Development and Democracy

What have we learned and how?

Edited by
Ole Elgström and Goran Hyden

London and New York

Development and Democracy

How much is democracy dependent upon supportive economic and social conditions? This question, which has occupied political scientists and sociologists for almost half a century, has attracted special attention in the last ten years as more and more countries have engaged in efforts to democratise. This volume is the first collection to take stock of current literature and put it into context.

This book highlights the principal new gains of knowledge as well as continuing gaps in our understanding of the relationship between development and democracy. The chapters cover key issues in the field of comparative politics such as:

- economic development and democracy
- globalisation and democracy
- class and democracy
- state and democracy
- civil society and democracy
- various institutional arrangements and democratic governance

Development and Democracy confirms the robust relationship between level of economic development and democracy, but suggests that globalisation is a key variable in determining the tenuous nature of this relationship in the periphery of the world economy. It raises new questions about the role of social classes in democratisation, and points to the importance of including the nature of the state as a factor in the study of democratisation. A further important finding is that countries with mixed legal systems correlate less positively with democracy than do countries with more homogeneous legal systems. Moreover, *Development and Democracy* shows conclusively that the way researchers design their studies has a major impact on their findings.

Ole Elgström is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden. His latest book is *Images and Strategies for Autonomy: Explaining Security Policy Strategies in the 19th Century*. **Goran Hyden** is Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Florida, Gainesville. He has published extensively on politics and development with special emphasis on East Africa; his many books include *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*; *No Shortcuts to Progress*; and *Governance and Politics in Africa*.

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Series editor's preface

One does not have to be a Marxist to accept the notion that economic development shapes our world and determines the prospects for democratic government. Ever since Seymour Martin Lipset published his seminal work on this relationship more than four decades ago, scholars have been discussing the impact of industrialisation, modernisation and economic growth on political decision-making processes. The overwhelming amount of evidence collected unambiguously corroborates a straightforward thesis: in each and every empirical study a significant positive correlation between economic development and democracy is reported. Yet, in spite of this remarkable and rather unusual consensus about the empirical record, controversies and disputes did not wane. On the contrary. The relationship between economic development and democracy is still a never-ending story; apparently invulnerable to fashions and whims, and irrespective of the amount of empirical evidence compiled.

It is not difficult to come across the reasons for the continuous attention paid to the political consequences of economic development. From the very beginning of the debates it was clear that the empirical record consisted of *correlations* and that explanations in causal terms were extremely complicated and controversial. Exactly because the empirical record is so comprehensible and undisputed, widely deviating interpretations are presented all the time. Besides, the third and fourth waves of democratic transition underlined the need for much more analytical rigidity in this area. Is economic development a prerequisite for the transition of authoritarian regimes into democratic regimes? Or are its main consequences related to the persistence or stability of existing democracies? Does economic development improve the level of democratic decision making in the short run and is that a contribution to the long-term stability of these regimes? And shouldn't we consider the opportunity that liberal democracy facilitates economic development instead of the other way around? Analytical confusion and evident under-specification of explanations seem to be as characteristic of this research area as broad conformity about the empirical record.

The present volume does not constitute yet another popular account of the debates about the Lipset thesis in the light of rapid transformations of authoritarian regimes or the fact that democracy developed into 'the only game in town'. Neither does it present a simple solution to the theoretical and

methodological complications in this area. As the editors point out in their introduction, the contributions to this volume are based on the idea that both quantitative and qualitative approaches are needed and that we should be careful not to generalise our findings without paying proper attention to the potential relevance of related factors. What is needed, then, is a closer look at intervening, intermediate and contextual factors that might explain the relationship between development and democracy. In addition, painstaking analyses of social, economic and political developments in parts of the world that have attracted less attention so far, might enhance our understanding of the actual mechanisms underlying these processes.

A first attempt to pay attention to specific factors is presented by Jonas Johansson in his extensive discussion of the connection between democracy and globalisation, arguing that globalisation establishes an additional explanatory dimension of democratisation (Chapter 2). The next four contributions focus on different specifications of intervening and intermediary factors in the relationship between development and democracy. Renske Doorenspleet shows that the most plausible explanations in terms of the positions of the middle and working classes have to be refuted on the basis of the empirical evidence available (Chapter 3). The role of political leaders is underlined by Axel Hadenius by confronting the approaches of Dankwart Rustow and Arend Lijphart (Chapter 4). Karin Hilmer Pedersen and Ole Nørgaard show that the predictability provided by legal systems is a mostly neglected, but important factor (Chapter 5), and Lars Johannsen discusses the impact of the electoral system on the level of democracy (Chapter 6). The two subsequent contributions are addressed to the problems of development and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. The huge differences between the countries in this part of the world are summarised by Staffan Lindberg in his distinction of the transition processes in four groups of states (Chapter 7), while Goran Hyden stresses the need to consider more carefully the impact of stateness, ethnicity and foreign aid on democratisation in Africa. An extensive discussion of the relationship between civil society and democratisation is presented by Caroline Boussard (Chapter 9). The analyses of Anders Uhlin of the impact of external factors on the transition of the Indonesian regime (Chapter 10) bring us back to the starting point of the volume as presented by Jonas Johansson in his contribution on globalisation. The editors' summary and interpretation of the major findings are presented in Chapter 11 and do not have to be reproduced here.

The complicated and complex social, economic and political changes in the last few decades have urged several researchers to develop their own fields of specialisation. 'Transitology' and 'consolidology' have replaced parts of the conventional approaches in comparative politics. Although the suggestion that democracy is 'the only game in town' might be somewhat too simplistic (and too optimistic), it is clear that a further fragmentation of scientific research is not to be aspired to. The evident interdependence of economic development, democracy and democratisation continuously requires open and critical approaches. Together with the volume *Democracy and Political Change in the 'Third World'* (edited

by Jeff Haynes) published earlier in this series, the contributions to the present volume provide a unique overview of the problems and prospects of democratisation and democratic government in all parts of the world.

Jan W. van Deth, *Series Editor*
Mannheim, July 2001

Preface and acknowledgements

The relationship between development and democracy has now been the subject of research for more than four decades. Ever since Seymour Martin Lipset's seminal article in *American Political Science Review* in 1959, students of comparative politics have returned to the subject with a view to testing the robustness of his findings. Although his study was confined to countries that had already enjoyed some degree of democracy, his initial conclusion that democracy is positively correlated with higher levels of economic development has largely stood the test even when additional countries have been included in subsequent studies. To be sure, how this relationship should be interpreted has varied. Thus, the debate about this subject matter is far from over. As researchers have revisited it in the last ten years, substantive insights have been refined, but the question of how we acquire our knowledge has come into greater focus. Thus, methodological issues have attracted fresh attention. This volume is an effort to take stock of the literature, addressing the issues of both what we know and how we know it.

It grows out of a series of events in the Department of Political Science at the University of Lund, Sweden, where Goran Hyden served as Visiting Professor in the autumn of 1997. In a stock-taking effort both he and his students recognised the need for a more complete overview of the development–democracy interface. The occasion to respond to this need came with the Joint Workshops of the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) in Copenhagen in April 2000. The two editors of this volume were responsible for organising a workshop specifically focusing on the relationship between development and democracy. A total of 17 scholars attended in a thorough scrutiny and discussion of 14 papers. The majority of the chapters included in this volume were originally submitted to the workshop in Copenhagen, but all of them have been thoroughly revised in the light of comments received at the workshop or subsequently. The contribution by Jonas Johansson has been solicited specifically for this volume, based on work that he has done in conjunction with and following the 1997 autumn seminar in Lund.

The editors would like to acknowledge their thanks to ECPR for accepting our workshop proposal and to the Swedish Institute for providing partial funding of the event. Finally, we would also like to thank the doctoral students in Political

Science at Lund for having actively lobbied for the realisation of this project. The contribution by Staffan Lindberg who assisted in the preparations of the ECPR workshop is especially appreciated.

Goran Hyden and Ole Elgström, *Editors*
Gainesville and Lund, June 2001

Abbreviations

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
ANC	African National Congress
AV	Alternative Vote
BV	Bloc Vote
CL	Civil Liberties
CPP	Convention People's Party
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
FH	Freedom House
FHI	Freedom House Index
FONAC	Foro Nacional de Convergencia
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional
FPTP	First-Past-The-Post
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IFI	International Finance Institutions
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
ILP	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
List-PR	Proportional Representation by List
MMP	Mixed Member Proportional
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PM	Plurality-Majoritarian
PR	Proportional Representation
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SNTV	Single Non-Transferable Vote
SP	Semi-Proportional
STV	Single Transferable Vote
TNC	Transnational Corporation
TRS	Two Round System
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States

1 Development and democracy

An overview

Goran Hyden

Introduction

The accelerated rate of political transformation that characterised the last decade of the past century in various regions of the world stimulated a renewed interest in the relationship between development and democracy. While the argument in the 1960s had been that democracy was positively correlated with level of modernisation – then viewed as the equivalence of development – the two subsequent decades were much more circumspect about any such relationship. It was only the tumultuous years following the fall of communism and the attempts to move away from autocratic modes of rule that encouraged students of comparative politics to revisit the development–democracy nexus. To be sure, students of Latin American politics had already begun to respond to reform efforts undertaken in their region in the early 1980s, but it was only in the 1990s that issues of democratisation re-entered the mainstream of comparative politics. The reorientation in the field of comparative politics has already resulted in a broad range of publications. This volume is an effort to provide an understanding of this literature by focusing on two elementary questions: (1) what do we know? and (2) how do we know it? As such, the book is aimed at serving as a text that introduces the reader to an increasingly complex set of issues that scholars have raised and are still grappling with.

The biggest challenge facing this effort is to do justice to the full range that this literature now encompasses. The first section of this introductory chapter tries to provide a map of how the different contributions may be conceptualised and classified. Although there is a growing interest in exploring the extent to which democracy – or any dimension of it, such as 'freedom' – is beneficial to development (Leftwich 1996; Ersson and Lane 1996; Bhalla 1997), our focus is primarily on democracy as a dependent variable. We are interested in how democracy is brought about, not what it produces in terms of public goods or benefits. Explanatory variables may be found at three different levels: structural, institutional and human agency levels. Our volume is organised so as to reflect this broader distinction that is apparent from a review of the existing literature. These triple levels may also be viewed as points on a continuum defining the extent to which democracy is a product of circumstances over which individual political actors have or don't have

control. Development, in other words, is viewed here not only in socio-economic terms, but also in terms of values and institutions that help shape political outcomes. The principal objective of this chapter is to present and discuss these distinctions and place the individual chapters of the volume in the broader intellectual context where they belong.

Mapping the major approaches

Development and democracy are both difficult concepts because they tend to mean different things to different people. For example, conceptions of development have varied over time in the past five decades: from being the equivalence of modernisation to being concerned with overcoming social inequities and on to providing opportunities for individuals in the marketplace and institutional improvements in the name of 'good governance'. Similarly, the definition of democracy has been the subject of much debate as to whether it should be a 'minimalist' concept useful for analytical purposes or more encompassing to do justice to its substantivist dimensions. We acknowledge these variations and controversies that still tend to affect the literature and will return to some of them in our discussion below.



Figure 1.1 Different emphases in the study of the development–democracy nexus

In mapping the main contributions in the literature on development and democracy, I suggest that it may be helpful to follow a distinction along two axes.[1] The first is epistemological and methodological where the two endpoints are 'structure' and 'agency'. The second is substantive in nature and differentiates between a focus on 'elite' or 'mass' level. With the help of these analytical dimensions, it is possible to characterise the mainstream of the literature on this subject as shown in Figure 1.1. This conceptual map is not necessarily complete. It highlights only names of the more important person or persons associated with each approach constituting a research tradition or focus that is established and generally recognised in the field of comparative politics as especially relevant for understanding the development–democracy nexus.

The structuralist approaches typically adopt a historical perspective in explaining the success or failure of democratisation. They also tend to look at cases where democracy is already established. Because of their historicist approach, they avoid discussing cases of democratisation that are recent, the only exception to this being the literature that deals with the relation between economic reform and democratisation since that is also a contemporary phenomenon, notably in developing countries that have responded to Structural Adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This literature, like the one dealing with democratic breakdowns due to economic dependence on external forces, is included on the structuralist side, because the variables are economic and thus underlying causes of political action.

Approaches emphasising 'agency', on the other hand, work with a shorter-term perspective. They tend to discuss the process in which decisions are made and do not necessarily assume a linear causal relation between independent and dependent variables. Much of the literature focuses on the choices political leaders make to foster their own interests. In the context of democratisation, studies look at the extent to which self-interests are pursued with or without interest in a positive-sum outcome. The latter implies readiness to compromise; to make the necessary trade-offs to secure a gain for oneself but also a guarantee that the other party to the agreement will gain something and adhere to it. Because agency is not autonomous or free, I refer to it in this chapter as 'structured contingency'. In this approach, institutions matter. The neo-institutionalist approach to the study of politics that emerged prominent in the 1990s presupposes that institutions are designed by autonomous actors, who make choices from the perspective of their own interest. These institutions tend to survive because they create a climate of predictability and trust, both of which are important for the consolidation of democracy. There are some neo-institutionalists, notably March and Olsen (1984, 1989), who see institutions in a historical light, arguing that they are not merely means to promote greater efficiency but also serve a number of other objectives. North's notion of institutional 'path dependency' (1990) also implies that human choice is not autonomous, i.e. free from influence by factors outside their control. Neo-institutionalists, whether they originally come from a pure agency perspective or recognise the bounded nature of rationality, are listed on the side of 'agency', because they acknowledge the relative autonomy of choice.

The literature on development and democracy also differs in terms of its focus on elites or the mass of the population. Those who are interested in providing prescriptive advice tend to be focusing on elites because they are the ones most directly concerned with making policy. Huntington's oft-quoted study on the 'third wave' of democratisation (1991) is very much written in this vein, based on the premise that political scientists have accumulated enough knowledge about processes of democratisation that we can tell the political elite what traps to avoid and what opportunities to seize. While this remains the ultimate goal of good political science, most people in the discipline are probably likely to adopt a more humble position, realising that our knowledge of democratisation is still very general and, at the same time, fragmented. The almost manual-like presentation in Huntington's volume may be viewed as a bold attempt to aggregate knowledge of practical interest to democratising elites, but it is also, in the minds of many others, a pretentious effort that misrepresents the state of knowledge in this field of study.

Studies focusing on the masses, or citizens at large, tend to be more varied. They focus on values as well as associations. Almond and Verba's analysis of political culture (1963) draws on political surveys in five different countries with the purpose of testing the relation between 'civic' values and democracy. The World Values Survey that is administered by the University of Michigan has contributed to an understanding of how human values and preferences shift in response to changes in material conditions. For instance, Inglehart (1997) demonstrates a significant shift from materialist to post-materialist values among the population in industrialised societies. Associations, however, also count in this genre of political studies. Putnam draws attention to the long-term positive outcome that comes from people working together in small-scale groups. In his view, these associations generate trust – or social capital, as he calls the end product – a key ingredient in any effort to generate economic development or political democracy (Putnam 1993). Tarrow (1998), however, also shows that political opportunity matters and that organised activity can make a difference also in the short run.[2] His study of social movements shows that civil society can be energised by concerted action around a specific issue that captures the minds of large numbers of people.

Having mapped the intellectual terrain that this volume enters, it is now time to discuss in greater length the various issues that are covered here. In so doing, an attempt will be made to take stock of how the knowledge around a particular issue has evolved and changed over time. Contributors to this book are engaged in either reviewing existing work with a view to providing a fresh perspective or charting new paths, i.e. indicating areas that are under-researched and offering opportunities for future studies.

Structuralist studies

This type of study constitutes a significant share of the literature on development and democracy. As it has evolved over the past 40 years, authors have generally been able to prove that this is a fruitful area of research. Three issues have crystallised as being of special interest: (1) does location in the global economic order

matter? (2) does class or social structure matter? and (3) do value changes caused by structural factors matter? I shall discuss these three issues in turn before addressing some of the methodological challenges associated with this approach.

Location in the global economic order

This issue first emerges in the seminal study by Lipset, originally presented as an article in the *American Political Science Review* (1959) and subsequently further detailed in a full-length book with the somewhat ambiguous title, *Political Man* (1960). Studies in this area, therefore, have a long pedigree with many other prominent political sociologists and political economists having made contributions. Lipset's original finding was that 'the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy' (1959: 56). This point was then discussed in the context of modernisation. It was not so much the location in the global economic order that was significant, but the ability of a country to adopt the structural and cultural features associated with modern society, i.e. an urbanised and educated population as well as an industrialised economy.

Other scholars who have reviewed this thesis include Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979 and 1983), Bollen and Jackman (1985), and Brunk, Caldeira and Lewis-Beck (1987). Using the regression type of statistical analysis, they have demonstrated that level of economic development consistently emerges as a statistically and substantively significant influence on democracy. The latter, for example, found that level of economic development alone accounts for more variance in democracy than all other independent variables taken together (Brunk, Caldeira, and Lewis-Beck 1987: 468). It is no surprise, therefore, that some students of development and democracy are ready to treat it as such a strong relation that it ought not to be in question. Diamond (1992: 110), for example, maintains that 'given the considerable variation in quantitative methods, in countries and years tested, in the measures of democracy employed, and in the vast array of different regression equations . . . this must rank as one of the most powerful and robust relationships in the study of comparative political development'.

Even if it is a robust relationship, it raises questions about what in that relationship really matters, and what kind of conclusions to draw therefrom. What matters is at least in part determined by how the independent and dependent variables are specified. Hadenius (1992), for example, developed a composite index of democracy that was more encompassing than the one used in earlier studies. In testing no fewer than 17 indicators associated with Lipset's modernisation thesis, he found that, while being 'well-to-do' matters at the level of cross-national comparison, it is not necessarily the economic but the social factors, such as literacy and education, that are the more powerful explanatory variables.

Some scholars have also questioned whether it is *level* of economic development or *rate* of economic growth that is more important. Writing before the prospect of changes in the Communist bloc was evident, Huntington (1984) asked himself the question of what the prospects are for more countries to become democratic. He concluded that such prospects were rather dim, not because most

Third World countries have low average per capita incomes, but because economic development was not fast enough, i.e. the rate of growth was slow. Although Huntington does not address the question of what the reason is for the slower growth in these countries, he points to the potential importance of location in the global economic order as a significant variable. Using a series of dummy variables to test how far the position in the world economy matters, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994: 906) conclude that economic development has a differential impact: it matters most in the core countries, i.e. the industrialised societies, only half as much in the semi-peripheral countries, and even less so for nations in the periphery. Even in the periphery, however, the effects remain statistically and substantively significant.

Studies like that of Burkhart and Lewis-Beck establish positive correlations between key variables but they do not necessarily rein in everything that matters in the development–democracy equation. Furthermore, one may assume that economic development matters most in the core countries simply because it has been present there for a longer time. Nonetheless, the value of their study is that they draw attention to an under-studied and under-theorised aspect of democratisation studies, namely the role of external variables. It is not only the domestic environment of countries in the periphery that counts but also their external environment. As we look to gaps that need to be filled in the research on development and democracy, one issue is clearly what difference globalisation makes. In this volume, Jonas Johansson explores the relationship between globalisation, socio-economic development and democracy with specific reference to countries that are not already mature or consolidated democracies. This first attempt to operationalise globalisation in the study of democratisation is yielding interesting results that should form the basis for many future studies on this set of issues.

While we may have to await more studies on globalisation before knowing its varying impacts, we can at least at this point accept two bottom-line propositions that seem reasonably well supported. The first is that economic crises and other performance problems in non-democratic regimes help promote a democratic transition. Gasiorowski (1995) provides the most exhaustive test of the validity of this set of hypotheses, although it is made with reference to scholars of Latin America like Remmer (1990). Using data for 97 Third World countries with populations of at least one million inhabitants in 1980 for the period 1950–89, Gasiorowski (1995) convincingly demonstrates that inflationary crises tended to inhibit democratisation in the 1950s and 1960s but seem to have facilitated the same process in the late 1980s. The second proposition, most strongly made by Przeworski and Limongi (1997), is that there is no relationship between per capita income level, on the one hand, and the probability of democratic transition, on the other. Contrary to what both Lipset and Huntington have indicated, these authors argue that rising income does not make a democratic transition more likely; it just makes democracy more likely to endure if it comes into being for other reasons.

One such reason may be growing international pressure to democratise. Both Hyden in Chapter 8 and Anders Uhlin in Chapter 10 provide evidence from

Africa and Indonesia respectively, that such external variables are important in determining political outcomes. Taking structural factors in the international economy into consideration, however, is still to be more systematically examined in cross-national time-series analysis.

The role of class structure

The latter type of study is useful for focusing on broad systematic causal processes that hold across time and space, but needs to be complemented by those that include more idiosyncratic explanations that hold at certain times or in certain regions or countries only. That is why this volume includes both these types. The analysis of specific historical events or processes is often an inevitable complement to statistical techniques, especially if the research objective is to concentrate on the occurrence of discrete events within their historical context.

Attempts to generalise from such 'thick' event histories have been made, the most widely cited being the study by Barrington Moore Jr (1966) on the various historical pathways to democracy. His conclusion that capitalist economic development creates growing pressure for democratisation by fostering the emergence of a middle class has been very broadly accepted: 'without a bourgeoisie, no democracy'. The latter sets the broader parameters for the development of democracy by liberalising economic market forces and thereby also individualising both behaviours and choices.

Although Moore's study clearly draws its inspiration from historical shifts in the basic structural level of society, his analysis recognises class as an independent variable. As social forces, classes can take society in different directions. Comparing Germany and Japan, which adopted a fascist approach to rule, with the United Kingdom and United States, which chose a democratic path, he clearly admits that class is a significant factor. More specifically, he implies that the middle class – or the bourgeoisie – enjoys a degree of autonomy by being able to shape the course of political development in one direction or the other. As the above comparison suggests, it is not inevitable that the middle class will choose a democratic path over a non-democratic one. It all depends on how they manage the challenges that structural factors, e.g. in the economy, present.

There is little, if any, disagreement with Moore's thesis about the role that the middle class plays in democratic development. Even those like Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) who focus on the role of the working class admit that without the middle class it is difficult to perceive of liberal democracy getting on the political agenda. Rueschemeyer and his colleagues, in other words, do not contradict Moore but qualify his argument by suggesting that democratic consolidation takes place only when the working class has accepted the principles of constitutional democracy. Without the latter, democracy remains contested and is far from 'the only game in town'.

With economic liberalisation being pushed around the world, one can hypothesise that class may grow in significance. After all, deeper social inequalities are reported from all regions of the world. Livelihoods are being threatened; quality of

life is going down for a majority of people, especially in Third World countries (UNDP 2000). So, how far can we trust the inductive findings of the historical structuralist studies quoted above? Can we come up with any more systematic findings? This is the challenge that Renske Doorenspleet takes up in Chapter 3. The most immediate issue is how to operationalise the concept of class. There is no universal agreement about how that should be done. Given the relative shortage of data that lend itself to an analysis of the concept, it is not easy at this point to arrive at any firm conclusions about the relationship between class and the prospect of transition to democracy. In a first attempt to do so, however, Doorenspleet finds that her logistics regression suggests that class structure does not have an impact on the probability that a country makes a transition to democracy. Hers is a path-breaking study that points to the need for more studies in this area, notably surveys that try to measure people's subjective perception of class. Such survey data are available for rich countries, but are yet to be collected in developing countries. Such data would considerably improve our ability to say something about the relationship between 'class', on the one hand, and the probability of transition to democracy, on the other.

Value changes

Changes in the economy do not only produce new forms of social stratification, as indicated above. They also tend to influence our cultural values. Modernisation and value change is the subject of several important studies in the field of comparative politics. Almond and Verba (1963) made it a key relationship in their attempt to understand what type of values is associated with democracy. Inglehart (1990 and 1997) studies value changes associated with both modernisation and what he calls 'post-modernisation'. Fukuyama (1995) discusses how social trust is related to the growth in material prosperity. These cultural studies are all important for our understanding of how values become intervening variables in the search for democracy.

There is, however, at the same time a rather simplistic understanding of the relationship between development, value changes and the prospect for democracy. In addition to an under-specification of the common dimension in which modernisation, value change, and democratisation converge, studies tend to be caught in the logic of bivariate relations rather than a broader logic of social change. Assuming that subjective aspirations reflect the nature of objective conditions, a point that is associated historically with Marxism but is also reflected in psychological theories, e.g. Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2000) suggest that the intensification of human striving for self-expression that follows from enlarging people's physical and cognitive resources (modernisation) reduces constraints on the level of formal rules by generating 'negative' and 'positive' freedom rights (democratisation). Using data from 63 societies included in the World Values Survey, they find that (1) democratisation originates in aspiration adjustments on the individual level, (2) democracy does not flow directly from economic changes but via shifts in ethical values, (3) this sequence has cross-cultural validity and (4) the

sequence holds against rival influences – in particular, the transnational infusion of changes in historically connected societies.

Although more research is needed to confirm whether these findings hold if other data sets are used, the notion that democratisation in a given society is the result of both material and ethical changes is important. It suggests that the dynamics of social change, after all, is driven more by internal than external factors. We do not specifically address this issue here, but it is one that should be considered in the light of increased global communications. How important is the latter factor when it comes to democratisation? Do collective entities, such as countries, really learn from each other? Or, is it a very selective learning that does not necessarily produce testable outcomes in the short run? These are some of the substantive questions that the study of value changes gives rise to.

Methodological issues

One of the problems with research on development and democracy is that scholars using quantitative methods tend to ignore those using qualitative methods, and vice versa. The latter tend to use 'thick' concepts which are applied to a small number of cases, while the former tend to rely on 'thin' concepts that are applied to a large number of cases. Because of the lack of dialogue between these two groups of researchers, the task of knowing more about causal relations has been stifled. This volume tries to correct this by including both types of approach, the assumption being that qualitative researchers play a key role in opening up new areas of inquiry, while the quantitatively oriented can ascertain the extent to which findings are generalisable. In short, the study of development and democracy needs both approaches since they are complementary.

There are many problems with the existing state of knowledge in this field that stem from methodological shortcomings. I shall draw attention to at least some of the more common. The first concerns the quality of the data available. Generally speaking, there has been heavy reliance on the Freedom House Index of Civil Liberties and Political Rights. With few other data sets available, it is understandable that many researchers have found the FHI handy. There are at least two problems, however, with that Index. The first is that it relies on the evaluative input of a panel of experts rather than primary data collected in survey form. The scores in the Index, while not wholly invalid, nonetheless suffer from lack of representativeness of opinions in individual countries. The second problem is that the aggregate scores provided for each indicator and country tend to be rather crude. This lack of differentiation is also evident in many studies that use other data (e.g. Banks 1979; Jaggers and Gurr 1995; and Vanhanen 1997). To highlight this problem, it may be interesting to compare the work by Arat (1988) and that of Gonick and Rosh (1988). The former commits the mistake of using 'economic development' as an undifferentiated independent variable in trying to replicate the findings of Lipset. The latter, in contrast, employ a more specified equation and include among independent variables a greater range than most scholars have, but in so doing expose themselves to the risk of an unusual amount of collinearity. Both

these studies, incidentally, rely on the cross-national time-series data of Banks (1979), but as Bollen (1993) has shown, Banks' democracy indicators contain considerable measurement errors.

In addition to the questionable quality of much of the data on the development–democracy nexus, there is the problem of over- or under-specification of key concepts. Over-specification refers to the concept being loaded with too many empirical referents. For example, the inclusion of social justice as a dimension of democracy may be an illustration of over-specification. Under-specification means omitting a relevant dimension of a concept. In this kind of situation, there is a risk that all cases automatically become instances of the concept. Much of what is relevant in a definition can only be determined with reference to the existing literature and the objective of the research undertaken. Collier and Levitsky (1997) provide a helpful overview of the procedures for such an analysis of concepts with special reference to the literature on democracy.

There is also the possibility of mis-specification, i.e. the failure to logically organise the dimensions of a concept. Using a common definition of democracy (Dahl 1971) that builds on two dimensions – contestation and participation – it is possible to logically identify the components of each dimension as illustrated in Figure 1.2.[3]

The various components included in the diagram follow from the disaggregation of the concept of democracy into two principal dimensions. It is important that each level of disaggregation – and there could be more than those identified in Figure 1.2 – offers explicit criteria for distinguishing among cases. The two most common errors are conflation and redundancy. The first refers to the introduction of dimensions or components that do not modify the immediately superior level of aggregation but concern instead a different overarching concept or dimension. For example, adding 'access of parties to public financing' as a component of participation would be conflating it with contestation, since that component refers to



Figure 1.2 The logical structure of the democracy concept

'contestation' rather than 'participation'. The second error – redundancy – occurs when the student uses a new dimension that does not add any clear distinctions. For example, adding 'extent of suffrage' under 'participation' does not help since it overlaps with the 'right to vote'.

Measurement also produces its own challenges with regard to validity, reliability, and replicability. The validity of measures refers to how well indicators are operationalised to measure what they are supposed to measure in the empirical realm. The greatest difficulty here is to ensure that the indicator does not measure more than one empirical manifestation of the concept. Most researchers have to settle for what might be called a 'sub-optimal' choice, because it is extremely difficult to identify a singular manifestation. Reliability refers to the prospect that the same data-collection process would produce the same data. Replicability prevails whenever other scholars are able to reproduce the process through which data were generated. Staffan Lindberg highlights these problems in Chapter 7, where he examines the findings of one of the most commonly cited books on democratisation in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Lindberg shows that very different results are reached if the time periods are changed and the number of countries in the sample is increased. With regard to both reliability and replicability, therefore, the two authors do not score very highly. It would be wrong, therefore, to draw any firm conclusions from the findings that they present with regard to groups of countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Structured contingency

If the structuralist concern with the prerequisites of democracy constitutes the 'first' generation of studies on democratisation, a distinct second generation has emerged in the past two decades that is more process-oriented and focused on contingent choice. This new approach incorporates institutional factors as explanatory variables. Much of this literature takes its inspiration from regime transitions in southern Europe (notably Spain and Portugal) in the latter part of the 1970s and in Latin America in the 1980s. The five-volume study of these transitions by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) clearly stands out as a landmark in this genre. Democratisation is understood as a historical process with analytically distinct, if empirically overlapping, stages of transition and consolidation. A variety of actors with different followings, preferences, calculations, resources and time horizons come to the fore during these successive stages. As, for example, Karl (1990) notes, elite factions and social movements seem to play the key roles in bringing about the demise of authoritarian rule, i.e. at the onset of the transition; political parties move to centre stage at a later point in the transition; and business associations, trade unions and state agencies become major determinants of the type of democracy that is eventually consolidated.

These stages differ in terms of degree of uncertainty prevailing at each point. During regime transitions, political calculations and interactions are highly uncertain, as Przeworski (1991) points out. Actors find it hard to know what their interests are, who their supporters are, and which groups will be their allies or

opponents. The absence of predictable 'rules of the game' during a regime transition expands the boundaries of contingent choice. In fact, the dynamics of the transition revolve around strategic calculations and tentative arrangements between actors with uncertain power resources aimed at defining who will be legitimately entitled to play in the political game and what criteria will determine the winners and losers. It is in negotiating the transition that human agency is typically most autonomous. A regime is being consolidated whenever contending groups come to accept some set of rules, formal or informal, about 'who gets what, when and how' from politics. I have suggested elsewhere (Hyden 1999) that we should reserve the use of the governance concept for this type of 'constitutive' politics.

The notion of contingency, which accepts that outcomes depend less on objective conditions than on subjective norms, images and perceptions surrounding strategic choices, stresses the importance of collective decisions and political interactions in ways that the structuralist approach does not. Decisions take place within specific structural or institutional frameworks; hence the notion of 'structured contingency.' Skilful bargaining by astute political leaders is not enough for understanding why certain decisions are made. They are also shaped by the institutional circumstances in which the actors operate. For example, the institutional legacy of Communist rule is typically used as the principal reference in the literature on Eastern Europe. This 'path-dependent' approach to the study of political regime transitions has become particularly popular in recent years and was adopted, for example, by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) in their study of political transitions in sub-Saharan Africa.

Even though decisions are seen as contingent on structural or institutional conditions, authors writing in this genre tend to be more optimistic about the chances for democracy. Democracy can be created regardless of what the socio-economic conditions are. It is a matter of people – and the elite, in particular – learning to work together and generate the institutional framework that keeps democracy going (Rustow 1970). Among institutions that are important for achieving this objective, four sets are of special interest: (1) power-sharing arrangements, (2) electoral modalities, (3) legal systems and (4) voluntary associations, or civil society. I shall discuss each one, in turn.

Power-sharing arrangements

Democratisation often runs into serious difficulties because societies are divided vertically rather than horizontally. Resource conflicts are not interpreted in straightforward social class terms but take on meaning only in the context of identity politics. Whether race, ethnicity or religion constitutes the line along which cleavages are defined, they pose a special problem for democratising countries precisely because the issue of inclusion in government is conflated with inclusion in the community. In other words, strategic choices are socially or culturally embedded to such an extent that it becomes difficult to produce governance agreements that satisfy all parties to the conflict. Arend Lijphart has more than any other

political scientist devoted his academic interest to this kind of issue. He is associated with the concept of 'consociationalism' (Lijphart 1977), a power-sharing arrangement meant to secure inclusion of all groups in the state. It resembles a corporatist system of rule in that it relies very extensively on the ability of members of the political elite (1) to work out agreements among themselves and (2) to persuade their followers to comply with these rules.

The problems of inclusion and exclusion do not disappear when new institutions are being adopted and put into operation. In fact, democratisation itself may exacerbate such problems precisely because it brings elements of openness and competition into the political process. Conceptions of the scope of the political community become more salient as people interact with each other in the public realm and have to make choices about who is an 'insider' and who is an 'outsider'. One of the ironies of democratisation, as Horowitz (1995: 23) notes, is that, as the future is being planned, the past intrudes with increasing severity. While he and many other writers on ethnic conflict are right that there is no such thing as a fresh start in culturally plural societies, differences in historical depth are likely to matter. For instance, where the notion of 'first-comers' is deeply rooted, claims of political priority by virtue of indigenousness are typically made to challenge those deemed to be immigrants. Asia and Europe are particularly full of such claims. 'Sri Lankan Tamils really belong to South India', 'Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia are immigrants' and 'Bengalis are illegally in Assam' are only a few of those claims made in Asia. The Balkans as well as the Baltic and Caucasus regions of the former Soviet Union are other examples of places where such claims are being made. They are particularly hard to resolve because they are often embedded in religious differences that reinforce the ethnic dimension and have a long history.

Although ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are many, they tend to be of a different kind. First of all, they are more recent and thus there is less cultural material to sustain them. Second, they tend to be ignited by individual politicians in search of power relying on different models of constructing political order (Ndegwa 1997). The result is that ethnic conflicts in Africa are short-lived and less deeply embedded in cultural idioms. They are socially constructed to serve instant political ends, but they can be resolved through realignments once there is a change of government. There are a few exceptions to this pattern, Rwanda and Burundi being the most prominent. They are different because the relations between Hutus and Tutsis are not just horizontal – as in most other ethnic conflict situations in Africa – but also vertical in the sense of one group taking for granted that in a historical perspective it makes up the ruling caste, while the other sees itself as the perennial 'underdog' (Lemarchand 1970).

Consociational solutions may work along lateral lines of inclusion. Ethnic or religious groups develop a stake in the system. They do, however, tend to have more ambivalent consequences when it comes to vertical inclusion. Citizens at large eventually grow disillusioned with the 'top-down' character of consociational arrangements. In this volume it is Axel Hadenius in Chapter 4 who examines the uncertain outcomes associated with such arrangements. He does so via a closer

analysis of the arguments put forward by Rustow and Lijphart as alternative explanations to those of modernisation theorists. He is cautiously optimistic that the institutional forms of democracy can be introduced – and possibly consolidated – regardless of socio-economic circumstances. At the same time, he is mindful of the potential pitfalls associated with consociationalism, notably its tendency to 'freeze' segmentation in society and to alienate the citizens at large. What often emerges in these cases is what O'Donnell (1994) calls 'delegative' democracy, one where power has been delegated to a small circle of elite actors to run the show.

Electoral modalities

In the 1990s, greater attention was paid to how different electoral rules may help promote inclusiveness. Such rules, as Sartori (1968: 273) has noted, are 'the most specific manipulative instrument of politics'. Africans realised this point at independence and many leaders proceeded to promote inclusiveness within a democratically designed one-party system (Cliffe 1967). Although the principle of competitive elections within a single-party system was an interesting innovation, practical experience soon showed that sustaining the democratic element in such a system became very difficult.

Most of the discourse on what difference electoral systems or modalities make has focused on the comparative advantages of proportional representation and majority/plurality systems (also referred to more colloquially as 'first-past-the-post'). For example, Lijphart (1991) has argued for the combination of parliamentary system with a proportional system of representation as the constitutional arrangement most likely to serve ethnically divided societies well. The power-sharing arrangement in such a system provides scope for inclusion in ways that other electoral systems do not. Barkan (1995) disagrees that electoral systems make such a big difference, at least in the African context, where people vote in geographic blocks that are highly homogeneous. Referring to Malawi and Namibia as cases in point, he argues that the more agrarian the society, the higher the geographic concentration of the vote and the more closely the distribution of seats under a single-member district (first-past-the-post) system will mirror the distribution of the total vote. It is only in industrial societies with a more dispersed population that proportional representation (PR) has the intended effects of enhancing the sharing of power among elites. Another study of electoral systems in southern Africa (Reynolds 1999) maintains that a mixed member proportional system (MMP), as used, for example in Germany and New Zealand, may prove to be particularly relevant in countries such as South Africa where forms of power-sharing have been considered vital to a successful democratic transition. What much of this literature tends to do is to emphasise the 'engineering' side of political reform. It is much less attentive to the fact that electoral reforms are always going to be contested, precisely because they have potentially such direct impact on the political power structure. This is likely to be the case especially in a transition phase.

There is a need, therefore, to analyse electoral systems in a broader socio-economic context. Johannsen makes an effort in this direction in Chapter 6. He

examines the relationship between modernisation, electoral system, and democracy. He finds that electoral system as an intervening variable contributes to the explanation of democracy, although the modernisation variables are the more powerful. More specifically, his analysis reveals that higher levels of per capita income or Human Development (as manifest in the HDI) are positively correlated with higher levels of democracy, whereas plurality-majoritarian and semi-proportional electoral systems are negatively correlated with the level of democracy (as manifest in the FHI). What is not clear, according to Johannsen, is whether electoral systems in the study of democratisation should be treated as independent or dependent variables. Are they first and foremost creations by political leaders or do they have an independent impact on democracy?

Legal systems

One of the more powerful arguments for the link between capitalism and liberal democracy rests on the premise that with the rise of a private property regime, the estate (of the landlord) is fully severed from the state, thus consolidating the separation between private and public spheres of power. Capitalist ownership dispenses with all paternalistic obligations to safeguard subjects' welfare, transferring them to the public domain (Katz 1997). At the same time, capitalist economic rule is no longer legitimated politically, by reference to the performance of communal functions. Private power is stabilised to the extent that democratic principles of rule are successfully insulated within a public domain. In democratising countries that are still poor, the significance of the global pressures to promote the growth of a capitalist economy as the bedrock of political reform is that they strip the community of its authority to distribute the resources needed to guarantee a basic livelihood. They leave open the fate of individuals who could previously rely on communitarian institutions to help secure their livelihoods. This means that traditional dispute resolution mechanisms on which individuals and local communities have relied tend to become less adequate. This process also calls for a more differentiated legal system that caters for the emerging needs of citizens to find authoritative and legitimate resolutions of conflict, whether they are public or just civil in nature.

It is increasingly being recognised that the provenance of rights is both the state and the market economy. With the eclipse of the community, rights have become increasingly important. The subordination of the community by the state is reflected in the shift of language as regards obligations from duties to rights (Bobbio 1984). These rights were originally developed in national jurisdictions, notably in countries with a liberal democratic tradition, but they have, thanks to the international community and its various organisational instruments, become both more universal and more diverse so as to respond to a broader range of concerns. For example, the earlier emphasis on the individual and on civil rights has been supplemented by recognition of groups and communities such as women, children, minorities and indigenous peoples. Similarly, cultural and economic rights have been added to the previous concerns with civil and political rights to produce a stronger social justice orientation. Thus, the regime of rights, as Ghai (1999: 249)

notes, is much better balanced today than is acknowledged by its critics, especially in Asian governments. The argument put forward in those circles that liberal democracy is not compatible with 'Asian values' is being called into question by at least one authoritative analyst, Fukuyama (1995). Social and economic rights may still, according to some observers, be the stepchild of the international bill of rights, but more voices are reflected in the human rights discourse as it affects democracy and development than ever before.

This new emphasis on human rights has also brought a renewed importance to concepts such as 'rule of law' and, therefore, by implication to the role of legal systems in democratisation. What difference does the legal system make to democracy? This is a topic that is little known and we are pleased to see an initial effort to examine this relationship in this volume. Karen Hilmer Pedersen and Ole Nørgaard use Chapter 5 to demonstrate that 'pure' legal systems correlate positively with democracy more than 'mixed' systems. The latter are those where the formal legal institutions are not compatible with underlying norms in society, or what the authors call 'informal' institutions. This lack of compatibility is especially apparent in developing and transitional societies where an old system of law has been replaced by another system. Examples would be civil or common law being introduced on top of systems of customary law in sub-Saharan Africa or civil law replacing socialist law in Eastern Europe and Russia. In the light of the widespread interest in the legal side of governance, this subject is an area where more research is both needed and welcome.

Civil society

Civil society is a troublesome concept. It usually refers to all voluntary associations that have been created to mediate relations between the family household and the state. This excludes productive enterprises since their purpose is not to link individuals to the state. Most students of civil society take a functional view of society, counting in all associations regardless of their normative stand on the issue of democracy. This causes problems for all those who are interested in the relationship between civil society and democracy. In what ways is it an intermediate variable in democratisation? An answer to this question forces the student to accept the normative dimension of the concept. 'Civil' begins to count more than 'society'. These are some of the issues that Caroline Boussard takes up in Chapter 9 where she discusses civil society, in general, and its presence in Central America, in particular.

Many countries that are attempting to consolidate democracy suffer from what is sometimes referred to as a 'civic deficit'. This implies that society is short of the values that really help build democracy. This deficit often stems from disillusionment with the political leadership; the fact, that the new democratic regime proves ineffective in various ways, such as not being able to curb corruption or to deliver tangible policy results. Once the transition from autocratic rule has been made, it is more difficult to mobilise popular support for the measures that are necessary to keep the democratic process on track. The general consensus in the literature is

that civil society is most effective in the initial phase of the transition. It tends to lose its significance in the political process as it moves from transition to consolidation.

What tends to keep civil society alive and alert to civic values is the presence of social movements. Not all associations have broad membership but movements typically do. They are organised around a pertinent issue, e.g. environmental conservation, human rights, social justice, gender or a combination of several of these concerns. The literature on social movements builds on an older thesis, going as far back as Aristotle, that participation itself promotes democracy because it teaches people the social skills and attitudes that are necessary for democracy to take root. This argument is also central to the work of contemporary scholars such as Pateman (1970) and Putnam (1993).

Social movements are typically more concerned with realising specific values than with putting a particular regime in place. Their involvement in the political transition process is a product of the former. The literature on social movements, therefore, is concerned not with elite choices and pacts but with the mobilisation of the public for specific causes. These causes typically stem from dissatisfaction with repression or exploitation by the preceding authoritarian regime. Collier (1999) provides a comparative analysis of the contributions made by working-class movements to democracy in Western Europe and Latin America. She shows that in countries such as Uruguay, for example, workers mobilised into a movement of their own were significant players in broadening the political opposition to become more effective in negotiating the end of military dictatorship. Other visible participants in the political transition in Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru were women. They participated in social movements opposing military rule and in some cases formed their own women's movements. Particularly prominent among these was the human rights group, Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, whose members marched weekly in front of the presidential palace in Buenos Aires to demand the return of their children who had been imprisoned, tortured or killed by the military. Other important movements involving women included those of poor women in the cities who organised boycotts to protest rising prices. Although most of these women rejected the term 'feminist', their experiences in meeting together outside the home brought about an awareness of gender and other related rights issues (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998).

As Tarrow (1998) notes in his review of the literature on social movements, deprivation is not enough to explain why ordinary people pour into the streets, risking life and limb to lay claim to their rights. If it were the only factor, there would be many more such spontaneous actions. It is necessary, therefore, to include in the analysis levels and types of opportunity that people experience, the constraints on their freedom of action, and the threats that they perceive to their interests and values. The process that led to the break-up of the Soviet Union and the creation of a Russian Federation is a particularly interesting case in point. Because people tend to act on opportunities, the most perilous moment for a bad government is when it seeks to mend its ways, as Tocqueville (1955) argued with reference to the French Revolution in 1789. This is precisely what happened in the last few years of

the Soviet Union when Gorbachov introduced *perestroika* and *glasnost* in an effort to reform the Communist system. As Fish (1995: 32) notes, these measures engendered a process of liberalisation that sparked an explosion of organised extra-state political activity. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) use a similar argument when they maintain that social protests stemming from new economic policies in the 1980s constituted the beginning of democratic transition in sub-Saharan Africa. Because social movements use extra-parliamentary means of exercising influence, their role tends to diminish as the process of political reform moves beyond the initial transition from authoritarian rule. This is what happened, for example, in South Africa following the constitutionalisation of the new political order in the mid-1990s and the rise of the African National Congress to power (Deegan 1999). If co-opted by political parties, many of these movements are likely to become influenced by considerations that may go contrary to their objectives. A recent study of how rural people in India use democracy to serve their own ends is quite clear that agrarian movements, often of landless people, thrive most effectively as long as they do not turn themselves into political parties and become the instruments of power-hungry politicians (Varshney 1998: 197).

Social movements clearly energise civil society. They often spearhead major political transitions, but they also contribute to keeping civil society healthy at other times (Dryzek 1996). Without such movements, the impact of civil society on democracy would most probably be much less significant. Uhlin provides support for this point in Chapter 10. Without implying that social movements always work for a civic or democratic cause, it seems a feasible proposition to state that a democratic transition without the backing of a social movement is less likely to succeed than one with such backing.

Conclusions

We are offering a more extensive concluding discussion at the end of this volume but it may be worth making a few general observations on the studies of development and democracy. The first is that the difference between quantitative and qualitative studies is often exaggerated. To be sure, there are substantive differences between the two, but they lie not in the criteria used to create and justify a particular research design but in the manner in which the latter is executed. It is primarily in the implementation of research that quantitative statistical analyses come to differ from qualitative forms of study. When it comes to designing research, substantial qualitative reasoning goes into designing quantitative studies. For example, when choosing the unit of analysis, set of cases, and indicators for measurement, qualitative criteria are being used to justify the design. Lipset's argument about economic development and democracy, referred to by many scholars, including several in this volume, is a case in point. While his discussion of democracy is placed in terms of the competitiveness of regimes, his measure is more problematic, resting on a four-fold classification that first distinguishes between European and Latin American cases – where the latter are treated as being less democratic – and then within these two categories classifies them

according to whether or not they are 'stable democracies'. The qualitative reasoning in this example enters into the design in at least two ways: first, by differentiating between Europe and Latin America; second, by bringing in the concept of stability, which does not even feature in the conceptual definition of democracy. We should be alert, therefore, to the fact that the distinction between quantitative and qualitative forms of reasoning is more blurred than many scholars would have us believe.

The second observation is that the relations between variables are not always linear in a causal sense. The study of the development–democracy nexus provides plenty of evidence that the relations are often interactive: development, or dimensions thereof, influences democracy but dimensions of democracy may also affect development. For example, historical determinists, whether modernisationists or Marxists, tend to assume that political democracy is the outcome of underlying changes in the socio-economic or cultural spheres. Those who fundamentally believe in human agency, on the other hand, would argue that institutions and choices can be made to shape developmental outcomes. For example, much of the current debate in the international development community focuses on the independent effects that 'good governance' is expected to have on various aspects of development. We warn against assuming too simplistic causal relations in contexts where instead such relations are often complex and ambiguous. Empirical outcomes are not always what researchers expect them to be. What we stress in this volume is the important role that institutions play as intermediate variables between micro choices and macro outcomes, and vice versa. It is important, therefore, to be open to a range of outcomes (even if some of them go against the normative preference or the hypothetical causality of the researcher).

The third and final observation concerns the tendency to treat findings as 'universal' or to generalise without taking into consideration the potential influence of contextual variables. Much knowledge that we have acquired on the issues relating to development and democracy are both time- and context-specific. Changing either temporal or spatial dimensions may have significant influence on the outcomes. Generalisations that hold across national and regional boundaries, therefore, are typically at a high level of aggregation. The challenge that we are often faced with in our research is not only to disaggregate – or deconstruct – these concepts and variables but also to continue testing how far these general findings still hold at lower levels of aggregation.

In sum, whichever way we turn in our research exercise, there are challenges just around the corner. The contributors to this volume are highlighting many of these challenges in their respective chapters, thereby providing a sense of what students of comparative politics have achieved while studying development and democracy but also what remains to be done. We return to this subject in Chapter 11.

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2 Globalisation and democracy

An overlooked connection

Jonas Johansson

Introduction

Without a doubt globalisation studies is a growing industry. Twenty years ago, six books and articles including the title word 'globalisation' were published according to IBSS and the Library of Congress. The corresponding figure for 1996 was 413 (Busch 2000: 22–23).[1] Even though this increased interest of academia obviously cannot be taken as evidence of the globalisation of the contemporary world, we can presume that the attention is not gratuitous. That a significant part of this interest is focused on globalisation in combination with one of the cores of political science, i.e. the principles and conditions of democracy, is not a matter for wonder but simply a logical consequence.

As concepts, globalisation and democracy share the feature that not only are they highly ambiguous but there is scant chance that they will ever be given a fixed and universally acknowledged definition once and for all. 'With only slight exaggeration, globalisation has become the leading social science mantra in the 1990s and is used to account for almost all changes' (Pierre and Peters 2000: 56–57). Democracy is no exception in this respect and subsequently globalisation is claimed to be involved in the progress as well as the regress of liberal democracy worldwide. In consequence, the fashionable concept of globalisation runs the risk of being abandoned as an analytical tool and left as an indistinct phenomenon and explanation residual. As indicated, however, in this case the blur is caused not only by the independent variable but also by the dependent one. Hence, there is a great demand for clarification of the globalisation–democracy nexus and the chapter will begin by addressing this question, although we will not embark on the fruitless mission of balancing pros and cons. Instead, we shall argue that genuinely all-embracing claims about how globalisation affects democracy are rather pointless. Drawing on this argument we shall, thereafter, illustrate how such a scope can be limited but at the same time conducted at a high level of generalisation. More precisely, does globalisation make a systematic difference and, if so, does it hinder or promote democracy (not universally, but in those countries which are not yet mature democracies, i.e. the states customarily subject to comparative democratisation studies)? In addition, how should we regard socio-economic development, as traditionally defined by modernisation theory, in an age of globalisation? The

endeavour includes an attempt to find an operational definition of the concept of globalisation. In pursuing this, we shall try to fill a gap in line with the objectives of this volume, by engaging in a systematic analysis of the external dimension of democratisation and what difference globalisation makes. At the same time, we shall avoid the intuitive sense of regarding globalisation as merely an external factor.

The false paradox and the neglected obvious

> There is a striking paradox to note regarding the contemporary era: from Africa to Eastern Europe, Asia to Latin America, more and more nations and groups are championing the idea of democracy; but they are doing so at just that moment when the very efficacy of democracy as a national form of political organization appears open to question.
>
> (Held 1997: 251)

Much of recent research with the ambition to scrutinise the internal relationship between globalisation and democracy – and to make general statements about it – departs from a paradox such as the one stated above. This paradox – or irony of history – is revealed (or at least so it is claimed) when the development of recent decades is examined. Following this line of argument, we have witnessed, on the one hand, a global spread of democracy with the nation-state as territorial anchor. Normatively, democracy has truly surpassed its alternatives over the past decades and on a global scale the idea of democracy has never been more popular. On the other hand, democracy has during the very same period of time been questioned and has been reduced to a necessary – but not sufficient – condition for organising society so as to maintain the idea of popular rule and control (Archibugi, Held and Köhler 1998: 1; Clark 1999: 147; Diamond 2000: 246; Held 1998: 11; McGrew 1997a: 323; Parry and Moran 1994: 8).

However, does the argument drawn from these two observations constitute a solid enough basis to speak of a paradoxical relation between globalisation and democracy? Not really. First, what looks like globalisation's contradictory effects on democracy is nothing but a consequence of the generic notion of the concept of globalisation. A vast majority of the scholarly works on the concept emphasise that it should be considered an *umbrella term*, covering the intensification of a variety of processes – of related or disparate nature regarding their consequences (Østerud 1999: 199). According to this notion, a process will qualify as globalisation as long as it shares the lowest common denominator of being some kind of movement across territorial borders. Thus, the two conclusions above concerning the status of democracy are in fact based on completely different processes or mechanisms. Second, reflecting on the dependent variable, we realise that the object of study, on which the conclusions are drawn, is not the same. In the latter case, the analysis relates to mature nation-states and relatively established democracies, i.e. the states of Western Europe and North America, and with a few exceptions the rest of the OECD member countries. In the former case, the object of study is primarily

constituted by the countries categorised as belonging to the Third World or what used to be the Second World (i.e. developing countries and the former industrialised communist countries in Eastern Europe).

