relevant (human) development issues to ‘set the scene’ for the analyses of the phenomena in the MMC contexts.

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Chapter 3

Human Development: Perspectives, Gaps, and Issues for the MMCs

Samiul Hasan

3.1 Introduction

The recent debate about world development have two major dimensions—while one group of experts (independent scholars, government bodies, international organizations) is engaged in identifying ways of defining and measuring ‘development’, the other is keen to study why economic growth through the market system has failed in some, not in others (Chang 2008; Diamond 1997, 2005; Reinert 2008). There are obvious differences in economic and social systems, and ecological conditions among countries, and thus in the dimensions of development and sustainability. Sources of the problems of development, as a result, are varied and need to be understood contextually in order to find appropriate solutions. This chapter encapsulates the approaches of studying development and identifying the major concerns of human development in the Muslim majority countries (MMCs) in Africa and Asia (the focus of this Volume). This chapter is divided into two major parts dealing with the approaches of studying human development, and some explanations for development differentials among people and countries highlighting the need for diversifying the economy, and issues related to rentier economy.

3.2 Approaches of and Progression to the Study of Human Development

Development is about improvement and stability in human life in as many as four major aspects: quality, capability, equity, and institutional, and entails structural transformation encompassing cultural, political, social, and economic changes (cf. Hettne 1990). Economic growth, however, is an imperative to ensure improvement

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in these dimensions to offer people (the beneficiaries) enhanced capability to survive and function to achieve ‘progress’. Human (economic) activities for fulfilling needs require resources. Gaining legal/political power (authority), social support (legitimacy), and (natural or) technical capacity to control and optimize (not necessarily maximize) resource use to meet human needs, however, is more important for development than having the resources. It is because a natural substance does not become resource until it is utilized (or socially or legally sanctioned to be utilized) for or proven to have the potential of fulfilling needs (primarily of human beings as well as of any other living beings, in ecological sense, Mitchell 1989) or recognized to have any economic value (Caldwell 1990). An enabling system is also required to deal with sustainable development and should concentrate on opportunity to have the least acceptable functional levels to achieve the minimum acceptable standard of living “without compromising future generations’ ability to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987).

An enabling system requires a structure and a process to involve people (the beneficiaries of any ‘development’ effort) in formulating, implementing, and monitoring policies. All these require a reasonable process of capability building for the policy makers, program and product providers, and the beneficiaries who need to articulate demands, influence decisions, and monitor resource use. This rational process of capability building calls for institutional development. But then there is the question of capability egalitarianism because capabilities consist of the sets of functioning one can achieve, given the personal, material, and social resources, and the differences in desires of capabilities. Thus capability measure is not actually to achieve functioning, but a person’s freedom to achieve valued functioning (Clayton and Williams 2004) to fulfill intragenerational needs, and to protect the future generation’s potential for needs fulfillment (without being forced to be ‘patron’ serving). The introduction of a system by formalizing the tasks (applying knowledge and skills in creating utility and ensuring productivity) that reduces indispensability of individuals emphasizing merit (or achievement) over (crony or dynasty-based) ascription is also an imperative for development (as shown in Box 3.1; updated from Hasan 1991).

Box 3.1: Aspects of Development: Requirements and Essentials

Aspects	Requirements	Essentials
Quality	Self-sustaining quality of life	Access to resource and work (income)
Capability	Optimizing resource use to meet the ‘needs’	Knowledge, skills, and authority
Equity	Intergenerational needs protection	Intragenerational needs fulfillment
Institutional	Individual’s dispensability	Merit-based system of running the state

Because of the above complexity, during the post-World War II period that created a massive need for reconstruction in Europe and new economic aspirations of the decolonized Africa and Asia, there have been considerable efforts in measuring and theorizing ‘development’. The first major approach, in the 1950s by W.W. Rostow, to study development focused on the ‘capitalist-system-embedded’ growth model. The approach advocated ‘personal achievement’ as opposed to community benefit presupposing a ‘trickle-down’ effect to the ‘periphery’ inevitable. In the next fifty years, the foci of development moved from growth, administration, self-reliance, needs, ecology, people, good governance, high standard of living with good education and health (human development), gender empowerment, and finally poverty (Millennium Development Goals; Box 3.2).

The Growth Model (W.W. Rostow) focused on five stages of growth starting from the ‘traditional or subsistence production stage (One)’ through to ‘transitional stage (Two)’ (surplus, transport, trade, accumulation, entrepreneurship), ‘take-off stage (Three)’ (manufacturing concentrated in specific sectors and regions with continuous investment in high value production), ‘drive to Maturity stage (Four)’ (differentiation and diversification), and the final ‘high mass consumption stage (Five)’ (industrial and service sector growth; Rostow 1954). The Rostow model emphasized economic growth, and was applicable to the old world of western Europe and the new world of Australia, Canada, and the USA with uninterrupted ‘capability’ and a steady market progression. Others, especially the countries in Africa and Asia succumbed to European colonization while at ‘Stage Two’ because Europe, having reached ‘Stage Three’ (the ‘take-off stage’ with mass manufacturing), had to explore new suppliers of raw materials (and buyers of the produce). Colonization transformed the natural economic growth pattern in Africa and Asia, and created a (self-reinforcing) condition of ‘underdevelopment’.

Box 3.2: Major Foci of Development

Focus	Time period
Growth or (trickle-down)	1950s
Administration (Comparative Administration Group)	1960s
Self-reliance	1972–80
Needs	1976–80
Ecology	1970s
People	1980s
Structure (Structural Adjustment Program)	1980s
Intergenerational equity (sustainability) (WCED)	1987–Current
Good governance (The Prince, the Merchant, the Citizen)	1989–Current
Human development	1990s
Gender (GAD or GDI) Empowerment (GEM)	1990s
Poverty (UN Millennium Development Goals 1999)	2000–2015

WCED World Commission for Environment and Development, *GAD* Gender and Development, *GDI* Gender Development Index, *GEM* Gender Empowerment Measure

Thus underdevelopment is not just failure to develop or an original stage, rather a created condition of active process of impoverishment (Frank 1995). Colonies were deprived of economic surpluses through colonial exploitation (Baran 1957), and then of a rightful and historically documented place in world history because of the dominance of excessively Eurocentric perspectives on early modern and recent world economic history and social science (Frank 1995).

This phenomenon also suggests that since the sixteenth century (CE), the capitalist world economy incorporated previously isolated self-sufficient societies into a complex system of functional relations (Wallerstein 1976, 1984) transforming the fate of the previously well-to-do people in Africa and Asia. Economic activities in the 'world system' or 'world-systems' (Amin 1993) instead of tributary relationships created hegemonic leadership and rivalry for hegemony. The long and short economic cycles of alternating ascending and descending phases and changes in 'centre-periphery' relationships transformed world economic centers.

Thus the 'Growth Model' was not applicable to the decolonized economies of Africa and Asia. The postcolonial 'reconstruction' work, in particular, the development administration approach of the 1960s, a byproduct of the Comparative Administration Group (Hope 1984; Hasan 1988), ignored the fundamental issues of the development debate (e.g., economic and political impacts of colonization) and focused on a "people-oriented administrative system involving the participation of the beneficiaries" (Hasan 1988) because a good development management system must be accountable to the public through its representatives (Hsueh 1970). The narrowing down of the focus of 'development' to administrative failure did not advance the poor economies because people and their needs were absent from the 'agenda'.

Thus appeared the people's 'self-reliance' and 'needs' centered development approach of the 1970s, for a brief stint though. The 'Basic Needs' included certain minimum requirements of a family for private consumption (e.g., food, shelter, clothing, and other household items), and certain essential services (e.g., water, sanitation, transport, health, and education). The 'Basic Needs' (BN), a country-specific and dynamic concept, was to be placed within the "context of national independence, the dignity of individuals, and peoples and their freedom to chart their destiny without hindrance" (Hettne 1990, p. 169). Thus the achievement of the basic needs was likely to reduce (if not eliminate) poverty because poverty is the absence of "living conditions and amenities that are customary in the societies to which a person belongs" (Townsend 1979). The BN approach, however, at the end failed to appreciate and address the geography and culture based differences in 'needs', and to protect people from being uprooted from resources, culture, and tradition. Much worse, the approach did not consider needs beyond the subsistence level, and became an instrument of "retarding growth and keeping developing countries at a low level of technological development" (Hoeven 1988) to provoke a call for its reorientation.

The self-reliant (SR) development, that followed, meant 'autonomy' in choice and decision-making, and was to ensure mass participation in and ecological balance of the development initiatives. The SR development, an antithesis of dependency theory (Hettne 1990), often times, was directed to increasing military capa-

bility.¹ Further, the SR did not start from the ‘bottom’, as promised or was expected. Since national ‘self-reliance’ cannot be achieved by ignoring the grass-roots institutions, ideas, and knowledge, the approach was destined to fail. Its failure was accelerated by the fact that ‘experts’ from industrialized countries and international organizations (though not always from the industrialized world, invariably students of the industrialized world’s ‘development’ theories and approaches) took the lead in ‘guiding’ the people in the ‘undeveloped’ countries in their initiatives for SR development.

In order to rectify the patronizing SR approach (and the Bretton Woods approach²), the Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), initiated by the ‘developing countries’ and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1974, called for the programs of action for improved terms of trade for the exports of poor countries, greater access of the poor economies’ manufacturing goods to markets of the industrialized world, greater financial assistance alleviating the past debts and reforming the International Monetary Fund (IMF), greater say of the nonindustrialized world economies in the decision-making of the international food programs, and greater technical cooperation for the poor economies (Thirlwall 1983, p. 6). The NIEO aimed at ensuring a ‘self-reliant approach’ to development free from “dependence on outside influences...” (Hettne 1990, p. 173). In practice, the countries exerting ‘outside influence’ (for their own economic benefits) as well as the seventy-seven countries that experienced (often with ‘outside influence’) military intervention in politics (Jackman 1976; Maniruz-zaman 1987) did not respect this desire of the ‘developing world’ and the SR development continued to remain ‘external reliant’.

The Structural Adjustment Program of the 1980s promoted by the World Bank and the IMF buried the euphoria of the BN and SR approaches to development and called for government austerity (by expenditure cut), increased resource extraction (and export), currency devaluation, trade liberalization (easing of import/export restrictions), the removal of (agriculture) subsidies, divestment (or privatization), and enhancing the rights of foreign investors in the national laws.

World Bank (1989) highlighted the failure of the structural adjustment program to produce economic development, mainly in Africa, due to the failure in governance (also referred to as the ‘The Prince, The Merchant, The Citizen’ approach). Governance has three distinct aspects: the form of political regime; the processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources; and the capacity of a government to design, formulate, and implement policies (cited in World Bank 1992). The governance approach also out maneuvered the sustainable development approach initiated by the Brundtland Commission Report as *Our Common Future* (WCED 1987).

¹ This was one of the thirteen rationales of the self-reliant development approach as discussed by Galtung and Friedensforscher 1980, pp. 34–36.

² A generic term used to refer to ‘development prescriptions’ of the IBRD, World Bank, and IMF (since the 1944 meeting in the Bretton Woods, NH, in 1944).

The problem of sustainable development is that the ‘animal spirit’ or the “desire to maximize profits” upsets the “equilibrium of perfect competition” (Reinert 2008, p. 250). The dominance of maxima (initiated or revered by Europe or the ‘western’ culture) or maximum of everything including needs, work, return, ambition, power, alteration of external capital, relationship and exchanges (Khan 1995) creates an accessibility imbalance in society. Due to different local and regional issues, the problems of sustainability in the low income countries are different from those of the high income industrialized countries. The ‘gap’ created by high ‘access’ and consumption level of the rich and low access and consumption level of the poor complicates the situation further. Poverty results from political, cultural, and economic entitlements (Sen 1981) to create physical and mental conditions that inhibit a long term productive life.

The economic-benefit-focused development measures do not reflect people’s condition and their human capability. Thus the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in 1990, initiated a program to focus on overall human development in terms of life expectancy at birth, educational attainment (adult literacy rate and primary enrolment ratio), and standard of living (measured by per capita income considering purchasing power parity—PPP\$). These three measurable criteria are used to prepare a composite human development index (HDI). There are, however, problems of calculating the goods and services produced for subsistence rather for value-adding, and variation of temporal, regional, seasonal value-adding activities, variation in intrahousehold (gender-based) access to resources (as well as goods and services), variation in the farm workers’ access to homestead, and variation across social classes. Notwithstanding the above issues, gender inequality and its monitoring became a major part of human development measure. The UNDP Human Development Report begun to include Gender-Related Development Index³ followed by a comprehensive Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM).⁴ The ‘HDI’ does not, however, analyze important issues like the relationships between resources, resource use, and the levels and structure of economy, and thus is not likely to provide a complete picture of the level of development.

The latest significant effort in dealing with development came in 1999 from the UN in the form of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A sustainable development strategy aimed at eradicating poverty to ensure that poor people’s efforts to meet immediate needs for food and shelter do not contribute to environmental degradation is essential for a vibrant economy. The MDGs target the establishment of sustainable development through environmental sustainability and global partnership by eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary

³ Measuring male and female differences in life expectancy at birth (LEB), adult literacy rate, and combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary, and tertiary education, and in earned income.

⁴ The GEM considers mainly four dimensions: percentages of women legislators; women senior officials, and managers; women professional and technical workers, and women’s earned income.

education, promoting gender equality and empowering women, reducing child mortality rate, improving maternal health, and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases by 2015. Nonetheless, irrespective of the above normative endeavor to define and promote development, there have been differences among the MMCs like everywhere else in the world, in achieving dignified life for all. Thus in the next section we endeavor to analyze these development differentials.

3.3 The Development Differential: Some Explanations

The above mentioned approaches and methods of defining and measuring ‘development’ do not discuss the requirements for economic progress or explain why some countries are firmly positioned on the ‘development’ path than some others (while some others are yet to find the path). Some recent authors identify low/no diversity of and failure to protect economic activities, and rent-seeking (through agriculture and industrial sectors, and foreign aid) as two major factors of development differentials. Further, to some others corrupt practices in economic and political activities are also influencing the levels of development in Africa and Asia, and in many Muslim majority countries (MMCs). This section is to elaborate the above three factors, in sequence, to argue what may have gone wrong, and be important for human development in the MMCs.

3.3.1 Diversifying and Protecting Economy for Targeted Development

Many factors contributed to Europe’s advancement and domination: the geographic position of its sources of energy (coal); later the availability of food, wood, and markets from the colonies; but also its brutality, religious zeal, organizational ability, institutional creativity (e.g., double-entry book-keeping) and intellectual curiosity (Reinert 2008, p. 14). Europe’s large diversity and fragmentation (topographic, climatic, ethnic, and political) was the starting point for the rivalry that helped to create a large pool of alternative ideas and approaches to continuously emulate each other (Reinert 2008), and became a source of further improvement of the economy and of the society. None of these seem to apply to poor economies in Africa and Asia.

There always has been a general claim that poor countries do not have land—need to buy food; remain poor. A lack of arable land (coupled with a resultant absence of feudal structure), however, normally is likely to contribute to the creation of a diversified economic structure including activities subject to increasing returns (Reinert 2008, p. 225) and decreasing human misery. Since famine is a result of agriculture (distribution) failure (Sen 1981), and occurs mostly in countries spe-

cializing in food production⁵ (because industrial states can feed and maintain a far larger population than an agriculture state occupying the same territory), restructuring of economic activity (increasing the proportion of value-adding) is likely to end poverty faster than in any other ways (Reinert 2008). Simply put—Singapore would never have been able to feed its people had it concentrated in agriculture (rest alone having a rich country status); likewise Bangladesh, the most densely populated agriculture based country in the world, will never be able to improve its people’s quality of life until it diversifies its economy out of agriculture.

The vicious circle of poverty and poor economy in the past, in many instances, was thus successfully confronted by “qualitatively changing the productive structures of poor and failing states” by “increasing diversification away from sectors with diminishing returns” (e.g., traditional raw materials and agriculture)⁶ to sectors with increasing returns (technology, intensive manufacturing and services),⁷ “creating a complex division of labor and new social structures in the process” (Reinert 2008, p. 253).⁸ Schumpeterian (urban) economic activity-based ‘diversity’ (with skilled labors, higher wages led by technical changes, and larger synergies) facilitates interaction between sectors with increasing and diminishing returns in the same labor market and maximizes the “number of professions in the economy” working as a basis for “selection between technologies, products, and organizational solutions”. In the post-World War II European reconstruction era an understanding that “economic development was the result of synergies and increasing returns” and its subsequent practice helped to “overrule the free trade ideologies in Washington, and reindustrialize Europe and industrialize parts of Asia” (Reinert 2008, p. 257).

The Washington Consensus,⁹ completely ignoring the European experience, to reinforce the ‘kicking-the-ladder’ approach (Chang 2008), invented a panacea for the poor that contradicts the economic principles followed by the Continental Europe before and after the World War II for its industrialization. The economic ‘miracle’ in the post-World War II Europe (and also in the Asian tigers) proved that poor economies excel only by reaching the competitor’s economic level through

⁵ The Morgenthau Plan argued that Germany “had to be entirely deindustrialized and turned into an agricultural nation” to be kept “away from ever threatening world peace” (Reinert 2008, p. 152).

⁶ Due to a lack of alternative employment, “diminishing returns will eventually cause real wages to fall. So the more a country specializes in the production of raw materials, the poorer it will become” (Reinert 2008, p. 154).

⁷ See Chang (2008) for an interesting and enlightening discussion on the subject. Chang argues that Walpole knew this 300 years ago, Alexander Hamilton knew this when he defended the promotion of ‘infant industries’ defying Adam Smith. So “poor countries should deliberately promote manufacturing industries” like the developing countries that pursued import substitution ‘industrialization’ in the mid-twentieth century.

⁸ This will help breaking away from subsistence agriculture, and create an urban market for goods, inducing specialization and innovation, seeking new technologies, and creating both alternative employment and the economic synergies (Reinert 2008, p. 253).

⁹ A ‘wish-list’ of ten economic policies: (1) impose fiscal discipline, (2) reform taxation, (3) liberalize interest rates, (4) raise health and education spending, (5) secure property rights, (6) privatize industries, (7) deregulate markets, (8) adopt a competitive exchange rate, (9) remove barriers to trade, and (10) to FDI (Ferguson 2009).

industrialization¹⁰ (to gradually integrate with other economies); and by diversifying the manufacturing sector (including the recent knowledge-intensive services),¹¹ to attain increasing returns, as opposed to ‘decreasing returns’¹² (Reinert 2008, p. 216, 268). An efficient industry-based economic structure in the successful economies, virtually without any exception, has been created only “by conscious targeting, nurturing and protection of industrial activity”.¹³ A desired and efficient economic structure (urban artisanal and industrial activities) leads to an effective political structure, not the other way around. These, preconditions for “wealth, democracy and political freedom” (Reinert 2008, p. 216, 268), are missing from the ‘check-list’ of development prescriptions of the Washington Consensus.

Since “creating and protecting industry is creating and protecting democracy” (Reinert 2008, p. 226), today’s rich countries, for a long time, were the most protectionist countries in the world discriminating against foreign investors with subsidies and opening up “their economies selectively and gradually”¹⁴ (Chang 2008, p. 17). The ‘Washington Consensus’ actually does not allow for any protection, thus Reinert (2008, p. 23) advises the poor economies of the world “don’t do as the Americans tell you to do, do as the Americans did”¹⁵ (referring to the fact that “following England’s practice rather than her theory, the United States protected their manufacturing industry for close to 150 years”; Reinert 2008, p. 25; Schuman 2010). The proof of the ineffectiveness of the Washington Consensus, in the recent past, is that China and India have been following the (forbidden) recommendations of the Marshall Plan (i.e., industrialization, diversity, protection) rather than those of the Washington Consensus (that emphasizes comparative advantage and withdrawal of protections; Reinert 2008, p. 258). The Korean economic miracle, the result of a clever and pragmatic mixture of market incentives and state direction (Chang 2008; Schuman 2010), is another example of success brought about by the approaches forbidden by the World Bank. The Korean government nurtured certain industries (in consultation with the private sector), controlled the credit market (owning all the

¹⁰ The readers may also like to see Chang (2008), in particular Chap. 3 provocatively titled (‘My six-year-old son should get a job: Is free trade always the answer?’)

¹¹ “Diversifying from raw material production is necessary for creating a basis for democratic stability and increased welfare, even if the new sectors may be unable to survive world competition initially (Reinert 2008).

¹² This was the principle promoted by the first US Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, upon which the US economy was built, and which was rediscovered by George Marshall in 1947 (Reinert 2008, p. 264).

¹³ The Electronic division of Nokia took 17 years to make any profit, Toyota required protection and subsidies for 30 years to be competitive, it took Britain 100 years after Henry VII to “catch up with the Low Countries” in woollen manufacturing, and the USA 130 years to “develop its economy enough to feel confident about doing away with tariffs”. “Without such long time horizons, Japan might still be mainly exporting silk, Britain wool, and the US cotton (Chang 2008, p. 212).

¹⁴ In the recent past, China and India are more protectionist than comparable economies (Chang 2008).

¹⁵ By updating the American maxim of 1820s “don’t do as the English tell you to do, do as the English did”.

banks), guided foreign direct investments (by welcoming FDI only in sector in the national development plan priority list), and managing exports (exporting garments to earn currencies to pay for the advanced technologies)¹⁶ (Chang 2008, p. 14).

On the contrary, however, in the twenty-first century CE of the ‘free trade’ (favored by the ‘Washington Consensus’), poor economies face comparatively higher barriers while exporting to rich economies. For example, the overall import tax rate in the USA is about 1.6% that rises to 4% for some items from India and Peru, to 7% for Nicaragua and, 14–15% for Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Nepal (cited in Chang 2008, p. 75 from an Oxfam Report). Thus in 2002, India paid more tariff to the US government than did Britain (though the former’s economy is one-third of the latter); Bangladesh, with 3% the size of economy of France, paid almost as much tariff as the latter, to the US government (Chang 2008, p. 75).

Further, an important part of the European story is the emulation of technologies and skills from other continents (Africa and Asia including the MMCs) since most civilizations that have existed have not been European (Reinert 2008, p. 13). Apart from the well-planned and well-defined strategies of protecting the ‘nascent’ industries, the strategy of ‘emulation’ (to equal or surpass others in certain industrial endeavors) and its extensive ‘toolbox’ (developed for the purpose of emulating) made Europe rich (Reinert 2008, p. 15). ‘Emulation’ (for import substitution), however, is quite different (or rather opposite) to Ricardian theory of ‘comparative advantage’ (apparently ‘emulated’ by the Washington Consensus) that advises a nation to specialize in that economic activity where it is relatively least inefficient (Reinert 2008, p. 15). Reinert (2008, p. 15) opines that the Ricardian frame of mind eliminates “the dynamics that create the need for emulation” and creates a counter-intuitive policy conclusion destroying the dynamic elements of technological change and progress that create “the intuitive logic of emulation”, rather than static specialization.¹⁷

Ricardian theory fails when a country wants to acquire more advanced technologies for better economic achievements for which the “backward producers need a period of protection from international competition during this period of learning” (Chang 2008, p. 47). There are two issues. The first one is the question of competition among equal partners (as in any sports¹⁸). Second, Chang (2008, p. 220) suggests that if “stair-lifts for wheelchair users or Braille text for the blind” is not ‘special treatment’, “higher tariffs and other means of protection additionally made available for the developing countries” cannot be called ‘special treatment’. There is also the question of “providing the economically less advanced countries with the tools to acquire new capabilities by sacrificing short-term gains”. Indeed, allowing

¹⁶ Also see Schuman (2010), Chap. 2 (‘Why Korea Wants to Clone a Dictator’).

¹⁷ Reinert 2008 (15) suggests a delightful example that citing the Ricardian trade theory the USA, in response to the ‘the Sputnik (USSR) shock of 1957’, should have argued that the comparative advantage of the USA “was in agriculture, not in space technology”. But President Eisenhower, contrary to the Ricardian argument of comparative advantage, created NASA in 1958 to emulate the Soviet Union.

¹⁸ Chang (2008, p. 219) cites a good example: in Boxing two weight categories, Bantamweight (51–54 kg) and Featherweight (57 kg), with a difference of only 3 kgs cannot compete.

the poor countries to raise their capabilities more easily reduces the gap between the players as well as the necessity to tilt the playing fields (Chang 2008, p. 220). Further, the timing of the opening up of an economy is crucial; opening up too late can seriously hamper growth, too early may result in deindustrialization, falling wages and increased social problems (Reinert 2008, p. 252).¹⁹ Thus independent nations should be allowed to freely make decisions to diversify the economy. Unfortunately, however, in most cases in Africa and Asia, the absence of this ‘freedom’ constrained economic growth.

Further, bureaucratic obstruction, stringent regulations, import licensing, political risk, and the shortage of (skilled) labor, low supply of energy, and poor transport and communication facilities (Meredith 2006, p. 277) kept the private (domestic or overseas) investors away from these economies. Thus some countries cannot diversify the economy for low level of FDI or savings/investment, some for international political economy, some for social constraints, and some others for exploitative resource dependence.

3.3.2 *Resource Dependence (Rent-seeking/Rentier State)*

People acquire or create (material or legal) property for security. Property can be assets (things of material value or usefulness; an advantage or resource) of every kind, whether corporeal (perceptible to the senses—land, merchandise) or incorporeal (legal rights—patents, easements), movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interests in such assets.²⁰ In a natural economic system property (mainly as the three major factors of production—land, labor, and capital) is unified to compete and complement to have a desired outcome (to be equitably distributed among the three factors). In the absence of an equitable economic system of profit-distribution, rent-seeking or extraction of ‘unearned value’ by manipulation, by imposing (bureaucratic) regulations or by (mis)using (sociopolitical) relationships may occur. Thus patents (regulating knowledge protection) and tariffs (promoting produce in new areas) represent legalized rent-seeking “to promote goals not achievable under perfect competition” (Reinert 2008, p. 256).

The ‘rentier’ states (i.e., allocation states dependent on either resources or security rents for their revenues) have discouraged the emergence of an independent bourgeoisie that can engage the state in economic give-and-take by becoming or remaining authoritarian without transforming themselves to ‘production states’ where

¹⁹ Mexican farmers’ lack of ‘competitiveness’ compared to American producers of maize and wheat is a key factor in the migration from southern Mexico. A large percentage of 650 million farmers in India are also similarly ‘uncompetitive’. ‘Uncompetitive’ Mexican farmers can seek work in the USA, but the Indian framers, even being ‘victims’ of ‘free trade’ have nowhere to go (Reinert 2008, p. 252).

²⁰ Adopted from Webster Online Dictionary.

income is derived primarily “through taxation of domestic economic activity”²¹ (Kazemi 2002, p. 43). Food aid, foreign aid, and aid consultancy in many countries also create a ‘rentier’ situation entangling civil society to the state that is used by the government to justify their authoritative means. This section discusses rent seeking in agriculture, industry, and foreign aid, and their respective development impacts.

3.3.2.1 Rentier Agriculture

Development requires the advancement in productive forces and the existence of a bourgeoisie (to coordinate the means of production and of bringing about fundamental structural transformation for innovations and investments). The European bourgeoisie was based on: private appropriation of the means of production, and a relatively rapid mode of production: the slave system, the feudal system, and the capitalist system (slave system was not as prominent in Africa and Asia; Lacoste 1984). Historically poor economies have been in lands without bourgeoisie. The collective land ownership system in Africa (tribe controlled) and Asia (village community based), in general, disallowed the use of slaves in farming because the dependent relations were not feudal since land was not privately owned. Many new rulers (e.g., the Mughals in India), offered rights to raise taxes without any rights to the land. In Arabic speaking West Asia, personal relations based on the ‘*himaya*’ system (receiving protection for surrendering ‘land rights’²²) developed in towns and surrounding areas where tribal control of land ended (Lacoste 1984) to pave ways for rent-seeking.

Rent seeking in agriculture, in general, in most part of Africa and Asia is a very recent phenomenon related to European colonization, in particular. The community based land ownership and farming system attracted outsiders to Asia, the local inhabitants, being content with the resources and peaceful living, did not mind the arrival of new people (Moses 2006). As a result, the area has become the most densely populated region in the world. European colonization, emulating the European private land ownership system, introduced individual land or lease titles, as an efficient approach to revenue collection and of ensuring continuous flow of raw materials for European manufacturing.

Owing to this colonial ‘invention’/‘imposition’, land—the most important factor of agriculture, in most parts of Africa and Asia is still not owned by the tillers because the rural and urban elites who do not cultivate, have been protecting their ownership through different means.²³ Many governments over the years apparently

²¹ Kazemi (2002) cites two relevant works (Luciani 1987, 1994) to conclude that “taxation and the widening of the state’s fiscal base are essential inducements for democratization” (p. 43).

²² Still significant in maintaining ‘tribal’ relationships or even in the creation of new states, e.g., Saudi Arabia.

²³ For example, in Bangladesh, one of the worst land poor countries in Asia, 19% of the families own 70% of the land. Twenty-three percent is cultivated by tenants or owner cum tenants. Another 45% of the land is cultivated by paid laborers. The rest by *bargadars* (share croppers).

have undertaken measures for land reforms which were either ill-conceived or half-hearted. The experience from some developing countries show that the land reform measures were successful when legislated through revolutionary programs (e.g., USSR, China, and Cuba) or through overseas support (e.g., South Korea and Taiwan). In other instances the owners (essentially the law makers or their cronies) can easily find ways to bypass land laws by dividing land among family members (Eckholm 1979) redefining family (Bangladesh) or land (Philippines; Maristela and Hasan 2000). In Indonesia, in the 1960s, members of religious organizations organized themselves against the Communists not for any ideological reasons but to protect the lands.²⁴

In many countries, due to the absence of any other substantive resource, land, on the one hand is a main source of economic ‘rent-seeking’ (in the absence of ‘return’ regulation for the ‘labor’), as well as of ‘political’ power generated through the continuation of this land-based unequal (patron-client) relationships. Most countries are yet to undertake serious efforts in rationalizing land tenure and use by allowing the cultivators landownership. Agriculture productivity thus remains low because the owner does not want to pay for (higher) inputs to share higher production with the other party. The tillers, irrespective of their intentions, run short of cash.²⁵ In some countries the problem has been solved with a three-share system—one each for the owner, the tiller, and the inputs to reduce the rent-seeking effects (instead of thinking of its elimination due to political reasons). To complicate the situation further, the existence and a lack of access to ‘market’ has created a rent-seeking comprador class who control the agriculture produce market (especially of the staple crop) disallowing the producer fair price and motivation. In some countries in Africa and Asia (including many MMCs), the rent-seeking tradition in agriculture has continued in the industry as well.

3.3.2.2 Rent-seeking in Industry

The oil shocks of 1973 (in the wake of Arab-Israeli war) that pushed the oil price 400% higher in a year (from \$ 3 in 1973 to \$ 12/barrel in 1974) and about 1200% in about eight years (to \$ 38/barrel in 1981 during the Iraq-Iran war) created sufferings of the non-oil producing countries due to the rent-seeking of the oil economies. According to a World Bank report, the percentage of export earnings used for oil import for many African non-oil producing countries (e.g., Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia) rose to 23.2% (1980) from 4.4%

²⁴ In the 1960s it was widely talked over that the communists would abolish private ownership of land so the land owners under the leadership of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) organized themselves (or did lend their hands) in the killings of the members of the communist Party (Hefner 1990). Recent laws in Indonesia disallow absentee ownership of agricultural land (Frederick and Worden 1993).

²⁵ Also in the absence of bank loan for agriculture (due to the high risks of crop failure from flash floods, pest infestation or bad seeds), local money lenders offer loans at a restrictive interest rate (often as high as 1200%).

(in 1970; Meredith 2006, p. 276). The oil producing countries, however, received tremendous wind-fall from the oil price.

This resource dependence for many countries, however, have been creating ‘resource curse’ removing incentives for more productive economic activity, and strengthening rent-seeking autocrats at the expense of representative assemblies (Ferguson 2009, p. 27). Unfortunately, however, since the “value of precious metal (or resources) is not absolute”, an increase in the supply of money does “not make a society richer, though it may enrich the government that monopolizes the production of money”; other things being equal, monetary expansion fuel price hike (Ferguson 2009, p. 27) without making the economy any better. Further, resource dependency creates internal conflicts because of the “competition for control of resources” primarily in poorer economies²⁶ (Moyo 2009, p. 59) destroying opportunities or conditions for industrial growth.

Features of many countries in Africa and Asia (including many MMCs) prevent growth in the manufacturing sector. There is low investment resulting from low saving potential, political instability creating fear of investment loss, underdeveloped banking system with high interest rates and no incentives for productive sectors, and the influx (often with the use of money) of landowning class into politics to undermine low diminishing return activities (where they do not have any personal interest) over high diminishing return activities (because they own the land). The manufacturing activities are further jeopardized by the ‘enabling actions’ (e.g., issuance of licenses and permits) by the government leaders (often to themselves or the cronies) to import goods to compete with the local industries (often at the latter’s peril). The nascent, primarily labor-intensive, manufacturing sector becomes a source of rent-seeking and not a source of progressive industrialization (that requires protection, time, investment, and efficient management) because due to the political risk and uncertainty the investors (often political cronies) look for overnight gains.

Industrializing poor countries creates ‘rent-seeking’ and ‘cronyism’ but then some would argue that “rent-seeking is the basic driving force of capitalism”. So the question is whether this “rent spreads through society in general—in the form of higher profits, higher wages and higher taxable income—or not”²⁷ (Reinert 2008, p. 253). It did not happen in most African and Asian economies because a lack of both democracy and market “impair productivity and growth” (Bhagwati 2002, p. 158). “Markets and competition can deliver growth, with or without democracy”; “democracy without markets is unlikely to deliver significant growth” because the democrats’ ability to translate ideas and know-how into effective innovation and productive efficiency is seriously handicapped by market restrictions, and the

²⁶ During the 1990s there were seventeen major armed conflicts in Africa, compared to ten elsewhere in the world (Moyo 2009, p. 59). Thus the African economic malaise may be blamed on internal factors, not external ones (Meredith 2006, p. 277). But the internal sources of conflicts are often reinforced by external influence.

²⁷ There are also concerns about the low wage (0.10% of the face value of a brand-name garment item is paid for its sewing) and the worker-manager wage gap (often 1:200), See *Corporation*—a documentary.

“incentive to produce and to innovate is seriously compromised because the returns to such activity could not be substantial when there were extensive restrictions on production, imports, and investment” (Bhagwati 2002, p. 158). Open and fair competition creates incentives to excel and to outperform others. Accumulated economic and political ‘outperforming’ activities steadily move a country forward. Many MMCs, due to the absence of open economic competition (please see Chap. 10) supported by a congenial political system (see Chap. 8), have failed to develop manufacturing sector to improve overall human development. The situation thus forces many MMCs to depend on and have rent-seeking in foreign aid.

3.3.2.3 Aid-based Rent-seeking

In the last few years, due to a combination of low resource availability and lesser capability of resource use and lesser external support the unchanged poverty situation has been an unwelcome economic outcome in some low income countries. In order to alleviate the poverty condition, all countries agreed to the UN Millennium Development Goals to halve extreme poverty, end hunger, reduce child and maternal mortality, and reverse the spread of diseases like malaria by 2015. Estimates showed that the amount of aid required by the poor countries to achieve the MDG targets is \$ 135–195 billion/year (i.e., about 0.44–0.54% of the rich-world’s GNI) for the period of 2005–2015 (Sachs 2005, p. 299). Actually, the UN Commission on International Development urged donors to provide 0.7% of their GNI (GNP) by 1975 in aid.²⁸ The donors revived their pledge at the 1992 Earth Summit, but, due to the end of the cold war, did cut their aid budget pushing it down to an all time low of 0.22% of the total GNI (Gross National Income) in 1997 (UNDP 2005, p. 84). The richest and the largest donor, USA, contributed 0.1% of its GNI to foreign aid in 2000 and 0.16% in 2004 (or to \$ 18 billion) claiming an increase of 60%.²⁹ The total DAC (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD) bilateral foreign aid to all developing countries in 2008 was \$ 87 billion. Contrary to popular perception, the annual per capita foreign aid to Africa is very small.³⁰

Irrespective of its size, foreign aid always has been donor-serving and/or purposive, and has a long history of misuse. The Marshall Plan (aimed at helping war-ravaged Europe) is regarded as a good example of what can be done to help others in crisis. Nonetheless, most of the \$ 13 billion under Marshall Plan did not even leave the donor country (just changed hands), and around 15% of the aid went to

²⁸ Only five OECD countries, Norway, Luxemburg, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, ever achieved the UN target of 7% of GNI as ODA.

²⁹ The USA cannot do any better, Sach tells in *The End of Poverty*, because Pentagon eats up \$ 700 billion/year.

³⁰ For example, in 2002 sub-Saharan Africans received \$ 30/person from the entire world. Of this modest \$ 30, almost \$ 5 was actually for consultants from the donor countries, more than \$ 3 was for food and relief, another \$ 4 for debt servicing, and \$ 5 was for debt relief operations. The rest, \$ 12, went to Africa (Sachs 2005, p. 310).

the oil companies to help Europe shift from coal to oil³¹ (Chomsky 1992). Further, oftentimes the donors instead of focusing on the recipient country's development needs, impose hardships by asking for debt servicing at any cost.³²

Irrespective of its fault (or donor-favoring strategies), the Marshall Plan had a much greater success (than any other later aid or reconstruction program) in achieving its goals. Various attempts to replicate the Marshall Plan through government-to-government aid programs proved deeply disappointing because the American aid, in particular, became hedged around political and military conditions that were not always in the best interests of the recipients³³ (Ferguson 2009, p. 308). Western donors, instead of standing back to be asked for support, "would market aid themselves and follow through with an active 'after-sales' service hedged with conditions" (Browne 2006, p. 2).

To complicate the situation, governments, in many countries in Africa and Asia, determined to keep urban food prices low with higher food supply (through aid) dampened the market. They also maintained overvalued exchange rates to reduce both the cost of food imports (e.g., wheat, corn, rice) and the cost of consumer items (e.g., household items, cars) favored by the urban elite. This strategic economic tool for political purpose penalizes and demotivates the farmers (with selling price of farm produce often being lesser than the production cost).³⁴ Further, the inefficient and (purposively) inflated bureaucracy drains a lot of the aid-boosted government revenue.

In a foreign aid-dependent environment, governments are less interested in promoting entrepreneurs and the development of a middle class than in furthering their own financial interests. In most functioning and healthy economies, the middle class respects and defends the rule of law, has trustworthy individuals, and pays taxes in return for government accountability; the "foreign aid short-circuits this link". An aid-driven economy politicizes the country so much so that the success and failure of the middle class becomes wholly "contingent on its political alliance" creating an aid-based rentier society.³⁵

³¹ Noam Chomsky adds that in fact France and the Netherlands used the Marshall Plan funds for arming the forces to fight independence movements in Cambodia and Indonesia, respectively.

³² For example, the Western donors (supporting Pakistan in the liberation war against the Soviet support for Bangladesh) advised Bangladesh to accept debt liability contracted by Pakistan prior to 1971 (Browne 2006, p. 2) and did not cancel the debts 'owed' to (liberation war-ravaged) Bangladesh.

³³ Ferguson cites an example from a chief economist of an US company who was "employed to ensure that the money lent to countries like Ecuador and Panama by the IMF and World Bank would be spent on goods supplied by US corporations". The chief economist, John Perkins, later wrote in his book (*The Confessions of An Economic Hit Man*) that "this empire, unlike any other in the history of the world, has been built primarily through economic manipulation, through cheating, through fraud, through seducing people into our way of life, through the economic hit men" (Ferguson 2009, p. 311).

³⁴ For example, the government in Mali used to pay the rice growers 20% less than the production cost of rice (which was 80 francs/kg) (Meredith 2006, p. 280).

³⁵ The information and quotations in this paragraph are from Moyo 2009, p. 57.

In the recent past, since the international organizations' (especially the World Bank's) interest in good governance (in the 1990s) to include the civil society in policy governance and accountability structure of the state, about 10% of the ODA, for many countries, was meant to be channeled through the civil society (NGO) sector. A little percentage of this fund is also available for advocacy, social science research, and consultancy involving the intellectuals in the respective countries. The money, though small, being converted to the local currency and used in the creation of comprador intellectuals and a foreign-aid based rentier society contribute in neutralizing the middle class and their potential political activism.

Foreign aid dependency diminishes economic motivation as well. Poor countries can extricate themselves from economic dependency only by opting for Schumpeterian cronyism, instead of aid-based cronyism. Schumpeterian cronyism increases the size of the national and world economic pie. Aid-based cronyism adds nothing, but creates an incentive system that moves attention away from national values taking the country deeper into foreign dependency (Reinert 2008, pp. 255–256). Worse still, rentier elites or rent seeking intellectuals tend to profit by deciphering symptoms not creating utility but, in the process, inflate demands for goods and services. One depressing by-product of this trend is the absence of 'voice' as well as a neutral monitoring mechanism to watch and agitate against the corrupt use of power and position for personal (and group) gains that are likely to have devastating economic impacts to expand the development differential among countries and communities.

3.3.3 Misuse of Economic or Political Power: Corruption

During the colonial era many local residents viewed "stealing from the government as a legitimate form of resistance" because the colonists were seen as exploiters of their resources and funds through taxation (Marston et al. 2005, p. 266). Unfortunately, the 'stealing' continued unabated during the postcolonial period as a habit compounded by the high personal expectations from the 'independence' and low salary scale. Imitating the first generation office-holders then became a norm because the high executives themselves were not away from the corrupt practices. Further, the race among the cold-war warriors to create and sustain their respective international hegemony offered 'refuge' even to the corrupt politicians, enticing the latter to be involved in many corrupt practices for self-preservation (and for protecting the hegemon's interests).

Pilferage of state funds by the (newly installed) executives, law makers, or judges may have been outrageously discouraging from a nationalist perspective, but were welcome from an international hegemonic perspective.³⁶ President Kennedy

³⁶ Corruption was overlooked or even indirectly supported by the rich world for the latter's economic benefits. Leaders like Mobutu, with proven corruption records, was praised by President Nixon at the White House in 1970 with words like "there are things we can learn from you" extolling the virtues of Congo "as a good place for US investment" (Meredith 2006, p. 295). The

commented in 1962 that “we see Africa as probably the greatest open field of maneuvered in the worldwide competition between the [communist] block and the non-communist” (Meredith 2006, p. 142). During the cold-war, Egypt, Morocco, the Sudan, and Somalia, for example, established or intensified security ties with the West; Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, and Libya went for the Soviet bloc (Keylor 2006, p. 388). For the above reasons the overseas donors and ‘friends’ overlooked the unethical activities of their ‘development partners’. The ‘C’ word (corruption) was categorized as a very ‘political’ term and kept out of the World Bank’s vocabulary until very recently (Stiglitz 2006). Thus corruption cannot be seen or solved in isolation to international political economy which seems to be always tilted toward the big powers.

The World Bank, IMF, and other UN agencies employ about 10,000, 2,500 and 5,000 people, respectively. Added with private charities and government aid agencies the number of people engaged in “the business of aid” tallies to around 500,000 and are under pressure to lend (Moyo 2009, p. 54), even when the receivers are proven to be corrupt. Irrespective of its size or character, corruption distorts decision-making, with negative effects on competition, market efficiency and development (Richards et al. 2003, p. 307).

3.4 Conclusion

Development is about improving quality, capability, equity, and institutions to create stability in human life. The availability of resources as well as the (political and technological) capability for its use to fulfill the owners’ needs and interests are essential for ‘development’. Thus if it is assumed that people or economy ‘evolve’ through stages, the tragedy is that most MMCs (37 out of 47) were colonized when they had reached ‘Stage Two’.³⁷ The European colonization transformed the natural economic growth pattern in the MMCs (like everywhere else in Africa and Asia) and created a (self-reinforcing) condition of ‘underdevelopment’ devoid of the ‘capability’. ‘Underdevelopment’ is not just failure to develop, rather a created condition of active process of impoverishment (Frank 1995).

The debates on measuring ‘development’, focusing on certain human aspects, divert peoples’ and governments’ attention from reinforcing or restoring the ‘capability’. The economic ‘miracle’ in the post-World War II Europe (and also in the Asian tigers) proved that poor economies excel only with capability of reaching

praise won the USA “a generous investment code”. Despite Doe’s atrocities in Liberia, the stolen election, the corruption, a senior US official commented “He never wavered in his support for us against Libya and Iran. He was somebody we had to live with” (Meredith 2006, p. 555).

³⁷ Six of the rest, being land-locked, were not in the world’s ‘mainstream’ economic activities. Iran and Turkey have done pretty well (though Iran has lost a bit in the race since the Islamic revolution of 1979). Afghanistan did reasonably well until the Soviet occupation in 1980. Saudi Arabia was left alone for political and economic reasons.

the competitor's economic level through industrialization (to gradually integrate with other economies); and by diversifying the manufacturing sector (including the recent knowledge-intensive services), to attain increasing returns, as opposed to 'decreasing returns' (Reinert 2008, p. 216, 268). The Washington Consensus contradicts these economic principles of 'development', fails to help rebuild the 'capability', and seems to reinforce the 'kicking-the-ladder' approach (Chang 2008).

The absence of diversity and fragmentation (topographic, climatic, ethnic, and political as seen in Europe) in the large Asian empires hampered the areas' involvement in increasing return activities fundamental to civilization. Further, the imposition of 'civilization' and democracy on nations without a critical mass of Schumpeterian (City) activities did lead to 'failed states' (Reinert 2008, p. 242). In some countries the failure was also a result of not living (or not being able to live) within the available environmental and economic means (Diamond 2005). The failure in diversifying economic activities (to increasing return), and in reducing rent-seeking hampered human development in Africa and Asia.

In the recent past, foreign aid available for advocacy, social science research, and 'development' consultancy involving 'experts' in the respective countries has been creating comprador intellectuals and a foreign-aid based rentier society to neutralize the middle class and their potential political activism. The palliative³⁸ 'development aid', even being generous and well-intentioned, unless becomes truly developmental, will continue to remain extremely powerful mechanism by which rich countries will control poor countries (Reinert 2008, p. 264) with the active support of the purposively created rentier class in the recipient countries.

Thus purposive foreign aid, nonrepresentative governments,³⁹ and a self-preserving (civil, military) elite group in postcolonial Africa and Asia reinforced the (colonial) practices of misusing power and position for personal (or group) gains to hamper human development in their respective country.

The failure to diversify economic activities or to curb rentier economy, and the influence of the external forces reinforcing the misuse of economic and political powers may have been responsible for lower achievement in human development in the MMCs in Africa and Asia. What role did the geographic features play in this outcome? This Volume will endeavor to analyze these and other related phenomena as well.

³⁸ Jeffrey Sachs, one of the recent scholars, has become a great champion of palliative economics (cf. The End of Poverty 'through mosquito netting'), "of giving aid to soothe the poverty and suffering his own economic policies helped create" (Reinert 2008, p. 179).

³⁹ Even in an elected government, because of a very high number of candidates in each constituency often the winning candidate bag only about 20% of the cast vote. At the end the total support for a 'majority' government, as a percentage of primary votes cast for the party, may be as low as 1/3rd of the cast votes.

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Part II
Muslim Majority Countries (MMCs):
Geography, Resources, and People

Chapter 4

The Muslim World: A Geographical Analysis

George Odhiambo

4.1 Introduction

There are 47 Muslim majority countries (MMCs) in Africa and Asia (the focus of this Volume; see Chap. 1). The MMCs are scattered in six major geographic regions, namely North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (Box 4.1). In this chapter, the general physical geography of these MMCs is explored. Physical geography deals with earth's natural processes and their outcomes including the climate and the landforms (Marston et al. 2005). The chapter focuses on the landforms and topography as well as the climate. The climate of any region is largely determined by its geographic position, its latitude, elevation (topography), distance from large water bodies (e.g., ocean, sea), and prevailing wind patterns. Climate has a strong influence on a number of human activities such as agricultural production (considered as the most weather-dependent of all human activities), creating significant socio-economic impacts of varied severity among different geographical regions. The availability of water resources is also dependent on the climatic conditions of any area. Thus all these are important for understanding the development in a country, to be specific the MMCs for this Volume.

Box 4.1 MMCs in Africa and Asia: Their Geographic Regions

North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia

Sub-Saharan Africa: Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia

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West Asia: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen
 Central Asia: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
 South and Southeast Asia: Afghanistan, Brunei, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, and Pakistan.

This chapter is divided into six sections (along the above geographic zones) each dealing with the geographical framework, land terrain, and climate in the related MMCs with a summary of the climatic conditions for all the MMCs (Table 4.3). The chapter, in the next section, provides a general introduction of the MMCs and their geographic location.

4.2 The MMCs in Africa and Asia

While Muslims are found in all five inhabited continents, the majority of the estimated 1.57 billion global Muslims (about 25% of an estimated 2010 world population) is in Africa and Asia (Fig. 4.1; Pew Forum 2009). Two-thirds of the world Muslims lives in the 47 MMCs (Kingston 2008; Pew Forum 2009; see Chap. 1).

Table 4.1 shows the location of the MMCs and Table 4.2 the major terrain features of the MMCs. While eighteen of the MMCs are in lower latitude (1–18° north or south), only ten are in the ‘best’ zone (28–35° latitude) with good climate for human habitation and economic activities (see Chap. 1), twelve are between latitude 19–27° and seven MMCs are in latitude 37–45°. The geographic sizes of the MMCs, however, vary widely from 300 km² in Maldives to 2,724,900 km² in Kazakhstan. The problem, however, is many large MMCs, especially in the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa, do not have much or do have only a small percentage of arable land. For example, Saudi Arabia with about 2 million km² land and Libya with about 1.75 million km² land have only 1.8 and 1% arable land, respectively. On the other hand, 60% of the land area (the highest in the MMCs) in Bangladesh is arable. At the same time, at least four MMCs (Bahrain, Morocco, Qatar, and Oman) have almost no permanent forest cover; while nine MMCs (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, and Yemen) have < 1% forest cover. On the other extreme, four MMCs have 50+% forest cover—Brunei (53%), Eritrea (54%), Malaysia (64%), and Guinea-Bissau (73.7%) (Table 4.1). Landforms, topography, and climate, however, are the most important physical features for economic activities. In this chapter, these physical characteristics for the different regions are discussed.




Fig. 4.1 MMCs are between 12°S and 45°N. (Source al-Qaydi (Chap. 5); CIA Factbook 2009)

4.3 North Africa

4.3.1 Geographical Framework

North Africa or Northern Africa is the northernmost region of the African continent, linked by the Sahara to sub-Saharan Africa, stretching from the Atlantic shores of Morocco in the west to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in the east (Zoubir and Haizam 2008). There are variations on the definition of the exact area, but generally ‘North Africa’ includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, and Egypt. As such, North Africa stretches from longitudes 13°W to 25°E and from latitudes 19°N to 34°N. Covering more than 4,750,000 km² area, it is about half the size of the United States or China (with well over four-fifths being desert).

4.4 Topography

The relief of North Africa falls into two broad categories: the Atlas Mountains and the Sahara. The Atlas Mountains, a group of related ranges stretching some 2,000 km in length run from southwestern Morocco to northeastern Tunisia (Anderson and Fisher 2000; de Blij and Muller 2007). The High Atlas are the highest mountains in North Africa, with many snowcapped peaks south of Marrakech exceeding 3,900 m and culminating in Mount Toubkal at 4,165 m (de Blij and Muller

Table 4.1 Physical location (in terms of coordinates) as well as other physical attributes of the MMCs in Africa and Asia

Name	Location	Land (Km ²)	Arable (%)	Forest (%)
Afghanistan	33 00 N, 65 00 E	652,090	12.1	1.3
Algeria	28 00 N, 3 00 E	2,381,740	3.2	1
Azerbaijan	40 30 N, 47 30 E	86,600	22.3	11.3
Bahrain	26 00 N, 50 33 E	710	2.8	0
Bangladesh	24 00 N, 90 00 E	144,000	61.1	6.7
Brunei	4 30 N, 114 40 E	5,770	2.7	52.8
Burkina Faso	13 00 N, 2 00 W	274,000	17.7	24.8
Chad	15 00 N, 19 00 E	1,284,000	2.9	9.5
Comoros	12 10 S, 44 15 E	1,861	35.9	2.2
Djibouti	11 30 N, 43 00 E	23,200	0	0.3
Egypt	27 00 N, 30 00 E	1,101,450	3	0.1
Eritrea	15 00 N, 39 00 E	45,230	13.9	53.9
Gambia	13 28 N, 16 34 W	11,300	31.5	47.1
Guinea	11 00 N, 10 00 W	245,860	4.5	27.4
Guinea-Bissau	12 00 N, 15 00 W	36,120	10.7	73.7
Indonesia	5 00 S, 120 00 E	1,904,570	12.7	48.8
Iran	32 00 N, 53 00 E	1,745,150	9.8	6.8
Iraq	33 00 N, 44 00 E	438,320	13.1	1.9
Jordan	31 00 N, 36 00 E	8,878	2.1	0.9
Kazakhstan	45 00 N, 68 00 E	2,724,900	8.3	1.2
Kuwait	29 30 N, 45 45 E	17,820	0.8	0.3
Kyrgyzstan	41 00 N, 75 00 E	199,900	6.7	4.5
Lebanon	33 50 N, 35 50 E	10,400	16.6	13.3
Libya	25 00 N, 17 00 E	1,759,540	1	0.1
Malaysia	2 30 N, 112 30 E	329,740	5.5	63.6
Maldives	3 15 N, 73 00 E	300	13.3	3.3
Mali	17 00 N, 4 00 W	1,240,190	3.9	10.3
Mauritania	20 00 N, 12 00 W	1,030,700	0.5	0.3
Morocco	34 44 N, 7 24 E	446,550	19	0
Niger	16 00 N, 8 00 E	1,267,000	11.4	1
Nigeria	10 00 N, 8 00 E	923,770	33.5	12.2
Oman	21 00 N, 57 00 E	309,500	0.1	0
Pakistan	30 00 N, 70 00 E	796,100	27.6	2.5
Qatar	25 30 N, 51 15 E	11,000	1.6	–
Saudi Arabia	25 00 N, 45 00 E	2,000,000	1.8	1.4
Senegal	14 00 N, 14 00 W	196,720	12.8	45
Sierra Leone	8 30 N, 11 30 W	71,740	8	38.5
Somalia	10 00 N, 49 00 E	637,660	1.7	11.4
Sudan	15 00 N, 30 00 E	2,505,810	7.2	28.4
Syria	35 00 N, 38 00 E	185,180	26.5	2.5
Tajikistan	39 00 N, 71 00 E	142,550	6.6	2.9
Tunisia	34 00 N, 9 00 E	163,610	18	6.8
Turkey	39 00 N, 35 00 E	783,560	31	13.2
Turkmenistan	40 00 N, 60 00 E	488,100	4.7	8.8
UAE	24 00 N, 54 00 E	83,600	0.8	3.7
Uzbekistan	41 00 N, 64 00 E	447,400	11	7.7
Yemen	15 00 N, 48 00 E	527,970	2.9	1

Table 4.2 Terrain characteristics of the MMCs

Name	Plains (%)	Lowlands (%)	Plateau (%)	Hills (%)	Mountains (%)
Afghanistan	0.9	0	8.7	0.3	90.1
Algeria	12.4	4.2	51.7	5.1	26.6
Azerbaijan	0.7	31.2	0	5.6	62.5
Bahrain	57.3	42.7	0	0	0
Bangladesh	67.1	20.3	0	10.8	1.8
Brunei	0.3	75.7	0	0	23.9
Burkina Faso	34.4	0.1	65.6	0	0
Chad	35.9	0	42.4	3.7	18
Comoros	0	0	12.4	26.2	61.4
Djibouti	0	18.6	0	30	51.4
Egypt	5.7	27.8	41.4	16.4	8.7
Eritrea	0.1	11.6	0	14.6	73.8
Gambia	100	0	0	0	0
Guinea	5.9	11.9	23.7	20.9	37.6
Guinea-Bissau	71.9	24.6	0	3.5	0
Indonesia	13.3	30.5	0.1	32.3	23.8
Iran	1.1	4.3	0.3	4.9	89.4
Iraq	19.2	27.2	35.1	12	6.4
Jordan	0	0	53.3	9.8	36.9
Kazakhstan	22.7	22.4	27.4	7.9	19.6
Kuwait	7.9	70.9	21.1	0	0
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	0	99.8
Lebanon	0	0	0	0	100
Libya	23.5	11.4	52.8	2.6	9.7
Malaysia	2.9	48.2	0	29.5	19.5
Maldives	99	0	0	0	0
Mali	59.3	2.4	36.6	1.8	0
Mauritania	56	13.4	29.6	1.1	0
Morocco	1.3	4.8	6.7	17.8	69.5
Niger	50.2	0	41.8	0	7.9
Nigeria	16.1	21.8	35.4	17.5	9.2
Oman	31.3	17.9	14.4	20	16.3
Pakistan	21.9	10.2	0.9	15.6	51.4
Qatar	79.2	20.8	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	0	16.4	0	83.6	0
Senegal	19.7	5.2	48	3.4	23.6
Sierra Leone	35.4	64.6	0	0	0
Somalia	0.1	51.4	0	48.4	0
Sudan	0	0	0	100	0
Syria	0	0	0	0.5	99.5
Tajikistan	0	0	0.3	0.7	99
Tunisia	1.2	40.5	17.4	36.4	4.4
Turkey	0.0	4.3	0.6	9.1	86
Turkmenistan	36.5	34.6	11.1	8.1	9.7
UAE	29.8	50.7	0	19.5	0
Uzbekistan	23.5	27.2	12.4	17.6	19.4
Yemen	2.5	1.8	21.5	3.7	70.4

2007). The six MMCs in North Africa, however, have different sizes and percentages of hills and mountains and plain or low lands. For example, most terrain of Sudan is categorized as hills, while Egypt has about 25% high elevation (including 9% mountains) and Libya has about 13% hills and mountains (including 10% mountains). Thus Sudan does have almost no plains, and Morocco has about 1% plains and about 5% lowlands (Table 4.2).

Algeria, one of the largest countries in North Africa comprises 2,381,741 km² area, more than four-fifths of which is desert. The Algerian portion of the Sahara extends south of the Saharan Atlas for 1,500 km to the Niger and Mali frontiers. About one-quarter of the territory is covered by sand dunes called *areg* (Metz 1994). The northern portion, an area of mountains, valleys, and plateaus between the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara Desert, forms an integral part of the section of the Maghreb (de Blij and Muller 2007). Eastward in Algeria and Tunisia, where the Atlas system is not as lofty, the ranges gradually converge.

In Libya, only the northwestern and northeastern corners of the country, separated by the southward projection of the Gulf of Sidra, lie outside the Sahara. In southwestern Egypt, the desert rises to the Jilf al-Kabir plateau. East of the Nile is the Arabian (or Eastern) Desert, a dissected highland area (rising to 2,180 m) that is mostly barren and virtually uninhabited except for a few settlements along the Red Sea coast (Hobbs and Salter 2006). The Sinai Peninsula is a plateau broken by deep valleys; Jabal Katrinah (2,637 m), Egypt's loftiest point, and Mount Sinai, or Jabal Musa (2,285 m), are located in the south. Northern Sinai is largely a sandy desert.

Further south of the Maghreb region in Sudan, plateau and plains predominate. Mountainous areas exist behind the Red Sea coast, in the far south, and in the far west. The only interior highlands of consequence are the Nuba Mountains west of the White Nile River (Hobbs and Salter 2006). Western Darfur in Sudan is a rolling plain dominated by the volcanic massif where the drainage from Jabal Marrah supports a settled population. The southern region of Western Sudan (the Qoz), a land of sand dunes, has more reliable sources of water with its bore holes and *hafri* (sing., *hafir*) than does the north. The central clay plains stretch eastward from the Nuba Mountains to the Ethiopian frontier, broken only by the Ingeessana Hills, and from Khartoum in the north to the far reaches of southern Sudan. The central clay plains provide the backbone of Sudan's economy where settlements cluster around available water.

4.4.1 *Climate*

Climatically, most parts of North Africa are greatly affected by Mediterranean conditions in winter and by Saharan conditions in summer (Bradshaw et al. 2004). The resulting north-south climatic and vegetation gradient, from Mediterranean to Steppe to desert, is well marked and is generally associated with a decline in agricultural activity and population density. However, given its wide coverage, from the temperate shores of the Mediterranean and Atlantic to the snowcapped peaks of the

High Atlas to the heart of the Sahara, North Africa is a region of climatic extremes. The region is particularly affected by the seasonal movement of the Azores high-pressure cell, which in summer merges with the Iberian high and bars cyclones from entering the Mediterranean, while in winter it moves south over North Africa, permitting their entry. Consequently, in summer, Saharan climatic conditions prevail over the whole of North Africa, complete with frequent incursions of the desert's hot desiccating winds. In contrast, winter brings to the northern parts moister and cooler Mediterranean climatic conditions, which gradually fade south toward the interior. In the far west, for example, much of Morocco coastward of the mountains benefits from the ameliorating effects of Atlantic maritime conditions, which lower annual temperatures and increase relief rainfall. To a lesser extent, Eastern Tunisia, notably the as-Sahil coast, is also favored by maritime effects, but farther east the southward projection of the Gulf of Sidra brings the Libyan desert virtually to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

The result of unusual evolution, peculiar geographic circumstances, and isolation, North Africa is, in fact, neither wholly African nor European nor Middle Eastern, but it has its own distinctive identity and internal diversity (de Blij and Muller 2007). Its transitional position-between the Mediterranean and the Sahara, between Europe and Africa, and between West and East gives rise to much of its distinctiveness. North African land terrain is dominated by the expansive Sahara desert towards the south of the sub-region and the Atlas Mountains to the North. The southern portion of the region covered by the expansive Sahara desert is inhospitable and consists mainly of huge sand dunes and rocks with very hot conditions unsuitable for human habitation.

Much of North African climate is mainly arid (characterized by hot and dry conditions in summer and cold winters). The Atlas Mountains and the neighbouring Mediterranean Sea create cooler conditions and more rainfall at higher elevations that makes the region towards the north suitable for farming and livestock rearing. The inhospitable conditions within the Sahara also resulted in concentration of most of the region's population in the north where the Atlas Mountains and higher rainfalls create suitable conditions for agricultural production.

The Sahara desert is a barrier between the northern territories and the rest of Africa and obstructs interaction between these parts. Most countries in North Africa have therefore developed much stronger ties with their neighbors in West Asia that does not get much rain or have agriculture (Table 4.3).

4.5 Sub-Saharan Africa

4.5.1 Geographical Framework

The Atlantic Ocean forms the western and southern borders of sub-Saharan Africa. The northern border of the region is the Sahara desert, with the Ranishanu Bend as

Table 4.3 General climatic condition of the MMCs. (Compiled by the author from the www.nationmonster.com and the CIA factbook)

Name	General climatic condition
Afghanistan	Arid to semiarid; cold winters and hot summers
Algeria	Arid to semiarid; mild, wet winters with hot, dry summers along coast; drier with cold winters and hot summers on high plateau
Azerbaijan	Dry, semiarid steppe
Bahrain	Arid; mild, pleasant winters; very hot, humid summers
Bangladesh	Tropical; mild winter (October to March); hot, humid summer (March to June); humid, warm rainy monsoon (June to October)
Brunei	Tropical; hot, humid, rainy
Burkina Faso	Tropical; warm, dry winters; hot, wet summers
Chad	Tropical in south, desert in north
Comoros	Tropical marine; rainy season (November to May)
Djibouti	Desert; dry
Egypt	Desert; hot, dry summers with moderate winters
Eritrea	Hot, dry desert strip along Red Sea coast; cooler and wetter in the central highlands (up to 610 mm of rainfall annually, heaviest June to September); semiarid in western hills and lowlands
Gambia	Tropical; hot, rainy season (June to November); cooler, dry season (November to May)
Guinea-Bissau	Tropical; generally hot and humid; monsoonal-type rainy season (June to November) with southwesterly winds; dry season (December to May) with northeasterly Harmattan winds
Guinea	Generally hot and humid; monsoonal-type rainy season (June to November) with southwesterly winds; dry season (December to May) with northeasterly harmattan winds
Indonesia	Tropical; hot, humid; more moderate in highlands
Iran	Mostly arid or semiarid, subtropical along the Caspian coast
Iraq	Mostly desert; mild to cool winters with dry, hot, cloudless summers; northern mountainous regions along Iranian and Turkish borders—cold winters with occasional heavy snows that melt in early spring
Jordan	Mostly arid desert; rainy season in west (November to April)
Kazakhstan	Continental, cold winters and hot summers, arid and semiarid
Kuwait	Dry desert; intensely hot summers; short, cool winters
Kyrgyzstan	Dry continental to polar in high Tien Shan; subtropical in southwest (Fergana Valley); temperate in northern foothill zone
Lebanon	Mediterranean; mild to cool, wet winters with hot, dry summers; Lebanon mountains experience heavy winter snows
Libya	Mediterranean along coast; dry, extreme desert interior
Malaysia	Tropical; annual southwest (April to October) and northeast (October to February) monsoons
Maldives	Tropical; hot, humid; dry, northeast monsoon (November to March); rainy, southwest monsoon (June to August)
Mali	Subtropical to arid; hot and dry (February to June); rainy, humid, and mild (June to November); cool and dry (November to February)
Mauritania	Desert; constantly hot, dry
Morocco	Mediterranean, more extreme in the interior
Niger	Desert; mostly hot, dry, dusty; tropical in extreme south
Nigeria	Varies; equatorial in south, tropical in center, arid in north

Table 4.3 (continued)

Name	General climatic condition
Oman	Dry desert; hot, humid along coast; hot, dry interior; strong southwest summer monsoon (May to September) in far south
Pakistan	Mostly hot, dry desert; temperate in northwest; arctic in north
Qatar	Arid; mild, pleasant winters; very hot, humid summers
Saudi Arabia	Harsh, dry desert with great temperature extremes
Senegal	Tropical; hot, humid; rainy season (May to November) with strong southeast winds; dry season (December to April) dominated by hot, dry wind
Sierra Leone	Tropical; hot, humid; summer rainy season (May to December); winter dry season (December to April)
Somalia	Principally desert; northeast monsoon (December to February), moderate temperatures in north and hot in south; southwest monsoon (May to October), torrid in north and hot in south, irregular rainfall, hot and humid periods between monsoons
Sudan	Tropical in south; arid desert in north; rainy season varies by region (April to November)
Syria	Mostly desert; hot, dry, sunny summers (June to August) and mild, rainy winters (December to February) along coast; cold weather with snow or sleet periodically in Damascus
Tajikistan	Varies from tropical along coast to temperate in highlands
Tunisia	Temperate in north with mild, rainy winters and hot, dry summers; desert in south
Turkey	Temperate; hot, dry summers with mild, wet winters; harsher in interior
Turkmenistan	Subtropical desert
UAE	Desert; cooler in eastern mountains
Uzbekistan	Mostly mid latitude desert, long, hot summers, mild winters; semiarid in east
Yemen	Mostly desert; hot and humid along west coast; temperate in western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry, harsh desert in east

the northernmost part of the region. The Horn of Africa, which denotes the Eastern corner of the region includes MMCs of Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia jutting hundreds of kilometers into the Arabian sea.

4.5.2 Topography

Most part of sub-Saharan Africa, especially the Western part, lies below 1,500 m but most of it is below 500 m and dominated by plains (Table 4.2). Many MMCs in the region like Djibouti, Comoros, and Eritrea have mostly mountains, 51, 61, and 74%, respectively. On the other hand, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, and Somalia have no mountains. Further, Burkina Faso and Gambia have no mountainous or hilly areas but Eritrea has only hills and mountains (88.4% including 73.8% mountains). Somalia's topography is characterized only by lowlands (51.4%) and hills (48.5%). Thus the MMCs' topography characterised by plains

and lowlands also vary widely. For example, Djibouti, Comoros, Eritrea, and Somalia have almost no plains; but many MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa have 50+% plains, for example, Gambia (100%), Guinea-Bissau (72%), Mali (59%), Mauritania (56%), and Niger (50%).

Isolated high plateaus and mountains are found in Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Two types of coasts dominate western Africa's ocean shoreline. Low, muddy coasts, with mangrove swamps and interconnecting tidal creeks, are found along major river deltas and along coasts where the offshore current is weak. There are also long, smooth, sandy beaches often backed by older, sandy barrier ridges and lagoons.

The eastern part of sub-Saharan Africa is the most topographically diverse region in Africa. In eastern Africa, the straight coastlines of Eritrea and northern Somalia were created by the drifting away of the Arabian Peninsula, which opened up the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

One of the most important countries, in the region, for its natural resources, Nigeria is a land of plains, hills, and plateaus (except for mountains rising to 2,419 m along the Cameroon border) (Table 4.2). Nigeria generally consists of four major natural zones characterized by lagoons and the Niger River Delta; forest-covered mountains; Highlands; and the plain of Sokoto and the Lake Chad Basin, which forms part of the Sahel region, and is semi desert.

Africa's easternmost country, Somalia's terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains, and highlands. In the far north, however, the rugged east-west ranges of the Karkaar Mountains lie at varying distances from the Gulf of Aden coast. In Djibouti, mountains in the center of the country separate a coastal plain and a plateau; and there is no arable land, irrigation, or permanent crops (only negligible forest cover). Nine percent of the country is permanent pastureland. Virtually all the land is desert, and the coast is fringed by a narrow plain. The interior consists mainly of rough plateaus, volcanic mountains (often 1,500–1,800 m), deep depressions, or basins (often 156 m below sea level—the lowest elevation in Africa).

4.5.3 Climate

Lying entirely within the tropics and sandwiched between the Sahara to the north and the equatorial Atlantic to the south, sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the West, displays hot, wet, and humid climate in the south and very hot and dry conditions in the north. Most areas in western sub-Saharan Africa has a single wet season—about 11–12 months along the southwest coast, gradually decreasing to 3 months in the north. Annual total rainfall in the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa decreases northward from more than 3,000 mm in Conakry (Guinea) on the southwest coast to about 500 mm between Dakar (Senegal), Mopti (Mali), and Niamey (Niger) in the north. Even though there are pockets of dry areas in the region, most parts receive adequate rainfall and have mild temperature. Because of its location close to the equatorial region or the tropics, the western part of sub-Saharan Africa experiences

high rainfall most of the year and has adequate water. Combined with the fact that the region does not suffer from major climate hazards, there is high agriculture potential for the region.

Straddling the equator from latitudes 18°N to 18°S, the eastern part of sub-Saharan Africa's climate is dominated by its tropical location and a great range of elevation. High average elevation experiences lower average temperature restricting the growth of vegetation. It is the volume and seasonal duration of rainfall that distinguishes most climatic regions. As the sun moves into either the northern or southern tropic, the converging air flows, being uplifted because of its confluence with the low pressure called the 'inter tropical convergence zone', bring intense summer rains; these are followed by a winter dry season as the sun shifts to the other tropic.

Around Lake Victoria on the equator, more continuous rains follow from two seasons of overhead sun and from the local effects of the 70,000 km² surface of the lake. Here, in the northern summer, airflow diverges toward the low pressure of the Indian Ocean monsoon system, resulting in a gently subsiding atmosphere rather than the uplift needed to generate precipitation. In winter, a contrary outflow from Southwest Asia brings little moisture, but one along the Red Sea brings winter rain to dry coastal Eritrea.

In comparison to North Africa, which is mainly arid, sub-Saharan Africa consists mainly of low lying deltas and plains with more fertile soils and occasional plateaus, the region is also interspersed by large rivers and streams making water available to majority of the population. Lying within the tropics, the western part of sub-Saharan Africa displays hot, wet, and humid climate in the south and very hot and dry conditions in the north. Much of the eastern region consists of plains (located primarily near the coastal areas), plateaus, and highlands. In the East, high average elevation results in lower average temperature but restricts the growth of vegetation. Washed by the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, the Eastern part of sub-Saharan Africa has long been in contact with the Arabian Peninsula and West Asia.

4.6 West Asia

4.6.1 Physical Dimensions and Location

West Asia with its varied physical character occupies about 10% of the Earth's inhabited land. Although vast deserts are common in the region, some areas have mountain ranges with some peaks rising as high as 5,791 m (Beaumont et al. 1988). Snow is a common sight in these mountain ranges. Between the mountains, high plateaus are common. Most of the deserts are bare with only huge sand dunes. The desert of the Arabian Peninsula, for example, is so inhospitable that it has been given the name "The Empty Quarter." Other significant deserts exist throughout the region. In areas better served by rainfall and rivers (for example, the Tigris-Euphrates

Table 4.4 The highest and lowest points for MMCs in West Asia

Middle East	Lowest point	Highest point
Bahrain	Arab/Persian Gulf (0 m)	Jabal ad Dukhan (122 m)
Iran	Caspian Sea (−28 m)	Kuh-e Damavand (5,671 m)
Iraq	Arab/Persian Gulf Gulf (0 m)	Unnamed peak (3,611 m)
Jordan	Dead Sea (−408 m)	Jabal Umm ad Dami (1,854 m)
Kuwait	Arab/Persian Gulf (0 m)	unnamed elevation (306 m)
Lebanon	Mediterranean Sea (0 m)	Qornet es Saouda (3,088 m)
Oman	Arabian Sea (0 m)	Jabal Shams (2,980 m)
Qatar	Arab/Persian Gulf (0 m)	Tuwayyir al Hamir (103 m)
Saudi Arabia	Arab/Persian Gulf (0 m)	Jabal Sawda' (3,133 m)
Syria	Lake Tiberias (−200 m)	Mount Hermon (2,814 m)
Turkey	Mediterranean Sea (0 m)	Mount Ararat (5,166 m)
United Arab Emirates	Arab/Persian Gulf (0 m)	Jabal Yibir (1,527 m)
Yemen	Arabian Sea (0 m)	Jabal an Nabi Shu'ayb (3,760 m)

river systems, the Jordan River, and the Mediterranean coastline), agriculture is practiced. Most of the people in the region live in these areas and near the major water bodies such as seas and oceans.

4.6.2 Topography

The Arabian Peninsula, also called Arabia, is a vast landmass, covering about 2,590,000 km². It is bounded by the Red Sea on the west and southwest, the Arabian Sea on the south, and the Gulf of Oman and the Arab/Persian Gulf on the northeast. The Arabian Peninsula, composed of seven countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), is one of the driest subcontinents in the world. The *Rub al-Khali* (the Empty Quarters), one of the world's largest sand deserts, spans the southern third of the Arabian Peninsula in Saudi Arabia, parts of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

Much of West Asia is arid and has topographic features like extensive desert areas, rugged mountains, and dry plateaus (See Tables 4.2 and 4.4). Many MMCs in West Asia are categorized to have mostly mountains, for example, Iran, (89%), Lebanon (100%), Syria (99.5%), Turkey (86%), and Yemen (70%); whereas, Saudi Arabia is mostly hilly (84%). There are, however, many MMCs with no plains at all—Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. Apart from the two tiny city-states (Bahrain and Qatar with 57% and 79% plains, respectively), Oman and the UAE have about 30% plains. Jordan, Lebanon, Syria have no 'low lands', but Kuwait do (71%)—the highest percentage of low lands in any of the MMCs in West Asia (Table 4.3).

While most areas in West Asia are mainly of low relief, Turkey, Iran, and Yemen include mountainous terrain—rising as high as 5,166 m, 5,671 m, and 3,760 m,

respectively. A fault-zone also exists along the Red Sea, with continental rifting creating trough-like topography with areas located well-below sea level (Bosworth et al. 2005). The Dead Sea, located on the border between the West Bank, Israel, and Jordan, is situated at 418 m below sea level, making it the lowest point on the surface of the Earth (Beaumont et al. 1988).

The terrain of Saudi Arabia is varied. From the humid western coastal region (Tihamah) on the Red Sea, the land rises from sea level to a peninsula-long mountain range (Jabal al-Hejaz) beyond which lies the plateau of Nejd in the center (Anderson and Fischer 2000). Approximately 30% of the land of Saudi Arabia is covered by three major sand bodies (Beaumont et al. 1988). The eastern region lies on the Arab/Persian Gulf coast and contains salt flats (*sabkhas*). With most parts of Arabia consisting of sand deserts or unproductive stony land and the scarcity of water, it is not surprising that most of the region is not suitable for agriculture and the countries within the region mainly depend on imported food. The only exceptions are the areas of ‘Aseer’ (Saudi Arabia) and Yemen, and parts of Oman, and the oases spread over the region with long desert or wasteland between them.

In the north of the region, Syria has varied physical features consisting of mountains and hills, the plains of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Al Hassakeh, and Dara’a situated to the east of the mountainous region; and the Desert (Badia) (the desert plains situated in the southeastern part of the country along the Jordanian and Iraqi borders). Jordan extends from the lowlands (at the Dead Sea) at 405 m below sea level to the highlands reaching an altitude of 1,600 m. Deserts, river plains, and high mountains are Iraq’s chief physical features. To the east, the desert descends to the largely alluvial plains of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Below Baghdad, the land is low lying, barely above sea level, and often marshy. Above Baghdad, the two streams occupy individual basins and are separated by a desert like upland called Al Jazira. Northeastern Iraq, part of the region known as Kurdistan, is crossed by plateaus and mountains that are part of the high Zagros system lying mainly in Iran.

In the northwestern part of the region, Turkey has a relatively high elevation in comparison to its neighbors, with almost half of the land area being higher than 1,000 m and two-thirds higher than 800 m. Apart from the low rolling hills of Turkish Thrace, the fertile river valleys that open to the Aegean Sea, the warm plains of Anatolia and Adana on the Mediterranean, and the narrow littoral along the Black Sea, Turkey’s topography is widely characterized by many rugged mountain ranges that surround and intersect the high, semiarid Anatolian plateau (Anderson and Fisher 2000; de Blij and Muller 2007). One significant aspect of Turkey’s topography is its continental character, reflected in its ancient name—Asia Minor. An irregular topographic structure has created a wide diversity of ecological conditions and species in Turkey.

Within the Arabian Peninsula, the UAE primarily consists of flat or rolling desert except for the north eastern and some eastern portions which is mountainous. The UAE’s highest point, at 1,527 m, is Jabal Yibir in the jagged Al Hajar al Gharbi mountain chain, which splits the UAE from north to south in the northern emirates. Al Fujayrah, in the West has sandy beaches; in the south and west parts of Abu

Table 4.5 Deserts in West Asia and Central Asia

Desert	Description	Country
An Nafud (part of the Arabian Desert)	This desert of western Saudi Arabia is famous for gigantic sand dunes, some reaching over 30 m high	Saudi Arabia
Ar Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter) also (Arabian Desert)	Known as the Empty Quarter, it's the largest (only sand) desert in the world and famed for huge sand dunes that can extend for over 40 km. It covers most of southern Saudi Arabia, and is almost moisture less. The Ad Dahna' is the northern expanse that connects to the An Nafud Desert	Saudi Arabia
Dash-E Lut (Lout Desert)	This region of eastern Iran is an arid, wind-blown desert, completely surrounded by mountains. In the summer months, it can be one of the hottest and driest spots on the planet. In some areas here, rain has not been measured	Iran
Dash-E Kavir (Kavir Desert)	This plateau of north-central Iran is often referred to as the "Great Salt Desert." It's the largest desert in the country and is mostly uninhabited wasteland covered with crusty salt ridges	Iran
Kara Kum Desert	This desert of south-central Turkmenistan is a large mass of sand known for its towering sand dunes extending in all directions. It's about 298,000 km ² in size	Turkmenistan
Syrian Desert	At approximately 518,000 km ² it covers parts of Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and western Iraq. Very little rain falls in this arid wasteland, however, Arab nomads inhabit the desert and successfully raise cattle and camels. Oil pipelines are commonplace, as well as scattered oases	Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq

Dhabi, there are vast, rolling sand dunes which merge into the *Rub al-Khali* of Saudi Arabia (Fulner 1996). A vast gravel desert plain covers most of the central Oman, with mountain ranges along the north (Al Hajar Mountains) and southeast coast, where most of the country's main cities (the capital city Muscat, Sohar and Sur in the north, and Salalah) are also located. Oman's climate is hot and dry in the interior and humid along the coast. The southern region of Dhofar is separated from the rest of Oman by several hundred kilometers of open desert (Beaumont 1988).

Iran consists of rugged, mountainous terrain surrounding a high central plateau, sometimes called the Plateau of Iran. The main mountain chain, the Zagros Mountains, exceed 3,000 m above sea level (de Blij and Muller 2007). The only lowlands are along the coasts of the Caspian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arab/Persian Gulf, especially the northern section. The center of Iran consists of several closed basins that collectively are referred to as the Central Plateau, with average elevation about 900 m. The eastern part of the plateau is covered by two salt deserts, the Dasht-e Kavir and the Dasht-e Lut. Except for some scattered oases, these deserts are uninhabited (Table 4.5).

4.6.3 Climate

The West Asian region displays a great variety of climatic conditions but generally a large part of the region is arid and covered by large deserts. In the desert areas, rainfall is low averaging about 100 mm per year. Temperatures in such areas show great extremes. Along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the Black and Caspian Seas, the water serves to lessen the temperature extremes of the desert resulting in a more moderate climate. Although there is variation in climatic condition in the region, vast part of the region, especially within the Arabian Peninsula displays a climate characterized by mild winters and hot summers (Beaumont et al. 1988). Winter also brings rainfalls, averaging around some 80 mm a year.

