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The Collegial Tradition in the Age of Mass Higher Education

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Preface

Much of our writing reflects a long-term commitment to the analysis of the collegial tradition in higher education. This commitment is reflected most strongly in *Oxford and the Decline of the Collegiate Tradition* (2000), which we are pleased to say will re-appear as a considerably revised second edition (*Oxford, The Collegiate University: Conflict, Consensus and Continuity*) to be published by Springer in the near future. To some extent this volume, *The Collegial Tradition in the Age of Mass Higher Education*, is a reaction to the charge that our work has been too narrowly focussed upon the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge (Oxbridge). Not surprisingly, you would expect us to reject that critique, while responding constructively to it. The focus may be narrow, and although the relative presence and, more arguably, the influence of Oxford and Cambridge may have declined in English higher education, they remain important national universities. Moreover, as the plethora of so-called world-class higher education league tables would have us believe, they also have a powerful international status. This, however, is essentially a defensive response dependent upon the alleged reputations of the two universities.

This book is intent on making a more substantial argument. To examine the collegial tradition in higher education means much more than presenting a nostalgic look at the past. It is our contention that we are dissecting a model of the university that exhibits a range of characteristics, which are to be found widely in higher education systems and their universities, and not just in England. Our work on the two ancient collegiate universities represents one particular theme in the collegial tradition, which will be set in a much broader context as this book unfolds. We believe, therefore, that there is a synergy of purposes between this volume and our work on Oxbridge; the one complements and reinforces the other. This book therefore will be reinforced by the forthcoming *Oxford, The Collegiate University: Conflict, Consensus and Continuity* and certain themes that are more integral to Oxbridge's collegial tradition (for example, tutorial teaching) will discussed fully in that setting. Furthermore, while we may believe that Oxford and Cambridge, as collegiate universities, represent the most developed model of collegiality, this book consistently illustrates the point that its core ideas can be expressed in different ways in contrasting supportive contexts.

This book has several purposes. Initially we dissect the concept of collegiality, with this essentially conceptual task being followed by an overview of the

contemporary challenges that the collegial tradition faces. There are three broad themes contained within our interpretation of collegiality. First, the collegiate university with the focus mainly upon collegiality as a federal model of governance in which university and college share responsibility for the delivery of key academic functions. Second, there are colleges and commensality with the former providing the framework within which the latter develops. Broadly speaking commensality refers to the social fabric of the colleges, the manner in which the college shapes the socio-cultural and academic relationships of its members – tutors to tutors, students to students and tutors to students.

Third, there is the organisation of the academic life of the university. While within the collegiate university the most distinctive facet of this relationship may be the pattern of interaction between college and university, the book examines the extent to which non-collegiate universities nonetheless incorporate the idea of collegiality in their delivery of academic goals. The proposition is that universities need to be organised collegially if they are going to deliver high-quality academic goals. The proposition is examined in the light of the recent penetration of the university by the so-called managerial revolution.

The intellectual focus of this book is broad ranging. Self-evidently, the concept of collegiality is at the heart of the book, which inevitably leads to an analysis of the idea of the university. The conceptual interest is located within both a social science and historical context. The history, with the exception of the wide-ranging historical sweep of the collegial tradition in continental Europe, focuses mainly upon developments in higher education that have unfolded over the past 25 years. The historical material, however, provides the context for our interpretation of the contemporary collegial tradition.

We draw upon political science to understand the process of change in higher education with particular reference to the policy significance of ideas, the manner in which different national systems of governance have attempted to influence (more by steering than outright state control) the development of higher education and the response of higher education institutions to state pressure. We turn to sociology to examine the way in which the internal dynamics of college life have been destabilised by social change as well as to show how broader societal pressures, often expressed through market mechanisms, have impacted upon higher education institutions. The central, albeit obvious, contention is that on an international front higher education is experiencing if not a crisis then a profound ongoing change in its character. And, of course, we believe that the prism of collegiality provides a fruitful avenue for charting and interpreting those changes.

Our previous research has taken an essentially British, more particularly English, perspective. That continues to be true of this book, although we have attempted to move beyond our own national boundary with chapters that examine differing aspects of the collegial tradition in the United States (the importance of the residential college in American higher education) and in continental Europe (the identity of the university in the light of the power of the academic and student guilds, including the role of the professoriate). It would have been possible to extend the empirical scope to create a broader international perspective. We feel, however, that even

within the current confines of our range of empirical case studies, we come close already to stretching the boundaries of our academic competence and credibility.

More importantly, however, although the comparative dimension is critical to this book, it should be remembered that it serves a particular purpose. It is designed to demonstrate both different interpretations of the collegial tradition and in the process provide a guide to its conceptual and pragmatic boundaries. No doubt (with particular reference to those Commonwealth nations – Australia, Canada and New Zealand – in which the British settled in large numbers) we can find different manifestations of the collegial tradition, but we believe we have a sufficiently robust comparative perspective that covers the most interesting variations. Furthermore, it is our contention that intrinsic to the idea of the university is the penetration of, and at the very least powerfully influencing the conduct of its academic affairs, the values of collegiality. If this is so, then a truly global empirical scope was required. Almost by default, therefore, we have been purposefully focussed as opposed to being dangerously over-ambitious.

Undoubtedly this is an academic text, but hopefully one that avoids most of the jargon that seems to overwhelm the current burgeoning research into higher education. We have written it with the intention of providing a serious analysis of current developments in higher education. We offer no policy prescriptions, although we do present alternative scenarios of the future of the collegial tradition. Besides the usual academic audience – students (both undergraduates and postgraduates) and academic faculty – we hope it will also appeal to those who are formally responsible for shaping the direction of higher education policy at both the institutional and system levels. It will not tell them, except in the broadest possible terms, what we believe is the best way forward, but we hope that it will help to provide a context in which they can think more deeply and reflectively about that most important of issues: the essence of the idea – and the ideal – of the university.

Oxford, UK
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But, of course, we alone take responsibility for the final product.

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Part I
Collegiality: Definitions and Challenges

Chapter 1
Collegiality: Setting the Agenda

Introduction

The writing of this book requires us to place our study of the collegial tradition in context: the social, economic and political forces with which it interacts, thus reshaping its identity. There is, however, an additional context within which this book has to be located, that is the literature attempting to understand – describe, analyse, evaluate and prescribe – the concept of collegiality. It is the presentation of this framework, composed of the pertinent literature, that forms the central purpose of this chapter.

This chapter has three interrelated tasks. First, it will present a broad overview of the literature that dissects the collegial tradition. At the outset, however, it is important to stress that this is not meant to be a comprehensive review. To take this approach would push the book in a direction that we do not wish to follow. The book is not intended as an all-encompassing study of collegiality, that is its principles and practices in all its forms. While it will review different interpretations of the idea of collegiality, the primary focus is upon the pressures to which it is exposed and how, consequently, the idea of collegiality is being reshaped. What role does it have to play within the present-day governance of higher education and perhaps more importantly within the individual institutions of higher education? There is a particular, although far from exclusive, reference to the English model of higher education. At the outset, it should be said that we believe collegial values need to be embedded into the governance and administration of institutions of higher education. We can debate the extent, depth and form of that commitment but underwriting the book is the conviction that if higher education institutions are to fulfil their core concerns of teaching, learning and research, they need to have embraced collegiality.

The literature review takes the form of presenting different approaches to the study of collegiality. There is a necessary degree of arbitrariness about this dissection: there is no definitive list of categories into which the approaches can be placed, the categories are not sharply defined, and authors and their research more often than not fall into more than one category. In other words, we have exercised our judgement in these matters. However, the reader will be able to see what decisions we have made and reach his or her own assessments as to their appropriateness. If the process should appear somewhat arbitrary (which, undoubtedly, it is) then in our

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defence we can only plead the need to impose some sort of order on a large body of literature and re-iterate the point that this overview is not meant to be a systematic literature review.

The second task is to outline the direction of our book in relation to this categorisation of the literature. The purpose is to show the book's own focus while demonstrating how it ties into the established canon. This is a straightforward descriptive task, which should not only draw the reader's attention to topics that may be of particular interest but also show the scope of our work. The third and final objective is the most difficult, but the most interesting. If the second task addresses the scope of the book, the third presents its intellectual purposes. A convincing case can be made out for an in-depth study of the collegial tradition in its own right, and we will make that case. However, it is part of the rationale of this book that our analysis of collegiality should both throw light upon developments in national – and more particularly the English – systems of higher education and present a model for the analysis of change in higher education. The collegial tradition is integral to a particular idea of the university and its evolution therefore presents an opportunity to interpret the process of change in higher education.

Studying Collegiality

The second chapter of this book examines in some depth different interpretations of the collegial tradition. It is our contention that, although there is frequent reference in the higher education literature to the concept of collegiality, there is not a great deal of systematic investigation of its meaning. More often than not meaning is implied with the assumption that a familiar concept is being introduced to the readers who share a broad understanding of its nature. As an aside, it is interesting to ponder why so much attention has been devoted to analysing the idea of the university while – in comparison – there has been so little systematic dissection of the various models of higher education, including the collegial model. Part of the purpose of this book is to suggest an alternative analytical route: that to commence with the comparative dissection of different working models of higher education provides a more meaningful approach to understanding the idea of the university.

The book draws a broad distinction between the expression of collegiality within the collegiate universities (of which Oxford and Cambridge are currently – and perhaps always have been – the best exemplars) and the manifestation of the collegial tradition within varying national systems of higher education. Can the values of collegiality be sustained only within collegiate universities with federal structures of governance? Does the idea of collegiality take a particular, perhaps narrower, path, within non-collegiate universities? Is it possible that the collegiate universities, while maintaining their formal allegiance to collegial values, in practice operate in ways that in fact suggest these values are being abandoned slowly rather than consistently embraced? Within the latter situation, is it possible for the collegial tradition to be more deeply entrenched in non-collegiate than the collegiate universities?

The literature review follows the structure of the book – first the analysis of the collegial tradition within Oxford and Cambridge with the focus then shifting to its manifestation more broadly within Britain and then overseas (the United States and continental Europe). But, to re-iterate a previous warning, the categorisation acts as a means of organising a complex range of material and is far from watertight.

The Collegiate Universities

It is doubtful if there is a single institution of higher education in the world that is without a record of its own history, even if it should be no more than a short website overview. Moreover, biographies and autobiographies of the university-educated invariably contain reminiscences on the blessings and/or trials and tribulations of undergraduate days. And the wide range of popular – in literature, film and television – manifestations of collegiality should not be forgotten (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000: 4–8). To this mass of material is to be added those archives that periodically either the universities themselves or the public authorities consider they are obliged to produce – the official enquiries. What is true of higher education institutions at large is particularly true of those universities, which include Oxford and Cambridge, with both national and international reputations. This may reflect the tendency to indulge institutions that arguably are already too self-indulgent but it is perfectly understandable given the purported significance of those universities in terms of their contribution to both scholarship and the shaping of state and society.

The Historical Overview

There is an abundance of histories of the two English collegiate universities as well as their respective colleges. These tend to be descriptive chronologies exhibiting varying degrees of analytical depth. In an insightful, if overly generous, observation Sheldon Rothblatt has claimed that

> Institutional histories proper vary considerably in purpose, scope and content. Some are relatively straightforward, impressively detailed and pioneering narrative studies or descriptions of university growth in terms of faculties, facilities, curricula and numbers of students, with additional miscellaneous information (Rothblatt, 1981: 17).

With particular reference to Oxford and Cambridge, Rothblatt goes on to argue that the histories tend to fall within one of two broad camps. First there is the Whig history, which includes ‘the many notable volumes D.A. Winstanley produced on Cambridge’, and second there is ‘. . .the class conflict or class interest theory . . . which may be derived from strands of labour history or from a general theory of social change in industrial society’ (Rothblatt, 1981: 17, 19–20). The Whig historians focussed upon the political dynamic that drove the process of change, which they interpreted essentially in positive terms, as Oxford and

Cambridge responded – or were required to respond – to the shifting balance of political authority within society at large. As the nineteenth century unfolded, English society at large and its two ancient universities were more closely aligned. For the class theorists, although broadly in sympathy with the Whig interpretation of the course of historical change, this was far from a benign development. Oxford and Cambridge, along with the public schools, were enveloped in the process of class accommodation between declining gentry and emerging bourgeoisie. It was the poor but talented potential scholars who paid the price as access to scholarships was restructured to squeeze out the needy in favour of those who had been privately educated.

This historical polarisation can be refined in various ways. The very title of Rothblatt's masterpiece *The Revolution of the Dons* forcefully reminds us that it was an internal revolution that shifted sharply the balance in Oxbridge's role from 'church' to 'scholarship' while securing for the college teaching fellows the dominant stake in the newly regenerated colleges – an internal political process with a vengeance. Halsey, unsurprisingly given his sociological training, has been to the fore in interpreting the socio-cultural terms on which the revolution was achieved. In the struggle to reshape the socio-cultural identity of the two universities, it was Jowett's idea of the cultivated man that prevailed (Halsey, 1992: 27–33; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2008: 306). In the words of Perkin, a new model of the gentleman (obviously building on Newman's contribution) was created: '. . . efficient, responsible Christian gentlemen rather than effete aristocratic rakes and loungers' (Perkin, 1989: 367). It was not that the increasingly influential German model with its emphasis on inculcating expertise and enhancing research (which, in his later years, was so attractive to Mark Pattison) was rejected but that it had to coexist – essentially as a minor partner – in universities that continued to stress the importance of undergraduate teaching – of a certain style – as their primary purpose.

A further refinement that we have suggested (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2008: 303–318) is – like Rothblatt and Halsey – to look inwards but to see the changes as essential to institutional well-being – as reflected in the need to resist the burgeoning challenge of the emerging English civics along with the Scottish universities (in this respect note in particular professional, and more especially medical, education) and thereby to broaden their appeal to the upper echelons of the expanding bourgeoisie. A sophisticated interpretation of this thesis is to see the institutional changes as driven in part by the wider academy, including developments in research and scholarship in continental Europe. The implication is that without a positive response to 'the scientific revolution' both Oxford and Cambridge would have become increasingly irrelevant as centres of research, scholarship and learning (for a powerful presentation of this thesis, see Ashby, 1966). Thus the Whig historians and class theorists are by-passed while both Rothblatt and Halsey's interpretations are incorporated within an essentially Weberian perspective: there are shifts in the balance of power amongst internal interests, which are responding to broad societal change (social, economic and political) incorporating critical developments in the idea of the university. This is the basis for institutional regeneration in the

nineteenth century that was vital to securing the long-term reputations of Oxford and Cambridge.

Of course, the very nature of some historical overviews makes it impossible to discern any clear-cut interpretations of the evolving persona of the collegiate universities. The best example of this genre is the massive multi-volume ‘official’ *The History of the University of Oxford* with a range of authors contributing to each volume with (and inevitably so) no consistently discernible internal intellectual position within each volume and no standard range of research themes from volume to volume, although certain topics (for example, portrayals of ‘college life’) appear regularly.

Within both the edited collections and many journal articles, it is specific developments, even puzzling problems, which the authors set out to unravel. Two very interesting examples of this are Howarth’s *Science Education in Late Victorian Oxford: A Curious Case of Failure?* (1987: 334–371) and Macleod and Moseley’s *The ‘Naturals’ and Victorian Cambridge: Reflections on the Anatomy of an Elite, 1851–1914* (1980: 177–195). While both articles of necessity relate developments within the university to wider social change, they draw the balance between the two very differently. Howarth’s article is more introspective – to explain how the collegial character of Oxford, with comparative reference to Cambridge, retarded the development of its departments of natural and applied sciences, so delaying the creation of a thriving research tradition in these fields. Macleod and Moseley also analyse the context within which Cambridge established its Natural Sciences Tripos (NST) but their focus is more upon the impact of external developments – the growth in the sciences and scientific medicine at Owen’s College, Manchester and University College, London and the concomitant expansion of a national scientific elite.

It is the studies of developments at Oxbridge in the nineteenth century, and more specifically from 1850 onwards, that throw into sharpest relief the distinctiveness between the in-depth studies of the changing universities and those examining broader social change into which developments within the collegiate universities are incorporated. On the one hand, there is the scholarly Rothblatt (1968) and the more workmanlike Engel (1983) analysing on the basis of careful research ‘the revolution of the dons’ in response to those social changes. On the other hand are to be found Anderson (1992) with a broad focus on the universities and elite formation in Britain, Perkin’s research into the rise of the professions in England (1989), Coleman’s careful analysis of the cultural influence of the collegiate universities and the public schools upon Victorian society (Coleman, 1973), and in a similar vein – but with more sweeping generalisations – the claims of Barnett (1972) and Wiener (1986). It would be wrong to polarise the different approaches too sharply, but a distinction can be drawn between an approach that moves from the changing socio-cultural structure and its concomitant values towards Oxbridge and the public schools, as compared to an in-depth analysis of the latter from which wide societal implications can then be drawn (with contributions to Stone’s edited two volumes *The University in Society*, 1974, containing both approaches).

Contemporary Analysis

Much of the historical literature has the embedded assumption that Oxbridge was 'exceptional' and analysed how that quality was reshaped in the context of broad societal change and how in turn Oxbridge exerted its influence upon the emerging social order. The contemporary literature (with 1945 as a convenient starting point given that from this date onwards the two universities, if not all their colleges, are increasingly dependent upon public funding) has a somewhat different focus. The emphasis is upon the relationship of Oxbridge to the wider system of higher education in Britain. In terms of its presence within the higher education system, it is in decline and, although it may continue to sustain its relative prestige (Halsey & Trow, 1971: 213–225), it has had few formal privileges in terms of its relationship to the funding council and the state apparatus. Indeed, there is considerable questioning of its peculiar qualities. The broad ranging overviews (Rose & Ziman, 1964; Tapper & Salter, 1992; Brooke, 1993; Brock, 1994; Soares – with reference to Oxford – 1999; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000) illustrate various aspects of this decline in their unique character – the colleges are less monastic; recruitment of undergraduates is driven more by meritocratic criteria than by social considerations; there is a relative expansion of research, graduate students and the sciences; and Oxbridge has to demonstrate its continuing excellence rather than live contentedly on its laurels.

Much of the contemporary analyses centre on a number of perceived key problems with a frequent stress upon how these should be addressed by the collegiate universities (for a reasonably composite overview of this approach, see Kenny & Kenny, 2007). The most commented upon are undergraduate admissions (evoking more or less continuous scrutiny and undoubtedly receiving the most public and political attention, which is likely to continue given the broad political acceptance of the widening participation agenda), the governance and administration of the two universities (which has been a central issue for the internal reports, see University of Oxford, 1966 – the Franks Report; University of Oxford, 1997a – the North Report; University of Cambridge, 1962 – Bridges Syndicate; University of Cambridge, 1989 – the Wass Syndicate) and funding (with respect to the augmentation of overall income, how to distribute public resources to meet the respective needs of the universities and colleges and the distribution of college endowment income).

It is scarcely surprising that much of the analysis of the issues either swiftly degenerates into an attack upon Oxbridge's so-called peculiarities or manifests an inherent sympathy for the two universities even if (as is certainly true of the internal official reports) there is a perceived need for reform. Thus, to give a concrete illustration, in social terms Oxbridge remains grossly unrepresentative of the country at large even though access may be more determined essentially by meritocratic criteria (Ball, 2003: 88–92). But Halsey and McCrum (2000) inform us of *The Slow but Certain Arrival of Equality at Oxford University*. In terms of governance and administration, the Treasury's *Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration* comments:

> Responses to the review have, however, also shown a general sense of unease about the direction of both universities. Despite its successes, there is a view that Cambridge, for example, could have done even more to build dynamic industry partnerships if it had been better organised while it is agreed that universities should not be regarded as businesses, there is a view that both Oxford and Cambridge would benefit from being more business-like in the way they run their affairs (Treasury, 2003, paragraph 5.15).

This was followed by the recommendation (Recommendation 7.6) that 'In 3 years' time, the vice chancellors of Oxford and Cambridge should take stock of the progress of reform, and agree with the Government what further steps will be necessary for the two universities to sustain their global position.' In concrete terms, the subsequent struggle has evolved around the representation of lay members on the two universities' Councils (in each case the central, if not ultimate, governing body), with a fierce and public struggle at Oxford in which the proposal to give lay membership of Council majority representation has been defeated.

In terms of the question of funding, there are both important internal divisions within the two universities and the need to respond to an external perception that views Oxbridge as receiving overly generous public funding. Both Oxford and Cambridge would see the greatest threat to their global positions as not dependent upon their structures of governance and administration but rather a consequence of their relative poverty in comparison to other so-called world-class universities. Thus, in conjunction with British universities in general, there has been a concerted attempt to be more entrepreneurial, to secure more resources in the marketplace. The internal struggles in part centre around the need to distribute public resources between university and college. What are the mechanisms that will secure not only a fair college–university divide but also an equitable distribution amongst the colleges? The other big financial issue is college endowment resources. Should these be used solely at the discretion of the colleges to which the endowments have been made? Or should endowment income be pooled and then distributed on the basis of either a formula or some criteria of need? Kenny and Kenny (2007: 64–74, 86–88) present an excellent overview of these issues with respect to Oxford, although their support for 'an appreciable redistribution of wealth' over and above the current arrangements would meet fierce opposition.

The internal focus on the essentially technical issues of wealth generation and the internal distribution of resources is juxtaposed to an external view of Oxbridge that at times comes close to a moral critique, which considers them to be institutions in receipt of disproportionate amounts of public funding but unprepared to make an equitable contribution to society. A very recent re-iteration of this view is found in the interview that Brian Roper, the then Vice-Chancellor of London Metropolitan University, gave to *Times Higher Education* in which he is reported as saying:

> The money could be better used in places which transform people's lives rather than serving as rather superior finishing schools, which is what these other places are about (Attwood, 2008: 4).

This is not the occasion for an analysis of this perspective, but rather the purpose is to point out that Roper's views reflect a position within British higher education

that has some support. Whereas it is possible to argue that there was a central focus to the historical interpretations of the collegiate universities (that is the adjustment of the two universities to Victorian England) the contemporary analyses have been issue oriented and demonstrate highly polarised positions. However, it should not be forgotten that there were also bitter conflicts as those nineteenth century histories unfolded (note, Mark Pattison's very jaundiced view of collegiate Oxford – Pattison, 1868; Sparrow, 1967; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000: 11).

The Wider Impact

In view of the comparative embrace of this book, it is important to examine the impact of the collegiate universities – actual, imagined and hoped for – upon models of higher education more generally. While the concept of collegiality in the broad sense is viewed positively, the evaluation of the influence of the collegiate universities is more ambivalent. Amongst the most ardent admirers was Woodrow Wilson who in a letter to his wife wrote, 'Oxford is enough to take one's heart by storm . . . I am afraid that if there were a place for me here, America would only see me again to sell the house, to fetch you and the children' (as quoted in Duke, 1996: 82 – see also Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000: 59).

But it is one thing to infatuate a future American president and quite another to construct a viable collegiate model in a not altogether sympathetic social context. As Duke goes on to note:

> If the American research university was recent, revolutionary, bureaucratic and impersonal, the English college was ancient, intimate, and, in the best Whig tradition, the product of an inevitable march forward. If the product of the teutonized American university of the present was an expert and a specialist, the product of the anglicised university of the near future would once more be a gentlemen and a scholar (Duke, 1996: 63).

Indeed, a key part of Duke's book is his cataloguing of the repeated failure to establish little more than residential colleges in American universities, although the fascination is far from dead as witnessed by Clark Kerr's 1960s high hopes for the Santa Cruz campus of the University of California. In the words of Rothblatt,

> The Swarthmore ideal of liberal education with a stress on ethical conduct remained with him forever, best illustrated by his dream of making the new University of California at Santa Cruz, which he founded, into a west coast version of a collegiate Cambridge University. What he had in mind was a publicly-financed 'Swarthmore under the redwoods' (Rothblatt's obituary of Clark Kerr).

And it is no secret that Santa Cruz, as part of the research-driven University of California, has found it difficult to sustain its identity as a collegiate experiment devoted to quality undergraduate education (see pp. 119–121 for a review of the experiment).

Where apparently the collegiate universities have had an impact upon the academic culture of other institutions, it has not always been perceived as a benign influence. In a general historical overview, Barnes essentially concludes that the

English civic universities lost confidence in their ability to establish their own tradition of higher education and '. . . as the twentieth century progressed, Manchester along with the rest of the civics appeared to forfeit the sense of confidence and purpose which had initially sustained them' and there was a need to investigate what happened between 1900 and the 1930s that led '. . . contemporaries and historians alike to point accusingly to the civics' failure to become anything other than pale imitations of Oxford and Cambridge?' (Barnes, 1996: 272). A strong theme of Davie's scholarship on Scottish higher education (*The Democratic Intellect*, 1961; *The Crisis of the Democratic Intellect*, 1986) is the extent to which that powerful tradition was undermined by English (for which read 'Oxbridge') values. This is not the place to examine the claim (for a discussion of the issue, see Slee, 1987: 194–197; Paterson, 1998: 459–474; 2003: 67–93) but to note that the idea of the residential college as a central pivot within the collegiate model of the university is not always perceived as the most perfect expression of higher education.

The Collegial Tradition

Whereas there may be divided views of the Oxbridge model of higher education and of the wisdom of trying to create collegiate universities (especially in alien cultural territory), there is no such equivocation regarding the collegial tradition. It is almost universally seen as an intrinsic component of any higher education institution that wants to call itself a university. But the literature focuses overwhelmingly on the issues of governance and administration and tends to ignore the wider socio-cultural and pedagogical dimensions of collegiality. Furthermore, it is a literature that sees these more limited (but arguably the more important) dimensions of collegiality as threatened by the expansion of a managerial ethos, which is invariably presented as a mode of conducting institutional affairs that enshrines values antithetical to the collegial tradition (for a good overview of the managerial ethos as a 'cultural challenge', see Bargh, Scott, & Smith, 1996).

Like the collegial tradition precisely what is meant by the managerial ethos is open to interpretation. Based on his study of organisational change in four British universities, Taylor encapsulates concisely the 'spirit' of managerialism:

> The new arrangements developed in all four universities represented a key change in the role of academic staff within the governance and management of their institutions. Widespread consultation was replaced by short decision-making procedures; committee structures within a framework of Senate and Council found their powers eroded and replaced by more executive bodies and individual managers; involvement and participation was replaced by devolved responsibilities and accountability. In this sense, the supremacy of the academic body in university governance and management had been reduced beyond recognition (Taylor, 2006: 271).

And, not surprisingly, there have been some interesting attempts to construct models of universities as organisations. For example, Dopson and McNay, on the basis of interrelating 'tight' and 'loose' control of policy definition and policy

implementation, arrive at four models, which they term collegium, bureaucracy, corporation and enterprise (Dopson & McNay, 1996: 25, and for a wider discussion, see Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000: 19–20).

However it is defined, the emergence of the managerial ethos within higher education is clearly a critical development. What is of importance for this book is to gauge its impact upon collegial values. In the conclusion to his article, Taylor records that, '. . . in all four universities the changes were agreed and implemented with remarkably little dissent' (2006: 271). But in a telling observation, one young lecturer commented, '. . . I am not bothered if I am not involved directly in management. My concern is my teaching and my research; others are better equipped to worry about running the University' (2006: 272). But, as we argue, running the university inevitably involves making policy decisions about both teaching and research. Initiating and implementing research and teaching programmes may be made at the level of the department and/or research centre, but between initiation and implementation there could well be a range of issues to be resolved – most notably involving the commitment of institutional resources. Who will make these decisions and how are they to be made?

In his *Managing Successful Universities*, Shattock (2003: 85–91) has devoted a few interesting pages discussing 'Collegiality or Managerial Direction', which is a model of ambivalence. Collegiality is perceived as virtuous, but higher education institutions also need leadership and management. Moreover (in similar vein to Taylor's 'young lecturer'), collegiality is required for the delivery of teaching and research, but there also needs to be 'managerial direction'. Furthermore, there is an explicit attack on 'the cosiness' of Cambridge '. . .which weakens accountability and results in a serious loss of authority in carrying out the essential legal requirements of corporate governance' (Shattock, 2003: 107).

If Shattock's position can be described as ambivalent, there is no shortage of hostile interpretations of the managerial ethos, which see it as an explicit attack upon the collegial values that supposedly were embedded in British higher education. However, it should be said that those who believe this to be so can have scant knowledge of how those institutions that acquired the university label after 1992 traditionally functioned (for a solid overview, see Pratt, 1997: 274–304). In an unrelenting (if not very reflective) attack upon what they term 'the new managerialism' in British higher education, Deem, Hillyard and Reed conclude that, 'Though collegiality has had its problems, a more collective approach to managing and leading higher education may still have much to offer' (2007: 187). But this ray of hope is no more than a glimmer:

> We have also extensively illustrated the hold of neo-technocratic Managerialism over UK universities and government policy on higher education. Though we have also observed that there is resistance to this from academics, support staff and some manager-academics themselves, there is little sign that this resistance has produced any new ideas about how to manage universities, that would set aside the *tenacious* grip of NM (Deem et al., 2007: 189, stress added).

Is collegiality within British institutions of higher education in its death throes as this research would have us believe? Or are we witnessing a restructuring of

university administration that redefines our understanding of collegiality? And in this respect note Hardy's positive evaluation of collegial strategies in the management of retrenchment in Canadian universities (1996: 183–184). However, the conceptual difficulty, which all analysts (including ourselves) have to address, is that collegiality is a socially constructed concept, and thus its meaning is always problematic. What has to change or be sustained before we can evaluate its strength? Does it make sense to retain the idea of collegiality in the context of senior management groups, the commitment to strong institutional leadership and speedy decision-making?

Our Focus: Intellectual Concerns and Empirical Directions

At the outset we should say that this is a study of collegiality exclusively within the context of higher education, where we believe it has been expressed in its most developed form, to the point that it has been widely perceived as intrinsic to the idea of a university. Although the focus is very much upon contemporary developments, it is impossible to consider the present in isolation from the past. This is particularly true when much of our current understanding of collegiality was forged in the past, with the latter half of the nineteenth century being especially important for the English collegiate universities of Oxford and Cambridge. What are the pressures upon this legacy? How is this heritage being reshaped and what does this mean for our understanding of collegiality?

There is a body of literature, which we have already noted, that views the prospects for collegiality very pessimistically (indeed we ourselves are the authors of *Oxford and the Decline of the Collegiate Tradition*). But the stress in this book, driven very much by the recognition of the inevitability of change, is upon reformulation, although we recognise this may take a form which some would argue means the abandonment of core collegial values. To explore this process we examine collegiality in different institutional settings. Within the British context we commence with the ancient collegiate universities of Oxford and Cambridge; next we examine the pressures upon federal structures of governance in the belief that, although federalism and collegiality are not synonymous, federalism is central to the definition of a collegiate university; and then we turn to universities that have residential colleges but are not collegiate universities (a proposition that needs to be analysed). Thereafter we examine the rise of the managerial ethos with reference to five British universities, consider the form it has taken and its challenge to the collegial tradition. The final part of the book will draw upon the US and continental European traditions of higher education that are different (even very different) from those prevailing in Britain to explore whether they can be said to have a collegial tradition.

Our intellectual interests, as expressed in this book, are very diverse. Although we present a basically sympathetic interpretation of the two ancient English collegiate universities (perhaps too sympathetic for many) as well as the broader idea of the collegial tradition, we think of ourselves as reflective and sympathetic insiders and by no means advocates for a cause. Second, we believe we are presenting an

in-depth study of the meaning of collegiality. There may be an enormous literature that draws upon the concept but there are few sustained attempts to define what it actually means. In this respect we are returning to, while elaborating quite substantially, the first chapter ('Collegiality Debated') of our *Oxford and the Decline of the Collegiate Tradition* (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000: 1–28). We would see our contribution as attempting to parallel the work of Rothblatt with particular reference to 'The Idea of a College' in his *The Revolution of the Dons* (1968: 209–247). However, the differences are also very clear-cut: his focus is Cambridge, it is placed in a particular historical context, and it emerges out of a much deeper research basis.

Halsey used his stylish *The Decline of Donnish Dominion* (1992) to present an overview of the development of British higher education mainly from the Robbins Report of the mid-1960s onwards. To some extent we have done the same, although our remit is both wider (the international dimension) and narrower (with the concept of collegiality constituting the central thread). Donnish dominion is an element in the traditional understanding of collegiality and undoubtedly its influence has been truncated, at least in the past 25 years. However, even more central to the idea of the collegial tradition is that institutions of higher education are independent corporate bodies (autonomous institutions is the usual descriptive phase, although autonomy has always been partial and conditional) and it is the steady undermining by state and market of this ability of universities to manage their own affairs and so steer the course of their development that constitutes the most significant battleground in the recent history of British higher education. Thus the decline of collegiality, because of its particular reference to how universities go about their affairs, provides a potentially more fruitful base for the analysis of the development of higher education in the United Kingdom than 'the decline of donnish dominion', with a focus upon the declining authority of one particular set of interests. In certain respects, therefore, this book will present a picture of the shifting character of British higher education. But, given that the collegial tradition is an internationally shared legacy, it also casts a wider light upon developments in higher education.

For better or worse, the study of higher education sucks in different disciplinary approaches. It is impossible to analyse collegiality without drawing upon intellectual history (explaining the interpretation of key concepts), sociology (access, cultural values, elite socialisation and recruitment), politics (the dynamics of external and internal pressures in the process of change) and pedagogical debates (the tutorial as a mode of teaching and the idea of a liberal education). To a greater or lesser extent this book genuflects in each of these directions but its central focus is to interpret how the idea of collegiality has evolved over time and how this evolutionary pattern is to be explained. The sociological and pedagogical issues are therefore incorporated into the broader debate – politics responds to new ideas while in turn the political process determines how those ideas are translated into policy. Ideas, therefore, are a resource that aids and resists change while the politics, rather than the intrinsic quality of the ideas, determines which path will triumph.

We agree with the historians that the process of change cannot be fully understood without considering the input of those who are on the receiving end of the

process. In Rothblatt's elegant phrase it is 'the revolution of the dons'. However, it is not surprising that our more pronounced social science perspective leads us to give greater stress to the impact of the broad contextual pressures emanating from state and society as opposed to the policy role of individuals within the institutions. It is an interactive process and some institutions are better placed to respond to those pressures on terms more under their control. We need also to think in terms of conflicting institutional interests, which are represented by differing internal parties. Whose views will prevail and what are the patterns of accommodation? Moreover, what is the process through which these matters are determined? In *The Revolution of the Dons* Rothblatt wrote a history that would address itself:

> . . . to the perennial distinction between what a particular historian thinks about the past and the actual historical experience itself, between the patterns that the past seems to offer the trained historical mind . . . and the past as it might have appeared to those who were its principal actors in a dramatic action to be related (Rothblatt, 1968: 4).

As must already be clear to the reader, this is a book with an interest in dissecting the meaning of analytical concepts. But it also contains implicit assumptions about the process of higher education development. The pressures for change – social, economic, political and cultural – impact upon the universities through a combination of state and market forces. This is not a neat and tidy process for these pressures invariably contain, if not contradictory, then ambivalent messages and policy implications. Institutional responses will be heavily dependent upon market position (some have more room to manoeuvre than others) and how these internal interests are mobilised to determine institutional responses. In some cases it will be a bottom-up response shaped by pluralist struggle, in other cases a top-down strategy formulated at the centre and by-passing an input from the grassroots. But in most cases it is likely to be a complex mix of the two. The focus, therefore, is upon adopting an analytical approach that allows for both differing modes of decision-making and the possibility of varying outcomes within a context that the actors cannot change but which they can interpret differently.

Chapter 2
The Collegial Tradition in Higher Education

Introduction

This chapter presents our descriptive overview of the collegial tradition in higher education. It is an interpretation that is heavily, although not exclusively, dependent upon an analysis of the two ancient English models of the university – the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, which we see as representing two variants of the same model. However, this is not yet another dissection of the peculiar practices of Oxbridge. Collegial values have penetrated widely within many national systems of higher education and some would argue that the embracing of collegial values constitutes the essence of a university – that it is the embodiment of the idea of collegiality that distinguishes a university from an institution of higher education as simply a managed machine for teaching at the tertiary level.

The chapter, therefore, will examine the collegial tradition on a wider front than Oxbridge, and this breadth is strongly reinforced by the analysis pursued in subsequent chapters. There are several parts to this chapter. First, we will examine what we consider to be the core elements of collegiality, which are:

1. the federal structure of governance
2. donnish dominion
3. intellectual collegiality
4. commensality

Having analysed the collegial tradition in terms of these four significant constituent elements, the chapter will distil the core values that constitute the basis of these ingredients and compare and contrast their representation in the collegiate universities (Oxford and Cambridge) with practices in unitary models of the British university. The chapter will conclude with a limited reflection on whether there is indeed an inner core to the meaning of collegiality or can it be re-interpreted infinitely as it adjusts to changing circumstances? The issue is whether collegiality is a viable concept for the purposes of analysis.

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Collegiality: The Core Elements

The Collegiate University

Although the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge best represent our understanding of the collegiate university, it is important to remember that they are but powerful symbols of the university as a federal rather than a unitary structure. While this is a critical dimension to our understanding of Oxbridge, it is only one aspect of their embracing of the collegial tradition and, at least in the popular imagination as represented in literature and film, rarely features in any representation of the two universities.

In a powerful early attempt to initiate 'systematic historical inquiry' into 'the federal principle in higher education', Sheldon Rothblatt has written:

> By the 'federal principle' is meant the habit or practice of relating different segments of a higher education organization or system to some larger whole or centre. It is possible to dispose of the federal principle altogether and simply have a centre, or what is called a 'unitary' model, but the federal principle has features that, for historical and other reasons are considered desirable, have proven valuable, and are regarded as indispensable (Rothblatt, 1987: 151).

And Rothblatt goes on to argue that:

> The federal principle, the separation of functions and the academic division of labour, was Cambridge's gift to British higher education generally and to wherever the British model was exported (Rothblatt, 1987: 157).

As Rothblatt shows, the federal principle also underwrote the 1836 agreement that allowed University College and King's College to retain their separate identities while withholding their right to regulate examinations and award degrees; powers that were granted to a third body, the University of London. The contemporary analysts of the new public management mode of governance may want to examine this early example of state steering, which in fact has always been intrinsic to the relationship between society, state and higher education in Britain. Thus, examining was a public function regulated, albeit indirectly, by the state through the universities so leaving the colleges to sustain the daily affairs of the higher education enterprise.

Interestingly, like that most famous of all examples of federalism – the American polity – university federalism is also bounded by written constitutions (university and college statutes). But equally, statutes can be revoked, amended or simply re-interpreted over time in response to changing circumstances. Undoubtedly the collegiate model of the university, as represented by contemporary Oxford and Cambridge, owes its present form to changes that took place in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Rothblatt, 1968; Engel, 1983). The pressures for change were both internal and external. The outcome was the re-invigoration of the colleges in which teaching, under the control of college tutors, became central to the Oxbridge experience. Besides establishing academic careers for themselves, college dons created a model of learning that both reinforced a socio-moral code (the cult of 'the gentleman', muscular Christianity and the well-rounded scholar) and at the

same time enabled their graduates to compete effectively for entry into both the upper echelons of the burgeoning professional class and the administrative rank of the civil service.

Within this context the power of the centre, that is the university, also expanded. The university regulated the awarding of degrees, and in order to pursue professional careers or administrative posts in the public sector it was increasingly vital to have a university degree. Patronage was in decline; entry into prominent posts in both state and society was increasingly determined by bureaucratic procedures rather than the personal connections central to a system of patronage. Moreover, these changes occurred as new forms of knowledge, with their own degree programmes (the Natural Science Tripos – NST – at Cambridge and, albeit at a later date, Philosophy, Politics and Economics – PPE – at Oxford) penetrated higher education. Although colleges, especially at Oxford, did establish their own laboratories, the two universities steadily assumed the responsibility for providing much of the infrastructure for science teaching, including the faculty and support staff (this development came later to Oxford – in the inter-war years – and was dependent on public grants channelled through the University Grants Committee, UGC).

In his judgement on Oxford's response to its own commission of enquiry (the Franks Commission – University of Oxford, 1966), Halsey, Oxford's eminent in-house sociologist, concluded:

> Franks left the public life of Oxford as he found it, quietly led and controlled by the private life of its colleges. Thus Oxford continues to stand as a collegiate alternative to the normal professional and administrative hierarchy of university organisations in Britain and internationally (Halsey, 1992: 166).

This is not the context in which to examine the implementation (or perhaps non-implementation) of the recommendations of the Franks Commission, but rather we want to use Halsey's judgement to suggest different ways of interpreting the balance of power within the federal model.

Halsey is suggesting that although the Franks Commission led to important changes in the governance and administration of Oxford (most notably the extension of the vice chancellor's term of office from 2 to 4 years), the overall balance of power within the university remained in favour of the colleges. The implication of his argument is that rather than functioning as a collegiate university, Oxford was, and arguably still is, a confederation of colleges rather than a collegiate university. Or if this is too strong a judgement, it is a federation with a very weak centre and a strong periphery.

From the point of view of understanding developments in the federal model, the more interesting implications of Halsey's observations are that we have an essentially stable distribution of authority, and, moreover, any sophisticated analysis of change will need to look beyond the formal model to examine how it is steered by 'the private life of its colleges'. However, our interpretation of Rothblatt and Engel's research points to a model within which it is possible for both the centre and the periphery to enlarge their respective roles without necessarily impacting upon their

relative influence. But, of course, Rothblatt and Engel were dissecting the histories of Oxford and Cambridge during a 'revolutionary' period; the two universities were in the process of breaking the links with the Anglican Church and steadily establishing themselves as secular institutions committed to expanding knowledge through teaching and research (or at least the pursuit of scholarship).

Within that historical context the key issue was not so much the balance of power within the federal model but rather the purpose of the university. However, the re-invigoration of the colleges, with the development of significant roles for college tutors, was the most evident of changes. In effect there was a power struggle involving different interests, with the state also a very significant party to the process of change. The expansion of the centre appears to have occurred somewhat later, reflecting the intrusion of new areas of knowledge (the experimental sciences) and the expansion of university income, which was augmented post-1919 by the UGC's annual grant. No doubt Rothblatt's reference to 'the separation of teaching from examining within the federal university constitution' as the 'Cambridge principle' (Rothblatt, 1987: 156) in part reflects Cambridge's stronger centre, which was reinforced by the fact that the University appointed its own faculty (who would then acquire a college base) whereas at Oxford there were many joint appointments with faculty dividing (in differing ratios) their time between college and university commitments.

Although there were critical changes to both the ancient collegiate universities throughout the twentieth century, they do not compare with the redefinition of their very raison d'êtres that occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century. We have seen an evolutionary process of change, which has not led to a fundamental redefinition of the purposes of colleges and university but rather has instigated a steady shift in their relationship. Oxford, notwithstanding the frustrated hopes of those who looked to the Franks Report for radical change, has moved steadily from a confederation of colleges to a collegiate university, while at Cambridge the role of the centre has remained firm but not without its critics.