Consequently, to claim that globalisation's impact on democracy during recent decades has been genuinely paradoxical, we have to meet two demands: the study (and comparison) must relate to the same (kind of) processes and the analysis must be based on the same object of study and not on a comparison between mature democracies in the western hemisphere and developing countries with an initially poor or non-existing level of democracy. Apparently, since it does not meet our demands, the paradox initially claimed is a false one. The impression of contradiction is first and foremost nothing but an outcome of an unfortunate mix of findings which cannot appropriately be compared.

A superficial comparison of the two parallel tendencies above shows that they originate in different academic fields, each with its own theoretical, methodological and empirical traditions. The former description and analysis is most definitely rooted in the tradition of comparative research and democratisation studies. The latter is rather a product of the efforts within the field of political theory, or political philosophy, and democratic theory. Even though it feels rather like playing the part of the child in the fairytale 'The Emperor's New Clothes', we have to acknowledge that this observation obviously deserves more attention than it has been paid so far.

Thus, before we can even start to elaborate on how to employ globalisation in a systematic manner and as an independent variable in order to examine its impacts, we have to determine the nature of the dependent variable. Drawing on the argument above, this differs depending on whether we are scrutinising a mature and consolidated democratic state, or a country where the principles of democratic rule are newly born or non-existent, i.e. the states of interest to theorists of democracy and democratisation respectively.

Mixed findings due to mixed foundations

The difference stems from theoretical standpoints as well as practice. The mutual point of departure for theories of democracy and theories of democratisation is obviously the well-contested concept of democracy. Rather than to focus on the problematic definition of the concept, it can be claimed that it does not have to be all that complicated. Democracy can be considered a method of decision making concerning collectively binding and compulsory rules, where the citizens exercise the control and enjoy the status of political equality in order to do so (Beetham 1999: 33). By placing this ideal type at one end of a spectrum and its contrary at the other, i.e. a political system lacking all of the defining characteristics mentioned, the definition of democracy is no longer a question of an absolute condition, but of degrees. With this approach the endless debate on the topic of democracy does not really concern the definition as such (what it is and is not), but instead the validity and applicability of various theories of democracy – claiming different normative standpoints on how much democracy is

desirable and feasible as well as how it should be implemented in an institutional manner (Beetham 1999: 33). In other words, how wide or encompassing should the spectrum of democracy be? From this perspective, the relevance of studying how every individual political system can be made more democratic and identifying the mechanisms that can facilitate such a desired move along the spectrum becomes evident. This is where we will find the various theories of democratisation, which accordingly share the interest in political transformations going in the same direction: towards a higher degree of democracy (Beetham 1999: 33; Potter 1997: 3).

An attempt to illuminate the relation between theories of democracy and theories of democratisation is made in Figure 2.1. However, it is necessary to make two additions to this orientation, which is otherwise relatively simple. The additions are crucial and one of the main rationales behind the ambiguous accounts of globalisation's impact.

First, considering the literature within these fields of study, we can readily note a difference caused by a tendency to employ one of the salient characteristics of democracy – political equality – in separate ways. Whereas theories of democratisation focus mainly on the definition of political equality in terms of legislative rights, e.g. the right to vote, to run for office and to enjoy freedom of speech, theorists of democracy are rather more interested in the concept of power and the extent to which citizens are able to exercise this individually as well as collectively, something which by then also includes all kinds of social relationships, for instance based on gender and/or class (Allison 1994: 10).[2] Second and of utmost importance, a comparison of the operative use of the actual research carried out so far tells us that theories of democratisation are mainly employed in the case of regime transition – i.e. from authoritarian to democratic principles of rule – and not in cases of gradual shifts once the democratic regime is established. Theories of democracy, on the other hand, have within the frame of political philosophy or theory been reserved primarily for the study of mature and established democratic states, for instance from different normative standpoints regarding political equality and the exercise of power (Karvonen 1997: 11; cf. also Uhlin 1997: 8). Thus, the two fields of research are disparate in many ways, a point which is also captured by Allison in a somewhat different way:



Figure 2.1 The spectrum of democracy

> In English academic terms, the democratization crowd are empirical students of politics while the democracy gang are political theorists or philosophers. Translated into American terminology, this makes the theorists of democratization political 'scientists' and theorists of democracy 'normative' theorists.
>
> (Allison 1994: 8)

This established epistemological practice implies that there are actually different categories of states that are scrutinised, although the distinction does not have any theoretical support. As the empirically oriented research on democratisation tends to focus on the process, while theories of democracy focus on the state (condition), it is no wonder that the countries that come under the magnifying glass are at the opposite ends of the spectrum of democracy. It is therefore also quite logical that the research on democracy has highlighted a deterioration of the democratic state in the western hemisphere – for instance in terms of increasing social and economic gaps or decreasing electoral turnout (cf. Held 2000: 26); and that the simultaneous research on democratisation can establish a series of successful processes, where the number of states converting from an authoritarian to a democratic mode has risen significantly – particularly in the south and within the former Communist bloc (Karatnycky 2000). As we have tried to demonstrate, globalisation can obviously be used as an independent variable in the analysis of democracy – in terms of both a process and a state. It is therefore crucial not to range the conclusions against each other, despite the difference.

Globalisation, democratisation and development

Let us return to the initially cited paradox and establish that attempts to make general statements on the globalisation–democracy nexus are somewhat futile. Instead, as we have tried to prove, there is a striking need for a systematisation of the relationship between these two societal phenomena in order to make possible a reliable analysis of their causalities. The argument here is that such a systematisation should depart from the basic distinction between democracy and democratisation.[3] Given the lack of theoretical support for a distinction between research on democracy and research on democratisation, it can indeed be argued that it should be a task of great importance to bridge this gap (Allison 1994). Any successful outcome of this mission would make general statements on the relationship between globalisation and democracy possible – and valid in a true global scope. Yet this has not been the case and meanwhile we had better continue in a somewhat more traditional way henceforth and limit our efforts to the countries usually included in the research on democratisation.

We have hitherto been occupied with some neglected essentials and are now capable of focusing on the second and more specific task: does globalisation hinder or promote democratisation, or more specifically, how does it affect the probability of a successful outcome for countries without a long tradition of this particular principle of rule? This gives us three clusters of countries: relatively newborn democracies, those countries in transition to democracy and those where the

transition has not begun. In other words, to what extent can the degree of democracy in the developing countries be explained by their degree of globalisation? Development (primarily in its socio-economic sense) will be included in the analysis to elucidate its status in the relation between the independent and dependent variable. The approach taken in this chapter, therefore, is structuralist and quantitative. This ambition is, needless to say, also a consequence of the independent variable itself. Besides, taking the geographical dimension of the concept of globalisation seriously requires studies with a broad scope – including large comparisons. With a few exceptions, such as a minor endeavour published in *Foreign Policy* (2001), the possibility which this kind of approach affords of gaining greater insight into the globalisation–democratisation nexus has been totally overlooked. The reason for this is presumably, as we will note later, the complicated activity of creating an operational definition of the concept of globalisation. Nonetheless, that is what we attempt to do in the remainder of this chapter, albeit with a somewhat modified ambition. The empirical analysis is of cross-sectional nature – not longitudinal – and captures the situation of today. The objective will be to find some evidence of how globalisation affects democratisation, bearing in mind the problems of large *n* analysis.

The triumph of liberal democracy

Drawing mainly from the annual reports of Freedom House (FH), several researchers on democratisation confirm the triumph of democracy in the past two decades based on the steady growth in the number of countries ruled by democratic principles as measured by the Freedom House Index (FHI) (Piano and Puddington 2001: 87; Karatnycky 2000: 194; Diamond 1998: 311 and 1996: 20; Russett 1998: 168 and Huntington 1997: 4).[4] In the 2000 survey, 44 per cent of the world's 190 internationally recognised states were rated Free, 31 per cent Partly Free and 25 per cent Not Free. Exactly the same proportions and numbers are valid for the survey the year before (Piano and Puddington 2001: 87). A comparison with the situation back in 1980, however, shows quite a different distribution. The proportion of Free rated countries was then 32 per cent, the same as for the Partly Free category, whereas the share of the Not Free was 36 per cent (Diamond 1996: 27). A superficial comparison of the regional patterns today shows that liberal democracy now constitutes the standard in all parts of Europe as well as the continents of America, and to an increasing degree also in Asia and the Pacific. The picture regarding the former Soviet Union is less clear, while in the case of Africa the democracies are still in a minority and they are completely absent among the Arabic countries (Karatnycky 2000: 194). In spite of methodological problems associated with the FHI, the trend of liberal democracy appears to be dominant and not only as something applicable to the Western hemisphere. This is also evident if the classification is limited to 'electoral' or formal democracies. Of all states, 63 per cent were electoral democracies in 1999 as compared to 28 per cent in 1974 (Karatnycky 2000: 189; Diamond 1996: 26).[5]

The triumphal procession and spread of nationally defined democracy during

this period can undeniably be claimed as evidence supporting the argument that the globalisation of politics is on the increase. With the aid of the FHI rankings, we can argue that democratisation of domestic politics worldwide is a globalisation process in itself. The observations that there really has been an increase and that the idea of democratisation is a kind of globalisation process are actually not very problematic or even contested. Hence, the debate has primarily dealt with the extent to which the transformations are merely formal in character, i.e. whether the norm of liberal democracy has achieved a deeper and more genuine stronghold and spread (cf. Allardt 2000; Cammack 1998; Diamond 1996).

The numerical increase and geographical spread of the norm of liberal democracy can in this perspective consequently be analysed as a global process of diffusion, i.e. as an innovation disseminating from one country to another – in this case, ideas related to liberal democracy.[6] Even though the victory of liberal democracy is far from complete, the escalating diffusion of its values is held to justify the declaration that we are witnessing a global consensus with respect to the ethics behind a specific national form of political rule. Hence, the conclusions are drawn that democracy is being globalised or that we are experiencing global democratic revolution (Diamond 2000: 246; 1993: 95).

At the same time, however, this perspective does not inform us at all about *how* and *why* this diffusion of ideas occurs (Uhlin 1995: 37). Thus, to gain more knowledge requires us to abandon this approach of describing the reality and the argument that democratisation equals globalisation. Instead, we have to scrutinise the nexus of globalisation and democratisation as *cause* and *effect*, i.e. other globalisation processes that promote or hinder a development in the direction of intra-national democratisation. This is, needless to say, a far more complicated task.

Modernisation theory and the international dimension

Since the seminal work of Lipset, one of the dominant paths of finding out what promotes democracy has been to scrutinise the domestic environment and first and foremost its structures. The quotation: 'The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy' (Lipset 1960: 48–49) is without a doubt the most quoted one in the discipline of democratisation research. The thesis expresses the core of the modernisation theory – an explanatory perspective which has been paid much attention ever since. The reason for this is not far-fetched, as a vast majority of the empirical cross-national studies over the years robustly support the idea of a connection between socio-economic development and democracy (Karvonen 1997: 28; Diamond 1992: 110).[7] The basic element of modernisation theory is that a modern society, in terms of a general economic development, will cause a radical change of its own prerequisites, which in turn gives rise to political transformation towards democracy (Hadenius 1992: 77). Standing as an ideal type of what Potter (1997: 32) characterises as the variable-oriented approach, the modernisation school is aimed at very general explanations.[8] As a result, the conventional method has primarily been large *n* comparisons,

including many or all nations, regarding a cluster of independent variables such as GDP and income per capita and the number of those enrolled in different levels of the education system. In addition, the general level of illiteracy, average lifetime expectancy and proportion of inhabitants in urbanised areas are also used as explanatory variables (Lipset 1960; Deutsch 1961; Cutright 1963).[9] In short, everything that can possibly be employed when trying to establish a profile of what characterises a 'modern' society.

Eschewing further elaboration on the complex chain of thoughts concerning why such socio-economic progress generates healthy circumstances for democracy, we shall instead be content with noting that: (a) the positive relation between socio-economic development and the prospects of democracy cannot be dismissed – despite profound criticisms (Lipset, Seong and Torres 1993; Diamond 1992: 110; Diamond and Marks 1992: 6; Hadenius 1992: 82), and (b) all the explanatory factors are to be found domestically and the external dimension is totally overlooked.[10]

As explanatory perspective, modernisation theory is by no means alone in its neglect of the external dimension. In fact, this goes for all major approaches adopted in democratisation research – structuralist or agency oriented – with the exception of the Marxist-oriented dependency theory. The latter, however, tends to overlook the domestic context, by giving almost exclusive importance to the asymmetrical patterns of dependency in the world economy (Frank 1969). It can also be argued that the primal focus of the dependency theory is development and not its connection to politics, even though the domestic underdevelopment caused by international capitalism has immediate implications in the direction of authoritarianism (Hadenius 1992: 91). Without making any efforts to do this school of thought justice, it is an interesting approach since it represents a diametrically opposite view to the hypothesis soon to be put forward here, i.e. that a higher degree of international interaction will cause a higher degree of democracy.

Before addressing this question, however, let us briefly return to the scholarly work of modernisation and especially to the variables employed to operationalise its hypothesis. The comparative approach aims at explaining why the level of democracy differs from one country to another by pointing to their dissimilarities concerning the degree of socio-economic modernisation, i.e. qualities assumed to be causally related to the prosperity of democracy. Accordingly, the logic of the modernisation theory presupposes that the individual countries are independent in respect of the features involved, i.e. the degree of democracy and the socio-economic explanation variables respectively (Karvonen 1997: 108).

Albeit few possible explanations are to be found in isolation and they are most frequently an outcome of a complex interplay between internal and external factors, the efforts within the field of democratisation tend to focus solely on the endogenous dimension. In cases where exogenous aspects are taken into consideration they are predominantly employed as secondary factors with less significance. Besides, their impact is more often presumed than proved (Pridham 1997: 7; Uhlin 1995: 28). Given the viability of the traditional modernisation approach this

incongruity does indeed open up for complementary efforts to disentangle whether the external dimension strengthens the correlation even more. However:

> There is no existing unified theory about the importance of international factors in democratisation. [. . .] It is, nevertheless, vital to regard international influence as a particular theoretical dimension, which can limit the range of internally oriented theories and sometimes contribute to an explanation of those cases where such theories are inadequate.[11]
>
> (Karvonen 1997: 107)

Even though there is no homogeneous theoretical framing of the external dimension, there are a few studies predominantly devoted to the external dimension as a potential explanatory factor and as a special theoretical perspective. The most extensive work in this respect has been carried out by Pridham (1991, 1997) and Whitehead (2001, 1996, 1986) who both stress that the external dimension plays a different role depending on the status of the democratisation process, i.e. the liberalisation, transition or consolidation phase. Among what is labelled inner-directed linkages, all referring to the impact of the international system on domestic structures, Pridham distinguishes between different (albeit overlapping) sources of external democratic influence such as political, economic and military and whether they are of coercive or persuasive nature (Pridham 1991: 2, 29).[12] Following this, 'one can make a further distinction between direct external influence where foreign actors try to promote democracy, and more indirect influence from significant external events or the international context' (Uhlin 1995: 29, cf. also Chapter 10 in this volume where Uhlin uses these three domains in his analysis of Indonesia).

The approach taken by Whitehead (1996: 4) is also to classify distinct kinds of external influence and he suggests three main categories under which international factors can be analysed. However, the principle governing the distinction between these categories is somewhat different as the rationale is the nature of the influence, i.e. according to whether it is exerted by what Whitehead calls contagion, control and consent. Aware of the significant overlap among these three, he also operates with sub-categories but remains confident that each of the main groups – or modes of analysis – represents a different structure and illuminates distinctive features. Whitehead stresses the importance of considering different actors, processes and motivations under each of the three broad headings and distinguishes between state-to-state interaction, non-governmental transactions and more diffuse societal processes – including different kinds of external actor such as foreign governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations (Whitehead 1996: 4, 23; 1986: 5). As noted by Uhlin in this volume, recent work on the topic of the exogenous explanations for democratisation has also been done by Schmitz and Sell (1999) who to a large extent follow the design of Whitehead and suggest three similar modes of influence, i.e. pressure from the surrounding environment, voluntary adaptation to institutional structures and socialisation by diffusion of democratic values (Schmitz and Sell 1999: 37).

Globalisation as explanatory factor

However, as noted above we should not take the division into endogenous and exogenous factors too far since they most often interact in their impact on the mode of governance in a single country (Whitehead 1996: 24). The necessity to be careful in this respect is indeed supported by the process of globalisation, which disembeds social relations from the local context and underpins the interdependence between states (Giddens 1990: 64). Drawing on the claim that globalisation is a '*domestic* as well as a transnational international process' (Cerny 1996: 91), and the suggestion that one of the main effects of globalisation is a subordination or erosion of territorial frontiers where the autonomy of the state in domestic decision-making decreases, we can easily question the separation of explanatory factors of democratisation into an internal and external dimension. Basically, the phenomenon of globalisation makes our traditional conceptual tools somewhat obsolete and '[o]ne might say that the validating test for globalisation is precisely its success in eroding those separations on which the Great Divide has hitherto been predicated' (Clark 1999: 16). The great divide refers here to the conventional view of the domestic and international environment as two distinct political spheres with different preconditions, but also to the following epistemological division into the academic disciplines of, respectively, comparative politics and international relations (cf. Caporaso 1997). The theoretical foundation for such a distinction appears to be somewhat weakened by the globalisation of world politics, and the immediate consequence for the study of democratisation should therefore be to introduce *a third theoretical and explanatory dimension*, i.e. globalisation in itself (apart from domestic predictors and not regarding it simply as another way of labelling the external dimension, as do for instance Schmitz and Sell (1999: 34)).

While the definitions of globalisation differ considerably, there is a basic consensus about the lowest common denominators of its consequences: that is, the intertwinement of the particular states' political, economical and cultural systems – formally as well as informally – creating a greater interdependence (cf. Clark 1999: 36). These new conditions obviously require structural adjustments of the states since they constitute a 'significant shift in the spatial form of human social organisation and activity' (McGrew 1997b: 8). Logically, these adjustments cannot take traditional distinctions between the national and international level into consideration (Held 1995: 21). This then necessarily also applies to the search for explanations of a given condition – in this case the nature of the principles by which states are governed, which hardly can be limited to such a distinction. Thus, we have to accept the complexity following from the fact that the border between domestic and international factors and processes is more difficult to define.

To employ globalisation in a systematic manner as a third explanatory dimension, i.e. as a third group of independent variables, we have to overcome the methodological challenge that results from such an approach. However, given the argument that there is a scant theoretical reason for a separation between internal and external explanation variables, globalisation should be considered as a (variable) *state* of each and every country and not, *nota bene*, as an external pressure on

the same. This agrees perfectly well with the comparative logic and renders possible a systematic analysis of its impacts. A country's degree of globalisation is hence to be compared with other types of condition that for different theoretical reasons are presumed to facilitate a development towards a higher degree of democracy. This is also how we are about to deal with the hypothesis raised earlier, which addressed as a question can be formulated: To what extent can the degree of democracy in the developing countries be explained by how globalised they are? In other words, is it feasible to complement the traditional picture of explanations, provided by the modernisation school, by adding the dimension of globalisation? The endeavour requires an operational definition of the concepts of both democracy and globalisation to be able to identify the phenomena empirically and to make a large *n* comparison of the developing countries viable. The former part will here be circumvented and not closely examined since we will simply rely on the efforts of Freedom House and its index of political rights and civil liberties. The latter, however, demands a different treatment since there has been virtually no previous such attempt in this context.

Making it work as explanatory factor: an index of globalisation

The multitude of dimensions and interpretations of the globalisation debate have generated a variety of definitions, which theoretically capture the phenomenon to a varying degree of success. None of them, however, is of much use if the ambition is to operationalise the concept and to make a cross-national analysis of its impacts possible. Mainly, the reason is an obvious consequence of the fact that globalisation goes beyond the traditional state-centric perspective and tries to describe and explain a change in the global political system as a whole. Thus, the definitions of globalisation involve a necessary contradiction since they presuppose the existence of the independent territorial state while pointing at the cross-border flows, which create greater dependence and ultimately dissolve the very border, i.e. what defines them as individual political (and analytical) units. The state, in other words, is taken to be a constant and a variable at the same time (cf. Goldmann 2001). Given the task here, it is apparent that we must focus not so much on globalisation *per se*, i.e. on the systemic level of analysis, but on the consequence which stands out as the lowest common denominator of all definitions: that globalisation generates a higher level of interdependence for each and every one of the single nation-states (unit level of analysis) (cf. Keohane and Nye 2001: 229). In short, we have to identify empirically some relevant processes that increase this interdependence – in order to obtain an indication about how this in turn affects the degree of democracy.

To classify the myriads of links that connect the state to the surrounding environment on different levels we need a principle of division based on the individual state's varying degree of control over, and influence on, these processes. It must furthermore be a principle which is motivated by the most important and evident effect of a greater interdependence, namely the altered ability of a state to exercise its sovereignty and shape its own national conditions. Goldmann (2001) offers an analytical

framework, which in part can be employed for this purpose even though he actually elaborates on the concept of internationalisation.[13] Goldmann distinguishes between two different ways in which the national and international environment amalgamate, based on, precisely, the state's capacity to control development.

First, *globalisation of decisions* refers to an additional level of decision-making. The political decisions – formal as well as informal – are partly transferred to the international level and former domestic issues are to an increasing degree decided outside the traditional national political structure. The shift is brought on by commitment to international law, bilateral or multilateral negotiations with other states and/or within the frame of international organisations or regimes with a varying degree of authority, i.e. a logical response to a development towards a world where the political problems are of an increasingly global scope.

There are a number of international fora which represent this additional level of decision-making and cross-national cooperation. The function of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) is precisely to coordinate and formalise this kind of international collaboration and the membership includes an obligation to comply with its agreements and to work according to the aims of the particular IGO (Jacobsen 1984: 30). Membership of such an organisation does in fact mean that political decisions with domestic consequences are transferred outside the border of the country – however, to a varying degree and importance. The emergence of IGOs has changed the international as well as the national structure of political decision-making, and membership – no matter whether it is universal or limited – is a part of those networks characterising globalisation (Jacobsen 1984: 5, 367). In other words, the political decisions can be said to be globalised in parity with the involvement in external and inter-governmental organisations. Moreover, international laws and treaties can be considered as another example of arrangements which limit the state's autonomy and regulate domestic conditions. Commitments to the global system of norms therefore also represent a kind of decisional globalisation, constraining the options and accentuating political interdependence (Held 1995: 101). An operationalisation of these arguments can then be expressed by the two propositions below. The first is based on the assumption that membership of IGOs includes a real structural adjustment, a changed decision pattern and a concrete organisation of the international level of decision-making. The second is based on a commitment to obey the international system of norms which is created together with the rest of the world community, e.g. the UN – although it should be noted that, because of differing interpretations, signing a convention is not the same as factual compliance.

1. The greater the number of inter-governmental organisations to which a country belongs, the more globalised is its decision-making.[14]
2. The greater the number of international conventions ratified by a country, the more globalised is its decision-making.[15]

Second, globalisation of societies refers to the domestic society's intensification of its external (transnational) relations, manifested in for instance tourism, student

exchange programmes, television, Internet, trade and industry investments. Society and, above all, the market are constituted by innumerable actors who act on behalf of themselves or their principals – with little concern for national frontiers. These trans-border flows of goods, services, labour, capital, information and ideas, etc. across nation-states are all perfect examples of processes entwining domestic societies to a greater extent (Goldmann 2001; 1999: 17–19).

The many connections make it hard to operationalise the societal globalisation of a country. Thus, we have to focus on its more organised manifestations and we therefore also need to make another distinction, namely between civil society and the economy (or the market). Civil society refers to the citizens' self-organising throughout all parts of society, independent of the state. It is based on the individual's voluntary participation and operates outside the institutional and administrative apparatus of the state (Weigle and Butterfield 1992: 3). In this respect, globalisation would be equivalent to contacts, cooperation, networks and the creation of common systems of norms between individuals or groups from civil societies in different countries. In its organised form this is probably best distinguished by the non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The tasks of the NGOs vary considerably but they all represent an exchange of ideas and influence of public opinion on a non-territorial basis (Boli, Loya and Loftin 1999: 77). Some NGOs work alongside individual states or IGOs as informal supervisors of international agreements and issues, while others are of only minor importance.

The second aspect distinguished above, namely the economy or market, is associated with a mapping of the flows of economic activity across borders. Economic globalisation is today the dominant discourse within globalisation studies and there is an extensive literature on capital flows and their impact worldwide (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1996). Given our macro perspective on globalisation we ought to operationalise the aggregated flows in the economies of the countries in question, roughly divided into trade and foreign direct investments (Petersson 1990: 27). The former is probably the most traditional way of measuring the degree of a society's economic globalisation, and the expansion of world trade since World War II is indeed clear-cut evidence of the integration among states. The aggregated import and export is by definition a kind of indicator of a country's connections to the surrounding environment. Different comparative advantages make trade beneficial and the economic profit is an incitement for the private actors. External trade simply reflects the efforts of a multitude of domestic actors to enlarge their market by globalising their business.

However, a significant proportion of this trade consists of flows of goods and services between units of the same company, but located in different countries. To some countries, among them the USA, this intra trade accounts for over 50 per cent of their imports (Krugman and Obstfelt 1991: 167). The multi- or transnational corporations (TNCs) are today most definitely one of the main non-state actors, domestically as well as on the global scene:

> The multinational corporation is probably the most visible vehicle for the internationalization of the world economic system. [. . .] Foreign investment is seen

> as a way to obtain capital funds, technology, managerial know-how, and industrial and consumer products so desperately needed for economic development.
> (Walters and Blake 1992: 103)

The growing number of TNCs can – just like increasing world trade – be held as evidence of the economic globalisation. The approximately 60,000 TNCs of the world point as well to integration and interdependence and should reasonably be included in an operationalisation (UNCTAD 2000: 71). A measure of the aggregated presence and activities of the TNCs in a particular country is given by the size of the foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. FDI is defined as international capital flows by which a company in one country establishes or increases its activity in another country – including a long-term relationship, lasting interest and control (UNCTAD 2000: 267). In other words, the inflow of FDI is the result of the overall interest of the TNCs in the domestic (host) society.

Drawing on these arguments, the three indicators of a country's degree of societal globalisation can be formulated by the following final propositions:

3. The more non-governmental organisations a country is associated with through its civil society, the more globalised is its society.[16]
4. The greater the share of trade in a country's economy (export plus import of goods and services as a proportion of GDP), the more globalised is its society.[17]
5. The greater the inflow of FDI in a country, the more globalised is its society.[18]

Based on the dimensions of decisional and societal globalisation we have generated five valid indicators of a country's degree of globalisation – assuming that greater prevalence of an indicator is equivalent to a more globalised state. The platform makes it possible to create an index, which weighs the indicators together equally and ranks the countries according to their average score.[19] The index breaks down globalisation into some of its most important component parts and quantifies the operational definition – i.e. the five indicators – on a country-by-country basis. Table 2.1 reports the result of the countries' index ranking in accordance with the principle: the lower the rank, the higher the degree of globalisation. The ambition of the index is illustrative and it should be considered as a way of showing how we might establish an operational definition of globalisation – and thereby measure it. It should be emphasised that the indicators constituting the index can be questioned, and that others can be added – making the globalisation index more complete and comprehensive. However, by combining these data from cross-national activities we have produced a measure of globalisation which takes not only economic but also political flows into account and therefore goes beyond the traditional way of conceptualising globalisation empirically (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1996: 2, 68; Keohane and Milner 1996: 10, 259).

The selection of the cases is vital and needs a closer look before we reveal the results and enter the empirical analysis. Initially we draw the conclusion that general statements about the status of the globalisation–democracy nexus are rather pointless unless they relate to the same kind of processes and are based on the same

object of study. The five indicators satisfy the former demand. The concern is rather the latter. The point taken here is that mature democracies and non-democracies (as well as fragile or newborn ones) are all states but that does not mean that they represent the same object of study. Even though the analysis performed is not genuinely about the degree of democratisation achieved, i.e. it is not an analysis focusing on process and political *change*, the fact that the countries enjoy different initial status is vital in order to examine globalisation's effects on democracy properly. Hence, the population will be selected due to their democratic track record, excluding mature democracies since it is after all the phenomenon of democratisation that is of interest in this context. This line of argument does not mean that the cases are selected by reason of their value on the dependent variable. On the contrary, the point is that this way of reasoning instead splits democracy into two different dependent variables.

Operatively a country qualifies as a mature democracy if Freedom House has rated it Free every year since the institute started its annual review and measure – no exceptions allowed.[20] This condition implies that the country in question has been ruled by democratic principles at least since 1973, though in fact most of the countries meeting this demand were democratic long before. Starting with the world's 190 independent states and after excluding 31 micro states (population less than 450,000) this gives us 134 cases (i.e. 25 mature democracies were excluded). However, because of missing data in the globalisation index another ten cases drop out, which leaves us with the population of 124 countries reported in Table 2.1.[21]

The statistical laboratory: 124 countries

On the basis of the results reported in Table 2.1 we can now undertake the empirical study and scrutinise the relationship between the index of globalisation and the dependent variable – i.e. the degree of democracy – defined, operationalised and measured as the Freedom House rating. However, instead of using FHI's rather crude categories of Free, Partly Free and Not Free we will draw on the two underlying seven-grade scales of Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL). Thus, the composite measure employed here is based on the average score of the two indexes of PR and CL.[22] Is there a positive correlation between the index of globalisation and democracy and, if so, to what extent does the former enjoy an independent explanatory power of its own and to what extent does it complement the traditional (domestic) socio-economic variables of explanation? The rather strong correlation ($r = 0.45$) between the degree of globalisation and socio-economic development, defined through the Human Development Index,[23] implies that the analysis must involve a control for this variable.[24] If not, it is impossible to tell whether or not this relation is mirrored in the correspondence between globalisation and democracy. The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Table 2.2.

The results revealed in Table 2.2 support three main arguments. First, it certainly upholds the hypothesis that the degree of globalisation has some explanatory power *vis-à-vis* the countries' varying degrees of democracy ($r = -0.52$). Second, in this sample of countries the globalisation index surprisingly has

Table 2.1 Index of the degree of globalisation, the average Freedom House rating and the Human Development Index score: country-by-country basis

Rank no.	*Country*	*Index of globalisation*[a]	*Freedom House Index 2000*[b]	*Human Development Index 1998*[c]
1	Hungary	103.8	1.5	0.817
2	Czech Republic	100.2	1.5	0.843
3	Tunisia	99.3	5.5	0.703
4	Indonesia	89.9	4.0	0.670
5	Jordan	89.2	4.0	0.721
6	Mexico	89.2	3.5	0.784
7	Chile	89.1	2.0	0.826
8	Panama	88.9	1.5	0.776
9	Poland	88.2	1.5	0.814
10	Estonia	88.0	1.5	0.801
11	Malaysia	87.8	5.0	0.772
12	Ecuador	87.4	2.5	0.722
13	Côte d'Ivoire	87.2	5.0	0.420
14	Slovakia	86.0	1.5	0.825
15	Philippines	85.7	2.5	0.744
16	Egypt	85.5	6.0	0.623
17	Bulgaria	84.5	2.5	0.772
18	Bolivia	83.8	2.0	0.643
19	Latvia	83.8	1.5	0.771
20	Slovenia	83.3	1.5	0.861
21	Guyana	82.9	2.0	0.709
22	Korea, South	82.2	2.0	0.854
23	Brazil	82.0	3.5	0.747
24	Venezuela	81.8	4.0	0.770
25	Colombia	81.7	4.0	0.764
26	Romania	81.3	2.0	0.770
27	Russia	81.1	4.5	0.771
28	Thailand	79.4	2.5	0.745
29	Nigeria	78.9	3.5	0.439
30	Morocco	78.2	4.5	0.589
31	Argentina	77.8	2.5	0.837
32	Senegal	77.5	4.0	0.416
33	Lithuania	77.3	1.5	0.789
34	Nicaragua	76.3	3.0	0.631
35	Cameroon	76.0	6.5	0.528
36	Togo	76.0	5.0	0.471
37	Zambia	75.9	4.5	0.420
38	Singapore	75.7	5.0	0.881
39	Croatia	74.6	4.0	0.795
40	Yemen	74.5	5.5	0.448
41	Namibia	73.6	2.5	0.632
42	Sri Lanka	73.5	3.5	0.733
43	Gabon	71.4	4.5	0.592
44	Congo	70.9	5.5	0.507
45	Peru	70.9	4.5	0.737
46	Vietnam	68.6	7.0	0.671
47	China	68.4	6.5	0.706

Table 2.1 cont.

Rank no.	*Country*	*Index of globalisation*[a]	*Freedom House Index 2000*[b]	*Human Development Index 1998*[c]
48	Mauritius	68.4	1.5	0.761
49	South Africa	68.3	1.5	0.697
50	Bahrain	67.5	6.5	0.820
51	Algeria	67.2	5.5	0.683
52	Guatemala	67.0	3.5	0.619
53	Paraguay	66.9	3.5	0.736
54	Honduras	66.8	3.0	0.653
55	Malawi	66.7	3.0	0.385
56	Ukraine	66.7	3.5	0.744
57	Dominican Republic	66.5	2.5	0.729
58	Lesotho	66.5	4.0	0.569
59	Saudi Arabia	66.4	7.0	0.747
60	Moldova	65.9	3.0	0.700
61	Kuwait	65.2	4.5	0.836
62	Zimbabwe	65.1	5.5	0.555
63	Azerbaijan	65.0	5.0	0.722
64	Uruguay	65.0	1.5	0.825
65	Papua New Guinea	63.8	2.5	0.542
66	El Salvador	62.7	2.5	0.696
67	Turkey	62.6	4.5	0.732
68	India	61.4	2.5	0.563
69	Gambia	61.3	6.0	0.396
70	Mali	59.8	3.0	0.380
71	Fiji	59.1	2.5	0.769
72	Ghana	59.1	3.0	0.556
73	Benin	59.0	2.5	0.411
74	Kenya	58.4	5.5	0.508
75	Chad	58.0	5.5	0.367
76	Pakistan	57.7	6.0	0.522
77	Niger	57.4	5.0	0.293
78	Angola	57.3	6.0	0.405
79	Belarus	57.0	6.0	0.781
80	Taiwan	56.8	2.0	–
81	United Arab Emirates	56.4	5.5	0.810
82	Kyrgyzstan	55.7	5.0	0.706
83	Armenia	55.3	4.0	0.721
84	Macedonia	55.2	3.0	0.763
85	Uganda	54.9	5.0	0.409
86	Lebanon	54.8	5.5	0.735
87	Cambodia	53.2	6.0	0.512
88	Tanzania	52.8	4.0	0.415
89	Congo, Dem. Rep.	52.2	6.5	0.430
90	Kazakhstan	51.9	5.5	0.754
91	Burkina Faso	51.4	4.0	0.303
92	Mauritania	51.2	5.5	0.451
93	Albania	50.9	4.5	0.713
94	Libya	50.3	7.0	0.760
95	Botswana	48.5	2.5	0.593

Table 2.1 cont.

Rank no.	*Country*	*Index of globalisation*[a]	*Freedom House Index 2000*[b]	*Human Development Index 1998*[c]
96	Syria	47.7	7.0	0.660
97	Guinea	45.8	5.5	0.331
98	Ethiopia	45.1	5.0	0.309
99	Nepal	44.9	3.5	0.474
100	Turkmenistan	44.7	7.0	0.704
101	Sudan	44.5	7.0	0.477
102	Oman	43.5	6.0	0.730
103	Mozambique	43.3	3.5	0.341
104	Madagascar	43.0	3.0	0.483
105	Qatar	42.8	6.0	0.819
106	Cuba	42.3	7.0	0.783
107	Mongolia	41.8	2.5	0.628
108	Georgia	40.8	3.5	0.762
109	Liberia	39.3	4.5	–
110	Bangladesh	38.5	3.5	0.461
111	Uzbekistan	36.1	6.5	0.686
112	Central African Republic	35.1	3.5	0.371
113	Iran	35.0	6.0	0.709
114	Burundi	33.4	6.0	0.321
115	Haiti	32.8	5.0	0.440
116	Djibouti	32.2	5.0	0.447
117	Rwanda	30.0	6.5	0.382
118	Guinea Bissau	28.8	4.0	0.394
119	Tajikistan	28.1	6.0	0.663
120	Laos	27.1	6.5	0.484
121	Comoros	24.3	5.0	0.510
122	Korea, North	14.8	7.0	–
123	Afghanistan	11.6	7.0	–
124	Burma Myanmar	6.3	7.0	0.585

[a] Calculated as the mean of the five indicators' rank value. The theoretical range goes from 1 to 124. The higher the score. the more globalised the state.

[b] The aggregate score on the two indexes of Political Rights and Civil Liberties is divided by two. The index ranges from 1 to 7 with a lower score indicating a higher level of democracy. *Source*: www.freedomhouse.org.

[c] *Source*: UNDP 2000.

– Indicates missing value.

an even higher explanatory power than that coming from the HDI ($r = -0.29$). Drawing on the figures in Table 2.2, it is in fact viable and relevant to bring the entire modernisation approach into question, given Diamond's (1992) argument that HDI is the best possible way of making the modernisation variables operational. However, we should be careful in this respect since the correlation is not totally negligible but is just relatively lower. Besides, the fact that it is hard to operationalise does not prove that the theoretical foundations are wrong *per se*. However, a more important argument regarding this matter will be presented below. Third,

Table 2.2 The correlation between FHI, HDI and index of globalisation respectively

	HDI 1998	*Index of globalisation*	*Index of globalisation with control for HDI 1998*[a]
FH Index 2000	$r = -0.29$[b]	$r = -0.52$[b]	$r = -0.42$[b]

[a] The last column states the partial correlation coefficient, i.e. the relation between FHI and globalisation controlling for the interference of the HDI.
[b] Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (Pearson).

the partial coefficient tells us that the correlation between globalisation and democracy is just slightly weakened when controlling for the level of socio-economic development, in terms of HDI values. Hence, the modest weakening signifies that globalisation – herein argued to be a third explanatory dimension of democratisation – is not only of a complementary nature but must also be ascribed a certain significant effect on the presence and degree of democracy in general, regardless of the level of development. However, the coefficients do not reveal anything of the answers to the following two questions, which aim to bring out a more nuanced picture of the possible claims about the consequences of a more globalised state:

1. Does the degree of globalisation have a *specific* significance for the degree of democracy only (or preferably) as regards the countries at a specific level of development (high or low)?
2. If that is the case, are globalisation and development *interacting* factors regarding their effects on democracy?

These questions can be answered if we systematically compare the Freedom House ratings between clusters of countries, which in different ways combine high and low values of the HDI and the globalisation index respectively.[25] The comparison of the average FHI score is shown in Table 2.3.

Indeed, the results in Table 2.3 paint a more detailed picture of the correlation patterns. A systematic analysis of the differences in average FHI score between the six groups gives a quite clear-cut answer to the two questions raised:

1. The degree of globalisation has an unambiguous significance for the degree of democracy but *mainly* for countries at a relatively high level of socio-economic development. The effect of the relative state of democracy in the high-range HDI groups is no less than –2.8. On the FH scale of democracy, ranging from one to seven, this must be interpreted as considerable. In addition:
2. The degree of globalisation and development are interacting and evidently strengthen their respective effects on democracy. The two factors have a *synergic effect* producing a comparatively low FH mean (i.e. more democracy) but it is far more pronounced in countries which simultaneously combine a high degree of globalisation and socio-economic development respectively.

Table 2.3 The FH mean (2000) within different clusters of countries due to their ranking on HDI and the globalisation index

		Degree of globalisation			
		Low (rank no. 84–124)	*Medium (rank no. 42–83)*	*High (rank no. 1–41)*	*Effect of globalisation*
HDI 1998	Low (–0.671)	5.1 $n = 29$	4.3 $n = 20$	4.3 $n = 13$	**–0.8**
	High (0.672–)	5.6 $n = 12$	4.1 $n = 22$	2.8 $n = 28$	**–2.8**

Note: The lower the value, the higher degree of democracy. The HDI as well as the globalisation effect is calculated as the difference between high and low values.

Table 2.4 Percentage of democracies (rated Free by FHI) within different clusters of countries according to their ranking on HDI and degree of globalisation

		Degree of globalisation		
		Low (rank no. 84–124)	*Medium (rank no. 42–83)*	*High (rank no. 1–41)*
HDI 1998	Low (–0.671)	6.9 $n = 29$	25.0 $n = 20$	**15.4** $n = 13$
	High (0.672–)	0.0 $n = 12$	27.3 $n = 22$	**60.7** $n = 28$

Drawing on these findings, it becomes evident that the initial state of socio-economic development is of paramount importance for the overarching question of how well the score on the globalisation index predicates the level of democracy. In this respect the state of globalisation could be regarded as a positive contribution to the conventional modernisation approach after all. Still, a smaller effect is also present in the low-range HDI cluster. In terms of correlation coefficients the difference is expressed when comparing $r = –0.33$ and $r = –0.62$ for the low-range and high-range HDI clusters respectively.[26] In other words, the degree of globalisation requires an initially higher degree of socio-economic development if it is to have a more pronounced effect. A look at the distribution of the relative numbers of democracies within each and all of the six categories bolsters the findings about the synergic effect, and the pattern is even more obvious. Of the 28 countries achieving high values on both the HDI and the globalisation index, 60 per cent are rated Free by FH. Needless to say, however, the six categories are artificial and should be treated with care. Nevertheless, the difference in the shares of democracies is considerable, from 6.9 per cent to 60.7 per cent comparing low/low with high/high values. In the analysis undertaken here this discrepancy is produced by

two interacting variables – globalisation and socio-economic development. The figures are presented in Table 2.4, which in addition exposes two deviant cases combining low degree of globalisation and development with FHI top rank.

Concluding remarks

Following the initial argument – that the initial level of democracy is of utmost significance when trying to judge whether and how globalisation in general affects it – we were left with the conclusion that this obviously also bifurcates the dependent variable into mature democracies and non-, newborn or fragile democracies respectively. Given that the ultimate proof of the pudding is in the eating we have made efforts to discuss the recipe, i.e. how to make globalisation workable as an explanatory predictor. Moreover, we also tried to do the cooking. Pointing at the increase over the last 50 years, with an intensification over the last 20, in different numbers such as FDI, world trade and the number of IGOs and NGOs, data in the globalisation discourse are usually employed as scattered evidence that something, labelled globalisation, is in progress causing greater interdependence. Instead of making general assumptions we have broken down this development and the systemic figures into an index exposing on a country-by-country basis the relative allocation of this increase. This in turn makes it possible not only to make assumptions about its impacts on democracy but also to measure and prove them: broken down into its constituent parts the variance in the state of globalisation was shown to matter.

Statistics comes with strings attached. However, using three different techniques in a cross-sectional analysis, the interpretation of the main result must be a simultaneous prevalence of a high score on the globalisation index developed here and a higher level of democracy according to FH measures. In addition, we have shown that an increasing degree of socio-economic development paralleled with a more globalised state create better conditions for the progress of democratic institutions and values. Thus, the independent explanatory value of globalisation signifies its *raison d'être* as a third explanatory dimension in the analysis of democratisation. The globalisation index, defined through the five indicators, demonstrates that the extent to which a country is intertwined in the global context contributes to our understanding of the predictors of democracy. In a changing political world, increasingly characterised by the concept of globalisation, this variable ought to be added to the traditional modernisation approach – the main challenge being how to operationalise such a complex concept and make it possible to capture and measure empirically. One of the aims of this chapter was to start taking on that challenge.

However, we should bear in mind that the causal links are difficult to disentangle and naturally the relationship also works the other way around. Reversing the dependent and independent variable would presumably, as well as reasonably, report that a higher level of democracy facilitates a more globalised state, i.e. that globalisation goes with democracy and increases under the conditions of political openness.

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3 Development, class and democracy

Is there a relationship?

Renske Doorenspleet

Introduction

The relationship between development and democracy is a very strong finding. Dozens of quantitative studies have tested this relationship and although they differed in many ways, they all found it to be positive. Higher levels of development generate a significantly higher probability of democratic government. Class structure is considered as an important intervening factor: economic development expands the size of the middle class and/or working class in a non-democratic regime, causing such a regime to have a high probability of collapsing and undergoing a transition to democracy.

While many pages have been written on the theoretical influence of class structure on democracy, this relationship has rarely been tested in a broad empirical quantitative study. Bollen and Jackman (1995) pointed out that this omission creates some problems in interpreting the strength of the different factors. They called for studies that take into account the influence of class structure:

> Further analyses of the structural factors that may mediate the relationship between industrialization (that is development) and democratization are needed. The impact of the changes in the class structure has not been evaluated. Do such changes mediate the effects of industrialization on democratization?
>
> (Bollen and Jackman 1995: 988)

This chapter makes an initial attempt to carry out cross-national quantitative tests concerning the relationship between class structure and transition to democracy. In the next section, attention will be paid to previous research on the relationship between class and democracy. In the third and fourth sections, the concepts of class structure and democracy will be defined and measured. Then, the fifth section will present the results of the analyses in which the hypotheses concerning the influence of class are tested. The final section will contain a conclusion and will offer suggestions for future research.

Class and democracy: previous research

The belief that there is a strong positive relationship between development and democracy has been supported by many researchers in the fields of international relations and comparative politics. Theorists (cf. Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Huntington 1991; Inglehart 1997; Vanhanen 1997) argued that when the people of a state are more developed the people are more inclined to believe in democratic values and will support a democratic system. Only in a wealthy society can a situation exist in which

> the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues. A society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy [. . .] or in tyranny.
>
> (Lipset 1959: 75)

The important hypothesis that there is a relationship between development and democracy has been replicated many times: all previous empirical studies clearly support the positive relationship between development and democracy (e.g. Cutright 1963; McCrone and Cnudde 1967; Neubauer 1967; Olsen 1968; Jackman 1973; Coulter 1975; Bollen 1979, 1980, 1983, 1991; Bollen and Jackman 1985, 1989, 1995; Muller 1988, 1995a, 1995b; Inglehart 1988; Muller and Seligson 1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994). This long tradition of replication should convince everyone that the correlation between development and democracy must stand as an accepted result (cf. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992: 4).

But what explains this strong relationship between development and democracy? Knowing that establishing correlation is not the same as proving causality, several theorists (e.g. Lipset 1959; Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992) discussed the causal factors that might link economic development and democracy. According to these authors, the most important process that underlies the correlation is the class struggle.

Lipset (1959) argued that increased wealth is related causally to the development of democracy by changing the social conditions of workers, increasing the extent to which the lower strata are exposed to cross-pressures, which will make them less receptive to extremist ideologies. Increased wealth moderates the lower classes and thus makes them more prone to accept and even support the status quo. It also affects the political role of the middle class through changing the shape of the stratification base, to a diamond with a growing middle class. According to Lipset, a large middle class plays a role in moderating conflict since 'it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalise extremist groups' (Lipset 1959: 83).

In addition, Moore (1966) asserted that class is a crucial variable in explaining democracy. The researcher pointed out that the path to democracy is a complex

one, and that 'a decisive precondition for modern democracy has been the emergence of a rough balance between the crown and the nobility, in which the royal power predominated but left a substantial degree of independence to the nobility' (Moore 1966: 417). The same author also emphasised that a strong bourgeoisie is of critical importance: 'we may simply register strong agreement with the Marxist thesis that a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy' (1966: 418). He also noted that in all three cases of democratic development studies, there was a revolutionary break with the past led by the urban bourgeoisie, stopping the domination of state and lords.[1]

Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) followed Moore in hypothesising that large landlords would be the most implacable opponents of democracy. However, in contrast to Moore, they also expected the bourgeoisie to oppose suffrage extension to the working classes because such a move posed a potential treat to their interests. It was expected that the working class would be the most frequent proponent of the full extension of democratic rights; such an extension promised to include the working class in the polity where this class could further pursue its interests and could organise itself. As a consequence, the correlation between development and democracy occurs because development changes the balance of class power in favour of the working class.

> Socioeconomic development enlarges the size of the working class and it increases the organizational power of subordinate classes generally. At the same time, it erodes the size and power of the most anti-democratic force – the large landowning classes, especially those that rely on coercive state power for the control of their labor force.
>
> (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992: 76)

The authors also hypothesised that the middle class would favour its own inclusion, but would be ambivalent about further extensions of political rights, leaving it open as to whether it would side with democratic or anti-democratic forces in society. The interests of the middle class are not clear and its intermediate position in the class structure makes it potentially attracted to alliances with anti-democratic elements within the dominant class that owns and manages capital (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992: 5–6, 57–63). In short, according to this approach, development increases not only the size of the middle class, but also the size of the working class and these classes, especially the working class, increase the probability that a country undergoes a transition to democracy.

Although theories emphasise the role of classes, broad quantitative empirical studies have rarely been conducted. At first sight, Muller (1995a; 1995b) seemed to include the influence of class structure in his analyses. He discussed how changes in the class system, measured as changes in the proportion of working class and middle class, affect democratisation. Theoretically he considered this intermediate variable to be essential, but his empirical analyses did not include any measure of class structure.

Fortunately, in Inglehart's unique study (1988), the influence of the size of the middle class on the stability of democracy was investigated. The middle class was measured by the proportion of the labour force working in the tertiary sector, and the stability of democracy was measured by the years that a regime was continuously democratic from 1900 till 1986.[2] The results indicated that the size of the middle class does indeed have a positive influence on the stability of democracy, according to Inglehart.

In addition, in an earlier publication (Doorenspleet 1997), I examined whether there was a relationship between the size of the middle class and the level of democracy for 87 developing and developed countries over four time periods: that is, 1965–75, 1970–80, 1980–90 and 1965–90. The middle class was measured by the proportion of the economically active population consisting of professional, technical, administrative, managerial and clerical workers. The results of this research also indicated that the size of a country's middle class is an important variable. The study supported the theoretical idea that a country with a higher level of development generates a bigger middle class, which in turn has a positive influence on the level of democracy.

It has to be emphasised that Inglehart's study (1988) focused on explaining the stability of democracy, and my previous article (Doorenspleet 1997) concentrated on explaining the level of democracy at one point in time. This chapter, by contrast, focuses on explaining *transitions to democracy*. We already know, on the basis of other studies (Rustow 1970; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Doorenspleet 2001), that the transitions to democracy might require a different explanation from that for the presence or endurance of democracy. On the basis of a relationship between the size of the middle class and the presence of democracy one cannot simply conclude that there is a relationship between the size of middle class and the probability that a country will make a transition to democracy. The value of this chapter, therefore, is that the relationship between class and transition to democracy will be investigated for the first time. Not only the role of the middle class but also the role of working classes will be studied. Finally, two different measurements will be included, which are both newly developed measurements.

The concept and measurement of class structure

Before the role of the different social classes in the transitions to democracy can be assessed, the concept of class must be discussed. Such a discussion is not easy because it has been heavily influenced by political and ideological interests. Moreover, also in the important theoretical studies, the concept has not been very clearly used. For instance, Lipset investigated the role of classes in democratisation processes in a thorough and extensive way (e.g. Lipset 1960: 45–53, 78–180), but he did not define and operationalise the concept of class. Although Rueschemeyer and his colleagues tried to conceptualise 'class' (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992: 51–53), they never operationalised and measured the concept in their study. Thus, it is impossible to determine which workers belong to the working class and which belong to the middle class. The idea of class becomes a rather blunt tool.

What is class? Marxist sociological theorists have provided the most influential answers to this question. In fact, all democratisation theorists seem to rely on the ideas of Karl Marx. The latter argued that the relations among individuals are defined by the position of the individual in the productive system of society: that is, by the class to which the individual belongs. He suggested that with industrialisation, two main classes would emerge: on the one hand, the capitalists, who employ individuals and own economic profits, and on the other hand, the proletariat, or propertyless workers (Rempel and Clark 1995: 242–43).

Marx argued that members of the same class have the same social opportunities, same identities and same political interests. He believed that the members of different classes have unequal opportunities to advance in society; they do not have an equal chance in education or in work. Everyday work experiences of the members in the same class generate a wide range of common personal and common political interests. Members share personal identities like communication styles, cultural interests and leisure activities. However, the dominant class, which in industrialised societies consists of capitalists, tries to suppress the rise of common identities among subordinate classes by using coercion. The capitalists, for example, (mis)use schools by teaching children of the subordinate class to accept ideas that are supportive to the interests of the dominant class. In Marx's opinion, it is nonetheless inevitable that members of the subordinate classes would attain a consciousness of their oppressed status, would become aware of their common political interests and would finally act together to fight for political change (Rempel and Clark 1995: 242–43).