Climatic conditions in the region are strongly influenced by large water bodies such as the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean sea, the Arabian/Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman. This explains why high temperatures in summer are always accompanied by high humidity along the coast. The high mountains such as the Atlas mountains in North Africa, Zagros, Elburz, and Hindu Kush to the North of the Middle East also create microclimatic conditions mainly characterized by very cold winters, and higher rainfall than in the surrounding areas.

Most of the Arabian Peninsula, with an average precipitation of less than 100 mm (rising to 200 mm in the coastal areas) per year, is a desert region (Nasrallah and Balling 1996) where the climate is generally hot and dry (Kotwicki and Zaher 2009). It is also one of the hottest areas, with daytime temperatures often exceeding 50°C in summer (Anderson and Fischer 2000; Kotwicki and Zaher 2009). Temperatures are moderate from November through May, when average winter; December to February, temperature may be 17 to 20°C, falling to 5°C, or less, in the highland areas. In the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains in the UAE, due to high elevation, temperatures are much cooler (Böer 1997). Rainfall is negligible, but being occasional floods the small ravines and the usually dry *wadis*, mostly in winter.

The southernmost part of West Asia, Yemen has very varied climatic conditions because of the variations in its topography. Summers are very hot in the desert, much milder in the mountains. The surrounding seas bring moist air which results in sufficient rains for Yemen to make it the most fertile country in the Arabian Peninsula. In the north, due to the higher altitude, the climate is drier, and cooler that accompany occasional frost at night. The east is mostly desert, and as such dry and warm to hot year round (Nasrallah and Balling 1996). On the other hand, in the north of West Asia, Turkey is indeed a small scale continent in respect of climate of the interior. During the spring months, it is usual to find weather typical of two or even three seasons at different locations around Turkey in a single day. Some parts of the temperate Black Sea region gets as much as 2,000 mm of precipitation, while part of Central Anatolia gets only about 250 mm.

In general, West Asian MMCs have varied features of land terrain. To the north of the region, mountainous landscapes dominate whereas the Arabian peninsula is dominated by desert and semiarid conditions, with some mountainous regions towards the southern part of Saudi Arabia and southwest Yemen. The Arabian Penin-

sula has a primarily desert landscape with extensive sand dunes, oases, and *wadis* (dry river beds). There are also some spectacular offshore islands, coral reefs, and *sabhka*, or salt marshes (Beaumont et al. 1988). Most parts of West Asia consist mainly of sand deserts or unproductive stony land limiting agricultural production. In these regions, vegetation is limited to weeds, xerophytic herbs, and shrubs.

Temperatures in West Asia show great extremes—along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the Black and Caspian Seas, the water serves to lessen the temperature extremes of the desert resulting in a more moderate climate. Climatic conditions in the region are strongly influenced by large water bodies such as the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean sea, the Arabian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman. This explains why high temperatures in summer are always accompanied by high humidity along the coast. The high mountains such as the Atlas mountains in North Africa, Zagros, Elburz, and Hindu Kush to the North of the West Asia also creates microclimatic conditions mainly characterized by very cold winters and higher rainfall than in the surrounding areas.

4.7 Central Asia

4.7.1 *Geographical Framework*

Central extends from the Caspian Sea in the west to the border of western China in the east. It is bounded on the north by Russia and on the south by Iran, Afghanistan, and China, and covers an area of 3,994,000 km² (de Blij and Muller 2007).

4.7.2 *Topography*

The physical geography of Central Asia is quite varied, and the landscape can be divided into the vast steppes of Kazakhstan to the north and the Aral Sea drainage basin in the south. Western and central Kazakhstan contains arid or semiarid grasslands ill-suited to agricultural use (Hobbs and Salter 2006). Only in the far eastern part of the country does the steppe give way to the foothills of the western Altai Mountains, which extend eastward into Mongolia and China (Mandelbaum 1994).

In Kazakhstan, topographical variation is considerable. The highest elevation, Khan Tengri Mountain, on the Kyrgyzstan border in the Tian Shan range, is 6,995 m and the lowest point, at Karagiye, in the Caspian Depression in the west, is 132 m below sea level (Bradshaw et al. 2004). Only 12.4% of Kazakhstan is mountainous. Many of the peaks of the Altai and Tian Shan ranges are snow covered year-round, and their run-off is the source for most of Kazakhstan's rivers and streams. All of Kazakhstan's rivers and streams are part of the landlocked systems (Weston 1989), and flow into isolated bodies of water such as the Caspian Sea or simply disap-

pear into the steppes and deserts of central and southern Kazakhstan. Many rivers, streams, and lakes are seasonal, evaporating in summer. Most of the country lies at between 200 and 300 m above sea level, but Kazakhstan's Caspian shore includes some of the lowest elevations on Earth.

The physical environment of Uzbekistan is equally diverse, ranging from the flat, desert topography that comprises almost 80% of the country's territory to mountain peaks in the east reaching about 4,500 m above sea level. The southeastern portion of Uzbekistan is characterized by the foothills of the Tian Shan Mountains, which rise higher in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and form a natural border between Central Asia and China (de Blij and Muller 2007; Bradshaw et al. 2004). The most fertile part of Uzbekistan, the Fergana Valley, is an area of about 21,440 km² directly east of the Qizilqum and surrounded by mountain ranges to the north, south, and east. The western end of the valley is defined by the course of the Syrdariya, which runs across the northeastern sector of Uzbekistan from southern Kazakhstan into the Qizilqum.

In Kyrgyzstan, the terrain is dominated by the Tian Shan and Pamir mountain systems, which together occupy about 65% of the national territory. The terrain extends east to west from the Caspian Sea to the Altai Mountains and north to south from the plains of Western Siberia to the oasis and desert of Central Asia (Mandelbaum 1994). Almost one-third of the country (804,500 km²) is taken up by the Kazakh Steppe (the world's largest dry steppe region). The steppe is characterized by large areas of grasslands and sandy regions. Kyrgyzstan's average elevation is 2,750 m, ranging from 7,439 m at Peak Jengish Chokusu to 394 m in the Fergana Valley near Osh. Almost 90% of the country lies more than 1,500 m above sea level.

4.7.3 *Climate*

The central Asian MMCs are very dry, and in comparison to the rest of the Eurasian landmass deficient in precipitation with very high rates of evaporation to become dependent on irrigation from limited water resources (Bradshaw et al. 2004). The height of the mountains prevents moisture from entering Central Asia from the south; too much distance of the water bodies does not allow precipitation from any other direction. Average annual precipitation to the south of the Aral Sea is only about 75 mm and in Bukhara in central Uzbekistan about 127 mm (Weston 1989); the area is thus still a desert. But at Tashkent (Toshkent), near the base of the mountains in the east, precipitation averages about 356 mm per year, enough to make the area semiarid in winter but desert hot in dry summer. In the Fergana Valley in the east, surrounded by high mountains that cut off rain-bearing winds, precipitation is low. The high temperatures, bright sunshine, low precipitation, and low relative humidity levels during the growing season (April to October) throughout Central Asia underlie the necessity of irrigation for agricultural production.

The six MMCs in Central Asia comprise a huge land area featured with mountain terrains, deserts, and plains. Sparse precipitation, a wide range in annual tempera-

tures, and very low humidity characterize most of Central Asia. Thus the region has not been much vibrant economically. Further, being landlocked, the area is not likely to have much international trades.

4.8 South and Southeast Asia

4.8.1 Geographical Framework/Introduction

South and Southeast Asia is a geographically diverse region extending from Afghanistan in the West to Indonesia in the East. The mainland extends to islands. The islands of Indonesia are spread across the tip of the mainland peninsula and are bordered by the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and Pacific Oceans.

4.8.2 Topography

The topography of the eastern part of the region (also known as South Asia) is dominated by the Indian Plate, which rises above sea level as the Indian subcontinent south of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush, and comprises of the following three regions (Weightman 2006): the Himalayas, Karakorum, and Hindu Kush mountain ranges and their southern slopes; the Indo-Gangetic plain, and the Deccan plateau. The Himalaya, Karakorum, and Hindu Kush mountain ranges separate the South Asian subcontinent from the rest of Asia. The Himalayas, the highest mountains in the world, extend 2,415 km west from the Brahmaputra River to the Karakorum, a mountain range that extends 483 km and lies between the Indus River to its east and the Yarkand River to its west. The Hindu Kush, the world's second highest range, extends 800 km west and south of the Yarkand River. This alluvial plain has been created by the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra rivers and their many tributaries as they flow from the Himalayas to the sea. The Indus and its tributaries flow south and west to empty into the Arabian Sea; the Ganges and Brahmaputra and their tributaries flow south and east to enter the Bay of Bengal and fertile Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively.

The terrains in the south and southeast Asian MMCs have extreme features. While some countries, for example, Afghanistan (90%) and Pakistan (67%) are mountainous, on the other hand Bangladesh (87%) and Maldives (99%) are mostly plains and low lands. Indonesia and Malaysia are between the two extremes with 56% mountains and hills in Indonesia and 49% in Malaysia, and the rest (i.e., 44% in Indonesia and 51% in Malaysia) are plains and lowlands to help the economies in better way than the other five MMCs in the region (Table 4.3).

In Pakistan, the Northern Areas have five of the world's seventeen highest mountains. It also has such extensive glaciers that it has sometimes been called the 'third

pole' (Khan 2004). Situated at the western end of the great Indo-Gangetic Plain, Pakistan is divided into three major geographic areas (Weightman 2006): the northern highlands; the Indus River plain, with two major subdivisions corresponding roughly to the provinces of Punjab and Sindh; and the Balochistan Plateau. Of the total area of the country, about three-fifths consist of rough mountainous terrain and plateaus, and the remaining two-fifths constitute a wide expanse of level plain. The northern highlands include parts of the Hindu Kush, the Karakoram Range, and the Himalayas. This area includes such famous peaks as K2 (8,611 m, the second highest peak in the world) and Nanga Parbat (8,126 m, the twelfth highest) (Hobbs and Salter 2006).

The physical geography of Bangladesh is varied and has an area characterized by two distinctive features: a broad deltaic plain subject to frequent flooding and a small hilly region crossed by swiftly flowing rivers (Bradshaw et al. 2004). The plain is part of the larger Plain of Bengal, which is sometimes called the Lower Gangetic Plain. Most areas of Bangladesh lie within the broad delta formed by the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. Lands are flat, low lying, and subject to annual flooding. Much fertile, alluvial soil is deposited by the floodwaters. Most elevations are less than 10 m above sea level, although altitudes up to 105 m above sea level occur towards the northern part of the plain. The only significant area of hilly terrain, constituting less than 10% of the nation's territory, is the Chittagong Hill Tracts near the border with Myanmar. Fertile valleys are between the hills running north-south (Bradshaw et al. 2004; Weightman 2006). West of the Chittagong Hills is a broad plain, cut by rivers draining into the Bay of Bengal that rises to a final chain of low coastal hills, mostly less than 200 m. On the south is a highly irregular deltaic coastline of about 580 km, fissured by many rivers and streams flowing into the Bay of Bengal (Hobbs and Salter 2006; Rashid 1991). Due to the low elevations and numerous rivers, flooding is a predominant physical feature in Bangladesh.

Maldives, small island atolls, located on the southwest of India, has sea covering 99% of its territory (Weightman 2006). Thus the islands are susceptible to erosion—the islands are low lying; emerging almost 2 m above the sea level. While one part of an island erodes, the other expands. Over the course of time, some islands may erode completely while others may be formed gradually on a sandbank. There are still many islands and sandbanks at various stages of formation. Hence, the Maldives is a dynamic country in the making.

The Malay Peninsula in Southeast Asia stretches south for some 1,448 km from the head of the Gulf of Thailand (Siam) to Singapore and thus extends the mainland into insular Southeast Asia (Bradshaw et al. 2004). Peaks on the peninsula range from 1,524–2,130 m in elevation. The summit levels in Brunei range from 700–900 m, but reach more than 1,000 m (Gupta 2005).

Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world. Straddling the equator, the archipelago is on a crossroads between two oceans, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and bridges two continents, Asia and Australia. The islands of Indonesia were formed from volcanic eruptions. The volcanoes have provided the region with rich agricultural soils, while undersea earthquakes have resulted in some of the world's largest tsunamis which have claimed many lives. The Greater Sunda Islands section

comprises of all the major islands of Indonesia, like Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Java. Bali, Lombok, and Komodo are parts of the Smaller Sunda islands. The country is predominantly mountainous with some 400 volcanoes (falling on the ‘Ring of Fire’), of which 100 are active. Many rivers flow throughout the country to serve as useful transportation routes. Mountains ranging between 3,000 and 3,800 m above sea level can be found on the islands of Sumatra, Java, Bali, Lombok, Sulawesi, and Seram. The country’s tallest mountains are located in the Jayawijaya Mountains and the Sudirman Mountains in West Papua. The highest peak, Puncak Jaya, also known as Mount Carstenz, which reaches 4,884 m, is located in the Sudirman Mountains. The formations under the sea are an important part of geography of Indonesia.

4.8.3 *Climate*

The climate of Southeast Asia and much of South Asia is influenced heavily by the monsoon, with Southeast Asia receiving heavy rainfall most of the year. The region is prone to multiple climate hazards such as flooding, typhoons, and landslides with low-lying areas such as Bangladesh experiencing annual flooding and massive loss of property and sometimes life. Rainfall is adequate, and water is abundant. Farming is one of the major economic activities within the region because of adequate precipitation and good soil. Parts of South Asia, for example, Pakistan, experience generally dry climatic condition with occasional high rainfall, which sometimes causes flooding.

All of Southeast Asia falls within the warm, humid tropics, and its climate generally can be characterized as monsoonal (i.e., marked by wet and dry periods). Although there are variation across the latitude, average regional temperature at or near sea level remains fairly constant throughout the year—close to 27°C (Gupta 2005). Higher elevation and latitude lowers the average temperature.

Much of Southeast Asia receives abundant annual rainfall—some areas much more than 1,500 mm. The rainfall pattern is distinctly affected by two prevailing air currents: the northeast (or dry) monsoon and the southwest (or wet) monsoon (Takahashi and Arakawa 1981). The northeast monsoon occurs roughly from November to March and brings relatively dry, cool air, and little precipitation to the mainland. As the southwestward-flowing air passes over the warmer sea, it gradually warms and gathers moisture (Gupta 2005). Precipitation is especially heavy where the air-stream is forced to rise over mountains or encounters a landmass. The east coast of peninsular Malaysia and parts of Eastern Indonesia receive the heaviest rains during this period. The southwest monsoon prevails from May to September, when the air current reverses and the dominant flow is to the northeast. The mainland receives the bulk of its rainfall during this period. Over much of the Southern Malay Peninsula and insular Southeast Asia, there is little or no prolonged dry season (Takahashi and Arakawa 1981).

The MMCs in South and Southeast Asia are characterized by varied topographic features—mostly not helpful for sustained economic development. There are moun-

tainous Indonesia straddling the equator, mountain ranges in Pakistan separated by a number of major river valleys and their associated deltas, and the low lying flood dominated deltas in Bangladesh.

4.9 Concluding Remarks

The physical features of the MMCs are quite diverse even within each sub-region. Nonetheless, some features dominate in each of the sub-regions. For instance, much of North Africa and neighboring West Asia consist mainly of desert and arid conditions unsuitable for agricultural activities. The inhospitable conditions within the Sahara desert have created concentration of people mostly to the north of the region where the Atlas Mountains and higher rainfalls create suitable conditions for agricultural production. The Sahara desert is a barrier between the northern territories and the rest of Africa and obstructs interaction between these parts. Most countries in North Africa have therefore developed much stronger ties with their neighbors in West Asia that does not get much rain or have agriculture.

The six central Asian landlocked MMCs consist mainly of rugged mountains with some plateaus and plains and experience sparse precipitation to suffer from low productive economy. Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, consists of low-lying deltas and plains with fertile soil interspersed by large rivers and streams making water and agriculture available to majority of the population. The MMCs in South and Southeast Asia, with diverse physical conditions, but mostly fertile river deltas, plains have been appropriate farming and livestock production.

The climate of the 47 MMCs, under discussion, is also varied. Much of North African climate is arid. The Atlas Mountains and the neighbouring Mediterranean Sea create cooler conditions and more rainfall at higher elevations that makes the region towards the north suitable for farming and livestock rearing. The inhospitable conditions within the Sahara also resulted in concentration of most of the region's population in the north where the Atlas Mountains and higher rainfalls create suitable conditions for agricultural production.

The climate of the West Asia is hot and dry with the Arabian Peninsula having the hottest and driest conditions found anywhere in the world. The western part of sub-Saharan Africa experiences wet and humid climatic conditions in most parts with high temperatures all year round, although there is a south-north gradient—the South has two main rainy seasons; the North, though humid, has less rain with one wet period. The humidity, in both cases, is reduced by a dry and dusty north easterly wind which blows from the Sahara. The eastern part of sub-Saharan Africa has near desert conditions with very low rainfall often resulting in drought. Areas near the coast and around the mountains experience much lower temperatures and more precipitation as the altitude increases. The high temperatures, bright sunshine, low precipitation, and low relative humidity levels in most part of the Central Asian MMCs, have low precipitation and evaporation rates necessitating irrigation for agricultural production.

The MMCs in South and Southeast Asia have a tropical climate characterized by high temperature and humidity throughout the year. The climate of Southeast Asia and much of South Asia is influenced heavily by the monsoon, with Southeast Asia receiving heavy rainfall most of the year. Parts of South Asia, for example, Pakistan, experience generally dry climatic condition, with occasional high rainfall; on the other hand, low lying Bangladesh experiences moderate rainfalls and temperatures but property (and life) destroying cyclical flooding.

The variations in climate within each region impact on the socio-economic activities differently in the MMCs—while some MMCs may have good agriculture to ensure food security, others may be food-importing countries. Both groups, due to varied reasons, may not have much industrial development to attain economic diversity for a higher human development but, because of varied geographical characters, are positioned to complement one another. Thus there lies a huge potential for complementary economic activities among the MMCs.

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Chapter 5

Biophysical Resources and the Built Environment: Features, Foci, and Issues in the Muslim Majority Countries

Saif Al Qaydi

5.1 ‘Technosphere’ (Physical Infrastructure and Techniques)

‘Technosphere’ (physical infrastructure and techniques) is created by human beings by transforming (exploiting) the biosphere, for example, physical features and resources to meet their needs for production and living (Kassas 1987). Thus an appreciation of geographical locations and biophysical resources of places are fundamental to the analyses of development potential of a particular area because human beings can create, manage, or exploit structures and techniques for economic activities only at the benevolence of the biosphere.

Located between Latitude 45°N and 12°S—with a wide range of climatic conditions—and physical characters, the Muslim majority countries (MMCs) of Africa and Asia (the focus of this book) contain diverse natural resources, river systems, vegetation patterns, topography, and soil types suitable for agriculture and other economic activities of different types (see Chap. 4). The MMCs, from Mauritania in the west to Indonesia in the east, are blessed with varied natural resources suitable for diverse development structures and patterns (Fig. 5.1).

This chapter is divided into four major sections to analyze the availability and use of natural resources and their potential infrastructure and environmental impacts in the MMCs. The next section (Sect. 5.2) after this introductory part (Sect. 5.1) deals with biophysical resources highlighting features and issues related to renewable (e.g., water) and non-renewable resources (e.g., oil and natural gas). The next section (Sect. 5.3) (often in comparative terms) deals with facts and issues related to conventional energy as well as other alternative energies (e.g., solar, wind) in the MMCs. The next section (Sect. 5.4) deals primarily with physical infrastructure that supports economic growth within the borders (railways and roads) and across the seas (the port infrastructure). The last section (Sect. 5.5) deals with the human im-

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


Fig. 5.1 Geographical location of the Muslim majority countries. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:World_Muslim_Population_Map.png; See Chap. 10)

pacts on the environment as well as on the economy (farming, manufacturing, trade, tourism, and other services) and human development in the MMCs in Africa and Asia. The chapter is based on the data available mainly in the *World Development Reports* of the World Bank, FAO publications, CIA Fact book, World Resources Indicator, UN *Human Development Reports*, and other related literature.

5.2 Biophysical Resources

Biophysical elements (biotic, abiotic, renewable, and non-renewable) are the sources of life and living space and of creating utility (goods) to satisfy varied needs (see Chap. 1). Understanding the physical features (location and topography)—as the most important aspect of our study (see Chaps. 1 and 4 of this book)—needs to be followed by an analysis of the biophysical resources in the MMCs. This section is divided into two parts dealing with renewable and non-renewable biophysical resources.

5.2.1 Renewable and Perpetual Resources

Water, a precious commodity, significantly influences economic conditions of people and places and is a source of disparity as well as conflicts. Forests—another major renewable natural resource—are also important for an analysis of development as a major source of economic activities and as a neutralizer of its adverse impacts. The level of forest covers in the MMCs is widely different (see Chap. 5). Nonetheless, due to the constraints related to word limit, this section deals only with water.

Table 5.1 Main rivers and lakes in the MMCs

River	Long in km	Lake (closed waters)	Area in sq. km
Nile	6,695	Qazvin	438,000
Niger	4,700	Ural	63,000
Sind	2,900	Chad	16,000
Phurat	2,736	Dead Sea	1,050
Zambezi	2,700	Balkhash	16,400
Tiger	1,835	–	–
Senegal	1,700	–	–

5.2.1.1 Water Sources

The MMCs have diverse access to water, but the gradual increase in needs for water for agriculture, human consumption, manufacturing, recreation, and transportation in the recent years has made the situation even more volatile in the water-scarce regions of the MMCs, particularly in the desert areas. One of the longest rivers in the world (the Nile) is a major source of water for three MMCs (Egypt, Eritria, and Sudan), but flowing through the desert it also has been a source of high density human settlements only along its banks. Several lakes (e.g., Lake Chad, Lake Balkhash in Kazakhstan, Lake Nasser in Sudan) located in the MMCs provide water for irrigation, drinking, industry, transportation as well as for recreation (Table 5.1).

All the above uses of water are significant in the MMCs where, in 2008, the annual water consumption reached about 7,371 km³. Nonetheless due to the differences in location (influencing the climate and precipitation rate), river systems, topography, and soil structure (defining water flow, water retention, and aquifer replenishment rate), there is a huge variation in the total availability and per capita consumption of water among the MMCs. According to the FAO, about 70% of the MMCs' water is used in agriculture and 23% in industry leaving 7% for household consumption. For example, in 2008, with about 235 million people, Indonesia had access to 2,838 km³ water (or about 393 m³/capita/year) followed by Bangladesh with a total of 1,210 km³ (or 224 m³/capita/year). These figures show that people of Indonesia and Bangladesh have access to about 2,310 and 1,540 liters of water respectively for household consumption (or 7% of the total water use). Though most of this water is not potable, its mere existence is likely to create opportunities for water-abundant countries, such as Indonesia and Bangladesh, because many MMCs are facing severe water crises, for example, Chad and Niger. The rate of water withdrawal (per capita) also varies significantly among the MMCs. For example, water withdrawal per capita, in 2008, was 2,525 m³ in Iraq and 13.5 m³ in Chad (Table 5.2).

In the meantime, as an alternative, many countries, especially in the Gulf, have resorted to desalinated water with a total installed annual capacity (so far) of 2.5 km³ in Saudi Arabia and about 2 km³ in the United Arab Emirates—capable of

Table 5.2 Water consumption, water withdrawals irrigated farmlands in the MMCs. (Source: FAO 2010. All figures are for 2002 except Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Oman, Saud Arabia, Iran, Bahrain, Qatar, Somalia, Eritrea, and Azerbaijan for 2007, Maldives 1987, and Brunei 1997)

Country	Water consumption in km ³	Water withdrawal per capita (m ³ /capita/yr)	Irrigated farmland (Km ²)
Afghanistan	2,400	1,061	27,200
Algeria	14	193	5,690
Azerbaijan	30	1,415	14,550
Bahrain	0.1	470	40
Bangladesh	1,211	224	47,250
Brunei	9	297	10
Burkina Faso	18	64	250
Comoros	286	26	300
Chad	43	14	N/A
Djibouti	0.3	25	10
Egypt	87	937	34,220
Eritrea	6	122	210
Gambia, The	8	22	20
Guinea	226	173	950
Guinea-Bissau	31	128	250
Indonesia	2,838	393	45,000
Iran	138	1,288	76,500
Iraq	96	2,525	35,250
Jordan	1	158	750
Kazakhstan	110	2,345	35,560
Kuwait	0.02	374	130
Kyrgyzstan	47	1,989	10,720
Lebanon	5	315	1040
Libya	1	777	4,700
Malaysia	580	372	3,650
Maldives	0.03	17	N/A
Mali	100	595	2,360
Mauritania	11	618	490
Morocco	29	427	14,450
Niger	34	185	730
Nigeria	286	61	2,820
Oman	1	485	720
Pakistan	234	1,092	182,300
Qatar	0.1	390	130
Saudi Arabia	2	959	16,200
Senegal	39	213	1200
Sierra Leone	160	84	300
Somalia	16	378	2,000
Sudan	154	1,025	18,630
Syria	46	814	13,330
Tajikistan	100	1,895	7,220
Tunisia	5	296	3,940
Turkey	234	549	52,150
Turkmenistan	61	5,319	18,000
UAE	0.2	916	760
Uzbekistan	72	2,295	42,810
Yemen	4	176	5,500
<i>Total</i>	<i>7371</i>	<i>–</i>	<i>730,480</i>

meeting around 60% and 90% water demand in these two countries, respectively. A proper use of, reasonable (economic) accessibility to and the suitability of water for human consumption, agriculture, manufacturing, and other productive and recreational purposes are the important issues, not the quantity of water as such. Ineffective or unimplemented water sharing agreements among riparian countries is often a major source of water crisis in many countries; for example, there are problems of water sharing in the Lake Baikal, the Ganges River, and the Jordan River.

5.2.2 *Non-renewable Resources*

Since the advent of steam engine followed by motor vehicles and electricity, the world has obsessively been dependent on non-renewable resources of energy including non-reclaimable (coal, oil, natural gas, etc.) and reclaimable or recyclable resources (metal and non-metal). This section deals mainly with non-reclaimable non-renewable resources: oil, natural gas, and coal.

5.2.2.1 Oil

The MMCs' proven oil reserve, in 2009, reached 900 billion barrel or about 69% of the world total reserve (Table 5.3), but the rate of production (45%) remained proportionately lower in the world daily output of about 85 million bbl. Only six countries, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and the UAE, contribute about 55% to the total daily MMC oil production. Due to a small population size (see Chap. 1) and a relatively small manufacturing sector (see Chap. 10), the MMCs are likely to be low consumers of oil. In reality, however, oil use in the MMCs overall is not different from other regions of the world. For example, in 2008, with about 14% of the world population, the MMCs (using about 12.1 million bbl/day) shared 14% of the total world oil consumption. There is a huge variation in oil use among the MMCs, though. For example, in 2008, Chad and the UAE consumed about 1,000 bbl/day and 463,000 bbl/day oil respectively (Table 5.3) that converts to one barrel oil use daily for every 10,000 people in Chad and ten barrel oil use in the UAE for every 10,000 people daily. The UAE oil use has been high largely because of enormous electricity generation need for cooling, the construction explosion, and Modern lifestyle of its people. Still, since the MMCs consume only about 32% of its oil production, most of the large oil producing MMCs are able to contribute a relatively large share in the international oil market. In 2009, about 48% of the world oil export (about 11.7 billion bbl/day) was generated in the MMCs, again 60% of it in only five MMCs (Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE, Kuwait, and Nigeria) (in sequence of volume) (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Non-renewable energy: production, consumption and export in the MMCs, 2008. (Source: CIA Fact book 2010)

Regions/Country	Oil			Natural gas		
	Reserve (Billion Bbl)	Consumption (000 Bbl/ day)	Export (000 Bbl/ day)	Reserve (Billion m ³)	Consumption (Billion m ³)	Export (Billion m ³)
<i>South and South East Asia</i>						
Afghanistan	0	5.0	0	49.6	0.030	0
Bangladesh	0.028	95.0	2.6	141.6	17.9	0
Brunei	1.1	15.0	153.0	390.8	4.2	9.2
Indonesia	3.99	1,564.0	85.0	3,001.0	36.5	33.5
Malaysia	4	547.0	512.0	2350.0	26.27	31.03
Maldives	0	5.5	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	0.339	383.0	30.0	885.3	37.5	0
<i>Central Asia</i>						
Azerbaijan	7	126.0	529.0	2,000.0	10.12	5.564
Kazakhstan	30	239.0	1,345.0	2,407.0	33.68	17.66
Kyrgyzstan	0.040	15.0	1.8	5.7	0.750	0
Tajikistan	0.012	36.0	349.0	5.7	0.266	0
Turkmenistan	0.700	153.0	38.0	7,940.0	20	14
Uzbekistan	0.594	148.0	6.1	1,841.0	52.6	15
<i>West Asia And Turkey</i>						
Bahrain	0.1246	38.0	238.3	92.0	12.64	0
Iran	136.2	1,755.0	2,719.0	28,080.0	119	4,246
Iraq	115	500.0	1,910.0	3,170.0	9.454	0
Jordan	0.001	108.0	0	6.0	2.97	0
Kuwait	101.5	325.0	2,349.0	1,794.0	12.7	0
Lebanon	0	92.0	0	0	0	0
Oman	5.5	81.0	59.0	849.5	13.46	10.89
Qatar	15.21	129.0	753.0	25,260.0	20.2	56.78
Saudi Arabia	266.7	2,380.0	8,728.0	7,319.0	80.44	0
Syria	2.5	256.0	155.0	240.7	6.18	0
Turkey	0.2847	632.0	149.0	6.83	32.1	0.721
United Arab Emirates	97.8	463.0	2,700.0	6,071.0	59.42	7.567
Yemen	3	N/A	274.0	478.5	0	0.455
<i>North Africa</i>						
Algeria	12.2	299.0	1,891.0	4,502.0	26.83	59.67
Djibouti	0	13.0	0	0	0	0
Egypt	4.4	713.0	89.0	2,190.0	42.5	8.55
Eritrea	0	5.0	0	0	0	0
Libya	43.66	273.0	1,542.0	1,540.0	5.5	10.4
Morocco	0.100	187.0	17.0	1.5	0.560	0
Tunisia	0.425	90.0	77.0	65.13	4.22	0
<i>Sub-Sahara and Africa</i>						
Burkina Faso	0	9.0	0	0	0	0
Chad	1.5	1.0	158.0	0	0	0

Table 5.3 (continued)

Regions/Country	Oil			Natural gas		
	Reserve (Billion Bbl)	Consumption (000 Bbl/ day)	Export (000 Bbl/ day)	Reserve (Billion m ³)	Consumption (Billion m ³)	Export (Billion m ³)
Comoros	0	1.0	0	0	0	0
Gambia, The	0	2.0	0	0	0	0
Guinea	0	9.0	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	0	3.0	0	0	0	0
Mali	0	5.0	0	0	0	0
Mauritania	0.100	21.0	30.0	28.32	0	0
Niger	0	6.0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	36.22	286.0	2,327.0	5,215.0	12.28	21
Senegal	0	38.0	5.6	0	0.050	0
Sierra Leone	0	9.0	0.5	0	0	0
Somalia	0	5.0	1.5	5.6	0	0
Sudan	5	86.0	304	84.9	0	0
<i>MMCs Total (about 1 billion people)</i>	<i>895.2</i>	<i>12,151.5</i>	<i>29,528</i>	<i>108,017.7</i>	<i>700.32</i>	<i>306 (31%)</i>
<i>World Total (about 6.5 bil- lion people)</i>	<i>1343.0</i>	<i>84,340.0</i>	<i>66,130</i>	<i>182,100</i>	<i>3,159</i>	<i>980</i>

5.2.2.2 Natural Gas

The MMCs, with about 108 trillion m³ or 57% of the world's total proven natural gas reserve, are in a good position in leading the world in future clean energy. Due to the recent significant investments in the natural gas industry, many MMCs (such as Iran, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) are already able to lead the world in natural gas industry. In 2008, the MMCs' natural gas production was about 940 billion m³ (30% of the world's natural gas production) with Iran (116 billion m³) leading the list followed closely by Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar respectively (Fig. 5.2). At the same time, Yemen, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Senegal respectively are the least producers of natural gas among the MMCs.

Since it is regarded as a clean source of renewable energy, the demand for natural gas has increased in the world market driving its price up. The situation has enticed many MMCs to take advantage of the situation by increasing production to meet the international market demand for the commodity. This apparently may seem to be a natural corollary of the exponential growth in economic activities, in particular in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, but it is also an evidence of the respective governments' interest and preference for the use of clean




Fig. 5.2 Main MMC production of natural gas in 2008 (*billion cu m*)

energy. Thus in 2008, the MMCs exported about 306 billion m³ (31% of the total world export) with Algeria (59 billion m³ or 19% of the total world export), Qatar (57 billion m³ or 18%), and Indonesia (33 billion m³ or about 11%) being the main exporters of natural gas. These three countries collectively exported 48% of the total natural gas produced in the MMCs (Table 5.3). The MMCs were not as active in natural gas import, though—resorting to only about 67 billion m³ or 6.7% of the total world import in 2008 with Turkey and the UAE (to supplement its own production) at the top of the list. In certain cases, in addition to its huge production, some countries imported additional natural gas from neighboring countries. For example, in 2008, the UAE consumed about 59 billion m³ of natural gas (9 billion m³ imported from Qatar). Some MMCs, for example, Somalia and Sudan are not at all using, while Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, and Libya are using only a little of, their small quantity of natural gas.

5.2.2.3 Coal

The MMCs have less coal compared to oil and natural gas. A small number of MMCs produce coal; for example, Indonesia and Kazakhstan (being among the top ten coal producers in the world in 2009) (Table 5.4).

Coal is not used as fuel for generating electricity in most MMCs. Some MMCs produce coking coal for their domestic supply. For example, in 2008 Bangladesh produced 1,257 Kt of bituminous coal and used 439 Kt to generate electricity. Some other MMCs import small quantities of coal for their electricity plants. For example, Morocco imported 4,463 Kt of bituminous coal in 2008 for its electricity plants (www.iea.org). In fact, 50% of (21 billion kwh) electricity in Morocco in 2008 was generated from coal. The largest user of coal-driven electricity, in 2008, however

Table 5.4 Top ten hard coal producers, in million tons (2009). (Source: International Energy Agency 2010; World Coal Association, <http://www.worldcoal.org/coal/coal-mining>)

PR China	2,971
USA	919
India	526
Australia	335
<i>Indonesia</i>	263
South Africa	247
Russia	229
<i>Kazakhstan</i>	96
Poland	78
Colombia	73

was, Kazakhstan (generating 70% of 78 billion kwh electricity from coal) (World Energy Council 2010). Some countries, for example, the Gulf countries, never had a coal-based electricity generation system.

5.3 Energy Production

Until the nineteenth century CE, when kerosene (also known as paraffin) was introduced for household use followed by coal-powered electricity in the later part of the century, renewable sources of energy (fuel-wood) and some non-renewable source of energy (in the form of pit-coal) had been the main energy sources in the world. Though some MMCs are blessed with abundant quantity of non-renewable sources of energy (oil and natural gas—often as sources of electricity as well), many MMCs are still dependent on renewable and rudimentary renewable sources of energy; for example, fuel wood. Thus the energy use situation in the MMCs differs widely. This section, however, deals mainly with electricity followed by a discussion on alternative sources of energy.

5.3.1 Electricity

Though coal is still a major source of electricity, oil, natural gas, and dam water are increasingly used in the generation of electricity. In recent years, new technologies of using wind and sea tide for electricity generation also have been gaining popularity, mainly due to environmental concerns for burning coal. As a result, rivers and lakes (natural and man-made) have been used in the MMCs to generate electricity. In 2008, the MMCs generated about 1.5 trillion kwh of electricity with Turkey leading the list by generating 198 billion kwh followed by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Egypt. Being rich in water resources from rivers and lakes and having invested generously in infrastructure (likely to be \$130 billion by 2023), Turkey already operates 172 hydroelectric power-plants (www.invest.gov.tr) and is plan-

ning to export water and electricity to the neighboring countries, including the Gulf countries. At the other extreme, however, due to a modest economic sector, lower investment capacity (and FDI; see Chap. 11) and limited infrastructure, MMCs such as Comoros produced only 22 million kwh of electricity followed by Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, and Niger (Table 5.5).

Due to the above and the resultant economic activity influencing the standard of living, there has been a large variation in electricity use in the MMCs. The MMCs, in 2008, consumed more than 1.5 trillion kwh of electricity, which is about 8% of the total world electricity consumption (for about 14% of the world population). Thus the electricity use, in general in the MMCs, is lower than the world average. The actual situation in some MMCs is even worse because the average is distorted by a large variation in electricity use among the MMCs. The available data reveal a wide variation in per capita electricity use in different MMCs. Kuwait (15,345/kwh/capita), Qatar (15,108/kwh/capita), UAE (13,759/kwh/capita), and Bahrain (11,622/kwh/capita) in the Gulf, among the MMCs are the largest consumers of electricity per person. At the other extreme, Chad (10/kwh/capita), Sierra Leone (15/kwh/capita), Somalia (29/kwh/capita), and Comoros (36/kwh/capita) are the lowest consumers of electricity per person in the MMCs.

Due to a lack of infrastructure in respective regions, the MMCs' import of electricity is a meager 31 kwh (or 4.8% of the total world import). Uzbekistan, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Lebanon (in sequence of volume) are the major importers of electricity among the MMCs (Fig. 5.3). In the recent past, geographically contiguous MMCs have embarked on connecting themselves in a general electricity grid. For example, the Gulf countries have included electricity in their economic integration agenda. A success in the Gulf experience may encourage other MMCs to join in a central electricity transmission grid among the countries in specific regions.

5.3.2 Solar Energy

The recent increase in oil price worldwide and concerns for global warming resulting primarily from the use of non-renewable sources of energy have forced many countries to look for alternative (environment-friendly) sources of energy to stay on the development path without impacting much on the environment. Solar energy, considered to be one major alternative sources of energy, may be suitable for the MMCs blessed with huge desert areas or longer average day light. Since Latitude 15°N to 35°N have the most favorable condition for solar energy application (Acra et al. 1984), the MMCs (26 out of 47 situated within these Latitudes or nearby) (see Chap. 5) are in a very good geographic position for that.

Table 5.5 Electricity production in the MMCs, 2007–2008. (Source: CIA Fact book 2010; all figures are from 2007 except for Iraq, Lebanon, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tunisia, and Turkey which are from 2008. Underlined figures (in Column 3) are calculated by the author using the respective population data)

Regions/Country	Billion kwh	Kwh/capita
<i>South and South East Asia</i>		
Afghanistan	0.2311	80
Bangladesh	21.38	135
Brunei	2.98	8509
Indonesia	134.4	512
Malaysia	99.25	3177
Maldives	0.542	1548
Pakistan	72.2	455
<i>Central Asia</i>		
Azerbaijan	18	2407
Kazakhstan	77.9	4072
Kyrgyzstan	9	1842
Tajikistan	16.7	2233
Turkmenistan	13	2017
Uzbekistan	40.1	1659
<i>West Asia and Turkey</i>		
Bahrain	10.1	11622
Iran	192.6	2117
Iraq	52	1044
Jordan	10.4	1764
Kuwait	40.21	15345
Lebanon	9.793	2203
Oman	11.36	3598
Qatar	13.73	15108
Saudi Arabia	179.1	6813
Syria	27.35	1394
Turkey	198.4	1921
United Arab Emirates	65.98	13759
Yemen	4.133	176
<i>North Africa</i>		
Algeria	28.34	899
Djibouti	0.2604	325
Egypt	118.4	1235
Eritrea	0.228	47
Libya	22.17	3325
Morocco	20.78	630
Tunisia	11.8	1205
<i>Sub-Sahara and Africa</i>		
Burkina Faso	0.5688	379
Chad	0.1	10
Comoros	0.022	36
Gambia, The	0.1488	106

Table 5.5 (continued)

Regions/Country	Billion kwh	Kwh/capita
Guinea	0.7905	80
Guinea-Bissau	0.065	43
Mali	0.479	37
Mauritania	0.3862	121
Niger	0.5895	40
Nigeria	19.21	127
Senegal	1.384	158
Sierra Leone	0.08	15
Somalia	0.2604	29
Sudan	3.438	79
<i>MMCs Total (about 1.4 billion people)</i>	<i>1470</i>	<i>1181</i>
<i>World Total (about 6.5 billion people)</i>	<i>17.93 trillion</i>	<i>2769</i>




Fig. 5.3 Main MMC in exporting electricity in 2008 (billion Kwh)

At the end of 2008, the total installed solar capacity in the MMCs reached 34.4 MMp. This figure is small compared to some European countries; for example, Germany’s installed solar energy capacity is more than 5,887 MMp. Morocco and Malaysia lead the MMCs in solar energy production with a total of 18.8 MMp, representing 55% of the total installed solar energy capacity in the MMCs (Table 5.6). Other MMCs are joining the club.

Many experimental solar energy stations have been already in use in some MMCs, while many are in the testing or refining stage. Some MMCs, for example, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have installed solar energy plants, on a very small scale though. At present, most solar energy stations provide electricity for telecommunication and lighting areas not connected to the national electricity grids. Though there are encouraging prospects, since large scale production capacity

Table 5.6 MMCs' solar energy: installed photovoltaic capacity, 2008. (Source: World Energy Council (2010), 2010 Survey of Energy Resources, p. 428, http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/ser_2010_report.pdf)

Countries	Install capacity (MWp)
Algeria	>2.8
Bangladesh	>3.5
Egypt	>4.5
Iran	0.1
Guinea	>0.1
Jordan	>0.5
Malaysia	8.8
Morocco	10.0
Turkey	4.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>> 34.3</i>

in solar energy is yet to be built, it may be a while before the solar energy becomes (economically) available to meet large scale demands for energy in the MMCs.

5.3.3 *Wind*

Along with solar energy, wind energy is a promising cheap and low-tech alternative source of producing clean energy. The vast area between the Far East and the West coast of Africa receives many types of winds in different directions. The MMCs located in North Africa receive the West and North West winds good for producing energy. By installing wind generation stations at the Mediterranean Sea and also in the Indian Ocean, the respective MMCs could utilize the monsoon and the North East summer winds for wind energy.

An attractive source of energy, the wind energy sector is likely to create about one million jobs by 2012 (World Wind Energy Association 2010) and also improve the economy and the standard of living in the world. The use of wind energy has been spreading all over the world, but not much in the MMCs; though many MMCs are in good geographic location for generating wind energy. In 2005, the total installed capacity of wind energy in the world was about 47,617 mw and the MMCs' wind installed capacity was only 406 mw or only 0.9% of the world total. Some MMCs (e.g., Egypt) have adopted this new technology for water pumping and electricity generation. In 2005, Egypt with an installed 300 mw wind energy capacity ranked 19 worldwide to lead the MMCs in the use of wind energy. After four years, Egypt increased the installed wind unit to 430 mw (Table 5.7). In 2009, the total installed wind units in the MMCs increased to 1,594 mw (or about 1% of the total installed wind energy capacity of the world). Some new studies (Alnaser & Alnaser 2009) predicted, though, that by 2015 wind installed capacity may reach 5,000 mw in the GCC countries with Qatar (3,500 mw wind generated energy), Bahrain (1,000 mw), and the UAE (500 mw) leading the race.

Table 5.7 MMCs' wind energy installation in 2005 and 2009. (Source: www.nationmaster.com and World Wind Energy Association (2009). *World Energy Report 2009*, p. 16. http://www.wwindea.org/home/images/stories/worldwindenergyreport2009_s.pdf)

World ranking	Country	2004 (MW)	World ranking	Country	2009 (MW)
19	Egypt	300	19	Turkey	796.5
28	Morocco	53.9	26	Egypt	430
33	Turkey	20.6	29	Morocco	253
35	Tunisia	19	38	Iran	82
38	Iran	11	51	Tunisia	20
49	Syria	1.45	59	Pakistan	6
MMC	Total	405.95	66	Nigeria	2.2
World	Total	47,616.65	69	Jordan	1.5
–	–	–	70	Indonesia	1.4
–	–	–	73	Eritrea	0.8
–	–	–	75	Kazakhstan	0.5
–	–	–	75	Syria	0.5
–	–	–	81	Algeria	0.1
–	–	–	MMC	Total	1594.5
–	–	–	World	Total	159213.3

5.3.4 Wave and Tidal Power

In the recent years, tidal power (or energy) has also become an alternative source of energy where the underwater currents help run turbines installed in offshore areas to generate electricity. The MMCs are located on two oceans (the Indian and the Atlantic) and on many seas, with an estimated combined coastal areas of about 100,000 km. Thus water tide could be one of the major alternative sources of energy in most MMCs except for the ten land-locked countries (six in Asia—Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; and four in sub-Saharan Africa—Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) (see Chap. 1). Though good locations (with very high normal tides) and low cost turbines are still not available, the technology has a huge potential for the post-oil era to supply energy to large populated areas without much other sources of energy.

5.3.5 Other Non-renewable Sources of Energy

As discussed above, due to the recent oil price hike and concerns for global warming (resulting primarily from non-renewable energy based human activities), many governments are investing in inventing alternative (environment-friendly) sources of energy. Advancement and interests in bio-fuel technology are the results of the above. Biomass (primarily sourced from biodegradable wastes), a major part of

Table 5.8 Combustible waste energy in the MMCs. (Source: www.nationmaster.com (2010))

Rank	Country	Metric ton of oil equivalent
4	Nigeria	616.678
13	Sudan	393.238
42	Indonesia	216.442
52	Pakistan	174.061
69	Malaysia	112.475
70	Tunisia	108.936
74	Senegal	93.976
84	Turkey	78.103
87	Bangladesh	58.485
91	Brunei	49.222
99	Lebanon	35.873
100	Libya	26.306
102	Egypt	19.41
107	Iran	11.676
111	Kazakhstan	4.862
112	UAE	3.935
113	Yemen	3.788
114	Algeria	2.349
116	Kuwait	2.112
118	Qatar	1.287
119	Iraq	1.067
120	Kirghizstan	0.785
121	Jordan	0.561
122	Azerbaijan	0.482
124	Syria	0.269
125	Saudi Arabia	0.178

bio-fuel technology, is also available and in vogue in many MMCs. Animal (and human) wastes are also major sources of biomass in many African and Asian countries including many of the MMCs. Among the MMCs, it seems, Nigeria (Table 5.8) is in the forefront of generating biomass energy followed by Sudan ranking 4 and 13 respectively, in the world. Desert (like) areas with low vegetation (potential) and resulting (low animal density) or areas with low population density are not likely to be good places for biomass energy generation as evident in the data (Table 5.8). Twelve Arab countries are among the sixteen countries featuring lowest in biomass generation in the MMCs with Syria and Saudi Arabia bottoming the list ranking 124 and 125 overall, respectively, in the world (Table 5.8).

‘Bioethanol’ (fermented sugar sourced) and ‘biodiesel’ (sourced mainly from vegetable oil, agricultural residues, trees, feedstock, or even animal fat) are major and rapidly expanding parts of the bio-fuel family which have enormous potential to become the major energy sources of the future (at present being mixed with hydrocarbon fuel or even being used unadulterated in cars). Though the US and Brazil are two leading contributors of bio-fuel stock in the world, there are signs that the MMCs will be catching up. In 2007, Turkey (with 64 million liters) and Pakistan (with 36 million liters) were the top two bioethanol producers among the MMCs

Table 5.9 Top 15 ethanol-producing countries or regions, 2007. (Source: Oak Ridge National Laboratory (2009); Renewable Fuels Association, industry statistics, <http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/#E>)

Country or Region	Million gallons, all grades
USA	6,498.6
Brazil	5,019.2
European Union	570.3
China	486.0
Canada	211.3
Thailand	79.2
Columbia	74.9
India	52.8
Central America	39.6
Australia	26.4
Turkey	15.8
Pakistan	9.2
Peru	7.9
Argentina	5.2
Paraguay	4.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>13,101.1</i>

contributing 5% and 3%, respectively, of the total annual world production of bioethanol. Pakistan, among the MMCs, is leading the way in producing bioethanol (Table 5.9), ranking 12 in the world in 2007.

Geothermal energy (sourced in earth's solar/radiation heat) is one of the promising sources of energy in the world. China, the USA, and Iceland are leading the world producing 45% of the total world geothermal energy. Only four MMCs (Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Indonesia) are generating geothermal energy accounting for only about 2.1% of the total annual world production (www.nationmaster.com). This might be a result of the limited available physical characteristics, especially the availability of geothermal reservoirs capable of providing hydrothermal (hot water and steam), or a lack of available technology in these MMCs.

The MMCs produce 25% of the total world uranium, but utilize only a little of it (Table 5.10) mainly because of a lack of nuclear technology. For example, Pakistan ranks 28 worldwide producing 1.8 terawatt-hours (www.nationmaster.com) of nuclear energy equivalent to per capita consumption of 0.0110824 terawatt-hours/million people (compared with 7.64275 terawatt-hours/million people in Sweden—the highest in the world).

The geographical location (lower Latitude) and the desert may enable many MMCs to be in the forefront of future solar and wind energy generation/use. Biomass energy is also being generated and used in some MMCs. Though many alternative sources of energy (water tide, geothermal, etc.) require a significant investment, depleting non-renewable energy sources may render some MMCs, especially those with high savings and investment, future opportunities to harness these clean energy alternatives. Since the technology for many alternative sources of energy is yet to be invented, is in the initial stage, or is expensive (for mass adoption), it may be a while before the MMCs (like the rest of the world) reduces dependence on oil and gas much.

Table 5.10 MMC Uranium Production, 2005. (Source: www.nationmaster.com)

World Ranking	Country	Tons	MMC%
# 3	Kazakhstan	4,175	43.45
# 5	Niger	3,093	32.19
# 7	Uzbekistan	2,300	23.95
# 19	Pakistan	40	0.41
MMC	Total	9,608	100
World	Total	41,616	–

5.4 Infrastructure

The availability of internal (and regional) transportation infrastructure defines economic growth (potential) for any country (see Chap. 13). Since the invention of the steam (locomotive) railway (in the early nineteenth century), the railway sector has advanced significantly (Abduh 1994). For example, the energy source has shifted to electricity (instead of coal), and the narrow gauges (about 23% around the world now) and broad gauges (about 17%) of the world railways have welcomed the standard gauge (60% of the world railways) (Rodrigue 2009). Magnetic levitation (maglev) trains have also been installed to have much faster, safer, and cleaner transport in high density movement areas.

The total length of the MMC railway lines increased to about 100,000 km (2008) connecting cities and trade centers within and across the countries. This figure, representing only about 9% of the total world railways (for about 14% of the world population), suggests that railway availability in the MMCs per capita is about 60% of the world average. The combined efficiency in the railways system in the MMCs is also likely to be less than the world average because the efficient standard gauge railway lines in the MMCs are much less (only 35,000 km or 37%) than the world average (60%). On the other hand, the length of the broad gauge in the MMCs (36,000 km or 38% of the total) is much higher than the world average of only 17%; the length of the narrow gauge lines are also longer in the MMCs (23,000 km or 24%) against 23% of world average. The inefficiency is further compounded because of the difference in rails' gauge in many neighboring countries that creates obstacles in inter-country train services. The railway gauge difference in the neighboring MMCs exists between Jordan and Syria or Algeria and Tunisia, for example. Differences in gauge continue to make railway integration between these MMCs difficult due to a lack of money to develop dual-tracks by the interested parties.

The highest concentration of railway lines in the MMCs is in Kazakhstan with about 15,000 km of railways in 2009 (i.e., 14% of the total MMC lines). While only five MMCs have 49+% of the total MMC railway lines (Fig. 5.4), many MMCs do not have railways because of topography or a lack of public investment. On the other hand, in the recent past, some rich MMCs, with huge public investment, are installing railways. For example, Saudi Arabia has about 1,393 km of railways, and




Fig. 5.4 Main railways network in the MMCs, in 2008 (km). (Source: CIA Fact book 2010)

there is a future plan to develop rail networks to connect the GCC countries (which will have a very high potential to connect other MMCs in Central Asia through Iraq/Iran or to the MMCs in the West through Iraq/Kuwait).

As mentioned above, due to topographic constraints (e.g., mountains) and low public investment potential, many MMCs cannot and do not have railways (e.g., Chad, Niger, Oman, Yemen). Thus, these countries are highly dependent on road networks that require high construction and maintenance costs to meet the international standard (for human and freight safety). The advancement in the high speed vehicles with high-tech navigation systems coupled with higher disposable incomes of many individuals create further challenges for road authorities in many MMCs. It is worth noting that the road networks are not for facilitating high speed movement of people, rather for the efficient movement (with high safety and low cost) of provisions, industrial raw materials and products, and other services to (and from) the manufacturers, distributors or consumers inland or to the ports (connecting overseas). It seems, even until 2006, with only about 3.3 million km or about 5% of the world roadways (for 14% of the world population), the MMCs are much behind the average world standard. In a comprehensive analysis, the situation may seem more miserable because only 35% (1.2 million km) of the MMC road networks is paved, while about 44% (or 1.5 million km) is unpaved, the remaining 21% is considered expressways.

Due to huge public capital investments, some MMCs, the GCC countries in particular, in the recent past have experienced significant achievements in developing road networks. On the other hand, due to a lack of funds, the transport situation in some MMCs is worse than the MMC average. For example, less than 1, 4, 8, 9, and 10% roads in Chad, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leon, Yemen, and Bangladesh, respectively are paved (Table 5.11). The quality of these roads does not help economic development in these countries (see Chap. 12), and cannot help in the improvement

Table 5.11 Paved and unpaved roadways in selected MMCs in 2008 (km). (Source: CIA Fact book 2010)

Country	Year	Total	Paved	%	Unpaved	%
Bangladesh	2003	239226	22726	9.5	216500	90.5
Burkina Faso	2004	92495	3857	4.2	88638	95.8
Chad	2002	33400	267	0.8	33133	99.2
Guinea	2003	44348	4342	9.8	40006	90.2
Mali	2004	18709	3368	18	15341	82
Niger	2006	18550	3803	20.5	14747	79.5
Nigeria	2004	193200	28980	15	164220	85
Sierra Leone	2002	11300	904	8	10396	92
Somalia	2000	22100	2608	11.8	19492	88.2
Syria	2006	97401	19490	20	77911	80
Yemen	2005	71300	6200	8.7	65100	91.3

of living standards of the people. If the number of cars (per 1,000 people) is any indicator of economic development, it significantly varies among the MMCs—seemingly being directly correlated to the size of the road networks. For example, in 2007 (World Bank (2010)), Sierra Leone had 5.21 vehicles per 1,000 people while Qatar had 724 vehicles per 1,000 people (compared to 437 world average per 1,000 people). At the same time, there were 101 vehicles per km of road in Jordan while in Oman the number was only 28 per km of road (see Chap. 12).

The MMCs have more than 75,000 km of waterways spread over in rivers and canals leading to international waters. Waterways are also important for regional trade between countries sharing rivers (for example, Indonesia and Malaysia). Due to differences in topography, geographic location, and the availability of navigable water, the MMCs have different levels of access to and use of waterways. For example, due to its geographic location, Indonesia has more than 29% of the total MMCs waterways. On the other hand, the MMCs in West Asia do not have inland waterways.

Some MMCs with coasts, however, have good sea ports. Table 5.12 shows that port infrastructure in some countries is comparatively much better within the MMCs. For example, the MMCs with high income, such as the GCC countries and Brunei, built modern sea ports with international standards in container and passenger facilities. At the same time, MMCs with low income could not develop ports to maintain a high international standard of containers and passenger facilities, for example, Bangladesh or Gambia. Algeria, Indonesia, and Malaysia (with nine seaports each) have more seaports and terminals than the other MMCs. In term of the seaport infrastructure quality, the UAE rated 7.0 in world standard quality of the seaports infrastructure (7.0 is the best score in infrastructure quality and efficiency) compared to Djibouti, Guinea, Jordan, Qatar, Maldives, Senegal, and Sudan with 1.0 (the score that represents a very poor seaport infrastructure).

Table 5.12 Quality of ports infrastructure in the MMCs, 2007. (Source: World Bank 2009 (WDI))

Countries	2007	2008	2009	Ports & terminal quality
<i>High income</i>				
Bahrain	5.3	5.4	5.5	2
Brunei Darussalam	NA	5.0	4.8	3
Kuwait	4.2	4.0	4.1	2
Oman	4.8	5.1	5.2	2
Qatar	4.4	4.4	5.0	1
Saudi Arabia	4.5	4.5	4.7	4
UAE	6.0	6.1	6.2	7
<i>Upper middle income</i>				
Algeria	3.3	3.1	2.9	9
Iran	NA	NA	NA	2
Kazakhstan	3.3	3.2	3.0	0
Lebanon	NA	NA	NA	4
Libya	2.7	2.8	3.3	6
Malaysia	5.7	5.7	5.5	9
Turkey	3.4	3.4	3.7	8
<i>Lower middle income</i>				
Albania	2.1	2.4	3.2	4
Azerbaijan	4.4	4.2	4.2	0
Egypt	3.5	3.9	4.3	3
Indonesia	2.7	3.0	3.4	9
Iraq	NA	NA	NA	3
Jordan	4.3	4.4	4.5	1
Maldives	NA	NA	NA	1
Morocco	4.1	4.2	4.2	6
Nigeria	2.7	2.6	2.8	3
Sudan	NA	NA	NA	1
Syria	3.1	3.2	3.3	2
Tunisia	4.8	4.8	4.9	4
Turkmenistan	NA	NA	NA	0
<i>Low income</i>				
Afghanistan	NA	NA	NA	0
Bangladesh	2.4	2.6	3.0	2
Burkina Faso	3.9	3.9	4.0	0
Chad	2.8	2.7	2.7	0
Comoros	NA	NA	NA	2
Djibouti	NA	NA	NA	1
Eritrea	NA	NA	NA	2
Gambia	4.1	4.1	4.7	1
Guinea	NA	NA	NA	1
Guinea-Bissau	NA	NA	NA	4
Kyrgyz Republic	1.5	1.8	1.6	0
Mali	3.7	3.7	3.8	0
Mauritania	2.6	2.7	3.5	2

Table 5.12 (continued)

Countries	2007	2008	2009	Ports & terminal quality
Niger	NA	NA	NA	0
Pakistan	3.7	3.7	4.0	2
Senegal	3.6	3.8	4.4	1
Sierra Leone	NA	NA	NA	3
Somalia	NA	NA	NA	5
Tajikistan	1.4	1.6	1.9	0
Uzbekistan	NA	NA	NA	0
Yemen	NA	NA	NA	2

5.5 The Effects of Human Activity on the Environment

Human activities are expanding all over the world due to the increase of population creating higher demands for food, goods, and services, and resultant higher disposable income boosting consumerism. Increased agricultural activities for meeting higher demands for food and increased economic activities, and resultant expansion of urban areas witness depletion of renewable and non-renewable resources, farm lands, and the pollution of air and water. Logging, increased numbers of vehicles and factories, fossil fuel extraction (coal, oil, and natural gas), as well as water desalination plants (in some countries) are affecting the environment tremendously by increasing CO₂ in the atmosphere (McElroy 2002).

According to the recent available data, the Gulf countries lead the world region in CO₂ emission per capita. Due to very high level of income per capita and resultant tremendous growth in economic activities as well as people's movements, Qatar and the UAE top the carbon emission list; while on the opposite pole (because of the reverse reasons), CO₂ emission in Chad, Afghanistan, and Mali is at the bottom end of the MMCs, respectively (Table 5.13). The table also shows that CO₂ emission per 1,000 people in the top ranking country, Qatar, is about 1.44 times higher than the second country (UAE) in the list and about 3,040 times higher than the lowest ranking country Chad (that emits only about 44% CO₂ per 1,000 people produced by the second lowest carbon emitting country, Afghanistan).

The increase of CO₂ in the atmosphere affects human beings as well as the flora and fauna. For example, the increase of CO₂ in the atmosphere could lead to higher agricultural yield (e.g., rice or wheat), but with lesser concentration of nutrition (Hepeng 2005). Thus the MMCs, like the rest of the world, need to find ways to reduce CO₂ in the atmosphere.

Table 5.13 CO₂ emissions in the MMCs (with world ranks), 2008. (Source: <http://www.nation-master.com>)

World rank	Countries	Ton CO ₂ /1,000 people/year	Rank	Countries	Ton CO ₂ /1,000 people/year
N/A	Brunei Darussalam	N/A	107	Mauritania	1.01636
N/A	Iran	N/A	108	Morocco	1.01559
1	Qatar	40.6735	112	Kyrgyzstan	0.942344
2	United Arab Emirates	28.213	119	Djibouti	0.813924
3	Kuwait	25.0499	123	Pakistan	0.652524
4	Bahrain	20.0253	124	Sudan	0.621873
21	Saudi Arabia	10.072	124	Turkmenistan	4.50801
28	Oman	8.32285	130	Yemen	–
29	Kazakhstan	8.14471	135	Nigeria	0.373901
41	Libya	7.33176	137	Senegal	0.335571
42	Tunisia	6.98387	144	Bangladesh	0.206999
55	Malaysia	5.16022	145	Guinea-Bissau	0.202548
58	Uzbekistan	–	148	Gambia, The	0.175737
62	Lebanon	4.06937	153	Somalia	0.145642
65	Azerbaijan	3.72721	154	Guinea	0.141363
71	Tajikistan	3.21359	156	Eritrea	0.133298
71	Turkey	28.213	157	Comoros	0.132142
72	Iraq	3.0108	160	Niger	0.0983228
77	Jordan	2.69712	161	Sierra Leone	0.0974945
84	Algeria	2.28009	162	Burkina Faso	0.0801141
88	Syria	2.00289	171	Mali	0.0497854
92	Maldives	1.72756	174	Afghanistan	0.0305824
93	Egypt	1.64027	175	Chad	0.0134721
102	Indonesia	1.18206	–		

5.5.1 Concluding Remarks

The MMCs in Africa and Asia are situated in a vast area of land expanding from Mauritania in the West to Indonesia in the East with a correspondingly wide variation in access to natural resources. Average availability of water in the MMCs, for example, is not worse than the world in general, but the rate of water withdrawal (per capita) varies significantly among the MMCs. Though most water is not potable, its mere existence is likely to create opportunities for water-abundant countries. But the problems of water are related to mismanagement and misuse as well as in unimplemented water sharing agreements among the riparian countries.

The MMCs, with about 69% of the total world oil reserve, producing only about 45% of the world daily output (of about 85 million bbl) are likely to be in an advantageous position in world energy market for a long time to come. The problem, however, seems to be that oil use overall in the MMCs is not different from other regions of the world which means there is a large variation in access to and use of

oil among the MMCs. For example, every 10,000 people in Chad and ten in the UAE use one barrel of oil a day. The phenomenon translates into a huge variation in creating environmental impacts among countries. For example, annual CO₂ emission per 1,000 people in Qatar is about 41 tons which is about 3,040 times higher than the lowest level of CO₂ producing MMC, Chad (that emits only about 0.0134721 ton/1000 people/year).

Thus these MMCs need to move to the alternative sources of energy. The geographical location (lower latitude) and the desert may enable many MMCs to generate and use solar energy in future. Though there are encouraging prospects, large scale production capacity in solar energy is yet to be built to have solar energy available for large scale consumption in the MMCs.

In general, water is important for all countries and cities, not only to move people, provisions, and products between places but also for farming and fishing activities, tourism, recreation, and health. Modern transportation networks boost tourism, (domestic and international) economic activities—with multiplier effects if the road network is entwined with good waterways. While natural comparative advantage is a logical requirement for such development, availability of funds is an even greater precondition of its success. With resource scarcity in some MMCs and abundance in some others, the MMCs can strive to cooperate to build new integrated transportation networks and develop and upgrade the existing ones for mutual benefits.

The diversity of biophysical resources in the MMCs, the availability of skilled labor force (due to globalization), and the technology could lead to a better use of resources in the future. This of course depends on the future strategies of and relationships among the MMCs for (economic) benefit optimization through the use of resources that will protect the environment balancing the ecosystem to improve the MMC standard of living in the present without compromising that of the future generations.

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Chapter 6

People in the Muslim Majority Countries: History, Composition, and Issues

Samiul Hasan

The Arabs, living in a barren land with only rudimentary agriculture, could only become trader. Since Prophet Muhammad¹ himself was a trader, the Arabs, converting to the new religion, Islam, continued with trade and reached as far as China long before Marco Polo did (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005). They arrived at the border of India in 643 CE (in the 33rd year of Islam's existence; Hitti 1970, p. 67), and Sindh in early eighth century CE (Bhattacharya 2000). By the end of the Umayyad period (mid-eighth century CE), around 10% people outside the Arabian Peninsula were Muslim (Hourani 2005, p. 467).

In 632 CE, the year Islam was born, most people in Syria used to speak Greek or Aramaic (or Syriac—a written dialect of Aramaic); in Iraq Persian or Aramaic; in Egypt Greek or Coptic; in Iran Pahlavi; and in North Africa Latin, Greek, or Berber. In Egypt there was no Arabic speaker. Within a century of the Prophet's death, these lands, along with Spain, Portugal, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, or southern Pakistan (Sind) came under the rule of Arabic-speaking Muslim elite, where the local population began to convert to the new religion (Kennedy 2007, pp. 3, 28). During its first millennium Islam became the world's "most powerful engine, agent, and vehicle of globalisation" (Simons 2003, p. 3).

Interestingly enough evidences suggest that there has been an "inverse relationship between the degree of Muslim political penetration and the degree of Islamization". For example, the highest Muslim concentration in the Mughal India was in Bengal and western Punjab,² not in the heartland of Muslim rule—Delhi Fort and Agra—where the Muslim population ranged from 10 to 15% (Eaton 1993). Islam

¹ God's blessings and peace be upon him (PBUH). Muslim readers are supposed to (and reminded of the obligation to) utter the blessings to the Prophet every time they come across his name.

² These two regions were in the fringes of Muslim rule, that witnessed the weakest 'sword', and "where the brute force could have exerted the least influence", for more see, Eaton (1993), Chap. 5 "Mass Conversion to Islam: Theories and Protagonists".

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became the ‘religion of social liberation’ (e.g., being embraced by the oppressed and the lower caste Hindus in India³), and because of its comprehensiveness and openness to adaptation to all ages and/or cultures Islam received supports from even some unlikely sources.⁴

Thus while kinship connections and social organizations had been the fundamental support provider for the Muslims in ‘homes’ and in alien communities, Islam’s openness to culture and values of people in the new land (even that of the occupied people) was a catalyst for cultural exchange and ‘symbiosis’. Further, the low impact political expansion of Islam resulted in social consolidation. These three phenomena seem to be essential in understanding the character and structure of population in the Muslim majority countries (MMCs), and will be discussed here in sequence.

6.1 Kinship and Social Organizations: Protecting the Pasture and Pride

Kinship (a “relationship based on blood, marriage, or adoption”) in the Arab world has been a valued phenomenon for expressing solidarity and connection, and is often used to “assert a feeling of group closeness, and as a basis for identity” even when no ‘natural’ or ‘blood’ ties are present (based on Marston et al. 2005, p. 201). The clan organization is the basis of *Bedou* (nomad; Anglicized as *Bedouin*) society, developed in the tents, in Arabia. Every tent represents a family, and members of one encampment constitute a clan. A number of kindred clans group together to make a tribe.⁵ All members of a clan (or a tribe) consider each other as of one blood, submitting to the authority of but one chief (*sharif*; pl. *ashraf* in early Muslim time)—the senior member of the clan—and used one battle-cry (Hitti 1970, p. 17). Tribes neither were always nomads nor were claimants of exclusive biological descent. Men could and did move across to attach themselves to new tribes.⁶ A tribeless man is practically helpless and “the spirit of the clan demands boundless

³ That resulted in the invention of a new term in India (*‘dalit’* or low caste Muslims) to refer to these Muslims. Noteworthy, people near the (Muslim) power centres (in its early years), in India were high caste and did not convert (Eaton 1993).

⁴ For example, Warren Hastings, the first Governor General of British India, appointed in 1773 sponsored the founding of Calcutta Madrasa, an Islamic law school opining “Muslim law is as comprehensive and as well defined as that of most states in Europe” (cited in Ferguson 2008, p. 39).

⁵ Though a contested phenomenon with a ‘negative label’, in North Africa and (Arabic speaking) West Asia, “tribe is not seen as a primitive form of social organization but rather a valuable element in sustaining modern national identity” (based on Marston et al. 2005, p. 201).

⁶ For example, the tribes in southwest Yemen or southeast Oman were “grouped into tribes, like the Arabs of the desert, but they were not nomads” (Kennedy 2007, p. 42).

and unconditional loyalty to fellow clansmen, a passionate chauvinism” (Hitti 1970, p. 18), and a handful tribes have supplied most Arab modern leaders.⁷

In some parts of Africa, kinship ties going back many generations in the same region may define ‘clan’ allegiance and may drive primary loyalties, as in contemporary Somalia—where inter-clan conflicts have dominated recent political events (Marston et al. 2005, p. 266). For example, Somalis, relatively homogenous ethnic and religious people (possessing a common language and culture based on pastoral customs and traditions; Meredith 2006, p. 464) give political allegiance first to their immediate family, then to their immediate lineage, then to the clan of their lineage, then to a clan-family that embraced several clans and ultimately to a confederation of five clan-families—the Darod, the Hawiye, the Isaq, the Dir, and the Digil-Mirifleh—that comprised the nation. No other line of communication exists between the pastoralists at the outback and the cabinet ministers, for example.⁸

In the Maghreb (i.e. the present countries of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) different geographical conditions gave rise to complementary economic occupations in the new Muslim lands creating conflicting group interests—though not as strong as the blood- and/or matrimony-related groups. For example, the pastoralists used to invade lands cultivated by the peasants, while the townspeople tried to impose their control over the regions surrounding their towns to ensure their security and economic well-being and consequently ran into conflicts with both the peasants and pastoralists. The value systems, methods of organization, and patterns of leadership developed by the pastoralists, peasants, and urban communities were related to their distinct major economic occupations and differed accordingly. The history of the Maghreb has been dominated until modern times by constant competition between the two forms of political organization: tribalism, which was especially relevant to the life of the pastoralists (and to some extent of the peasants), and the centralized state (sustained by the urban communities; Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 12). While the first group of people was driven by a need for protecting the pasture, the driving force behind the latter group was to protect the pride.

This was not a new phenomenon. The strength of the tribal structure in the past weakened the power of the rulers and made subjugation or even mobilization of people impossible (Lacoste 1984). The result of shared tribal identity is the formation of collective loyalties creating “a primary allegiance to the tribe” (Marston et al. 2005, p. 201) inimical to the creation of a national identity. The *himaya* system (surrendering land rights for receiving physical protection) developed in towns and surrounding areas in the Arabian Peninsula (that eventually moved to other parts of the region) neutralized tribal control (Lacoste 1984) by easing the obstacles of pastoral and semi-pastoral way of life. Severing the tribal connection was never on the agenda, nevertheless. For example, the people attracted to Gulf pearl near

⁷ For example, the rulers of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are descendents of the Anaizah tribal confederation. The ruling families of Abu Dhabi and Dubai are from Bani Yas; rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah (in the UAE) are from al-Qassimi tribe (O’Sullivan 2008, pp. 20, 21).

⁸ The later part of this paragraph is based on Meredith (2006, p. 465).

Dubai (because of its shallow water, intense light, and high temperature) in the nineteenth century CE to work in the “thousands of pearling boats” retained their tribal loyalties and attachment to the desert even after (if) they had settled on the coast (O’Sullivan 2008, p. 67).

In North Africa and in West Asia, in general (except for Iran), kinship helps shape a whole range of social relationships from “business to marriage to politics” on an assumption that such affinity-based (political, economic, or social) relationship is not “an abuse of political authority but a guarantee of loyalty” (Marston et al. 2005, p. 201) that ensures access to resources. Though there were no political borders in Arabian Peninsula, waterhole, *Wadi* (water channels carrying rainwater), and grazing pastures were controlled by tribal groups (and remained sources of tribal conflicts; O’Sullivan 2008 pp. 20, 21). Kinship relationship is also “connected to traditional forms of land tenure in Africa, where in many regions land was viewed as given by the spirits or held in trust for ancestors and future generations” (Marston et al. 2005, p. 266).

Though resource protection is not an issue, family and kin relationships are considered primary institutions of a village system in Southeast Asia, and guarantee the survival of its members through the provision of necessary material welfare and psychological encouragement (Boonmathya 2001) in human relations. The individuals working in reciprocity (or being hired for group solidarity) share identities expressed in ethnicity, beliefs, family, kinship, and neighbourly relations, and render a good foundation for developing trust, cooperation, network ties individually and collectively (Boonmathya 2001).

The situation is reinforced by the Confucian philosophy of Kinship primacy, which is completely immersed into modern Islamic tradition of Southeast Asia. For example, the concept of *Mengabdi* (being subservient to family and friends) in Javanese (Indonesia) culture (similar to family and community obligations propounded in Confucianism) requires the (Javanese) people with authority (economic or political) to provide unquestionable private (monetary) and public (political) support to promote other Javanese people.⁹

Moral obligations to the ethnic groups collide with moral obligations to society as a whole¹⁰ (Collier 2010, p. 53). In parts of Asia, especially in the mountainous landlocked areas like Pakhtunkhawa that was impenetrable even by the British colonial power (or may be was ignored because of its no access to sea or low-resource potential), social stratification is strongly based on ethnic and tribal groupings as

⁹ Anything contrary is tantamount to failing in the fulfilment of family obligations or even betrayal to the ethnic values; either of which may call for ostracization (Hasan 2008, p. 188).

¹⁰ For example, prevailing morality in Nigeria is described as “good if they benefit a few thousand kin at the expense of the nation” (Collier 2010, p. 54). When the newly elected Nigerian Speaker of the House was criticized of misappropriating funds for procuring 12 Mercedes for herself, her ethnic group, Yoruba, in a voice shouted: Hands off: “she is our only representative at the trough” (Collier 2010, p. 58).

well as the *biraderi* (derived from a root Persian term to imply fraternal relationships) system¹¹ (Hussain 2005, p. 146).

The regions of South and South East Asia are endowed with abundance of life-supporting natural resources (land and water), thus kinship system in most areas is not resource-protection-based. In rural societies in these areas, people live in close proximity to each other, emotionally as well as physically, forming ‘shadow’ (invisible) social units of nuclear groups (of meal sharing), extended family (name sharing), kith (ancestry sharing), and society (affinity groups; pride sharing; Hasan 2005, 2008). The units are able to create strong bond among the members because the members belong to the units for blood and marriage connections, and not for just geographic proximity to each other. There are, however, some visible or ‘shining’ space-based units of social living and solidarity formation, for example homestead, neighbourhoods, or a village formed by people not related to each other through blood or matrimonial connections. The units and their geographic boundaries and relations are visible and obvious. The ancestry, marriage, or space-based affinity groups, in South Asia, are still exerting significant influence on its members’ human relationships within and outside the groups. Family and kinship relations are bases for group formation and cooperation for social and economic affairs in many Southeast Asian societies, as well.

In Central Asia kin-based solidarity supported some of the world’s most advanced civilizations and sophisticated cities of the pre-modern world. Until the eleventh century CE, sedentary agriculturalists, gathering around and working in kin groups, prospered in the fertile oases of Central Asia, buffered from outside intrusion by the surrounding deserts. The region was on the lucrative trade route, the Silk Road,¹² connecting Europe and China from Roman times until Portuguese navigators found their way around Africa and established the sea route to Asia. Many ancient cities like Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khiva (all in present day Uzbekistan), were meeting places for philosophies, knowledge, and religion, and produced scholars like al-Khorezm (78–847), al-Biruni (973–1048), or ibn Sind (980–1037). The civilizations were overcome by Mongol Tatar horsemen who ruled until the fourteenth century CE. Timur (Tamerlane) one of the descendents of Genghis Khan, converted to Islam and built a vast Central Asian empire stretching from Syria to India, with capital in Samarkand. These events shaped the cultural, social, and economic characters of the people in Central Asia.

With multiple identities (discussed above), people functioned perfectly well, but problems arose when those sub-national identities created loyalties to override loyalty to the nation as a whole (Collier 2010, p. 51). It becomes worse, like in

¹¹ Other terms like *quom* (nation) and *zat* (ethnic group; though not rigidly stratified like in the Hinduism) are used interchangeably denoting notions of common ancestry or a social network of related tribes (Hussain 2005, p. 146).

¹² A shifting trail of caravan tracks (connecting at its longest stretch cities of China with Turkey through places now within the territories of India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan as well as cities in Myanmar and Thailand) that facilitated the exchange of silk, spices, and porcelain from the East and gold, precious stones, and Venetian glass from the West (cf. Marston et al. 2005, p. 173).

Bangladesh—a reasonably homogenous society, where political groups are created to proxy group, regional or economic interest or identity. Further, an increased access to education and/or democracy is likely to increase people’s interests in identifying themselves through their ethnicity. In some democracies the process of assigning public sector jobs through ethnic allegiance is generating identity politics, as a result (Collier 2010, p. 179). In some areas, for example in Nigeria, ethnic and religious groups are turning their backs on the state, resorting to a primary loyalty for aid and protection. Politicians also tend to “exploit the despair and disillusionment with central governments for their own ends” (Meredith 2006, pp. 464–484) by (dis)favouring one group or the other.

Kinship connections in the ‘homes’ were carried by the ‘wandering’ Muslims to the ‘new’ lands; linked back to the ‘homes’ these connections remained a source of survival as well as of identity protection and cultural symbiosis. Kinship and/or social organizations in the past were influential factors in preserving as well as transforming people’s characters in the Muslim communities and remain to be so even in the twenty-first century¹³ promoting cultural symbiosis and cultural exchange of people, in general, and Muslims, in particular.

6.2 Symbiosis and Cultural Exchange

Islam’s geographic expansion continued through the sixteenth century, and Islam was still decidedly dominant in the world at the end of that century or even later.¹⁴ The emergence of Islam as a dominant religion and Arabic as the near-universal language could not have “occurred without the conquest” (Kennedy 2007, p. 97). Arabic became a language of the Muslim conquerors—but did/could not remain so for long because of the non-intrusive nature of the Arab conquest, the existence of older and robust civilizations around, and the geographic expansion of Islam due to the rulers’ conversion to the religion (not always by swords).

Before the Arab conquest the Maghreb was colonized by the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals,¹⁵ and the Byzantines, which contributed to the ethnic composition of its people and the development of its culture.¹⁶ The external in-

¹³ As manifested in the differences in the rituals, food habits, dress codes, and the patterns of human relationships among different Muslim groups in the same country or in the same city all over the world.

¹⁴ Cited in a lecture (Asian-based world economy 1400–1800: A horizontally integrative macrohistory) by Andre Gunder Frank (proponent of ‘development of underdevelopment’ thesis) at the University of Amsterdam on 12 November 1995, available at: <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/50/089.html>.

¹⁵ A Germanic people coming from Spain invaded the area in the fifth century CE with about 80,000 people and settled in the wheat producing territory of Tunisia (Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 15).

¹⁶ Thus it is said that the Maghreb did make no original contribution to human civilization because its constant exposure to the people of more advanced cultures, as rulers, that led to the development of its culture from outside (Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 1).

filtration is manifested no less in the fact that the ‘indigenous’ Berbers “did not constitute a homogenous ethnic group” or develop a consciousness of their unity as a people—the final allegiance of an individual was to a tribe but almost never to the whole people.¹⁷ The Arabization of the Berbers was part of a wider process of ethno-cultural symbiosis between them and the Arabs which affected both the Arab residents of the Maghreb as well as the Berbers.¹⁸

The process of integrating new ethnic and cultural elements did not diminish after the Arab conquest of the Maghreb because the ‘Arab’ conquerors were not all Arabs. The Rustamid dynasty (776–910 CE) of Algeria was Persian, the Christian (re)conquest of Spain saw the arrival of Andalusian Muslims and Jews to the Maghreb, Ottoman occupation of the area in the sixteenth century CE brought Turks (and ‘Turkified’ Europeans) to the area, trade with the Sudan brought African slaves in large numbers (especially girls for the service of Muslim rulers from the ninth century CE because Islam allowed concubinage), and so on (based on Abun-Nasr 1987).

The situation in Egypt was not different. Most of the Arabs who conquered Egypt were of Yemeni or south Arabian origin though the governor was a Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet¹⁹ (Kennedy 2007, p. 26). There were about 100,000 Arab immigrants (including the conquerors’ family members) among about three million local population, and further Arab immigration or conversion of the Copts was not encouraged because that would have meant “spreading the resources more thinly” (Kennedy 2007, pp. 162, 165). For most of the first century after the conquest “the overwhelming majority of the population remained Coptic Christians and the lower ranks of the administration were largely drawn from the families and groups who had served the Roman and Persian imperial administrations before” (Kennedy 2007, p. 163). The Arab conquest brought to an end a thousand-year rule by Greeks (with contacts in the Mediterranean world) but did not result in the arrival of “hordes of nomads” to ravage the settled lands, as often believed (Kennedy 2007, p. 97).