It is important to point out that this interpretation of developments is dependent upon a longer time perspective than was available to Halsey when he arrived at his 'steady-as-you-go' judgement. In the next chapter we will examine the pressures that have led to this change. The point is that federal systems of governance can be viewed as both inherently stable and inherently fragile! They are fragile in the sense that at any one point in time they represent a particular accommodation of interests with the distinct possibility that the balance is likely to be challenged by those who believe they are not well-served by the status quo. Stable in the sense that the model can still prevail as it is restructured to accommodate, or rather re-accommodate, the interests of the differing parties. Naturally, with reference to the United States, one hopes that it will not take a civil war to secure a new balance within the federal model. Moreover, it is also important to look beyond changes to the formal constitution to see how practice has actually evolved on a daily basis. Halsey may well have reflected on the fact that, although American presidents may not have the constitutional power to declare war, that is what they – thankfully only intermittently – actually do. The question, therefore, is whether beyond the set piece

commissions of enquiry, which present snapshots at specific points in time, there are contextual changes that over decades steadily undermine the established equilibrium within the federal model.

The next chapter will look at those pressures that have impacted upon the federal models of university governance. An examination of the recent histories of Oxford and Cambridge would suggest, although it is a contested process, that there has been a steady increase in the power of the centre (the university) over the periphery (the colleges). But the federal model can be reshaped to permit a change in the balance of power that may go in the opposite direction, and it is important in this respect not to be unduly influenced by developments at Oxford and Cambridge. As we will see, the federal models of governance at both the Universities of London and Wales have been seriously eroded, with certain colleges establishing their independence at both London (Imperial College) and Wales (Cardiff University as it is now known). Interestingly it is precisely the same developments that have led to diametrically opposite reactions at Oxford and Cambridge, which is a perfect illustration of the point that pressures on the federal model act in ways that are dependent upon the particular institutional context.

The analysis of the federal model of governance has placed most of its focus upon the shifting relationship between the colleges and the university, but a critically important consideration is inter-collegiality, that is how the colleges organise their joint affairs. It is of importance because it impacts upon our understanding of collegiality. Are the colleges truly independent institutions? Or do they belong to a collegiate system in which they demonstrate their commitment to mutually supportive measures? And the answer is complex. Formally, the colleges are autonomous institutions with a legally defined corporate status. Indeed, this is the single most vital distinguishing characteristic of the ancient collegiate universities – their colleges are not mere creatures of the university but rather have a legal status in their own right as chartered eleemosynary corporations.

Although the colleges provide accommodation for students they are not mere halls of residence. Living in college, or so the myth would have us believe, means being entwined in a broad socialisation experience. But if the colleges were just independent corporations that provided a convivial residence for students (mainly undergraduates), although they might be more than halls of residence (perhaps upmarket hotels or holiday camps!), their role within the collegiate university would be decidedly marginal.

There are three key functions beyond 'board and lodgings' that the colleges perform:

1. They are responsible for teaching undergraduates, which means they hire and pay tutors (with – as we noted – a stronger college input in this respect at Oxford), and consequently provide some of the infrastructure that underwrites teaching and even research (financial support and appointing college research fellows). Moreover, much of the organisation of undergraduate teaching takes place at the collegial level.

2. They control the admission of undergraduate students. In spite of the attempts to encourage 'open' admissions applications, candidates still prefer to apply to colleges of their choice. Furthermore, both Cambridge and Oxford have admissions offices, which continue to be (for now) under the control of the colleges. Thus, they regulate the access of the junior members to the university.
3. In direct confirmation of the idea that there is an intercollegiate system in which the individual colleges offer mutual support, the more richly endowed colleges have provided through the college contribution schemes regular financial support for the more poorly endowed colleges. Moreover, there have been initiatives by individual colleges, most notably Cambridge's very richly endowed Trinity College, to provide financial support for particular poorer colleges.

It is impossible to determine precisely the extent to which these institutionalised measures of intercollegiate cooperation demonstrate that there is a flourishing model built upon mutual support. Colleges are committed to selecting their own students and, not surprisingly, within the present environment are determined to choose the most academically gifted – those who are most likely to ensure a high ranking in those tables (with Oxford's Norrington Table receiving far more publicity than Cambridge's Tompkins Table) that purport to measure and rank finals results by college. If to the outsider this may seem an unlikely scenario (Oxford attracts only academically gifted candidates), then the scramble in the 1970s of Oxford's men's college to admit women demonstrates otherwise. At a stroke you could widen your pool of gifted candidates, including sustaining demand from those male applicants who prefer to reside in mixed colleges (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000: 87–89).

The tensions over endowment income also bubble to the surface from time to time. Are endowments the property of an individual college to be used as its fellows determine within the terms of the endowment? Legally undoubtedly so, but is it nonetheless poor practice with potentially dubious outcomes? Have the college contribution schemes served as a convenient sop to the poorer colleges, which undermines the internal political push to pool endowment income? Of course there is the critical counter-argument that college endowments are essentially the gift of grateful college alumni, who are donating to *their* college and *not* to support a fanciful notion of the collegiate system and its collective strength.

The organisation of teaching represents the most entrenched example of intercollegiate cooperation. This goes back to the nineteenth century 'revolution' and was part and parcel of the manoeuvring to place the teaching of undergraduates firmly under the control of the colleges. It was critical that if a college lacked tutors who had the academic expertise to teach some of its undergraduates, then it could turn to other colleges to fill the void. This both kept the students within the collegiate teaching structure and built up intercollegiate ties by establishing mutual obligations. Inevitably this required organisation through a committee of college representatives who knew the teaching expertise of their college teaching fellows, the weight of their commitments, and who were prepared to keep the tally of credits and deficits and so bargain accordingly.

This is a clear picture, therefore, of an extensive intercollegiate structure of governance that runs in parallel with the federal model, which is dependent upon the interaction of colleges and university. Moreover, it extends back over a considerable period of time, calls for a measure of administrative sophistication, can function in part only because there are supportive bureaucratic structures and – for the most part – appears to have operated reasonably effectively, although clearly being incapable of satisfying the policy goals of all the interested parties.

But this picture of competence and continuity runs up against the fact that this is piecemeal inter-collegiality that evolves around discrete areas of cooperation. It is not a system of governance but rather a number of pacts and deals designed to reconcile competing interests (especially with respect to admissions and the college contribution schemes) – less indicative of a system, more a recognition of the need to express mutual interests or define pragmatic responses to the pressures for change. Halsey's judgement on Oxford's response to the Franks Report was very dependent upon its failure to persuade the colleges to create a 'Council of Colleges' as a forum for determining common policy positions. The Report intended the Council to be a body composed of college representatives who would both discuss the key policy issues of the day and through a process of binding votes determine an agreed course of action. The outcome, however, was the creation of a Conference of Colleges, which would debate the pertinent issues, certainly reveal the spread of college positions but would not have the authority to bind individual colleges. It was, but now less so, as Alan Bullock, Oxford's first post-Franks vice chancellor, was scathingly to call it, 'a mere talking-shop'. However, the failure to achieve a centralised inter-collegiate system of governance does not mean that the Franks Report failed to shift the balance within the federal model between university and colleges, if not decisively, then at least markedly.

The essence therefore of the collegiate university is the federal model of governance. But does it follow that within itself this is a sufficient ingredient for us to label federal universities as embodying collegiality? If not, then what other qualities are required? Moreover, is it possible for federal universities to be non-collegial in character?

Donnish Dominion

Judgements will vary, but in our opinion Halsey's phrase 'donnish dominion' is an elegant description of the ideas we are attempting to convey in this section of the chapter (Halsey, 1992). Besides elegance it has the virtue of not being too detailed a description of institutional practices because when the affairs of higher education are under the microscope they are open to subtly different interpretations. To put the point perhaps too baldly, higher education institutions are composed of a range of both competing and co-operating interests, and donnish dominion is an interpretation of the extent to which the affairs of those institutions are controlled by their academic faculty.

In its most pure form, some would say its most maverick manifestation, donnish dominion is to be found in the collegiate universities. Contemporarily there are intense struggles to restructure the membership of the executive bodies of the two universities (Oxford's and Cambridge's Councils), which centre on the drive to impose a majority lay membership. At present the respective legislatures of the two universities, the Regent House (Cambridge) and Congregation (Oxford), still retain the potential authority to frustrate the wishes of their respective executives. And at the collegiate level, even if they should delegate their authority, the governance of colleges remains constitutionally in the hands of their fellows. The perception is that these – both university and colleges – are institutions, which are governed from below: equal rights and obligations for members, traditionally a leadership that seeks consensus rather than presents an unequivocal way forward, governance by committee and a significant reliance on key individuals who serve on more than one committee (the overlapping membership) or are rotated steadily through the committee system.

To express the matter positively, it is a mode of governance that is dependent upon the active commitment of all the governed – the exalted and the lowly, and new arrivals as well as those who are deeply entrenched. This is a markedly different mode of governance from all other British universities, including the two federal universities of London and Wales. The executive bodies of British universities invariably have a predominance of lay members, and they are certainly not constrained by what is in effect a legislative body composed of the massed ranks of the assembled members of the university.

But, nonetheless, there is a powerful commitment in the British tradition of higher education to the belief that the academic mission of the universities – what is taught and researched, and how it is taught and researched – should be under academic control. This has meant that ultimate responsibility for such matters invariably resides in a Senate dominated by the institution's academic members, although not necessarily equally representative of all ranks given the tendency for professors to dominate. If Senates symbolise the idea that the faculty should control the conduct of the university's academic mission, it is usually within departments that this principle finds its most collegial expression. Undoubtedly this is a legacy of the potent idea that teaching, especially for undergraduates, needs to be organised collegially if it is to function meaningfully. It is at the departmental level that degrees will be defined, courses prescribed, teaching loads organised and examinations set and marked. These have been seen as the collective responsibility of departmental faculty and they cannot – so the argument would run – be undertaken without a collegial input for they need to belong to the department as a whole. In spite of the counter-pressures that have emerged, this is an idea that still retains considerable support as an ideal and in practice. Of course, the deference to rank that prevails in the composition of most Senates can also prevail within departments, but these are confined arenas with more persistent and closer interaction between their members coupled with a more intense level of mutual need. In such circumstances collegiality

may not simply be a traditional modus operandi but an absolute necessity, although as we will discuss in Chapter 6, the future of the departmentally organised university is far from certain.

By definition donnish dominion means that other interests within the university have secondary roles to play in the formation of policy. But, as any policy analyst will tell you, the gap between policy formation and policy implementation is often relatively narrow. The implementation of policy is invariably administratively controlled and policy innovation in higher education is often dependent upon the advice and information that administrators provide.

Within British higher education, and more particularly the ancient collegiate universities, donnish dominion was sustained by both ideas and practices that undermined the potential challenge of the administrative cadre. As was the case with civil servants in their relationship to government ministers, the university administrative class was caste in a service role – to ensure that policy was implemented, information provided and advice given – and no more than that. Second, collegial values were traditionally perceived as hostile to the idea of the administrative expert. In the words of Merton College's evidence to the Franks Commission: 'Education in general and university education *par excellence* are worlds in which the university administrator should be kept in his place' (University of Oxford, 1965, Part 13: 35). University administration was seen as a role that the gifted amateur, the average don, could perform with relative ease. Consequently the commanding heights of the administrative machine were manned not by career bureaucrats but by dons, sometimes pressed into service. To add salt to the wound there was a tradition of short-term appointments as the dons scurried back to their colleges or labs, or perhaps moved into another top-level administrative post as the jobs circulated within the magic inner circle. Most decidedly this is a world that is fading rapidly. There may well be an increase in the interchange of academic and professional roles, but the greatly increased specialisation of both career lines ensures that changing tracks invariably means a permanent move (Whitchurch & Gordon, 2009).

If you believe that an integral component of the collegial tradition is the idea and practice of donnish dominion, then it is difficult to sustain the argument that a federal structure within itself is the hallmark of collegiality. But this is not a world of absolutes for the issue is how deeply entrenched donnish dominion has to be before it can be said that collegiality thrives. It could be argued that control of the academic purposes of the university – the fulfilment of its mission for teaching and research – is a sufficient remit for donnish dominion and that the university is more likely to thrive if a focussed donnish dominion is combined with a strong, independent executive that has a leaven of (perhaps even a majority of) external members. But this is to separate how the university mission is defined from how it is fulfilled. If academics lose control of the former (and there are – as we will see – numerous external pressures for change in addition to the evolving internal institutional distribution of authority), then not only is donnish dominion in decline but perhaps the collegial tradition also becomes a hollow concept.

Intellectual Collegiality

One of the periodic claims that is made for colleges is that, given the broad academic interests of their fellows, they act as a natural stimulant for the pursuit of interdisciplinary research. To give but one recent example:

> One of the great benefits of Oxford colleges is that they offer opportunities for effortless multi-disciplinary interactions. You don't have to make an appointment to meet someone or organise a conference. You just go to lunch and know that colleagues from different disciplines will be there (Stamp Dawkins, 2006: 6).

Concluding with what is almost a rallying cry:

> They (the colleges) contribute educationally, intellectually and financially and, as the Somerville experience shows, they can bring people together in multidisciplinary interactions that other universities can only envy. But we do need to say so (Stamp Dawkins, 2006: 7).

While there is the possibility of such intellectual interactions, which result in interesting interdisciplinary research, it is difficult to pin down with any degree of precision how common an occurrence this is. One suspects that lunchtime conversation for the most part gravitates around the personal trials and tribulations of the day, especially if the weather should be inclement.

But this is not to deny the importance of intellectual collegiality on both the teaching and research fronts, but to insist that it has a broader base than colleges and a wider remit than interdisciplinary research. The intellectual focus for many, if not most, academics will be expressed within their departments and laboratories. There is an enormous quantity of collaborative research and the publications of many academics bear the imprint of some of their colleagues, including jointly published work. There may still be lonely scholars who spend most of their time in their garrets labouring to produce the great work, but one can confidently say that these are the significant exceptions. If you define intellectual collegiality broadly as a process of interaction amongst academics that focuses upon their research and teaching, then it is indeed the very lifeblood of the profession. Much research, in the sciences and increasingly in the social sciences, is dependent upon the work of research teams, which are likely to be led by senior academics with known research records (often professors) who have headed the bid to obtain funding. In this context we are not thinking of collegiality as a process that involves the participation of equals with equal voices. But we are thinking of factors such as cooperation in the achieving of shared goals, a recognition of the significance of all inputs and mutual respect across the team – in short professional teamwork. Indeed this may be a stronger expression of collegiality than is found in some colleges, which can be rent with bitterness and mutual recrimination rather than infused with collegiality.

Understandably, in terms of research, intellectual collegiality has focused on the research process itself – idealised as a pattern of collaboration amongst equals who have mutual respect. However, perhaps an equally important part of that process is the requirement of openness – transparency in conducting research and broad

access to its findings. So, integral to this interpretation of intellectual collegiality is an understanding of the social purposes of research – to inform both the wider intellectual community and also its availability to the public at large. Collegiality, therefore, is about enhancing the educative process at large and not simply an observation on how academics relate to each other.

The discussion of intellectual collegiality has tended to focus on how interdisciplinary research is encouraged within the collegiate universities. We have attempted to broaden that understanding while retaining the focus on research. The research process inevitably involves intellectual interaction between members of faculty. It is possible, however, to interpret intellectual collegiality in relation to teaching as a particular understanding of the relationship between tutors and students within the learning process. The Oxbridge colleges are noted for their tradition of tutorial teaching embodied within the strong commitment to undergraduate education (Palfreyman, 2008). However, even within Oxbridge, courses taught by the weekly tutorial composed of the tutor and one undergraduate have all but disappeared. But a number of practices have been retained that are sufficiently distinctive to suggest a mode of teaching that can be described as collegial in character. Tutorials remain small in size, invariably conform to a weekly schedule, students are required to attend, the focus of the tutorial is the student's written essay or its equivalent, and it is this that guides the discussion. The tutor may lead but the expectation is that tutors and students are engaged in an interactive process of analysis. It can be best described as a liberal education defined by the process of learning rather than by the label of the academic discipline that brings the parties together.

Thanks to the fact that it is historically ingrained in Oxbridge, tutorial teaching is seen as one of the continuing hallmarks of the collegiate universities. But, at least prior to the arrival of mass higher education, aspects of the tradition had penetrated British higher education very widely – small group teaching, a Socratic pedagogy, regular written work (and not work submitted simply as part of the examination schedule) and the idea of an integrated degree course with examinations at the end of each academic year and with 'finals' at the end of the degree course. The intense pressure upon resources, coupled with the drive for greater research output, has resulted in the serious erosion of such commitments, but it is still widely perceived as an ideal, a tradition that gave British higher education a particular value.

Our analysis of intellectual collegiality has a more fragile basis than our examination of either the collegiate university or the concept of donnish dominion. Partly it is the difficulty of finding substantive empirical evidence to corroborate the assertion that the collegiate universities make a unique contribution to intellectual collegiality. We have lots of interesting, if random, examples but little proof. We have sought, therefore, to identify aspects of the academic character of higher education that could be labelled as intellectual collegiality, drawing our examples from both research and teaching, and thus in the process expanding the idea of the collegial tradition.

Commensality

Halsey uses the esoteric concept of commensality to conjure up an image of the social life of the collegiate universities. Higher education has always been about more than the transmission, acquisition and augmenting of knowledge. It is also a social process that unfolds in an institutional framework enveloping both faculty and students, and it is this process that shapes commensality, that is the means by which a sense of community and long-term institutional loyalty is created.

For students, residence in an Oxbridge college is a socialisation process built upon the close proximity of living space, shared dining facilities, college tutorials, participation in governance and a veritable plethora of sporting, social and cultural activities. There may be no longer compulsory daily attendance at chapel but services are still held and college choirs sing regularly. For faculty, few are now actually resident in college but there are offices to be filled, tutorials to give, dining rights, the opportunity to participate in college governance and, for the especially exalted, plaques and portraits for the deceased and the departed. And, of course, both tutors and students, accompanied by distinguished college alumni, will have the opportunity to participate together in the commemoration of special college historical landmarks – the gaudies as they are known.

The extent to which undergraduates and tutors will want to be embraced by the college will vary – some may have alternative bases to which they show stronger allegiance. And for others the ties to college may be essentially instrumental rather than reflecting a deep-seated loyalty. However, when it comes to establishing commensality the colleges have certain in-built advantages over university institutions. The variables that encourage commensality within the colleges are an intrinsic part of their character, embedded in the way in which they function. Laboratories, research institutes and departments may share some of the same functions (for example, teaching responsibilities) and be able to graft on others (common rooms and dinners), but commensality is not a core dimension of their purpose and unlikely to be central to their effective functioning. Halls of residence for undergraduates appear to be watered-down colleges and occasional departmental dinners (unlike formal departmental meetings) a somewhat contrived, and very limited, substitute for college's daily high table. Undoubtedly the cities in which the collegiate universities are ensconced can provide something of a counter-attraction to the commensality of the colleges; however, both Oxford and Cambridge are comparatively small cities and there still remains a 'town and gown' divide.

In the collegiate university and, although to a much lesser extent within the collegial tradition more broadly defined, commensality functions as the glue which holds the model together. It is a function that is ingrained into the historical experience of what is meant by a college, although – as one would expect – the richer the college, the more lavishly and enticingly it can finance its trappings. For both tutors and students it is a tangible way of building collegial loyalty, which has both practical and social (not least a sense of belonging) payoffs. And, although we have treated this claim with some scepticism, it has been argued that it forms a base for academic collegiality by enhancing the social interaction of fellows from different

disciplinary backgrounds. Indeed, it may make an even more significant contribution to donnish dominion by providing informal settings for the resolution of college affairs – over lunch or high table the cabals can arrive at informal deals. There is a popular literature given succour by the internal conflicts amongst college fellows, perhaps an inevitable fact of life in any institutional setting but potentially made more intense by the relatively small size of most college fellowships. It is probable that aspects of commensality will help to defuse tension or ensure that at least in public the semblance of good manners prevails. Moreover, although the benefits of commensality may be widely shared within a college, it is undoubtedly the fellows who gain most – their status within the hierarchy is reaffirmed and perhaps even a sense of ownership takes root.

A comparative lack of commensality may reflect not only different historical developments but also different interpretations of the purposes of higher education and contrasting individual needs. Although exposure to the experience of higher education is more than an academic training (excepting perhaps the distance-learning institutions), the broader socialising experiences have historically been linked to the collegiate universities, and commensality is integral to those experiences. Furthermore, if donnish dominion is restricted in the non-collegiate universities, both federal and unitary, then commensality inevitably has a more confined role to play. In those circumstances the policy-making and implementation process is more hierarchical and bureaucratic rather than collegial.

The Manifestation of Core Values

Our presentation and interpretation of the core collegial values will be organised around three institutional characteristics: structures, modes of governance and goals. The intention is to outline the underlying premises of the collegial tradition and then compare and contrast their manifestation in the collegiate universities of Oxford and Cambridge with their representation in the wider system of British higher education. It is important to emphasise at the outset that this juxtaposes models that have considerable internal complexity. As we have already noted, there are differences between Oxford and Cambridge, and the British system of higher education also has a varied character with an internal diversification that is almost certainly increasing. The analysis, therefore, will address some of the critical differences with respect to both values and institutional behaviour across and within the different models.

Structures

In the age of mass higher education, universities have expanded rapidly in size and are increasingly complex institutions – the multiversity that shelters a diverse range of interests with a myriad of identities. In apparent antipathy to this trend is to be found the collegial tradition, which embraces the idea that 'small is beautiful'. But

it is not so much the size of the multiversity that is an issue but rather the need for its constituent elements to embody a number of comparatively small, relatively autonomous identities if it is to retain any semblance of the collegial tradition.

Within itself smallness is of little value without the sense of institutional identity; to be meaningful small institutions have to establish a clear presence. This can be expressed in various ways: a defined purpose, a strong historical legacy and physical manifestations of their image – buildings, walls, gardens and even insignia. However, there are two ultimate defences that will ensure the longevity of small institutions. They need to have their autonomy founded on a legal basis (they are formally recognised as independent bodies), and they need to generate their own resources (wealth, income, status and power), which preferably are based on past legacies and current activities rather than dependent upon the largesse of others.

So, within the collegial tradition smallness is combined with strength. However, it cannot be a strength that results in institutional self-indulgence at the expense of the greater whole, and certainly not a strength that leads to independence. Autonomy in the collegial context does not mean complete freedom of action. Thus the key facet of collegiality is not that smallness alone is a virtue in its own right, but also how the various colleges co-operate with one another in conjunction with the central body to fulfil the functions of the university. Collegiate universities are federal institutions and if cooperation is dissipated, as in recent years has been true of both the University of London and the University of Wales, then not only is the federal model threatened but so is the idea of collegiality itself. As the federal model is eroded, for collegiality to survive in London and Wales it will need to be expressed in different contexts – that is within the increasingly independent colleges.

The collegial tradition has an ambivalent relationship to the concept of power. It could be argued that it is a key collegial value to ensure that power is dispersed by a federal model of governance and within both college and university ultimate authority is located in the membership at large. But there is also a firm belief in the efficacy of the collegial tradition as a mode of governance so its federalism is perceived, not simply as a way of dispersing power as an end in itself, but also as a means of enabling a number of institutions to work together to achieve the more effective delivery of higher education. Of course, the federal model, as clearly illustrated by the foundation of the University of London in relation to University College and King's College, can serve political purposes but, unless it is also perceived as a positive value in its own right, its appeal is limited.

Modes of Governance

A strong case can be made out for the claim that, although the collegial tradition may have many qualities, in particular it values highly (perhaps in certain circumstances – including the contemporary context – too highly) the stability of established structures and practices. Viewed in this way it is a conservative force. However, it is not a question of an obsessive attachment to the past but rather the

value that is placed upon proceeding consensually. Thus it is the decision-making process itself rather than an attachment to particular values that induces conservatism. Change may occur at a faster pace than suits the most recalcitrant individual, but it is a tradition that gives well-organised groups (which in fairness may well be representative of a body of opinion) if not a veto on change, then the opportunity to forestall action. When change (eventually) comes, it should be with a sense of communal ownership since all have fully participated in the decision-making process. But the difficulty, as always, is to know when opposition reflects more the advocacy of a constructive defence of the status quo as opposed to the protection of vested self-interests.

The conservatism that is inherent to collegiality partly embodies a rejection of both the charismatic and managerial modes of governance coupled with structures and processes that incorporate a combination of the academic attachment to rationality, the institutional embracing of bureaucratic modes of administration (how do colleges and universities within the collegiate model conduct their day-to-day business?) and kinship ties – in the sense that tutors are a community of articulate, broadly equal, participants in the decision-making process. Collegial governance operates, therefore, through committee structures. The path to the truth is determined by rational, open discussion with a certain amount of steering (there are college committees and college officers). This is a rational and participatory citizenry, which places a high value upon institutional loyalty. The contemporary resistance at Oxford to majority lay representation on its supreme executive body, the Council, is not just about keeping 'the barbarians' at bay but also reflects a firm belief that the established governance model worked well in the past (so why change it?), and that the development of the University of Oxford is likely to follow a more benign path if its executive body is composed of a majority of insiders – those who have demonstrated their loyalty to, and understanding of, the University by serving it well in the past.

Thus, there is a procedural conservatism to collegiality that has ingrained within it the idea that institutions function effectively if they function consensually. Underlying this idea is the powerful belief that collegial institutions are communal institutions. Whatever functions they are required to perform they need to fulfil them in a manner that emphasises their communal identity. Tutorial teaching is not just about the supposed pedagogical potency of a particular mode of teaching for it also establishes an intellectual, even social, relationship between tutors and students. And, of course, that communal identity is reinforced by college control over the selection of its membership and its rituals of socialisation.

Collegiality therefore functions in a manner that is underwritten by the three 'Cs' of conservatism: 1. commitment to established procedural practices, 2. consensus building, and 3. continuous reaffirmation of communal identity. It looks inwards rather than outwards and responds to pressure for change rather than anticipating it and implementing effective response strategies. Its mode of operation is deep but with a narrow reach; it functions in a manner designed to embrace those who belong but to exclude those who are not considered to be members, and even many of those who would aspire to be members.

Drawing the Argument Together

The ultimate purpose of most institutions is to secure their reproduction, and institutions with identities that in many cases have been formed over centuries are likely to be prime examples of this proposition. Therefore, for the colleges within the collegiate universities, collegiality has to achieve the goal of institutional survival, indeed of institutional prosperity. In certain respects the comparative reference point is the college's past, and there is a considerable literature that charts the fluctuating fortunes of individual colleges, and of the two ancient collegiate universities, with the eighteenth century often singled out as a period of decline.

The alternative reference point is institutional comparisons – colleges with other colleges, the collegiate universities both with one another and other models of the university (incorporating both a national and an international perspective). Although historically within the national system of higher education Oxford and Cambridge have been accorded a combined elevated status (Oxbridge suggests both a common identity and an equal status), the contemporary fashion for league tables separates them out with Cambridge invariably scoring better in the international rankings. Is this because Cambridge is a more effective collegiate university? Or does it have more to do with the fact that Cambridge has a larger science base and thus is able to post more favourable scores in the science citations indices that carry so much weight in determining world-class league table positions? Be it as it may, the question of the impact of the collegial tradition upon institutional performance has to be addressed as the comparative evaluative scope widens.

While colleges may continue to worry about inter-college comparisons, this is an essentially parochial concern when Oxford and Cambridge are being compared with the elite American institutions, and more particularly the Ivy League universities. Is the collegiate model of the university an asset or an impediment when it comes to acquiring and sustaining global status? If collegiality hinders institutional performance with reference to the criteria that determine rankings, how does the collegiate university respond to the possible dilemma? Jettison the model (assuming this is possible)? Modify practices to lessen the apparent handicap? Carry on regardless in the conviction that collegiality conveys advantages that outweigh league table performance?

If the first goal is institutional self-perpetuation and enhancement, then the second is a commitment to the effective performance of core functions, which means preserving a valued model of the experience of higher education. At the very core of the collegial tradition, within all its various institutional manifestations, is to be found the belief that without its presence the experience of higher education has, if not little, then considerably less value. Moreover, it is within the collegiate universities in particular that it is able to make its most significant contribution to our understanding of higher education – in terms of the formal education of undergraduates, the broader socialisation variables that make being a student a worthwhile experience, and the enrichment of academic careers. One of the central tasks of the next chapter is to examine the recent challenges to the tradition and whether or not

it is, if not about to disappear, then of decreasing worth because the character of higher education has changed in ways that make the collegial tradition less relevant in today's world.

The bald representation of institutional differences between the collegial and unitary models of higher education (see Fig. 2.1) has to be refined by a range of considerations. First, it could be argued that the differentiations between the two models are too sharply drawn, and this is particularly so with regard to 'procedural values' and 'goals' (which, unlike the other variables, are less easy to define in terms of structures). For example, the idea of a liberal education has penetrated the British system of higher education on a wide front and professional training (note law and medicine) is not something that the collegiate universities shun, although this may be enwrapped in a liberal pedagogical framework. Moreover, the tension between 'consensus building' and competition for resources (including status) is germane to most institutions. The categorisation comes down to making judgements regarding the balance between the contrasting representational forms.

It is also important when interpreting Fig. 2.1 to recognise that British higher education has undergone rapid changes in recent years, which are still working their way through the system. In comparison to the 30-year period following 1945, the subsequent 30 years have been marked by considerable change and turmoil, which – arguably – has speeded up and intensified over time. The issue, therefore, is to discern in which direction the representational forms are moving. There appears to be shifts in both directions: the generation of income is part of the entrepreneurial vision that many higher education institutions (HEIs) now promote, and there seems to be a universal urge to produce development plans – projections of future institutional growth, well-being and harmony. But are eddies in one direction overwhelmed by a tidal wave in the opposite? Is the future a steadily watered-down but more universally distributed collegial tradition?

Undoubtedly the development that has most complicated the picture is the expansion and diversification of higher education – the rise of the multiversity coupled

	Representational Forms	
The Key Characteristics	*Collegiate Universities* (Oxford and Cambridge)	*Unitary Models* (Most other UK institutions)
Sharing of functions	Federal structures	Devolution of responsibilities/authority
Institutional forms	Colleges/university	Academic units/colleges/university
Formal institutional status	Legally defined	Underwritten by university constitutions and models of future development
Resource distribution	Self-generating/formula-funding	Formula-funding/drivenby planninggoals
Locus of control	Donnish dominion/administration	Leadership cadre/managerialism
Procedural values	Stability/consensus building/communal ethos	Continuity/resource discrimination/competitive ethos
Goals	Institutional reproduction/a liberal education	Institutional dynamism/the training of experts

Fig. 2.1 The representation of institutional characteristics and practices in UK higher education

with the growth of a system of higher education within which there is considerable internal differentiation in terms of institutional missions. Moreover, within individual universities one will find contrasting segments pursuing very different goals: undergraduate education, cutting edge research, and a range of service and consultancy functions. The premise is that these different purposes are likely to require contrasting organisational forms. Therefore, an alternative model of the future is to think of islands of collegiality surviving within a wider environment that could very well be, if not hostile, not especially supportive of the collegial model. In response to this diversity the book, with reference mainly to the University of London, will explore the pressure upon the federal model of governance (which we have claimed is core to the collegial tradition) and the role of the colleges at the Universities of Durham, Kent, Lancaster and York. These are developments that complicate the simple bipolar model constructed in Fig. 2.1.

Equally significant is the fact that the current British system of higher education is composed of institutions with contrasting histories, including markedly different traditions of governance and administration. We have referred to the fact that Oxford and Cambridge represent two somewhat contrasting interpretations of the collegiate university, but this pales into insignificance in comparison to the divide between the pre- and post-1992 universities. The key discriminating factor in discerning institutional differences may have more to do with their embedded historical traditions rather formal structural comparisons – for example, unitary as opposed to federal universities. Of course, the embedded historical traditions will have structural variables that are part of their character, and in the case of the pre-1992 universities, one can point to the one-time dependence on local funding, accountability to local authorities and a strong managerial ethos. These are historical legacies that may have been eroded over time but what has to be determined is the strength of the cultural heritage. How sympathetic is it to the intrusion of new values and practices given that some of the traditional values (accountability, responding to local interests and the need for firm institutional management in higher education institutions) may gel with the dominant contemporary political sentiment?

It is possible, therefore, to interpret Fig. 2.1 as representing two contrasting models of the university or to argue that the two models have sufficient in common to see them as variants of one model, especially if the qualifications – diversification within institutions and across the system, the two-way flow of change over time and the problem of defining institutional goals (there is scarcely a British university that does not claim to have a vibrant, even if narrow, research record) – are taken into account. To stretch the interpretation of the collegial tradition further means going beyond the British experience.

There are three different avenues of analysis that will be explored in this book. First, there is the focus on trends mainly in English higher education: the University of London (although the future of federalism is also an issue for the University of Wales); the Universities of Durham, Kent, Lancaster and York (universities with colleges but not – arguably – collegiate universities); and the impact of the so-called managerial revolution (with the focus on the Universities of Birmingham, Edinburgh, Newcastle, Nottingham and Southampton). Second,

there is the American experience, which is critical in spite of the powerful influence of the German tradition of higher education. The Ivy League universities and the east coast liberal arts colleges embody clear elements of collegiality encompassed within the commitment to a liberal education. The American fascination with Oxbridge remains strong (embodying clear elements of nostalgia), even embracing someone as clear-sighted and pragmatic as Clark Kerr who saw the University of California's Santa Cruz campus as a state-funded embodiment of the collegiate tradition. Although this was perhaps an impossible dream, the Claremont Colleges of California continue to relish the challenge with the Graduate University of Claremont billing itself as 'an Oxford in the orange groves'!

The American embracing of the collegial tradition required modifications of the values and structures that took root in England. The critical variant was the need to place that tradition in a different social context – one that embodied the idea of social mobility, classlessness and frontier traditions. Collegiality was an educational ideal and not tied into a process of social reproduction – although the reality was clearly very different with contemporary scholarship confirming what must have been widely known – even if concealed – at the time (Karabel, 2006). Interestingly this draws the Anglo-American traditions of collegiality closer together.

For a third and very different tradition of collegiality, continental Europe provides the model. Whilst higher education institutions, especially in Germany, may have been extensions of the state apparatus and their academics in effect civil servants, this is not to say that policy direction was in the hands of the state – either its political or its bureaucratic arms. Universities have been controlled by a professorial guild – an elevated form of donnish dominion. The residential college for undergraduates is conspicuous for the most part by its absence with the university encompassed within the urban environment. Also universities have different academic concerns (the making of experts and the pursuit of research), which necessitate different interpretations of collegiality within the framework of the legacies of Humboldt and the Napoleonic model.

A Core Meaning?

With respect to the collegiate universities the key to understanding their futures is dependent upon two variables. First, there is the relationship between university and colleges in the fulfilment of core functions. Once there is a serious disturbance of the balance of authority between these two power centres then the collegiate university is in trouble. Second, it is a model of governance that is dependent upon a broad input across the faculty into defining and implementing the institution's academic goals. The central academic purposes – what is to be pursued and how it is to be pursued – have to be under donnish control if the collegial tradition, within and beyond the collegiate universities, is to survive. By way of contrast, intellectual collegiality is a potential by-product of the collegial process, and commensality essentially a means for achieving and sustaining it. Neither are core characteristics that match

either the importance of a viable federal model of governance or the control that academic faculty need to exercise over the essential purposes of the institution.

The commitment to federalism necessitates the perpetuation of a particular model of the university, one in which the autonomy of institutional levels is constructed on secure foundations, and there is an acceptance that the fulfilment of functions is a shared responsibility. And it is difficult to imagine the flourishing of either the collegial tradition or the collegiate university without the embracing of agreed procedures of governance and administration, the building of broad alliances in response to potentially divisive policy issues, and the presence of practices designed to build a sense of communal identity. These are the means by which the collegial tradition is sustained.

Collegiality (both as collegiate universities and as a more widely embedded tradition) is, therefore, about the steady reinforcement of particular structures and procedures of governance. But it also has embedded within it a belief in the value of what we have termed a liberal education. So the collegial tradition is more than structures and procedures for it also embodies a powerful educational ideal that embraces the very purpose of the university.

Ideas will be underwritten by particular values but realised in different forms, and the form in which they are made concrete can lead to their withering away rather than their prospering. Not surprisingly, the instigators of change may believe that they are acting in the best interests of the institution, that their proposed reforms are essential to its survival. Survival may indeed be achieved, and the successful strategy may well have been the only viable option. But institutional preservation may be achieved at a very high price, that is the steady erosion of any meaningful understanding of the embedded traditional values and that the core sustaining ideas could lose all their intrinsic value.

The situation, however, is more complex than the straightforward endeavour to maintain conceptual integrity. The collegiate universities and the collegial tradition have been reformulated over the centuries. Why should established structures and procedures take precedence over new ideas and needs? The core values of collegiality that we have identified are social constructions that emerged out of responses to past pressures. They may have become sacrosanct over time but were at the centre of political struggle in the latter half of the nineteenth century when so much of contemporary Oxbridge was taking shape. The issue, however, is not the defence of an innate conservatism against progressive change but rather a desire for conceptual clarity. The process of social change is inevitably encompassed in a struggle between competing ideas, and it has to be recognised that old values and practices do not necessarily survive in new forms but, on the contrary, they may wither and die.

But this is not to say that reformulation is impossible. We have argued that federalism is an inherently unstable model of governance and, rather than a weakness, this can be one of its inherent strengths. It is a model of governance that can evolve both formally (constitutional change) and informally (acting differently in response to evolving needs). We have suggested that part of the revitalisation of Oxford and Cambridge in the latter half of the nineteenth century was that the authority of the colleges and the universities expanded in conjunction with one another – first the

colleges and then the universities. As our next chapter will demonstrate the contemporary pressures are such that power is in danger of gravitating (that is, within the collegiate universities) from the colleges towards the universities. Does this represent a significant evolution of the federal model to the point that we can say collegiality is under threat at Oxford and Cambridge? Similarly, it is possible to point to the development of a far stronger managerial ethos in most universities, which steadily restricts the scope of donnish dominion. Moreover, a distinction needs to be drawn between fulfilling the current agenda (what is taught and researched, the means of delivery and the process of evaluation) and determining future academic developments. Without control of the latter, donnish dominion becomes essentially the efficient use of technical expertise.

As so often the question of whether we are experiencing the demise of an idea of the university or merely a long overdue reformation of its character depends upon the evaluation of the evidence. And, sooner or later the social construction of reality will be shaped by the weight of that evidence. At a certain point in time it may be necessary to accept that a myth rather than an idea is under the microscope.

Chapter 3
Collegiality: The Contemporary Challenges

The Tension between Image and Reality

The previous chapter outlined some of the characteristics of collegiality. An ideal-type model was not constructed, as the purpose was to show that collegiality could assume different, if overlapping, forms (for Weber's interesting interpretation of the origins of collegial authority, see Weber, 1964: 392–407). However, we have in the process created the difficult problem of how to define the boundaries of collegiality. In a nutshell, how far can those boundaries be stretched before collegiality evaporates?

It could be claimed that a concept that is open to varying interpretations lacks a secure sense of its own meaning and thus is inherently fragile. However, collegiality prescribes individual and institutional behaviour, and for it to persist its meaning has to change over time. Institutions cannot survive unless their structures and procedures can adjust to the changing environment within which they function. Whether it is pertinent to term the new institutional models as collegial is another issue, but the inevitability of change is a reality, and even ancient, venerable institutions face this dilemma.

The interpretation of collegiality that was presented in the previous chapter imposes an image on the functioning of those institutions it is employed to analyse. In that sense, even allowing for a very generous understanding of the collegial tradition, a gap between conceptual definition and actual institutional practices may be identified. The collegial tradition, more especially its representation in the collegiate universities, incorporates *possible* contradictory consequences. To provide a simple example: small may be 'beautiful' but should there be internal institutional conflict then smallness may make it more difficult to diffuse the tensions as the warring parties divide into self-contained cliques. The implication is that as circumstances change gaps between conceptual construction and institutional behaviour, no matter how broadly the idea of collegiality is stretched, will almost inevitably emerge.

Formally, within the collegiate universities of Oxford and Cambridge, both their colleges and the universities, the idea of academic demos (in Halsey's terms 'donnish dominion') may still reign supreme. However, it is very much a reserve power

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as given testament to by the spread of college councils/executive committees and the failure of their general assemblies (Cambridge's Regent House and Oxford's Congregation) to attract little more than a cursory attendance except when issues of perceived principle are at stake (note, for example, the fracas generated by the recent moves to give Oxford's executive body, its Council, a majority lay membership). In his analysis of the consequences of Oxford's Franks Commission, Halsey argued that 'Franks left the public life of Oxford as he found it, quietly led and controlled by the private life of the colleges' (1995: 166). It is interesting that, some 40 years after the publication of the Franks Report, Halsey is still prepared to sustain this perspective. However, his interpretation is heavily dependent upon attaching considerable weight to the constitutional structures and leaves unexplored what precisely is meant by control.

If the first issue is that of conceptual clarity, followed by whether change makes a mockery of our traditional labels, then the next question to address is whether we are indeed facing a 'crisis of collegiality'. What, if anything, is so special about the contemporary situation? Are we experiencing another process of adjustment or is the collegial tradition about to disappear? And is this essentially a crisis for English higher education because its system contains the two most renowned collegiate universities, with collegiality in its broader but less comprehensive form continuing to prevail elsewhere?

The final chapter of our *Oxford and the Decline of the Collegiate Tradition* was entitled 'Crisis? What Crisis?' (2000) and concluded with the ambivalent observation 'that much of the contemporary malaise within academic circles' is more a consequence of the general direction of higher education policy outcomes 'than the erosion of collegiality' (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000: 199). In the context of the late twentieth century, more especially within Britain, this may well have been a justified claim but it is not to deny the possibility that there was also a serious and continuing erosion of collegiality. However, with respect to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge even if this is the case, it is important not to ignore the historical perspective. With such long histories it is to be expected that they would have experienced both positive and negative times.

There is a case for arguing that the recreation of the collegiate universities was a direct response to the various pressures that emerged in the nineteenth century: the changing balance between industry and agriculture in determining the nation's wealth, the rise of the manufacturing and professional classes, the expansion of the state administrative apparatus in response to both home and colonial needs, and the steady extension of political democracy. The emergence of Oxford and Cambridge as refurbished collegiate universities represented their response to those pressures and in the process they slowly detached themselves from the Anglican Church to become institutions of higher education. The question, therefore, is whether contemporarily that tradition is in the process of being constructively reformulated or is in fact now in its death throes? The final section of the chapter will address this question and reach a tentative conclusion as to how successfully the collegiate universities are responding to the pressures for change.