Although Marx can be considered as the founder of contemporary work on class, some important objections to Marx's ideas should be noted here. In particular, Max Weber's critical comments have been influential. Weber accepted the Marxist idea of class as a category within the network of economic relations, but he denied that economic divisions were necessarily mirrored in the cultural and political relations in the society. Apart from classes, there are other important groups in society. For instance, ethnicity or race could have more influence than class over personal identities. Weber disagreed that class divisions always result in common class identities and political movements. Moreover, Weber opposed Marx's view that capitalists and workers are the main classes. In addition to the jobs market, in which capitalists are divided from workers, there also exists a credit market, with lenders and borrowers, and a commodity market, in which consumers are divided from sellers. The relative importance attached by an individual to each of the groups or classes to which he or she belongs is not automatically determined in advance, according to Weber (Rempel and Clark 1995: 243).

The modernisation (cf. Lipset 1959) and historical-structuralist approaches (cf. Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992), which pay attention to the influence of classes on democracy, tend to follow Marx and elaborate on his ideas. As they discuss democracy, they all assume that classes are created in and by the labour market. Moreover, they believe that members of the same class have the same interests in stating, for instance, that *the* middle class promotes democracy or

in arguing that *the* working class has interest in promoting a transition to democracy. Hence, it is important to notice and acknowledge that the democratisation theories do not embrace some of Weber's important refinements.

Developments in the twentieth century have led to another critical comment on the ideas of Marx. In addition to the classical division of capitalists and working classes, several intermediate classes, such as professionals, middle managers and small-business owners, have arisen in society. In particular, the expansion of administrative jobs in the public sector and the growth of finance, computer and high-technology industries in the private sector have created a larger 'middle class'.

Modernisation theorists and historical structuralists acknowledge the existence of this recently developed middle class. The new modern intermediate class has been created in the labour market, just like the capitalists and working class. The similarity between members of the middle class and members of the working class is found in their relation to 'ownership': neither class owns productive resources. The lack of ownership sets both classes apart from the capitalist upper class. On the other hand, the middle class can be distinguished from the working class by its professional potential. The middle class is better paid and needs more intellectual skills in fulfilling the demands of employment than the working class. While the working class is a manual-labouring class, the middle class is a mental-labouring class. In short, the middle class, which is a class with certain intellectual skills and without control over the means of production, is now generally recognised as such in the democratisation literature.

Back to the question: what is class? In this chapter, a class is considered a grouping or positioning within the social hierarchy in which divisions stem from differences in economic relations: that is, from differences in types of economic ownership and intellectual/professional skills (cf. Wright 1985; 1997a; 1997b). Although people often refer to classes as rich or poor, this chapter does not consider class divisions to be derived from wealth, but from ownership and skills.

How is the size of the different classes to be measured? It is essential to measure the size of the working class and middle class, because these are the classes that are central in democratisation theories. Although *theories* of democratisation stress the importance of the size of classes, cross-national *empirical quantitative studies* have not yet taken this factor into account. That is why authors who focus on explanations of democracy have not yet tried to operationalise the concepts of working and middle class.

Inglehart's effort is an exception (Inglehart 1988). He interpreted the percentage of the labour force employed in the tertiary sector as an indicator of the size of the middle class. In my opinion, his operationalisation is not soundly based in theory. Inglehart did not define the concepts in advance, so we do not know where his measurements were derived from. Why do employees of the tertiary sector belong to the middle class? Why are labourers in the industrial sector members of the working class? Inglehart did not give reasons for these choices. He would consider a cleaning-woman, who works in the service sector, part of the middle class; he would classify not only factory-workers, but also factory-managers and factory-owners as members of the working class, because they all work in the industrial sector.

I do not believe that the size of the tertiary sector is a valid measure of the size of the middle class. Nor is the size of the industrial sector a very valid measure of the size of the working class. Nonetheless, I will include this measurement as a proxy for pragmatic reasons because available data are lacking and this proxy has also been used in previous studies.

The size of the industrial and service sector can be determined on the basis of data collected by the UNDP and reported in the *Human Development Report*. In this way, countries with a high percentage working in the service sector (like Singapore with a 'middle class' of 70.5 per cent) can be distinguished from countries with a small service sector (like Burundi with a 'middle class' of 5.5 per cent). In the same way, countries with a large industrial sector (like South Korea) and those with a small industrial sector (like Mali) can be identified, indicating that these countries have either a large working class or a small working class.

Another, presumably more appropriate, way of measuring the size of the different classes is by further developing the classification of Erik Olin Wright.[3] In determining the size of the middle and working classes, Wright did not focus on the *sector* in which the employees work, as did Inglehart, but on the *occupations* and skills they have. The occupations of the middle class need more intellectual and organisational skills than the type of work of the working class, according to Wright (1985; 1989; 1997a; 1997b).[4] The middle class is a mental-working class, and the working class is a manual-labouring class. On the basis of the types of occupation, Wright classified employees into different classes using data from seven developed countries: the United States, Sweden, Norway, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan.

Although Wright's data cannot be used in this study, since this chapter focuses on mainly developing countries, Wright's measurement may offer a background for the operationalisation of the size of middle and working class in a broader cross-national setting of research. The International Labour Organisation has collected a lot of data that can be used to measure the size of the middle and working classes. Every year, the ILO publishes data on the proportion of the economically active population classified by occupation or the type of work performed (ILO 1969). I relied on the data of the ILO, and gathered the data from ten volumes of the *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*: that is, from the years 1985 to 1994.

To measure the size of the middle class, I calculated the proportion of the economically active population who are professional, technical, administrative, managerial and clerical workers (groups 1, 2 and 3 in ISCO-1968; cf. ILO 1969). In this way, the middle class consists of, among others, teachers, journalists, architects, medical and dental workers, government administrators and bookkeepers. To measure the size of the working class, I calculated what proportion of the economically active population are production workers, transport equipment operators and labourers (groups 7, 8 and 9 in ISCO-1968; cf. ILO 1969). Consequently, the working class embodies, among others, miners, quarrymen, metal processors, paper makers, spinners, weavers, tanners, shoemakers, plumbers, carpenters and other construction workers.

The concept and measurement of democracy

When students of democratisation try to classify regimes, the key distinction is made between those that are democratic and those that are not. Determining the meaning of these concepts is not easy. Illustrative of this conceptual chaos is that David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997) identified more than 550 subtypes of democracy in about 150 mostly recent studies. Hence, it has to be emphasised that this chapter adopts a definition of democracy that fits into the Schumpeterian tradition and relies on Dahl's ideas. Dahl (1971) developed some widely accepted and used criteria for classifying a country as democratic. His procedural definition, which was based on Schumpeter (1947), has significantly affected the conceptualisations of democracy in the field of quantitative research on democracy. In this chapter, a democratic regime is defined as a system of government in which:

1. there are institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies at the national level and there are institutionalised constraints on the exercise of power by the executive (competition);
2. there exists inclusive suffrage and a right of participation in the selection of national leaders and policies (inclusiveness/ participation).

Non-democratic regimes are defined as those political regimes that fail to meet the (first) requirement of competition and/or the (second) requirement of inclusiveness. Within the category of non-democratic regimes, several subtypes can be identified. Non-democratic regimes that fail to meet both conditions are called 'closed hegemonies'. On the other hand, the two requirements can vary somewhat independently. During the Cold War, the USSR had almost no system of competition, though it did have inclusive suffrage. Dahl called political regimes that only meet the second requirement of inclusiveness 'inclusive hegemonies' (Dahl 1971: 5–7).

Another type of non-democratic regime is a political system that does not meet the second requirement: that is, there is no inclusive suffrage in the selection of national leaders and policies. This norm of inclusiveness requires that most adults living on the territory of the state – regardless of their sex, race, language, descent, income, land holdings, education or religious beliefs – formally have the rights of citizenship to vote and to be elected (cf. Schmitter 1995: 346–50). The fact that certain prerequisites are demanded, such as age, sound mind or absence of a criminal record, does not negate this principle. For centuries, several restrictions on citizenship have been imposed in competitive systems according to criteria of gender, literacy and income. For example, the political system of Belgium could be considered already competitive during the nineteenth century, but women received the right to vote only in 1948. In South Africa, a racially restricted suffrage excluded more than two-thirds of the population until 1994. These kinds of political system that deny suffrage for certain groups in society are not inclusive, and consequently

are non-democratic regimes. Dahl called regimes that do not meet the second requirement of inclusiveness 'competitive oligarchies' (Dahl 1971: 5–7).

It is surprising – and in my opinion rather shocking – that most quantitative studies have considered this type of exclusive regimes as 'democratic'. Many studies have taken into account only one of Dahl's two dimensions – competition – and ignored the other (cf. Bollen 1980; Gastil 1991; Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Alvarez *et al.* 1996). In my opinion, however, the concept of democracy will be biased, or even possibly racist or sexist, if the dimension of inclusiveness is ignored. In this chapter, therefore, a political regime is considered as democratic when it fulfils the requirements of both competition and inclusiveness.

The first requirement of minimal democracies, the existence of competition, can be seen to be met if there exist institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies at the national level and if there are institutionalised constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Indicators of these phenomena have already been collated in Gurr's well-known Polity III data set, which covers most independent countries on an annual basis from 1800 to 1994, and which therefore offers an ideal source to measure the presence of competition. Moreover, these data are also easily adapted to the definition of 'competition' that I will employ in this analysis.

The second requirement of minimal democracies is the existence of inclusive, universal suffrage at the national level. The norm of universality requires that all citizens of the state – regardless of their sex, race, language, descent, income, land holdings, education or religious beliefs – formally enjoy the right to vote and to be elected to public office. Only countries that at some stage meet the first requirement of competition from 1800 to 1994 are considered when measuring the inclusiveness of the system. Following Coppedge and Reinicke (1991), levels of inclusiveness of the political system may be broken down into one of the following four categories: (1) no popular suffrage; (2) suffrage denied to large segments of the population (more than 20 per cent is excluded); (3) suffrage with partial restrictions (less than 20 per cent of the population is excluded); (4) universal suffrage or minor restrictions.

Using these definitions and requirements, I carefully examined a variety of historical sources to determine the type of political regime, and when the political regime in each country changed from one of the categories to another: that is, from a non-democratic to a democratic regime or vice versa (cf. Doorenspleet 2000). I also investigated the extent of variation in transitions of political regimes that has occurred across different countries and over time (Doorenspleet 2000; Doorenspleet 2001). Indeed, the three waves initially identified by Huntington (1991) can be distinguished. When the requirement of inclusive suffrage is included, however, the first wave is seen to begin much later, indicating that transitions to minimal democracy are a twentieth-century phenomenon. Moreover, the peaks of the first and second waves of democratisation also appear to be lower. In addition, the first wave of transitions to democracy appears to be very striking, but there is no strong evidence of a second reverse wave. And finally, the explosion of democratisation in the period 1990–94, in which an impressive total of 34 authoritarian regimes effected a transition to minimal democracy, emerges with real force.

These results clearly show that the period after the Cold War is the most interesting period to investigate. The explosion of democratic transitions since 1990 has been striking. At the end of the 1980s, the wave swept through Eastern Europe. In 1988, the Hungarian transition to a semi-democratic system began. In 1990, Hungary moved to democracy. That same year, Poland became democratic after elections for a national parliament and a president. The voters chose a non-communist government and the leader of Solidarity, Lech Walesa. Russia began to liberalise and the communist regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania collapsed. The 1990s saw the widespread and rapid collapse of non-democratic regimes in Africa, and 13 minimal democracies emerged in this region. This rapid political transformation spread also to Latin America (e.g. Chile) and parts of Asia (e.g. Mongolia and Nepal).

This recent democratisation wave has not only been more global and affected more countries than earlier waves did; there have – at least so far – also been fewer regressions to non-democratic regimes than in the past. Gambia's democratic tradition of almost three decades ended with a military coup in 1994. The minimal democracy of Comoros lasted only three years and collapsed in 1994. The democracy of Peru reversed in 1992 when President Alberto Fujimori declared a state of emergency, gave himself special powers and dissolved the legislature. This *autogolpe* (self-coup) took place under siege by drug traffickers and the 'Shining Path', a guerrilla group. Haiti moved to democracy, but experienced a short reversal when the first democratically elected president, Aristide, was forced out by a military coup in 1991. In 1994, however, Aristide came back with the help of outside intervention and democracy was restored.

During this short period, there were 34 transitions to minimal democracy and only four transitions back to non-democratic regimes. This can be considered as a true wave of democratisation: the difference between transitions to and from democracy ('outnumbered transitions') is 30. One can really speak about an impressive fourth wave, indicating that this is an excellent period to investigate.

These positive developments, however, should be seen in perspective. In particular, the Middle East has seemed immune to changes and the democratic wave has not engulfed Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and Libya. In Algeria, democratic experiments came abruptly to an end when the first competitive elections in 1992 led to a victory of Islamic fundamentalists. More than 60 countries remained non-democratic in 1994.

Hence, contrasts between political regimes in the world still remain and it is very interesting to investigate why some non-democratic regimes have undergone a transition towards a minimal democratic political system while others have not done so during the fourth wave of 1990–94. Class may be an explaining factor.

Now that the concepts of class and democracy have been defined and measured, the empirical relationship between class and transitions to democracy can be tested. It has to be emphasised that this relationship has not yet been investigated in previous quantitative empirical research. In order to test the relationship, I decided to compare countries that remained non-democratic during the period from 1990 to 1994, the period that I also refer to as the fourth wave

of democratisation (cf. Doorenspleet 2000), with countries that made a transition to democracy in this period. In such a research design, the probability that a country made a transition to democracy can be estimated.

Class and democracy: empirical analyses

What are the results of the analyses? Do the data support the hypotheses brought up by the theories? Does a larger middle class or working class lead to a higher probability of a transition to democracy?

As noted above, not only Lipset (1959) but also Moore (1966) elaborated on the role of competing classes in the rise of democracy, and reserved a key role for the middle class as principal agent of democratisation. In their view, the social structure changes gradually into a diamond shape as a consequence of economic development, resulting in an economic system in which the majority of the population is relatively rich and belongs to the middle class. Because middle-class occupations require an educated population, its members will have democratic political attitudes that are attained through education.

The empirical analyses in this chapter suggest however that the middle class has no decisive influence on the probability that a country makes a transition to democracy. Analyses with logistics regression show that there is no significant link between the size of a country's middle class and the probability of its transition to democracy during the fourth wave of democratisation. Table 3.1 demonstrates the results with the middle class measured as the proportion of the labour force working in the tertiary sector (labelled as Middle Class (I) in Table 3.1). There is no significant relationship between this measurement and transition to democracy. Countries that made a transition to democracy during the fourth wave possessed a middle class that was as large as the middle class in countries that remained non-democratic. For instance, the proportion of the labour force working in the service sector is small in both Burkina Faso and Nepal (that is, 9 per cent and 6.5 per cent), but Burkina Faso remained non-democratic while Nepal made a transition to democracy. The service sector is large in both Chile, which became democratic during the fourth wave, and Jordan, which remained non-democratic.

Table 3.1 Middle Class (I) and transition to democracy during the fourth wave, 1990–94

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Sig*	*Exp(B)*
Middle Class I	–0.003	0.013	0.80	0.997
Constant	–0.611	0.489		

Table 3.2 Middle Class (II) and transition to democracy during the fourth wave, 1990–94

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Sig*	*Exp(B)*
Middle Class II	–0.011	0.029	0.70	0.989
Constant	–0.261	0.522		

Table 3.3 Working Class (I) and transition to democracy during the fourth wave, 1990–94

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Sig*	*Exp(B)*
Working Class I	–0.023	0.029	0.43	0.977
Constant	–0.440	0.429		

Table 3.4 Working Class (II) and transition to democracy during the fourth wave, 1990–94

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Sig*	*Exp(B)*
Working Class II	–0.012	0.023	0.58	1.012
Constant	–0.715	0.621		

Table 3.2 shows comparable results when the middle class is measured by the proportion of the economically active population that consists of professional, technical, administrative, managerial and clerical workers (labelled as Middle Class (II) in Table 3.2). Once more, there is no significant relationship between the size of a country's middle class and the probability of its transition to democracy.

Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) argued that the emphasis on the middle class was misplaced, and they focused instead on the role of the working class for the establishment of democracy. They stated that the size of the working class is the crucial intervening variable between development and democracy. The correlation between development and democracy occurs because development changes the balance of class power in favour of the working class.

What are the empirical results? Does a larger working class indeed generate a higher probability that a country makes a transition to democracy, as proposed by Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992)? In Table 3.3, the working class is measured as the proportion of the labour force working in the industrial sector (labelled as Working Class (I) in Table 3.3), while in Table 3.4 the working class is measured as the proportion of the economically active population consisting of production workers, transport equipment operators and labourers (labelled as Working Class (II) in Table 3.4). Both Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 make it clear that there is no significant relationship between the size of the working class and a country's transition to democracy.

These empirical analyses show that the size of the working class did not matter during the fourth wave, although structural theorists, like Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, emphasise the importance of the working class as a major force pushing for more democratisation and promoting the extension of suffrage. It is very likely that working classes did not get special benefits by promoting democratisation during the 1990s, because the universal right to vote (and as a consequence, also the suffrage for the working class) had already been extended to many non-democratic regimes (cf. Doorenspleet 2001). The working class had no inherent need to promote democratisation in the late twentieth century as it had a hundred years earlier in Europe and subsequently in industrialising countries in Latin America.

In summary, the findings in this section clearly do not support the theoretical idea that class structure matters in explaining transitions to democracy. A larger middle class does not lead to a higher likelihood that a country makes a transition to democracy. Countries that remain non-democratic, such as Burkina Faso, have a middle class that is as large as the middle class in countries like Nepal that made a transition to democracy. The rise of a potentially pro-democratic class need not by itself cause a transition to democracy. Furthermore, a country with a large working class does not have a higher probability of undergoing a transition to democracy than a country with a small working class.

It has to be pointed out that even proponents of the class thesis admit that the explanatory strength of class was particularly strong during the first wave of democratisation (in the early twentieth century), and that the class influence is less evident in more recent periods. Huntington, for instance, states that the emergence of 'a middle class, the development of a working class and its early organisation, and the gradual decrease in economic inequality all seem to have played some role in the movements towards democratisation in northern European countries in the nineteenth century' (Huntington 1991: 39). Now, however, class has less influence than in the past.

Why did the middle and working classes not play a major role in promoting recent transitions to democracy? One possible explanation for this result is that non-democratic states are likely to dominate class formation by setting government policies in terms of state-organised interests. As Kasfir put it: 'Class interests will be served through participation in the state, but must be justified on the state's terms' (Kasfir 1983: 9). Moreover, middle classes probably have little autonomy relative to the non-democratic state, because their economic position is dependent on remaining in political favour (Kasfir 1983: 12). Theorists who argue that there is an impact of class on democracy, like Lipset (1959) and Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), conceive classes as a force that can act autonomous of (and against) the state. In my opinion, however, it is very doubtful whether class can act independently of the political regime. The role that classes actually play is mainly dependent on the general political setting. Class can be created, supported, manipulated and repressed by any political regime. Where the regime is non-democratic, the role of classes will be limited. The state is not like groups in society such as classes. It fixes the boundary conditions and the basic rules of all associational activity. In a non-democratic system, the autonomous space of classes will certainly be more restricted than within a democratic system.

A second explanation for the unexpected result in this chapter may be that other influences, such as the strength of civil society, are intervening variables that can better explain the association between development and democracy.[5] Lipset (1959; 1994), for instance, stated that development is conducive to democracy via a growing civil society. Lipset here followed Tocqueville's argument that economic development increases the likelihood of a democratic regime via a vigorous associational life, i.e. a strong civil society. Civic organisations

> are a source of countervailing power, inhibiting the state or any single major source of private power from dominating all political resources; they are a

> source of new opinions; they can be the means of communicating ideas, particularly opposition ideas, to a large section of the citizenry; they serve to train men in the skills of politics; and they can help increase the level of interest and participation in politics.
>
> (Lipset 1959: 84)

In addition, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) argued that development furthers the growth of a civil society.

A third explanation for the non-relationship between class and transition to democracy is that short-term factors may have been more important than long-term factors during the 1990–94 wave of democratisation. If long-term structural factors, such as class structure, did not seem to play an important role during the fourth wave, it is probably better to theorise that the transitions were shaped by choices and strategies of the elite. The policy of important actors may also matter in explaining transition to democracy. The (structural) factor of development changes the strategies of elites, which has impact on the probability of a transition to democracy. Actions of elites may be an important intervening factor between development and democracy. This explanation has to be investigated in future empirical research, together with the other two possible explanations described above.

Conclusions

This chapter has focused on an investigation of the relationship between class structure and transition to democracy. The most important finding is the absence of support for the theoretical idea that a larger middle class or a bigger working class leads to a higher likelihood that a country makes a transition to democracy. The positive, though not perfect, correlation between capitalist development and democracy cannot be explained by the intervening influence of the middle class or working class. Class does not seem to matter in explaining transitions to democracy during the period studied here (1990–94).

Before accepting the main conclusion of this chapter that class structure does not have impact on the probability that a country makes a transition to democracy, some critical remarks should be made. In particular, more research concerning the operationalisation and measurement of classes should be conducted. Class was here defined as a grouping or positioning within the social hierarchy in which divisions stem from differences in economic relations: that is, from differences in types of economic ownership and intellectual or professional skills. In this way, the working class, the middle class and the capitalists can be identified. Following the Weberian critique, however, it could be objected that these are not the only classes of importance. In addition to the job market, other markets stratify society. In this chapter, class was merely defined in the context of the job market, but it would be interesting to investigate whether other classifications of class, for instance classes in the context of the credit market or commodity market, play a role in the transition to a democratic regime.

In addition, Weberian insights urge us to pay attention to subjective perceptions of class. In this chapter, class is taken as an objective given, but the relative importance attached by an individual to each of the groups or classes to which he or she belongs is not automatically determined in advance. As Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens also suggested, it is necessary to complement the objective concept of class by 'an analysis of the subjective mentality, ideas, and dispositions found among members of a class' (cf. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992: 53). Data of subjective classifications, collected in mass surveys, are needed. In such surveys, people are asked to classify themselves in the class they feel they belong to. Data are available for rich countries, but broad surveys have not yet been done in developing countries. Such broad cross-national surveys would be very useful, certainly in order to test the relationship between class (as a subjective category) and the probability of a transition to democracy. In short, more research concerning the operationalisation and measurement of classes should be conducted.

Finally, it must also be stressed that this study has focused on the 'transition to democracy' as key variable. It is quite possible that the relationships between class and transition to democracy found here would be different if the correlation were with consolidation, instead of transition to democracy. In other words, further research on whether the findings reported here hold also in the consolidation phase would be both important and interesting in the future.

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4 Transitions to democracy

Pros and cons of the Rustow–Lijphart elite approach

Axel Hadenius

Introduction

For a long time in comparative politics, the 'to be or not to be' of democracy was held to be dependent mainly on social and economic conditions. According to one school of thought, economic development is the basic prerequisite of democracy. In the 1950s and 1960s, researchers such as Daniel Lerner, Seymour Lipset and Philips Cutright presented evidence pointing to a strong statistical relationship between the level of economic growth and various measures of democracy. These data furnished powerful support for a theory of modernisation. According to this theory, changes in economic life provide the basis for democratic government. Through concomitant processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, together with improvements in the areas of communication and education, a social transformation in society takes place. In effect, ordinary citizens – who had been easily excluded before – acquire political resources and develop democratic attitudes, and so become able to take active part in the political process. This is a theory, in other words, of political emancipation at the mass societal level. And the driving factor behind the process is economic development.[1] Democratic potential can accordingly be measured in per capita GNP and related indicators. In poor and underdeveloped countries, therefore, the prospects for democracy are bleak. Democratic hopes stand little chance of fulfilment until profound changes have taken place in the social and economic realms. According to this analysis, then, the room for political manoeuvre is very limited. If an economic 'take-off' has not yet been accomplished, efforts must be concentrated on that task. In the meantime, the democratic project must be put on the waiting list.

The modernisation school based its analysis on two general conjectures. First, it portrayed political empowerment at the mass societal level as the foundation of democratic advancement. Second, it presumed that such empowerment can only come about through economic development. According to a widely held belief at the time, moreover, economic growth presupposes authoritarian government. Thus democratic-minded political actors have, presumably, almost no role to play in underdeveloped countries. Their main task is simply to stay calm.

Another obstacle often cited in the debate over the preconditions of democracy has to do with the level of trust and unity among popular groups. Democracy, as

we all know, entails competition for political power. At the same time, it makes possible the exposition of a range of views on political issues. Democracy is thus signified by conflict over political positions and matters of policy. But it has another side as well. It entails the peaceful resolution of disputes. It presupposes, therefore, a considerable element of concord and agreement among the actors involved. Democracy requires a high degree of unity regarding the basic rules of the political game: respect for majority rule, the maintenance of political liberties, the protection of minority rights, etc. Democracy demands, then, a goodly amount of tolerance and trust between the competing actors. If this is lacking, the open exposition of conflict will not be matched by a capacity to resolve differences in a peaceful and orderly manner. Under such conditions, democracy is bound to collapse.

It is normally more difficult, therefore, to apply the rules of democratic government in societies marked by grave conflict among social groups. It is thus unsurprising that, ever since ancient times, the belief that democracy can take root only in small and homogeneous societies has been widely held. From the age of Plato to the days of Rousseau, this was the dominant view among political philosophers. The ideal example was often thought to be the Greek city-state. Only in very small units, it was argued, can the solidarity and trust between people required by democracy emerge.

The bottom line, in other words, is a high degree of affinity among citizens. John Stuart Mill stressed this precondition firmly. He argued that the unity necessary for a functioning democracy cannot exist among a people without a fellow-feeling, particularly if said people are divided along linguistic lines (1958: 230). And Mill was not the last pessimist in this regard. Modern research on the preconditions of democracy – wherein extensive empirical evidence has been collected – has in many cases pointed out the cleavage structure in society as a troublesome factor (Forbes 1997; Weingast 1998).

If democracy presupposes nationhood – a sense of common identity, of being a 'we' – how then can that 'we' be brought about? Theorists on nation-building, from Otto Hinze to Stein Rokkan, have seen national integration as the outcome of a process of state-making. According to Rokkan, this involves setting up institutions for the penetration of the territory and the standardisation of rules and behaviour. This is a top-down enterprise. If it succeeds, a dynamic process of national integration will be set in motion. The road can then be opened to the extension of bottom-up influence, i.e. for participation on the part of the citizenry at large. The stage of participation, in other words, can only come after a stage of national integration. The latter often requires heavy-handed methods for its accomplishment.

As in the case of economic growth, it was generally believed that the great changes in society entailed by such a process can only be realised through policies of imposition. If society is to be modernised, and the various popular groups amalgamated, society and the groups in question should be excluded from the decision-making process.

For poor and divided societies the message was clear. Democracy could not –

should not – be an option. Among scholars and political actors on the international scene, it was generally seen as an understandable resort – and indeed a well-advised one – to introduce authoritarian modes of government in developing countries. Hence, the introduction of one-party states all over Africa in the 1960s often met with international endorsement. This form of government – and even military dictatorship – was seen as a necessary instrument for achieving economic development and national unification. Samuel Huntington (1968) was an influential exponent of this point of view. The authoritarian governments (and especially the one-party systems) which had been established throughout the Third World should be seen, he argued, as functionally equivalent to the absolute monarchies of Europe during the seventeenth century. The latter regimes, in pursuit of the same objectives of development and national integration, had established a strong central power insulated from the influence of society. Then, as today, backward and parochial societies needed to be changed fundamentally, and this could only be accomplished through forceful rule from above.

In order, therefore, to further democratic fortunes in less developed societies over the long run, democracy must be shunned over the short run. For democracy, it was feared, will hamper economic progress, so vital to democracy's survival. Furthermore, the unrestrained exposition of cleavages within a population to which democracy gives rise might lead to an escalation of segmental conflicts, which can in turn ruin the prospects for democracy in the future.

Rustow's argument

In a much-quoted article from 1970, Dankwart Rustow took issue with the dominant economistic perspective on the preconditions of democracy. True, Lipset and others had presented evidence indicating a statistical correlation between economic development and democratic stability. But correlation and causality are different things, Rustow remarks:

> correlation evidently is not the same as causation – it provides at best a clue to some sort of causal connection without indicating its direction. Lipset's data leave it entirely open, for example, whether affluent and literate citizens make better democrats [or] whether democracies provide superior schools and a more bracing climate for economic growth.
>
> (Rustow 1970: 342)

A lack of economic development does not constitute a fundamental obstacle to democracy, Rustow claims. In countries like England, Sweden and the United States, processes of democratisation started far back in history – at a time when these countries could hardly be considered 'developed' in the sense used in modernisation theory. When the process began, these countries were backward indeed. Yet the project succeeded all the same.

What made this possible? In Rustow's view, the democratic achievements in these and other countries were a result of skilful political manoeuvring on the part

of the political actors involved. In each process of transformation, it was the interaction between elite actors that decided the outcome of the game in the long run. To be successful, elite representatives from different political camps had to come together and work out some kind of accord, thus making cohabitation and cooperation possible. A process of democratisation thus starts with 'a deliberate decision on the part of the political leaders to accept the existence of diversity and unity and, to that end, to institutionalise some crucial aspects of democratic procedures' (1970: 355). This is the 'decision phase' – during which peace is reached among formerly antagonistic parties. Rustow mentions the agreement on plural and limited government between the Whig and Tory factions in England in the seventeenth century. He also points to important elite accords in the history of Sweden.[2] For all of the actors involved, the decision to embark on the road of coexistence and compromise is a second-best strategy. They choose it in order to avoid the least attractive outcome: the maintenance of prevailing political divisions. This worst-case scenario involves continued – or even worsening – political conflict, which in turn can result in the continuation (or establishment) of authoritarian rule. Without an accord, both sides believe, they will suffer great losses; for no one stands a chance in such a zero-sum game of ousting the other. It is better, therefore, to make the game cooperative and positive-sum in nature.

After an agreement has been reached, a phase of habituation then follows. This is a critical juncture, especially in its early stages. If urgent political questions cannot be effectively solved, the whole process of reconciliation and democratisation can be damaged. If the game can be kept going, on the other hand, this fact in itself can have a healthy socialising effect on the actors involved.

With its basic practice of multilateral debate, democracy in particular involves a process of trial and error, a joint learning experience. The first grand compromise that establishes democracy is, if it proves viable, in itself a proof of the efficacy of the principle of consolidation and accommodation. The first success, therefore, may encourage contending political forces and their leaders to submit other major questions to resolution by democratic procedure (Rustow 1970: 358).

Establishing democracy, in Rustow's view, is basically a process of learning – of creating trust and understanding between the parties, and confidence in the institutions that have been established. Democratic development, as he sees it, is not a simple matter of cause-and-effect; it is not the consequence of some objective conditions that must first be at hand. Rustow thus rejects the notion, put forward by Lipset and others, that democracy has certain 'functional requisites'. Instead he advances a 'genetic theory' of democratic development, featuring a recursive, two-way causal flow – a process of circular interaction, which can be of a positive or negative nature. It is a matter of breaking a vicious circle of ever-increasing mistrust and conflict, and of setting the stage for a virtuous circle wherein trust and sympathy spread among the parties. The key to success is to set the democratic process of interaction in motion, and to keep it alive long enough that it can start generating favourable side-effects (in terms of socialisation). It is a question, first of all, of getting democracy started; and secondly, of keeping it going. If that is possible, democracy can then strengthen itself.

In this perspective, there is broad latitude for inputs by political agents. According to the theory of functional requisites, political actors should adopt a wait-and-see approach until the appropriate conditions are present; the genetic theory, by contrast, issues an invitation to political action. Democracy does not grow like a grape on a vine. (Grapes require certain special natural conditions, and they cannot be consumed until the time is right.) Democracy is something that can be created under very different 'natural' conditions. Its creation is contingent on constructive interaction between political agents. The earlier such interaction begins (other things being equal), the better are the prospects for democratic governance.

In one respect, however, Rustow departs from his anti-functionalist stance. If democracy is to get started, he maintains, one basic condition must be met. This is 'national unity'. In a democracy-to-be, the vast majority of citizens must have no doubt as to what political community they belong. This excludes situations of latent succession, as with the late Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, or many contemporary African or Arab states. Democracy needs a manifest demos – a sense among the people of belonging to a single community. Such natural unity must be present prior to the phase of democratisation. On this score, in other words, Rustow takes the same view as Hinzte and Rokkan: nationhood must be established before democracy can emerge. If unity is lacking from the outset, the decision phase is hard to reach. And if it is reached notwithstanding, the subsequent habituation phase is likely to be unhappy.

As for cleavages within the population, Rustow holds that divisions of a religious and linguistic nature are the most difficult to handle in a democratic setting. Conflicts arising from such divisions tend to be zero-sum, leaving little room for deals and compromises. By contrast, on matters relating to class division – i.e. socio-economic conflicts – it is normally easier to split the difference, and to find suitable half-way solutions (especially in the context of an expanding economy). For that reason, democracy has proved most effective at resolving political questions in countries where the major divisions have been economic in nature. This is why the background condition of national unity relates primarily to identities of an ethnic – i.e. a cultural and ascriptive – sort. Ideally, such divisions have been toned down before democratic institutions are inaugurated.

Lijphart's argument

In 1968, Arend Lijphart published a study of his native country, the Netherlands. His basic assertion was that democracy in that divided society has been possible due to political arrangements of a conciliatory and accommodative nature. In a later work (1977), he expanded his scope of inquiry to include certain other countries (Austria, Belgium and Switzerland), and he commented on a number of non-European cases too. Drawing on these experiences, Lijphart advances a general explanatory approach: the theory of 'consociational democracy'.[3]

As in Rustow's work, the actions of political leaders play a central role in Lijphart's explanatory scheme. The inauguration of democratic government depends crucially on the democratic commitment and political skill of elite actors:

> It [the consociational approach] assumes that political elites enjoy a high degree of freedom of choice, and that they resort to consociational methods of decision-making as a result of a rational recognition of the centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural societies and a deliberate effort to counteract these dangers.
>
> (Lijphart 1977: 165)

In consequence, Lijphart rebuffs socio-economic determinism. Like Rustow, he rejects the view that economic development is the decisive factor, and he questions the causal direction of the demonstrated statistical relationship. But unlike Rustow, he maintains that even cleavages of a cultural character can be overcome. The European cases he has studied certainly support such a conclusion, he avers. These countries were characterised by strong tensions between different segments – segments often defined on a religious and/or linguistic basis. Nevertheless, it was possible to find solutions capable of resolving old conflicts, and to lay the ground for peaceful and democratic interaction. To that extent, Lijhpart's approach is more voluntaristic than is Rustow's.

According to Lijphart, the accomplishment of a fruitful agreement has two preconditions. First, the parties must realise they have more to win from a peace accord than from a continuation of conflict. This is a matter of commitment. Second, the parties must find appropriate solutions; they must apply the right techniques.

Where the first precondition – the commitment factor – is concerned, Lijphart puts a strong emphasis on the role played by the key actors: political elites. The actions of political leaders can make a huge difference, and they should live up to that responsibility (his argument has an almost moralistic character). At the same time, he mentions several circumstances that can have a favourable impact. The prospects are better if no party has the potential of dominating the political game. The segmental composition should preferably be such that a small number of groups (three to four) of almost equal size confront one another. In addition, the external context can play a role. The existence of threats from the outside which affect all groups tends to increase interest in cooperative solutions. A long experience of joint action against an external aggressor has often served as a facilitating circumstance. It strengthens the sense of unity among the different popular groups. Such circumstances pertain, of course, to the objective, 'natural' conditions at hand. The existence of such conditions limits the action potential of the parties. It bears noting that Lijphart's focus on such matters restricts the voluntaristic character of his explanatory approach.

Where the second factor – the choice of appropriate techniques – is concerned, Lijphart points out certain arrangements that have proved to be helpful. Trust among parties is easier to uphold if a system of comprehensive representation is applied. Proportional electoral formulas are therefore to be recommended. In addition, executive organs should be oversized in order to accommodate a broad spectrum of parties and segments. By the same logic, positions in the bureaucracy should be distributed proportionally, on some kind of quota basis. In this way, all

groups of significance will have a say in the important organs of decision-making – and a piece of the 'pie' in terms of access to public resources. In addition, some sort of protection for minority rights should be in place. All groups should be protected from decisions that violate their vital interests. Therefore, some sort of agreement involving a mutual veto on sensitive questions should be worked out. Another way of dealing with questions where different segments tend to take sharply opposed positions (such as religious and linguistic issues) is to 'decentralise' them – i.e. to let different regions and segments decide such matters independently. Federalism and segmental autonomy (involving parallel standards in terms of policy) are therefore part of the consociational package.

In Lijphart's view, then, certain institutional components are decisive. If institutional arrangements aimed at power-sharing and consensual decision-making are established, democracy can be applied even in severely divided societies. That is the lesson taught by the fragmented states in Europe. The same techniques could be applied in divided societies all over the world.

Rustow, for his part, stresses the importance of the habituation phase, during which democracy gets rooted through practice. But he is not very specific as to what gets the habituation project going. If the democratic game is maintained, he argues, a 'genetic' process of enhanced trust and understanding can get under way. But why does the game continue in some cases but not others? The key is to be found, according to Lijphart, in institutions of a specific type. If a functioning institutional design is lacking, the 'genetic' process cannot be sustained. Inter-segmental trust in a divided society cannot survive unless the competitive and zero-sum dimension of democracy is de-emphasised. The majoritarian principle must therefore be restrained. Principles of power-sharing and reciprocity should signify the terms of interaction instead – all in order to relax the prevailing conflicts in society.

As noted earlier, political elites are instrumental in this development. Consociational arrangements are worked out in a bargaining process at the summit level, and political leaders dominate the game in the new democratic era. It is the interaction between these central actors that keeps the conciliatory game on track. As a result of this interaction, increased confidence and a sense of community take root at the highest echelons of political life. The cooperative spirit thus established then eventually trickles down to the rank-and-file.

At the mass level, Lijphart claims, it is best to maintain separation between the segments. He gives two reasons for this. First, separation serves to safeguard against conflict: 'clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility' (1977: 88). Contacts between the groups should be concentrated at the elite level instead. Second, segmental isolation reinforces the representative position of elite actors. Members of dense groups tend to exhibit a strong loyalty to their leaders. This makes it easier for elite actors to control their group. In addition, it gives them a far-reaching freedom of choice in their dealings with the representatives of other segments. In both ways, then, their bargaining potential is boosted.

Reading and judging the arguments

Explanatory scheme

What made Rustow's article so influential was the fact that it criticised the prevailing belief in socio-economic determinism. Democracy's prospects are not, he argues, a foregone conclusion – decided by such parameters as the level of per capita GNP. Political agents play an important role. Democracy is not a mere by-product of economic development. It results from certain actions taken by the parties involved. Lijphart takes the same view. Indeed, he stresses the actor-oriented element yet more strongly, inasmuch as he challenges Rustow's thesis that national unity is a prerequisite for democracy.

Rustow and Lijphart, then, bring political agency into the analysis. The latter bases his view mainly on empirical observation. He maintains that, in the European societies he has studied, certain actors have played a crucial role indeed. Rustow, by contrast, supplies a rationale of a more general and methodological type. He proposes, that is, a causal logic of a genetic character. Democratic collaboration sets in motion a process of integration and political learning. The argument here reflects a socio-psychological theory of popular interaction. The idea is that familiarity breeds understanding. Such processes have been documented in several studies of conflict resolution and of the establishment of trusting relationships between groups. Through interaction on a personal level, the actors come to trust one another. Each party becomes better informed about the attitudes and behaviour of the other(s). In addition, a process of reciprocal influence can get under way. In the course of their mutual dealings, the persons in question are affected by the values and cognitive patterns of their counterparts. A convergence of preferences may thus ensue. Certain overarching loyalties emerge which are shared by the members of the various segments. It is the development of such loyalties that can bring about a lasting reduction of conflict and the establishment of social peace (Hadenius and Karvonen 2001).

Rustow's genetic approach can be seen as an outflow of this general theory of integration. Since democracy entails collaboration between groups in regulated forms, it can contribute to the relaxation of prevailing tensions in society. Through its very practice, then, democracy can reinforce its own preconditions.

According to this approach, the process through which democracy emerges is not uni-directional: it is not the case that there is first a cause (the existence of some external factor or factors) and then an effect (democracy). Rather, the explanatory logic is reciprocal in character. A virtuous circle of mutually reinforcing conditions is the key. The critical thing is to start a fruitful process of democratic interaction between different political groups. If that can be accomplished, the prospects of democracy are enhanced. Democracy is viewed here, then, as both a cause and an effect.[4] The introduction of democracy should not be delayed until conditions have become 'ripe'. Democracy 'ripens' through its own exercise. The sooner this exercise gets started, in other words, the better.

This is why agency is so important. Whether or not the virtuous circle of

democratic interaction 'kicks in' is contingent, to a great extent, on the decisions made by political agents. At the initial stage, however, Rustow sees a structural restriction. Some essential degree of national unity must have been established already. In cases where this obstacle has been surmounted, the actors can enter the 'decision phase'. After that, moreover, they can proceed to the 'habituation phase', during which positive experiences enable democracy to take root.

Lijphart emphasises the responsibility of political actors even more strongly. Even in cases where an overarching loyalty in society is lacking, he argues, the actors have the possibility of changing the terms of the political game for the better. He points, however, to certain structural factors of importance such as a history of threats from the outside, and a suitable composition of segments.

The latter means that the groups should be of roughly equal significance; nor should they be too many. Generally speaking, the outcome of a political game is not predetermined if there are several groups of broadly equal importance. All of the parties in such a case stand a chance of being either on the winning or on the losing side (especially if shifting coalition patterns are possible). This enhances the prospects for some kind of power-sharing, inasmuch as none of the parties can be sure of dominating the game.

Given that an accord can be reached, moreover, Lijphart has a number of proposals about what could make the ensuing process a happy one. Rustow, it is true, is not very precise on that score. He refers to a 'habituation phase' during which democracy is stabilised. But he does not have much to say about what makes such a positive scenario possible. Lijphart, by contrast, is very concrete on this point. In divided societies, the upholding of democracy is possible due to certain institutional arrangements of a consociational type. These arrangements make democracy work. Lijphart thus endorses an institutionalist perspective. He can be seen as an early exponent of the argument that institutions ought to be brought back in (cf. Skocpol 1985).

The role of elites

For both Rustow and Lijphart, political elites are important indeed. The behaviour of these actors determines, to a great extent, whether or not the positive route can be followed. Why is this? Rustow offers us no penetrating speculations on this matter. He simply notes in passing that, since political elites are specialists in power, they are naturally the key players in the game of transformation (1970: 356). Lijphart has more to say. If popular conflicts in divided societies are to be resolved, people from different segments must be held apart. Interaction at the grassroots can lead to an outbreak of severe clashes between groups. And such clashes, in turn, can yield a spiral of negative effects. Responsible leadership is the safeguard against escalating conflict. It is also the vehicle for the establishment of accords between segments.

It is a question, then, of restraining the rank-and-file. This argument recalls the observations of later students of democratic transition. On many different occasions, extensive mobilisation at the mass level has brought down authoritarian

regimes. When a new regime is to take over, however, demobilisation at the mass level is often warranted. There are several reasons for this.

First, in cases where the transformation involves some settlement between the old regime and the new, a cooling-down of old conflicts is required. The objective is to reach an agreement that both camps can accept. To carry out such a task, political soft-liners – leaders inclined to make deals and reach compromises – must be in control on both sides; while hard-liners – those pursuing a confrontational agenda – must be held at bay (Przeworski 1991). A continued militant popular upsurge can result in self-reinforcing cycles of political violence and state repression that make it difficult for the reformist leaders to control the game; only hard-liners benefit from such an antagonistic atmosphere. Hence, uncontrolled mass action constitutes a latent threat to the peace-settlement in process (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 65; Gunther 1995: 59).

Second, centralised leadership is crucial in the initial phase of democratisation, which requires bargaining among groups. Large groups of people cannot, quite naturally, be involved in a negotiating process. Duties of this kind must be assigned to small groups of persons who meet face to face. To be effective as partners 'at the table', moreover, these representatives must enjoy substantial autonomy *vis-à-vis* their followers. In order to be able to make deals with other parties, you must be in control of your own people. Otherwise the other parties will have no confidence in you, and an agreement will be impossible. Such is the logic of bargaining (Przeworski 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Hadenius and Karvonen 2001). Since a negotiation-like atmosphere permeates the habituation phase, elite domination must be preserved. If consensual politics are to become possible in a society torn by popular animosity, top-down rule is necessary.

Third, protracted intense interaction among a small circle of individuals may have important psychological effects. Constructive decision making is generally easier when the number of people involved is fairly small. As noted by Richard Gunter, numerous experiments in group behaviour have demonstrated that 'the number of participants *per se* has a significant effect on the capacity to make decisions. The optimum size for reaching collective decisions appears to be six. Larger groups tend to dissolve into debating societies and reach decisions only with great difficulty' (1995: 71). Communication is easier in small groups. The interactive effect is also stronger. This breeds trust and understanding, and stimulates a convergence of preferences among the parties.

When political leaders come together, then, a group dynamic of this type can emerge. A process of integration takes place at the summit level of society: mutual confidence is encouraged, and common beliefs are developed regarding the need for conflict resolution and the ways it can be carried through. Hence, a unification – at least of a rudimentary sort – takes place among the elite strata. This atmosphere of trust and concord can then, eventually, spread down to the rank-and-file.

The elite actors who direct the transition game do not just serve as bargaining agents, or as guarantors for the curbing of hostilities. They can also – as a side-effect of their interaction with each other – initiate a process of integration in

society. In other words, unity among citizens – which Rustow and others consider to be a prerequisite for democracy – can be nurtured by the elite-dominated process of democratisation.

Evidence

To what extent have accords at the elite level actually played a role as a means of democratisation? Rustow, as we know, brings up a number of historical examples in support of his argument. Lijphart's cases are generally of a more recent date. He reviews a number of divided societies in Europe where his consociational approach of power-sharing has been applied. He also demonstrates that this approach has been used in South America, the Middle East and Asia. Outside of Europe, however, the results have been fairly modest. He points to a few examples that have been successful in terms of duration, such as Israel. On the other hand, there are several countries where the method of power-sharing has been tried, but without lasting effect. Lijphart concludes, therefore, that the consociational approach is no guarantee of democratic maintenance (1977: 224–25). What he can claim is that it offers a pretty good shot. In several instances, it has made possible the continuation of a democratic order for quite some time. It has also helped, when practised over time, to dampen segmental conflicts. Lijphart argues that the consociational model is better at handling popular conflicts than both the majoritarian form of democracy (of the British type) and the authoritarian mode of governance (which has been tried in many forms). In deeply divided societies, he maintains, the consociational formula is the only realistic alternative. In many countries, especially in the Third World, the choice is 'between consociational democracy and no democracy at all' (1977: 238). Overall, however, he has but weak evidence to back up that fairly strong statement.

Are there other cases we can examine? As I see it, there are two countries (one of which was dealt with only briefly by Lijphart) which are worthy of scrutiny. I have in mind Colombia and Venezuela. In both countries, comprehensive elite agreements between previously antagonistic parties were reached in the late 1950s. As a result, democratic institutions have been sustained for a very long time, by Latin American and Third World standards.[5]

In Colombia, an extensive civil war – involving the two main parties, the Conservatives and Liberals – had taken place in the late 1940s and early 1950s. To put an end to the hostilities, the military forces intervened. A period of military rule followed. This was seen as a temporary caretaker government, and was accepted by both sides in the conflict. When it became evident, however, that the military ruler intended to stay permanently in power and to push the traditional parties aside, the latter decided to take joint action. Through an agreement between the two parties, and after negotiations in which the military leadership was involved, a civilian government based on power-sharing took over in 1958. The agreement – known as the National Front – stipulated an alternation in the presidency. The two parties would field a common candidate at election time. Furthermore, the agreement established parity between the parties in regard to public positions, from the government on down. Thus the two parties would have an equal number of seats

in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate and in lower elected bodies. This system was maintained for 16 years, and it certainly did contribute to the moderation of old animosities between Conservatives and Liberals, and thus to the maintenance of civilian rule (Peeler 1995).

The initial situation in Venezuela was similar. A period of intense party conflict in the late 1940s issued in military intervention. Military rule in Venezuela was marked by extensive corruption, economic mismanagement and harsh treatment of opposition groups. By the late fifties, influential figures in the social, political and economic life of the country had come to the conclusion that the situation had to change. Many military leaders took the same view. Through a process of negotiations – involving top representatives of the political parties, the business community, the trade unions, the church and the military – a number of interrelated pacts were ratified. The outcome was a government of national unity. Unlike in Colombia, the main parties – AC (left-centre) and COPEI (Christian-right) – would field their own candidates in presidential elections. However, the candidates would also agree on a minimum common programme binding the two parties to the same platform – in regard to economic policy, labour relations, agrarian reform, etc. – irrespective of the electoral outcome. In addition, the parties promised to maintain a 'prolonged political truce'. Terry Lynn Karl summarises the essence of this elite agreement:

> This truce, although not involving explicit power quotas, did require the formation of coalitions and an equitable distribution of state benefits. Regardless of who won the elections, each party was guaranteed some participation in the political and economic pie through access to state jobs and contracts, a partitioning of ministries, and a complicated spoils system which would ensure the political survival of all signatories.
>
> (Karl 1986: 213)

As in Colombia, a notable convergence ensued at the summit level of political life. From having been strongly divided on matters of policy and access to political positions, the two big parties in Venezuela developed into middle-of-the-road catch-all parties inclined to consultation, compromise and power-sharing. Despite strong tensions in society (related to grave socio-economic cleavages), the democratic game could be maintained through a consensual mode of elite interaction (Peeler 1995; Coppedge 1994).

These cases would indeed seem to support the Rustow–Lijphart thesis: political and other leaders in society can get together and establish new – more peaceful and democratic – relationships. And through prolonged interaction (Rustow would call it 'habituation'), a process of integration is set in motion among the elite actors. In effect, mutual trust and confidence in prevailing institutions are encouraged. Democratic procedures can thus be upheld.

Let us now leave these examples and move forward in time. What are the experiences from the third wave of democratisation, which started in the mid-1970s and is to some extent still going on? Elite agreements have certainly orchestrated the turn

from authoritarianism to democracy in many places in Latin America and in Southern and Eastern Europe. The gradual and negotiated transformation in Spain is often pointed to as an illustrative case in point. In all of these cases, however, the agreements were of limited reach. They set the stage for democratic government, and sometimes they included guarantees of judicial immunity for representatives of the old regime; they did not, however, produce accords aimed at future power-sharing (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Burton, Gunther and Higley 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996; Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998). All the same, democracy has been upheld. Even when there was no elite agreement prior to the phase of transformation (as in some instances in Southern and Eastern Europe), it has so far been possible to maintain democratic institutions (see, e.g., McFaul 2001 about Russia).

This would certainly come as a surprise to Rustow, in view of his contention that some kind of agreement between the central actors must be reached at an early stage if democracy is to be stabilised.[6] Lijphart, on the other hand, limits his approach to truly divided societies. What signifies such a society can certainly be debated (Lijphart does not, in fact, provide us with any precise definition). Yet few would question the assertion that many African states are marked by strong segmental divisions. To what extent has the consociational formula been applicable in that continent?

Developments in South Africa in particular are worth examining. Suffering from international pressure, domestic turmoil and a stagnating economy, the White Apartheid regime realised in the early 1990s that it could not gain the upper hand. Its main adversary, the ANC, came to a similar conclusion. Under prevailing conditions it could not win a military victory; among other things, important support from the Soviet Union was now cut off. Leaders in both camps, therefore, grew increasingly interested in reaching an agreement. Through a complicated process of negotiations, an accord concerning the transformation to democracy was reached in 1993. This involved the introduction of proportional representation (PR), a federal structure and a government of national unity. All parties with at least 5 per cent of the seats in the Assembly were awarded positions in the cabinet. After 1999, however, minority parties are no longer guaranteed cabinet positions. Yet the government is still oversized, for the ANC has wanted to include leaders from some of the other parties (Strand 2000). Similar 'rainbow' cabinets have also been established in Namibia and (on and off) in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In Mozambique, a bloody civil war ended through an agreement between the two contenders. The democratic package included PR, federalism and some possibilities of power-sharing.

On the other hand, similar measures in other places have failed completely. Angola and Rwanda can be mentioned as examples. In Rwanda, efforts to create a cross-segmental (Hutu–Tutsi) government actually caused the outbreak of the genocide in 1994. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, periods of power-sharing have been interrupted by civil war (which in Sierra Leone has been extremely brutal).

As Andrew Reynolds (1997) remarks, many observers of African politics tend to take a Lijphart-like position. In order to set the stage for a new, more peaceful and more democratic era, some kind of elite accord – with an essential element of

inclusive governance – must be introduced. But this is, obviously, more easily said than done. It is hard to get started; the decision phase is not easily attained. Entering the habituation phase is also difficult: even when an agreement has been reached, it has not, in several cases, been upheld for very long. Why is this? A number of factors could be important here.