The fact that about 25–50% of “North African female pool is made of typical sub-Saharan lineages” with increasing percentages closer to sub-Saharan Africa (Harich et al. 2010, p. 138) can be explained by trans-Saharan slave trade, which possibly had begun (or increased in volume) in the seventh century CE with the arrival of the first camel-riding Muslim Arabs to North Africa.²⁰ Although estimates are very rough, plausible figures refer to the movement of around five million slaves across the Sahara in the first one thousand years of slave trade (i.e. between 650 and 1600

¹⁷ The only basis of describing the Berbers as a single people is linguistic—the people who speak Berber (that used to be called ‘Libyan’ in the past, Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 2).

¹⁸ This paragraph is based on Abun-Nasr (1987, pp. 2–5).

¹⁹ The Yemeni families lost influence by the mid-ninth century CE, when “Turkish troops employed by the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad came to take over military power in Egypt” (Kennedy 2007, p. 27).

²⁰ It is argued that there was no regular trans-Saharan trade system before the rise of the camel-mounted Berber nomads, in the first Christian centuries, or most likely in the seventh century CE with the arrival of the first camel-riding Muslim Arabs to North Africa (Harich et al. 2010, p. 153 from J. Wright, *The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade*, Routledge, London, 2007).

CE; Harich et al. 2010, p. 139). The trans-Sahara slave trade continued until very recently resulting in the shipment of about 1.5 million slaves from Southern Sudan to Egypt in the nineteenth century CE during the reign of Muhammad Ali Pasha and his successors between 1820 and 1885 CE.²¹ Slaves from sub-Saharan Africa and West Africa were brought to the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) and Egypt (by Arab and Berber merchants) in six interconnected main routes through the Sahara desert and many human settlements²² and became the sources of (involuntary) intercultural/interracial as well as genetic mix in Africa and beyond. Since the traders were Muslims, Muslim communities may have been affected more by this slave migration. All became absorbed with the passage of time into the local urban ‘Arab’ communities (based on Abun-Nasr 1987).

In West Africa, the Bantu people were the most developed with contemporary technologies, such as iron smelting. Their move initiated the arrival of the technologies to sub-Saharan Africa. The Bantu people because of their ‘technological advancement’ helped in the creation of several power centres,²³ between 500 and 1000 CE, with “links to Roman and Arabic empires”, through Mauritania (at the Atlantic). Trade also linked the Mediterranean coast (past Mauritania) to the kingdoms of Songhai (with capital in Gao located in present day Mali), Kanem (comprising lands of present day Chad and Libya), and Mali, and led to the “conversion of many in these empires to Islam”. The east coast of Africa was brought to the Arab system around 1000 CE through a series of trading posts, for example Mogadishu (Somalia), to extend trade connections with South and Southeast Asia that resulted in huge cross-migration as well as cross-fertilization of cultures.²⁴

The fear of losing tribal affiliation and related benefits forced people, especially in Africa south of the Equator (where resource constraints resulted in tribal ownership of land), to stay away from conversion to Islam (because that would mean losing access to means of living—pasture, land). This phenomenon also explains the lesser percentage of Muslim population in sub-Saharan Africa (closer to the birthplace of Islam) than in countries like Bangladesh or Indonesia. People in western

²¹ When state monopoly on (Southern) Sudan-Egypt slave trade continued for a longtime (Muhammad Ali Pasha himself was in charge of this slave trade until 1843 CE). Please check history of Sudan in Wikipedia.

²² Route 1: To the North (Morocco) from ancient Ghana (at present South-Eastern Mauritania and Western Mali); Route 2: To Tuwat (southern Algeria) from ancient Timbuktu (Mali)—being connected to Route 1; Route 3: To Libya through Niger valley and the Hausa towns; Route 4: From Lake Chad region to Libya (Murzuk); Route 5: From Sudan (Dar Fur) through the Nile river to Egypt (Assiout); and Route 6: Through the confluence of the Blue and the White Nile to Egypt—being connected to Route 5 above (Harich et al. 2010, p. 139).

²³ Including the Kingdom of Ghana, centred in the present day Mali, where gold was mined and traded with Berber merchants from Sahara and North Africa in exchange for salt (Marston et al. 2005, p. 247).

²⁴ By 1600 CE most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa had contacts with the rest of the world through trading networks set up by the Arabs in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and by the Portuguese along the Atlantic coast and in the southern Africa (selling gold, ivory, and slaves in return for cloth, glass, horses, and salt). Please see Marston et al. (2005, p. 247) for this, and most facts and the quotations in this paragraph.

Africa, being exposed to other cultures, involved in trade, owners of larger pastures and water resources (due to a higher volume of rainfall; see Chap. 4), were less dependent on the tribal protection of pastures and in turn more inclined to convert to Islam. In many instances, however, even after converting to Islam the people did not (dare to) lose their tribal/kinship connections because it was stronger than any religious bond, and both parties needed each other, and thus siblings following different religions shared same meal under the same old roof.²⁵ This was a source of ‘alien’ cultural consolidation (or local cultural preservation) in Muslim communities, especially in Africa.

By the time the Arab conquest reached Persia, it seemed to have had run out of steam,²⁶ and the failure of Muslim arms in southern Afghanistan marked the end of the conquest in Persia (Kennedy 2007, p. 198). The ‘Arab conquest’ in Persia thus did result “in a reshuffle among the Persian elite”, but not in an Arab conquest (Kennedy 2007, p. 177). Islam’s expansion in Persia, however, received a boost after the relocation of Muslim power centre to Baghdad by the Abbasids with support of some Persian elements.²⁷ The initial Persian resistance (due to Persia’s longer and much robust cultural tradition) remained in place, however. The partial and scattered nature of the Muslim conquest of Persia had an important cultural legacy—in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt the Muslim conquest led to the triumph of the Arabic language; it did not happen in Iran or beyond (Kennedy 2007, p. 199). The survival of the Persian language ensured the survival of many “aspects of Persian political culture” resulting in benefit maximization through self-preservation. This survival of the non-Arab culture of Persia or Iran (derived from the term *Aryans* or the nobles and adopted in 1935, O’Sullivan 2008, p. 25) was in part the result of the nature of the initial Arab conquest—the very slow pace of Arab settlement, and the conquerors’ reluctance (for strategic reasons) to disrupt the existing power structures (Kennedy 2007). Persia became firmly Muslim, no non-Muslim ever came to the power again, but, at the same time, the “Persian language and identity lived on into the twenty-first century” (Kennedy 2007, p. 199). For the same reason (i.e. the co-existence of different cultures and languages) different variation of Turkish language are spoken in Central Asia today (Marston et al. 2005, p. 154).

The Arabs arrived at the border of India in 643 CE (in the 33rd year of Islam’s existence; Hitti 1970, p. 67). The Umayyads, during the seventh and eighth centuries CE, attempted to gain a foothold in the southern part of Sindh on the Arabian Sea (i.e. the lower part of the present Punjab province) following the religious conversion of its people to Islam. By the eighth and the ninth centuries CE Sindh was part of Muslim Abbasid Empire (along with the present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province previously known as the North-West Frontier Province, NWFP). From the twelfth to the seventeenth century CE there were large-scale conversion from

²⁵ Shared with the author by a colleague from West Africa, Stephen Ameyaw.

²⁶ Reflected in the fact that some army personnel became more interested in its rights against the Muslim government instead of expanding the lands of Islam; the preservation of their salaries was more “valuable than the acquisition of new booty” (Kennedy 2007, p. 198).

²⁷ Syed Hossain Nasr, as quoted in the History of Iran in Wikipedia.

lower caste Hindus to Islam led by Sufi saints in Sind, Gujarat, Baluchistan, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Kashmir. The arrival of a series of Muslim forces from Central Asia, including the Mughals via Afghanistan, expedited the spread of Islam in Northwestern India, and the Eastern part of Pakistan.²⁸

The area in the past had also been frequented by Dawodi Bohra leadership (relocated from Yemen, especially to Gujarat and places surrounding present-day Karachi in 1539 CE), the Sevener Shi'a (or Ismaili) Muslims (in the tenth and eleventh centuries CE during the Fatimid period), and the Nizari Ismaili leadership.²⁹ The majority (60%) of the present population in Punjab originates from Rajputs³⁰ (literal meaning 'sons of kings' or the part of the local aristocracy) and Jats³¹ (an Indo-Aryan tribal group spread also in Haryana, Rajasthan, Sind, Uttar Pradesh; separate from generic 'zat'). Other groups such as the Awans, Khattars, and Khokars claim lineage from Qutb Shah of Ghazni.³² However, it seems that the majority of the groups were part of the local indigenous population of Punjab, which converted to Islam between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries CE (Hussain 2005).

The population of Baluchistan is largely a blend of immigrants from Eastern Iran (Kerman) and the indigenous population. The population of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province is mainly of Turkic/Afghan lineage (the Pathans/Pushtuns), while the Hazaras are considered to be the descendants of the Mongol armies. The genealogy of the *Mohajirs*³³ includes an admixture of Muslims from Central and West Asia and indigenous Indian populations that converted to Islam. There is also a small but noticeable presence of Baloch ethnic groups in Sindh. A small proportion of the Sindhi population is of Arab, Persian, Turkic, and Mughal descent, and some claim to trace back their lineage to Ali, son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad. Thus both the Sunni and Shi'a Muslim populations of Pakistan are a blend of indigenous local

²⁸ This paragraph is based on Hussain (2005) that cites from Bose and Jalal (1998), Wolpert, (1991, 1993).

²⁹ Who relocated from Iran to India in the late eighteenth century facilitating the spread of Ismaili communities within undivided India; based basically on Hussain (2005); but some information and dates have been clarified by related topics in the Wikipedia.

³⁰ Many Rajputs are believed to have belonged to the Hindu Kshatriya (warrior) caste that ruled some of the princely states in India, in particular Rajasthan; others believe they are of tribal origin or may have migrated into the area from Central Asia (cited in Hussain 2005).

³¹ *Jats* may have been linked to *Zutts* in Arabia of the seventh to tenth centuries, and moved from Sind into Multan between the seventh and eleventh centuries when they became the main pastoral group until the Mughal invasion in the sixteenth century CE; Many *Jat* tribes in Punjab are large landowners. Their mass conversion to Islam probably took place around the thirteenth century CE after the introduction of Muslim rule in India (cited in Hussain 2005).

³² Of the Ghaznavid Empire of Afghanistan that ruled large tracts of Northern India from the late tenth to the mid-eleventh century CE (Hussain 2005).

³³ An Urdu-speaking community that immigrated, mainly, to Karachi at the partition of India from the western coast of India, and, for centuries before that, had considerable intermixing, though some had Arab/Turkic descent (Hussain 2005, p. 149).

communities and ‘foreign’ Muslim-invading armies, including Arabs,³⁴ who still embark on ethnic conflicts.

Bangladesh, a major delta, in the downstream of three major rivers (the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna) has also witnessed significant cross-fertilization of its people over the centuries. The flat alluvial plain of Bangladesh (most of which is around five-thousand-year-old), with some variations in soil characteristics and hydrologic regions, being fertile in general, has attracted people from all three directions on land and through the Bay of Bengal. Having been incorporated in the Maurya kingdom (centred near Bihar in India) from the early fifth century BCE, being frequented by Muslim travelers, traders, Sufis since the tenth century, being occupied by the Muslim Sultans (of Delhi) in 1204 CE³⁵ (and the Mughals in the sixteenth century CE), invaded by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century CE,³⁶ colonized by the British (East India Company followed by the Raj; see Chap. 7) in the mid-eighteenth century, and being dumped in to (independent) Pakistan over the years Bangladesh has experienced tremendous transformation of its people, and their culture, language, and behaviour. There was never a mass-conversion, and higher caste Hindus did not convert nor were they coerced while at work in the Muslim administration (Eaton 1993; Karim 2004). Thus Bangalee Muslim peasants have survived and functioned under large Hindu landholders for years, and in the process have incorporated cultural practices and rituals from the ‘masters’ daily and religious lives.

The Kingdom of Langkasuka in the Malay peninsula (for 1500 years from about the first century CE), Srivijaya Empire in Sumatra (present Indonesia) for about 500 years from as early as the eighth century CE, and the Majapahit in Java (that engulfed the Srivijaya) were all inspired by Indian models of Hindu kingdom. But being on the trade routes of the Strait of Malacca, all the areas were also subject to Arab/Islamic influence as well. The occupation of Aceh by the rulers of Champa Kingdom (centred in modern Vietnam) in 1471 CE who subsequently converted to Islam, the flourishing of the Sultanate of Sulu and Northern Borneo (by an Arab Muslim born in Johor/Malacca), and the creation of the Brunei Sultanate followed by its ruler’s conversion to Islam³⁷ in the fifteenth century CE transformed the cultural and political geography of Southeast Asia. The sudden conversion of the pow-

³⁴ This paragraph is based on information contained in Hussain (2005, pp. 145–149).

³⁵ The local ruler of the Sen (Hindu) dynasty had fled, so it was a bloodless occupation.

³⁶ The Portuguese captured the fort of Chittagong in about 1590 CE (in 1598 CE there were 2,500 Portuguese and Eurasians in Chittagong and Arakan), and the (present) Feringhi Bandar across the Southern bank of the Karnaphuli River in the late seventeenth century CE. A Portuguese, Sebastiao Goncalves Tibau, occupied Sandwip in 1607 CE, and ran it as a King with a force of 1,000 Portuguese, for about ten years, until defeated by the King of Arakan. They allied with the King of Arakan and settled in Feringhi Bunder and Chittagong. From there, in 1665 CE, when the Mughals took Chittagong, they moved to Ferenghi Bazar in Dhaka (where they had arrived earlier in 1580 CE). Portuguese descendants still reside in these places; <http://www.colonialvoyage.com/eng/asia/bengal/index.html>.

³⁷ The huge significance of this event was the fact that the Brunei Sultanate was a part of the Srivijaya Kingdom (since the latter’s beginning) and was in control of Sabah, Sarawak, Sulu ar-

erful local rulers accelerated the spread of Islam in South East Asia, and helped shape the manifestation of Islam through cultural symbiosis (because the rulers did not want to impose Islam with a wholesale rejection of the past).³⁸

6.3 Social Consolidation Through Political Expansion

The initial Arab conquest was very simple and informal. After a formal system of government administration was formed by the Umayyads in Damascus (661–750 CE), for example, Arabic-speaking Muslims came to the top, but in the first half-century, the bureaucracy continued to use Greek and was staffed in large by local Christians (Kennedy 2007, p. 97). In the conquered Egypt “the same tax collectors collected much the same taxes under Byzantine and Muslim rule and they continued to use Greek as the language of government” (Kennedy 2007, p. 160). Thus most people in the occupied land, except for the “hierarchies of some religious communities”, did not notice (or could not care about) the rulers because they were, in general, safe, at peace and reasonably taxed³⁹ (Hourani 2005, p. 23) being served by the same old local administrators, anyway.

Muslim ‘occupation’ of Transoxania⁴⁰ and the surrounding area created in reality “a protectorate and the Arab authorities ruled with and through the local aristocracy” (Kennedy 2007, p. 263). The old civilizations of Transoxania, though remained almost intact at and after the introduction of the Muslim rule, came under threat because of the invasion of Mongol Tatar horsemen who ruled until the fourteenth century CE. The threat, however, diminished when the ruler Timur (the Lame; Tamerlane), one of the descendents of Genghis Khan, converted to Islam and built a vast Central Asian empire stretching from Syria to India, with capital in Samarkand. The conversion of the Mongol invaders to Islam helped in the continuation of Transoxania with a little dent. The preservation of the locals was evident in the fact that within about two hundred years, around the sixteenth century CE, at the demise of the Timurs, the nomadic peoples established three kingdoms in Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand that prospered as trading posts on the trans-desert caravan routes until falling to the Russian empire in the nineteenth century CE (Marston et al. 2005, p. 173). The descendents of the Mongols in Central Asia occupied India in the sixteenth century CE with an administrative system based on the principles of incorporation (not annihilation) to successfully install a multireligious and multiethnic

chipelago, and parts of Borneo (that was later gifted to Sulu) (see Marston et al. 2005, p. 457, and related info in Wikipedia).

³⁸ The source of this paragraph as well as the quotation is Marston et al. (2005, p. 457). Some facts are clarified through related entries in the Wikipedia.

³⁹ By the end of the Umayyad period (mid-eighth century CE), around 10% people outside the Arabian Peninsula (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Spain, Syria, and Tunisia) was Muslim (Hourani 2005, p. 467).

⁴⁰ The ancient geographic area covering the watershed of Amu and Syr rivers; corresponding approximately with the modern day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and southwest Kazakhstan.

society (as depicted in the character of the administrative staff) to influence the people and their social systems in Mughal (Mongol) India.

Muslim conquerors retained the institutions, and administrative practices of the local community, merely replacing the leaders and key officials, as appropriate, as a strategic need of making Islam less intrusive and more attractive (Gladden 1988). For example, the Mughal rulers did not seek to impose Islam on indigenous population, but the Mughal's commitment to the religious precepts of Islam and to an equitable system of governance, made Islam attractive to many people, especially in the northwest (the Punjab) and northeast (Bengal; Marston et al. 2005, p. 503). The two areas previously had Buddhist dominance most likely for their geographic locations on most fertile lands in the Buddhism's trail to the West (blessed by at least five rivers including the Chenab, Indus, Jhelum) and the East (the Ganges),⁴¹ respectively, and thus welcoming to new religion.

The largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, Pashuns (Pukhtuns, or Pathans)—a complex ethnic group comprised of many tribes—is claimed to be the descendents partially of one of the 'Twelve Lost Tribes' from Israel.⁴² The "Pakhto" or "Pashto" (the name of the language) is synonymous with a "pre-Islamic honor code/religion" formally known as Pashtunwali (or Pakhtunwali) that "governs and regulates nearly all aspects of Pashtun life ranging from tribal affairs to individual honor and behavior".⁴³

The spice route to the Malay–Indonesian archipelago, in the ninth and tenth centuries CE, was in use by Muslims in spreading Islam in the region. Local people were attracted to Islam due to its good image reflected in the activities of the Muslims. The spread of Islam was greatly enhanced partly by social contact as a consequence of trade, but more importantly by marriages (Hasan 2007). It will be just naïve not to think that, like in West Asia, conversion to Islam was very attractive to the common people in Southeast Asia because it used to guarantee the new converts social and economic rights equal to that of the ruling community (Kennedy 2007, p. 291).

The rulers' seal of allegiance also increased chances of Islam's expansion. Malacca's strategic location at the trading route between India and China made it a commercially powerful sea-based trading state, and its rulers' enthusiastic adoption of Islam helped the dissemination of Islamic beliefs and institutions in Southeast

⁴¹ Low caste Hindus also gravitated to this fertile land of the East as tillers, fishermen, milkmen, potter, blacksmith, washers, or cleaners.

⁴² For details see '*Im Nin'alu's 2nd Book*' at <http://www.imninalu.net/tribes1.htm> (accessed on 16 Aug 2010), especially the section on 'The Israelite Diaspora: The "Unknown Hebrews"'. There are also claims that some of these people (through the Silk Road to China and back) settled in Sylhet (Bangladesh) and the surrounding areas who have a social support system and language completely different from the other parts of Bangladesh.

⁴³ For an interesting and enlightening discussion on the topic please see, 'Pashtun' in Wikipedia. For example, two of the best known tenets of 'Pashtunwali' (resembling many of the Israelites and Torah), '*Melmastia*', or 'hospitality and asylum to all guests seeking help' and the '*Badal* (swift revenge)' for perceived injustices though were fundamental in organizing the struggle against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan are now creating troubles for the coalition forces.

Asia. The rulers' economic interest was in keeping good relationships to all not in isolating a community (for its conversion to a new religion). The rulers' strategic open and inclusive approach served as a source of conversion and, by extension, as a means of local cultural protection.

The arrival of the European colonial powers to the area in about a century after its rulers' conversion to Islam initiated a new era of economic, political, and social relationships in the area. The European colonial powers' insistence for cash crop production required more expatriate workers. The resultant persistent "stream of migrants from India and China" changed the geography of Southeast Asia. The Chinese migrants in particular, determined to have permanent roots in the area fearing bad days in war-torn China,⁴⁴ and then being seen as "more entrepreneurial and fit to govern" were allowed by some colonial administrators to successfully bid in auctions for "rights to collect taxes and harbour duties, to market opium, or to operate gambling" (work seen either too demanding or forbidden, '*haram*', by local Malay Muslims).⁴⁵

The Chinese migrants, essential for the success of the colonial economies in these countries, upon independence became entrepreneurs to steer the nascent service sector (running banks, insurance companies, and shipping) as well as the new resource-processing (e.g. logging) businesses-making fortunes. Because of the above reasons the Chinese people's influence in the economic and social life of the countries in Southeast Asia was disproportionately higher than their respective percentage in the total population. In order to rectify the 'injustices of the past', the Malaysian government in the 1960s framed an affirmative action plan for the Malays.⁴⁶ Indonesia saw an outburst of the frustration against Chinese domination of its economy in 1997⁴⁷ (at the fall of the military-backed Suharto regime). Political expansion through colonization made significant impacts on cultural transformation and social consolidation of the MMCs (see Chap. 7).

The influence of the Chinese population in these economies is still significant because of the Chinese people's upholding of Confucian tradition of family and ethnic business links and the provision of professional high-quality education to the children⁴⁸ (Marston et al. 2005, p. 467). Irrespective of their present religious fol-

⁴⁴ Due to the Mongol invasion of China in the thirteenth century CE, their removal in the thirteenth century, the palace rebel of the seventeenth century, and the nationalist expansion of the twentieth century CE. Not to mention the Communist struggle of the twentieth century followed by the cultural revolution in the 1960s.

⁴⁵ The facts and quotations in this paragraph are from Marston et al. (2005, pp. 460, 461).

⁴⁶ Further, the dominant business class, the Chinese, must have a Malay business partner (Marston et al. 2005, p. 468).

⁴⁷ The 'apparent' frustration of the local Indonesian population in the success of the Chinese business communities (through a 'rentier' relationship with the government leaders) was vented in the looting, burning, and killing of Chinese business owners resulting in the emigration of many Chinese Indonesian (Marston et al. 2005, p. 468).

⁴⁸ Since there is a restricted quota system for the Chinese children in higher education and government jobs they have to go for education overseas and opt for businesses any way (Marston et al. 2005, p. 468).

lowing the Chinese people, some having converted to Islam, have influenced human development and administration in these countries because of their traditionally higher achievement levels in education, science, technology, and entrepreneurship.

The impacts of indigenous control (before and after the rulers' conversion to Islam) with a very short European colonization are visible in Southeast Asia. None of the three MMCs (Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia) ever managed (or tried) to have a unifying common (foreign) language. The situation is more vivid in Indonesia because of its geographical fragmentation (the archipelago comprises of about 17,000 islands, with inhabitants only in 6,000) resulting in as much as 300 ethnic groups and languages with scripts. Because of different colonial influence, no 'alien' language has unified the region (in the way that Arabic has in West Asia and North Africa; English in South Asia; or French in West Asia). The most common dialects are versions of Malay spoken in Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia (Marston et al. 2005, p. 470).

6.4 Conclusion

The need for protecting the pasture, and an emotional urge for gravitating around the 'pride' throughout the history have enticed Muslims to group around kinship and social groups in their traditional habitat or beyond. The low impact political expansion of Islam resulted in its own evolution helping the followers to be consolidated in social groups. Muslim administrative systems based on the principles of incorporation (not annihilation) successfully installed multi-religious and multiethnic peaceful society to influence the people and their social systems (often borrowing from the occupied people). These social and cultural mixing created a symbiosis of Muslim people, which is as varied as Africa or Asia.

There seems to be a claim that Asia is not unified by any religion but by "religious tolerance, by the way in which religions have co-existed and even influenced each other in the region" (Emmott 2009, p. 33). Since people of different religions have intermixed in the MMCs, there has not been much religious violence. Some apparent religious violence have ethnic or tribal (e.g. Indonesia, Nigeria, Somali, or Sudan), economic (e.g. land ownership in Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, or Pakistan), or political (e.g. Afghanistan, Lebanon, Turkey, or Yemen) reasons.

The process of cultural symbiosis, that begun in different parts of Africa and Asia through the arrival of Muslim traders (as well as Islam), continued unabated for centuries creating new nations with heterogeneous identities united by a single faith. Thus the expansion of Islam in Southeast Asia (Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia with about 200 million Muslim populations at present), e.g., is a result of the arrival of the Arab/Indian Muslim traders, the conversion of the rulers to the new religion, and interreligious marriages. As a result, in order to enrich itself and the followers, Islam has adopted and lived with local customs (*urf*), local customary laws (*adat*), and institutions that do not contradict the fundamental principle of Islam—the Unity of God (see Chap. 2). The Muslim religious identity superimposed on the ethnic

identity have created—Acehnese Muslims, Arab Muslims, Bangalee Muslims, Fulani Muslims, Javanese Muslims, Punjabi Muslims, or Tajik Muslims. Thus people in different MMCs, dealing with different types, profiles, and sizes of resources or different systems of social relationships are likely to be widely different from one another in approaching human development within or beyond their borders.

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Part III
Power Relationships and External
Influence in the MMCs

Chapter 7

European Colonization and the Muslim Majority Countries: Antecedents, Approaches, and Impacts

Samiul Hasan

7.1 Introduction

Historically, Africa and Asia have been resource rich with core regions, especially of industrial production, in China¹ and India.² West Asia and Southeast Asia (being at the centers of the then international trade routes) also remained “economically more important than Europe.”³ The climate, fertile land, (see Chap. 1) community-based land ownership, and farming system attracted outsiders to these lands (see Chap. 6). The availability of natural resources (raw materials and labor), and the resultant products became the causes of these regions’ colonization for up to 400 years. The colonial powers in the pursuit of political and economic control of the seas, and in search for resources (land for cultivation, raw materials, and manpower) and markets increasingly arrived at the shores of Africa and Asia.

This chapter is divided into three main parts to discuss the characters, processes, and the consequences of colonization in the Muslim majority countries (MMCs). The first part deals with the characters of European colonization. Second part deals

¹ In the eleventh century CE Chinese factories were producing 125,000 tons of iron every year—a figure Europe would not match for 700 years (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005, p. 15).

² In 1700 CE the population of India was 20 times that of the UK; India’s share of total world output at that time is estimated to be 24%, Britain’s share was just 3% (Ferguson 2008, p. 27). In terms of proportion to the number of population it was not much, but in terms of volume it was.

³ For example, (in 1960 CE US\$) Asian GNP was \$ 165 billion in 1860 CE and \$ 120 billion in 1750 CE, while the entire ‘West’ (Europe and the Americas as well as Russia and Japan), during the two corresponding periods had a GNP of \$ 115 and \$ 35 billion. The figures are recalculated by A. G. Frank in a lecture (‘Asian-based world economy 1400–1800: A horizontally integrative macro-history’) at the University of Amsterdam, 12 November 1995, available at: <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/50/089.html>. Also see (Abu-Lughod 1989; Chaudhuri 1986, 1991) for interesting discussions of the phenomenon.

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with the major processes of European colonization that created the most significant impacts on the colonies. The third part of the chapter (European colonization and the MMCs) underlines the possible human development impacts of the European colonization on the MMCs. The chapter ends with concluding remarks highlighting the fact that geography played the most dominant role in the direction, focus, and outcome of the colonization.

7.2 The Characters of European Colonization

Based on the literature, used in this discussion, the European colonization era is divided into an early period targeted at control of the Sea (that continued on), and a later era targeted at expanding the colonizers' economy in a trade-based mercantile period (1500–1800 CE) dominated by the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and (then) French, and the industrial period (1800–1963 CE) dominated, mainly by the British. This first part is divided into two main sections dealing with these two major features and approaches to the European colonization: control of the Sea for (economic and political) security, and the control and expansion of the respective economy.

7.2.1 *Control of the Sea*

During the middle Ages control of the seas, not large land mass, became important. Due to its geographic position, a higher number of ('disciplined') manpower, and superior talent in building Ocean going vessels (resulting from the first two factors) China undertook expeditions of the seas to reach many shores in Africa and America possibly in early fifteenth century CE, that is, long before anybody else did.⁴ Due to a natural disaster that destroyed the newly built palace, the Emperor in Beijing withdrew support from overseas voyages⁵—ending a 'lost' era of human expedition.

During that period, the English, in spite of being islanders, could not be in control of the seas because of certain climatic condition, in particular the south-easterly wind of the North-East Atlantic that blows (from the South) all round the year, against the British vessels. The clockwise pattern of Atlantic winds and currents, however, allowed the Portuguese and Spanish vessels a relatively smooth passage between the Iberian Peninsula and Central America. The English were laggard in

⁴ Chinese Muslim Admiral Zheng He (along his colleagues) is claimed to have reached the Cape of Good Hope (60 years before Dias), Strait of Magellan (98 years before Magellan), Australia (three centuries before Captain Cook), Antarctica and the Arctic (four centuries before the Europeans), and America (70 years before Columbus) between 1421 and 1423 CE (Menzies 2003, p. 456).

⁵ For an enlightening discussion on the voyages, and their ends as well as about the splendid boats they used to build, see Menzies (2003).

naval technology as well, and “took time to learn the arts of oceanic navigation” (Ferguson 2008, p. 9). Thus, because of the safer northern location of their island, control of the sea was not much of an issue for the English, and since places like Jamaica (1655 CE) were left for them (the rest was occupied by the Spanish and Portuguese; Ferguson 2008, p. 4), and there was a need and prospect of complementary import and export, trade trips to (much prosperous) India were more lucrative for the English.⁶

Due to the progression in technology and the advent of the steam engine, the English were finally able to influence the seas and its trade routes.⁷ Nonetheless still under the influence of the climate, Atlantic winds, and the tide, sea trade had a seasonal pattern: ships left for the West Indies between November and January; ships for North America left between mid-summertime until the end of September. Journey to India from England would take much longer (about six months) sailing for India in the spring (returning back in the autumn; Ferguson 2008, p. 25).

Thus, before the English could control the Arabian/Indian seas (frequented by the Muslim traders at the time), the Portuguese targeting the “trade in the Gulf, Arabian Sea, and the western Indian Ocean” sacked Sohar (Oman), pillaged and burnt Khor Fakkan (UAE), attacked Muscat and Hormuz, besieged Aden (between 1506 and 1515 CE). They then built forts at Dibba, Khor Fakkan, Bidiya, and Kalba (all in the UAE), and Muscat (Oman). Fortunately for the region, the Portuguese (being absorbed by the Spanish in 1580 CE) became weaker, and were ejected by the British and Dutch East India companies who settled in the area in early seventeenth century CE (being invited by Shah Abbas to “help eject the Portuguese from Persia”). The fleeing Portuguese built the last regional fort in Julfar (Ra’s Al-Khaimah in the present day UAE) receiving supports from the powerful al-Qassimi tribe—the most prominent ruler of the northern UAE (from Dubai to Julfar) with a trading center in al-Qashm island (in the western part of Bandar Abbas). The Spaniards and Portuguese thus left for the West⁸ leaving the British ‘rule’ the Gulf to save Africa and Asia from major destruction and sociocultural transformation (e.g., experienced by the Spanish or Portuguese colonies in South America or the Philippines; Isbister 2001).

The British, arriving in the area, opened up a new trade route to India (avoiding the longer Cape of Good Hope route) through the “Mediterranean, across Syria and Mesopotamia to Basra and from there down the Gulf,” and defeated the al-

⁶ England’s outward vessels included silver as well as lead, tin, mercury, corals, ivory, armor, swords, satins, and broadcloth (some of which were obtained from Africa) to be traded in India for cotton textiles, that were to be traded in the ‘Spice Lands’ for pepper, cloves, and nutmeg. In the return journey spices were to be traded in India for tea for Europe (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005, p. 31).

⁷ By 1700 CE it was possible to reach Boston from England in 6/7 weeks (two weeks less in the return trip), and Barbados in about nine weeks (but by the mid-1830s steamship reduced the journey time to only two weeks, cutting further to about ten days by the 1880s; Ferguson 2008, p. 25).

⁸ For example, Goa in India remained a Portuguese enclave for a long time and lost its ‘Indianness.’ Luckily for Mumbai (the then Bombay) it was received by Charles II of England as a dowry when he married Princess Catherine of Portugal in 1661 CE (see Ferguson 2008, p. 24).

Qassimi tribe (for their supports to the Portuguese and the Salafis by supporting the al-Sauds; see Chap. 2), and destroyed its fleet. The General Treaty of Peace in 1820 CE signed by the British with the other rulers of the region changed the power relationships of the area for ever (creating later the so-called Trucial states through the Perpetual Maritime Truce, 1853).⁹

The British were also interested in checking the Russians' southward expansion and offered strategic enticement to the Ottomans (Keylor 2006, p. 7). Ottoman Turkish sovereignty over the Straits (the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanells) and the adjacent Balkan Peninsula in Southern Europe deprived Russia, for a long time, of a secure outlet for its foreign trade and naval power in the Mediterranean which the Czars needed to have access to the 'Persian Gulf.' So, for the Ottomans coalescing with the British to frustrate the Czarist expansionism was akin to be rewarded for guarding one's own home. A problem occurred (that eventually led to, or may be was designed for, the obliteration of the Ottomans) when Britain during World War I, for fear that Russian neutrality (in the case of Turkey being in the Alliance) would leave Britain at the mercy of the Germans, advised the Ottomans to stay 'neutral' (Alavi 1998).

Being frustrated by the British behavior with a former ally vis-à-vis a former enemy, for strategic reasons, the Ottomans declared war on Russians by joining the Germans. The German's 'credential' as the protector of the 300 million Muslims of the world was reinforced by the military alliance (2 August 1914) between Germany and Turkey¹⁰ which was revealed in the Ottoman Sultan's call to a *jihād* ('holy war') of fellow Muslims against their 'Christian European masters' (Keylor 2006, p. 52).¹¹

The Ottoman Sultan's appeal failed to rouse the Arabs "for whom hatred of Turkish over lordship surpassed in intensity the historic grievance against the Christian West" (Keylor 2006, p. 54) because Arab lands came under Ottoman rules due to geographic proximity, not for religious affinity (e.g., the Ottomans fought the Arabs, Muslim Safawids, or Safawids). The British capitalized on these 'grievance gravity' and opened communications with Grand Sharif Hussein of Mecca (between July 1915 and February 1916), and pledged support for independence of most of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in exchange for an Arab revolt against Turkish rule (Keylor 2006, p. 54). Sharif Hussein (who was an Ottoman appointee) raised

⁹ This paragraph is based on O'Sullivan (2008, pp. 73–75).

¹⁰ Germans had to work hard to secure Turkey as an ally. For example, since 1888 CE the Deutsche bank had played a leading role in the financing of the Berlin–Baghdad Railway. The bank had to agree, under an order from the Kaiser in 1899 CE, to the extension of the existing line to Baghdad from Istanbul across Anatolia via Ankara, but finally planned to make it profitable by extending line to Basra. In fact, the British also had played a role in this project because "a deal had been struck on the eve of the war giving the Germans the right to extend the line to Basra in return for letting the British lead the exploration of the Mesopotamian oilfields" (Ferguson 2008, p. 302).

¹¹ Since about a half of the world Muslims at that time were under British, French, or Russian rule, "this could have been a masterstroke of German strategy," and as the Germans had hoped, the British responded to the Turkish threat by diverting men and materials away from the Western Front to Mesopotamia (Iraq) and the Dardanelles (Ferguson 2008, pp. 302, 303).

the Arabs in rebellion and was soon joined by various chieftains on the Arabian Peninsula (Keylor 2006, p. 54). The Ottoman Turks, due to the Arab revolt,¹² lost the capacity to fulfill its obligation to the Germans (Keylor 2006, p. 54), and for being an accomplice of the Germans (that resulted possibly from a ‘grand plan’ charted to dismantle the Ottoman Turks), by default, became the loser in the World War I.

A deal¹³ between ibn Saud and the (US) Standard Oil “ensured America’s later predominance over Britain in the Arab oil fields”¹⁴ (Ferguson 2008, p. 321), enlisted the US help for the region, and undermined Sharif Hussein’s position. Thus, “British betrayal” of Ottoman friendship (cherished to neutralize the Czarist expansionism) ended the latter’s place and power (Alavi 1998). Due to the weakening of the Ottoman Turks and its military might (the World War I ‘defeat’) and the end of the Russian threat, Arab lands became subject to external control (Alavi 1998). In 1919 CE, the three victorious leaders (Wilson, George, and Clemenceau of USA, UK, and France, respectively) “sitting in Paris determined what countries would exist and which would not, what new countries would be created, what their boundaries would be and who would rule them, and how the Middle East and other parts of the world would be divided up among the victorious powers.”¹⁵ The World War I European allies carved up Ottoman Arab lands among themselves (Arab territories were already under British and French control any way). The demise of the Czars and the advent of a Communist government through the creation of the Soviet Union ushered a new strategic ball-game in the region, and different colonies or postcolonial states gravitating with one or the other side of the ‘Cold War’ warriors lent a new meaning to the ‘control of the seas.’

Thus, the casual purpose of controlling the seas for security increasingly took the course of controlling trade bolstering the power holders’ economy to eventually become the reason for controlling the world.

7.2.2 *Expansion of the Colonizers’ Economy*

The colonial period in Africa and Asia can be divided into two eras: the trade-based mercantile period (1500–1800 CE) dominated by the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and (then) French, and the industrial period (1800–1963 CE) dominated, mainly, by the British (and to an extent the French; Marston et al. 2005).

The trade-based mercantile period (1500–1800 CE) in the MMCs began in Southeast Asia by the Portuguese and the Dutch. Portuguese colonizers, in 1511 CE,

¹² The British military advance from Egypt to Palestine and Syria in 1917–1918 CE was greatly assisted by the guerrilla operations against the Turks mounted by Arab contingents in contact with British officers such as T. E. Lawrence (Keylor 2006, p. 54).

¹³ It was mediated by Harry Philby—a Muslim convert and an ex-British government official.

¹⁴ That became more influential creating Chevron with the acquisition of Gulf oil in 1984 (see Chevron’s history in its Homepage).

¹⁵ Comments Huntington (1991; cited in Moten 2005, p. 237).

moved to gain control of the vibrant and strategic port of Malacca, to obtain “commodities such as cloves, nutmeg, and pepper” relying on the local and other Asian merchants. The Dutch, as a result had to trade on the outer islands where the local merchants “wished to avoid trading through Malacca because it was dominated by Portuguese Catholics who criticized Islam, imposed heavy taxes, and monopolized markets” (Marston et al. 2005, p. 458). The Dutch (East India Company formed in 1602 CE with a license fee of 18% of the profit; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005, p. 33) took full advantage of the ‘bad behavior’ of the Portuguese, and focused on the ‘spice island’ of Moluccas (in the Eastern part of present day Indonesia) for “valuable commodities of nutmeg, cinnamon, and cloves.” The expulsion of the Portuguese from Malacca (in 1700 CE) and overpowering of the Sultanate (because of its past support for the Portuguese) resulted in the cooptation of the local leaders to serve the Dutch East India Company, and the (enticed) influx of the Chinese to fill the administrative and commercial posts¹⁶ (in the newly occupied land).

The British’ “insatiable appetite for imported commodities (linen, tea, coffee, tobacco, and sugar),” coupled with their focus only on trade helped transform “piracy to political power that would change the world forever” (Ferguson 2008, p. 12). By the 1770s almost 85% of the tobacco and 94% of the coffee imports to England was re-exported (Ferguson 2008, p. 15). Further, a sudden change in the interests in calicos, chintz, or cotton (more than tea, coffee, tobacco, sugar, or spices) meant that the English trade profit surpassed that of the Dutch spice trade¹⁷ (Ferguson 2008, p. 23). The colonial activities also targeted the extraction of resources of the colonized land in Africa and Asia ignoring the owners. The British PM, Salisbury, thus keenly asserted that: “if our ancestors had cared for the rights of other people, the British Empire would not have been made” (Ferguson 2008, p. 239).

Since procurement of raw materials was essential, all colonial powers (the British and French in Africa, the British in South Asia, and the British and Dutch in Southeast Asia) insisted on cash crop production in the colonized lands. The European colonial powers, in order to have a firm control on the newly enforced export-oriented agriculture in Africa, introduced “privately owned and bounded plots” through the European managers and courts replacing the traditional African communal land-tenure (with flexible boundaries), decision-making, and legal systems (Marston et al. 2005, p. 254). In South Asia the British colonial power introduced a land tenancy Act to grant individual taxation and tilling rights creating adversaries and divisions within the previously harmonious communities.¹⁸ In Southeast Asia, particularly in colonial Indonesia, a ‘dual system’ of land laws offered land title to

¹⁶ This paragraph is based on Marston et al. (2005, pp. 458–461). Some facts and assertions are clarified from the Wikipedia.

¹⁷ But an Anglo-Dutch (company) merger “meant that the British could operate far more freely in the East.” The deal “effectively gave Indonesia and the spice trade to the Dutch” (Ferguson 2008, p. 23).

¹⁸ There was no freehold title of land in South Asia; common properties, being the only resource, used to motivate collective productive efforts resulting in the creation and sharing of public good (Hasan 2008).

nonlocals on the basis of Western civil law, allowing the *adat* (custom; or unwritten village practices) to continue for the local people. The imposed land law allowed the Europeans “to rent communal village lands for sugar cultivation by contracting only with the village headman (*penghula*),” and created an adversarial relationship within the local communities (with the help of some local leaders) to strengthen the colonial hands (Frederick and Worden 1993). The economies and the land-use pattern of Southeast Asia was transformed by the ‘culture system’ introduced by the Dutch in Java in 1830 CE that required the farmers “to devote one-fifth of their land and their labor to export-crop production,” especially coffee¹⁹ and sugar (Marston et al. 2005, p. 460).

The British introduced plantation agriculture (e.g., coconut, cotton, indigo, jute, rubber, tea) to South Asia producing food crops for the British domestic population and commodity crops for the British industry and British merchants (Marston et al. 2005, p. 504). They also “focused in reorienting the economies to exports of tin, rubber, and tropical hardwoods and on controlling trade routes between India and China” and introduced, in Malay, rubber plants “grown in Britain from seeds smuggled out of Brazil.”²⁰ In spite of the ban on rubber plantation by local Malays, aimed at protecting the profits and monopoly of European planters, rubber quickly became popular with local farmers because of higher profit margin and lower labor needs (Marston et al. 2005, pp. 458, 459), and transformed the subsistence agriculture pattern of the area.

These manipulative land tenure systems ensured the colonial powers’ restructuring of the agriculture patterns toward the production of ‘cash crop’ for their own industries or for exporting. Nonetheless, in order to be successful in cash crop agriculture in the colonies as well as in the manufacturing in the ‘homes,’ the colonial powers (had to and) did trade on slave labors (in the comprehensive sense of the term) from outside the cultivation (or manufacturing) area (primarily from China, India, and western Africa). In addition the British did coerce about half a million low caste low paid ‘voiceless’ workers to work in ‘atrocious’ condition in the tea plantations in Asia (Marston et al. 2005, p. 506), for example.²¹ The influx of labors had a domino effect—increased labor created higher demands for food supply that in turn increased the need for more agriculture ‘slaves’—and a resultant movement of labors from other economic activities. The colonizers thus saw a need to

¹⁹ The Dutch started planting coffee in Java and the surrounding islands in the seventeenth century CE acquiring the plant seeds from the Arabia (O’Sullivan 2008, p. 67).

²⁰ Fueled with the increased demand of rubber tires because of the “explosion of automobile ownership in Europe and North America,” the land area under rubber plantation skyrocketed to 2.1 million acres in 1920 from only 2,000 acres in 1898. This paragraph is based on Marston et al. (2005, pp. 458–461). Some facts and assertions are clarified from the Wikipedia.

²¹ In the mid-nineteenth century CE, while looking for ways for exploiting newly colonized lands, the British arranged for the introduction of 12,000 tea plants, related tools and workforce from China. Receiving lands from the British government, the planters, blessed by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (that boosted profit margins cutting the transportation cost to England) increased the tea plantation area in Bengal six-fold (Marston et al. 2005, p. 506), primarily with slave labors.

come out of this ‘industrial’ system based on exploiting resources (raw materials and people).

A true ‘industrial period (1800–1963 CE)’ of colonization occurred in Southeast Asia with the control by the British of strategic ports of Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), and Malacca (1824). The colonists themselves established large plantations like rubber, but used a variety of fiscal instruments to force the peasant farmers to produce peanuts, coffee, cocoa, or cotton for global markets.²² Further, the British government prohibited the export of woollen clothes from its colonies to other countries (Chang 2008, p. 44), and banned the sale of Asian silks and the import of cotton textile and use of fancy cotton of India, the finest at the time (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005, p. 33) to develop its own fabric industry.

The European colonization introduced manufacturing and technology to displace indigenous crafts and industries in the colonies (Marston et al. 2005, p. 504). The British Prime Minister Walpole, in 1721, through legislations, wanted to make sure that “the colonists stuck to producing primary commodities and never emerged as competitors to British manufacturers” (Chang 2008, p. 45). Since the first European industrial revolution was in cotton textile industry (Reinert 2008), raw-materials of Africa and Asia, being very important to the industrialization of the core European economies, brought the cotton producing economies into peripheral relationships within the world-system, and in the process “textile mills of Manchester destroyed the weavers of Bengal” (Reinert 2008, p. 190).

After about 300 years of the Walpole initiatives²³ and about 50 years of decolonization, the Western governments still determined to protect their own producers, seemed not to be inclined to amend their trade and agricultural policies supportive of a system of “subsidies and tariff barriers that have a crippling effect on African producers”²⁴ (Meredith 2006 p. 684). Further, the Western agricultural surpluses, produced at a fraction of the real cost, are then ‘dumped’ to undermine domestic producers in Africa (Meredith 2006, p. 684) and Asia.

To complicate the matter further, the cash crop, introduced in the colonies, is now under attack by other new economic ‘powers.’ For example, annual cotton production in Francophone Africa soared 900% after independence to 900,000 tons. But then, according to a recent Oxfam study, because of the US subsidy in domestic

²² Restrictive ‘taxes’ were imposed on items not approved by the colonial administrator (see Marston et al. 2005, pp. 458, 459). Tariffs on imported foreign manufacturing were significantly raised, while tariffs on raw materials used for manufacturing were lowered (or even dropped), or export subsidies were introduced to encourage manufacturing exports (Chang 2008).

²³ British Prime Minister Walpole, in 1721, introduced tariffs on imported foreign manufacturing, reduced (or even dropped) tariffs on raw materials used for manufacturing, and introduced export subsidies to encourage manufacturing exports. The law also banned cotton textile imports from India, and the export of woollen clothes from the colonies to other countries (Chang 2008, p. 44).

²⁴ The total value of the industrialized countries’ agriculture subsidies (about \$ 370 billion a year) is higher than the GDP of whole of sub-Saharan Africa. The European subsidy for each of its cow’s is about \$ 900/year, Japan’s is about \$ 2,700 (Meredith 2006, p. 684), while about two billion of the world’s population survive on \$ 730/year (\$ 2/day).

cotton²⁵ “the world price was 25% lower than it would otherwise have been” forcing Burkina Faso to incur 1% GDP (and 12% export earning) loss, Mali to incur 1.7% GDP (and 8% export earning) loss, and Benin to incur 1.4% GDP (and 9% export earning) loss²⁶ (Meredith 2006, p. 684).

The European colonial powers invaded Africa and Asia to expand and protect their manufacturing sector by securing markets as well as raw materials and ‘man-power.’ They thus undertook measures to strictly dominate land, labor, and capital in the colonies to shape the latter’s economy that may ensure continuous supply of the factors of production to the ‘masters’ and would eliminate all threats to the formers’ nascent manufacturing. Thus control of the land, of the traditional land-tenure system, of the pattern of agriculture, of the labor, and of industries to displace the colonies’ traditional crafts (often through taxation) were all in the agenda of the European quest for colonization. These actions installed a process of polarization to increase economic gaps (to sustain a patron–client relationship) mostly with the help of local ‘representatives.’ The tragedy is that the ‘race’ continued on—again being dominated by geography.

7.3 The Processes of European Colonization

The two-pronged approach of expanding the colonizers’ economic interests and outcomes (through trade-based mercantile system, and industrial growth) affected the agriculture system and destroyed the crafts and industries in the colonies. In the process millions of dollars were siphoned out every year just from India by Britain (Hettne 1990). For example, Dadabhai Naoroji, an Indian nationalist, estimated in 1867 CE, in the ‘drain theory,’ that Britain drained “about £ 30,000,000 of India’s wealth every year” in a variety of ways and “thereby reduced the bulk of the Indian population to extreme poverty, destitution, and degradation” (Hettne 1990, pp. 103, 104). This ‘drain’ was significant for many economies. For example, an estimated 7–10% of the domestic product was drained by the Dutch from Indonesia (Ferguson 2008, p. 216). The above trade and economic benefits of the colonial impositions inflicted long-term economic, political, and social dents in the colonies.

This part highlights the major processes of European colonization that had the most significant impacts in the future economic, political, and social aspects of the colonies highlighting the use (or not use) of Faith; transformation of institutions, and infrastructure; and social and spatial fragmentation for power expansion.

²⁵ The \$ 4 billion subsidy to 25,000 cotton farmers amounts to “more than the value of entire crop” (Meredith 2006, p. 684).

²⁶ It is possible because the agriculture sector in the USA is “exempt from anti-trust” legislation and is largely controlled by “legal monopolies” (Reinert 2008, p. 160).

7.3.1 *The Faith Factor*

Due to a natural disaster that hit the newly constructed Forbidden City, the Chinese emperor, sensing a rage of the nature in the events (including that of the Ocean voyages), abandoned the sea expeditions. The result was that the “cultured Chinese” instructed to see “people with kindness” were replaced by the “cruel, almost barbaric Christians”²⁷ as the colonizers of the world (Menziés 2003, p. 454). The “crusades, like the conquests that followed, were as much about overcoming Europe’s monetary shortage as about converting heathens to Christianity” (Ferguson 2009). The Portuguese, “in the grip of an ideologically motivated plan to continue the war against Islamic rule, which ended in the Iberian Peninsula in 1492,” aimed to “seize control of trade in the Gulf, Arabian Sea, and the western Indian Ocean” under the control of Muslim seafarers at the time (O’Sullivan 2008 pp. 73–75). The problems related to the shortage of money in Europe could be overcome in two ways. They could export labor and goods, exchanging slaves and timber for silver in Baghdad or for African gold in Cordoba and Cairo. Or they could plunder precious metal by making war on the Muslim world. The colonizers, the Spanish and Portuguese in particular, seemed to have had resorted to both (Ferguson 2009).

The Portuguese and Spaniards were interested in wealth, hegemony, as well as spiritual conversion (Isbister 2001). The Spaniards, under the fleet command of Columbus, discovered America in 1492 (the year they also were able to reconquer Spain from the Moors). By 1493, the Pope had ‘allocated’ trading rights of the Americas to Spain and of Asia to Portugal, while the former hits gold and silver in Mexico and Peru, the wealthiest and populous territories on the American continents, the latter got sugar, spices, and slaves (Ferguson 2008, p. 3). The transformation from these expeditions is evident in two Portuguese colonies in Africa (Angola and Mozambique) and one in Asia (Timor Leste), and one Spanish colony in Asia (the Philippines).²⁸ The Portuguese mode of colonization was much harsher (with direct rule and often ruthless control of land and labor; Marston et al. 2005, p. 254).

The British were latecomer, “imperial imitators,” in the colonizing race acquiring Jamaica in 1655. “The English conception of empire was thus formed in reaction to that of her Spanish and Portuguese ‘Popish’ rivals” (who were meant to spread “the gospel of Christ”; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005, p. 27) to be based on ‘Protestantism’ (Ferguson 2008, p. 4). But unlike, the Spaniards, the British did not have the Royal seal. Except for a brief period of about 40 years (1820–1858 CE) of the

²⁷ For example, in support of this contention Menziés (2003) cites one instance that “Francisco Pizarro gained Peru from the Incas by massacring five thousand Indians in cold blood. Today he would be considered a war criminal.” The readers may like to read this fascinating account (with evidence) of Chinese discovery of the world that has remained unknown to the world for long.

²⁸ In all four countries, sociocultural and religious characters of the people are completely different from the neighboring countries. Also, one Portuguese enclave (Goa) and a French enclave (Pondicherry) in India and their people, culture, social structure and relationships, and religion (being completely different from other parts of India, except for the mountainous Eastern regions) are also vivid examples of this phenomenon.

East India Company's 'disastrous attempt,' the British colonial government in India "explicitly banned preaching to the Indians themselves" (Ferguson 2008, p. 135). Queen Victoria, in fact, had to renounce in 1858, while taking over the Indian administration (away from the East India Company), the "right and desire to impose Our convictions on any of Our subjects" with a pledge that "the new government would never again lend its support to the Evangelical project of Christianization"²⁹ (Ferguson 2008, p. 154). Thus, by the 1880s most British officials in India had "reverted to the habit of their predecessors of the 1820s in regarding missionaries as, at best, absurd, at worst, subversive" (Ferguson 2008 p. 154).

The Spanish and Portuguese colonial powers were interested in spiritual conversion in the colonies. The Dutch and the French were interested in accumulating wealth by influencing culture and social structure. The French colonial policy was one of assimilation withering away the traditional power structure. The Dutch initiated social and cultural transformation (e.g., introduced Roman scripts for the language replacing the Arabic script in use for the local language), not mass religious conversion.³⁰ The British imperial power, interested exclusively in the wealth of the colonies, with a flexible and noninterventionist or minimalist approach, outsized and outlasted all other colonial powers (Easterly 2006; Isbister 2001).

7.3.2 *Transformation of the Institutions and Infrastructure*

The colonial powers had different approaches and objectives of colonization that resulted in different levels of economic, cultural, political, and religious transformation in the colonies. The colonial powers used or transformed the local institutions to favor themselves. The transformation of the MMCs began with the European colonization (Armstrong 2002). Each of Britain's 14 African colonies was governed separately under a powerful governor with individual budget, own laws, and public services (Meredith 2006, p. 11) favoring a system of indirect rule using local leaders to "keep order, collect taxes, and supply labor that involved a minimum of staff and expense"³¹ (Meredith 2006, p. 6). For example, in northern Nigeria Fulani *amirs* (chiefs) who "had governed in accordance with Islamic traditions of law and

²⁹ While installing the British government's authority (replacing the East India Company's 'rule' of about 100 years) in reaction to an armed rebellion (known as *Sepoy*, soldier, mutiny; or the first step toward independence of the region) following the Company's actions in insulting Hinduism and Islam.

³⁰ Indonesia with a 300 years colonial history under Dutch has about 8% Christians; the next door, the Philippines, being occupied by Spain, for a similar time period, followed by the Americans for a short period, has about 88% Christian now.

³¹ The British had "a paternalistic indirect rule for most of their (African) colonies, making pre-existing power structures and leaders responsible to the British Crown." The local leaders were required to collect all newly imposed taxes to indirectly transform the economy by forcing the use of land for commodity production because, in order to pay the taxes, people had to produce crops to sell to the Europeans (Meredith 2006).

discipline stretching back for centuries” were allowed to continue; in some places, however, “chiefdoms were invented”; in some others “traditional chiefs were left bereft of all functions” (Meredith 2006, p. 6). The British, preceded by the missionaries in Africa, also introduced some European-style schools, and by the 1940s a selected group of (overseas educated) Africans were given posts in government administration (Marston et al. 2005, p. 254).

In India, the British intended to create “Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals, and in intellect” to perpetuate the economic exploitation with ease. Thus, “Western educational curricula flourished in colleges; British-style public universities were established” (Marston et al. 2005, p. 504). In 1867 CE, about 50% of the total public service jobs (though in the lower levels) in British India were held by the Indians without whom the British would “have been impotent” (Ferguson 2008, p. 189). The 1885 Local Government Act also created a layer of local government (e.g., the union board) sidelining the traditional *panchayets* in local matters.

The French did not regard their colonies as separate territories but as parts of France represented by deputies from each (Meredith 2006, p. 12), and encouraged elites in the colonies to evolve into French provincial citizens with allegiance to France,³² keeping agriculture and mining under close supervision from Paris (Marston et al. 2005, p. 254). Sensing low prospects of immediate wealth to make the territories self-supporting, the French colonial master, kept the administration to a minimum, handed the education to the missionaries,³³ and the economic activities to private companies.³⁴ The French colonial government limited its responsibility to maintaining “law and order, raising taxes, and constructing roads and railways” (Meredith 2006, p. 5). All these features of French colonial administration in Africa shaped the economic, sociocultural, and political behavior and relationships of the colonies during (and after) the colonial period. The people in colonies occupied by Belgium and Portugal were never permitted involvement in ‘political’ activities (Meredith 2006, p. 12).

The English were to look after its economic interests and did initiate slave trade in Africa in 1750 CE. In the decade of 1790 CE, when one British prime minister estimated that three-quarters of the country’s overseas earnings were coming from slave-related business, the British (re)exported 400,000 (West) African slaves in about 150 ships leaving Liverpool every year (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005,

³² By 1946, there were about 20 Africans, elected from West Africa, in the French parliament (Marston et al. 2005, p. 254).

³³ By 1910, about 16,000 European missionaries were stationed throughout sub-Saharan Africa (Meredith 2006, p. 7).

³⁴ In some places it was a private union of the three. For example, in 1908 the private empire of King Leopold, the Congo, came under “the control of a small management group in Brussels representing an alliance between the government, the Catholic church, and the giant mining and business corporations whose activities were virtually exempt from outside scrutiny” (Meredith 2006, p. 96).

pp. 46, 47). The British government, due to agitation in its own home,³⁵ began to introduce Western institutions in the colonies by restricting slave-trade (e.g., by introducing the Indian Slavery Act V of 1843).³⁶ In India it also abolished the *sati-dah*—(a widow’s ritual suicide on the husband’s funeral pyre—*chita*; Marston et al. 2005, p. 504).

The investment of the British colonial power on Indian infrastructure,³⁷ irrigation (increasing it by a factor of eight to cover about 25% of the arable land), and industry³⁸ (Ferguson 2008, p. 216) may be regarded as the precursor of later development in the region. The first railway line, a 30-mile stretch between Bombay and Thane, was commissioned in India in 1853; 24,000 more miles were laid in the next 50 years (Ferguson 2008, p. 169). It also laid railway lines in other parts of the Empire around the same time. Other colonial powers took the benefit of newly invented steam engine, and laid railway lines in some of their colonies. The difference, however, is that the railways in the British Empire being in grid pattern (e.g., in India) contributed in a tremendous improvement of the overall transportation systems in the colonies. The railways in other European colonies (e.g., Mauritania) were laid in tree patterns to connect the raw material producing areas or the mining areas to the nearest port in the colony, and failed to create economic benefits like in the British colonies.

The British expanded knowledge, ideas, tastes, and habits in the colonies but kept firm control on the economic activities not to benefit the locals much. The other colonial powers did not manage the colonies any better economically, culturally, or socially. In some cases they were even worse and used different tools of power aggrandizement.

7.3.3 *Social and Spatial Fragmentation for Power Expansion*

Social and spatial fragmentation was a tool (Isbister 2001) for power expansion used by the colonizers. Under the auspices of Bismarck, 12 European states, the Ottoman Turkey, and the US,³⁹ attended the Berlin Conference (between 15 November 1884 and 26 February 1885 CE) to sign a charter for the partition of

³⁵ Because of a consumer boycott in the 1790s of the ‘blood-stained’ sugar from the West Indies, the East India Company was “eventually forced to get its sugar from slave less sugar producers in Bengal” (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005, p. 37).

³⁶ Asia did not have slave trade any way. The British colonial government officially opened up the slave trade, in 1750 CE, leaving it under the control of a club, the “Company of Merchants Trading to Africa” (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005, p. 46).

³⁷ About £270 million or about 20% of its entire investment overseas by the 1880s; the figure had reached £400 million by 1914 (about 11% of British investment of £3,800 million; Ferguson 2008, p. 244).

³⁸ A coal industry was established in India from scratch to produce 16 million tons a year.

³⁹ Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the USA (Ferguson 2008, p. 234).

Africa into ‘spheres of influence’ based nothing more legitimate than their ‘effective occupation’ completely ignoring the existing rights of native rulers and their peoples (Ferguson 2008, p. 234). The Berlin Conference created “small nations whose arbitrarily drawn borders would always make it difficult for them to stand on their own two feet”—“economically and politically” (Moyo 2009, p. 31). Thus, 10,000 African tribal kingdoms (except Abyssinia and Liberia) were transformed to 36 European colonies and protectorates⁴⁰ (Meredith 2006, p. 2)—roughly a third of which came under the British (Ferguson 2008, p. 222).

The Berlin Conference extended the number of colonizers⁴¹ of Africa from three (Britain, France, and Portugal) to six to include Belgium (founded in 1831) to colonize Congo (as a personal property of King Leopold II), Italy (founded in 1861) to colonize the present day Libya, Eritrea, and a part of Somalia (Somaliland), and German Empire (founded in 1871) to colonize Cameroon, Namibia, Togo, and Tanganyika (in Tanzania; Ferguson 2008, p. 239). The British territorial claims also expanded to include Cape Colony, Natal (South Africa), Bechuanaland (Botswana), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Nyasaland (Malawi) in the southern Africa and also Egypt, the Sudan, Uganda, East Africa (Kenya; essentially connecting the northern and southern most corners of Africa), and (northern) Somalia, and Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast (Ghana), and Nigeria in western Africa. Algeria and Tunisia (in North Africa), and most part of West Africa including Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan (Mali), Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Dahomey (Benin), Niger, Chad, French Congo (Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and the Central African Republic), and Madagascar came under the French. Portugal handed on to Angola, Mozambique, and the small enclave of Guinea (Ferguson 2008, p. 240).⁴²

African societies of the precolonial era had a mosaic of lineage groups, clans, chiefdoms, kingdoms, and empires (often formed with shifting and indeterminate frontiers and loose allegiances; Meredith 2006, p. 154). At the outset of colonial rule, the administrators and ethnographers endeavored to classify the people in Africa in ‘tribes’⁴³ (distinct ethnic units under a chief) for easy control⁴⁴ (Meredith 2006, p. 154). Thus during European colonization, for example, in Sudan and Morocco,

⁴⁰ The total number of independent states increased to 54 at the end of the decolonization process that saw the creation of Eritrea in 1993 (see Collier 2010, p. 179).

⁴¹ The conference was to acknowledge the right to ‘pursue’ “legal ownership of land, free from interference by any other” as the Act had mentioned (see the related entry in the Wikipedia).

⁴² These dramatic acts of the colonialists in Africa are the reasons of the colonization of Africa for “only about eighty years (1880–1960 CE)” (Marston et al. 2005, p. 254). This paragraph is based on Collier (2010); Ferguson (2008); Marston et al. (2005); Meredith (2006).

⁴³ The term ‘tribe,’ refers to a form of social identity of a (kinship, language, or resource based) group who shares a common set of ideas about collective loyalty and political action, and often has negative connotations, is thus often replaced by the term ‘ethnic groups’ that refers to lesser exclusivity (Marston et al. 2005, p. 254).

⁴⁴ Entirely new ethnic groups emerged for example, Abaluyia or Kalenjin in Kenya. Tribal identities were used to by the colonial masters to divide the subjects (e.g., British in Sudan and French in Morocco). New powerful linguistic groups (like Yoruba, Igbo, Ewe, Shona, and so forth) were

tribes, being regarded as the “forms of social organization that might inhibit nationalist movements” were promoted and supported by the colonial states⁴⁵ (based on Marston et al. 2005, pp. 203, 204).

The African and Asian territories faced bifurcation once again following the World War I under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916 CE.⁴⁶ The former German colonies of Togoland, Cameroon, and East Africa were added to the British possessions of Africa (Ferguson 2008, p. 315). The Agreement established British ‘mandates’ over Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine; and the French authority over Syria and Lebanon. Before the World War I, Aden, Egypt, Sudan, Northern Somaliland, and the ‘Trucial States’ (of the present day UAE), and Muscat, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait had been brought under direct British influence (Ferguson 2008, p. 316). The British influence also increased in Persia (renamed Iran from Aryan or ‘noble’) due to the majority British shareholding in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later British Petroleum). As an Admiralty memorandum of 1922 CE did mention that because of strategic reasons “Great Britain should control the territories on which the oil is situated” (Ferguson 2008, p. 316).

The independence of many countries preceded a desk-based demarcation or intentional scramble ignoring ethnic spread or language of different groups of people (Meredith 2006). Many ethnic communities were partitioned into two or three states (e.g., Hausa/Fulani Muslims of Africa were partitioned between Niger, Nigeria, and Chad; the Somalis were partitioned between Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia).⁴⁷ Thus, chaotic decolonization with arbitrary (or purposive) border demarcation saw the divisions of Tutsis (between Congo and then Burundi and Rwanda), of Bangalees (in India and Pakistan, and Bangladesh), Punjabees (between India and Pakistan), Serbs, and Bosnians (into arbitrary boundaries; Based on Easterly 2006, Chap. 7).

Box 7.1 Spatial Fragmentation and Related Impacts: Somalia Somalis, being a relatively homogenous ethnic and religious people (possessing a common language and culture based on pastoral customs and traditions; Meredith 2006, p. 464), have over the years fought among subclans of the dominant Hawiye clan. But the real reason for the infighting goes back to its colonial past. During the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the nineteenth century CE Somalia

formed to reinforce language-based solidarity. The newly ‘appointed’ chiefs were regarded as the symbol of ethnicity, and the colonial agents (Meredith 2006, p. 155).

⁴⁵ Comprehending the worse impacts of tribalism on ‘nationhood,’ the state in Iran, in the early twentieth century CE ruthlessly and systematically attempted to eliminate tribal affiliations (Marston et al. 2005, pp. 203, 204).

⁴⁶ A ‘secret’ agreement between the UK and France (assented by Russia) defining their respective ‘spheres of influence’ in Ottoman land after the latter’s expected downfall during the World War I (see the entry in Wikipedia).

⁴⁷ Yet, Muslims have accepted these divisions as enshrined in the Organization for Islamic Conference charter (Article 11; Moten 2005, Endnote 14).

was “carved up into five separate territories”⁴⁸ (under four colonial ‘masters’). During decolonization the colonial divisions remained intact fragmenting the Somalis into different independent states⁴⁹ and (an unrecognized) Somaliland.⁵⁰ The frustration resulting from the above divisions, worsened by the competition between the two cold-war warriors in keeping Somalia (a strategic location to keep control on the East-West trade) on side changing ‘allies’ (support one or the other factions in the country) for their own strategic interests, became a source of disenchantment of the Somalis about the prospect of reunification resulting in the present conflict-laden chaos.⁵¹ Having lost about 400,000 people in the civil wars, the country is still suffering being hostage to 14 different private armies (Keylor 2006, p. 455). But the Somalis, remaining optimistic about the Somali reunification, have enshrined the desire in the constitution and “emblazoned” it on the Somali flag (with a five-star representing the five segments of the Somali people; Meredith 2006, p. 465).

Muslim Khanates of Tashkent, Samarkand, Khiva, and Emirates of Bukhara (all in the present day Uzbekistan) fell to Russian control in 1865, 1868, 1873, and 1868, respectively (Marston et al. 2005, p. 147). The collapse of the USSR in 1991 also witnessed splits and scrambles in ethnic groups in many newly emerged countries. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had about 30% and 13% ethnic Russian people, respectively. Further, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan had about 15%, 14%, and 4% Uzbek minority.⁵²

Box 7.2 Spatial Dumping and Related Impacts: Sudan The problem in the Sudan is a result of colonization or rather a wrong decolonization attempt that witnessed the dumping of two completely different geographic areas,

⁴⁸ An enclave of desert surrounding the port of Djibouti became French Somaliland to function as a coaling station. The British acquired northern Somaliland to ensure the supply of meat to the “British garrison at Aden.” The Italians carved a portion for themselves with Mogadishu as its capital. Southern Somaliland was incorporated “within the boundaries of British colony of Kenya.” Finally, in the late nineteenth century CE the western part of Somaliland came under Ethiopia (Meredith 2006, p. 465).

⁴⁹ Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.

⁵⁰ The Somali government due to the subclan infighting is so weak that it did not (or could not) do anything at the declaration of independence by Somaliland, an Italian colony federated with Somalia in 1960. Somaliland, unlike Eritrea, did not get international support (Keylor 2006, p. 455) but has been able to survive as a sovereign entity since 1991 because of its internal harmony and external apathy (i.e., no claims from Somalia).

⁵¹ For excellent discussions of related matters, see Chap. 26 (‘Black Hawk Down’) in Meredith (2006, pp. 464–484).

⁵² The figures are from the online CIA Fact Book available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>.

under two British administrators, into one independent state. The relatively advanced north was Arabic-speaking Muslims (three times the size of the population in the South) in “hot, dry, and partly desert” land; the remote, green, and fertile (with abundant annual rainfall) South was inhabited by the adherers of traditional religions (as well as Christianity—the graduates of the mission schools) who speak a multitude of languages.

The mistrust created among the people in the South because of its plundering by the North in search of slaves and ivories as late as in the nineteenth century (see Chap. 6) was accentuated by the North’s contemptuous snubbing of the ‘*abid*’ (or slave—a common name for the South used in the North) out of the independence negotiation and ‘winning’ them from the British. The British “obliged to reach a swift agreement” on power handover (because Egyptian King Farouk was attempting to control the Nile by declaring himself the King of Sudan), nudged the South out placing them at the mercy of the North. The action also served a strategic purpose of the British defeating both—Sudanese nationalist movement and a possible ‘unity of the Nile valley’ (under the auspices of King Farouk of Egypt).⁵³

The colonizers (and also the decolonizing European powers, and ‘friendly’ invaders like in Iraq; did and) do tend to highlight miniscule differences among the people of the colonized (decolonizing; invaded) lands, downplaying or even hiding the latter’s noteworthy similarities (reminding themselves the adage—united we stand, divided we fall). For example, while creating Lebanon, the French ensured a great deal of political power to right-wing Maronite Christians turning them into majority by arbitrarily drawing territorial boundaries (Marston et al. 2005, p. 207).⁵⁴

The problem in the Palestine (also a result of arbitrary border demarcation) is that there “too the British cut and ran, in 1949, bequeathing to the world the unresolved question of the new state of Israel’s relations with the stateless Palestinian and the neighboring Arab states” (Ferguson 2008, p. 357). Britain’s foreign secretary Arthur Balfour’s declaration⁵⁵ of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine, a proposal of European devotees of Zionism (headed by an Austrian journalist Theodor Herzl) complicated further the postwar partition of former Ottoman Arab land because this

⁵³ This paragraph is based mainly on Meredith (2006, pp. 35, 36). These two parts were re-separated in July 2011.

⁵⁴ The Christians, even after having been dwindled to about one third of the five million population now, are still guaranteed 50% of the parliamentary seats, the presidency, and the position of the army chief (Gulf News, 9.10.10, p. 11) because all groups fear a return to the ‘conflicts’ of the 1980s, if the statuesque is threatened.

⁵⁵ The Declaration contained “a hopeless contradiction: ‘His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine....’” (Ferguson 2008, p. 357).

piece of ‘Ottoman’ land at that time contained roughly 60,000 Jewish out of a total of about 750,000 inhabitants (Keylor 2006, p. 55).

Box 7.3 Nigeria—An Invented ‘Hodgepodge’ Nation Since independence Nigeria, with 25% of Africa’s population, has not experienced peaceful life because Nigerian unity was a “British invention” (Meredith 2006, p. 8) by a “hodgepodge of some 250 ethnic groups that inhibit the development of national loyalty, and the endemic political corruption flowing from the hope of instant wealth from oil sales” (Keylor 2006, p. 460). The North, with three-quarters of the total area was largely Muslim and Hausa speaking, accustomed to a feudal system of government run by the Fulani ruling class with not much education⁵⁶ did not allow its people to associate with the ‘Southerners’—the ‘pagans’ and ‘infidels.’ People in the West (Lagos and many other states under kingly chiefs), being exposed to the Europeans earlier, did progress well in education, commerce, and administration. The Igbo, from the Eastern region, swarmed to different towns across the country “as clerks, artisans, traders and laborers” because of their higher level of education (Meredith 2006, p. 76).⁵⁷ A new constitution in 1979, in order to reduce the risk of polarization among the three main ethnic groups, created a federation of 19 states, consisting of four predominantly Hausa-Fulani (29% of the population) states, four Yoruba (21%), two Igbo (18%), and nine ethnic minority states requiring the political parties “to demonstrate a broad national presence before they could qualify for registration” (Meredith 2006, p. 219). By around the same time, Nigeria became the sixth largest producer of petroleum with a \$ 24 billion annual oil revenue setting off “a vicious scramble for political office and the wealth that went with it” creating “a government of contractors, for contractors, by the contractors”⁵⁸ (Meredith 2006, pp. 220, 221).

Arbitrary demarcation of borders during colonization (and once again during decolonization) did have debilitating impacts on some MMCs so much so that some authors commented that the task of the colonialists was to “split the Muslim world, to break its moral unity, using to this effect the ethnic and political divisions to

⁵⁶ At independence only 57 of the 1,000 students at the University College in Ibadan were from the North (Meredith 2006).

⁵⁷ The government positions were filled by highly qualified Igbo (and about 1% of Nigerian higher executive posts were held by the Northerners) because at independence, the North, with 54% of the population, had only 10 and 5% of the primary and secondary school enrollments, respectively.

⁵⁸ For example, Chief Masood Abiola, a Yoruba and a future president, made huge fortunes with his connections with the military. In the eight years’ of Babangida’s regime alone, Abiola’s companies (dealing with agriculture, aviation, banking, communications, oil exploration, publishing, shipping, and so forth) “were estimated to have gained government contracts worth some \$ 845 million” (Meredith 2006, p. 395).

accentuate these differences.”⁵⁹ In some MMCs, ethnic and spatial fragmentation created more problems (e.g., Nigeria) than some others (e.g., Indonesia). Irrespective of the colonizers’ purpose, the fact of the matter is that the dividing of a people in different tribes, at the beginning of the colonization, and then dumping them into many more arbitrary national boundaries during decolonization both proved detrimental to growth and functioning of the people concerned. The divided people, uncertain of the future, tended to scramble on whatever resources (or power) they could place their hands on.

European colonization of about 400 years in Asia and that of about a hundred years or so in Africa was responsible for economic restructuring of the colonies. Owing to the different approaches and objectives of different colonial powers, colonial experiences in different decolonized countries had different levels and patterns of social, cultural, and political form to create different extents of economic and political miseries in many postcolonial MMCs.

7.4 European Colonization and the MMCs

Most of the 47 MMCs in Africa and Asia had been under European colonial powers. For example, most areas of Mughal and Ottoman empires became British and French colonies/protectorate⁶⁰ (20 and 14, respectively). Two were Portuguese colony (Guinea Bissau and Oman), and one was a Dutch colony (Indonesia). Among the rest, four (Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) never faced European colonization, and six countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) spent few decades under the Soviet system. These ten countries (Afghanistan until the Soviet invasion in 1980 and the wars that followed) did comparatively much better than the compatriots in different aspects of human development (as demonstrated in different chapters in this Volume).⁶¹

Except for Iraq (decolonized in 1932) and Oman (decolonized in 1650), all these colonies became independent states between 1941 (Lebanon) and 1993 (Eritrea) the largest number (15) of which gained independence in the 1960s. Eleven of these countries are in Zone 4⁶² (Latitude 28–36° N) and nine are in Zone 3 (Latitude

⁵⁹ A comment made by Baron Carra de Vaux of the Catholic Institute in 1901 (cited in Moten 2005, p. 236; from al-Attas 1985, p. 95).

⁶⁰ Apart from remaining a part of the Ottoman Empire, for a short period Egypt (between 1882 and 1922) was under British protection, and Libya was under Italian rule (1911–1943). None was a ‘colony.’ Thus, Egypt and Libya are grouped as British protectorates.

⁶¹ The far-reaching influence of the characters of the European colonial powers on the economy and society in Asian countries are demonstrated by the facts that the East Asian tigers (China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) were never colonies. On the other hand, the Asian tragedies like Cambodia and Laos were under French, and Timore Leste was a Portuguese colony (Easterly 2006). The situation in the MMCs seems not to be different.

⁶² Since Ibn Khaldun suggested that, if 0–63° Latitude is divided equally into seven zones (with 9° Latitude each) it seems the (old) world civilizations were most developed in Zone 4 (28° and

19–27° N). Most (20) countries are in Zones 1 and 2 (Latitude 1–18° N), and seven are in Zone 5 (Latitude 28–36° N; Table 7.1). There seems to be a relationship between Latitude and (de)colonization—countries in the lower Latitude had to wait longer for independence. Of the nine decolonized countries in Zone 4 (higher Latitude—28–36° N), six achieved independence in the 1940s and 1950s. On the other hand, there are 14 decolonized MMCs in Zone 2 (Latitude 10–18° N)—12 of them achieved independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Out of the nine countries in Zone 3 one (Saudi Arabia) was not a colony, one (Oman) was decolonized in 1650, and two (Bangladesh⁶³ and Mauritania) were decolonized in 1947 (from Britain) and 1960 (from France), respectively. The rest (Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Qatar, and the UAE) were not colonies in the true sense of the term. Most countries with no colonial experience are in the higher Latitude (more than 39° N) except for Afghanistan (33) and Saudi Arabia (27).

The first and the most important aspect of the economic structuring program of European colonial powers in the colonies was to ensure continuous supply of the factors of production to the ‘masters’ that was made possible by introducing cash crop in the colonial economies. The British protectorates (since the end of the World War I) in the Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE), and a tiny colony (Maldives—an island) did not have economic activity to complement or compete with the British, or raw materials necessary for British manufacturing sector.⁶⁴ Thus, these countries were not subjected to economic restructuring. The colonies in other parts of Africa and Asia had both, and were subjected to economic restructuring (primarily through the introduction of cash crops).

Economic restructuring under the colonial powers permanently transformed many MMCs’ economic system. The introduction of cash crops replacing food crops, during colonial era, created economic dependence of the peasants who did/do not own lands. Further, some cash crops degraded (food crop) lands ‘beyond repair,’⁶⁵ and created a cash crop-supporting economic comprador class who strived for self-preservation through political manipulation in the postcolonial era often creating and/or sustaining neocolonial political system(s) (see Chap. 8). A cash crop, once introduced in an agricultural economic system, becomes so entrenched into the economic or social systems that its uprooting (‘rewinding’ the agricultural system) becomes very difficult. For example, after years of practices opium became a major export earner of Turkey but the government ban on its export (to induce

36° N; expanding to zones 3 and 5; Lacoste 1984). The ‘zones’ in this chapter correspond to this classification (for more see Chap. 1).

⁶³ Bangladesh (East Pakistan) became a part of the decolonized Pakistan to become an independent state in 1971.

⁶⁴ The discovery of petroleum in the region that started a competition between the UK and USA to secure (better) deals from the local Sheikhs allowed the external powers influence the Arab economies.

⁶⁵ For example, cotton severely lowers soil fertility; areas of West Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa (Sudan), South Asia that experienced the introduction of cotton plantation during the colonial era are “now unable to switch to more profitable crops or even to produce food because of the depleted soil” (based on a Wikipedia entry on Economy of West Africa).

Table 7.1. MMCs: Colonial past and economic, political, and social impacts

Geographic location	British colony (20)	French colony (14)	Dutch (1)	Portuguese (2)	None/USSR (10)	Total
1: Lat. 1–9	4		1 (Lat. 5 S)			5
2: Lat. 10–18	7 (one 12 S)	7		1		15
3: Lat. 19–27	6	1		1	1	9
4: Lat. 28–36	3	3			2	11
5: Lat. 37–45					7	7
Total	22 (43%)	14 (30%)	1 (2%)	2 (4%)	10 (21%)	47
<1945	1	2		1	4	8
1946–1959	4	4	1			9
1960–1969	8	7				15
1970–1979	5	1		1		7
1980–1989	1					1
1990–2000	1				6	7
Total	20 (43%)	14 (30%)	1 (2%)	2 (4%)	10 (21%)	47
Subjected to restructuring of the economy	All (except Bahrain, Kuwait, Maldives, Qatar, UAE)	All	All	Guinea Bissau Oman	All (except Iran and Saudi Arabia)	40
Subjected to cultural/social organizational transformation	All (except Maldives)	All	All	All	All (except Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey)	43
Subjected to arbitrary border demarcation	All (except one small island: Maldives)	All (except one small island: Comoros)	All	All	Afghanistan (with Pakistan), Iran (with Iraq), Saudi Arabia, Turkey (post-WWI); others during the formation of USSR	45

British colonies and protectorates (20): Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya (was under Italian occupation between 1912–1927 CE), Malaysia, Maldives, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, UAE, and Yemen; *Dutch colony (1):* Indonesia; *French colonies and protectorates (14):* Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Syria, and Tunisia; *Portuguese colonies (2):* Guinea and Oman; *Under Soviet Union (6):* Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; *No colonial history (4):* Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey

indirect pressure for its elimination) in 1972 had to be lifted in two years because the “farmers were unable to adapt their land to other crop.”⁶⁶

As discussed earlier, the European colonial powers influenced social structure (responsible for the resources, for example land in Africa) everywhere (except Maldives) to exploit the colonies’ resources. All noncolonies (except Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey) faced social transformation for different reasons. For example, Saudi Arabia, though not colonized (or made a protectorate like the rest in the region) during the anti-Ottoman agitation in the area, as a part of the negotiation for a better petroleum deal, witnessed the creation of the country as well as a new social power structure with the help of the Americans (and the Europeans). For the same reason the other five countries in the Gulf (Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE), Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen faced reorganization of their social power relationships when they were under the European protection or the European colonial powers were around.⁶⁷ Under the Soviet system the party apparatchik created a new form of social structure that continued in the post-USSR central Asian MMCs.