The Pressures for Change

The pressures we are going to dissect are impacting globally upon national systems of higher education, and the subsequent chapters consider how different institutions are responding to those pressures with particular reference to how traditions of collegiality are being reshaped. The task for this chapter is to impose some symmetry upon the range of variables, although it is recognised that this creates order where very little in fact prevails. The process of change is interactive and subsequent chapters will present evidence to demonstrate this. It is not simply that institutions respond to change pressures but institutional responses can modify their impact and perhaps even the manner in which they are exerted, so they are intensified, weakened or deflected.

Broadly speaking, institutions of higher education have to respond to three contextual pressures: the economic, the political and the social. Frequently, these pressures are transmitted through a combination of state and market demands, which can reinforce one another. This does not preclude independent action by the institutions – they perceive a problem or an opportunity and act accordingly. Indeed they may pre-empt state and/or market pressure or even stimulate it by creating a model of so-called ‘good practice’ that others are then called upon to emulate, either thanks to state intervention or to the realisation by other universities that action is needed in order to protect their market position. There may also be rare examples of universities whose market positions are secure but, nonetheless, they act to bolster reputations to ward off potential long-term threats. For example, in several countries there is current sensitivity to the charge that elite institutions are pursuing aggressive research agendas to the detriment of the quality of their undergraduate teaching. Thus Harvard is compared unfavourably with Princeton and promises action to rectify the situation. It is a question of preserving institutional pride and may have little rational basis because students (despite what they may say) go to Harvard to acquire what can best be termed ‘symbolic capital’ rather than to experience quality undergraduate teaching (for a sophisticated analysis of the types of ‘capital’ associated with elite higher education, see Bourdieu, 1988, 73–127). But not to act is to take a risk; institutional reputations are at stake, and it is important to counter the charge of complacency.

Political Pressures

Integral to the concept of collegiality is the idea that higher education institutions should be independent corporate bodies free to determine their own development. In the United Kingdom, from 1919 onwards, given the increasing financial dependence of higher education upon the public purse, including also the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge and – although to a somewhat lesser extent – their colleges, it was obviously an autonomy that could prevail only under particular conditions.

First, there was the relatively small burden of higher education expenditure upon the public purse. Second, there was the policy concordat between the Treasury

and the University Grant Committee (UGC), which from 1919 to 1989 had the responsibility of distributing the government's annual grant as well as underwriting long-term development plans, by which the latter steered universities along a path that was broadly in line with dominant political opinion. And third, the state respected the idea of institutional autonomy – intrinsic to higher education was the belief that research and teaching were matters in which the state should not intervene.

A major policy development has been the emergence of the new public management (NPM) model of governance, with the state (usually through quangos) adopting a more dirigiste approach to steering the development of higher education. Ironically, the proliferation of the model in continental Europe has meant a sharper formal institutional separation of the state and higher education, although not necessarily to less central steering of the pattern of development. In the United Kingdom the consequence has been more state control with financial muscle acting as both a carrot (rewards for following the prescribed paths) and a stick (failure to comply means the loss of income).

Inevitably if there is to be more state steering of higher education it will incorporate an element of policy direction. It is possible to point to a number of examples in the United Kingdom of which three will be suffice to illustrate the potential impact upon collegial values. Globally student numbers have expanded so it has become possible, in Trow's terms, to refer to systems with universal access (Trow, 1973). In the United Kingdom the focus is not only upon *rates of participation* but also embraces the drive *to widen participation* so that access becomes more socially diverse (which in effect means more representative of the social character of the population) across institutions as a whole. Although there is no explicitly sanctioned political drive to enforce positive discrimination, there are targets that it is expected institutions should strive to meet.

In the British university system individual institutions retain the right to select their entry and there is no automatic guarantee of a place in higher education. While, in theory, this principle has been retained, in practice its operation is under scrutiny, and certainly the pressure for change has impacted upon how universities select their students even if it has not influenced directly individual decisions, which a positive discrimination strategy to promote widening participation would almost certainly do.

If the state's policy on widening participation represents an indirect attempt to reshape collegial values, then its strictures on the principles of governance are more direct. There is support from the Higher Education Funding for England (HEFCE) for the emergence of 'senior management groups' within the governing structures of universities. Although there is a recognition that universities will have different models of governance, the contention that the executive body of a university should have a majority lay membership is one of the recommendations supported by the Council of University Chairmen (CUC), and the Treasury-inspired Lambert Report made explicit criticisms of the governing structures of Oxford and Cambridge (Treasury, 2003). As we have argued, it may well be inevitable that the reshaping of collegial values will result in the restriction of academic control over the

delivery of academic goals (with some ambivalence as to the determination of academic policy), but it should not be forgotten that there has been a persistent official push to achieve this end. The state is an active participant, far from a neutral force, in these affairs.

A very explicit manifestation of the NPM model of governance, and one with international resonance, is the development of more extensive accountability mechanisms. Note that in the United States this was one of the issues raised in the Spellings Report – a quite remarkable development given the Federal Government's limited formal responsibility for system outputs (US Department of Education, 2006). But it is the institutionalisation of the accountability mechanisms in the United Kingdom that represents one of the most developed forms of state steering in this domain. The United Kingdom leads the way, with European nations apparently lining up to emulate us. Currently, the universities have reached a temporary *modus vivendi* with the most significant regulatory body, the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), but its continued presence is now taken for granted and what is at issue is the extent of its remit and how that should be implemented.

The developments in terms of accountability mechanisms have critical implications for professional groups in general and not just academics. Intrinsic to the definition of professional status is the idea that the person delivering the product is responsible for the maintenance of standards. This has been an essential element in the integrity of the professional person. If there are to be regulatory bodies then they need to be constructed and dominated by professional interests – the watchword is self-regulation. In effect state-controlled regulatory procedures imply a lack of trust in professionals – they have little incentive to regulate themselves fairly and effectively. In the contemporary climate, globally and not just in the United Kingdom, it may be impossible to resist the accountability culture (if you have nothing to hide then you have nothing to fear) but, nonetheless, it is a development that eats away at the morale of institutions steeped in collegial values.

The three politically driven policy areas we have examined pose direct challenges to collegial values: intrusion into the selection of undergraduate students, prescription as to the desirable modes of governance (the advocacy of principles that would augment managerialism and limit the scope of academic policy control), and the implementation of accountability procedures that are controlled by quasi-state organisations, which demonstrates a lack of trust (or at least declining trust) in the efficacy of professional training, practices and values.

Besides these focussed messages there are indirect pressures that impact upon the core characteristics of the university. For example, accountability mechanisms open up a wide range of possibilities: what should be taught, how it should be taught, and what are the desired outcomes of the process. While there may be formal support for institutional diversity, accountability pressures inevitably, even if surreptitiously, generate pressures in favour of a safe norm. Universities have always been part of the wider society responding to the needs of state and society, but the collegial tradition has embedded within it the idea that the terms of this relationship are infused with academic values and practices. Increasingly, however, the values and practices

that guide this relationship are shaped outside the institutions of higher education, with pressure to make them more subservient to the needs of state and society.

Economic Pressures

In the sense that most national systems of higher education, and indeed most institutions within those systems, are underwritten by public funding the distinction between economic and political pressure is somewhat artificial. For publicly funded institutions a perennial issue is how to ensure a favourable political outcome in terms of resource allocation. Inevitably publicly funded bodies are vulnerable to political pressure exercised through control of the purse strings. Ideally, therefore, if collegiality is to thrive, institutions need to have an undemanding paymaster (the alleged circumstances that prevailed in the United Kingdom after 1945 – although for how long the halcyon days lasted is a matter of dispute) or they need to have alternative sources of funding – student fees, entrepreneurial activities or their own endowment income. Although institutions can augment their private incomes, most universities and certainly all national systems of higher education in today's world continue to be heavily dependent upon public funding, if only indirectly in the form of financial support for students or state-funded research projects.

The question, therefore, is whether economic pressure is being used to secure political ends. In terms of the United Kingdom, and with particular reference to the widening participation and accountability agendas, it can be argued that this is indeed the case. However, the pressure is more in the form of incentives than sanctions – the rewards that follow from implementing a widening participation strategy and the possibility of accessing funds that enable institutions to research and develop programmes designed to enhance the teaching and learning process. Perhaps as critical as the levels of public support are the changes in how funding is channelled into higher education (competitive as opposed to formula funding), which inevitably impact upon how universities conduct their affairs. Increasingly universities have to decide what values they want to embrace and how they can best organise their affairs to maximise their fulfilment.

There is a debate in Britain as to the homogeneity of its system (increasingly systems) of higher education. There is a general acceptance of its diversity (although as long ago as in 1998 Watson discussed, 'The Limits to Diversity') but it does not necessarily follow that it has a status hierarchy composed of a number of clearly defined institutional strata. There is a common funding mechanism for the distribution of public resources (which perhaps for some time meant the equal sharing of misery) and a range of shared purposes. However, there are two critically important funding initiatives that undermine, or potentially could undermine, this scenario: the selective distribution of research income through the periodic (approximately every 5 years) Research Assessment Exercises and the introduction of variable fees (that is in England) to be repaid through an income-contingent loans scheme. The impact of the latter policy change has yet to be realised as all but one institution charges the maximum permitted fee for all their courses (some £3,000),

which for the time being curtails the development of a market that could impact upon student access to higher education. Moreover, the 2008 RAE resulted in a somewhat flatter distribution of research income, thanks to a funding model that recognised 'pockets of research excellence' within departments rather than simply distributed resources based only on an overall departmental grade. But the institutional levels of research income still remain acutely different and are likely to intensify.

The setting of the £3,000 cap demonstrates two things – the strength of the lobby that is opposed to sharp institutional differentiation and the desire not to move one step further than necessary down the road of abandoning state regulation. The creation of the Office for Fair Access (OFFA) beautifully demonstrates the potency of this latter faction. OFFA negotiates 'access agreements' with the universities before they can exercise the right to charge variable fees. Moreover, the political drive to strengthen the cause of widening participation remains strong. The expectation is that universities will use a percentage of this additional fee income to provide grants for students from lower-income families.

It is evident that the politically driven introduction of these funding mechanisms has had a significant impact upon the relationship between the state and the universities, and with a much bigger impact to come should the fee cap be raised or removed following the ongoing review. In that context a more competitive higher education market is likely to emerge in England as institutions compete for students in part on the price of their courses. While this may be a brave new world for English universities, it is quite familiar territory for many higher education systems (most notably that of the United States) and indeed to the private sector of schooling in Britain. Regardless, its repercussions are potentially traumatic.

The most notable consequence for collegiality of the public policy measures that reshape the mode of state funding is their impact upon the balance of authority within the federal model of governance. In the collegiate models of the university (with reference to Oxford and Cambridge in this chapter) the authority of the university has been reinforced, a shift further enhanced by the channelling of the declining public funding of college fees through the Universities rather than directly to the colleges. In the federal universities of London and Wales the reverse is the case because it is the individual colleges that organise their responses to the quality regime as well as their research submissions, and thus they receive directly the concomitant funding. In other words these are matters handled at the periphery rather than at the centre.

Besides the impact of the changing funding strategies upon the federal model of governance, there are two equally important concomitant cultural changes that also impact collegiality. The response to external intervention has to be managed because both institutional prestige and funding are at stake. Increasingly universities have managed research strategies, a change that runs in the opposite direction to the informal spontaneity associated with the idea of intellectual collegiality. Even if intellectual collegiality and research management can be co-ordinated, the end result is another layer of bureaucracy, undoubtedly under the auspices of a newly created post of pro-vice chancellor along with the required support staff. And what

is true of research management is equally true of quality assurance. Although it may be possible to find academics prepared to undertake responsibility for such functions, it is harder to imagine that too many would rotate easily between academic and managerial roles. Membership of the senior management group beckons as the department and even college fade into the past. The cultural change means that effective management is increasingly perceived as critical to the smooth functioning of the university and that donnish dominion – if not carefully circumscribed – could represent a threat to long-term institutional welfare.

The second critical cultural change, underwritten by the new pattern of research funding, is the shifting balance of research and teaching priorities in the careers of academics and the purposes of universities. In view of the fact that the national and international league tables that purport to measure and rank the academic status of institutions place such store by research output and the attendant rewards that accrue to the most distinguished researchers (Field Medallists and Nobel Laureates), it is scarcely surprising if those universities that think of themselves as 'word class' should place an increasing premium upon the quality of their academic staff's research. It would be difficult to resist the claim that promotion has been linked increasingly to research output and, moreover, in Britain success in the RAEs is related directly to core public funding for research. In Japan, Germany, China and France, to provide just a few examples, considerable trances of public money have been made available for the purposes of promoting research excellence in higher education with the distribution usually determined through a competitive process of bidding (for examples see, Kehm & Pasternak, 2009; Kitagawa, 2009).

This poses a real problem for British universities, and perhaps even more so for Oxford and Cambridge. Not surprisingly, the recent imposition of fees has increased student complaints about the quality of undergraduate teaching and universities can scarcely ignore the perceived grievances. Both Oxford and Cambridge have reputations for taking undergraduate teaching very seriously, and we have argued that 'the Oxford tutorial' is integral to its collegial tradition and represents perhaps that university's most important contribution to higher education. But, in the face of RAE pressure, the drive of many individuals and institutions to acquire international reputations, and the natural desire for promotion, it does not cut much ice to argue that there is a symbiotic relationship between teaching and research (even if true) or, if you are a star research professor, you should deny yourself a considerably reduced teaching load. As we have argued, the collegial tradition promotes the idea of a common academic identity and cannot easily embrace the notion that some have an elevated status and so are deserving of special privileges –including considerably enhanced economic rewards.

In recent years one of the most interesting developments in British higher education has been the state's encouragement of universities to become more entrepreneurial. In part this has been stimulated by funded initiatives coupled with a great deal of exhortation: the need to attract overseas students (especially non-EU residents), to build more links to the local economy, to work closely with Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), to market research, to use campuses to generate

income (hosting conferences, catering to public and private local events), to encourage alumni donations and to restructure investment portfolios. In effect the state has helped to promote the marketisation of higher education by encouraging initiatives that diminish the reliance of institutions upon the public purse. And if you examine university budgets you will discover that this represents a general shift with many institutions now generating comfortably over half of their annual income from the market.

Ironically, the most potent pressure in the stimulation of this shift to the market was neither state exhortation nor its special funding initiatives but rather its protracted financial parsimony. Between approximately 1992 and 2002 the number of undergraduate students at British universities doubled but the public support for teaching (funding per student) remained more or less static, so in time each student was supported by almost 50% less public funding. For institutions of higher education it was a question of acquiring private income, cutting their commitments or going into debt (or, possibly, all three at once). Rather than seeing the creation of private universities (the University of Buckingham is the only British university that can be classified as a truly private institution in terms of both its legal status and its non-reliance upon public funding) the sector as a whole has become increasingly dependent upon a mixture of public and private funding with variations in the relative inputs from university to university. However, it is fascinating to note the continuation of most universities as essentially publicly funded bodies in the United Kingdom, which contrasts with trends in countries as different as Poland, Hungary, South Korea, China and India with their expanding private sectors.

There is no reason why the market will not place greater pressures upon the collegial tradition than the state. The issue is whether the market position of a university allows it to remain in control of the pressures or whether its position is so fragile that it has no choice but to respond in a manner that it believes will best ensure the augmentation of its income with all other considerations of secondary importance. It appears that some courses are constructed because of their assumed (hoped for) market appeal, which is particularly true of the flourishing 1-year-taught masters' programmes. Moreover, some of the combined honours undergraduate degrees seem so convoluted that it is difficult not to believe that they were put together with the aim of buttressing degree programmes with declining market appeal. The manoeuvring may work in financial terms but whether one can say that academic control of the curriculum (a key facet of the collegial tradition) remains secure is an entirely different matter. It is possible that academic integrity gives way to income generation, accompanied by the inclusion of a 'Director of Marketing' in the 'Senior Management Team'!

With regard to their respective market situations there is a clear distinction between universities that are in a position to select their students and those that have to recruit them. Formally universities select their students, but if student demand for places is weak then to all intents and purposes these universities can lose control of their admissions process. In such circumstances it is not at all unusual to learn that a minimum academic entry requirement (usually quite undemanding) is agreed

upon and recruitment is handled bureaucratically until the quota is met (or possibly not met). It is difficult to imagine that any pristine interpretation of collegiality can survive in such circumstances because the market has determined who enters the university, not the academic faculty. But the pressure to be financially solvent is a hard taskmaster.

Social Pressures

The preceding web of political and economic changes, of the interaction of state and market pressures, is located within the context of a range of important social developments, which, while driven by economic and political forces, also represent a response to cultural change. These are forces that have had a significant global impact and to which the universities can respond with greater discretionary authority.

Undoubtedly the most important and widely experienced change is the expansion of higher education, and most national systems have mass or even universal undergraduate participation rates. The United States is no longer the sole exemplar of mass higher education, with several countries having higher rates of participation. In many societies experiencing higher education is almost part of the rite de passage into adulthood for middle-class youth. And this has been accompanied by state-sponsored widening participation initiatives, programmes to ensure that 'drop-out' rates are minimised, the expanding entry of under-represented social groups and even the introduction of the idea of lifelong learning.

In spite of this almost universal expansion it is still possible to identify within most systems individual institutions that have an elevated national, even international, prestige. It can be argued that the expansion of higher education, including the founding of institutions embracing different forms of higher education, in fact protected prestigious institutions because increasing student numbers could be accommodated elsewhere in the system. This is not to say that the elite institutions did not also augment their undergraduate numbers but rather the issue is comparative expansion rates.

Even if the sustenance of elite institutions and the arrival of mass systems are complementary trends, the issue of what happens to the collegial tradition within the new mass model is problematic. If, as we have argued, an interactive learning process designed to educate critically aware students is central to the collegial tradition, the question is whether this can be sustained in a mass system. Moreover, what happens to those broader experiences (higher education as elite socialisation) that were part of the package of attending a collegiate university? Assuming that the colleges can control the size of their annual intake of undergraduates (in part through the foundation of new colleges and the fact that the sheer physical confines of existing colleges may even militate against expansion), then presumably it will be easier to sustain established traditions.

The experience of higher education has always meant different things to different students but mass higher education has undoubtedly sharpened its polarisation.

There is a range of variables that will impact strongly upon the interaction between students and the universities, of which the following are the most important:

full-time or part-time students
balancing university commitments against wider pressures (for example from family or employment)
residence on campus or commuting/distance-learning students

The issue then is how the university responds to the contrasting intensities of interaction thrown up by these differences. It can still stress the values of a liberal education as well as a commitment to an interactive teaching process, which can be reinforced both by strong structures of pastoral care and by institutional socio-cultural activities. But how meaningful these facets of collegiality are for those students who have to establish pragmatic relationships with the university, or even in some cases maintain merely tangential connections, is another matter.

Within this fragmented social context contrasting interpretations of what it means to be a student have emerged. It may well be that dimensions of the collegial tradition from the perspective of many students are marginalised or even irrelevant. It will be interesting to see how significant a place is given to the undergraduate teaching experience in the plans of those governments attempting to create world-class universities. The emphasis to date has been upon funnelling considerable resources into selected institutions that appear to be in a position to compete effectively in terms of fulfilling a high-quality research agenda. The question of the student experience rarely figures. However, not all is lost. In the United Kingdom there is a growing concern that the quality of mass higher education leaves much to be desired but, as yet, there is limited progress on how to address the issue. Interestingly, in the Netherlands – under the guise that all students should experience an education that is tailored to their needs – there has been a tentative step towards a measure of differentiation within the mass model. But it has taken the familiar path of constructing demanding programmes for the more gifted students (for example, by establishing honours colleges – Kaiser & Vossensteyn, 2009: 177). It appears to suggest that if the collegial tradition is to survive within the context of mass higher education then it will do so by providing avenues of escape for some students. So collegiality becomes an experience confined to elite universities rather than a defining characteristic of higher education.

However, even within the collegiate universities the values binding student to college and university do not necessarily conform to any immutable idea of collegiality. It is impossible to deny the increased importance of standardised measures of pre-university academic success in determining undergraduate recruitment, the role of the collegiate universities in forming – or at least enhancing – social networks, and the significance for the individual of elite higher education as a form of symbolic capital. The college as an active force for shaping values and character appears to be in decline. Nonetheless, the demand for places at the collegiate universities from well-qualified applicants continues to be high, and those universities that foster residence in college testify to its significance in sustaining buoyant

student enrolment and satisfaction with the university. In these terms collegiality appears to be a mutually satisfactory deal with benefits to the student, the college and the university. While the intensity of the collegial experience may have lessened (tutors no longer take reading parties to the Lake District or actively participate in inter-collegiate sporting activities) and its impact is different, there still appears to be sufficient returns to make residence in college a worthwhile experience.

What is more problematic is the impact of social change upon the relationship of academics to the collegial tradition. Within the non-collegiate universities if collegiality is defined essentially in terms of control of academic affairs then this should not present a substantial problem, although there is always the possibility of the development of a self-perpetuating inner-cadre dominating the key decision-making bodies. But at the level of the department, the research centre, the laboratory, the honours college or even the graduate school, we should be sufficiently close to the academic face to sustain collegiality – in effect it is the label that best describes how a group of professionals go about maintaining and enhancing their key functions. But within the collegiate universities, embraced by – perhaps encumbered by – a wider understanding of collegiality, the situation is very different.

Historically Oxford and Cambridge were bastions of male privilege with a few women's colleges as more recent foundations. How much the change in the gender balance has impacted upon male privileges is a contentious issue but the colleges are now all co-educational institutions with approximately equal numbers of men and women undergraduates as well as a significant representation of women tutors. Inevitably this will affect the social life of a college. It may still represent an experience in elite socialisation but its inherent cultural values (although not necessarily its forms) had to change. The increased presence of women has been matched by a declining number of unmarried dons, many of whom lived in college. The social obligations of married tutors (or those with partners) will be very different from those who are unmarried. Moreover, although at both Oxford and Cambridge there are designated graduate colleges, there has been a serious attempt to incorporate the graduate students into the wider collegiate system. Thus colleges provide at least a social base for graduate students (who are selected by the departments) through the creation of middle common rooms.

Therefore, in a comparatively short space of time the colleges have become a very different mix of social ingredients. The issue for the college tutors, those with obligations to both college and university (as at Oxford) or even those who have a college allegiance even though they are full-time employees of the university (as at Cambridge), is how much of their time and energy to devote to the wider aspects of collegiality. This is an especially sharp issue given the changing academic culture in which research output is more critical both in determining university income and in shaping individual careers. In fact the colleges have been able to respond flexibly to these pressures. They are in a position to steer their own course of action and have less need to accommodate counter-institutional pressure. This is broadly parallel to the response of universities (in most national systems) to market pressures – it may be a question of 'Hobson's choice' but it is your choice!

In view of the flexibility built into this scenario it is unsurprising to see a range of institutional responses. College tutorial teaching has been sustained for many years by the employment of tutors (including now, not surprisingly, graduate students) who hold neither a college nor a university post – a considerable irony in view of the fact that central to the reforms of the latter half of the nineteenth century was the assertion of control over teaching by the college fellows. The employment of part-time tutors (paid on an hourly rate) is not only cost-effective but also helps to put a cap on the teaching obligations of fellows. It is possible to expand your numbers and so alleviate the pressure of larger student numbers while still increasing your fee income. More significantly, it helps to reinforce the preservation of tutorial teaching ('supervisions' rather than 'tutorials' at Cambridge), and – significantly – it also enables teaching fellows to spend more time on their research. Moreover, there is no reason why part-time tutors should be less effective – even if less experienced – teachers than college fellows. The continuing commitment to tutorial teaching (Oxford's 'jewel in the crown'), which some would see as central to the collegial tradition, is thus, at a price, sustained.

Like teaching, participation in governance, assuming administrative responsibilities and imbibing in commensality can all be time-consuming tasks for research-committed academics with family obligations. In each case the accommodating measures are both obvious and widely replicated. The fellows cede their responsibilities for governance to college councils/executive committees while retaining their formal sovereignty over the development of the college (perhaps discussing and agreeing upon policy options at scheduled meetings composed of the fellows as a body). The colleges increase their administrative expertise, including delegating some key responsibilities (for example, investment decisions and the restructuring of endowment portfolios) to private firms. The idea of a college fellow (and John Maynard Keynes springs to mind), or even a professional bursar alone, determining investment strategy is frankly absurd. There will still be posts to fill and committees to run but for some fellows these may present welcome opportunities to diversify your career and possibly augment your income.

In the context of bachelor dons living in college along with colleges committed to playing an explicit role in elite socialisation (with the chapel, the reading parties and inter-collegiate sports providing a range of examples) commensality was an important part of college life. In its current form, although it may still be attractive for both dons and students, it clearly makes less demands of both parties. Fellows, particularly those with college tutorials to teach, may find it convenient to lunch in college while attending only the occasional dinner, especially those held to commemorate special occasions (the gaudies). They may enjoy listening to evensong in the college chapel without in the least feeling that they are assisting in the making of English gentlemen. Undergraduates may come to feel a sense of collegial loyalty but how committed they may be to the multifarious activities sponsored by the collegial system is another matter.

The response to social change reinforces the idea of the pragmatic reconstruction of the collegiate ideal. Loyalty is underpinned, as to some extent it always was, by the tangible rewards of belonging to a college. Perhaps this is most clearly illustrated

by those colleges that underwrite some of the housing costs of those tutors who do not live in college. Is this a way of reinforcing commitment to the idea of collegiality (local residence encourages closer interaction with the college)? Or is it a not-so-subtle bribe, which acts as the glue to cement collegial commitment? Or, as seems most probable, is it simply a question of acceptable trade-offs and is it difficult to separate cause and effect?

Conclusions: Threatening Pressures, Institutional Responses and Inherent Tensions

This chapter opened by suggesting there are inherent tensions within institutions that purport to represent collegial values. However, all institutions have to cope with internal conflict as they evolve over time. Moreover, as the collegiate universities have long experience in handling such difficulties, this may be a perfectly manageable problem. However, external developments appear to have an in-built rationale that questions the long-term viability of collegiality as a basis for sustaining institutions of higher educations. We have outlined an interactive combination of political, economic and social forces, sometimes driven forward by complementary state and market pressures, which make it more difficult to sustain a strong understanding of collegiality.

And yet it would be naive to examine the change process without incorporating the part that higher education institutions, and their associated interests, play in accommodating these pressures – by re-interpreting the demands made of them, by deflection through pre-emptive action or even resistance based on the skilful employment of their resources. But it is important to recognise that, while men make their own histories but not in circumstances of their own choosing, so institutions evolve without controlling all the variables that constantly reshape their development. Consequently, there is no master plan with an inevitable outcome.

We have argued that state pressure, because it is reinforced by financial leverage and sustained by an institutional apparatus, poses the greatest threat to the continuation of the collegial tradition. Such pressure so often limits flexible responses from higher education because predominant financial resources underwrite its policy prescriptions. The market invariably permits a wider range of institutional reactions to pressures for change but whether it will elicit policies that are more sympathetic to collegial values is another question, for it may suggest outcomes that are more likely to ensure institutional survival as opposed to the sustenance of collegiality.

The impact upon higher education consequent upon these pressures is indeed substantial. There are four possible outcomes that require special mention because of their particular significance for both the collegiate universities and the collegial tradition more generally. First, there is the tilting in the federal model of governance that shifts sharply the balance of authority in favour of either the centre or the periphery. It is more difficult, therefore, to sustain the equilibrium of power that is a central feature of the collegiate model of governance. Second, there is the

spread of managerial decision-making procedures that are potentially antithetical to the collegial tradition, so embedding a culture of managerialism that erodes collegiality. Third, there is the marketisation of higher education, which leads to financial well-being taking precedence over, if not all, most other considerations. The desire for financial stability (perfectly understandable) becomes an end in its own right. Finally, there are the critical shifts in academic culture (in part driven by the economic, political and social pressures) that undermine the commitment of the profession to collegial values. Collegiality places a value on local reputations, a sense of community, collective ownership and responsibility, and in status terms embodies an egalitarian impulse. The current evolution of higher education runs counter to such values.

The question is how do institutions respond to these pressures? Both the Research Assessment Exercises and the mechanisms of the Quality Assurance Agency require action on the part of the universities and their departments, but within the collegiate universities for many students the most critical teaching takes place within the colleges. Moreover, colleges have played a part in augmenting their input into the research agenda by offering research fellowships. Furthermore, the widening participation policy has to incorporate the colleges given their control over undergraduate admissions. The question, therefore, is whether – regardless of where formal responsibility may reside – the collegiate universities can organise their responses to the external pressure to create a united strategy incorporating the colleges and university. If so, it is conceivable that the external pressure could enhance rather than undermine many of the facets of collegiality.

With respect to market pressures, Oxford and Cambridge, at least in comparison to many other British universities, find themselves in a relatively favourable situation. Many of the colleges have substantial endowment incomes, they remain universities that select rather than recruit students and their pre-eminent market position attracts potential benefactors, and this is without factoring in their appeal to overseas students who can be recruited almost on their own terms. Reputation is a critical asset in securing resources in the market, and undoubtedly the fact that Oxford and Cambridge are major collegiate universities contributes significantly to their worldwide status.

Within the non-collegiate universities the reaffirmation of the collegial tradition can be interpreted as a professional commitment to maintaining academic control of teaching and research with particular reference to their delivery rather than their development. Within this narrow confine collegiality then finds expression in the university's academic institutions – departments, research centres and laboratories. With respect to academic development there will be an interaction between these 'grassroots' component parts of the university and the more centralised decision-making bodies, which may in fact result in a more meaningful and sustainable pattern of growth. The decisions that are determined collegially have to undergo a 'reality check', but in turn this may lead to a re-ordering of institutional priorities. There is a bargaining process in which judgements are made and compromises constructed with the internal decision-making process steered by external pressures. For example, no university research development office is going to back a

departmental research plan with internal resources without taking into consideration, or least forcing the department to take into consideration, the possibility of external funding and the likely impact of the initiative upon the department's subsequent ratings in the research assessment exercises. Indeed, past poor rating may encourage the university to wield the axe rather than support resuscitation.

Oxford and Cambridge face the problem that they embody a more developed understanding of the collegial tradition, which has various dimensions that require their faculty and officers to nurture. We have examined some of the responses to this dilemma but the point remains that commitment on both the academic and professional fronts is required to undertake the obligations that collegiality imposes. It is difficult to say categorically how far that commitment can decline before the broader understanding of collegiality becomes little more than a myth. However, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which this possibility steadily becomes a reality.

The Oxbridge dilemma is that they are indeed world-class universities (Chester & Bekhradnia, 2009). While some of the ranking lists (for example, that of the *Times Higher Education Supplement*, now *Times Higher Education*) perhaps place undue reliance on the judgement of academic peers (which almost certainly reflects historical perceptions of reputation), there is a powerful stress upon research output, a stress that is likely to increase. The further problem for Oxford and Cambridge is that they are both universities with broad academic profiles and thus research excellence has to be spread across a very wide range of disciplines. Historically universities with international reputations have had to sustain a range of commitments that have helped to mould their identities over time (recruitment of academically gifted undergraduates, links with alumni, augmentation of endowment income and the perception that they offer high-quality degree programmes that are well taught) but today there is little doubt that the main driver of international reputation is research output (Tapper & Filippakou, 2009).

The question, therefore, that has to be asked is whether research reputation is enhanced by the fact that Oxford and Cambridge are collegiate universities? Or does collegiality in this more developed sense hinder the drive to be at the cutting edge of research? And, if so, is the price nonetheless worth paying? An interesting question to pose is whether the definition of what constitutes 'world-class status' can be changed so that the quality of teaching, more especially of undergraduate teaching, is built into the equation.

Figure 2.1 outlined comparatively the institutional forms and practices of the collegiate and unitary models of the university. What this analysis of the contemporary challenges to higher education suggests is that the modern university has inherent tensions in terms of its central purposes. The pressures for change have made it an increasingly complex institution that has to balance competing goals. In effect, there are conflicting ideas of the university coexisting within the same institutional boundaries, which present us with a different order of potential institutional conflicts from the essentially operational difficulties of the collegiate universities that we outlined at the start of this chapter. This is a conflict of purposes and values rather than the managing of the daily tensions of everyday institutional life.

Access	Selective/competitive	Open access
Purposes	Undergraduate teaching	Research
	Critical thought	Transferable skills
	Elite socialization	Professional training
Means	Honours degrees	Useful knowledge
	Small group teaching	Driven by lectures
Accountability	Professional trust and self--regulation	External control
The Faculty	A 'calling' for tutors	Careers for professionals
Relations to state /society	A critical distance	Fully integrated

Fig. 3.1 The value tensions

Figure 3.1 outlines value tensions rather than consistently clear-cut differences. For example, it can be reasonably argued that an education designed to develop a critical mode of thinking in the undergraduate student inevitably will enhance transferable skills. Moreover, neither list embodies exclusively virtues that all would consider to be desirable, and it can be expected that within all universities different institutional segments will move in varying directions. Departments within universities have also evolved contrasting relationships to state and society, which will dictate where they are located between the polar positions – or even whether they can embrace both polar positions (for example, high-quality undergraduate teaching with cutting-edge research).

The question is what mode of governance best enables the institution to steer a viable path through these tensions, which ensures both survival and a valued identity? And, as Gary Rhoades in his brilliant *Calling on the Past: The Quest for the Collegiate Ideal* observes, the answer will be determined politically but it is a politics driven by ideas: 'The ideas are unstable, political constructions. Yet they create parameters that delimit our discourse and detract from our ability to explore alternatives. Structuralist thinking structures our options and future' (Rhoades, 1990: 532). It was ever thus.

Part II
Collegiality in Action

Chapter 4
Collegiality as Colleges

Introduction

Most universities, and not only those located in the United Kingdom, would perceive themselves as embracing at least elements of the collegial tradition, but besides Oxford and Cambridge there are only four British universities that make considerable play upon the importance of their colleges in defining their identities. These are the universities of Durham, Kent, Lancaster and York. On their respective websites, possibly the most public self-expression of their identities, the following descriptions are to be found:

> Durham University is a 'collegiate' university. The colleges are a major part of the Durham University experience and are one of the key reasons our students give for applying (Durham University: 19 December 2008).
>
> The five colleges at Kent are each named after distinguished British figures . . . They are more than just halls of residence (University of Kent: 19 December 2008).
>
> Lancaster University has nine colleges. . . The colleges are a highly distinctive feature of campus life (Lancaster University: 19 December 2008).
>
> The University of York's college system is a major part of the student experience at York . . . York is justly famous for its College system . . . (University of York: 19 December 2008).

Durham, therefore, goes so far as describing itself as a collegiate university, while for Kent, Lancaster and York the colleges are billed as a distinctive feature of their respective profiles.

But why should these particular universities have embraced a very traditional facet of the English model of the university? What do they see as the role of their colleges in how their universities function? And is it appropriate to view them as collegiate universities, albeit embracing a softer version of collegiality compared to the interpretation derived mainly from the Oxbridge model that was presented in the previous chapters? And, if they are not collegiate universities do their colleges, nonetheless, enhance their effectiveness within the contemporary system of English higher education? In what ways do they contribute to our understanding of the collegial tradition?

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Why Colleges?

Along with the University of London (arising out of the founding of University College and King's College), Durham University represents the start of the nineteenth century expansion of the English system of higher education. From the 1830s onwards the civic foundations (sometimes known as the redbrick universities) emerged to challenge the hegemony of Oxbridge (although whether Durham could be described as a civic foundation is debatable). What is fascinating about the nineteenth century English expansion of higher education is the very diversity of the new models of the university: the federalism of the University of London, the unitary structure of Birmingham and the collegiality of Durham, albeit that there was initially only one college, University College, situated in Durham castle.

While the Oxbridge collegiate model may have been held in high regard in certain quarters, it is important to remember that both Oxford and Cambridge faced considerable internal and external pressures for reform, including forthright attacks upon their collegiate character. As they were then currently constituted many felt they served the needs neither of scholarship nor of society – let alone their own interest in self-preservation – with particular distinction. However, as the only English universities they certainly represented the past. With its one college, University College – college and university as one – located in Durham Castle, which was appropriated by an Order of the Queen in Council (8 August 1837) for the benefit of the University, Durham was able to create a very particular version of the collegiate model (Durham University: 20 December 2008).

But the other nineteenth century foundations, including the University of London, are proof that the past did not impose a dead hand on the present for, besides the antipathy to the Oxbridge collegiate model, there were the practical problems – not least the financial burden – of creating colleges where none already existed. However, Barnes (1996) has argued that by the end of the century Oxbridge values were not simply penetrating the civic universities but becoming increasingly dominant. Nonetheless, this required the resuscitation of Oxbridge, and the idea of higher education it represented had to take root within a different model of the university. But, regardless, the University of Durham stands out as a unique Victorian contribution to the development of English higher education.

With respect to the three other universities that form the empirical core of this chapter – Kent, Lancaster and York – it would only be too easy to jump to the conclusion that their colleges are indeed a 'genuflection at the altar of the collegiate ideal'. But this would be to simplify the analysis beyond the bounds of plausibility. The three universities are part of that expansion of English higher education, tied into but not determined by, the publication of the Robbins Report (Committee on Higher Education, 1963), perhaps the most interesting official government report into the condition of British higher education.

Kent, Lancaster and York were part of a wave of 'new universities', as they were known, that also included Sussex, Essex, Warwick and East Anglia. Indeed at the time, there was in certain quarters a sharp negative reaction to their foundation on the very grounds that they failed to break with past traditions – there was very little

that was 'new' about them. The critique, however, was more deep-seated than the decision of three of the universities to create colleges:

> The decision to site the new universities in ancient cities was implicitly criticised by the Robbins report, in advocating that future expansion should take place in large conurbations, where resources of industry, housing, and culture made them better suited to nurture growing academic organisms (Beloff, 1968: 37).

And, given the need to build on a large scale, it is not surprising that the campuses should be located not in but close to the towns, suggesting an even further isolation from the mainstream of British society – an embracing of the past rather than the future. Not surprisingly, in certain quarters the new universities were contrasted very unfavourably with the polytechnics that were created almost simultaneously (1965). The polytechnics were billed as 'the people's universities', located in the cities and embracing technical and vocational higher education – symbols of the future rather than the past (Robinson, 1968).

Although the new universities were not the product of the Robbins Report, and in particular respects their creation may have run counter to certain of the Report's specific recommendations, in broad terms there was a synergy between the Report and this most novel expansion of English higher education. They complemented rather than contradicted one another. Perhaps the most significant synergy was the support for the combination of a modest expansion in the overall size of the student population coupled with the need for greater innovation in the undergraduate curriculum. In a highly critical review of the Report ('The Robbins Trap: British Attitudes and the Limits of Expansion'), although written with the benefit of some 25 years of hindsight, Martin Trow has argued that Britain needed to move towards a mass system of higher education but this was thwarted by the failure of Robbins to challenge some of the traditional characteristics of the British system of higher education (Trow, 1989: 55):

– the monopoly of state-supported institutions over the awarding of degrees
– the commitment to sustaining high and common standards for the honours degree
– the retention of full-time, 3-year degree programmes
– the state's almost complete financial support for student maintenance and fees

Although it is a significant weakness in Trow's position that he fails to place the Report in its historical context (for example, imposing upon Robbins the remit to promote a significant expansion of higher education), he does reaffirm Rhoades' point that past values can sustain a potent, and perhaps inappropriate, legacy (Rhoades, 1990: 512–534). And, ironically, at the very time of his article's publication, the United Kingdom was about to commence down the road of mass higher education.

It is reasonable to claim that, while in the early 1960s, Britain was ready for a moderate expansion of student numbers, it was far from thinking in terms of the need for a rapid growth of the universities. Moreover, given the modest aims of reformers it was to be expected that the new universities would retain much of the legacy of the past – small institutions, set in 'cathedral' towns and intent on establishing

institutions with a sense of community to which, at least in three cases, colleges would be central. If there was to be a significant change it would not to be defined by rapid expansion (which could have been accommodated by a modest increase in the student populations of the existing institutions) or by a rejection of the collegiate model of the university, but rather in terms of the creation of new maps of knowledge, accompanied by innovative modes of teaching and learning. And it is important not to forget the almost parallel development of the polytechnics, which resulted in a binary model of higher education.

Asked by Perkin why the UGC founded the new universities, its Chairman Sir Keith Murray, the person most responsible for steering the new universities from the drawing board to fruition, responded: 'It was one third numbers and two thirds new ideas' reinforced by a belief in certain quarters that the established universities were too committed to the existing system to be experimental (Perkin, 1991: 296). And Perkin provides powerful documentary evidence to illustrate the UGC's view:

> . . . On the academic side, we had declared our main interests to be in the general broadening of the undergraduate curriculum, in the breaking down of the rigidities of departmental organisation, and in the strengthening of the relationship between teacher and taught (UGC's Annual Report, 1964 as quoted in Perkin, 1991: 296).

Indeed, in Beloff's *The Plateglass Universities* (1968) and the overview (edited by Michael Shattock) produced under the auspices of the Society for Research in Higher Education (SRHE), 'The New Universities' (*Higher Education Quarterly*, 1991), a significant percentage of both publications is devoted to the way in which 'the new map of learning' was constructed, and this is by far and away the dominant interest in Daiches' edited book, *The Idea of a New University: An Experiment in Sussex* (1964), which is reinforced by Ainley's *Degrees of Difference: Higher Education in the 1990s* (Ainley, 1994: 51).

With careful selection of the documentation it would be possible to support a case that the seven new universities of the 1960s represented an attempt to re-invent aspects of the collegiate ideal: located in 'cathedral' towns, 'green and pleasant' campus sites, a bias towards the arts and/or social sciences and a desire to re-invent a pedagogy that stressed the centrality of close tutor–student contact – shades of the Oxford tutorial. *The Times* even went so far as to label Sussex as 'Balliol by the sea' (Sampson, 1962: 210).

However, some telling counter-points would have to be rebuffed (for an incisive review of the differing perspectives, see Shattock, 1994: 73–80). Only three of the seven new universities decided to establish residential colleges. If the appeal of the past is so powerful, why in this case was it only partially embraced? Essex, with bed-sits located in tower blocks, seems to have opted for a model of student campus accommodation virtually the polar opposite to residence in college. Presumably there were conflicting judgements as to what was appropriate in the context of 1960s Britain, and some arrived at the conclusion that colleges were outmoded, simply not in tune with the spirit of the times. Moreover, it was evident that there would not be resources to create colleges in the Oxbridge style and, consequently, it was perhaps preferable to seek alternative models rather than construct pale imitations. As Rhoades remarked collegiality is a political construction (1990: 532), and as such

how it manifests itself is open to negotiation. What the foundation of the new universities, like the nineteenth century civics, illustrates is that the collegial past will be interpreted, possibly rejected, in the context of prevailing circumstances – financial and social as well as academic and political. Although the collegial ideal may be accorded a hallowed and unalloyed status in the literature when it comes to founding a university purity soon evaporates.