First, the states in Africa are fairly new political entities. The boundaries were drawn in an arbitrary manner by the colonial powers, who divided the continent in the late nineteenth century. Colonial rule ended in the 1960s. Since independence, moreover, the experience of pluralist politics has been very restricted in the majority of cases. A wave of democratisation started in the 1990s. At an early stage of democratisation, it should be recalled, an atmosphere of confrontation between political groups is the usual pattern. Working out strategies of cooperation and trust between competing parties normally takes time to accomplish.

Second, according to Lijphart, the composition of the segments may play a role. Ideally, some four groups of equal importance should be on the political scene: not too many to bar effective decision making; not too few to allow dominance on the part of one segment. Both unfavourable conditions, however, prevail in Africa. Some states – such as Uganda and the Congo (Zaire) – are extremely pluralistic in composition. Others – such as Zimbabwe and Angola – consist mainly of two large groups, one of which is larger than the other (very much so in the case of Zimbabwe). Segmental dominance prevails in South Africa and Namibia too. Herein lies a latent danger.

Third, Lijphart maintains that the existence of a common enemy is a favourable condition. He refers primarily to threats from the outside. In many of the small states of Europe, this has indeed been a unifying factor. In Africa, by contrast, external intervention has been uncommon since independence. And to the extent it has occurred, it has normally been related to internal turmoil. Invading forces have normally sided with one of the domestic contenders. External threats have not, therefore, worked as a unifying factor. (Sometimes, as in the Congo, external intervention has in fact contributed to a cementation of the original fractions.) In addition, however, there may be internal enemies of political significance. In Latin America, the military has played that role in many cases. It was a common desire to get rid of a military dictatorship, as we saw, that united formerly divided parties in Colombia and Venezuela. In Africa, however, the military (when it plays a role in politics) is often tied to particular segments; it does not naturally serve, therefore, as a common enemy which can unite civilian forces.

Fourth, the terms of the political game are also contingent on the nature of state institutions. If access to central positions within the state apparatus provides great advantage to a particular party, this generally reduces said party's interest in making deals and in sharing power. Under such conditions, the incumbent party tends to have a considerable edge with regard to resources – a fact that serves to affect the balance of power in its favour. Insiders, then, stand a far better chance of winning the game than do outsiders. Incumbency tends, other things being equal, to make you a dominating player. This makes for very high stakes in the political game. When the 'prey' is very big, competition for it is prone to be harsh.

The incentives are in place for a confrontational, zero-sum mentality among political actors. In the view of many commentators, this is often the case in Africa. Politics has a winner-take-all character. This may be related to the existing cleavage structure (as well as to certain cultural traits); but no less important, I would maintain, is the institutional setting. The typical African state scores high in terms of the concentration of power and resources. At the same time, it is marked by soft administrative and judicial procedures. This makes access to the top echelons in political life extremely rewarding. As long as such incentive structures exist, the prospects for changed political relationships are bleak (Hadenius 2001).

Fifth, what about economic factors? Africa is, of course, a poor continent. Does that matter? Both Rustow and Lijphart would say it is not an insurmountable obstacle. So what do we know from the comparative research in this field? Briefly put, the correlation between democracy and socio-economic level demonstrated by Lipset and others still holds. Moreover, using more advanced statistical techniques, better data and more refined measurements, numerous later studies have demonstrated the connection. Yet one could question, as Rustow and Lijphart do, the direction of causality. In this field as well, however, progress has been made. The verdict seems to be that the causal arrow running from democracy to economic development is very weak; with the use of appropriate historical mass data, one tends to find a zero-relationship, or close to that (see, e.g., Hadenius 1992; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski *et al.* 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Inglehart 1997). It is not likely, in other words, that the reversed causality which has been suggested actually obtains. This leaves us with the conclusion that the connection runs in the direction indicated by the modernisation thesis. Obviously, this affects the prospects for democratisation in less developed countries in a negative way. Yet it bears stressing that, while economic development is important, there is no one-to-one relationship between the degree of democracy and the level of economic prosperity. We know, after all, of many exceptions to the 'developmental' logic, both historically and in today's world. This implies that other factors – demography, institutions, agency, etc. – can play a significant role for the transition to democracy.

Elite agreement, power-sharing – and then?

In applying Rustow's approach, we have so far been occupied mainly with the decision phase. Most African states, we may conclude, are still in a position prior to that stage. And if we make use of the background variables suggested by Rustow and Lijphart – together with other parameters that seem appropriate – we find that conditions do not look bright over the short run.

For both Rustow and Lijphart, it is the habituation phase – during which trust and understanding are nourished by democratic interaction – which is the promising one. This is the essence of the genetic theory of democratisation, as laid down by Rustow and spelled out more concretely by Lijphart. Only South Africa, among the strongly divided states in Africa, seems to be entering this phase. As for the outcome, only the future will tell.

Let us turn to those countries, therefore, where the habituation game has been going on much longer. Let us return, then, to Colombia and Venezuela. As we saw, elite agreements were reached in those two countries, and power-sharing practices were established. As indeed the theory predicts, a political culture of reconciliation and consensus emerged at the elite level. On this basis, civilian rule and democratic institutions have been maintained. But what more is there to tell? Has democracy put down strong roots? In brief, the answer is no. Neither in Colombia nor in Venezuela has the democratic project fared well.

Summarising developments in Colombia up to the early 1990s, Johan A. Peeler provides the following account:

> Its traditional political and economic elites, organized around the clientelistic Liberal and Conservative parties, have continued to dominate the state [. . .] Popular political participation outside the clientelist networks is discouraged. Persistent guerilla movements and corresponding counterinsurgency efforts have led to numerous violations of human rights at the hands of insurgents, security forces and rightist death squads. The rapid expansion of the cocaine trade, with Colombia at its center, has added an immensely powerful and wealthy illicit sector of society and the polity, one that can be found collaborating at times with both insurgents and rightist forces and that increasingly penetrates the state and legitimate business. The old system of elite domination through liberal democratic institutions is still working, but society is moving beyond its control. In effect, the Colombian democratic regime is going through a process of deconsolidation.
>
> (Peeler 1995: 81)

Nor have things changed for the better in recent years. On the contrary, conditions have continued to deteriorate. Guerrilla groups and drug traffickers control huge parts of the territory. Political violence has spread throughout the country. Human rights violations are rampant. Political murder, which is almost uncontrolled, has at times reached astonishing levels. Surprising as it may seem, regular electoral institutions have in fact been maintained. But Colombia can be reckoned no more than a quasi-democracy, in view of the widespread violations of basic liberties and the grave distortions of the democratic process (including threats and economic interference by drug cartels and insurgent groups) (Diamond 1999: 45 ff. and 133).

Venezuela is a somewhat different story – but overall a sad one too. For a long time, the two main parties dominated the political scene completely. Through 'concertacion' in matter of policy, and reciprocity in the division of positions and benefits, a powerful political machine was established. It was fuelled by control over a burgeoning oil economy. This gave political leaders access to extensive spoils, which could be utilised in a clientelistic manner. The parties themselves were heavily centralised, with total control being exercised from the top of the electoral and parliamentary pyramid. Organisational life, moreover, was subordinated altogether to the parties. Independent and oppositional groups were effectively kept out. Party dominance was maintained partly through access to spoils, partly through a

thoroughgoing penetration of the state apparatus, including judicial and auditing organs and the electoral commission. In addition, most media of importance were under party influence. Society was demobilised, and all channels of influence were strictly controlled by party elites.

This 'partyarchy', as Michael Coppedge (1994) has called it, functioned fairly well up to the late 1980s. But fiscal crisis caused by declining oil prices, in combination with corruption and mismanagement in the state apparatus, made painful austerity measures necessary. The result was political turmoil. Far-reaching riots followed. Two military plots – which enjoyed broad popular support – were stopped only with difficulty. Under accusations of extensive corruption, the President of the Republic was forced out of office through impeachment. But that sacrifice on the part of the old elite was not enough. In 1994, an independent candidate (albeit a political old-timer) won the presidential election. This was a sign of profound popular distrust of the traditional parties.

In the subsequent election, in 1998, Hugo Chávez – a former military plotter and a complete political outsider – swept the polls. His agenda was strongly populist and anti-establishment in character. Acting like a *caudillo* and popular hero (which he in fact has become), Chávez launched a radical reform programme. Disregarding existing institutions, such as Parliament and the Supreme Court, he has handed over power to a constituent assembly – an action endorsed by a 90 per cent majority in a referendum (McCoy 1999). The aim is obviously to do away with the old order. What it will be replaced with is still unclear, however. (A frequent guess is that Chávez will follow the path of Alberto Fujimori, the former president of Peru, whom he resembles in several ways. This would involve increased personalism and concentration of power, which would not be very promising from a democratic point of view.)

Of course, the problems that have arisen in Colombia and Venezuela cannot be attributed in all respects to the mode of political life in those countries. (Drug trafficking and falling oil prices, for example, have their specific causes.) Nevertheless, I would maintain that these examples tell us a few things about the dark side of the pacted elite approach championed by Rustow and Lijphart.[7] I discuss this question further below.

Concluding remarks

In rejecting the economistic paradigm in the debate on democratisation, Rustow and Lijphart give political actors a part in the play. Political leaders can install democratic institutions through conscientious, rational choices. Through its continued practice, moreover, democracy can strike roots; indeed, it can come to be regarded by the actors as the 'only game in town'. The process of successful habituation can be explained, as Rustow demonstrates, by a genetic interaction theory. Through the fraternisation and political learning it entails, democratic intercourse can have a self-reinforcing impact. There are certain parameters that constrain the actors, however. At the preparatory stage, demographic and historical factors determine the likelihood that the society in question will reach the decision phase

(during which a new, virtuous circle can get started). And to keep the circle going, Lijphart argues, certain institutions – which serve to promote power-sharing and to protect vital segmental interests – should be in place.

This way of arguing, as I see it, represents an important step forward in the debate on democratisation. Challenging the notion of a 'mechanical', one-way flow of causality, the genetic approach allows for an interactive causal process, in which the outcome is determined in part by effects which the democratic system itself has on relationships between the actors. This does not deny the importance of certain background conditions (of a helpful or hampering sort). But if a 'window of opportunity' is open, the strategic choices made by actors in the game can have an important impact on the outcome. The right choice, in the genetic perspective, is to start interacting as soon as possible, and to try to keep the process alive as long as possible.[8]

As for background conditions, the list of circumstances that may be important needs to be somewhat expanded. In all probability, the level of economic development does, after all, play a role. The nature of the state apparatus is another factor that deserves to be heeded, inasmuch as it affects the relationship between the political actors. Experience seems to be fairly mixed when it comes to the impact of those consociational institutions which, according to Lijphart, can help keep the game going once it has started. As it looks, it is not the exact institutional setup that counts. Different arrangements can be applied. The important thing is to establish a formula that secures inclusiveness and consensual decision-making.

Consociationalism, it bears noting, is a concept with two dimensions. The original meaning of the term, as it was used by David E. Apter (1961), is fairly broad. It refers to a willingness to accommodate a variety of interests, and an ambition to reach compromises resulting in some minimal programme acceptable to all. Some kind of collective or corporate leadership is part of the picture as well. Lijphart's scheme of institutional characteristics, based on experiences from Europe, relates to the latter aspect of Apter's definition (the form of leadership). Lijphart's way of spelling out the concept is thus more specific. However, when his institutional scheme does not really match reality – which happens on many occasions – he either remains content with only a limited institutional fit, or he talks instead in more general terms (as did Apter) about an atmosphere of consensus and inclusiveness in political life. Lijphart has been accused, on this account, of being too flexible in his application of the concept of consociationalism: if the specific criteria do not apply, he resorts to the broader meaning of the concept instead (see, e.g., Lustick 1997). This critique is certainly well founded.[9] I would argue, however, that it is the broader notion which is the most fruitful. The specific arrangements proposed by Lijphart are just one set of possible institutional solutions. Other arrangements, however, could be used for the same (power-sharing-cum-consensual) purpose.[10]

Where pacts between elites are concerned, we may conclude that such agreements are not, *pace* Rustow, a generally necessary condition for a stable democracy. In many cases, in fact, democracy has been introduced without any prior accord, and has proved nonetheless to be durable. It seems more reasonable to argue, as

does Lijphart, that this approach is necessary mainly in heavily divided societies. Under such conditions, some kind of power-sharing agreement is probably the only way to restrain existing tensions. And such an agreement, in turn, can normally only be achieved through elite action. Political leaders have a very important role in striking deals and making sure that the habituation process stays on track. Only elite actors with the ability to pacify and control their followers can accomplish this task. They must therefore be given wide room to manoeuvre.

What emerges, in other words, is a delegative democracy (cf. O'Donnell 1994). People transfer power to a small circle of elite actors who run the show. This implies a restricted democracy in several ways. First, it is a matter of strict control from above. Due to the consensual mode of decision-making employed, furthermore, the majority principle is confined.[11] In addition, the segmentation of political life tends to be preserved. It could be argued, however, that a limited form of democracy is better than no democracy at all; and also that it is better to have social peace than open (and potentially spiralling) conflicts. Through this form of collaboration, moreover, a genetic process of increased trust and understanding may develop in society. Hence, the elite actors may make themselves superfluous in the long run.

If the game is to be changed from a vicious circle into a virtuous one, then, elite actors must be in command at the start of the process. The problem is that this is a state of affairs which tends to reproduce itself. Political developments in Colombia and Venezuela illustrate this plainly. This is an aspect of the elite approach with which Rustow and Lijphart deal lightly indeed. Only the latter has a few words to say on the matter – as when he admits that a two-way elite-mass interaction is difficult to establish within a consociational framework. Yet, he maintains, it is in fact possible to establish it; in support of this he cites – without specifying – certain positive European experiences.

The root of the problem is the fact that unconstrained agents of the people tend to develop a power agenda of their own. As Aristide Zolberg notes in reference to undemocratic rule: 'From having been a means, the political monopoly becomes a self-justifying goal' (quoted in Lijphart 1977: 229). The same seems to hold for political oligopoly in consociational forms. As we saw in the two South American examples of long-term power-sharing, this mode of governance tends to breed corruption, clientelism and a 'softening-up' of state institutions. Through policies of exclusion and demobilisation, the parties that dominate the game can effectively hold sway over both political life and civil society. As a consequence, channels of bottom-up control are severely restricted. If applied over long periods of time, such a system is likely to spur a growing sense of alienation and frustration in society, and an ever-diminishing political legitimacy. This in turn opens the floodgates to undemocratic action (riots, insurgencies, military interventions, etc.) and breeds anti-system tendencies in general. In all, the result can be democratic deconsolidation.

In order to function as a vehicle of democratic consolidation, the pacted-elite model must demonstrate a capacity – eventually, at least – to meet certain bottom-line standards of democratic performance. It must be open, for instance, to the inclusion of other groups than the founding parties (Burton, Gunther and Higley

1995). Institutions for administrative and judicial control must be maintained (and strengthened if necessary). Limits must be set on the political regime's domination of economic and social life, in order to make room for the emergence of new, independent political groups. In general, power in political and social life must be de-concentrated. At the same time, institutions capable of being opened up to bottom-up influence should be established. An important objective in divided societies, moreover, is to introduce measures that can stimulate integration at the mass social level.[12]

This could be seen as an extensive and demanding list of desiderata. What it implies, however, is that democratic consolidation is contingent on democratic quality – that, as I see it, is the essence of Guillermo O'Donnell's important remark concerning the drawbacks of delegative democracy (1994). It is also the essence of the genetic theory of habituation. This is a theory of positive feedback. Democracy becomes rooted as a result of good experiences among those taking part. If it is to become the natural state of affairs – the 'only game in town' – such experiences must be shared by an ever-growing part of the citizenry. If the degree of democracy must be limited at the start (due to start-up problems), it must at any rate be possible to increase it over time. If there is no such possibility, the feedback from participation will be negative.

Elite actors who introduce at least some of the elements on 'the list' can take credit for laying the basis for democratic consolidation. Within the ruling circle, however, the incentives for such a course are normally not very strong (since concentrated power tends to blind and corrupt). Reforms must be pursued gradually, and they should be initiated through pressure from outside. This in turn presupposes a minimum degree of openness in political and social life. If there is no such openness, societal upheaval is the only option. Often, under such conditions, a strong man with a populist appeal makes his entrance on the political scene. He could turn out to be a reformer and a democratic institution-maker. But he could also – which unfortunately seems more likely – prove to be a personalist and a power-concentrator.

Under certain conditions, we may conclude, the elite-pact model is a necessary means of political change. Depending on what follows, however, this kind of regime can work to further democratic prospects – or to thwart them.

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5 Development, law and democracy

Exploring a new relationship

Ole Nørgaard and Karin Hilmer Pedersen

Introduction

This chapter addresses an issue that has become increasingly salient in the context of regime transition but which remains largely under-researched. It focuses on the compatibility between legal institutions and underlying legal norms. There are some countries around the world where for historical reasons such compatibility is high. There are others where the main feature is disjuncture rather than compatibility between institutions and underlying norms. The latter is particularly true in developing countries and transitional societies such as those undergoing change from a communist to a liberal-democratic order. As Fukuyama (1995) has noted: unlike formal institutions, culture is a slow-moving variable. The probability, therefore, that institutions are out of tune with cultural norms is very high in societies attempting a regime transition. The purpose of this chapter is not to explore the full consequences of this type of disjuncture, but to lay the foundation for future research by examining the correlations that exist between development, law and democracy with special reference to 'pure' and 'mixed' systems of law. Legal systems are in this context seen as the outcome of historical choices at the constitutional level (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). We pursue this type of analysis with a view to developing hypotheses about the role that the legal system plays as a factor in democratisation and development.

The revival of institutionalism

During the past decade, the study of institutions has recaptured the centre stage in comparative politics and, in particular, in the study of emerging democracies. Facilitated by conceptual developments in new institutional theory, political scientists have revived attention to the autonomous role played by formal and informal institutions in the development and consolidation of old and new democracies. In developed democracies, recent studies have explored the effects of alternative 'visions' of democracies (Lijphart 1999; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Huber and Bingham Powell 1994). In developing (or emerging)[1] democracies, attention has been especially directed towards the effect of government structures (Shugart and Carey 1992; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Johannsen 2000; Nørgaard 2000),

party systems (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) and electoral rules (Elklit 1999). As observed by Snyder and Mahoney (1999), the focus on economic and political performance of institutions in new democracies has, however, not been accompanied by a corresponding interest in the role played by institutions in the explanation of the origin of these regimes. Probably moved by the 'tabula rasa' assumption of rational choice institutional theory, only a few studies based on historical and sociological institutional theory have examined the effects of pre-change political institutions (Stark and Bruszt 1998).

In the course of the institutionalist revival, legal institutions have so far received scant attention. In political science, on the one hand, studies of the political and economic performance of legal institutions in Western systems, which appeared from the late 1980s (Tate 1987; Gibson *et al.* 1998; Nyikos 1999), have with only a few exceptions been extended to the emerging democracies (Tate and Vallinder 1995; Magalhães 1999). Comparative law, on the other hand, is still trapped in the descriptive tradition of classical institutional theory, focusing on comparison of formal institutions (Widner 1998). None of these studies has made an attempt to trace the effects of legal institutions in the incumbent systems on democratic transition.

This chapter makes a first explorative attempt to fill this void. We make a point of distinguishing between legal institutions and legal culture but see them as two ends of a continuum where informal institutions also play an important part. Another way of looking at it is in terms of the formal institutions being part of an institutional superstructure, while values, attitudes and beliefs, as well as habituated actions form part of the institutional infrastructure. Constitutions, laws and administrative regulations would be examples of the superstructure or the formal side of institutions. Beliefs in individual human rights, the role of communitarian values, the presence of a 'civic' culture or the existence of civility in political competition are examples of what constitute here informal institutions or part of the institutional infrastructure. As is evident from these examples, informal institutions are more deeply embedded in culture than formal ones are.

By democratisation we refer to a process where a totalitarian or authoritarian regime is replaced by liberal democracy in which the broad populace is given a voice in decision-making. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, whether of ideological, religious or traditional type, may (but need not) have a developed legal system involving a high degree of formal codification, as we have seen in the communist world and in contemporary Muslim societies. Democratic societies, in contrast, must have a firmly stipulated legal base providing the individual with basic political and civil rights and predictable boundaries of legal behaviour. In this perspective, the genesis of the legal institution is unimportant. It may, as in the British common law tradition, be the result of a bottom-up process, where the legal bases of democracy evolve as part of an evolutionary process, with decisions by judges reflecting changing political values in society. Or it may, as in the Roman/German civil law tradition, be a top-down process, where the democratic *Rechtsstaat* is installed in conjunction with the democratisation of the state itself. However, whereas the legal system in developed democratic societies evolves in

conjunction with the general nature of the polity and society, the process becomes more indefinite in recently democratising societies. Should they be advised to adopt the bottom-up liberalism of common law as a vehicle for development and democratisation? Or are they better advised to maintain the more top-down oriented communitarian perspective included in civil law?

Hayek argued as early as 1960 that the English decentralised judge-made common law was superior in terms of providing a suitable institutional framework for economic development. This argument has recently been revisited by Mahoney (2000). In a study of 102 countries from 1960 to 1992, he shows statistically that common law countries have slightly outpaced civil law countries in terms of economic growth. Both Hayek's and Mahoney's arguments are based on the liberal perception of the individual as the constituting element in democracy and economic development. Within this conception, common law represents a universal and superior legal institutional framework because it promotes individualism and private economic activity in contrast to civil law's greater orientation towards government interventions.

In this article we start from a different assumption. We believe that institutional efficiency in terms of economic and democratic development is shaped by the societal context (Nørgaard 2000). Different societies require different institutional solutions to foster development and democracy in the same way as the efficiency of regulative regimes has been shown to depend on the institutional endowments of specific societies (Levy and Spiller 1996). In the present context, formal institutions should reflect the basic value systems in society along the communitarian – individualistic divide. This implies that the individualism and responsiveness of common law may be the right solution for societies where individual values are predominant. Yet, for societies where communitarian values are stronger, the application of these principles may have perverse economic and political implications. A case in point may be what has happened when ultra-liberal economic policies were imposed on basically collectivist societies in Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe.

In the rest of this chapter we explore the relation between the formal legal system, democracy and economic development. The next section establishes a typology of legal systems in the contemporary world. We later explore the statistical relationship between legal systems and changes in level of political and economic development. In the concluding section we discuss causal models linking legal institutions to development and democratisation.

Contemporary legal systems

The classical typology of the world's legal systems includes three major systems: common law, civil law and socialist law, based on legal sources and ultimately on the perception of the role of law in social development.[2] Recent political developments, however, have obfuscated this distinction. First, the collapse of the Communist bloc has obviously diminished the role of socialist law as a distinct legal system, although remnants of socialist law still can be found in the legal systems of

post-communist democracies. China, Cuba and Vietnam continue formally to operate under a socialist legal system, but significant changes in even the Chinese legal system have taken place (Chenguang and Xianchu 1997). Countries previously ruled by socialist law are now in transition of their legal system. Second, several countries today have a legal system based on religious ideology. The Koran in Iran and the Talmud in Israel are cases in point. Third, in a large number of countries, legal systems based on civil or common law coexist with traditional customary law and/or religious law (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.). This development suggests that many contemporary legal systems do not correspond with the classical typology.

Classification of legal systems is about what constitutes the ultimate source of laws and about the principles guiding the relations between the state and civil society. In institutional terms, legal systems are based on 'the world of constitutional choice'. As summarised by Kiser and Ostrom (1982), the constitutional level epitomises the rules that guide the way collective decisions are taken and the range of decisions that are entrusted to the individual. Hence, legal systems differ on three dimensions (for an overview, see Figure 5.1):

1. the ultimate sources of law, in particular whether law originates in institutionalised expressions of popular sovereignty or in religious, ideological or traditional codes and conventions,
2. judicial review, i.e. the superiority of a (written) constitution in contrast to an unrestricted legislature, and
3. adjudication in courts, i.e. the role of rational-logical assumption based on law-statutes in contrast to either precedent and the use of analogy, ideological or religious prerogatives in conflict setting.

Below we describe the genesis of contemporary legal systems along these dimensions. We start with what in terms of legal sources are called the four genuine or pure legal systems: common, civil, socialist and religious law. We include a description of socialist law because it is this tradition which constitutes the specific mixture of legal systems in contemporary post-socialist countries. We then turn to what we call 'mixed' legal systems, differentiating between such systems based on socialist law, common law and civil law.

Pure systems

Common law originated in late seventeenth century England (Mahoney 2000). The legal system was the outcome of disputes over economic freedom and individual liberty in which the common law courts (represented by a strong lawyers' guild) together with landowners and merchant groups in Parliament had a strong influence over society. This historical origin explains why the emphasis is on the individual's freedom to pursue private ends. The English common law reflects the liberal aspect of democracy, with its emphasis on the supreme political and civil rights of the individual *vis-à-vis* the community. A written constitution is not a

necessary element in common law countries, nor is judicial review. The basic principles were defined already in the *Magna Carta* (1215), which defines the individual's (baron's) rights in relation to the state (the monarch). Checks and balances between the legislature and the judiciary in common law are based on the courts' use of precedent and individual cases in their adjudication. This provides the legal system with flexibility to adapt to social changes gradually over time and consequently strengthen the degree of stability and predictability for individual decisions.

Civil law follows the tradition in which the church began to codify how people – according to the Bible – should behave. Later in the French post-Revolution period, civil law was introduced as the *Code Napoléon* designed to defend the executive from interference from the courts, which were dominated by the nobility (Merryman 1992). In Germany, the development of civil law was seen by Weber as the ultimate rational legal system under the *Rechtsstaat*. Due to this specific historical origin, civil law focuses on the ability of the state executive and legislature to regulate individual behaviour, while still protecting the individual against arbitrary state power. The legal system in the civil law tradition prioritises the government's freedom to pursue collective objectives. The individual is in this tradition seen as an integrated part of the state, as a *Staatsbürger* in German parlance, in contrast to the free citizen of the liberal common law countries. At the same time, however, the discretion of the government is constrained by a written constitution. Contrary to the development of common law in pre-industrial England, an elite of judges and barristers never obtained an independent position in France and Germany. Instead, the development of the legal system occurred simultaneously with a bureaucratisation of the state, including an increasing use of trained administrative experts. This element came to its institutional expression in the existence of strong Constitutional Courts, which through judicial review limit the power of government by checking that codification of new legal acts is in accordance with the existing legal tradition. Adjudication in courts is based on a 'rational interpretation of law on the basis of strict formal conception' (Weber 1991: 126). This means that legislation is superior in settling individual disputes while precedent plays only a secondary role. It also means that legislative amendments immediately change the rules upon which individual behaviour is judged. Consequently, the individual can predict the consequences of decisions only to the extent that legislation is not changed.

Socialist law developed as a distinct legal system in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. It was structurally based on the continental civil law tradition, and to a considerable extent the concepts of civil law continued to be used. The distinct elements in socialist law were its ideological sources and the ensuing absence of legal mechanisms for power-sharing, the concrete content of the legislation supporting for example state property rights (Fogelklou 1997). The judicial thinking behind Soviet Union 'law' was legitimised with the help of Marxist-Leninist ideology, as epitomised in the programmes of the Communist Party formulated by a small political elite. The ultimate objective was to transform the social and political system in accordance with the ideological blueprint formulated in constitutions and party programmes. Accordingly, socialist law was to an even higher degree

than civil law founded on a state–society relation where the state was superior to the individual, and where individual political rights and liberties were subordinated to the ideological goal of the state. In socialist law there was obviously no place for liberal democracy, and democratic participation was only legitimised as an educational experience where the people would carry out the tasks defined by the political elite.

Religious law, or *Kadi*-justice in Weber's terminology, is, like socialist law, based on an ideology (religion) as the ultimate legal source. Also like socialist law, religious law is open to interpretations by a political-ideological elite, as illustrated by Weber's example from Talmud-law: 'It is written [. . .] but I say unto you [. . .]' (Weber 1991: 219), implying that the reader is free to make his own context-bound interpretation of the text. Thus, the development of law is not a prerogative of elected politicians but constrained by a text of religious nature. Although religious law obviously is anathema to liberal democracy, countries differ with respect to how rigidly religious law is practised (Mallat 1993).

Mixed systems

'Mixed law' indicates the pluralism of legal systems characteristic of countries which for one reason or another are undergoing institutional change. Three different legal systems can be identified depending on their association with socialist law, common law or civil law. 'Mixed with socialist law' is defined as a specific legal system developing on the background of socialist law. Despite ideological and institutional similarities there were differences between the legal systems of the countries belonging to the communist world, reflecting longer historical trajectories. These histories, which to a varying extent were embedded in the local versions of socialist law, make their present legal transformation different. For example, the Central European countries may face an easier task to return to their pre-communist civil law heritage than do the Central Asian countries with their strong Islamic influences. In the two legal systems 'mixed with civil law', and 'mixed with common law', either civil or common law serves as the basis of the legal system, but these 'genuine' legal systems coexist with traditional and/or religious law. In most cases the choice of either civil or common law as the basis of the legal system reflects the influence of a previous colonial power.

Defining a legal system for each country in the world and building on the above categorisation of six legal systems highlights several problems of classifications. One problem is related to common law countries. A characteristic in common law is the lack of judicial review. However, in the American legal system judicial review by the US Supreme Court plays a central role in reviewing legal statutes according to the constitution (Drewry 1996: 200). Many Latin American countries have adopted this tradition as well. We have chosen to categorise the USA and these Latin American countries as common law countries because of the character of adjudication that is based on precedent and analogy, giving the legal system its specific character of state–society relation known from common law. Second, countries categorised in civil law also show differences as, for example, between

	Pure legal systems				Mixed legal systems		
Criteria	Common law	Civil law	Socialist law	Religious law	Mixed with common law	Mixed with civil law	Mixed with socialist law
Legal acts	Codification under 'case' law	Codification as the prerogative of the legislature	Codification as the prerogative of the Communist Party	Codification with reference to a religious source	Codification with respect to 'case law' and local customs	Codification as a prerogative of the legislature but with respect to local customs	Codification with reference to an ideology/party
Judicial review	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes but weak	Yes but weak
Adjudication in courts	Interpreting concrete 'precedents' through 'analogy' (case law)	Logical subsumption according to legal acts	Subsumption under ideological concepts (Marxist/Leninist or Marxist/Maoist)	Subsumption under religious concepts	• Interpreting concrete 'precedents' (common law) • Subsumption according to 'charismatic justice' or religious concepts in local courts	• Logical subsumption according to legal acts (civil law) • Subsumption according to 'charismatic justice' or religious concepts in local courts	Subsumption according to legal acts and ideological orientation of the government

Note: The classification of legal systems is based on David and Brierley (1985), de Cruz (1995) and Pedersen (1998).

Figure 5.1 A typology of legal systems

civil law in Germany, Scandinavia and France. These differences notwithstanding, it seems justifiable to treat civil law countries as one category. Third, African countries categorised in 'mixed law' differ not only according to their basis in civil or common law but also to the extent that their legal pluralism is grounded in African traditional law: most countries in sub-Saharan Africa – or Islam – select countries in West and East Africa (de Cruz 1995: 24). These nuances are important to have in mind in the next section where we use the categories in statistical analysis.

Statistical analysis of relations

The legal system[3] and democracy

This section provides a tentative assessment of the association of the historically constituted legal systems with democratic development. As a measure of democracy we employ the Freedom House ratings (FH).[4] We use a composite measure based on the aggregate score on Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL): the lower the score, the higher the level of democracy, according to this method. Although CL comprises 'rule of law', we do not find that testing legal systems against both PR and CL is tautological for two reasons.[5] First, the estimation of 'rule of law and human rights' in the CL rating does not respond to the legal system *per se*, but to the suitability of *a legal system*. Thus, the CL rating is about how the legal system performs, i.e. the protection of civil liberties through an independent judiciary, the equal treatment of individuals under the law, etc. In this way, the measure of CL is more related to the informal function of a legal system – a behavioural or cultural aspect – than to the formal institutionalisation of the legal sources and adjudication in courts. Secondly, we choose to use both PR and CL ratings, since using PR ratings alone would restrict the measure of democracy to its procedural and electoral aspects.

Table 5.1 displays the mean of FH scores for each legal system for the periods of 1973 to 1990 and 1990 to 1997 respectively.[6] Further, the table contains FH-means for each legal system when OECD countries are excluded. This division is made in order to obtain a (somewhat crude) assessment of whether the hypothesised relation between legal systems and levels of democracy in reality only reflects the historical origin of legal systems embedded in West European modernisation. Table 5.1 reveals information on the relation between legal system and the development in democracy between the two periods.

From Table 5.1 we can conclude that common and civil law countries are more democratic than the remaining groups.[7] In addition, the group of common law countries is marginally more democratic than the group of civil law countries, the largest difference being displayed in the first period. The group of countries with religious law is the most authoritarian. Furthermore, this group has become even more authoritarian in the second period (from 11.24 to 12.04). The development in countries with 'mixed legal systems' has gone towards more democracy. In the first period 'mixed with socialist law' and 'mixed with civil law' countries were less democratic than 'mixed with common law' countries. In the second period these

Table 5.1 Legal systems and level of democracy: the FH mean in two periods, 1973–90 and 1990–97

Legal system	*Mean Freedom House ratings*				*Numbers of observations*[a]			
	Incl. OECD		*Excl. OECD*		*Incl. OECD*		*Excl. OECD*	
	1973–90	*1990–97*	*1973–90*	*1990–97*	*1973–90*	*1990–97*	*1973–90*	*1990–97*
Common law	4.76	4.09	5.72	4.75	23	23	17	17
Civil law	5.43	4.47	7.09	5.46	44	48	25	29
Religious law	11.24	12.04	11.24	12.04	6	6	6	6
Mixed with socialist law[b]	12.65	8.67	13.06	9.17	13	35	11	32
Mixed with common law[b]	9.25	9.32	9.25	9.32	26	27	26	27
Mixed with civil law	11.06	9.69	11.06	9.69	37	37	37	37
Total	8.25	7.35	9.31	8.21	145	170	122	148

[a] *N* varies because data have not been available for all countries in all periods. The larger *N* in the second period is largely due to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
[b] The 1973–90 is valid for socialist countries.

Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

three groups perform rather evenly (9.17, 9.32 and 9.69). This indicates that countries with legal systems closer to civil law have changed towards more democratic regimes while countries with legal systems closer to common law have experienced an insignificant change away from democracy (from 9.25 to 9.32). Including the two 'mixed with socialist law' OECD countries, the change towards democracy in this group is even more evident with a change in FH ratings to 8.67 in the second period compared to 9.32 in the first.

We may ask whether the development towards democracy is related to the strong codification of legal sources found in civil law regardless of whether we speak of 'genuine' or 'mixed' legal systems. First, looking at the 'pure' common and civil law systems, there is but a weak tendency towards more democracy (a lower score on FH) in common law countries than in civil law countries when including OECD countries. When excluding OECD countries, however, civil law countries have become more democratic when we compare the two periods (a difference of 1.64 in civil law countries compared to a difference in common law countries of 0.97). Second, when we look at the 'mixed' legal systems, the 'mixed with civil law' group has gone through a larger change towards democracy (from 11.06 to 9.69) than the 'mixed with common law' group (from 9.25 to 9.32, i.e. even a slight worsening). What we notice is that countries having gone through a democratisation process from the first to the second period have all based their legal system on civil law. On the other hand, we should notice that common law countries did perform better in terms of level of democracy in the first period.

When assessing the data it should be noted that countries *within* each legal group are very heterogeneous in terms of geography, economic development, cultural and historical background. In order to investigate this aspect, Table 5.2 subdivides

each legal system according to geographic region. In general and not surprisingly, the democracy score is highest in Europe and Central Asia together with the two common law countries in North America. The lowest democracy score is found in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, while East Asia and the Pacific together with Latin America and the Caribbean fall in-between. Taking a closer look at the group of countries with 'mixed with socialist law', Europe and Central Asia (average of 7.63) are substantially more democratic than Latin America, Africa and East Asia. However, these regions include countries such as Cuba, China and North Korea, which have not formally rejected the socialist system, i.e. in terms of democracy being authoritarian with ratings between 12.08 and 14.00.

Table 5.2 Legal system and democracy by region: FH mean score, 1990–97

Region	*Common law*	*Civil law*	*Mixed with socialist law*	*Mixed with common law*	*Mixed with civil law*	*Religious law*	*N*
East Asia and Pacific	5.21 (7)	5.50 (3)	12.08 (5)	7.03 (4)	8.81 (2)	–	21
Europe and Central Asia	2.42 (3)	2.59 (21)	7.63 (27)	–	–	–	51
Latin America and Caribbean	3.37 (8)	5.66 (21)	14.00 (1)	5.50 (1)	7.13 (1)	–	32
Middle East and North Africa	-	–	–	9.93 (5)	11.46 (9)	12.50 (4)	18
North America	2.00 (2)	–	–	–	–	–	2
South Asia	6.38 (1)	–	–	9.38 (5)	–	11.13 (2)	8
Sub-Saharan Africa	6.44 (2)	8.17 (3)	11.63 (2)	10.13 (12)	9.30 (25)	–	44
N	23	48	35	27	37	6	176

Sources: www.freedomhouse.org; World Bank 1999) – WDI Regional Codes.

We can now infer that there are differences between legal systems and between regions when we look into each legal system. Countries constituting a legal system within a region do, however, also differ considerably. For example, the European and Central Asian group of 'mixed with socialist law' has differences in democracy score as large as 3.63 in Poland and 10.43 in Kazakhstan. We may also infer that legal systems with a background in common law are more democratic than their civil law counterparts, with sub-Saharan Africa as the exception. When it comes to change, legal systems based on civil law perform better than their common law counterparts.

These findings, however, do not imply that countries with common and civil law systems are more democratic as a result of their legal systems, nor do the improvements in levels of democracy across time necessarily stem from legal origin alone. They may be attributed to a range of other explanatory variables. Theories of democracy and development suggest that both economic and human development are strong indicators of modernisation. Hence, these variables constitute a strong test in the search for the relation between legal systems and democracy. We have controlled for indications of modernisation by performing a univariate analysis with 1997 FH ratings as dependent variable, and legal system, log to GDP per capita 1997 (economic development), and an education index for 1997[8] (human development) as independent variables. Thus, we do not take into account the time aspect, but only examine the 1997 cross-country pattern. We expect the legal system, log to GDP per capita, and the education index to be negatively correlated with democracy (low scores on the FH indicate a high level of democracy).

Table 5.3 Legal system and democracy: univariate analysis, 1997

		95 per cent confidence interval		
Independent variables	*B*	*Lower*	*Upper*	*Sign.*
Log GDP per capita	–2.03	–3.82	–0.24	0.027[a]
Education index	–2.22	–6.60	2.16	0.319
Legal system				0.000[b]
1. Civil law	–7.00	–9.89	–4.11	–
2. Common law	–7.76	–10.81	–4.71	–
3. Mixed with socialist law	–4.54	–7.75	–1.32	–
4. Mixed with civil law	–3.68	–6.60	–0.76	–
5. Mixed with common law	–3.74	–6.77	–0.71	–
6. Religious law	0	–	–	–
R square	0.462			
N	161			

[a] Significant at the 0.05 level.
[b] Significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 5.3 reveals the legal system to have the expected sign and is significantly correlated with level of democracy when we control for modernisation variables at a 10 per cent level. GDP per capita is also, as expected, significant but at a 5 per cent level. Surprisingly, because theories of democratisation often indicate that education has an independent effect on democracy, the education index is insignificant. This may indicate that our education index measures the same dimension of modernisation as the GDP per capita variable, i.e. the higher GDP per capita, the more resources are available for education purposes. The legal system variable 'survives' the control for modernisation. As anticipated, both common and civil law systems predict the highest levels of democracy (countries within these groups are expected to lie between 11 and 4 points higher on the FH scale than countries with religious law). Moreover, 'mixed legal systems' are all associated with significantly

lower levels of democracy. However, we see that 'mixed with common law' compared to 'mixed with civil law' at the same time predicts the closest and the most remote score to common law countries (0.71 versus 0.76 and 6.77 versus 6.60 respectively). This means that 'mixed with common law' countries represent a more heterogeneous group with countries both closer to and more remote from religious law countries, while 'mixed with civil law' countries perform more evenly in the direction of more democracy.

We may infer that legal systems are related to the level of democracy also when controlled for modernisation. The model in Table 5.3 explains 46 per cent of the variance, which means that there are other important explanatory variables. We therefore question if the correlation between legal system and level of democracy is indirect in the sense that legal systems relate to economic development, which affects the level of democracy.

The legal system and economic development

The relation between legal systems and economic development is explored by using the average GDP per capita for two periods, 1980–89 and 1990–97 (see Table 5.4). We note that the 'pure' legal systems – common, civil and religious law – perform best in terms of economic development. For common and civil law this corresponds to our previous findings with respect to level of democracy. The relation between religious law and economic development is in this respect a disturbing finding. However, countries with religious law are a very heterogeneous group covering oil-producing countries, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia with levels of GDP per capita between $10,000 and $17,000, as well as countries such as Pakistan and Mauritania with $1,380 and $1,445 GDP per capita respectively. Thus, average economic development for this group is artificially high because economic growth in two cases comes from exploitation of natural resources and not from the functioning of a particular political or legal system.[9]

Table 5.4 Legal system and economic development in the 1980s and 1990s

	GDP per capita (PPP Int. $)		*N*	
Legal system	*Average 1980–89*	*Average 1990–97*	*1980–89*	*1990–97*
Common law	6185,28	9737,67	20	20
Civil law	6595,32	10524,39	41	42
Religious law	10745,60	10651,50	5	5
Mixed with socialist law	3551,87	3675,53	23	31
Mixed with common law	2464,07	3536,31	22	23
Mixed with civil law	1910,54	2821,13	30	30
Total	4546,53	6423,48	141	151

Source: World Bank 1999.

Table 5.5 Legal system and economic development by region: average GDP per capita, 1990–97 (current international $)

Region	*Common law*	*Civil law*	*Mixed with socialist law*	*Mixed with common law*	*Mixed with civil law*	*Religious law*	*N*
East Asia and Pacific	12.421 (5)	13.623 (2)	1.519 (4)	4.674 (2)	2.822 (1)	–	14
Europe and Central Asia	16825.00 (2)	17972.87 (17)	4220.39 (25)	–	–	–	44
Latin America and Caribbean	5988.07 (8)	5055.47 (20)	–	2422.50 (1)	1790.00 (1)	–	30
Middle East and North Africa	–	–	–	8754.27 (5)	5158.57 (7)	12953.13 (4)	16
North America	23051.88 (2)	–	–	–	–	–	2
South Asia	893.75 (1)	–	–	1858.13 (4)	–	–	5
Sub-Saharan Africa	2046.88 (2)	2709.58 (3)	1176.25 (2)	1669.09 (11)	2091.01 (21)	1445.00 (1)	40
N	20	42	31	23	30	5	151

Source: World Bank 1999.

Countries with 'mixed law' perform on average more than twice as bad in terms of GDP per capita than countries with 'pure' legal systems. The relation between economic development and countries with 'mixed law' is presented in Table 5.5. It depicts average GDP per capita levels for 1990–97 according to legal system and subdivided by geographic region.

We may infer that when disregarding region, 'pure' legal systems, in general, perform better than 'mixed' legal systems. Region, however, does not provide additional information about differences between 'mixed common law' and 'mixed civil law' in relation to economic development. In sub-Saharan Africa, legal systems based on civil law perform best, but in other regions 'mixed common law' does better. Hence, it may be concluded that with respect to economic development it is more important to which region a country belongs than to which legal system it adheres. Pursuing the question of whether countries with legal systems based on civil law perform better than countries with legal systems based on common law, we look at sub-Saharan Africa as the least economically developed region in the world. Here, 'pure' civil law performs better than 'pure' common law, and 'mixed civil law' performs better than both 'mixed common law' and 'pure'

common law. However, the picture becomes blurred if we look at the two countries with 'mixed socialist law' as another variation of civil law in the region, since they perform worst of all. Thus, when including region we cannot infer that there are systematic differences between countries with civil or common law.

To test further the relationship between economic development and legal systems we turn to a cross-country analysis at a specific time, 1997, i.e. we do not consider the time aspect. In Table 5.6, we perform two univariate analyses. First we use the log to GDP per capita 1997 as independent variable to test the bivariate relationship between economic development and the legal systems variable (model 1). Secondly, we include level of democracy (FH ratings) and the education index as control variables (model 2). The education index should be positively correlated with economic development, while the FH rating should be negatively correlated.

Table 5.6 Legal system and economic development: univariate analysis, 1997

	Dependent variable Log GDP per capita 1997[a]							
	Model 1				*Model 2*			
	95 per cent confidence interval				*95 per cent confidence interval*			
Independent variables	*B*	*Lower*	*Upper*	*Sign.*	*B*	*Lower*	*Upper*	*Sign.*
Freedom House	–	–	–	–	–0.015	–0.03	–0.002	0.027
Education index	–	–	–	–	1.71	1.44	1.98	0.000
Legal system				0.000				0.000
1. Civil law	0.02	–0.34	0.39		–0.40	–0.67	–0.13	–
2. Common law	–0.05	–0.43	0.34		–0.46	–0.74	–0.19	–
3. Mixed with socialist law	–0.44	–0.81	–0.007		–0.83	–1.09	–0.57	–
4. Mixed with civil law	–0.58	–0.95	–0.21		–0.43	–0.68	–0.18	–
5. Mixed with common law	–0.49	–0.87	–0.11		–0.54	–0.80	–0.28	–
6. Religious law	0	–	–		0	–	–	–
R square	0.309				0.694			
N	161				161			

[a] The logged levels of GDP per capita lie between 2.67 and 4.49, corresponding to a range from $410 (Sierra Leone) to $30,368 (Luxembourg).

Source: World Bank 1999.

Model 1 reveals that the legal system variable as a whole is related to economic development. Countries within 'mixed law' are predicted to perform worst as they are expected to have levels of GDP per capita approximately within the range of 0–1 point below the group of countries with religious law. Following the previous findings, countries with 'pure' common or civil law are expected to perform best but at the same level as the group of religious law, as indicated in B-values of 0.02 and 0.05. This model, however, explains only 30 per cent of the variance.

In model 2 we find that, when controlling for democracy and education, the model explains nearly 70 per cent of the variance in economic development. This suggests that democracy and education are important variables when we discuss economic development. Even so the importance of the legal system does not disappear but the differences between 'pure' and 'mixed' legal systems become less obvious than in model 1. This suggests that the significance of the relation between the legal system and economic development is due to the religious systems generating high levels of economic development and 'mixed with socialist law' generating low levels. An interesting finding is that in countries with 'mixed common' and 'mixed civil' law, the relation between legal system and economic development does not change considerably when controlling for democracy and education, as indicated by only small differences in their predicted values in models 1 and 2. We may thus infer that countries with 'mixed common and civil law' relate to economic development independently of level of democracy or education. In addition, the fact that these countries are mainly located in the same regions supports our thesis that in terms of economic development region is a better indicator than legal system, democracy or education.

The relation between legal system, democracy and economic development is a complex one. We may tentatively conclude this section with comments on three issues. First, we ask whether the relation between legal systems and democracy is direct or indirect. Our statistical exercise indicates that the legal system correlates independently and significantly with both democracy and economic development. It also shows 'pure' common and civil law to be related to higher levels of democracy than are 'mixed' legal systems and 'religious law'. The same pattern was not equally obvious when we looked at the relation between legal systems and economic development. Due to rich oil-producing countries 'religious law' performs just as well as other 'pure' legal systems, while 'mixed with socialist law' has a predicted value for economic development which, when controlled for democracy and education, is more remote from 'religious law' than other legal systems. Thus, the relation between legal system and economic development reflects a high correlation, first between 'religious law' and high levels of GDP per capita, and second between 'mixed with socialist law' and low levels of GDP per capita. Furthermore, the predicted value of economic development falls within the same values in both 'pure' and 'mixed' common and civil law systems. These findings indicate that differences in economic development are very weakly related to the legal system.

Second, we ask whether there are differences between common and civil law in relation to democracy and democratic development. 'Pure' common and civil law were shown to have stronger legal foundations for democracy than 'mixed' legal systems. In terms of democratisation we compared the level of democracy in two periods, 1973–90 and 1990–97, and found two indications of a difference between the two systems. It was shown that 'pure' civil law became more democratic than common law, and that 'mixed civil law' countries had undergone a change towards a higher level of democracy while this was not the case in 'mixed common law' countries. Thus, we infer that to the extent that countries have a choice when it comes to democratisation, civil law may be a 'better' bet than common law,

although common law countries from the outset of our period performed better than civil law countries whether 'pure' or 'mixed'.

Third, we question how to interpret the relation between religious law, democracy and economic development. First, the positive relation between religious law and low level of democracy is not surprising because religious law per definition indicates elimination of central democratic rights. Second, the countries basing their economic development on exploitation of oil resources explain the relation between religious law and economic development. With this in mind, we infer that there is an association between legal system, democracy and economic development. This statistical correlation, however, is not identical to causality. At this explorative stage of research, we argue that there is an association between legal system and democracy, while economic development has a supportive but not necessary effect on democracy. We need, however, to explain this observed pattern of relations between legal systems and democracy. In our introduction we stated that in accordance with much of the new institutional theory, legal institutions consist of formal (the legal system) and informal (the legal culture) rules and norms regulating relations between individuals and groups in society. Further, along this line, institutions are the outcome of historical trajectories, which, after a certain time through institutional path dependencies, become a factor of their own in the formation of policies. Our tentative concluding discussion is structured around this theoretical argument.

In search of causal models

The most persuasive finding of our analysis is that 'pure' systems tend to perform better than their 'mixed' counterparts. Our assumption that the compatibility between the formal and informal sides of the legal system matters has been borne out by our study. The legal 'superstructure' as evident in concrete rules and regulations which determine policy, identity, strategy and ultimately the power of specific groups in society can only be fully understood through the lenses of underlying norms, beliefs and attitudes. Our study demonstrates that compatibility between formal and informal institutions matters positively while disjuncture matters negatively.

Scholars continue to argue whether formal institutions shape the informal or vice versa. One school believes that the underlying values and beliefs are what shapes formal institutions, while others, such as those who believe in the autonomy of institutions (e.g. March and Olsen 1984), argue that institutions shape beliefs and attitudes. Our study does not provide an answer to which approach is right, but indicates the need for further research along the lines of what causal relations may exist between formal and historically formed informal institutions as well as between these institutions and democracy or development. It was in particular historical trajectories that formed the two archetypes of legal systems – civil law and common law – which subsequently decided how 'decisions about decision rules' (constitutional choices) were made. These constitutional choices in turn established the institutional arrangements (for collective choices) that guide and constrain individual behaviour. Feasible reform strategies are thus ultimately contingent upon historically made constitutional choices.

The 'mixed' systems, regardless of their content, are clearly the problematic cases. The prevailing disjuncture between formal and informal institutions, most recently the result of ambitious economic or political transformations, leaves the state, in general, and the legal system, in particular, out of tune with society. Laws do not have a genuine foundation in prevailing social beliefs and attitudes. Rules and regulations often lack legitimacy because those in power use their legislative capacity to serve their private interests. The state is 'soft' in the sense that its legality is weak and its legitimacy consequently low.

This study may appear to confirm the prevailing notion in international governance circles that the rule of law matters. We like to believe, however, that what matters most is not so much the rule of law in the liberal-democratic sense as the fact that the legal system provides a sense of stability and hence predictability. It is, as we have argued, the compatibility between formal and informal institutions that is the most important factor. Thus, one hypothesis for further research may be that 'mixed' legal systems suffer greater political uncertainty because formal and informal rules do not mutually reinforce each other to the same extent as in 'pure' legal systems.

If the relations between legal system and political certainty are fairly convincingly supported by the findings in this study, the relations between legal system and economic development produce different effects. One interesting hypothesis that we can develop from this study for further research is that if we disregard countries with 'religious law' and those with 'mixed with social law', the variance between 'pure' and 'mixed' legal systems is minimal as far as effect on economic development is concerned. This suggests that in the contemporary world characterised by a global economy, any legal system seems to produce enough predictability for individuals interested in engaging in economic development. This also suggests that it is not only common law systems with their emphasis on individualism, as conventional economic wisdom wishes to have it, but also other legal systems that may produce positive economic outcomes. The key, as this study has indicated, may not be individualism but predictability.

These findings have important repercussions for everyone interested in international development. They clearly point to the need for paying more attention to how formal institutions relate to the informal and what the two do to each other. Fashioning formal legal institutions in isolation from the informal context in which they are expected to function may be of little value. The real challenge is to find ways of marrying the former to the latter in ways that make them reinforce rather than undermine each other.