Noteworthy that irrespective of their colonial relationship all countries (except two small islands of Comoros and Maldives) were subjected to arbitrary border demarcation during colonization, decolonization, or (de)colonization of the neighbors, as an outcome of the World War I (dismantling the Ottoman lands), or during the annexation by the USSR (that was preserved at the independence) resulting varied social and political unrests.⁶⁸ Economic consideration and social restructuring were precursors of geographic boundaries of the decolonized states. Unfortunately, however, all countries, irrespective of their relationships to the European colonial powers, faced arbitrary border demarcation. For example, (noncolony) Afghanistan⁶⁹ and Iran faced arbitrary border demarcation during the creation of Pakistan and Iraq, respectively, and Saudi Arabia and Turkey faced arbitrary border demarcation during the dismantling of Ottoman Turkey (following the World War I).

Interesting to note, it seems people in countries where border demarcation was a result of other sociocultural factors (e.g., Nigeria, Somalia) did not take the border demarcation gracefully, and, often, continued a hostile attitude toward the matter with huge economic and social impacts. Ethnic unrest and political violence cost many African states dearly. Apart from direct casualty, between 1960 and 1987 around 100,000 trained and qualified Africans left their homelands to work abroad; between 1986 and 1990 alone, some 50,000–60,000 middle and high level state managers left Africa (Meredith 2006, p. 368). On the other hand, border demarcation resulting from economic considerations (like in the Gulf) has been taken sport-

⁶⁶ The government itself finally had to take charge of the production and sale of opium in the country (Marston et al. 2005, p. 224). Similar stories are evident in Afghanistan in the recent past.

⁶⁷ For example, the British signed the General Treaty of Peace in 1820 CE and the Perpetual Maritime Truce in 1853 CE with the then rulers—the forefathers of different rulers in the Gulf (based on O’Sullivan 2008, pp. 73–75).

⁶⁸ Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey were not colonies but suffered annexation of its territory during the decolonization of their neighbors.

⁶⁹ That was created as a buffer state to protect British India from the Tsarist invasion.

ingly without any economic and social consequences.⁷⁰ Border demarcation as a part of the independence deal, however, has been defended by the ‘winning party’ in the new state. The frustration of the ‘losing’ party, multiplied by years’ of neglect by the government, in the recent past has been a source of political conflict in many MMCs (the worst examples, as discussed before, being Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and so forth).

7.5 Conclusion

It seems that the European colonial period in Africa (for about 100 years) and Asia (for about 400 years) destroyed the traditional local leaderships, introduced individual land ownership (replacing the traditional community or village-based land tenure system in Africa and Asia, respectively), siphoned away resources (and profits, from ‘rentier’ economic activities), imposed arbitrary borders (often intentionally disregarding language, ethnic, and religious backgrounds), created new ‘tribes’ (as a tool of social as well as economic exploitation), forced the intrusion of cash crop (to support the colonizers’ industry and create food dependency), and destructed the indigenous knowledge, value-adding skills, and the economic systems. All these European colonial actions have been reasons for economic downturn and sociopolitical conflicts in the postcolonial societies. Nonetheless, the colonial investment in physical infrastructure, education, transmigration for agriculture/industrial workers and the initiatives for land (re)distribution may have been sources of economic growth in some colonies.

The European colonization of the MMCs (like anywhere else) had different objectives and approaches. A better understanding of economic relationships in the MMCs rests on an understanding of the colonial systems, and their respective economic, political, and social impacts. The Dutch and the French colonial powers were interested in accumulating wealth as well as influencing culture; while the Spanish and Portuguese colonial powers were interested in spiritual conversion as well. The British imperial power, on the other hand, was interested exclusively in the wealth of the colonies (and thus outlasted the rest by efficiently manipulating the existing local power structures). The MMCs with no colonial invasion were also subjected to some outside intervention to face economic, political, and social transformations. In all these events (in the invasion and the outcomes) geography played a significant role.

The arbitrary border demarcation acts of the decolonizing powers ignoring the geographic spread of different languages have aggravated the situation beyond imagination in some countries. For example, there was no dominant single indigenous African language (but many important languages across different territories)

⁷⁰ The worst incident resulting from a border demarcation for economic reason is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (to stop oil drilling in Ramallah oil field by Kuwait and recapture the strategic Bubian Island) at the Iraqi border.

in many independent ‘nations’ in Africa. As a result, many independent African states chose a European language for official business and education systems (Marston et al. 2005, p. 266) to deal with the situation. The recent increased educational enlightenment in the affected areas (e.g., West African countries) this ‘invasion’ of colonial language in the postcolonial societies is opening up the wounds of colonization (and related ethnic dumping; Collier 2010, p. 179). The search for ‘imaginary’ enemies creating conflicts among different ethnic communities retarding the process of creating a harmonious relationship required for economic investment, activities, and human development.

Menzies (2003) argues that economic history of the world, in general and the colonial history, in particular, would have been different had the sea voyages by the Chinese Muslim Admiral Zheng He received continued Chinese imperial support to protect Africa and Asia from European colonial invasion. Though the history cannot be rewritten, it seems China and many MMCs (like many other countries in Africa and Asia) are planning to shape the future differently with significant Chinese involvement in (the conflict ridden areas of) Africa through direct investment (China owns 40% of the Greater Nile Petroleum Company in Sudan), and the construction of unique infrastructure in Asia (not subject to the tensions or turmoil in the Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, or the Red Sea⁷¹), and the creation of a new (regional) economic cooperation group (primarily with the MMCs in Central Asia).⁷² These activities have seen exponential growth in African exports to China (from \$ 5.5 billion in 2000 to \$ 12.6 billion in 2006) and imports from China (from \$ 5.1 billion to \$ 26.7 billion during the same period).⁷³ Chinese investment may bring temporary respite for the MMCs (along with other African and Asian countries). Nonetheless, the introduction of economic, social, and political structure and institutions are more important (then their historical analysis) to have a sustained human development, and should be a priority in the MMCs’ human development efforts because appreciating the past to identify the lessons for future will have beneficial effects on human development than that of living in it.

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⁷¹ China has been rebuilding and widening the Karakoram Highway (with a proposal for railways), and financing, and building a deep-water port at Gwadar in Pakistan exclusively for shipping its goods through Karakoram (Emmott 2009, p. 53) avoiding the above water bodies.

⁷² Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), being parts of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO, created in 1996 as ‘Shanghai Five’ and reorganized and renamed in 2001 also includes China and Russia) are likely to influence the future geopolitics of the region.

⁷³ This chapter is based on Emmott (2009, pp. 146–154); some information has been updated from related Wikipedia entries.

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Chapter 8

Power Configuration in the Muslim World: Exploring the Post-WWII Era

S. M. Abdul Quddus

8.1 Introduction

The 47 Muslim majority countries (MMCs) in Africa and Asia are situated in geographically diverse areas stretching from the Atlas Mountains in the west to the Malay Archipelago in the east and the Himalayas in the south as well as from sub-Saharan Africa to the steppes of Central Asia. These MMCs have great diversity in social, economic, ideological, institutional, and political expressions as well as in the structure of government ranging from the Islamic Republic of Iran to secular Kazakhstan as well as from absolute monarchy in Saudi Arabia to democracies in Mali, Malaysia, or Turkey. There are states with comparatively effective government institutions (e.g., Malaysia, Turkey) while other governments (like in Somalia) have only a precarious existence.

Most countries in Africa and Asia have weak governmental systems owed predominantly to the “syncretic” character of such states where the governance system is based on clientelism (aka the patron–client model of politics). Observers of these countries (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002; Organski 1967) commonly note the existence of loose coalition of both modern and traditional elites, who tend to foster economic and political changes without changing the complex privilege–obligation relationships among different unequal players or the status or ‘tradition’ of the society.

Further, to complicate the situation the inhabitants of the colonized (Muslim) countries had to modernize far too rapidly and were forced to comply with somebody else’s program (while Europeans and Americans were free to modernize at their own pace setting their own agenda; Armstrong 2002, p. 124). Unlike the West,

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the modernization process in the MMCs did not accompany autonomy (or independence) or innovation (free from imitating the West).¹ Thus, “very different ingredients have gone into the modern cake of the colonized (Muslim) countries,² and democracy, secularism, pluralism and the rest are not likely to emerge from the process in the way that they did in the West” (Armstrong 2002, p. 124).

In this chapter our point of departure is in order to understand the dynamics of power configuration (hence governance in the MMCs), one has to grasp, among others, the features and the extent of colonial legacies over the political and administrative structure and process in the MMCs. In order to explore the power configuration in the MMCs, we shall begin by looking at the styles of governments in the MMCs. The authoritarian style of government in the MMCs that promotes ‘clientelism’ also results in ‘syncretic’ politics of coercion and conflicts. These issues will thus be discussed. At the end the chapter will look at the regime types and their respective impacts, in regards to the above phenomena, on the MMCs to draw some concluding remarks.

8.2 Government Styles in the MMCs: The Reflection of Authoritarian Regimes, Patrimonialism and Clientelism?

Most MMCs in Africa and Asia have been formed or decolonized in the last 60 years. These countries had different traditions and colonial powers and established different forms of government. The nations of the world can be classified according to how they govern themselves or determine the leadership. In the recent past, the system of ‘governance’ has become an essential component in any explanation of economic and social development of a society. It is considered as both cause and effect of the formation and transmission of *values*, to the creation and distribution of *wealth*, and the emergence and consolidation of *institutions* (Tarschys 2001, p. 28), and is necessary for the positive growth and continuity of human civilization. World Bank (1991, p. 1) defines the term ‘governance’ as “... the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development.” For Hyden (2001, p. 15), “governance links values and interests of citizens, legislative choice, executive and organizational structures and roles, and judicial oversight in a manner that suggests interrelationships among them that might have significant consequences for performance... .” In this respect, ‘governance’ refers to the way society governs itself, and is a much broader term than the traditional ‘government’ that places emphasis just on actions of public organizations. Peter Evans (1995) in his ‘embedded autonomy’ thesis suggested three conditions for ‘governance’ (called efficient development administration). The ad-

¹ Economic and political modernization in Europe and America had two main characteristics: (a) innovation; and (b) autonomy, such as declarations of independence on the political, intellectual, religious, and social fronts (Armstrong 2002, p. 124).

² For more discussion on the subject, please see Chaps. 1 and 7 in this Volume.

ministration (a) should not codify only rules and rationality rather emphasize an ethos or morality that binds it together and sets standards for decision-making; (b) should allow autonomy to the private agents and organizations in society; and (c) should be embedded in society, in effect having communication channels to deliver relevant information both ways between all major stakeholders and the state.

A country's governance may be considered democratic when it meets three conditions: the legislature is elected freely in multiparty elections; the executive is directly or indirectly elected in popular elections and is responsible to voters or to a legislature elected according to the first condition; and at least 50% of the adult population have the right to vote³ (Boix 2003, p. 66; Boix and Rosato 2001). Scholars (e.g., Boix 2003; Elkins 2000, and so on) have identified five major categories of governments.⁴ *'Democracy'* refers to the use of competitive and periodic elections to determine leadership of the country; and *semidemocracy* denotes the occurrence of periodic elections to produce leaders, while monarchies with constitutional roles are still retained and institutionalized. In a *semiauthoritarian* government election is operational but a strong institution personified in an individual with the highest political authority referred to as the supreme leader or president holds all executive powers. All *authoritarian* government indicates an executive with absolute power (derived from a monarchy, a party or the armed forces); and a *transitional* state may have a 'caretaker' administration or no clearly structured government.

Table 8.1 reveals that 28 (60%) of the 47 MMCs in Africa and Asia have governments akin to an authoritarian system. Governments (formed by monarchs, military dictators, or 'turn-coat' politicians) in these MMCs are either unelected or authoritarian in nature. Out of the total 47 MMCs only nine countries are characterized as 'democratic' and another nine as 'semidemocratic' (38% of the MMCs).⁵ Among the 20 British colonies 8 now have democracies, and 11 authoritarian system of government; the corresponding figures for the 14 French colonies are 6 and 8, respectively.

The authoritarian nature of government in the MMCs may be sourced in the colonial history and legacy of the West. Most MMCs were politically subjugated by the European colonial empires such as Britain, France, or Holland. The British controlled Iraq, the Arabian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent, Malaya, and Brunei; whereas the French were in West and North Africa, Lebanon, and Syria; and the Dutch took control over Indonesia, and then Portuguese and Russians held some Muslim territories (see Chap. 7).

Hyden (1973 quoted in Gran 2004) describes the distinctive features of British and French—the two dominant colonizers of the MMCs—and their effect on the governance system of newly emerging states in Africa. French colonialists intro-

³ Boix and Rosato's said data cover the period from 1800 to 1999. During that period some countries did give voting right to some of their citizens while others gave voting rights to half of their citizens. Therefore, Boix and Rosato took 50% as minimum requirement for a country to be categorized as democracy.

⁴ For a detailed discussion of regime type see (Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes 2003; Elkins 2000).

⁵ One country, Somalia, is placed under 'transition.'

Table 8.1 Muslim majority countries: Government types and colonial past. (Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2009, Online)

Country	Government type	Colonial past
Afghanistan	Semidemocracy	N/A
Algeria	Authoritarian	French
Azerbaijan	Authoritarian	USSR
Bahrain	Authoritarian	British
Bangladesh	Semidemocracy	British
Brunei Dar-us-Salam	Authoritarian	British
Burkina Faso	Semidemocracy	French
Chad	Semiauthoritarian	French
Comoros	Democracy	French
Djibouti	Authoritarian	French
Egypt	Authoritarian	British
Eritrea	Authoritarian	British
Gambia	Authoritarian	British
Guinea	Auth/transitional	Portuguese
Guinea Bissau	Democracy	French
Indonesia	Democracy	Dutch
Iran	Semidemocracy	N/A
Iraq	Semidemocracy	British
Jordan	Semiauthoritarian	British
Kazakhstan	Authoritarian	USSR
Kuwait	Authoritarian	British
Kyrgyzstan	Authoritarian	USSR
Lebanon	Semidemocracy	French
Libya	Authoritarian	British
Malaysia	Semidemocracy	British
Maldives	Democracy	British
Mali	Democracy	French
Mauritania	Authoritarian	French
Morocco	Authoritarian	French
Niger	Authoritarian	French
Nigeria	Democracy	British
Oman	Authoritarian	Portuguese
Pakistan	Semidemocracy	British
Qatar	Authoritarian	British
Saudi Arabia	Authoritarian	N/A
Senegal	Semidemocracy	French
Sierra Leone	Democracy	British
Somalia	Transitional	British
Sudan	Semidemocracy	British
Syria	Authoritarian	French
Tajikistan	Authoritarian	USSR
Tunisia	Authoritarian	French
Turkey	Democracy	N/A
Turkmenistan	Authoritarian	USSR
United Arab Emirates	Authoritarian	British
Uzbekistan	Authoritarian	USSR
Yemen	Authoritarian	British

duced ‘top-down’ administrative system, while British colonialists implemented indirect rule by decentralizing the state system and absorbing local authorities into the system. The colonial state was to hold a loosely coupled, horizontal, multicultural society together. “Nepotism and corruption were for that reason important means of rule, connecting individuals of local authority and separate communities into the realm of colonial rule without them mobilizing for participation” (Gran 2004). Hyden (1973) also argues, the European colonial state structures and administrative systems (portrayed in Gran’s discussion) were taken over unreformed by the new regimes in Africa, and there was no middle class in the newly emerged countries to force and implement change along the lines of the principles and choices of the peoples. These phenomena seem to be applicable for newly decolonized MMCs in Asia as well.

The possible positive impacts of European ideologies, technologies, modern system of education, commerce and trade, as well as ‘institutions of modernity’ brought to the colonies (Bertsch et al. 1978, p. 343) were eclipsed by the consequential replacement of indigenous system of governance, political structures and process, sociopolitical values and standard, legal practices, educational, and economic systems and institutions. Before colonization many countries in the so-called developing world were not as distinct as they are now. The legacy of colonialism is the key in explaining the points of convergence and divergence in experiences with state formation across the developing world, hence the Muslim world, where the colonists usually forced together many different cultures or split cultures (Giddens 1993, p. 529). The influences of Western colonial power over its former settlement, to some extent, still remain valid (varying in degrees because of the socioeconomic and political conditions of the nation). The previous colonial powers (and the new powers with ‘colonial’ economic objectives) receive a better access to the resources and market of these MMCs through the authoritarian regimes (in particular in comparatively weak socioeconomic and political conditions) tolerating or supporting the latter’s nondemocratic reign and unethical actions. Thus, Giddens (1993, p. 530) opines that the setting up of ‘concession companies’ was a significant economic intervention of colonialists and the successors of some of them are very prominent in the world trade today. It is to mention that colonialism not only altered the geographical boundary of the Muslim states (Armstrong 2002, p. 134) but also paved the way for colonial masters to find the ‘right’ persons to be in power. Thus, Armstrong (2002) argues that the transformation in the MMCs began when the Europeans came in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to militarily colonize the Muslim world.

In many (postcolonial) MMCs, the previous colonial master (or the new world powers) created or supported the creation of authoritarian regimes. The colonial intervention also challenged the Muslim faith as Armstrong (2002, p. 133) claimed while referring to Egypt. Thus there has been (neo)colonial influence in state formation, nation-building, and the governance process in the MMCs. The other important aspects of governance in many MMCs are ‘patrimonialism’ and ‘clientelism’ based politics and administration. Patrimonialism is where government authority and resources are considered as private property and rights (Weber cited in

Parsons 1947, p. 353). On the other hand, the term ‘clientelism’ refers to a complex chain of personal bond between a (political) patron and the individual clients or followers that create mutual material advantage: the patron furnishes excludable resources (money, jobs) to the dependents and accomplices in return for their support and cooperation (votes, attendance at rallies). This patron–client relationship (or clientelism) provides the patron disproportionate power to arbitrarily distribute the resources (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002, p. 2) always as a tool of power enhancement.

The patron–client system of politics—the key ‘network’ that connects the nation and the mass of citizens—in the MMCs seem to be very strong. Social bonding in these states is not developed beyond the boundary of the family, the ‘local,’ the ethnic group, or religious communities/sects. Many observers (e.g., Dove 1981; Maloney 1991; Quddus 2007, and so on) suggest that there are problem of independent conceptions of ‘person’ and ‘self’ in many MMCs. Political institutions in these countries do not operate on the basis of any ‘ideology,’ and the regimes often try to win support as ‘patrons’ by using an intricate mixture of positive (e.g., prestige, positions, licenses) and negative (e.g., removal from position or of benefit) rewards (Khan 1991; Scott 1972).

Governance systems in West Asian and North African MMCs, in particular, seem to have resemblance to patrimonialism and clientelism which is highly personalized with strictly limited legitimacy (only within the ruling family or clan). To cite Gran (2004, p. 57), the elites “and clans use politics to secure their familial/ethnic interests. There are no institutions with legitimacy across sections of elites or social classes. Even disorder and chaos are rational elements in the elites’ political repertoires.” There are of course MMCs, such as Bangladesh or Nigeria where democratic governance is operational in hierarchical societies with state powers, in most cases, being heavily reliant on the colonial-type administrative system (where the ‘rationalization’ of administration meant an emphasis on rigidity to promote speed and efficiency) under the control of central administration, and the security forces (e.g., police, para-military, or military). These governments emphasize on the codification of law, rules, and procedural rigidity as well as rationality or rather emphasis on an ethos or a morality that sets standards for decision-making. In these MMCs political, intellectual, and social autonomy is limited and freedoms of assembly and speech are severely restricted. The functioning of the public service in these states also reflects a pervasive clientelism and group interests (Baxter et al. 1993, p. 278; World Bank 2002, p. 6).

Another important feature of governance in many MMCs is the regimes’ skeptic view about the expansion of civil society in line with their styles of government. Irrespective of their character (‘democratic’ or authoritarian), regimes usually do not allow civil societies to operate as they are seen as independent and alternative centers of power. Moreover, the regimes fear that the colonialists (and their allies) may have space for reconstructing and consolidating their political interest/power through the civil society organizations (Gran 2004). Intolerance to civil society, in most MMCs, is also a reflection of deep-rooted culture of despotism in their political process. All these phenomena allow the continuation of authoritarian system in the MMCs.

8.3 Syncretic Politics and Conflicts and Coercion in the MMCs

In Western liberal democracies, all citizens enjoyed the benefits of modernization that saw a steady industrialization and commercialization of the agrarian sector. Thus, the conflict between the two ‘interest groups,’ i.e., the landowners and the industrialists dissolved slowly. In the then ‘socialist countries’ the industrial elites smashed the peasant class (known as antimodern group) to solve the conflicts. But substantial disparity in income and influence between traditional landowners and rising industrialists existent in all postcolonial states degenerated in to ‘syncretic’ politics where the government had to intervene in the inevitable conflict between the landed aristocracy and rising industrialists. Further, the existence of patron–client politics, the dominant nature of the executive branch, and the networks of military bureaucracy made the governments, often in the hands of the aristocracy, all powerful (Bertsch et al. 1978).

In the newly emerged Muslim states which are only several decades old, the landed aristocracy (somewhat developed by the colonial rulers to serve their colonial interests) is too strong to be destroyed or converted by the industrial elites. In fact, the landed aristocracy and the neoindustrialists are actually separated from one another along class interests, and ethnic, racial, linguistic, or religious identities. These two dominant groups, failing to overcome their differences, pave the way for a syncretic party or an authoritarian regime or a military dictator to rule the country where the “rural and the industrial elites have managed to cover over their differences enough to cooperate in governing the country usually through the mechanism of a semiparliamentary, authoritarian regime.” Governments in many MMCs symbolize the characteristics of “syncretic states” because the industrialists needing “a large, mobile, well-educated, disciplined, and motivated work force, and will seek to lure farm workers into the cities....” On the other hand, the “landlords want to keep their peasant class docile, traditional, and poorly educated so that they will not wish to upset the clientelist system” (Bertsch et al. 1978, p. 421).

Further, some MMCs have been portrayed as the ‘iron cages’ of bureaucracy being governed (since independence) by civil servants (often a creation of the colonial master), and later by both civil servants and the army. Many MMCs in Africa and Asia that became independent after World War II experienced military rule. For scholars (e.g., Clark 1974; Jahan 1980; Siddique 1996), military reign in the post-World War II MMCs is attested to the sociopolitical instability, corruption and ineffectiveness of the civilian regimes, external intervention by major world powers or the neighboring states, the defeat of the military in a war with another country and so on. Alavi (1973) also identified the role of states in some postcolonial Muslim societies as ‘military-bureaucratic oligarchy.’ According to his thesis, the notion of an ‘overdeveloped’ superstructure or state bureaucracy was a crucial element in some postcolonial MMCs in South Asia, and the role of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy in these countries was to mediate the competing interests of the three

propertied classes,⁶ i.e., the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie, and the landed classes (Alavi 1973, p. 147). In the postcolonial MMCs in Africa and Asia there is a relationship between the authoritarian regime, the ‘overdeveloped’ bureaucracy and the military intervention in politics and administration. It is also likely that in such situations the military (or a civil–military coalition) enjoys more autonomy and control compared to weak traditional power blocks such as national political institutions, weak private enterprises, and the feudal landowning class, and create a system of coercion through (or often to avoid) conflicts.

8.4 Composition and Imposition of Regimes in the MMCs

As mentioned earlier majority of the MMCs are authoritarian in nature, where states are largely organized around the ethnic groups (in particular in Africa). ‘Trust’ as a means of ‘social control’ (Barber 1983) or ‘reduction of complexity’ (Barber 1983; Luhman 1980) in these countries is not directed towards the common public (Gran 2004). Alike the MMCs in Africa, patron–client political relationship in Asia is more important than elected–electorate trust and relationships, and determines whose voices will be heard (Barman 1988; Bertsch et al. 1978; Jahangir 1982; Quddus 2010; Zaidi 1970). Moreover, there are two power centers in relation to the developing MMCs: the governments of colonial states or powerful democracies of the West; and the urban as well as the traditional landed aristocracies, i.e., the patrons of both the city and the rural areas. Whenever these two (international and domestic) power blocs are in agreement about the necessity to change a regime or to limit the power of a regime they can easily implement their missions.⁷ Thus, democratic transition in the MMCs is likely to be influenced by the above two forces.

Table 8.2 reveals a disappointing scenario of the status of democracy index (SDI)⁸ in the MMCs. Except for Brunei, all the MMCs offer some type of suffrage to its citizens. The data, however, show that only in 12 (out of the 47 MMCs) the executive is elected in free and fair elections; while the legislature is elected in 18 MMCs. In 18 MMCs the executive and in 10 MMCs the legislature is not subject to any election. In the rest of the MMCs the present election system is not free or fair. Though there are elections in some MMCs there is no party-based electoral system to offer the citizens opportunities for interest articulation and aggregation except for

⁶ Alavi argued that the “over-developed” bureaucracy had been established by the colonial metropolitan bourgeoisie comprised of urban-based political elites to exercise dominance over the indigenous classes such as “merchants” and “landlord” (Alavi 1973).

⁷ The political development before 2008 national election in Bangladesh, and recent political developments in Tunisia and Egypt are a few examples in this respect.

⁸ Table 8.2 is composed of six ‘elements’ of democracy index, e.g. (1) election for executive; (2) election for legislative; (3) party completion; (4) suffrage; (5) press freedom; (6) human rights. Each of these elements have two points weightage (total 12 points), where 2 points indicate: “yes” (“direct”) / “free” / “Fully observed,” 1 point refers to: “indirect” / “partly free” / “some (controlled),” and 0 point indicates: “no” / “not free” / “not observed.”

seven MMCs; while there is no political party at all in 16 MMCs. Thus, the SDI in general is very low in the MMCs and 25 (out of total 47 or 53%) MMCs score less than 50 (ranging from 8 to 45%). Worth noting that the SDI scores for the oil-rich countries and that of the former USSR states are much lower (e.g., 08.33 in Bahrain, Brunei, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE or 16.67 in Qatar and the UAE).

Being signatories to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the MMCs showed dismal performance in upholding and maintaining human rights—none scoring ‘2’ (signifying ‘fully observed’ human rights record) with 24 scoring a zero or 0.5. There is not a single MMC in which human rights (i.e., political rights or liberty, freedom of individuals to remove the existing regimes through elections, able to live in peace without fear, and so on) of the citizens are ‘fully’ observed. Many MMCs systematically violate the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Table 8.2 shows that human rights violations constitute a significant problem in the MMCs in Central and West Asia, and North Africa because except for Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan all MMCs in these three regions have a human rights protection score of a zero or 0.5 (i.e., not observed or minimally observed).

Moreover, all MMCs, exercise control and censorship of the electronic and print media. No MMC has a ‘free’ media (to score a ‘2’). As Table 8.2 shows media in 25 MMCs are characterized as ‘not-free.’ In the rest (22 MMCs) it is partly free with the best score (1.5) received by Bangladesh, Maldives, and Mali. Even in the MMCs such as Indonesia, Iran, Maldives, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Senegal where elections for the executive, and the legislature under a party system are in place, media is only partially free (scoring only 1). Thus, many ‘democratic’ governments do not seem to be any different than their authoritarian counter-parts in curbing media freedom. For example, the democratically elected governments in the MMCs such as Bangladesh, Iran, or Yemen tend to manipulate the media (electronic or print) to promote themselves (by forcing to veil the ‘unwanted news’ to ‘protect public interest’). Regimes in these states try to justify their actions against mass media by highlighting the need to advance the cause of national unity and security.

It is evident from the data (Table 8.2) and the above discussion that free election of the executive or the legislature, a party system, suffrage, press freedom or human rights is not available in most MMCs. There are of course MMCs with high scores in democratic features (10 or 10.5 out of a possible 12) or in the SDI (scoring 83.33 or 87.5—the higher the better) such as Indonesia, Iran, Maldives, Mali, Malaysia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Turkey. Other MMCs are way behind these scores. Some (Bahrain, Brunei, and Saudi Arabia) have a long way to go (scoring a dismal 8.3 in the SDI) in achieving democratic governance.

Due to a weak legitimacy within the country resulting from the absence of democratic practice or faulty election systems, leadership in the MMCs (like in many other similar countries) are forced to depend on the recognition and support of the external power centers. Motivated by narrow economic interests, the external powers support the transfer and acquisition of power in many MMCs with violent and extralegal means (i.e., through a military coup or civil–military alliance). Thus,

Table 8.2 Status of democracy index in the MMCs, 2008–2009. (Source: Compile by the author form UNDP, 2009; CIA Fact-book, World Bank Reports, and BBC country profiles)

Country	Election for executive	Election for legislature	Party competition	Suffrage	Press freedom	Human rights	Total points	% SDI
Afghanistan	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	7.0	58.33
Algeria	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	0	0.5	7.5	66.67
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	2.0	0	0.5	2.5	20.83
Bahrain	0	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	1.0	08.33
Bangladesh	1.5	1.5	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.0	8.0	66.66
Brunei	0	0	0	0	0	1.0	1.0	08.33
Burkina Faso	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	9.0	75.00
Chad	0	0	0	2.0	0	0	2.0	16.67
Comoros	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	9.0	75.00
Djibouti	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	0	1.0	6.0	50.00
Egypt	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	0	0.5	6.5	54.17
Eritrea	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0	0.5	4.5	37.50
Gambia	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	0	1.0	5.5	45.83
Guinea	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	0.5	5.0	41.66
Guinea Bissau	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	6.5	54.17
Indonesia	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	10.0	83.33
Iran	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	10.0	83.33
Iraq	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	8.0	66.66
Jordan	0	1.5	1.0	2.0	0	0.5	5.0	41.67
Kazakhstan	1.0	1.0	0	2.0	0	0.5	4.5	37.50
Kuwait	0	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	0.5	5.0	41.67
Kyrgyzstan	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	0	1.0	5.5	45.83
Lebanon	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	7.5	66.67
Libya	0	1.0	0	2.0	0	0	3.0	25.00
Malaysia	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.5	10.5	87.50

Table 8.2 (continued)

Country	Election for executive	Election for legislature	Party competition	Suffrage	Press freedom	Human rights	Total points	% SDI
Maldives	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.0	10.0	83.33
Mali	2.0	2.0	1.5	2.0	1.5	1.5	10.5	87.50
Mauritania	0	0	1.0	2.0	1.0	0.5	4.5	37.50
Morocco	0	2.0	1.0	2.0	0	0.5	5.5	45.83
Niger	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	9.0	75.00
Nigeria	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	10.0	83.33
Oman	0	1.0	0	1.0	0	0.5	2.5	20.83
Pakistan	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	9.0	75.00
Qatar	0	0.5	0	1.0	0	0.5	2.0	16.67
Saudi Arabia	0	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	1.0	08.33
Senegal	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	10.0	83.33
Sierra Leone	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	7.0	58.33
Somalia	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5	5.5	45.83
Sudan	0.5	1.5	0	2.0	0	0	4.0	33.33
Syria	0.5	1.5	0	2.0	0	0.5	4.5	37.50
Tajikistan	0	0	0	2.0	0	0	2.0	16.67
Tunisia	1.0	1.5	0	2.0	0	0.5	5.0	41.66
Turkey	2.0	2.0	1.5	2.0	1.0	1.5	10.0	83.33
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	2.0	0	1.0	3.0	25.00
UAE	0	0.5	0	1	0	0.5	2.0	16.67
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	2.0	0	0	2.0	16.67
Yemen	1.5	2.0	1.0	2.0	0	0.5	7.0	58.33

Legend: *Free Election of Head of State 2006*: 0=no; 1=indirect or partially; 2=yes; *Free Election Legislature/Council 2006*: 0=no; 1=indirect or limited; 2=yes; *Political Rights/Civil Liberties/Political Parties Competition 2006*: 0=prohibited or nonexistent; 1=controlled by government approval; 2=reasonably free; *Suffrage 2007*: 0=none; 1=some; 2=some; 2=yes; *Press Freedom 2007*: 0=not free; 1=partly free; 2=free; *Human Rights 2006*: 0=not observed; 1=partly observed; 2=fully observed

power in many of these countries can be thought of as a commodity which can be exchanged or traded, like money; and taken from one person or group and given to another, like property (Bertsch et al. 1978, p. 459).

From the above discussion it can be concluded that once in power, many regimes in the MMCs, like many of their counter parts, tend to devote efforts and resources to the task of remaining in power. With only a few exceptions, regimes in the MMCs have made good use of the following strategies in order to be in power: *firstly*, establishing a one-party system (disallowing or delegitimizing multiparty systems, e.g., Sudan); *secondly*, accumulating and consolidating power through charismatic (or often manipulative) leadership that degenerates into ‘image worshipping political dynasty’ obstructing the growth of the political parties as truly democratic organizations; and *thirdly*, buying out discontents through patronage distribution (e.g., in the resource rich MMCs in West Asia and North Africa) to have full control on the ‘state’ resources (often with the use of force, if required, to maintain the status quo).

8.5 Conclusion

The above discussion shows that there is still noticeable influence of colonial powers in the state formation, nation-building, and the governance process in most of the 47 MMCs in Africa and Asia. Many of the MMCs have used unaltered colonial state structures and administrative systems, and experienced a lack of effort from the middle class to force and implement change along the lines of popular choice. This has been possible because of the existence of an authoritarian or semiauthoritarian political system in many MMCs, often with external support.

The MMCs also exhibit a wide variation in the structure, process, and functioning of the government. There are authoritarian, unelected regimes as well as democratically elected regimes in the MMCs. Still ‘patrimonialism’ and ‘clientelism’ can be identified as two major principles of governance in most MMCs. The functioning of the public organizations in many MMCs also reflects a pervasive clientelism accompanied by the use of security forces and the rationalization of administrative rules, norms, and regulations to protect certain group interests. The above systems result from and reinforce imbalance in the society and favor the ‘advanced section’ to disadvantage the rest.

Our discussion also reveals that as the rate of industrialization has been slow, the landed aristocracy still remains dominant in many MMCs to develop a symbiotic relationship with the rising industrial elites, the bureaucracy and the military that eventually pave the way of the authoritarian rule of syncretic regimes. The networks of patron–client system of politics further help to create a psychological bond between the power elites and the populace to allow the regimes to ignore popular demands. Moreover, ‘executive dominance’ in the MMCs is inevitable considering the authoritarian nature of many MMCs. That is to say, the chief executive (President, Prime Minister, King, and so on) in many MMCs can rule and distribute prestige,

wealth, and power under his/her influence without being challenged by the outside interests or groups as long as the ‘clientelism’ (operating within clearly defined hierarchies), group interests, and bureaucracy-military-business elites coalition remain intact.

Although there were efforts in the past to improve the political system and governance in the MMCs, in some cases clientelism still dominates over elected–electoral relationships, and power and allegiance remain divided among three competing forces, i.e., local (traditional) elites, national governments, and powerful international (colonial or neocolonial) states. Because of a lack of democratic values and institutions, many regimes suffer from weak legitimacy and tend to depend on the supports and recognition of national and international power elites. These ‘power blocs’ directly influence the regime and its handover to another person or group, as and when appropriate. As a result, free and fair election, tolerance of opposition political views/parties, transparency, and accountability are nonexistent and non-elected or indirectly elected executives run many MMCs.

It seems that the influence of colonialism, the ‘organizational self-preservation’ (that frustrates institutionalization of a system), the holding of important political/administrative positions by the favored individuals (often through their domestic and overseas supports), and the absence of democratic values and institutions in the state-machineries are still haunting many MMCs in Africa and Asia. Many of these MMCs by virtue of their authoritarian (semiauthoritarian or semidemocratic) government style suffer from conflicts between landed aristocracy and rising industrialists, patron–client politics, ‘executive dominance’; and a symbiotic relationship between the military, bureaucracy, and the business elites. These factors, resulting from colonial influence as well as from the built-in institutional difficulties, configure power relationships and governance in the MMCs to hamper human development.

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Chapter 9

Foreign Aid, Foreign Debt, and Development: The Muslim World Scenario

M. Moniruzzaman

9.1 Introduction

The 47 Muslim majority countries (MMCs) in Africa and Asia following their independence,¹ mostly in the 1950s and 1960s, from European colonial powers have achieved different levels of economic development. Thirty-three out of the 47 MMCs have a very low or medium economic development² and are in need of foreign aid. Further, among the 40 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) in the world 15 are MMCs.³ Thus, foreign aid is associated with these MMCs.

The term ‘foreign aid’ (interchangeably used with ‘international aid’ or ‘overseas aid’), since the 1960s, refers to (monetary or technical) ‘development assistance’ given to the poor countries bilaterally or through multilateral institutions (Raffer and Singer 1996). Due to the inclusion of diverse elements in the ‘development assistance’ and the involvement of many agencies or institutions broader terms—Official Development Assistance (ODA) and ‘Other Official Flows (OOF)’—are now popularly used to include different types of financial flows to the poor economies.

The ODA refers to grants or loans (including related technical assistance) to eligible countries and to multinational agencies channeled through the official sec-

¹ Four MMCs (Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) did not face European colonization, and six countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) spent few decades under the Soviet system to become independent in 1991 (for more please see Chap. 1 in this Volume).

² According to the 2009 World Bank classification, 16 of the 40 low income economies (US\$995 or less) in the world, 17 out of 56 lower middle income economies (US\$996–3,945), 8 out of 48 upper middle income economies (US\$3,946–12,195), and 6 out of 69 developed economies (US\$12,196+) are MMCs in Africa and Asia.

³ Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leon, Chad, Comoros, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Eritrea, Kyrgyz Republic, Somalia, and Sudan.

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tor (for the economic development and welfare of the recipient country) at concessional financial terms (including at least 25% of the amount as grant). The OOF refers to transactions by the official sector with countries not eligible for the ODA. A grant or grant element of ODA refers to transfers made in cash, goods, or services for which no repayment is required (DAC 2010).⁴ The ODA and OOF do not include commodity, food, or military aid.

The recent World Bank publications, however, use a more generic term—official financial flows—including both loan and nonloan financial flows (not included in the earlier terms), disbursed through bilateral and multilateral channels. While the term ‘bilateral’ obviously denotes transactions between two countries, the ‘multilateral’ channel includes a host of entities such as the World Bank (International Development Association and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development); the International Monetary Fund (concessional and nonconcessional); regional development banks (e.g., African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank); the United Nations agencies (UNICEF, UNTA, IFAD, UNDP, UNPF, UNRA, WFP, and so on); and ‘other institutions’ (e.g., Caribbean Development Fund, Council of Europe, European Development Fund, Islamic Development Bank, Nordic Development Fund, and so on). The consolidated financial flows recorded by the World Bank include all or combinations of these sources and require repayments, unless disbursed as grants. However, private foreign direct investments (e.g., of the multinational corporations) are not considered as official financial flows.

The main purpose of this chapter is to analyze the characters and economic impacts of foreign aid (including all types of financial flows) disbursed to the MMCs. The chapter deals with 32 MMCs⁵ (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leon, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen) for the analysis. The discussion takes a general cross-country comparative analytic approach and does not focus on any particular MMC. Noteworthy, the intra-MMC aid flow is not separately explored in this work (primarily because the World Bank data are all inclusive). The analysis covers only the post-Cold War period (1990–2008) based on the data available online and in printed sources of the World Bank, Islamic Development Bank, and other country reports (of various years).

⁴ Often about 10% of development assistance is channeled through the NGOs with notification to the government. However, regional and country specific agencies (e.g., Nordic Development Fund), not any international financial institutions, channel funds through the NGOs. Funds channeled through the NGOs, however, are added in the consolidated multilateral flows.

⁵ Out of the 47 MMCs, Brunei, the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE), and Libya are not aid recipient. Further, due to unavailability of data another seven countries (Afghanistan, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Iraq, Maldives, and Somalia) are excluded from this study.

The remaining part of the chapter, in three major sections, deals with the concepts and parameters of studying foreign aid and economic development, facts and issues related to foreign aid and debt servicing in the MMCs, and the issues related to foreign aid and national economic development in the MMCs (analyzing aid dependency and the relationships between debt servicing and the HDI ranks).

9.2 Foreign Aid and Economic Development

The element of ‘charity’ or ‘humanitarianism’ likely to be implied in the term ‘foreign aid’ make the idealist theorists suggest that development assistance should be essentially altruistic and humanitarian because peace through human cooperation can be achieved if the wealthier nations meet their moral obligation to respond to social and economic development needs of the poor economies. Thus, because of the (social) cooperative nature of human beings, and supports for such an act in all religious principles, foreign development aid should promote mutually supportive and beneficial relations, increase understanding, and liberate societies from the scourge of poverty. Further, narrow national interests can be overcome by contributing to greater international cause through foreign aid. In reality, complete equality among nations, through foreign aid, cannot be achieved or desired, but the differences among nations can be minimized but that too never seems to be targeted.

Thus, some analysts tend to suggest that in an anarchical and hostile international system, where the protection of national security reigns supreme in international relations, the primary objective of foreign aid is not humanitarian. Foreign aid or development assistance is used to buy cooperation from other nations to increase ones security (Lumsdaine 1993), not only with military capability but also by strengthening financial capability of the recipient to enhance security indirectly using it as a weapon to buy friendship and cooperation for national interest (Hook 1995). In such cases, the donor country tends to augment its national security by building support bases overseas ignoring the economic development needs of the recipients.⁶

Due to the above distrust, the proponents of the ‘imperialist’ or ‘dependencia’ theories in foreign aid argue that rich and powerful countries use foreign aid to influence domestic and foreign policies of the recipient countries (Topik 1998) and to control the elites in the recipient country to use international financial and production structures to exploit the natural and strategic resources for their (the donors’) national interest. Thus foreign aid is simply exploitative (Vernengo 2006), and is an instrument for the rich countries to preserve and expand their dominance on the poor countries. It is thus argued that foreign aid has become heavily influenced by

⁶ There are thus claims that, the US aid program in the 1960s called the ‘Alliance for Progress to Latin America’ or the US PL480 food aid program were to strengthen relations with friendly countries in the region to counter the Soviet influence; and the Soviet aid to Cuba and Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s was to counter American influence in the regions (Ball and Johnson 1996).

commercial interests of the donor states as well as their multinational corporations (Riddell 2007). Rapid globalization and diffusion of technology have brought national economies and corporations under intense competition internationally creating pressure on the donor countries to utilize aid as a mechanism for bolstering comparative advantage.⁷

During the Cold War era (from the end of WWII to 1990) foreign aid was also used for political reasons, e.g., to contain Communism or Socialism (Boschini and Olofsgard 2007) or for keeping countries within the 'Soviet bloc.' The Cold War divided the world largely into two rival camps each of which wanted to create client states and friendly regimes all over the world. During that period political legitimacy of the regimes or economic condition of the people in the recipient countries mattered little compared to their political allegiance.

Because of the politicization of foreign aid, legitimate questions have been raised about the effectiveness of aid in promoting economic growth (Boone 1996; Cassen and Associates 1994; Levy 1988; Moyo 2009; Papenek 1973). Some studies argue that aid is required on a temporary basis to help economies achieve a self-sustaining capability and suggest that the effects of aid are conditioned by the nature of the economic gaps (savings and foreign exchange) that a country faces.⁸ Some studies claim that positive effects of foreign aid on economic growth in the recipient countries may occur only with certain favorable conditions (like in Malaysia) in the recipient countries (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2002; Hansen and Trap 2000); while others argue that foreign aid increases consumption making aid a substitute for savings, and creates negative effects on economic development (Browne 2006; Weisskopf 1972). Other studies have found mixed evidence of effectiveness of aid, or little or no effect at all, on macroeconomic growth (Bauer 1972; Mosley 1987; White 1992). In any event, foreign aid apparently achieves one primary (unwritten) purpose of extending the donor's markets in the recipient countries (not least by the likes of the Commodity Assistance Support Program of the AusAid—the aid management agency of the Australian government, for example).

Both, bilateral and multilateral, foreign aids always thus have been conditional creating a new term 'aid conditionality' (cf. Killick 1996, 1997; Hermes and Schilder 1997) to mean conditions imposed by the donors on foreign aid. Some aids are, however, explicitly termed 'tied aid' referring to rigid conditions of its receipt and use (e.g., the IMF's 'stabilization program,' and the 'Structural Adjustment Program' of the World Bank; Raffer and Singer 1996). Conditions on foreign aid, especially in the case of bilateral aid, may require the recipient country to use aid (loans as well as grants) in approved sectors, projects, or products, to purchase material only from the donor country (or from its 'allies'), or to hire consultants/expertise from the donor country. The donor countries or the multilateral agencies tend to argue that 'aid conditionality' is meant to prevent the recipient country from divert-

⁷ Readers may like to look at many interesting works related to the issue published recently, in particular (Chang 2008; Easterly 2006; Stiglitz 2002, 2007); also Chap. 8 in this Volume.

⁸ These studies adopted the so-called two-gap model referring to savings gap and foreign exchange gap (Chenery and Strout 1996).

ing money to ‘unapproved’ projects. However, this cannot be substantiated with the data because foreign aid is always predestined to promote the donor country’s interest (commercial/political) as well.⁹

The recent easing of interest rates by bilateral and multilateral agencies does not help in the economic development of the recipient countries either¹⁰ (Potts and Chung 2008). Thus, in order to make foreign aid effective for economic growth in the recipient countries, the donors must undertake a self-evaluation of its goals, understand the diverse realities of the recipient countries, and avoid the hope for overnight achievement of growth (Easterly 2003). It is also argued that foreign aid promotes growth only in a politically stable environment irrespective of the quality of the country’s economic policies (Islam 2005), and the weak institutions are the main problem of economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2003). The World Bank, however, emphasizes the fact that development aid is effective in stimulating economic growth only in countries with good economic policies and strong institutions (i.e., good governance).¹¹

A related concern of foreign aid is the relationship between (foreign aid induced) debt and development, especially in countries with weak economic institutions, because high indebtedness negatively affects national economic growth due to high capital flight (Dooley and Keltzer 1994; Varman-Schneider 1991), irrespective of the term of the debt (long or short; Cerra et al. 2008). Definitely both increased aid inflows (Collier et al. 2004) as well as increased external debts (Boyce 1992; Chippakatti and Rishi 2001; Demir 2004) increase capital flight. The capital flights have made the foreign aid recipient countries net creditors to the donor countries because the “private assets held abroad as measured by accumulated capital flight exceed the total stock of external debt” (Cerra et al. 2008, p. 1191). This revolving door syndrome (between external borrowing and capital flight) as evidenced in the sub-Saharan African countries (Boyce and Ndikumana 2001) seriously discredits the HIPC debt sustainability targets and national economic growth (Hjertholm 2003).

Since, foreign aid failed to bring about economic development during the Cold War period, many governments, following serious criticism from researchers, have changed strategy for aid effectiveness (Osborne 2002). Thus, the ODA conditionality has been expanded to include many institution building measures including the formation of sensible economic and social policies, strengthening of the financial accountability system, transparency, the creation of market-friendly environment, and the undertaking of poverty eradication strategies (Hoeven 2001). The World Bank and the IMF loans are now categorically tied to transparency and poverty al-

⁹ Readers may like to look at two very interesting works, Chomsky (1992, the new edition of an earlier work offering, among others, an elaborate analyses of political use of foreign aid); Reinert (2008, offers an analyses of the commercial roles of ‘aid conditionality’).

¹⁰ This is because “declining prices of traded goods increase the opportunity cost of loan repayment ... which in turn has implications for the future real costs of debt repayment for loans from all sources” (Potts and Chung 2008, p. 1033).

¹¹ After almost 50 years of aid politics the World Bank published in 1998 an important self-evaluative report entitled *Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why* (World Bank 1998).

leviation objectives in the recipient country (Burnham 1994). Further, the expanded economic conditionality is now complemented by political ones emphasizing human rights, democracy, and good governance (White and Morrissey 1997; Woods 2000; Wood and Lockwood 1999; Hermes and Lensink 2001).

Irrespective of aid conditionality and its aims, foreign aid is likely to have some impacts on the recipient countries. The following section examines the volume and trends of foreign aid in the MMCs, and the extent and issues related to debt servicing.

9.3 Foreign Aid and the Muslim World: An Analysis

The net ODA the MMCs have received during 1990–2008 has two apparent characteristics. First, majority (17 of the 32 MMCs under discussion)—two MMCs in South Asia, four in West Asia, two in Southeast Asia, four in North Africa, and five in sub-Saharan Africa)¹² saw a decline in aid inflow in 2008 compared to 1990, while 13 MMCs (one in West Asia, two in North Africa, four in sub-Saharan Africa, and six in Central Asia)¹³ experienced an increased inflow of foreign aid. Second, compared to 2000, 20 MMCs (two in South Asia, one in West Asia, one in Southeast Asia, one in North Africa, ten in sub-Saharan Africa, and four in Central Asia)¹⁴ experienced higher aid inflows in 2008; and compared to 2007, 21 MMCs (one in South Asia, three in West Asia, one in Southeast Asia, three in North Africa, nine in sub-Saharan Africa, and four in Central Asia)¹⁵ had higher inflows in 2008. Again compared to 2000, nine MMCs (one in Southeast Asia, two in West Asia, three in Central Asia, one in North Africa and two in sub-Saharan Africa)¹⁶ experienced decline in aid flows in 2008, and compared to 2007 nine MMCs (one in South Asia, one in Southeast Asia, three in Central Asia, and four in sub-Saharan Africa)¹⁷ experienced lower aid inflows in 2008 as well. The trend of receiving larger volume

¹² South Asia=Bangladesh, Pakistan; West Asia=Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen; Southeast Asia=Indonesia and Malaysia; North Africa=Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia; Sub-Saharan Africa=Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Niger.

¹³ According to regional ordering—Iran; Egypt, Sudan; Burkina-Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

¹⁴ According to regional ordering—Bangladesh, Pakistan; Lebanon; Malaysia; Sudan, Tunisia; Burkina-Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra-Leone; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan.

¹⁵ According to regional ordering—Bangladesh; Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen; Indonesia; Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia; Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.

¹⁶ According to regional ordering—Indonesia; Jordan, Yemen; Iran, Turkey, Uzbekistan; Egypt; Mauritania, Guinea.

¹⁷ According to regional ordering—Pakistan; Malaysia; Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkey; Burkina-Faso, Gambia, Mali, Senegal.

Table 9.1 Total external debt, 2008. (Source: Compiled from the World Bank online Databank)

Range (millions US\$)	Nos. of MMCs	MMC names
$\geq 1,000$	5	GAM, GNB, NGR, SRL, TKM
$1,000 \leq 10,000$	14	ALG, AZB, BKF, CHD, GUN, JRD, KYZ, MAL, MAU, NIG, SEN, TJK, UZB, YMN
$11,000 \leq 20,000$	1	SUD
$20,000 \leq 50,000$	7	BGD, EGY, IRN, LEB, MOR, PAK, TUN
$50,000 \leq 100,000$	2	KAZ, MYS
$100,000 \geq$	2	IND, TUR
Data missing	1	SYR
<i>Total MMCs</i>	32	

Keys: *ALG* Algeria; *AZB* Azerbaijan; *BGD* Bangladesh; *BKF* Burkina Faso; *EGY* Egypt; *GAM* Gambia; *GNB* Guinea-Bissau; *GUN* Guinea; *IND* Indonesia; *IRN* Iran; *JRD* Jordan; *KAZ* Kazakhstan; *KYZ* Kyrgyzstan; *LEB* Lebanon; *MAL* Mali; *MAU* Mauritania; *MYS* Malaysia; *NGR* Nigeria; *NIG* Nigeria; *PAK* Pakistan; *SEN* Senegal; *SUD* Sudan; *SYR* Syria; *TJK* Tajikistan; *TUN* Tunisia; *TUR* Turkey; *UZB* Uzbekistan; *YMN* Yemen

of aid every year from 2000 is clearly evident in most of the MMCs, which is likely to create higher aid dependency.

Due to a continuous increase in the annual aid inflow, the cumulative amount each MMC received by 2008 is staggering. As Table 9.1 shows, only five MMCs (Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Sierra Leon, and Turkmenistan) maintained total external debt below 1 billion in 2008. Fourteen MMCs (eight from sub-Saharan and North Africa, two from West Asia and four from Central Asia) registered between \$1 and 10 billion; one (Sudan) between \$11 and 20 billion; and seven (Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Mauritania, Pakistan, and Tunisia) between \$20 and 50 billion accumulated foreign debt in 2008. Kazakhstan and Malaysia had \$96.1 and 53.7 billion debt, respectively, and finally Indonesia and Turkey had \$140.7 and 251.4 billion foreign debt in 2008. A total of 21 MMCs have experienced increase in the total debt by manifolds in 2008 compared to 1995, and 11 MMCs experienced decline in total external debt during that period.

When compared to the respective GNI (Gross National Income), the present value of external debt in the MMCs is ominous. Table 9.2 shows that six MMCs maintain present value of the external debt to 1–10% of the GNI, nine between 11 and 20%, five between 21 and 30%, six between 31 and 50%, and seven MMCs maintain present value of the external debt to 51+% of the GNI. Iran's present value of external debt is 4.32% of the GNI—the lowest, while that of Guinea-Bissau, at 214.22%, is the highest among the MMCs. Table 9.2 also shows that foreign debt as a percentage of their respective GNI in poor economies of Guinea or Mauritania (31–50%) and Guinea-Bissau and Sudan (50+%) is very high creating major crises in debt servicing like many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 9.2 Present value of external debt as % of GNI, 2008. (Source: Compiled from the World Bank online Databank)

As GNI % range	Total MMCs	MMC names
1–10	6	ALG, MAL, IRN, NGR, SRL, TKM
11–20	9	AZB, BGD, BKF, CHD, EGY, NIG, SEN, UZB, YEM
21–30	5	GAM, MOR, PAK, SYR, TJK
31–50	6	GUN, IND, JRD, KYZ, MSY, MAU
51–~	6	GNB, KAZ, LEB, SUD, TUN, TUR
Lowest (4.32)	1	IRN
Highest (214.22)	1	GNB
<i>Total</i>	<i>32</i>	

Keys: *ALG* Algeria; *AZB* Azerbaijan; *BGD* Bangladesh; *BKF* Burkina Faso; *EGY* Egypt; *CHD* Chad; *GAM* Gambia; *GNB* Guinea-Bissau; *GUN* Guinea; *IND* Indonesia; *IRN* Iran; *JRD* Jordan; *KAZ* Kazakhstan; *KYZ* Kyrgyzstan; *LEB* Lebanon; *MAL* Mali; *MAU* Mauritania; *MOR* Morocco; *MYS* Malaysia; *NGR* Nigeria; *NIG* Nigeria; *PAK* Pakistan; *SEN* Senegal; *SRL* Sierra Leon; *SUD* Sudan; *SYR* Syria; *TJK* Tajikistan; *TKM* Turkmenistan; *TUN* Tunisia; *TUR* Turkey; *UZB* Uzbekistan; *YMN* Yemen

9.4 Debt Servicing

Since increased debt creates increased burden of debt servicing, the MMCs, in the recent past, have witnessed a tremendous increase in debt servicing responsibility. Table 9.3 shows that 21 MMCs (South Asia=2, Southeast Asia=2, North Africa=4, sub-Saharan Africa=5, Central Asia=5, West Asia=5) experienced increase; and nine (North Africa=2, sub-Saharan Africa=4, Central Asia=3) experienced decrease in their respective debt service burden between 1990 and 2007. Two aspects of debt servicing burden are noteworthy. In 1990 only three MMCs (Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia) spent between \$1 and 3 billion in debt service, while eight¹⁸ and seven MMCs¹⁹ in 2000 and 2007 respectively had to spend that amount. Secondly, in 2000 only two (or 06% of the) MMCs (Indonesia, Turkey) had a debt service burden of \$10+ billion, in 2007 two more MMCs (Kazakhstan and Malaysia) joined this list. The data, available from 23 MMCs in 1990 and 31 MMCs in 2007, show that the number of MMCs spending between \$3 and 10 billion in debt servicing decreased from six in 1990 to three and two in 2000 and 2007, respectively. Yet, an increasingly higher number of MMCs spent between 100 million and 3 billion dol-

¹⁸ Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Pakistan.

¹⁹ Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia.

Table 9.3 Total debt service trend of aid receiving MMCs 1990–2007. (Source: Compiled from the World Bank online Databank)

Range (millions)	Countries in 1990	Countries in 2000	Countries in 2007
<100	6(26)	7(23)	7(22)
100–999	8(35)	10(33)	10(32)
1,000 ≤ 2,999	3(13)	8(27)	7(26)
3,000 ≥ 9,999	6(26)	3(10)	2(06)
10,000 ≥	0	2(06)	4(13)
No data	9	2	1
<i>Total countries</i>	32	32	32

The percentage figures in the parentheses are based on the number of countries with data.

lars for the purpose. Nine MMCs in this group had to spend \$17 billion in 1990, 18 MMCs spent \$23 billion in 2000, and \$24 billion in 2007.

The impact of high debt servicing expenses can be severe on national economies, especially when measured in relation to the respective GNI. The debt service expenditure as a percentage of the GNI in 2008 (compared to that of 1990) decreased in 21 and increased in 11 MMCs. The best result in this regard was achieved by Jordan, Mauritania, and the Gambia spending 12.2, 4.39, and 3.26% of the respective GNI in 2008 compared to 16.5, 13.5, and 12.9% in 1990. These reduced percentage levels, though compare favorably with three MMCs (Jordan 12.2%, Lebanon 15.6%, and Kazakhstan 29.2%), are very high compared to some other MMCs. For example, in 2008 seven MMCs (Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leon, and Sudan) spent <0.1%, and 20 MMCs spent 1.0–5.0% of the GNI in debt servicing. The cumulative debt service responsibility of the MMCs during 1990–2008 as a percentage of the GNI, in general, was very high. The cumulative debt servicing of five MMCs (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Sudan) between 5.0 and 30.0% of the GNI was the lowest during the period. However, 13 MMCs (including six poorest economies in sub-Saharan Africa)²⁰ spent between 30.0 and 100%, ten MMCs (including six small economies)²¹ between 100 and 200%; and one MMC (Kazakhstan) 200+% of the respective GNI during the period (1990–2008) in debt servicing (see Table 9.4).

The debt servicing figures look very large not for the repayment needs of the principal, rather of the interests on it, and may be a matter of great concern. Table 9.5 shows that eight MMCs paid between \$100 and 500 million as interest on their debts during 1990–2008, but six MMCs (including poor economies of Senegal and Yemen) had to pay between \$1 and 3 billion in interest. Noteworthy, poor economies of Bangladesh and Gambia had to spend between \$3 and 5 billion, and small economies of Jordan, Lebanon, or Tunisia had to pay between \$5 and 20 bil-

²⁰ Six poor economies in sub-Saharan Africa (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leon), the poorest in West Asia (Yemen), and Egypt, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.

²¹ Six small countries (Gambia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Turkmenistan), and Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritania, and Nigeria.

Table 9.4 Total debt service as % of GNI, 1990–2008. (Source: Compiled from the World Bank online Databank)

% of GNI	MMCs in 1990	MMCs in 2008	Cumulative (1990–2008)
≤0.1	2	7	
1.0≤5.0	13	20	
5.0≤30.0	11	3	5
30.0≤100	1	0	13
100≤200	0	0	10
200≥	0	0	1
Data missing	6	3	3
<i>Total</i>	32	32	32

Table 9.5 Total Interest Payment on External Debt 1990–2008. (Source: Compiled from the World Bank online Databank)

% Range (millions)	MMCs	MMC names
100≤500	8	BKF, CHD, GMB, GNB, NGR, SRL, SUD, TJK
500≤1,000	6	AZR, GUN, KYR, MAL, MAU, TKM
1,000≤3,000	4	PAK, SEN, UZB, YMN
3,000≤5,000	1	BGD, GMB
5,000≥20,000	5	ALG, IRN, JRD, LEB, TUN
20,000≤50,000	5	EGY, KAZ, MSY, MOR, NGR
50,000≥	2	IND, TUR
Data missing	1	SYR
<i>Total</i>	32	

lion in interest in 19 years (1990–2008). Indonesia alone paid more than \$102 billion in interest during the period, averaging about \$5.3 billion per year as interest to its debtors while its total debt stood at about \$141 billion in 2008.

The above volume of interests paid by the MMCs is quite substantial in terms of percentage of the respective GNI. There is, however, wide variation among the MMCs in the payment of interests as a percentage of their respective GNI. For example, Guinea-Bissau paid 0.9% of its GNI as interest on external debt (the lowest among the MMCs), while Kazakhstan paid 3.88% of the GNI—the highest among the MMCs. The good news, however, is that the interest payment on foreign debt for almost all the MMCs as a percentage of the respective GNI decreased in 2008 (compared to 1990). For example, Nigeria paid 8.42% of the GNI as interest to the foreign debtors in 1990, but only 0.12% in 2008. Nonetheless, eight MMCs (Gambia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Tunisia) paid 1.0% of their respective GNI as interest payment to foreign debt, while 17 MMCs paid 0.10–0.99% of the GNI.²² Interestingly, many of these MMCs being

²² South Asia—Bangladesh, Pakistan; West Asia—Iran, Yemen; North Africa—Egypt, Sudan; Sub-Saharan Africa—Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leon; Central Asia—Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

debtors in present foreign aid relationships receiving around 0.2–0.3% of the GNI (0.2% in Indonesia or 0.3% in Kazakhstan) as foreign aid while paying 0.1–29.2% (e.g., Kazakhstan) of the GNI in debt servicing may not benefit from aid. It may be appropriate now to look at the relationships of foreign aid, debt servicing, and development.

9.5 Foreign Aid and National Development

As discussed earlier, many national governments frame ambitious plans for economic development requiring massive capital and target foreign aid as its source. The international donor organizations and countries provide funds as aid or loan in support of these national development plans. In the recent past foreign aids are also attached to the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be achieved by 2015. The MDGs include eight major goals which are to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and finally, a global partnership for development. These MDGs are broken down into 21 quantifiable targets measured by 60 indicators. The national development plans of the poor economies in Africa and Asia are incorporating strategies to achieve the respective goals by 2015. The limited space in this chapter is neither appropriate nor enough to embark upon a comprehensive analysis of foreign aid vis-à-vis the MMCs' performance in achieving the MDGs. Therefore, this section concentrates on analyzing, in general terms, aid dependency of the MMCs, the impact of aid dependency on economic growth, and the relationships between foreign aid, debt service, and the achievement in the Human Development Index (a composite indicator of aspects of the MDGs).

9.5.1 Aid Dependency

The aid dependency of a country can be analyzed by looking at the aid receipt per capita, foreign aid as a percentage of the GNI, and foreign aid as a percentage of central government expenditure. Table 9.6 shows 5 MMCs²³ received US\$10–20 per capita, 11 MMCs²⁴ US\$20–50 per capita, 2 MMCs (Iran and Senegal) US\$50–70 per capita, 3 MMCs (Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, and Jordan) US\$70–100 per capita, and 1 MMC (Mauritania) US\$100+ per capita foreign aid in 1993. In 2000

²³ Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sudan, and Syria.

²⁴ Sub-Saharan Africa—Burkina-Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone; North Africa—Egypt, Tunisia; West Asia—Lebanon and Yemen; Central Asia—Kyrgyzstan.

Table 9.6 Aid per capita 1993–2000 to 2007. (Source: Compiled from the World Bank online Databank)

Range \$US	Number of MMCs		
	1993	2000	2007
0≤1	1	0	0
1≤5	6	5	3
5≤10	3	6	4
10≤20	5	10	7
20≤50	11	8	8
50≤70	2	2	4
70≤100	3	1	4
100≥	1	1	2
<i>Total</i>	32	32	32

per capita receipt of foreign aid dropped in most MMCs but more MMCs (18²⁵ as opposed to 10²⁶ in 1993) received US\$5–20 per capita in 2000. Per capita aid receipt in 2007 (compared to 1993 and 2000) increased in at least 18 MMCs.²⁷ Most importantly, the number of the MMCs receiving US\$50+ per capita also increased to ten (from six in 1993).

Since an increase in dollar per capita may not be a good measure of aid dependency (because of the changes in dollar value itself), a look at the foreign aid as a percentage of the GNI is likely to provide a better picture of the phenomenon. As shown in Table 9.7, the number of MMCs receiving foreign aid as 0≤1% of the GNI increased from 9²⁸ in 1993 to 12²⁹ in 2007, as 5≤10% increased from 5³⁰ to 6,³¹ and as 10≤20% increased from 3 (Chad, Guinea and Mali) to 5 (Burkina Faso, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). On the other hand, MMCs receiving aid as 1≤5% of the GNI dropped from nine in 1993 to seven in 2007, and as 20≤50% of GNI dropped from six to two. These figures suggest that extreme aid dependency decreased in 2007 for four MMCs but moderate dependency (between 5 and 20%) increased for 12 MMCs, in sub-Saharan Africa, in particular.

²⁵ South Asia—Bangladesh, Pakistan; South East Asia—Indonesia; West Asia—Syria, Turkey, Yemen; North Africa—Algeria, Egypt, Sudan; Sub-Saharan Africa—Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Morocco; Central Asia—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

²⁶ South Asia—Bangladesh, Pakistan; Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia; North Africa—Algeria, Sudan; West Asia—Syria, Turkey; Central Asia—Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

²⁷ South Asia—Pakistan; Southeast Asia—Malaysia; West Asia—Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey; North Africa—Sudan, Tunisia; Sub-Saharan Africa—Burkina Faso, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone; Central Asia—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

²⁸ Southeast Asia—Malaysia; West Asia—Iran, Turkey; North Africa—Algeria; Central Asia—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

²⁹ Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia; West Asia—Iran, Syria, Turkey; North Africa—Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia; Central Asia—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

³⁰ Egypt, Jordan, Senegal, Sudan, and Yemen.

³¹ Chad, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Senegal, Sudan, and Tajikistan.

Table 9.7 Aid as % of GNI 1993–2007. (Source: Compiled from the World Bank online Databank)

% Range	Number of MMCs		
	1993 (GDP)	2000	2007
0≤1	9	7	12
1≤5	9	13	7
5≤10	5	3	6
10≤20	3	8	5
20≤50	6	1	2
<i>Total</i>	32	32	32

9.5.2 Aid Dependency and Economic Growth

At this stage, though establishing a relationship between national development and foreign aid dependency can be studied further analyzing the foreign aid as a percentage of the central government expenditure, the data for most of the MMCs under study are missing. Yet, the available data show that the level of dependency on foreign aid for central government expenditure remained the same during 1993–2007. As shown in Table 9.8, low dependency ($0 \leq 5$) remained constant at five MMCs³²; moderate dependency ($5 \leq 20$) slightly dropped from seven³³ in 1993 to four in 2007 (Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan); high dependency ($20 \leq 50$) increased from none in 1993 to two MMCs in 2007 (Bangladesh and Kyrgyzstan), and extreme dependency (50% and above) remained constant at two (Mali, Niger; though in 2000 the number rose to five). The available data from 13 MMCs (Table 9.8) show that majority of these MMCs remained significantly dependent on foreign aid for central government expenditure during 1993–2007. Nine (Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan) of which remained dependent on foreign aid for 20+% of its national expenses, while six of them remained dependent on foreign aid for all or nearly all of their national government expenses (in 1993 Burkina Faso 99.0%, Sierra Leone 149.8%; in 2000 Kyrgyz Republic 99.2%, Mali 128.0%, Sierra Leone 98.8%, and Tajikistan 160.3%; and in 2007 Mali 97.4%, and Niger 108.4%).

The question, however, is to what extent does this aid dependency impact on the national economic development of the recipient countries? A number of other macroeconomic indicators such as the GDP growth rate can help explain the impacts of aid dependency on the level of development of a country, and are discussed here.³⁴

Table 9.9 indicates that 21 MMCs experienced GDP growth during 1997–2008 either throughout the period or between two particular years.³⁵ Eight MMCs

³² Algeria, Iran, Kazakhstan, Tunisia, Turkey.

³³ Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, and Yemen.

³⁴ The data for these factors are taken mainly from the Islamic Development Bank (IDB 2009).

³⁵ Algeria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Gambia, Iran, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leon, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

Table 9.8 Aid as % of central government expenditure 1993–2007. (Source: Compiled from the World Bank online Databank)

% Range	Number of MMCs		
	1993 (GDP) ^a	2000	2007
0 ≤ 5	5	5	5
5 ≤ 10	4	2	2
10 ≤ 20	3	0	2
20 ≤ 50	0	1	2
50 ≤ 100	1	3	1
100 ≥	1	2	1
Data missing	18	19	19
<i>Total</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>32</i>

^a Some data in the 1990 s have maintained GDP as GNP started to be used only in the later period. Therefore, in this study GDP is used in certain cases where the original data sources have recorded the data in GDP form itself.

Table 9.9 GDP growth performance 1997–2007. (Source: Compiled from the Statistical Monograph, No. 29, Islamic Development Bank, 2009)

Category	MMCs in 2007 compared with 1997
Achieved positive growth	21
Registered negative growth	8
Data incomplete	3
<i>Total</i>	<i>32</i>
Increased growth from absolute negative	8
Fell from positive to absolute negative	1

experienced decline in growth during the period.³⁶ If this factor is taken as continuous positive growth as well, then the number of MMCs performing positive growth is higher. However, the relationship of this growth to the volume of aid received can be evaluated by looking at the HDI performance and other factors discussed in the following section. Five aid receiving MMCs recorded decrease in real GDP growth in 1990–1997 (Kyrgyzstan – 7.6%, Sierra-Leone – 4.0%, Tajikistan – 14.7%, Turkmenistan – 7.9%, and Uzbekistan – 2.2%). Five MMCs (Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Indonesia, and Guinea-Bissau) experienced more than three percentage point contraction in their output during these two periods (1990–1997 and 1998–2007).

The real per capita GDP of the MMCs did not improve substantially during the period under study. Five MMCs of Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa experienced decline in per capita GDP in 2007 compared to that of 1990.³⁷ The per capita GDP of the aid receiving MMCs ranged from US\$130 in Guinea-Bissau to US\$5,045 in Turkey. The bottom three MMCs in terms of per capita GDP in 2007 were Sierra Leone US\$235, Niger US\$169, and Guinea-Bissau US\$130.

The mixed picture of growth can be corroborated with sectoral performance. However, due to unavailability of complete data for all the MMCs, a partial refer-

³⁶ Gabon, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Syria, Turkey.

³⁷ Guinea-Bissau, Kyrgyzstan, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan.

ence to poverty and health is made here based on the available data. In terms of poverty, the earliest data could be traced for 15 MMCs in 1994 for a comparison with 2008. Based on that, out of the 15 MMCs, nine registered improvement, four experienced decline, and two experienced no change in poverty in 2008. Similarly, compared with 2003, government expenditure on health declined in 21 MMCs in 2008. Thus, in the absence of a complete picture it can only be commented that foreign aid may not have been very helpful in boosting the economic activities of the MMCs.

9.5.3 Relationships Between Foreign Aid, Debt Service, and Development

The foregoing discussion has highlighted aid flows to the MMCs including aid per capita, as a share of the GDP and of the GNI. The discussion has also highlighted growth performance of the MMCs. Now, the question is to what extent has the economic growth been affected by the aid flow? Or what is the relationship between aid, debt service, and development? Three important indicators are useful in determining the relationship. These are debt service as a percentage of the GNI, debt service as a percentage of the export of goods and services (XGS) earnings, and the impacts of debt servicing on the Human Development Index.

Regarding debt service and GNI, it can be assumed that a decline in percentage of the GNI to debt servicing would mean an increase in redirecting capital to human development sectors leading to higher HDI achievement. Regarding debt service and export earnings, the assumption is that countries need to have higher export earnings to meet the debt servicing responsibility. Capability in this would indicate positive economic growth with positive impact on its HDI ranking. Following this assumption one can argue that a decline in the percentage share of the XGS to debt servicing responsibility would mean less foreign debt and less dependence on foreign aid, and more economic development and higher achievement in the HDI. This is because less expenditure in debt servicing may mean more expenditure on human development. On the other hand, an increase in the percentage share of the XGS to debt servicing may mean more expenditure on foreign aid, and less economic growth and decline in the HDI (because more expenditure on debt servicing would mean contraction in human development expenditure).

Table 9.10 presents the relationship between the three indicators. It shows that in all but two cases (Iran and Lebanon) percentage of the GNI and the XGS to debt service between 1997 and 2007 declined (in many cases substantially), yet their HDI ranking has also declined (in some cases sharply).³⁸ Compared to their 1992 HDI ranks, 6 MMCs slipped by 6 to 10 ranks (Algeria, Guinea, Jordan, Mauritania, Turkey, Yemen), 11 by 11–20 ranks (Bangladesh, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia,

³⁸ Though HDI ranking of the MMCs in 1992 and 2008 was based on 160 and 182 countries respectively, the overall position in the ranking apparently did not change in 2008.

Table 9.10 Comparison of % of debt and debt service to GNI and XGS, and HDI

MMCs	Total external debt						Debt service						HDI rank	
	US\$ billions		% GNI		% XGS		% GNI		% XGS		HDI rank			
	1990	2007	1990	2007	1990	2007	1990	2007	1990	2007	1992	2008		
Algeria	28.1	5.5	47.0	4.1	193.5	6.8	14.7	1.1	60.5	1.8	95	104-		
Azerbaijan	-	3.1	-	11.7	-	18.2	-	0.6	-	1.0	106	86+		
Bangladesh	12.4	22.0	40.4	30.1	674.4	147.9	2.4	1.1	40.6	5.5	135	146-		
Burkina Faso	0.8	1.5	26.9	22.3	244.6	183.9	1.1	0.9	10.1	7.4	157	177-		
Chad	0.5	1.8	29.9	29.1	219.4	51.6	0.7	1.2	5.0	2.1	150	175-		
Egypt	33.0	30.4	78.5	23.5	381.6	75.9	7.3	1.9	35.5	6.0	110	123-		
Gambia	0.4	0.7	126.7	122.4	194.4	295.7	12.9	6.0	19.9	14.4	154	168-		
Guinea	2.5	3.3	98.4	72.5	298.8	191.7	6.7	3.9	20.4	10.3	160	170-		
Guinea-Bissau	0.7	0.7	296.6	213.0	2855.4	488.5	3.6	9.2	34.8	21.2	152	173-		
Indonesia	69.9	140.8	64.0	33.9	241.1	110.8	9.1	3.5	34.3	11.5	98	111-		
Iran	9.0	20.1	7.8	7.5	53.5	22.6	0.6	1.2	3.9	3.7	90	88+		
Jordan	8.3	8.4	219.0	50.4	334.8	91.8	16.5	4.6	25.2	8.3	86	96-		
Kazakhstan	96.1	-	103.4	-	194.5	-	29.6	-	55.7	-	93	82+		
Kyrgyz Rep	-	2.4	-	69.7	-	189.7	-	5.4	-	14.8	107	120-		
Lebanon	1.8	24.6	51.4	103.3	348.1	399.3	2.9	19.0	19.4	73.6	89	83+		
Malaysia	15.3	53.7	36.4	29.3	46.7	26.5	10.3	5.5	13.2	4.9	51	66-		
Mali	2.5	2.0	102.6	29.6	594.4	104.3	2.8	1.0	16.3	3.4	155	178-		
Mauritania	2.1	1.7	196.4	62.2	454.1	112.1	13.5	4.5	31.3	8.1	148	154-		
Morocco	25.0	20.2	100.7	28.1	366.1	83.4	7.2	5.5	26.3	16.5	106	130-		
Niger	1.7	1.0	71.4	23.0	464.4	146.7	4.1	0.7	26.5	4.7	156	182-		
Nigeria	33.4	9.0	130.7	6.0	270.4	13.9	13.0	0.8	27.0	1.9	128	158-		
Pakistan	20.7	40.7	49.5	27.8	332.4	203.2	4.6	1.8	30.6	13.0	120	141-		

Table 9.10 (continued)

MMCs	Total external debt				Debt service				HDI rank			
	US\$ billions		% GNI		% XGS		% GNI		% XGS			
	1990	2007	1990	2007	1990	2007	1990	2007	1990	2007		
Senegal	3.7	2.6	68.0	23.5	258.4	93.2	5.9	1.6	22.3	6.5	137	166
Sierra-Leone	1.2	0.3	202.9	20.4	806.7	78.0	3.6	0.8	14.5	3.1	159	180
Sudan	14.8	19.2	179.0	44.8	2958.3	246.4	0.6	0.8	10.0	4.7	145	150
Syria	17.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	72	107
Tajikistan	-	1.2	-	34.0	-	174.1	-	2.2	-	11.2	115	127
Tunisia	7.7	20.2	64.7	60.8	143.6	111.6	12.0	7.5	26.7	13.8	87	98
Turkey	49.4	251.5	23.5	38.7	-	174.4	3.5	7.5	-	33.8	71	79
Turkmenistan	-	0.7	-	5.9	-	9.1	-	1.6	-	2.5	85	109
Uzbekistan	-	3.9	-	17.3	-	53.2	-	3.6	-	11.2	100	119
Yemen	6.4	5.9	132.6	27.9	921.5	106.7	3.5	1.2	24.5	4.6	130	140

Data for total external debt and debt service are taken from Islamic Development Bank Monograph Series 29, 2009

Data for HDI ranks are taken from UNDP 1992-2008

1992 HDI ranks for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are of 1997

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uzbekistan), 10 by 21–30 ranks (Chad, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leon, Turkmenistan), and 1 MMC (Syria) slipped by 45 ranks in the HDI in 2008. Between 1992 and 2008, majority MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa slipped 10–30 ranks in the HDI. Therefore, though the total number of countries in the global ranking increased from 160 in 1992 to 180 in 2008, the performance ranking of the MMCs remained the same commensurate to the changing number of countries. In the case of Iran, in 2007 its percentage share of GNI to debt service was higher, and its share of the XGS to debt service was lower than in 1990. But the country moved upward in the HDI by two ranks. While Lebanon with an increased share of both the GNI and XGS in debt servicing moved upward in the HDI by six ranks. These figures suggest that debt servicing expenses may influence human development, but only partially.

But the intriguing matter is that an overwhelming majority of the MMCs (30) recorded a decline in the HDI ranking even though their percentage share of their debt servicing responsibility to the GNI and XGS also decreased. This indicates a negative correlation. It may mean that foreign aid either did not contribute to economic development or is irrelevant to development. Thus, some possible reference can be made to other factors which might have contributed to the declining HDI index. Probably, the factors that can be considered are the flow of aid to the productive sector, consumption purpose, adjusting ‘balance of payments,’ or even loans for repayment of existing debts. It might happen that since almost half the MMCs under study belong to the HIPC, the lion share of their inflow of foreign official finance might have been for consumption, ‘balance of payments’ and existing debt repayment (debt reschedule). Furthermore, recent studies (Moniruzzaman 2010) are indicating that unfavorable business environment and political instability in the MMCs have become deterrents for foreign direct investment constraining economic development (see Chap. 11). Such factors could be examined extensively in relation to the HDI performance. In addition, the MMCs consistently tend to score high on corruption index every year (see Chap. 3) which can also help to explain the phenomena.

9.6 Conclusions

Foreign aid is now an integral part of international political economy. International financial institutions and donor countries offer programmatic loans and aid to poor economies. However, due to various reasons many poor MMCs often fail to achieve expected economic outcome to repay the loans and then enter a debt cycle. As the analyses show, many MMCs are heavily or highly indebted to foreign sources for capital and are trapped in debt cycle. The increased capital inflow to the MMCs is reflected in per capita annual aid receipt, the total annual aid as a percentage of the GNI, and the aid receipt as a percentage of the central government expenditure. Majority of the 32 MMCs (with available data) experienced increase in total aid flow in

2008 compared to early 1990s—about two third of which experienced an increase in the level of indebtedness by manifolds as well. The increase in the volume of aid receipt during 1990–2008 did not, however, proportionately increase the level of performance in national development.

This analysis suggests that foreign aid had no or minimal effects on the national development of the recipient countries. Further, the debt servicing expense of many MMCs is higher than its public expenses in education, health, or poverty alleviation program. Factors like the business environment, political instability, and corruption are likely to influence aid inflow to (as well as its outcome in) the MMCs. Nonetheless, the recent volatility in international financial markets may force many MMCs to foreign loans in the short and medium terms for their national development. Thus, aid dependency and debt cycle are likely to continue in the near future unless the MMCs embark on restructuring their economy (see Chaps. 3 and 11).

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Part IV
Human Development in the MMCs:
Situational Analyses

Chapter 10

Economic Activity and Achievements in the Muslim World

Anis Chowdhury and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeeddin

We define a Muslim country as an independent territory with a predominant Muslim population. In total there are 48 Muslim countries in the world.¹ Figure 10.1 shows these countries according to the percentage of their Muslim population. Muslim countries are concentrated around the birthplace of Islam in sixth century Saudi Arabia. We can observe a continuous geographical distribution of Muslim countries stretching from Mauritania in West Africa to Bangladesh in South Asia, with India separating Bangladesh from the rest. However, it should be noted that India has a Muslim population of around 160 million, the second largest after Indonesia. Located not far from South Asia, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia in Southeast Asia are also predominantly Muslim nations.