But the question of why three of the new universities decided to create colleges and the other four did not remains unresolved. With respect to Durham it is almost a non-issue: the college was the university and the university was the college. Its foundation was strongly influenced by the Anglican Church with theological studies, embedded in the seminary tradition, at the very core of its purpose. In terms of the 1960s new universities the question needs to be resolved by further research but the strong suspicion is that this was an issue resolved at the local level. This was a matter on which the UGC did not impose a prescriptive line and, therefore, the delegation of responsibility gave weight to the input of powerful individuals supportive of values that favoured the creation of colleges – or believed that, in the context of the 1960s, students would prefer the independence of bed-sits rather than the warm embrace of colleges. These are questions that we will leave to the historians to answer. Our task is to explore the contemporary role of the colleges at the four universities. In what ways does their presence shape our understanding of the collegial tradition even if these are not collegiate universities?

Rhoades argued that the potency of the collegiate ideal imposed structured thinking but the creation of the English new universities suggests the continuing criticality of key individuals to the process of change in higher education. Such individuals may be ‘victims of structured thinking’, but the creation of the new universities suggests both convergence and divergence in the range of ideas that shaped their founding. To provide a contemporary American example of the role of the powerful individual in the development of higher education, one can find no better example than Clark Kerr. Clark Kerr’s unwavering support was critical to the attempt to create the Santa Cruz campus of the University of California as a collegiate university, perhaps particularly incongruous given the University’s status as a public institution with a very strong focus on graduate studies and research. But, incongruous or not, this is not to deny the point that individual agency can have a significant impact upon the policy-making process.

But individual agency is shaped by the realities of the context. The realisation of the collegiate idea would be formulated within the constraints of the 1960s, especially by the almost total dependence of British higher education institutions upon public funding. This may have been a golden era in the public support for higher education but inevitably there were boundaries to that largesse. So we are driven to the conclusion that the decisions were made at the institutional level by individuals who felt that colleges would enhance the character of their universities, and they cut the cloth to match their circumstances. Interestingly, the three new universities that decided to establish residential colleges did receive some additional funding from the UGC to underwrite their efforts. In part this was a recognition of the extra costs the universities incurred because of their colleges (note the fees that were paid

directly to the Oxbridge colleges) but also because there was an official commitment to encouraging diverse models for the delivery of higher education. So, it could be argued that Kent, Lancaster and York were not so much embracing the past but pointing us in the direction of the very contemporary concern that the system of higher education should be more diverse!

So what were the advantages of colleges over tower blocks and bed-sits (and in this respect it should be noted that 'Balliol by the sea' was far closer to Essex than its three collegiate cousins)? From the university websites it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the dominant, and overarching, belief is that colleges help to create a sense of community. It is not simply that they break down the large university into smaller, more secure and intimate spaces (even today Durham, Kent, Lancaster or York cannot be described as large universities. In fact for much of their histories all four universities have been relatively small in terms of the size of their student populations. The key point is that colleges are seen as central to the creation of a sense of institutional loyalty; they reinforce the very English idea of the university as a community to which students, and indeed faculty, belong and embrace. Receiving a university education is much more than obtaining a degree, it is also about forming a bond with the university that awards the degree, to which it is assumed there will be a life-long commitment. Perhaps the most symbolic manifestation of this point is the student's reference to the college rather than the university as defining personal institutional loyalties, which in England is particularly applicable to Oxford and Cambridge students – a Balliol or Trinity graduate rather than someone with an Oxford or Cambridge degree.

College Profiles

We have noted how the four university websites highlight the presence of their respective college systems. In each case this is followed by an almost immediate reference to their central role in establishing a sense of community:

> Durham University's college system is arguably the most distinctive feature of the University. Colleges are small enough to foster *a strong sense of community*... Every student at the University belongs to a college. They remain a member of their college throughout their time at Durham and beyond. ... each college is a small community.... (Durham University, 19 December 2008, stress added).

> All students and academic staff belong to a college, whether or not they live on campus. So you have plenty of opportunities to meet people studying different subjects. The colleges give you access *to a ready-made community* from the moment you arrive at Canterbury (University of Kent, 19 December 2008, stress added).

> Most colleges have about eight or nine hundred members and all on-campus accommodation is located within the colleges which makes it easy to get to know people and gives a sense of *belonging to a supportive community* (Lancaster University, 19 December 2008, stress added).

And finally,

> By breaking the University down into a series of smaller groups, the Colleges help to foster a strong sense of community (University of York, 19 December 2008).

Although it can be argued that this attempt to create a sense of community, in part through establishing colleges, is nostalgia for the past, it can also be interpreted as a reaffirmation of the traditional English idea of the university. It may represent a reluctance to embrace a mass system of higher education, but it is something more than, to use Rhoades' phrase, a 'calling on the past'. In the United Kingdom we have moved steadily, if unevenly, towards a mass system of higher education as measured by the size of the undergraduate population. However, we have found it difficult to abandon the values, and the language of the traditional order that reflects those values, which is as much a consequence of the unease that mass higher education generates as nostalgia for the past. To put it simply, not everyone has accepted that the rapid expansion of higher education has been desirable, and although mass higher education now appears to be triumphant, the ideological conflict continues. A new system has emerged but the old values and cultural assumptions – as reflected in how these universities see themselves – remain deeply embedded (Scott, 2001: 186–204).

Durham University has 16 colleges and 3 theological seminaries (Ushaw College, Cranmer Hall and the Wesley Study Centre, attached, respectively, to the Roman Catholic, Anglican and Methodist Churches, reflecting the University's deep theological roots). There are 2 colleges on the University's Queen's Campus at Teeside (John Snow and Stephenson) and 14 in Durham:

Collingwood	St Chad's	Trevelyan
Grey	St Cuthbert's Society	University
Hatfield	St Hild and St Bede	Ustinov
Josephine Butler	St John's	Van Mildert
St Aidan's	St Mary's	

Source: Durham University: 19 December 2008

All the colleges are now co-educational (until October 2005 St Mary's College admitted only women), and all colleges accept postgraduates with Ustinov College as the only postgraduate college. Total student numbers (which is not the same as the number of students actually resident in college at any one point in time) range from under 500 (Josephine Butler, St Chad's and St John's) to over 1,000 (Collingwood, St Cuthbert's Society, St Hild and St Bede, Stephenson, Ustinov and Van Mildert). University (1832), St Hild and St Bede (1839), Hatfield (1846), St Cuthbert's Society (1888) and St Mary's (1899) are nineteenth century foundations; St Chad's (1904) and St John's (1909) were founded in the early twentieth century; and since 1945 Grey (1959), St Aidan's (1947), Trevelyan (1966), Ustinov

(1965) and Van Mildert (1965) have been added to the list with John Snow and Stephenson Colleges (the Queen campus colleges) being established in 2001, while Josephine Butler (2006) is the latest foundation. Therefore, excepting the depression years of the inter-war period, the Durham collegiate system has expanded at regular intervals, which is an impressive achievement in its own right as well as demonstrating the university's commitment to the continuing importance of residential colleges as part of its identity.

Kent has five colleges:

Darwin	Rutherford
Eliot	Woolf
Keynes	

Source: University of Kent: 19 December 2008

Eliot was the first of Kent's colleges to be founded (1965), soon to be followed by Rutherford (1966), Keynes (1968) and Darwin (1970). Unlike at Durham, and symbolising the partial decline of Kent's commitment to the residential collegial ideal, it was not until 2008 that a fifth college was founded, Woolf College, which provides accommodation for graduate students. The residential expansion that has occurred at Kent has taken the form of annexes to colleges (for example Tyler Court and Rutherford College; Darwin Houses and Darwin College) and the creation of the student village, Park Wood, that opened in 2005 is in effect an upmarket agglomeration of flats and houses. What is taking place at Kent is a mixed pattern of campus accommodation, which is centred on the colleges without being completely embraced by them.

Lancaster has nine colleges:

Bowland	Fylde	Graduate
Cartmel	Grizedale	
County	Lonsdale	
Furness	Pendle	

Source: Lancaster University: 19 December 2008

The majority of the nine colleges opened in the 1960s: Bowland (1964), Lonsdale (1965), Cartmel and Furness (1968) and County (1969). In the 1970s three followed: Fylde (1970), Grizedale (1975) and Pendle (1975), with the aptly – if prosaically – named Graduate College making its appearance in 1990. Several of the colleges have moved location in order to permit expansion and, like the Kent colleges, have started to develop annexes providing more 'bed-sit' than 'collegial' style accommodation.

And finally, *York* has eight colleges:

Alcuin	Langwith
Derwent	James
Goodricke	Vanburgh
Halifax	Wentworth

Source: University of York: 19 December 2008

Five of the eight are the 1960s foundations: Langwith and Derwent Colleges (1965), Goodricke and Vanburgh Colleges (1968) and Alcuin College (1969). Since the 1960s, James (1992), Wentworth (2001 – a college for postgraduate students) and Halifax (2003) have been added. Both Halifax College (with 8 courts) and James College (with 12 blocks), in parallel with developments at both Kent and Lancaster, point to the erosion of a core collegiate identity that must impact upon both the character of the colleges as well as the broader image of the three universities.

The Colleges: Their Roles

The key reason Oxford and Cambridge remain collegiate universities is because they continue to have effective federal systems of governance. Both colleges and universities retain critical roles in the performance of the central functions of the two institutions. Conversely, the key reason, as we shall see, the Universities of London and Wales find it increasingly difficult to sustain themselves as collegiate universities is because their federal systems of governance are in steady decline, the periphery is increasingly more detached from the centre. It is as if the southern states had won the American Civil War. Of course, within itself, an effective model of federal governance is insufficient to sustain a collegiate university but without federalism a collegiate university cannot function.

The implication of the above argument is that the four universities forming the empirical core of this chapter cannot be collegiate universities because they are unitary universities with structures of governance and administration that formally exercise overall responsibility for all their constituent parts including their colleges. This is an argument to which the chapter will return and, which in the case of Durham University, needs to be amplified. However, the question of what functions the colleges perform and, perhaps of greater significance, what functions they do not perform still has to be addressed. In what ways do they sustain collegial values?

Commensality

The provision of residence is potentially a critical resource in the development of commensality because the residential college is assumed to provide the framework for the construction of a vibrant sense of community. But for this to take root and flourish the college has to be the force that stimulates the bonding of its individual residents for since without this there can be no commensality and no sense of community. It is no exaggeration to say that all the colleges at each of the four universities under observation see this as their central purpose. It is not just a question of having a room in college in which to sleep and study but also being engaged in the various activities that the college has to offer.

The college's sponsorship of commensality can assume different forms. Within the colleges of Durham, Kent, Lancaster and York there is considerable emphasis on the college as a centre for social activities and a great deal of inter-collegiate

sporting rivalry is prominent. Less stress is placed upon communal dining for either fellows or students. At Kent in particular, the appearance of self-catering facilities (especially in the residential units linked to colleges) is evident and cafeteria provision is the norm. There may be 'High Table' dinners but these usually occur after the delivery of a guest lecture. In other words they are seen as special events rather than as part of the routine process of social interaction. The shift is away from formalised college-centred dining to a model that offers choice and variety. In certain respects the colleges are not too dissimilar from the halls of residence to be found in many British universities, which provide the context for a variety of social activities, including in some halls the occasional communal dining.

The emphasis at all four universities is upon the convenience of college residence – a ready-made community, a natural base for social and sporting activities and the provision of dining facilities to suit various tastes and pockets. Not surprisingly, the publicity of a particular college tends to proclaim both the excellence of its facilities and the distinctiveness of its identity – the college wins the loyalty of its student body through the active presentation of a supposedly unique persona. How sharply defined, widely shared, deeply felt or even how long-lasting the proclaimed spirit may be are matters of conjecture. One measure of the decline of the collegial spirit at Kent is the stress upon the very practical in its literature ('how many rooms are there?', 'occupancy details', 'are there computer links?', etc.) rather than the 'images' conveying special (even if somewhat pompous) identities that the colleges at Lancaster, York and Durham present:

Durham: Some good reasons for choosing Trevelyan College
Trevs is small and perfectly formed
Trevs is a real community
Trevs students get involved!
Trevs students achieve!
Trevs has had the best academic results in the University for the last 6 years
Trevs has a huge variety of fun events. . ..
Trevs students love the arts, music and sport (Trevelyan College, 2008, March 27)

Lancaster: Welcome to Bowland College Website
All members are commonly referred to as 'Bowlanders' and it is the way in which we work, socialise and support each other which underpins our success as a collegiate community (Bowland College, 29 December 2008).

York: As a member of Goodricke college, we hope that you will take advantage of social and sporting activities provided in the College. We are here as scholars, but part of our scholarly pursuit is realised through social activity, much of which is offered by the College. As newcomers you have many opportunities to forge friendships, some of which may endure through your lifetime, and engage in new and exciting adventures. Have fun! And remember that fun comes from work as well as play (Goodricke College, 29 December 2008).

Historically within Oxbridge commensality was expressed in forms that brought together the undergraduate and college fellow: besides dining there were the reading parties in the vacation, faculty involvement in the inter-collegiate sporting rivalries and even regular attendance at the college chapel. While at Oxbridge this more

extended grip of commensality is but a pale show of what it was in the past, at Durham, Kent, Lancaster and York, except on ritualistic occasions, such as high table dinners, it scarcely ever took this form. Moreover, at Kent, Lancaster and York faculty identification with the colleges appears to be limited. Their colleges lack an elected fellowship with faculty membership limited to those who take responsibility for college governance, with – naturally – the head of college as the key person (and note that halls of residence would have wardens). Although, as we will see, the picture at Durham is more varied (certain colleges have an elected fellowship), nonetheless the University remains the sole employer and the benefits of a fellowship are severely curtailed by Oxbridge standards (certainly in comparison to the richer colleges). As far as faculty careers are concerned the situation is very much the same as prevails in all British universities – you are appointed to a department or research institute, it is that context which defines your daily institutional commitments and within which you will deliver the outputs (mainly published research) that will determine the success (or otherwise) of your career as an academic.

The Academic Input

Notwithstanding the limited significance of the colleges at the four universities in defining academic careers, they do have an impact upon shaping the academic environment of their students. With the exception of Durham, academic departments are located in colleges, inevitably drawing a closer relationship between colleges and particular departments than is true of Oxbridge (for a jaundiced student assessment of its impact at the University of Kent, see Ainley, 1994: 52). Some colleges have libraries and may also provide those students who are interested with the facilities to learn IT skills or a foreign language. Colleges will facilitate the presentation of guest lectures open to all university members, which tend to have a broad intellectual appeal. Moreover, one or two of the Durham colleges (see below) possess limited economic resources that they use to finance academic scholarships.

The above range of activities illustrates that the colleges are engaged in a number of initiatives that amount to the provision of some academic support for students. This is critically different from what prevails at Oxbridge where the colleges are still responsible for the admission of undergraduate students, provide a great deal of the teaching, finance college research fellowships and may even possess rare archives that are critical to the advancement of scholarship in certain fields. It is not so much supporting the academic enterprise but fulfilling a key role in the very delivery of that enterprise.

However, there is an important dimension to the functions of the colleges at Durham and Lancaster (and, to a lesser extent at York, although not at Kent), which – although a support role – can be seen as integral to the contemporary teaching and learning process, at least in those universities that believe undergraduate education is still central to their mission. The colleges of Durham and Lancaster have established tutorial systems that are designed to monitor the academic progress of their students,

identify those who are experiencing difficulties (who will often identify themselves) and take appropriate action. This is a support function but one that many would consider to be integral to any model of teaching and learning that functions effectively and certainly any model that seeks student approval.

That the Lancaster and Durham colleges set great store by their tutorial systems is evident from their claims:

> The most important welfare system at Lancaster University is the College Tutorial system. This provides support for students at college level, and should be able to give some help with problems which you might encounter as an undergraduate student. The Senior Tutor is responsible for the smooth and successful running of Pendle's Tutorial System (Pendle College, 6 December 2008).

> We have excellent support arrangements at Collingwood [a Durham college] to help people through even the toughest times. Every student is assigned a personal tutor when they first arrive. You can consult your personal tutor about anything, including finance, careers, health, homesickness, academic concerns and many more – if it matters to you, it will matter to them. (Collingwood College, 27 March 2008).

At York the tutors are involved in maintaining the general welfare of the colleges rather than specifically offering guidance to students (obviously the two concerns will overlap). Interestingly, as important as the universities and colleges may deem the role of tutor to be, it is a job that is often undertaken by graduate students rather than faculty. It may be that a competent graduate student is the most appropriate person to undertake the task, but it does suggest that finding faculty members to undertake the role can be difficult. As ever the implementation of what may be seen as good practice runs up against practical obstacles.

Federalism – Once Again

The collegiate structure at Durham University has a more influential bearing upon its mode of governance than is true for the Universities of Kent, Lancaster and York and, therefore, will be analysed separately. Regardless of how one evaluates the role of the colleges at Kent, Lancaster and York these are unitary institutions with formal authority residing in university structures. The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge only became effective bodies long after the foundation of many of their colleges. From the start at Kent, Lancaster and York, the colleges were creations of the universities. Even if they had had the authority to do so, it is difficult to see why the universities would have wanted to create colleges with an independent power base. The implication is that while it is possible to create colleges, creating a collegiate university is of an entirely different order.

Moreover, for collegiate autonomy to be meaningful it would require a legal basis and independent financial resources. In fact the Kent, Lancaster and York colleges possess neither; they are university institutions. It is not simply the absence of a federal structure of governance for there is also no sense of an inter-collegiate structure of governance to deal with issues that fall within the domain of the colleges or even the semblance of an independently organised 'college interest' that

university governance and administration – if they are acting wisely – take into account within the policy-making and implementation process.

Although these may reflect the realities of the situation, it is important for the universities to act where necessary to ensure that the sensibilities of the colleges are indeed receiving the necessary genuflection. It is beyond the remit of this chapter but it would be interesting to explore how the University of Kent came to the decision that it could no longer sustain its traditional commitment to its original collegial foundations. What was the context in which this occurred and what course did the politics of change follow? In particular, how were the supporters of the original idea of the university reconciled to change? Or did they also recognise that the times had changed and that the colleges, although still symbolically important, were less significant in shaping the image of Kent?

Perhaps more important than the sensitive handling of college feelings is the construction of an image that in certain respects counters the prevailing realities. The colleges across the three universities are invariably described as 'self-governing' communities (rather than 'autonomous institutions') with responsibility for the day-to-day running of their affairs residing in their own hands. The senior college posts (usually a head, deputy head and a dean who will take responsibility for managing the tutorial system with graduate students constituting the bulk of the tutors) are academic appointees who are assisted by a small administrative staff. They will have a junior college room (JCR), a senior common room (SCR) and a college council (meeting once or twice a term). For the most part there is no need for the university to intervene in college business (although its representatives tend to dominate the committees that appoint new heads) for the colleges are in effect administrative rather than policy-making bodies. If the committees have a policy-making remit it is confined to the details of how the college manages its affairs, which may be very important to its members but has little relevance for the direction of university policy regarding major academic issues. Colleges can have constitutions, which again conveys an aura of independence, but as the constitution of York's Halifax College records: 'Nothing in this Constitution shall over-ride the provisions, the Statutes and Ordinances of the University or the decisions of the Council of the University'.

Therefore, in relation to the Universities of Kent, Lancaster and York we are not analysing a federal model of governance in which there is a sharing of, and interaction between, different institutions each with significant policy responsibilities. The three Universities have a devolved model of governance in which the colleges have been delegated by their respective universities' certain responsibilities. These tasks evolve mainly around the welfare of the student population, including – through the tutorial system – a measure of responsibility for its academic welfare. In view of the fact that the colleges were creatures of their universities, with a restricted role to perform and subject to their continuing jurisdiction, it is difficult to imagine that collegiality could have taken root and grown into a more vibrant force. Indeed, especially at Kent, the contrary has occurred, which Ainley claims was undermined soon after its foundation, 'collapsing under the weight of increasing student numbers' (Ainley, 1994: 52). The universities continue to pronounce

publicly (and forcefully on their websites) the continuing importance of their colleges, but in fact have underwritten new forms of campus residence that are non-collegial.

The contrast between, on the one hand, colleges at Oxford and Cambridge and, on the other hand, colleges at Kent, Lancaster and York is probably best illustrated by comparing their respective legal status and functions. Oxford and Cambridge colleges are independent corporate bodies recognised in law, they select their own undergraduate students, they are responsible for organising and undertaking a great deal of undergraduate teaching, they appoint college fellows and pay – at least in part – their salaries (more applicable to Oxford than Cambridge) and for both students and faculty they sustain much of the wider socio-cultural image of the two universities. Except for possibly the final point, none of these factors apply to Kent, Lancaster and York.

What makes Durham something of an exception, embracing a mode of governance of which certain elements are more akin to the federal than the devolved model? First, the Durham colleges are 'listed bodies' and 'recognised by the UK authorities as being able to offer courses leading to a degree of a recognised body' (Department of Innovation, Universities and Science, 1st January 2009). A distinction has to be made between *maintained colleges* (in effect colleges that fall under the jurisdiction of the University) and *recognised colleges* (St Chad's and St John's), which, although recognised by the University, have an independent legal status with more control of their governance, administration and finance. This is reflected in their sources of income (income and expenditure accounts for both colleges can be found on their websites), the larger size of their administrative staff, the extent of their academic fellowship (with academic fellows – rather than graduate students – acting as tutorial fellows), their support for research (there are college research fellows) and their wider input into the provision of resources to support teaching. St Chad's leads the way on the latter front with its Collegiate Studies Programme:

> In order to give you further opportunities to make the most of your time at university, St Chad's College has established an innovative Collegiate Studies Programme (CSP). CSP offers you opportunities to acquire a range of life experiences and skills to complement those obtained through university courses. CSP aims to help you: (1) develop critical thinking skills and a desire for lifelong learning; (2) explore, understand and appreciate North East England; and (3) acquire key skills for employment, volunteer service and domestic life (St Chad's College, 27 March 2008).

In spite of the assertion that Durham is a collegiate university, one suspects that the strength of its collegiality is particularly pronounced in a limited number of colleges, which would include University College, St John's and St Chad's. Moreover, colleges do not control the entry of their undergraduate students, which continues to be a key function for the Oxbridge colleges, with control of membership as integral to the collegial ideal. While applicants may express a college preference, it is the departments that make the decisions ('... academic staff from the department to which the student has applied make individual decisions, based on merit and potential' – Higgins & Forster, 2009 June 4: 24). However, the self-proclamation of Durham to be a collegiate university is in general terms much stronger than any

such claim that could be made with respect to Kent, Lancaster and York (which it should be remembered do not go so far as to describe themselves as such). Seven of Durham's colleges (if St John's, which celebrates its centenary this year, is included) are more than a 100 years old; they all have a special legal status; and Grey College and University College (which are both *maintained* colleges) have set up college trusts and alumni associations (in part with a view to expanding their resource base) and consequently are developing the potential to extend their range of activities. Oxford and Cambridge continue to be the two English universities that offer the best examples of the collegiate model of the university but there is some substance to Durham's claim that it also belongs to that club.

Conclusions

The creation of the new universities in the 1960s was a clear symbol of the optimism that at the time surrounded the development of higher education in England. Whatever the equivocations, it would be impossible to deny that there were good reasons to be hopeful about the future. Certainly within the academic community the desire to create new maps of learning would have been widely welcomed, as would the modest expansion that Robbins advocated. The decision of Kent, Lancaster and York to create residential colleges on their campuses did not attract significant attention at the time. In a short descriptive overview of 'the vision of the 1960s', Rich devotes but one sentence to the colleges of the new universities ('Three universities, Kent, Lancaster and York, developed a collegiate system. . .' – Rich, 2001: 50). Certainly the colleges received far less exposure than the pedagogical innovations, but they were seen by some as an attempt to sustain what many considered to be a highly valued component of the English idea of higher education, that is of the university as an academic community.

Much of this chapter has demonstrated the failure to sustain the idea of the collegiate university, or at least to enhance it much beyond the residential colleges. Given the broader changes that have impacted upon English (indeed, British) higher education, this was perhaps to be expected: the hesitant emergence of a mass system, periodic financial crises, the reshaping of academic values and the changing socio-cultural mores of students. Within this context perhaps the colleges are to be congratulated for their very survival and the fact that their universities still proclaim (as the colleges also continue to maintain) their centrality in defining what it means to be a student. It is also critical to remember that these broader changes have also impacted upon Oxford and Cambridge, the heartland of the collegiate university. There is no one ideal of the collegiate university that remains immutable forever.

The chapter has drawn a critical distinction between the principles of federalism and devolution. It was not to be expected that at Kent, Lancaster, York or even Durham that the devolved model of sharing responsibility for the effective functioning of the university would evolve into a federal model. This would have required the universities to cede authority and for the colleges to have expanded their responsibilities – both very unlikely scenarios. What one would have expected

if collegiality were to flourish on these campuses is that over time the colleges would have expanded their roles. Although this is occurring at some of the Durham colleges (buttressed in part by the different legal status of some of its colleges vis-à-vis the University), it is neither a widespread nor a deeply rooted development. But to expand the support role requires resources, which means establishing an income stream that is independent of the university. With respect to Oxbridge much of the attraction of their colleges – to both students and fellows – is the range of practical benefits that they have to offer. The commitment to the idea of collegiality may be present but if you wish to sustain it then nourishment is helpful.

Obviously the Oxbridge colleges are enmeshed in a different relationship to their Universities, but is it the federal model of governance alone that makes the collegiate university or is it also nurtured by the expectation that colleges need to generate resources that will enable them to establish strong self-identities? It would make an interesting project to compare those colleges at Durham, Kent, Lancaster and York that have made a protracted effort to underwrite their roles with self-generated resources (as opposed to their public affirmation of those roles) with those colleges that have not. What distinguishes one group from the other? Moreover, in this respect how do they compare with the more recent Oxbridge college foundations, which also lack substantial endowment income?

As a concluding observation it is important to note that there is no reason why universities with residential colleges and collegiate universities should not be analysed as completely separated entities – as two different models of the university evolving over time along separate tracks. In the contemporary context, residential colleges may be seen as more of an aid to generating a positive student community with high levels of student satisfaction (and note the importance of the National Students Surveys) rather than telling us much about the collegiate university. To a considerable extent this chapter has suggested that this is indeed the case as far as the universities forming its empirical base are concerned. It is possible, however, to make the case out for Durham as a hybrid model but more representative of the idea of campus-based residential colleges rather than the collegiate university. The intention has not been to denigrate one model in comparison to another and, indeed, we may now be witnessing the emergence of the multiversity as a multi-headed hydra, perhaps with the collegiate university constituting but one head but hopefully incorporating throughout the university the collegial tradition. The purpose of comparison, therefore, has been to aid conceptual understanding – what precisely is meant by the collegiate university?

Chapter 5
The Slippery Slope Known as Federalism

Introduction

Besides the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, there are two British universities that can claim to have federal structures of governance: the University of London and the University of Wales. With reference to these two universities, and more especially to the former, the purpose of this chapter is to explore interpretations of the federal concept of governance. As with the previous chapter, there is no pretence that a contemporary history of either university is being presented for the primary goal is conceptual refinement. However, given how in recent years the model of governance at both universities has shifted radically, new in-depth contemporary histories are undoubtedly overdue.

There are a number of questions that have to be addressed by this interpretative analytical approach. Precisely what does a federal model of governance mean and why was it adopted at these two particular universities? In what ways have the federal models evolved over time, and how is the pattern of change to be explained? That is, what are the pressures for change as well as the trajectory of the change process itself? Within this context it will be important to compare these developments with those that have reshaped the federal models at Oxbridge. At the outset it can be said that they appear to be moving in diametrically opposite directions. How is this to be explained?

In our earlier chapters we made the claim that a federal model of governance was an intrinsic characteristic of the collegiate university. But does federalism have to assume a particular form before a higher education institution can justly describe itself as a collegiate university? Moreover, is it possible for a university to be federal in terms of its structure of governance but nonetheless have limited commitment to the collegial tradition? What, therefore, is the relationship between federalism and collegiality?

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Why Federalism?

In a lecture delivered as part of Nuffield College's celebration of the 15th anniversary of its college charter, Halsey – one of the college's eminent fellows – remarked, 'In fact Oxford was not created: it emerged'. And, quoting the historian Richard Southern, went on to say, 'It emerged after a long period of discontinuous and fitful scholastic activity, which only gradually received the stamp of corporate identity in the first quarter of the thirteenth century' (Halsey, 2008, June 7). But the point should not be overstressed because the collegiate model that is currently to be found at Oxford and Cambridge owes much to political intervention in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The collegiate university may have emerged over time but its more recent development has most definitely been steered, with much of that steering coming from outside the universities.

Nonetheless, in spite of this cautionary note, the contrast with the foundation of the Universities of London and Wales is startling. Both London and Wales are the products of official intervention, created by parliamentary legislation almost at a stroke rather than emerging out of a long and slow process of historical distillation. The University of London acquired its Royal Charter in 1836 establishing it as the examining body for both University College (founded in 1826 as the University of London) and King's College (founded in 1829). The University of Wales received its charter in 1893 and incorporated three colleges: the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth; the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire; and the University College of North Wales, Bangor. Henceforth the colleges would award degrees under the auspices of the University of Wales rather than the University of London's external degrees.

It is fair to say that the creation of the University of Wales was widely welcomed in the Principality as a manifestation of the revival in Welsh culture that had marked the final quarter of the nineteenth century. But one could not say, at least not with the same degree of confidence, that this was equally true of the University of London. The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge were bitterly opposed to both King's College and the original University of London foundation (which became University College) being granted the authority to grant degrees in their own right, which certainly the latter desired (Harte, 1986: 68–76). Unlike Oxford and Cambridge, both the Universities of London and Wales were formally created (as opposed to emerging through a slow process of evolution); but all four universities exhibit a common characteristic of federal models – the balance of institutional authority is never completely resolved.

Sheldon Rothblatt, in another of his powerful overviews of the historical development of higher education in Britain, has stressed the importance of principle in driving the creation of the federal model:

> The division of labour and responsibilities was perhaps greater than it had been in centuries, or at least clearer. Universities examined; that was mechanical. Colleges taught; that was nurturing... The separation of teaching from examining within the federal university constitution can be called the 'Cambridge principle'... It is not surprising, therefore, that the Royal Charter of 1836 creating the examining University of London referred to a 'Board

> of Examiners ... to perform all the functions of the examiners in the Senate House of Cambridge', or that the new governing body of London should have drawn as many as ten of its founding fellows from Trinity College, Cambridge (Rothblatt, 1987: 156–157).

Thus both London and Wales are constructed around the principle of federalism by which '... is meant the habit or practice of relating different segments of a higher education organization or system to some larger whole or centre...' (Rothblatt, 1987: 151).

But as is so often the case when principle is evoked politics and practical concerns are not far behind. In the case of University College and King's College there was the division between secular and Anglican interests, the challenge to the hegemony – at least in England – of Oxford and Cambridge and the fear of a different definition of the university taking root and prospering. While the central control of examining may have protected standards, as well as shaped the curriculum, this was also a practical concern for the colleges themselves. It was important to establish an identity that carried both weight and respectability. Indeed, it is the prestige of the University of London, a brand with an international appeal, which has proven to be its most enduring selling point. Smaller colleges could find a refuge in the brand name and within a federal context they had the opportunity to create alliances with similarly placed institutions. Thus, in the nineteenth century higher education was increasingly driven by competing interests (pluralism) and federalism was devised as the means for constructing compromise and a measure of consensus amongst the competing parties (Rothblatt, 1987: 157). However, the nineteenth century constitutional lawyer, A.V. Dicey, saw federalism as resulting in weak government, producing conservatism and encouraging legalism (Dicey, 1982: 97–100), which have perhaps also been the hallmarks of federal universities.

Although a federal model of governance invites discussion on what the respective balance of responsibility between the universities and the colleges should be, it has also proven to be very resilient and generates considerable loyalty. Nonetheless, it may be not so much a question of 'looking to the past' but rather 'entrapment by the past'. In a recent consultation paper on the very future of its federal structure the Vice-Chancellor of the University of London:

> Throughout the University's history there has been an ongoing debate about its constitution and role. Yet for more than 150 years, there has been steady support for the federal University of London amongst both the Colleges and their academic staff and students (University of London, 2005, February: 3, para 7).

Some 35 years ago, at yet another 'crisis point' in the history of the University, the 'Final Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Governance of the University of London' (the Murray Report) asserted that: 'The evidence submitted to us does not suggest any disposition to attack or undermine the principle of federation' (University of London, 1972: 79). And it would not be too difficult to find numerous quotations expressing parallel sentiments. Harte, in what amounts to an official history of the University (*The University of London, 1836–1986*), should be permitted to make the final affirmation of the point: 'Serious consideration had to be given to such views, and to other criticisms [raised by University College in the mid-1960s].

The University approached them heartened by the clear expression of the desire to maintain the federal organization' (Harte, 1986: 263). But the question was, on what terms would the federation be sustained? Would it continue to be recognised as a meaningful federation?

Federal but Not Collegial?

While the examining powers of the University of London may have been, to use Rothblatt's phrase, a manifestation of 'the Cambridge principle', in other critical respects London purposefully rejected the collegiate model of the university as represented by Oxford and Cambridge. The colleges may have been teaching institutions but there was little stress on the importance of college residence, either for students or for faculty, in creating a particular ideal of the purposes of higher education. Even after the reforms that were introduced at Oxbridge in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the colleges retained a critical role in educating 'the cultivated person'. There continued to be so much more to an Oxbridge undergraduate education than obtaining a degree, although clearly that was assuming a greater significance. London provided the means for a local bourgeoisie to cement its social status as reflected in the strong emphasis on professional training with medicine and law to the fore. This was the training of experts rather than the education of well-rounded, cultivated gentlemen.

Barnes has argued that, 'For the civic universities, the rise of professional society only served to confirm their status as second-tier institutions. In an educational system increasingly geared towards producing (and reproducing) professional elites, Oxford and Cambridge possessed an unassailable advantage' (Barnes, 1996: 303). And that 'unassailable advantage' was 'the cultivation of character', which owed so much to the Oxbridge colleges. While neither the University of London nor Wales are civic universities, much the same socio-cultural variables would shape their place in society. However, this is to tell only part of the story for the undergraduate recruitment base of Oxbridge would continue to be socially distinctive, and the two universities were reformed (or were forced to reform) in response to the changing economic and social character of Britain, and without those reforms it is dubious whether 'the cultivation of character' alone would have been of much benefit to most of their students. Moreover, professional society was not homogenous but contained its own status hierarchy. The issue is how significant was an Oxbridge education in obtaining and cementing an elevated niche in that hierarchy.

The main overlap between Oxford and Cambridge on the one hand and London and Wales on the other is their federal structures of governance and administration. But how do they interpret this facet of collegiality? Historically the governance of both Oxford and Cambridge was de facto in the hands of the colleges symbolised

by the fact their vice-chancellors were heads of college, serving their short-term tenures (2 years) in rotation. Moreover the formal sovereign bodies of both institutions were (and still are) Congregation (Oxford) and the Regent House (Cambridge) for so long dominated by college fellows wearing their university hats. Although in both respects Oxford and Cambridge have changed, and certainly their respective administrative structures have become more potent bodies, they still resist the predominance of lay representation in their Councils and still insist upon the claim that ultimate authority for making university policy resides in Congregation and the Regent House (although it has become more of a reserve power rather than one that is exercised on a regular basis). Although the picture has changed over time, both the Universities of London and Wales (as well as their respective colleges) have been led by executive bodies composed of a majority of lay members, which exercise ultimate responsibility for the financial management and policy direction of their institutions.

As is common in all British universities, the control of academic affairs in the Universities of London and Wales resided formally in bodies composed of the academic members of the two universities. However, in the context of a declining role for the two universities this has less significance over time, but within the colleges the principle is still retained. Nonetheless, given that financial decision-making and the determination of institutional policy is not under academic control, the principle becomes more a question of taking responsibility for ongoing programmes (which invariably will permit a measure of departmental flexibility) rather than dictating the direction of the institution's overall pattern of academic development. And, as we will see in the next chapter, this is a general trend in British higher education.

It is also of significance that in both London and Wales, the tradition of showing deference in academic matters to the professors was established practice. In other words, it was quite the reverse of what prevailed at both Oxford and Cambridge in which college fellows were for so long the dominant pedagogical force and, arguably, had the greater status at least within the colleges, if not within the universities. Thus, in terms of three critical variables – the extent of lay representation on executive bodies, the formal location of institutional sovereignty and the weight attributed to professors in determining academic policy – both London and Wales have operated a contrasting federal model from that of Oxford and Cambridge, leading to a very different interpretation of how it should function and whose interests it most forcefully represents.

Although particular colleges of the University of London will share the responsibility for managing their joint degree programmes, there are no all-embracing inter-collegiate bodies – as there are at Oxford and Cambridge – to consider issues in which they have a common interest. Although Oxbridge may lack an overall structure of governance that binds colleges to agreed policy lines, there are college bodies that manage important inter-collegial interests such as undergraduate admissions, the organisation of college teaching and – at one time – college fees.

However, as one would expect of a federal model of governance the London colleges are formally represented in the University's governing structures. According to the latest statutes (in force since 1 August 2008) the 14 members of its Board of Trustees (the university's executive body) includes 4 heads of colleges (as does Cambridge's Council) who are chosen by the Collegiate Council. The latter body, which advises the Board of Trustees (it has the authority to make recommendations on a number of key issues), incorporates all the heads of the colleges who, with the addition of the Vice-Chancellor and the Dean of the School of Advanced Study, comprise its total membership (University of London, 2008, August 1: 9.1, 11.1). Again this illustrates the point that the federal model at London functions around the interaction of key leadership roles (including eminent lay persons). By comparison, while still over-representative of 'the great and the good', the Councils of Oxford and Cambridge are composed of more elected members drawn from a wider range of the academic body at large, including student representation, and as such they are more inclusive bodies and more broadly reflective of the 'academic demos'.

The Pressures for Change and the New Model of Governance

Internal and External Pressures for Change

If over time the federal models of the Universities of London and Wales have come to represent a 'fitter and leaner' mode of governance, the question is whether they can still be described as federal universities? Does the current interaction of universities and colleges in the delivery of their core academic functions merit the description of federalism in action? This is the question that this section of the chapter will address but it is important to place it in the context of the fundamental structural problems that the two universities have to handle and how these have been intensified by contemporary developments in the governance of British higher education.

It is not uncommon to read that federal universities are Byzantine institutions with a veritable maze of labyrinths that only the well-informed insider can truly understand and appreciate. Evaluation oscillates from empathy, through bewilderment to impatience or even hostility. We have noted that Rothblatt saw federalism as a means of responding to pluralist pressure, but those pressures are to be found not only within the broader societal context but also within the collegiate university itself. If you look at the University of London and to a lesser extent (because of its smaller size) the University of Wales they can only be described as diverse (to put it politely) institutions. For London the contemporary mix is as follows (and it should be remembered that this is after a period of rationalisation following a number of amalgamations and the defection of Imperial College).

London Colleges: Range of Academic Focus[a]

Institutions with a specialised academic focus	
The Central School of Speech and Drama	Courtauld Institute of Art
Heythrop College	The Institute of Cancer Research
London Business School	Royal Academy of Music
Royal Veterinary College	St George's
The School of Pharmacy	Institute of Education
Institutions with a broad, although still bounded, academic remit	
School of Oriental and African Studies	Goldsmith's College
London School of Economics	Royal Holloway
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine	Birkbeck College[b]
Institutions with a diverse academic range	
King's College	Queen Mary and Westfield
University College London	

[a]The precise categorisation can be disputed but not the point it is designed to make. It should be noted, however, that the Institute of Education has developed over time a much broader academic remit, thanks to the expansion of its graduate programmes.
[b]Birkbeck College is also distinctive because of its commitment to students who want to study part time.

Besides the above 19 colleges, the University encompasses a School of Advanced Study (SAS), which is composed of 10 institutes, and also has responsibilities for the University of London Institute in Paris and the University Marine Biological Station at Millport. And, as if this were not enough, the University still continues with a considerable programme of examining and awarding its degrees to 'external' students (most of whom are now students resident overseas).

Because it is not so large, the University of Wales is less complicated to dissect, although similar divisions appear, albeit not to the same intensity. The Universities of Aberystwyth, Bangor, Swansea and the University of Wales Institute, Cardiff, have a diverse range of academic programmes while the focus at the Universities of Glyndŵr, Swansea Metropolitan, Lampeter and Newport along with Trinity College, Carmarthen, is more restricted, but not so specialised as in the smaller London colleges.

The internal institutional variety at the University of London can only be described as remarkable. It is not simply that the size and academic diversity of King's, UCL and, to a lesser extent, Queen Mary and Westfield College (the latter more on a par in terms of the range of its academic programmes with Aberystwyth, Bangor, Swansea and the University of Wales Institute) would entitle them to the university label in their own right but the sheer gulf in size between them and the smaller colleges is enormous. Moreover, it is not only that the smaller institutions have narrowly defined academic foci but also the fact that these are very distinctive in character from one another, giving rise to specific institutional identities. It

should also be remembered that many of the colleges place considerable emphasis on professional training, which inevitably draws in the appropriate regulatory bodies, and in the case of medical training, the National Health Service in its various bureaucratic forms.

Not surprisingly, college heads have been known to trumpet institutional weight and distinctiveness and none more so than the current Provost (Malcolm Grant) of UCL:

> UCL proudly embraces a range of inquiry across all disciplines and a remarkably wide variety of subjects. . . . It is the broadest possible community of scholarship. . . . It has strengths in basic science, and in translational and applied research; in theory and in practice. . . . And it pursues an approach to teaching that is rooted in original research (Grant, 2004: 6).

Indeed, in Grant's *The Future of the University of London: A Discussion Paper from the Provost of UCL* scant reference is to be found to any positive functions that the University may perform, and his call was for 'a radical settlement' of the relationship between the colleges and the University (March 2005). In view of the fact that since the publication of his paper new statutes have been enacted, the Provost's wish appears to have been granted but whether the changes have been sufficiently radical to suit his tastes remains to be seen.

A few simple statistics on student numbers alone are suffice to demonstrate the magnitude of the variation. King's College has the largest number of students (21,230) followed by UCL with 19,385. In vivid contrast, the Institute of Cancer Research, the Central School of Speech and Drama, Heythrop College and the Royal Academy of Music all have less than a thousand students. The Institute of Cancer Research, the Institute of Education, the London Business School and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine provide courses for only postgraduate students. All the other colleges have a significant wedge of postgraduates with some selected figures for 2006/2007 as follows:

	Postgraduate Nos.	Total Student Nos.
LSE	5,205 (57.6%)	9,030
SOAS	2,050 (43.4%)	4,725
UCL	7,580 (39.1%)	19,385
Goldsmith's	2,670 (35.0%)	7,620
King's College	7,220 (34.0%)	21,230
Royal Holloway	2,375 (28.5%)	8,335
Queen Mary	3,230 (25.7%)	12,585

Source: Higher Education Statistical Agency (2006/2007): Table Oa.