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6 Modernisation and democracy

Electoral systems as intermediate variable

Lars Johannsen

Introduction

The theory of modernisation as an explanation for democratisation has demonstrated great explanatory power concerning developments in unlike countries (Lipset 1981;[1] Dahl 1971; Diamond 1992; Hadenius 1992, Lipset, Seong and Torres 1993). It is therefore also constantly under debate. Increasingly sophisticated techniques have been used to challenge the direction of the causality (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Leblang 1997) and the variables in the model (Diamond 1992). However, the debate has not only taken place within the paradigm itself, but also come to encompass other approaches, in particular transitology, which was developed in direct response to the structuralism and the implicit determinism of modernisation theory. Transitology brought attention to the political actors and Przeworski and Limongi (1997) convincingly qualified modernisation theory, arguing that transitions to democracy are not products of modernisation, but that economic development and growth improve the chances that democracy will survive once installed by political actors. In effect this debate between what have become the mainstream approaches to democratisation lands squarely in the old problem of structure and agency. Where does this leave the much-heralded 'new institutionalism' in relation to the mainstream approaches and the study of democratisation?

A central claim of this chapter is that institutionalism can generate new insight and contribute to the two other approaches. Institutionalism directs our attention towards much-forgotten political institutions, and by virtue of the inherent 'duality' in institutionalism – or perhaps rather its dual faces – it contributes to the other approaches. It is, on the one hand, comparable to modernisation theory in that institutions are seen to have an independent effect not only on policies, but also on the quality and sustainability of democracy. As such, it may enrich modernisation studies where the trend has been to concentrate on the indicators of socio-economic advancement and by and large ignore institutional structures in the search for the requisites of democracy. Institutions structure, on the other hand, solutions to the problem of collective action, and political actors take an interest in institutional design because institutions have distributional consequences (Przeworski 1988: 64). Because transitions to democracy consist of negotiations and the establishment of institutions, it is evident that the new institutionalism cannot

escape the problem of agency and structure. Institutions may cause outcomes, but are themselves outcomes of a political struggle in which political actors seek to protect and promote their interests.

Before evaluating the possible contribution of institutionalism to the study of democratisation, however, we shall be well advised to carry out some preliminary empirical studies. The task of empirical institutionalism is to confront propositions about the impact of institutions within an empirical research design.[2] In effect, the Przeworski and Limongi (1997) argument is that modernisation is not a prerequisite but a requisite of democracy. Hence, modernisation indicators are – because of the strong association with the level of democracy – applicable as controls for institutional variables in cross-sectional analyses. On that assumption this chapter examines the influence of electoral systems on the level of democracy in the late 1990s. The importance of electoral systems in building democracy is not disputed. As Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 2) have argued: 'electoral rules can make or break a party – or even a country'. The first part of the analysis demonstrates that electoral systems are indeed significantly associated with the level of democracy, and that among the different electoral systems, proportional representation (PR) is related to higher levels of democracy than either plurality-majority (PM) or semi-proportional (SP) systems. The association is robust when expressions of modernisation are included in the equation.[3] In the second part of the analysis this relationship is challenged from the agency or transitology perspective through a closer examination of the inexplicable cases: that is, the outliers in the cross-sectional analysis.

Modernisation and transitology

The study of democratisation can be described as having two sides or faces. The first approaches the study in terms of the factors that enable a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule (or the reverse). The second approaches it in terms of what facilitates the survival and/or consolidation of democracy. This is clearly reflected in the two sides of institutionalism (see Table 6.1), where the first focuses on the origin and change of institutions, and the second proposes that institutions affect individual and collective values and outcomes.[4] These two sides allow us to compare 'new institutionalism' with the two mainstream approaches to the study of democratisation, transitology and modernisation.

When comparing the first face of institutionalism with transitology it becomes evident that they share a number of propositions. Both focus on change and institutions as central to our understanding of transitions to democracy. Within transitology the primary feature of democracy is understood as uncertainty in comparison with authoritarian rule. In a democracy political actors must struggle for the realisation of their interests through competition, whereas political outcomes are controlled in an authoritarian setting (Przeworski 1988: 62). Institutions offer political actors the possibility of conditioned uncertainty: that is, institutions become the rules of the game and, once institutionalised, provide information about the likely behaviour of other political actors and the procedures for determining political outcomes. Despite the pay-offs involved for all actors engaged

in initiating a transition and institutionalising democracy, political actors are not at all indifferent about which institutions are adopted. Sartori (1994: 27) states this quite bluntly as a rhetorical question: 'Indeed, if electoral systems were of little consequence why on earth would politicians fight so bitterly about them?' The point of departure for studies of the origin of institutions (at least when cloaked in the rational choice perspective) is that institutions matter to political parties precisely because they influence the distribution of power within the political system, or at least because politicians believe that to be true.

The empirical consequences of this line of thought with respect to electoral systems are easily spelled out. All electoral systems have distributional consequences, and no electoral system has the effect of producing ideal proportionality, in which the percentage of seats allocated to political parties that gain representation in the parliament equals the percentage of votes won in the election. Ideal proportionality can be described by the break-even point B. Parties with a share of votes below B are 'robbed', because fewer seats are allocated to them. Parties with a share of votes above B are 'rewarded' by receiving more seats than under ideal proportionality. Plurality-majoritarian (PM) systems with their reliance on single seats tend to increase B, whereas proportional systems (PR) with large districts (plus additional compensatory mandates on occasion) reduce B (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Thus PM systems favour larger parties, whereas the interests of small and medium-size parties are best served under PR, and semi-proportional (SP) systems offer the actors a possibility to hedge (Johannsen 2000).

Table 6.1 The two faces of institutionalism, transitology and modernisation, in the study of democratisation

	Time perspective	*Focus*	*Level of explanation*	*Explanation with reference to democracy*
Transitology	Short	Regime change	Actors and institutions	Democracy is the result of an institutional agreement made by actors
First face of institutionalism	Short	Origin and change of institutions	Institutional properties affecting the choice and bargaining position of actors	Democracy is expressed by institutions
Second face of institutionalism	Long	Institutions affecting individual and collective values and outcomes	Structural (interrelationship with behaviour and attitudes)	Some institutions are more conducive for the development and sustainability of democracy
Modernisation	Long	Development affecting individual and collective values and outcomes	Structural (interrelationship with behaviour and attitudes)	Socio-economic conditions are requisites for the development and sustainability of democracy

These considerations make it evident that the first faces of institutionalism and transitology respectively can enrich each other. And electoral systems can be seen as factors that enable democracy. In the following, however, we shall discuss whether some electoral systems may act as confining conditions for democracy.

A comparison of modernisation theory with the second face of institutionalism clearly shows that they share a number of features. Both see structures in interrelationships between behaviour and attitudes, and whereas modernisation theory proposes that development is a prerequisite for the development and sustainability of democracy, institutionalism proposes that some institutions are more conducive to the development and sustainability of democracy than others. So they operate on the same level, even in terms of dependent variables.

Modernisation theory has quite successfully established a statistical association between democracy and structural characteristics, so we can apply it as control for the propositions made in the debate about electoral systems. This debate about institutions (electoral systems) and their consequences is not new, but has perhaps been downplayed following the – appropriate and timely – break with the now old-fashioned constitutional approach to political science that was extant in the first half of the twentieth century. However, in the efforts to explain the 'third wave' of democratisation and the performance of recently established democracies, institutional factors have attracted interest (Linz 1990a, 1990b; Huntington 1991; Shugart and Carey 1992; Przeworski *et al.* 1995; and Lijphart 1999). Much of the energy within this debate has been spent on the question of the form of government, whereas the influence of electoral systems upon the development and survival of democracy has been assigned to a secondary position (or used as an add-on condition). It is nevertheless characteristic that consensus is not to be found in the literature.

We can cite at least three reasons for this state of affairs. First, scholars differ about what constitutes 'good' democratic procedures in terms of the alternatives offered by the different electoral systems. Blais and Massicotte (1996: 73) note that this is 'because there are alternative visions of democracy, and because electoral systems are meant to accomplish not one but many objectives'. One often-quoted advantage of PM systems is that single-seat constituencies tend to discourage third parties, offering voters a 'clear choice' between two contestants. Furthermore, the tendency for PM systems to produce majority governments allows the voters to have greater influence *ex ante* on government formation: that is, they need not depend on *ex post* bargaining among numerous political parties in quest for majorities. These effects, however, can only be achieved at the cost of disproportionality in these systems. For proponents of PR systems disproportionality amounts to electoral injustice, while justice would be that any minority is to be represented as long as it passes the minimum threshold (Lijphart 1994: 140). These considerations lead towards different hypotheses concerning the impact of electoral systems on democracy. Lardeyret (1991: 31) and Quade (1991: 35–41) argue that the inherent bipartism of PM systems favours government stability, decision-making capacity and periodic alternations in power. Moreover, PM systems encourage parties to be moderate and form strong and accountable

governments. In contrast, they argue, multi-partism – associated with PR – leaves long periods during which the chief executive office is vacant (due to the bargaining process), extremism may be generated, and government remains ineffective. These arguments are raised in response to Lijphart's (1991) findings that PR systems are superior to PM systems with respect to democratic performance. Lijphart (1995, 1999) has later qualified these findings, in the sense that there is also an upper limit to the fragmentation of a parliament before it becomes counterproductive to democratic performance.[5] Even so, he maintains that the principal thrust of his argument holds.

Blais and Dion (1990) find that among the non-industrialised countries that have adopted PR (and have low government stability) democracy breaks down more frequently. In his assessment Bohrer (1997) utilises Stepan and Skach's (1993) finding, that parliamentary systems are more likely to survive than presidential systems, to show that proponents of PR are both right and wrong: that is, broader representation comes at a cost. Efficient and effective governance may be impossible as a result of parliamentary fragmentation due to low thresholds.[6] We should be careful not to interpret this as a recommendation for SP systems. Sartori (1994: 69–75) lists the pros and cons of majoritarian and proportional systems and warns against 'mixed' or in the terminology used in this chapter, 'semi-proportional systems', in particular parallel systems, because it would be misguided to believe that such systems would encompass only the best aspects of the two 'pure' forms. Finally, even if he recommends two-round systems, he concludes that no electoral system is 'best for all seasons'.[7] In practical terms this means that the field for generating hypotheses is relatively open.

Second, there is no consensus about how to measure the dependent variable. In general terms the dependent variable is conceived as democracy or democratic performance, or stability or consolidation of democracy. The literature thus burgeons with discussions about what constitutes consolidated democracy. Should a minimalist turnover test be required, or should requirements be tightened not only concerning the longevity of democratic rule, but also by incorporating measures that help us determine whether the political culture can be deemed democratic to begin with? Similar problems exist with the operational definition of democracy and the indicators related to performance. Thus, the conclusions and lessons to be drawn from empirical institutionalism to a large extent depend on how the dependent variable is defined and rendered operational. Lijphart (1999), Shugart and Carey (1992), Stepan and Skach (1993) and Merkel (1998) all illustrate these problems.

Third, partly because of the differing views on how to measure the dependent variable and partly because of divergent research strategies, the studies come to include varying mixes of cases. This is more evident in the parallel debate over form of government – presidentialism versus parliamentarism – than in the debate over electoral studies. However, it is notable that Quade (1991) invokes the fall of the Weimar republic as the best test case for PR, whereas Lijphart (1999) has included some 36 existing democracies in his comparative study.

This study builds on these previous studies. But having blazed the trail by

arguing that institutions and modernisation indicators can be tested in the same model, and that transitology and institutionalism can enrich each other, it is imperative to show how this can be done. The first step involves using a combination of the Freedom House rankings for Civil Liberties and Political Rights (simple addition) in order to obtain a rough measure for the level of democracy. The combined scale runs from 2 (most democratic) to 14 (least democratic). This decision indicates that we have chosen to follow Lipset, Seong and Torres (1993), who combine the Freedom House rankings into a similar scale, in order to make our findings comparable.[8] The second step entails an effort to obtain a first control on the possible impact of electoral systems on the level of democracy by examining the data not only by using the distinction developing–developed countries, but also at the regional level, adding a second possible 'grand' control for regional dynamics and culture. The third step involves examining the extent to which the three commonly used modernisation expressions – GDP per capita, urbanisation and level of education – account for the differences between the electoral systems. If they do not, our institutional variable contributes to the model. The fourth and final step implies asking one further question about the supposed and implicit causal chain indicated by the analysis by drawing on our earlier discussion of institutions as factors enabling democracy.

Electoral systems, democracy and modernisation

This section provides a rough guide to the world of electoral systems and the relationship between electoral systems and democracy at the global and the regional level in an attempt to ascertain the initial robustness of the propositions. It then proceeds with a control for the modernisation expression in a cross-sectional analysis, demonstrating the contribution of electoral system in the explanation of the level of democracy by the late 1990s, before the discussion focuses on 'the causes of the cause'.

Although electoral systems consist of three elements, the ballot structure, the constituency structure and the electoral formula, the latter has given names to the different electoral systems (Reeve and Ware 1992: 64–8), because it reflects what they seek to achieve by the way in which votes are translated into seats. Thus, a proportional system is designed to reduce the deviation from proportionality in that translation, whereas a majoritarian system is geared to producing a winner (Sartori 1994: 5). The main 'families' of electoral systems can be ordered into nine types (IDEA 1997: 18). The First-Past-the-Post (FPTP), the Block Vote (BV), the Two Round System (TRS) and the Alternative Vote (AV) systems belong to the PM family. The Mixed Member Proportional (MMP), the Single Transferable Vote (STV) and the Proportional Representation by List (List-PR) constitute the PR family.[9] The Single Non-transferable Vote (SNTV) belongs to the SP family, as do Parallel systems that mix various types of majoritarian and proportional traits.

As shown in Figure 6.1, where the two-layered categories and the distribution by number and percentages are reported for both the global sample and the

developing world, PM and PR systems are the largest families. In the global sample 45.2 and 41.8 per cent have adopted respectively PM and PR systems, whereas only 13 per cent have adopted a 'mixed' version of semi-proportional representation. Primarily at the expense of PR systems, PM systems are slightly more popular among non-OECD members. Despite the lower number of SP systems, we will maintain that fruitful comparisons can be made between the families for both samples, whereas it is not fruitful when we consider the types of electoral systems.[10]

Table 6.2 reports the distribution of the developing countries, the OECD member states and the global sample upon the level of democracy in 1997. It is notable that the majority of the OECD members have received the highest ranking and that none is ranked above 9, compared to the developing countries where the distribution is more even, even if none of these countries has the status of being most democratic. These differences in their own right naturally lend credence to the modernisation thesis, but a similar argument can be made for the institutional thesis.



Developing world in italics. FPTP = First Past the Post, TRS = Two Round System, BV = Block Vote, AV = Alternative Vote, SNTV = Single Non-Transferable Vote, List-PR = List Proportional Representation, MMP = Mixed Member Proportional, STV = Single Transferable Vote.

[a] Freedom House country list used as basis (N = 200). No longer existing countries excluded. Countries with a population of fewer than 1 million inhabitants are excluded (N = 151). For electoral families China, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are missing (N = 146). In addition for electoral types Côte d'Ivoire, Lebanon, Singapore, Taiwan and Yemen are missing (N = 141).

[b] Freedom House country list used as basis (N = 200). No longer existing countries excluded. Countries with a population of fewer than 1 million inhabitants and OECD members are excluded (N=124). For electoral families China, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are missing (N = 119). In addition for electoral types Côte d'Ivoire, Lebanon, Singapore, Taiwan and Yemen are missing (N = 114).

Sources: IDEA, 1997:18, 139–42; Moldova: author's classification (see Johannsen 2000).

Figure 6.1 Electoral systems: global[a] and developing world[b], 1997 (percentage of total in parentheses)

Table 6.2 Level of democracy: global, developing countries and OECD members, 1997

Level of democracy	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13*	*14*	*Total*	*Mean*
Developing countries	0	9	7	11	12	12	10	11	8	9	12	9	14	124	8.72
OECD	14	9	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	27	2.93
Total (global)	14	18	9	11	12	13	10	12	8	9	12	9	14	151	7.68

Source: DEMSTAR database (see appendix).

Tables 6.3 and 6.4 report the average means of level of democracy by electoral system for the global (and regional) developing countries and OECD member samples. In the global sample it is notable that those countries that have adopted PR systems on average significantly outperform countries that have adopted PM systems, with SP systems somewhere in between.[11] It is also noteworthy that this pattern is relatively robust for a regional comparison. With the exception of East Asia and the Pacific, where SP systems outperform the other two categories, and North America where we only find data for the two PM systems, PR outperforms the PM system. That PR in five of the six regions where this system is found receives lower values – that is, higher levels of democracy – than the average for the region, merely reflects the above pattern.

When comparing the developing world with the OECD members (Table 6.4), we see that PR systems significantly outperform PM systems, also in the context of the developing world. Again, we find SP systems somewhere in between.[12] This pattern is somewhat turned on its head when we only look at the OECD members, where PM systems outperform PR systems, and SP systems by average fare the poorest of the three groups. The sample size is small, however, and the comparison is neither significant nor robust.[13] As an additional examination for robustness besides changing the classification for the developing world, we also tried to use the average mean of the democracy ranking for the five-year period 1993 to 1997 as the dependent variable. This course of action provided an overall confirmation of the findings.[14]

Electoral systems in their own right are thus significantly associated with the level of democracy. Moreover, the results indicate that PR systems significantly outperform PM systems, with SP systems somewhere in between. The next natural step in the analysis is to check whether this pattern is upheld when traditional indicators of modernisation are introduced.

Modernisation and electoral systems

It is important how the independent variable – modernity – is perceived and made operational for empirical testing with the modernisation thesis. Towards this end Lipset's original study suggests a number of indices for wealth, industrialisation, education and urbanisation.[15] Diamond (1992) proposes that human development as summarised in the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) would be a better predictor of the presence and degree of democracy, because the HDI includes life

Table 6.3 Level of democracy: global and regional by electoral family ($N = 146$), 1997

	PM		*SP*		*PR*		*Total*	
	Mean	*N*	*Mean*	*N*	*Mean*	*N*	*Mean*	*N*
North America	2.0	2					2.0	2
Europe and Central Asia	8.6	10	7.4	7	3.9	27	5.5	44
Latin America and Caribbean	7.8	4	6.5	2	5.6	16	6.1	22
South Asia	8.4	5			7.0	1	8.2	6
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.8	26	10.2	5	8.1	12	9.4	43
East Asia and Pacific	8.9	11	3.7	3	9.0	3	8.0	17
Middle East and North Africa	11.8	8	9.5	2	8.0	2	10.8	12
Total[a]	9.2	66	7.7	19	5.6	61	7.5	146

[a] Scheffe's post-hoc test comparing the means reveals significant means differences between PM and PR systems at 0.05 or better (0.05 test applied). The overall $F(17.7)$ reports significance at 0.001 or better. Regional coding from WDI.

Source: DEMSTAR database (see appendix).

Table 6.4 Level of democracy: developing world and OECD members by electoral families ($N = 146$) 1997

	PM		*SP*		*PR*		
	Mean	*N*	*Mean*	*N*	*Mean*	*N*	*Total*
OECD members[a]	2.40	5	3.50	2	3.00	20	27
Developing world[b]	9.79	61	8.18	17	6.83	41	119
Total	9.23	66	7.68	19	5.57	61	146

[a] The overall F is not significant.

[b] Scheffe's post-hoc test comparing the means reveals significant means differences between PM and PR systems at 0.05 or better (0.05 test applied). The overall $F(10.9)$ reports significance at 0.001 or better.

Source: DEMSTAR database (see appendix).

expectancy, knowledge in the form of adult literacy and school enrolment in addition to the traditional measure of wealth, GDP per capita. This is to some extent confirmed by Hadenius' (1992) study of the requisites for democracy in Third World countries, where literacy is among seven variables that display significant association (0.10 level or better) with the level of democracy. Using GNP per capita (log), and excluding oil-exporting countries, communist countries[16] and the advanced industrial market economies, Lipset, Seong and Torres (1993) show a long-term positive correlation with democracy. In other words, the original linearity assumption occurs over time, although they also found that negative relations at intermediate ranges are possible.

In order to arrive at the strongest possible expression for modernisation, four variables – GDP per capita (PPP, log), HDI, urbanisation in percentages of

populations and the UNDP education index – were utilised in several stages of simple and multiple regressions (Table 6.5).[17] The application of the latter instead of the traditional measure of literacy is primarily due to the inclusion of the post-communist countries in the sample. The data basically support Hadenius' (1992) finding of the literacy component if the sample is narrowed to include only Third World countries, but when the post-communist countries are included the relationship disappears. The obvious reason is that the former Eastern bloc reports very little variance in literacy, but in as far as the education index reflects the same underlying feature – knowledge – the conclusion remains firm. Since, however, some of the variables exhibit strong correlation, rendering the regression analysis uncertain, only one of these should be included in the final model. For understandable reasons this uncertainty arises in the case of HDI and GDP per capita, and HDI and the education index, since GDP per capita and education are already accounted for by the HDI.

Table 6.5 Modernisation and the level of democracy: simple regression, 1997

	Standardised reg. coefficients	*Explained variance (percentage)*[b]	*N*
GDP per capita (PPP, log)	–0.586[a]	33.9	143
Human Development Index	–0.569[a]	32.0	143
Education index	–0.500[a]	24.5	143
Urbanisation (% of population)	–0.412[a]	16.4	148

[a] Significance at the 0.001 level. [b] Adjusted R^2.

Independent and dependent variables are coded from the same year. However, where measures for GDP per capita were not available, it was decided to use data from 1996 or 1998, or an average of the two if both were available.

Source: DEMSTAR database (see appendix).

When combining these variables it becomes evident that we are left with GDP per capita and the HDI as the most powerful modernisation expressions. Since there is little to choose between the two expressions (HDI and GDP per capita), except that the HDI describes a broader dimension of development than GDP per capita alone, both will be applied in the following analysis, thereby gaining an additional robustness check on the electoral system explanation.

It is now possible to introduce the electoral families as fixed factors in two univariate analyses with GDP per capita and HDI respectively as covariates. The findings in Table 6.6 confirm our suspicion that the electoral systems contribute independently to explaining the variance in the level of democracy. A between-subjects effects test reveals significant results for all three variables and the parameter estimates all carry the expected sign. Thus higher levels of GDP per capita and Human Development are positively correlated with democracy, whereas PM and SP electoral systems are negatively correlated with democracy – recall that the lower the score, the more democracy a country has according to the Freedom House scale. This means that we would expect countries that have adopted PM

systems to lie between 1 and 3 Freedom House scale points above countries that have chosen PR systems. This is the theoretical value of electoral systems. The effect is smaller than what we found when the means for the three electoral systems were compared (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3). This was to be expected because of the power of the modernisation expressions. Thus, electoral systems contribute to the explanation, but the modernisation expressions remain the most powerful predictors.

Table 6.6 Modernisation and electoral systems: univariate analysis upon the level of democracy, 1997 ($N = 138$)

	B	*95% confidence interval*		*Between-subject effects significance*
		Lower	*Upper*	
A) Intercept	22.03	18.11	25.95	[a]
GDP per capita (PPP, log)	–4.44	–5.47	–3.42	[a]
Electoral family				
1. Plurality-majoritarian	2.20	1.16	3.24	
2. Semi-proportional	1.26	–0.26	2.73	
3. Proportional[b]	0			
B) Intercept	13.22	11.10	15.35	[a]
HDI	–10.83	–13.57	–8.089	[a]
Electoral family				
1. Plurality-majoritarian	2.39	1.33	3.45	
2. Semi-proportional	1.64	0.11	3.17	
3. Proportional[b]	0			

[a] Significance at the 0.001 level.

[b] The parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. Independent and dependent variables are coded from the same year. However, where measures for GDP per capita were not available, it was decided to use data from 1996 or 1998, or an average of the two if both were available.

Source: DEMSTAR database (see appendix).

Table 6.7 Over- and underachievers in the modernisation plus electoral system models

	Underachievers (less democracy than expected)	*Overachievers*
A)	Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Singapore	Malawi, Mali
B)	Algeria, Cuba, Indonesia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Vietnam	Malawi, Mali

Using the non-standardised predicted values in a regression against the level of democracy, we find that the overall explained variance increases to 48.9 and 45.8 per cent when electoral systems are included in the equation with GDP per capita and HDI respectively, compared with 33.9 and 32.0 per cent in the original modernisation expressions (Table 6.5). When the over- and underachievers (two standard deviations) in these two new regressions (A and B refer to the models in

Table 6.6) are compared in Table 6.7, the aforementioned explanations are even more striking.

The comparison of the over- and underachievers reveals the same core: the legacy or sustainability of different paths of modernisation following either a political-ideological path, the windfall of oil income or the East Asian modernisation 'model'. More important, however, is that with respect to the overachievers the recent wave of democratisation in Africa now turns up. In these countries democracy is expected to falter, not only because of the lower level of modernisation, but also because of the PM electoral systems. It is, of course, difficult to evaluate the sustainability of the democratic progress made in these African countries in a cross-sectional analysis, except to note that the odds against them are heavy. As Lindberg shows in Chapter 7, not only is there variation between countries on that continent, but also the findings vary according to what time frame is being used.

The causes of the cause?

Recent democratisations above all imply a critique of the deterministic perspective of traditional modernisation approaches and constitute a stepping-stone for considering the actor-driven transitology approach. These processes underline the first face of institutionalism applied to transitology. In this explanation political actors deliberately choose electoral systems – assuming that they are not installed by a foreign power.

The causal chain thus inferred by the analysis should be qualified when we consider the different phases of the process of democratisation. Electoral systems not only are requisites of democracy on a par with the modernisation indicators but are themselves caused. As discussed above – under the assumption of a deliberate choice – political actors want to hedge and secure their future influence through the electoral system. The electoral system thus comes to reflect the initial bargaining and the relative strength of the political actors involved in the negotiations (Johannsen 2000).

According to this line of reasoning we should expect a PR system to be adopted, because of its 'we all get our share' logic, when several political actors are present and none can expect to be able to gain a majority or a near majority manufactured via a majoritarian system. In contrast, dominant political actors will want to reap the spoils of the 'the winner takes all' logic of PM systems. When PR systems outperform PM systems, it may be because countries that adopt PR systems are pluralist from the outset. Conversely, the choice of the PM system may reflect the preference of dominant political actors, whether that be the pro-democracy forces or the *ancien régime* reluctantly democratising but still expecting to retain control through the majoritarian elements. Hence the associations we have found between the different electoral systems and the level of democracy may merely reflect the underlying pluralism, whether ethnic, religious or political in nature. In this questioning of the 'causes of the cause', however, the argument overlooks that electoral systems will tend in the long run to modify already existing patterns of cultural pluralism. PM systems, for example, will tend to produce a two-party system, whereas

PR systems will maintain multi-party systems. In conjunction with the other requisites of democracy, the effect of making or breaking political parties may in the long run be the confining condition observed in the association between electoral systems and the level of democracy.

Conclusions

At the outset we argued that institutionalism may enrich democratisation studies by comparing the two faces of institutionalism with transitology and modernisation theory respectively. We argued for the possibility and the necessity that the propositions about institutions be applied in an empirical test if we are to accept the contribution of institutionalism to the study of democratisation.

We have found a robust association between electoral systems and the level of democracy. The form of electoral system contributes to the explanation of the level of democracy, and the parameter estimates imply that electoral systems do indeed carry a theoretical value worth pursuing in the explanation. Institutionalism can enrich both studies of transition to democracy and traditional studies of modernisation and democracy. That institutions can be seen both as factors in the creation of democracy – as products of political actors – and as structures with an independent impact on democracy naturally renders the analysis more complicated, since questions of the causality inferred come to the forefront. Depending on the perspective employed, we thus find two different stories about the roles of electoral systems and institutions in the study of democratisation. We cannot settle the issue in this chapter, but should point to the possibility that new studies may answer some of the questions raised here. One possible research strategy would be to compare highly pluralist societies with PM and PR systems and proceed in traditional fashion by comparing homogeneous countries with PM and PR systems in order to try to control for these questions. A different research strategy would seek to control for the initial transition by comparing different systems across time from the establishment of democracy.

Although it is tempting to conclude that institutionalism can form a bridge between the structural and actor-driven approaches, we should await further studies and debate. Despite the intangible nature of this conclusion, the dual function of institutionalism in the study of democratisation should be seen as a potential enrichment of the two mainstream approaches. As this chapter has tried to demonstrate, electoral systems can be meaningfully studied in terms of both how they help shape the association between modernisation and democracy, on the one hand, and how they are chosen by political actors for strategic reasons, on the other.

Appendix: The data set

The data set is coded in the DEMSTAR database. The DEMSTAR database is developed and maintained to support the project 'Democracy, the State and Administrative Reforms in Post-Communist Countries' led by Ole Nørgaard

(project director), Lars Johannsen, Karin Hilmer Pedersen and Ole Hersted Hansen. The project is financed by a grant from the Danish Social Science Research Council. More information can be found at http://www.demstar.dk. Enquiries concerning the overall project should be directed to Ole Nørgaard, Research Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus (ON@ps.au.dk). Enquiries concerning the DEMSTAR database should be directed to Lars Johannsen, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus (johannsen@ps.au.dk).

For the purposes of this study a modified version of the Freedom House indicators for Civil Liberties (CL) and Political Rights (PR) are used as a proxy for the level of democracy. Thus the CL and PR scores are added to find a proxy for the level of democracy. The combined scale runs from 2 (most democratic) to 14 (least democratic).

The coding for electoral systems – family and type – is derived from the IDEA (1997) classification, except in the case of Moldova, which was classified by the author. For a discussion and classification of the Moldovan electoral system, see Johannsen (2000).

Socio-economic indicators are derived from the UNDP *Human Development Report* (1999) and the World Bank' s *World Development Indicators* (CD-rom edition, 1999).

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7 Problems of measuring democracy

Illustrations from Africa

Staffan Lindberg

Introduction

Democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter referred to as Africa)[1] has attracted increasing academic attention during the last decade. Case studies and comparative accounts *en masse* have created a flora of more or less helpful theories. However, general approaches using statistical methods have been very limited in number. One that stands out is Bratton and van de Walle's *Democratic Experiments in Africa* (1997), which analyses the period from 1988 to 1994. It has had considerable influence on the opinions of scholars and other analysts alike. But how robust are the findings? And, which are the principal challenges to a quantitative study of democratisation in Africa? These are the questions that this chapter addresses. Its main argument is that Bratton and van de Walle's results do not pass the test of time. The models they present have low predictive power when applied to both a shorter and a longer time-span than in the authors' original analysis. Hence, the theoretical gains of their contribution are limited.

Second, this chapter shows that by approaching the differences in timing and extent of democratisation in Africa during 1988–98 it is possible to distinguish between four groups of states in Africa: one group that never democratised, a second that made substantial gains early in the period but then stalled or slid back, a third that started late but eventually made substantial gains in political rights, and a fourth that made incremental progress throughout the period. Differences in the political economy between these groups of states, especially their dependence on external actors, constitute an important explanatory variable for these variations.

This chapter examines the explanations of the level of democracy and the extent of democratisation in the first two sections respectively, as presented by Bratton and van de Walle (1997). The third section approaches the issue of different timing and extent of democratisation in Africa. I examine the difference between early and late transitions and include a discussion of the countries that never made any progress as well as the cases that progressed slowly but surely throughout the period in question.

The level of democracy

Bratton and van de Walle (1997) built their study of democratisation in Africa 1988–94 on a database of 63 variables. In their analyses, the five states that were considered democracies at the beginning of 1988 were excluded from the analysis. The total number of cases analysed is hence 42. The authors' final explanatory model of the *level* of democracy as of end 1994 is included in Appendix I. They argue that their results demonstrate the impact of inherited political institutions and domestic political actors. The number of elections from independence to 1989 was used as an indicator of *political participation* and the largest party's percentage of legislative seats in 1989 was used as an indicator of *political competition*. Both indicators were found to be positively related to the level of democracy by the end of 1994. Key actors' involvement in the process of democratisation, operationalised as the role of the military and the frequency of mass political protests, were additional determining factors. Democratisation was more successful if the military refrained from reversing the transitions or intervened in favour of democracy, and if popular political protests were frequent. Bratton and van de Walle are firm in their conviction about the significance of these factors as predictors of the level of democracy by end 1994. It might be proper to quote them at some length:

> We have shown that these variables constitute core elements in accounts of [. . .] the level of democracy achieved during transitions. [. . .] It implies that the heritage of political institutions underpins the entire phenomenon of regime transitions in rather fundamental ways. Manifestly, the *extent of both political participation and political competition in previous regimes* must be included in any analysis aimed at fully understanding regime changes, including their outcomes. [. . .] the presence of a capable opposition party or parties was necessary for installing viable democracies.
>
> (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 225; emphasis in original)

Two things should be noted. First, it is hardly an astonishing conclusion that effective opposition parties are necessary for viable liberal democracies. Second, it might seem premature to draw such firm conclusions out of data representing only the first years of what promises to be a long and sometimes protracted process. Yet, the authors' theoretical explanation suggests that their model is applicable across time. We have now the opportunity to probe if such a claim is sustainable by applying the model to a longer time-span.[2]

I used Bratton and van de Walle's model but shifted dependent variable by replacing the Freedom House ratings on political rights for 1994 with the years proceeding as well as following that year. Appendix I presents the summarised results of the analysis. It suggests several things. First, the model has negligible explanatory power in 1992.[3] Either it took some time for the institutional factors to influence the transition processes or it was only the cases following the initial period 1988–92 that were influenced by the factors included in Bratton and van de Walle's model. Second, the relevance of political protests seems to be an artefact of

the periodisation by the authors. Political protests are statistically relevant for explaining the status of political rights in Africa only for the level of democracy in 1992 and in 1994. In *any* other year including 1993, the protests variable is not statistically significant. Therefore, we may be well advised not to ascribe too much explanatory power to political protests in explaining the *level* of democracy in Africa. Rather, and contrary to any immediate intuitive reflections, it seems that political protests have played an insignificant role *in general* in raising the level of democracy in Africa.

One can perhaps suspect that different types of state democratised during different periods and that partly distinct models are needed to explain political transitions in different types of state. This argument implies that the variation in explanatory variables over time is itself a consequence of variation across space, i.e. types of state or political economy. A brief summary of the Freedom House ratings shows that as many as 20 of the 42 non-democratic states in 1988 had progressed in terms of political rights by the end of 1992. The Old French colonies dominated this first 'sub-wave' (Robinson 1993).[4] Hence, there is reason to investigate whether the outcomes of democratisation, and indeed the process, should be analysed in distinct types of African state. This is what this chapter does in the third section. But first I want to look at the second part of Bratton and van de Walle's analysis; the *extent* of democratisation as distinct from the level of democracy discussed above.

The extent of democratisation

Bratton and van de Walle's model (1997: 222) explaining the *extent* of democratisation has four variables: the role of the military (whether it intervened in the process of democratisation or not, and whether such interventions were pro- or anti-democratic), the frequency of mass political protests, the level of official development assistance (ODA) and the degree of cohesion among the domestic political opposition. This four-variable model explained 67 per cent of observed variance in the authors' analysis. Bratton and van de Walle's conclusion is that regime transitions in Africa were highly contingent processes, primarily moved by domestic political factors. Where the opposition was cohesive, protests were frequent and the military intervened in favour of democracy, the *extent* of democratisation tended to be greater. The remaining influence of external pressures as measured by ODA provided only a conducive setting to domestic political action.

At this point we should note two things. First, a multiple regression analysis in which three out of four variables are either dummy- or ordinal variables has restricted analytic value particularly in terms of cause and effect description because of the bluntness of the variables.[5] Secondly, the inclusion of ODA restricts Bratton and van de Walle's analysis to 31 cases. Exclusion of 11 cases out of 42 (26 per cent) because of missing data creates a risk for selection bias distorting the analysis.[6] Did it cause a real bias in the analysis? The answer is yes. Out of the 11 cases that were deselected by the authors' ODA variable, six (54.5 per cent) recorded no protests, three (27.3 per cent) some protests, and only two (18.2 per

cent) frequent protests compared to the valid cases (25.8/32.7/39.5 per cent). As with regard to the degree of opposition cohesion, six cases (54.5 per cent) were coded as cohesive and five cases (45.5 per cent) as not cohesive compared to the valid population (32.6/63.8 per cent). Finally, on the role of the military one case was coded as having a pro-democratic intervention (9.1 per cent), ten cases (90.9 per cent) recorded no intervention, and none had an anti-democratic intervention compared to the original set (20.7/58.6/20.7 per cent). The differences between the two sets of included and excluded cases are significant. I have data for the same indicator (ODA), measured in exactly the same way but from a later year (1993).[7] By filling out the missing values I managed to include 10 out of 11 missing cases and consequently had 41 valid cases for the analysis instead of 31. I judged the increase in the number of cases to be more important than a minor uncertainty in the figures. Using the authors' model but with the 'recharged' variable on ODA ('Aidflo1'), I did regression analyses with changes in political rights 1988–91 as the dependent variable, adding then one year at the time with the last analysis estimating 1988–98. Selected results are summarised in Appendix II.

My first conclusion is that Bratton and van de Walle's model *does not account adequately for the extent of democratisation in Africa either over a shorter time-span or over a longer time-span* than in the authors' original analysis. This is an important finding since the authors' final argument about the prospects of consolidation of democracy in Africa (1997: ch. 7) takes for granted that their explanation of the extent of democratisation (as with the level of democracy) is valid over time. The refined model's explanatory power is still strong 1988–94 (62 per cent explained variance as compared to the original 67 per cent). In the earliest period until 1992 and over the whole period as such, however, its explanatory power is low (18 to 36 per cent explained variance). When we consider sub-periods starting either in 1992 or in 1994, i.e. looking specifically at cases that started late, the model simply does not apply.

A look at the performance of individual variables gives some further indications. When I used the authors' original model that restricted the number of cases to 31, political protests and the degree of cohesion among the opposition were significant almost *only* in the 1988–94 period despite the bluntness of these variables. In the refined model, these two variables turn out to be highly significant and positively related to changes in political rights scores, in particular in the earliest period 1988–92. Yet, in the estimations of the longer periods 1988–96 and 1988–98 respectively, the variables are totally irrelevant. Interestingly, both turn out to be *negatively* related to changes in political rights ratings in the last sub-period 1994–98. It seems that the political protests and opposition cohesion played a role only in states that democratised during the first years of the period. Those cases are presumably the ones that were 'most ripe' or 'on the verge' of making transitions due to other conditions than protests *per se*. They may have been the states where leaders were most insecure in their positions. For such reasons, the opposition and protesters had the most to gain and the least to lose from taking firm action. Examples of these states include Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia, which held founding elections in September 1990, November 1990 and October 1991 respectively.

'Insecure' in this line of reasoning might imply external dependence, typically on exports, imports, loans and/or aid; hence, sensitive to the new demands for 'good governance' that were articulated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One can easily hypothesise that many of the early 'transitionists' in Africa were undertaking anticipatory reforms in order to prevent losses in economic as well as political terms because of their dependence on external relations. 'Insecure' may also imply internally insecure in terms of fluid neo-patrimonial structures, disputes with the military and other conflicts between factions within the ruling regime. Leaders facing such conditions seem to have had more to gain from a fast transition since they had a good chance of winning a founding election by using the advantages of incumbency. A continuation of authoritarian rule, however, promised a relatively determinate end to rulers' hold on power.

Military intervention displays something of a continuous influence on democratisation, although its significance is very low for the earliest period 1988–91 as well as for the sub-period of 1994–98. Using Bratton and van de Walle's original model, ODA was significant *only* in the 1988–94 period. In my recharged version of the model, ODA is *highly* significant and positively related to changes in political rights not only 1988–94 but even over the entire period 1988–98. Looking at sub-periods, ODA is not significant in the earliest period 1988–92 but highly significant 1992–94. In other words, the greater the flow of aid as a percentage of GDP, the more democratic African states tended to become during 1992–94. It seems that the poorest states with the largest shares of aid flows took a while before they 'jumped' on the transition 'bandwagon'. In the end, however, they had perhaps less of a choice whether to embark on the democratic journey or not. High levels of ODA correlate with high levels of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the late 1980s as well as with low levels of GDP per capita and annual economic growth and high long-term debt.[8] In other words, these states tended to have a higher coercive potential to control protesters from the opposition. Yet, with full-blown fiscal crises, high debts, low growth and little donor sympathy states like Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Guinea Bissau presumably had to make concessions and finally accept demands for political liberalisation and democratisation. To that extent, it seems justifiable to shift emphasis from agency to structural explanations. For these states in this particular period, non-personal factors seem to have exerted great influence.

To reiterate, it seems safe to conclude that the selection bias introduced by the missing data on 11 states in Bratton and van de Walle's indicator on ODA had significant consequences. The initial doubt regarding the explanatory value of politically motivated protests has been corroborated. More than anything, it seems probable that protests were politicised when the ground was already fertile for other reasons. Protests as such did not cause states in Africa to democratise. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the average number of political protests in countries that did not liberalise at all *exceeded* the average number of political protests even in the group of democratising states that had most protests. It seems that the emphasis in previous studies on opposition movements in 'civil society' has been misdirected. Rather, Bayart's (1991) and Wiseman's (1990) early observations

that political protests had occurred throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s without any significant impact on political change, seem validated. There are numerous other examples to illustrate this. For example, Buijtenhuijs and Rijnierse (1993) report that in Gabon the opposition party, Morena, dates back to 1981. In Zambia, where a political opposition dates back at least to 1968, the one-party system was condemned as early as 1980. In Zaire the opposition movement under Tshisekedi was founded in 1980. The first pro-democracy demonstration in Mali was held in 1977. The logic of anticipatory reforms (admittedly indicated by Bratton and van de Walle themselves (1997: 180) but for which they presented no data) and externally enforced transitions is worth further exploration.

Discriminating between periods and factors

The discussion above raises both the question of periodisation and the issue of subgroupings among African states. There are principally two ways to approach this. One can either categorise the African states based on analytical criteria and check if one's groupings of states accompany each other with regard to democratisation. Alternatively, one can check for common empirical traits among those states that actually group together in terms of timing and extent of democratisation. In this section, I have chosen to do the latter. The multivariate analyses above have provided us with a hypothesis that two groups of states can be identified: those states that progressed in terms of political rights ratings during 1989–92 and 1993–98 respectively. I use simple comparative means analysis to confirm that it is reasonable to divide the entire examination-period into those two halves.

Table 7.1 Ratings of political rights January 1993, compared to changes in political rights, 1988–92 and 1993–98

Political rights rating 1993		*Changes in political rights 1988–1992*	*Changes in political rights 1993–1997*
PR = 1–4	Mean	2.38	–0.94
	N	16	16
PR = 5–7	Mean	0.00323	0.90
	N	31	31

Table 7.1 shows that those countries that had gained in political rights by the end of 1992 tended to regress 1993–98 even if the tendency is underplayed in the figures because of the five cases that progressed throughout the entire period. Those that did not change 1989–92 had a tendency to do so in the later period. This tendency is also stronger in reality than these figures reveal since those that never progressed in political rights ratings – 11 cases – reduce the scores. Hence, there are four groups to be accounted for. One group of states progressed in terms of political rights 1989–92 and then stalled or regressed (15 cases), one group did not

progress until 1993–98 (10 cases), one group made progress during both subperiods (5 cases) and one group never progressed at all (11 cases).

I use discriminant analysis in order to construct models that can predict why individual countries fall into the same category based on when progress in democracy is made. In order to find the distinct characteristics of the two main groups that democratised in different periods I use two different models to predict progression/no progression 1988–92, and progression/no progression 1993–98 respectively. I have restricted the use of variables to those that have values for all, or almost all, states in Africa. The reason is simple: to avoid any back-door introduction of selection bias.

Progression – or not: 1988–92

The best possible model predicting the changes in political rights scores 1988–92 included all the four variables from the last regression model: the role of the military during the transition, the degree of cohesion by the opposition, our recharged ODA and frequency of protests. The last one is modified for the following analysis. Instead of the blunt ordinal variable on protests, I use the more precise variable of absolute number of politically motivated protests 1985–94. Even if ordinal variables as well as dummies are usable in discriminant analyses, they are arguably not as helpful.[9] Bratton and van de Walle chose the period 1985–94 as the period in which it can be assumed that popular protest could have influenced the political development from 1989. Although 1985 might be a bit early as the starting point, I nevertheless accept it as reasonable. As expected, this particular model predicts changes, and non-changes, in political rights scores 1988–92 quite well: 75.6 per cent of all cases were correctly classified.[10] Furthermore, the distribution of correct classified cases was even between the two categories. In other words, the model predicted progression in political rights with the same accuracy as it predicted cases that were unchanged or even regressed 1989–92. That is a good indicator of the adequacy of the model. The discriminant functions[11] are presented in Figure 7.1.

The classification function coefficient displays an expected pattern. Military interventions in favour of democracy, a larger number of protests, somewhat higher levels of ODA and a cohesive opposition enhance the probability for progression in political rights score 1988–92. In this group we find countries like

Variable	Not progress	Progress
Military intervention	–0.426	1.229
Absolute no. of political protests	0.220	0.264
Recharged ODA	0.005536	0.005275
Degree of opposition cohesion	1.382	3.383
Constant	–2.326	–3.459

Wilk's 0.714. Model significance 0.014.

Figure 7.1 Classification function coefficients: changes in political rights, 1988–92

Benin, Cape Verde and Congo Brazzaville. It is also interesting to note that the model does not perform well if applied to changes 1993–98. Although the correctly classified cases stayed at 75.6 per cent, the distribution changed dramatically. The model classified 92 per cent of the unchanged cases correctly but only 53 per cent (close to random) of the cases that progressed.[12] In other words, it was the cases that had progressed in the earlier period that the model could predict. A vast majority of these states remained unchanged or slid back in the second period. However, the model could not account for the progressive changes that occurred in the second period, i.e. it did not capture that which caused positive changes 1993–98.

Progression – or not: 1993–98

Working with the variables identified in the regression analyses above, I subsequently added variables that showed high correlations with changes in political rights 1993–98. My main motivation for going about this way was to find the most powerful predictors. As a matter of fact, there are very few indicators (among the 900 or so in my data set) that show significant correlation with changes in political rights in Africa. I ended up with a model based on only three variables that together predicted as much as 84.6 per cent of 39 valid cases:[13] absolute number of protests 1985–94, absolute number of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 1980–89 and central government total external debt as a percentage of GNP. The distribution of correctly classified cases was reasonable, with slightly less than 91 per cent of the unchanged/regression cases correctly classified and slightly more than 73 per cent of the progression cases correctly classified.[14] In other words, the model predicted the unchanging cases better mainly because of the protest variable that is closely tied to progressions in the first period.

Hence, a lower number of politically motivated protests, a higher number of SAPs and slightly higher debt as a percentage of GNP predict the progression of political rights scores during 1993–98 and the reverse. Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda are countries in this group of states. Notably, the predictive capacity of this model is higher than in any of the regression models that were used in the previous sections. However, applying this model to the first period (1989–92) produces only 66.7 per cent correctly classified cases. The model is not significant (0.661) and Wilk's Lambada comes close to 1 (0.956). With regard to the distribution of correctly classified cases 81 per cent of the unchanged cases

Variable	Not progress	Progress
Absolute no. of political protests	0.230	–0.00145
No. of SAPs	0.0028	0.332
Debt as % of GNP	0.0012	0.0017
Constant	–2.468	–3.131

Wilk's Lambada 0.656. Model significance 0.001.

Figure 7.2 Classification function coefficients: changes in political rights, 1993–98

were correctly classified which strongly supports the idea that this model only relates to the group of cases that changed in the second period.

These findings support the idea that the two groups of states are not only separated in time. The early democratisers could be predicted based on their values on four variables that all came very close to Bratton and van de Walle's analysis. Latecomers were better predicted based on variables indicating a strong international influence over domestic politics: external debt and structural adjustment programmes. Besides that, the negative relationship of political protests with progress in the second period mostly accounts for the lack of change in the first period by the same group of cases.

Four groups of states: 1988–98

Finally, I made an effort to predict the movements of all cases throughout 1988–98 using only one model. Since we have two periods and two optional outcomes for each period, we end up with four groups as mentioned earlier:

1. unchanged or regression in both periods (11 cases)
2. progression 1988–93 and unchanged or regression 1993–98 (15 cases)
3. unchanged or regression 1988–93 and progression 1993–98 (10 cases)
4. progression in both periods (5 cases)

Using something of a combination of the two first models, I succeeded in classifying 65.9 per cent of the cases correctly (random is 25 per cent with four possible outcomes). The model included four predictors: the role of the military during transitions, the 'recharged' overseas development assistance as a percentage of GNP 1989/1993, the absolute number of structural adjustment programmes 1980–89 and the absolute number of politically motivated protests 1985–94. All 41 cases entered the analysis.

Since we now have four categories of cases to classify, the classification function coefficients make for a more complex pattern. Military intervention seems to discriminate between all four categories according to a consistent pattern. Progress in political rights 1988–92 and progress in both periods have the same directional relation with the role of the military during transitions. In both cases, military interventions in favour of democracy seem to have enhanced the outcomes of the transitions. On the other hand, military interventions in order to stop democratisation have been influential in the no progress cases. For states that did not progress in the first period but then progressed 1993–98, the relationship is much weaker as expected based on the foregoing analysis. However, it shows that military intervention, or the lack thereof, only succeeded to halt or delay the process.

Interestingly, the number of politically motivated protests seems to have been almost as frequent in the cases that experienced no progress as in the cases that progressed 1988–92 but then stagnated. In the other two groups of cases, protests seem to have been significantly less frequent. My earlier stated doubts about the extent to which political protests played a crucial role on their own are corroborated by these

results. The number of structural adjustment programmes displays an interesting pattern. While the no-progress cases have had some of these programmes, in the group of cases that progressed in 1988–92 the number of such programmes was insignificant. On the other hand, in the latter two groups that experienced progress either over the entire period (hence a protracted transition) or only in the second period (late transition) the number of structural adjustment programmes was remarkably high. Again, the hypothesis delineating this group as being pressed by external actors to pursue democratic reforms gets support from available data. Finally, ODA, interestingly, is positively related only to the last group of states: those that progressed over the entire period in protracted but sure transitions. As for the other groups, the values are low and not too distinct. A good leverage for creditors and donors relating to a prolonged transitional period might suggest that those with protracted transitions were indeed reluctant but without much of a choice. The distribution of correctly classified cases is presented in Figure 7.4.

Variable	No progress	Progr. 88–92 Not 93–97	Not 88–92 Progr. 93–97	Progress in both periods
Military intervention	–2.199	0.733	–0.171	0.132
No. of political protests	0.224	0.211	–0.0008	0.0040
No. of SAPs	0.184	0.0027	0.429	0.461
Recharged ODA	0.0055	0.0044	0.0075	0.124
Constant	–4.1	–2.4	–3.6	–6.5

Wilk's Lambada 0.386. Model significance 0.001.

Figure 7.3 Classification function coefficients: changes in political rights, 1988–98

ACTUAL GROUP	PREDICTED GROUP			
	No change or regression in both periods	Progression 1988–92 but regression or stagnation 1993–97	Regression or stagnation 1988-93 but progression 1993-97	Progression in both periods
No change or regression in both periods	**6 (54.5%)**	3	2	0
Progression 1988–92 but regression or stagnation 1993–97	2	**13 (86.7%)**	0	0
Regression or stagnation 1988–93 but progression 1993–97	1	2	**6 (60%)**	1
Progression in both periods	0	2	1	**2 (40%)**

Figure 7.4 Classification of cases, 1988–98

Not surprisingly, the model predicts the two middle groups best. These two groups were discussed above and are the groups for which the indicators used in the present model had proven effective. The two groups on the margins – no progress and progress in both periods – are less well predicted. It may be that the no-progress group was immune, so to speak, to the factors that propelled democratisation in the different periods. Among these countries we find states like Equatorial Guinea where President Obiang Nguema M'basogo proclaimed a new 'era of pluralism' in January 1992 but where democracy remains a sham and real political rights are denied. We also have states like Angola and Somalia where warfare and state inversion have precluded any form of liberal government. It may also be that the states that experienced a continuous, protracted progress were sensitive to variables in both periods identified in the analyses above. In this group, we find both South Africa and Ghana but also Malawi. As a working hypothesis, I would subscribe to that interpretation. Yet, further research is needed on this issue in order to clarify its status as an empirical categorisation.

Final reflections

Many factors cannot be quantified, even if they can be compared in qualitative terms. This puts an obvious, and well-known, limitation to what we might hope to achieve by way of statistical analysis. More crucially, the *process* of democratisation cannot be included in a statistical analysis. We can only use crude approximations of the general move over time such as with the Freedom House ratings on political rights. On the other hand, separate qualitative accounts of processes like democratic transitions are seldom comparable because of methodological differences. Genuine in-depth comparative studies tend to compare only a handful of the 48 African states, making generalisations tentative at best. My understanding is that there are pros and cons with all three forms of analysis and they should be viewed as supplementary rather than alternative ways of reaching better explanations.

When a number of like units (states) show variance in their behaviour or outcome (timing and extent of democratisation), there are principally three ways of explaining it. The first is to argue that unpredictable behaviour of key agents and mere flux caused the difference in outcome. In other words, all African states were alike in their predisposition for democratisation and were under similar external pressures but the unpredictable choices of rulers and other actors made states democratise early, late or not at all. If this is the case, one cannot expect a predictable pattern in statistical tests of structural factors. The second, largely opposite, hypothesis is that the states varied in internal structures and the kind of external pressure they were subjected to, which caused differentiation in the outcome. In other words, there are different types of African state that were structurally predisposed to respond differently to dissimilar pressures for democratisation. The choices made by leaders, by this perspective, were predictable on the basis of structural predispositions. If this is the case, we should be able to find one model that is capable of explaining most outcomes in all periods when pressures were similar.