Despite geographical continuity, the Muslim world is not a homogenous unit. There are wide variations among Muslim countries in terms of political structure, language, natural resource endowment, human resource and financial capital.² Their level of economic development and socio-political achievements also vary widely. This chapter aims at providing a broad picture of their socio-economic development and, where possible, will try to develop stylised facts and offer some tentative analysis of underlying factors that might have played a role in these developments.

¹ Excluding Albania (in Europe) there are 47 Muslim countries in Africa and Asia. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are also two predominantly Muslim countries in Europe; however, we cannot include them in the analysis due to lack of data, as they are newly established countries from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

² However, there is one common element—all but Saudi Arabia were colonised after the demise of the last pan-Islamic Ottoman Empire. Saudi Arabia, however, emerged as a monarchy from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, and was protected by the Western powers. Turkey itself survived as an independent country after a brief occupation towards the end of the World War I.

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


Fig. 10.1 The Muslim world. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:World_Muslim_Population_Map.png. Accessed on 20 March 2010)

10.1 Income and Human Development

According to World Bank classifications, the majority of Muslim countries fall within the category of lower middle and low income countries and one-third are categorised as Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC; see Table 10.1). All high-income countries are oil rich; their high income is not the result of being advanced industrial economies as in the case of high-income countries around the world (such as the OECD members). Among the upper-middle income Muslim countries, even Malaysia is to some extent dependent on oil and natural resources. Only Turkey and Lebanon are not dependent on oil or any other natural resources. Abundance of natural resources could be seen as a blessing for capital scarce developing countries, as they are able to earn more foreign exchange as well as become more attractive for foreign investment. However, many economists, especially of the structural school of thought, expressed doubt for at least three reasons. For example, Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer argued that primary commodity producers would experience secular declines in their terms of trade (export price/import price) vis-à-vis exporters of manufactured products, resulting in a widening gap between developing and industrialised countries. Secondly, international commodity prices are generally more volatile, making foreign exchange earnings and government revenues highly unpredictable and private investment more risky. Thirdly, profits from foreign investments are not re-invested locally and foreign investments in resource sectors create enclave economies without any significant backward or forward linkages with the rest of the economy.

Many neo-classical economists, too, believe that being dependent on natural resources can make these countries prone to the resource curse, which can manifest in a number of ways, such as bad governance, internal conflict and 'Dutch

Table 10.1 Income and human development, 2007. (Source: World Bank (*World Development Indicator*) and UNDP (*Human Development Report*))

No.	Country	PCGDP (PPP US\$)	PCGDP (US\$)	World Bank Income group	World Bank Other ^a	HDI	UNDP-HDI Category	Economic characteristic ^b
<i>Middle East & North Africa</i>								
1	Albania	7,041	3,405	Lower middle		0.818	High	
2	Algeria	7,740	3,996	Upper middle		0.754	Medium	Oil dependent
3	Bahrain	29,723	21,421	High		0.895	High	Oil dependent
4	Djibouti	2,061	997	Low		0.520	Medium	
5	Egypt	5,349	1,729	Lower middle		0.703	Medium	Oil dependent
6	Iran	10,955	4,028	Upper middle		0.782	Medium	Oil dependent
7	Iraq	-	-	Lower middle		-		Oil dependent
8	Jordan	4,901	2,769	Lower middle		0.770	Medium	
9	Kuwait	47,812	42,102	High		0.916	Very high	Oil dependent
10	Lebanon	10,109	5,944	Upper middle		0.803	High	
11	Libya	14,364	9,475	Upper middle		0.847	High	Oil dependent
12	Morocco	4,108	2,434	Lower middle		0.654	Medium	
13	Oman	22,816	14,031	High		0.846	High	Oil dependent
14	Qatar	74,882	64,193	High		0.910	Very high	Oil dependent
15	Saudi Arabia	22,935	15,800	High		0.843	High	Oil dependent
16	Syria	4,511	1,898	Lower middle		0.742	Medium	Oil dependent
17	Tunisia	7,520	3,425	Lower middle		0.769	Medium	
18	Turkey	12,955	8,877	Upper middle		0.806	High	
19	UAE	54,626	38,436	High		0.903	Very high	Oil dependent
20	Yemen	2,335	1,006	Low		0.575	Medium	Oil dependent
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>								
21	Burkina Faso	1,124	458	Low	HIPC	0.389	Low	
22	Chad	1,477	658	Low	HIPC	0.392	Low	
23	Comoros	1,143	714	Low	HIPC	0.576	Medium	
24	Eritrea	626	284	Low	HIPC	0.472	Low	
25	Gambia	1,225	377	Low	HIPC	0.456	Low	


Table 10.1 (continued)

No.	Country	PCGDP (PPP US\$)	PCGDP (US\$)	World Bank Income group	World Bank Other ^a	HDI	UNDP-HDI Category	Economic characteristic ^b
26	Guinea	1,140	487	Low	HIPC	0.435	Low	
27	Guinea-Bissau	477	211	Low	HIPC	0.396	Low	
28	Mali	1,083	556	Low	HIPC	0.371	Low	
29	Mauritania	1,927	847	Low	HIPC	0.520	Medium	
30	Niger	627	294	Low	HIPC	0.340	Low	
31	Nigeria	1,969	1,118	Lower middle		0.511	Medium	Oil dependent
32	Senegal	1,666	900	Low	HIPC	0.464	Low	
33	Sierra Leone	679	284	Low	HIPC	0.365	Low	
34	Somalia	-	-	Low	HIPC	-		
35	Sudan	2,086	1,199	Lower middle	HIPC	0.531	Medium	Oil dependent
	<i>Central Asia</i>							
36	Azerbaijan	7,851	3,652	Lower middle		0.787	Medium	Oil dependent
37	Kazakhstan	10,863	6,772	Upper middle		0.804	High	Oil dependent
38	Kyrgyzstan	2,006	715	Low	HIPC	0.710	Medium	
39	Tajikistan	1,753	551	Low		0.688	Medium	
40	Turkmenistan	4,953	2,606	Lower middle		0.739	Medium	
41	Uzbekistan	2,425	830	Low		0.710	Medium	
	<i>South & Southeast Asia</i>							
42	Afghanistan	1,054	-	Low	HIPC	0.352	Low	
43	Bangladesh	1,241	431	Low		0.543	Medium	
44	Brunei	50,200	30,032	High		0.920	Very high	Oil dependent
	Darussalam							
45	Indonesia	3,712	1,918	Lower middle		0.734	Medium	
46	Malaysia	13,518	7,033	Upper middle		0.829	High	
47	Maldives	5,196	3,456	Lower middle		0.771	Medium	
48	Pakistan	2,496	879	Low		0.572	Medium	

^a HIPC (Highly indebted poor countries)

^b A country is classified as oil dependent if its oil export exceeds 30% of total merchandise export

Fig. 10.2 HDI performance relative to per capita income, 2007. (Source: Tabulated from UNDP HDR data)



disease'.³ The central argument of the natural resource curse is that, in the longer term, resource abundance is not translated into overall community welfare, economic transformation and sustainability through the development of non-resource sectors (Auty 1993). Pioneering cross-country empirical evidence on this hypothesis was put forward by Sachs and Warner (1995), who found that resource-rich countries, measured by the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP, tended to grow relatively slow. Within the growing literature on the resource curse, at least three mechanisms can be identified. The first mechanism works through failure to shift the structure of production to the dynamic manufacturing sector. This can happen due to real exchange rate appreciations (the Dutch disease phenomenon) and disincentive to entrepreneurship (Neary and Wijnbergen 1986; Baland and Francois 2000). The second channel works through institutional failure resulting in bad governance, which includes the presence of the rentier effect, corruption and authoritarianism (Ross 2001a, b; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). The third channel is conflict (civil war), as the presence of natural resources on one hand may create the appetite to control resource rents (Collier 2007), and on the other hand may result in grievances based on inequitable access to resources (Stewart 2008).

As can be seen from Table 10.1, the UNDP human development classification is more or less consistent with the World Bank income classification. Figure 10.2 plots the rankings of the 46 Muslim countries in terms of their per capita income against their HDI rankings—a higher rank means higher HDI or income. It shows that the HDI achievements of majority of Muslim countries are worse than what could be expected based on their income level—their HDI ranks are below the 45 degree

³ The Dutch disease concept was originally developed to explain the negative impact on the manufacturing sector after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959 in the Netherlands. The term was coined in 1977. The theory is that an increase in revenues from natural resources (or inflows of large amount of foreign exchange) de-industrialises a nation's economy by raising the exchange rate, which makes the manufacturing sector less competitive. For a review see Barbier (2005).




Fig. 10.3 Income per capita (PPP\$) and HDI, 2007. (Source: Tabulated from UNDP HDR data)

line. For countries above the 45 degree line, HDI achievements are better (relative to their income).

Figure 10.3 is a scatter plot of the level of HDI and income per capita (in terms of current PPP\$) for all countries in the world, with 46 Muslim countries identified by their names. The linear regression line of income and HDI shows the world average relationship between income and HDI. Countries located above the regression line performed better in terms of HDI achievement compared to their income level, and vice-versa. All seven high income Muslim countries are located below the income-HDI regression line, pointing to their poor HDI achievements relative to their income levels. The majority of low income Muslim countries also suffer from a similar relative disadvantage, with a few exceptions (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Bangladesh, Comoros and Eritrea). The majority of the middle income group (lower-middle and upper-middle)—except Turkey, Iran, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco—performed better in terms of their HDI achievements relative to their incomes.

10.2 Long Term Growth and Structural Change

More worryingly, there is an indication of income divergence among Muslim countries, as the low-income countries grew at much slower rates during the past four decades; several countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa, even experienced negative growth (see Table 10.2 and Appendix 10.16).

In general, structural transformation from agriculture to manufacturing has not happened in both high and low income groups (Table 10.3). As all of high income

Table 10.2 Average growth of per capita GDP by income groups. (Source: Calculated from Penn World Table; for details see Appendix 10.16)

Income groups	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2007
High	5.0	–3.7	1.3	2.7
Upper middle	2.6	–0.6	1.7	3.9
Lower middle	3.4	0.9	1.8	5.2
Low	0.1	1.2	–0.3	2.7

Table 10.3 Structural transformation. (Source: Calculated from World Bank (*World Development Indicators*))

Countries	Income group	Period	Percentage point change in value added (as % of GDP)	
			Agriculture	Manufacturing
Bahrain	High	1980–1990	–0.1	0.5
Brunei	High	1980–2007	0.1	–1.4
Kuwait	High	1970–2000	0.1	–1.6
Oman	High	1970–2001	–13.5	5.2
Qatar	High			
Saudi Arabia	High	1970–2007	–1.7	0.5
UAE	High	1980–2006	1.3	8.5
Algeria	Upper middle	1970–2007	–1	–12.2
Iran	Upper middle	1970–2007	–9.8	0.5
Kazakhstan	Upper middle	2000–2007	–2.6	–5.3
Lebanon	Upper middle	2000–2007	–0.9	–2.3
Libya	Upper middle			
Malaysia	Upper middle	1970–2007	–19.2	15.6
Turkey	Upper middle	1970–2007	–31.5	2.7
Albania	Lower middle	1980–2007	–12.2	
Azerbaijan	Lower middle	1990–2007	–23.1	–14.1
Egypt	Lower middle	1970–2007	–15.3	3.5
Indonesia	Lower middle	1970–2007	–31.2	16.8
Iraq	Lower middle			
Jordan	Lower middle	1970–2007	–8.4	8
Maldives	Lower middle			
Morocco	Lower middle	1980–2007	–4.8	–1.9
Nigeria	Lower middle			
Sudan	Lower middle	1970–2007	–15.3	–1.7
Syria	Lower middle	1990–2007	–11.7	–9.8
Tunisia	Lower middle	1970–2007	–6.7	8.8
Turkmenistan	Lower middle			
Afghanistan	Low			
Bangladesh	Low	1980–2007	–12.4	4
Burkina Faso	Low	1970–2006	1.9	–3.5
Chad	Low	1970–2007	–16.3	–4.7
Comoros	Low	1980–2007	11.3	0.3
Djibouti	Low	1990–2007	0.8	–1.1
Eritrea	Low	2000–2007	9.2	–5.7
Gambia	Low	1970–2007	–5.4	1.7

Table 10.3 (continued)

Countries	Income group	Period	Percentage point change in value added (as % of GDP)	
			Agriculture	Manufacturing
Guinea	Low	1990–2007	-7.1	-0.5
Guinea-Bissau	Low	1970–2007	5.6	-10.9
Kyrgyz Republic	Low	1990–2007	-0.6	-16.4
Mali	Low	1970–2007	-29.5	-4.8
Mauritania	Low	1970–2007	-16.8	-5.3
Niger	Low	1970–2000	-27.1	2.2
Pakistan	Low	1970–2007	-16.2	2.9
Senegal	Low	1970–2007	-6.5	1.2
Sierra Leone	Low	1970–2007	15.1	-2.8
Somalia	Low	1970–1990	6.1	-4.7
Tajikistan	Low	1990–2007	-11.9	-4.8
Uzbekistan	Low	1990–2007	-8.8	3.2
Yemen	Low	1990–2000	-13.9	-4.1

countries are oil dependent, the shares of agriculture and manufacturing value added in GDP are very limited and their shares overtime remained more or less stagnant. This implies that almost all high income, oil-dependent countries are suffering from some kind of Dutch disease in the sense of failure to develop their manufacturing sector. Only one country (UAE) has recorded a significant increase in the share of manufacturing value added by 8.5 percentage points (from 3.8 to 12.3%) during the period 1980–2006. This has turned the UAE into the most dynamic and diversified economy in the Middle East. It is followed by Oman, which has experienced a rise in the share of manufacturing by 5.2 percentage points.

Unfortunately, the low income, resource-poor group also shows a similar long-term stagnation in structural transformation. In most cases, both the shares of agriculture and manufacturing values added have declined, while they are the most important tradable sectors in any economy. This indicates a structural shift towards less dynamic non-tradable sectors. In several Sub-Saharan low income Muslim countries, the shares of agriculture have increased while those of manufacturing have declined. The failure to achieve structural transformation in the low income group is consistent with their poor performance in terms of both long-term income growth and human development as presented in the previous section.

The data show a mixed picture with regards to the middle income group. Several countries, such as Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, share the characteristics of the poor performing low income group, where the shares of manufacturing have declined. Thus, these countries have experienced structural regression. However, a number of countries have achieved the normal pattern of structural economic transformation where there has been a shift from agriculture to dynamic manufacturing. The top performers among them are Indonesia and Malaysia, followed by Tunisia, the UAE, Jordan, Oman and Bangladesh. In countries like Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey, the rise in the shares of manufacturing has not

been commensurate with significant declines in the shares of agriculture, implying the growth of the service sector, which is usually less dynamic than manufacturing.

Not surprisingly, low income countries have very high poverty rates. However, some of them also have a relatively high degree of income inequality (i.e. Gini measure of around 40). The middle income group shows a relatively moderate level of income inequality (Table 10.4).

During the past half-century, the low-income group has not been able to significantly lower their population growth (Table 10.5). Given their lower level of income and widespread poverty, the current 2.5% annual population growth is still considerably high. The middle income group has managed to significantly lower their population growth. The high income group still has high population growth, which could be sustainable, given that all of them are less populated countries with significant resource (oil) endowment.

10.3 Sources of Growth: Labour, Capital and Technology

Human resource, physical capital and productivity are three sources of growth. Besides quantity, the quality of human and physical capital plays an important role, especially in productivity growth. The main driver of productivity is technological progress. Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman attributed growth from increased employment of low skilled labour and higher investment to “perspiration”, and growth from technological progress or productivity to “inspiration” (Krugman 1994). They are also referred to as “factor driven” and “innovation driven”, respectively (Porter 1998).

Human Resource The simple and ready indicator of human resource is the labour force participation rate. Higher labour participation rates among the low income group are an encouraging sign; however, the participation rates are much lower among upper-middle and lower-middle groups (Table 10.6). This might be due to significantly low female participation in the labour force, which may be related to local Arab cultural factors towards women in general. Labour force participation rates in some MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries (Jordan, Iraq, UAE, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey) are less than 50%, but the figures are much higher in Southeast Asian Muslim countries which hold somewhat more liberal attitudes towards women and their participation in the labour force. The labour force participation rates in the Muslim countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are also high. Because low labour force participation is confined to the Arab Middle East countries, it cannot be attributed to the influence of Islam. Lower labour force participation in Turkey (47.5%) is a surprise, given its more secular and European tradition.

As can be seen from Table 10.7, the quality labour force in high income Muslim countries is much lower than in the OECD countries. Even the middle income Muslim countries do not fare well in comparison with middle income countries as whole. This is consistent with the overall poor literacy rates in most Muslim

Table 10.4 Poverty and inequality. (Source: WDI)

	Poverty HCR (PPP) 2000–2007 ^a		Gini index 1992–2007 ^a
	\$ 2	\$ 1.25	
<i>High income</i>			
Bahrain	–	–	–
Kuwait	–	–	–
Oman	–	–	–
Qatar	–	–	–
Saudi Arabia	–	–	–
UAE	–	–	–
Brunei Darussalam	–	–	–
<i>Upper middle income</i>			
Algeria	23.6	6.8	35.3
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	8	<2	38.3
Lebanon	–	–	–
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	–	–	–
Turkey	9	2.7	43.2
Kazakhstan	17.2	3.1	33.9
Malaysia	7.8	<2	37.9
<i>Lower middle income</i>			
Albania	7.8	<2	33
Egypt	18.4	<2	32.1
Iraq	–	–	–
Jordan	3.5	<2	37.7
Morocco	14	2.5	40.9
Syrian Arab Republic	–	–	–
Tunisia	12.8	2.6	40.8
Nigeria	83.9	64.4	42.9
Sudan	–	–	–
Azerbaijan	<2	<2	36.5
Turkmenistan	49.6	24.8	40.8
Indonesia	–	–	39.4
Maldives	–	–	–
<i>Low income</i>			
Djibouti	41.2	18.8	40
Yemen	46.6	17.5	37.7
Burkina Faso	81.2	56.5	39.6
Chad	83.3	61.9	39.8
Comoros	65	46.1	64.3
Eritrea	–	–	–
Gambia	56.7	34.3	47.3
Guinea	87.2	70.1	43.3
Guinea-Bissau	77.9	48.8	35.5
Mali	77.1	51.4	39
Mauritania	44.1	21.2	39
Niger	85.6	65.9	43.9
Senegal	60.3	33.5	39.2
Sierra Leone	76.1	53.4	42.5

Table 10.4 (continued)

	Poverty HCR (PPP) 2000–2007 ^a		Gini index 1992–2007 ^a
	\$ 2	\$ 1.25	
Somalia	–	–	–
Kyrgyzstan	51.9	21.8	32.9
Tajikistan	50.8	21.5	33.6
Uzbekistan	76.7	46.3	36.7
Afghanistan	–	–	–
Bangladesh	81.3	49.6	31
Pakistan	60.3	22.6	31.2

^a The latest available data

Table 10.5 Population pressure. (Source: Calculated from WDI, for details see Appendix 10.17)

Income groups	No. of countries	Population 2008	% Pop	Population growth				
				1960–1970	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2008
High	7	37,087,767	2.6	6.3	7.0	4.9	2.8	3.5
Upper middle	7	233,315,661	16.6	2.9	2.6	2.3	1.6	1.4
Lower middle	13	619,526,133	43.9	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.0	1.7
Low	21	519,805,494	36.9	2.7	3.1	2.7	2.4	2.5
<i>Total</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>1,409,735,055</i>	<i>100.0</i>					

Table 10.6 Labour force participation rates in Muslim countries, 1980–2007. (Source: Calculated from WDI, for details see Appendix 10.18)

Income groups	Labour force participation rate (% of 15+)			
	1980	1990	2000	2007
High	54.6	53.5	61.3	61.1
Upper middle	54.6	56.0	55.8	56.2
Lower-middle	55.0	55.5	54.2	54.8
Low	70.2	70.6	68.2	68.9

Table 10.7 Labour force with tertiary education (% of total labour force), 2007. (Source: Calculated from WDI, for details see Appendix 10.18)

Income groups	Muslim countries	All countries
High (or OECD)	17.2	40.4
Upper middle	21.8	23.7
Lower middle	10.3	–
Low	9.1	–

countries. This is really a sad outcome of the fact that Islam encourages education and makes it compulsory (*Fard*) for every Muslim male and female. Nonetheless, such factors as cultural roadblocks or the vicious circle of poverty might account for the poor literacy (Table 10.8).

Table 10.8 Literacy rate (aged 15+), average 2003–2008. (Source: Calculate from WDI (latest available data, 2003–2008), for details see Appendix 10.18)

Income groups	Muslim countries	All countries
High (or OECD)	90.8	–
Upper middle	87.6	93.2
Lower middle	82.5	79.9
Low	54.9	69.3

Table 10.9 Gross investment (as % of GDP). (Source: Calculated from WDI, for details see Appendix 10.19)

Income groups	Muslim countries			All countries		
	1981–1990	1991–2000	2000–2008	1981–1990	1991–2000	2000–2008
High (or OECD)	23.4	22.5	21.9	22.6	21.4	20.5
Upper middle	23.5	26.3	25.6	21.9	21.4	20.8
Lower middle	26.9	24.8	24.8	29.6	31.2	33.5
Low	20.5	18.2	20.7	16.9	19.3	23.9

Table 10.10 Paved road (as % of total road). (Source: Calculated from WDI, for details see Appendix 10.20)

Income groups	Muslim countries		All countries	
	1990	2000	1990	2000
High (or OECD)	60.2	63.3	79.8	90.9
Upper middle	67.8	72.2	47.6	41.8
Lower middle	61.9	60.5	33.8	36.3
Low	29.6	29.9	15.4	12.1

Capital Formation and Infrastructure Table 10.9 presents data on gross investment as a percentage of GDP. As can be seen, in the past two decades investment rates in low income and lower-middle income Muslim countries were relatively lower than their worldwide counterparts. However, the average investment rates in both high and upper-middle income Muslim countries were higher than high income OECD and the rest of the middle income countries. Higher investment rates in high income Muslim countries are due to their high dependence on the resource (oil) sector, which is very capital intensive. Higher investment rates should result in higher growth rates, but this is not the case in most Muslim countries. This implies inefficiency of investment, which could be due to the poor quality labour force as seen earlier. The inefficiency of investment could also be due to other factors, such as poor governance and a low level of infrastructure.

Infrastructure According to two available infrastructure indicators (paved road and port quality), high income Muslim countries lag considerably behind their counterparts in high income OECD countries (Tables 10.10 and 10.11).

Table 10.11 Quality of port infrastructure. (Source: Calculated from WDI, for details see Appendix 10.20)

Income groups	Muslim countries			All countries		
	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009
High (or OECD)	4.9	4.9	5.1	5.3	5.3	5.3
Upper middle	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.7
Lower middle	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.4	3.5	3.7
Low	3.0	3.1	3.4	3.1	3.2	3.4

The scores of quality of port infrastructure range from 1 (extremely underdeveloped) to 7 (well developed and efficient by international standards)

Table 10.12 Personal computer per 100 population. (Source: Calculated from WDI, for details see Appendix 10.20)

Income groups	Muslim countries				All countries			
	1990	1995	2000	2005	1990	1995	2000	2005
High (or OECD)	1.0	4.1	9.9	15.8	11.1	19.8	39.0	63.1
Upper middle income	0.5	1.7	5.0	8.2	0.5	2.0	5.4	11.5
Lower middle income	0.2	0.6	1.6	5.0	0.1	0.3	1.2	3.3
Low income	0.1	0.2	0.5	1.3			0.3	1.7

Table 10.13 Gross expenditure on research and development (GERD), 2004–2007 (average of latest available data). (Source: Calculated from UNESCO, for details see Appendix 10.19)

Income groups	GERD as % of GDP		GERD per capita (in PPP\$)	
	Muslim countries	All countries	Muslim countries	All countries
High (or OECD)	0.1	2.00	14.2	730.6
Upper middle	0.5	0.61	52.6	82.3
Lower middle	0.3	0.54	11.3	25.8
Low	0.3	0.19	5.8	2.3

Technological Progress Data on personal computers and spending on research and development show that high-income Muslim countries are lagging significantly relative to their counterparts in high-income OECD countries (Table 10.12 and 10.13). This worsens their prospect for moving from oil/resource-dependent economies to advanced technology- and industrial-based economies. A similar situation is found in terms of expenditure for research and development. The high income Muslim countries are far behind their OECD counterparts (Table 10.13). Middle income Muslim countries also spend significantly less on research and development compared to middle income countries in general.

10.4 Development and Institutions: The Role of Democracy

There is a growing body of literature, pioneered by Nobel Laureate Douglas North, which attributes economic development or sustained growth to good institutions (North 1990). An offshoot of this school of thought links economic performance to

democracy. However, there is considerable debate about causality: does democracy result in better economic performance, or does the rise in income cause demand for democracy (Acemoglu et al. 2008)? Nobel Laureate A. K. Sen believes that the debate misses an important point and leads to the wrong question: is a country fit for democracy, or not? Instead, he holds the view that a country becomes fit through democracy (Sen 1999).

In general, Muslim countries have low polity scores, indicating a democracy deficit (Table 10.14).⁴ Most of them are still under some form of dictatorship or partial dictatorship. Out of 48 countries, only 10 (Indonesia, Albania, Senegal, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Bangladesh, Turkmenistan, Mauritania and Comoros) have polity scores of 7 or higher, a threshold for a polity score indicating a country has a functioning democracy. A few, such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Senegal and Albania, have undergone successful democratic transitions only in the past decade. However, it should be noted that some of them (e.g. Bangladesh, Lebanon, Mauritania) show features of illiberal democracy (or anocracy), having regular elections as the key indicator of democracy, but lacking in civil liberties, as indicated by the presence of election-related violence and/or temporary military rule.

Data from 48 Muslim countries show a strong negative correlation between level of income and democracy score. This is in contrast to global data where most of high income countries are mature democracies. Is it a problem with Islam? The answer is no. Muslim countries are rather unfortunate from the perspective of democracy for two reasons. First is the fact that high levels of income in some Muslim countries are due to oil, not due to dynamic industrial sector growth. It has been suggested that, in general, oil hinders democracy (Ross 2001a) and oil wealth strongly inhibits democratic transitions in authoritarian states (Ross 2009). A rentier effect, through which governments use low tax rates and high spending to dampen pressures for democracy, serves as the main mechanism that links oil and authoritarianism. A second factor relates to the fact that the majority of Muslim countries are categorised as low- and lower-middle income countries, and the majority of them fall within a HIPC category. Low-income countries tend to have a low score of democracy, reflecting their lack in institutional development. It should be noted that levels of income and institutional development (democracy) are interrelated factors that move together (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002, 2005).

Muslim countries are also prone to armed conflict, which has adverse impacts on both economic growth and social developments. Only a few of them recorded zero or low numbers of armed conflict. In the MENA region, only four countries (Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Libya) documented no incident of armed conflict during the past half a century. Most of Sub-Saharan Muslim countries are conflict prone.

⁴ The Polity data set gives a rising democracy score of between 0 and 10. A truly meaningful democracy is only arrived at with a Polity score of 8. The autocracy data set gives an autocracy score of between -10 and 0. The Polity score is a combination of both autocracy and democracy, and a reflection of a country's democratic or non-democratic status. See www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.

Table 10.14 Polity score (level of democracy) and armed conflict. (Source: Polity score from Polity Project (www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm) and conflict data from PRIO-Uppsala conflict dataset (<http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/>))

Country	Average polity score				Number of armed conflict (number in brackets is war)					
	1981-1990	1991-2000	2001-2008	2008	1960-1970	1971-1980	1981-1990	1991-2000	2001-2008	1960-2008
<i>Middle East & North Africa</i>										
Albania	-8.0	4.1	7.8	9						
Algeria	-7.6	-4.1	0.1	2	3 (1)			10 (8)	8 (1)	21 (10)
Bahrain	-10.0	-9.2	-7.1	-7						
Djibouti	-8.0	-5.0	2.0	2				5	1	6
Egypt	-6.0	-6.0	-4.5	-3		1 (1)		6		7 (1)
Iran	-5.8	-2.4	-2.6	-6	3	4 (3)	14 (9)	8	5	34 (13)
Iraq	-9.0	-9.0	-9.0	-3	11 (7)	10 (3)	19 (9)	6 (1)	5 (5)	51 (25)
Jordan	-8.3	-2.2	-2.3	-3	1 (1)					1 (1)
Kuwait	-9.0	-7.0	-7.0	-7			1	1 (1)		2 (1)
Lebanon	0.0	7.0	7.0	7		2 (1)	7 (1)			9 (2)
Libya	-7.0	-7.0	-7.0	-7						
Morocco	-8.0	-6.8	-6.0	-6	1	7	9			17
Oman	-10.0	-9.0	-8.1	-8		4				4
Qatar	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	-10						
Saudi Arabia	-10.0	-10.0	-10.0	-10		1				1
Syria	-9.0	-8.8	7.0	-7	1 (1)	3 (1)	2 (1)			6 (3)
Tunisia	-6.8	-3.4	-3.9	-9		1				1
Turkey	5.0	7.8	7.0	-4			7	12 (8)	9	28 (8)
UAE	-8.0	-8.0	-8.0	-8						
Yemen	-5.0	-2.3	-2.0	-2	9 (5)	4	2	1 (1)		16 (6)
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>										
Burkina Faso	-7.0	-4.5	0.0	-6			2			2
Chad	-4.6	-3.1	-2.0	-2		7 (3)	8 (2)	8	6 (1)	29 (6)
Comoros	-5.4	2.5	5.9	9		1	1	1		2
Eritrea		-6.0	-7.0	-7				4 (3)	1	5 (3)
Gambia	7.1	-1.6	-5.0	-5		1				1
Guinea	-7.6	-2.6	-1.0	6			1	1	1	2

Table 10.14 (continued)

Country	Average polity score					Number of armed conflict (number in brackets is war)						
	1981–1990	1991–2000	2001–2008	2008	2008	1960–1970	1971–1980	1981–1990	1991–2000	2001–2008	1960–2008	
Guinea-Bissau	-7.7	1.0	4.0	-1	-1	8	3		2		13	
Mali	-7.0	5.9	6.9	6	6			2	1	2	5	
Mauritania	-7.0	-6.0	-4.1	7	7		4				4	
Niger	-7.0	2.5	5.6	4	4				3	2	5	
Nigeria	-2.4	-3.5	4.0	6	6	4 (4)				2	6 (4)	
Senegal	-1.0	0.0	8.0	8	8			1	6	2	9	
Sierra Leone	-7.0	-3.0	5.1	7	7				10 (2)		10 (2)	
Somalia	-7.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	1	2	8 (2)	6 (2)	5 (2)	22 (6)	
Sudan	-2.1	-7.0	-5.1	-4	-4	8 (8)	4 (2)	8 (8)	10 (8)	8 (5)	38 (31)	
<i>Central Asia</i>												
Azerbaijan		-4.7	-7.0	-7	-7				3 (3)	1	4 (3)	
Kazakhstan		-3.6	-5.8	3	3							
Kyrgyzstan		-3.0	0.1	-6	-6							
Tajikistan		-4.0	-2.5	-3	-3				6 (2)		6 (2)	
Turkmenistan		-8.9	-9.0	7	7							
Uzbekistan		-9.0	-9.0	-9	-9				2	1	3	
<i>South & Southeast Asia</i>												
Afghanistan	-8.0	-4.3					3 (3)	10 (10)	10 (10)	8 (6)	31 (29)	
Bangladesh	-5.7	6.0	3.0	7	7		6	10	2		18	
Brunei Darussalam												
Indonesia	-7.0	-4.2	7.3	8	8	5 (1)	9 (7)	10 (1)	5	5	34 (9)	
Malaysia	4.0	3.4	3.4	-5	-5	4	2	1			7	
Maldives												
Pakistan	-1.6	5.0	-3.0	5	5	2 (1)	5 (3)	4	8 (1)	8 (1)	27 (6)	

Polity scores range from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy)

Number of conflict in a decade may exceed ten since a country might face more than one conflict in a year

PRIO-Uppsala dataset defines *armed conflict* as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. *War* is defined as armed conflict with 1,000 or more battle-related deaths.

Armed conflict was quite rare in Central Asia, while Maldives and Brunei recorded zero armed conflict cases.

10.5 Lack of Economic Integration

Despite geographical continuity and common Islamic values and culture, Islamic countries lag in economic integration (inter-country trade, capital flows). The only significant integrating factor is labour movements—the flow of migrant workers from labour surplus Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Yemen and Indonesia, to rich Arab countries. Again, this is mostly a one-way flow of unskilled workers and hence does not contribute much to economic dynamism as can be expected from two-way flows of skilled workers. Even the economic integration within the MENA is also weak.

Trade integration among Muslim countries is generally low. Trade with other Muslim countries outside their regions is very limited (Table 10.15). However, there are a few exceptions, where some countries have a high proportion of exports to other Muslim countries, in particular to one or two key neighbours. For example, in 2009, 75% of Djibouti's exports went to Somalia, 43% of Syria's exports went to Iraq, 54% of Lebanon's exports went to Syria and UAE, 81% of Somalia's exports went to UAE and Yemen, and 67% of Pakistan's exports went to UAE and Afghanistan. Exports of landlocked Central Asian countries are dominated by exports to their immediate neighbours. For example, 77% of Afghanistan's exports went to Pakistan and Tajikistan (45 and 32% respectively).

Flows of investment from capital-rich Muslim countries to capital-scarce Muslim countries are very limited. Inward FDI to capital-scarce Muslim countries are dominated by FDI from developed countries. For example, according to the UNCTAD's FDI statistics, Chad moved from a small scale FDI recipient country to one of the top five in Africa in 2002, and the largest affiliate foreign TNC in Chad in 2002 was from France. Two of the three largest affiliates of foreign TNCs in Djibouti in 2002 were from Switzerland, and the third was from the Netherlands.

10.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has provided a snapshot of the socio-economic performance of Muslim countries in the world. Unfortunately, the majority of Muslim countries are low-income and highly indebted. The few high-income Muslim countries are dependent on natural resources, mainly oil. They have failed to use their resource revenues to industrialise or achieve structural transformation. Thus, their economic position remains vulnerable to the developments in the international markets for oil. Their achievements in human development are also less spectacular, given their level of income. Only a handful of middle-income Muslim countries have been successful

Table 10.15 Export to other Muslim countries (% of total export; average during). (Source: Calculated from IMF Direction of Trade Statistic)

Country	Income group	1991–1995	1996–2000	2001–2005	2006–2009
<i>MENA</i>					
Albania	Lower middle	4.9	1.3	1.4	2.1
Algeria	Upper middle	3.4	7.4	7.7	6.8
Bahrain	High	21.3	10.8	10.4	10.6
Djibouti	Low	63.3	77.6	68.4	86.3
Egypt	Lower middle	17.3	17.6	20.4	25.8
Iran	Upper middle	10.3	11.3	10.0	11.8
Iraq	Lower middle	82.5	27.8	8.1	4.3
Jordan	Lower middle	48.0	57.5	47.0	47.7
Kuwait	High	11.3	11.6	13.2	12.6
Lebanon	Upper middle	56.2	52.7	59.0	71.7
Libya	Upper middle	8.4	11.5	11.1	6.4
Morocco	Lower middle	12.2	7.7	6.4	7.5
Oman	High	13.8	18.0	19.1	20.0
Qatar	High	11.0	6.5	7.6	7.4
Saudi Arabia	High	15.2	15.3	14.2	14.7
Syria	Lower middle	27.3	24.6	39.5	65.9
Tunisia	Lower middle	11.7	9.3	10.7	13.3
Turkey	Upper middle	18.7	15.5	15.0	22.1
UAE	High	15.1	14.8	19.0	20.8
Yemen	Low	14.9	6.4	13.2	12.2
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>					
Burkina Faso	Low	5.7	15.4	13.5	16.7
Chad	Low	5.4	7.3	4.6	0.4
Comoros	Low	2.2	1.7	4.6	29.6
Eritrea	Low				
Gambia	Low	15.7	10.1	12.1	6.6
Guinea	Low	0.9	1.6	1.7	3.6
Guinea-Bissau	Low	0.8	2.3	11.7	26.7
Mali	Low	8.6	8.5	13.0	16.5
Mauritania	Low	1.0	3.6	7.6	4.0
Niger	Low	20.0	27.4	30.4	30.6
Nigeria	Lower middle	1.5	3.0	4.6	1.6
Senegal	Low	16.0	16.9	27.1	38.0
Sierra Leone	Low		3.3	1.5	2.2
Somalia	Low	81.9	88.9	83.9	94.7
Sudan	Lower middle	27.1	32.6	16.5	10.5
<i>Central Asia</i>					
Azerbaijan	Lower middle	40.8	29.4	12.9	18.3
Kazakhstan	Upper middle	10.8	8.7	10.8	8.1
Kyrgyzstan	Low	40.2	35.4	42.7	41.2
Tajikistan	Low	11.3	28.4	33.3	43.2
Turkmenistan	Lower middle	26.2	35.8	22.4	23.3
Uzbekistan	Low	11.2	23.1	29.0	29.2

Table 10.15 (continued)

Country	Income group	1991–1995	1996–2000	2001–2005	2006–2009
<i>South & Southeast Asia</i>					
Afghanistan	Low	16.0	31.9	34.9	39.7
Bangladesh	Low	7.9	5.2	3.7	4.3
Brunei Darussalam	High	1.6	2.8	7.0	24.4
Indonesia	Lower middle	6.5	7.9	9.3	10.6
Malaysia	Upper middle	5.8	5.5	6.5	9.1
Maldives	Lower middle	0.8	0.2	2.0	2.6
Pakistan	Low	17.7	17.0	24.3	33.3

to achieve significant structural change and industrialise. They have also made better progress in human development, including democratisation of their polity.

A number of factors can be identified for the lack of socio-economic progress in Muslim countries. They include deficits in education, infrastructure, research and development. The absence of democracy and conflict may also have contributed to their poor performance. However, one important contributing factor is the lack of economic integration among Muslim countries. This is a serious shortfall, given the unity of faith and the contiguity of geography. While addressing the critical deficits, the Muslim countries must harness their complementarities, especially in terms of capital and labour, to accelerate progress.

10.7 Appendix

Appendix 10.16 Long term growth of per capita GDP, 1950–2007. (Source: Penn World Table)

Countries	1950–1960	1960–1970	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2007
<i>High income</i>						
Bahrain			1.7	–2.5	1.0	4.2
Kuwait			–7.2	–5.8	6.0	2.4
Oman			4.1	4.2	1.9	0.7
Qatar			0.5	–5.2	3.2	5.7
Saudi Arabia			8.4	–5.7	–1.5	0.8
UAE			21.9	–5.3	–0.7	4.2
Brunei Darussalam			5.7	–5.7	–0.9	0.7
<i>Upper-middle income</i>						
Algeria		1.3	2.1	0.3	0.0	2.9
Iran	10.8	7.3	–3.9	1.5	3.6	3.8
Lebanon			5.2	–2.1	2.2	0.5
Libya			2.9	–9.4	–0.3	3.9
Turkey	4.5	3.3	1.9	2.7	1.9	2.9
Kazakhstan			.	.	–1.2	10.2
Malaysia	1.6	3.3	7.1	3.6	5.4	3.4

Appendix 10.16 (continued)

Countries	1950–1960	1960–1970	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2007
<i>Lower-middle income</i>						
Albania			1.8	-0.5	1.8	5.9
Egypt	0.9	2.6	1.7	5.7	2.7	2.9
Iraq			7.4	-3.4	3.8	1.4
Jordan	6.0	0.3	3.0	-2.3	-0.5	2.6
Morocco	-0.6	7.0	3.0	1.5	0.3	2.5
Syria		2.5	5.7	-1.5	3.1	2.8
Tunisia		3.3	4.5	2.1	3.3	4.2
Nigeria	3.3	0.2	1.1	-1.6	-0.4	10.6
Sudan			-0.3	-1.7	5.0	5.8
Azerbaijan					-1.4	16.3
Turkmenistan					-1.1	4.0
Indonesia		2.0	6.0	3.9	2.7	3.2
Maldives			3.3	7.9	4.5	6.0
<i>Low income</i>						
Djibouti			-4.2	-1.7	1.8	-2.2
Yemen				15.5	3.0	-0.1
Burkina Faso		-0.4	2.3	-0.1	2.0	3.0
Chad		1.0	-4.0	2.9	-0.3	8.7
Comoros		3.4	1.0	1.1	-1.6	-1.0
Eritrea					3.8	-1.7
Gambia		-0.1	0.2	0.2	-0.4	1.4
Guinea		-2.6	1.0	-1.1	1.6	1.5
Guinea-Bissau		-1.6	5.1	1.2	3.2	-0.7
Mali		-1.5	1.5	2.1	2.4	2.0
Mauritania		9.9	1.2	-0.9	0.9	1.6
Niger		0.5	-2.0	-1.8	-0.8	0.9
Senegal			-0.7	-0.3	-0.5	1.3
Sierra Leone		4.7	0.4	0.5	-8.2	7.5
Somalia			-1.3	-0.6	-3.6	-0.5
Kyrgyzstan					-0.2	1.2
Tajikistan					-2.9	5.9
Uzbekistan					-2.3	5.1
Afghanistan			-0.4	-1.0	-5.7	14.6
Bangladesh		-0.2	-0.9	1.4	1.1	3.9
Pakistan	-0.4	4.5	2.5	3.1	1.1	4.2

Appendix 10.17 Population growth. (Source: Calculated from WDI)

	Population	Population growth				
	2008	1960– 1970	1970– 1980	1980– 1990	1990– 2000	2000– 2008
<i>High income</i>						
Bahrain	766,926	3.5	4.7	3.6	2.8	2.1
Brunei Darussalam	396,692	4.7	4.1	2.9	2.6	2.2
Kuwait	2,728,041	10.3	6.3	4.4	0.3	2.8
Oman	2,785,361	2.8	4.7	4.5	2.7	1.9
Qatar	1,280,862	9.5	7.5	7.4	2.8	9.6
Saudi Arabia	24,645,686	3.5	5.3	5.5	2.3	2.2
United Arab Emirates	4,484,199	9.6	16.3	6.3	5.7	4.1

Appendix 10.17 (continued)

	Population	Population growth				
	2008	1960– 1970	1970– 1980	1980– 1990	1990– 2000	2000– 2008
<i>Upper middle income</i>						
Algeria	34,361,756	2.4	3.2	3.0	1.9	1.5
Iran	71,956,322	2.8	3.2	3.4	1.6	1.5
Kazakhstan	15,674,833	2.7	1.3	0.9	-0.9	0.6
Lebanon	4,139,281	2.6	1.3	0.7	2.4	1.2
Libya	6,276,632	4.0	4.4	3.6	2.1	2.0
Malaysia	26,992,577	2.9	2.4	2.8	2.5	1.9
Turkey	73,914,260	2.5	2.5	2.0	1.7	1.3
<i>Lower middle income</i>						
Albania	3,143,291	2.9	2.3	2.1	-0.7	0.3
Azerbaijan	8,678,851	2.9	1.8	1.5	1.2	0.9
Egypt	81,527,172	2.5	2.2	2.7	2.0	1.9
Indonesia	228,248,538	2.3	2.4	1.9	1.5	1.3
Iraq	31,234,000	3.1	3.2	2.6		
Jordan	5,906,043	6.0	3.8	3.8	4.2	2.6
Maldives	310,473	2.1	2.7	3.2	2.4	1.6
Morocco	31,228,981	2.5	2.6	2.2	1.7	1.2
Nigeria	151,319,500	2.4	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.4
Sudan	41,347,723	2.6	3.2	2.8	2.6	2.1
Syria	21,226,920	3.3	3.5	3.6	2.6	3.2
Tunisia	10,326,600	2.0	2.2	2.5	1.6	1.0
Turkmenistan	5,028,041	3.2	2.7	2.5	2.1	1.4
<i>Low income</i>						
Afghanistan	28,150,000	2.1	1.7			
Bangladesh	160,000,128	2.5	2.7	2.5	2.0	1.6
Burkina Faso	15,208,586	1.8	2.3	2.7	3.0	3.1
Chad	11,067,437	2.2	2.3	2.9	3.3	3.4
Comoros	643,571			2.6	2.2	2.2
Djibouti	847,732	6.7	7.7	5.1	2.7	1.9
Eritrea	4,996,204	2.6	2.9	2.5	1.6	3.9
Gambia	1,660,200	3.1	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.1
Guinea	9,833,055	2.1	1.9	2.9	3.2	2.0
Guinea-Bissau	1,575,446	0.2	3.3	2.0	2.5	2.4
Kyrgyzstan	5,277,900	3.2	2.1	2.0	1.1	0.9
Mali	12,711,140	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.7	3.0
Mauritania	3,200,288	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.8
Niger	14,668,743	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.6	3.5
Pakistan	166,036,895	2.8	3.2	2.7	2.5	2.3
Senegal	12,211,181	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.7
Sierra Leone	5,559,853	1.7	2.0	2.3	0.3	3.5
Somalia	8,953,890	2.5	6.1	0.4	0.5	3.0
Tajikistan	6,836,083	3.5	3.0	3.0	1.5	1.3
Uzbekistan	27,313,700	3.4	2.9	2.5	1.9	1.3
Yemen	23,053,462	2.0	2.7	3.9	4.0	3.0

Appendix 10.18 (for Table 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8) Labour force participation rate (LFP), Educated labour force; literacy. (Source: WDI)

Countries	LFP, 1980–2007				% Total labour with tertiary education 2007	Literacy rate Latest available data 2003–2008
	1980	1990	2000	2007		
<i>High income</i>						
Bahrain	59.8	65.0	65.2	63.7	16.7	90.8
Brunei Darussalam	59.5	65.1	67.6	66.8		95.0
Kuwait	55.6	62.1	68.9	66.9	16.7	94.5
Oman	52.7	56.3	58.2	55.2		86.7
Qatar	68.3	75.8	72.8	77.2	18.6	93.1
Saudi Arabia	45.2	53.6	53.5	54.3		85.5
United Arab Emirates	41	41.9	43.2	43.9	16.6	90.0
<i>Upper middle income</i>						
Algeria	44.7	48.9	55	57.3	10	72.6
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	50.9	51.9	51.1	53.5	15.4	82.3
Kazakhstan	69.4	69.8	70.1	69.4	50	99.7
Lebanon	50.4	51.2	50.3	50.1		89.6
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	51.6	50	50.9	52.7		88.4
Malaysia	59.7	61.9	62.9	62.7	20.3	92.1
Turkey	55.7	58.1	50.5	47.5	13.1	88.7
<i>Lower middle income</i>						
Albania	75.6	75.9	61.1	60.3	7.9	99.0
Azerbaijan	70.6	71.7	64.6	65.2	22.3	99.5
Egypt	45.4	48.9	46.5	47.3		66.4
Indonesia	63.2	65.8	67.5	67.7	6.5	92.0
Iraq	41.5	42.9	42.6	41.8		77.6
Jordan	39.5	41.1	44.8	44.4		92.2
Maldives	50.9	50	55.4	65.5		98.4
Morocco	52	52.6	53	51.4	8.7	56.4
Nigeria	56.6	55.9	55.1	54.5		60.1
Sudan	58.1	50.4	51.6	51.5		69.3
Syrian Arab Republic	44.3	49.6	49.3	49.8	6.3	83.6
Tunisia	49.8	48.2	48.3	48.3		78.0
Turkmenistan	67.4	68.8	65.3	64.8		99.5
<i>Low income</i>						
Afghanistan	59.4	58.9	58.5	59.6		–
Bangladesh	74.4	76	71.2	71.2		55.0
Burkina Faso	83.1	82.9	83.2	83.3		28.7
Chad	60.1	70.1	72.5	74.1	0.6	32.7
Comoros	75.7	75	72.7	73.1		73.6
Djibouti	71.3	70.5	69.1	67.3		
Eritrea	71.6	70.7	70.5	70		65.3
Gambia	78.1	77.9	77.4	76.9		45.3
Guinea	84.5	84.9	84.7	84.1	3.2	29.5
Guinea-Bissau	70.6	70.9	71.5	71.4		51.0
Kyrgyzstan	63.4	66	64.9	63.8	2.5	99.3

Appendix 10.18 (continued)

Countries	LFP, 1980–2007				% Total labour with tertiary education 2007	Literacy rate Latest available data 2003–2008
	1980	1990	2000	2007		
Mali	50.5	50.5	50.3	50.1		26.2
Mauritania	71.1	70.7	70.3	70.1		56.8
Niger	64.6	63.4	63.5	63.5		28.7
Pakistan	49.2	49.8	51.1	53.8	22.9	53.7
Senegal	75.7	75.7	74.4	73.7		41.9
Sierra Leone	65.2	65.6	67.4	66.1		39.8
Somalia	71.1	70.2	70.5	71.1		
Tajikistan	79.7	79.2	50.6	61.5	10.9	99.7
Uzbekistan	75.6	72.8	76.3	77.7		99.3
Yemen	79.9	80.3	61	64.2	14.4	60.9

Appendix 10.19 (for Tables 10.9 and 10.13) Gross investment and gross expenditure on research and development. (Source: WDI for Investment data. GERD (Gross Expenditure on Research and Development) data from UNESCO)

	Gross investment (% of GDP)			GERD % of GDP Latest available data 2004–2007	GERD/capita/PPP\$ Latest available data 2004–2007
	1981–1990	1991–2000	2000–2008		
<i>High Income</i>					
Bahrain	31.3	18.2	23.4		
Brunei Darussalam	18.6	28.4	14.1	0.04	17.33
Kuwait	19.2	18.5	17.4	0.09	
Oman	22.5	16.2	23.2		
Qatar		28.8	33.4		
Saudi Arabia	22.6	20.5	19.6	0.05	11.06
UAE	26.4	27.2	22.5		
<i>Upper middle income</i>					
Algeria	32.9	28.1	31.5	0.07	4.78
Iran	23.5	34.4	34.1	0.67	65.63
Kazakhstan		20.8	30.1	0.21	22.94
Lebanon	17.8	28.2	23.3		
Libya	18.6	13.4	18.0		
Malaysia	28.3	35.8	22.6	0.64	79.90
Turkey	20.1	23.1	19.4	0.71	89.85
<i>Lower middle income</i>					
Albania	32.3	16.2	26.3		
Azerbaijan	26.5	20.7	34.9	0.18	13.88
Egypt	28.8	20.0	18.8	0.23	11.59
Indonesia	29.2	26.7	24.6	0.05	1.58
Iraq					
Jordan	28.8	28.4	25.9		
Maldives		30.8	33.8		

Appendix 10.19 (continued)

	Gross investment (% of GDP)			GERD % of	GERD/capita/
	1981–1990	1991–2000	2000–2008	GDP	PPPS
				Latest available data 2004–2007	Latest available data 2004–2007
Morocco	24.3	22.7	29.4	0.64	24.69
Sudan	12.1	17.0	22.0	0.29	4.63
Syria	21.9	22.7	18.6		
Tunisia	28.5	26.6	25.0		
Turkmenistan	36.1	40.8	13.4		
<i>Low income</i>					
Afghanistan			23.9		
Bangladesh	16.7	19.7	23.9		
Burkina Faso	18.4	22.3	16.9	0.11	1.25
Chad	6.3	14.7	30.3		
Comoros	27.4	17.1	11.2		
Djibouti	14.1	10.5	20.2		
Eritrea		25.9	22.7		
Gambia, The	19.3	19.6	24.0		
Guinea	18.0	20.8	17.4		
Guinea-Bissau	32.2	24.1	20.2	0.25	4.87
Kyrgyz Republic	30.5	17.5	18.8		
Mali	18.0	22.7	23.4		
Mauritania	26.8	13.6	29.9		
Niger	13.3	9.2	15.7		
Pakistan	18.7	18.6	19.1	0.67	15.89
Senegal	15.7	13.7	24.5		
Sierra Leone	11.5	7.0	12.6		
Somalia	26.1				
Tajikistan	31.3	24.7	15.3	0.06	1.13
Uzbekistan	29.9	21.2	22.2		
Yemen	14.6	22.5	22.6		

Appendix 10.20 (for Tables 10.10, 10.11, and 10.12) Paved roads, port quality and personal computers. (Source: WDI)

	Paved % of total		Quality of port infrastructure					PC/100 people				
	1990	2000	2007	2008	2009	2009	1990	1995	2000	2005		
<i>High income</i>												
Bahrain	75.4	77.6	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.5	–	5.1	14.6	17.7		
Brunei	31.4	34.7	–	5.0	4.8	4.8	–	3.7	6.9	8.8		
Kuwait	72.9	80.6	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.1	0.4	5.3	11.4	23.7		
Oman	21.0	30.0	4.8	5.1	5.2	5.2	0.2	0.9	3.3	5.0		
Qatar	85.6	90.0	4.4	4.4	5.0	5.0	–	5.7	14.6	16.4		
Saudi Arabia	40.6	29.9	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.7	2.3	3.5	6.3	13.6		
UAE	94.2	100.0	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.2	–	4.7	12.3	25.6		
<i>Upper middle income</i>												
Algeria	67.0	68.9	3.3	3.1	2.9	2.9	0.1	0.3	0.7	1.1		
Iran	–	64.8	–	–	–	–	–	2.5	6.3	–		
Kazakhstan	55.1	94.0	3.3	3.2	3.0	3.0	–	–	–	–		
Lebanon	95.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.4	4.6	10.2		
Libya	51.7	57.2	2.7	2.8	3.3	3.3	–	–	–	2.2		
Malaysia	70.0	76.2	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.5	0.8	3.0	9.5	21.8		
Turkey	–	–	3.4	3.4	3.7	3.7	0.5	1.5	3.8	5.7		
<i>Lower middle income</i>												
Albania	–	39.0	2.1	2.4	3.2	3.2	–	–	0.8	1.7		
Azerbaijan	–	49.4	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.2	–	–	–	2.3		
Egypt	72.0	78.1	3.5	3.9	4.3	4.3	–	0.4	1.1	3.5		
Indonesia	45.1	57.1	2.7	3.0	3.4	3.4	0.1	0.5	1.0	1.5		
Iraq	77.9	84.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		
Jordan	100.0	100.0	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.5	–	0.8	3.1	6.6		
Maldives	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.2	3.7	15.2		
Morocco	49.1	56.4	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.2	–	0.3	1.2	2.5		
Nigeria	30.0	15.0	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.8	–	0.5	0.6	0.8		

Appendix 10.20 (continued)

	Paved % of total		Quality of port infrastructure					PC/100 people				
	1990	2000	2007	2008	2009	1990	1995	2000	2005			
Sudan	33.8	36.3	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.3	8.4		
Syria	-	-	3.1	3.2	3.3	-	-	0.7	1.5	4.2		
Tunisia	76.1	68.4	4.8	4.8	4.9	0.3	-	-	2.2	5.7		
Turkmenistan	73.5	81.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.2		
<i>Low income</i>												
Afghanistan	13.3	13.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Bangladesh	-	9.5	2.4	2.6	3.0	-	-	-	0.1	1.5		
Burkina Faso	16.6	4.2	3.9	3.9	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6		
Chad	0.8	0.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	-	-	-	0.1	0.2		
Comoros	69.3	76.5	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.6	0.9		
Djibouti	12.6	45.0	-	-	-	0.2	0.6	0.9	0.2	2.4		
Eritrea	19.4	21.8	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.2	0.6		
Gambia	32.0	35.4	4.1	4.1	4.7	-	0.1	1.2	1.2	1.6		
Guinea	15.2	16.5	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.5		
Guinea-Bissau	8.3	27.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2		
Kyrgyzstan	90.0	91.1	1.5	1.8	1.6	-	-	-	0.5	1.9		
Mali	10.9	12.1	3.7	3.7	3.8	-	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.5		
Mauritania	11.0	11.3	2.6	2.7	3.5	-	-	1.0	1.0	2.6		
Niger	29.0	25.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.1		
Pakistan	54.0	56.0	3.7	3.7	4.0	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4	-		
Senegal	27.2	29.3	3.6	3.8	4.4	0.2	0.7	1.6	1.6	2.2		
Sierra Leone	10.6	7.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Somalia	11.1	11.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.9		
Tajikistan	71.6	-	1.4	1.6	1.9	-	-	-	-	1.3		
Uzbekistan	79.0	87.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.9		
Yemen	9.1	15.5	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.2	1.9		

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Chapter 11

International Trade and Foreign Investment

Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeeddin and Anis Chowdhury

11.1 Introduction

The trade volume of a country is determined by many factors, and not simply by government policies. For example, some countries trade more just because they are closer to well-populated countries or endowed with abundant natural resources, and some trade less because they are isolated or land-locked or do not have any significant amount of natural resources. Muslim countries have all these geographic characteristics (see Chaps. 4 and 5), and such geographic factors are not a consequence of income or government policy. As the literature on the gravity model of trade demonstrates, geography is a powerful determinant of bilateral trade (see, e.g., Frankel 1997; Linneman 1966).

Frankel and Romer (1999) attempted to isolate the impacts of geography on trade; however, the size seems to be a determining factor. Once country size is controlled, geography appears to account for only a moderate part of the variation in trade—the rest of the variations could be due to trade-related policies. Their empirical results, although not very robust, also suggest that a rise of 1% point in the ratio of trade to GDP increases income per person by at least one-half percent.

How international trade affects standards of living is an old question, but it is a difficult one to answer. Simple correlations between trade and income or growth cannot identify the effect of trade. Economic theory contends that trade can lead to substantial economic benefits through more efficient allocation of resources and deepening specialization allowing countries to profit from comparative advantage (so called static gains from trade). Economic theory also suggests that trade can lead to dynamic gains in addition to these static gains through a number of channels (see, Nordas et al. 2006).

First, trade is an important means for the transfer of technology, thus enabling countries to increase the pool of technology available for their domestic innovation process (see, Grossman and Helpman 1991). Second, trade enhances competi-

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Table 11.1 Exports of goods and services (% of GDP). (Source: WDI)

Country	1970	1980	1990	2000	2008
Afghanistan	9.8	–	–	–	17.2
Albania	–	23.1	14.9	19.1	31.2
Algeria	22.1	34.3	23.4	41.2	47.5
Azerbaijan	–	–	43.9	39.0	69.5
Bahrain	–	124.1	115.6	89.4	96.8
Bangladesh	8.3	5.5	6.1	14.0	20.3
Brunei Darussalam	–	93.4	61.8	67.4	67.7
Burkina Faso	5.5	9.0	11.0	9.1	11.5
Chad	16.3	16.9	13.5	16.9	54.1
Comoros	–	8.7	14.3	16.7	12.8
Djibouti	–	–	53.8	35.1	59.2
Egypt	14.2	30.5	20.0	16.2	33.2
Eritrea	–	–	–	15.1	6.3
Gambia	37.8	42.7	59.9	48.0	30.0
Guinea	–	31.2	31.1	23.6	33.2
Guinea-Bissau	4.0	12.7	9.9	31.8	29.8
Indonesia	13.5	34.2	25.3	41.0	29.8
Iran	19.2	14.4	14.5	22.7	32.2
Iraq	–	–	–	–	–
Jordan	–	39.9	61.9	41.8	58.2
Kazakhstan	–	–	–	56.6	57.2
Kuwait	59.8	78.3	44.9	56.5	66.4
Kyrgyz Republic	–	–	29.2	41.8	56.5
Lebanon	–	–	18.0	14.2	27.2
Libya	–	–	39.7	35.6	67.4
Malaysia	41.4	56.7	74.5	119.8	110.2
Maldives	–	153.5	85.5	89.5	83.5
Mali	12.5	14.7	17.1	26.8	27.3
Mauritania	40.8	36.8	45.6	46.2	57.7
Morocco	17.6	17.4	26.5	28.0	36.7
Niger	10.8	24.6	15.0	17.8	15.4
Nigeria	8.4	29.4	43.4	54.0	41.6
Oman	73.7	62.7	47.2	59.2	55.9
Pakistan	7.8	12.5	15.5	13.4	12.8
Qatar	–	–	–	67.3	64.2
Saudi Arabia	54.5	63.5	40.6	43.7	68.9
Senegal	23.5	23.9	25.4	27.9	25.0
Sierra Leone	31.0	22.9	22.4	18.1	16.3
Somalia	11.5	33.2	9.8	–	–
Sudan	16.3	10.6	4.0	15.3	23.8
Syria	17.9	18.6	28.3	35.4	31.3
Tajikistan	–	–	27.8	98.8	16.7
Tunisia	22.0	40.2	43.6	44.5	61.0
Turkey	4.4	5.2	13.4	20.1	23.9
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	95.5	80.5
UAE	–	77.9	66.4	73.3	91.0
Uzbekistan	–	–	28.8	24.6	41.9
Yemen	–	–	14.3	42.3	–

tion, which affects rents and influences firm behavior, including the incentives to innovate (see, Acs and Audretsch 1988). Third, trade, especially exports, extends the size of the market over which margins can be earned, providing greater incentives for increased investment in innovation. Other studies focus on the relations between exports and performance enhancement, so called “learning by exporting” (see, Clerides et al. 1998).

This chapter provides an overview of the Muslim majority countries’ (MMCs) trade structure and foreign direct investment (FDI), without attempting to examine any causal relation between trade and growth. It was found that the MMCs’ export patterns closely follow their production patterns. They are not significant receivers of FDI, except those producing oil. Due to non-availability of data, it was not possible to examine intra-Muslim country investment flows.

11.2 Exports and Imports

Table 11.1 presents decadal data on export shares in GDP. It shows wide variations among the MMCs. Most MMCs can be regarded as moderately close economies, with the share of exports in GDP less than 50%. A number of MMCs, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Comoros, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone can be regarded as close economies with exports accounting for not more than 20% of their GDP. Only in a handful of countries do the shares of exports in their GDP exceed 50% (see Fig. 11.1), and most of these countries are primary producing economies. On the other hand, for a majority of the MMCs, imports account for 21–50% of their GDP. Thus, they run a deficit in their trade account.


Table 11.2 shows decadal data on imports as percentage of GDP. Similar to exports, imports vary widely. On average, the MMCs’ imports exceed their exports, where none of them have imports less than 20% of their GDP (Fig. 11.2). Majority of the MMCs are moderately import dependent; for 32 countries the import-GDP ratio is between 21 and 50%.

11.3 Export Pattern

The export pattern of Muslim countries follows their sectoral economic composition and reflects their rather stagnant structural transformation as explained in Chap. 10. As Table 11.3 demonstrates, it is not surprising to see that high-income Muslim countries’ exports are dominated by oil. The importance of oil export has declined only very marginally over the past three decades.

Manufacture accounts for only tiny share of exports of the rich MMCs. More worryingly, they have a very small proportion of high-technology manufactured exports. On average, the percentage of technology and skill intensive exports in total manufacturing exports was only 1.2% in the early 1990s and the figure has

Fig. 11.1 Muslim countries by relative export sizes, 2008. (Source: Calculated from WDI)



increased only slightly to 1.6% after two decades. This figure is only one-tenth of those in high-income OECD economies (Table 11.4). This finding is consistent with Chap. 10, that is, the rich MMCs are lagging behind their counterpart high-income OECD countries in terms of investment, education, research, and infrastructure.

Middle-income MMCs show a mixed picture with regards to their changing export patterns. Some countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey, show progressive records of structural transformation in terms of export patterns. The shares of their primary commodity exports (agriculture and oil), in the recent past, have significantly declined, while their manufacturing exports have dramatically risen. For example, in Indonesia, between the early 1970s and late 2000s, the shares of agriculture and fuel exports declined from 23 to 6% and from 57 to 26% respectively, while at the same time Indonesia's manufacturing exports rose from a tiny 1.4 to 42%. In the other countries, the shares of manufacture exports increased by three to seven times during the same period. On the contrary, another group of middle-income MMCs such as Algeria, Nigeria, Sudan, and Egypt became more reliant on primary commodity exports and showed shrinking or stagnant manufacturing exports.

11.4 Key Trading (export) Partners


Two general patterns are discernable (see Table 11.5):

1. Muslim countries have very limited trade links with other Muslim countries outside their regions. For example, in 2008:
 - In Southeast Asia, Indonesia's export shares to the Middle East and Africa were only 4.2 and 1.8% respectively. Malaysia also had roughly similar figures;
 - In Sub Saharan Africa, Nigeria's and Senegal's export shares to the Middle East were only 0.1 and 1.9% respectively;
 - Central Asian Muslim countries have virtually no exports to Africa.

Table 11.2 Imports of goods and services (% of GDP). (Source: WDI)

Country	1970	1980	1990	2000	2008
Afghanistan	11.9	–	–	–	52.7
Albania	–	22.7	23.2	37.5	59.4
Algeria	29.2	30.3	24.9	21.4	23.5
Azerbaijan	–	–	39.2	38.4	24.8
Bahrain	–	115.2	94.6	64.4	74.3
Bangladesh	12.5	17.9	13.5	19.2	28.8
Brunei Darussalam	–	11.7	37.3	35.8	27.8
Burkina Faso	16.1	31.3	24.5	25.2	26.8
Chad	22.0	28.9	27.9	34.7	49.6
Comoros	–	51.9	37.1	32.5	36.9
Djibouti	–	–	78.4	50.4	80.0
Egypt	18.8	42.9	32.7	22.8	38.8
Eritrea	–	–	–	81.8	34.5
Gambia	40.9	63.6	71.6	56.8	48.9
Guinea	–	28.1	33.4	27.9	38.4
Guinea-Bissau	30.2	41.8	37.0	51.6	49.8
Indonesia	15.0	20.2	23.7	30.5	28.6
Iran	19.7	27.1	23.1	17.4	21.5
Iraq	–	–	–	–	–
Jordan	–	84.2	92.7	68.5	90.6
Kazakhstan	–	–	–	49.1	36.9
Kuwait	24.1	34.3	58.1	30.1	25.6
Kyrgyz Republic	–	–	49.6	47.6	93.6
Lebanon	–	–	99.9	35.9	56.7
Libya	–	–	31.1	15.5	27.5
Malaysia	37.3	54.3	72.4	100.6	89.9
Maldives	–	205.1	82.6	71.6	110.1
Mali	18.2	29.1	33.7	39.4	37.1
Mauritania	25.0	66.7	60.7	74.2	64.9
Morocco	21.6	26.7	31.9	33.4	50.2
Niger	18.1	38.1	22.0	25.7	24.8
Nigeria	11.2	19.2	28.8	32.0	24.7
Oman	19.7	37.7	27.6	31.4	40.2
Pakistan	4.7	4.1	3.4	4.7	3.8
Qatar	–	–	–	22.3	38.2
Saudi Arabia	23.1	27.3	31.6	24.9	37.6
Senegal	26.4	38.4	32.2	37.2	47.5
Sierra Leone	29.3	38.2	23.8	39.3	29.4
Somalia	16.7	88.5	37.7	–	–
Sudan	16.4	23.1	7.1	17.7	23.0
Syria	21.5	36.1	28.0	28.6	31.6
Tajikistan	–	–	35.2	100.9	58.3
Tunisia	24.7	45.6	50.6	48.2	65.3
Turkey	6.4	11.9	17.6	23.1	28.4
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	80.9	50.8
UAE	–	34.5	41.2	55.3	66.7
Uzbekistan	–	–	47.8	21.5	31.5
Yemen	–	–	20.1	36.6	–

Fig. 11.2 Muslim countries by relative import sizes, 2008



2. Muslim countries do not have other Muslim countries as their key export destinations (defined as having at least 5% share of a country's total exports) with very few exceptions. Some key trends are as below:
 - Key export destinations of the rich MMCs are Japan, Korea, China, and USA where they sell most of their oil;
 - Among upper-middle income MMCs, Turkey, Malaysia, and Iran can be regarded as the most dynamic economy. However, none of the other Muslim countries are their key trading (export) partners, with only one exception; around 6% of Turkey's exports goes to Iran and vice versa;
 - Indonesia, with the largest Muslim population, trades mainly with the USA, Japan, Singapore, China, Korea, and Malaysia;
 - North African MMCs, such as Tunisia and Morocco export more to Europe than to their neighbors or to other Middle Eastern countries.

11.5 Key Trading (import) Partners

A consistent picture has been found when a similar exercise is conducted for key import origins of selected MMCs where imports display similar patterns as exports (Table 11.6). However, the following needs a highlighting when comparing import and export patterns of the MMCs:

- In general, the total shares of imports from key trading partners are less than those of the export shares. This indicates that the MMCs' exports mainly consist of primary commodities and are more dependent on few key trading partners, while they have more options for their imports which are mainly manufactured goods.
- The MMCs' imports generally originate from developed countries and China, indicating that their imports mainly consist of manufacture goods. This is due to the fact that almost all the MMCs' economies are still dominated by the primary sector, which is also reflected in their main export commodities.

Table 11.3 Export by commodities (as % of merchandise export). (Source: WDI)

Countries	Agric. raw material		Food		Fuel		Manufacture	
	<i>Period</i>		<i>Period</i>		<i>Period</i>		<i>Period</i>	
	Earlier	Later	Earlier	Later	Earlier	Later	Earlier	Later
<i>High income</i>								
Bahrain	0.1	0.0	3.0	0.4	81.3	80.8	12.3	7.9
Brunei Darussalam	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1	99.6	96.3	0.0	3.3
Kuwait	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.4	93.3	92.4	5.8	6.8
Oman		0.0	0.2	2.1	99.8	89.1	–	7.5
Qatar	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	96.4	90.9	2.1	–
Saudi Arabia	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.9	99.6	90.1	0.4	8.6
UAE		0.0		0.9	94.9	62.3	3.6	3.0
<i>Upper-middle income</i>								
Algeria	0.4	0.0	12.4	0.2	85.7	98.4	4.7	0.9
Iran	2.4	0.3	1.7	4.3	91.9	83.3	3.3	9.6
Kazakhstan	–	0.6	–	4.3	–	66.0	–	13.2
Lebanon	5.6	–	25.7	14.3	0.4	0.3	66.8	62.7
Libya	0.1	–	0.0	–	99.9	–	0.0	–
Malaysia	42.2	2.4	17.7	9.2	8.4	14.2	11.9	70.9
Turkey	24.5	0.4	48.4	8.4	3.0	4.8	17.6	80.9
<i>Lower-middle income</i>								
Albania	–	3.4	–	5.3	–	7.5	–	70.3
Azerbaijan	–	0.6	–	8.3	–	81.4	–	6.5
Egypt	46.3	1.6	17.4	7.9	7.1	52.2	28.9	18.6
Indonesia	23.1	6.2	13.6	14.6	57.3	25.6	1.4	42.3
Iraq	17.5	0.0	43.9	0.1	16.7	99.6	20.0	0.3
Jordan	1.2	0.3	38.2	15.4	0.5	0.8	23.2	76.2
Maldives	–	0.0	–	73.5	–	0.0	–	26.1
Morocco	3.5	1.5	40.4	19.1	0.5	3.8	13.5	65.1
Nigeria	1.5	0.4	10.9	0.1	85.5	98.2	0.4	–
Sudan	61.1	2.3	35.5	5.6	2.0	89.8	0.1	–
Syria	21.5	2.1	5.7	17.4	62.8	40.3	7.9	–
Tunisia	2.5	0.5	31.1	9.5	33.2	16.2	19.1	69.8
Turkmenistan		9.9				81.0		
<i>Low income</i>								
Afghanistan	34.3	–	37.6	–	14.8	–	12.0	–
Bangladesh	–	1.6	–	5.9	–	0.9	–	91.3
Burkina Faso	21.8	71.9	71.0	16.3	0.1	2.8	6.9	7.9
Chad	67.1	–	18.9	–	7.2	–	4.0	–
Comoros	–	0.0	–	86.2	–	0.0	–	13.4
Djibouti	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Eritrea	–	26.0	–	42.0	–	0.0	–	30.3
Gambia	0.3	6.2	99.6	81.6	0.0	0.8	0.0	11.7
Guinea	–	0.6	–	–	–	0.1	–	–
Guinea-Bissau	7.4		90.5		0.3		1.7	
Kyrgyz Republic	–	5.0	–	17.0	–	11.7	–	35.5
Mali	40.6	13.8	48.2	7.0	0.1	0.5	10.3	3.2

Table 11.3 (continued)

Countries	Agric. raw material		Food		Fuel		Manufacture	
	<i>Period</i>		<i>Period</i>		<i>Period</i>		<i>Period</i>	
	Earlier	Later	Earlier	Later	Earlier	Later	Earlier	Later
Mauritania	0.9	0.0	10.0	24.8	0.0	–	6.7	–
Niger	4.2	2.6	50.5	14.3	0.0	1.5	6.9	5.6
Pakistan	21.8	1.2	22.1	12.3	1.4	5.8	55.9	79.4
Senegal	3.7	2.9	54.4	36.8	5.7	19.3	18.1	36.1
Sierra Leone	0.9	0.8	21.3	91.6	2.5	–	60.7	–
Somalia	7.6	–	89.3	–	0.0	–	2.0	–
Tajikistan	–	12.2	–	4.2	–	13.3	–	12.8
Uzbekistan								
Yemen	66.5	0.2	26.3	5.3		93.3	6.9	0.9

Earlier period: average, 1970–1975; Later period: latest available, 2000–2007

Latest data for Maldives are for 2004 (before the tsunami)

Table 11.4 High-technology export (as % of manufacture export). (Source: WDI (for details, see table in Appendix 11.8))

	1990–1995		2005–2008	
	Average		Latest	
	<i>Muslim countries</i>		<i>All countries</i>	
High income (or OECD)	1.2	1.6	19.5	15.0
Upper middle income	11.9	11.7	13.0	8.8
Lower middle income	2.2	2.7	10.2	22.0
Low income	3.9	5.3	2.5	6.2

High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery

11.6 Foreign Direct Investment

In general, middle and low income MMCs are less attractive for inward FDI compared with the similar income groups of all countries (Table 11.7). Inward FDI flows to high-income MMCs are a bit higher than those to high-income OECD countries indicating their attractiveness to foreign investment. However, this is generally because of the attractiveness of the resource (oil) sector. For example, 77% of total flow of inward FDI to Brunei during 1999–2002 went to the primary sector, mainly oil, gas, and mining. A similar trend can also be found in two oil-dependent MMCs in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan; during 1995–2002, respectively 60 and 73% of total inward FDI flows went to the primary sector (oil and gas). The concentration of inward FDI in the rich MMCs in the primary (oil and gas) sector is a further indication of their lack of economic diversification.

Table 11.5 Key trading (export) partners of selected Muslim countries, 2008. (Source: Calculated from IMF Directions of Trade Statistics)

Countries	% Exports to key trading partners	
	Total	Key partners (export shares)
<i>High income</i>		
Bahrain		
Kuwait	61	Japan (18%), Korea (15%), India (11%), US (9%), Singapore (8%), China (6%)
Oman	79	China (32%), Korea (17%), UAE (12%), Japan (11%), Thailand (7%)
Qatar	75	Japan (38%), Korea (21%), Singapore (11%), India (5%)
Saudi Arabia	58	US (17%), Japan (15%), Korea (10%), China (9%), India (6%)
UAE	53	Japan (23%), Korea (9%), India (9%), Iran (6%), Thailand (5%)
Brunei Darussalam	87	Japan (40%), Indonesia (21%), Korea (15%) Australia (10%)
<i>Upper-middle income</i>		
Algeria		
Iran	56	China (15%), Japan (14%), India (9%), Korea (6%), Turkey (6%), Italy (5%)
Lebanon		
Libya		
Turkey	48	CIS and Mongolia (11%), Germany (10%), UK (6%), UAE (6%), Italy (6%), France (5%), Russia (5%)
Kazakhstan		
Malaysia	52	Singapore (15%), US (12%), Japan (11%), China (10%), Thailand (5%)
<i>Lower-middle income</i>		
Albania		
Egypt		
Iraq		
Jordan	57	India (16%), Iraq (16%), US (13%), Saudi Arabia (7%), UAE (5%)
Morocco	43	Spain (19%), France (17%), Brazil (7%)
Syria		
Tunisia	66	France (28%), Italy (18%), Germany (9%), Libya (6%), Spain (5%)
Nigeria	72	US (41%), Brazil (9%), India (9%), Spain (7%), France (5%)
Sudan		
Azerbaijan		
Turkmenistan		
Indonesia	64	Japan (20%), US (10%), Singapore (9%), China (8%), Korea (7%), India (5%), Malaysia (5%)
Maldives		
<i>Low income</i>		
Djibouti		
Yemen		
Burkina Faso		
Chad		
Comoros		

Table 11.5 (continued)

Countries	% Exports to key trading partners	
	Total	Key partners (export shares)
Eritrea		
Gambia		
Guinea		
Guinea-Bissau		
Mali		
Mauritania		
Niger		
Senegal	46	Mali (20%), India (10%), France (6%), Gambia (5%), Italy (5%)
Sierra Leone		
Somalia		
Kyrgyzstan		
Tajikistan		
Uzbekistan		
Afghanistan	77	India (34%), Pakistan (18%), US (17%), Tajikistan (13%), Netherlands (7%)
Bangladesh	54	US (21%), Germany (13%), UK (9%), France (6%), Netherlands (5%)
Pakistan	36	US (16%), UAE (12%), Afghanistan (9%)

11.7 Concluding Remarks

Although, empirical evidence on channels linking trade to economic growth is mixed, trade appears to raise income and growth by spurring the accumulation of physical and human capital and by boosting productivity growth. Most Muslim countries seem to have failed to use trade as an engine of growth. On the other hand, import-GDP ratios exceed export-GDP ratios in the majority of the MMCs, resulting in trade deficits.

Except for a few oil producing countries, the MMCs are also not very attractive destinations for FDI. Besides geography, these reflect their general lack of structural transformation, poor quality human capital and infrastructure, and low investment in research and development as noted in Chap. 10. As a first step, to overcome these disadvantages, the MMCs should explore complementarities and expand trade and investment links among themselves.