No doubt a close examination of the two ancient collegiate universities would reveal considerable variations amongst their colleges with respect to a range of variables: date of foundation, overall student numbers, the balance between undergraduate and postgraduate representation, the range of degrees for which their students are studying and – perhaps most significantly – the size of their endowments and the incomes these may generate. The contrast with the University of

London is in terms of the sheer magnitude of its internal differentiation. Moreover, the framework within which these differences are contained is more confined geographically as well as by their differing sizes – Cambridge in 2007/2008 had 18,307 students of whom 6,216 (34%) were postgraduates (University of Cambridge, 2008 October 9: 4), and at Oxford there were 18,798 students as of 1 December 2007 of whom 7,461 (39.7%) were postgraduates (University of Oxford, 2008, July 9: 1343). However, more critically important are the historical links (academic, social and cultural) between the colleges coupled with a more interwoven model of federalism. But inevitably internal structural differentiation will exert tensions in its own right, even at unitary universities.

Although both the histories of the Universities of London and Wales have been fraught with regard to the continuation of the federal model, nonetheless they still survive as federal universities. Writing in 1971 Halsey and Trow claimed: ‘London, too, has a collegiate structure though the autonomy of the colleges is less complete than in Oxford and Cambridge largely because they are individually not so well endowed and depend more on government money which is distributed among the schools by the university Court’ (Halsey & Trow, 1971: 103). While this judgement relies far too heavily upon the internal distribution of university income, if the centre was potent in 1971, and the past teaches us that regardless of the reoccurring crises the federal model has always prevailed, then why should this not continue indefinitely?

The first and most obvious point is that recently the University of London and Wales have each lost one of their flagships, respectively, Imperial and Cardiff. Whilst it may be possible that both universities can continue to draw succour from the belief that they have internationally recognised brand names, it becomes more difficult to sustain this self-image if your leading colleges take flight. Of course within a federal model there is always the theoretical possibility of secession along with the acquisition of new members. However, it is important to reflect on the relative value of what are you gaining in comparison to what you are losing.

The University of Wales may wish to seek comfort in the fact that Cardiff University remains an affiliated institution:

> . . . two of the University’s longer-established members found themselves in the position of having to prepare for secession from membership. In 2003, Cardiff and the College of Medicine . . . decided to merge with effect from 1 August 2004 under the formal title “Cardiff University”. . . Because it is not deemed to be possible, under the present legal and policy framework, for an institution that bears university title in its own right to be a member of another university, Cardiff and the College of Medicine have been obliged to withdraw from membership of the University of Wales. Cardiff University retains a connection with the University as an Affiliated (Linked) Institution and has indicated that it wishes to continue for the foreseeable future to enrol students onto University of Wales undergraduate schemes in medicine, dentistry and some related areas (University of Wales, 2009, February 8: 10–11).

However, this situation could hardly have occurred inadvertently for the various parties must have been aware of the consequences of the change in title. It was not, as the Historical Notes imply, an almost unforeseen occurrence. Presumably Cardiff

felt that the title of ‘Cardiff University’ was so critical to its future success that this counted for more than remaining a full member of the University of Wales. And, equally, it can be inferred that the decision to continue, at least for the time being, to enrol students in medicine, dentistry and related fields in the programmes of the University of Wales has a similar pragmatic basis. This raises the interesting question of what determines loyalty to a model of governance? How do the pragmatic considerations interact with deep-seated loyalty and, possibly, even inertia? It is hard to believe that the merged institutions could not have selected a title that would have allowed them to continue as full members of the University of Wales if the political will to do so had been present.

The desertions of Cardiff and Imperial are in fact symbols of a process change that threatens to imbalance the federal model on a wide front, including how it functions at Oxford and Cambridge. First, there is the flow of public money, in particular the annual grant from the funding provided by councils (with respect to English and Welsh institutions, which means HEFCE and HEFCW) into the colleges and universities. Except for Imperial College, Halsey and Trow were correct in their observation that the funding provided by the then University Grants Committee was allocated to the University of London (and, incidentally, also to the University of Wales) as a block grant, which was then distributed amongst the colleges. As we have noted, at the time UCL chaffed bitterly at the fact that it did not have the same ‘privileged’ position as Imperial College.

Although the distribution was determined by a negotiated formula, the appearance that the colleges were in tutelage to the university was difficult to avoid, and the university’s hand was strengthened considerably in the negotiations to cover its own costs given that it was the initial recipient of the funding. This is perhaps how it should be within a federal model, but (as Halsey and Trow noted) the fact that the colleges had few alternative sources of income undoubtedly generated resentment in some quarters. If you felt that the activities of the colleges were responsible for the income, and the returns they received from the services provided by the university were not worth the costs they incurred, then you were likely to be especially aggrieved. And so there was consistent pressure, with respect to both London and Wales, to make the colleges the direct recipients of state funding with the costs of university services underwritten by a tax on the colleges, again determined by a negotiated formula.

The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act merged the then separate funding councils of the polytechnics and universities (to create funding councils for England, Scotland and Wales) and, thus logically, allowed the polytechnics to acquire the university title. The consequences for both the Universities of London and Wales were critical. It meant that there was no substantive obstacle to their colleges instigating the procedures to acquire the university title, which would have meant (as we have seen with Cardiff) a legal requirement to leave the university. Moreover, once an institution of higher education acquired the university title it had the right to award degrees and so, with respect to the polytechnics, the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA) could be wound up as the ‘new universities’ acquired this responsibility. The inevitable, if delayed, response from the University of London was to

relinquish its absolute right to award degrees to the students of its constituent colleges. The colleges can assume this right should they wish to go down this route. In effect it is a strategy to forestall the possibility of secession, although as we have seen it was insufficient to mollify Imperial College. But for other institutions the appeal of the brand name, 'The University of London', could be sufficiently strong to persuade them that they should retain the university as the examining body and continue to award its degrees. Alternatively, they could award their own degrees but contrive to have 'The University of London' appear on the degree certificate in some shape or form!

Yet another critical development has been the emergence of the quality assurance agenda, spearheaded since 1997 by the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA). The difficulty for the University of London is that, although it is in effect an examining rather than a teaching body, it has some responsibility for the quality of the teaching and learning process in its constituent colleges. How can the university be sure that its colleges are offering a teaching and learning experience of a sufficient quality to justify the awarding of its degrees? If it is not monitoring the learning experience in its colleges, is it taking too much on trust? Matters came to a head in June 2005 when the QAA issued its 'institutional audit' report for the University of London.

Although the QAA's Report recognised that the University of London was a federal university and the colleges exercised responsibility for '... the academic standards of the University's awards and the quality of the programmes of study to which they lead', nonetheless the Agency's audit trail did '... assume that the University's responsibility as an awarding body covers all its awards wherever and however they are offered'. On the basis of the auditing of the individual colleges (undertaken between 2003 and June 2005) the QAA concluded, '... broad confidence can be placed in the management, by the individual constituent Colleges of the academic standards of awards and the quality of programmes offered in the University's name'. But there was a sting in the tail: 'However, only limited confidence can be placed in the soundness of the present and likely future management by the University, as a corporate institution, of its specific responsibilities as an awarding body under the current statutes and ordinances' (all the quotes immediately above are from, QAA, June 2005: 1). In the judgement of the QAA, the colleges were performing their responsibilities adequately but the same could not be said of the university. Either the university had to change its procedures or the then statutes and ordinances needed to be modified to reflect current practices.

Not surprisingly, the University of London responded robustly to the QAA's strictures. In effect it blamed the Agency for misunderstanding the operation of its federal model:

> Under our federal system the Colleges and other constituent elements of the University have an individual and collective responsibility for maintaining and guaranteeing the quality and standards of the University of London degree – it is they that constitute the University of London. The audit has produced a set of recommendations which appear to have been made on the basis of a misunderstanding of these arrangements (University of London, 2009, February 8).

But the University also indicated that it intended to respond to the Agency's recommendations 'by amending its relevant Ordinance'. Thus the QAA's Report and the issuing of the vice-chancellor's consultation paper on 'the future for the federal University' are almost entwined.

The pressures upon the University of London's federal model that have been presented so far are reasonably precise in scope: the shift in the allocation of public funding from the university to the colleges, the opportunity for the colleges to acquire the university title and with it the concomitant right to grant degrees and the apparent confusion of the relative responsibilities of university and colleges in the quality audit trail. A much broader force, but exercising a subtler impact, has been the introduction of the research assessment exercises (the first undertaken in 1986). The colleges of both the Universities of London and Wales were evaluated individually (given the structure of both Oxford and Cambridge it is inconceivable that they could have followed this route), which raises the possibility of making invidious – although perhaps not unfair – comparisons between colleges, so exacerbating potential institutional rivalries (for a summary of the outcomes for individual institutions, see RAE 2001, 2009 August 24). However, and perhaps more importantly, RAE 2001 (more relevant to this chapter than RAE 2008 in view of the fact that by 2008 London had a new set of statutes in place, and Imperial College and Cardiff had flown their respective nests) demonstrated the national standing of both Imperial College and UCL across a broad academic spectrum, with the London School of Economics showing parallel eminence but within a more restricted range. Imperial College made 22 submissions of which all but 2 were ranked 5 or 5*; LSE made 13 submissions with only one being less than 5/5*, with UCL recording 5/5* for 41 of its 48 submissions (and Cardiff was in the same league with 28 submissions and all bar 4 being awarded a 5/5* grade).

What the research assessment exercises demonstrated is that certain colleges had research reputations that merited, at the very least, a national standing (and if this is the comparative reference point then several other London and Welsh colleges could be added to the list), indeed even international standing. For comparison, the figures for the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford were, respectively, 51 submissions of which all but 3 were graded 5/5* and 46 submissions of which but 4 were graded 5/5*.

The chapter has referred to the strength of the University of London as a brand name and how in part this was the appeal of membership for the colleges. What the research assessment exercises have enabled the colleges to do is to brand themselves as leading universities in their own right. It could be argued that Imperial College, like the University of Wales, Cardiff (as it was formally titled), had acquired a status that enabled them to construct a brand name that had as much, if not more, appeal than their respective universities. It is not that the federal models were destined to collapse (indeed the University of Wales has increased its institutional membership), but the reasons for membership were changing. If the prestigious research-led colleges could create a positive international identity in their own right then there was less reason to belong to a university especially if you felt membership increasingly incurred more costs than it conferred benefits.

Significantly, the external pressures that augmented the leverage of the colleges in both London and Wales vis-à-vis their respective universities worked in precisely the opposite direction in both Oxford and Cambridge. There is protracted internal wrangling at both Oxford and Cambridge to determine the distribution of public funding but these are resources that go directly to the two universities, which has been augmented recently by the fact that college fees (albeit reduced) are also now paid directly to the universities rather than to the colleges. Both universities take responsibility for organising their strategic approach to the research assessment exercises and the demands of the QAA. The QAA's institutional reports (QAA, February 2008 (Cambridge); QAA, March 2004 (Oxford)) were both broadly supportive of the procedures the two universities had in place to monitor the quality of their programmes and highlighted some good practices while making some – essentially minor – recommendations for improvement. In view of these favourable reports, there is a certain irony in the fact that both universities had been in the forefront of resistance to the more intrusive procedures of the QAA that were in place post-1997 (Tapper, 2007: 174–184). And the thought that colleges would take possible advantage of the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act to declare independence, acquire the university title and award their own degrees is frankly absurd. Within Oxbridge itself, and the world into which it is intimately meshed, there is undoubtedly a college status hierarchy but the universities labels are far from tarnished.

New Statutes

The new statutes of the University of London (in effect since 1 August 2008) define its goals as: '. . . to promote education of a university standard and the advancement of knowledge and learning by teaching and research; and to encourage the achievement and maintenance of the highest academic standards'. And 'In pursuit of these objects, the university will serve and support the interests of the Colleges' (University of London, Statutes 2.1, 2.2). The question is whether the university can pursue these objectives without also serving and supporting the interests of the colleges? In other words, does it have a significant independent role to play? Moreover, will the colleges also serve and support the interests of the university? Or, is this essentially a one-way relationship in terms of who will support whom? Is the University of London no more than the agglomeration of the interests of its colleges? The very general university objects convey sentiments with which none of the institutional parties – university or colleges – would disagree. The issue is how the university and colleges share responsibility for the delivery of these broad goals.

The 2008 Statutes affirm that: 'The University has the power to grant degrees and other awards and to do all things permitted by law which are necessary or desirable to promote its objects' (University of London, Statutes 3.1). Article 16.2 goes on to state, 'Each College shall be entitled to award degrees of the University, and (provided it has the power to do so) may award its own degrees subject to any protocols that the Board of Trustees may establish'. However, even if the colleges acquire this

right they may not as yet actually exercise it, an issue that is currently in the process of being resolved. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that in a comparatively short period of time few, if any, of the colleges will decide to award University of London degrees, which would surely put the university in an invidious position – forsaken by its members with respect to the core function that justified its very foundation.

In terms of its relationship to the colleges (as opposed to its responsibilities for its external degree programme and the School of Advanced Studies – SAS) the University (besides its right to grant degrees) performs what can best be described as support functions for its colleges and their students. The most important of these are as follows:

- the provision of halls of residence, located mainly in Bloomsbury
- responsibility for university-wide computing facilities (University of London Computing Centre)
- maintenance of the Senate House library
- a careers service
- estate management, with some properties used, at least in part, by certain colleges

With the exception of the maintenance of the Senate House library (note that colleges also provide their own computing services and libraries) these can scarcely be described as core academic functions. Even the right of the university to confirm the colleges' senior academic appointments by the colleges has been swept away. The contrast with Oxford and Cambridge could not be more striking where the two universities at least share with the colleges, or are the dominant partners in: awarding degrees, examining, the provision of teaching facilities, the promotion of research, the employment and promotion of faculty, the admission of postgraduates, and the distribution of public monies, besides providing parallel support functions to those that are the responsibility of the University of London. In view of the considerable geographical dispersal of its colleges, the University of Wales is not even in a position to provide the services that the University of London makes available. In a review of its own history the observation is made, 'It [the University] will, in future, focus on its roles as a degree-awarding authority for institutions in Wales and beyond and as a leading body involved in the protection and promotion of the language and culture of Wales' (University of Wales, 2008, February 8). While its degree-awarding authority may have stronger grounds for survival compared to London, this is scarcely the basis on which to sustain a vibrant federal model.

Conclusion: The Federal Model and the Collegiate University

With reference to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, Rothblatt has written:

> The only 'hold' of the centre over the periphery was the importance attached to degree-taking and, as time went on, it was virtually the only control of the whole over its parts (Rothblatt, 1987: 154).

As the importance of 'degree-taking' increased, the power of the centre (the universities) vis-à-vis the periphery (the colleges) was enhanced. However, the move towards a federal model of governance was dependent upon the development of a greater role for the centre than just its degree-granting powers as significant as these may have been. In his analysis of the Franks Report, Halsey has argued that:

> The ancient syndicalist arrangements survived and the central authorities could still, justly if satirically, be described as the executive committee of the collegiate class. Franks left the public life of Oxford as he found it, quietly led and controlled by the private life of its colleges (Halsey, 1995: 166).

However, formal changes in the machinery of governance have to be set in the context of wider developments. Although little of substance may have changed at Oxford in direct response to the Franks Report, the weight of balance within the collegiate university has steadily shifted to the centre, and this was a process set in motion long before the Franks Enquiry. Undoubtedly the undermining of the collegiate class has speeded up in recent decades, thanks to a combination of changing academic and social values (internal pressures) and financial and political demands (external pressures generated mainly by the state). The Universities of London and Wales responded to these forces differently from Oxford and Cambridge because they had contrasting models of federal governance that had emerged well before the halcyon days of the post-war years evaporated.

The chapter commenced with the argument that the federal model of governance as represented by the Universities of London and Wales was based upon a clear separation of two key functions – the universities examined and awarded degrees, the colleges recruited students and then taught them. Because both the respective functions were of critical importance and responsibility for them followed separate and clearly demarcated institutional lines, a confederal model of governance was created.

But the business of higher education is never static: research, as opposed to either teaching or examining, becomes a key academic pursuit; graduate student numbers expand; the state provides increasing amounts of funding and is not above changing the rules that determine its distribution; issues regarding the appointment and promotion of faculty have to be resolved; there are demands for greater accountability that require a response from the universities; and (at Oxford and Cambridge) the expansion of science results in the development of a major teaching role for the universities. The question then is how these developments impact upon the model of governance. The argument is that at Oxford and Cambridge they have been resolved in a way that steadily (more swiftly at Cambridge) turned the two universities into federal universities: both sets of players – universities and colleges – have retained a monopoly of certain critical roles while sharing other roles, some of equal importance. Although there have been changes over time, and there will continue to be changes, contemporarily (and for the foreseeable future), the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge will remain federal universities.

The prognosis is more equivocal for the Universities of Wales and London. It appears that the University of Wales will retain its examining and degree-granting powers vis-à-vis its colleges, a sufficiently critical function to suggest that it

sustains its role at the centre of a confederal model. But if the colleges acquire, and act upon, their right to assume degree-granting powers then the current Cardiff University could provide the model for the future, with the University of Wales disintegrating into a number of unitary institutions. Perhaps the most pertinent question is which institution will be next to desert the ship? An interesting conundrum is the role of the Welsh Assembly, which has looked favourably upon the idea of a planned higher/further education sector in Wales. Would the Assembly see the University of Wales as a means for enhancing that goal or as an obstacle that impedes it?

Much the same uncertainties surround the future of the University of London. It is likely that for most of the colleges the University's degree-awarding powers will continue to be attractive and it performs a number of services that enable it to retain the aura of a potent central force. But there is a considerable imbalance in the authority of colleges and university in terms of their respective contributions to core academic functions. As with the University of Wales, we can anticipate the perpetuation of a confederal model, but the likelihood of the centre declining still further cannot be ruled out at either university. Are Imperial and Cardiff exceptional cases or harbingers of the future?

Although both London and Wales can be described as collegiate universities because they have confederal models of governance, it is evident that they did not embrace collegial values on a wide front. Indeed, London saw itself as purposefully countering the Oxbridge tradition of higher education. Moreover, besides the absence of residential colleges, the University of London always genuflected to professorial dominance when it came to determining academic matters. Nonetheless, in spite of these equivocations, it would be unwise to see the future as evolving without a significant input from grassroots academic opinion. Dorothy Wedderburn, in an interesting analysis of the merger of Royal Holloway and Bedford Colleges, has written:

> The collegial character of both institutions made these conflicts [driven by the merger process] acute at times, but in the end was an asset . . . that same collegiality provided the base from which a strong new institutional identity has developed (Wedderburn, 1991: 152).

Thus, the idea of the collegial tradition – like the idea of the collegiate university – is open to interpretation. The question is in what form, and how deeply, the collegial tradition was embedded in Royal Holloway and Bedford Colleges, and now in the new college of Royal Holloway, University of London (its current title). The collegiate university may disintegrate because the federal model collapses, but the collegial tradition can survive in different institutional settings. Indeed, in his *Towards a Vision and Strategy of the Future of UCL*, the Provost claims that the college's 'strong spirit of collegiality and loyalty' is 'a most remarkable characteristic of UCL' (Grant, 2004: 7).

Perhaps a more interesting question than the evolution of the University of London is how the wider London map of higher education will develop. London Higher, with a membership of over 40 universities and colleges in the London area, was created with the 'long-term aspiration . . . that London will be universally

acknowledged as the knowledge capital of the world' (London Higher, 2007–8: 3). Is it possible that some of the existing universities in the London area may wish to become members of the University of London once the issue of university titles is resolved or perhaps even merge with current colleges (note that at one time it was proposed that Royal Holloway should link up with Brunel University)? And, of course, there is every reason to believe that the present colleges within the University of London will continue to develop joint degree programmes; indeed it is hoped that the new statutes will actually encourage this process. Perhaps what is emerging is a multiversity, with fluid institutional boundaries, spread across the parameters of a great city. Are we returning to the nineteenth century with those fascinating structures that brought under one roof institutions based in different northern conurbations? If this is a map for the future, with higher education in other cities following the same path, then the concerns with federalism and collegiality may come to be seen as rather parochial – issues for a dying past rather than the future.

Chapter 6
Managerialism as Collegiality: The Impossible Conjuring Trick?

Introduction

The two previous chapters retained the analysis of the collegial tradition within the British context but broadened the focus beyond Oxbridge. Inasmuch as this chapter retains the dominant British interest (extending the scope beyond England and Wales, thanks to the inclusion of the University of Edinburgh) it complements the two previous chapters. However, given the ubiquitous spread of the managerial ethos in higher education, it is impossible to retain a narrow research parameter. Therefore, at least within the analytical section, the net will be cast more widely.

The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act, building on the 1988 Education Reform Act, brought together – while continuing to differentiate between – two sectors of higher education in England. In 1992 the public (mainly polytechnics and colleges of higher education) and the university sectors in England were amalgamated and placed under the auspices of the Higher Education Funding Council for Education. However, in spite of this apparent creation of a unitary model, an important binary difference was retained – the new (post-1992) universities (notwithstanding many assertions of how they valued their distinctive heritage and identity, swiftly acquired the university label) were designated as Higher Education Corporations. The state determined the structure of their mode of governance (for the precise implications of the legislation, see Bargh et al., 1996: 23–24; Pratt, 1997: 291–294; Thorne & Cuthbert, 1996: 172–173), whereas the governance of existing universities was for the most part guided by their own charters.

The distinction reflected the fact that new universities had emerged out of a tradition of local education authority surveillance and they had experienced limited control over their own development in comparison to the formal autonomy exercised by most pre-1992 universities. If the managerial ethos is interpreted as the reshaping of forms of institutional governance and administration in a manner that undermines donnish dominion (to use Halsey's phrase), then it follows it is less relevant to focus the analysis upon the new (i.e. post-1992) universities and to concentrate upon those universities where apparently it once held sway. The empirical base for this chapter will therefore be drawn from the pre-1992 universities and

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more particularly from those universities that have revamped their organisational structures while reaffirming that their dominant decision-making bodies are their lay-dominated councils. This chapter will examine developments at the Universities of Birmingham, Edinburgh, Newcastle, Nottingham and Southampton on the pragmatic grounds that in recent years these five institutions have received considerable publicity in the higher education press for the revamping of their organisational structures. It is important, however, not to overlook the fact these case studies simply represent examples of a very prevalent trend.

An important additional point is that the decision to reconstruct as Higher Education Corporations the governance of those institutions that before 1992 were under the umbrella of the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt by the government of the day to demonstrate its willingness to shape the new model of higher education. If, however, the pre-1992 universities, in spite of not being obliged to operate within the same legal framework, are in fact moving in a broadly parallel direction in terms of their modes of governance, what does this tell us about the purposes and values that underpin how they function?

The chapter is structured around three central themes: an entwining of the analytical interpretation of the managerial ethos with the historical context within which it took root in the United Kingdom, the presentation of institutional change at the five universities that form the empirical core of the chapter and a conclusion that presents an overview of the challenges of these development to the collegial tradition, posing the question ‘whither collegiality’? It is possible to interpret this interest in disparaging terms: ‘What we have had is a lament for the past and a romantic reminiscing over a lost era based mainly on two higher education institutions, not nearly 150’ (Dopson & McNay, 1996: 29). However, it should be possible to explore one of the important trajectories of change in higher education without being accused of lamenting the past or engaging in romantic reminiscing. While Oxford and Cambridge are undoubtedly the two most significant collegiate universities, the concept of federalism, around which that collegiality is centred, has a much broader appeal. Moreover, the claim that the goals of higher education can only be delivered effectively through structures and procedures infused with collegial values has had a significant impact across the whole spectrum of British higher education, including the post-1992 universities.

Contextual Considerations: Historical and Analytical

Just as it is impossible to pinpoint when the collegial tradition could be said to have taken root in British higher education, or even when Oxford and Cambridge could be fairly described as collegiate universities, so it is equally difficult to date precisely the implanting of the managerial ethos. In their authoritative *Power and Authority in British Universities* Moodie and Eustace claim that by the 1970s the University Grants Committee was already becoming more dirigiste: issuing guidance to universities on their distribution of the block grant, inviting bids for the funding of projects

in designated areas and pushing for the growth of student numbers in particular disciplines (Moodie & Eustace, 1974, 170–172). By the early 1980s the UGC, in its *Strategy for Higher Education into the 1990s*, stated its intention to use its funding resources to encourage universities to 'tackle the problem of small departments', urged university councils 'to ensure that hard decisions are faced and choices are made', exhorted vice-chancellors to exercise leadership and expressed the belief that universities should examine their machinery of government to ensure effective decision-making and promote a climate of change (UGC, 1984: 39–40).

Increasingly the universities were operating in an environment that both restricted their room for manoeuvre and placed more demands upon them. The former limited the scope of institutional autonomy while the latter stimulated the expansion and professionalisation of their administrative personnel. It is widely recognised that the publication of the Jarratt Report (*Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities* – CVCP, 1985) represented a key stage in the push for more effective administrative structures and, albeit to a lesser extent, for more streamlined models of governance (this was to come more forcefully at a later date). Writing in 1987, Geoffrey Lockwood, a member of the team that produced the Report, conveyed the sense of impending change that was about to refashion 'the management of universities'.

> Whether it be Jarratt, the UGC, or the overseas markets, the effects have been the same. The managerial systems at the institutional level are becoming more explicit, more capable of internal differentiation, able to generate an increased speed of response to outside stimuli, more internal evaluation, and better external projection of the university's values (Lockwood, 1987: 103).

It was obvious which way the wind was blowing. However, the historical perspective is complicated by the fact that, although by the 1980s the universities may be entering a new era in terms of how they were managed, with respect to their governance they were returning to the past as the authority of senates declined and councils, invariably with a majority of lay members, re-asserted their role as the supreme policy-making body, with overall responsibility for directing the future development of the university. It can, therefore, be plausibly argued that the period from approximately 1945 to 1985 – perhaps excluding Oxford and Cambridge – was a unique period in the history of the governance of British universities (Bargh et al., 1996: 5–7; Shattock, 2002: 236).

The analytical issues associated with the emergence of the managerial ethos can be defined reasonably precisely, although they generate conflicting interpretations. First, there is a need to distinguish between its two components: institutional governance and institutional administration. However, while this may be a meaningful analytical distinction in reality the two functions are invariably closely entwined. The primary purposes of the structures of governance are to assume overall responsibility for institutional strength, with a strong focus on the solidity of the financial base and control of the policy-making process. However, these goals can scarcely be achieved without the aid of an effective administration – both how it is structured, its mode of operation, and the quality of its personnel. While there may be many inputs

into the policy-making process, invariably university councils will be influenced by the advice that percolates through to them from the administrative structure. Furthermore, without effective implementation even appropriate policy decisions are likely to fail. Finally, policy decisions are often little more than broad-brushed strokes and it is how they are implemented that gives them their real meaning. It is important therefore to see governance and management as two interacting forces, which do not necessarily complement one another on all occasions.

So far in this chapter we have used interchangeably the concepts of university administration and university management. The research focus has to be directed at changes in structures, modes of operation and the balance of authority between the various interests as they manoeuvre to shape the values and purposes of the university. But language is far from unimportant because its use is reflective of subtle variations on all these fronts. If the discourse is that of chief executives, senior management groups, line managers and middle management we know we are in a very different world from one in which the references are to vice-chancellors, principals, heads of departments and colleagues. But we need to move beyond the discourse to dissect how institutions actually function.

A great deal of the pertinent literature on the functioning of universities is as much about advocacy as it is about describing, analysing and theorising. It presents a model of what is seen as good practice, with the implication (admittedly with the occasional cautionary notice) that if universities wish to be successful this is a path they should at least consider, if not follow. This is clearly exemplified in the voluminous literature of two eminent figures in the field, Burton Clark and Michael Shattock.

Shattock has addressed the question of how successful universities should be managed (*Managing Successful Universities*, 2003; *Managing Good Governance in Higher Education*, 2006). The not unreasonable assumption is that successful universities will want to perpetuate their success and good governance and management are necessary prerequisites to achieve this. However, the more interesting question, that is not addressed, is *how* important to sustaining institutional reputation is good governance? Indeed, Shattock has made a sharp attack on 'the cosiness' of Cambridge, 'which weakens accountability and results in a serious loss of authority in carrying out the essential legal requirements of corporate governance' (Shattock, 2003: 107). So, perhaps we are to conclude that at least in certain respects Cambridge is governed ineptly but it would be difficult to deny that it is a successful university.

Equally important is the assumption that there is a consensus underlying our understanding of what is a successful university (Tapper & Filippakou, 2009: 55–66; Palfreyman & Tapper, 2009: 203–218). Of course it is possible to attach importance to particular measures (rankings in the world league tables, the outcomes of 'student satisfaction' surveys, how British universities fare in the research assessment exercises, the strength of institutional financial balance sheets – to name but a few) but whether such measures amount to 'success' is highly debatable.

In parallel fashion Burton Clark has presented a model of institutional success that is underwritten by good governance – it is the entrepreneurial university

(*Creating Entrepreneurial Universities*, 1998; *Sustaining Change in Universities*, 2004). The institutional characteristics that are essential to the creation of the entrepreneurial university are its

strengthened steering core
expanded developmental periphery
diversified funding base
stimulated academic heartland
integrated entrepreneurial culture

As with Shattock's work, the problem is that we are still faced with a particular (essentially implicit) understanding of success (the case studies are self-evidently successful institutions) and there is little attempt to test out alternative explanatory hypotheses. The methodological weaknesses (in particular the complete absence of a comparative dimension, that is the failure to incorporate institutions that embraced the entrepreneurial path but apparently are still failing or institutions that prosper in spite of not following the assigned road to salvation) are disguised by the appeal of the thesis – that in troubled times it is possible for universities to pull themselves up by their bootstraps and turn around their fortunes. One is reminded of Michael Rutter's very influential *Fifteen Thousand Hours: Secondary Schools and Their Effects on Children* (1979), which shifted the explanatory responsibility for educational failure from the wider society and state policy onto the schools themselves, in particular their management forms and styles of leadership.

Given its incorporation in a research field that has always embraced a strong policy advocacy theme, it was always to be expected that the analysis of the governance and administration of higher education would show a clear measure of prescriptive bias. In this case it is reinforced by the fact that the pressure on institutions to change was considerable, that the advocates of change were eminent persons in the research field and with at least one closely associated with an institution that was widely considered to be successful. Perhaps, most importantly, was the evident commonsense embedded in the message and the clarity of its presentation. But what makes for effective policy advocacy is not the same as presenting a cogent intellectual argument, a fact that is too often overlooked in the field of higher education research.

From the perspective of this book, what is most interesting about the writing of both Shattock and Burton Clark is their own interpretation of their work in relation to what we have called the rise of the managerial ethos. Burton Clark has written:

> 'Entrepreneurial' is an embracing but pointed term for referencing the attitudes and procedure that most dependably lead to the modern self-reliant, self-steering university. When we also stress that entrepreneurial action comes in collegial as well as personal forms – nailing the flag of 'collegial entrepreneurship' to the masthead – we are at the core of the complicated business of changing universities in the early twenty-first century (Clark, 2004: 7).

The five dominant characteristics of Burton Clark's entrepreneurial university are an interesting mix of structural change (the strengthened steering core), cultural change

(integrated entrepreneurial culture) and agency (the stimulated academic heartland and expanded developmental periphery). But to use the term 'collegial entrepreneurship' is to do no more than apply a descriptive label. What is the character of academic entrepreneurship that makes it collegial? It is hard to avoid the conclusion that a political game is being played, one designed to persuade the opponents of change (or more likely those sitting on the fence) that the traditional culture is being reconstituted not abandoned. Thus, collegiality is the self-reliant, self-steering university with the central steering core (invariably a small, appointed senior management group) and the stimulated academic heartland (heads of departments and schools as constituting a middle-management stratum) with at the top of the apex the most stimulated and financially rewarded of all – the vice-chancellor as chief executive).

Shattock has criticised official attempts to impose (or rather to steer universities towards adopting) prescribed models of governance and administration. Writing as long ago as 1997 he noted:

> . . . the Committee of University Chairman (CUC), of which I am Secretary, issued a note of Advice on Governance to all universities and followed it up with a *Guide for Members of Governing Bodies* issued in June 1995. The CUC was at pains to emphasize that it had no powers, constitutional or otherwise, to compel universities to implement its recommendations and it has taken the line in its evidence to the Nolan Committee that voluntary action by universities acting autonomously is very much preferable to legislation or other government action (Shattock, 1997: 18).

Moreover, he has been keen to stress that there is no one model that will fit all universities. Therefore, it is acceptable to issue guidelines but not to impose a straitjacket, and thus his opposition to the recommendation of the Dearing Committee, which did 'not seek uniformity' but did propose 'a code of practice on governance and, as part of that, we think that, as a general rule in the interests of effectiveness, membership of a governing body should not exceed 25', and when membership exceeded 25 the university should 'show good reason why a larger body is needed for its effectiveness' (National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, 1997: 25–26). And it goes without saying that the more dirigiste tone of the subsequent *Lambert Review*, which offered the carrot of 'a significantly lighter-touch regulatory and accountability regime to well-run universities' (Treasury, 2003: 103, Recommendation 7.5), would also be an anathema.

What we see, therefore, in the work of Shattock is the attempt to construct a balancing act (parallel to Burton Clark's 'collegial entrepreneurship'). As autonomous institutions, universities need to define their own structures of administration and governance but, nonetheless, there are some general guidelines that are worth following if the university wants to be successful. Consequently,

> Successful universities try to keep the powers of governance in balance – they appoint able and forthright laymen because they value the contribution they can bring, they develop strong corporate leadership where the vice-chancellor leads an effective steering core which is accountable to but maintains a close dialogue with a senate or academic board which reflects the views of a vibrant academic community. They encourage academic leadership

> at all levels and a full participation by the academic community, or a representative part of it, in the decision-making process (Shattock, 2003: 108).

It is not surprising to see the clear overlap with Burton Clark's model of the entrepreneurial university given the prominent part that the University of Warwick played in the construction of that model and the fact that Michael Shattock was a long-term registrar of that university.

What is of particular interest is that the debate between the 'official' literature (we have quoted from the Dearing Report and the *Lambert Review*) and the 'academic' literature (as represented by Burton Clark and Shattock's work) demonstrates that the managerial ethos – like collegiality – is a contested concept. Both concepts can be said to have acceptable and unacceptable manifestations in the eye of the beholder. For Dearing and Lambert the stress is upon structure and for Shattock and Burton Clark the focus is upon culture. Both parties emphasise the importance of leadership but a distinction is drawn between leading from above as opposed to leadership that engages in inclusive consultation. And Goodhall has attempted to demonstrate that 'research universities' need to be led by distinguished scholars because this will influence their research performances (Goodhall, 2009, 55–78). The contemporary importance attached to leadership roles in the United Kingdom is symbolised by the creation (operational since 2004) of the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education.

Regardless of the particular emphasis of those who would reform the governance and administration of higher education (either via modifications to structure, culture or agency – and invariably a range of changes is proposed), the issue is whether any variant of the managerial ethos, either in its soft or hard form, can be said to interact smoothly with the collegial tradition. In effect Shattock and Burton Clark appear to be proposing a middle way (and for supportive interpretations, see Dearlove, 1997; Palfreyman, 1989) in which collegiality, entrepreneurial activities and the managerial ethos interact constructively. The central issue for our book is whether this is a strategy that resurrects collegiality or one that buries it more deeply.

A radical interpretation of this process of change is to be found in the Deem, Hillyard and Reed volume, *Knowledge, Higher Education, and the New Managerialism: The Changing Management of UK Universities* (2007), which claims that much of the new managerialism in the delivery of public services in the United Kingdom has been driven by the steady entrenchment of neo-liberal policy values: 'Both Thatcherite-style "market-Managerialism" and Blairist-style "modernizing-Managerialism" . . . have achieved discursive supremacy and, at least a substantial degree of ideological legitimacy and organizational control within global and national power structures. . .' (Deem et al., 2007: 5). These shifts in 'underlying core ideological commitments and cultural values' become, so the argument proceeds, the key to drivers of change in higher education. This takes us beyond the analysis of institutional behaviour back into the wider pressures for change in higher education that we considered in Chapter 3. But it is worth picking up on the main themes as they relate to the governance of universities.

It is critical to locate the drivers for change in their historical context (Tapper, 2007: 9–26) and to be sensitive to the fact that there is a considerable gap between the ideas that drive policy forward and the process of policy implementation. It is this gap that provides the room for institutional manoeuvring. In terms of the delivery of social policy a new policy consensus emerged out of the political and economic crises that Britain experienced in the 1970s, but it is essential to explore how ideas are translated into policy because it is the translation process that gives policy its substantive meaning. And what one invariably finds is that the political process will reshape the interpretation of the ideas, which may not be to the liking of some of the staunchest ideological missionaries – those in the vanguard of the movement that favours the strengthening of neo-liberal values.

There was a barrage of exhortation in favour of new structures, which ranged from the softly, softly approach of the CUC, through the prescriptions of the Jarratt and the Dearing Reports, and then onto 'the bribery' implicit in the recommendations of the *Lambert Review*. But reform needed to be driven by more than exhortation, no matter how heavy-handed. While universities in the post-1945 period may have persistently trumpeted their autonomy (a strong theme in the work of Berdahl, 1959; Carswell, 1985; Owen, 1980; Salter & Tapper, 1994; Shattock, 1994; Shinn, 1986), nonetheless they had become publicly funded institutions. Consequently, when the nation suffered one of its periodic economic crises, the higher education budget was squeezed with, in the early 1980s, a substantial cut in income. In his 1994 publication, *The UGC and the Management of British Universities*, Shattock has a subsection entitled, *Buckingham and the Government's efforts to reduce state funding of universities*, which follows on immediately from another subsection, *The state takes over the funding of universities*. The juxtaposition is telling. Once the protective shield of the fragile idea of autonomy had been breached, the ability of the universities to resist state pressure was steadily eroded. The 1982 cuts in the university budgets were as much a psychological as a financial blow.

The question was how the higher education institutions were going to manage retrenchment and, for the more farsighted, what steps were they going to take to replenish their incomes (other than to sustain the forlorn hope that if you held on long enough then eventually government policy would change)? Almost at a stroke we entered the age of the entrepreneurial university, the recognition of the need for institutional planning and the careful management of resources. It is not that the role of senates controlled by academics was entirely irrelevant in this context but the major issues confronting universities were now firmly in the domain of university councils. Moreover, the issues now required the steady, precise gaze of full-time professional administrators rather than the partial attention of those taking a furlough from academic duties, while undertaking a light teaching load and attempting to keep their research going. University governance and administration was forced to become serious.

On the heels of the decline in public funding came the new mechanisms for steering system outcomes. The UGC, which had become steadily more proactive since the 1960s, was replaced by the funding councils embodying the new public

management mode of governance. It is debatable whether this made the universities less autonomous institutions (Tapper & Salter, 1995) but it is a model of governance in which the state, through quasi-state organisations, attempts to steer the pattern of university development. The state both establishes a regulatory regime and puts forward policy initiatives designed to shape the pattern of institutional behaviour. The universities need officials who will guide academics through the quality assurance regime, maximise their effectiveness in competing for research income, evaluate whether it is cost-effective to respond to the policy initiatives promoted by the funding councils and provide ammunition for defusing government political pressure (for example, the persistence of the official commitment to 'the widening participation agenda').

What the state has created is a market that it manages. It can vary the rules through which it manages that market, as it has done so for the quality assurance regime, the research assessment exercises and is likely to do so for student fees – with the possibility that if the threshold is raised by a sufficient amount, then a competitive rather than a managed market will emerge. Thus, changes in institutional behaviour have been driven by the new relationship that successive governments have forged between the state and the universities, which – interestingly – has followed the same broad direction regardless of the government's particular political persuasion.

We have a political consensus on the management of social policy that has replaced the broad post-war commitment to the welfare state. It will be critical to analyse how the balance between state steering and institutional entrepreneurialism evolves in the future and what impact this will have upon the character of university governance and administration. An entirely plausible scenario is that universities not only diverge along different paths but also become increasingly fragmented internally – a trend, as we noted, that applies to the University of London.

There is a tendency in the literature (of which the volume of Deem and her colleagues is an example) to blame the recent travails of British higher education on perfidious government policy. However, a more sophisticated perspective would look at the interaction between developments in the structure and culture of the academic profession along with the direction of government policy in order to theorise more persuasively about 'the crisis of the university'. Halsey has commented upon the proletarianisation and casualisation of the academic labour force (1995: 124–146). Both trends are suggestive of structural and cultural developments that are scarcely conducive to the creation of a positive sense of institutional identity, which is vital to sustaining collegiality. Moreover, even the core of the academic profession (the 'tenured' members of the guild) has become more stratified and segmented over time, which runs counter to the idea of a shared and equal membership in a community of scholars.

While Oxbridge may be perceived to be at the very pinnacle of the British academic establishment, for the individual academic this may be of little comfort unless she/he has reached the summit of her/his individual career trajectory with institutional standing offering more status and comfort than professional recognition. But for those who remain professionally ambitious then meetings, voting on the issues

of the day, committee membership, holding a minor office or even simply being involved may be too much of a burden to bear. You may want to make a contribution but this can be done by establishing a powerful disciplinary identity through research rather than a forceful collegial presence. Undoubtedly state policy, incorporating the espousal of neo-liberal values and practices, has played its role in this process of change, but it is also important to examine the wider dynamics of professional development, that is those social forces – including the evolution of values within the academic profession itself – that have brought about this situation.

‘Old’ Universities as ‘New’ Universities: The Managerial Revolution in Action

In a concise article on organisational change in the academic structures of British universities, John Hogan has written: ‘Particularly noticeable has been the reorganisation of a number of large civic universities. Birmingham, Edinburgh, Newcastle, Nottingham and Southampton have all reorganised a large number of departments into a smaller number of schools’ (Hogan, 2005, April 2: 55). This section of the chapter will focus on the governance and administration of these five universities, although the extent of system-wide change means that these are essentially case studies of a much broader process.

In terms of the formal structure of governance the picture is one of continuity with a wide measure of overlap between the five universities. In each case the Council (known as the Court at Edinburgh) is the governing body:

> The Council is the University’s supreme governing body, responsible for setting the strategic direction and policies governing all aspects of the University’s activity (University of Birmingham, 2009a, March 26).
>
> The Court takes all final decisions on matters of fundamental concern to the institution. The Court is required to regularly monitor its own effectiveness and the performance of the University, its planned strategies and operational targets (University of Edinburgh, 2009a, March 26).
>
> Council is the supreme governing body of the University. It is specifically charged with the management and control of the University’s finances and property and with reviewing the work of the University (University of Newcastle, 2005 July 18, Minute 88: 1).
>
> The University’s governing body is the Council, which meets five times a year. The Council approves the strategic plans of the University and is ultimately responsible for its finances, buildings and staff (University of Nottingham, 2009a, March 26).
>
> The Council is the governing body of the University. It is ultimately responsible for the overall planning and management of the University... (University of Southampton, 2009a, March 26).