A combination of the first two produces a third hypothesis: structurally differentiated states that were exposed to different kinds of external and internal pressure gave some leaders the opportunity to go their own way. Both structure and agency made a difference. If this is the case, we expect to find a pattern of democratisation where structural variables can perhaps account for a greater part of the explanation but where choices by individual leaders must also be taken into account to explain at least the deviant cases.

Official development assistance (ODA) is most strongly related to late progression towards democracy and to a protracted transition over 1988–98. States in these two categories are clearly candidates for the argument about an externally enforced democratisation. Particularly since these states also had significantly fewer political protests than the other two groups, there is evidence that domestic pressure was weaker. The states that spearheaded the wave of transitions, however, had substantially lower levels of ODA. The same is true for the states that never opened up for political liberalisation, yet the latter experienced the strongest internal pressures in the form of political protests. Hence, it seems that mass protests in Africa would have achieved little without external support.

States that took the lead in democratisation in the early 1990s had less debt than average while those with protracted or late democratisation were the ones with higher levels of debt. Strongest pressures to conform to the demands by the donor community for good governance, democracy and respect for human rights seem to have confronted those states that started off late in liberalising their political systems. Democratisation for the group of states in the first sub-wave, on the other hand, was a strategy to cling on to power for incumbents pressed by real or imagined threats of isolation (although they did not always succeed as the case of President Kaunda of Zambia shows). The non-democratisers had, or imagined they had, more leeway. In some cases, both new and old regimes had to rely heavily on coercion from their own point of view due to internal security threats and civil wars over resources, such as in Zaire, Burundi and Sierra Leone. The late democratisers reluctantly made incremental gains mainly because of external pressures such as in Mauritania and Guinea Bissau. A high level of debt in combination with extensive dependence on ODA, which in most countries determine what a government can do in terms of meeting popular demands, gave them little choice.

Finally, the number of adjustment programmes seems to be rather evenly distributed across the groups of states. Yet, the number of SAPs is significantly lower for the group that progressed in the early period. Hence, it cannot be argued that structural adjustment programmes caused the political protests in this group of states. Rather, it indicates that the group that took on reforms in the first period had not been forced to get involved with so many structural adjustment programmes. They were economically stronger. They had high stakes in keeping good relations with the Western world to avoid falling into the same category as the heavily indebted and poor countries. Therefore, anticipatory reforms seemed a viable strategy. The group that had slightly more SAPs on average is the group that progressed throughout 1988–98. In other words, in conjunction with the significantly

higher level of debt that these states had, the argument that these states were unwillingly dragged along the transitional path by circumstances not of their own choosing is corroborated.

My research suggests that as we continue to work with data on the African transitions, there is reason to bear in mind that there are four distinct groups of states that we need to account for. The first group consists of the states that so far have not unleashed any significant political reforms. In many of these cases, military rulers or military interventions have crushed the hopes for political liberalisation. These are to a great extent the war-torn countries like DRC, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Sudan but also strong autocracies like Equatorial Guinea. The countries in the second group started transitions early with a revitalised civil society in which various groups pressured for liberal reforms. In countries like Zambia and Benin the internal pressures without doubt had significant influence. Yet, as a tentative conclusion we may argue that anticipatory reforms were undertaken in an effort by most of the rulers in this group to stay in power in the light of internal pressures as well as external indications of the possibility of future sanctions. This drive for liberal reforms could then be relaxed as the internal pressure was somewhat dismantled and external sanctions turned out to be less strictly enforced than advertised. This seems, for example, to have been the case in Ivory Coast and Congo Brazzaville. In other cases, the quest for liberty was too strong and the old rulers were thrown out of power as with General Da Costa in São Tomé and Principe, and General Pereira in Cape Verde.

Yet, it remains astonishing how many incumbents succeeded in holding on to, or coming back into, power during the 1990s. As many as 20 autocrats who were in power in 1990 still held, or had come back into the highest office by 1997 (Baker 1998). A typical example is Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings who headed a military regime in Ghana from 1981 until he was elected president in two subsequent general elections, 1992 and 1996. Likewise President Biya of Cameroon, President Moi in Kenya, and Mauritania's President Taya remained in office as elected officials. Others initially lost power but came back via the ballot box, like President Kerekou of Benin who lost power to his rival Soglo in 1991 but returned as an elected president in 1996.

The third group of states that we should be concerned with seems to have experienced much less internal pressure. These were generally poorer, less industrialised states with a legacy of more structural adjustment programmes and larger debts on their accounts.[15] With less domestic opposition, at least less cohesive and threatening, these states tended to be less easy to rock. Transitions came later, were issued more reluctantly and were less dramatic in terms of changes in political rights scores. Guinea Bissau, Togo and Tanzania are cases in point.

The fourth group of states, which made incremental political reforms throughout the 1990s, often made more significant achievements. It seems that these states have been under sustained pressure from the outside. Heavily dependent on loans attached to SAPs and development aid for recurrent expenditures, pressures mounted in the 1990s for political reforms certainly had great influence. But in this group, the internal pressures have also been significant and most probably deserve

the credit for the fact that the political reforms have been taken further and further, so as to widen and deepen the scope of democracy.

If we look at studies that cover other regions of the world, how do the results here relate to them? Although there are a large number of contributions that one could discuss, I shall confine myself to a few of the most important. For example, Przeworski and Limongi's (1997: 177) conclusion that democracy is not a by-product of economic development is corroborated indirectly by the findings presented here, but the rest of their argument does not get support. The authors make a strong case that democratisation is an agency-directed process and that economic constraints only play a role *post facto*. In Africa at least, it seems that economic factors and structural pressures from the international systems did indeed play primary roles. In every case, these structural factors have translated in different ways due to divergent historical and contextual factors and due to different skills and tactics of incumbent regime rulers. However, almost nowhere have incumbents been able to direct the general move towards political, civic and economic liberalisation. My analysis is more in line with the arguments of authors such as Bates (1999) and Mkandawire (1999) who have recognised the limited scope for democracy in Africa, because neither are regimes accountable to the general citizenry nor can they fall back on a strong middle class to procure taxes. Therefore, leaders have little incentive to seek accommodation with domestic socio-economic forces.

Many have argued that lessons learnt in Latin America cannot be transplanted to Africa. The present analysis seems to confirm such conclusions. Studies of Latin American politics, whether in the mainstream transitions literature stemming from O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) seminal work or in the Marxist vein of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), their conclusions do not seem to apply to Africa. For example, O'Donnell and Schmitter's argument about the importance of a split in the incumbent regime and the subsequent striking of a bargain between key elite factions does not resemble the African experience in the 1990s. Nor does Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens' focus on changes in the configuration of power between upper class landowners and the working class, the bourgeoisie, the middle class and the rural peasantry apply to the African transitions. The closest they come to arguments presented here is the claim that democratisation is first and foremost an increase in the equality of political power. The notion that power relations will determine whether or not democracy can emerge, stabilise and maintain itself is a good starting point for any analysis of African politics. In short, the theoretical gains made so far with regard to more universal (however partial) explanations remain of limited value when it comes to the study of democratisation in Africa. Making empirical sense of democratisation, or the lack thereof, in individual countries is not the challenge. Many different accounts have proven what is already well-known to historians: recounting the narrative history of a single case by identifying what seem to be the prime movers in each particular case can be done without sophisticated theoretical tools. The challenge we face is to develop such tools and enhance our theoretical as well as empirical understanding of Africa so we know that it applies to at least a qualified majority of African states.

Appendix I Test results for selected years of Bratton and van der Walle's model explaining the level of democracy

Variable			*Stand. B*	*Sign.*
Military intervention		1992	–0.249	0.105
		1993	–0.446	0.002
		1994	–0.496	0.000
		1995	–0.554	0.000
		1996	–0.474	0.001
		1998	–0.381	0.012
No. of elections		1992	0.154	0.350
		1993	0.094	0.533
		1994	0.298	0.024
		1995	0.283	0.031
		1996	0.295	0.041
		1998	0.254	0.112
Political protests		1992	–0.288	0.095
		1993	–0.139	0.371
		1994	–0.276	0.041
		1995	–0.185	0.163
		1996	–0.167	0.254
		1998	–0.071	0.661
Percentage of legislative seats		1992	–0.199	0.185
		1993	–0.286	0.040
		1994	–0.253	0.033
		1995	–0.235	0.046
		1996	–0.223	0.085
		1998	–0.217	0.134
			Multi. R	*Adj. R2*	*Model sign.*
Model	1992	0.489	0.157	0.035
	1993	0.605	0.298	0.002
	1994	0.736	0.492	0.000
	1995	0.738	0.498	0.000
	1996	0.665	0.382	0.000
	1998	0.546	0.222	0.009

Appendix II Test results for selected years of the recharged variant of Bratton and van der Walle's model explaining the extent of democratisation

Variable			*Stand. B*	*Sign.*
Military intervention		1988–91	0.017	0.911
		1988–92	0.294	0.040
		1988–94	0.483	0.000
		1988–96	0.486	0.000
		1988–98	0.394	0.005
		1992–94	0.369	0.013
		1992–96	0.268	0.088
		1994–98	–0.196	0.205
ODA (Aidflo1)		1988–91	0.224	0.149
		1988–92	0.213	0.140
		1988–94	0.440	0.000
		1988–96	0.444	0.001
		1988–98	0.446	0.002
		1992–94	0.413	0.007
		1992–96	0.307	0.057
		1994–98	–0.066	0.672
Political protests		1988–91	0.496	0.004
		1988–92	0.390	0.013
		1988–94	0.367	0.002
		1988–96	0.202	0.119
		1988–98	0.105	0.463
		1992–94	0.054	0.726
		1992–96	–0.182	0.275
		1994–98	–0.403	0.019
Opp. cohesion		1988–91	0.320	0.042
		1988–92	0.343	0.020
		1988–94	0.283	0.010
		1988–96	0.148	0.224
		1988–98	0.131	0.335
		1992–94	–0.017	0.907
		1992–96	–0.195	0.219
		1994–98	–0.245	0.030
		Multi. R	*Adj. R2*	*Model sign.*
Model	1988–91	0.514	0.182	0.023
	1988–92	0.604	0.294	0.002
	1988–94	0.810	0.617	0.000
	1988–96	0.736	0.491	0.000
	1988–98	0.665	0.366	0.000
	1992–94	0.580	0.263	0.004
	1992–96	0.472	0.137	0.053
	1994–97	0.482	0.147	0.045

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8 Democratisation in Africa

In search of depth and nuances

Goran Hyden

Introduction

When it comes to studying the relationship between development and democracy, sub-Saharan Africa offers unique challenges. Not only is this part of the world the poorest in per capita terms. It is also peripheral to mainstream economic processes and as such less likely to be positively influenced by the factors that have helped promote democracy in more developed country settings (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994). Sub-Saharan Africa is also made up of an unusually large number of countries, virtually all of which are multi-ethnic and multi-religious. What is more, the modern state institutions were established by colonial powers and have been retained after independence despite their lack of validity, if not legitimacy, when it comes to individual political behaviour and choice. One of the most frequent points made about politics in Africa is its 'informality' or lack of adherence to formal institutions. This means that official data are not really collected with the same degree of discipline and precision as is the case with civil administration in other countries. Getting a handle on what is really happening in the field of African democratisation, therefore, is difficult. In spite of a growing number of studies on the subject, our understanding is still at best very general and not at all robust.

This is evident in Chapter 7 of this volume, where Lindberg scrutinises the findings of what in the minds of many analysts is deemed to be the most authoritative study of African democratisation to date: that by Bratton and van de Walle (1997). He shows how their conclusions are determined by choice of country and selection of time periods. Cross-country studies like theirs are important in order to provide a better understanding in the long run, but they have little or no value without the complement of qualitative studies that help us gain greater depth and finer nuances for the purpose of hypothesis testing. Qualitative reasoning, incidentally, is an important part of the design of any quantitative study. For instance, the choice of a 'most similar systems' design, in which attention is restricted to a subset of countries with something in common, is justified on the ground that it provides at least a qualitative degree of control. Johannsen, for example, is doing this in Chapter 6 as he examines the role of electoral laws in shaping democratic outcomes.

We do not wish to encourage the idea of 'African exceptionalism', implying that

everything that goes on in sub-Saharan Africa can only be understood with the help of a set of variables that are unique to that continent. Yet, it is clear that in order to move beyond the general and often superficial analyses that have characterised much of the literature on democratisation in Africa so far, we need to identify the factors of greatest potential importance in a 'most similar systems' study design. Lindberg, in examining Bratton and van de Walle, has already dismissed 'political protests' as a variable that has played a significant role in promoting democratisation on the continent. In this chapter, we would like to look more closely at three structural variables that the comparative politics literature at large has identified as important: (1) the degree of 'stateness' (Linz and Stepan 1996); (2) cultural pluralism (e.g. Young 1976; Lijphart 1977; Lustick 1979; and Horowitz 1991), and (3) external influences (e.g. Maren 1997; Moore 1998; and Brautigam 2000). More careful attention to these variables should enable us to develop hypotheses that better capture nuances in the democratisation process in Africa. To fully appreciate the importance of 'returning to the drawing-board', it is necessary to begin the exercise with a closer look at some of the literature on African regimes that date back to the earlier post-independence period. Regime studies are not new as far as sub-Saharan Africa is concerned; nor are studies of elections.

Past studies of political regimes

We do not have many studies of African politics that systematically examine differences among African countries. The tendency has been to focus on case studies of individual countries or 'overgeneralise' trends based on a rather loose and often unstructured analysis of a small number of cases. For example, it was very common in the 1960s and 1970s to emphasise similarities based on the premise that African countries faced the same kind of structural constraints to their development. These common characteristics included the historical context of African countries as 'late-comers' to development, their economic and political dependency, and, eventually, the ever-growing gap between development aspirations and actual accomplishments (e.g. Lofchie 1971; Wallerstein 1971). Though the constraint thesis raised important issues, it was often carried to the point of economic determinism, thus leading to a neglect of important political differences among countries. It may be historically interesting to cite here the incumbent President of Brazil, F. H. Cardoso, who in his days as sociology professor challenged more determinist scholars by arguing that any particular type of economic system may coexist with and be maintained by a variety of different types of political regime (Cardoso 1977). Another reason why similarity rather than difference was highlighted in the early post-independence literature was an attempt to discredit the earlier contributions by scholars like Hodgkin (1956), Wallerstein (1971) and Coleman and Rosberg (1964) who had stressed the importance of different types of colonial rule and the difference in party systems that emerged at independence. Ruth Berins Collier (1978) was one of the first to react against this 'over-homogenisation' in the literature by arguing that differences in the experience

with colonial rule and in types of party system and patterns of electoral participation are important.

Comparing British and French colonies in Africa as they held their pre-independence elections, Collier found an interesting difference when it comes to the relationship between party dominance and electoral turnout. Among the French colonies voting was greater where there was a more dominant political party that attracted and mobilised the vote. In the British colonies, by contrast, the relationship between dominance and turnout was negative, suggesting that higher levels of party competition (rather than party dominance) produced higher levels of turnout (Collier 1978: 68–69). In Ghana, for instance, Austin (1966: 340) observed that turnout was low in certain areas because the dominance of the Convention People's Party (CPP) was taken for granted and the electoral outcome not in question. Kenneth Post, with reference to Nigeria, found that turnout was higher in those constituencies where competition was high (Post 1964: 351–54). Collier draws the conclusion that the distinct patterns of party dominance and electoral participation in the years leading up to independence meant that African leaders had different political resources and faced different political problems as their countries became independent. These changes led to different choices regarding mobilisation and control in the new nations.

Even if most leaders eventually ended up governing one-party regimes, it is important to remember that these regimes came about in different fashions. In some cases, like Tanzania, the one-party regime was the result of the total electoral success of the leading party. In other countries, like Kenya, it was the creation of a merger of the two leading political parties. In yet others, e.g. Ghana, the one-party system came about as a result of banning the opposition. There was a positive relationship between the degree of party dominance, on the one hand, and the establishment of a one-party regime by 'legitimate', i.e. non-coercive, means, on the other. It is also important to note that the political leadership in the former French colonies was much quicker in establishing final dominance than its counterparts in the former British colonies. In the latter, competitive elections continued to be held in several countries after independence. In several of these colonies, where one-party regimes were established by non-coercive means, competitive elections were held within these systems. This happened by allowing more than one candidate to stand in each constituency and by arranging primary elections to choose the two finalists. These elections were not just plebiscitary but provided an element of choice that the electorate appreciated. In Tanzania, for example, 45 per cent of the former Members of Parliament who ran in the 1965 elections lost their seats, as compared to just 7 per cent in the 1972 elections for the US House of Representatives (Hyden and Leys 1972; Hill 1974).

These studies are important because they are likely to throw light on the current democratisation process in Africa. They provide us with a set of hypotheses that have yet to be tested. For example, one such hypothesis may well be that the prospects for a democratic transition to succeed are higher in former British colonies because the seeds of political pluralism were allowed to germinate longer than in former French colonies. This nuance has largely been missed in the

literature so far. To the extent that the ex-British colony variable has featured, it has been primarily in relation to non-African colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. For example, Huntington (1991: 20) dismisses this variable with reference to sub-Saharan Africa and notes only that with the exception of Botswana, other African countries became authoritarian at independence or shortly thereafter. We suggest here that any serious study of the variation that already exists in terms of degree of democratisation at present should include an examination of the influence of colonial regime and how the new nationalist leadership established control of the territory.

This takes us to another hypothesis that no one has explored or tested, namely the effect of party dominance. We noticed above that party domination in former French colonies led more quickly to authoritarian rule than in former British colonies where a competitive element was retained for a longer time and in some countries institutionalised within the one-party regime. As we turn to the present, the question is how important party dominance is for the democratisation process. The conventional wisdom is to regard it as a threat to this process, because the leadership is unlikely to be challenged by a strong opposition. This, however, is not necessarily the only interpretation. Hyden (1999) shows that party dominance in Tanzania may in fact provide more room for the transition to democracy than is the case in countries where the political field is polarised between a government and a strong opposition, as for instance in Kenya. This could be formulated into a hypothesis that would be relevant for the study of regime transition in sub-Saharan Africa and other societies that lack a liberal-democratic tradition.

Another study that confirms the existence of a variety of political regimes in the past is Berg-Schlosser's (1984) effort to relate economic performance to regime type. Although structures such as interest groups are weak in Africa, he acknowledges the existence of significant participatory elements in some societies. He also notes that the peasantry in Africa – the majority of the population – is still relatively free, i.e. the landlord system is not in place as it is in other regions of the world. In differentiating between African post-independence regimes he looked at the following dimensions: the party system, the basis of legitimacy, the patterns of recruitment of the head of state, the formal vertical and horizontal separations of power, the actual power structure, the scope of political control, and the ideological orientation of the system. These characteristics, which are all relevant to the present democratisation processes, allowed Berg-Schlosser to distinguish between four major types of post-independence regime: (1) polyarchic, (2) socialist, (3) authoritarian and (4) military. Although there is a fair amount of change of regime within each country during the period that his study covers – 1960–82 – some interesting patterns occur when regime is correlated with economic (GNP per capita) and social (physical quality of life) development. Stable authoritarian systems have the highest per capita GNP growth rate for the period under consideration, but the actual improvement of living conditions for a large part of the population is the lowest of all types. Gabon serves as a relevant case in point. Socialist countries, on the other hand, exhibit more moderate rates of economic growth, but they also display a more egalitarian form of development, Tanzania

being a prototypical example. The performance of stable polyarchies seems to be quite satisfactory on both economic and social accounts, achieving relatively high levels of economic growth and significant improvements in the basic quality of life. Berg-Schlosser uses Kenya as fairly representative of this group.[1]

The polyarchies also come out on top when the author correlates regime type with the Freedom House Index of civil liberties and political rights. Socialist systems display a mixed pattern: while criteria such as freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary are not satisfied by those regimes, their political record of repression (including incarceration for purely political reasons, torture of prisoners and so forth) is not quite as bad as that of authoritarian and military regimes (Berg-Schlosser 1984: 142–43). What is not clear from his study is whether economic and social levels of development determine political regime, or vice versa. Without really providing any rationale for his position, Berg-Schlosser adheres to the latter: the effectiveness of more democratic and humane forms of government promotes better economic and social performance and thus lays the necessary conditions for their long-term chances of success. Whatever way one looks at this relationship, however, his study confirms the positive association between economic development and democracy that has been established by so many other studies.

Of special significance for the study of democratisation in Africa, however, is the fact that there were a good many regime differences prior to the 1990s. These differences existed between countries but also over time within a given country. For instance, while Tanzania experienced no real regime change between 1960 and 1990, countries like Ghana and Nigeria experienced at least a handful. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) argue that former regime type is a powerful explanatory variable for understanding the current process of regime transition. We believe that it is not just what existed immediately prior to the re-introduction of multi-party politics in the 1990s that is significant but also the full history of regime change since the days of decolonisation. Time has come to structure variables that allow us to tap into the dynamics of the whole post-independence period for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of present transition processes in Africa.

The stateness factor

Crucial to understanding the relationship between development and democracy is the role that the state plays in determining both processes and outcomes. Of particular importance is the degree of 'stateness' that a given society can rely upon. The notion of stateness refers to the degree to which the administrative and legal order in a country is compatible with the interests of individual members of the political community. This is an issue that Linz and Stepan (1996: 16) rightly describe as under-theorised in the literature on democratisation. What the latter have to say on the subject, however, is not enough for understanding its significance in the African context. This section, therefore, will briefly review the arguments that have been put forward about stateness in the past before proceeding to identify how this variable is best operationalised in a study of African transitions to democracy.

There is general agreement that an organisation with state-like attributes is a necessary condition for the pursuit of democratic or, for that matter, any form of governance. Without the ability to effectively exercise a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory, collect taxes and put in place a judicial system, such an organisation would lack stateness. State-building, therefore, is an important part of laying the foundation for democratisation. The analysis of the stateness factor has so far taken place primarily in relation to nation-building and nationalism.

State-building is typically contrasted with nation-building. While national consciousness is seen as the outcome of an organic growth of a political community, state-building is a conscious activity characterised by creation and craft. As Weber noted with regard to the concept of nation: it 'means above all that it is proper to expect from certain groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups' (Weber 1968: 921). There is no agreement on how these groups should be delimited or what concerted action should result from such solidarity. In other words, there are no clear rules about membership in a nation and no defined rights and duties that can be legitimately enforced. The nation, therefore, needs the state to set these rules and enforce them.

Sorting out the relationship between state and nation has generally been viewed as a prerequisite of democratic development (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Countries in Western Europe where the state had organically emerged from a national political community were among the early democratisers. Late democratisers, however, have often found themselves in a situation where the creation of a democratic polity may be in conflict with the formation of a nation-state. Whether the task is to define a national language, identify common cultural symbols or determine the role of religion, the policies to create a nation-state may be in conflict with democratic values, notably respect for minority rights and their participation in the polity. Robert Dahl (1989: 207) has noted that the criteria of the democratic process presuppose the rightfulness of the democratic unit itself. If the latter's scope and domain are not seen as legitimate, then they cannot be made rightful simply by democratic procedures. The very definition of democracy, therefore, involves agreement by the citizens of a territory, however specified, on the procedures to be used to generate a government that can make legitimate claims on their obedience (Linz and Stepan 1996: 27). If a significant group of people does not accept the legitimacy of specific state claims because the people do not want to be part of that political unit, even if constituted by democratic means, democratic transition is under threat.

Potentially explosive are such questions as 'who is a citizen?' and 'how are the rules of citizenship defined?' Is it by blood (*ius sanguinis*), implying citizenship by descent, or is it by residence (*ius soli*), referring to citizenship by the sole virtue of having been born in the country? Because citizenship typically confers the right to vote, it is clear that democratic governance is inevitably linked to stateness. Even though membership of a community can exist without citizenship, it is difficult to see a complex modern democracy without voting, no voting without citizenship, and no official membership in the community without a state to certify that membership.

The issue of stateness has been largely overlooked in the literature on regime transition in Latin America because most countries have not experienced the same degree of cultural pluralism as countries in Africa, Asia and Europe.[2] It has come to the fore, especially with the renewed interest in democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. A considerable group of Russians have been left as 'settlers' in the new states that were created out of the former Soviet empire. For example, in Latvia, the Latvian language is spoken by fewer urban residents than Russian is. The same applies to the other Baltic states. In countries like Kazakhstan, Russians make up over half of the total population. It is not difficult to see that the creation of a nation-state by democratic means is a major challenge in these countries.

To understand the specific problems of stateness in African countries it is necessary to move beyond the nation/state nexus. Although most of these countries are multi-ethnic, the principal issue – contrary to conventional wisdom – is not cultural but material or economic. This is not to suggest that citizenship laws lack significance in Africa. They do as, for example, Herbst (1999) has demonstrated. Nonetheless, especially intriguing in Africa is the extent to which citizenship laws are ignored and not enforced. There is a tremendous mobility across territorial borders throughout Africa. Each country has large numbers of 'illegal immigrants'. While state action may occasionally be taken against such groups, the interesting thing is how quickly they come back in large numbers. The question that must be asked, therefore, is why the state is so ineffective in enforcing citizenship laws in Africa.

The answer to this question lies in the absence of a strong middle class with an interest and capacity to develop the continent's own resources. Hyden (1980), in his analysis of why socialism was failing in Tanzania, was the first to draw attention to the anomaly of the African state as not structurally rooted in an indigenous mode of production and hence unable to effect changes in the relations of production. More recently, others have revisited this issue in the context of democratisation. Bates (1999), for example, argues that the market economy in Africa has failed to produce a coherent bourgeoisie that can provide the impetus for political reform. He finds convincing evidence of this in the fact that when macro-economic imbalances occurred and massive price imbalances followed, Africa's middle class remained largely silent. Rather than taking to protest, they turned to informal trade, facilitated by the distorted policy regime imposed by African governments. For these reasons, it is no surprise that the call for free markets, liberalisation and privatisation came from international, not domestic, capital.

While in other parts of the world at other times, the bourgeoisie has provided the political impetus for democratic reform, translating economic forces into political ones, in Africa merchant capital has circumvented government rather than confronting it. Political leaders have silenced public managers and played groups against each other based on parochial rather than civic loyalties. While protests may have taken place, the few that have find no common origin in a class programme. Rather, the impetus for political reform has come from brave individuals – often intellectuals – and losers in the post-independence struggle for power.

We agree with Bates' own conclusion that in the study of democratisation in Africa, it is necessary to recognise that the driving forces behind economic and political reform are not domestic but international. The economic foundations for reform in Africa originate from the attempts of revenue-starved fiscs and government creditors to extract political regimes from loss-making policies. The economic impetus for political reform, therefore, does not come from the private economy – as it has elsewhere at other times – but from the needs of the public sector (Bates 1999: 93). At the centre of all this, therefore, is a low level of stateness. The African state can be described variably as 'weak' in capacity to enforce laws and policies or 'soft' in terms of its ability to create and adhere to laws and policies in its own operations. It is this combination of weakness and softness that puts a definite limit to how far political reform can be carried out in a peaceful and constructive manner. The African state does not 'see like a state' (Scott 1998): that is, it does not follow a modernist approach to development. Because the state does not constitute a reliable agent, members of the political community typically find other avenues for satisfying their needs. They use their 'exit' option rather than their 'voice' in expressing dissatisfaction with the status quo. Future studies of democratisation in Africa need to incorporate these considerations.

Cultural pluralism

There is a strong tendency even among many academic analysts to focus on ethnicity or cultural pluralism as the factor that more than anything else determines African politics. While it is true that communal identities are important as 'tempting vote banks for party organisers' (Young 1999: 73), cultural pluralism in Africa has a very different impact on politics than it has in other parts of the world, e.g. Asia, Europe or Middle East. The mainstream literature on ethnicity deals with it in terms of ethno-nationalism, i.e. the demand for self-governance. Ethno-political conflicts are seen as especially threatening to the state since they ultimately seek to change not only the government or the regime but the very boundaries of the state itself. As Clifford Geertz noted a long time ago, ethnic loyalties differ from 'ties to class, party, business, union, profession or whatever' in that these other 'ties are virtually never considered as possible self-standing, maximal social units, as candidates for nationhood' (Geertz 1963: 261). Because ethnic loyalties are viewed as consuming more of people's identities, they are also seen as a threat to democracy, which involves political pluralism, i.e. tolerance of different viewpoints within the same constitutional unit (Sartori 1997).

Eric Nordlinger (1972) and Arend Lijphart (1977) argue that culturally plural societies can achieve stability through practices and institutions that share the government's decision-making rights among the leaders of major ethnic groups. Such power-sharing arrangements typically have two constitutional features in common. The first is that in realms where decisions are binding on all members of society, power-sharing institutions guarantee participation of representatives of all ethnic groups in the national government. Arrangements that have been adopted in practice include ethnic cooptation, parliamentarism and proportional representation

(PR). Ethnic cooptation, for example, may be implemented through the creation of a special legislative chamber apportioned by ethnic group or ethnic homeland. Such a measure brings representatives of ethnic groups into the decision-making process. Parliamentarism and PR do not guarantee this, but increase its likelihood by encouraging coalition rather than 'winner-take-all' types of government. The second feature is that in policy realms where issues divide ethnic groups, power-sharing prescribes partitioned decision-making so that ethnic agencies such as homeland administrations make policy. Federal or decentralised forms of government are examples of such power-sharing.

Power-sharing arrangements, however, have not been very stable. Horowitz (1985), for example, cites 16 experiments with power-sharing institutions between 1960 and 1983, of which subsequently no less than three-quarters were subsequently discarded. Even among those four cases that were deemed successful – India, Malaysia, Spain and Switzerland – there have been some significant problems. For example, Malaysia's federalism saw secession of one ethnically distinct region – Singapore – just two years after independence and widespread ethnic violence in the 1970s. The reasons for this relative instability inhere in the structures of power-sharing. In the context of the bilateral bargaining relationship between national government leaders and 'ethnopoliticians', power-sharing actually increases the likelihood of escalation to ethno-national crises. On the one hand, power-sharing leads to the proliferation of institutional mechanisms that ethnopoliticians can use against the national government. For instance, a power-sharing veto gives the ethno-politician the power to paralyse the decision-making process and potentially threaten mutual disaster in order to induce the national government to give in. On the other hand, where the balance of leverage favours the national government leaders, power-sharing arrangements make ethnic rights particularly vulnerable to encroachment from national leaders because power-sharing isolates ethnic elites from other elites. 'Non-ethnic' elites such as labour and business leaders or dissident intellectuals – as well as ethnic elites excluded from power-sharing arrangements – have no interest in defending rules of the game that discriminate against them and instead have an active interest in changing these rules.

Africa has had its share of power-sharing arrangements, but they have not lasted long. Ethiopia's incorporation of Eritrea eventually broke up. Suggestions in the early 1980s of a consociational arrangement for South Africa were abandoned because it did not include the black African majority. Nigeria is still a federal state, but the instability of its power-sharing formula is obvious in the endless proliferation of new units that have been created since it was first introduced in the 1960s. Most national leaders in Africa have shied away from power-sharing. One explanation may be that these leaders are aware of the problems inhering in such arrangements. They threaten their control of power.

The reasons why consociationalism and other formulas for power-sharing have had such a limited presence and effect in sub-Saharan Africa, however, also include the fact that ethnicity manifests itself differently there. Africa's cultural pluralism is genuinely plural in the sense that, with the exception of a few countries, African

states are made up of several distinct ethnic groups, none of which can really lay claim to its own statehood. Unlike Asia, Europe or the Middle East, ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa does not translate into ethno-nationalism. Ethnic diversity has been possible to manage within unitary states. It is not as such a threat to democracy in the way that has been suggested in the discussion of the fragility of power-sharing arrangements above. It is no coincidence that wherever ethnicity has been turned into ethno-nationalism in Africa, it is precisely in those countries where such arrangements have been attempted: the Ibos in Nigeria; the Eritreans in Ethiopia; and the ethnic groups in southern Sudan.

The predominant pattern has been to handle ethnicity within the confines of a unitary system of government. The ethnic factor has been managed in an informal manner through cooptation in ways that have tended to reduce its overall impact on politics. To be sure, elected legislators in African countries, especially from rural electoral districts, are typically chosen as representatives of the dominant ethnic group in these constituencies. As Chabal (1986) notes, their communal identity weighs heavily on the shoulders of these legislators, who are all expected to bring home 'the pork', but also represent their groups in ways that give them honour and respect. Because there are so many groups represented in the national legislature, other factors automatically become influential in determining decisions. That is why one may say that ethnicity in Africa is more important on the 'input' than the 'output' side of the political process. The 'black box' that we also call the political system has the effect of toning down ethnic claims and making policy supersede them.

The point we are making here is that ethnicity is much more compatible with democracy in Africa than it is in other parts of the world. Even if social and economic development has left the continent with massive numbers of small ethnic groups, these in themselves do not constitute a threat to democratisation. It is only in places like Burundi and Rwanda, where only two ethnic – some say 'cultural' – groups compete for control of the state, that we witness the same kind of threat to democracy as we see in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Palestine, Central Asian countries and the Balkans.

Africanist political scientists, by and large, acknowledge the social significance of ethnicity and its potential for political mobilisation, but they also recognise the malleability of communal identities on the continent. The latter are not primordial but in most cases are the product of imaginative acts of social construction to suit very pragmatic and basic ends such as finding enough to eat, getting a job or just moving ahead in life. Whether driven by economic poverty or the mere multiplicity of ethnic groups, this is a generalised behaviour that Hyden (1980) has designated the 'economy of affection'. Africans have no problems in transcending ethnic lines when it comes to interacting with others. The citizenry at large does it on an everyday basis in order to survive; politicians do it in order to guarantee their own position in power.

It is only when these political leaders become too exclusivist and fail to consider the claims of others that instability arises. Tensions in such situations may take on an ethnic dimension, as they have in countries like the Congo (Clark 1997), but it

is typically a mistake to reduce such conflicts to their ethnic dimension only. The difference between the present and the past is that when African countries were governed under an autocratic regime ethnicity was usually handled behind 'closed doors', i.e. these issues did not come out in the open. At present, ethnicity is more transparent so it easily gets treated as *the* determinant of political behaviour and choice. A closer examination of political behaviour in African countries today suggests, however, that ethnicity is only one of many factors that determine it. Political parties that have a national standing can typically not prosper if confined to a single ethnic group; hence, they ordinarily transcend ethnic boundaries. This is true for countries in Anglophone as well as Francophone Africa, west as well as east and southern regions of the continent. Ndegwa (1997) provides a fascinating account of how intensified political competition in Kenya, which in many respects is openly ethnic, nonetheless is couched in terminologies that reflect Western models of *republican* vs *liberal* definitions of citizenship.

The fact that many democratising countries in sub-Saharan Africa still have a large number of small parties, in spite of having an electoral system that should encourage a two-party system, is not an indication of the strength of ethnicity in party formation but rather proof that politics is still personalistic and neo-patrimonial. Political leaders act in an opportunistic fashion in the belief that they are potentially capable of seizing power (or at least enough of it) to become a figure of national prominence. This type of opportunism is characteristic of a system like the economy of affection where investments in social relationships can multiply instantly and turn a relatively unknown person into one of national standing. It is no surprise that Bratton and van de Walle (1997) do not include ethnicity as a variable in their study of democratisation in Africa. They recognise that it is less important than many other explanatory variables.

This is not to imply that democracy is safe in Africa. All we are saying is that in trying to understand what the threats may be to a democratic transition or consolidation, ethnicity or cultural pluralism *per se* may not offer as much explanatory power as other variables. For example, the heavy discount rate of the future that is inherent in the opportunistic economy of affection is likely to be a more relevant factor around which to build future hypotheses. It is precisely because of such discount rates that institutions are so difficult to sustain at the national level in African countries. How we study such behaviour is an important issue in itself, since it raises the question of whether the economy of affection is a modified version of rational choice, according to which self-interest expresses itself in a different form than in a market economy setting, or involves a different rationale altogether derived from a conceptualisation of African political behaviour being 'communalist'. As indicated above, we lean towards the former and believe that future studies of democratisation in Africa should be designed with such considerations in mind.

External influences

Much of the effort to spur an accelerated economic development in Africa since the 1980s has focused on reintegrating the continent into the global economy, the

assumption being that there are considerable benefits to be derived from such integration, notably in terms of infusion of fresh private capital and more competitive prices for the consumer. It is now clear that the market itself has not been the kind of *wunderkind* that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund believed some 20 years ago. African countries that have implemented structural adjustment programmes since the 1980s have little to show for themselves. Their economies remain peripheral and doubts exist as to whether countries so placed really can benefit from the increasing economic globalisation (Olukoshi 1999). Van de Walle (1999) thinks that countries that can take advantage of sizeable stocks of natural resources and those that can benefit from a relatively large market integrated by decent road, rail and communications links should do a bit better, but he is pessimistic about the rest of the continent. They lack resources, have neighbours racked by civil conflict and have typically achieved little progress on reform to date. The structural conditions have not changed enough to enable the African countries to accelerate their development in a sustainable manner. If Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) are correct, the prospects for democracy in these places are not very great.

The structural conditions that underlie the ongoing efforts to democratise in Africa, however, are set not only by the market, but also by government-to-government relations in the context of foreign aid. The latter has been tied to specific political conditionalities throughout most of the past ten years. The international development community assumes that by setting such conditions, they can induce or coerce hesitant African governments to engage in a more systemic transformation of state institutions. The policy impact of donor conditionality, however, has too often been exaggerated by the international finance institutions (IFIs) as well as by Western governments providing aid. For example in a study of adjustment lending, Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1991) found that reforms are hard to implement and sustain, mainly because the IFIs are so excessively exposed in Africa that all they can do may be best described as 'defensive lending'. The implication of such lending is that the penalties governments face for not implementing reform are not very onerous. For example, there is rarely an attempt to reduce lending for reasons of non-compliance. Governments thus lack the incentive or pressure to implement reform programmes fully. For the most part, they have accepted IFI money and have then sought to wheedle their way out of their implementation promises (van de Walle 1999: 109).

The significance of foreign aid in the context of the national budget varies from country to country, but it is not unusual for the capital expenditure part of it to be almost exclusively funded from external aid sources (Goldsmith 2000). In several countries, these sources are also responsible for supporting part of the recurrent budget. In Uganda, for instance, foreign assistance is reported to account for as much as 55 per cent of government spending annually (Borzello 1998). Such a high level of donor dependence gives international technocrats who are not accountable to the local electorate a lot of influence on policy. As an extension of the same phenomenon, it privileges donor-driven bureaucratic and financial processes such as the Paris Club, the Consultative Group, the Policy Framework

Paper, the Letter of Agreement and the Public Investment Program – all IFI mechanisms – while weakening the conventional instruments of national policy-making such as the national budget, economic planning and the cabinet, let alone the legislature. For example, the national budget has come to matter much less than what has been promised to the donors. It is not surprising that government officials lack a sense of ownership for agreements that have been authored in Washington DC or Paris rather than in national policy-making institutions. According to a Danish report of a few years back, it was found that the government of Tanzania presented different budget estimates in 1995 to the Consultative Group of creditors and to its national legislature. In the former, it projected a surplus; in the latter, a deficit (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995).

We do not want to give the impression that all African governments act in a cynical manner to undermine the efforts to promote economic and political reforms. What we are saying, however, is that foreign aid does not really work to improve the economy or foster 'good governance' in ways that donors expect and recipient governments promise their citizens. It tends to corrupt efforts as often as it supports them. Foreign aid, therefore, when it comes to democratisation, is at best a double-edged weapon.

There is an emerging literature that pays attention to the effects of high levels of aid on governments and their behaviour *vis-à-vis* their citizens. Mick Moore (1998), for example, argues that the way the donors support governments, they often undermine the very values of democracy and good governance that they try to promote through 'general' political conditionality and specific aid interventions. His point of departure is the acknowledgement that bargaining over the budget and associated tax policies is the primary way in which different state and societal goals are reconciled in a democracy. For instance, in Europe over the past two centuries, taxation and disputes over the use of revenues stimulated the development of greater citizen rights and privileges, with democratic institutions enforcing accountability and greater transparency in expenditures (Tilly 1992).

Moore's key thesis is that the more a state 'earns' its income through the operation of a bureaucratic apparatus for tax collection, the more the state needs to enter into reciprocal arrangements with citizens about provision of services and representation in exchange for tax contributions. The hypothesis that follows from his argument is that the larger share that 'earned' incomes represent of total revenues, the more likely it is that state–society relations are characterised by accountability, responsiveness and democracy. In many African cases, aid dependency thwarts these processes. African states have significant 'unearned' incomes, the result being that they face more organised and effective pressures for accountability and transparency from the international donor community than from their own citizens and parliaments (Brautigam and Botchwey 1998).

Even if we account for the fact that foreign aid often becomes the scapegoat for failures in Africa because of its high visibility, it is difficult to discount the many perversities that it generates. Klitgard, in a case study of Equatorial Guinea, explained the country's total neglect of facility maintenance by arguing that 'everything is given to them, they don't take care of anything and don't have to' (Klitgard 1990:

98). Maren (1997) has written extensively on how large-scale aid methodically undermined Somalia's civil society in the 1980s. Uvin (1998) argues that foreign aid has been instrumental in fostering much of the civil violence in Rwanda. The litany could be made much longer. Suffice it to underline here that the literature suggests foreign aid not only weakens government institutions but also has an ambiguous effect on civil society associations.

The effects of foreign aid dependency on democratisation in African countries are still in need of further specification. More research is needed on issues that have been indicated but not yet fully explored. For example, what difference does it make if a country's given quantity of aid is concentrated to a few big donors as opposed to being distributed among many? Both Moore (1998) and Brautigam and Botchwey (1998) believe that the potential damage is larger, the greater the number of donors. Another issue that needs further research is whether integration of democracy and governance objectives in development activities, e.g. integrated conservation and development projects, may yield better results than efforts to fund civil society associations or government institutions through more targeted democracy or governance interventions. There is also reason to examine how far Moore's thesis about the civic effects of bargaining over budgetary and fiscal issues may hold in the African context of neo-patrimonial politics. Will state and society representatives really imitate the model on which Moore's argument is based? That is a potential hypothesis worth further study.

Conclusions

This chapter has argued that the study of the present democratisation processes in Africa is still at an incipient stage. We deal with very broad and general variables that are typically under-specified. The dependent variable – democracy – in the African context needs further specification. It becomes especially important to decide whether the sub-categories of democracy that are relevant in the African context are exclusively those used in the study of democratisation elsewhere. The tendency, of course, is for comparative studies to assume that variables are universal, i.e. applicable anywhere. This approach is important for the purpose of integrating African democracy studies in a broader comparative setting. It may also, however, have the effect of overlooking nuances that are specific to the African continent. In the absence of good data sets, it is easy to draw far-reaching conclusions from findings that are not very robust. Lindberg's re-examination of the data used by Bratton and van de Walle in Chapter 7 convinces us that further qualitative studies are needed to strengthen the basis for quantitative analysis in the future.

More specifically, we have argued with reference to three independent variables associated with development – stateness, ethnicity and foreign aid – that there is need to evaluate further how they influence democratisation. It is not so much the struggle over the basic rules of what defines 'territory' and 'citizenship' that makes either stateness or ethnicity important in the African context. It is rather the 'softness' of the state, i.e. its inability to enforce rules, that is important in Africa.

Similarly, it is not battles over power-sharing that make ethnicity relevant to the study of democracy in Africa, but rather its malleability. As Morrison (1983) concluded in a study of ethnicity and national integration in Ghana, contemporary ethnicity in Africa is indeed marked by multiple affiliations and a general fluidity that allows affiliations to shift. This suggests to us that ethnicity is not really a threat to democracy. The challenge is really how to build on it in ways that taps into its potential for political development. With regard to foreign aid, it is still unclear what the costs and benefits of its contribution to democracy and good governance are. There is a tendency in the literature to discount its contributions, often because foreign aid is such an easy political target of criticism. We believe that the role of foreign aid in African democratisation needs to be studied with a view to also assessing the institutional constraints of economic and political reform associated with the absence of a strong enough African bourgeoisie capable of driving the reform process.

Finally, we are reiterating our call for more attention to past studies of African regimes. Studies of contemporary democratisation in Africa tend to draw too liberally not only on literature of that process elsewhere in the world but also too exclusively on the publications that have come out in recent years. We believe that previous studies of the relationship between development and political regimes contain valuable insights that should be incorporated into current research in order to give the latter greater depth and fine nuances in formulating research hypotheses. Africa's peripheral status in the global economy is no reason for studies of African democratisation to remain peripheral to the field of comparative political studies.

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9 Civil society and democratisation

Conceptual and empirical challenges

Caroline Boussard

Introduction

One of the most frequently used concepts in the literature on regime transition and democratisation is 'civil society'. Some authors have identified it as a key actor in initiating such transitions. Others have seen it as the sphere in which democratic values are fostered through associational life. Yet others go even further, suggesting that all organisations between the state and the family household constitute civil society. This chapter tries to address the question of what this concept really refers to. The task is important because it has implications for understanding the role of this concept in democratisation and what to look for empirically.

The chapter focuses on three issues that are important for the future study of civil society in the context of promoting democracy. The first is to explore the role that civil society plays in democratic consolidation, the reason being that even though frequently discussed in the literature on democratic consolidation, the role of civil society remains unclear. Putnam's study of the link between civic participation and democracy in Italy (1993) has not only put Tocquevillian ideas back on the research agenda. It has also attracted attention from international development agencies interested in how to foster democracy in developing countries. The second is the dynamics between civil society and other factors that shape democracy. Here the reason is the importance of questioning the extent to which unilinear models of explanation are helpful. Although most authors recently have discussed Lipset's finding that democracy correlates with modernisation, it is important to remember that he also recognised the role that intermediary organisations play as a countervailing power against the state and as a generator of democratic values (1959: 84). At least one author, Brysk (2000), has examined more closely what are the functions performed by civil society and in so doing she has developed an approach that recognises the more complex relations between civil society and democracy. The third is the significance of 'civil' in society, the point being that the concept inevitably implies something normative and the need, therefore, to identify its defining attributes. Not all associations are necessarily sources for the growth of democratic values. Only those that in one way or another foster 'civic' values may have such effects. Civil society may or may not be civic, but the latter is not itself a defining attribute of the concept.

The first part of this chapter discusses how democratic consolidation is used as a concept by various authors. After sorting out some of the conceptual differences that exist, the analysis centres on what functions civil society performs in a process of democratic consolidation. The discussion is illustrated by examples from societies attempting democratisation in Central America.

Conceptualising democratic consolidation

Even though it has been the main focus of empirical democratic theory lately, the concept of democratic consolidation certainly leaves much to be desired. Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle argue that the reason why 'consolidology' is complicated is that scholars use different definitions (1995: 5). There is, however, a strong tendency to adhere to the well-known 'only game in town-definition' (Linz 1990).[1]

Most scholars seem to agree on the essential contents of the definition, but they are actually referring to different empirical phenomena and this results in what Schedler refers to as an 'unclear, inconsistent, and unbounded concept' (Schedler 1998: 92). According to Schedler this conceptual mess can be explained by the different empirical contexts in which we work. Whereas some work in liberal democracies, others work in pseudo democracies. Against their respective empirical backgrounds, scholars focus on either democratic survival or democratic progress. The original meaning of democratic consolidation was concerned with democratic survival, but recently it has come to involve other things such as the development of a democratic culture (Schedler 1998: 103–04). The solution is to use a four-fold classification of regime types – authoritarianism, electoral democracy, liberal democracy and advanced democracy – which serves as a conceptual map for consolidation studies. Scholars who are working in electoral democracies are probably concerned with democratic stability in terms of avoiding democratic breakdown, the opposite of democratic consolidation. Those who work in liberal democracies, on the other hand, are concerned with democratic progress in terms of deepening democracy, a positive outcome (Schedler 1998: 94–95).

One weakness of consolidation studies is the ambiguity inherent in the scholarly debate over which scientific tradition to adhere to. Implicitly, the language used indicates a predilection for explanatory models with unidirectional causality. It is for example often argued that a democracy cannot be consolidated without a democratic civil society and a democratic political culture. Unfortunately, the attempts to explain how and why these factors are important are less numerous. Karvonen correctly points out that there is no *systematic* empirical evidence of the influence of civil society on democratisation (Karvonen 1997: 96). A process perspective on democratic consolidation allows for a more flexible approach. Some aspects, such as the elimination of undemocratic institutions, are more important immediately after the formal transition has taken place, whereas other aspects are more important late in the process. Development of informal institutions such as democratic culture is an example of factors that are important later in the process. Hence, depending on where in the process of consolidation the empirical case is located, we tend to focus on different factors. The process of consolidation is not

linear, nor is it irreversible. A process perspective is therefore an appropriate method to analyse this elusive phenomenon.

Even with such an approach to the study of democratic consolidation, however, we need to be open to the fact that there are factors that either facilitate or impede democratic consolidation. One such prevalent hypothesis is that the character of the prior regime has implications for the prospects of successful consolidation. The degree of pluralism accepted by the authoritarian regime is a decisive factor for democratic consolidation, as it sets the conditions for the growth of a civil society and, thereby, the development of a democratic culture. Other related factors that may have an impact are the duration of authoritarianism, i.e. if there is a prior experience of democracy, and the character of the transition (see e.g. Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996; Schmitter 1995).

Democratic consolidation is hence conceptualised as a process, analytically separated from the transition process. The process of consolidation is not just a prolongation of the transition process, and it engages 'different actors, behaviors, processes, values, and resources' (Schmitter 1995: 12), and what facilitates a transition may very well impede the consolidation and vice versa. But even though transition and consolidation are conceptually distinct processes, they may overlap temporally (Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995: 3; Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch 1998: 10). Consolidation is thus both a process and a state of being, and this is the reason for the teleological character of the concept (Schedler 1998; O'Donnell 1996). One solution is to treat the final destination as an ideal type and concentrate on the process; or, as Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle put it:

> by clearly separating the ultimate long-term product of consolidation (regime sustainability) from the concept of consolidation itself (which focus on the extent of attitudinal support for the key representative institutions of the democratic regime and respect for its specific rules of the game) [. . .]
>
> (1995: 13)

Two different approaches to the study of consolidation can be identified. From an evolutionary perspective, consolidation is treated as an adaptation process in which politicians and citizens learn to act according to democratic rules, norms and procedures. It puts emphasis on the gradual change of values such as trust, moderation and tolerance, i.e. on the development of a democratic culture. Another way of approaching the process of consolidation is from a more actor-oriented perspective that puts emphasis on the actual creation of institutions, such as the establishment of democratic institutions or the elimination of authoritarian institutions (Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch 1998: 12–16). The latter is probably most convenient for analysis of the negative notion of democratic consolidation whereas the evolutionary perspective serves as a better tool for analysing the positive notion of democratic consolidation. The evolutionary perspective demonstrates the urgent need for an integration of cultural theory with consolidation theory. Fukuyama has argued that democratic consolidation must take place at four different levels: the ideological, the institutional, the civil societal and the cultural level. The civil

societal and cultural levels are, however, so slow to change that they lag behind. Hence, democracy might be consolidated at an institutional level but not at the cultural level, and Fukuyama argues that this is the chief problem of the third wave democracies (Fukuyama 1995: 7–8).

Another aspect of democratic consolidation is whether masses or elites should be in focus. Transitology, traditionally, concentrated the analysis to the elite level. Most transitions are controlled from above: that is, they are initiated and guided by elites. Among scholars concerned with democratic consolidation, only Gunther and Higley (1992) analyse consolidation from a strictly elite-centred perspective. The greater part of the consolidation literature argues that that even though masses are much more important in the consolidation phase than in the transition phase, the elite is crucial for democratic consolidation. In order to get the full picture, however, elites as well as masses should be taken into consideration (cf. Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch 1998; Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995; Shin 1994).

Civil society and civic virtues

What distinguishes civil society from the rest of society is that it contains only citizens who act collectively in order to promote or defend their interests towards the state. It is often defined as all organised collective activity that is not part of the state or the family sphere. A definition with few defining attributes makes it possible to analyse civil society in different contexts. Such a definition may embrace all kinds of civil societies, in democratic or authoritarian contexts. The concept of civil society, as it is defined within empirical democratic theory today, is based upon two different perspectives or theory traditions and these two have been described in various ways. Hadenius and Uggla refer to the two functions of civil society – the pluralistic and the educational function (1996: 1622). Related to these functions but expressed in a somewhat different way are Foley and Edwards' 'two versions of civil society'. The first version is the civil society that 'fosters patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a democratic polity' (civil society I). The second version is the civil society that is independent of the state and a source of resistance to the existing regime (civil society II). Whereas civil society I has positive implications for democratic governance, civil society II is a counterweight to the state (democratic as well as authoritarian) (Foley and Edwards 1996: 39).