Table 11.6 Key trading (import) partners of selected Muslim countries, 2008. (Source: Calculated from IMF Directions of Trade Statistics)

Countries	% Imports from key trading partners	
	Total	Key partners (import shares)
<i>High income</i>		
Bahrain		
Kuwait	43	US (12%), Japan (9%), Germany (8%), China (8%), Saudi Arabia (7%)
Oman	48	UAE (27%), Japan (16%), US (6%)
Qatar	57	US (12%), Germany (9%), Italy (9%), Japan (9%), Korea (7%), France (6%), UAE (5%)
Saudi Arabia	42	US (12%), China (10%), Japan (8%), Germany (7%), Korea (5%)
UAE	46	China (13%), India (12%), US (9%), Germany (6%), Japan (6%)
Brunei Darussalam	73	Singapore (36%), Malaysia (19%), Japan (8%), China (5%), Thailand (5%)
<i>Upper-middle income</i>		
Algeria		
Iran	66	UAE (19%), China (13%), Germany (9%), CIS & Mongolia (9%), Korea (7%), Russia (5%), Italy (5%)
Lebanon		
Libya		
Turkey	57	Germany (13%), CIS & Mongolia (10%), Italy (8%), US (7%), Russia (7%), France (6%), UK (5%)
Kazakhstan		
Malaysia	53	China (13%), Japan (12%), Singapore (11%), US (11%), Thailand (6%)
<i>Lower-middle income</i>		
Albania		
Egypt		
Iraq		
Jordan	44	Saudi Arabia (21%), China (10%), CIS & Mongolia (7%), Germany (6%)
Morocco	57	France (17%), Spain (14%), Italy (7%), China (6%), Germany (6%), Saudi Arabia (6%)
Syria		
Tunisia	56	France (21%), Italy (19%), Germany (9%), CIS & Mongolia (7%)
Nigeria	43	China (14%), Netherlands (10%), US (8%), UK (5%), Korea (5%)
Sudan		
Azerbaijan		
Turkmenistan		
Indonesia	59	Singapore (17%), China (12%), Japan (12%), Malaysia (7%), US (6%), Korea (5%)
Maldives		

Table 11.6 (continued)

Countries	% Imports from key trading partners	
	Total	Key partners (import shares)
<i>Low income</i>		
Djibouti		
Yemen		
Burkina Faso		
Chad		
Comoros		
Eritrea		
Gambia		
Guinea		
Guinea-Bissau		
Mali		
Mauritania		
Niger		
Senegal	42	France (20%), UK (15%), China (7%)
Sierra Leone		
Somalia		
Kyrgyzstan		
Tajikistan		
Uzbekistan		
Afghanistan	65	Pakistan (36%), CIS & Mongolia (14%), Germany (8%), India (7%)
Bangladesh	44	China (15%), India (15%), Kuwait (8%), Singapore (7%)
Pakistan	43	China (14%), Saudi Arabia (12%), <i>UAE</i> (11%), Kuwait (5%)

Table 11.7 Inward and outward FDI flows, 1995–2008 (as % of GDP, annual average). (Source: Calculated from UNCTAD FDI Statistics (for details, see table in Appendix 11.9))

	Muslim countries		All countries	
	Inward	Outward	Inward	Outward
High income (or OECD)	4.5	1.4	3.8	4.4
Upper middle income	3.4	0.9	4.5	0.7
Lower middle income	3.8	0.3	4.5	0.3
Low income	2.9	0.1	3.2	0.8

Appendix 11.8

High technology export (as % of manufacture export) in Muslim countries. (Source: WDI)

	1990–1995	2005–2008
	Average	Latest
<i>High income</i>		
Bahrain	0.6	0.1
Brunei Darussalam	0.1	6.4
Kuwait	5.9	0.5
Oman	1.6	0.7
Qatar	0.0	0.0
Saudi Arabia	0.14	0.6
UAE	0.03	3.2
<i>Upper-middle income</i>		
Algeria	1.1	0.7
Iran	–	5.9
Kazakhstan	4.5	21.9
Lebanon	–	0.3
Libya		
Malaysia	40.9	39.6
Turkey	1.3	1.7
<i>Lower-middle income</i>		
Albania	–	3.7
Azerbaijan	–	0.9
Egypt	0.4	1.0
Indonesia	4.0	10.6
Iraq	–	0.1
Jordan	3.0	0.9
Maldives	–	0.0
Morocco	1.7	8.8
Nigeria	–	0.3
Sudan	–	0.1
Syria	–	1.3
Tunisia	1.9	4.9
Turkmenistan		
<i>Low income</i>		
Afghanistan	–	–
Bangladesh	0.05	0.8
Burkina Faso	1.9	22.5
Chad		
Comoros	0.8	0.6
Djibouti	–	–
Eritrea	–	6.1
Gambia, The	6.2	14.3
Guinea	0.1	0.1
Guinea-Bissau	–	3.9
Kyrgyz Republic	12.5	2.4
Mali	–	2.7
Mauritania	–	–
Niger	9.4	8.0

Appendix 11.8 (continued)

	1990–1995	2005–2008
	Average	Latest
Pakistan	0.04	1.9
Senegal	–	5.4
Sierra Leone	–	–
Somalia	–	–
Tajikistan	–	–
Uzbekistan	–	–
Yemen	–	0.3

High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery

Appendix 11.9

Inward and outward FDI flows, 1995-2008 (as % of GDP, annual average). (Source: UNCTAD FDI Statistics)

	Inward	Outward
<i>High income</i>		
Bahrain	8.6	4.5
Brunei Darussalam	12.2	0.5
Kuwait	0.1	0.9
Oman	1.9	0.3
Qatar	3.7	1.0
Saudi Arabia	1.9	0.5
UAE	3.3	2.1
<i>Upper middle income</i>		
Algeria	1.1	0.1
Iran	0.8	0.1
Kazakhstan	7.8	0.3
Lebanon	8.4	1.6
Libya	1.4	1.0
Malaysia	4.0	2.7
Turkey	1.6	0.3
<i>Lower middle income</i>		
Albania	3.6	0.1
Azerbaijan	13.2	3.4
Djibouti	6.5	0.0
Egypt	2.8	0.2
Indonesia	0.6	0.5
Iraq	0.3	0.1
Jordan	6.8	0.0
Maldives	1.8	0.0
Morocco	2.8	0.2
Nigeria	4.8	0.4
Pakistan	1.3	0.0
Sudan	3.8	0.0
Syria	1.4	0.1
Tunisia	3.6	0.0
Turkmenistan	6.1	0.0

Appendix 11.9 (continued)

	Inward	Outward
<i>Low income</i>		
Afghanistan	1.3	0.0
Bangladesh	1.0	0.0
Burkina Faso	0.9	0.0
Chad	11.1	0.0
Comoros	0.4	0.0
Eritrea	3.8	0.0
Gambia	8.6	0.0
Guinea	4.1	1.3
Guinea-Bissau	2.1	-0.1
Kyrgyz Republic	3.8	0.3
Mali	2.6	0.1
Mauritania	7.9	0.1
Niger	1.0	0.1
Senegal	1.8	0.1
Sierra Leone	1.9	0.0
Somalia	0.8	0.0
Tajikistan	4.3	0.0
Uzbekistan	1.2	0.0
Yemen	-0.1	0.2

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Chapter 12

Urban Infrastructure in the Muslim Majority Countries: A Situational Analysis

Abdellaziz El Jaouhari and Samiul Hasan

Urban areas in the 47 Muslim majority countries (MMCs) in Africa and Asia (the focus of this Volume) over the years have emerged through different historical processes to face different challenges. Some cities, including some adjacent to different power centers, developed as major trade centers in Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, or Indonesia. The Muslim empires of the Abbasids, Mughals, Ottomans, Safavids, or in Brunei (see Chap. 6) helped in the expansion and consolidation of geographic areas (significantly during European colonization). The violent fragmentation of lands during decolonization of Africa and Asia (see Chap. 7) created many (power and economic) centers resulting in huge migration of people (and workers) across borders or from the periphery to the newly created/regenerated urban centers. The flourishing of urban areas in North Africa and West Asia, following the discovery of oil, added another dimension to urban development in these regions (because of a huge concentration of expatriate population).¹

The future of urban extension is likely to be challenging for Asia because between 2010 and 2030 (Table 12.1) it is expected to absorb about 61% of the increase in world urban population (to increase to 60% overall). Further, by 2015, 43% of the world's 358 urban agglomerations with more than 1 million inhabitants will be in Asia.² An increase in urban population resulting from increased economic activity increases challenges of moving workers, raw materials, and manufactured goods fast and cheap, and of providing better amenities of living for the residents. Thus, better infrastructure creates better urban areas. Urbanization becomes more challenging in the poor economies because of these countries' higher density of popu-

¹ For example, a very high percentage of population (70–80%) in the working age group (15–64) in Bahrain, Brunei, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, or UAE is a testament to these countries' dependents on expatriate workers (for more see Chap. 16 in this Volume).

² A recent report from the United Nations Center for Human Settlement states that the most challenging form of urbanization in the future will be faced by Africa and Asia.

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Table 12.1 Urban population in the world compared to selected regions. (Computed by the author from Data available in *World Urbanization Prospects*, 2007)

Year	World	Less developed regions	Africa	Asia
2000	2,853,909	1,980,984	295,131	1,372,686
2005	3,164,635	2,264,787	349,392	1,565,109
2010	3,494,607	2,569,905	412,190	1,769,616
2015	3,844,664	2,895,828	484,434	1,986,704
2020	4,209,669	3,237,347	566,229	2,211,851
2025	4,584,233	3,589,513	657,833	2,440,276
2030	4,965,081	3,949,451	759,402	2,669,175
2000–2010 (in '000')	640,698	588,921	117,059	396,930
		92%	18%	62%
2010–2030 (in '000')	1,470,474	1,379,546	347,212	899,559
		94%	24%	61%

lation and lower density (or quality) of urban infrastructure. Further, urbanization in most developing countries is characterized by the domination of a single urban agglomeration creates urban primacy (El Jaouhari 2004) resulting in other national problems (e.g., environmental pollution, health crisis).

This chapter presents a descriptive and comparative analysis of current patterns of urbanization in the MMCs, and highlights the state of infrastructure in the MMCs' urban areas. The major discussions in this chapter (after this introductory section) deal with urbanization in the MMCs highlighting the patterns of urbanization, and then urban infrastructure highlighting the infrastructure gap and its relationship to geography, historical past, and human development in two sections followed by the concluding remarks. The data for the chapter are collected (and analyzed by the authors for all tables) from related publications of the United Nations, UNDP, World Bank documents, and other secondary sources (as cited appropriately).

12.1 Urbanization in the MMCs

Urban areas in different MMCs have grown differently due to different physical, sociocultural, political, or economic reasons. In this section, a situational analysis deals with the general patterns of urbanization in the MMCs highlighting the rates of urbanization, trends in urban growth, and their respective impacts on urban concentration in the MMCs.

12.1.1 Urbanization Pattern

As discussed in Chap. 1, about 1 billion Muslims live in the 47 MMCs in Africa and Asia inhabited by about 1.4 billion people.³ The MMCs' urban population of 663

³ Please see Chap. 1 in this Volume for an explanation and listing of the MMCs.

Table 12.2 MMCs and world urban population between 1995 and 2008

	1995	2008	Growth 1995/2008 (%)
MMCs' urban population	441,636,564	662,820,013	50.08
World urban population	2,536,218,171	3,330,573,540	31.32
MMCs' urban as % of world urban	17	20	17

million in 2008 (World Bank)⁴ accounted for 20% of the world urban population (as opposed to 17% in 1995). Between 1995 and 2008, the MMCs' urban population grew by 50%, while in the same period the world urban population grew only by 31% (Table 12.2). The percentage of urban population in the MMCs (52% of the MMCs' population in 2008 increasing from 48% in 1995) was higher than that of The world average (50%) (Table 12.3).

The rates of urbanization in the MMCs, however, vary widely ranging from 98% in Kuwait, the highest, to 17% in Niger (the lowest; Table 12.3). Annual urban growth rates in some MMCs are also much higher than most others; for example, Qatar in 2008 experienced 12% rise in urban population. But in seven MMCs in Africa (Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Gambia, Mali, Niger, and Sudan), and three MMCs in Asia (Afghanistan, Maldives, and Yemen) annual urban growth was between 4% and 6%. Eleven MMCs (five in Africa: Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Somalia; and six in Asia: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Syria) registered a 3% urban growth in 2008. Only in three MMCs (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Lebanon) annual urban growth was less than the natural population growth rate: about 1%.

Most MMCs are not very large (23 MMCs have <10 million population), and 17 of them do not have cities with 1+million population. Twenty-one (of the 47) MMCs have only one city each with 1+million people. In addition, there are six MMCs with megacities (8+million people: Dhaka, Karachi, Cairo, Istanbul, Lagos, and Jakarta; Table 12.3). Tehran is about to join the list. With 25+% of the urban population concentrated in the largest urban areas, 20 MMCs can be considered to be experiencing urban primacy.

The negative influence of the lack of access to the seas is visible in urban growth patterns in the MMCs. In 2008, about 93% of the total urban population lived in 37 MMCs (79% of the total 47 MMCs) with a coast, where the rate of urbanization is also much higher (58%) than the landlocked MMCs (33%). The rate of urbanization in the landlocked MMCs was a bit faster (3.14%) than the rest (3.11%) in 2008 (Table 12.4) indicating that may be things will move there for the better in the near future as technological development help people defeat the hindrances resulting from being landlocked (see Fig. 12.1).

It seems that urban population in the lower Latitude in the MMCs is proportionately much larger (40% of the urban population in the MMCs live in Zones 1

⁴ The figures look different because while the number of Muslim population in a country is available that in urban areas is not. Thus, population numbers in urban areas include non-Muslims.

Table 12.3 Urbanization indicators: MMCs, 2008


Country	Muslim population (%)	Urban population (%) (Annual growth)	Population in the largest city	Large city (% of urban)	Population in urban areas 1+ million
Afghanistan	99	24(04)	3,420,138	49.02	3,420,138
Algeria	97	65(03)	2,681,359	11.96	2,681,359
Azerbaijan	93	52(01)	1,927,946	42.78	1,927,946
Bahrain	65	89(02)			
Bangladesh	85	27(03)	13,845,810	31.89	20,102,231
Brunei Darussalam	67	75(03)			
Burkina Faso	50	20(06)	1,653,045	55.48	1,653,045
Chad	53	27(04)	788,691	27.09	
Comoros	95	28(03)			
Djibouti	94	87(02)			
Egypt	93	43(02)	10,811,913	31.04	15,032,628
Eritrea	51	21(05)			
Gambia, The	90	56(04)			
Guinea	92	34(04)	1,545,738	45.64	1,545,738
Guinea-Bissau	52	30(03)			
Indonesia	88	51(03)	9,034,989	7.72	20,812,811
Iran	98	68(02)	7,147,658	14.51	17,534,446
Iraq	96	67(02)	5,615,224	27.45	6,973,764
Jordan	93	78(03)	1,072,407	23.15	1,072,407
Kazakhstan	57	58(02)	1,336,494	14.72	1,336,494
Kuwait	95	98(03)	2,148,832	80.08	2,148,832
Kyrgyzstan	75	36(01)	844,360	44.10	
Lebanon	60	87(01)	1,878,900	51.52	1,878,900
Libya	97	78(02)	1,084,388	22.22	1,084,388
Malaysia	60	70(03)	1,469,712	7.73	2,482,977
Maldives	100	38(05)			

Table 12.3 (continued)

Country	Muslim population (%)	Urban population (%) (Annual growth)	Population in the largest city	Large city (% of urban)	Population in urban areas 1+ million
Mali	90	32(04)	1,558,985	38.13	1,558,985
Mauritania	99	41(03)			
Morocco	96	56(02)	3,211,416	18.14	5,972,476
Niger	90	17(04)	962,750	39.59	
Nigeria	50	48(04)	9,831,147	13.44	22,186,169
Oman	99	72(02)			
Pakistan	97	36(03)	12,517,030	20.84	29,932,560
Qatar	99	96(12)			
Saudi Arabia	100	82(02)	4,596,868	22.63	10,143,792
Senegal	91	42(03)	2,690,772	51.99	2,690,772
Sierra Leone	80	38(03)	851,164	40.54	
Somalia	99	37(03)	1,220,214	37.43	1,220,214
Sudan	85	43(04)	4,881,163	27.18	4,881,163
Syrian Arab Republic	87	54(03)	2,884,171	25.85	6,568,249
Tajikistan	90	26(02)			
Tunisia	99	67(02)	751,460	10.94	
Turkey	98	69(02)	10,223,473	20.14	20,550,155
Turkmenistan	89	49(02)			
UAE	95	78(03)	1,466,809	41.99	1,466,809
Uzbekistan	88	37(02)	2,192,700	21.80	2,192,700
Yemen, Rep.	99	31(05)	2,117,018	30.15	2,117,018
Total MMCs		52(03)			
World		50(02)			

Table 12.4 MMCs Urban population: Landlocked/open sea divide

Landlocked	Number	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean
0 Urban population	37	115,483	116,991,779	618,116,267 (93%)	16,705,845
Urban population % of total	37	20.72	98.36		57.63
Urban population growth (%)	37	0.89	11.95		3.11
1 Urban population	10	1,808,827	10,056,904	44,703,745 (07%)	4,470,374
Urban population % of total	10	16.54	57.94		32.51
Urban population growth (%)	10	1.26	5.59		3.14

Fig. 12.1 Percentage of urban population for selected regions (2008). (United Nations 2009)

and 2; Latitude 0–18° N/S)⁵ than the rest of the world (23% in these two zones; Table 12.5). On the other hand, while about 41% of urban population in the world lives in higher Latitude (Zone 5+), in the MMCs the figure is only 12% (26+% of the urban population in the world is now in Zone 6 or above, no MMCs are in these Latitudes, though). The percentage of the MMCs' urban population living in Zone 4 (the moderate zone; Latitude 28–36° N/S) compares well with higher urban population concentration in 'Zone 4' in the world, in general. These differences (higher concentration of urban population in the lower Latitude and lower concentration in the higher Latitude which is opposite to the situation in the world) are indicative of the general fact that MMCs' urban population, being concentrated in geographically inefficient areas, is economically less productive (Chap. 17). Since Table 12.5 also shows that urban growth rate in lower Latitude in the MMCs is much higher than

⁵ According to Ibn Khaldun if the North/South axis (0–63°) is equally divided in seven zones (with 9° Latitude each), the (old) world civilizations were most developed in Zone 4 (28° and 36°N; Lacoste 1984). Zones in this chapter are divided on that basis (for more see Chap. 1 in this Volume).

Table 12.5 Urban characters across geographic regions

	Geo. zones			All 2008			MMCs 2008		
		Number	Sum	Number	Sum	Mean	Number	Sum	Mean
Urban population	1	37	305,284,352	5	138,507,454				
	2	51	480,257,807	15	125,693,178				
	3	30	611,229,920	9	112,163,400				
	4	23	959,140,833	11	205,870,200				
	5	27	497,416,618	7	80,585,781				
Urban population (%)	1	37				48.37			54.45
	2	51				48.88			36.87
	3	30				60.76			67.16
	4	23				67.07			63.72
	5	27				63.19			46.67
Growth urban population	1	37				3.13			3.45
	2	51				2.78			3.90
	3	30				2.65			3.46
	4	23				2.11			2.51
	5	27				0.97			1.71

Geography Zone 1, Latitude 0–9° N/S; 2, Latitude 10–18° N/S; 3, Latitude 19–27° N/S; 4, Latitude 28–36° N/S; 5, Latitude 37–45° N/S; see footnote 5

the corresponding Latitude in the world, and the other zones (higher Latitude) in the MMCs; it can be presumed that economic activities that influence urban growth may gradually take place in the MMCs in the lower Latitudes.

Table 12.6 compares urban population concentration in the MMCs with that of the world, in general. These data, placed according to geographic regions (Geographic Zones 1–5 corresponding to Latitude 0–45° N/S), reveal the preponderance of urban population in the largest cities in each country in ‘Zone 3’ (Latitude 28–39° N/S). But urban concentration in ‘Zone 4’ is comparatively much higher than the other zones. Further, while the highest 80% of total urban population in an MMC lives in the largest city, in some countries outside the MMCs 100% urban people live in one city (Table 12.6). The size of population in the largest cities as well as its mean in the largest cities in both cases (the MMCs and the world) is higher in Zones 3 and 4 than that in the rest of the geographic zones.

Though six of the 30 megacities (8+ million people in each) in the world are in the MMCs, the size of the megacities in the MMCs, in general, are still smaller than many large cities in the world. As shown in Table 12.6, the largest city in the MMC has a population of about 13.8 million (Dhaka) as opposed to 36.3 million in Tokyo. Though all geographic zones seem to have megacities, the largest of its kind are still in either ‘Zone 3’ (in the MMCs) or ‘Zone 4’ (the world) proving the importance of geography in urban growth.

12.2 Urban Infrastructure in the MMCs

Every urban area needs three types of physical infrastructure. These infrastructures for cheap and fast movement of goods and services (shaping the area with the highest and the best distribution of economic gain); water and sewer facilities (improving the cleanliness, beauty, and hygiene of the city); and communication and utility services (Levy 2008) are most important for any city’s development and survival. This section highlights the transport infrastructure and water and sewer services situation in the MMCs.

The level of transport infrastructure can be measured by the road density (km/100 km² land area), the length of total rail networks, the length of total road networks, and the percentage of paved roads (out of the total road networks) in a country. It seems most MMCs have to go a long way to achieve the average quality of the world transport networks (so far the above variables are concerned). The average road density in the MMCs (39 km) is much below the world average (117 km; Table 12.7). In 28 MMCs the road density is below the MMCs’ average (data are not available from 12 countries). In 14 MMCs (including Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) road density is < 10 km. Apart from the city state of Brunei and Qatar, Azerbaijan (68), Lebanon (67), and Turkey (54.8) have the best road density in the MMCs.⁶ Unless measured in terms of ‘rail density’ the length of the

⁶ Road density in Bangladesh, a predominantly rural country, is 166, but about 10% of the roads is paved (Table 12.8).

Table 12.6 Urban concentration indicators: The MMCs and the world compared, 2008

Geo. -zone	Muslim majority countries				The world			
	Population code	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Mean
1	A	851,164	9,034,989	3,785,288	787,744	9,034,989	2,845,666	
2	A	788,691	9,831,147	2,724,952	770,358	19,638,871	3,560,448	
3	A	1,084,388	13,845,810	6,361,157	1,084,388	21,245,311	6,235,445	
4	A	751,460	12,517,030	3,938,963	751,460	36,314,755	6,512,704	
5	A	844,360	10,223,473	3,304,995	844,360	19,167,635	4,070,490	
1	B	7.72	40.54	18.66	7.72	95.36	33.92	
2	B	13.44	55.48	36.61	11.95	69.73	34.12	
3	B	22.22	41.99	29.95	6.31	100.00	34.68	
4	B	10.94	80.08	30.31	2.82	80.08	30.76	
5	B	14.72	44.10	28.71	7.72	56.42	29.57	
1	C	2,482,977	20,812,811	11,647,894	1,262,159	20,812,811	5,246,064	
2	C	962,750	22,186,169	4,312,873	962,750	76,553,652	7,212,319	
3	C	1,084,388	20,102,231	9,565,970	1,084,388	143,537,950	17,328,211	
4	C	1,072,407	29,932,560	7,818,313	1,072,407	228,532,466	24,275,437	
5	C	1,336,494	20,550,155	6,501,824	1,108,614	135,760,427	13,877,621	
1	D	9.15	9.19	9.17	3.47	95.36	24.40	
2	D	6.55	22.04	12.98	6.55	68.55	18.77	
3	D	12.56	40.89	24.37	9.18	59.44	23.94	
4	D	7.80	78.77	27.75	7.80	78.77	32.75	
5	D	8.03	27.80	16.64	8.03	48.07	25.16	

Geography Zone 1, Latitude 0–9° N/S; 2, Latitude 10–18° N/S; 3, Latitude 19–27° N/S; 4, Latitude 28–36° N/S; 5, Latitude 37–45° N/S

Population Code A, Population in the largest city; B, Population in the largest city as % of total urban population; C, Total population living in 1 + million urban areas; D, Percentage of total urban population living in 1 + million urban areas; Out of 47 MMCs, data for only 34 are available (because World Urbanization prospects do not include data for cities with fewer than 750,000 people; e.g., cities in Bahrain, Maldives, or Qatar are not listed). The World Bank data do not include <750 K cities, nor does this table

Table 12.7 Selected infrastructure indicators and geography: MMCs compared to all countries

Geo. code	All countries			MMCs		
	Average 2000–2007	Number	Mean	Number	Mean	Mean
All	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	134	117.42	35	38.85	
All	Rail lines (total km)	102	10,766.65	26	3,167.81	
All	Road (total km)	182	172,628.09	46	67,411.59	
All	Roads paved % of total	175	49.91	42	49.23	
1	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	22.00	49.63	4.00	31.79	
	Rail lines (total km)	13.00	1,326.56	1.00	1,652.38	
	Road (total km)	34.00	42,799.01	4.00	118,288.54	
	Roads paved % of total	30.00	29.21	4.00	50.12	
2	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	25.00	63.33	10.00	13.60	
	Rail lines (total km)	15.00	3,763.69	6.00	1,974.87	
	Road (total km)	43.00	78,507.97	15.00	35,084.67	
	Roads paved % of total	44.00	31.79	15.00	23.75	
3	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	20.00	131.79	8.00	95.63	
	Rail lines (total km)	8.00	13,769.02	4.00	2,471.88	
	Road (total km)	27.00	202,213.66	9.00	70,391.28	
	Roads paved % of total	27.00	48.76	9.00	55.05	
4	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	18.00	87.84	10.00	20.60	
	Rail lines (total km)	15.00	11,681.94	8.00	3,317.11	
	Road (total km)	22.00	231,652.24	11.00	67,979.57	
	Roads paved % of total	20.00	57.01	9.00	68.29	
5	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	19.00	261.50	3.00	41.92	
	Rail lines (total km)	21.00	12,929.03	7.00	4,633.86	
	Road (total km)	24.00	371,220.61	7.00	102,887.45	
	Roads paved % of total	21.00	74.26	5.00	80.21	

Geography Zone 1, Latitude 0–9° N/S; 2, Latitude 10–18° N/S; 3, Latitude 19–27° N/S; 4, Latitude 28–36° N/S; 5, Latitude 37–45° N/S

Table 12.8 MMCs and transportation infrastructure (Average 2000–2007)

MMCs	Colonial past ^a	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	Rail lines (total km)	Road (total km)	Roads (paved % of total)
Afghanistan	N/A	5.3		33,851.8	23.4
Algeria	French	5.0	3,616.2	106,151.0	69.6
Azerbaijan	USSR	68.0	2,120.0	43,270.0	49.4
Bahrain	British	490.0		3,406.0	77.7
Bangladesh	British	166.0	2,822.0	223,355.5	9.5
Brunei	British	63.0		2,400.0	56.0
Darussalam					
Burkina Faso	French	34.0	622.0	92,495.0	4.2
Chad	French	3.0		37,800.0	0.8
Comoros	French			880.0	76.5
Djibouti	French		781.0	3,065.0	45.0
Egypt	British	9.0	5,141.3	78,185.0	79.6
Eritrea	British			4,010.0	21.8
Gambia, The	British	33.0		3,394.7	24.7
Guinea	Portuguese	10.0		37,424.0	13.1
Guinea-Bissau	French	12.0		3,455.0	27.9
Indonesia	Dutch	19.5		371,773.0	57.4
Iran	N/A	10.5	6,875.1	175,623.5	67.8
Iraq	British		1,898.0	45,550.0	84.3
Jordan	British	8.5	292.3	7,496.1	100.0
Kazakhstan	USSR	3.0	13,899.4	90,488.2	92.1
Kuwait	British	31.5		5,245.0	83.3
Kyrgyzstan	USSR		417.0	26,250.0	91.1
Lebanon	French	67.0		6,970.0	
Libya	British			83,200.0	57.2
Malaysia	British	28.7	1,652.4	87,666.2	79.2
Maldives	British				
Mali	French	1.0	733.7	16,904.5	15.1
Mauritania	French	1.0	717.0	9,290.0	22.8
Morocco	French	13.0	1,907.0	57,656.7	58.6
Niger	French	1.0		17,340.3	22.6
Nigeria	British	21.0	3,522.3	193,200.0	15.0
Oman	Portuguese	16.0		40,837.0	33.0
Pakistan	British	33.3	7,791.0	253,134.5	61.0
Qatar	British	68.0		4,510.0	90.0
Saudi Arabia	N/A	10.0	1,207.3	186,708.0	25.7
Senegal	French	7.0	906.0	14,079.5	29.3
Sierra Leone	British	16.0		11,315.0	8.0
Somalia	British			22,100.0	11.8
Sudan	British		5,284.3	11,900.0	36.3
Syria	French	19.8	2,095.4	36,982.2	
Tajikistan	USSR		616.0	27,767.0	
Tunisia	French	12.0	2,061.9	19,114.5	66.5

Table 12.8 (continued)

MMCs	Colonial past ^a	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	Rail lines (total km)	Road (total km)	Roads (paved % of total)
Turkey	N/A	54.8	8,687.3	426,837.0	
Turkmenistan	USSR		2,709.0	24,000.0	81.2
UAE	British	5.0		4,030.0	100.0
Uzbekistan	USSR		3,988.3	81,600.0	87.3
Yemen	British	14.0		68,222.0	12.1

^a The MMCs in the Gulf, Egypt, or Libya were not colonies as such. The Gulf countries were under British protection following the Truce in the nineteenth century. During the Ottoman rule Egypt and Libya were under Italian influence, but most affects in these countries were during their British association. So, all these countries are placed under British protectorates

Table 12.9 MMCs, infrastructure and landlocked variable

Land-locked	Average 2000–2007	Number	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean
0	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	29	1.00	490.00	1,312.58	45.26
	Rail lines (total km)	19	292.29	8,687.25	59,377.65	3,125.14
	Road (total km)	36	880.00	426,837.00	2,652,436.36	73,678.79
	Roads (paved % of total)	33	7.95	100.00	1,650.02	50.00
1	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	6	1.00	34.00	47.33	7.89
	Rail lines (total km)	7	417.00	13,899.43	22,985.43	3,283.63
	Road (total km)	10	16,904.50	92,495.00	448,496.75	44,849.68
	Roads (paved % of total)	9	0.80	92.05	417.74	46.42

railways may not (dis)prove anything, but if compared to the total length of the road networks, it may. Noteworthy, in some MMCs, for example Iran and Kazakhstan, lower road density is compensated by huge length of railway lines.

As expected road density in the world and in the MMCs is best in geographic ‘Zone 3’ (132 and 96, respectively). Though road density in the world in ‘Zone 4’ is also higher, it is not in the MMCs (the data for two MMCs in ‘Zone 4’ are not available; the nine other MMCs include Afghanistan and Algeria with road density of 5 km in both, and Jordan with 8 km; Tables 12.7 and 12.8). Road density is worse in the landlocked MMCs (7.89 km) compared to the MMCs with access to seas (45.26 km; Table 12.9).

Road density in the French colonies (see Chap. 7), is worse (with an average of 8.7 km) than in any other colonies (or noncolonies; Table 12.10). Road density in the noncolonies (and previous Soviet territories) is also less (25.26 km) than the British colonies (67.11 km) to impact the respective human development efforts.

Though transport infrastructure is important for an area’s economic life, infrastructure for sanitation and water is the most important for city survival, function-

Table 12.10 MMCs, infrastructure and colonial past

Colonies/protectorate	Average 2000–2007	Number	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean
<i>British</i> (20): Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, UAE, and Yemen	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	16	5.00	490.00	1,073.83	67.11
	Rail lines (total km)	9	292.29	7,791.00	30,498.95	3,388.77
	Road (total km)	22	880.00	253,134.50	1,157,152.15	52,597.82
	Roads (paved % of total)	20	7.95	100.00	1,083.95	54.20
<i>Dutch</i> (01): Indonesia	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	1	19.50	19.50	19.50	19.50
	Rail lines (total km)	0				
	Road (total km)	1	371,773.00	371,773.00	371,773.00	371,773.00
	Roads (paved % of total)	1	57.35	57.35	57.35	57.35
<i>French</i> (14): Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Syria, and Tunisia	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	10	1.00	34.00	87.00	8.7
	Rail lines (total km)	8	622.00	3,616.20	11,344.74	1,418.09
	Road (total km)	11	3,065.00	106,151.00	411,320.55	37,392.78
	Roads (paved % of total)	11	0.80	69.55	347.57	31.60
<i>Portuguese</i> (02): Guinea and Oman	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	2	12.00	16.00	28.00	14.00
	Rail lines (total km)	0				
	Road (total km)	2	3,455.00	40,837.00	44,292.00	22,146.00
	Roads (paved % of total)	2	27.94	32.97	60.91	30.46
<i>Under Soviet Union</i> (06): Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan	Road density (km/100 km ² land area)	6	3.00	68.00	151.58	25.26
<i>No colonial history</i> (04): Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey	Rail lines (total km)	9	417.00	13,899.43	40,519.39	4,502.15
	Road (total km)	10	24,000.00	426,837.00	1,116,395.42	111,639.54
	Roads (paved % of total)	8	23.43	92.05	517.97	64.75

ing, and growth because “sanitation services infringe on the health and dignity of human beings” and a lack of it may contribute to “water pollution, with widespread consequences for human security”⁷ (UNDP 2009a, p. 45). Thus, “migrants to urban centers significantly improve their chances of survival relative to rural residents” because of “poor health services, water quality and sanitation in rural areas” (UNDP 2009b, p. 56). At this stage of this discussion the urban infrastructure situation in the MMCs is assessed for an analysis of infrastructure access index (IAI).

The available data show (Table 12.11) that the access of people in the MMCs to sanitation and water,⁸ on an average, is much lower than that of the world. About 74% of the urban population in the MMCs has access to sanitation; as opposed to about 79% in the world. The MMCs’ urban people’s access to sanitation (74%) compared to that of the world (79%) though seems lower, that of rural population (53%) is much worse than the rural population in the world (65%). But then the minimum percentage of urban population’s access to sanitation in any MMC is higher (23%) than that of the world (15%). Access to water (90%) of the urban population in the MMCs is better than the access to sanitation but is still less than the world average (94%; Table 12.12).

A composite IAI has been prepared to comparatively study the access of the people (of both rural and urban areas) to sanitation and water infrastructure in the MMCs vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and its impact on certain human development related variables. The IAI is a compound factor of an average of percentages of urban people with no access to sanitation, percentage of urban people with no access to water, and the access gaps for both between rural and urban people. Lower percentages of no access and of the gaps will create lower figures in the index (0.00) reflecting a better infrastructure situation in the country and vice versa (100).⁹ A world comparison of IAI shows that the MMCs’ IAI is better (12.52) than the world average (17.30; Table 12.12). Table 12.12, however, shows that the worst IAI (46.25) is in the MMC (Somalia), and that the IAIs both in the MMCs and the World, like in many other variables, are better in ‘Zone 3’ (average 7.71 and 12.24, respectively) and ‘Zone 4’ (11.57 and 10.20, respectively) than all other geographic zones (Table 12.12).

A regional analysis shows significant variations in the IAI scores across different geographic regions with the best IAI scores in the MMCs in West Asia and Central Asia¹⁰ and the worst in sub-Saharan Africa. The average IAI in the first set of

⁷ For example, as explained in the Human Development Report 2006, in Egypt “high levels of pollution from raw sewage in the Nile Delta region” “undermines the potential health benefits of near universal access to water” (cited in UNDP 2009a, p. 45).

⁸ Access to sanitation is defined by the existence of sanitary latrine within the living area; and access to water is defined by availability of running water within 500 m of the living area.

⁹ An urban rural parity situation (99% no access for both sanitation and water and only a possible 1% gaps in both between rural and urban areas) and an urban biased situation (a 0% no access in urban areas for both sanitation and water and 1% access in both in rural areas) both will create the worst IAI of 100.

¹⁰ Since all data are not available, six MMCs Bahrain, Iran, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan are not included in the analysis.

Table 12.11 Access to sanitation and water: The MMCs and the world compared

	Muslim majority countries			The world				
	Number of countries	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Number of countries	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Access to sanitation (% of total population)	41	9	100	61.24	172	9	100	71.67
Access to sanitation (% of rural population)	41	4	100	53.46	171	3	100	65.26
Access to sanitation (% of urban population)	45	23	100	74.47	181	15	100	79.23
Access to water (% of total population)	41	30	100	77.90	175	30	100	86.44
Access to water (% of rural population)	41	9	100	69.73	172	9	100	80.23
Access to water (% of urban population)	45	52	100	90.00	184	52	100	94.05

Table 12.12 Infrastructure access index and geography: MMCs and the world 2008

Geo. zone	Muslim majority countries (46 countries)			The world (190 countries)		
	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
1 Index	1.50	42.00	17.81	0.00	42.00	20.05
2 Index	12.25	46.25	31.45	0.00	46.25	19.43
3 Index	0.00	36.00	7.71	0.00	40.25	12.24
4 Index	0.00	32.75	11.56	0.00	32.75	10.20
5 Index	2.00	22.50	8.03	0.00	22.50	3.42
6+ Index	No MMCs so not included					
All Index	0.00	46.25	12.52	0.00	46.25	17.30

MMCs is 9.88 with the best score (.00) in Kuwait and the worst (28) in Yemen. The war-torn Somalia, in sub-Saharan Africa, has the worst IAI (46) with Sierra Leone trailing close-by (42), while the two tiny MMCs, Comoros and the Gambia, in the region have better IAI scores (18 and 12, respectively), though the average IAI in the sub-Saharan MMCs is very high (32.73). The MMCs in North Africa (15.8) and South/Southeast Asia (17) have very similar average IAI scores where the worst and the best IAI score in individual MMCs are also similar. For example, the troubled country of Sudan in North Africa, and Afghanistan (in South Asia) both have a IAI score of 33, and Egypt in North Africa and Malaysia in South/Southeast Asia with IAI scores of 2 and 3, respectively have the best infrastructure access in their respective region. These results unsurprisingly corroborate the common knowledge we had about the infrastructure situation and their relationships to geographical locations. Higher IAI scores also means that the rural–urban differential in access to water and sanitation in the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa is much higher and is likely to create continuous pressure on urban centers jeopardizing the positive effects of urbanization.

Though colonial past have some influences in the economic and infrastructure development of the MMCs, like all other MMCs in Africa and Asia, analyses from our data show that geography also plays significant roles in differentiating the present situations. For example, the IAI score (17.76) in the 17 MMCs with British colonial (or protectorate) experience is much better than the 14 MMCs with French experience (26). Nevertheless, the MMCs with past British influence in sub-Saharan Africa have much worse average IAI score (33.6) than those outside (9.25; Table 12.13). The MMCs with French historical connection outside sub-Saharan Africa have a much better IAI score (12) than those within (32.33). The MMCs without any colonial past have an average IAI score (12.57) similar to the MMCs' average (12.52) which is not much better than the MMCs with colonial past but are not situated in sub-Saharan Africa.

All these analyses prove influence of geographic factors on the infrastructure situation in the MMCs. Except for two tiny MMCs (Gambia and Maldives), and Malaysia MMCs in the lower Latitude scored very high in the IAI. As expected, MMCs in Zone 3 or above (28°+) have a very lower score in the IAI except for the troubled MMCs of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen with comparatively much lower corresponding LEB (life expectancy at birth) of 43.95, 67.93, 66.53, and 62.92, respectively (Table 12.14).¹¹ Thus, the IAI directly affects other factors of human development. As seen in Table 12.14, for example, child mortality, in general, is much lower and the LEB rate, in general, is much higher in MMCs with low IAI score and vice versa.

¹¹ It seems the IAI scores in the two MMCs of higher Latitude (Azerbaijan due to a lower access to water, and Morocco due to a lower access to sanitation) also defy the pattern.

Table 12.13 Infrastructure access index: Regional variation among the MMCs, 2008

Regions	Number	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia	5 (except Libya)	15.80	3.00 (Egypt)	33.00 (Sudan)
Sub-Saharan Africa: Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia	15	32.73	12.00 (Gambia)	46.00 (Somalia)
West/Central Asia: Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Yemen	15 (except Bahrain, Iran, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan)	9.88	0.00 (Kuwait and Qatar)	28.00 (Yemen)
South/South East Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan	7 (except Brunei)	17.00	2.00 (Malaysia)	33.00 (Afghanistan)
British Colonies or protectorates: Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Maldives, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, UAE, and Yemen	17 (except Bahrain, Brunei, Libya)	17.76	0.00 (Kuwait and Qatar)	46.00 (Somalia)
British Colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa: Italicized above	5	33.60	12.00 (Gambia)	46.00 (Somalia)
British Colonies outside Sub-Saharan Africa: Not Italicized above	12	9.25	0.00 (Kuwait, and Qatar)	33.00 (Sudan)
French Colonies: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Syria, and Tunisia	13 (except Lebanon)	26.00	5.00 (Syria)	39.00 (Niger)
French Colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa: Italicized above	9	32.33	18.00 (Comoros)	39.00 (Niger)
French Colonies outside Sub-Saharan Africa: Not Italicized above	4	12.00	5.00 (Syria)	28.00 (Morocco)
MMC's Under Soviet Union (06): Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan	7 (except Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan)	12.57	5.00 (Uzbekistan)	33.00 (Afghanistan)
No colonial history (04): Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey				
MMC	46	12.52	0.00	46.25
The world	190	17.30	0.00	46.25

Table 12.14 Infrastructure access index (IAI) and its relationships to geography and human development

Country	N/A sanitation	Sanitation gap	N/A water	Water gap	IAI score	Latitude	TFR	LEB	Child mortality rate
Afghanistan	40	30	22	39	33	33	6.60	43.95	201.00
Algeria	2	10	15	6	8	28	2.36	72.39	33.50
Azerbaijan	49	12	12	17	23	40	2.30	70.18	36.30
Bahrain	0		0		0	26	2.27	75.91	12.20
Bangladesh	44	4	15	7	18	24	2.34	66.15	55.20
Brunei						4	2.08	77.36	6.70
Burkina Faso	67	27	5	23	31	13	5.91	52.99	168.70
Chad	77	19	33	23	38	15	6.16	48.73	209.00
Comoros	50	20	9	-6	18	-12	3.95	65.35	105.10
Djibouti	37	53	2	46	35	11	3.90	55.39	94.90
Egypt	3	5	0	2	3	27	2.86	70.14	23.00
Eritrea	48	48	26	17	35	15	4.63	59.45	58.20
Gambia, The	32	3	4	10	12	13	5.05	55.93	105.70
Guinea	66	23	11	28	32	11	5.41	57.82	145.80
Guinea-Bissau	51	40	17	32	35	12	5.71	47.82	195.20
Indonesia	33	31	11	18	23	-5	2.17	70.79	40.50
Iran			2		2	32	1.81	71.44	32.40
Iraq	24	10	9	36	20	33	4.05	67.93	43.90
Jordan	2	1	2	7	3	31	3.49	72.71	25.70
Kazakhstan	3	-1	1	9	3	45	2.56	66.44	30.20
Kuwait	0	0	1	0	0	29	2.17	77.97	10.20
Kyrgyzstan	6	1	1	14	6	41	2.70	67.37	38.00
Lebanon	0		0		0	34	1.85	72.05	13.30
Libya	3	1			2	25	2.70	74.33	19.10
Malaysia	4	1	0	1	2	2	2.56	74.38	6.40
Maldives	0	4	1	13	5	3	2.02	71.58	14.90
Mali	55	13	19	37	31	17	6.54	48.43	193.80

Table 12.14 (continued)

Country	N/A sanitation	Sanitation gap	N/A water	Water gap	IAI score	Latitude	TFR	LEB	Child mortality rate
Mauritania	50	41	48	5	36	20	4.47	56.73	117.70
Morocco	17	31	2	38	22	32	2.35	71.29	39.20
Niger	66	30	4	57	39	16	7.12	51.40	166.60
Nigeria	64	8	25	33	33	10	5.70	47.91	142.90
Oman	3		8	15	9	21	3.05	75.91	12.80
Pakistan	28	43	5	8	21	30	3.96	66.53	89.10
Qatar	0	0	0	0	0	25	2.41	75.94	11.10
Saudi Arabia	0		3		2	25	3.12	73.12	21.30
Senegal	31	31	8	40	28	14	4.82	55.60	95.40
Sierra Leone	76	18	14	60	42	8	5.20	47.60	198.00
Somalia	48	46	33	58	46	10	6.39	49.84	180.00
Sudan	45	37	36	12	33	15	4.17	58.15	108.90
Syria	4	1	6	10	5	35	3.25	74.23	16.70
Tajikistan	5	1	6	33	11	39	3.41	66.75	64.20
Tunisia	4	32	1	15	13	34	2.06	74.30	21.30
Turkey	3	22	0	4	7	39	2.11	71.89	22.00
Turkmenistan	1	2	3		2	40	2.48	64.82	47.60
UAE	2	3	0	0	1	24	1.94	77.75	7.70
Uzbekistan	0	0	2	17	5	41	2.56	67.76	38.40
Yemen Rep.	6	61	28	15	28	33	5.22	62.92	69.50

N/A Sanitation/Water refers to % of urban population with no access; Sanitation/Water Gap refers to differences in rural/urban access to sanitation and water. Some IAIs are stroke off because of missing data

12.3 Concluding Remarks

The MMCs, in general, in the recent past, have been ‘catching-up’ and have about 52% population living in urban areas. There are, however, huge differences in the rates of urbanization in different MMCs influenced by the recent rapid urbanization in the Gulf region and North Africa. Massive trade, value-adding (e.g., in Malaysia), and service sector activities (associated with oil economy) in the Gulf region and a huge level of migration of (rural) population of the international ‘periphery’ to the above economic activities are contributing in the urbanization of both the immigrating and emigrating (as a result of the remittances) MMCs. The movement of expatriate workers is likely to create tremendous impacts on the socioeconomic conditions in both types of MMCs influencing urban growth as well as urban life.¹²

Resulting from the recent forward and backward linkages of the international ‘value chain’ across borders or economies, some MMCs’ urban areas have witnessed the growth of huge urban agglomeration, and 6 of the 30 megacities (8 + million population in each) in the world are in the MMCs. Though all geographic zones seem to have megacities, the largest of its kind are still in either ‘Zone 3’ (in the MMCs) or ‘Zone 4’ (the world) proving the importance of geography in urban growth, even in the present world.

Urbanization results from (and influences) economic activities, and creates massive challenges of moving workers, raw materials, and manufactured goods fast and cheap, as well as of creating healthy living condition in the urban areas with better transportation, water distribution, and sanitation facilities. The provision of adequate transportation, water, and sanitation facilities in rural areas is also as important to deter unwanted swelling of the urban areas (with rural people who abandon rural areas for better amenities of life, irrespective of their economic reasons for being in urban areas).

The average road density in the MMCs (39 km) is much below the world average (117 km). In some MMCs the deficiency in road density is complemented by a better railways system, for example, in Iran or Kazakhstan. Noteworthy, most MMCs do not have rail networks primarily because of their sizes (e.g., 23 MMCs have < 10 million population and 17 have only one city with 1+ million population), low population density or low investment opportunity. Some MMCs (e.g., the UAE), in the recent past, however, have undertaken projects for rail networks. It seems most MMCs have to go a long way to achieve the average quality of the world transport network.

Many MMCs have not been able to achieve much in sanitation and water infrastructure, either. The IAI prepared for this chapter shows that though the MMCs fared well in average IAI (12.52) compared to the world average (17.30), there are huge variations in the IAI scores among the MMCs ranging from 0.00 (Kuwait, Qatar) to 46 (Somalia). The regional variations in the IAI scores are also worth

¹² For example, Chap. 1 in this Volume discusses the possible impacts in West Asia (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) with the largest percentage of expatriate population in the region that creates a male/female ratio of 245/100, 128/100, and 276/100, respectively in the 15–64 age group.

noting. For example, the average IAI score in the MMCs in West Asia and Central Asia (9.88) is significantly better than the IAI scores in the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa (32.73). These results highlight low access (and high rural–urban differential in access) to water and sanitation in the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa to corroborate a geographic influence that may jeopardize the positive effects of urbanization, or worse, be reasons for continued poor life and large conflicts in the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa.

Lower level of access of rural population to sanitation and water in sub-Saharan Africa and the other MMCs may create continuous pressure on the urban infrastructure (due to rural–urban migration), and eventually neutralize the benefits of available urban infrastructure defeating the whole purpose of urban development unless urban problems are seen comprehensively as a part of the country or region (and not an isolated problem). Comprehensive and integrated planned measures need to be undertaken, especially in the MMCs in lower Latitudes, to improve the IAIs that will help achieve sustained human development through better health and better living to support a better economy.

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Chapter 13

Human Development: Health, Hygiene, and Education in the Muslim World

Abdellaziz El Jaouhari and Samiul Hasan

According to the international norm, human development is a process of enlarging people's choices, in particular, for leading a long and healthy life, acquiring transferrable skills, and having access to resources to achieve a decent standard of living (UNDP 1990, p. 10). A long and healthy life as well as knowledge and skills to ensure effective functioning and intended progress of human beings are fundamental to human development (see Chap. 3). Human development is likely to eliminate conditions detrimental to functioning and progress of human being. The fundamental tenets of Islam emphasising education and health encourage activities relevant to human development. The first word revealed to Prophet Mohammad as a part of the Qur'an is 'read' (or proclaim; iqra¹). Islam emphasises learning (without any differentiation in educational opportunities for boys and girls).² Further, good hygiene and cleanliness, absolute necessity for *ibadah* (in particular, for five daily ritualistic prayers), are parts of the Believers' life.

Islam is now dominant in 47 varied sizes of countries (with about 300,000 people in Maldives and about 227 million in Indonesia) in Africa and Asia where about one billion Muslims live.³ Since Islam travelled to different parts of these two continents characterised by different geographical features and climatic conditions, the density of population in these Muslim majority countries (MMCs) are also varied ranging from three and four people per km² in Mauritania and Libya, respectively, to an average 1000+ per km² in countries like Bahrain (1,092), Maldives (1,017), and Bangladesh (1,229) (see Chap. 1). Noteworthy that some countries with low density overall have very high population density in the (sole) urban area. These

¹ "Proclaim! (or Read!) in the name of thy Lord and Cherisher, Who created..." (Al Qur'an, 96: 1-2).

² Prophet Mohammad said "acquiring knowledge is compulsory for all Muslim men and women".

³ Total population in these 47 countries is about 1.4 billion about one billion of which are Muslim; see Chap. 1.

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variations are likely to create different levels of human development in different MMCs resulting from different achievement levels in education and health.

This chapter is to undertake an analysis of education, health and hygiene in the 47 MMCs (in Africa and Asia) as they relate to human development (the focus of this Book) using data available, primarily in the UNDP and World Bank documents. The chapter, at the end, highlights the need for development of cooperation among the MMCs for sharing resources, skills, and institutions for planned improvement in education and health because most MMCs are yet to achieve internationally comparable standards in different criteria for education and health. The chapter is divided into two main sections dealing with education and health in the MMCs.

13.1 Educational Achievements in the MMCs

In the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), education is accorded the highest degree of importance (if the sequence of the goals is considered) to follow the poverty reduction target and to be followed by goals in health, infant mortality reduction and maternal health improvement targets. The achievement in universal primary education (the MDG 2) is to be measured, primarily by the 'net enrolment ratio' and completion rate of primary education and the adult (15–24 years old) literacy rate (ALR). The data for primary education completion rate are not available for 14⁴ MMCs in our list. It seems in eight⁵ MMCs all children received primary education.⁶ Nine MMCs in Africa (Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Sudan), and three MMCs in Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Yemen) are still struggling to have all their children complete primary education.

It seems some MMCs have been trying hard in expanding primary education to all the residents because the data show that some of these MMCs achieved about 100% (Eritrea, Burkina Faso) to about 180% (Guinea 179, Niger 182) increase in the primary school completion rate between 1995 and 2008. Mali (with 290% increase), however, outperformed all other MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa achieving 57% primary education completion rate in 2008.

In spite of a better present performance in primary education, the data available from 28 MMCs (out of the 47), show that the MMCs are yet to achieve much in terms of ALR because about one-third of the populations each in eight MMCs in

⁴ Afghanistan, Chad, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Turkmenistan, and UAE.

⁵ Algeria, Azerbaijan, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Qatar, and Syria.

⁶ It is worth noting though that in all eight MMCs completion rate of primary education is more than 100% (ranging from 104% in Kazakhstan and 121% in Azerbaijan), which essentially means that children (as well as some adults) not of primary school age are undergoing primary education forcing us to think that may be some of the present primary school going children are remaining out of the system.

sub-Saharan Africa (Chad, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone), one in North Africa (Morocco), and three in Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Yemen) still do not have functional literacy. At least in eight MMCs in Asia (Bahrain⁷, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) ALR is above 90% (reaching almost universal coverage in the five central Asian MMCs; Table 13.1, Column 7). The average ALR (73%) of the MMCs is below the world (83%) and low and middle income country average (80%) but much higher than the all country average in South Asia (61%) and sub-Saharan Africa (63%). One interesting phenomenon of the ALR is that because of the near to universal ALRs in the landlocked Central Asian MMCs (for a long time), the ALR in the landlocked MMCs, at the end, becomes higher (88%) than the MMCs open to the sea (68%; see Chap. 4).

An important question, however, is what percentage of the primary school graduates are moving to secondary schools? Again data from 15⁸ MMCs are not available. The situation in some MMCs is very encouraging because about 90+% of the primary school graduates progress to secondary education with almost 100% progression in six MMCs in Asia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, UAE, and Uzbekistan). Most MMCs in Africa still seem to be behind in achieving this feat and have a very low primary completion rate and even lower progression rate to secondary school except for Algeria and Morocco (primary school completion rate is 114%⁹ and 81%, and secondary school progression rate is 76% and 77%, respectively; Table 13.1, Column 3)

Tertiary enrolment data are not available for about a half of the MMCs in the list. The data from the rest of the MMCs show that average tertiary enrolment (20%) is much less than the world average (26%). In nine MMCs (Azerbaijan, Brunei, Indonesia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, UAE, and Uzbekistan) in Asia¹⁰ and in Egypt and Morocco (from where the data is available), tertiary education enrolment rate is 10–30%. Only in four MMCs in Asia (Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey), and in Tunisia (in Africa), tertiary education rates are between 34% and 47%; while in Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon it is 52%. The average rate of tertiary enrolment in the MMCs (20%) relates favourably with all low and middle income MMCs (22%) and in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (both are at 6% level).

In ten MMCs in Asia and one in Africa (Tunisia), female tertiary enrolment rate is higher than the national average. It is very interesting to note that the above list includes three MMCs, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, where a very large

⁷ Worth noting, that the number of expatriate population in Bahrain is more than 1/3rd (including the families). Thus this figure may not be a correct reflection of the local population's ALR.

⁸ Afghanistan, Comoros, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Yemen.

⁹ The figure shows that quite a good percentage of people beyond the school age completed primary education.

¹⁰ Worth noting, that the percentage of expatriate population (including their families) in the six Arab/Persian Gulf MMCs (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) vary from 20 (in Oman and Saudi Arabia) to at least 70–80% in Qatar and UAE (see Chap. 2). Thus these tertiary education figures are not correct reflections of the local people's university graduation status.

Table 13.1 Selected education indicators

Country	Primary completion 2008	To secondary school	Tertiary enrolment 2008	Tertiary enrolment female 2008	Secondary vocational % 2005
Afghanistan					1.38
Algeria	113.86	76.34			12.35
Azerbaijan	121.1	99.06	15.75	14.27	0.29
Bahrain	97.84	96.29			21.97
Bangladesh	54.49	97.38			
Brunei	105.71	93.92	16.04	21.48	6.86
Burkina Faso	38.00	44.44	3.06	2.03	7.59
Chad		53.92	1.92	0.49	1.47
Comoros	81.02				0.39
Djibouti	2.88	73.11			7.70
Egypt			28.45		
Eritrea	46.90	82.65			0.86
Gambia, The	79.06				
Guinea	54.71	71.18	9.22	4.58	1.03
Guinea-Bissau					
Indonesia	106.40	88.49	21.26	20.37	13.53
Iran		88.05	36.14	38.51	8.81
Iraq					7.97
Jordan	99.57	96.32	40.65	42.88	4.95
Kazakhstan	104.25	99.99	46.92	55.60	4.99
Kuwait		97.56			5.96
Kyrgyzstan	92.10	99.89	51.96	60.00	3.95
Lebanon	86.60		51.53	57.04	
Libya					
Malaysia		99.01			
Maldives	112.91	80.59			
Mali	56.76	59.38	5.44	3.39	9.82
Mauritania	64.24	48.04			3.51
Morocco	81.32	77.44	12.29	11.55	6.03
Niger	37.87	60.18	1.16	0.62	2.54
Nigeria					
Oman	80.41	98.43	26.89	28.84	
Pakistan	60.35	71.68	5.18	4.75	3.13
Qatar	115.44	97.67	10.98	31.08	0.93
Saudi Arabia	95.15		29.85	37.36	3.13
Senegal	56.26	50.22	8	5.64	1.20
Sierra Leone					
Somalia					
Sudan	50.14	96.69			1.30
Syrian Arab Republic	113.56	95.85			5.12
Tajikistan	97.72	98.08	20.15	11.41	2.46
Tunisia	92.82	88.25	33.70	40.47	8.29
Turkey	93.43		38.37	33.56	20.48
Turkmenistan					
UAE		99.23	25.19	35.75	0.48
Uzbekistan	94.68	99.79	9.95	8.04	
Yemen	60.91				0.69

percentage of expatriate population creates a unique male/female ratio of 245/100, 128/100, and 276/100, respectively, in the 15–64 years age group. At the same time the data show that female tertiary enrolment in these three MMCs are 20%, 08%, and 10%, respectively, higher than the (both gender) average. The data, however, reflect the unusual population structure (expatriate:local ratio) and not a unique interest in tertiary education among the girls in these MMCs.¹¹

In any event, the growth of technical and vocational education is also important for all MMCs, especially when the white-collar jobs are in crisis (or even cannot be accessed because of a low tertiary education in the MMCs). The situation can be analysed by percentage of the secondary school students in technical education.

Data for this variable, available from 33 MMCs, show that only in 3 MMCs in Asia (Bahrain, Indonesia, and Turkey), and 1 in Africa (Algeria) about 10% of the secondary students are in vocational schools. The percentage is as low as <3% in 13 MMCs (including 11 of the 15 sub-Saharan MMCs with Muslim majority population), and between 03% and 5% in 16 other MMCs. It seems the MMCs have failed to create skilled human capital for a (globalised) dynamic job market.

Though Islam emphasises education for all, many MMCs have not been able to do much for education. Education in these MMCs for a long time was under the orbit of *madrassa* and *kuttabs*. Some non-religious educational institutions offering science and technology education arrived in many MMCs during the colonial period. The performance of these educational institutions does not seem to be impressive, may be because of the apparent low investment in education. The available figures from 20 MMCs suggest that in the MMCs public expenditure in education varies between 8% (Lebanon) and 27% (UAE) of the respective total government expenses (Table 13.2). The data, however, do not confirm any relationship between a higher public investment in education and a higher ALR suggesting that education even in the MMCs also have become more a private responsibility and may not be dependent only on public investment.

13.2 Human Health in the MMCs

The health related criteria in the Human Development Index (HDI) is Life Expectancy at Birth (LEB). Two of the MDGs, Goal 4 (Reduce child mortality) and Goal 5 (Improve maternal health) directly relate to health issues. Though there are many targeted measures, the most widely used criteria to measure the above are the child (or <5 years old) mortality rate, maternal mortality ratio, contraceptive prevalence rate, and the general fertility rate. The *Human Development Report* also intends to comprehend the quality of health services (and of the government's effort in that) with the use of two more sets of data: the government's health expenditure (as a

¹¹ Local boys get into jobs in the administration, defense, and security, or in the family business at a very early age, and boys from the expatriate families go abroad for higher education; while girls (both groups) remain with the parents to study in their country of residence.

Table 13.2 Public spending on education and adult literacy rate, 2008

Country	% of GDP	% of Public expense	Adult literacy rate
Afghanistan			
Algeria	4.27	20.27	
Azerbaijan	1.90	11.88	
Bahrain	2.93	11.72	90.80
Bangladesh	2.39	13.99	55.00
Brunei			95.00
Burkina Faso			
Chad			32.70
Comoros	7.61		73.60
Djibouti			
Egypt	3.76	11.93	
Eritrea			65.30
Gambia, The			45.30
Guinea	1.70	19.21	38.00
Guinea-Bissau			51.00
Indonesia			
Iran	4.79	19.98	
Iraq			77.60
Jordan			
Kazakhstan			99.70
Kuwait			
Kyrgyzstan			99.30
Lebanon	2.05	8.05	
Libya			88.40
Malaysia			92.10
Maldives	8.06	12.03	
Mali	3.82	19.53	
Mauritania	4.44	15.58	56.80
Morocco	5.71	25.71	56.40
Niger	3.70	15.47	
Nigeria			60.10
Oman			86.65
Pakistan	2.91		53.70
Qatar			
Saudi Arabia	5.71	19.26	85.50
Senegal	5.09	19.01	
Sierra Leone			39.80
Somalia			
Sudan			69.30
Syria			83.60
Tajikistan	3.48	18.72	99.70
Tunisia			78.00
Turkey			
Turkmenistan			99.50
UAE	0.90	27.16	
Uzbekistan			99.20
Yemen	5.22	16.00	60.90

percentage of government expenditure and total health cost), and physicians per 1,000 people.¹² Thus the analyses in this section are based on the above criteria.

The MMCs in Africa and Asia are spread over a wide geographic area extending from Mauritania in the West to Indonesia in the East, with varied levels of resource endowment, economic activities, and income per capita. The influence of geography on human health is reflected in the average LEB across different MMCs spreading from 47.6 years¹³ in Sierra Leone (sub-Saharan Africa) to 77.97 years in Kuwait (West Asia). The LEB (of 64.8 years) in the MMCs is below the world average (68.95 years), but individually at least 21 MMCs (including five in North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) have a much higher LEB (Table 13.3).

The MMCs' average LEB is lower than the low and middle income country average (66.82 years), in general, but much higher than the average in South Asia (64.09%) and sub-Saharan Africa (52.11). Noteworthy is that all MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa (except Comoros) have the lowest LEB among the MMCs. Like in any other parts of the world the female LEB is higher than the male LEB consistently across all MMCs (except in some, the difference is higher than the others). The female LEB figures over the male LEB (100) in five central Asian MMCs are the best among the MMCs: Kazakhstan (119), Kyrgyzstan (114), Turkmenistan (113), Uzbekistan (110), and Tajikistan (108). Three other MMCs: Turkey (107), Lebanon (106), and Saudi Arabia (106) also have much better male:female ratio in the LEB.

While the world average (under-five) child mortality rate is 62.76 per 1,000 children, the rate is 72.11 in the MMCs. The rate, however, varies widely among the MMCs with a clear distinction between the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa (with all countries in the region, except Eritrea, registering higher child mortality rate than the world average reaching as high as 209 in Chad) and the rest of the MMCs where the best results are in Malaysia (6.4), Brunei (6.7), and the UAE (7.7), while other MMCs in West Asia are close by—Bahrain (12), Kuwait (10), Lebanon (13), Oman (13), Qatar (11), Saudi Arabia (21). It is interesting to note that the LEB in Malaysia (74.38), Bahrain (75.91), Lebanon (72.05), Oman (75.91), Qatar (75.94), or Saudi Arabia (73.12), being lower than many other MMCs (e.g. Brunei—77.36; Kuwait—77.75, and UAE—77.99) do not reflect the corresponding lower child mortality rates.

Many MMCs in the last few years achieved impressive results in reducing child mortality rate. For example, between 1995 and 2008, seven MMCs in Asia (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Oman, and Turkey), and Egypt were able to reduce their respective child mortality rate by at least 50%. There is likely to be a direct relationship between child mortality rate and fertility rate, because if the parents are not sure about the survival of their child to the full potential they are likely to desire more children. Further, in Muslim communities women

¹² Number of hospital beds per 1,000 people is also an important measure; but due to a lack of data is not included in this analysis.

¹³ A lower life expectancy rate registered in war-torn Afghanistan (43.95 years) now is not included in the discussion.

Table 13.3 Life expectancy and mortality rate (1995–2008)

Country	LEB total 2008	LEB male 2008	LEB female 2008	Child mortality rate 2008	Maternal mortality ratio 2008	Mortality change 1995–2008 (%)
Afghanistan	43.95	43.98	43.92	201	1,400	-14.58
Sierra Leone	47.6	46.36	48.9	198	970	-27.79
Guinea-Bissau	47.82	46.3	49.42	195.2	1,000	-16.30
Nigeria	47.91	47.41	48.43	142.9	840	-32.27
Mali	48.43	47.75	49.14	193.8	830	-16.97
Chad	48.73	47.48	50.05	209	1,200	3.62
Somalia	49.84	48.43	51.31	180	1,200	0.00
Niger	51.4	50.54	52.31	166.6	820	-39.15
Burkina Faso	52.99	51.72	54.32	168.7	560	-15.78
Djibouti	55.39	54.04	56.81	94.9	300	-16.97
Senegal	55.6	54.11	57.16	95.4	410	-30.62
Gambia, The	55.93	54.33	57.62	105.7	400	-29.16
Mauritania	56.73	54.82	58.73	117.7	550	-6.22
Guinea	57.82	55.85	59.89	145.8	680	-30.44
Sudan	58.15	56.64	59.73	108.9	750	-8.18
Eritrea	59.45	57.18	61.84	58.2	280	-49.44
Yemen	62.92	61.31	64.6	69.5	210	-41.69
Turkmenistan	64.82	60.83	69.01	47.6	77	-45.35
Comoros	65.35	63.18	67.63	105.1	340	-12.64
Bangladesh	66.15	65.13	67.22	55.2	340	-53.65
Kazakhstan	66.44	60.69	72.48	30.2	45	-46.36
Pakistan	66.53	66.21	66.86	89.1	260	-26.55
Tajikistan	66.75	64.13	69.5	64.2	64	-43.63
Kyrgyzstan	67.37	62.96	72	38	81	-38.61
Uzbekistan	67.76	64.66	71.01	38.4	30	-43.61
Iraq	67.93	64.24	71.81	43.9	75	-8.92
Egypt	70.14	68.41	71.96	23	82	-64.56
Azerbaijan	70.18	67.89	72.59	36.3	38	-61.13
Indonesia	70.79	68.85	72.84	40.5	240	-39.19
Morocco	71.29	69.1	73.59	39.2	110	-42.44
Iran	71.44	70.12	72.83	32.4	30	-46.36
Maldives	71.58	70.07	73.17	14.9	37	-81.35
Turkey	71.89	69.51	74.39	22	23	-64.46
Lebanon	72.05	69.94	74.26	13.3	26	-61.67
Algeria	72.39	70.99	73.86	33.5	120	-38.98
Jordan	72.71	70.92	74.6	25.7	59	-22.59
Saudi Arabia	73.12	70.98	75.36	21.3	24	-30.16
Syrian Arab Republic	74.23	72.36	76.19	16.7	46	-37.92
Tunisia	74.3	72.4	76.3	21.3	60	-40.50
Libya	74.33	71.81	76.98	19.1	64	-36.33
Malaysia	74.38	72.09	76.79	6.4	31	-52.24
Bahrain	75.91	74.35	77.55	12.2	19	-9.63
Oman	75.91	74.34	77.56	12.8	20	-59.49
Qatar	75.94	74.97	76.97	11.1	8	-32.32
Brunei	77.36	75.05	79.8	6.7	21	-21.18
UAE	77.75	76.71	78.84	7.7	10	-43.80
Kuwait	77.97	76.1	79.94	10.2	9	-30.14

Table 13.4 Relationships between total fertility rates and mortality rates

	Please see footnotes 16 and 17	Mortality group			Total
		1.00	2.00	3.00	
Fertility rate groups	1.00	5	1	0	6
	2.00	9	9	0	18
	3.00	2	2	19	23
Total		16	12	19	47

have to give birth to be respected by their husbands' families, gain approval, gain their husbands' support and play an active role in the family decision-making process. Women gain higher status both in the family and in the community by giving birth, especially to a son (Bahar et al. 2005).

In order to establish a relationship between the two, we grouped the fertility¹⁴ and the mortality¹⁵ rates. The analysis shows that the higher the mortality rate the higher the fertility rate (i.e. in 19 MMCs Total fertility rate (TFR) is 3.16+ and mortality rate is 63+ per 1000 children) (Table 13.4). For example, in the sub-Saharan African MMCs of Chad, Mali, Niger, and Somalia the fertility rates (6–7) and mortality rates (167–209) both are the highest among all the MMCs. There seems to be a significant geographic divide in the fertility and mortality rates—the MMCs in lower Latitude have higher fertility and mortality rates and the vice versa (Table 13.5). For example, all 15 MMCs in 'Zone 2' have a fertility rate above 3.16 (the highest) and 14 has mortality rate above 63+. Fertility rates in some MMCs (in particular in lower Latitudes of sub-Saharan Africa) are still very high reaching up to 7.1 (Niger) or 6.54 (Mali). Compared to the above figures, fertility or mortality rates in higher latitude (geographic Zone 4 or 5) are very low. For example, only one (out of seven MMCs) in 'Zone 5' has such high fertility or mortality rate.¹⁶ In six MMCs (Brunei, Iran, Lebanon, Maldives, Tunisia, and the UAE) fertility rates are below the replacement rate where the mortality rate is also low. Except in two MMCs (Indonesia and Malaysia) the mortality/fertility relationship is not as distinct.¹⁷

Health condition of a country is also reflected on the maternal mortality ratio (i.e. modelled estimate of maternal mortality per 100,000 live births). The data reveal that the six MMCs in the Arab/Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), Brunei, and Turkey have achieved the best (less than

¹⁴ Fertility rate was grouped into three. The first group included up to 2.1 (the replacement fertility rate, RFR), the second group included between 2.11 and 3.15 (i.e. up to 50% more than the RFR) children per women, and the third group included the rest (i.e. 3.16+ children per women).

¹⁵ The first 2 groups of the mortality rate were created by dividing the world average child mortality of 63 into 2 (up to 31.5 and 31.51–63.00), the last group included the rest of the figures.

¹⁶ The geographic influence on fertility and mortality rates, however, defy the pattern because of the MMCs in central Asia where birth rates have historically been high and rates of natural increase remain at a level comparable to that of South Asia and Southeast Asia (Marston et al. 2005, p. 153).

¹⁷ In Malaysia, mortality rate is only 6.4 but the fertility is 2.56; while in Indonesia fertility and mortality rates are 2.17 and 40.5, respectively. The existence of a large non-Muslim Chinese people in Malaysia coupled with a very good health service may explain the result (see Chap. 2 for more).

Table 13.5 Fertility and mortality rates across geographic regions

	Zone					MMC
	1	2	3	4	5	
<i>Fertility rates</i>						
Up to 2.1	2	0	1	3	0	6
2.1–3.15	2	0	7	3	6	18
3.16+	1	15	1	5	1	23
Total	5	15	9	11	7	
<i>Mortality rates</i>						
Up to 31.5	3	0	7	5	1	16
31.51–63.00	1	1	1	4	5	12
63+	1	14	1	2	1	19
Total	5	15	9	11	7	47

Geographic zone 1: Latitude 0–9° N/S, *2:* Latitude 10–18° N/S, *3:* Latitude 19–27° N/S, *4:* Latitude 28–36° N/S, *5:* Latitude 37–45° N/S

24 per 100,000 live births) in maternal mortality ratios. On the other extreme are the 14 MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa (except Eritrea) with maternal mortality ratios ranging from 340 to 1,200.

The promises of achieving the targets of the MDGs require all MMCs to invest squarely in the goal achievement programs. A government's efforts in that can be judged by its investment in the health sector. The data (Table 13.6) show that in many MMCs (Azerbaijan, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone) the government expenditure in health is less than 1/3rd of the total health expenses. Only in a few other MMCs (primarily the six Arab/Persian Gulf countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE; Algeria, Brunei, Djibouti, Libya, Turkey, and Tajikistan), the government bears 2/3rd of the health expenses (with the highest around 80% in Algeria, Brunei, and Saudi Arabia). These governments get direct health benefits of their higher investment in the health sector because a correlation analysis between higher governmental expenses and high LEB and low child mortality rate is established.


The life expectancy at birth (LEB), however, does not seem to be influenced by physician-people ratio. For example, with the best physician/people ratio (3+ physicians per 1,000 people), the LEB in Djibouti, Burkina Faso, or Senegal is very low (55, 53, and 656, respectively). On the other hand, with about one physician per 1,000 people, Indonesia or Azerbaijan has much better LEB (71 and 70, respectively). There seems not to be a relationship between high governmental health expenses, and a good physician-people ratio (Table 13.6), mainly because different expense needs for training and retaining the physicians, efficiency and attractiveness of the health sector in general, and the social status of the physicians in general (Table 13.6).

One of the major problems of the MMCs has been high fertility rate and low contraceptive prevalence rate. The relationship between the two has been tested through a simple coefficient of correlation that indicated a statistically significant negative strong correlation between the two ($r^2 = -0.60$). The data on contraceptive

Table 13.6 Selected health indicators

Country	Health expense/capita \$	Public health expense % total	Physicians per 1000 people	TFR	TFR change 1995/2008 (%)	Contraceptive prevail Av 2000–2007
Afghanistan	3.73	23.63	1.79	6.6	18.11	10.17
Algeria	10.66	81.6	3.56	2.36	-31.59	60.80
Azerbaijan	3.78	26.84	0.98	2.3	0.44	53.87
Bahrain	9.78	69.62	2.61	2.27	-25.08	–
Bangladesh	8.04	33.59	1.14	2.34	-35.00	56.03
Brunei	6.73	81.5	1.92	2.08	-28.52	–
Burkina Faso	13.27	56.06	3.4	5.91	-9.91	14.60
Chad	13.77	56.33	2.7	6.16	-7.23	5.35
Comoros	8.37	57.22	1.87	3.95	-16.67	25.70
Djibouti	14.15	76.64	5.54	3.9	-28.96	13.40
Egypt	7.14	38.06	2.38	2.86	-21.21	58.43
Eritrea	4.17	45.28	1.49	4.63	-21.39	8.00
Gambia, The	11.6	47.91	2.63	5.05	-14.98	13.50
Guinea	4.74	11.02	0.61	5.41	-15.34	7.80
Guinea-Bissau	4.02	25.88	1.58	5.71	-3.55	8.95
Indonesia	6.18	54.54	1.18	2.17	-19.63	59.95
Iran	11.52	46.76	3	1.81	-42.17	76.35
Iraq	3.06	75.01	1.88	4.05	-28.06	46.65
Jordan	11.36	60.61	5.4	3.49	-26.22	56.45
Kazakhstan	11.22	66.13	2.45	2.56	13.27	50.70
Kuwait	5.41	77.49	1.71	2.17	-24.39	–
Kyrgyzstan	9.77	54.02	3.52	2.7	-18.43	47.80
Lebanon	11.69	44.7	3.95	1.85	-35.54	59.67
Libya	5.38	71.8	1.9	2.7	-26.43	–
Malaysia	6.93	44.38	1.94	2.56	-21.71	–
Maldives	10.51	65.38	6.38	2.02	-53.46	39.00
Mali	11.77	51.38	2.94	6.54	-2.39	8.15
Mauritania	5.27	65.27	1.56	4.47	-18.58	8.65
Morocco	6.17	33.75	1.68	2.35	-28.57	63.00
Niger	12.37	52.84	2.8	7.12	-7.53	12.60
Nigeria	6.48	25.34	1.68	5.7	-8.80	12.60
Oman	5.21	78.75	1.91	3.05	-47.05	31.70
Pakistan	3.48	29.98	0.81	3.96	-25.42	28.60
Qatar	9.72	75.59	2.91	2.41	-35.39	–
Saudi Arabia	8.38	79.46	2.72	3.12	-38.10	–
Senegal	12.12	55.97	3.2	4.82	-22.38	11.15
Sierra Leone	7.82	31.32	1.38	5.2	-4.94	4.80
Somalia	–	–	–	6.39	-1.54	14.60
Sudan	6.14	36.84	1.31	4.17	-26.06	7.30
Syrian Arab Republic	6.01	45.89	1.65	3.25	-25.46	50.07
Tajikistan	3.56	21.48	1.13	3.41	-25.55	31.22
Tunisia	9.11	50.53	3.01	2.06	-22.85	62.77
Turkey	10.33	68.97	3.43	2.11	-22.99	71.00
Turkmenistan	10.33	52.08	1.38	2.48	-29.34	54.90
UAE	8.86	70.52	1.94	1.94	-42.77	–
Uzbekistan	7.89	46.1	2.3	2.56	-28.89	66.60
Yemen	4.47	39.57	1.53	5.22	-27.70	25.40

Fig. 13.1 Adult literacy and contraceptive prevalence rate



prevalence rate is not available from eight MMCs that have been very successful in the health services.¹⁸ In 15 of the rest of the MMCs contraceptive prevalence rate is 50+% including that of Iran (76.35%; the highest in the MMCs) and Turkey (71%). Ninety per cent of ever married and currently married Turkish women have used a family planning method at some time in their life. Overall, 72% of currently married women are using birth control device (43% uses modern and 29% uses traditional methods). Current use of contraceptive methods also varies according to urban/rural residence, geographic region, level of education and number of living children (Bahar et al. 2005). In all MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa (except Comoros) contraceptive prevalence rate is the lowest (Table 13.6). Contraceptive prevalence rate may have some relationship to geographic location, and it seems out of the 18 MMCs in the lower Latitude (0–18°) 14 have the lowest contraceptive prevalence rate ranging from about 4 (Sierra Leone) to about 14% (in Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Gambia, and Somalia). Apart from the geographic influence on health care activities, a more plausible reason for low contraceptive prevalence in sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be ALR. A correlation analysis between the two indicates strong positive and statistically significant coefficient of correlation ($r^2=0.652$; see Fig. 13.1).

13.3 Concluding Remark

Islam emphasises learning (without any differentiation in educational opportunities for boys and girls) and good hygiene and cleanliness as requirements for everyday ritual prayers. The fundamental tenets of Islam thus, in turn, support activities relevant to human development. Many MMCs, however, have not been able to do

¹⁸ For example, Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.

much for education and health. The performance of many educational institutions in the MMCs does not seem to be impressive, as revealed in the discussion of many relevant criteria, mainly because a comparatively lower investment in education, in general. The discussion, however, does not confirm any relationship between a higher public investment in education and a higher ALR suggesting that education even in the MMCs also have become more a private responsibility and may not be dependent only on public investment. Further, there may be religious prejudice or the parents' need to have children to contribute to the family income (for survival), often as the bread-winner, as hindrances to educational attainment overall.

Religious prejudice seems to be a factor in health development as well. Health behaviour and outcome are also affected by socio-economic status. At the same time there is not much relationship between high governmental health expenses, a good physician-people ratio, and the LEB because of the different efficiency levels of the health sector in general, and the existence of alternative health care in almost all countries in Africa and Asia. Thus a comprehensive and holistic planning for health development may be essential for higher human development.

Noteworthy that the worst performance of the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa, in general, in almost all criteria for measuring the quality of education and health, and the best performance of the MMCs in the Gulf and Southeast Asia indicate geographical as well as monetary influence in educational and health performances. Geography and economy influence health, education, and human development in the MMCs like anywhere else in the world. The MMCs, still away from achieving internationally comparable standards in different criteria for education and health, need to rethink their priorities and develop inter-MMC cooperation for sharing resources, skills, and benefits.

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Part V
MMCs: Political Integrity
and Umma Solidarity

Chapter 14

Democracy and Development in the Muslim World

Abdul Rashid Moten

Muslims in the world number about 1.58 billion of whom 60% live in Asia. One-fifth of the world's Muslims live as minorities in various countries (Pew Forum 2009).¹ In at least 47 countries, Muslims form the majority of the population (see Chap. 1). Indonesia, with an estimated 202,867,000 Muslims, is the largest Muslim majority country (MMC) followed by Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Muslim world is endowed with immense natural resources like oil, coal, iron, uranium, rubber, tin etc. They control some 56% of world oil reserves (see Chap. 5). Yet, per capita income in the Muslim world, except for oil-producing countries, remains remarkably low. Their level of literacy, unemployment, industrialization and the share of industry as a percentage of GDP are poor. The 2002 *Arab Human Development Report* portrayed a dismal picture of the Arab world lagging behind other regions in terms of socio-economic development, individual freedom and women's empowerment (UNDP 2002). Taking life expectancy, adult literacy and gross enrolment in education and per capita real income, the United Nations Human Development Report 2009 places 37 of the 47 MMCs on 'medium' and 'low' on the Human Development Index (HDI). There are many MMCs that are included among the poorest of the poor. Only four, oil producing, MMCs are ranked 'Very High' on the HDI (UNDP 2009).

The Muslim world is also characterized by the lack of democratic political institutions and processes. Bernard Lewis found in 1996 that of the 53 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), only Turkey could pass Huntington's criterion of democracy as it made two consecutive, peaceful changes of government via free elections (Lewis 1996). Examining the findings of the 2001 Freedom House Survey, Adrian Karatnycky concluded that "the democracy gap

¹ This report of 232 countries is based on census reports and population surveys and was released in October 2009.

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between the Islamic countries and the rest of the world is dramatic. In the 47 countries with an Islamic majority, only 11 (23%) have democratically elected governments, while 110 of the 145 non-Islamic states (76%) are electoral democracies” (Karatnycky 2002, p. 103). Since the publication of these two articles, not much has changed in the MMCs. Indeed, Kuwait renewed its experiment with liberalization after the 1991 Gulf War; Saudi Arabia is experimenting with democracy at the local level; and Iraq has held parliamentary elections. These developments do not make these countries democratic even by Huntington’s rather modest “criterion”.

Governments in the Muslim World range from a monarchy to illiberal democracy to states run by military in civilian garb. Some states term themselves “Islamic republics” (e.g. Afghanistan, Iran, Mauritania, Pakistan), others declare Islam as the state religion in their constitution (e.g. Bangladesh). Some countries permit *shari’ah* law to operate side by side with the civil law (e.g. Malaysia), while others have accepted secularism (e.g. Senegal) or laicism (e.g. Turkey). Legislative assemblies are either non-existent or weak (if existent) acting as rubber stamps to approve executive actions. Political parties are more common but they operate under severe restrictions. Opposition parties are constantly under surveillance and their movements are very much restricted. In most of the MMCs, citizens either have no right to vote or their right to vote is restricted by gender or other factors. Elections for the position of ruler are not permitted in at least eight countries, and elections for the legislative assemblies are not possible in four of them (see Chap. 8).

Applying some elements of electoral-procedural definition of democracy (popular sovereignty, popular consultation, majority rule and political equality) by Robert Dahl, some 25 or 54% of the 47 MMCs emerged as authoritarian, additional 3 countries can be considered as semi-authoritarian (Dahl 1982).² Only 8 or 17% of the states in the Muslim World are classified as democracies and additional 10 as semi-democracies. Somalia is in transition since a system of government is yet to emerge (Table 14.1). How to explain this poor level of human development and a huge democracy deficit in the MMCs? Three theses have been suggested as explanatory models: the culturalist thesis, the modernization thesis and colonial/post-colonial thesis. This study examines these theses in the light of existing evidence. It argues that the explanation for democracy and development in the Muslim World must take into consideration the legacies of colonialism and the policies adopted by the post-colonial elites in their attempt at state and nation building. The colonial legacies in the forms of ethnic fragmentation and artificial borders have been manipulated by political elites for power position that led to intensification of conflicts that in turn led to the militarization and military coups. Transition to democracy in some of the MMCs was due to the ability of political elites to regulate conflicts, de-emphasize the role of the military and militarization, and full commitment to establish democracy.

² Dahl labelled democracy as “polyarchy” because he considered “democracy” as an unachievable ideal.