These are comparatively small bodies of some 20 members composed of a majority of laypersons with one taking the chair. The vice-chancellor (principal at Edinburgh) is an ex-officio member who is occasionally labelled as the university’s chief executive: at Edinburgh the Court has the responsibility ‘to appoint the Principal as chief executive...’ while at Southampton the Council delegates ‘... authority to the Vice-Chancellor, as chief executive and accounting officer...’ But everywhere

he or she is supposed to demonstrate the quality of leadership, and those lower down the pecking order are expected to be equally proactive.

Although court or councils may be the primary governing bodies, *academic* authority resides in senates, although in some cases this may be subject to the jurisdiction of council:

> The Senate has delegated authority from the Council for regulating and directing the academic work of the University in teaching, examining and research... (University of Birmingham 2009b, March 26).

> The Senatus Academicus is the senior academic committee in the University of Edinburgh and meets at least three times per session (University of Edinburgh, 2009b, March 26).

> Senate is by statute, the supreme governing and executive body of the University in all academic matters (University of Newcastle, 2005, July 18, Minute 88: 2).

> The academic authority of the University is the Senate... Its responsibility is to direct and regulate teaching and examinations, and to promote research (University of Nottingham, 2009a).

> The Senate is the University's primary academic authority. As set out in the University's Charter it is the role of the Senate subject to the Statutes of the University and the control and approval of the Council to "regulate and superintend the education and discipline of students and of undergraduates of the University" (University of Southampton, 2009b, March 26).

The authority of the senates is not therefore expressed uniformly in quite the unequivocal terms as the powers of the councils. They are composed of the academic members of the universities (a combination of those who have membership as of right and members elected by different faculty groups) and have a token student representation. They are much larger bodies than councils and usually meet more infrequently with the vice-chancellor (principal) as chair. Although, as we have argued, the change in the relative balance of power between councils and senates is essentially a consequence of the broader contextual pressures, the differences in the size of their respective memberships and frequency of meetings probably helped to reinforce the shift once the process had commenced.

There is also the interesting question of precisely what senate's academic authority means in practice. Over time degree programmes offered by universities inevitably change. In recent years considerable publicity has been generated by departmental closures with some pressure to ring-fence certain disciplines (the so-called STEM subjects – science, technology, engineering and mathematics). While university senates may discuss such issues it is difficult to see how they can act as an effective decision-making body especially in view of the concomitant financial questions. However, this is not to say that in certain circumstances grassroots faculty opposition to academic change cannot be effective, as the failed attempt to terminate the teaching of chemistry at the University of Sussex demonstrated (or to provide a bolder example, the failed merger of University College London and Imperial College). But this is far from saying that senates retain the ability to exercise effective long-term control over the academic development of a university. One swallow does not make a summer; neither do two.

Therefore, in terms of the formal structure of governance, these snapshots are not especially remarkable. The really significant changes are in the academic

organisation of the five universities – the structures through which they deliver their academic programmes. Hogan's article focussed upon the trend towards merging the array of departments into a smaller number of schools, a process that Taylor encapsulated under the title *Big is Beautiful. Organisational Change in Universities in the United Kingdom: New Models of Institutional Management and the Changing Role of Academic Staff* (Taylor, 2006: 251–273). This is a remarkable development given that some 20 years ago Lockwood (one of the gurus of the managerial revolution) could write, 'The elementary particle of academic life is the individual faculty member, but the academic department is the primary unit in the structure' (1987: 92).

So have the departments indeed disappeared? And, if so, what has replaced them? The academic structures of the five universities are in broad terms as follows:

> The *University of Birmingham* has been organised since August 2008 into five colleges: Arts and Law, Engineering and Physical Sciences, Life and Environmental Sciences, Medical and Dental Sciences, and Social Sciences. Each of the colleges is a composed of a number of schools, which in turn list their academic programmes and departments (University of Birmingham, 2009c, March 26).
>
> The *University of Edinburgh* (as of January 2009) also uses the term college as the label for the top tier of its organisational structure but has three rather than five colleges: Humanities and Social Sciences, Medicine and Veterinary Medicine, and Science and Engineering. The three colleges are composed of twenty-one Schools, which are essentially made up of cognate disciplinary fields. Thus the School of Social and Political Science contains the following 'subject areas': Politics and International Relations, Social Anthropology, Social Policy, Social Work and Sociology (University of Edinburgh, 2009c, March 26).
>
> The *University of Newcastle* operates with a model of three faculties: Humanities and Social Sciences, Medical Sciences, and Science, Agriculture and Engineering. Each faculty is made up of a number of schools, research institutes and research centres with the schools combining cognate disciplines (University of Newcastle, 2005 July 18, Minute 88: 3–4).
>
> The *University of Nottingham* has five faculties: Arts; Engineering; Medicine and Health Sciences; Science; and Social Sciences, Law and Education. Within the faculties are located academic units referred to as either schools or departments. As is the case with the other universities, the schools embrace disciplines that historically have close links with one another (University of Nottingham, 2009b, March 26).
>
> The *University of Southampton* is organised into three faculties: Engineering, Science and Mathematics; Law, Arts and Social Sciences; and Medicine, Health and Life Science. Twenty-five schools are distributed across these three faculties (University of Southampton, 2009c, March 26).

Although departments may not have disappeared without trace, they are now somewhat hidden from the public gaze and it would be difficult to see them – at least in relation to these five universities – as *the primary unit* in the academic structure.

How is this development to be explained, and what are its implications for the collegial tradition in higher education? In relation to the four universities that formed the basis of his research, Taylor makes a number of pertinent points. First, there was the need to improve the quality of the administrative structure by tackling the problem of the inefficient use of resources generated by the presence of small departments and in the process to create a more streamlined organisation. Second, the

development of new interdisciplinary groupings in teaching and research needed to be reflected in (and indeed encouraged by) supportive administrative structures. Third, the changes were a way of demonstrating to outside bodies (in particular government and the quasi-government bodies that distributed financial resources) that the universities were taking the demands for more professional management seriously. And fourth, it was believed that the new models would enable them to engage in more effective market competition, to enhance their competitive edge over other universities – presumably those that had not reformed (Taylor, 2006: 256–260). The implicit expectation was that structural reform would be accompanied by a steady development of an entrepreneurial culture and underwritten by proactive leadership at all levels of the university.

Referencing Shattock (2003) by way of support, Hogan has suggested that we need to take the official line with at least a pinch of salt. He claims that there is an element of 'being driven as much by fashion or received ideas from industry or the public sector'. Moreover, 'it is rare for organisational change to be driven by educational ideas' but rather there is a range of likely random inputs: perception of the lack of success, reaction against previous organisational changes and the desire of a new vice-chancellor to make a mark. But for Hogan, 'the most dominant factor forcing organisational change has been how best to allocate or distribute internal resources'. To this he would add 'concerns about communication' and, significantly, 'the desire to increase the responsiveness of the academic structures to management needs' (Hogan, 2005: 51–52). The clear implication of the last point is that we have been witnessing the unfolding of a power struggle between the different interests that are embedded in higher education institutions. The question around which it is being fought is 'who will govern the university?'

While it is not a dominant theme in the analysis of this struggle, the question of what such changes mean for collegiality has emerged. It cannot be a coincidence that both Birmingham and Edinburgh should use the term 'college' as the descriptive label for the top tier of their academic structures. In an editorial the *Times Higher Education Supplement* remarked: 'Birmingham is striking a blow for time-honoured collegiality, with a nod to the ancient traditions of universities as self-governing communities of scholars' (Editorial, 2007, June 15: 12). But in an earlier cautionary note, Tony Tysome observed: 'But the most radical and controversial proposal relates to the level of power and autonomy that will be delegated to the new heads who will manage devolved budgets and will sit on the executive board with the vice-chancellor' (Tysome, 2007 April 6: 44).

Hogan makes the perceptive observation that the key issue is

> . . . whether the universities with an intermediate level, typically a series of faculties, are perceived to have a greater degree of devolution to the academic community or whether the faculties are regarded as mechanisms for exercising even tighter managerial control (Hogan, 2005: 54).

The answer to Hogan's conundrum is likely to be dependent on what resource allocation model is employed. Jarzabkowski (with the London School of Economics,

and the Universities of Oxford Brookes and Warwick as her research base) has argued that

> A centralised RAM is defined in this study as one in which resources are authorised and allocated by the senior management team from a central pool on a zero basis. This method of RAM permits redeployment of resources with strategic priorities at the corporate or overarching university level (Jarzabkowski, 2002: 7).

Whereas,

> Decentralised resource allocation is defined as departmental control over budgets, with responsibility for their own strategic direction, income-generation and financial viability. In such a model, departments are able to be locally responsive to strategic initiatives within their discipline and to generate, deploy and allocate their own income streams (Jarzabkowski, 2002: 7).

However, she concludes that, ‘These two models are theoretical polarities and it is likely that most universities will operate between the extremes’ (Jarzabkowski, 2002: 7).

Although Jarzabkowski’s judgement is undoubtedly correct, the direction of change in academic structures coupled with the increased responsibilities of councils and vice-chancellors (academic planning/strategy, financial control, risk management and measurement of outputs against performance indicators) suggests declining discretion for departments (even if they should still exist) or a carefully prescribed discretion rather than wide room for manoeuvre. While this may be interpreted as a purposeful attempt to centralise institutional control, nonetheless it may also be perceived as a rational response by ‘the centre’ to fulfilling its obligations.

A critically important development, and one that has not received a great analysis in the literature (Deem et al., 2007: 51–53), is the emergence of small core decision-making bodies within higher education institutions. Their significance is dependent not only upon the fact that they symbolise the centralisation of institutional authority (although they do send out this message) but also because they bridge the structures of governance and management. Each of the five civic universities that forms the core of this section of the chapter has proceeded down this route.

> The *University of Birmingham* has a *University Executive Board* (a committee of Council) with the vice-chancellor in the chair. It is composed of those who occupy the most senior roles within the University – besides the vice-chancellor: the vice-principal(s), pro-vice chancellors, heads of the five colleges, the registrar and secretary, the director of finance and the director of human resources (with the possibility of co-opting other members on the recommendation of the vice-chancellor after consultation with the Board and approval of Council). It combines a powerful governance role (‘To develop, consider and recommend to the Council or Senate, as appropriate, new and revised University strategies, plans and policies’) with an equally potent administrative role (‘To take executive responsibility for ensuring the effective communication and implementation of the University strategies, plans, policies and the decisions of the Board throughout the University’) (University of Birmingham, 2009d, March 26).

> The *University of Edinburgh* has a *Principal’s Strategy Group*, which is convened by the Principal and a membership composed of: the heads of the three colleges; the vice-principal for planning, resources and research policy; the university secretary; the director of corporate services; and the vice-principal for knowledge management and librarian to the University (with other senior members of the University in attendance). ‘Its purpose is to

discuss and advise on issues of strategic importance to the University as a whole'. And very significantly 'its role includes considering new strategic initiatives *prior to wider consultation in the University's committee structure*, identifying internal strategic priorities, and ensuring that opportunities for the University are exploited appropriately' (*stress added*) (University of Edinburgh, 2009d, March 26).

The *University of Newcastle* has an *Executive Board* (which is a joint committee of Council and Senate) that, besides the vice-chancellor, consists of six pro-vice-chancellors, the registrar, the executive director of finance and the executive director of human resources. It has both key a policy (for example, directing the University's strategy and exercising 'an integrated overview of the University's policies and resources') and managerial role (for example, ensuring the efficient management of major initiatives and managing key risks) (University of Newcastle, 2009, March 10).

The *University of Nottingham* has a *Strategy and Planning Committee* (a committee of Council), which is chaired by a lay member appointed by Council with a membership consisting of up to five members of council, the six pro-vice-chancellors, the treasurer/chair of the Finance Committee, the president and vice-president of Council, and the vice-chancellor. As its title suggests its main purpose is to formulate and review the University's strategy and 'develop University plans for review by the Council, including academic and other resource allocation and management plans'. It also reviews performance 'in relation to approved strategic objectives and plans' (University of Nottingham, 2009c, March 30).

The *University of Southampton* has a *University Executive Group,* which is described in the following terms: 'A pivotal role in the new structure is played by the University Executive Group (UEG), a joint committee of Council and Senate, which meets monthly. UEG coordinates strategies and policies, develops major initiatives, receives reports from the Executive Committees of Council and Senate, presents financial plans and makes proposals to Senate and Council'. The UEG is chaired by the vice-chancellor and composed of the senior deputy vice-chancellor, the pro-vice-chancellors/deputy vice-chancellors, the deans of the faculties, the registrar and the director of finance. Significantly in a diagrammatic representation of its committee structure the UEG is placed at the very centre of the model reporting to Council and Senate and through them to their committees, while being reported to by the University's organisational infrastructure (University of Southampton, 2009d, March 26).

The 'senior management groups' clearly receive their constitutional authority from powers delegated for the most part from councils (Court with respect to Edinburgh) and senates. This is structural change that undoubtedly will operate somewhat differently in universities with their own histories and cultural legacies. Moreover, it is structural change that delegates considerable formal authority (embracing both policy direction and administrative oversight) to those with leading institutional roles. Thus, the style in which it operates will be determined by how its leadership chooses to go about its tasks with 'top-down' and 'inclusive' approaches at either end of the continuum, and equally its effectiveness will be heavily dependent on the quality of that leadership. Of particular interest is how these new structures interact with those – especially the professors – who have traditionally exercised academic leadership. These are important issues for future research.

Whither Collegiality?

There are three plausible interpretations of the future of collegiality in the light of the evidence and analysis that we have been considering in this chapter. The most optimistic is associated with the work of Burton Clark and Shattock. They are

both very conscious of the contemporary pressures that universities face but believe important aspects of the collegial tradition are critical assets in enabling them to respond positively to those challenges. This is the tightrope strategy. On the one hand there is an inevitability about the shifting equilibrium in the balance of power between councils and senates, the numerical dominance of councils by laypersons, the increasing importance of leadership roles and – more especially – the enhanced authority of vice chancellors and the emergence of 'senior management groups'. On the other hand both believe that if universities wish to sustain their 'success' (Shattock) or become effective 'enterpreneurial' institutions (Burton Clark) they can best achieve these goals by adopting strategies that engage their academics. Shattock, therefore, wants to sustain the identity of departments, not impose models of governance but allow universities to evolve in ways that they believe best reflect their needs and encourage leadership styles that are built around consultation and inclusion. Following parallel lines, Burton Clark wants both 'a stimulated academic heartland' and 'an expanded developmental periphery', neither of which seem feasible unless there is an engaged faculty committed to the long-term welfare of the university.

As we have noted, both Shattock and Burton Clark see their strategies as encompassing collegiality but evidently they are more dependent upon the style of institutional leadership and the stimulation of a supportive cultural milieu rather than the formal structure of governance and administration. Our interpretation of the collegial model of governance and administration, while recognising both the importance of leadership style and the need for a supportive cultural context, argued that its sustenance was dependent upon structures that reflected the pre-eminence of 'donnish dominion' with procedures (committees, consensus building, protracted deliberation and – if needs be – a supportive vote from the assembled dons) that reinforced that pre-eminence. In fact it was about power – who had it and how it was exercised. Significantly, neither Shattock nor Burton Clark say much about the distribution and exercise of power. If collegiality survives in the Shattock and Burton Clark models then it does so in a particular form with consultation, exhortation, partial incorporation and tangible incentives as its drivers rather than the exercise of authority.

In 1987 Lockwood had written,

> The Vice-Chancellor needs to have a prominent voice in the selection of key officers.... So he or she can build up a senior management team or cabinet. In that regard the Jarratt Committee's recommendation that the heads of department should be appointed on the nomination of the Vice-Chancellor is both one of its most crucial and one its most controversial suggestions... (Lockwood, 1987: 104).

The problem, as Hogan noted, is that heads of department could then be perceived as incorporated in the management structure of the university (as middle managers), representing not so much the interests of the department and its members to the senior management but as the conduit through which messages from the centre are relayed to the periphery. In fact Deem's research (2007: 113–114, 155–156) shows the ambivalence that many heads of departments (and, although to a lesser extent,

deans) express about their roles. This raises the interesting possibility of universities incorporating different values within their organisational strata (Berquist & Pawlak, 2008, are now up to 'six cultures of the academy'!) with some departments (or research centres) exhibiting greater collegiality than others perhaps dependent upon their disciplinary basis or even the personal styles of their heads. There is also the distinct possibility of a collegial ethos developing within, but not necessarily across, the formal organisational units – research teams within departments, specialised degree programmes within schools or some colleges within a university. The implication is that as the university becomes more infused with the managerial ethos, collegiality retreats to its heartland.

An optimistic interpretation of the change in the academic structures of the five universities examined in this chapter could take the line that this represents a genuine devolution of responsibilities from the centre. Within the overall framework of the university's strategic development, academic units have the authority to sustain and enhance their own futures. Moreover, they have a better chance to do this than in a model where there is central control, especially if they have also made a significant initial input into the planning process. How individual academic units conduct their affairs is a matter for investigation but, so the argument would run, devolution presents a real opportunity for those who believe that collegial values and practices should be maintained. Thus, although collegiality may be retreating to a heartland, its cause could be buttressed by devolved academic structures, thus the heartland is of significant proportions with prospects of expanding rather than small and in terminal decline.

Both the scenarios presented (reformulation and retreat/devolution) could be seen as staging posts on the route to the third interpretation: collegial governance is withering on the vine with a combination of external pressure, changes in the character of the academic profession and institutional connivance coalescing to sap its vitality. The belief that 'big is beautiful' combines with the recognition that 'small is powerful' to create a new world of university administration and governance. So the culling of committees is proclaimed with great enthusiasm and admissions by recruitment (rather than selection) combine with a market-led restructuring of degree programmes to usher in the promised land of the corporate university.

One of the more interesting characteristics of the collegial model of governance is that its inherent frailty is there for all to see – overburdened with committees, cumbersome, slow moving and making equally impossible demands of both rank-and-file academics and would-be institutional leaders. By way of contrast managerialism appears a perfect model of efficiency – small, sleek, fast and purposeful. But it is important to remember that the context within which higher education institutions function is not unchanging. The corporate model of governance, which provided a clear point of reference for the reformers, looks far less inviting in the light of the contemporary financial crisis. Moreover, as Shattock reminds us, it was academics that have tended to blow the whistle on poor leadership and maladministration (Shattock, 1994: 111; 2002: 240). Besides the changing environment within which universities function, the constant presence of institutional politics – as C.P. Snow's *The Masters* (1951) reminds us – is always lurking beneath the

surface (Cornford, 1908; Bailey, 1977). If, as this chapter has charged, we are in part witnessing an institutional power struggle, with a conflict of values – collegiality as opposed to managerialism at its core – then politics will not disappear. Even if one side should appear to triumph that will not be the end of the struggle for no matter how 'small, sleek, fast and purposeful' the resource distribution mechanisms may be the losers will always suspect, or even proclaim, foul play. And, inevitably, circumstances will change.

Part III
Cross-National Perspectives on Collegiality

Chapter 7
Lessons from America: A Comparative Perspective on the Collegial Tradition

Introduction

In spite of the misgivings that have been expressed regarding the current health of the US system of higher education (Douglass, 2006 and 2007), there is little doubt that the central characteristics of the US model are widely admired (Bassett & Tapper, 2009: 127–129). In terms of undergraduate numbers, the United States established the first system of mass higher education. It is a highly diversified model with a plurality of institutional missions. Furthermore, it is the prime example of a model that depends for its sustenance upon a mix of public and private funding. Finally, it contributes many members to that elite 'world-class' sector of higher education, which several nations are anxious to see their leading universities join (Palfreyman & Tapper, 2009: 203–218).

It is somewhat ironic, therefore, to discover that there should be such a persistent attempt, in the words of Duke, 'to import Oxbridge' (Duke, 1996). As can be illustrated, it is a fascination that can be almost irrational in its intensity and expectations.

> Oxford is enough to take one's heart by storm . . . I am afraid that if there were a place for me here, America would only see me again to sell the house, to fetch you and the children (Woodrow Wilson, President of Princeton and then of the United States – as quoted in Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000: 59).

> Pomona might develop into a "group of institutions divided into small colleges – somewhat on the Oxford type. . . In this way, I hope to preserve the inestimable *personal* values of the small college while securing the resources of a university" (James Blaisdell, president of Pomona from 1910 and the inspiration for the foundation of the Claremont Colleges – as quoted in Duke, 1996: 128).

It would not be too difficult to provide numerous quotes expressing parallel sentiments. However, it is critical to place them in their historical context and to explore the rocky road from what are essentially expressions of deep personal sentiment to concrete policy development.

It is scarcely surprising that the American colonies should look to England for models of higher education to emulate, although it probably makes more sense to trace particular links, above all to the Ivy League universities in view of their

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longevity and their historical ties to regional class elites (Karabel, 2006). However, the Oxbridge input has to be weighed against the very significant influence exerted by the Scottish and German legacies combining, respectively, traditions of personal and community betterment with the pursuit of research. More significantly, as Oxbridge's acolytes were sometimes painfully made aware, ideas and values have to be translated into practice. The European models had to be restructured to fit the American context, which meant being receptive to the local social environment as well as engaging in complex and protracted institutional haggling. The European experience of higher education has been refashioned, and the American university has been forged in America, not Europe (Rudolph, 1990: 90–91).

In our second chapter we claimed that there are four paramount dimensions to the collegial tradition: the collegiate university, donnish dominion, intellectual collegiality, and commensality. This chapter will focus predominantly on the first and fourth dimensions. The initial goal is to explore why collegiate universities have failed to flourish in the United States, although the conclusion will be more equivocal than this bold statement suggests. The second section argues that commensality, in the form of the residential college, is integral to the American interpretation of collegiality. The intention is to explore what this means and to account for the strength of its appeal. It will also be necessary to incorporate one critical dimension of intellectual collegiality, which is the long-established (if waning) American commitment to providing a liberal undergraduate education. Colleges and a liberal education have been linked in the American model in, broadly speaking, a parallel fashion to the marrying of tutorial teaching to an Oxbridge undergraduate education. While tutorial teaching has been perceived as integral to Oxbridge's broader socio-cultural role, so a liberal education performs the same function in American higher education. It embraces a commitment to a broad experience of undergraduate education, both academically and socially.

The chapter, therefore, purposefully fails to cover all the dimensions of collegiality but there are good reasons for this. With reference to Oxbridge, we examined (albeit sceptically) the claim that their colleges have helped to stimulate cross-disciplinary research. It would seem inappropriate to follow such a trail within the American tradition given the dominance of the graduate and professional schools. Indeed, the rise of the research university strongly influenced the overall development of higher education in the United States by reshaping its central purposes (Veysey, 1965: 121–179; Geiger, Colbeck, & Williams, 2007). Its growing strength in the nineteenth century, with John Hopkins University to the fore, underwrote the move from a system dominated by the college to one that was essentially the preserve of the university. Rhodes scholars may have returned to America for the most part enamoured of the charms of Oxbridge but this was dwarfed by the impact of those who had travelled to Germany in the latter part of the nineteenth century to seek a postgraduate education dependent upon scholarly research.

Of greater significance is that the chapter does not address in depth the question of donnish dominion. Given the diversity in the character of American higher education, including its multiple origins then, not surprisingly, there has been considerable variation in the scope of the academic input into institutional governance

with the idea of ‘shared governance’, although in decline, underwriting the dominant model (Rothblatt, 2007a: 446). What is particularly interesting is that the trend in the pattern of governance appears to be broadly similar in the United Kingdom and the United States, with the latter providing the lead.

In the chapter on ‘the managerial revolution’ in British higher education we examined the rise and decline of the power of the academic estate in the governance of British universities since 1945, with Oxford and Cambridge proving to be fortified bastions of donnish dominion – even if the cracks are starting to appear. The chapter analysed a reshaping process driven by institutional expansion and increasing structural complexity, state pressure, the need to augment funding through entrepreneurial activities, the greater intensity of market forces and changes in academic culture.

Richard Chait has presented a powerful portrayal of parallel trends in the United States taking Jencks and Riesman’s *The Academic Revolution* (1968) as his starting point:

> A little more than thirty years ago, Jencks and Riesman (1968) announced the arrival of the ‘academic revolution,’ a term intended to convey a profound transformation of American higher education. At the heart of the revolution was ‘the rise to power of the academic profession’ . . . ‘The professors . . . won the war’ over curriculum, course content, selection of colleagues and senior administrators, and meritocratic standards for admissions and graduation (Chait, 2002: 293).

Chait then goes on to chart the subsequent steady decline in academic authority, not only in relation to other campus interests but also in response to the steady incorporation of the university into the economic structure of the wider society. The most powerful expression of this thesis is to be found in that body of research, which has examined comparatively the rise of ‘academic capitalism’ and assessed its impact upon the character of academic labour (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).

But the picture, as in the United Kingdom, is not one of unmitigated doom and gloom. Even Chait records that academics still tend to like their jobs and believe they work in essentially collegial institutions, even if the realities of the changing higher education environment make this increasingly difficult (Chait, 2002: 306–308). Moreover, the new model of institutional governance may invoke at the very least acquiescence if it is infused with the devolution of authority, policy consultation and styles of leadership and management that embrace rather than dictate. Dill (viewing the issue comparatively) has called for a renewed strategy of academic self-regulation in which there is a reaffirmation of the commitment to collegial values (Dill, 2005: 184–190), whereas Burgan has implied that the shift in the balance of power on campuses is to some extent due to the tendency of the academic faculty to become actively engaged only in crisis situations rather than playing the role of ‘continuously involved citizens’ (Burgan, 2006: 192–194). One is reminded of the spasmodic interventions of Oxford’s Congregation: with respect, for example, to the award of an honorary degree to Mrs Thatcher and the recent attempts of Vice-Chancellor John Hood to increase the presence of laypersons on Oxford’s Council. To remain continuously engaged, however, means a commitment of time

and energy, which the individual academic may feel are better spent in pursuing other goals.

There are those who argue that the ousting of Harvard's President, Larry Summers, was not so much the consequence of the negative impact of the particular issues in which he was embroiled, but stemmed more from the fact that these occurred within the framework of a continuously abrasive leadership style. Apparently he had failed to act with sufficient collegiality in a university that had a devolved structure of authority, including the devolution of financial control (Bowley, 2006, May 13/14; Phillips, 2006, March 10; Ryan, 2006, March 24).

Moreover, and more positively, Hardy's study on how Canadian universities handled retrenchment in response to budget cuts suggests that collegial procedures of decision-making can play a significant part in securing long-term institutional welfare (Hardy, 1996). Nonetheless, for individual academics to be enmeshed in the formal decision-making process does not within itself mean that we are observing a collegiate university at work, but it does suggest the presence of a collegial culture. Moreover, it may provide guidelines for the construction of a viable model of governance and administration in the age of mass higher education – continuous collegial engagement embracing the different interests within the academy.

The intention, therefore, is to examine how those parts of the jigsaw (colleges, commensality and a liberal education) that we are piecing together will enhance the understanding of the collegial tradition. In an interesting review of Duke's *Importing Oxbridge* Leslie has implied that a valuable contribution to interpreting the development of higher education in America would be to discern precisely what has been the impact of Oxbridge rather than to focus specifically upon failed attempts to import it (Leslie, 1998). This would require a detailed historical analysis that is beyond the scope of this chapter but by introducing a more rounded understanding of collegiality this chapter should help to establish the preconditions for a considered move in this direction.

The Beckoning Promise of the Collegiate University

What does it mean 'to import Oxbridge' or to construct a collegiate university that claims to be replicating the Oxbridge model of the collegiate university? In Chapter 2, we argued that the idea of the collegiate university, as exemplified by Oxford in particular, evolves around the entwining of a pattern of socio-cultural variables and a structure of governance and administration that defines the relationship between university and colleges in the performance of key institutional functions. The structure has a number of layers:

Functions that are the responsibility of individual colleges
Functions that are managed by inter-collegiate bodies
Functions that are the responsibility of the university
Functions that are managed through the interaction of the university and the colleges, with an increasing emphasis on the need to co-ordinate university and inter-collegiate decision-making within the framework of joint committees

And, as we have discussed, in recent years there has been a steady augmentation in the decision-making authority of the university within both Oxford and Cambridge.

But what are to count as key institutional functions? Within the Oxbridge model one would point to college control of both those who are admitted as undergraduates and those who are appointed to college fellowships. Admission of undergraduates has a large element of inter-collegiate cooperation built into the process, and the appointment of college fellows at Oxford almost always incorporates a university voice in the proceedings, whereas at Cambridge the university makes academic appointments with the colleges then selecting whom they will offer fellowships. The second key function is the continuing responsibility of the colleges for undergraduate teaching, although again there are both critical inter-collegiate (colleges need to organise their teaching resources cooperatively) and university (the departmental control of laboratories, lecture rooms and responsibility for examinations and awarding degrees) inputs.

Although the balance in responsibility for these two tasks may be shifting, there are two support mechanisms that help to sustain its relative stability. First, university governance at Oxbridge is still infused with the ethos of donnish dominion, which means the college tutors retain a powerful voice – in fact, more than a voice, because they continue to fulfil vital roles, as well as having significant committee representation, within the university structures. Second, although the colleges vary considerably in terms of their wealth, many of them retain enviable financial resources – endowment income, tuition fees for the teaching they provide and even their embracing of entrepreneurial activities. Although some voices have called for the pooling of endowment income (not surprisingly, resisted by the richer colleges), a taxation model operates whereby the richer colleges provide (with varying degrees of enthusiasm) support for the sustenance of the college system as a whole.

The above short section encapsulates (drawing heavily upon the Oxbridge experience) our interpretation of the collegiate university. The issue is to what extent the long-running American fascination with Oxbridge has led to the foundation, or redevelopment of existing institutions, that replicate these characteristics. If this is not the case, can we nonetheless discern a viable American model of collegiality, one that is centred on socio-cultural values (the other critical dimension of the collegiate university as we have defined it) as opposed to modes of governance and administration underwritten by the financial inputs that oil the machinery of shared responsibilities?

Our exploration of the American flirtation with the collegiate university is based on three targets. First, there are the Ivy League universities with particular reference to Harvard, Yale and Princeton (the other Ivy League universities are Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth and the University of Pennsylvania – Geiger, 2009: 281). Second, there is the University of California at Santa Cruz, which is one of the campuses of the University of California. Third, we have included several models of inter-collegiate cooperation: the Claremont Colleges of southern California, the Five Colleges, Inc., which incorporates five institutions located in New England, and the almost informal cooperation that has developed between Bryn Mawr and Haverford Colleges since the 1930s. Thus, three very different models of higher education are

on view: well-established elite universities with an international status; a comparatively recent foundation (Santa Cruz was founded in the mid-1960s) created with the purposeful intention of giving it a unique brand within the array of the University of California's campuses – indeed a bold venture for a publicly funded institution; and the comparatively small (within the American context) of essentially liberal arts colleges. These are the institutions that have received some analytical exposure and provide an interesting range of institutional profiles. The dominant consensus is that, regardless of the fascination with Oxbridge, none of these differing models of higher education have succeeded in creating collegiate universities. Will our analysis sustain this interpretation?

The Ivy League Triumvirate: Harvard, Yale and Princeton

Duke records how during the Progressive Era (late nineteenth/early twentieth century) both Harvard and Princeton contemplated the creation of residential colleges (1996: 65–73, 78–90). For some (notably Lawrence Lowell, who became President of Harvard in 1909, and Woodrow Wilson of Princeton) the inspiration was Oxbridge, although it is difficult to discern any serious intention to replicate the collegiate model. The would-be reformers were reacting to the fact that both institutions, strongly influenced by the German model of the university, had moved significantly in the direction of becoming research universities. They wanted a stronger focus upon undergraduate education with colleges providing a measure of social cohesion, enhancing the socio-cultural dimensions of an undergraduate education and creating a more academic environment than the prevailing residential arrangements. As Duke's narration illustrates, at both universities the reform impetus (although not without its achievements) ran into the ground, petering out in the face of internal opposition and the lack of financial resources – both the difficulty of generating new earmarked income and/or securing the redistribution of current income. Thus Harvard College remained essentially unreformed, and Princeton retained its undergraduate eating clubs (for a concise, lucid account of Wilson's impact on Princeton, see Veysey, 1965: 341–348).

The subsequent benevolence of Edward Harkness resolved the issue of financial backing, and in the 1930s residential colleges that were founded at Yale and Harvard College acquired its houses. In a succinct summarising evaluation Rudolph has written:

> The great monuments to the return of Aristotle, that symbolized the revolt against the university idea, were the benefactions of Edward S. Harkness, which provided Harvard in 1928 with its house system and Yale in 1930 with its system of colleges. The Harvard houses and Yale colleges recognized the responsibility of the two great old colonial institutions to inculcate patterns of social conduct and moral behavior and . . . to provide encouragement for those collegial values that Harvard and Yale had once so nobly sustained (Rudolph, 1990: 461).

But references to the idea of a collegiate university are conspicuous by their absence, with the focus directed at the residential colleges and the desire to shape moral and social values.

The University of California at Santa Cruz

Perhaps the most significant link between, on the one hand, the University of California at Santa Cruz (UCSC) and, on the other hand, Harvard, Yale and Princeton is that they each belong to very powerful research clusters – UCSC to the University of California and the latter three to the Ivy League. In other critical respects – sources of funding, dates of their foundation and national and international reputations, they are quite distinctive. And yet it is this one common denominator linking Santa Cruz to the Ivy League universities that has made it particularly difficult for it to develop as a collegiate university.

Clark Kerr's greatest legacy was his leadership in bringing California's Master Plan for higher education to fruition. Whatever the current woes of the university few would doubt the magnitude of this achievement, which makes Kerr one of the greatest American university presidents. Kerr also played a leading role in the foundation of the University of California at Santa Cruz. In a moving obituary to Kerr, Sheldon Rothblatt has written:

> The Swarthmore ideal of liberal education with a stress on ethical conduct remained with him forever [Kerr was an undergraduate at Swarthmore], best illustrated by his dream of making the new University of California at Santa Cruz, which he founded, into a west coast version of collegiate Cambridge University. What he had in mind was a publicly-financed "Swarthmore under the redwoods" (Rothblatt, 2003b, December 1).

But the judgement on UCSC would be far more equivocal than that accorded the Master Plan. Rothblatt reflected at a later date: 'There are indeed many mansions in the multiversity – [which is should be remembered was a concept popularised by Kerr – *The Uses of the University*, 1963] – but the collegiate one came up against formidable fiscal, political and demographic odds' (Rothblatt, 2006: 27).

Grant and Riesman (1978: 253–290) outlined the considerable early promise of UCSC: high demand for undergraduate places in colleges that combined residence along with a strong commitment to the fostering of academic values through close faculty–student intellectual contact, made possible by small-group teaching, the advocacy of a liberal education with significant college control of the curriculum and the sponsoring of a range of socio-cultural activities. But from the beginning there were in-built tensions that would inevitably come to the fore as the first blush of vitality faded. It was always expected that Santa Cruz would become a large university with a projected student population of 27,500 as it grew out of its undergraduate base and started to incorporate professional and graduate schools. The hope was that Santa Cruz would act as a model in which the spirit of a collegiate undergraduate university could interact positively with the ethos of graduate and professional schools (Duke, 1996: 144–145).

Rothblatt has written:

> About a year before his death, Kerr asked me to write a history of the 'failure' of the Santa Cruz campus. I was not able to undertake the project. But I also did not regard the campus as unsuccessful, but I understood that a fully collegiate public sector university was Kerr's very special lifelong dream. . . .But as I saw the situation, a collection of Swarthmores could not really be incorporated into a multiversity research University federation (Rothblatt, 2007b: 297–298).

Although the campus may not be judged as 'unsuccessful' (and we look forward with anticipation to Rothblatt's analysis and evaluation), it most certainly has not lived up to its early promise, becoming more akin to the other campuses of the University of California rather than developing into a distinctive collegiate university.

To a considerable extent the continuing influence of the colleges in the Oxbridge model (and both Oxford and Cambridge are also multiversity research models) has been dependent upon the range of resources they possess: their corporate independence, their financial muscle, their political influence within the university and their substantial international reputations (which, to a measure, they possess independently of the university). In nearly all respects Santa Cruz's colleges could not compare in these terms: no separate legal identity, no real independent financial base, a political influence and reputation within the Santa Cruz campus but little clout in the wider University of California and certainly no established international reputation, although generating considerable national and international interest. Over time the college control of the curriculum waned (and along with it the commitment to a liberal education), while the pressures of belonging to an international research university inevitably impacted upon faculty culture.

It may be regrettable but in terms of both promotion and standing within the academic discipline, what increasingly counted was the quality and quantity of research output rather than a campus reputation for commitment to teaching. In this respect the crucial difference between Santa Cruz and Oxbridge is that the collegiate tradition, to which quality undergraduate education is critical, was established long before Oxford and Cambridge acquired international research reputations. But that said, it is increasingly a moot point whether Oxbridge can continue to balance the respective halves of its bifurcated identity.

Rhoades has raised the possibility of universities seeking to establish and sustain what he terms in his jargon, 'strategic, sustainable, synergistic niches' (Rhoades, 2007: 131–141). And with explicit reference to UC Santa Cruz he wrote:

> From the standpoint of UC Santa Cruz, subsequent efforts to enhance prestige by modelling patterns being pursued by other public research universities might seem to make sense.

However, he continued by proposing a possible alternative scenario:

> Or would the system, the state, and prospective students, be better served by Santa Cruz pursuing its historically distinctive culture and the interdisciplinary programmatic emphases in the social sciences and humanities (Rhoades, 2007: 122)?

The problems with Rhoades' alternative strategy are self-evident: it is a precarious path to pursue (at best a calculated risk, at worse a gamble), and in the case of UC Santa Cruz public funding would have underwritten such an initiative, so bringing into play considerable political risks.

Developments at Santa Cruz made it difficult to sustain the initial buoyant mood. Duke notes that in the early years '. . . a spirit of optimism prevailed at Santa Cruz, fuelled by the opening of new colleges and healthy growth in enrolment' (Duke, 1996: 163). However, this bright start was rather swiftly punctured by both flattening enrolment (within the California state system of higher education Santa Cruz was especially hit hard) and a comparative decline in the Scholastic Aptitude Test scores of the student body (Duke, 1996: 163). So, there were fewer, and formally less well-qualified, applicants.

In the absence of hard research evidence, it is difficult to make categorical judgements but it is possible that the original ethos of Santa Cruz was increasingly out of tune with the leaner times of the 1970s. Thus the market was passing judgement on courses that were credited with a pass/fail rather than a numerical grade and on a curriculum that may have offered an enlightened liberal education but was supposedly short on inculcating marketable skills. Of course, there may have been a sufficiently large niche market to have sustained the early ethos but this would have meant abandoning the original development plan that envisaged considerable growth, incorporating both graduate and professional studies, but with no guarantee of success. One is reminded of the saga of the new British universities founded in the 1960s. The fortunes of the University of Warwick, which from its early years followed the solid path of collaboration with local – often business – interests, and developed a strong entrepreneurial culture, waxed while those of the early leader – the University of Sussex – with its (now substantially modified) new map of learning, radical political image (now vanished) and 'trendy' reputation (in terminal decline) waned.

With respect to the University of California at Santa Cruz it is likely that the inherent tensions within the model would sooner or later have come to the fore. However, it was difficult to predict that California's higher education system would be rent so soon after Santa Cruz's foundation by political turmoil and financial constraints. This was swiftly to become a far from sympathetic environment in which to embed a radical experiment in public higher education. In view of this context it is perhaps more appropriate to celebrate Kerr's vision than to carp at the limitations of its realisation.

From Inter-collegiate Cooperation to the Collegiate University?

The analysis so far has centred on powerful universities that, under the banner of the collegial impulse, took up the challenge of modifying their identities. At Harvard and Yale the outcome was the founding of residential houses/colleges with the goal of refurbishing the quality of undergraduate education. At Santa Cruz the chosen policy path was the construction of a collegiate university within the framework

of one of the nation's (indeed, one of the world's) leading research universities. In these cases the process of change represented a policy move initiated essentially by powerful individuals who held a prominent university position – invariably the most powerful position. With respect to the possibility of a shift from inter-collegiate cooperation to the emergence of a collegiate university, the process is apparently reversed – the move is from the periphery to the centre. Is this a more viable process for creating a collegiate university?

Bryn Mawr and Haverford Colleges

The links between Bryn Mawr and Haverford colleges are the least institutionalised of the three examples of inter-collegiate cooperation we will investigate, and both colleges also have separate academic ties to Swarthmore College and the University of Pennsylvania. A Two-College Committee on Academic Cooperation (with five representatives from each college) acts as the body that oversees the Bryn Mawr–Haverford ties. These links are essentially of an academic character (with both joint departments and counterpart departments), but they have broader policy implications. In its overview of 'Agreements on Two-College Cooperation' the Bryn Mawr *Handbook for Faculty* states:

> As part of the new institutional relationships, the two colleges agree to full consultation with each other at all appropriate faculty, student and administrative levels before any decision is made concerning policies which will have a significant effect on the other college. Such policies will include, but will not be limited to standards and policies of admission, curriculum changes and staffing decisions. Consultations should seek agreement and not mere notification (Bryn Mawr College, 2009, May 19).

But tellingly, the Handbook continues by making the point that '. . . each institution will retain the authority to make its own final decisions as neither institution seeks veto power over the decisions of the other'. The limits to inter-collegial cooperation were vividly illustrated by Haverford's decision to admit women, which Bryn Mawr (with only women students) felt would be inimical to its interests. Oxford's North Commission of Inquiry (which reviewed inter-collegiate cooperation in the United States) had noted Haverford initial genuflection to the wishes of Bryn Mawr, concluding that, in spite of the relationship lacking a formal legal structure, 'the affairs of the two colleges are very closely inter-connected' (University of Oxford, 1997b: 290). But apparently not so closely entwined that when the stakes are high inter-collegial cooperation will break down. It should be noted, however, that the very same issue was probably handled with even less dignity at the University of Oxford for all its claims to be a collegiate university (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000: 87–89).

But the Bryn Mawr–Haverford alliance has more to do with very practical concerns that are managed pragmatically rather than representing a move towards the creation of a collegiate university. The two colleges maintain their independent legal status, and there is no authoritative overarching body to establish a policy direction

that runs counter to powerful collegiate interests. The emphasis is entirely on consultation and consensus building within and between the colleges. Conflicts may emerge as the policy-making process unfolds but this is far from the kind of tensions that can be generated when different institutions with possibly conflicting interests interact within a federal system of governance. The parties to inter-collegiate cooperation can simply walk away but in the collegiate university they cannot.

In its Periodic Review Report, 2004, Haverford College made the ambiguous statement, 'We think that, when appropriate, we should look beyond cooperation towards the rewards of genuine collaboration, especially between counterpart departments and other programs with significant possibilities for collaborative gain' (Haverford College, 2004: 75). But there is no suggestion of proceeding on any other basis than through consensus building between equal parties. Thus, inter-collegiality appears to have worked for the most part to the benefit of both Bryn Mawr and Haverford, and there is no reason to suppose that it will develop into a different mode of governance.