The civic virtue tradition has been brought together with the liberal perspective, expressed in the Scottish enlightenment philosophy. These two theoretical traditions emphasise different aspects of civil society. Whereas the first perspective emphasises the civicness of civil society (i.e. the idea of actively participating citizens with a concern for the common good of the whole society), the latter focuses on civil society as a countervailing power that limits state power. Whereas Thomas Paine's perspective was clearly anti-statist, Alexis de Tocqueville, even though he saw the perils of a powerful state, in one sense conceived civil society as supportive of the state as it was a virtuous arena where citizens were socialised into patterns of civility (Hyden 1997). These two meanings of civil society will imply a problem unless we make a clear analytical distinction between them.

> Civic community is both a broader and narrower concept than civil society: broader in that it encompasses all manner of associations (parochial included); narrower in that it includes only associations structured horizontally around ties that are more or less mutual, co-operative, symmetrical, and trusting.
>
> (Diamond 1999: 226)

In the liberal perspective, therefore, the main linkage of civil society to democracy is its function as a countervailing power, or watchdog, whereas civil society defined in terms of its civic function has a more explicitly democracy-building role. Not all organisations, however, are necessarily concerned with public ends and therefore we may question a civic community's ability to affect democracy. The idea of civil society is problematic as it could actually be made up of non-civic organisations with undemocratic goals and methods. Therefore, any study of civil society in the consolidation process should start by examining the level of civicness and democracy in civil society organisations.

Civic community, in the tradition of Putnam, contains all types of organisations, even those that are parochial, as long as they are all civic and democratic and, accordingly, it has a clearer connection to democracy through the notion of civicness. This illustrates the problem of tautology. If we want to use the concept of civil society as an explanatory factor in democratisation or consolidation studies, it is crucial to realise that a civil society is not necessarily democratic or civic. A civil society may be 'not only undemocratic, paternalistic, and particularistic in its internal structure and norms but also distrustful, unreliable, domineering, exploitative, and cynical in its dealings with other organisations, the state, and society' (Diamond 1999: 227).

Hence, we must separate the concept of civil society from the notion of civic virtues. Not all civil society organisations are democratic, virtuous or trustful (Van Rooy 1998a: 12–15). And the role civil society can play in the process of democratic consolidation is ultimately determined by the degree of civicness and the internal democratic structures the civil society has attained. It seems reasonable to argue that civil society characterised by civicness is crucial from the positive notion of democratic consolidation, by generating trust and a democratic political culture (i.e. the Putnam argument). A civil society with a civic deficit can, on the other hand, still be significant as the countervailing power.

Civil society in the transition phase

Civil society may play a crucial role for successful transition as well as for democratic consolidation. But the character of civil society is different during the transition compared with the consolidation phase. It is necessary to acknowledge these two different roles in order to avoid conceptual confusion. During the democratic transition, civil society organisations are often active in the process of putting an end to the authoritarian rule and of inaugurating democracy. Civil society is united – it has a common goal and internal differences are put aside. Whether civil society organisations are civic or not is irrelevant from this point of view.

It is, however, unlikely that a civil society by its own power can overthrow an authoritarian regime. Civil society's role during the transition is primarily as a force delegitimising the old regime. With relatively small resources civil society groups may discredit the authoritarian regime to the extent that it loses legitimacy, not only at home but also in an international context. After the formal transition to democracy, a decline in the activity of civil society often becomes visible. Once the authoritarian regime is replaced, participation may seem less important to ordinary citizens. Internal differences that during the transition were put aside in order to stand united in the fight for democracy may rise to the surface. Organisations and other associations have different, sometimes rival, goals that give rise to competition and the more diversified character of a post-transition civil society. The diversification and the declining activity of civil society are not necessarily threats to democratic consolidation. The greatest threat in a post-transition democracy may actually be the opposite: the demands of the previously repressed citizens (Diamond 1999: 251; White 1994: 386).

Civil society in the consolidation phase

Civil society's role in the process of democratic consolidation is sometimes described rather vaguely. In order to obtain a more complete and dynamic picture of civil society's role in the consolidation process we should focus on civil society as a source of change. It is the broader social changes produced by civil society that are important for democratic consolidation. I will concentrate on two specific areas where civil society can produce social changes that may facilitate democratic consolidation. Civil society can do so by developing a democratic participant political culture and by strengthening political society.

Civil society and democratic culture

Democratic culture here refers to democratic attitudes and behaviour. It is a simple way of treating an elusive concept, and its strength lies in the simplicity. Through participation in civil society organisations, citizens may learn democratic principles practised within those organisations and thereby understand the principles for democratic governance and act according to these rules in society. Through participation individuals are exposed to democratic norms and values and may adopt these values – which may in turn be reflected in attitudes and behaviour. The relation between civil society participation and the development of a democratic culture is, however, mutually reinforcing; by participation citizens may adopt democratic attitudes and behaviour, and democratic culture will facilitate further participation.

Not all organisations in civil society, however, are democratic. Some do not promote internal democracy and others foster authoritarian values or discriminate against other groups in society (Hyden 1997). It seems impossible to learn democratic rules and adopt democratic values and norms in organisations with an undemocratic internal structure, goals or methods. Hence, in order to produce

attitudes and behaviour that support democracy, civil society organisations must practise internal democracy, in terms of decision making and leadership selection and rotation. Civil society organisations that practise equal participation, transparency, accountability, mutual respect, consultation with constituencies, etc. socialise their members into these norms and generate democratic values such as trust, civicness and cooperativeness. Thus, by strengthening these values, democracy may be developed (Diamond 1999: 228; Brysk 2000: 161).

Central America is an intriguing region for all kinds of democracy studies. The region comprises one of the few stable democracies in Latin America – Costa Rica – a deviant case that has been democratic since 1949. El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua have all experienced civil wars that have become aggravated because of the cold war logic. Together with Honduras, once famous as the 'Banana Republic', they all have long traditions of authoritarian rule. In the 1980s and 1990s they went through a transition to formal democracy. Even though there have been attempts to return to authoritarian rule, such as president Serrano's coup attempt in 1993, all Central American republics have democratic constitutions today.

There is generally little public enthusiasm for democracy in Central America.[2] The Hondurans' support for democracy is the lowest in Latin America – only 42 per cent find democracy preferable to other political systems (compared with 80 per cent in Costa Rica, 59 per cent in Nicaragua, 56 per cent in El Salvador and 51 per cent in Guatemala). Satisfaction with democracy is also low, ranging from 51 per cent in Costa Rica down to 16 per cent in Guatemala.

Social capital – trust, norms and networks for civic engagement – is the key to overcoming the dilemmas of collective action, and to improving the efficiency or performance of democratic governance (Putnam 1993: 167). Social capital is created in associational life. It could be argued that social capital is created in all kinds of associations and may be directed towards malevolent purposes, such as criminal gangs – *maras* – or used by ethnic groups that tyrannise other ethnic groups. We must distinguish, therefore, between bridging, or inclusive, social capital and bonding, or exclusive, social capital (Putnam 2000: 22). Trust is a significant aspect of social capital. We can distinguish between personal trust, manifest in trust in your fellow citizens, and institutional trust, i.e. trust in the various institutions in society.

In Central America the level of trust is low (Lagos 1997). Generally, Central Americans do not believe that their fellow citizens are honest and obey laws. One remarkable thing is that the level of distrust is actually higher in Costa Rica than in the other republics – 86 per cent, compared with the 71 per cent in El Salvador, 66 per cent in Guatemala, 73 per cent in Honduras and 77 per cent in Nicaragua who agreed with the statement 'you can never be too careful when dealing with others'. Institutional trust is also low.[3] Almost half the population in El Salvador (46 per cent), Guatemala (48 per cent) and Honduras (45 per cent) believe that elections are fraudulent. In Costa Rica and Nicaragua there is more confidence in the electoral process (30 and 40 per cent respectively believe that elections are fraudulent). Central Americans also have low trust in the judicial power, in public administration, in parliament and in the government. The Church is one of the few institutions that people trust.[4]

Participation in politics is generally low. More than half of the population in Central America never discuss politics with friends and, with the exception of Nicaragua, a majority never follow politics. Most people never or almost never work for something that concerns themselves or their community. However, El Salvador stands out with 26 per cent who state that they have frequently or very frequently worked for something that concerned the community. El Salvador is commonly referred to as a case of strong civil society participation. However, participation in demonstrations and in voluntary organisations is as low in El Salvador as in the other republics: only 4 per cent in El Salvador, 5 per cent in Honduras, 6 per cent in Guatemala and Nicaragua, and 7 per cent in Costa Rica participate in voluntary organisations. The case of El Salvador shows that there might be a difference between participation in formal organisations and less formal networks, something that we will return to.

From this we could conclude that civil society is not very successful in altering the political culture in a more democratic or civic direction. We should, however, consider some additional aspects. First, the percentage of citizens who participate in voluntary organisations is remarkably low and is one obvious explanation of low personal and institutional trust. Second, it is normally assumed that it will take generations to change cultural patterns (see e.g. Fukuyama 1995). Only 20 years have passed since the third wave of democratisation reached Central America, and it might be too early to expect democracy to have become 'the only game in town' (see Huntington 1991). Even if we witness civil societies emerging in this region, it will take time before this process is reflected in popular attitudes and behaviour.

A third possible explanation is lack of internal democracy and civicness in civil society associations. As has been argued, the mutually reinforcing relation between participation in civil society and the development of a civic and democratic culture is based on the assumption that civil society organisations are civic and have democratic goals. Many organisations in Guatemala and Honduras are controlled from above. The vertical and paternalistic structures in society deeply affect participation and the internal structures of the organisations. The organisational culture is a reflection of the political culture at large (interview with civil society representative, Honduras). Besides being controlled by strong charismatic leaders, some civil society organisations have problems with lack of accountability, transparency, rotating leadership and representation (cf. Brysk 2000). Verticalism permeates all levels in society (interview with civil society representative, Honduras). It seems fair to say that traditions of *continuismo* and *personalismo* exist, not only in the traditional political structures, but also in civil society. Hence, it is not necessarily strong civil society that is needed in Central America, but rather more democratic civil societies (cf. Brysk 2000: 151–52).

Finally, political structures might impede civil society's ability to produce a democratic culture. In a study in Central America in the first part of the 1990s, Booth and Richard (1998) found that formal group activity was lower in the most repressive states than in the less repressive states. At the same time, communal activism focused on local development issues was actually higher in the more

repressive states. Their conclusion, therefore, was that regime repression lowers social capital.

> Thus, not only does intense repression drive Central Americans into communal activity and away from other formal group participation, but it also reduces all forms of social and political capital [. . .] Repression thus has profound implications for the potential impact of civil society's impact on the state. [*sic*]
>
> (Booth and Richard 1998: 40)

This suggests that the political context will affect the ability of civil society to generate democratic values and that it is therefore crucial that the political context is taken into consideration.

In another study, Seligson found that in Central America, only participation in community development groups has an impact on democratic behaviour. Putnam treats any form of participation as equally important but Seligson's result shows that of seven different kinds of organisation, only community development groups have any effect on demand-making (Seligson 1999). This conclusion supports the idea that not all organisations have explicit democracy-strengthening capabilities and that, if we are to reach a full understanding of civil society's role in democratic transition and consolidation, we must differentiate between the different units of civil society. The question of the democracy-building capacity of the so-called 'development NGOs' (private organisations that deliver services to the poor) illustrates this point. As Biekart correctly points out, the 'NGO literature' has identified NGOs as central actors in democratic transition and this would be to exaggerate the value of NGOs' role in civil society (Biekart 1998: 39). NGOs are part of civil society and may play an important role in development. However, their main contribution is not to deepen democracy by stimulating democratic attitudes and behaviour.

We can conclude at this point that the development of democratic attitudes and behaviour is influenced by a range of different factors. Among these, it is evident that the political context is especially important. It is time, therefore, to turn to the relations between civil and political society and how they help shape the process of democratic consolidation.

Civil society and political society

Civil society cannot be analysed in isolation from political society, i.e. all political actors and structures of society such as political parties, electoral systems, political leadership and legislatures (Linz and Stepan 1996: 8). Berman (1997) argues that in order for us to understand whether a civil society weakens or strengthens democracy, civil society must be analysed in relation to the political institutions. Her example is inter-war Germany where civil society flourished. Weak political institutions with low legitimacy make civil society an alternative for social and political action.

How states are organised in terms of exclusion and inclusion also has important implications for the democratic vitality of civil society, according to Dryzek (1996: 482). Foley and Edwards argue in the same way that the reason why civil society is so poorly understood is because the political variable is missing. What role civil society will play is ultimately determined by the larger political context within which it is situated. How collective action through civil society is pursued depends on the responsiveness of state institutions, rather than on civil society itself. Hence, an unresponsive authoritarian state is more likely give rise to either aggressive forms of civil society participation or apathy than a democratic state with institutions that hear and mediate citizen demands (Foley and Edwards 1996: 48–49).

One aspect of the state–civil society relation is the state's ability to include civil society, and thereby take control of oppositional interests in society. Civil society's strength depends on its capacity 'simultaneously to *resist subordination* to the state and to *demand inclusion* into national political structures' (Oxhorn 1995: 252). In Latin America controlled inclusion made it possible for the state to control civil society. This pattern of controlled participation became institutionalised by means of populism and clientelism (Oxhorn 1995: 254–55).

The key actors in political society – political parties – also have a complicated relation to civil society organisations. If political parties are banned during authoritarian rule, it is not unusual that a democratic transition may turn political parties and civil society organisations into competitors in serving as the principal arena for interest representation and the main link between the citizens and the state. Oxhorn argues that political parties may actually undermine the potential power of social forces. After the democratic transition has taken place, an institutionalised and legitimate party system will probably stand out as the principal arena for interest representation. Thus, there is a risk that the parties will absorb civil society organisations. By contrast, if the party system is weak and not as deeply rooted in society, organisations may continue to play the role that they had during authoritarian rule (Oxhorn 1995: 266–67).

In an authoritarian context, demands for democratisation usually come from the civil society and never from the state, except for those cases where liberalisation is initiated as a means for the rulers to obtain enough legitimacy to stay in power and thus avoid further democratisation. In a democratic context, civil society is the main autonomous countervailing power that controls state power. If civil society vacates this oppositional area and is instead included in political society, the state no longer has to fear opposition and demands from society. Mexico is an example of a strong state that has dominated the weak civil society by populist means. Inclusion in the state thus refers to corporatist arrangements by which autonomous organisations are co-opted by the state to serve what is defined as a common public interest. This is a problem in any effort to deepen democracy because it tends to accord some organisations, notably those representing economic interests, a more favourable position than others (Dryzek 1996: 475–85).

Another potential loss to democracy is that the groups that become included will achieve some access but no real influence. Interests in civil society, according to Dryzek, have no reason to become included – they can still act in various ways to

change public policy, political culture, etc. Hence, for a flourishing civil society, state exclusion is actually preferable to state inclusion. Passive exclusion, i.e. when civil society is left alone, however, is preferable to active exclusion, i.e. when attacks are carried out to intimidate civil society organisations. Accordingly, avoiding inclusion does not mean that civil society has to become powerless (Dryzek 1996: 480–83).

Civil society cannot be understood in isolation from political institutions, but how can we analyse the complex balance of interaction and autonomy in the consolidation process? Is it a relationship characterised by competition or is it complementary? It will be argued below that civil society can strengthen a weak political society, but the political institutions must become legitimate in the process or civil society runs the risk of being co-opted. I have chosen to refer to this as a politicisation of civil society.

Civil society may be an important factor in the consolidation process by strengthening political society.[5] Civil society can educate citizens by stimulating participation and increasing their knowledge both of what they can expect from political institutions and of what is expected of them as citizens, i.e. their rights and duties in a democratic system. Participation in the political process will become more widely spread, and this may increase the legitimacy of the political institutions and processes, as citizens no longer concentrate on the output of the system, but rather identify themselves as necessary components of a working democratic system.

By co-operating with political institutions such as political parties, civil society may increase their legitimacy. It is not unusual that popular enthusiasm declines after the formal transition to democracy, and if government effectiveness is much lower than expected an authoritarian nostalgia or backlash may evolve. If civil society acknowledges the work and the structure of the new democratic government, legitimacy may increase. This is, however, a delicate balancing act because civil society should not be allowed to act as a mere rubber-stamp of government policies. The democratic system must be acknowledged *per se*, regardless of its performance. It is also imperative that civil society organisations make themselves visible in order to preserve their role in society and not become superseded by the political parties. Civil society can, for example, act as an important agenda-setting force. Finally, civil society can strengthen the political society by generating a new democratic leadership that has its background in popular movements, networks and organisations rather than the traditional parties that are often associated with the authoritarian regime.

The degree of political institutionalisation varies between the Central American countries. However, the one thing they all, except Costa Rica, have in common is the authoritarian legacy. Political parties have not yet managed to become trusted institutions, and citizens often feel distanced from the parties that are supposed to represent them. For example, most people believe that no matter how they vote things are not going to change for the better. In Honduras 37 per cent of all people believe that things can change, i.e. that voting makes a difference. In Guatemala the figure is 38 per cent, in El Salvador 42 per cent and in Costa Rica 45 per cent. In Nicaragua elections are regarded as effective – 69 per cent believe

that things can be changed.[6] Although the situation is better in Nicaragua than in the other countries, there is a widespread disillusion with the politicians. Most citizens believe that politicians are uninterested in the issues that concern the citizens. An overwhelming majority believes that the politicians offer no, or few, solutions to the problems of their respective countries, and that the politicians do not engage in the same questions as themselves.

There is also low trust in political parties. In Costa Rica, 75 per cent of the population distrust political parties. The figures for the other countries are: 72 per cent in Honduras, 62 per cent in Guatemala, 60 per cent in El Salvador and 58 per cent in Nicaragua. Political parties do not work satisfactorily, as they should in a consolidated democracy. This is a vicious circle: low legitimacy contributes to a declining participation in elections, and political parties, in turn, become even more distant from the citizens. Even though civil society could perform some of the parties' tasks, it cannot replace political society, as both are necessary components in a consolidated democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996: 7). But the existence of a strong civil society could break the vicious circle by generating a new, democratic political leadership, as well as a tradition of civic participation.

The relations between civil society and political parties are complicated. In Central America these relations have been described as an atomisation of civil society and a crisis of traditional organisations (El Salvador); a relation based on distrust and asymmetrical power (Guatemala); temporal relations, based on clientelism (Honduras); politicisation of civil society (Nicaragua) (Dada *et al.* 1996: 41–46). In Honduras the Liberal Party and the National Party together hold about 95 per cent of the votes. There is almost no difference between the two in terms of ideology, and there is no substantial political debate. Traditional rural *caudillismo* has a strong hold over the parties, and the internal democracy is questionable. Political parties, therefore, have a low legitimacy in Honduras. The political parties represent the system rather than society, and the main opposition comes from civil society, not the party in opposition (interview with civil society representative). Whereas Honduras is characterised by bipartisanism and continuity, the other countries have more fluid party systems. For example, Guatemala has a rapidly changing multi-party system with about 20 registered political parties. The victory of Frente Republicano Guatemalteco – former dictator Efraín Riós Montt's party – in the latest election raises serious doubts concerning the consolidation process in Guatemala. In Nicaragua the recent pact between the Sandinista party (FSLN) and the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista) signifies a crisis for the new democracy. The pact undermines the democratic process and will probably also further weaken the trust in politicians and the political process.

A vital democratic civil society could break this vicious circle of low trust, low participation and a party system that represents a traditional oligarchy rather than the poor majority of Central Americans. There is, however, always the peril of efforts by the state to co-opt civil society. The Nicaraguan case is of special relevance as civil society organisations have had, and to some extent still have, a close relation to the FSLN. Civil society in Nicaragua therefore has a problem with autonomy from the Sandinista party, and this could become a serious problem with

FSLN in a government position. In other countries, civil society associations are political constructions made up in order to meet the demands of the donors, and to produce legitimacy for the policies of the government. One such example is the FONAC in Honduras, created by President Flores in order to satisfy the donor community (interview with civil society representative, Honduras). Politically created organisations like this tend to be too intimately involved with those in government positions. By giving up their autonomy, these organisations weaken not only civil society but also democracy at large.

Civil society may play an important role in consolidating democracy, but experience in Central America indicates that there are many potential traps in this process. Finding a way of treading the fine balance between autonomy and opposition, on the one hand, and co-optation and support of political society, on the other, appears to be the biggest challenge. How external support may affect this challenge is the subject of the last section of this chapter.

Civil society and foreign aid

The donor community has invested much prestige in the enterprise of strengthening civil society as a method of deepening democracy. Support for civil society is often part of aid for 'good governance', together with the development of political institutions (legislative assistance, assistance to local government, party building and judicial reforms), and monitoring elections (Diamond 1995). As Uhlin also shows in Chapter 10, the external impact on civil society in a given country is very important.

The rationale for assistance to civil societies in developing countries can be divided into two major themes. One is that civil society organisations are more efficient than government agencies in getting things done. This argument has met with sympathy at a time when many Western countries are affected by aid fatigue. Development NGOs have been considered an alternative because they have a reputation for being flexible, non-bureaucratic, innovative, participatory and cost-effective. They also often have field presence and contacts with local partners. Furthermore, NGOs are considered to be more transparent and less corrupt than state agencies, to be better equipped to reach the most needy, and to work with empowerment of the most marginalised groups, etc. (see e.g. Van Rooy and Robinson 1998: 39; Burnell 1997: 177; Hudock 1999: 8). The second rationale for assistance to civil society has been its part in promoting democracy. Civil society has been looked upon as a useful method to build trust in people and institutions, to mobilise civic participation, to educate and train citizens in democratic practices and to provide additional channels for interest representation, etc. (see e.g. Diamond 1995).

Some NGOs are making a considerable effort to promote development. Some also play an important role in putting the issue of poverty on the political agenda and thereby forcing political parties and other political actors to address the question. One such example is Jubilee 2000, which has managed to attract attention to foreign debt. Access to information on the external debt conditions may enable

citizens to comprehend the difficulties faced by a new democratically elected government in seeking to satisfy citizens' demands and needs. By pointing to constraints posed by structural adjustment programmes, the organisation may help to enhance the legitimacy not just of the democratically elected government but also of the democratic system as such.

Central America is a poor region. At the bottom are Nicaragua and Honduras. While Nicaragua is the poorer of the two, both suffer from extreme inequality. Civil society organisations are carrying out development projects that aim to reduce poverty in these countries. A good number of organisations – working with various projects such as micro credits and self-development projects – receive considerable amounts of foreign aid. Hurricane Mitch hit Central America in October 1998 and caused tremendous damage to both human life and physical infrastructure. Civil society became an important actor for receiving and distributing the foreign aid that was and still is flowing into the region, and civil society came to be a central actor in the reconstruction process. In Honduras the hurricane also had another effect: when civil society was confronted with a common threat the organisations were able to unite and work together in the reconstruction of the country. Civil society organisations formed various forums such as Interforos and Foro Ciudadano. Whereas state agencies focused mainly on the reconstruction of the country, these forums argued that reconstruction was not enough. Structural changes were necessary to avoid a similar situation in the future (Foro Ciudadano 1999).

There is obviously a danger in romanticising NGOs as they may be just as corrupt and inflexible as state institutions. Civil society organisations are sometimes unprofessional and sometimes they discriminate against certain ethnic or religious groups (Van Rooy and Robinson 1998: 41–43). A related problem is that not every civil society organisation is deeply rooted in the social structures of the country. Some organisations have no contact with the grassroots they are supposed to represent (Ottaway and Chung 1999: 107). Urban NGOs exist in the same context as the donors and develop a capacity to come up with agendas that have more or less the same goals as the donor society. Several organisations are top-down controlled entities. There is a danger that donors, unconsciously, give rise to and support organisations that have the same agenda as they have themselves. As a consequence an artificial civil society with no popular support will emerge (Van Rooy 1998b: 206; Ottaway and Chung 1999: 107–08; see also Robinson 1996: 212). Organisations with the same agenda as the donor community are not a problem *per se*, but they pose the question of the civil society's 'authenticity'. In many instances, these organisations cannot survive when donors withdraw. The main problem with aid dependence is that organisations easily become targets for pressure from the donors. Their ability to perform a democracy-building role is hampered if they lack autonomy in their financing and operations (see e.g. Diamond 1999: 250).

One unfortunate consequence of the donor community's focus on civil society as a method of strengthening democracy is that civil society is sometimes given priority at the expense of political institutions. There is a danger that citizens in newly democratised states, with no prior experience of popular participation or

democracy, perceive civil society and political society as incompatible elements and civil society as the more democratic part in this relation. Political institutions often have a weak position in newly democratised states, as the initial enthusiasm for democracy tends to disappear shortly after the inauguration of democracy. When government is inefficient, the legitimacy of the political institutions often declines. If external actors put all emphasis on the democratic value of civil society, it might make citizens turn away from the political institutions and to civil society. To strengthen civil society at the expense of the efficacy of government, and thereby of the legitimacy of political institutions, does not contribute to democratic consolidation. In fact, it may undermine democratic governance. Civil society is important for democratic consolidation, but political institutions and procedures are necessary components for a successful consolidation.

Conclusions

Democratisation studies today are concerned with the question of how democracies can become consolidated. Civil society is often presented as a crucial factor in this process. Unfortunately the concept has come to mean everything and nothing and accordingly civil society has become weak as an analytical tool. Civil society, or rather the wider societal changes that it may produce, however, has the potential to be an important aspect of democratic consolidation. We simply need to refine our understanding of the concept. Three things seem to be of special importance to consider in future research.

The first is the idea that civil society does not necessarily serve democracy. Organisations in society may or may not have a democratic objective. In other words, civil society may be civic or suffer from a civic deficit. When civil society is equated with everything that is democratic, the analysis becomes tautological. A civic deficit may be compatible with the principle of pluralism, but it is hardly an environment in which democratic values will be fostered. One way to deal with this analytical issue is to separate the concept of civil society from associational life. The latter could be assessed in terms of how it ranks along a scale of 'civic/non-civic' values, thus providing a measure of how strong civil society really is as a force supporting democracy.

The second point concerns the relations – in terms of autonomy and opposition – between state and civil society. The latter has a reason to be satisfied when state institutions place their concerns on the public agenda. At the same time, such inclusion may serve to weaken civil society. Its causes may be neutralised by the state and this can be seen as a threat to civil society. In studying the role that civil society plays in democratic consolidation, therefore, we need to focus our attention on the realm of issues that associations adopt and to assess how their handling of these issues helps, or fails to help, civil society to perform an autonomous and politically significant role in the political process.

The third point refers to the role that the external support of civil society organisations plays. Associational life has become increasingly global. Many NGOs operate in a transnational fashion with local branches in many countries. Foreign

aid has been increasingly targeted on these transnational NGOs and also on their local counterparts. Experience in Central America indicates that such external support is a mixed blessing. While it may help give these organisations greater autonomy from the state, there is a potential danger that they end up becoming extensively dependent on donor support. In this kind of situation, they may lose their interest in building local membership or constituency support. It is clear that future research on civil society needs to pay more attention to the external influence. It is especially important to find a method of analysis that gives us a measure of the autonomy dimension as it applies not only to state but also to donor.

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10 Development and the external dimension of regime transitions

Illustrations from Indonesia

Anders Uhlin

Introduction

One of the more interesting recent findings in the study of the relationship between economic development and democracy is that its relative robustness may be determined by the position a given country occupies in the world economic system (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994). In a study involving 125 countries over a period of 25 years (1960–85) – and thus a total number of 3,125 observations – their statistical analysis shows that economic development and other social forces are indeed positively associated with democracy. A semi-peripheral or peripheral position in the world economy, however, takes away much of these positive effects. Although one can clearly offer different explanations for this, e.g. that the results are influenced by the timeframe used in the study, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994: 907) are ready to conclude that economic development actually causes democracy. Theirs is a challenge to the study of democratisation in developing countries. It raises a number of intriguing questions. What are the main factors behind a transition to democracy in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries? Does the strategic importance of the country in global politics make a difference? Is the growing global integration at the economic and other levels redrawing the parameters for assessing the relationship between economic development and democracy? These are the questions that this chapter addresses with specific reference to Indonesia, the fourth largest country in the world as far as population goes and one that occupies a strategic military and economic role in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia, however, is important for the study of democratisation also because of what has happened in that country in recent years. When the 'Asian economic crisis' that began in Thailand in 1997 hit Indonesia, the military-based New Order regime of General Suharto could no longer resist pressure for political reform. When student-led mass demonstrations demanded the president's resignation, the military elite eventually abandoned Suharto in order to protect its own interests. On 21 May 1998 he was forced to step down. Suharto's hand-picked successor, B. J. Habibie, under strong international and popular pressure, introduced some political reforms. The political space was considerably widened. New political organisations and parties were formed and media reports became much more independent and critical of the government. Some – but far from all – political

prisoners were released. Free elections were promised. Indonesia had entered a phase of regime transition. Elections, eventually held in June 1999, were surprisingly free and peaceful. New reform-oriented parties gained a substantial majority of the votes. In October 1999, the liberal Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid was elected the new president. He formed a coalition government including all major political forces in the country.

The process of democratisation had been successful in many respects, but serious problems remained and prospects for further democratisation seemed highly uncertain. The economy did not recover from the crisis. Living conditions were very hard for a vast majority of the population. The corrupt bureaucracy – a crucial component of the authoritarian regime – remained largely intact. The military seemed determined to keep its political and economic privileges. Violent repression by the armed forces continued after the fall of Suharto, especially in East Timor in connection with the August 1999 referendum leading to the independence of the occupied territory. The Wahid government had to face strong demands for self-determination in the provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya (West Papua) too. Civil society remained weak after decades of authoritarian state dominance and policies of depolitisation. Social conflicts took the form of violent clashes between different religious and ethnic groups. Meanwhile, the political elite was preoccupied with internal power struggles, manifested in the efforts to replace President Wahid.

These dramatic developments in the country cannot be understood without a thorough analysis of how external factors interact with domestic ones. In this chapter I am looking at three domains that were crucial for the political transition: (1) the economy, (2) the military and (3) civil society. Developments in each of these were driven by domestic forces but were strongly mediated by external factors that influenced the outcome of the political process. As a case study of regime transition, this chapter provides insights that are important for understanding the specific case of Indonesia but also adds a 'thicker' description of what factors matter in explaining such a transition more generally in the contemporary global context.

The importance of the external dimension

If we want to understand processes of democratisation, we cannot limit the explanatory factors to those aspects directly related to economic development and other structural prerequisites. We need a broader view of development, including political processes. Within the field of development studies, modernisation theory has suffered from a neglect of the external dimension, whereas dependency and world system theories used to ignore the domestic context. An increasing number of scholars from different disciplines, however, have argued that domestic and external factors are so interrelated that they must be studied simultaneously (e.g. Gourevitch 1978; Almond 1989; So 1990; Risse-Kappen 1995; Whitehead 1996: 24). Despite this widespread support for an integration of domestic and external factors in the analysis, there is a relative lack of systematic studies. The external dimension is often treated as a secondary factor or residual category, at best.

Research on transitions to democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America tend to conclude that domestic factors were predominant (e.g. O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 19). The more recent transitions in Eastern Europe and some Asian countries, however, suggest that external factors can be very important, if not more important than domestic factors.

The external dimension of democratisation processes is very complex and includes many different aspects. I suggest that there are at least six different questions to be asked when trying to make sense of the external dimension and its relation to domestic aspects of a democratisation process: (1) what external forces (transnational and international actors and structures), (2) through what modes of influence (pressure, adaptation, socialisation), (3) in what country-specific context (level of development, status in international system, situation of political and economic crisis, etc.), (4) influence in what domain (economy, military, civil society etc.), (5) to what effects (timing, nature and intensity of democratisation), (6) in what phase of the democratisation process (pre-transition, transition, consolidation)? The external dimension includes both international relations (i.e. relations among states) and transnational relations (i.e. relations across state boundaries that involve non-state actors). We should pay attention to both structural aspects and actors who (intentionally or not) have an impact on processes of democratisation. In the analysis of the external dimension of regime transitions we should analyse different modes of external influence. Schmitz and Sell (1999) usefully distinguish between pressure from the international environment (based on a realist perspective on international relations), voluntary adaptation to concrete institutional models (a liberal perspective on international relations) and socialisation via diffusion of ideas (a constructivist perspective).

External influences are mediated by domestic structures and the specific global context of the country. A relatively low level of development and a peripheral or semi-peripheral status in the international system are likely to make a country more vulnerable to certain forms of outside pressure whereas a high strategic importance may strengthen the bargaining position of its government. A situation of severe economic, political and social crisis markedly increases the vulnerability of the country, and the external dimension is likely to be more important than under more normal situations. These are all characteristics of the Indonesian case.

The external impact is likely to be different depending on what domain we deal with. Here we focus on the interaction of domestic and external factors in the economic, military and civil society domains. External factors may have both positive and negative effects on a process of democratisation. They may influence the timing of the events, but also the nature and intensity of the process. Finally, we should distinguish between different phases in the process. The external dimension is likely to have a different impact on the transition process compared to both the pre-transition and consolidation phases. We shall bear these points in mind as we proceed to a more detailed analysis of each of the three domains listed above.

The economic domain

One of the most quoted propositions within the field of comparative politics is Lipset's claim that 'the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy' (Lipset 1959: 75). Working within the paradigm of modernisation theory, many scholars have refined the analysis and found empirical evidence of the relationship between economic development and democracy (e.g. Diamond 1992; Hadenius 1992). Given the obvious importance of the international economy in the contemporary world, the external dimension has been surprisingly lacking within modernisation studies. External variables have rarely been specified for inclusion in statistical analyses of their significance for political choices, Johansson (1998) being one of few exceptions. (See also Chapter 2 in the present volume.) Structural theories of democratisation have typically paid more attention to the impact of the global economy and transnational power relations (e.g. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). In a similar analytical approach, Winters (1996) has stressed the structural power of those who control the flow of capital. From this perspective the relationship between the global economy and national democracy is complex. The external economic impact is not necessarily supportive of democracy.

According to conventional modernisation theory, the steady economic growth under the Suharto regime should have resulted in political liberalisation. This did not happen. Instead, the economic crisis triggered the fall of the dictator. Modernisation theory has not shown any impressive explanatory power when it comes to sudden transitions from authoritarian rule. On a general level, however, there is something to the claim that economic development makes it easier for democracy to develop. An economic crisis can undermine the legitimacy of an authoritarian regime, as in Indonesia, but it does not follow that democracy will automatically develop in its stead, especially in countries that are poor and exposed to the fluctuations of the global economy.[1]

Indonesia was hit harder than any other country by the 'Asian crisis'.[2] In order to understand why that was the case, we have to examine how external and domestic factors interacted to exacerbate the crisis. The short-term nature of a large portion of Indonesia's huge foreign debt made the foreign loans impossible to repay when exchange rates dropped a dramatic 80 per cent in 1997–98. The Indonesian economy was especially vulnerable because of the ease with which foreign money could be moved in and out of the country. Corruption was worse in Indonesia than in other countries suffering from the economic crisis. Whereas the comparatively flexible and democratic political systems in Thailand and South Korea managed to produce new, more reform-oriented governments with democratic credentials to implement economic reforms, the authoritarian regime in Indonesia proved itself unable to adjust to the new economic and political situation.

The first response by the Suharto government was to float the currency and call in the International Monetary Fund for assistance. Some banks were closed and several large projects were postponed, but business interests close to the president

were protected. The second IMF package forced on Indonesia on 15 January 1998 did not stop the fall of the rupiah. Prices of consumer goods rose rapidly, first on imported items, but soon spreading to the whole economy. Mass unemployment was another consequence of the economic crisis. Despite domestic as well as external pressure for reform, Suharto tightened his grip on the political system.[3] In March 1998 the People's Consultative Assembly, filled with Suharto loyalists, re-elected the ageing president for a new five-year period. The new cabinet was made up of Suharto's closest associates, including his daughter Tutut and his business and golf partner Bob Hasan. The new government satisfied neither international market forces nor the Indonesian people. The fall of the rupiah continued and mass demonstrations, especially by students, against the Suharto regime became increasingly common. The tough economic policies demanded by the IMF probably worsened the crisis. In order to reduce public spending, as demanded by the IMF, the Suharto government removed some subsidies on fuel and electricity in early May 1998. This led to new price increases and riots, further destabilising the regime. Suharto, who had been known to his people as *Bapak Pembangunan* – Father of Development – was losing control of the political process.

The deteriorating economic situation brought national attention to a factor that hitherto had not been of such political significance: Indonesia's dependence on foreign capital, especially from the IMF. Given its strategic importance to economic developments in the Southeast Asian region, the IMF and the World Bank were anxious to mitigate the worst effects of the crisis (McGillivray and Morrisey 1999). Indonesians became painfully aware of the power of capital and the structural limitations that follow from being a semi-peripheral, if not peripheral, country in the global economy. To be sure, Indonesians had mixed feelings about the prospects of a large aid package from IMF. On the one hand, those who were pushing for political change recognised IMF conditionality as their leverage in reforming the New Order regime, because they viewed themselves as powerless in confronting it single-handedly. On the other, many argued that the conditions of restructuring and the tight monetary policies imposed by the agreement would compromise Indonesia's sovereignty and possibly worsen the economic situation. Students were divided among themselves on this issue, but despite their internal differences, they were in the forefront of translating economic frustrations into political demands. Slogans such as *Harga turun* or 'prices come down' became *Suharto turun* or 'Suharto step down'.

The Asian economic crisis of 1997 was the 'watershed event' in the Indonesian transition. It had its origin outside Indonesia, but its significance for political change is that it exposed the severe problems of corruption, nepotism, social and ethnic cleavages, an unresponsive government structure and lack of political freedom from which the country suffered. The global capitalist system today constitutes the framework for national political processes to an extent that was never the case during the heyday of 'dependency' studies in the 1970s. Capitalist development helped keep the Suharto regime in power for more than three decades but changes in the global economy in the 1990s helped transform the structural parameters of national governance, even in large countries such as

Indonesia. With growing economic liberalisation, national political sovereignty was no longer immune to threats from external economic forces as it had been in earlier decades.

Events in the economic domain have been of great significance to political developments in Indonesia in the past few years. Because of the severity of the economic crisis the IMF and the World Bank have been able to help change the structural parameters within which politics occur. By insisting on increased transparency in public institutions and the dismantling of economic monopolies run by Suharto's cronies, the international finance institutions are potentially fostering democratisation in the country. At the same time, cuts in government spending and removal of public subsidies on basic commodities hit hard against the poor. Thus, this external intervention may have the effect of undermining democratisation as social unrest grows over tighter monetary policies and related public finance reforms. What we can say in concluding this section is that the economic crisis has been instrumental in undermining the legitimacy of an authoritarian regime, but it has not helped in laying the foundation for a complete transition to democracy. The 'standpatters', as Huntington (1991) calls those opposed to reform, still wield power. One place where one can expect this to be the case is the military domain.

The military domain

While different views are expressed in the literature on what the impact of an economic crisis is on democratisation, there is more widespread agreement that a military that meddles in politics is harmful to that process. While the military needs to enjoy a definite measure of professional autonomy to play its role, a democracy requires that its role be subject to civilian control. In other words, its autonomy must not be allowed to spill over into the political realm. This, however, is not the pattern that has dominated much of the Third World in past decades. In many countries, the military leaders have been the rulers. Even where they have not been officially in charge of government, they have exercised considerable influence over civilian leaders. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the literature on regime transitions has paid special attention to the role of the armed forces in this process. As the literature on Latin American politics demonstrates, many such transitions have begun inside the armed forces. For example, tension between 'hard-liners' and 'soft-liners' within the military has opened up and undermined authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 15–17). Based on self-interest or ideological conviction, 'hard-liners' believe that authoritarian rule must continue and are thus prepared to use very repressive means against opponents. 'Soft-liners', on the other hand, believe that the authoritarian regime needs some reforms in order to make it acceptable to moderate sections of the opposition as well as powerful external actors.

Although it has been argued that new democracies have been more successful in improving civil–military relations than they have in most other problem areas (Huntington 1995), establishing full civilian control over the military remains a major problem in many democratising countries. Civilian control in theory means

that all government decisions, including on issues of national security, are made or approved by officials outside the military (Kohn 1997: 142). A transition to democracy must therefore include 'a systematic reduction of many of the military's professional prerogatives and of most, if not all, of its political prerogatives; of the special powers of security and intelligence agencies; and of many other authoritarian residues entrenched at the heart of the state' (Luckham 1996: 128).

The external dimension is to a large extent neglected both in the general theoretical literature on politics and armed forces and in texts on the Indonesian military. This is both strange and problematic given the magnitude of foreign military assistance during the Cold War. The main references to date have been made by representatives of the US military establishment and its academic supporters to the effect that the training of soldiers from authoritarian and military-dominated states in the Third World contributes to the diffusion of 'liberal democratic norms of military professionalism and civilian control' (Huntington 1995: 12). However, critics of US foreign policy argue that Western training and support strengthen military regimes and that Western-trained troops often commit serious violations of human rights (Nairn 2000).

In Indonesia, more so than in most other Third World countries, the post-colonial society was born with powerful armed forces as a result of a protracted struggle for independence. Political ambitions of the Indonesian military, ABRI, were already evident in the 1950s, but it was the 1965 coup events that made the armed forces the dominant political power. ABRI leaders have ever since tended to consider their involvement in politics a permanent feature. The doctrine of the armed forces' 'dual functions', *dwi-fungsi*, served to legitimise this involvement. Its permeation of Indonesian society is secured by its 'territorial structure', meaning that army units are spread all over the country, supervising the civilian administration in every town and village. This is an important aspect of the political power of the military (Crouch 1999: 145).

Although armed forces in other parts of the world had split up along the lines of 'hard-liners' vs 'soft-liners', no such division occurred in Indonesia in the period leading up to the crisis in 1997. Splits within the armed forces had other bases. An often-cited cleavage was between a secular nationalist (red and white) and an Islamic (green) faction within the army (Liddle 1996: 61). Suharto managed to rule by creating or manipulating such splits. No military leader was allowed to develop a power base strong enough to challenge the president. It is significant that as late as after having managed to secure support for his re-election in February 1998, Suharto promoted members of both the nationalist and the 'green' factions to the top posts of ABRI. General Wiranto (representing the secular nationalists) became commander-in-chief and Suharto's son-in-law, Lieutenant General Prabowo (with Islamic connections), took over as commander of the Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) (Mietzner 1999: 73). Rivalries between the two factions would guarantee that a united military would not move against Suharto. Given that the circumstances this time had dramatically changed, however, the split weakened the armed forces to a degree that it contributed to the fall of the president. In particular, the two factions had different approaches to handling the student-led mass protests against Suharto

in March–May 1998. Whereas Wiranto allowed student activists to continue their demonstrations as long as they stayed inside campuses, troops under the command of Prabowo kidnapped, tortured and murdered many radical activists. There is substantial evidence that some of the worst violence in the May 1998 riots was orchestrated by elements within ABRI (Walters 1999: 61; Bourchier 1999: 151). The riots went on for two days without intervention by troops loyal to Prabowo (Mietzner 1999: 79). As the mass protests continued, the army leadership eventually realised that its own interests were no longer served by protecting Suharto's presidency at any cost. Wiranto overlooked the transfer of power to Suharto's vice-president Habibie, promised to protect Suharto and his family, and managed to get Prabowo and his associates dismissed from their active command. Thus Wiranto had full control of the armed forces and seemed to be in a very powerful position. Yet, a series of events rapidly contributed to putting the military on the defensive. The shooting of students at the Trisakti University in Jakarta, the failure to contain the riots in May 1998, the killing of protestors outside the parliament in November 1998, the humiliating defeat in East Timor in 1999, and not the least the popular movement that helped bring down the Suharto regime, all contributed to reducing the influence of the armed forces (Bourchier 1999).

President Wahid, who took up the presidency in October 1999, acted to weaken further the political power of the armed forces by promoting reform-oriented officers. He included several retired generals in his new government, but the fact that a civilian (albeit a conservative academic close to the military) became minister of defence was of great symbolic significance. By giving the post as commander of the armed forces to the navy, Wahid further weakened the army. When he in February 2000 effectively dismissed Wiranto from the government due to investigations into his responsibility for the violence in East Timor during 1999, this was another important step on the way to civilian supremacy. Nevertheless, the Indonesian military remained in a powerful position and continued to constitute a big obstacle to the process of democratisation. Many of the military's professional and political prerogatives (including uncontested parliamentary representation and control of the local bureaucracy through its territorial structure) remained intact, and security and intelligence agencies kept their power. In the second half of 2000 anti-reform sections of the military regained strength, as President Wahid was forced to accept the appointment of conservative officers to key positions within the armed forces and new legislation provided the military with more power and in practice secured impunity for those responsible for severe human rights crimes under the Suharto regime. For a deeper process of democratisation to occur, however, it is not even enough to abolish the formal political power of the armed forces. Indonesia needs a complete demilitarisation of the political culture. After decades of military propaganda, Indonesian society is infected by military ideas and values.

To fully understand the regime transition in Indonesia and the constraints and opportunities associated with the process of bringing the military under civilian control, it is necessary also to examine the external dimension. It is a reasonable assumption to make that Western support made the authoritarian New Order

regime last much longer than it would otherwise have done. As in the case of many other countries, the Cold War provided an excuse for the USA and some of its allies to support the Indonesian military (cf. Luckham 1996: 120). When Suharto seized power in a military take-over in 1965, the USA was already heavily involved in the Vietnam War, so Indonesia was seen as all the more important to support as an anti-communist bastion in Southeast Asia. The Indonesian military received a huge amount of assistance from the USA. A series of training programmes and exchanges between American and Indonesian officers were initiated. Despite the new political situation in the world following the end of the Cold War, the US embassy continued to have very close ties to the military leadership in Indonesia (Nairn 2000). For example, the US defence and army attaché in Jakarta 1990–94 acknowledged his 'widespread contacts at every level within the Indonesian military' and presented a view of East Timor echoing that of the ABRI leadership (Haseman 1995). Lieutenant General Prabowo, in particular, seems to have enjoyed strong support from the USA until he lost the power struggle with General Wiranto after the fall of Suharto.

Because of their dependence on international assistance from the Western powers, however, the Indonesian armed forces are also vulnerable to external political pressure. For example, the US and European decisions to suspend military links with Indonesia because of its human rights violations in East Timor, forced the political and military leadership in Jakarta to accept international troops being sent there. When military relations with the Western powers were threatened, this was a powerful sanction against the Indonesian elite, arguably more powerful than economic sanctions. However, external pressure in the military domain was not maintained for long. Both the EU and the USA resumed military cooperation with Indonesia in 2000. This occurred despite clear indications that growing concern in Jakarta with independence movements in Aceh and West Papua (Irian Jaya) was leading to a reversal to the previous pattern of relying on the military to solve domestic conflicts. Thus, the Indonesian armed forces remained a powerful obstacle to the process of democratisation. The main opponents of the military were found in the civil society domain.

The civil society domain

Civil society can be defined as a public sphere in which actors who are relatively autonomous in relation to the state and economic society develop identities and articulate interests. Social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are among the most important actors within civil society (Uhlin 2001). As Caroline Boussard discusses further in Chapter 9, the literature on democratisation is rich in hypotheses and contains reasonably well-grounded empirical findings about the relationship between civil society and formal democracy. Three points are typically made about the role of civil society in the transition to democracy. First, in a pre-transition phase as well as during the regime transition, actors within civil society put pressure on the authoritarian regime and struggle for democracy. The role of civil society actors like labour, women and environmental movements,

human rights NGOs, intellectuals and religious leaders have been widely acknowledged in the democratisation literature (e.g. O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Haynes 1997). A strong civil society, however, is not necessarily supportive of democratisation. Elements of civil society may in fact take any position towards democracy, from support to authoritarianism, via passivity to active struggle for democracy of some variety (cf. White 1994: 380).

Second, after the transition has started, civil society produces political actors in new democracies. Civil society plays a greater role in putting an end to authoritarian rule than it typically does in building formal democratic institutions (Linz and Stepan 1996), the reason being that as actors within civil society succeed in bringing about a regime transition, they tend to move on to political society by forming political parties and other formal political organisations. Political leaders in new democracies, therefore, whether democratic or anti-democratic, are often former civil society actors.

Third, the pluralist character of civil society in itself supports democratisation. A pluralist civil society balances different interests and makes sure that power is not concentrated in one dominating group or the state. We should, however, remember that widespread popular participation in different civil society organisations is not a guarantee of popular influence on political decision-making in the polity at large or even inside specific civil society organisations.

There are two issues that the literature on civil society tends to overlook. The first is the role of ethnicity and cultural diversity in explaining the conditions for successful democratic transitions. Because so much of this literature draws on the experience of countries where ethnic conflict has not threatened the state, e.g. Latin America, the focus has been on the creation and management of elite pacts. Attempts to study the link between democratisation and ethnic or religious conflict remain inconclusive. There appears to be no obvious positive or negative relationship. In some instances, democratisation can lead to better management of inter-ethnic or inter-religious relations, as democratic institutions allow more space to express differences in constructive ways. It is not clear, however, at which point democratic institutions may begin to produce such opportunities. Before they are established and function well, there can be instability associated, for example, with elections and the establishment of political parties along ethnic lines (Horowitz 1985). Whether a democratic transition leads to peaceful ethnic relations is likely to depend on a dominant elite group being ready to extend a 'generous' offer to minority groups in a conciliatory gesture that facilitates negotiations on political change.

The second omission refers to the transnational dimension of civil society. Although there is a growing interest in the influence that transnational NGOs and social movements exercise, e.g. in the fields of human rights and the environment (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998), the vast majority of analysts of civil society limit themselves to the study of civil society within the borders of a particular state. Unlike the state, however, civil society has no absolute and clear geographic boundaries. The emergence of transnational civil society groups is a trend that is likely to become increasingly strong not only

because of the development and spread of new forms of communication technology, but also because economic and political processes of globalisation give rise to new problems that stimulate interconnections between more local and geographically limited civil societies (Uhlin 2001). A transnational civil society offers a new political space for efforts at democratisation and raises the question of possible forms of democracy on a transnational level. Transnational civil society actors may put pressure on the authoritarian regime and support local and national pro-democracy movements. Transnational human rights and solidarity groups are often important actors in the struggle for democracy.

Civil society under the New Order regime in Indonesia was poorly developed due to state repression. Those NGOs that managed to exist in the first two decades of Suharto's rule were generally weak and held a low political profile. Some new pro-democracy groups developed in the late 1980s and benefited from a brief period of limited political openness in the early 1990s. The pro-democracy movement, however, did not manage to present a united political challenge to the authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, certain actors within Indonesian civil society – especially student activists – were instrumental in the popular protests that brought down Suharto.[4] Huge demonstrations were held daily on university campuses all over the country. When troops shot dead four student demonstrators at Trisakti University in May 1998 the opposition gathered momentum. Opposition figures addressed crowds of demonstrators when the student activists were buried the following day. Rioting broke out in the districts surrounding the university campus, but with little or no participation of students. More than one thousand people died, dozens of women were raped and the material destruction was substantial. Ethnic Chinese were, as many times before, the main targets of the violence. Meanwhile massive peaceful demonstrations occurred in many parts of the country. On 18 May student activists began to occupy the parliament buildings, demanding Suharto's resignation. This show of 'people power' increased the division within the ruling elite and forced representatives of the authoritarian regime to negotiate with moderate opposition figures, including Muslim leaders. Eventually the armed forces abandoned Suharto.

Most commentators agree that the interplay between civil society and the armed forces was essential in the fall of Suharto, but there are different views on who played the leading role. Some claim that civil society actors forced ABRI to abandon Suharto (Bourchier 1999), whereas others argue that civil society actors united against the president only when ABRI signalled it would not continue to support Suharto (Mietzner 1999). It was obviously an interaction between public protests and splits and rethinking within the military that led to the resignation of Suharto. It is, however, highly unlikely that the armed forces would have departed from their support for Suharto if there had not been such strong popular pressure. It is easier to imagine a united opposition within civil society, including the prominent moderate leaders, without the military signalling that it might abandon the president. Thus, I contend that civil society was the driving force in the process.

After having brought down the Suharto government, the pro-democracy alliance quickly disintegrated. Although the Habibie government was widely seen

as a continuation of the New Order regime and the armed forces kept their dominant position in Indonesian politics, student activists found it impossible to keep the momentum of the struggle for more fundamental change. Many civil society leaders were satisfied with the slower pace of political reform that the weak Habibie government was forced to implement. Meanwhile they could position themselves in anticipation of the coming elections. Civil society elites formed new political parties. Each of the main opposition figures became associated with a political party and many NGO activists became involved in party politics. Civil society also produced political leaders for the new government after the relatively democratic elections in June 1999. Ex-President Wahid himself had strong roots in the Indonesian (and transnational) NGO community.

Actors within civil society thus played an important role in the regime transition in Indonesia, but civil society in itself is neither strong nor pluralistic. Patron–client relationships characterised many of the small NGOs that were allowed to exist under the authoritarian regime. Civil society groups that had a clear pro-democracy tendency, and especially those who tried to organise a mass base, were heavily repressed. The fall of Suharto considerably opened the political space within civil society. A large number of new political groups emerged. But it takes a long time to develop a vibrant civil society. A situation of economic crisis, social tension and elite-manipulated ethnic and religious conflicts are not favourable to the development of strong civil society groups.