Table 14.1 Human development by regime type, 2010. (Source: United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2009*. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/>. Accessed 2 June 2010; Freedom House, *Map of Freedom in the World 2010*. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010&country=7919>. Accessed 10 July 2010)

HDI	Regime type			
	Authoritarian	Semi-authoritarian	Semi-democracy	Democracy
Very high	4 (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE)	0	0	0
High	5 (Bahrain, Kazakhstan, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia)	0	3 (Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia)	1 (Turkey)
Medium	13 (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Djibouti, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen)	1 (Chad)	4 (Bangladesh, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan)	4 (Comoros, Indonesia, Maldives, Nigeria)
Low	4 (Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Niger)	1 (Jordan)	3 (Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Senegal)	3 (Guinea Bissau, Mali, Sierra Leone)

14.1 The Cultural Thesis: Islam

Scholars who subscribe to the cultural thesis consider Islam as being incompatible with capitalism and liberal democratic ideals and hence the principal cause of Muslim backwardness (Karatnycky 2002; Waterbury 1994; Kedourie 1994; Miller 1997; Pipes 1983; Naipaul 1982). This thesis is most prominently associated with Max Weber who attributed the rise of capitalism to Protestant Reformation. He considered other religions, including Islam, to be incompatible with rational thinking. He contended that “prebendal feudalism” and “arbitrary bureaucratic patrimonialism” of the Abbasid, Mamluk and Ottoman dynasties hindered the growth of rational capitalism (Crone 1999; Turner 1996). Daniel Pipes provided the more conservative version of culturalist thesis by arguing that “Islam does not offer an alternative way to modernize.... Only when Muslims explicitly accept the Western model will they be in a position to technicalize and then to develop” (Pipes 1983, p. 198). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in his desire to create a new Turkey forced modernization and Westernization upon its Muslim population. Analysing World Values Survey data, Guiso et al. (2003) found Islam to be negatively associated “with attitudes that are conducive to growth” and characterized Muslims as being the most anti-market. There are indeed American writings along the same line which are but evangelical imperial callings to eradicate evil (Islam) and make the world safe for democracy.

The cultural thesis received its greatest boost at the hands of Samuel Huntington whose “clash of civilization” thesis generated volumes of scholarly and public debate. Huntington is categorical: “Islamic culture explains in large part the failure

of democracy to emerge in much of the Muslim world” (Huntington 1996, p. 29). The basic argument is that “Islam” means submission and that it fosters an irrational sense of fatalism among its adherents. As a fatalistic religion, Islam teaches that everything in this world is predetermined and that there is nothing humans can do about it. Huntington and others are emphatic that fatalism inherent in Islamic doctrine impedes the ethic of individual self-empowerment and prevents the public from engaging meaningfully in the project of modernization and development (Lewis 1997; Manji 2004; Spencer 2002; Ibn 2003; Karatnycky 2002).

Critics have attacked Huntington’s work as largely anecdotal and lacking a concrete historical context. Others labelled the work as politically motivated and morally objectionable. Yet, the attitude evident in Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis remains ubiquitous in Western politics and media. It was found in the former President of the United States George Bush’s war on the “axis of evil”, in the actions and rhetoric of people in his administration, and in the writings of Muslim apostates who reject not just fundamentalism but Islam itself.

There exists a plethora of literature showing that Islam enshrines democratic values and is evident in the concepts of *shura* (consultative decision making), *ijma’* (consensus of the community), and *ijtihad* (judgment arrived through independent reasoning).³ As the writings of Pakistan’s Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), Sudan’s Hasan al-Turabi (1932–), and Iranian Ali Shariati (1933–1977) show, Islam provides a framework for combining democracy with spirituality which is much superior to Western democracies devoid of spiritual dimension.⁴ This is well-expressed in the concept of “theo-democracy” propounded by late Sayyid Abu al-A’la Mawdudi, the founder of the Jama’at e Islami of Pakistan, which is defined as a democracy under the sovereignty of God. Such a definition is found, despite linguistic variations, in the writings of Muhammad Hamidullah (1908–2002), Ayatollah Baqir as-Sadr (1935–1980), Khurshid Ahmad, AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, and Taha Jabir al-Alwani, and others (Voll and Esposito 1996, pp. 27–30, 186). These scholars, therefore, refuse to accept cultural explanation of democracy deficit in Muslim countries.

Additionally, the fallacy of the culturalist thesis is glaring. One, it erroneously assumes that Muslims see themselves as purely Muslims to the total neglect of their ethnic or regional identities whereas most of the Muslim’s behaviour have cultural or ethnic overtones. Two, the cultural thesis also errs in assuming that Muslims hold on to one monolithic interpretation of Islam. The fact, however, is that Muslims are divided into various sects and schools who hold varied opinions concerning the relationship between religion and politics in Islam. Indeed, Muslims come in various forms: secular, fundamentalist, liberal and illiberal. Some 89% of Kings, Presidents, Prime Ministers and their respective cabinet ministers of the 47 MMCs are educated in the West with no grounding in Islam. The system they established cannot be attributed to Islam. Finally, and more importantly, there is little empirical evidence

³ Esposito and Piscatory 1991, p. 434; Voll and Esposito 1994, pp. 7–8; 1996, pp. 27–30, 186; Esposito 1996, pp. 49–50.

⁴ Esposito 1991, pp. 137, 141, 181–183, 231, 245–246.

to support the claim that Islam impedes democracy. As shown in Table 14.1, the MMCs are characterized by different types of political systems ranging from pure authoritarianism to pure democracy.

The relationship between Islam and regime type in Muslim countries is not statistically significant. In 2002, Mark Tessler analysed the World Values Survey data for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria and concluded that “cultural explanations alleging that Islam discourages or even prevents the emergence of support for democracy are misguided, indeed misleading, and thus of little use in efforts to understand the factors shaping attitudes toward democracy in the Arab world” (Tessler 2002, pp. 229–249). John Esposito is emphatic that Islam is not merely compatible but encourages democracy. He argues that democracy exists in the Muslim World “whether the word democracy is used or not” (Esposito 2002, pp. 159–161). Shireen Hunter shows the commonalities between Islamic and Western values and argues that the slower pace of democratization in Muslim countries is not attributable to Islam itself (Hunter 1998; Hunter and Malik 2005). She blames colonialism and external forces for the democracy deficit in the Muslim world.

14.2 Modernization Thesis

A different type of explanation for the democracy gap in the Muslim world is provided by the modernization school (Hinnebusch 2006). This school relates lack of democracy to the lack of economic development. Modernization theory posits that the promotion of industrialization, urbanization and education brings about a series of socio-demographic and value changes that are conducive to the establishment and sustenance of democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Lipset et al. 1993; Lerner 1958). The values thus emerge are termed by Inglehart and Welzel as “self-expression values” that include tolerance, trust, civic or political activism and well-being, all of which make individuals to “demand and defend freedom of choice” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, pp. 52–53). These values are the byproduct of economic progress. Income brings about higher levels of education which are linked to human empowerment and increased information. Education also exposes individuals to information enabling them to think and make independent decisions which in turn increase the desire for self-government. In short, modernization will result in the emergence of a working and middle class which, in turn, will demand more political liberalization and participation and hence to democratization (Przeworski 2003).

There is no doubt that the MMCs suffers from the modernization deficit which is claimed to be responsible for the democracy deficit. The deficient economic profile of the MMCs is well-manifested in that 39 out of the 47 MMCs are either least developed or developing. According to Hunter, the modernization deficit is due to the lack of investment flows and low levels of industrialization which, in turn, produce a gender gap in the labour force, unemployment and illiteracy which inhibit the growth and sustenance of democracy in the MMCs (Hunter 2005, pp. 1–3). To

Ross, oil economies that render economic growth by resource extraction impedes the movement of society into industrial and service jobs, discourages the inclusion of women in the economic and political realms and sustains inequitable gender relations. All of these promote authoritarianism and impede democratization (Ross 2001, 2008). Steven Fish argues that authoritarianism in Muslim majority states is largely due to the societal subordination of women (Fish 2002). Donno and Russett qualifies Fish's findings by emphasizing that the subordination of women is severe and more consistent in Arab states than in other Muslim majority states (Donno and Russett 2004). Stepan and Robertson (2003) distinguish between the Arab and the non-Arab states and observes that considering their levels of economic development, the non-Arab Muslim states are overachievers in electoral competitiveness.

However, there are scholars who argue that economic growth is not linked to the form of government and that there is no evidence of a link between economic development and the transition to democracy (Leftwich 2002; Przeworski et al. 2000; Ersson and Lane 1966). Przeworski (2003) states it bluntly: "The inference that development makes it more likely that a country will become democratic is fallacious".⁵ He, however, found that once a democracy is established, it is more likely to survive in a wealthy than in a poor country. He writes that no democracy has ever fallen in a country with a per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975 (US\$ 6,055), whereas about 70 democracies have collapsed in poorer countries. The link between development and democracy in the case of the countries in the MMCs is at best extremely poor. The p-value using Fisher's exact test for the data in Table 14.1 is 0.799. A surprising number of very poor and underdeveloped countries operate democratic political institutions.

Finally, scholars have questioned the supposed role of the middle class in lending support to democratization (Huntington 1991, p. 37). Observation in Southeast Asia has shown that the newly emerging middle classes have generally been more concerned with political stability than seeking political rights, and more interested in satisfying their consumption demands than pushing for democratization. Daniel Bell explains that the "middle classes were the main beneficiaries of state economic paternalism, which gave them a strong stake in the perpetuation of authoritarian rule" (Bell 1988, p. 23). In fact, Bell links this to the "illiberal democracy" thesis: "There is little basis to the claim that the middle classes are the bearers of political liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region". Writing at the time of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, he wondered if the impoverishment, rather than the emergence of a prosperous middle class, might lead them to democratization (Bell 1988). The implied suggestion is that the factors militating against democracy in the MMCs are to be found in something other than culture and modernization.

⁵ Interestingly, Przeworski finds that once a democracy emerges, for whatever reasons, it is more likely to survive in a wealthy than in a poor country. He writes that no democracy has ever fallen in a country with a per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975 (US\$ 6,055), whereas about 70 democracies have collapsed in poorer countries).

14.3 The Colonial Heritage

It is well known that most of the MMCs were under the colonial rule of European powers during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Colonialism in the MMCs began in 1552 when the Dutch occupied the Indonesian Islands. This was followed by Czarist Russia's invasion of Qazan, capital of Tatarstan, in 1602. Around 1750, the British East India Company consolidated their position over the Indian peninsula which was under the Muslim rule. In 1798, France invaded Egypt and occupied Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881. In 1882, Britain colonized Egypt and Cyprus. In 1829, Britain occupied the south of Yemen which remained under its dominion until 1967. Senegal remained under French occupation from 1857 until 1960. In 1884, Spain occupied the Moroccan Sahara, located in the south of Morocco, and renamed it the Spanish Sahara. Nigeria was occupied by Britain in 1903. In 1912, France, and then Spain within the same year, occupied Morocco under the pretext of setting up a protectorate. In 1911, the Italian armies invaded Libya (Benghazi and Tripoli), triggering the two-year long Italian-Ottoman war (1911–1912). During World War II (1939–1945), France occupied the Libyan Fezzan region while Britain occupied Benghazi and Tripoli. During World War I (1914–1918), the Ottoman Empire was defeated and was divided into several provinces which soon became full-fledged states. France and Britain laid claim to the Arab provinces which were annexed to the Ottoman State, including Mesopotamia or Greater Syria (consisting of the present day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine), and Iraq. These provinces were occupied in the shape of mandates by virtue of a resolution issued by the League of Nations. The British also occupied Palestine, in the form of a mandate that ended only with the creation of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948. Thus, with the exception of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan, MMCs endured colonial rule of varied duration.

There are many scholars who have observed a linkage between colonial experience and democratic governance. Lipset et al. (1993) suggest that post-colonial states which experienced British rule were more likely to be democracies after independence than other post-colonial states. They found not a single ex-French colony as democratic whereas half of the ex-British colonies were democratic.

Myron Weiner observed in 1987 that

Every country with a population of at least 1 million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) that has emerged from colonial rule since World War II and has had a continuous democratic experience is a former British colony. Not a single newly independent country that lived under French, Dutch, American, or Portuguese rule has continually remained democratic (Weiner 1987, p. 20).

Weiner attributes the success of the British colonial model to “the British tradition of imposing limits on government, of establishing norms for the conduct of those who exercise power, and of creating procedures for the management of conflict has had a powerful influence on the creation of democratic systems in the Third World” (Weiner 1987, p. 20). Specifically, it is argued, one, that the British better prepared their colonies for democracy by holding elections for local self-governing bodies,

especially parliaments that were granted extensive powers of home-rule in the run-up to independence. Two, it is also argued that the British created superior infrastructure for independence and democracy. They provided a developed system of education, transportation, and communication and established rule of law through the creation and indigenization of such institutions as bureaucracy, judiciary, police force and the army. Last, the British relied on a pattern of “indirect rule” that accounts for the marginally better performance in sustaining multiparty rule in the aftermath of independence. According to Bollen and Jackman, indirect rule helps to explain the democratic success of former British possessions in general (Bollen and Jackman 1985, p. 34).

The thesis developed by Weiner, Lipset and others has been interpreted by some to mean that a properly conducted imperialism is a force for social improvement and that British colonialism is the proper way to administer colonized lands. Niall Ferguson argues for a new, American, empire colonizing such countries as the Central African Republic, Uganda, Liberia, Rwanda, Chad, Niger, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia, Afghanistan and several others to save them from their infirmities and to finish the job the British started (Ferguson 2004). Krauthammer (2004, p. 25) advised that the United States “could use a colonial office in the state department”.

Colonialism definitely had some positive effects. They provided infrastructure for economic development and social services. The benefits that accrued from these policies, however, were not uniform. The British ruled colonies differently. Their rule in the areas of European settlement differed significantly from the ones practiced in the areas where the majority of the people were indigenes. In countries populated largely by White immigrants from Britain, there had been considerable experience with elections, representative governments and a judiciary. These were absent in other colonies where the rule was a form of enlightened despotism. In India, for example, the British ruled a vast population and made no attempt to introduce representative institutions. The Government of India Act, 1935 provided for self-governance at the provincial level while expanding the franchise from 3–18% of the population. In the 1937 elections in India, the franchise was relatively more restricted and certain discretionary powers over even local matters were invested in the Governor General who was responsible only to the Westminster. This political dichotomy prevailed for the life of the Empire, and the double standards it involved provoked an equally long resentment among those non-Europeans whose countries were denied the status of the White dominions. Without having to agitate for it, Canada, Australia and New Zealand gained a large measure of self-government by the mid-nineteenth century. But for the next 100 years, the British government resisted transferring the same authority to India, Southeast Asia, Africa, the West Indies and the Middle East, until forced either by the pressure of opinion at home or by open revolt within the colonies themselves.

In the Muslim world, the impacts of colonialism were overwhelmingly negative and infrastructure was provided solely to enable the colonial power to exploit the natural resources and workforce of the colony. The task of the colonialists, as suggested in 1901 by Baron Carra de Vaux of the Catholic institute, was

To split the Muslim world, to break its moral unity, using to this effect the ethnic and political divisions.... Let us take advantage of political conditions. Egypt, for example, governed today by British power must form a moral entity clearly distinct from French Sudan or from Arabia which remains free.... In one word, let us segment Islam, and make use, moreover, of Muslim heresies and the Sufi orders.⁶

The British and other colonial regimes left political instability and ethnic conflict in their wakes. Colonial powers created boundaries without regard to indigenous populations and fostered high levels of ethnic and religious fractionalization. African states were not granted independence until the European powers were satisfied with the frontiers they created. Such borders restricted pastoral communities and created conflicts among ethnic groups. According to Asiwaju's (1985) estimate, about 177 African cultural or ethnic groups were partitioned across borders, representing on average 43% of their country's population.⁷ They divided large ethnic groups into various colonial states and simultaneously created states composed of various ethnic groups with a history of warfare and enmity. Nigeria contains the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo people professing different religions and the Sudan is composed of Muslim north and the Christian south. These states, since gaining independence, have experienced a long succession of internal violence involving quasi- or outright civil war, political assassinations, military takeover and chronic economic disruption that has led in several cases to recurrent food crises and widespread starvation. The Pan-Africanist Congress in 1945 observed that "the artificial divisions and territorial boundaries created by the Imperialist powers are deliberate steps to obstruct the political unity of the...African people" (Padmore 1963, pp. 130–134). As will be discussed in the next section, these artificial borders and the lumping of warring ethnic groups within the same territory have led to numerous inter- and intra-state wars and irredentist policies.

In the Middle East, the French created the borders for what is now modern Lebanon. The British set borders for Kuwait and Iraq composed of Shia and Sunni Muslims, a large number of discontented Kurds and a host of tribal groupings. The colonialists planned not merely to divide Middle East into pieces but also created conditions conducive to the creation of a Jewish state among Arabs with due understanding among the major powers sanctioned by the United Nations. This has de-stabilized the Middle East causing never ending wars.

Iran, though was never formally colonized, was coveted by both Russia and Britain who placed a very young Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on the throne, replacing his father as Shah. In 1951, the Iranian parliament and the popular, elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized Iran's oil industry. The intelligence agencies of Great Britain and the United States removed Mossadegh from power in a 1953 coup and the country moved towards autocracy under the Shah (Esposito and Mogahed 2007, p. 46). The Shah was dethroned by the Islamic Revolution that swept Iran in 1979.

⁶ Questions diplomatique et coloniales, 15 May 1901, p. 588. Cited in Bukhary 1982, p. 5.

⁷ Cited in Englebert et al. 2002, pp. 3–6.

In South Asia, the British decided in 1947 to create two nations out of one: predominantly Hindu India and the Muslim majority Pakistan. This partition included the geographical separation of the Bengal province into East (Pakistan) and West Bengal (India) and the Punjab province into West and East Punjab. This forced division resulted in the forced movement across the divide of about 20 million people and approximately 1.5 million deaths. Pakistan had two part (East and West Pakistan) separated by the Indian territory in between. The Muslim majority state of Kashmir became part of India causing several Indo-Pakistani wars.

The animosity between Hindus and Muslims itself was a British creation. When confronted with the struggle for independence, the British made political concessions but took steps to divide the opposition. This divide-and-rule strategy exploited existing religious divisions by communalizing the vote. Subsequent electoral mobilization to further the cause of the independence movement pitted communities against each other. In the post-independence period, the two countries experienced communal warfare between Hindus and Muslims; the migration of millions, and subsequently the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Conflicts in Kashmir over Indian rule continue today. One of the most robust findings from decades of scholarly research is that countries deeply divided along racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or class lines are generally less likely to establish and maintain democratic rule (Collier 2010).

As stated, Europe did import liberal democratic principles and institutions i.e. the election system, the media and the three arms of government. As implemented in the colonies, these institutions were a travesty of the Westminster model. The system of free and fair elections was not made available in the colonies. The franchise was restricted, controlled and at times, coerced to obtain majority support for the government. To Altaf Gauhar,

The whole legislative arrangement was an elaborate hoax.... There was no freedom which was not suppressed by the judiciary so long as the law was not violated.... The executive objectivity which was a guarantee for the citizen at home became a justification for servility in the colonies. The press, an instrument of free expression of views at home, was used to control and influence the intelligentsia in the occupied territories (Gauhar 1978, p. 302).

The education system was restricted to the sons of notables and meant to ensure that the educated carried out often tedious and disagreeable tasks assigned to them. They were trained in democratic values and ways, and did permit restricted representative institutions but “its first and most important goal was the preservation of its own authority, which was that of a martial law regime...highly authoritarian” (Diamond 1989, p. 13).

The colonialists built the roads, railways and ports to facilitate the collection and export of commodities as well as the import of manufactured goods. They controlled every aspect of the colonial economy to retain its domination and to realize the economic objectives of colonization. They did not use abundant natural resources in the colonies to create an industrial base. The colonies rather served as a source of raw materials and as an export market for the enrichment of the colonial metropolis. In order to ensure continuous supply of resources, they caused environmental damage and undermined several traditional economic sectors that served the local populace.

Thus, the pattern of colonial development did not facilitate the modernization of countries that were subsequently granted independence.

Since the colonial state was alien and authoritarian, it suffered a legitimacy crisis. Consequently, the colonial subjects revolted demanding self-rule. The colonialists delayed that as long as they could but eventually granted independence definitely not because the nationalist forces defeated colonial regimes. Most of the territories of the British Empire became independent, from the post-World War II period to 1984 (Brunei), because colonies became burdensome and expensive to maintain. The British handed over power to their chosen successors who shared their values and hence expected to be attentive to their interests. The new powers i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union, began taking a new interest in the MMCs, or at least in its oil supplies. It could, therefore, be argued that European colonialism was simply replaced by American neocolonialism. The US presence in the Muslim land is an indication of the continuation of Western interference in the affairs of the MMCs.

14.4 The Post-colonial State

During and after World War II, European influence waned and Muslim majority communities emerged as independent states. Most of the former British colonies and protectorates did not emerge as democracies. Pakistan emerged as a vice-regal system soon succumbing to authoritarian military rule. Qatar, United Arab Emirate and Kuwait remained emirates at the times of independence in 1971. Brunei gaining independence in 1984 remained a Sultanate. Maldives also remained a sultanate for three years after independence from Britain in 1965. Libya emerged as a constitutional and hereditary monarchy in 1951 which was dismantled in 1969 to emerge as a defacto dictatorship. Jordan emerged as a monarchy while Egyptian military abolished its monarchy in 1952. Sudan succumbed to the military rule two years after independence; Somalia suffered inter-clan rivalry and succumbed to the military rule. Nigeria emerged as an independent republic with sharp cultural and political differences among ethnic groups, experienced a secessionist war and then succumbed to the military. Sierra Leone adopted parliamentary system in 1962 while Gambia and Malaysia emerged as constitutional monarchies.⁸

In the aftermath of independence, the MMCs found themselves mired in a developmental crisis in the sense that the states were unable to fundamentally transform the economies inherited at independence and to generate the conditions necessary for a sustained improvement in the standard of living. Countries blessed with natural resources, especially oil, did enrich the governing and their subservient elites but often left the masses in penury. Few MMCs have seen their non-oil econo-

⁸ Information collected from Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers, *Polity IV Country Reports 2008* at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm> (accessed 15 July 2010); Central Intelligence Agency, *The WorldFact Book* at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> (accessed 15 July 2010).

mies flourish or their people enjoy the public services but majority of the Muslim countries suffered from the remnants of pre-independence times. Their record in economic modernization has been disappointing. Most of the socio-economic indicators showed a regressive trend, as the living standards for average citizens have deteriorated and unemployment levels have jumped very high. Inflation rates have been high causing a decline in real incomes and wages. Although per capita incomes have improved in some of the countries, there has been a general increase in the poverty level.

14.5 Violence and War in the Post-colonial State

In many post-colonial MMCs, the degradation of economic conditions and the deterioration of the services due to scarce resources, poor financial means, mismanagement and corruption gave birth to many social problems. The heightened sense of injustice and deprivation resulting from government mis-priorities and the allocation of funds led, in turn, to the flare-up of “tribalism”. Elites of various ethnic groups, taking advantage of the inherited ethnic polarization, challenged the legitimacy of the governing elite and organized mass protest and demonstrations to bring down the government. The governing elites resorted to the apparatus of state coercive power to enforce discipline on those groups who did not consent actively or passively to the decisions made by the government.

In most cases, the government used administrative detention to suppress dissent. Administrative detention, to be sure, was first introduced by the British and French colonial authorities prior to and during the World War II to control political dissent. The system survived and made its way into many constitutions of the post-colonial states. In many cases, these arbitrary powers are codified as “emergency powers” or “internal security” acts as in Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and other states. Human Rights Watch has regularly criticized this practice of detention without trial as use of emergency legislation for “repression of public dissent”. Repression led to greater injustices, which in turn encouraged more radical forms of revolt. This results in what is known as internal wars and given the artificial boundaries of the state, they invite external powers to intervene leading to inter-state wars. These intra-state and inter-state wars are inimical to democratization and development.

Inter-ethnic conflict has been predominant since the mid-1950s which increased steadily through the Cold War period. In 2009, Nigeria (Delta), Chad, Sudan (Darfur and South Sudan), Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Turkey (Kurds), Afghanistan and Pakistan experienced major inter-ethnic armed conflicts. Sierra Leone suffered 11 years of civil war. Sudanese nomadic conflict, South Yemen insurgency, war in Somalia and others are ongoing. These internal wars often received crucial military and/or material support from major powers. In many cases, the inter-ethnic conflicts have their roots at the international level as is evident from the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Kashmir. A majority of wars in the MMCs began well before the end of the cold war; some of them are the consequences and legacies of the cold war.

Equally noticeable are high magnitude interstate wars like the several Arab-Israeli wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973), the brutal and costly Iraq-Iran (1980–1988) war, the Soviet-Afghanistan war of 1979 and the US-Afghanistan war of 2001, the four armed conflicts between India and Pakistan (1947, 1965, 1971, and 1998), the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998–2000) and the first Gulf War (1990–1991). The United States virtually forced many Muslim states like Kuwait, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Morocco to fight on the allied side against Iraq during the 1991 Gulf war. Over the entire period, since 1946, wars have been quite common: there have been over 60 distinct episodes of major armed conflict affecting some 37 countries in the MMCs.⁹ Egypt, Jordan and Syria were involved in war with Israel ever since its creation in 1948. Soviet-Afghan war continued for ten years, Chad and Libya conflict lasted for nine years, and Indonesia and Malaysia were involved in “confrontation” for four years. The several episodes of warfare plaguing the central and eastern African region involved roving militias and cross-border tensions. Militants from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi took refuge and created havoc in the southern Sudan. Some of the internal conflicts, especially in Lebanon, Algeria, northern Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia (Aceh), have ended though political tensions continue to challenge state authorities.

14.6 Militarization, Development and Democracy

Countries that experienced internal and inter-state wars suffered economic retardation. Wars destroyed physical infrastructure, disrupted communications, reduced trade, displaced population and crippled administration. The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 and the ensuing conflict that continued for about ten years led to the death of about one million people and maiming or wounding of another three million. Irrigation systems were destroyed and almost all the farmlands were bombed. Landmines had killed about 25,000 Afghans, mainly children. In the Gulf war, the US-led coalition carried out aerial bombardment of military installations and infrastructure in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. Iraq was subjected to about 88,500 t of bombs. Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Arab states bore the financial burden of the war with substantial benefit for the defense sector of the US economy. The war left Iraq in “near apocalyptic conditions”, killed over 150,000 and reduced Iraq’s economy and levels of infrastructure to a pre-industrial state (Qureshi 1991, pp. 17–56; Graff 1991, pp. 57–91). To King Hussein of Jordan, “The real purpose behind this destructive war... is to destroy Iraq and rearrange the area... under direct foreign hegemony...” (Qureshi 1991, p. 34). The Iran-Iraq war left an estimated million casualties, including 400,000 dead, and over a trillion dollars in damage, and debt. Iraq is believed to have suffered damages and economic losses of \$ 452.6 billion. According to a World Bank study, during periods of civil

⁹ See EX-DESIGNS, *World History and Events*, at <http://www.ex-designz.net/history.asp> (accessed 13 July 2010).

war the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP registers about two percentage points below the trend, on average (Collier 1999). These standard economic indicators do not capture adverse changes in the quality of life. Armed conflicts disrupt the quality of life in many ways which cannot be measured by economic terms.

Armed conflicts may create profitable opportunities for traders, speculators and warlords, but bring sufferings for families that lose the only breadwinners or feel the burden of inflation. It has been observed that armed conflicts lead to famine, as happened in Sudan. Armed conflicts breed banditry and banditry in turn causes famine. A very good example is the vicious cycle of violence and famine in Somalia in the early 1990s which continues uninterrupted. The situation is worsened by the disruption in government services such as communication systems, sanitation facilities, transport networks etc. Among the worst casualties are health and education services. Systematic attacks on health and schooling facilities or personnel have been reported in many war-torn countries like Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, among others.

Armed conflicts displace people within and beyond borders. Proclamation of the State of Israel and the consequent first Arab-Israeli wars forced many Palestinians to flee their homes and means of livelihood and become refugees. Most of them (estimated to be around three million) remained refugees for over 60 years. The Soviet invasion in 1979 forced an estimated five million Afghans to take refuge in Pakistan and Iran. The Gulf war in 1991 displaced about 2.4 million people—most took refuge in Iran. Roughly 200,000 Palestinians living in Kuwait fled to Jordan. The 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan led some six million Afghans to flee to neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Sudan also hosted many refugees from the conflict ridden Ethiopia, Uganda and Chad.

Wars, internal or inter-state, are a major source of poverty. Many MMCs use their resources to augment military and police power in order to suppress enemies of the regime rather than on education and infrastructure programs to enhance the economic health of the citizens. The expenditure on the military in the MMCs ranges from 0.8–14.6% of their GDP. There exists a significant relationship between income and military expenditure (The p-value using Fisher Exact Test is 0.00341). The greater the GDP the higher the military expenditure. The fourfold classification of regimes (Authoritarian, Semi-authoritarian, Democracy, Semi-democracy) were converted to an eight point scale and correlated with the military expenditure as percentage of GDP figures. The analysis indicates a significant but negative correlation between military expenditure and the status of the regime (Pearson $r = -0.34$). In other words, authoritarian regimes tend to spend more on their military as against democratic regimes. Some Muslim countries spend less on the military focusing instead on development and economic reforms.¹⁰ Malaysia, for example, has industrialized its economy and has succeeded in substantially reducing income inequality among the various ethnic groups through an active redistribution (affirmative action) program (Gatsiounis 2006). Tunisia was also serious in reforming its economy

¹⁰ Albania, for instance, has used its resources wisely and thus managed to improve its customs and tax services and to modernize and liberalize its trade regime.

and has attracted international agencies for more funding. In contrast, Pakistan with significant levels of oil and gas revenues, but a high level of military expense has not achieved much economic development. The country has been impoverished due in no small part to its high military expenditure to confront security challenges from India and lately the 'Islamists'. This is despite the fact that successive US administrations have compensated for high military expenditures with billions of dollars in loans and aid. Even Indonesia which is blessed with large oil reserves spends heavily on the military and is suffering from the burdens of foreign loans and not much impressive economic growth.

The suppression of internal dissent by the police and paramilitary forces, the inter-state and intra-state wars have led to a formidable expansion in the strength of the armed forces and the state security apparatus at the expense of democracy in many MMCs. The consequences are threefold: One, these wars curtail civil liberties ranging from relatively mild violations of democratic rights such as censorship to large scale massacres of political opponents. Two, these wars in their aftermath bring the armed forces and intelligence services to play crucial roles in politics and society. Thus, the Algerian army terminated elections in 1991 to prevent the victorious Islamic Salvation Front from taking power. In the aftermath of 'September 11' incidents and the subsequent American "war on terrorism", the governments of Egypt, Sudan and Syria used their military and police forces to bolster their internal control. The military has also been the backbone of many regimes including Iran, Pakistan and Sudan etc.

Finally, the wars have been followed by spate of military coups and counter coups. Pakistan witnessed the first unsuccessful coup attempt in 1951. The military overthrew the monarchy in Egypt in 1952. In 1953, the Imperial Iranian Army supported by United States and UK staged a coup (codenamed Operation Ajax) against the democratic government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq and restored Reza Pahlavi as the monarch. In 1958, Pakistan, Iraq and Sudan suffered military coups. In 1966, Nigeria experienced two coups—the first ended the civilian regime and the second replaced the General who led the first coup. In 1969, Colonel Qadhafi overthrew the monarchy in Libya. The same year, Somalia, Sudan and Pakistan experienced coups. A rough count shows that 25 of the 47 Muslim countries experienced a total of 62 successful coups from 1950–2009. Since independence from France, the Comoros experienced more than 20 coups or attempted coups. Sierra Leone has experienced six successful coups. Pakistan suffered several decades of military rule (1958–1971; 1977–1988; 1999–2008). Evidently, military and militarization in MMCs made the development of democracy difficult.

14.7 Explaining Muslim Democracies

Negative effects for development and democracy of wars and militarization could be countered by elites committed to democratization. They need to contain the military and manage the cleavages avoiding recurrent violence. The cases of Albania,

Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mali, Malaysia and Nigeria confirm the significant role of the elite for democratization.

Albania, since 1991, has progressed by fits and starts towards democracy and is recognized as a parliamentary democracy established under a constitution renewed in 1998. The People's Assembly election in 2002 marked a turning point in the country's democratic history. The ruling and opposition parties elected Alfred Moisiu as a consensus candidate. This was followed by an agreement among the political party elites to engage each other within established parliamentary structures. This "truce" provided a period of political stability paving way for further progress in various spheres¹¹ and resulted in the reduction of the number of active troops from 65,000 in 1988 to 14,500 in 2009. The military expenditure of Albania is about 1.4% of the GDP. Free-market reforms have opened the country to foreign investment, especially in the development of energy and transportation infrastructure.

Bangladesh is a homogenous country with few cleavages in terms of ethnicity, religion or entrenched stratification. Gaining independence from Pakistan in 1971, the country soon plunged into a series of coups and counter-coups. A protracted mass agitations led by a "united political opposition" succeeded in dismantling the regime of the last of the military dictators—General H. M. Ershad. Since then, Bangladesh has operated parliamentary democratic system with regime alternations taking place through electoral process. The government has taken certain steps to control the armed forces. The Constitution vests the supreme command of the defence services of the country in the President and disallows any war without the assent of Parliament. The defence portfolio is held by the Prime Minister. There also exists an Armed Forces Division in the cabinet directly responsible to the Prime Minister. The Principal Staff Officer of the rank of Major General reports directly to the Prime Minister by-passing the army chief. Though the party elites agree on the parliamentary system, the contentious politics between the two major parties made democracy largely dysfunctional. The Freedom House ranks Bangladesh as partially free.

The Republic of Indonesia's transition from a totalitarian state to the third largest democracy in the world began with President (General) Suharto's fall in 1998 due to the massive dissatisfaction stemming from deteriorating civil liberties, the crumbling economy and united opposition movement with grass-root support. The post-Suharto elites handled ethnic conflicts with prudence. East Timor separated. Aceh became autonomous and other conflicts pacified. The armed forces decided to stay away from politics. As President S. B. Yudhoyono (a retired army general himself) pointed out, "Since 1998, the military has decided to stay out of day-to-day politics. The basic idea of military reform is to go back to the role and function of the military as a defence force and move them away from politics systematically. The trend is moving in such a way that there is no so-called 'dual function'

¹¹ US Department of State, "Diplomacy in Action, Background Note: Albania, June 14, 2010" at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3235.htm> (accessed 30 July 2010).

of the military, there is no so-called social political mission in the military”.¹² The representation of the armed forces in parliament has been annulled. Most people have enjoyed freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of information, checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government and a depoliticized military.

The Republic of Mali, since the 1992 elections, has developed a reputation as a “model democracy” in Africa. This reputation is based on the consolidation of the political institutions and the behaviour of the political elites. The constitution provides for a separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government. The executive power is vested in a president who is elected for no more than two terms of five-year duration each. The president is the chief of state and commander in chief of the armed forces. The armed forces number some 11,000 and are under the control of the Minister of Armed Forces and Veterans. A prime minister appointed by the president serves as head of the government and in turn appoints the Council of Ministers. The unicameral National Assembly consists of deputies elected to five-year terms. There is, since 1991, certainly a larger level of consensus among a broader group of political actors to work together to further entrench democratic politics in Mali, by respecting the Republican Pact and the “rules of the game” in multiparty competitive politics. The elites have not allowed the regime to backslide towards dictatorship. This “presents a happy contrast with many neighbouring countries (Ivory Coast, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone), where democracy is given lip service while conflict and authoritarianism seem to have the upper hand” (Smith 2001, pp. 77–78).

Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy. Malaysians, except for an interregnum of 21 months (May 1969–February 1971), have enjoyed competitive party system, regular elections at national and state levels, political stability and orderly transition in the leadership. Malaysian parliamentary democracy is based upon the beliefs of the political leaders about the legitimacy and necessity of a democratic government. The policies of the government aim at reducing tension and avoiding ethnic conflicts (Moten 2008). Malaysia has not experienced a coup or an attempted coup since independence in 1957. The military is considered to be apolitical and civil-military relations are characterized by civilian control and supremacy. Accordingly, the military not only has a subservient position but is also constrained from developing any ambition of capturing political power.

14.8 Conclusion

Democracy deficit and under-development in the MMCs have most often been explained by reference to the cultural and modernization theses. Islam has often been singled out as an obstacle to development and democracy. On the contrary, Islam

¹² *Indonesia: Diplomatic Handbook* (Washington: International Business Publications, 2008), 68.

emphasizes rationality and activism as against irrationality and fatalism. Muslim scholars repeatedly argue that constitutionalism and representative government are well rooted in Islamic socio-political thinking. Islam's emphasis on justice, equality and the dignity of man and its legal tenets such as *shura* (consultation), *ijma'* (consensus of the community), and *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) form the core principles of democracy. Islam calls for the establishment of a system of governance that is equitable, beneficial and morally sound. Thus, there is much in Islam that is compatible with and conducive to democracy. Authoritarian trends in the MMCs are associated with leaders who are secular in nature.

Democracy deficit and underdevelopment resulted from serious disruptions in the social organization of the MMCs by foreign domination for long periods. Colonialism did have some benefits but was ruled by an alien, despotic power unaccountable to those colonized. Hence, the rulers used coercive means to weaken local resistance but masked their sayings and deeds in the guise of "good governance". Colonialists divided Muslim societies through artificial boundaries; created societies composed of warring groups and left a situation that promoted intra or inter-state wars. Many post-colonial MMCs experienced inter and intra-state armed conflicts, high volume of arms imports to perpetuate wars, high military expenditures and successive military coups. Post-colonial failures of democratization and development are, therefore, attributable to the nature of colonial rule.

Inter-state and intra-state wars resulting from cleavages within the society as well as border disputes are a major source of poverty. Twelve of the fourteen MMCs with 'low human development' (HDI=0.500), and 17 of the 24 MMCs with a per capita income below \$ 3,000 have experienced high intensity of wars since independence. About three-fourths of low income countries have experienced major political violence. As a result, at a progressively higher rate military expenditure in these MMCs continued to soar since independence. Large armed forces consumed and imported armaments from industrialized countries spending more than the foreign economic aid receipt. Evidences suggest that wars resulted in markedly poor performance in economic growth, food production per capita and in other human development indicators such as infant mortality rates or school enrolment ratio in many MMCs. Further, high military expenditure and activities remained an important factor in hindering the advancement of democracy in the MMCs because military governments tend to be more repressive inhibiting development and democracy. While colonialism left political instability and ethnic conflict in their wakes the post-colonial elites shirked their enormous responsibilities to stimulate economic growth and overcome democracy deficit.

An analysis of the few MMCs with functioning democracy show that the negative effects of colonial legacies could be countered by political elites. Democracy and development are contingent, among others, upon the elite's commitment to democratic rule, an agreement among them on the modus operandi of the system to contain ethnic conflict and violence and to establish civil-military relations characterized by civilian control and supremacy for economic growth and sustained democracy.

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Chapter 15

Muslim *Ummah*, International Organisations, and Human Development in the MMCs

Ishtiaq Hossain

15.1 Introduction

Islamic thought on international relations has been built on the premise that the Muslims form a distinct and separate community known as the *Ummah*. In this thought in the past the world was divided into *dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (the abode of war). This distinction was the hallmark of the Islamic system before the globalisation of European society and the rise of modern international system (Tibi 2002, p. 176). In the present world such a neat division is impossible (or not required) because the nation states in the globalised 'secular' international society follow the rules, norms, and values laid down by the UN Charter, and other universal and regional organizations all of which offers freedom of religion. However, this is not to suggest that the Muslim states have not tried to bond themselves together on the basis of their common Muslim identity within the contemporary international society.

International society is a particular form of human association that includes (and organise the relations among) different bounded political communities (Hjorth 2010, p. 1). Three international organisations, the League of Arab States (Arab League) established in 1945, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) established in 1969, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that came into existence in 1981, have been promoting the causes of Muslim *ummah* in different forms and fora. What and how much, if at all, have these three international organisations achieved in (committing to the reasons for their own creation and in) engaging the member states for peace and development, and what challenges do they face in their pursuit?

This chapter, by examining the features and achievements of these three international and regional groupings, will endeavour to find answer to the above questions. Before getting to the main analysis, the chapter presents a brief discussion on international society from the perspective of Islam. Then the chapter, in sequence,

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analyses the roles of the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Gulf Cooperation Council in promoting peace and development in the pursuit of human development in the 47 Muslim majority countries (MMCs; the focus of this Book), all of which are members of one or all three of these international organisations.

15.2 The *Ummah*: An Islamic Perspective on International Society

International society is understood to be a particular form of human association that organises the relations among different political communities (Hjorth 2010, p. 1). According to Bull “a society of states (or an international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 1977, p. 13). A common vital interest of ensuring an environment of peace and stability among themselves (without which the states would not be able to pursue their interests) bind the society of states together. However, in order to create and maintain such an environment, the states must agree to certain common minimum rules like respecting each other’s sovereignty. Sovereignty involves three norms: first, the ruler of a state exercises sole authority over its territory; second, all states are judicially equal; and third, the state parties are not subject to any law to which they do not consent (Zurn and Stephen 2010, p. 92). In addition to the sovereignty rule, the states also usually respect international agreements they enter into and restrict the use of force to settle inter-state disputes.

So long sovereignty rule reigns supreme, the weakness of the international society would continue to be the absence of an international authority with the full sovereign rights to enforce international laws. Neither the League of Nations (1914–1919) nor the contemporary United Nations have the sovereignty in dealing with violations of international laws. In other words, these world bodies are not world governments. Time and again, it has been demonstrated that these organizations worked very well only when their member-states cooperated with each other within the respective organization’s framework. It is an anarchical society in the sense that there is no centralised world government capable of enforcing international law as national governments are within their territorial domains. However, as Sheehan (2006, p. 12) points out the absence of a world government has not prevented the creation of an international order in which states are able to pursue their objectives peacefully most of the time. This is possible because the society of states do, in fact, agree on minimum rules and regulations to conduct their interrelationships peacefully. Although Bull (1977) emphasises the existence of international society, he does not ignore the existence of power politics in international relations. According to Little, although Bull (1977) initially stipulates that the institutional structure of

the European international society was underpinned by the balance of power, in practice all five factors (the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power management) are mutually interdependent (Little 2007, p. 128). Therefore, it may be pointed out that the contemporary international society may be based on certain common norms and values but power politics with all its trappings is a constant feature of such a system. Hence, in such a system, while one could expect adherence by states to rules, norms and values, the possibility of conflicts and wars are also ever present.

So far an international society in Islam is concerned, the Qur'an provides definitive guide to what constitutes a community and society based on principles laid down by Allah. The concept of Islamic community is definitively based on the Qur'anic meanings of Arabic word *Ummah* (plural *umam*). *Ummah* has been used in the Qur'an in multiple ways. The Holy Book of Islam refers to *Ummah* as a human religious community. But at the same time it has additional meanings, for example, any traditional value or belief system (al-Qur'an 43:22, 23); a tribe or subgroup (al-Qur'an 7:164; 28:32); a fixed term or time (al-Qur'an 11:8; 12:45); a paragon or exemplar (al-Qur'an 16:20); and a genera of animals (al-Qur'an 6:38). The last meaning is far-reaching in its moral and ecological implications, for animals and birds form "*ummas* like unto you" (McAuliffe 2002, p. 371). *Ummah* is referred to 62 times (including 15 times in plural) in the Qur'an. The term, though, has a variety of meanings, more or less exclusively refers to a fledgling Muslim community both as a religious and political entity that had been established in Madinah under Prophet Muhammad's (Peace be upon him) guidance.

Al Faruqi (2005, p. 2) argues that the word *Ummah* refers to a religious community bound by faith and transcending all other markers of belonging. However, some Islamic movements have extended the meaning of the *Ummah* beyond its religious characteristic. For example, the Muslim Brothers' Society (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) of Egypt believed that the Islamic *Ummah* superseded national, geographic, or racial divisions to embrace the principles, beliefs, and higher realities (El-Awaisi 1991, p. 127). El-Awaisi (1991) points out that the Muslim Brothers recognised that for purposes of practical collective action, mankind is divided into people and tribes, and therefore, they considered the Muslims to be belonging to two nations: the nation of his birth and of Islam. Both imposed obligations which Muslims should fulfil. But Saunders (2008, pp. 303–321) opines that the *Ummah* can be considered as a nation. He treats the controversy surrounding the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten's* September 2005 publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) as a watershed event (Saunders 2008, p. 304). He focuses on the role of mobility, the internet, and the emergence of new de-territorialised elite in promoting '*Ummahism*'—a sentiment which more closely resembles nationalism than religiosity (Saunders 2008). Saunders concludes that the *Ummah's* global response to the 'Cartoons Affair' underscores the development of a robust collective identity among the world's Muslims—one which cannot be adequately explained within the framework of religious fellowship. He further points out that while the *Ummah* functions as a nation, its membership does not

need to fully reject competing national identities nor does this membership necessarily avert internal divisions (Saunders 2008).

While Saunders highlights the ‘collective identity’ of the Muslims, Moses (2006, pp. 489–508) emphasises the ‘community feeling’ among the inhabitants of the *Ummah*. Moses (2006, p. 491) defines ‘*Ummah*’, in political terms that is less bound to the Islamic religious tradition, as an informal community of political entities that share common political and perceptual traditions, united in opposition to a constructed enemy that exists in the world beyond the *Ummah*. Moses portrayed the *Ummah* of Islam as a community largely at peace and describes the effect that this community had on the warring Arab tribes of the seventh century (Moses 2006, p. 494) pointing out that the notion of community was embraced by most of the members of the *Ummah*: the Arab masses found themselves united, whether in enthusiasm or in resignation behind the leader of the community (Moses 2006, p. 497). Thus community feeling among the members of the *Ummah* is a more important ingredient to maintain peace than institutions, rules, and norms that democratic peace theory, for example, underscores (Moses 2006).

While one can point out the ‘religiosity’, and ‘collective identity’ of the *Ummah* and emphasise the presence of ‘community feeling’ among the Muslim masses, the political unity of the *Ummah* as it existed in the seventh century, is absent at the contemporary period. Hassan (2006, p. 312) points out that in the contemporary modern world, the notion of *Ummah* is an integral part of religious, political and ideological discourses on Islam. Hassan (2006, p. 312), like Moses, emphasizes that the *Ummah*, as a community of believers entailed a consciousness of belonging to a community whose membership was open to all, without any need for qualification or restriction. In the past, such a collective consciousness of community among the Muslims most certainly helped to overcome significant ethnic and cultural differences in the Muslim world.

The Compact of Madinah (*Sahifat al-Madinah*, circa. 622 CE) not only formed the constitutional foundation of the political community established by the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him), but according to Luay Safi, also laid down the following as the five main features of the *Ummah*: Firstly, a political society, open to all individuals committed to its principles and values, and ready to shoulder its burdens and responsibilities.¹ Secondly, individual norms and the scope of political action within the new society can be created by preserving the basic social and political structures prevalent in tribal Arabia.² Thirdly, guaranteeing religious autonomy, based on the freedom of belief, for all members. Fourthly, subjecting all social and political activities to a set of universal values and standards that treat all people equally in a society where the sovereignty does not rest with the rulers, or

¹ The membership in the *Ummah* is subject to accepting the principles of the Madinah Compact manifested in the commitment to adhere to the principles of mutuality and justice, and to declaring allegiance to the political order defined by the Compact, through political contributions and struggles to actualize its objectives and goals.

² The Compact of Madinah preserved tribal structure, while negating tribal spirit and subordinating tribal allegiance to a morally-based legal order.

any particular group, but with the law founded on the basis of justice, maintaining goodness, the dignity of all and condemning injustice and tyranny. Fifthly, introduction of rights for all individuals, Muslims and non-Muslims, such as (1) rights to be helped, if oppressed; (2) rights not be liable for an ally's misdeeds; (3) rights to practice respective religion; and (4) rights to free movement from and to Madinah (Safi 2010, pp. 219–223). At close examination of the features, it seems that with its emphasis on community feelings, individual rights (of the members), and freedom of movement the *Ummah* is compatible with Bull's conception of an international society. Mention should also be made that the Compact of Madinah is also a guidance for Islamic approach to conflict resolution, and that many of the mediation techniques utilized by the Compact continue to be practised today (Yildirim 2009, pp. 439–450).

Muslims, in general, would like to see the international organisations play positive roles in effecting substantial changes in their living standards and ensuring justice in settling the major political issues affecting them. The following discussion is to demonstrate if the international organisations created and participated by the MMCs whether based on the principle of 'pan-Arabism' or *Ummatic* spirit have been able to meet the Muslims' expectations of creating the necessary political, economic, and social environment to bring about changes in the lives of the Muslims.

15.3 The League of Arab States

The League of Arab States (*Al-Jami'a ad-Duwal al-Arabiyyah*), popularly known as the Arab League (*Al-Jamiyah al-Arabiyyah*), was established on March 22, 1945 when six Arab countries—Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan (now known as Jordan), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria—signed in Cairo the Pact of the Arab League States. Yemen joined the League after a few months. The roots of the Arab League draw on the Pan-Arab projects in the nineteenth century, mainly as a reaction to the decline of Turkish/Ottoman rule over the Arab world (Khadduri 1946, p. 756). Currently composed of 22 member-states, the Arab League is ostensibly aimed to reflect Arab unity, but the reality is different. The Arab League has been fractious while trying to deal with questions that affect the member-states like supporting the Palestinians' cause³; Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Gulf War (1991), the American invasion and occupation of Iraq (2003), liberalisation of the media laws in the member-states etc.

However, the establishment of the Arab League in 1945 symbolised the successful fruition of the movement of the Arab nationalism and also the Arab unity, which had been developing rapidly in the Middle East since the end of the First World War.⁴ The entire Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, has a rich and historical past. Nonetheless, so far political development, in the post-World War I

³ Egypt was expelled from the League in 1980 when it signed a peace treaty with Israel.

⁴ For an excellent analysis of the development of Arab nationalism in the aftermath of World War I, please see MacCallum (1935).

era is concerned, only three Arab nations (Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia) had some headway in achieving stable governments (MacCallum 1935, p. 367). Political development in other parts of the region was not as successful. For example, the situation in the mandated territories was confused. Many Arab nationalist organisations though were active in the mandated territories, did not achieve much because of severe limitations imposed on these organisations by the mandated powers. Faced with overwhelming military strength of the mandated powers, the Arab nationalist groups relied chiefly on legal methods to achieve their nationalist objectives. With the outbreak of the World War II, there was a qualitative change on ground, and by the end of the War, the majority of the Arab states such as Jordan, Lebanon, or Syria, emerged as independent states and the stage was set for Arab unity in the face of the massive influx of the Jews in Palestine with the aim of setting up of a Jewish State—Israel.

An Arab state system was thus in place well before the establishment of the Arab League. Therefore, as Podedh (1998, pp. 50–51) argues the Arab League should not be studied in the context of the quest for Arab unity, as suggested by several authors, but rather as a mechanism to safeguard state interests *vis-à-vis* the revisionist pan-Arab ideology (Podedh 1998, p. 51). It must also be pointed out that despite the multitude of regional organisations, most of the cooperation within the Arab League has taken the form of bilateral or multilateral cooperation schemes (Laanatza et al. 2001, p. 43). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the Arab League is a unique organisation in more than one respect. For example, unlike other regional organisations, such as the European Union (EU), the League is based on a shared culture, rooted in a common language—Arabic (Toffolo 2008, p. 7). The other unique feature of the League is its granting of the membership to the Palestine Authority though it is not a sovereign state.

The Arab League has a wide and ambitious agenda consisting of the following tasks (Toffolo 2008, p. 44):

1. Promoting Arab security;
2. Supporting Palestine;
3. Helping Arabs gain their independence from Western colonialism;
4. Coordinating members' foreign policy;
5. Forbidding members to use force between themselves and helping to settle conflicts between members peacefully;
6. Generating economic and financial development and integration;
7. Developing agriculture and industry;
8. Developing communications and transportation;
9. Preserving culture and developing education;
10. Sorting out nationality issues (passports, visas, extradition of criminals);
11. Advancing social affairs; and
12. Promoting public health.

The Arab League comprises of the following organs to carry out the above-mentioned tasks: (1) The League Council; (2) Special Permanent Committees of the

League Council; (3) Secretary-General; (4) Arab Parliament; (5) Specialised Arab Organisations Affiliated with the Arab League. The League Council is the supreme authority. Usually attended by the foreign ministers of the member-states, the Council meets twice a year in Cairo—the headquarters of the organisation. In addition, there is also a provision for an annual summit meeting of the leaders of the organisation. In spite of the high hopes, neither of these meetings ever proved to be very effective in settling inter-Arab nation disputes.⁵

Whatever be the importance of the League Council, the Secretary-General of the Arab League is considered the organisation's official face to the world. The former Secretary General, Amr Moussa, was a popular figure. Using his experience as the former foreign minister of Egypt and his ties with Arab and non-Arab leaders, Moussa had endeavoured to try to resolve various Middle East conflicts. His voracious opposition to the 2003 American invasion and occupation of Iraq reflected the Arab masses' opinion on the issue. His warning of opening the 'gates of hell' if the US had gone ahead with the invasion plan of Iraq proved to be prophetic. His leadership role, however, has often been seen as ineffective may be due to the above mentioned divisions among the Arab League.⁶

Arab League promotes the interests of the Arab world by facilitating economic, cultural, scientific and social programmes through such institutions as the Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation and the Economic and Social Council of Arab Economic Unity. However, it is in the field of contentious political issues that the Arab cooperation has faltered. The Palestinian cause remains the single most important issue for the Arab League. President Barack Obama's Middle East peace initiative received sceptical response. Some Arab leaders, from past experiences, doubted the ability of Washington to put pressure on Israel to stop building the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Washington's announcement in late 2010 to the effect that it was stooping its effort to stop Israel from building those Jewish settlements proved the correctness of those Arab leaders' position.

The Arab Peace Initiative of 2008 (proposed by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia) stands out as a serious effort on the part of the Arab countries to find permanent peace with Israel. Known as the Arab Peace Initiative (API), the Arab states demanded the following: "(a) full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the lines of June 4, 1967, as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in south Lebanon; (b) achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, to be agreed upon in accordance

⁵ Occasionally, these meetings would degenerate into public mud-slinging involving the leaders. For example, the 2009 annual summit meeting held in Cairo was marked by a public outburst by the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar el-Gaddafi. He denounced King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia as a British product and an American ally. When the Emir of Qatar tried to quiet him, the Libyan leader claimed to be an international leader himself, the king of kings of Africa, and the dean of Arab rulers and the imam of Muslims.

⁶ However, his failure to organise a meeting of the Arab leaders to respond to the May 2010 boarding of the Turkish relief ship MV *Marmara* by Israeli soldiers demonstrated the limitations of the office of the Secretary General of the Arab League.

with UN General Assembly Resolution 194; (c) acceptance of a sovereign independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital” (Bahgat 2009, p. 35). In return, the Arab countries agreed to “consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended and enter into a peace agreement with Israel and provide security for all the states of region; and, establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace” (Bahgat 2009, p. 35). Israel reacted with ambivalence to the API while the Hamas leaders expressed their opposition to the section of the API dealing with a peace agreement with Israel.

The conflict resolution record of the Arab League seems to be poor. Pinfari’s study on the Arab League shows that the organisation mediated in 19 out of 56 conflicts or crises that developed in the region between 1945 and 2008 (34%), achieving full success on five occasions (9%) (Pinfari 2009, p. 10). The two main items in the Arab League agenda, the promotion of Arab security and supporting Palestine, have not been achieved much resulting in ineffective peace initiative for human development in the member states.

15.4 The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)

The Organisation of Islamic Conference (*Munazamat Al-Mut’zamar Al-Islami*) or OIC, as it is commonly known, was set up in 1969 to deal with the situation arising out of an arson attack on al-Aqsa mosque. However, expanding its activities during the 1970s, the OIC demonstrated to the world that its establishment was not merely a defensive reaction on the part of the Islamic countries. The Makkah Declaration in 1981, underlining the organisation’s keen interest in strengthening economic and commercial cooperation among the members, was a turning point in the history of the organisation.

The OIC has 57 member countries; 47 of which are in MMCs in Africa and Asia, and then there are Albania and Palestine. But eight member states (Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guyana, Mozambique, Suriname, and Togo) do not have Muslim majority population. There are also some countries with observer status in the OIC: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Thailand, and the Russian Federation. International organisations like the Arab League, the United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement and the African Union enjoy observer status in the OIC. The Moro National Liberation Front also has an observer status.

The OIC represents the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims (which is likely to increase to 2.2 billion by 2030) or nearly 23.4% of the world’s total population of 6.9 billion (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2011, p. 1). It is not only the sheer number of population that makes the Muslim world important in contemporary world. It commands key waterways like the Dardanelles, the Straits of Malacca, the Babel Mandab, the Suez Canal, and the Straits of Hormuz. The Muslim world is also endowed with enormous hydrocarbon and forest resources. Muslim countries including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Yemen,

Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei possess between 66.2 and 75.9% of the total world oil reserve.⁷

The role of the OIC in international affairs has been much debated by scholars. Baba (1993) examines the conceptual framework and institutional structures of the OIC, and points out that since the acceptance of a charter and a formal structure, the OIC has made considerable headway. According to him, although the OIC uses the word *Ummah* in its charter to denote all Muslims of the world collectively, it does not denote the entire Muslim community, united and functioning as a single political unit on the basis of identical or common ethno-cultural and geographical factors (Baba 1993, pp. 36–37). Simply put, the OIC is an international organisation of sovereign nation-states. Instead of attempting to transcend the reality of contemporary international relations, it has chosen to operate within that framework (Baba 1993, p. 36). Its working is, therefore, no way distinct from other similar international organisations (Baba 1993).

Sheikh (2003, p. 36) views the OIC as a half-breed pan-Islamic forum and believes that the organisation considers pan-Islamism as more of an idea than an organised movement. Rather than the product of a world-wide effort to unify the world's Muslims in an organisation, Sheikh regards the OIC as a child of the Arab cold war, which had trifurcated the regional system of the Middle East and North Africa into three competing camps—a regional scenario that only added complexity to the global picture of the bipolar Cold War during which the Muslim world found itself divided into three groups: pro-US, pro-Soviet, and non-aligned (Sheikh 2003, pp. 33–34). Haynes (2001), on the other hand, presents a different perspective of the OIC. He considers the OIC as a transnational religious actor and notes the often cited suggestion that rather like the Roman Catholic Church, the OIC is a body that seeks to extend the growth and influence of a certain religion at the global level (Haynes 2001, p. 152). There seems to be fundamental flaw in the perception of some Western observers that the OIC encourages 'Islamic fundamentalism' because the OIC members are frequently at each other's throat on the matter (Haynes 2001, p. 153).

Further, a Western perspective is that there is a fundamental incongruity between Islam and democracy. Proponents of this perspective claim that while Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe have seen some democratic development in the recent past, many members of the OIC are still away from this process (Calfano and Sahliyeh 2008, p. 752). This stereotypical perspective does not take into account the fact that about two dozen OIC countries have elected governments. Further, in the recent past, MMCs like Bangladesh, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, or Turkey have emerged as practicing stable democracies. Even some conservative Arab states (like Kuwait) have given voting rights to its women citizens who have been elected to the parliament. In the recent past, Saudi Arabia held municipal elections. The wave of mass uprising for democracy and freedom ignited by the people

⁷ The figures differ depending on the source and methodology of the estimate (<http://www.metaexistence.org/muslimoil.htm>).

of Tunisia in January, 2011 that swept through Egypt, Libya, or Yemen may yet prove historical in the Arab world.

To Akbarzadeh and Connor (2005, p. 80) the OIC is more a symbolic meeting place than a dynamic political body that has a disappointing record stricken by infighting, power struggles and a failure to articulate clear and consistent policies. However, judging by the recent professional dealings with some sensitive issues, it is claimed that the OIC has the potential to become a more effective international body because common history, religion, and contemporary grievances against the unequal economic and cultural power relationship offer the OIC extensive prospects for action (Akbarzadeh and Connor 2005, p. 91).

The OIC has a more difficult role to play with the nearly one-third of the world's total Muslims who live as a minority in various countries of the world (Khan 2002, pp. 351–367). The role of the OIC in the protection of Muslim minorities (for example, in Kashmir, Southern Philippines, India or Bulgaria) has been selective and tentative, owing partly to the fact that most Muslim states' treatment of their own people is not very admirable (Khan 2002, p. 366).

According to Clive Archer, a well-known scholar on international relations, an international organisation plays the role of an instrument, a forum, and an actor in international relations. Viewed from this perspective, the OIC remains an instrument in the hands of its member-states to pursue and advance their own individual foreign policy interests. The roles of a number of key countries like Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia within the OIC testifies quite well to this assertion. Just like the UN, as a forum the OIC has tried to play a positive role.

The OIC brings its member-states together to discuss various issues formally and informally. The OIC's role as an independent actor in world affairs can be questioned because its member-states have the tendency of not speaking in one voice on issues considered vital to the Muslim world. But it needs to be pointed out that on issues such as alleviating poverty among the member-states, Islamophobia, improving education, and social development in the Muslim world the OIC is beginning to speak with one single voice. The OIC also carries out the following functions: interest articulation, rule-making norms, socialisation, and information sharing.

The newly elected Secretary General of the OIC, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu of Turkey, raised hopes of reforming the OIC to make it more outward looking. A Commission of Eminent Persons was established to suggest changes to the Charter and make recommendations for reforming the organisation. The intention is to cope with the prevailing tendencies of the new world order, including the highly-tuned sensitivity to the values of human rights, democracy and good governance (Ihsanoglu 2005).

Living up to the expectations of the member-states for reforms, the OIC Ten Year Programme of Action was launched on June 19, 2006. The document promises to practice transparency and accountability, and protect the rights of women, children, and minorities. The OIC is also to actively promote sustainable development and help the least developed member-states to eradicate dreaded diseases such as AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. The document also promises to work closely with various international agencies and help implement the UN's Millennium Development

Goals. On a significant note, the Action Plan promises concrete steps to confront ideologies that claim to use Islamic rulings to justify extremism. This was mentioned to deflect often cited criticisms in some Western quarters that the OIC has not done enough to fight religious extremism.

An amended Charter of the OIC was adopted on March 14, 2008 in Dakar, Senegal. The amended Charter is divided into 18 chapters and consists of 39 articles. Article 5 of the Charter identifies the following as the organs of the OIC:

1. Islamic Summit
2. Council of Foreign Ministers
3. Standing Committees
4. Executive Committee
5. International Islamic Court of Justice
6. Independent Permanent Commission of Human Rights
7. Committee of Permanent Representatives
8. General Secretariat
9. Subsidiary Organs
10. Specialized Institutions
11. Affiliated Institutions

The OIC is to be guided by the Islamic values of unity and fraternity, and affirms the essentiality of promoting and consolidating the unity and solidarity among the Member States in securing their common interests at the international arena. Like the previous Charter, the amended version does not contain any provisions for an entity underlining political unity among the member-states. The OIC Charter reiterates the member-states' adherence to the UN Charter and international law. The member-states are to preserve and promote the Islamic values of peace, compassion, tolerance, equality, justice and human dignity. They are also to endeavour to work for revitalising Islam's pioneering role in the world while ensuring sustainable development, progress and prosperity for the peoples of member-states. The OIC members are to enhance and strengthen the bond of unity and solidarity among the Muslim people and member-states, and to respect, safeguard and defend the national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all member-states. As responsible members of the international community the OIC member-states undertake to contribute to international peace and security; the understanding and dialogue among civilisations, cultures and religions; and to promote and encourage friendly relations and good neighbourliness, mutual respect and cooperation with all. The member-states are to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, rule of law, democracy and accountability in accordance with their constitutional and legal systems.

The OIC also promised to respect the right of self-determination and non-interference in the domestic affairs and to respect sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each member-state. Specifically, the member-states have vowed to support the struggle of the Palestinian people, who are presently under foreign occupation, and to empower them to attain their inalienable rights, including the right to self-determination, and to establish their sovereign state with Al-Quds Al-Sharif

as its capital, while safeguarding its historic and Islamic character, and the holy places. The OIC members promise to safeguard and promote the rights of women and their participation in all spheres of life, in accordance with their respective laws.

It is commonly believed that an international organisation would emerge economically benefitted and well-integrated if the member-states undertake increased intra-organisational trade. A 2008 study, carried out under the sponsorship of Dinar Standard, Shikoh and Zain, found that the four biggest economies in the OIC—Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey—constituting 42% of the overall GDP of the OIC member-states, are driving increased intra-OIC trade (Shikoh and Zain 2008).⁸ According to them during 2003–2007, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey showed significantly larger growth in trade with OIC member countries than with the rest of the world (see Appendix 1).

Malaysia is at the top of these four countries in trading more with its fellow OIC member-states. During 2003–2007, Malaysian imports from and exports to the OIC member countries increased by 19.23 and 16.2%, respectively (compared to its import and export increases of 11.9 and 10.5%, respectively, with the rest of the world; see Appendix 1). Turkey and Saudi Arabia also showed similar increase in intra-OIC trade trends. Indonesia, one of the four large MMC economies, did not show a larger increase in its intra-OIC trade compared to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, it still had a healthy 19% increase in imports and a 13% increase in exports with other OIC member countries. Despite the favourable picture portrayed above the overall percentage of trade among the OIC member countries remains low. According to the Islamic Development Bank Annual Report (2006–2007), OIC member countries' overall share of trade with other OIC member countries was a mere 14% (Shikoh and Zain 2008). For OIC to have one single voice in the world trade talks, the OIC member-states must try to increase the OIC intra-trade. The problem, however, is that most OIC member-states are producers of primary commodities. Thus there could be hopes in economic growth and intra-OIC trade only if all OIC member states diversify their economy (see Chap. 2).

The establishment of the OIC in 1969 was aimed at creating unity among the Muslim states. Unfortunately the OIC Charter aims to build cooperation among the member-states in economic, social, cultural and scientific fields but not to build political cooperation among the member-states (Sheikh 2003, p. 38). The Makkah Declaration in 1981, underlining the organisation's keen interest in strengthening economic and commercial cooperation among the members, was a turning point in the history of the organisation. The Declaration also did not consider the political cooperation issues among the member states. There may be debates about the OIC's role in world affairs but there is no doubt that the OIC, consisting of 57 countries, is the second largest international organisation in the world, and is as much universal in nature as can be after the UN. There may be general dissatisfaction about its role

⁸ Using the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics and DinarStandard analysis, Shikoh and Zain examine the total trade volume (Imports and Exports) during 2003–2007 for each of these four large OIC economies. Discussion in the following paragraph is based on Rafi-uddin Shikoh and Maria Zain, *Intra OIC Trade* (Kuala Lumpur: Dinar Standard Research Brief, May 28, 2008).

but there should not be any doubt about its potential to achieve positive things in the world.

15.5 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The GCC came into existence on 25 May 1981 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia when an agreement was reached among Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Yemen has applied for membership in the GCC and hopes to join by 2016.) The GCC is a recognition of the member-states' special relationships, geographic proximity, similar political systems, and a pledge to provide "the means for realizing coordination, integration and cooperation" in economic, social and cultural affairs of the member states.

The GCC consists of a Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council and the Secretariat General. The Secretariat is located in the Saudi city of Riyadh. The Supreme Council, comprising of all six heads of state, is the highest authority of the GCC and determines the overall policy of the GCC. It also ratifies recommendations presented to it by the Ministerial Council or the Secretariat General. The Ministerial Council comprises the Foreign Ministers of the six member countries. The Ministerial Council draws up policies and makes recommendations on the means of developing cooperation and coordination among member-states in the economic, social and cultural spheres.

The Secretariat General⁹ prepares reports, studies, accounts and budgets for the GCC. It drafts rules and regulations and is charged with the responsibility of assisting member-states in the implementation of decisions adopted by the Supreme and Ministerial Councils.

The GCC is planned as a regional common market with a defence planning council as well, and is aiming to adopt similar systems and laws in the following sectors: economics and financial affairs; commercial, customs and transportation affairs; education and cultural affairs; social and health affairs; communication, informational, political, legislative and administrative affairs. It also aims to achieve coordination, integration and close ties leading to unity among the member-states; to deepen all aspects of cooperation between the people of the region; to foster scientific and technical progress in industry, mining, agriculture, water and animal resources; setting up joint ventures; encouraging cooperation of the private sector; and originally planned to have a common currency by 2010. However, the GCC recognises the political sensitivities of its members and issues statements based on consensus.

All six GCC countries are in the high income category of the World Bank. In 2007 the GDP per capita of each country was: Bahrain—PPP\$ 29,723; Kuwait—PPP\$ 47,812; Oman—PPP\$ 22,816; Qatar—PPP\$ 74,882; Saudi Arabia—

⁹ The Secretary General is appointed for a three-year term (renewable) by the Supreme Council on the recommendation of the Ministerial Council.

PPP\$ 22,935; and UAE—PPP\$ 54,626. Per capita income of the GCC countries as a block in US\$ 22,083, with an estimated population of 40,338,196 (including the expatriates), is one of the highest for any region in the world (El-Khoury 2009, p. 361).

The GCC, the most successful regional economic grouping in the Arab and the Muslim world, has established a free trade area and customs union. It is also a common market allowing local citizens and capital to move freely within the GCC countries.

The GCC also has been successful in trade integration, creating labour and capital mobility and setting common standards in various areas of regulation. In areas such as investment, stock-market participation and government procurement, at least some of the GCC governments have extended national privileges to people from other GCC countries (Hertog 2007, p. 53). The extent of intra-GCC non-oil trade as an indicator of economic integration is highest for Oman (given its close trading links with Dubai) and Bahrain (given its connection across the causeway to Saudi Arabia; Rutledge 2008). However, the GCC's potential for integration is yet to be achieved as a number of political and administrative problems remain unresolved.¹⁰ It is also interesting to note that about a quarter of Saudi Arabia's non-oil exports are to its GCC partners, reinforcing the case for a single currency from the perspective of Riyadh (Rutledge 2008).

The threat perception of the GCC countries presents a complex picture that has been affected by regional and international developments of the late last three decades. The GCC countries have witnessed three major conflicts in the last three decades: The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988); the Gulf War (1990–1991); and the Iraq War (2003). For the GCC countries the immediate threat emanates from their neighbouring regions. The GCC states fall between three hot zones: The Levant, from the west, where Palestinian-Israeli conflict is yet to be resolved; Iraq and Iran from north and north-east, which were site of wars since 1980; and Pakistan and India from east and south-east, which recently became nuclear powers and have territorial disputes that spark frequent armed clashes in the Kashmir region (Kahwaji 2003, p. 517).

Iran has been a source of concern for the Gulf states since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. With sizeable Shiite minority population of their own, the Gulf states' relations with Iran suffered considerable deterioration when the Iranian leadership threatened to export Islamic Revolution overseas. So when the Iran-Iraq war broke out in 1980, the Gulf states considered Iraq as a possible bulwark against Iran and supported Iraq during 1980–1989. However, to the annoyance of the Gulf States, in 1990 Iraq itself became a threat to the region when Iraqi troops occupied Kuwait. The development of ballistic missiles capability by both Saddam's Iraq and Iran worried the GCC states. It should be mentioned here that questions over the nature of Iran's nuclear programme and the country's development of Shehab-3 missiles

¹⁰ For example, the idea of having a single currency for the GCC has been debated for over a decade. At a meeting in December 2008 the GCC Heads of State agreed that although a single currency cannot be issued by January 2010 due to the lack of time, the deadline should be retained for monetary union.

with a 1,300 km range is a worrisome development for the GCC states' security concerns. Terrorism was added as another dimension to the GCC countries' threat perception after the tragic incidences of 9/11 because most offenders were from the GCC states. Further, America's 'War on Terror' began in the immediate vicinity of the Gulf region in Afghanistan in 2001.

The GCC states have adopted three approaches to prepare militarily to face the above-mentioned perceived threats (Kahwaji 2003, p. 518). The first is the signing of bi-lateral defence pacts with the United States and other Western powers (e.g. the UK, France).¹¹ The second approach was through collective defence.¹² The GCC states have taken practical steps in developing joint military command linking the air force and air defence centres, among others. The third approach was through boosting their national defence spending around US\$ 277 billion (amounting to 12.7% of its GDP) on defence and security between 1995 and 2002 (Kahwaji 2003, p. 518).

The concerns about Iran's missile-development programme also prompted moves to develop ballistic missile defence within the Gulf region. All GCC countries have expressed a desire to obtain, or are already obtaining, active defence systems¹³ (The Institute of Strategic and International Studies 2010, p. 239). In addition, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been buying new aircraft for their defence. In October, 2009, Saudi Air Force started using the first of its Typhoon Euro fighters. The Saudis have ordered 72 of the Typhoons. In 2010, Saudi Arabia made about \$ 65 billion worth deal with the United States to buy aircrafts and anti-ballistic missile systems. Saudi Arabia is also diversifying its arms procurements by talking with the Russians for possible purchase of arms (The Institute of Strategic and International Studies 2010, p. 241). The UAE has ordered A330 multi-role tanker transport aircraft, and more Patriot missile systems (The Institute of Strategic and International Studies 2010).

The GCC has not integrated politically but has been trying to develop common political institutions and has been successful in developing defence arrangements. This has been possible because the member-states share common threat perceptions. In the above sense, the GCC, as a sub-regional organization, may be considered successful but its potential in conflict resolution, aimed at world peace and development, has not yet been achieved.

¹¹ Most pacts allow stationing of the Western troops and equipment including war planes in their respective countries. Qatar allowed the United States' Middle East Command to be re-deployed in the country from Saudi Arabia. The US Navy's Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain, while American aircraft and troops are based in Kuwait. Oman and the UAE allow access of American and British ships and aircraft to their bases. British troops carry out military exercises in the desert areas of Oman. The UAE allowed French military bases (The Institute of Strategic and International Studies 2010, p. 240).

¹² In 1986 the GCC countries set up a joint force of 5,000 troops (to be increased to 20,000) known as Peninsula Shield (used in 1991 in the liberation of Kuwait); and during the invasions of Iraq in 2003.

¹³ In late 2008 Raytheon and Lockheed Martin were awarded contracts to deliver Patriot GEM-T and PAC-3 missiles and associated systems to the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait already field Patriot variants among their air-defence systems, while in 2008 the UAE also requested to purchase Terminal High Altitude Air Defence systems from the United States (The Institute of Strategic and International Studies 2010, p. 239).

15.6 Conclusion

The ongoing discussion shows that Islam's perspectives on international relations are not contradictory to contemporary international norms. The international organizations set up by the MMCs—the Arab League, the OIC and the GCC—are designed not only to create unity among the member-states but also for their human development. Whether these organizations have been able to achieve all of these aims is a legitimate question. However, it must be pointed out that the widening gaps between the rich and the poor (see Chap. 9); the widespread existence of lack of governance in the majority of the MMCs (see Chap. 7); the lack of democracy and respect for human rights (see Chap. 13); and the continued low rate of literacy among the majority of the MMCs (see Chap. 12) cannot be attributed to the performance of the organizations examined in this chapter. Although these organizations are dedicated to improving human development, each member-MMC is responsible for implementing the relevant policies. None of the MMC-initiated international organizations enjoy supra-national powers. These organisations can only recommend and help but due to the principle of sovereignty are unable to force the implementation of any policy.

The analysis also shows that these international organizations have tried to respond to the calls for reforms. For example, the OIC now has a new Charter. The change has not been revolutionary, but in the right direction. With the passage of time, the OIC which represents the Muslim *Ummah*, is likely to embark on more reforms because it will become irrelevant failing to respond more to the demands of the Muslim masses for more political, economic, and social unity. In the absence of 'hard power', 'soft power' or 'smart-power' need to be used in this regard (cf. Joseph Nye).

More trade among the members will also increase economic unity and help improve human development in the countries. Within the OIC, the MMCs like Malaysia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are trading more with the fellow members. The MMCs with large population and potential large economies need to harness the possibility of higher trade and industrial links with fellow members in the OIC.

The Arab League, the OIC, and the GCC have come a long way since their inception. These MMC-initiated international organizations have achieved different levels of success. But the MMC leaders need to be forward-looking. Without a precise vision for the *Ummah*, these organisations will but witness the members lag behind the rest of the world. Given that the MMCs are endowed with the necessary human and natural resources, this cannot be an acceptable outcome to the Muslim masses. Unlike the OIC, and the Arab League, the GCC has integrated quite well economically so much so that a common currency is still in the agenda. In terms of security, and defence, the GCC countries have succeeded a lot. Although difficult, the OIC and the Arab League should try to emulate the GCC in the areas of economic, political and security cooperation.

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Part VI
Space, Power, and Human Development:
Conclusions, and Recommendations

Chapter 16

Space, Power, and Human Development in the Muslim World: Connections and Conclusions

Samiul Hasan and Abdellaziz El Jaouhari

Space or geographic location from the beginning of civilization has created natural propensity to farming and human living to become a source of economic development debate (Diamond 1997; Harvey 1969, 1996). The disadvantages of geography and climate need to be compensated by economic policy—larger geographic and climatic ‘handicap’ requires larger protective barriers to compete with others to achieve economic growth (Reinert 2008). That seems not to have happened in the Muslim majority countries (MMCs). Corroborating Ibn Khaldun and other recent ‘geographic determinism’ theorists (see Chap. 1), the analyses in this Volume show that 95% of the MMCs in Zones¹ 3 (Latitude 28–35°) and 4 (Latitude 36–45°) have high or medium human development index (HDI) scores, whereas only 45% MMCs in Zones 1 (Latitude 1–9°) and 2 (Latitude 10–18°) have such scores. All seven MMCs in Zone 5 achieved high or medium HDI (Table 16.1). The impact of European colonization is also evident in the data—90% of the MMCs without European colonial experience achieved high or medium HDI, followed by 83% of the British colonies, as opposed to 57% of the French colonies.

The European colonization in many MMCs transformed the pattern of natural economic growth, like everywhere else in Africa and Asia, and created a (self-reinforcing) condition of ‘underdevelopment’ devoid of the ‘capability’ to ‘develop.’ In the post-World War II era, the ‘hegemony’ expanding competition and patronization for the ‘cold war’ powers created and perpetuated colonial-style governance in the MMCs that retarded human development. Though geographic locations and resources, and the

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¹ Latitudes 0–63°, following Ibn Khaldun, have been divided in seven equal zones. So Zone 1 is Latitude 0–9°, Zone 2 is Latitude 10–18°, and so on (see Chap. 1).

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Table 16.1 Geographic location, colonial past, and HDI

Geo. zones	Colonial past	HDI			Total
		(Very)high	Medium	Low	
1 and 2	British	2(25)	3(37.5)	3(37.5)	8 ^a
	French	0	2(25)	6(75)	8
	Portuguese			1	1
	Dutch		1		1
	Total	2(11)	6(33)	10(56)	18
3 and 4	British	5(50)	5(50)	0	10 ²
	French	1(17)	5(83)	0	6
	Portuguese	1			1
	None	1(33)	1(33)	1(33)	3
	Total	8(40)	11(55)	1(5)	20
5	None	2(29)	5(71)		7
Total	British	7(39)	8(44)	3(17)	18
	French	1(07)	7(50)	6(43)	14
	Dutch		1		1
	Portuguese	1		1	2
	None	3(30)	6(60)	1(10)	10
		12(27)	22(49)	11(24)	45 ^{a,b}

^a Data for Somalia are not available

^b Data for Iraq are not available. Numbers inside the parentheses are row %

‘growth-ladder’ robbing colonial invasion were major factors in development debacle, ‘human development’ in the MMCs was influenced by many other factors as well.

The factors such as the population structure and dependency ratio, the economic structure and income inequality, and the power structure (colonial system, governance pattern, postcolonial external relationships) and its misuse also influenced human development. Nevertheless, in all of the above factors the influence of geography has been prominent. In this chapter, the discussion of the Volume extends to summarize its conclusions dealing with the above factors. The data used here are mainly from the World Bank. In order to keep the flow of the discussion footnotes have been used for additional explanation. Also where many MMCs are being referred to, all country names have been placed in the footnotes; otherwise the country names are in the text.

16.1 Population Structure and the Dependency Ratio

Population density in the MMCs is related to the so-called ‘first-mover advantages’ (Gallup and Sachs 1998), because people were attracted to areas with natural resources and high potential for economic activities. The MMCs with large population do not have the largest population density, some other MMCs in biologically or ‘economically’ fertile lands do. For example, only Bangladesh among the seven MMCs with the largest population size has the largest population density (1,229/km²). The

other large MMCs have much lower population density.² On the other hand, two of the smallest MMCs (Bahrain³ and Maldives) have a population density of 1,000+ / km² (Table 16.2).

It seems there is an Africa/Asia divide in population density with the lowest population density (3–17 people/km²) in eight African MMCs (Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, and Sudan) except for four MMCs in Asia e.g., Oman (9/km²) and Saudi Arabia (12/km²) with deserts and mountains, and the landlocked mountainous MMCs of Kazakhstan (6/km²), and Turkmenistan (11/km²). On the other hand, the 13 MMCs with very large population density (100–1,000+ people/km²) are in Asia except for two small MMCs (Comoros, and The Gambia) in Africa.