Although Haverford and Bryn Mawr do not have a federal model of governance, there is an unwritten constitution guiding the policy-making process in a manner that sustains the continuing cooperation of the two colleges. It is interesting to contemplate how much this unwritten constitution owes to the Quaker origins of the colleges. Does this reinforce the framework of common values that underwrites their inter-collegiate cooperation? In a parallel line of argument, Burton Clark claimed that the colleges of Antioch, Reed and Swarthmore had created 'an organizational saga or legend' within the world of the liberal arts colleges (Clark, 1970: 233–262). But, as the tensions generated by the admission of women undergraduates to Haverford College demonstrates, even the strongest of inter-collegiate relations are insufficient to curtail the interests of the individual colleges when the stakes are sufficiently high.

The Five Colleges, Inc.

In a brief overview of its mission and history, the Five Colleges, Inc., describes itself as

> Five Colleges, Incorporated is a non-profit educational consortium established in 1965 to promote the broad educational cultural objectives of its member institutions, which include four private, liberal arts colleges and the Amherst campus of the state university. The consortium is the outgrowth of a highly successful collaboration in the 1950s among Amherst College, Mount Holyoke College, Smith College, and the University of Massachusetts Amherst, which resulted in the founding of a fifth institution, Hampshire College, in 1970 (Five Colleges, Incorporated, 2009, May 20).

The statement continues that the cohesiveness of the consortium is favoured by their proximity to one another in the Connecticut River Valley (Pioneer Valley) of western Massachusetts and 'their commitment to the liberal arts and to undergraduate education' (Five Colleges, Incorporated, 2009, May 20). Of course, it would be naive to ignore the extent to which the cohesiveness is also underwritten by the

practical payoffs for both students (able to select from a wider range of academic programmes) and faculty (the possibility of plugging into a stronger institutional research culture emerging out of collegial cooperation).

As is the case with Bryn Mawr College and Haverford College, each of the five colleges has a board of trustees, which is its governing body. However, the central co-ordinating body (that is the Five Colleges, Incorporated) is markedly more developed than that of Bryn Mawr and Haverford's Two-College Committee on Academic Cooperation. This reflects the greater longevity of the consortium, its larger membership (therefore the inevitability of a more complex co-ordination process) and the more extensive range of cooperative activities. The latter, besides academic cross-fertilisation (including the two Five College departments of astronomy and dance), incorporates transportation, the sharing of library resources, meal plans and a common set of disciplinary regulations. The statement on 'governance and administration' estimates that 'at the present time, approximately eighty groups are engaged in cooperative planning with the support of the Five Colleges staff' (Five Colleges, Incorporated, 2009a, May 20).

The key issue is whether this administrative structure is no more than that, and Oxford's North Commission concluded that it undertook 'far more of an administrative rather than a decision-making function' (University of Oxford, 1997b: 289). The membership of the two governing bodies of the Five Colleges, Inc. (Board of Directors and the Deans Council) along with the main officers (Principal Business Officers and Principal Student Affairs Officers) is drawn more or less equally from the five colleges (essentially one representative from each college) buttressed by the Five Colleges, Inc., senior staff. This is suggestive of a decision-making model designed to enhance consensus building, which, although a key collegial value, is very different from establishing a structure of governance that underpins a collegiate university.

In 1999 The Five Colleges, Inc., hosted a conference under the heading 'Cultures of Cooperation: The Future of Consortia in Higher Education'. The proceedings of the conference contained a precis of a review directed specifically at Five Colleges, Inc., which concluded that it was in part ' . . . a vigorous "sixth entity" with a constituency of its own, and an array of semi-permanent institutions and programs' (Five Colleges, Inc., 1999: 47). Moreover, at the time approximately one-third of its annual budget of some $4.5 million a year came from a combination of external grants and endowment income rather than from the colleges (Five Colleges, Inc., 1999: 46). But in relation to the incomes of the individual colleges, this is a small sum. Moreover, while it may facilitate the emergence of new programmes and ensure that they operate efficiently, it controls no core functions (admissions, residence, teaching, examination or research) that are the lifeblood of higher education. Of course at both Oxford and Cambridge for centuries the two universities were also very weak bodies, basically creatures that responded to the beck and call of the colleges, with – until comparatively recently – the 2-year tenure of the vice-chancellor's office rotating in turn from one head of college to the next.

It is possible therefore that the balance of authority between the five colleges and the Five Colleges, Inc., could change over time but it is difficult to see what

is the dynamic that would undermine the current structure. At Oxbridge it was a combination of university control of the examination process (a critical leverage as the completion of a degree programme became the central route for bourgeois class reproduction) and purposeful state intervention, in the form of royal commissions, designed to redress the balance of institutional power, a shift buttressed by the increasing infusion of public funding in the twentieth century.

The Five Colleges, Inc., is a monument to the idea that cooperation can stimulate cross-institutional benefits. It is cooperation that is driven by initiatives from below rather than led from above. While it may change how institutions interact with one another, there is no suggestion that a mode of governance with a federal distribution of authority is required to ensure its effective functioning. It does not challenge the balance of power. Indeed, it implies that the exercise of power, with the attendant echoes of coercion, is an inappropriate approach for effective institutional governance. Consensus building, undoubtedly constructed with the aid of competent and committed leadership, is perceived as the wisest way forward. At best we are observing a weak model of confederation, more one of administration than of governance, which clearly suits the interests of the individual colleges. Although there are clearly shared values across the consortium, it is the practical advantages of collaboration that provide the real glue.

The Claremont Colleges

The Claremont Colleges are composed of three institutional layers that differ from one another but have clear functional links:

1. The five undergraduate colleges (with date of foundation): Pomona College (1887), Scripps College (1926), Claremont McKenna College (1946), Harvey Mudd College (1955) and Pitzer College (1963).
2. The two graduate institutions (with date of foundation): Claremont Graduate University (1925) and Kreck Graduate Institute of Applied Life Sciences (1997).
3. The consortium's support centre: Claremont University Consortium, which was founded as 'a free-standing educational support institution of the Claremont Colleges', picking up the responsibilities assigned to a prior support centre (Claremont University Consortium, 2009, May 13).

Of the three collegial consortia analysed in this chapter, Claremont is the one that genuflects most explicitly to Oxford, and its various websites are testimony to its apparent influence. The Claremont Graduate University (which refers to the Claremont Colleges as 'Oxford in the Orange Groves') notes that 'Oxford was the explicit model for the Claremont Colleges'. The founding president of what is now Claremont Graduate University, James A. Blaisdell, sought to emulate the eminence and the experience, even 'the beauty of Oxford'. And, to quote Blaisdell directly, 'My own very deep hope is that instead of one great undifferentiated university, we might have a group of institutions divided into small colleges – somewhat of an

Oxford type – around a library and other utilities which they would use in common' (Claremont Graduate University, 2009, May 13).

Partially, as a reflection of Blaisdell's potent input, the Claremont Colleges are more explicitly upfront in the expression of the values for which they stand. The Claremont University Consortium (CUC), with a governing board known as the Board of Overseers, performs parallel functions to the Five Colleges, Inc., and Bryn Mawr–Haverford's Two-College Committee on Academic Cooperation. However, there is a more explicit emphasis on the virtues of smallness. Caps have been imposed upon college student numbers, and Article 2 of the Constitution of the Claremont Colleges states one of its objectives is 'to maintain colleges and other educational institutions of limited enrolment' (CUC, 2009a, May 13). Furthermore, there is an advocacy of close faculty–student engagement through tutorial teaching, a stress on the importance of the physical environment including the architectural landscape and a commitment 'to found and develop such new colleges and educational institutions or programs as sound educational plans and new resources make practicable, and to acquire and hold land to accommodate the founding of such institutions' (CUC, 2009a, May 13).

The fact that the individual undergraduate colleges at Claremont have developed reasonably differentiated academic programmes means that there is somewhat less emphasis on the academic inter-collegiate cooperation that has driven the other consortia. Moreover, having a central body that has as one of its purposes a remit 'to accommodate the founding of new colleges' makes Claremont distinctive, although it should be noted that Hampshire College owes its very existence to the efforts of the four other colleges within the Five Colleges, Inc. But the presence of Claremont's CUC does shed an interesting light on the idea of the collegiate university – a central administrative body with an important policy remit. It would suggest that possibly the CUC has the *potential* to reshape the structure of the Claremont Colleges by least taking the initiative in the creation of new colleges.

At the centre of the Claremont Colleges there are two critical bodies, which have formal constitutional authority. First, the Council of the Claremont Colleges (composed of the presidents of all member institutions) provides 'policy guidance to and operational oversight of the CUC chief executive officer' with specific responsibilities for developing and overseeing the joint academic programmes, establishing budgets for the central programmes and services and creating the formula that will determine how the costs of those programmes and services are to be distributed (Constitution of the Claremont Colleges, Article 1 V, Clause 5 – CUC, 2009a, May 13).

Second, the Board of Overseers, which is in effect the governing body specifically of the CUC, has at least as much formal power as the Council. It has the authority to return to the Council for further consideration its recommendations on how the costs of central services and common programmes are to be shared and – more significantly – has a central planning role. Furthermore, although the operational culture of the Claremont Colleges clearly favours consensual decision-making, the Board of Overseers can decide certain issues by voting: '. . . a binding vote of the Board must include an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the constituent

overseers on such matters' (Constitution of the Claremont Colleges, Article IV – CUC, 2009a, May 13).

There is, therefore, a stronger centre to the Claremont Colleges than is true of the other consortia in the shape of the Claremont University Consortium with its Board of Overseers. Nonetheless, its day-to-day remit is confined essentially to managing the shared programmes and services while its planning role is couched within this framework. There is the rather grandiose exception of possessing the authority to initiate steps towards founding new colleges, but this, although clearly part of the history of the Claremont Colleges, could not be described as a frequent occurrence. Beyond the stage of initiation it is difficult to conceive of a new college coming to fruition without a broad support base across the whole college system. Indeed, even the initiation stage is likely to reflect the presence of that broad support base.

The Claremont Colleges, therefore, exhibit an interesting distribution of institutional responsibilities in which a centralised administrative core has at least the potential to shape Claremont's future development. Moreover, with respect to the collaborative programmes negotiations are necessary to steer a path through the presence of the separate colleges, which will have interests of their own that have to be accommodated, and the CUC is ideally placed to secure the requisite accommodation. However, although it is right to stress that the departments within colleges (as in all the consortia) control the non-collaborative programmes, it is important not to interpret the idea of collegiality too narrowly. Blaisdell did not separate the formal process of learning and teaching from the social milieu of the colleges; these were interactive educative experiences and equally vital to the development of the student. In the words of Duke, 'Blaisdell insisted that a college not steer its students toward definite utilitarian objectives but instead provide them with a "deliberative acquaintance with cosmopolitan knowledge and sympathies before entering on ... intensive training for a life calling". He believed that students' close relationships with college faculty would provide that broad-based education' (Duke, 1996: 132). A strong case can be made out for the argument that at least since the latter half of the nineteenth century this idea has been central to the essence of an undergraduate Oxbridge education.

So, rather than misconceiving the Oxbridge ethos, Blaisdell failed to reproduce a model of the university that replicated Oxford in terms of its structure of governance in which the constituent colleges were bound to a central university. He replicated Oxford in socio-cultural terms, also incorporating a measure of inter-collegiate cooperation, but without creating a collegiate university. The Claremont Colleges, therefore, are in essence similar in character to the Bryn Mawr–Haverford and the Five Colleges, Incorporated consortia. For the most part the consortia are composed of liberal arts colleges, which share a common ideal of undergraduate education and cooperate on a range of administrative and academic matters to further both that ideal and sustain their institutional strength. They do not have a strong centre that has the authority to steer the development of the consortium independently of the individual colleges. The one possible exception to this generalisation is the Claremont University Consortium, but it remains essentially an administrative body. Of course, within the collegiate universities of Oxford and Cambridge one

expects interaction between the colleges and universities to shape their future, but the universities most definitely possess an independent power base. Consequently, the affairs of college and university are intimately entwined, their futures mutually interdependent.

The consortia of American liberal arts colleges are composed of individual institutions that are independent corporate bodies within their own right. They choose the path of inter-collegiate cooperation because its suits their interests and ultimately there are no indivisible links. While the individual colleges may uphold many of the traditional collegial values (as residential colleges with an emphasis on commensality, 'tutorial teaching' and a liberal education), they also have academic departments that manage the core formal business of the college – the conduct of its academic programmes. So, we have institutions that express and sustain collegial values outside the structure of a collegiate university.

The American Collegial Tradition

In his seminal history of American higher education (*The American Colleges and Universities*) Rudolph remarks: 'Imported with so much of everything from England, the collegiate way in America was from the beginning the effort to follow in the New World the pattern of life that had developed at the English colleges' (Rudolph, 1990: 87). However, as Rudolph goes on to show, the Anglicised collegiate way was reshaped by the American experience, which incorporated the old while colouring it in its own national flavour. The consequence was the creation of an educational tradition, which lasted for the best part of a century and still exerts a potent influence upon contemporary ideas and practices in American higher education.

The collegiate way, to use Rudolph's phrase, emerged out of an interesting mix of educational principles responding to social needs while adjusting pragmatically to the contemporary constraints of a rural society (for the most interesting perspectives on this history – besides Rudolph's research – see Burton Clark, 1995; Geiger, 2004b, 2004c: 115–129; Rothblatt, 2003a; Veysey, 1965: 180–251). The churches were the dominant force in establishing the early foundations and, not surprisingly, were keen that their colleges should promote their core values, including the importance of public service. Small colleges provided the ideal context for social control, with the college assuming – undoubtedly with the firm approval of parents – the role of moral guardian. In a nation of farmsteads and small towns colleges were inevitably located in rural areas with the provision of college residence as much a necessity as a means of fashioning student values. The rural idyll and the small college fitted neatly into a national ethos that stressed the virtue of the countryside over the city and of the well-rounded person over the scholar. Of course the reality could be very different: a highly paternalistic environment that induced a dull conformity and dormitory living that did very little to uplift the spirit let alone the mind. Nonetheless, a powerful myth of what constituted a college was embedded deeply in the American understanding of higher education.

The most fascinating aspect of the idea of the college was its commitment to a liberal education, perhaps best defined by what it is not rather than what it is. Due partly to the increasing influence after the Civil War of the German model of the university, the purpose of the university was increasingly defined in terms of the pursuit of academic scholarship, and the collegial ideal was steadily undermined. Colleges gave ground to the universities, as a broad-based liberal undergraduate education retreated in the face of an expanding emphasis on research and professional training. Post-1865 the old-time college was on the wane and yet deep in the psyche of American higher education a legacy is to be found: that universities should be committed to quality undergraduate education, integral to that quality is a liberal education that is enhanced by close tutor–student interaction in the teaching and learning process, and an experience of higher education that embraces more than the classroom for at its best the residential college acts as a positive force in the socialisation of the whole person.

Not surprisingly, this is not an ideal that too many of the old-time colleges lived up to or that too many contemporary higher education institutions would want to sustain. However, as this chapter has discussed, there remains a firm commitment to collegial values within the liberal arts consortia, and the journal *Liberal Education* (published by the Association of American Colleges and Universities) continues to carry a torch for the cause. Moreover, in spite of their reputations as world-class research institutions, the collegial tradition retains a hold on the Ivy League universities. Roger Geiger writes of Dartmouth College that, ‘Dartmouth shares with Cornell a rustic isolation, but takes fierce pride in its resolutely collegiate character, despite recent growth in research’ (Geiger, 2009: 282); and Axtell’s study of Princeton University portrays a university still committed to the core American collegial values, although this is undoubtedly reinforced by its wealth, selective recruitment of faculty and students, its comparatively small size, its narrower research profile (for example, it has neither a medical school nor a law school) and its historically embedded commitment to undergraduate teaching (Axtell, 2006). And not so long ago Harvard set up an enquiry into its undergraduate programmes, with the focus on how to improve the quality and status of undergraduate teaching, which has received considerable publicity (Lewis, 2006; Marcus, 2006, October 13; Rimer, 2007, May 10). What we appear to be experiencing is one of those periodic revivals of the collegial tradition, with its embedded advocacy of a liberal education, although it remains to be seen whether it will match that revival of the Progressive Era, which was so closely associated with Woodrow Wilson’s tenure at Princeton.

Lessons to Be Learnt

With reference to the analysis of the reports that formed the empirical base of his ‘Calling on the Past: The Quest for the Collegiate Ideal’, Rhoades observes:

> A casual reading . . . reveals reformers’ fondness for liberal education. Further there seems to be a validation and promotion of conditions characteristic of selective, private institutions, conditions grounded in the colonial liberal arts colleges (Rhoades, 1990: 515).

And his more detailed reading of the reports confirmed his suspicions (not surprisingly!), although the elite private universities (in addition to the liberal arts colleges) were also favoured in the reports' documentation (Rhoades, 1990: 531).

Rhoades does not castigate the reports for trying 'to import Oxbridge' but rather for their failure to appreciate that American higher education needs to relate to a societal context that has evolved out of all recognition with its past. However, it should be stated that the collegial tradition, incorporating the idea of a liberal education, has much deeper roots than Rhoades implies. It is a widely embedded tradition, not an idea confined to elite liberal arts colleges and universities, although that is where today it may be manifested most forcefully. Moreover, if we take a more rounded view of the collegial tradition, one that focuses upon socio-cultural and pedagogical values, then there are some important overlaps between the Oxbridge legacy and American experience. The precise interpretations may differ in form, because the circumstances in which these took shape contrast so sharply, but there are also some remarkable similarities. But what we do not have in the United States is a model of institutional governance in higher education, essentially federal in nature, which shares power over the central academic functions between a university and its colleges.

Even within the consortia of colleges we do not see the emergence of central bodies, with a power base independent of their colleges, which play a significant role in controlling and developing academic functions. What these bodies do is essentially co-ordinate rather than develop institutional missions. The key parties with respect to academic control and development within the individual colleges are a combination of the academic departments, the plethora of bodies engaged in matters such as 'strategic planning' and those administrative offices (deans' offices) that manage the academic programmes. Ironically, therefore, there is a combination of weak centres within the consortia and weak residential colleges in terms of responsibility for the delivery and development of the core formal academic responsibilities. But this is to define those responsibilities narrowly, which Claremont's founding father, James Blaisdell, for one would fiercely challenge.

One of the central themes of Duke's *Importing Oxbridge* is that those who wanted to recreate Oxbridge within America invariably held only a romantic image of the two collegiate universities. Moreover, they failed to appreciate that the essence of collegiality had been fought over numerous times and consequently was evolving constantly. Far from being practical reformers, they rarely took the trouble to discern in detail how the two universities actually functioned before proceeding with their own schemes (Duke, 1996: 7–8). While there is no reason to doubt Duke's claim that there was much naivety, even foolhardiness, accompanying the romantic illusions, it is important that he should be made aware of the implications of his own analysis. He constructs no explicit understanding of what the collegiate university is and fails to grasp the possibility that it may now function very differently from his own, essentially implicit interpretation. Oxbridge colleges may retain key academic functions but some are considerably more influential, internally and externally, than others. Furthermore, there has been a marked shift in the balance of power within both Oxford and Cambridge, which is a far from recent development. If you examine

teaching, the appointment of faculty, the control of the academic agenda (including the relative balance of undergraduate teaching to research) and the patterns of governance and administration, there has been a steady augmentation in the scope of the university vis-à-vis the colleges. Most definitely the Oxbridge colleges have not yet become mere halls of residence offering their student an upmarket socio-cultural experience and little else, but even within the past 25 years their influence relative to the university has waned (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2000). Thus, any comparative analysis has to be sure that it is comparing like-with-like.

Within the context of its broad panacea, the American experience of collegiality has some interesting specific messages, which have implications for our more general understanding of the process of change in higher education. Whereas the American collegial tradition, while responding to the English heritage, evolved in response to what may be called local needs and conditions, the drive to establish collegiate universities is closely identified with the energy and passion of particular individuals: Blaisdell at Claremont, Kerr at the University of California, Wilson at Princeton and Lowell at Harvard. Although it is easy to claim that they failed in terms of the goals they may have wished to fulfil, it is impossible to deny their respective impacts upon, if not the American system of higher education (although Kerr shaped very significantly the pattern of higher education in California), a number of leading institutions. They have left behind legacies that have coloured important institutions as well as ideas about what should be the character of higher education – and not just higher education in America.

The drive to establish collegiate universities in the United States is more than the manifestation of the whims of powerful educational leaders. There is a clear interaction of historical context with differing interpretations of the idea of the university. The late nineteenth/early twentieth century rediscovery of the collegial tradition represented a reaction to the emerging dominance of research as the central purpose of the university, which post-1918 was reinforced by the negative reaction to all things German following World War I. Clark Kerr was driven not only by nostalgia for his Swarthmore days but also by the desire to see the University of California incorporate a tradition of higher education that was part of the American heritage. Santa Cruz was his attempt to embrace on one campus the commitment to quality undergraduate education, which would complement the University of California's commitment to cutting-edge research.

But ideas have to be put into effect, and the bolder the message, the greater the opposition that it is likely to encounter. Undoubtedly, Wilson remoulded the ethos of Princeton but failed to introduce his residential colleges because those who supported the established dining clubs were determined to protect their interests. It may come as something of a surprise, but attempts in the Progressive period to create residential colleges at Yale and Harvard failed because of the lack of financial resources. The defenders of established projects had no wish to have their budgets cut. It was not until the Harkness bequest that Yale was in a position to create its colleges and Harvard its houses (Rudolph, 1990: 460–461). And clearly the pressure of being but one campus within a leading multi-campus research university has

steadily eaten away at the early spirit of Santa Cruz. Thus change in higher education is not simply about propitious times, strong leadership and an appeal to the past but also about continuous power struggles within institutions representing different interests and contrasting visions of the university.

Historically the major challenge to the old-time college came with the rise of the research university stimulating an intermittent debate, which has waxed and waned ever since, on how best to sustain the traditional collegial values. Ryan, significantly in a review of Duke's *Importing Oxbridge*, has argued that the collegiate university represents a viable option for managing the tension between teaching and research within the university agenda.

> So long as there are institutions which, like Oxford and Cambridge, Yale, Harvard and Princeton and a very few others, try to reconcile the inevitable tensions between undergraduate and graduate teaching, and liberal education and technical research, there will be an argument about what institutional arrangements can best shelter those ambitions. The collegiate university is one answer to that problem (Ryan, 1997, December 12).

But this assertion completely fails to address Duke's central argument that Yale, Harvard and Princeton are *not* collegiate universities. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the balance can be maintained given the dramatic shift towards the importance of research output in defining both institutional status and individual career paths. Incentives are required to sustain the balance between quality undergraduate teaching and world-class research, and the collegiate university within itself (as the contemporary soul searching at Harvard would illustrate) is no guarantee that this goal will be achieved. Collegial values will not disappear and invariably will manifest themselves in different contexts: in colleges incorporating both postgraduates and research faculty, in the research centres and in the laboratories. However, the two central pedagogical components of the collegial idea of the university – that undergraduate education is the core purpose of the university and that higher education is about developing the whole person and not simply the competently trained specialist – are, to put it mildly, on the defensive.

If the historical challenge to the idea of the college has come from developments within the academy itself, then the contemporary challenge is from the social basis of mass higher education. The demography of American higher education has changed. Levine and Cureton draw upon their survey data to conclude that,

> . . . higher education is not as central to the lives of today's undergraduates as it was to previous generations. Increasingly, college is just one of a multiplicity of activities in which they are engaged every day. For many, it is not even the most important of these activities; work and family often overshadow it (Levine & Cureton, 1998, May/June: 14).

There is an interaction of life style and cultural change in the lives of today's students, which means the American collegial tradition is retreating to what many would consider to be its heartland. Furthermore, even within the heartland the college may not exercise the same aura over its students or control the direction of their lives as it once did. If Rhoades' view of the past could be said to lack finesse, his implicit vision of the future is grounded in reality.

There are three scenarios to contemplate. The first is the retreat to the heartland thesis, which in the United States may mean the liberal arts colleges and in the United Kingdom the Oxbridge colleges (for a recent overview of the alleged decline in the centrality of undergraduate teaching in British universities, see Attwood, 2009, May 7). Second, the collegial tradition is resurrected in a form that appeals to institutional pride while placating, even playing to, market pressures. Evidently Harvard wants to be known as a university that takes undergraduate teaching seriously. Institutional pride cannot bear the thought that all the plaudits seem to be going to Princeton. Presumably, even students who have only a tangential relationship to their institutions will want to feel that their interests are being taken seriously and that the quality of the education they are receiving is worth the sacrifices they are making. Not all institutions are research-intensive, and even those in this league are rarely able to forget that students are potential alumni and, indeed, may have wealthy and well-connected parents who are already alumni.

Within the third scenario there is no dominant, still less permanent idea of the university, and that this is particularly true of the United States with its pluralist tradition of higher education and a system that has always been in historical flux. Within the context of mass higher education, wide institutional variation is the norm. There is no collegial heartland dependent upon its adherence to a particular understanding of higher education but rather varying models that reflect different institutional niches within the overall system. In this model it is not the commitment to particular values that determine an institution's character but rather its position in the marketplace. Values and institutional structure will change in response to market pressures.

Chapter 8
Lessons from Continental Europe: The Collegial Tradition as Academic Power

Introduction

In its search for the meaning of the collegial tradition this book has focussed predominantly upon the English experience of higher education. Even the small intrusion of the previous chapter into American territory presented only a very partial interpretation, one that concentrated on the seemingly wide appeal of the residential college. Despite the best efforts of admirers from Woodrow Wilson to Clark Kerr, the collegiate university – as opposed to colleges – did not take root in American soil. Indeed, in terms of its prestigious research universities, America's crème de la crème, German higher education with its strong research tradition, including its commitment to graduate studies has had a more potent impact.

It has been part of this book's purpose to pursue the understanding of collegiality beyond the classic Oxbridge model of the collegiate university. Thus the United States presents us with the residential colleges, the Universities of London and Wales with the federal model, the 'new' English universities (plus Durham) as pale replications of Oxbridge, and then there is the apparently universal managerial revolution posing a powerful challenge everywhere to the collegial understanding of institutional governance and administration.

The question, therefore, is what continental Europe – lacking for centuries any notion of a collegiate university and possessing but fragile replications of colleges – can offer our attempt to understand collegiality? The chapter will address this question that provides its central theme in three main segments: (1) by providing a note on the medieval continental universities; (2) by presenting a brief comparative analysis of the central themes in the three main traditions of European higher education (the Napoleonic, the Humboldtian and the Oxbridge collegiate model) that came to fruition in nineteenth century Europe; and (3) by addressing how in recent years the continental systems of higher education have sought to come to terms with new social, economic and political pressures that have impacted universally upon systems of higher education.

This chapter will approach the material with a comparative perspective, paying particular reference to how the continental models of European higher education differ from the English model, and more especially seeking to highlight the contrasts

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and similarities in the interpretation of the idea of collegiality. This chapter, like those preceding it, stresses the importance of an interactive process of change in higher education. It will conclude by raising the wry possibility that the continental systems of higher education, that still continue to be more state-moulded, have a better chance of preserving an interpretation of collegiality as the sustenance of academic authority than the market-driven Anglo-American model where historically collegiality can be said to have had its strongest representation.

Colleges and Collegiate Universities in Medieval Europe

In the seminal three-volume edition of Hastings Rashdall's *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, our attention is drawn to the mistaken perception 'of colleges as institutions peculiar to the English universities' (Rashdall, 1936: 498). Randall goes on to note that, 'The true home of the collegiate system is Paris' and it is 'from Paris it passed to those universities upon which it has obtained its longest and firmest hold' (Rashdall, 1936: 498). And Cobban confirms that, 'Paris must be regarded as the home of the university collegiate system in the sense that academic colleges of a kind arose there earlier than anywhere else' (Cobban, 1975: 126). Jacques Verger, in Rüegg's equally formidable *A History of the University in Europe*, claims that, 'In the years before 1300, a total of nineteen colleges were founded at Paris, six at Oxford, and one at Cambridge' (Verger, 1992: 60). Moreover, albeit on a somewhat lesser scale, colleges appeared in both Italy (notably at Bologna) and Spain (Cobban, 1975: 126). Verger goes so far as to assert that, 'It was rare indeed for a medieval university to have no college, as was the case with Orléans' (Verger, 1992: 61).

Although the medieval European colleges were founded primarily to provide a place of residence for students, their functions appear to have evolved over time. Schwinges (with reference to Rashdall) notes, 'During the later Middle Ages, however, university courses in all subjects, but especially in the arts and in theology, were transferred into the colleges themselves'. And, furthermore, 'At the end of our period, the situation over much of Europe was dominated by the colleges...; in Paris, in 1445, it was baldly said that the entire university was situated in its colleges, and that this statement held equally true for Oxford and Cambridge' (Schwinges, 1992: 214–215). Thus the residential European college transformed itself, which at Paris included intercollegiate cooperation on teaching (Cobban, 1975: 131), with even separate colleges for graduate and foreign students.

Evidently the collegiate model appears with varying degrees of development in the different national settings, but it also takes on contrasting characteristics, which, at least superficially, appear to be very important in ensuring its survival. Gieysztor claims, with reference to Paris, that 'external authorities' controlled 'college life' because they appointed the head of the college and filled the vacant fellowships. Moreover, college properties were more often than not managed by those who did not belong to the college. This was all very different from the circumstances that prevailed at Oxford and Cambridge where:

> . . . colleges had little administrative connection with governing bodies of the university; they organized their own endowment and benefited from the university's teaching and academic degrees; they elected their heads and co-opted the fellows who governed them under their own charters and statutes. Thus colleges in England did not follow the course taken by Paris (Gieysztor, 1992: 117).

And, in confirmation of the differences, Verger observed that, 'The English colleges were more independent and more democratic, their fellows being predominantly bachelors of arts and theology students' (Verger, 1992: 61).

Cobban provides a powerful concluding observation on the comparative status of the medieval universities:

> It is abundantly clear that the academic colleges in the medieval universities subsumed a diversity of types ranging from the autonomous, self-governing, landowning model usual in England to the humble institution frequently found in France and Italy, which was little more than a lodging house for students (Cobban, 1975: 124).

And what is the key variable that distinguishes the humble from the prestigious college? For Cobban the common explanatory thread is the endowed resources of the colleges: 'It is the endowed status of the college that decisively distinguishes it from hall or hostel, setting up the conditions of a permanent and stable existence within the university community' (Cobban, 1975: 124).

The historical evidence, however, throws up questions that the historians have failed to investigate in depth. Logically it would seem to follow that colleges with endowment resources, especially if they controlled them, would be more likely to flourish than colleges without either the resources or the control. The first issue is how to account for the fact that some colleges were generously endowed and others were not? Is it simply a matter of chance so that colleges with benevolent and generous founders survived while others lacking such good fortune steadily declined? What did colleges have to do to secure endowments? How important were the qualities of collegiate leadership in enabling some colleges to expand their remit to incorporate teaching duties while others remained mere lodging houses? Second, and more significantly for this chapter, why is it that the English colleges have survived (albeit with fluctuating fortunes) to the present, while the French colleges have not? It this regard, it should be noted that Cobban was prepared to include the College of Navarre, Paris, in the ranks of 'the sophisticated, highly-organized and prosperous societies' (Cobban, 1975: 124). Thus it was not only the poorly endowed and ineffectual continental colleges that perished but also those that were wealthy with strong identities and important functions.

Hastings Rashdall, by way of offering an explanation, points the finger at the French Revolution: 'And at the Revolution the collegiate system as a whole fell with the other institutions of medieval France – never (like so much of the *ancien regime*) to reproduce itself under altered forms in modern times' (Rashdall, 1936: 533). A view subsequently supported by Cobban who tersely remarks: 'The Paris colleges were suppressed at the French Revolution, and the university never reverted to collegiate lines' (Cobban, 1975: 132). The broader implication is that within post-revolutionary France the colleges no longer had a viable social role to play within the

new order and, like the universities themselves, were viewed with deep suspicion by the reconstituted French state. Given the ingrained ecclesiastical influence over the colleges and universities such hostility is unsurprising. In a somewhat unreflective eulogy to Oxford (perhaps unsurprising given his deep-rooted ties to the University) Rashdall drew the obvious contrast: ‘During the last 100 years the college buildings and the college system alike have silently adapted themselves to the altered needs of the present with that power of spontaneous self-development which is the happy peculiarity of English institutions’ (Rashdall, 1936: 533).

But, as Rashdall himself implies, it is difficult imagine the Oxbridge colleges ‘silently adapting themselves’ to traumas as extreme as the French Revolution and the rise of the Napoleonic state. No matter what the virtues of the French collegial institutions may have been (wealth, self-governance and effective performance) it was inevitable that they would be swept aside in such circumstances unless they could show they were in tune with the demands of new order, which they patently could not. In the case of France, medieval social institutions would be replaced by models that were sympathetic to the state and society of the early nineteenth century. And, following the same logic, it was critical for Humboldt to construct a model of the university at Berlin that would meet the needs of the emerging German state while embellishing a growing sense of a national culture. The contrast with circumstances in England could scarcely be more different. In no sense is Oxford or Cambridge integral to a process of nation building. The *Revolution of the Dons* (Rothblatt, 1968) is about the creation of ‘donnish dominion’ and the establishment of Oxford and Cambridge as centres of academic scholarship (and thus loosening the ties with the Anglican Church) while ensuring that they cement their links to the more elevated strata of the expanding bourgeois ranks in the professions, in the state, in finance capital and even in industry. This is about class reproduction and institutional regeneration in the nineteenth century and most certainly not about nation building. However, it should be said that Oxford and Cambridge did have a role to play in the earlier struggles between church and state (crown), which is unsurprising given the fact that as national institutions they would inevitably be drawn into the all-encompassing nature of the conflict.

Competing Models of the University: Is There Room for Collegiality?

The Napoleonic years witnessed not only the demise of the medieval colleges but also marked a period of decline for continental universities more generally, especially in France and Germany (Rüegg, 2004: 3). The question is what new traditions of higher education emerged and in what ways, if at all, did they embody any sense of collegiality? In order to address that question two models will be analysed – the Napoleonic and the Humboldtian – which came to dominate the continent as the nineteenth century unfolded. However, it is important to remember that, just as today there are varying national responses to the Bologna process, there were also national and local adjustments to these differing systems of higher education. There

was no neat and universal pattern of adaptation. Developments fitted local needs and undoubtedly would evolve over time, even in France and Germany, as circumstances demanded. Nonetheless, both models encompassed an idea of the university that continued to have considerable symbolic appeal long after universities and university systems moulded in their image had changed. With reference to von Humboldt, Nybom examines the long shadow he has caste over the development of continental higher education as a talisman for both the advocates of change and proponents of the status quo (Nybom, 2007: 55–79).

The Purpose of the University

To express the point boldly but narrowly, the central historical purpose of the university has been to educate undergraduate students in a manner that best enables them to assume a successful role in society. For many that successful role has gravitated around the extent to which higher education enables the graduating student to acquire a job and to pursue an effective career. The Napoleonic model comes closest to this interpretation as reflected in the creation of *les grandes écoles*, which had the task (and still have the task) of selecting and training rigorously a small cadre of students destined to occupy the commanding heights of the French state and society. In the words of Cécile Deer:

> Historically the task of the *grandes écoles* ... has been to select, educate and groom the nation's elite, society's future leaders in strategic areas such as engineering, state administration, business and education (Deer, 2009: 220).

And, while the *grandes écoles* predate the 1789 Revolution, the 'post-revolutionary period reinforced the prominence of the *écoles* as opposed to the universities which were considered too close to the *Ancien Regime'* (Deer, 2009: 220). But von Humboldt also recognised that the state needed the universities to educate students who would fill posts in its expanding bureaucratic apparatus (Nybom, 2007: 64), and if Oxford and Cambridge had remained wedded to providing clergy for the Anglican Church undoubtedly they would have become anachronisms by the turn of the twentieth century.

The issue that needs to be explored is the precise character of the Napoleonic and Humboldtian models in terms of the core values embedded in their respective forms of higher education. Inevitably, there are links to the state and society but do the universities possess a self-identity that shapes how they can best service those links while also fulfilling goals they believe are intrinsic to their own needs? This is a question (particularly with reference to von Humboldt's work) worthy of the closest attention. In the context of this chapter, with its broader goals, it cannot be given the detailed attention it deserves. The intention is to explore the extent of its affinity with our understanding of the collegial tradition. Do we have a genuine synergy of values or merely a number of random similarities?

Halsey, in his analysis of the 'Ideas of the University' (Chapter 2 of his *The Decline of Donnish Dominion*), has written:

> However, what none of these three English pedagogues [Newman, Pattison and Jowett] ever squarely faced was what Weber saw as the fundamental struggle, in the adaptation of education to industrialism, between the cultivated man and the expert... (Halsey, 1995: 37–38).

By the embracement in his later years of the increasingly influential German idea of the research university, Pattison radically modified his view of collegiate Oxford, but certainly both Newman and Jowett remain as central figures in reshaping Oxford as a collegiate university. However, von Humboldt, so widely seen as the inspiration for the foundation of the modern research university, espoused a very subtle idea of the university, which the research university soon outgrew (Clark, 2006 – in a feat of immaculate scholarship – provides the most comprehensive overview of the development of the German research university).

There are numerous succinct overviews of von Humboldt's central thesis (Fehér, 2001: 33–37; Flexner, 1930: 311–315; Krejsler, 2006: 213; Nybom, 2007: 60–68; Rothblatt, 2003a: 34; Sweet, 1980: 53–76) but we will let man speak for himself.[1] von Humboldt argued that the central purpose of intellectual institutions (by which he meant both academies and universities) was 'the cultivation of science and scholarship (*Wissenschaft*) in the deepest and broadest sense'. Their task was to achieve for the individual the transition from 'the mastery of transmitted knowledge' to the pursuit of 'independent inquiry'. Moreover, this was 'an unceasing process of inquiry' that joined student and teacher together in a never-ending quest. It was this goal that formed the central purpose of the university: 'At the higher level, the teacher does not exist for the sake of the student; both teacher and student have their justification in the common pursuit of knowledge' (von Humboldt, 1970: 242–243). Thus the continuous institutional search for *Wissenschaft* was matched by an equally perpetual process of individual self-development – usually referred to as *Bildung* – through the co-operative pursuit of knowledge.

The blueprint is so idealistic that it is difficult to imagine it could be anything other than visionary. But the central ideas – the interpenetration of research and teaching, a learning process embracing both teachers and students (von Humboldt favoured a process of learning incorporating seminars as well as lectures) and a belief in the unity of knowledge with philosophy at its core – still continue to exercise a profound influence. Clearly the German universities swiftly evolved to embrace professional and disciplinary-based graduate studies, with overseas students flocking to their doors to undertake research that led to doctoral degrees rather than crossing continents to embrace either *Wissenschaft* or *Bildung*. Thus, by the time Weber came to make his famous observation on the tension between a tradition that gave us 'the cultivated man' and another that gave us 'the expert', it is clear that German higher education had moved beyond the idealism (almost other worldliness) of von Humboldt. The Napoleonic model therefore provides a more forceful case for the virtues of the expert – carefully selected, highly but narrowly trained and fiercely instructed in institutions dedicated to turning out 'the best and the brightest' to serve the interests of the state.

In our chapter that defined the collegiate tradition, we claimed that an intrinsic element is the belief that the experience of higher education should for the student

(especially the undergraduate) embody more than a formal academic training. It is not simply about the making of experts, and even today in England the acquisition of professional qualifications often follows on from – for example, in both law and medicine – relatively broad-based undergraduate degree programmes. The idea of undergraduate education embracing a measure of character training still persists in those universities where the traditional ethos lingers on, and which have the resources and infrastructure to sustain it. Note also, that in the United States, incorporating a tradition of liberal education, it is still common to talk of 'going to college'.

The State and the University

Integral to both the Napoleonic and Humboldtian models of higher education is the proposition that the interests of the universities and state are closely interrelated but again this assertion disguises very important differences. von Humboldt wrote that '. . . the state must supply the organisational framework and the resources necessary for the practice of science and scholarship'. However, it must do so in a manner that is not 'damaging to the essence of science and scholarship' for:

> The state must always remain conscious of the fact that it never has and in principle never can, by its own action, bring about the fruitfulness of intellectual activity. It must indeed be aware that it can only have a prejudicial influence if it intervenes. The state must understand that intellectual work will go on infinitely better if it does not intrude (von Humboldt, 1970: 244).

The key conundrum is what we are to understand by state intervention. Ironically, in a statement that could be seen as conveying the essence of the Napoleonic model, Humboldt wrote: 'The university always stands in a close relationship to practical life and to the needs of the state, since it is always concerned with the practical affair of training the younger generation' (von Humboldt, 1970: 248). Furthermore, 'The right of appointment of university teachers must be reserved exclusively to the state... The condition of the university is too closely bound up with the direct interest of the state to permit any other arrangement' (von Humboldt, 1970: 249). There was also a belief that if appointments were formally the responsibility of the state, this would counter the factionalism generated by academic rivalries (in-fighting within an academic oligarchy) and keep guild politics in check (Sweet, 1980: 64–65). So, within both models the professors, who have most institutional status and power, are state – not university – employees, in effect civil servants, a situation that continues to prevail in certain European countries (for example, Greece). The distinction, however, between being a state employee and being appointed by the state needs to be kept in mind.

The assumption in von Humboldt's writing is that there is a synergy of interests between the state and the universities, and the universities will best fulfil their functions, including those that touch upon the concerns of the state, if they are allowed to pursue their goals free from state interference. What the state receives in turn is not

only a cadre of appropriately educated young graduates but also the sustenance of a culture that acts 'as a basic force for sustaining the state' and as a unifying force for German society (Knoll & Siebert, 1967: 43). The Napoleonic model, however, was more explicitly concerned to further the interests of the state. The bureaucratic apparatus was guided by the premise that French higher education institutions needed to gel with the interests of the new social order (downplaying the idea that there was a natural harmony) and was prepared to curb academic freedom 'if it seemed likely to prove dangerous to the state' (Charle, 2004: 45).

However, although von Humboldt argued that the interests of the university and of the state could be reconciled harmoniously, he did attempt to secure a measure of financial independence for the University of Berlin. The implication is that he was sensitive to the possibility of the state using its financial leverage to achieve policy goals that would be unacceptable to the university, and that endowment income would provide some protection. It was part of von Humboldt's plans for the University of Berlin that it should have 'a permanent endowment in landed property' (Sweet, 1980: 58). But whether this was to act as a guard against undue state intrusion, or even to make the university independent of the state, is a matter on which the historians disagree. Sweet has suggested a more pragmatic interpretation:

> That Humboldt thought a permanent endowment would give the university a certain *kind* of independence is, to be sure, not to be denied.

But

> Above all an endowment would ensure that the university would not be the first budgetary victim if the state fell on hard times (Sweet, 1980: 63–64).