In analyses of civil society in Indonesia the transnational dimension has to a large extent been neglected. Nevertheless, transnational support for the democratic opposition in Indonesia is nothing new. Transnational human rights groups played an important role in pressuring Western governments to tie human rights to foreign aid as early as the 1970s. The release of political prisoners in the late 1970s was to a large extent due to such foreign pressure on the Indonesian government (Fealy 1995). Transnational NGO networks have contributed to the improvement of the status of human rights in Indonesia (Jetschke 1999). Links between civil society groups in Indonesia and other parts of the world had a considerable impact on the ideas and actions of the Indonesian pro-democracy movement that developed in the 1990s (Uhlin 1997). In this case the foreign influence was mainly a form of socialisation through the diffusion of ideas. Modern information technology has increased the impact of such processes. Internet was an important means of communication for activists involved in the protests that brought about the resignation of Suharto. Key organisers of demonstrations in different parts of the country communicated through electronic messages. By using this new technology they managed to avoid censorship and spread their views of developments that might not have been broadcast in the government-controlled radio and television. Indonesian dissidents were also able to communicate quickly with supporters abroad (Basuki 1998; Marcus 1999). Evidence of ABRI involvement in kidnapping political activists, in orchestrating the May riots and not least in the systematic rape of dozens of Chinese women was gathered and publicised by NGOs with transnational contacts. This played an important role in delegitimising the Indonesian military. Reports in international media contributed to the

international pressure on the Indonesian government to take the human rights abuses of the armed forces seriously.

Unlike in the economic and military domains, socialisation and the diffusion of ideas seem to be the major mode of external influence related to civil society. This is not to say that transnational civil society relations are free from hierarchical power relations and coercive practices. Financial dependency threatens the autonomy of Indonesian civil society groups. While providing necessary resources, foreign funding agencies increase resource inequalities within Indonesian civil society, as the already strong and well-established NGOs tend to receive most funds. There is a risk that foreign funding strengthens old and creates new patron–client relationships within the Indonesian NGO community.

Final reflections

In drawing this chapter to closure, it may first be helpful to make an overall assessment of where Indonesia finds itself in the transition to democracy and then proceed to a discussion of the role of external influences in this process. Three years after the fall of Suharto, the new emerging political regime in Indonesia had severe shortcomings from a democratic point of view, although it represented a very significant step forward compared to the New Order regime. The transition to a formal democracy was still far from complete. It would require further legal changes in order to guarantee inclusive and competitive elections and civil and political rights as well as the abolition – *de jure* and *de facto* – of the military's political power.

The Indonesia case confirms the point made by other 'transitologists' (e.g. Karl 1990) that conditions that trigger the breakdown of an authoritarian regime are not necessarily supportive of a transition to democracy. The economic crisis has been a major problem for the post-Suharto political leadership. If the most serious problems of poverty and corruption cannot be solved, the whole transition process is threatened. People who benefited from the New Order regime remained in powerful positions and resisted political and economic reforms. The Indonesian government had little choice other than to implement the policies prescribed by the IMF. Although the IMF agreed with the need for 'good governance', harsh economic policies hitting hard against millions of poor Indonesians threatened to cause civil unrest and delegitimise not only the government, but also democracy as a political system. Despite serious efforts, the government under the leadership of President Wahid was not able to secure civilian control over the military. Whereas military coups are less likely to receive international support in the post-cold war era, continued military links to the major powers in world politics ensure that the Indonesian armed forces remain a powerful player in Indonesian politics. Sanctions against the Indonesian military introduced by Western powers following the killings and destruction in East Timor were not upheld.

This study confirms the importance of the legacy of the previous regime for the transition. Economic, bureaucratic and military elites that gained strength and political influence under the Suharto regime remained powerful. The depoliticisation and weakening of civil society under the long authoritarian rule could not

be quickly overcome. The New Order left a very strong authoritarian legacy, which made the outcome of the transition highly uncertain. Two years after the first democratic elections since the 1950s, prospects for a successful completion of the transition to democracy seemed rather bleak.

This leaves us with the question of where we place Indonesia in comparison with other countries. Jaggers and Gurr (1995), employing the global and time-series Polity III data set, show that by 1990 the degree of democracy in the world had surpassed the degree of autocracy, thus corroborating Huntington's (1991) description of the third wave. In addition to the quantitative aspects of their measure, which are highly correlated with other measures of democracy previously used in comparative studies, their measure is interesting because it points to the fact that autocratic and democratic elements may coexist with each other for a long time in societies undergoing transition. Thus, according to their measure, by 1994 the world (151 countries) was made up of 18 per cent coherent autocracies 50 per cent coherent democracies, 19 per cent incoherent autocracies, and 13 per cent incoherent democracies. The two 'incoherent' categories are of special interest, partly because they constitute one third of all countries, partly because they indicate how uncertain regime transition processes are likely to be. The outcome is by no means a linear move towards democracy. Reversal towards 'coherent' autocracy is also a probable option. In 1994 Indonesia was an incoherent autocracy, but it has since moved to becoming an incoherent democracy, a step forward on Jaggers and Gurr's scale.

The second concluding observation is related to the role of external influences in the transition. We have pointed to the significant impact of global economic structures in setting the parameters for the Indonesian transition. The restructuring of the global political system following the end of the Cold War opened up more political pressure on the Indonesian military. Conventional international political actors influenced the military domain in a way that was both positive and negative for democracy. Transnational civil society and economic actors, naturally, were prominent in the civil society and economic domains, also with mixed results for democratisation. The most common mode of external influence on the democratisation process in Indonesia has been pressure from various external actors. If we relate the mode of external influence to the different domains, lessons from the Indonesian case give rise to some more general propositions that might be further investigated in future research. The form or logic of external influence tends to be different in different domains. Pressure prevails in the military domain, but is also evident in the economy. Adaptation is mostly associated with the economic sphere, but in our case it was less clear. In a situation of severe economic and political crisis there is not much room for voluntary adaptation to external models and the mode of pressure predominates. Socialisation is the mode of external influence dominating in the domain of civil society.

As a peripheral or semi-peripheral country highly dependent on the global economy, Indonesia was particularly vulnerable to external pressure. The serious economic and political crisis further weakened the position of the Indonesian government and outside actors could step in to take advantage of its impotence. They

acquired an unusually high degree of leverage and could mediate political outcomes in ways that are not possible in normal times. The 1997–98 crisis, therefore, provided an historical opportunity for reform not only for domestic opponents but also for external actors interested in supporting economic and political reforms in the country. Especially interesting here is that Indonesia's size and strategic importance in military and economic security terms in the region did not help those opposed to reform. The international climate had changed by the end of the 1990s so much that autocratic rulers like Suharto enjoyed little leeway to act at their own discretion.

In comparison with trends in other countries in Southeast Asia during the 1997–98 crisis, it seems that the latter had a greater political impact in Indonesia than elsewhere. In Thailand a formal democratic regime was able to produce a change to a more reform-oriented government. In Malaysia the semi-democratic regime turned more authoritarian as opposition against Prime Minister Mahathir grew. Hence, unlike Indonesia, both countries weathered the storm in the sense of incurring fewer changes in the political system. Two factors may explain this. The first is that the Indonesian polity was less adaptable. The second, that the autocratic leadership was seen as corrupt and living off the masses, thus rendering it much less legitimate to convince the public about its ability to solve the crisis. Similar external influences, thus, may have very different effects depending on the domestic context. This observation underlines the claim that the distinction between a domestic and an external dimension must not be dichotomised. They are in reality highly intertwined.

Another proposition that the present case study gives rise to also concerns the effects of external influence on democratisation processes. An economic crisis may influence the timing of a transition, as in Indonesia, but the nature of the democratisation process is more likely to be determined by the political struggle and power relations between different social forces. The struggle between sections of civil society and the military in Indonesia – and external actors trying to influence this struggle – shaped the nature and intensity of the democratisation process. If the military is strong – partly due to external support – and civil society is weak – partly due to a lack of external support – the democratic reform process is likely to be very limited. In Indonesia the process of democratisation is both limited and uncertain due to a relatively weak civil society and a strong military. The continued economic crisis is also an obstacle to the completion of the transition to democracy.

Based on the findings of this study, it may be argued that the external dimension is most important in explaining the beginning of the transition whereas domestic factors are most relevant if we want to understand prospects for a successful completion of the transition. The external dimension is especially important in explaining relatively short-term or sudden events (such as the beginning of a regime transition), whereas domestic factors might be fundamental for more long-term processes (like the consolidation or deepening of democracy). A regime crisis and transition is characterised by great uncertainty about the political rules. In this situation external factors are more likely to have an impact on a political system and domestic actors are more likely to look abroad for support and inspiration. The

mode of external influence that is likely to dominate in a short-term crisis situation is pressure. Adaptation and socialisation are usually associated with more long-term processes of change.

Finally, as this chapter has tried to demonstrate: the external dimension is important in all public domains and relates to all factors and phases in the transition process, although in different ways and to varying extents. From this analysis it should be clear that when analysing the relationship between development and democracy, especially in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, we need to consider the growing global integration that changes the structural parameters of national governance.

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11 Development and democracy

Gains and gaps

Ole Elgström

This volume is an attempt to take stock of research on the relationship between development and democracy. The different contributions point out what is accepted knowledge within the field, they highlight areas in which different viewpoints exist, and they emphasise weaknesses and *lacunae* in existing research. They also, in various ways, try to reduce the gaps they have defined. In this concluding chapter, a humble attempt is made to structure and summarise this debate: what are the lessons learnt by recent research and what challenges still exist for researchers within the field? The selection of 'gains and gaps' is obviously highly subjective. Still, the arguments to be found in the chapters of this book provide a fairly good basis for an assessment of the field.

Theoretical gains and challenges

Today, the positive, causal relationship between development and democracy is an accepted scientific finding. Not only do many prominent scholars strongly support such a causal link for logical and theoretical reasons (Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Huntington 1991; Inglehart 1997; Vanhanen 1997), but the relationship has also been convincingly demonstrated in a large number of empirical studies (see Doorenspleet 2001 and in this volume). We may thus conclude that agreement exists on one basic and crucial point: development promotes democracy.

Recent research – including this volume – also indicates, however, that this strong overall finding has to be problematised and elaborated on. The picture that appears is complex and subtle. Both the independent and the dependent variables have to be carefully defined and specified. We need, as proposed in Chapter 1 of this volume, to pay close attention to different types of intervening variable, *nota bene* the structures and institutions to be found in different national contexts. The validity across time and space of the finding cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, analysis needs to be contextualised: when, where and under what circumstances are various causal mechanisms valid?

First of all, specification of both the independent and dependent variables is called for. The traditional emphasis on economic development has to be broadened to include measures of human development. Recent work by Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2000) is a step in that direction. Their introduction of cultural

variables into quantitative studies of the relation between development and democracy is a break-away from traditional analysis and its preoccupation with economic determinants. Value change, they argue, is a necessary ingredient of human development and an autonomous causal factor behind institutional democratic developments. It still remains to be specified, however, what are the most important values to be associated with democratic development. Interpersonal trust is certainly one crucial factor (Hadenius in this volume), attitudes of solidarity another. Furthermore, it may be argued that the quality of economic development, for example in terms of equality and gender equity, might have tremendous implications for democratic performance. Early choices of development model may have far-ranging consequences for what kind of democracy it is possible to realise. Such a conclusion seems warranted by comparing developments in different geographical regions, including Eastern Europe and the former USSR.

The dependent variable, democracy, also needs to be differentiated. First, we have to make clear whether we are interested in *transition* to democracy, democratic *consolidation* or levels of democratic *performance*. Are we studying the road leading to (formal) democracy, the process of making an already established democracy more resistant to internal and external shocks, or are we trying to describe and explain a certain existing level of 'democratic output'? Different explanatory factors are probably linked to each one of these phenomena. While economic growth or crisis and previous regime behaviour (Uhlin and Boussard in this volume) are likely to be linked to the chance for transition from autocratic rule, elite pacts and the existence of mass democratic values (Hyden and Boussard in this volume) seem to have a major impact on consolidation processes. The role and functions of civil society seem to differ in the transition and the consolidation phases. While a vibrant organisational life may significantly contribute to regime change, continued high levels of civil society protests after democratisation are seen as a problem, at least by some scholars, as they may question the role of democratically elected leaders. On the other hand, civil society may in the consolidation phase also be perceived as a guarantee for a pluralist society and as a vital ingredient in the deepening of democracy. External pressures may influence democratisation in all its phases (Uhlin in this volume), although foreign aid donors are sometimes more interested in stability than in democracy *per se*. But genuine democratic consolidation probably has to be grounded in internal value change and cannot be brought about by external forces only. This is certainly one main message of recent studies on democracy promotion in US foreign policy (Carothers 1999; Diamond 1999; cf. Rose 2000/01).

The concept of democratic performance has to be further developed and refined. The traditional emphasis on formal political events and institutions, notably the holding of general elections, is nowadays often complemented with measures of human rights achievements. Many of the authors in this volume utilise the Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties. Elsewhere, Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman (2000) have developed a multifaceted approach to democracy, including eight different variables, and tested the relationship between development and these different aspects of democracy. The complexity of the

phenomena under study is in itself a strong argument in favour of investigating whether a differentiation of the main variables leads to more sophisticated findings. In highly stylised terms, the most appropriate research question therefore would seem to be: what type of development leads to what type of democracy, and how?

Secondly, and consistent with the previous argument, a major finding of this volume is the variance across time and space in the relationship between development and democracy. There is, argue Doorenspleet (2001 and in this volume) and Lindberg (in this volume), no simple, universal link between the two phenomena. According to both authors, empirical data show that traditional explanations that build on Cold War democratic experiences do not hold for the wave of democratisation that has occurred since the fall of the Berlin Wall. New and more contextually sensitive theoretical constructs are needed. Lindberg, for example, contends that it is impossible to explain why some African states made substantial democratic gains early on while others made their transitions to democracy much later, and much less dramatically, if we were to utilise the same type of explanatory factors in both cases. While the early reforms were anticipatory efforts by domestic elites to stay in power in the face of internal pressure, democratisation in the 1990s is much more the result of external pressure. Lindberg also argues that lessons learnt about democratisation in a Latin American context cannot be easily transplanted to Africa. Doorenspleet's finding that class structure does not seem to have any significant explanatory power in an African context is consistent with such an assertion. The theoretical idea that a larger middle class leads to a higher likelihood that a country makes a transition to democracy is not supported in her study of African data 1990–94. In brief, causal chains may be different in various regions and in different time-periods. Once again, there is a need for complementary careful contextual analysis, as provided, for example, by Hyden with respect to Africa in Chapter 8.

Thirdly, research seems increasingly to focus on intervening variables that may explain the varying significance and strength of the overall relationship between development and democracy. In the words of Diamond, Lipset and Linz:

> Development enhances the prospects for democracy because – *and to the extent that* – it enhances several crucial intervening variables: [. . .] capacities for independent organization and action in civil society [. . .] a more equitable class structure (with reduction of absolute poverty), and a less corrupt, interventionist, rent-seeking state. Where [. . .] economic growth far outstrips these deeper structural and cultural changes, the level or probability of democracy will be much lower than that expected from the country's level of economic development. But where [. . .] these intervening variables have emerged through different historical processes – including tradition and the deliberate and effective innovation of political leaders – the level or probability of democracy will be much greater than that which would be predicted merely from the country's per capita GNP.
>
> (Diamond, Lipset and Linz 1995: 24; italics in original)

In Chapter 1, Goran Hyden highlights two types of intervening factor. Not only does he focus on deep, underlying structures, such as ethnic divisions and class structure, which are indicated in the quotation above, but he also points out the importance of societal institutions, like electoral systems, party systems and institutionalised norms. The explicit consideration of institutional factors, as reflected for example in this volume, is, we would argue, a significant gain in recent research on development and democracy. While attention to deep structures is vital, such factors are extremely difficult to do anything about in the short run. For the policy-oriented analyst, it is more promising to focus on institutional variables, though these are also change resistant and demand long-range planning to influence. In this volume, a broad definition of institution has been used, which, in addition to formal aspects (such as formal organisations), also includes norms and cognitive dimensions. Institutions thus consist of regulative (rules and laws), normative (social obligations, norm obedience) and cognitive structures (common world views). The state as an entity has, according to this view, to be penetrated and its institutional set-up highlighted.

Underlying structures are indeed crucial, although opinions may differ as regards which factors are most consequential. Doorenspleet (in this volume) thus argues that class structure does not matter in explaining transitions to democracy, a theoretical idea that other authors have otherwise strongly supported (Lipset 1959; Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). The role of ethnic cleavages is, as Hadenius (in this volume) reminds us, another contested area. Rustow's thesis that national unity is a prerequisite for democracy was, for example, challenged by Lijphart. At the same time, both Rustow and Lijphart gave political leaders a major role in democratisation processes. This is because political elites can install democratic institutions through deliberate choice. The role of institutions is highlighted in several contributions to this book. One key argument is that institutional choices and decisions on institutional design may have profound consequences for the probability of successful democratisation (in both the transition and consolidation phases). Hadenius, Johannsen and Hilmer Pedersen and Nørgaard (in this volume) introduce institutional variance as an intervening variable.

Factors well known to comparativists, such as electoral systems, party systems and characteristics of civil society, may have a bearing on whether democracy is consolidated or not. Johannsen argues that presidential and parliamentarian systems may differ in their propensity to produce stable democracies. More provocatively, it can also be argued, as Hilmer Pedersen and Nørgaard do, that judicial systems and the normative structures that accompany them exert an influence on the democratisation process. Hilmer Pedersen and Nørgaard find that 'pure' common and civil law constitute stronger legal foundations for democracy than 'mixed' legal systems and that civil law countries may be a better choice than common law ones when it comes to democratisation. Although their research is mostly explorative and by no means definite, the connection between legal/administrative systems and democratic success is certainly under-researched and a worthy topic of future research. Axel Hadenius (in this volume) relates Lijphart's argument

that certain institutions which serve to promote power-sharing and to protect segmental interests are useful to consolidate democracy, but concludes that the evidence seems to be rather mixed when it comes to the actual impact of consociational institutions. Hadenius points out, however, that institutions that further a willingness to accommodate a variety of interests and an ambition to reach consensus can probably be arranged in many different ways, not only in the specific combinations proposed by Lijphart.

The conclusion drawn in this volume is that both structural and process-oriented approaches are necessary to shed further light on the complex relationship between development and democracy. Structural accounts give impressive evidence on a strong, positive correlation between the two phenomena, but cannot, as demonstrated by Doorenspleet (2001), explain how and when transitions from autocracy to democracy take place. In general, explorations of the democratisation process are needed to investigate the causal mechanisms linking development to regime change, and also to trace the paths from unstable to consolidated democracy. Structure-oriented approaches, using quantitative methods, show us what correlations to look into; carefully conducted qualititive studies, using for example process-tracing (Bennett and George 1999), can then explore the mechanisms that bind the variables together. Process-tracing entails following, step by step, the process that links one supposed explanatory factor to its consequences. Vice versa, investigations of process may result in hypotheses that need to be validated by thorough quantitative research. Thus, both methodologies are indispensable.

A concentration on processes is obviously appropriate when focusing on the role of internal and external actors in democratisation. Several chapters in this volume have discussed the influence of external actors and their interplay with domestic forces (Hyden, Boussard, Uhlin). Uhlin, who pays attention to transnational civil society, to economic actors such as the IMF and the World Bank, and to foreign military assistance, makes a useful distinction between three different modes of external influence (cf. Risse, Ropp and Sittink 1999; Risse 2000). His hypothesis, based on the Indonesian case, is that *pressure* prevails in the military domain, but that it may also be found in the economic field. *Adaptation* is most closely associated with the economic sphere, while *socialisation* dominates in norm transmission from transnational civil society. Thomas Risse, analysing the impact of international norms in the field of human rights, has recently argued that processes of domestic change as a result of external and internal pressure follow a certain pattern (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999;). At an initial stage, when repression is the dominant governmental response to human rights complaints, transnational network activity is essential. Such intervention both puts pressure on the autocratic regime and helps to mobilise and strengthen domestic human rights groups. Total denial of the validity of human rights norms is usually followed by partial acceptance of such norms and by tactical concessions. These further fuel the struggle of domestic groups. A regime that has openly acknowledged the validity of human rights norms becomes vulnerable to international shaming. When norms reach prescriptive status, the freedom of action of the regime is very limited. At this stage, domestic non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) have become increasingly important. Transnational pressures are no longer needed.

Boussard's analysis of the Central American case demonstrates some problems that are often associated with foreign aid to civil society. Aid dependence may create artificial organisations without popular support. Civil society is at times given priority at the expense of political, democratically elected, institutions. Foreign assistance in this arena therefore has to be carefully balanced and directed at forces with autonomous popular backing. Risse's model suggests that such aid is more necessary in the initial stages of a democratisation process, but that support is needed until democracy is fully consolidated. Otherwise there is a risk of setbacks and renewed tight elite rule. Lindberg's finding in this volume that many of the newly established African democracies were a result of external pressure, and that several countries have experienced de-democratisation when pressure diminished, strengthens this point.

Gaps in existing research

In the previous section we have already identified areas in which further research is sorely needed. Cultural variables have to be genuinely integrated into the causal model leading from economic development to democracy. The recent focus on human development is a step in the right direction. Still, there is a need to further explore the relationship between underlying 'deep values' (like beliefs about human nature or about the roles of state and society), norms related to and enshrined in formal organisations and other regulative institutions, and democratic values *per se*. The importance of interpersonal trust, for example, has been hinted at by several contributors to this volume, but the exact linkages between trust and democracy still need to be worked out, not least in empirical studies.

The role of class structures as an intervening variable between development and democracy is undetermined. Dorenspleet's piece in this book has given us no conclusive answer but it has called into question the validity of previous findings. She hypothesises that the relationship may be time-bound and/or geographically limited by showing that class is unrelated to recent periods of democratic transition. Here, the statistical material has to be enlarged to include other time periods and geographical areas. And, as the author herself asserts, ways to develop more valid operationalisations of the key concept, class, have to be found. There is a clear possibility, however, that the concept of class – developed in studies of Europe – is of less relevance in analysing other cultural contexts. Civil society is another research area associated with several question marks. In fact, the very utility and fruitfulness of the concept has been put into question. The field is fraught with definitional problems. So many different types of association and organisation are today cramped into the concept that the risk is obvious of inconclusive findings and vague generalisations. There is a need for conceptual specification and categorisation, which then could form the basis for further research, for example on the role of different elements of civil society in transition and consolidation respectively.

Anders Uhlin, and others, have brought the military and its activities in democratisation processes back to the fore. We can talk about a 'return of the military' in many new-born democracies. Often, it is a return in civilian clothing. The borderline between civilian and military is today often fluid as high-ranking officers tend to participate in political life as civilians and not as official representatives of the military force. President Chavez, a former military officer of Venezuela, and President Obasanjo, once leading a military *junta* in Nigeria, are cases in point.

The importance attached to institutions in this volume seems a promising path to follow in future research. Our knowledge about the role of institutions as mediating factors with an impact on democratic transitions and consolidation is underdeveloped. It may be that institutional characteristics affect the possibility of *democratic learning*, including the learning of trust. 'Learning' is defined as 'a change in beliefs [. . .] or the development of new beliefs, skills or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience' (Levy 1994: 283). The assumption that institutional choice may affect learning capacity is consistent with the arguments of, for example, Lijphart. To illustrate, it has been argued that presidential systems are less prone to result in consolidated democracies than parliamentary systems, and this might be related to the higher openness and learning capacity of popular assemblies (cf. Stepan and Skach 1993). Hadenius (in this volume) argues that supportive institutional arrangements, facilitating the learning of trust, may be crucial for the building of accord and affinity in divided societies. We are in all these cases focusing on 'complex learning', where a recognition of value conflict leads to a modification of goals as well as means (cf. Levy 1994: 286). Key actors acquire a more complex cognitive structure, for example regarding causes and effects, and reorient their preferences to the favour of democratic values (although it should be pointed out that learning is not always 'positive'; actors may learn 'the wrong thing'). From social psychology and organisation theory we know that the success and failure of previous policies are particularly important external inputs and that people learn more from failure than from success. Also, people learn more from their own experiences than from the experiences of others (Levy 1994: 304–05). Therefore, early experiences from efforts to promote democratisation may be of extraordinary importance for subsequent actions. Elites as well as masses learn from past successes and attempt to replicate them – but unsuccessful attempts at democratisation may severely inhibit future efforts. In brief, research must therefore pay attention to the effects of institutional choices on trust-building, and elaborate on under what circumstances democratic learning is encouraged or discouraged.

In general, there is an obvious need for increased interplay between the different approaches to the subject. Although some inroads have been made, as reflected in this book, most scholars with an interest in the structural requisites of democracy still stick to quantitative analysis using rather crude measures of both the dependent and the independent variables. Likewise, process-oriented researchers tend to adhere to qualitative methods of analysis and to ignore (in deeds if not in words) the need to validate possible general associations beyond their detailed empirical work. Both approaches have to be developed and refined and, above all, have to engage in mutual debate, trying to learn from each other's analytical gains.

We have also identified a gap between scholars who emphasise structural explanations and those who focus on the role of actors as driving forces. What is lacking is research that centres on the interaction between the levels. One promising approach in this respect, which curiously enough seems to have had little impact upon development studies up till now, is constructivism. Constructivists (of the middle-of-the-road persuasion who try to build bridges between positivist and post-positivist accounts; cf. Adler 1997; Finnemore 1996; Ruggie 1998) consciously engage in efforts to demonstrate how structures that they see as socially constructed phenomena constrain human action and how human agency in the long run may result in structural change. For example, constructivists interpret national interests as socially constructed and view these interests as closely linked to and interacting with national identities. Interests are thus not exogenously derived and objectively 'given' but stem from ideational constructs such as identities and images.

In the same vein, the complex relationship between development, national identity, institutions and democracy seems an appropriate topic for a constructivist approach. In as far as ethnic divisions are viewed as obstacles to democratisation, the construction of identities is of major importance for the theme of this volume. Ethnic or national identities are thus not historically given – they are not 'primordial' – but a result of the interplay between existing ideational structures, previous institutional choices and human agency. The creation of identity may be manipulated by unscrupulous leaders. Such efforts are contrary to the aspirations for national unity and consensus that many scholars believe are preconditions for democratic consolidation. Existing institutions, including norms and cognitive structures, facilitate or impede the construction of identities. To illustrate, research could focus on concrete on-going and previous processes of identity formation in African states, the role of agency in these processes and their effects on democratisation. Identities are closely related to culture and ideas. Constructivism could, I believe, serve to close the gap between scholars who explore the role of values by quantitative studies and those more interested in discourses and qualitative interpretations of normative structures. The notions of human development and value change may be interpreted as linking more traditional approaches to a cultural and constructivist logic.

Constructivists are convinced that ideas have an autonomous impact on political decisions. Several constructivist scholars have demonstrated how non-state actors in world politics have successfully acted as norm entrepreneurs, spreading the norms they cherish to states and international organisations. Special attention has been paid to the role of NGOs as driving forces in for example the ban on land mines, in the diffusion of gender norms and in the environmental sphere (Price 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Nadelmann 1990). Constructivists have analysed how norms emerge and evolve, what norms are most likely to spread, under what circumstances and to what actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Florini 1996; Legro 1997; Checkel 1999). Many of these insights could easily be transferred to the discussion about external agency in the spread of democracy norms. For example, the degree of legitimacy of norm entrepreneurs is an essential feature in

explaining diffusion success or failure (Bernstein 2000). Elements of emulation, praise and shaming may all contribute to creating a 'norm cascade', exporting a norm to new areas (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901–03; Checkel 1997; 1999). All these concepts and ideas can be readily applied in discussing the diffusion of human rights and other democratic values.

A final gap concerns the effects of *globalisation*. Global economic, technological and cultural trends certainly influence both regional and local development and democratic processes. To illustrate, the revolution in information technology has created new instruments for indigenous social movements as well as for external pressure groups to try to influence democratisation processes, i.e. by building transnational coalitions. Transnational ideational influence has thereby been enormously facilitated (Risse-Kappen 1995). The effects of globalised economic patterns on the relationship between development and democracy also need to be further examined. As globalisation processes create new preconditions for economic growth, at the same time changing the position of countries in the world economy, the chances for democratic developments are also influenced. Johansson's chapter in this volume is one early attempt to clarify the causal mechanisms involved. The author underlines the need for empirical studies that actually investigate the links between development, democracy and globalisation. In order to do so, 'globalisation' has to be operationalised. Pointing out that higher levels of interdependence are a lowest common denominator for most definitions of globalisation, Johansson distinguishes between globalisation of decisions and societies and develops a number of – not only economic – indicators for these phenomena. He also makes an initial effort to apply his operationalisation to empirical data on 124 countries. The cases are selected on the basis of their democratic track record and the result shows that the state of globalisation has some independent explanatory power, even when controlling for the level of socio-economic development. However, in this cross-sectional analysis it becomes evident that initial level of development is still of great importance for globalisation to have a positive effect on the level of democracy.

Our overall conclusion is that because of the rapid growth of the literature on the development–democracy nexus, volumes like this are needed on a regular basis to provide both overview and synthesis. We do not claim to have succeeded in all respects in our own effort to do so, but we have taken an important step in the right direction with our emphasis on gains and gaps in substance and theory as well as method.

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Notes

1 Development and democracy: an overview

1 I am grateful to my research assistant, Emilia Gioreva, for helping to work out typology.
2 It could, of course, be argued that Tarrow's study should be listed on the structuralist side, because 'political opportunity' implies a focus on structures. I place him on the agency side, however, because what he is really arguing is the importance of actors seizing political opportunities as they arise.
3 This figure and discussion borrows from information contained in Munck and Verkuilen (2000).

2 Globalisation and democracy: an overlooked connection

1 International Bibliography of Social Science (IBSS).
2 There are of course also exceptions to this simplification. For instance, Uhlin (1995) presents a study of democracy and diffusion in Indonesia in which he uses democratisation in a broader sense including social movements and gender issues. The interest of this analysis pertains primarily to attitudes and behaviour rather than to formal institutions. Elofsson (1998) is another exception with reference to gender and democratisation in the case of Chile.
3 However, we should note that the distinction made here is certainly not the only possible principle of division in order to create a systematisation. With a less state-centric approach it could for instance be argued that the level of analysis provides us with another distinction, which can be employed in a taxonomy of approaches to globalisation and democracy – on its own or in combination with that concerning the object of study (cf. Johansson 2000). If we accept the notion of globalisation as being a reality, we also have to recognise that globalisation of necessity constitutes a subordination of territorial frontiers. This means that the efforts to contemplate the world as a single system of democracy, and not primarily as divided into nationally defined democracies and non-democracies, become relevant (Clark 1999: 23). The very nature of globalisation makes it intuitively quite logical to scrutinise its impact at the systemic level and not limit the analysis to the units, i.e. the individual states (for studies aimed at democracy beyond the nation-state, cf. Greven and Pauly 2000; Habermas 2000; Holden 2000; Zürn 2000; Archibugi, Held and Köhler 1998; McGrew 1997a).
4 The Freedom House survey has been published since 1973 and consists of an evaluation of political rights and civil liberties for all the countries of the world. Based on the values in these two dimensions the institute establishes a ranking dividing the countries into the categories of Free, Partly Free and Not Free (Karatnycky 2000: 188). A comprehensive account of how the survey is constructed and implemented is given in *Freedom of the World: 1999–2000* or at www.freedomhouse.org. For theoretical and methodologi-

cal concerns with the Freedom House data set including its validity and reliability, cf. Chapter 1 and the section 'Methodological issues'.

5 The definition of an electoral democracy is obviously more extensive when it only requires free and competitive elections. It does not consider whether the election and political institutions are followed by political rights and civil liberties (Sørensen 1998: 129; Elklit 1994: 90).

6 The diffusion approach originates among others from Huntington (1991: 280) who included diffusion as one out of five explanatory factors in the third wave of democratisation. Metaphors such as the snowball-, the domino- and the demonstration effect were used by Huntington to illustrate how successful processes of democratisation in one country pass on and inspire corresponding changes in other countries. Cf. also Starr (1991: 356).

7 This is not to say, however, that the modernisation theory has been without opponents. In *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) one of the most prominent, Samuel P. Huntington, claimed a nearly opposite relation between economic development and the prospects for democracy (Hadenius 1992: 80).

8 As opposed to the case-oriented approach. Cf. Potter (1997).

9 Among others Diamond (1992), Arat (1991, 1988) and Bollen (1979) belong to those who have concerned themselves with discussing, testing and refining the empirical trial of the connection between development and democratisation.

10 Our aim here is not to give an inclusive account of modernisation theory or analyse its theoretical and methodological shortcomings. For those kinds of concern, cf. Potter (1997), Diamond (1992), Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), and Chapter 1 by Goran Hyden in this volume.

11 My translation.

12 As opposed to outer-directed linkages which work the other way around and apparently are more of IR theory.

13 As we use the concept of globalisation here it is compatible with Goldmann's interpretation of internationalisation. Originally, however, the dimensions mentioned later on were designated as internationalisation of problems and internationalisation of societies.

14 Data for 2000. Source: UIA 2000: 1467–70.

15 The sample of conventions include: International convention on: 1. the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (1965), 2. civil and political rights (1966), 3. economic, social and cultural rights (1966), the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (1979), against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (1984), and the rights of the child (1989). Data for 2000. Source: UNDP 2000: 48–51.

16 Data for 2000. Source: UIA 2000: 1467–70.

17 Data for 1999. Source: World Bank 2001; CIA 2001.

18 Data for 1998. Source: UNCTAD 2000 319–31.

19 The index is constructed by ranking the countries from the highest to the lowest value of each of the five indicators. The aggregated rank of the country is then divided by five, which produces the average rank number and also the position of the countries in relation to each other. The ranking system avoids the risk of distortion caused by extreme values on a single indicator, which create a false effect on the country's overall figure for globalisation. In addition, the rank numbers create a common 'currency' necessary in order to transform the indicators into an index.

20 No rules without exceptions, though. Here they are three, namely Greece, Portugal and Spain rated Free in 1975, 1977 and 1978. Starting the third wave of democratisation and enjoying the status of membership in the EU, they ought to be considered as mature democracies.

21 The reason for excluding the micro states is to avoid the risk of getting a data set distorted by states of special preconditions, and thereby do justice to the general relationship between globalisation and democracy. Most of them are islands and

politically and economically dependent on greater states (Moore 1995: 6). *The micro states are:* Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brunei, Cape Verde, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Grenada, Iceland, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Solomon Islands, San Marino, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. According to the definition *the mature democracies are:* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom and USA. *Missing data:* Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Eritrea, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland and Yugoslavia.

22 See note 4.

23 Instead of employing a variety of development variables – as in the original work of the modernisation school – we use the composite Human Development Index (HDI) created by UNDP. This choice follows from Diamond's (1992) argument in favour of HDI as more representative of the modernisation theory and therefore a better predictor of the level of democracy than for instance just the GDP per capita. HDI is based not only on economic development but also on how a country manages to transform this into a higher average of life expectancy, ratio of literacy and education, i.e. effects of economic growth. The range of the index goes from 0 to 1 with three decimals (UNDP 2000: 147).

24 The r state the degree of linear correlation between two variables and range from –1 to +1. Positive correlation implies that low or high values on both variables occur simultaneously, while a negative correlation implies different values on the two variables. Values close to zero mean no linear correlation. By r^2 the Rsq is produced, which gives the percentage by which one variable's variation is explained by the variation of the other. Furthermore, '[t]he partial correlation coefficient [. . .] provides us with a single measure of linear association between two variables while adjusting for the linear effects of one or more additional variables. Properly used, partial correlation is a useful technique for uncovering spurious relationships, identifying intervening variables, and detecting hidden relationships' (Norusis 1992: 284, 295).

25 The clusters are created by simply categorising the globalisation index and HDI into three and two groups respectively. It must be noted that the categorisation is based on *n*, i.e. they consist of equally many cases, and have no theoretical connections. As long as we aim at finding general trends and do not analyse particular cases, this is not of great concern.

26 The $r = -0.32$ is significant at the 0.05 level and $r = -0.62$ is significant at the 0.01 level (Pearson).

3 Development, class and democracy: is there a relationship?

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1 The path to democracy travelled by India was rather special, according to Moore. Most conditions on the democracy route were absent, e.g. there was no strong bourgeoisie and no commercialisation of agriculture. So, India's parliamentary democracy is an exceptional case, Moore stated (Moore 1966: 430–32).

2 The choice of the years in which the variables are measured is disputable. While Inglehart preferred to be vague concerning the exact year in which the size of the tertiary sector was measured, it was certainly after 1950 (Inglehart 1988: 1218) and probably circa 1980 (Inglehart 1988: 1219). Anyway, the independent variable, i.e. the size of the middle class – was measured partly after the dependent variable, i.e. the stability of democracy that runs from 1900 to 1986 in Inglehart's model. It is clear that such a model is debatable.

3 Another right and relevant way of measuring the size of the different classes is by analysing opinion surveys in which people are asked to which class they belong. Knowing these subjective feelings, descriptions of the class structure as a whole can be generated. Data for developed countries are available, but broad surveys have not yet been done in the countries that are central in this chapter: that is, in countries that were non-democratic in 1989. Therefore, it is not yet possible to use such a measurement in a broad cross-national study.
4 Wright considered both skills and ownership as important dimensions. The middle class and working class both have no ownership: that is, no control over the means of production. As a consequence, the two classes differ only with respect to their skills.
5 It should be noted that the results in this chapter contradict the thesis of Nelson Kasfir (1998a; 1998b) that we should pay more emphasis to social structure. The results in this chapter show that class did not matter. On the other hand, I agree with Kasfir's second statement that the influence of civil society on democratisation is overestimated. Here, I do not oppose Kasfir's ideas: recently, I forcefully defended the notion that the impact of civil society has been exaggerated in the literature on democratisation and that the use of the concept has many theoretical and empirical problems (Doorenspleet 2001: Chapter 9).

4 Transitions to democracy: pros and cons of the Rustow–Lijphart approach

1 For a recent application of this theory on a grand scale, see Inglehart (1997).
2 In the case of Sweden, Rustow particularly emphasises the 'Great Compromise' of 1907, whereby universal male suffrage and proportional representation were instituted. This could indeed be seen as an exchange, inasmuch as the Left (Liberals and Social Democrats) got universal male suffrage, while the Conservatives (who were in the government at the time) got PR, and so were assured of substantial parliamentary representation in the future. Yet it was not in fact a compromise. The Liberal leaders and the Social Democrats had not taken part in any negotiations, and they voted against the proposal in Parliament. Two years later, however, they accepted the new constitutional arrangements. A better example of a 'Great Compromise' in Sweden is the elite settlement which paved the way for the new constitution in 1809, thus ending a period of strong royal predominance (see, e.g., Burton, Gunther and Higley 1995).
3 It should be noted that, in a way, the connection between Lijphart and Rustow I have made here is a construed one. Rustow makes only a very general reference to Lijphart, and the latter mentions Rustow only in passing. As I will try to show, however, their approaches are related in several ways.
4 More recently, Putnam (1993) has argued for the existence of such a reciprocal explanatory logic.
5 According to Jonathan Hartlyn, Columbia and Venezuela should be seen as examples of the consociational approach (1988: 236–37).
6 His prime example is Turkey. In that country, democracy was introduced in 1945 without any prior agreement among major political groups. For this Turkey had to pay a price, according to Rustow, inasmuch as the military took over in the early 1960s. A few years later, a new democratic experiment started – now after a deal between the military and the big agrarian party. This time, therefore, democracy was 'on a more secure basis' (1970: 362). With the benefit of hindsight, however, we know that this regime too was ousted by the military, after some 15 years. A pact, evidently, is no guarantee of success.
7 It should be observed that, in a recent Freedom House assessment, neither Colombia nor Venezuela is rated democratic ('free'). At one time they had both been (Karatnycky 2000)
8 Basically, of course, this is an empirical question. As argued in Hadenius (2001), the evidence appears to support the tenet that a long experience with pluralist politics is a favourable condition.

9 Lijphart's treatment of India is an illustrative example. Using his specific institutional criteria, Lijphart (1977) classifies India as a majoritarian democracy. In a later account (1996), however, he uses a broader, Apter-like definition of consociationalism. India is then rated a consociational democracy.
10 The cases of Colombia and Venezuela illustrate this.
11 Lijphart (1977) has a strange way of arguing on this point. Citing an undemocratic thinker such as John Calhoun, he maintains that the consociational formula is as democratic as the majoritarian. One source of confusion in Lijphart's book-keeping is that he does not make a clear distinction between the majority principle, as a decisional rule, and the majoritarian (British) electoral system. The first is an essential democratic principle; the latter is not (it is merely one democratic option among many). See also Lijphart (1999), where 'consociationalism' has been transformed into a vague notion of 'consensus democracy'.
12 Various means of popular integration are discussed in Hadenius and Karvonen (2001).

5 Development, law and democracy: exploring a new relationship

This paper is part of the DEMSTAR-Programme (Democracy, the State, and Administrative Reforms), funded by the Danish Social Science Research Council and Aarhus University Research Foundation. For further information on the programme, see www.demstar.dk. We thank Mikhael Nielsen who assisted in performing the statistical analyses.

1 We are using the theoretically unassuming concept 'emerging democracies' as a descriptive term to label political systems having just 'emerged' from a non-democratic system and as a match to 'emerging markets', 'emerging' from a non-market position. Hence, the term does not carry any indication about how far they have come and how far they have to go, or whether they are in the 'transition' or 'consolidation' phase. For an account of where and how the 'emerging markets' concept originated, see Partnoy 1998: 68–69.
2 In comparative law, the label 'legal family' has traditionally been used as the term for common, civil and socialist law. In order to stress the systemic aspect of legal institutions, we have chosen to use the label 'legal systems' for the formal judicial institutions. For a discussion on classification of legal systems see for example David and Brierley (1985) and de Cruz (1995).
3 Our categorisation of countries into the variable 'legal systems' is based on the CIA *World Fact Book*, checked with country descriptions in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. For other variables we have used the data set coded in the DEMSTAR database. The latter is described in the Appendix to Chapter 6 by Lars Johannsen in this volume.
4 The Freedom House ratings can be found on www.freedomhouse.org.
5 Bova (1997) has checked two specific years in FH and found that PR and CL ratings are identical in 49 per cent of the cases, and in 43 per cent of the cases it differs only 1 point, i.e. only 8 per cent of the cases rate PR more than 2 points different from CL. We therefore expect but a small variance between PR and CL.
6 First, a mean for each country is calculated for each period, after which a mean for each legal system is calculated.
7 A Sheffe's post-hoc test shows that in the second period, 1990–97, the FH means of the groups of common and civil law are significantly different from the other groups at a 5 per cent significant level. It also shows other combinations of differences (including the difference between common and civil law) to be insignificant. The same results apply to the 1972–90 period except that the FH mean of the group of socialist law countries is significantly different from the group of post-colonial common law countries. The pattern appears regardless of including or excluding OECD countries.
8 The education index is composed of adult literacy rate (weighted two-thirds) and combined first-, second-, and third-level gross enrolment ratio (weighted one-third) in 1997 (*World Development Indicators*, World Bank 1999).

9 Barro (1997) argues that economic growth from the exploitation of natural resources and not from industrial investments and investments in human capital may not be considered a cause of political and democratic development.

6 Modernisation and democracy: electoral systems as intermediate variable

This chapter was first prepared for presentation at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Copenhagen, Denmark, 14–19 April 2000. I am thankful for the comments received from the participants in the workshop.

1 The 1981 expanded edition of *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*.
2 If no significant effects can be demonstrated by the methods of empirical investigation, questions must be raised whether the variables, despite their apparent face value in the theoretical discussion, contribute to our understanding of democratisation. This research agenda is similar to the one proposed by B. Guy Peters (1999: 78–79).
3 Credit is due to Michael Nielsen and Asmus Rotne who assist in the compilation of material for and maintenance of the DEMSTAR database.
4 North (1990) sets out a similar agenda for institutionalism.
5 In all fairness we should note that Lijphart's project is related to the question of comparing consensual democracy with majoritarian democracy.
6 See also Vowles' (1999) comment on Bohrer's (1997) findings and Bohrer's own rebuttal (Bohrer, 1999). This debate is illustrative of the three points we are trying to make here.
7 Eckstein (1997, 1998) echoes this at a more abstract level. He warns against focusing on institutions without considering the context: culture, socio-economic development and historical experience.
8 For a discussion on the use of the Freedom House rankings as a proxy for the level of democracy, see Gastil (1991), Coppedge and Reinicke (1991), Inkeles (1991), and Johannsen (2000).
9 It can be argued that the MMP system should be categorised as a semi-proportional system. When this is not done here, it is because proportionality is consciously sought through the proportional compensation component. For further discussions on these matters, see Johannsen (2000).
10 Meaningful comparisons can only be made between FPRT, TRS, Parallel and List-PR systems, but we shall not attempt to continue this here.
11 The use of significance tests is debatable given the nature of the sample(s). Irrespective of the arguments for or against such a course of action, my (admittedly) strongest motivation is to follow the current of both empirical institutionalism and modernisation studies (see, for example, Hadenius (1992) and Lijphart (1999)). For further discussion on significance testing in non-randomised samples, see Risbjerg Thomsen (1997). For a discussion of the post-hoc test (Scheffe) applied here, see Hays (1974: 605–12).
12 These findings are robust to alternative classifications of what constitutes the developing world. We can use the 1997 Human Development Index (UNDP, 1999) to classify the countries into three groups: 1 ($0.8 \leq HDI \leq 1.0$), 2 ($0.5 \leq HDI < 0.8$) and 3 ($HDI < 0.5$). If the developing world is composed of groups 2 + 3, the corresponding means for the level of democracy are PM (9.65), SP (8.07) and PR (7.06) with $N = 106$. If we only look at the third group, the corresponding means for the level of democracy are PM (10.23), SP (10.33) and PR (8.50) with $N = 33$. However, for none of these alternative classifications is the overall F significant at the 0.10 level or better.
13 The higher average for the PR systems compared to the PM systems to a large extent depends on the two lowest ranked PR countries. If these, for whatever reason, were removed from the sample, the two means would approximate each other.
14 For the global sample Scheffe's post-hoc test revealed significant means differences between the PR and PM systems ($F = 15.169$, significance 0.01 or better). For the

developing world sample Scheffe's post-hoc test revealed significant means differences between the PR and PM systems ($F = 8.869$, significance 0.01 or better).

15 Lipset (1981) compared the means of these indices for his four groups: European Stable Democracies, European Dictatorships, Latin American Democracies and Latin American Dictatorships.

16 They examine the years 1973, 1975, 1980 and 1985.

17 Three multiple regressions were made. The first model included GDP per capita, the education index and urbanisation. The second model included HDI and urbanisation. From these it became evident that urbanisation should be dropped. Urbanisation is not significant, nor does it maintain its direction. A third model consisting of GDP per capita and the education index alone after the removal of urbanisation was then tested.

7 Problems of measuring democracy: illustrations from Africa

1 The label 'Africa' has increasingly come to denote what is properly called sub-Saharan Africa, including some 48 states. In economic analyses South Africa is normally excluded from this group because of its exceptional (with regard to African conditions) economic resources and development. In this chapter, however, South Africa is included but 'Africa' used to mean sub-Saharan Africa.

2 The number of elections and the percentage of legislative seats held by the largest party by 1989 cause no problems. Both are based on reliable sources and are relatively unproblematic to use in multivariate regressions. The other two variables – military intervention and frequency of political protest – however, seem rather blunt as operationalised by the authors. Military intervention has three values: –1 as the code for anti-democratic intervention, 0 as the code for no intervention and 1 as the code for pro-democratic intervention. Frequency of political protest has only three values: 0 for no protests, 1 for some and 2 for frequent protests. The authors coded both variables. Indeed, there is nothing inherently wrong with using variables on the ordinal scale in multivariate analyses. Yet, with two such crude variables out of four, the analytical value of a high adjusted R^2 in terms of its effect-descriptive value is reduced (cf. Shively 1990: 103–04).

3 The model produces short of 16 percent explained variance for 1992. In fact, the indicator on political protests appears to be significant *only* in estimates of the level of democracy in 1992 and 1994. While military intervention appears to be significantly related to the level of democracy for all the following years, the two institutional indicators are only partially applicable.

4 The inheritance of colonialism in the French colonies was distinct from the British and others in many ways. Moreover, their strong connection to France generally prevailed for example through the CFA-exchange mechanism. France was also relatively quick to jump on the bandwagon of applying political conditionalities to aid and credits in the 1990s, even if the French implementation of political conditionalities was generally reinforced with more modesty (Uvin 1993).

5 Military intervention and the frequency of political protest are ordinal variables on the lowest possible level with only three values. The degree of opposition cohesion is a dummy where 0 represents 'fragmented opposition, weak leadership and organisation' and 1 denotes 'dominant opposition leader and relatively strong and cohesive organisation' (Bratton and van de Walle 1996). Only ODA as percentage of GNP is a decisive variable at the interval level.

6 The cases excluded were: Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan and Swaziland.

7 A crosscheck of the level of ODA from 1989 with the level in 1993 reveals that the variance is small. For the majority of countries, the difference is relatively small, hence the use of 1993 figures to fill in the gaps from 1989.

8 ODA as percentage of GNP 1989 correlates with military expenditure as percentage of

GNP 1986 at 0.652** and with military expenditures as percentage of GNP 1989 at 0.384*. ODA's correlation with GNP per capita was –0.442**, with annual average growth 1989 –0.359* and with long-term debt by central government as a percentage of GNP in 1989 0.705**, or total external debt as a percentage of GNP 1989 0.612**. A crosscheck with the measure for aid flows from 1993 produces similar results.

9 Given that the classification function does not equal 0 and 1 respectively. In that case, the dummy is a very powerful predictor on its own.
10 The misclassified cases were Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland.
11 All discriminant analyses used Fisher's linear discriminant functions in SPSS 7.5.
12 The misclassified cases were: Central African Republic, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Thus, only a few overlapped with the analysis of the first period.
13 This time I could not save all cases since the combination of variables here deselected three cases as compared to the previous model which included all cases but one.
14 The misclassified cases were Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar and Somalia. Five out of these six misclassified cases were misclassified with the previous model as well. These cases might be outliners that are deviants from a general pattern.
15 I have produced correlation- and compare means analyses on all these relationships and the results corroborate the conclusion. Because of limited space, I do not report these here.

8 Democratisation in Africa: in search of depth and nuances

1 It is an irony that Kenya turned authoritarian by adopting a constitutional one-party system in 1982, the same year as Berg-Schlosser's coverage ended.
2 This does not mean that all citizens in these countries have enjoyed equal citizenship rights. Minority groups, especially of Indian descent, have often been denied their rights in ways similar to what happened in the American South prior to the rise of the civil rights movement in the 1950s.

9 Civil society and democratisation: conceptual and empirical challenges

1 '[A consolidated democracy] is one in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organised interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers. This does not mean that there are no minorities ready to challenge and question the legitimacy of the democratic process by nondemocratic means. It means, however, that the major actors do not turn to them and that they remain politically isolated. To put it simply, democracy must be seen as "the only game in town"' (Linz 1990: 158). Linz and Stepan argue that democracy must be seen as 'the only game in town' in attitudes, in behaviour and in the constitution to be consolidated. Democracy is the only game in town attitudinally when a majority of the population considers democracy to be the best political system to be ruled by, even in times when the performance of the government is low; behaviourally when no major important political actor tries to overthrow the democratically elected government, and the government does not have to devote all resources to fighting non-democratic groups; and constitutionally when all parts in society learn and get used to solving conflicts within the democratic rules and norms (Linz and Stepan 1996: 5).
2 All figures are from the Latinobarómetro 1996 as they are presented in Lagos (1997) and PNUD (1997).
3 The institutions measured in the Latinobarómetro are, for example: legislative institutions, police, political parties, judicial powers and executive institutions.

4 Ranging from 78 per cent in El Salvador to 88 per cent in Honduras.
5 What we refer to when we speak of strengthening political society is strengthening the core institutions of political society: political parties, legislatures, electoral systems (cf. Linz and Stepan 1996: 8) so that they become efficient and legitimate, and a more general appreciation of the democratic system evolves.
6 Lagos (1997) and PNUD (1997) have different figures for Nicaragua. According to Lagos it is 69 per cent and according to PNUD it is 68 per cent.

10 Development and the external dimension of regime transitions: illustrations from Indonesia

1 For a thorough comparative analysis of the impact of economic crises on democratic transitions see Haggard and Kaufman (1995).
2 On the economic crisis in Indonesia see Hill (1998); McGillivray and Morrisey (1999); Robison and Rosser (2000).
3 For an overview of events leading to the fall of Suharto see Bhakti (1998); Forrester (1998); Aspinall, Feith and van Klinken (1999); Eklöf (1999).
4 For an analysis of the 1998 student movement see Aspinall (1999).

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