Noteworthy, the highest population density (1,229/km²) is in the most fertile land, Bangladesh—a delta ‘blessed’ by 800 rivers and rivulets. The next two highest density MMCs are⁴ Lebanon 410/km² and Pakistan 215/km² followed by Nigeria (166/km²), Gambia, (166/km²), Indonesia (125/km²), Syria (112/km²), and Azerbaijan⁵ (105/km²). The location of these MMCs in the fertile land of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia proves geographic influence on population density. The availability of food, a result of geography, is also an important factor of high-population density. Most of the 56 nutritious seeds (including rice, wheat, or sorghums) grow in abundance in south-east Asia and the Mediterranean basin. Further, all 14 domesticated animals, except one, having been originated in the region are available for food or drafting (Diamond 2005; Morris 2010).

There seems not to have any relationship between population density and total fertility rate (TFR) in the MMCs or between the TFR and the percentage of Muslim population in the MMCs—as are popularly believed. For example, 14 of the 17 MMCs with the highest TFR (ranging from 4.17 Sudan to 7.12 in Niger) are in sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 13.14 in this Volume for complete TFR data). The list of the MMCs with a very high TFR includes all five MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa where the Muslim majority is only marginal (50–53%). In these five MMCs (Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria) the TFR ranges between 4.63 and 5.91. On the other hand, six MMCs with below-replacement TFR (2.10) include four MMCs with near 100% Muslim population with the list being topped by Iran (1.81), followed by the UAE (1.94), Maldives (2.02), and Tunisia (2.08).

Nonetheless, the relationships between geographic location, economic status, and the TFR are revealing. Since oil money distorts the income figures in the high-

² Forty-four people/km² in Iran, 96/km² in Turkey, 82/km² in Egypt, 125/km² in Indonesia, 166/km² in Nigeria, and 215/km² in Pakistan.

³ Worth noting, that the percentage of expatriate population (including their families) in the six Arab/Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) vary from 20% (in Oman and Saudi Arabia) to at least 70–80% in Qatar and the UAE. Thus, the population structure or the dependency ratio (discussed later) in these MMCs will have to be looked at with caution.

⁴ Not considering the three tiny states of Bahrain (with population density of 1,092/km²), Maldives (1,017/km²), and Comoros (346/km²). Also see footnote 3.

⁵ Small Kuwait also has 153/km² population density. Also see footnote 3.

Table 16.2 MMCs' population distribution and growth rate of age dependency, 2008

Country	Latitude	Density/km ²	0-14-year-old (%)	15-64-year-old (%)	65+ years old (%)	Age dependence ratio (ADR)	ADR change 1995/2008 (%)
Afghanistan	33	44	46.30	51.47	2.23	94.28	-1.76
Algeria	28	14	27.75	67.64	4.61	47.84	-37.43
Azerbaijan	40	105	24.62	68.61	6.77	45.75	-28.11
Bahrain	26	1,092	26.71	70.96	2.33	40.92	-16.80
Bangladesh	24	1,229	32.04	64.14	3.82	55.91	-26.80
Brunei	4	74	27.33	69.37	3.31	44.16	-20.22
Burkina Faso	13	56	46.16	51.81	2.03	93.01	-5.57
Chad	15	9	45.81	51.33	2.87	94.82	-2.59
Comoros	-12	346	38.19	58.73	3.08	70.26	-19.19
Djibouti	11	37	36.64	60.19	3.17	66.14	-21.47
Egypt	27	82	32.47	63.01	4.52	58.71	-25.11
Eritrea	15	49	41.53	56.04	2.43	78.44	-19.71
Gambia	13	166	42.48	54.71	2.82	82.80	-1.31
Guinea	11	40	42.95	53.85	3.21	85.70	-6.25
Guinea-Bissau	12	56	42.65	53.91	3.44	85.51	6.67
Indonesia	-5	125	27.35	66.77	5.87	49.76	-16.40
Iran	32	44	24.44	70.66	4.90	41.53	-47.68
Iraq	33	70	41.35	55.34	3.31	80.70	-10.10
Jordan	31	66	35.11	61.28	3.61	63.17	-18.72
Kazakhstan	45	6	23.67	68.95	7.38	45.04	-23.06
Kuwait	29	153	23.42	74.49	2.09	34.24	-20.24
Kyrgyzstan	41	28	29.74	64.88	5.38	54.13	-28.27
Lebanon	34	410	25.84	66.89	7.27	49.50	-20.21
Libya	25	4	30.15	65.72	4.13	52.17	-24.01
Malaysia	2	82	29.95	65.43	4.62	52.83	-20.24
Maldives	3	1,017	29.01	66.68	4.31	49.96	-47.44

Table 16.2 (continued)

Country	Latitude	Density/km ²	0-14-year-old (%)	15-64-year-old (%)	65+ years old (%)	Age dependence ratio (ADR)	ADR change 1995/2008 (%)
Mali	17	10	44.24	53.43	2.33	87.14	-7.27
Mauritania	20	3	39.76	57.59	2.65	73.65	-14.68
Morocco	32	71	28.79	65.88	5.33	51.79	-27.63
Niger	16	12	49.70	48.32	1.98	106.95	3.45
Nigeria	10	166	42.69	54.21	3.11	84.47	-7.98
Oman	21	9	32.04	65.07	2.88	53.68	-26.70
Pakistan	30	215	37.29	58.74	3.98	70.26	-20.44
Qatar	25	111	16.21	82.72	1.07	20.89	-45.56
Saudi Arabia	25	12	32.89	64.24	2.87	55.66	-28.95
Senegal	14	63	43.78	53.81	2.41	85.85	-10.13
Sierra Leone	8	78	43.26	54.89	1.85	82.19	2.12
Somalia	10	14	44.86	52.41	2.73	90.80	6.29
Sudan	15	17	39.54	56.89	3.57	75.77	-12.09
Syria	35	112	35.35	61.47	3.18	62.68	-31.61
Tajikistan	39	49	37.52	58.75	3.73	70.21	-22.39
Tunisia	34	66	23.71	69.58	6.71	43.73	-34.54
Turkey	39	96	27.23	66.94	5.82	49.38	-18.96
Turkmenistan	40	11	30.10	65.59	4.31	52.47	-32.18
UAE	24	54	19.15	79.84	1.01	25.25	-38.05
Uzbekistan	41	64	30.08	65.35	4.57	53.03	-34.15
Yemen	33	43	44.21	53.42	2.37	87.21	-20.39

income countries, the figures from the opposite spectrum show a very large relationship between low income and high TFR; the relationship is more vivid in the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa. The data show that the average TFR in the MMCs is 3.66, but in low income MMCs, in general, it is 4.25. There is also a geographic divide in the TFR. The TFR in all MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa is very high (between 3.9 in Comoros and Djibouti to 7.12 in Niger); while the TFR is very low in Southeast Asia (Brunei 2.08; Indonesia 2.17; and Malaysia 2.56), and widely varied in South Asia (2.34 in Bangladesh to 6.6 in Afghanistan).

The TFR, however, has decreased in the last few years (1995–2008) in almost all MMCs.⁶ The best performance in this regard has been achieved by Algeria (−32% in Africa and by Maldives (−53% in Asia. In seven other MMCs the decrease has been between (−)35% (Bangladesh) and (−)43% (UAE) including Iran (−)42%, Lebanon (−)36%, Oman (−)47%, Qatar (−)35%, and Saudi Arabia (−)38%. The success of many MMCs in decreasing the TFR is very impressive and encouraging, and casts doubt on the popular belief that some of these MMCs (e.g., Iran and Saudi Arabia) are very conservative in family management. Different MMCs, however, approach family management in widely different ways, though. A good example of this variation is evident in two neighboring MMCs in Southeast Asia—Indonesia and Malaysia. In Malaysia, the government encourages ethnic (and Muslim) Malay population to have at least five children per married couple.⁷ Indonesia has a successful ‘non-coercive’ family planning model based on “advertising, grassroots leadership training, and free distribution of birth-control” devices⁸ which has resulted in a TFR of 2.17.

Thus, both very moderate and conservative MMCs have achieved reasonable success in reducing the TFR between 1995 and 2008. For example, 22 MMCs reduced the TFR between (−)20 and (−)30%. This list includes 14 MMCs in Asia⁹ and eight in Africa including the so-called conservative MMCs in North Africa—Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia; and three MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa—Djibouti, Eritrea, and Senegal. A lower level decrease in the TFR in the sub-Saharan African MMCs compared to that of the MMCs in other regions suggests the influence of geography and location.

Resulting from a higher TFR rate, 43% of the population in the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa is in < 14 year age group, whereas the corresponding figure is 33% in South Asia, and 34% in the MMCs, on an average.¹⁰ Most importantly, higher TFR

⁶ Except for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan; in the latter two countries TFR increased by 13 and 18%, respectively.

⁷ That has witnessed the increase of Malay/Muslim population to about 60% (from 50% recorded in the 1960s). Worth noting, though the overall TFR in Malaysia is not very high (2.56), it is much higher in Malay population.

⁸ The source of information for both these countries is Marston et al. (2005, p. 465).

⁹ Bahrain, Brunei, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

¹⁰ In fact in all 15 MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa population in the young age group (<14-year-old) is very high ranging from 37% in Djibouti (the lowest) to 50% in Niger (the highest).

creates a higher percentage of young people resulting in higher age dependency ratio to detriment human development.¹¹ A good percentage of population in the working age (15–64-year-old) group, which has a world average of 65%, is essential for human development. Apart from the seven MMCs (Bahrain, Brunei, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Tunisia, and UAE) with a huge number of expatriate workers, the percentage of people in 14 MMCs in this age group¹² is more than the world average (65–69%). Nine MMCs without much expatriate population (Bangladesh, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Mauritania, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, and Tajikistan) seem to have a productive economic activity supporting 15–64-year-old population of between 64% (Bangladesh) and 56% (Eritrea). The danger, however, is low investment in job creation and resultant low job prospect may turn the frustrated young people to street agitation to retard human development.

Different forms of population structure create different levels of economic dependency with an average (nonworking/working population) dependency ratio of 54.88 in the world. The figure is much higher in the MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa (85.37), in general, and moderately higher in South Asia (59.47). The dependency ratio in the MMCs, on an average, is, however, 63.84 (Table 16.2). Though South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have a low percentage of 65+ years old population, the percentage of people in the 0–14 age group is very high—32.63 and 42.73%, respectively. Age dependency ratio in the MMCs can be studied from two angles. In 11 MMCs in sub-Saharan Africa¹³ and two in Asia (Afghanistan and Yemen), with a very high TFR and resultant larger <14-year-old group, dependency ratio is unusually high between 106.95 (Niger) and 82.15 (Sierra Leone). On the other hand, in most MMCs in West Asia, North Africa, and Southeast Asia, with a very large to moderate expatriate working population, age dependency ratio is unusually low between 20.89 (Qatar) and 55.66 (Saudi Arabia).

In fact, in 13 MMCs¹⁴ (with a high percentage of expatriate workers) the dependency ratio is < 50. This abnormal dependency ratio may help the economy but may have a long-term adverse impact on the society and culture of the local people as well as on the families of long-term expatriates.¹⁵ The most crucial point, however,

¹¹ See Chap. 13 for a good discussion on health, education, and human development issues related to fertility rates.

¹² Algeria, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Oman, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

¹³ Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.

¹⁴ Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Maldives, Tunisia, Turkey, and UAE. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan do not have high expatriate population but because of these two countries' very low percentage of population in the 0–14 age group (24.62 and 23.67, respectively) resulting from a very low TFR (2.56 and 2.3, respectively), the dependency ratio is low.

¹⁵ For example, millions of expatriate workers below the lowest income level required to sponsor the family (wife and children) have worked in the Gulf countries all their working life visiting the family once a year (or in every two years).

is that skills and productivity are important (but overlooked) factors of human development and is likely to adversely impact economic structure of the MMCs.

Thus, a large working age group people (15–64-year-old) may be a blessing for a robust economy ready to absorb the willing and skilled workers in the progressively job creating manufacturing economy, but is a risk for a stagnant economy that is dependent on ‘decreasing return’ activity unable to absorb the young and the restless gathering frustration only at the state’s peril. The only way out for the state is to diversify economic activities to create jobs to neutralize the agitated young offering them skills and opportunities to work for better economy and superior human development.

16.2 Economic Structure in the MMCs and Income Inequality

Since geography and climate influence the location of industry, the disadvantages of geography and climate need to be counteracted by economic policy to sensibly utilize the resources and promote the manufacturing sector. The European colonization in 37¹⁶ (out of 47) MMCs, like everywhere else in Africa and Asia, created a (self-reinforcing) condition of ‘underdevelopment’ devoid of the ‘capability’ to ‘develop’ by controlling their own destiny. Thus if it is assumed that people or economy ‘evolve’ through stages, the MMCs were robbed-off the ‘growth-ladder’ at ‘Stage Two,’ by the European colonization that destroyed political and technological capabilities for protecting, developing, or managing resources (land, forest, minerals, or people) to fulfill the needs and interests of the ‘owners’ of the resources. In the post-World War II era the ‘hegemony’ expanding competition and patronization for the ‘cold war’ power interests created and perpetuated governance in the MMCs that resembled the colonial past. The problem was worsened in the handicapped (or geographically ‘challenged’) countries with the ‘structural adjustment’ program (SAP)¹⁷ that prematurely removed all policy tools from the countries whose manufacturing industries had not yet reached the level of being competitive on the world market (Chang 2008; Reinert 2008). The SAP, being an imperative, with disregards to ‘time’ (e.g., the age of the country), status of the economy, availability of resources, or position of governance, reinforced poverty.

The vicious circle of poverty and poor economy, both of which are likely to be results of ineffective policy measures, require a qualitative change “in the produc-

¹⁶ Six of the rest, being landlocked, were not in the world’s ‘mainstream’ of economic activities. Iran and Turkey have done pretty well. Afghanistan did well until the Soviet invasion in 1980. The petroleum-based economy of Saudi Arabia has been doing well in the recent past.

¹⁷ The SAP of the 1980s promoted by the World Bank and the IMF called for government austerity (by expenditure cut), increased resource extraction (and export), currency devaluation, trade liberalization by easing of import/export restrictions, the removal of agriculture subsidies, divestment or privatization, and enhancing the rights of foreign investors in the national laws.

tive structures of poor and failing states” by diversifying “away from sectors with diminishing returns” (i.e., traditional raw materials and agriculture) to sectors with increasing returns (i.e., technology intensive manufacturing and services), “creating a complex division of labor and new social structures in the process” (Reinert 2008, p. 253). The economic ‘miracle’ in the post-World War II Europe (and also in the ‘Asian tigers’) proved that poor economies excel only by reaching the competitor’s economic level through industrialization to gradually integrate with other economies; and by diversifying the manufacturing sector including the recent knowledge-intensive services, to attain increasing returns, as opposed to ‘decreasing returns’ (Reinert 2008, pp. 216, 268). The Washington Consensus,¹⁸ encouraged the exploitation of the ‘comparative advantage’ of ‘decreasing return’ activities contradicting the economic principles followed by the Continental Europe before and after the World War II for its industrialization that concentrated on the ‘increasing return’ economic activities (Chang 2008; Reinert 2008).

Unfortunately, however, about one-third to two-thirds of the economic activities in nine of the ten poorest MMCs¹⁹ are still agriculture-dependent. All of these MMCs except two conflict-ridden MMCs in Asia (Afghanistan and Yemen) are in sub-Saharan Africa to reinforce the influence of geographic location and climate in economic structure even in the present world. Some MMCs, not dependent on oil, irrespective of their ‘comparative advantage’ in agriculture (because of geographic location, land, water, and climate) have done comparatively better in human development, than the comparable MMCs, with the advancement in the nonagricultural sectors. For example, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Turkey with about 91%, 86%, and 91% dependence on nonagricultural sector have achieved the best economic success among the MMCs.

The failure to promote the manufacturing or industrial sector as a major source of employment, economic activities or power relationships may be cited as major reasons for low HDI levels in many MMCs. We can use the case of Egypt and Turkey to illustrate this point further. Egypt and Turkey, two of the largest MMCs, have similar geographic features including an eastern Mediterranean climate, access to water, soils, and a shared history of no colonial invasion, albeit with some control by foreign bureaucrats in the past in Egypt. The two countries also have a similar sized population at 77 million in Turkey and 79 million in Egypt. Turkey occupies about 783,000 km² land 30% of which is arable; Egypt occupies about one million km² of which 2.92% is arable. The agricultural sector employs about 32% of Egypt’s workforce and supports about 13% of Egypt’s GNI, whereas the same sector in Turkey

¹⁸ A ‘wish-list’ of ten economic policies: (1) impose fiscal discipline, (2) reform taxation, (3) liberalize interest rates, (4) raise health and education spending, (5) secure property rights, (6) privatize industries, (7) deregulate markets, (8) adopt a competitive exchange rate, (9) remove barriers to trade, and (10) to FDI (Ferguson 2009).

¹⁹ Afghanistan, Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Yemen.

employs 29% of the workforce and contributes 9% to the GNI.²⁰ Economic sector in Egypt is also inefficient as reflected in per capita income (PPP\$5,349) compared to Turkey (PPP\$12,955) because of the latter's sophisticated industrialization (away from oil economy). These factors help to explain the fundamental differences in economic achievements of these two MMCs and the rest of the MMCs.

Low manufacturing sector is related to low economic achievements and vice versa²¹ (Table 16.3). Nonetheless, there seems to be geographic influence in the growth of the manufacturing sector relative to the other sectors in an economy. In the MMCs, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the economy is the highest (47%) in Zone 3 followed by Zone 4 (39%). In geographic Zone 2, 78% of the workforce is involved in the primary sector contributing about 28% to the economy; whereas in Zone 3, 15% of the primary sector workforce contributes about 47% to the economy (Table 16.4).

Irrespective of geographic location, most MMCs have not done much in achieving technically skilled human resources ready to work in the manufacturing sector. Data available from 33 MMCs show that only in three MMCs in Asia (Bahrain, Indonesia, and Turkey), and one in Africa (Algeria) about 10% of the secondary students are in vocational schools. The percentage is as low as <3% in 13 MMCs (including 11 of the 15 sub-Saharan MMCs), and between 3% and 5% in 16 other MMCs. It seems the MMCs have failed to create skilled human capital for a globalized dynamic job market dominated by the manufacturing sector, in particular, or the nonagriculture sector, in general.

Increased economic activity may increase income presumably to absorb the eager work force, but the problem is without active redistributive measures it may create economic inequality for self-destruction.

16.2.1 Economic Inequality and Human Development

The economic data demonstrate that even in the face of depressing effects of globalization on the resource-poor countries (Stiglitz 2006), some MMCs in the recent past have shown impressive resilience and success in achieving human development. Some of these MMCs in Asia also have performed better in reducing national income inequality as well. While a Gini coefficient >50 reflects high inequality (cf. the World Bank), the average income inequality in the world is 67, that of the OECD countries is 36.8, and in the MMCs it is the lowest in the central and south

²⁰ Expanded from some relevant facts and comparison contained in Marston et al. (2005, pp. 222–224).

²¹ Except for Guinea Bissau possibly because its small labor force about 80% of which is in the agriculture sector contributing to 17% to the economy and the 'manufacturing' sector, contributing to 45% to the economy, is mainly related to processing the agriculture produce (including beer).

Table 16.3 Economy—Performance and the sectors

Name	Value added as % of GDP: Activity and Labor Use in Different Sectors							
	GDP/capita PPP\$	Agriculture (%)	Labor (%)	Agri. production/capita \$	Industry (%)	Labor (%)	Services (%)	Labor (%)
Afghanistan	1,054	36.0	80		24	10	39	10
Algeria	7,740	8.0	14	2,225	61	38	30	48
Azerbaijan	7,851	6.0	39	1,143	62	12	32	49
Bahrain	29,723	0.4			66		33	
Bangladesh	1,241	19.0	63	338	29	11	53	26
Brunei	50,200	33.0	4		22	63	44	23
Burkina Faso	1,124	33.0	90	173	22	5	44	5
Chad	1,477	23.0	80	218	44	10	32	10
Comoros	1,143	40.0	80		4	10	56	10
Djibouti	2,061	3.0			15		82	
Egypt	5,349	13.0	32	2,072	36	17	51	51
Eritrea	626	61.0	80	61	18	10	24	10
Gambia	1,225	33.0	75		8	19	59	6
Guinea	1,140	62.0	82		12	9	26	9
Guinea Bissau	477	17.0	76	190	45	12	38	12
Indonesia	3,712	14.0	42	583	47	19	39	39
Iran	10,955	9.0	25	2,542	42	31	49	45
Iraq		5.0		1,756	68		27	
Jordan	4,901	3.0	3	1,360	32	20	65	77
Kazakhstan	10,863	7.0	32	1,557	44	18	49	50
Kuwait	47,812	0.3			52		48	
Kyrgyzstan	2,006	33.0	48	979	20	12	47	40
Lebanon	10,109	6.0		30,099	23		71	
Libya	14,364	2.0	17		71	23	27	59
Malaysia	13,518	9.0	13	241	51	36	41	51
Maldives	5,196	17.0	7		15	17	67	76

Table 16.3 (continued)

Name	Value added as % of GDP: Activity and Labor Use in Different Sectors							
	GDP/capita PPP\$	Agriculture (%)	Labor (%)	Agri. production/capita \$	Industry (%)	Labor (%)	Services (%)	Labor (%)
Mali	1,083	37.0	80	241	24	10	39	10
Mauritania	1,927	13.0	50	361	47	10	41	40
Morocco	4,108	12.0	45	1,775	29	20	59	35
Niger	627	39.0	90	157	17	6	44	4
Nigeria	1,969	33.0	70		39	10	28	20
Oman	22,816	2.0			36		62	
Pakistan	2,496	20.0	43	695	26	20	54	37
Qatar	74,882	0.1			75		25	
Saudi Arabia	22,935	3.0	7	15,780	65	21	32	72
Senegal	1,666	15.0	78	215	22	11	63	11
Sierra Leone	679	44.0			24		32	
Somalia		65.0	71		10	10	25	9
Sudan	2,086	32.0	80	666	28	7	41	13
Syria	4,511	20.0	19	3,251	32	15	48	66
Tajikistan	1,753	21.0	67	465	28	8	51	25
Tunisia	7,520	11.0	55	2,719	27	23	62	22
Turkey	12,955	9.0	29	1,846	28	25	63	46
Turkmenistan	4,953	9.0	48	1,222	39	14	52	38
UAE	54,626	2.0	7	25,841	56	15	42	78
Uzbekistan	2,425	24.0	44	1,800	27	20	49	36
Yemen	2,335	10.0	75	328	57	13	33	12

Table 16.4 Contribution of labor forces in different sectors of economy across geographic locations

	Agriculture % in economy	Agriculture labor % of total	Industry % in economy	Industry labor % of total	Services % in economy	Services labor % of total
Geographic Location 1 Latitude 0–9°	30	41	29	24	40	33
Geographic Location 2 Latitude 10–18°	28	78	24	11	48	11
Geographic Location 3 Latitude 19–27°	13	46	47	15	39	39
Geographic Location 4 Latitude 28–36°	11	34	39	22	50	43
Geographic Location 5 Latitude 36–45°	16	46	34	15	50	39

Asian countries (32.5).²² It should be noted that per capita income in these countries is also very low (PPP\$1,874) except for Kazakhstan (PPP\$10,863; Table 16.5).

A combination of low per capita income (average PPP\$1,410) and high income inequality (41.4) in the MMCs such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone seem to create violence and unrest retarding human development.²³ Noteworthy, these eight MMCs, being in sub-Saharan Africa within Latitude 8° (Sierra Leone) and 17° (Mali), reinforce the geographic conditioning thesis of economic activities, income, and income inequality as well as violence. Low income level and high income inequality both are likely explanation of the failure of democratic systems in Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone (the other three MMCs in the region—Chad, Djibouti, and Gambia are yet to introduce a democratic system).

It is noteworthy that income inequality is likely to be very high in the oil rich MMCs in general where per capita incomes are between PPP\$74,882 in Qatar and PPP\$22,816 in Oman with a huge percentage of expatriate workers.²⁴ Since no income inequality data are available for any of the oil dependent MMCs, nothing can be concluded except that most of these governments (except for Oman and Saudi Arabia) have done reasonably well in providing wealth and opportunities to

²² Egypt also has a very low income inequality (32.1) that is why it is highly likely that the political turmoil in Egypt in early 2011 which is given an economic character will subside quickly.

²³ A tiny island of about 2,235 km² with a population of about 770 thousand and a per capita income of PPP\$ 1,000 and income inequality of 64.3, Comoros is reasonably settled because of its above mentioned features.

²⁴ Bahrain (PPP\$ 29,723), Brunei (PPP\$ 50,200), Kuwait (PPP\$ 47,812), Saudi Arabia (PPP\$ 22,935) and the UAE (PPP\$ 54,626) also have a very high per capita income but because of their economic system (resources are owned by the original rulers of the respective geographic region) coupled with their huge dependence on lower end expatriate workers, these countries are likely to have a huge income inequality. For example, Dubai population is composed of 92% expatriates (including 80% unskilled or semiskilled laborers working in construction industry, domestic services, and other service occupations like the barbers).

Table 16.5 Income inequality and gender differentiation

Name	GDP PPP/P	F/M earned income	Poorest 10%	Richest 10%	Richest 10% higher than poorest 10%	Gini index
Afghanistan	1,054	0.24				
Algeria	7,740	0.36	6.1	17.5	2.9	36.5
Azerbaijan	7,851	0.44	6.1	17.5	2.9	36.5
Bahrain	29,723	0.51				
Bangladesh	1,241	0.51	4.3	26.6	6.2	31.0
Brunei	50,200	0.59				
Burkina Faso	1,124	0.66	3.0	32.4	10.8	39.6
Chad	1,477	0.70	2.6	30.8	11.8	39.8
Comoros	1,143	0.58	0.9	55.2	60.6	64.3
Djibouti	2,061	0.57	2.4	30.9	12.8	40.0
Egypt	5,349	0.27	3.9	27.6	7.2	32.1
Eritrea	626	0.50				
Gambia	1,225	0.63	2.0	36.9	18.9	47.3
Guinea	1,140	0.68				
Guinea Bissau	477	0.46	2.9	28.0	9.5	35.5
Indonesia	3,712	0.44	3.0	32.3	10.8	39.4
Iran	10,955	0.32	2.6	29.6	11.6	38.3
Iraq		18.10				
Jordan	4,901	0.19	3.0	30.7	10.2	37.7
Kazakhstan	10,863	0.68	3.9	25.9	7.3	32.9
Kuwait	47,812	0.36				
Kyrgyzstan	2,006	0.55	3.6	25.9	7.3	32.9
Lebanon	10,109	0.25				
Libya	14,364	0.25				
Malaysia	13,518	0.42	26.0	28.5	11.0	37.9
Maldives	5,196	0.54				
Mali	1,083	0.44	2.7	30.5	11.2	39.0
Mauritania	1,927					
Morocco	4,108		2.7	33.2	12.5	40.9
Niger	627	0.34				
Nigeria	1,969	0.42	2.3	35.7	15.3	43.9
Oman	22,816	0.23				
Pakistan	2,496	0.18	3.9	26.5	6.7	31.2
Qatar	74,882	0.28				
Saudi Arabia	22,935	0.16				
Senegal	1,666	0.55	2.5	30.1	11.9	39.2
Sierra Leone	679	4.10	2.6	33.6	12.8	42.5
Somalia						
Sudan	2,086	27.10				
Syria	4,511	12.70				
Tajikistan	1,753	0.65	3.2	26.4	8.2	33.6
Tunisia	7,520	0.28	2.4	31.6	13.3	40.8
Turkey	12,955	0.26	1.9	33.2	17.4	43.2
Turkmenistan	4,953	0.65	3.2	26.4	8.2	33.6
UAE	54,626	0.57				
Uzbekistan	2,425	0.64	2.9	29.5	10.3	36.7
Yemen	2,335	0.25	2.9	30.8	10.6	37.7

Table 16.6 Correlations between adult illiteracy rate and Gini index of inequality

		Gini index	Adult illiteracy (F)
Gini index	Pearson correlation	1	0.459
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.018
Adult illiteracy (F)	Pearson correlation	0.459	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.018	

the citizens. Thus, these MMCs are unlikely to have sudden economic or political upheaval. Further, women in many Arab countries, especially the members of the ruling families, hold significant amount of wealth e.g. an estimated US\$350 billion collectively in the UAE.²⁵ The size of the women's wealth in a country with about 850,000 citizens may be an indication of equal economic status for the women (mainly in the rich and ruling families), but may also be a source of high income inequality which also pervades gender differences to hamper overall human development in many MMCs.

16.2.2 Gender Difference and Inequality

Gender difference, being correlated to income inequality, helps perpetuate inequality in many aspects of human development. Gender difference in literacy rate is higher in the MMCs with larger inequality index. For example, in Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone with 35.5, 43.9, and 42.5 Gini Index of inequality, respectively, the female adult literacy rates are 31%, 18%, and 17% points lower than the respective male literacy rates of: 58%, 70%, and 45%. It seems that higher income inequality follows a higher gender gap in adult literacy rates (and vice versa) with a positive, quite high, and statistically significant coefficient of correlation (0.459) between the two (Table 16.6).

Gender differentiation in literacy rate then seems to be related to overall literacy rate in the country. It is evident from these MMCs that adult literacy rates for female are much lower than the fellow male citizens in those MMCs where overall literacy rate is low. For example, in Niger the literacy rate is 22% for male and 7% for female. In some other resource-poor MMCs, the differences in the male and female adult literacy rates are very high, for example, in Pakistan (29 points) and Yemen (40). The average adult illiteracy rate is positively correlated with gender gap in literacy rate. The coefficient of correlation between adult illiteracy rate and gender gap in literacy rate is relatively strong, positive (0.58), and statistically significant (Table 16.7).

²⁵ Claimed by an ex-member of the UAE National Federal Council (Najla Al Awadi), Gulf News, 27 March 2011.

Table 16.7 Correlations between adult illiteracy rate and gender gap in literacy rate

		Gender gap in literacy rate	Average adult literacy rate
Gender gap in literacy rate	Pearson correlation	1	0.582
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000
Average adult literacy rate	Pearson correlation	0.582	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	

Table 16.8 Correlations: Adult illiteracy and infant mortality (Countries with less than 33% oil in the GNP)

		Adult illiteracy (F)	Infant mortality rate
Adult illiteracy (F)	Pearson correlation	1	0.777
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000
Infant mortality rate	Pearson correlation	0.777	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	

The data also show that infant mortality rate (IMR²⁶) is comparatively much lower in the MMCs with lower gender difference in adult literacy rate. For example, IMR in Kyrgyzstan (per capita GNP of PPP\$2006) is 37 and in Nigeria (PPP\$1,969) 100; may be because the gender difference in adult literacy rates in the former is zero (99% for both), but in the latter 18 (70% for male and 52% in female). Table 16.8 demonstrates strong positive correlation between adult female illiteracy and infant mortality (coefficient of correlations equals to 0.77)²⁷ in the MMCs. Thus, through higher gender equality these MMCs can achieve higher literacy rate, and lower infant mortality to achieve higher human development. Gender difference in income, education, or health is a matter of policy failure which may lead us to analyze the power structure in the MMCs to relate the discussion to economic structure and inequality.

16.3 Power Structure in the MMCs: Its Misuse and External Influence

The European colonial powers had different approaches and objectives of colonization. The Dutch and French were interested in accumulating wealth as well as influencing culture and ensuring hegemony; while the Spanish and Portuguese colonial powers were interested in spiritual conversion as well. The British colonial power was interested exclusively in the wealth of the colonies, and had a flexible

²⁶ Infant mortality rate—death of < 12-month-old every 1,000 live births; a major criterion of judging health quality.

²⁷ To avoid the influence of money (i.e., oil) this calculation is based on the MMCs with <33% oil in the GNP.

and noninterventionist or minimalist approach that outsized and outlasted all other colonial powers (Easterly 2006; Isbister 2001). In the postcolonial period because of the implanted power relationships, economic structure and institutions, agricultural patterns, and the loss of resources, the MMCs with non-British colonial history suffered more than the British colonies in the struggle for development (Diamond 1997; Easterly 2006; Isbister 2001).

The data from the MMCs reveal that the past British colonies have done much better than the French colonies in achieving higher HDI ranks. The percentage of the MMCs with a high or medium HDI for past British colonies goes up to as high as 100% for the MMCs in Zones 3 and 4 (including 50% high HDI), whereas only 17% of the MMCs with a French colonial past in these Latitudes has achieved a high HDI and 83% has a medium HDI (Table 16.1). In Zones 1 and 2, 63% of the MMCs in British colonies and 25% of the MMCs in French colonies ever achieved high or medium HDI (Table 16.1).

A total of 18 (out of the 47) MMCs have elected governments. The rest of the governments are characterized as authoritarian (except Somalia—‘in transition’). Nine of these governments in the authoritarian MMCs have a hereditary system, and the rest have, often self-selected, civil and/or military coalition government (see Chaps. 8 and 14). Except for a small African country, Sierra Leone, all of these democracies have a per capita income of more than PPP\$1,000. On the other extreme, all MMCs with a per capita income of more than PPP\$5,000 (except for Iran, Lebanon, Maldives, Malaysia, and Turkey) have authoritarian system. This fact seems to be related to a resource (oil) rentier economy that also is coupled with (a domestic and international collusion in) resource protection system because the rich MMCs with democracy are not resource dependent.²⁸

Our study shows that election alone does not improve any aspect of development. In fact, in certain cases, the MMCs with an elected system are faring worse in all the variables of human development and have the lowest HDI scores compared to the MMCs, where the source of governmental power is selection or heredity (see Chaps. 8, and 14). Often the election becomes an end or a camouflage for ‘misrule,’ or a tool for annihilating the institutions it meant to reinforce.

Electoral democracy in the poor economies attracts candidates with criminal records because due to ethnic (or group) loyalties, the electors support their own criminals; only the criminals, not the honest people, can take opportunities of corruption. Corruption-fed easy money creates local Robin Hood to buy out the electors; and the elected offices providing immunity from prosecution, become attractive to the criminals (cf. Collier 2010, p. 27). These seem to be the dangers related to some recent ‘democracies’ because election was introduced in these MMCs before the fundamental values and essential institutions of democracy such as public accountability, rule of law, independent judiciary, and a free but responsible media, at the least (Diamond 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996) were established. In the absence of democracy, as a

²⁸ Noteworthy, that only about 10% economic activities in Malaysia and about 20% that of Iran is dependent on oil industry because of their huge nonprimary industry activities. On the other hand, all oil-dependent rich MMCs have an authoritarian system of government (Table 16.9).

society starts to get rich it becomes more prone to political violence; democracies get safer as income rises, whereas autocracies get more dangerous (Collier 2010, p. 21). The threshold level of income at which democracy has no effect on violence, is \$2,700/capita/year or \$7/capita/daily (Collier 2010, p. 21). Oil (combined with related external forces) tends to influence this outcome of democracy.

Monarchies in different forms, however, are reflection of the survival of the traditional tribal system in the MMCs such as Bahrain, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia to help ‘trickle-down’ the prosperity through an active patronage system. Many states, with a dictatorial system, created by or based on the armed forces, lost their traditional tribal social power structure once under the colonial rules and then under the ‘revolutionary’ leaders who replaced the traditional system by intimidation and annihilation with a protectionist and exploitative crony-capitalist system. So, the traditional tribal system-based governments (monarchies) by creating a direct resource ‘sharing’ and responsive mechanism have survived and are likely to survive longer because if not ‘of’ or ‘by’ the people, these governments are generally seen as ‘for’ the people. In all forms, the governments are, however, doing better only through external dependence.

16.3.1 Power Structure and External Forces

Almost all nationalist leaders in Africa who talked about equality, state power, and reigning in the foreign conglomerates were killed or ousted during the postcolonial construction era with direct involvement or authorization by the foreign powers (Meredith 2006). The situation is no different in Asia. ‘Yes-men’ were then allowed to form governments to protect the interests of the foreign ‘investors.’ There have been instances in the past (as early as in the 1950s) of indigenous initiatives to introduce liberal system of democratic governments in many MMCs. But the efforts were frustrated because of economic interests of the foreign powers. For example, the independent paths taken towards a liberal system in Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, or Iran (the first two were the leaders of the nonaligned movement) in the 1950s and the 1960s were frustrated because of these nationalist governments’ attempts to nationalize the oil fields. They were replaced by regimes promising to safeguard the (commercial and energy) security interests of the West.

Rather than promoting global democracy, such policies are likely to (and did) lead towards global plutocracy—a system of government influenced by wealth and run by the wealthy. This is feudalism with a new geographical twist—feudal lords still have total political control over the poor masses producing the raw materials, but the feudal lords and the masses now live in different countries (Reinert 2008, p. 264). Elections in Palestine and Iraq have made it clear that the West essentially approves of democracy only as long as the poor elect the politicians ‘useful’ for the West.²⁹

²⁹ Even in the political turmoil of 2011, the ‘West’ is not interested in supporting the removal of the decades old regimes in Libya or Yemen citing the risk of power vacuum that may bring ‘unwanted’ force to the state power through free and fair elections.

External forces seem to be influencing governance structure in many MMCs in many ways. Eight of the ten OPEC member MMCs have a monarchy or a civil/military dictatorship. These MMCs' GDPs are highly dependent on petroleum export to the tune of 82% of the GDP in Libya, 64% in Qatar, 64% in Kuwait, 49% in Saudi Arabia, 38% in Algeria, and 37% in the UAE. Non-OPEC member major petroleum exporting MMCs, for example, Egypt (2.4% of GDP is from petroleum export), Oman (45%), Sudan (11%), and Syria (14%), also have monarchy or civil/military dictatorships. All these countries, irrespective of their governmental systems, have reasonably good relationships with the West.³⁰

External influences over the years reinforced civil/military dictatorships in many nonpetroleum exporting MMCs as well, for example, in the MMCs in North Africa (Eritrea, Somalia, and Tunisia), sub-Saharan Africa (Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, and Sudan), central Asia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), West Asia (Lebanon and Yemen), and south Asia (Pakistan).³¹

In the economic exploitation targeted political system in many MMCs, world powers created 'foreign aid' as a tool which also helped further security,³² commercial,³³ and energy interests³⁴ of the donors, especially for the USA (Browne 2006, p. 111; also see Chap. 9 in this Volume). Thus, MMCs such as Bangladesh or Eritrea are forced to accommodate numerous—and sometimes conflicting—demands of donors: the precise nature of the aid, the choice of suppliers, the preferred domestic partners, the need for appropriate counterpart resources, or even often “the correct policies for running the country” (Browne 2006, p. 2).

Failure to address chronic biases against poorer countries, as set in the original design of the multilateral system, compounded by systematic trade protectionism by the richer countries, effectively knocked a huge hole in the foundations of development assistance (Browne 2006, p. 18). Even the US PL 480 (offering food-aid to countries facing crop-failure) has been instrumental in market stabilization and grower inducement within the USA, and opening up new markets in the aid

³⁰ France, UK, and the USA, among others, signed arms deal, especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, with countries like Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and so forth.

³¹ In many of these MMCs, for example, Eritrea, Somalia, ex-Soviet republics (of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and Yemen fighting off the socialist system (and later the Al Qaida) have been excuses for having nondemocratic stable and strong governments. In Algeria, Pakistan, and Tunisia tackling Islamic militancy had been an excuse for civil/military authoritarian regime for a long time.

³² Even infrastructure is built specifically to help the US military logistics: roads, housing, and communications in the immediate vicinity of American bases are always built and maintained to a high standard (Browne 2006, p. 112).

³³ In 2004, according to the OECD, more than 70% of foreign aid from Japan and the USA was tied to procurement from the donor's sources (Browne 2006, p. 113).

³⁴ American energy interests often overpowered democratic interests of other countries; in response to a British appeal and President Eisenhower's authorization the CIA in 1954 removed the elected PM Mossadegh of Iran from power because of his plans to nationalize the oil industry (Marston et al. 2005, p. 207).

Table 16.9 MMCs: Political systems, economic status, and geography. (Source: CIA Fact book, 2010)

Regions/ country	Latitude	Colony past	Government type	PPP GDP/ capita	Oil reserve million bbl	Oil export 000 bbl/ daily
Afghanistan	33	None	Semidemocracy	1,054	0	0
Algeria	28	French	Authoritarian	7,740	12,200	1,891.0
Azerbaijan	40	USSR	Authoritarian	7,851	7,000	529.0
Bahrain	26	British	Authoritarian	29,723	1,246	238.3
Bangladesh	24	British	Semidemocracy	1,241	28	2.6
Brunei	4	British	Authoritarian	50,200	1,100	153.0
Burkina Faso	13	French	Semidemocracy	1,124	0	0
Chad	15	French	Semiauthoritarian	1,477	1,500	158.0
Comoros	-12	French	Democracy	1,143	0	0
Djibouti	11	French	Authoritarian	2,061	0	0
Egypt	27	British	Authoritarian	5,349	4,400	89.0
Eritrea	15	British	Authoritarian	626	0	0
Gambia, The	13	British	Authoritarian	1,225	0	0
Guinea	11	French	Auth/ transitional	477	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	12	Portuguese	Democracy	1,140	0	0
Indonesia	-5	Dutch	Democracy	3,712	3,990	85.0
Iran	32	N/A	Semidemocracy	10,955	136,200	2,719.0
Iraq	33	British	Democracy		115,000	1,910.0
Jordan	31	British	Semiauthoritarian	4,901	100	0
Kazakhstan	45	USSR	Authoritarian	10,863	30,000	1,345.0
Kuwait	29	British	Authoritarian	47,812	101,500	2,349.0
Kyrgyzstan	41	USSR	Authoritarian	2,006	40,000	1.8
Lebanon	34	French	Semidemocracy	10,109	0	0
Libya	25	British	Authoritarian	14,364	43,660	1,542.0
Malaysia	2	British	Semidemocracy	13,518	4,000	512.0
Maldives	3	British	Democracy	5,196	0	0
Mali	17	French	Democracy	1,083	0	0
Mauritania	20	French	Authoritarian	1,927	100	30.0
Morocco	32	French	Authoritarian	4,108	100	17.0
Niger	16	French	Authoritarian	627	0	0
Nigeria	10	British	Democracy	1,969	36,220	2,327.0
Oman	21	Portuguese	Authoritarian	22,816	5,500	59.0
Pakistan	30	British	Semidemocracy	2,496	3,39	30.0
Qatar	25	British	Authoritarian	74,882	15,210	753.0
Saudi Arabia	25	N/A	Authoritarian	22,935	266,700	8,728.0
Senegal	14	French	SemiDemocracy	1,666	0	5.6
Sierra Leone	8	British	Democracy	679	0	0.5
Somalia	10	British	Transitional		0	1.5
Sudan	15	British	Semidemocracy	2,086	5,000	304.0
Syria	35	French	Authoritarian	4,511	2,500	155.0
Tajikistan	39	USSR	Authoritarian	1,753	12	349.0

Table 16.9 (continued)

Regions/ country	Latitude	Colony past	Government type	PPP GDP/ capita	Oil reserve million bbl	Oil export 000 bbl/ daily
Tunisia	34	French	Authoritarian	7,520	425	77.0
Turkey	39	N/A	Democracy	12,955	285	149.0
Turkmenistan	40	USSR	Authoritarian	4,953	700	38.0
UAE	24	British	Authoritarian	54,626	97,800	2,700.0
Uzbekistan	41	USSR	Authoritarian	2,425	594	6.1
Yemen	33	British	Authoritarian	2,335	300	274.0
<i>MMCs Total</i> <i>(about 1</i> <i>billion</i> <i>people)</i>					<i>895,200</i>	<i>29,528.0</i>
<i>World total</i> <i>(about 6.5</i> <i>billion</i> <i>people)</i>					<i>1,343,000</i>	<i>66,130.0</i>

recipient countries.³⁵ Further, food aid dependence has depressed domestic food prices and inhibited efforts to stimulate domestic food production in some countries (Browne 2006, p. 28).

Poor economies face four challenges from foreign aid: greater consumption for meeting immediate needs eliminating any possibility of savings and investment; inflation because of the higher floating of 'unearned income' that leads to interest rate rise, low investment, and more inflationary pressure; diminishing exports because of the appreciation of the local currency; and difficulty in absorbing such large cash influxes because of a lack of skilled manpower and investment opportunity (Browne 2006; Moyo 2009, pp. 60–66). No foreign aid-based economy has thus achieved economic 'miracle' (see Chap. 9).

In many recent international conflicts that are often instigated by the outsiders, for example the Iran–Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, a large chunk of 'foreign aid,' in addition to the military aid, has been used in arms purchase by many countries. In the 40 years since 1960, the world's average expense on arms was about \$1,200 billion or 3.4% of the total world national income³⁶ (Collier 2010, p. 105).

In the modern world, government's relationships with international organizations such as the IMF have also greatly influenced human development in the world. The economic giants of Asia (e.g., Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan) were never under the IMF program. China and Korea came out of it quickly but then suffered for being with it. Only one other Asian country, Malaysia, which has achieved

³⁵ US food aid (a tool of disposing of US domestic agriculture surplus) creates substantial benefits for three major domestic interest groups: four major grain traders (including Cargill, and ADM), five shipping companies and a group of NGOs (including CARE and Catholic Relief Services; Browne 2006, p. 113).

³⁶ Even the poor economies spend about 26% of the total ODA inflow (Collier 2010, p. 105) on arms.

a better economic success than the compatriots, was never under the IMF (Stiglitz 2006). The political impact of economic dependency is evident.

In the past, international political/economic interests influenced the shape of governmental systems in many MMCs. The present democratization process in many MMCs is apparently being supported by many external factors. At the same time, due to political interests, some MMC leaders, being involved in corrupt practices, are likely to develop mutually supportive relationships with the external forces that are also eager to protect their own interests through the ‘deal.’³⁷ The ‘plutocracy’ has been creating internal–external alliances, directly or indirectly, to misuse power for ‘group’ ‘interests.’

16.3.2 *Power Structure and Its Misuse*

Since the end of the World War II and the Marshall Plan, rich countries have given more than \$ 3,000 billion to poor countries; but a large part of that have been misappropriated with the knowledge of the donors³⁸ (Stiglitz 2006). Though the ‘outcome’ has devastated some countries nothing can be done because these international organizations and their employees in most countries are immune from any punitive actions against the failed ‘outcome.’ Due to the support from foreign powers many corrupt government leaders, in the failed countries, also remained ‘immune.’

Corruption in the MMCs is rampant with apparent geographic and colonial influence. The nine countries in Zone 3 (Latitude 19–27° N) have the best corruption-free image—with an average Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score of 4.3. This CPI score is much higher than the average CPI score (2.64) of 20 MMCs in Zones 1 and 2 (Latitude 1–18° N) or 18 countries (with an average CPI score of 2.75) in Zones 4 and 5 (Latitude 28–45° N).

Twenty (past) British colonies and protectorates have, on average, higher CPI score (3.36) than those of France (2.72). Also only one previous French colonies has a CPI score of 4+ (Tunisia, 4.3), whereas seven countries in the British group (colonies and protectorates) have a CPI score of 4+ including Qatar (7.7), the highest in the MMCs followed by the UAE (6.3), Brunei (5.5), Bahrain (4.9), Jordan (4.7), Kuwait (4.6), and Malaysia (4.4).

Corruption also seems to be higher in the MMCs prone to violence (ethnic, political, or religious) and/or with poor economy. Five (Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan) out of the seven MMCs with the worst CPI (score < 2) have been experiencing one or the other type of violence for at least 20 years (Iraq and Somalia) to more than 30 years (Afghanistan and Sudan). Four of these countries (except Iraq

³⁷ For example, even in the March 2011 political unrest against the sitting governments in Libya and Yemen, the US government suggested regime change cannot be an option because that could jeopardize regional (US?) security.

³⁸ For example, the C-word (corruption) was not used in the World Bank “because it is too political and the WB has to be above politics” (Stiglitz 2006).

due to oil money) have been in the list of the least developed countries (LDCs) and the worst performers in achieving the millennium development goals (MDGs). Eleven countries³⁹ scoring the best (score 4+) in the MMCs in being away from corruption are also away from violence.⁴⁰ Further, none of these countries are in the LDC or MDG worse performer list. Economic development, however, does not automatically reduce corruption as measured by the CPI of the Transparency International⁴¹; deliberate actions need to be taken to achieve that goal (Chang 2008, p. 168).

16.4 Concluding Remarks

The HDI is not a sound measurement for human development, but one of the best tools available to comprehend and compare ‘successes’ among nations. Nonetheless, it is contextual and needs to be approached and analyzed considering many geography-related factors such as the climate, topography, and resources, in particular. The factors such as the population structure and dependency ratio, the economic structure and income inequality, and the power structure (colonial system, governance pattern, postcolonial external relationships) and its misuse also have been of paramount importance for analyzing human development achievements. To complicate the matter further these latter dimensions are also influenced by geographical phenomena.

Importance of geography in studying human development or misery can be studied through the literature on famine. Famine is a result of agriculture (distribution) failure (Sen 1981), and occurs mostly in countries specializing in food production because industrial states can feed and maintain a far larger population than an agriculture state occupying the same territory. Thus, restructuring of economic activity increasing the proportion of value-adding is likely to end poverty faster than in any other ways (Reinert 2008) to accelerate human development. Since geography and climate influence the location of industry, the geographically challenged MMCs need to be compensated by economic policy for larger manufacturing sector. All measures targeted at human development need to be based on these factors and incorporate tools for dealing with the phenomena.

Planned measures for (re)structuring the population and their skills level to have low dependency ratios and high-end workforce for an efficient manufacturing sector supported by effective redistributive mechanisms (through cooperation among

³⁹ Bahrain, Brunei, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and the UAE.

⁴⁰ Except for Turkey that has experienced political violence from the Kurdish movement.

⁴¹ For example, the USA was more corrupt in the late nineteenth century than earlier in that century (Chang 2008, p. 168). Further, CPI 2009 places Chile with a per capita income of PPP\$13,880 at 21 with Kuwait (per capita PPP\$47,812); Costa Rica (PPP\$10,842), Oman (PPP\$14,363), and Poland (PPP\$15,987) with different per capita income levels (shown in parentheses) are all ranked 41 in the CPI index 2009 (updated from Chang 2008).

individuals, organizations, and states), (re)forming the economy to diversify for high productivity and low risks, and (re)configuring political powers to reduce its misuse and ensure public accountability may be of importance for human development in the MMCs. The next chapter deals with some specific recommendations.

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Chapter 17

Human Development in the MMCs: Uniformity of Purpose, Diversity of Actions

Samiul Hasan

Geographic and demographic factors influence human development, so do the structures of economy and power. Following on the conclusions in Chap. 16, it seems that the human development inhibiting aspects in these structures, to align with the geographic features, can be dealt with in many different ways as long as the problems are sincerely diagnosed, defined, and intentioned to be resolved. For example, deliberate policy actions through value creation for economic diversity, distributive justice, community preference internalising governance, organised cooperation among individuals and states for capability enhancement, and ethical practices could be seen as some of the strategies that may eventually become catalysts for human development. Here a modest attempt is made to elucidate these ‘catalysts’ in philosophical and practical terms in relation to human development in the Muslim majority countries. The discussion is indicative and in no way comprehensive.

17.1 Value Creation for Economic Diversity

Islam aims to elevate all its followers to the level of *ghina*—being free from want (cited in Hasan, 2007), and offers very clear principles of private property. All that is on earth is subservient to human beings (al Qur’an 22:65¹); the latter are trustees—not the absolute owners (Naqvi 1981; Baali 1988). The Believers are allowed to be involved in trade and make property grow through legal means but not by exploiting others. The Qur’an commands the Believers to be involved in economic

¹ The first digit in this reference refers to Chapter number in the Qur’an; the next one to the verse number. In subsequent references in this chapter only the digits are mentioned. Please note all verses of the Qur’an in this Chapter are taken from the English version by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938).

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activity to increase wealth staying away from extreme behaviour that may lead to violence resulting in harm or death (4:29) to themselves or to others.

Value creation is so important in Islam that property owners are advised not to leave property to those who do not have the intelligence or capability to manage and make it grow (4:5). According to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH²), the best earnings are a blessed sale and the product of a man's own hands (Rice and Mahmoud 1999); but then a sale would not be blessed if it resorts to deception. Consequently all activities, economic or otherwise, conducted within the given parameters (of pleasing God) may become 'worship' (Uddin 2003).

It is worth noting that when the Qur'an was revealed (610–633 CE) and Prophet Muhammad provided guidance, small scale farm produce or livestock rearing were the main economic activity of the Arabs. The guidance for rudimentary economic activities provided the fundamentals of market principles or ethics forbidding transactions of materials for profiteering,³ usury (as a tool of exploitation), or restricting others' access or benefit by deception.⁴ Comprehensiveness of Islamic business ethics is proven by the fact that Prophet Muhammad forbade insider trading.⁵ Around the same time, Islam (through the Prophet's dicta) established the principle of fair competition in business dealings.⁶ It seems Prophet Muhammad foresaw the manipulation of markets by the middlemen to defraud the growers from receiving fair price and forbade compradors.⁷ Islam promotes free market access and does not allow unfair competition practices like high risk investments or the creation of uncertainty for personal gains.⁸ Taking business risks is acceptable in Islam only if the Muslim investors do not act irresponsibly and diversify economy towards increasing return sectors to minimise possible losses because of their social and environmental responsibilities (Gambling and Karim 1991). Economic diversity is an Islamic concept because of the '*takaful*' responsibility (social support system), risk taking restrictions, and for the command of the Qur'an for self-initiated change.⁹

Diversifying also helps in reducing external resource dependence. Reduction on external resources may also be achieved by organising regionally for compatible regional economic activities and trade. For example, the creation of economic triangles (combining physical, human, and financial capitals) may be a much better

² God's blessings and peace be upon him (PBUH). Muslim readers are supposed to (and reminded of the obligation to) utter the blessings to the Prophet every time they come across his name.

³ Without value creation; see Shahih Muslim 010:3845–3858.

⁴ For example, by tampering products; see Shahih Muslim, 010:3620–3621, 3634–3635, 3639, 3654–3655.

⁵ Commanding not to meet a seller outside the market to enter into business deals until he knows about the market price. See Shahih Muslim, 010:3620–3621, 3623–3625, 3634–3635, 3639.

⁶ Through the prohibition of outbidding a negotiating buyer; see Shahih Muslim, 010:3617, 3618, 3619, 3620–3622, 3634–3635, and 3639.

⁷ See, Shahih Muslim, 010:3640–3643, 3646–3648, and 3649–3653.

⁸ For example, fruits on sale must be ready to eat and be weighed (Shahih Bukhari, 3:35:441–446; Shahih Muslim, 010:3665–3677).

⁹ "...never will God change the condition of a people until they change it themselves..." (al Qur'an, 13:11).

option than importing labour (often 10% of the total) from the fertile lands to introduce agriculture to contribute 2% of the economy in the desert that eats away the exporting countries' fertile lands through 'physical' encroachment of the foreign remittance. The countries involved in such labour trade should think of in-country 'cultivation contract' to import back the produce to the investor's country that will employ local labours in the high value products in possible agriculture processing zones and reduce pressure from the investing countries' citizen/expatriate imbalance.¹⁰ Private earnings to be used for 'hedonistic' consumption can become private investment in manufacturing through targeted incentives.

Muslims have a moral obligation to work rather than become a burden on the community (Smith 2002). This is not a matter of personal choice, though; the intention for economic actions should be the interest of the whole community (*ummah*)¹¹—'public benefit' shapes the Islamic economic doctrine. The concept of *maslaha* (public good), according to Imam al-Ghazzali (1058–1111 CE), requires the Believers to be involved in economic activities that create benefit, prevent harm, are harmonious to the objectives (*maqasid*) of the *Shari'ah*, and targeted to the protection of five essential values: religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property (Tamadonfar 2001, p. 213). The economic managers and entrepreneurs have social as well as environmental responsibility in the pursuit of economic activities aimed at the advancement of prosperity.

According to Imam al-Ghazzali, Muslims are likely to achieve virtue in economic relationships only by internalizing community preferences (Mehmet 1997; Umaruddin 2003). Muslims as "individuals-in-community", in their economic pursuits, are thus required to pay a portion of the income in charity to acquire virtue, and to internalize community preferences avoiding conspicuous consumptions (e.g. luxury or harm-inflicting extravagance) through self-discipline. Similarly, producers and traders, as "individuals-in-community" are required to produce community approved goods and services, and to be away from profiteering, from dealing with social or physical harm-inflicting items, and from any unfair (e.g. labour exploitation) economic practices (Mehmet 1997).

A property owner's right to property is subjected to being good to his/her community, if the property owner is incapable of understanding this limitation to the rights his/her control over property should be removed (Ali 1938, note. 510). Thus the modern concepts of community development or environmental sustainability are embedded in the tradition of Islam. Many economic or political theorists proposed, in the 20th century, concepts like the business social responsibility that the traditions in Islam embraced 1400 years ago.

The 'social contract' of the people has given the human beings an organised social system involving economic activities requiring business houses to commit to two contracts: to God, and to the community.¹² If Muslim workers (or employers for

¹⁰ Figures and facts used in this paragraph are from the UAE.

¹¹ The Islamic work ethic argues that life without work has no meaning and engagement in economic activities is an individual as well as social obligation (Yousef 2001, p. 153).

¹² 'Man' is created weak thus the Qur'an emphasizes *ummah* (community) solidarity (4:28) and obligations in addition to the loyalty to the Creator.

that matter) want to observe commitments to the Faith, they would ideally have a deep sense of commitment to work, a desire to advance the community, a sustained interest in human welfare, and be creative, co-operative and loyal to the organisation (Smith 2002)—because the holistic concept of human existence in Islam leaves no scope for segmented obligations.

In the Islamic concept of relationships among human beings, between human beings and the nature, and between human beings and God, everybody is responsible directly to God for their actions/inactions, and Prophet Muhammad warned the Believers that everyone is a shepherd and will be questioned with regard to the ‘trust’.¹³ Being the trustees of God, human beings need to harmonize their relationship with the nature as well as with the fellow human beings (in relation to resource use) to promote the community—the most important social institution in Islam. Individual responsibility in the achievement of social and environmental sustainability in value creation is of vital importance because Islam does not provide any role of mediators between individuals and God¹⁴ (see Chap. 2).

The fundamental ethical principles of economic relationships in Islam promote economic diversity, profit-making without jeopardizing community rights which should be the foundation of modern Muslim communities that will enhance trust, cooperation, and income leading to higher human development. The success of the system in ensuring human development, however, is to depend on distributive justice.

17.2 Distributive Justice

The fundamental of social justice in Islam is highlighted in the principles of distributive justice. The three ‘right and straight’ commands in the Qur’an for the people of the Book are: to worship God, offering Him sincere devotion, being true (in faith); to establish regular prayer; and to practice regular charity. The Qur’an and the Prophet from the beginning of Islam encouraged giving at its highest form. The Qur’an says that the Believers shall not attain righteousness unless they give of that which they love most. The Prophet praised individuals’ desires to do so recommending distribution among the relatives.¹⁵ Even planting a tree can bring rewards of charity for the planters because of its economic effects on others.¹⁶

¹³ The Caliph (an administrator) has to answer “how he conducted their affairs”, a man has to answer “how he looked after the physical and moral well-being of the family members, and a woman is to answer how she managed the household and brought up the children” (Shahih Muslim, Book 020, Number 4496–4499).

¹⁴ “There is no intermediary in the form of power or matter between the Creator and His creation” (Nomani and Rahnema 1995, p. 34).

¹⁵ Shahih Bukhari, Book 010, Number 3764, 3765–3770; 4:51:30; 2:24:540. Shahih Bukhari is a major and an authentic collection of Hadith. In the references the digits correspond to Volume, Book, and Number of the particular Hadith, respectively.

¹⁶ For what is eaten out of that by living beings or stolen out of that (Shahih Bukhari, Book 010, Number 3764, 3765–3770).

The givers should not expect “any increase for yourself” through giving or should not give without a purpose (Ali 1938, note 322). ‘Philanthropy’ is thus more an Islamic concept than ‘charity’, and is meant to be a source of social security (Gambling and Karim 1986) enabling individuals’ efforts to be steered towards a common goal (Benthall 1999, p. 5). Philanthropic activities, especially for targeting poverty alleviation, may have other spin-off effects in the society and for the religion. By giving in charity and alleviating poverty and enhancing poor people’s *taqwah* (remembrance of God) and commitment to religious duties, the givers can earn more benefit for their philanthropy (Hasan 2007).

The provision of *zakat-ul-mal* (charity for wealth) in Islam is the most important tool of distributive justice.¹⁷ *Zakat-ul-mal* is obligatory but its payment is subject to the payers’ conscience and *taqwah* (God’s consciousness), and being ‘enrobed’ with religious sanctity, is meant to ensure redistribution of wealth, not by coercion but through the acceptance of moral principles (Dean and Khan 1997).

According to Sunni *faqih*, *zakat-ul-mal* on business is obligatory to be paid from the earnings of business whether it is based on production, mining, fishery, shipping, supply, agriculture, services or others, as long as it is for the purpose of making profit (Hasan 2007). For commerce (banks, companies, small business) *zakat-ul-mal* is levied both on the net worth and (capital+reserves–assets), and on the net profit at the rate of 2.5%. For industry and income from investments *zakat-ul-mal* is levied at the rate of 10% on the net profit (Gambling and Karim, 1986). In many MMCs *ushr*¹⁸ has been extended to (or being debated for extension to) maritime produce, animals, forests, minerals etc. In order to ensure distributive justice across the national borders, a respected personality like Prince Hassan of Jordan, proposed an international *zakat-ul-mal* system, whereby the richer Muslim states would help poorer Muslims (Hasan 2007). These options of distributive justice available to the MMCs need to be coupled with intentions, in particular, of public benefiting or community preference internalising governance.

17.3 Community Preference Internalising Governance

Unlike other prophets or architects of religions, Prophet Muhammad took the responsibility of administering the socio-economic and security issues of the people, and offered the fundamental principles, as propounded in the Qur’an and the *Sunnah*, and did not impose any administrative system or a successor. Being given the challenge, the Muslims embraced the democratic principle of electing a Caliph (see

¹⁷ Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam. Its scope and intents need to be comprehended by the fact that zakat is also called alms-tax that might “purify and sanctify” goods (Ali 1938, note 5353) or obligatory charitable wealth tax or legal alms (Kamali 1999) meant to be for increase in “self-purification” (Al Qur’an, 92:18).

¹⁸ The original concept referred to ‘zakat’ on agriculture produce (10% of the produce; but 5% in irrigated land) has now been expanded to many other natural resources, see Hasan 2007.

Ali 1964, p. 293) after the death of Prophet Muhammad. The establishment of the Caliphate was a consensus decision not imposed by one on the others, disallowed a hereditary system because none of the Caliphs was an offspring or a sibling of Prophet Muhammad,¹⁹ did not give the Caliph absolute authority (since God is the only Monarch—the rulers, His viceroys and trustees, cannot be monarchs), and limited the ruler's authority by the commands and guidance of the Law (in the Qur'an, *Sunnah*, and other sources) (see Chap. 2).

The Qur'an places immense importance on truth and commands to keep in writing every promises or contracts (2:282), so that no party can disown or manipulate 'words' for exploitative reasons. In Islam everybody (the interpreter, the implementer, and the adjudicator) is subjected to the law, to God and to His commands. The ruler is subjected to the law and accountable to God and the citizens. The Qur'an wants the Believers to use their intelligence and knowledge to undertake the worldly affairs with justice, and commands the Believers to be fair in decision making (6:152; 17:35), not to misuse authority to break the trust (al Qur'an, 4:58), and not to be involved in nepotism (4:58; 6:152; 16:90). The Qur'an commands the Believers to be fair in judgment (17:35) with the highest integrity possible (even against own selves, or the parents, or the kin, or against rich or poor) (4:135).

The first Caliphs of Islam were very particular about following the laws and about the integrity of their actions. Good examples are found in the actions of the Caliphs in establishing and dealing with judicial tribunals. The tribunals during the period of the early Caliphs enjoyed supreme authority and were independent of the government. The Caliphs could not and did not pardon anybody convicted by the regular tribunals (see Ali 1964, p. 278). The later Caliphs followed these principles to develop more features of power relationships in Islam. For example, Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib²⁰ (656–661 CE) offered guidance well ahead of his time (targeting the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number') similar to many features of modern 'good governance' like showing tolerance, upholding judicial supremacy, protection of the minority rights, merit system, a honest monitoring and auditing system, and so on.

The concepts of justice and rejection of nepotism, protection of minority rights, a mutual protection regime, consultation, transparency, tolerance, rule of law, and free and responsible media are all attached to the classical system of governance in Muslim community.²¹ Islam emphasises the adherence to certain fundamental principles through the institutionalisation of a system with positive and negative

¹⁹ Except the first two Caliphs were the Prophet Muhammad's fathers-in-law, and the next two his sons-in-law.

²⁰ Caliph Ali's important sermons and letters (compiled as 'Nahj al-Balaga') contain guidance related to state (and its servants' authority). Letter 31 (sent to one of his sons), Letter 51 (to collectors of taxes and revenues), and Letter 53 (to Malik al-Ashtar—a newly appointed Governor of Egypt) in particular contain guidance akin to many features of modern state and government principles as cited in this paragraph.

²¹ For example, the Medina Charter compiled in 622 CE by Prophet Muhammad (regarded by many as the first written constitution of the world), to deal with socio-economic and security issues of all residents of Yathrib (the city of his refuge; renamed Medinat al-Nabawi—the City of

rewards, as appropriate. Thus outcome and intentions are of paramount importance in Islam than the process. Further, Islam gave people the opportunity to end social and economic deprivation resulting from exclusion in different social and religious systems. These features, unique at the beginning of Islam in the seventh century CE, helped Islam achieve attractiveness, and spread far and wide.

In fact, authority in Islam “is a trust”; its abuse or malicious exploitation “is explicitly prohibited, in order to guarantee fundamental human rights” (CDHRI,²² Article 23). The opportunity of living in a truthful environment “away from vice and moral corruption” is accepted as human rights in Islam, and “it is incumbent upon the state and society in general to afford that right” to the citizens (CDHRI, Article 17). No law can be more open and straightforward in guiding the principles of justice and condemning nepotism or favouritism or cronyism or any other forms of corrupt practices in administrative and/or economic relationships.

Thus, the Islamic principle of administration and the early tradition of Islam do not leave any scope for authoritarian rule. There is, however, no basic form of Muslim administration, but there are basic principles of governance. Islam does not detail the procedure of election or qualify the electorates. There is thus scope of maneuvering as long as the purpose is to get the best or a good person to administer the principles of justice in human activity. As a result, there could be different forms of governance in the MMCs fulfilling the ‘public benefit’ purpose of the state.

A good form of government is said to be the one that is of the people, for the people, and by the people. ‘Of’ and ‘for’ are about outcome; and ‘by’ is about process. This process has a variety of characters and, even in the best form of democracy, the government may be formed by 35% of the cast vote. Further, in many democracies candidates win constituencies, often with as little as 20% of the cast vote, for example, in Bangladesh or Pakistan because of a high number of contesting candidates. The problem is compounded when the winning candidate purposively forgets the reality (that 80% of the cast vote went against the winner). The law makers, who are often the executives as well, in the absence of democracy supporting institutions, tend to manipulate the system of government for their personal and/or group benefits. It may also be argued that some countries are really abusing or misguiding the people by highlighting election, which is often manipulated, as an end because it functions as a tool for self-aggrandisement. These ‘electoral democracies’ over-emphasise the outcomes of the election to overshadow the needs for instituting a system of interest articulation and aggregation without fear or intimidation, a system of making the public officials answerable, rule of law, independent judiciary, and a free but responsible media, at the least, to achieve a ‘democratic’ system. Thus many countries seem to suffer in ‘electoral democracy’ (Diamond 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996) even after a free and fair election (democratising backwards—going

the Prophet) to create conditions for a harmonious and peaceful living of all people belonging to different tribes and adhering to different religions, see Arjomand (2009).

²² The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam. Adopted by members of the Organisation of Islamic Conference in 1990.

for elections before the essential institutions are in place, see Rose and Shin 2001) and then fail to achieve human development.

So ‘by’ or the process aspect of governmental system to achieve human development is really contextual, and have many acceptable faces. In such circumstances a major question is do the MMCs need to focus only on ‘of’ and ‘for’ or the outcome of the governmental actions—irrespective of the process because while election is and should be a means of ensuring public accountability, and achieving a people-serving government, it is often purposively taken as an end. Islam actually emphasises the philosophical aspects of governance. Things and actions are acceptable as long as those are attempted for a good outcome adhering to the basic principles (ends justify the means). The philosophy and intention behind all human actions matters most to God.

The ‘process’ becomes complex because of the existence of a tribal system in many MMCs. In many MMCs, in particular in North Africa and West Asia, the tribe-based patrimonialism has three distinct faces. In Algeria and Tunisia the residual tribal system (that faced obliteration during the French colonial rule) was replaced by the revolutionary authorities who toppled the independence leaders. In Libya and Yemen the revolutionary authority has successfully ‘played’ with the tribal leaders (with crony capitalism and ‘local empowerment’ politics) to be protected in power. In all other Arab MMCs (from Morocco to Oman) the tribal groups are in harmony with the rulers (who are often revered for the presumed noble lineage or who often buy allegiance).²³ In Egypt the tribal system that was weakened by the external intervention from the north (Italy and England), south (Sudanese traders and slaves), and the East (the Ottomans) was completely demolished at the dismissal of the King in 1952 to be replaced by the military as the predominant political and economic force (having about 40% stakes in the economy). Since a system of ‘community preference internalising governance’ is defined, practiced, and legitimised differently under different jurisdictions, these and other MMCs will deal with a modern system, often with external political legitimacy, differently for a long time to come. Because of the above reasons, Tunisia (being supported by a robust civil society as well) is likely to have a quick transition to a community preference internalizing democratic governance, Egypt or Yemen, may not.

Landes (1999) argues that the ideal ‘growth and development’ model is one that is guaranteed by political institutions through a mandatory system to secure people’s “liberty, private property and contractual rights, enforced rule of law (not necessarily through democracy²⁴)” and offers an ombudsman-type optimally sized government, and intolerance towards private rent-seeking (See Moyo 2009, p. 34).

²³ The matter was evident in the demands placed by the ‘street activists’ (because of a lack of organisation) in different countries. The demands in some MMCs are for rights and representation (without unseating the current government e.g. in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria), in some for changes of government (e.g. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen), in some others no change at all (e.g. UAE the tribal leaders have renewed allegiances to the national leadership and their programs condemning agitation of five individuals).

²⁴ Actually many countries with non-democratic governments, (e.g. Chile, China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan) achieved economic success by ensuring some “semblance of property

Many MMCs, with financial capability or political intention already have it or may have it soon (following the ‘fruit-vendor’ revolution in Tunisia in November 2010). Irrespective of the government systems, the people and governments both can enhance capability (of achieving higher human development) through organized cooperation.

17.4 Organised Cooperation (among Individuals and States) for Capability Enhancement

A good system for development management requires a structure and a process to involve people (the beneficiaries of any ‘development’ effort) in formulating, implementing, and monitoring policies. An enabling system enhances human capability for policy making, program and product creation and delivery for fulfilling needs by inculcating (vocational) skills, ensuring fair access to market and services. Islam emphasises *ummah* (community) solidarity so that human beings can live a complete and effective capable life because “Man is created weak” (Al Qur’an 4:28), and cannot live and exist except through social organisation and cooperation. According to Ibn Khaldun, human society functions as a whole through cooperation. A united community could help the individuals follow the guidance of the Qur’an and achieve personal goals, receiving divine support and thus spiritual solace. Since cooperation is essential for the survival of human society, coercion may be used, especially if people are either largely ignorant of, or ignoring, the interests of other human beings (Baali 1988).

Collective organised efforts to attain or resist social change have been in the forefront of the world ‘social movement’ in the recent past. Nonetheless, the individual and interpersonal aspects of group organising are most important because organised activities are for the benefit of individuals in community. Organisations create or enhance power.

Three different types of organisations involved in fulfilling human needs are government, private, and non-profit. Government organisations’ primary obligations are to protect property (including the national border), life, and (economic and social) relationships; and to provide infrastructure for public health. Private organisations provide programs and/or services with a primary purpose of serving itself by distributing profits. Non-profit organisations are formed around ideas or actions (to offer goods and services, to advocate, or to standardise and regulate) without distributing profit (if any). A clear balance and coordination among these three types of organisations may create effective public benefitting system for the MMCs. Organisations create voice and regards for democratic values and norms like competition of ideas and personalities, a merit system, mutual respect, tolerance, honesty, trans-

rights, functioning institutions, growth-promoting economic policies (for example, in fiscal and monetary management) and an investment climate that buttressed growth” (Moyo 2009, p. 43).

parency, and mutual protection. The fundamental notion of an organised system is that security comes by extending it to, not jeopardising it for, others.

Many MMCs with large scale membership organisations have achieved much in institutionalizing a democratic system in the recent past. For example, Indonesia with about 30 million members in two organisations (Mohammadia and Nahdat ul Ulama) has been able to consolidate its democracy much faster than any other (re)democratizing country in the world. Fearing the power of organisation or the organized, authoritarian governments do not allow political party but allows non-political organisations to neutralize political party activism but political party based elected governments, in particular in countries that are ‘democratizing backwards’, are restricting the activities of the civil society organisations not to be outshined by the public benefit activities of the honest and popular ‘non-political organisations’.

Functioning of organisations promotes meritocracy in general which is also an absolute necessity for a modern state. A country on the path of advancement needs to establish a system in which the more a person educates himself/herself, trains himself/herself, develops skills and contributes to the economy, the more he/she is rewarded.²⁵ Self-fulfilling and self-functioning organisations promote human development by inculcating cosmopolitan values, creating skills, and allowing and defending merit-based competitions. Good organisations among states (like the EU) can help achieve the same for the member states, so can an inter-MMC organisation (see Chap. 15). All national efforts and international cooperation may become futile if ethical practices do not become parts of economic and political systems.

17.5 Ethical Practices for Sustained Capability

So as far as the MMCs and their economic ethics are concerned, illegal or unethical work practices are to be rejected because of the commands of the Qur’an to the people in power to be fair in decision making, away from nepotism or misusing power by breaking the trust (6:152; 17:35; 4:135; 4:58). The MMCs seem not to have done well in following the dicta of the religion, the CDHRI²⁶ codes, or even the ‘UN Convention Against Corruption’. The 2010 Transparency International CPI (Corruption Perception Index) data consist of 180 countries (26% or 47 of which are MMCs in Africa and Asia).²⁷ The list with the first 105 countries scoring CPI be-

²⁵ Follows a comment by Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of Singapore cited in Schuman 2010, p. 60.

²⁶ “Authority is a trust; and abuse or malicious exploitation thereof is explicitly prohibited, in order to guarantee fundamental human rights” (The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, Article 23).

²⁷ There are debates about the method of preparing the CPI based on perception, not data. The CPI is affected by what is perceived as corruption, and may change once the activities of many rich country firms are included in the discussion. Also, many activities in some rich countries, for example the spoils system of disbursing government jobs in the US may be considered corruption in some other countries (Chang 2008, p. 168). The CPI is used in the discussion because no other alternative is available.

tween 9.4–3.0 (the higher the better), includes only fourteen (13.3%) MMCs.²⁸ The list of the last 75 countries (scoring a CPI between 2.9–1.1) includes comparatively much higher number of MMCs—33 (44%).

Corruption is not an isolated national issue, but is entangled in international political economy and the big power politics which was worse during the cold-war. The cold-war boosted corruption in Africa and Asia had adverse impacts on national economies. A recent report of the World Bank estimated that about 40% of Africa's private wealth is held offshore, and the African Union (in 2002) estimated that “corruption cost Africa US\$148 billion annually—more than a quarter of the continent's entire GDP” (Meredith 2006, p. 687). Worse even at a hearing before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, experts argued that the World Bank has “participated (mostly passively) in the corruption of roughly US\$100 billion of its loan funds intended for development” (Moyo 2009, p. 52).

It is naively claimed that fearing that if more money is not pumped into “poor countries would not be able to pay back what they already owe, and this would affect the donors' financing themselves” (Moyo 2009, p. 55). The donors ignored these corrupt activities (Stiglitz 2006) to pump more ‘odious aid’. Evidences, however, show that donor governments (and some international organisations) preferred (corrupt) autocratic governments that promise to protect the donor's interests. For example, the (erstwhile) European colonial powers give about twice as much aid to their former colonies that are not democratic or that have relatively closed economies than they give to democratic and open non-colonies (Browne 2006, p. 9).

The end of cold war, however, meant that the “Western governments no longer had strategic interests in propping up repressive regimes merely because they were friendly to the West”. Thus the British government, in June 1990, declared that ‘henceforth’ the distribution of its aid programme was to favour countries “tending towards pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights, and market principles” (Meredith 2006, p. 387). President Mitterrand took the opportunity of talking at a Franco-African summit to warn the 33 African delegates, including 22 heads of state, that “French eagerness to offer development is bound to cool off in the case of authoritarian regimes which fail to heed the need for democratization while regimes prepared to embark on the courageous path of democracy will continue to have our enthusiastic support”²⁹ (Meredith 2006, p. 387).

The actions of these governments, however, are still far apart from their words. For example, French President Sarkozy, in 2007, hosted Libyan leader Gaddafi to “cut US\$14.7 billion in deals for arms and nuclear reactors” claiming that the deal would “save thousands of jobs” in France; and as late as one day before the fall of the Bin Ali government in Tunisia in January 2011, the French government authorized the delivery of ‘tear gas grenades’ to control the agitating crowds.³⁰ Further,

²⁸ Qatar tops the list with an overall position of 22 and a score of 7.0 followed by the UAE in number 30 with a CPI score of 6.5.

²⁹ “Previously, Franco-African summits had been known as lavish, back-slapping family gatherings, full of empty talks” (Meredith 2006, p. 387).

³⁰ An opinion column by Marwan Al Kabalan in The Gulf News 4 March 2011, p. 7.

a party thrown in honor of Dr Saif Al Islam Gaddafi for his doctorate degree at the LSE on ‘civil society and global governance’, included some of his ‘business partners/promoters’ including Tony Blair, Prince Andrew, and Sir Howard Davies.³¹

The success in curbing corruption in the world is in doubt because of the above dubious behaviour of some government leaders always mindful of their national ‘interests’ (or the next election, may be). The situation is further complicated by the fact that none of the important UN members has ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UN-CAC 2003). The UN-CAC does not define corruption, makes concealment an offence, emphasizes public reporting, is inclusive, makes overseas acts as similar offence, includes the private sector, and suggests anti-illicit enrichment as a national legal requirement (Hasan 2006). These provisions of the UN-CAC conflict with many National Acts.³² A major strategist of corruption eradication in the developing world, the USAID, in its Handbook on Fighting Corruption (1999), focuses on ‘lower-level bureaucratic and regulatory issues’. However, while administrative corruption reflects specific weaknesses within a system, ‘grand corruption can involve the distortion and manipulation of entire systems to serve private interests’ (USAID 2004; Hasan 2006). Further, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of the USA targets ‘exorbitant’ voluntary payments to high-ranking politicians and government officials, or the so-called ‘grand corruption’. The Act does not encompass ‘grand’ payment under ‘duress’, or ‘grease’ or ‘speed’ money paid to the ‘low-level agents or government officials to get them to expedite an action’ (the so-called ‘petty’ corruption) (Theobald 2002). Corruption hampers human development a) through resource pilferage, b) by demoralising the perpetrators, c) by demolishing merit systems and motivations for good work, d) by instigating violence, and e) by creating inflationary pressure in the market. MMCs need to wake up from this devastating system by diverting economy and being selective in dealing with ‘friends’. It is only possible with initial economic frugality (curbing luxury), independent comprehensive planning, and foreign direct investments (through local incentives, peaceful labor relations and international investment guarantee through strong patriotic political commitments above party or group benefits).

MMCs have had relatively lower achievements in human development. Independent analyses, however, “provide no support for the notion that Islam is a drag on growth”. Islamic tenets related to different aspects of human development “reinforce the notion that the impact of Islam” has been positive (see Chap. 1). There are other factors of lower human development in the MMCs. Geography, one of the factors of lower human development in the MMCs, makes all development efforts context-dependent; as such all MMCs need to devise development policies consid-

³¹ An opinion column by Anne Applebaum republished (from New York Times News Services) in the Gulf News 4 March 2011, p. 7.

³² The UN Convention infers a broad spectrum of actions as corruption, without defining it, to contradict with anti-corruption laws of many countries including that of the USA (see, Theobald 2002). Most countries have thus not ratified the Convention.

ering geographic location, climate, resources, and people. Thus the five catalysts of human development discussed above will have to be approached differently by different MMCs. These five essential catalysts of human development are likely to increase access to skills-supporting education, productive health, merit-based income that promotes savings for investment, manufacturing activities, economic diversity, open and fair market, and international cooperation for economic and political security; and reduce inequality, ‘rent-seeking’, and dependence on natural resources, external resources, and lower-end foreign workers. All five vehicles (i.e. value creation for economic diversity, distributive justice, community preference internalising governance, organised cooperation among individuals and states for capability enhancement, and ethical practices) have support in Islamic tenets and are less resource intensive but can institutionalise systems for human development in the MMCs.

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