And we have already noted the importance of endowment income for the medieval colleges: recognising that it may have been a necessary prerequisite if the college was to function effectively but was no guarantor of its survival. Sweet is claiming therefore that endowment income ensures financial security rather than providing protection against political intrusion.

We will highlight further differences between the Napoleonic and Humboldtian models and collegiate Oxbridge, but it is important not to overdraw the contrasts in terms of the relationship between the universities and state and society. English universities, even those founded since the introduction of an annual public grant (1919), have always possessed a considerable measure of formal autonomy. They have been shaped more by an internally constructed idea of the university rather than required to conform to the demands of a state-imposed model. However, until *the revolution of the dons* both Oxford and Cambridge served the interests of the Anglican Church, and it should not be forgotten that the Church of England historically has been embedded in the English state. The patterns of religious exclusion that persisted on the continent found its parallel in England. Moreover, an Oxbridge education was perceived as part of a wider process of cultural formation for a certain class of Englishmen, that very class which for so long dominated public life. Furthermore, manufacturing interests supported the nineteenth century civic foundations in the

belief that they would serve the needs of the local economy. Consequently, the idea that the university can be constructed from within has persistently run up against the reality of these external pressures.

Who Has the Institutional Power?

In collegiate universities critical functions are shared between the colleges and the university, but if there are no colleges then the university assumes the sole responsibility for those functions. Furthermore, if the university is under the close supervision of a regulatory state, including the ultimate control of its core academic duties, then the opportunity for collegiality to re-invent itself within the confines of the university is circumscribed. But within both the Napoleonic and Humboldtian models a tacit deal appears to have been struck between the academic guilds and the state.

The professors in von Humboldt's model, although state employees, clearly exercised considerable control over the academic affairs of their universities. In effect they were the department and determined its academic shape. In contrast, in the Napoleonic model the university, as an independent institution that shaped it own identity and pattern of development, all but disappeared. The professorial faculty secured an authority that was independent of the university and the key relationship was between the guilds (above all the professors) and the ministry. Within this setting professors were very powerful (as long as they operated within the boundaries formulated by the state) and without their support it would be virtually impossible to create a broadly based sense of collegial decision-making. The universities, because they were not masters in their own house, were not in a position to govern themselves. While there was strong genuflection to academic authority within both the Napoleonic and Humboldtian ideas of the university, it resulted in the creation of personal fiefdoms rather than collegial models of governance, or even for that matter strong administrative authority with its power base within the university.

Collegial governance does presuppose that there are institutional loyalties – to colleges and universities as well as to departments and research centres – that are sustained over time. Indeed, the supposition is that the collegial mode of governance is central to creating both institutional identity and individual loyalty to it. The predominantly continental guild tradition has fragmented institutional identity by creating an alternative focus for individual loyalty. In fact it is stronger than that for the guilds have been used to enhance and sustain the authority of particular interests. The guilds (of students as well as academics) emerged within the medieval world but, in his seminal work on Italian higher education, Burton Clark remarks: 'From the twelfth to the twentieth century, the university has predominantly had the shape of a federation of guilds. Historically, the guild is *the* generic organizational form for the support of academic work' (Clark, 1977: 158). And the thrust of Burton Clark's book was to explain how the guilds (with a pattern of internal control that combined both collegiality and oligarchy!) were able to sustain an especially potent presence in the Italian universities. It is not, therefore, that collegial forms of

governance were absent in the continental universities but there were not structures of governance with clear lines of control that gave the universities overall institutional authority, and thus:

> The interests of senior academics were strongly fixed in the chair . . . and the collegial bodies that ruled the faculty and the university; [while] those of public officials were rooted in the central and field offices of the education ministry. And the organization of the interests of the professors had historical primacy (Clark, 1977: 168).

In recent years the reform of the governance and administration of the continental universities has been at the very core of the developments in European higher education, and central to that process has been the attempt to challenge the values associated with the guilds and the pattern of governance they spawned.

Therefore, although we have drawn a distinction between the three models of the university (the Humboldtian, the Napoleonic and the Collegial) in terms of both how the purposes of higher education are interpreted and how the relationship of the universities to the state and society has been constructed, it is with respect to institutional power that the sharpest distinctions can be drawn. This is a consequence of the unique internal organisational structures of the collegiate universities and the very contrasting historical contexts within which the three models have developed. For centuries the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge were creatures of their colleges, the universities lacked a strong sense of their identities. The changes that came to fruition in the latter half of the nineteenth century put the college fellows, not the professors, at the heart of the universities with respect to who had both status and power. That has changed over time with the rise of university departments headed by professors who exercise considerable authority within their spheres of influence and now are also accorded a national, even international, status dependent upon their research output. But collegiate governance still retains a powerful hold both as an idea and in practice. It is most decidedly not only a symbolic touchstone, in the sense that Nybom believes is the case with von Humboldt's model, but rather a potent idea that impacts upon the policy-making process.

It can be argued that both the guilds and collegiality are parallel, even overlapping, manifestations of medieval forms of institutional governance (for a broad comparative overview see, Clark, 1977: 166–173). The question is why the academic guilds survived in continental Europe while the colleges, some of which – as we have noted – were flourishing institutions, did not? Again this is a conundrum mainly for the historians, but it seems plausible to argue that the post-revolutionary French state would have been intent on clipping the wings of all those institutions, universities as well as colleges that were perceived as unsympathetic to the new order of state and society. Colleges and universities were both an easily identifiable target and represented a particular threat because they were institutional representations of traditional values and interests. The guilds were more deeply embedded in the social order of medieval Europe and would be slowly undermined by the economic changes that developed throughout the nineteenth century, in particular the social relations of production associated with the spread of capitalism. In the meantime the academic guilds could be incorporated within the Napoleonic model of the university whereas the colleges could not.

All Change?

In this section of the chapter we will examine the more contemporary character of the continental model of the university, looking back to 1945 but with the predominant focus on the current struggles to restructure the governance of higher education at the level of the national system, and how those struggles have impacted upon institutional governance. But it is important to remember that the models, which we have been discussing, were reformulated in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In England there was *the revolution of the dons*, which reconstituted the collegial tradition at Oxbridge, and in continental Europe (more particularly Germany) stimulated the rise of the modern research university. Rothblatt and Wittrock's *The European and American University since 1800*, and more especially the contributions by Burrage (1993) and Wittrock (1993), provides an excellent comparative overview of the historical context within which the contemporary changes can be located.

In the words of Nybom:

> The second "revolution", the emergence of the modern research university, which in reality brought about a gradual restructuring and reorganization of all university systems . . . took place in the period between 1860 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 (Nybom, 2007: 69).

Moreover, these changes were driven as much by developments in the pursuit of knowledge as by forces external to the university: 'The driving forces behind these fundamental and simultaneous changes came not least from *within* science and scientific theory' (Nybom, 2007: 69), which swiftly left outmoded von Humboldt's commitment to the unity of knowledge. However, as Nybom goes on to reflect, the remarkable consequence was not the demise of von Humboldt's legacy but rather his canonisation:

> However, in our context it is equally interesting and remarkable that this process of cognitive and institutional disintegration, which in many respects signified a fundamental break with the original Humboldtian ideals, was not only explicitly presented as the ultimate fulfilment of Humboldtian dreams, it also, ironically enough, marked the reinvention and even canonization of Wilhelm von Humboldt himself as the spiritual *and* practical founding-father of the German (European) University (Nybom, 2007: 70).

Although there are some who still seem intent on canonising von Humboldt (Elton, 2008: 224–236), the critical task is to ascertain the significance of his *oeuvre* upon contemporary developments by evaluating its impact upon current policy ideas and decision-making, rather than expressing uncritical admiration for his legacy.

But in the immediate post-1945 years not a great deal changed in the governance of European higher education systems. Economic reconstruction took priority and higher education was not a policy issue that figured prominently in the political agenda. The dominant political sentiment was 'left of centre' embracing most of the mainstream parties and offering support for an agenda underwritten by the belief in education, including higher education, as a public good that should be used to fulfil desired social goals. To this end, the state had an obligation to provide the required public resources and sustain its control of the universities (in the United Kingdom

the system of higher education was by now virtually dependent upon public funding and the UGC was given new terms of reference – mildly more *dirigiste* – in 1946). These are the years *par excellence* of donnish dominion and the subordination of university councils to academic senates (see Chapter 6). On the continent, however, the ministries retained their authority and in the universities professorial power continued to hold sway.

The initial challenge to this authority structure, although stimulated by external events, interestingly came from within the university itself. Initiated by the student estate it threw into the melting pot the structure of university governance – who should have power and how should it be exercised? And, as has been true of the changing model of university governance more generally, it is the Dutch who instigated the most sweeping changes. In the words of De Boer:

> Prior to the 1970s, Dutch university governance was, on the one hand, dominated by state bureaucrats and, on the other, by the professoriate (De Boer, 2009: 223).

As the 1960s unfolded there was a growing demand in the Netherlands '… for democratic participation in university decision-making by junior academics, non-academic staff and students'. The consequence was the passage in 1970 of the *Wet op de Universitaire Bestuurshervorming* (WUB) Act, which introduced 'a system of functional representation through university and faculty councils'. This legislative Body (University Council) had to work with a small Executive Board, which included the *Rector Magnificus*, with the respective responsibilities of the two bodies following the hazy dividing line between academic and non-academic affairs (De Boer, 2009: 223; De Boer & Stensaker, 2007: 99–117). The potential for conflict was very real but the model was not replaced until 1997, and then as much as a consequence of new pressures for change as to its inherent weaknesses. Rather than follow the radical restructuring of governance that the Dutch attempted, the wider reaction was to make token gestures to the excluded parties (especially to student organisations) either by augmenting or by instigating their representation on existing university bodies. Another strategy, which appeared somewhat later, was to shift the locus of institutional power so that the more representative bodies (for example, academic senates) became increasingly marginalised players in the decision-making process.

While in the 1960s/1970s there may have been comparatively limited innovations in university governance (with the exception of the Netherlands), the same cannot be said of the past 20 years or thereabouts. Across Europe there have been attempts to change patterns of governance, at both the system and institutional levels, dramatically. Moreover, it appears that in recent years the continental European systems of higher education have been under even more pressure to change than their Anglo-American counterparts. Why is this?

There is broad agreement as to what pressures that have led to global change in higher education (for two interesting overviews, see Paradise et al., 2009: 88–106; Padure & Jones, 2009: 107–125). And, while it may be a statement of the obvious, it does amount to an interesting mix of social, political and economic pressures. The significant question is why these should have impacted upon continental European

systems of higher education with *particular* force. In Europe the expansion of student numbers has been universal but more pronounced in many of the continental nations than in England. However, this is not within itself a significant pressure for change as long as increased participation is matched by other developments: the availability of funding, the relevance of degree programmes to the requirements of the job market, low non-completion rates and a reasonably short cycle of graduation. If these factors do not apply then severe difficulties are likely to ensue, perhaps most vividly illustrated by developments in Italian higher education in which (cynically) the university is viewed as a comfortable, long-term parking lot for young, middle-class Italians – and not so young when they eventually graduate (Michelotti, 2005: 76–91).

The crux of the financial issue is the level of public funding, and it is evident that almost universally this has failed to keep pace with the rate of expansion in student numbers (certainly in terms of expenditure per student). Higher education is an area of social policy on which governments in hard times can restrict expenditure with a measure of immunity from public displeasure. Student numbers increase while the product changes its character, and although standards may deteriorate, this takes time to materialise and in any case is not easy to substantiate – the parking lot simply becomes more crowded. Not only was the movement towards mass higher education more measured in England but also there was an earlier recognition that if public funding was an unreliable source of income then it was perhaps time to consider charging students fees. In addition, the universities needed to develop strategies to increase their non-public funding – to become, to use Burton Clark's term, entrepreneurial (Clark, 2004).

Humboldt's model clearly embraces the idea of student self-development (*bildung*) – he or she is free to move from university to university, to construct within very liberal parameters a degree programme and to decide when it is time to take the examinations needed to graduate. The idea of an institutionally structured course of studies is anathema to the tradition. Furthermore, for example in France, access to higher education has been seen as an individual right for those who have successfully completed their secondary school examinations (Deer, 2005: 34–36). In many European countries (see Aamodt & Kyvik, 2005: 28–29 with reference to Scandinavia), access to higher education was funded out of the public purse because it was politically accepted on a broad front that this was a desirable goal to pursue in the belief that it promoted individual social mobility while cementing the social order. Higher education was a public good that embraced social goals that were part of its purpose and, if not more important than its central tasks (transmitting and expanding knowledge), then these at least provided a political rationale for sustaining state expenditure.

But the context began to change as the broad political consensus that had underwritten the welfare state started to crumble. The question of the efficiency and effectiveness of higher education was increasingly placed in the spotlight. It was even more difficult to defend public funding when there was a growing body of evidence to demonstrate that this subsidised students from the relatively well-off sections of society rather more than it enhanced working-class mobility.

Universities, therefore, were required to show that the public resources they consumed really did represent value-for-money for the taxpayer, and some continental systems found this particularly difficult to do given the seeming mismatch between degrees programmes and the kind of qualifications needed to find a job, large non-completion rates and students who seemingly viewed being a student as a career in its own right. Almost certainly the most evident manifestations of this new ethos was to be found in the United Kingdom, symbolised by the repeated electoral victories of the Conservative Party under the leadership of Mrs. Thatcher and the shift of the Labour Party to New Labour, thanks to the reforms instigated by Tony Blair. And in Britain the new policy drivers were stimulated by increasing evidence of both political and the economic failure as the 1960s and the 1970s unfolded (Tapper, 2007: 3–8).

It has always been the case that universities have had a responsibility to make available trained manpower for the labour market – whether this be the medieval universities and the training of priests, Humboldt's university and ensuring that the state was amply supplied with public servants, or late nineteenth century Oxbridge and recruitment into the higher echelons of professional life. As the twentieth century drew to a close the universities were increasingly perceived by the state and society (and indeed by many who worked in higher education) as essentially an economic resource. It is partly a question of providing students with the appropriate qualifications (or, in the jargon, 'the appropriate transferable skills') and partly the pressure to undertake cutting-edge research, especially if it can demonstrate its potential economic utility.

The relatively poor standing of the continental European universities in the various 'world league tables' (in part explained by the fact that in the continental systems, research was not necessarily a prominent part of the institutional mission) has augmented the pressure to change. There is a powerful belief that economic competition is increasingly global in its scope and those nations with knowledge-based economies will be in the best position to compete effectively at its cutting edge. It is this article of faith, rather than any desire to resuscitate the status of German higher education, that explains the decision of the German Federal Government to provide additional research funding for universities that can demonstrate their potential to produce research that is likely to be classified as world class (Kehm & Pasternack, 2009: 113–127). Ironically, it is Oxford and Cambridge, the two most traditionally collegiate of the European universities, that have tended to rank highest in the various league tables. But whether this has much to do with their collegiate structures and values is a very different question.

One measure of the extent and significance of the restructuring of the governance of the continental systems of higher education is the amount of attention it has received in the literature, with almost as much space devoted to it as the Bologna Process itself. For example, there had been special issues on governance published by *Higher Education Policy* in 1998 (Volume 11, Nos. 2/3) and by *TEAM* (Tertiary Education and Management) in 2001 (Volume 7, No. 2), to be followed more recently by several scholarly books (Amaral, Jones, & Karseth, 2002; Maassen & Olsen, 2007; Amaral, Bleiklie, & Musselin, 2008; Huisman, 2009).

What is notable is the broad convergence between the developments charted in this body of literature and the picture we constructed in Chapter 6 in which we discussed the rise of the managerial ethos in a number of British universities. But let us start with a subtle difference. The replacement of the University Grants Committee in the United Kingdom by the funding council model of governance has been widely interpreted as representing a decline in the autonomy of British universities with the state intent on steering more tightly the future development of higher education (Kogan & Hanney, 2000; Scott, 1995: 27; Shattock, 2008). On the continent, on the contrary, the new public management model of governance has been seen as granting institutions more autonomy, providing them with enhanced opportunities to map their own futures (with reference to Sweden, see Askling, Bauer, & Marton, 1999: 175–195).

But the debate about institutional autonomy is soon bogged down in convoluted analysis. Does state steering in fact represent a more sophisticated, but equally constraining, form of state control? What is the distinction between close and distant steering and what is their differential impact, if any, upon institutional behaviour? Does it make sense even to think of institutional autonomy when systems of higher education cannot be analysed without being located in their historical contexts with all the entwining socio-cultural, economic and political encumbrances this entails?

It is more plausible to argue that what has taken place are measures either to redefine institutional identity (in the United Kingdom) or to make it possible for institutions to establish a stronger sense of their identity (continental Europe). British universities have maintained a sense of their institutional identities, but there was no idea of the university that transcended the academic estate. The university possessed a self-identity built upon the interests of its academic members. However, that is far less true today, and it is realistic to think in terms of the decline of donnish dominion accompanied by increased institutional autonomy, *notwithstanding* more pronounced state steering. By comparison, with reference to the French system of higher education, Musselin and Mignot-Gérard have reflected on the basis of their research:

> . . . that one should not give too much weight to the overwhelming discourse on the 'impossible reform' of French universities, on their endemic immovability, and even on the conservative nature of the academic profession. Change has occurred and university government has evolved in France (Musselin & Mignot-Gérard, 2002: 63).

And in what direction has it moved?

> A major conclusion, based on this analysis, is that the previous conception of French universities as kind of administrative groupings of *facultés* has been modified in favour of a more cohesive, collective, institutional conception (Musselin & Mignot-Gérard, 2002: 64).

Moreover, the changes in France have been made without constructing a new public management model of system governance or moving towards the 'new managerialism' within the universities.

The question, and with reference to continental Europe more generally rather than just France, is how this has been achieved? There are two interconnected developments. First, changes in the national models of system governance with particular

reference to how the new structures and procedures impact upon the individual institutions. Second, changes in the governance of the universities themselves, which have been stimulated in part by the new system models. Let us deal with these changes in sequence, although it has to be strongly emphasised at the outset that we are presenting broad trends rather than pinpointing any one national system of higher education.

1. System change: a shift towards (France notwithstanding) a new public management model of governance in which the intention is to steer, rather than dictate, how individual institutions manage their daily affairs and plan their futures. Although there may be targeted funding for particular projects, institutions are increasingly given a block grant to manage with considerable discretion how they distribute it. The steering bodies are quasi-state institutions that often have the role of both interpreting government policy and determining how it is to be put into effect.
2. Institutional change: the leadership cadre is appointed rather than elected with strategy determined by a small executive body usually chaired by the Rector/President. It is not unusual to have lay representation on the policy-making bodies. Management structures within the universities are more under the control of the university (rather than the ministry) and they provide professional career lines for full-time administrators rather than seconded academics. Even middle-ranking academic administrative positions (for example, the deans) are appointed posts and have been incorporated into the management structures, and Acherman (1998) stressed how important this had been in changing the culture of the University of Amsterdam. In administrative terms (including control of the university's academic affairs) there is more hierarchy and bureaucracy (Teichler, 2007: 77–78, stresses the particular significance of the managerial revolution in European higher education) but more confined collegiality and fewer professorial fiefdoms.

   In policy terms consensus is desirable but the decision-making process is not simply about reconciling competing factions to support the broadest common denominator. Finally, there is a recognition that the model can work effectively only if there is highly competent leadership – individuals who can help develop a clear and coherent sense of institutional direction (planning) while working effectively within the boundaries of the existing academic culture. Leadership is more than brokering an agreement among competing interests.
3. System and institutional interaction: this depends very heavily upon what particular steering mechanisms are adopted. There is some targeted funding with incentives offered to encourage institutions either to pursue favoured initiatives (for example, the widening participation and teaching/learning programmes in England) or to develop aspects of their institutional profiles (for example, the German 'Excellence Initiative' that provides the funding to bolster the research output of selected institutions). Universities are required to produce 'institutional mission' statements and to demonstrate that they are indeed providing value for money. A contractual relationship has developed between the universities and the

> state, in which the universities have to demonstrate their effective use of public resources. Inevitably the quality assurance/accountability mechanisms are a key component in this interactive process, with ensuing struggles as to whether these should be institutionally centred or system driven. This is the price to be paid for greater institutional autonomy or state steering at a distance, which has led some to doubt whether this indeed represents the hollowing-out of the state or is in fact a more sophisticated form of state control.

Before turning to the question of how these changes impact upon interpretations of the changing governance of higher education – with, of course, particular reference to the collegial tradition – it is important to complicate somewhat the overly simplified picture presented so far. Important because the qualifications will have a bearing upon how we interpret what is happening to the governance of higher education in continental Europe. There is more to the picture than national variations in the pace of change,[2] although this is a convenient place to start. Austria and the Netherlands appear to have moved furthest and swiftest in embracing change, with France providing a powerful counterbalance at the other end of the continuum. But, regardless of the formal adoption of a new policy direction, invariably the enactment process itself has been protracted, at times incorporating a certain amount of oscillating practice. This has been due, not so much to resistance to change, but rather because within certain polities – and in this respect the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark provide good models – a long process of consultation invariably precedes policy implementation. Cerych and Sabatier (1986) present an interesting overview of earlier attempts to reform higher education in continental Europe and conclude – unsurprisingly – that the outcomes were mixed. It is also important to remember that this short discussion of comparative national developments is dependent upon the cases that are reported in the academic literature, and – an even stronger cautionary note – are published in English.

Interestingly several national governments (for example, those of Greece and Italy) have hidden behind the Bologna Process to justify change, seemingly as a way of shielding themselves from internal political opposition. The suggestion is that, although there may be widespread support for change, few are convinced what course it should take or are willing to bear the political consequences. Finally, there is as yet little clear evidence as to whether the new structures and procedures are producing changes in individual behaviour and, if so, whether this has contributed to making institutions more effective and efficient. With particular reference to the Netherlands, which observers would place at the end of the reformist continuum, Enders and his colleagues point to academic resistance, token compliance and how academic actors '. . . used their professional power and managerial roles to influence the enactment and implementation of new structures and processes' (Enders, de Boer, & Leisyte, 2008: 126). And the implication is that they have used that power to ensure their interests continue to be protected. But, in spite of their equivocal evaluation, these continental scholars do not deny that the world of European higher education – including its modes of governance – has changed significantly in the past two decades.

The Politics of Governance

In spite of all the academic equivocations about the precise character of the evolving systems of governance in European higher education, there is uniform agreement that new models of governance have emerged and are still evolving. As should be clear from the thrust of this chapter this is an uncertain process. Although there is some agreement as to the pattern of development – what has changed rather than what is emerging – the option widely adopted in the literature has been to list models of governance and then to present national case studies of reform. The purpose of this approach is not to argue that there is a general pattern of change but rather to look at how institutions, located within particular national settings, adjust to the pressures they face – including the pressure of system governance – as they try to fulfil their functions.

The volume edited by Maassen and Olsen (2007) presents a classic example of this methodology. They commence with 'four visions, or models, of university organization and governance', which are as follows:

> A rule-governed community of scholars
> An instrument for national political agendas
> An internal representative democracy
> A service enterprise embedded in competitive markets
> (Olsen & Maassen, 2007: 20).

And then, 'rather than assuming a single trend and institutional convergence . . . an institutional perspective invites the question, whether there are any general trends and whether there is convergence at all' (Olsen & Maassen, 2007: 20). The discussion we have presented in this chapter argues that there have been trends (although how general these are is open to debate) and that there has been a measure of convergence in the sense that increasingly different systems and institutions have come to adopt similar structures and procedures of governance and administration (the extent of convergence, however, is a matter of judgement).

Olsen and Maassen's 'four visions, or models' (of which various versions have been widely replicated in the literature) are to be found with different mixes in each of the European national systems. But the issue is not only about the changing composition of the ingredients but also about the politics of change for it is this that will determine the direction in which models of governance in higher education will evolve. Wright and Ørberg construct an interesting approach to understanding the change process, which is consistent with Olsen and Maassen's 'institutional perspective'. Contrasting their perspective with that of Neave and van Vught's *Prometheus Bound* (1991), which in their opinion presents a model of system governance that is too deterministic, they argue that:

> The meaning of the university will also change as new contexts arise and positioned actors will use the elements of the governance model . . . to negotiate the relation between control and autonomy and thereby enact the university in new ways (Wright & Ørberg, 2009: 85).

However, this anthropological interpretation – as they call it – of change (with Gulliver in Lilliput rather than the rock-bound Prometheus providing the mythological analogy) cannot avoid locating the university in its historical context with all the constraints of state and society that they imply (note that Gulliver was tied with ropes rather than the iron stakes and chains that bound Prometheus). Thus universities, like men, are not free to make their own histories. This institutional perspective needs therefore to interpret developments in the governance of higher education as a political process involving the interaction of institutional actors and those forces in state and society that constitute the dominant pressures for change. In doing so it may find that the ropes are more constraining than those of Gulliver's.

Conclusion: Collegiality as Academic Power

It would be difficult on the basis of reading our discursive overview to conclude that the continental universities have sustained a collegial tradition. Colleges and collegiate universities disappeared with the passing of medieval Europe while the nation states that evolved as the nineteenth century unfolded required institutions that would respond effectively to their needs – for trained public servants and for building a sense of national identity. However, regardless of what the state may have required, its demands had to be pragmatically negotiated. In effect, in both the Humboldtian and Napoleonic models a deal was struck in which state funding and formal control of the affairs of the academy were reconciled with the interests of the guilds.

For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the continental universities could maintain within this framework a particular tradition of collegiality – control of the daily affairs – especially the academic mission – of the institution. The universities sustained themselves through their continuous reconciliation of the major internal interests, which incorporated the expression of academic (essentially professorial) authority. *In this sense* it may be possible for the continental universities, given their past close ties to the state, to maintain themselves more effectively in the future as collegial universities than their Anglo-American counterparts. The state may yet prove to be a less-demanding taskmaster than the market when it comes to shaping the future of the university because (as von Humboldt consistently reminded us) there was, if not a natural affinity, then a coincidence of interests between the state and the universities. In part the issue will be resolved politically. Is the state prepared to support the universities with sufficient resources to enable them to resist the demands of the market or at least to accommodate the market in a manner that sustains academic power?

Indeed, the widespread support in continental Europe for the idea of higher education as essentially a public good does suggest a continuing powerful role for the state. The key question is whether the universities are going to be seen increasingly as independent corporate bodies (rather than as appendages of the state) that can determine for themselves how they should promote the public good? Or will that decision be arrived at through the accommodation of the traditional interests, with

the most powerful carrying the greatest weight? Although national trends vary, and the evidence is open to interpretation, the shift is clearly in the direction of stronger institutional identities with policy directions that are not simply the product of building a consensus out of competing interests. In this context institutional leadership and administrative structures have become increasingly controlling forces in both the formation and implementation of policy.

The collegial tradition was as much, if not more, about how the decision-making process worked rather than who controlled it. The spasmodic references to collegiality in the contemporary literature on the governance of higher education in continental Europe tend to overlook this distinction. However, if the focus of the academic guilds is concentrated essentially upon the management of their academic programmes, then the question of how that control is exercised becomes more visible simply because the scope for shaping wider institutional policy has shrunk. The proposition is that with the focus more upon academic affairs, then the greater the likelihood of collegiality. Certainly one can expect, especially given the historical legacy, professorial power will continue to be very important but almost by definition successful academic programmes have to be underwritten by collegiality. Thus, the state has an interest in promoting collegiality and sustaining the authority of the academic estate as long as that interest recognises the boundaries within which it should operate. Or to put the issue differently, will the academic guilds genuflect not only to state power but also to institutional authority in return for its support against the potential pressures of the market? We move therefore towards a model of governance within which the university becomes an actor independent of its various internal interests, while defending the right of those internal interests to maintain their control over important aspects of the university's mission. Moreover, this is accomplished in a manner that moves beyond the concentration of power in the hands of the professoriate to become more collegial within all those departments and research centres responsible for delivering the university's academic mission. This is the scenario that is currently unfolding with the outcomes likely to be as diverse as Europe itself notwithstanding either the Bologna Process or the broader pressures of globalisation accompanied by the spread of neo-liberal ideology.

Notes

1. The quotes in the following section are taken from von Humboldt's memorandum *On the Spirit and the Organisation Framework of Intellectual Institutions in Berlin*, which was apparently written sometime between the autumn of 1809 and the autumn of 1810, and is reproduced under the title *University Reform in Germany* in *Minerva*, Volume VIII, No. 2, April 1970, 242–250.
2. In this respect note how the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe stimulated a very significant wave of reform, including the rapid expansion of a private sector (Białecki & Dąbrowa-Szefler, 2009: 183–199).

Part IV
Whither Collegiality?

Chapter 9
Collegiality Revisited: Continuity, Rejuvenation or Demise?

Dimensions of the Collegial Tradition

It was never our intention in writing this book to construct a nostalgic portrayal of the collegial tradition in higher education or to glance back into the past and to lament that the world of higher education is not what it used to be. In the past 25 years most national systems of higher education have changed out of all recognition. We have used the idea of the collegial tradition to throw a spotlight on those changes. We have done so partly because this is a concept that we have grappled with in much of our writing. But it is more than a conceptual love affair. The collegial tradition represents a powerful idea of the university that embraces its purposes, how it should conduct its business and what its outcomes should be. Furthermore, in our analysis of the collegial tradition we have argued that it is a concept that is embedded not only in the collegiate universities but also has embraced higher education almost universally.

An examination of the idea of collegiality provides, therefore, a particular avenue into the analysis of change in higher education. It has certain advantages over other approaches. While requiring a presentation of the evolving historical context, it demands that the empirical evidence should be analysed conceptually rather than allowed to overwhelm the writing with descriptive detail. It does not prevent the intrusion of prescriptive judgements or the presentation of partisan policy proposals, but it does suggest that the researching of higher education deserves a better fate. As we have argued, it is a multi-dimensional concept but at its core is an argument about the character of higher education institutions – how they are structured to perform their key tasks. As such it enables the analysis to transcend, while drawing upon, the established research themes of access, funding, the evolution of the academic estate, the quality agenda, links to state and society or even exposure to the presumed perils of mass higher education.

In this chapter we want to bring together our analysis of the collegial tradition by presenting an overview of its current evolution and likely future development. The goal is to explore where it is going. We will do this in terms of the three central interpretations of the tradition that have formed the core of this book:

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1. the collegiate universities with particular reference to the federal principle of governance
2. colleges and commensality
3. the conduct of the academic enterprise

Within the context of this overview we will consider the future of collegiality both as a process (how collegial institutions should function) and as an idea (the purposes of collegiality and indeed of the university itself). The intention is to present contrasting (although not completely distinctive) scenarios: 'collegial continuity', 'collegial rejuvenation', and 'the demise of collegiality'. The chapter will conclude by briefly addressing the implications of the future of collegiality for our broader understanding of developments in higher education with, of course, particular reference to the national systems that form the empirical basis of this book.

Federalism: A Weak Form of Governance?

It is possible to argue that the foundation of the University of London, incorporating University College and King's College, was a political masterstroke in the sense that the creation of a federal university enabled the reconciliation of conflicting interests. Moreover, it could be maintained that this was a principled compromise in the sense that the University of London, as a publicly created body, would have the authority to control the examination process and award degrees, while the two colleges would be responsible for undertaking day-to-day academic functions. Furthermore, this could be seen as a principled outcome in that sense that the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge had set the precedent. It therefore genuflected to a model that embraced England's only two (leaving aside Durham) universities.

The contrary argument is that the federal model was little more than a convenient construction to reconcile irreconcilable interests and that, sooner or later, differing institutional ambitions would blow the compromise apart. In other words, to draw upon Dicey's strictures, the inherently conservative and weak nature of the federal model of governance would either prove unworkable or would impose too high a price upon the constituent members of the university. But, weak and conservative or not, it has been our contention that central to the collegiate university is a federal structure of governance, and if it is compromised beyond a certain point then the collegiate university is no more. Of course, as we have explored in this book, this leaves considerable room for manoeuvre because the line between acceptable and unacceptable compromises is far from certain.

With respect to the four federal universities (Cambridge, London, Oxford and Wales) that this book has drawn upon to analyse the collegiate university, the evidence supportive of 'continuity', 'rejuvenation' and 'demise' is mixed. The first point to stress, obvious but nonetheless very important, is that all four universities continue to have (albeit reformulated) federal structures of governance. When Oxford and Cambridge became collegiate universities, as opposed to mere creatures

of their colleges, is open to debate, but the University of London received its charter in 1836 and the University of Wales in 1893. Regardless of all the trials and tribulations, the four respective models of governance have persisted with broadly similar structures over time. Our prior analysis has made, which our subsequent discussion will reinforce, important qualifications regarding the federal structures of the four universities, but these should be evaluated in the light of this powerful manifestation of continuity.

The threat to federalism at the Universities of London and Wales is most clearly seen in the desertion of two of their respective flagships – Imperial and Cardiff. However, this does not mean that the two universities are bound to experience the fate of capsising instigated by further desertions. Indeed, it is possible that both will actually grow in size should other institutions (for example, the Brunel University with respect to London) decide that it is in their best interests to join. Both the Universities of London and Wales remain highly respected brand names, which could prove to be a greater attraction to prospective members than any of the perceived practical advantages (the centralised provision of shared services) of joining. Nonetheless, in terms of the overall prestige of the two universities it is not much comfort if highly prestigious members declare independence while other less-prestigious institutions, whatever their virtues may be, want to join. Such a change in the balance of a university's profile must inevitably impact upon the long-term strength of its appeal.

The same problem does not emerge at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge because the federal models are so much more deeply entrenched. However, the two universities have continued to incorporate new colleges and, while this may not dilute the overall brand name, it almost certainly extends the college hierarchy within both universities. It is not only a question of a prestige hierarchy built around the contrasting resources of the colleges for it also raises the issue of the relative weight of the individual colleges within both the inter-collegiate bodies and within the universities themselves. With respect to the formal rules all may be equal, but influence has a way of being determined by variables other than the constitutional niceties. So, all are equal but some are more equal than others. It may be inevitable that there is an imbalance of power amongst the constituent members of a federal system (after all, California, New York and Texas are not quite the same as Rhode Island, Nebraska and Idaho) but the impact of the expansion (albeit intermittent) of the collegial system at both Oxford and Cambridge upon their federal models of governance is a topic worthy of further investigation.

The evolution of the federal model at the University of London is a consequence of a great deal more than the change in the composition of its constituent members. The annual grant from the funding council is now distributed directly to the colleges (with the central services delivered by the university underwritten by a formula-driven financial contribution from the individual colleges) and the colleges can award their own degrees if they so wish. In effect the university has moved from a federal to a confederal model of governance. It is not too much of an exaggeration to draw a parallel with the collegiate consortia that are to be found in American higher education. In both cases the centre performs a service role, which entails

providing the support functions devolved to it by its constituent members. As it were, responsibilities are devolved to the centre, rather than as is the case in the more usual devolutionary process where the centre transfers responsibilities to the periphery.

Nonetheless, there are also critical differences because the University of London is not the creature of its colleges but rather an independent statutory body. The Universities of London and Wales are not inter-collegiate models in which the colleges delegate essentially administrative tasks to their universities as in the case with the collegiate consortia in the United States. However, although it is to make the point too sharply, in relation to its colleges the University of London has become essentially the provider of service functions, which entail administrative rather than policy-making responsibilities. And, as we have had occasion to remark previously, the constitutional position invariably carries less weight than what is taking place on the ground.

The conclusion that you are almost inexorably led to is that we are left with two somewhat different federal models of higher education in Britain – the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Furthermore, if we are to maintain that a federal model of governance is integral to the idea of the collegiate university, it follows that there are only two collegiate universities. However, we have already queried the strength in depth of the federal model at Oxford and Cambridge given the growth in the number of colleges. Are there other more significant causes for concern?

The contemporary struggles at Oxbridge (and more particularly, and certainly more publicly, at Oxford) over the governance of the two universities have focussed more on the decline of donnish dominion rather than on the possible erosion of the federal model of governance. While the defence of donnish dominion (especially seen in the resistance to the increased representation of lay members on Council) may be an evocative cause, it surely has no more importance than the surreptitious shifts in the balance of power within the federal model.

In Chapter 3 (*Collegiality: The Contemporary Challenges*) we discussed the pressures upon the federal model. At the core of the argument was the claim that successive governments had changed the relationship between the state and the universities in ways that tilted the power balance within the federal model from the colleges to the universities. This shift has followed on from the following (to name the key variables): the introduction of new funding mechanisms, the research assessment exercises, the quality assurance agenda and the persistent pressure upon the universities to 'widen participation' in order to achieve a more socially representative student intake.

How is this ongoing change in the federal model of governance of the two ancient collegiate universities to be interpreted? First, it has to be said that there is nothing new about the oscillation of power – once it was all colleges and virtually no university. Shifts in the balance of power is what one would expect of a federal model of governance (indeed what it was meant to accomplish), which provides an important counter to Dicey's negative analysis of federalism. Furthermore, the colleges at both Oxford and Cambridge continue to fulfil critical academic functions, and as long as they do so it would be very mistaken to see them as simply upmarket halls

of residence. The colleges – obviously some more than others – remain powerful in their own right; there are inter-collegiate bodies that (for example) organise undergraduate admissions and are responsible for the smooth running of undergraduate teaching, and within the decision-making bodies of both universities the college interests will be firmly represented.

So what is the problem? First, there is the fact that the relative balance of power appears to have been shifting inexorably for many years in one direction. Second, there is no sign that this is coming to an end, which raises the fears of those who feel that it has already gone too far. It is important to remember that Oxford and Cambridge sustain somewhat different representations of the collegiate university. For many years the University of Cambridge has had a stronger centre (reflecting in part the larger size of its science base), and nearly all college fellows are first and foremost university employees. And yet it is in Oxford that fears for the future of the collegiate university are more likely to be expressed and, although there may be stern critics of how Cambridge is governed, there is no voice to suggest that it is not a collegiate university. So what should be the balance of power within the federal model if the collegial tradition is to be sustained?

As long as the Oxford colleges continue to hold onto their core academic functions, the collegiate university will persist. But this is not to say that the fears for its future are completely groundless. The pressures associated with the research assessment exercises and quality assurance mechanisms have augmented the leverage of the universities over the colleges. But a perhaps more insidious development is the state interventions that impact directly upon the interests of the colleges. The most striking of these is the erosion of college fees and the channelling of the remaining income through the universities rather than paying it directly to the colleges. At one time negotiations on college fee income were conducted between the state and inter-collegiate bodies (with considerable cooperation between the Oxford and Cambridge colleges). The loss of this role therefore has both practical and symbolic significance.

The collegiate control of undergraduate admissions is another soft target. If the universities are to be held responsible by the state for their alleged failure to broaden the social base of their undergraduate recruitment then it makes sense for them, if not to wrest control away from the colleges, to seek a greater say in how the admissions process should function. It is far from an envious position for the universities in as much as the state accords them the responsibility but they do not control this sensitive policy area.

These developments suggest it is becoming increasingly difficult to hold onto any pristine understanding of the collegiate university as a federal model. The channelling of college fees through the Joint Resource Allocation Method (JRAM) has given rise to negotiations between representatives of the universities and of the colleges. Thus we have the interaction of two levels of governance – that of the university and that of the inter-collegiate representatives. In parallel fashion it is easy to envisage a joint university/inter-collegiate body taking over responsibility for undergraduate admissions, which would reshape in part how the federal model operates.

A perennial critical issue is the relationship between inter-collegiate bodies and individual colleges. Will the latter delegate to the former the binding authority to act on their behalf? Inter-collegiate bodies appear to function effectively, and with little rancour from the colleges, when they are focussed on specific issues such as admissions and the organisation of teaching. As the saga, following the recommendation of the Franks Report for the creation of a council of colleges (with binding decisions determined by the votes of college representatives), demonstrated there were limits to the spirit of inter-collegiate cooperation. It is evident that when core collegial interests are at stake many of the colleges want to protect their freedom of action just as Haverford College was prepared to incur the ire of Bryn Mawr College over the admission of women students in spite of their long inter-collegiate cooperation.

But, regardless of the sanctity of college sovereignty, it is evident that the federal model of governance is becoming more complex within the collegiate universities. There is a steady institutional entwining of the colleges to each other, and of them to the universities. The shift is away from the clearly defined models of governance to one in which it is difficult to apply unequivocal labels. As we noted, the University of Wales now describes its model of governance as confederal but London still continues to see itself as a federal university. Broader changes in higher education are stimulating an array of institutional links. The University of London can be viewed as a close federation of colleges, which are part of the loose federation known as London Higher. Within this context the possibilities for the development of collegial consortia, perhaps built around cooperation on specific degree programmes, are immense. Already such cooperation is expanding with, for example, the Universities of Sussex and Brighton, like the Universities of Plymouth and Exeter, sharing a medical school. Inevitably adjustments to the structures of governance have to be made to accommodate such developments. And Durham University, whose colleges for the most part are still little more than offshoots of the university, has a couple of colleges with an independent corporate identity and some endowment resources, which give them the potential to be more than simply residential colleges (and one could argue that the realisation of that potential is long overdue). If ever there were a hybrid model, it is Durham.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the two ancient English collegiate universities are far from alone in facing challenges to their models of governance. It is not simply that the federal model is under pressure but rather the governance of higher education at large is in flux. Although the fluidity makes for instability, with all the tensions that it can generate, it is also a dynamic situation that opens up possibilities for constructive change. While there may be parallel pressures that have impacted upon different national systems of higher education, there is no one pre-determined response that is dictated by those pressures. Inevitably response patterns will be shaped by the particular problems that an institution faces, but judgements will have to be made to determine how best to adapt to the pressures for change. It is a context that encourages innovation, lateral thinking and even risk taking. Moreover, it does provide opportunities for energetic leadership (with all the dangers that this possibly entails) for the structural constraints have been eroded.

Burgan (2006) argued that academics needed to be continuously engaged in the daily affairs of their universities if they were serious about impacting upon the decision-making process. The point is self-evident: if the academy is serious about retaining the collegiate university then it will have to fight for it. The restructuring of the federal models at both the Universities of London and Wales, including the defections of Cardiff and Imperial, came out of intense political struggles. And, to draw upon a broadly parallel Oxbridge example, the mobilisation of grassroots academic opposition defeated the then vice-chancellor of Oxford in his attempt to reformulate the composition of Oxford's Council. So, in one form or another, the collegiate university with its federal model of governance can survive but whether the commitment either to sustain or to reformulate it actually exists is another matter.

Colleges and Commensality

The perseverance of federal structures of governance is more than matched by the longevity of colleges in the history of higher education. Furthermore, the foundation of new colleges, although not a frequent occurrence, has not dried up. But it is equally clear that the character of the present-day college (even at Oxford and Cambridge) no longer conforms to the fictionalised model – gothic buildings, well endowed, an enclosed world constructed around a range of inward-looking social and cultural activities and – above all – dedicated solely to undergraduate teaching. The values that underwrote the foundation of collegiate models of higher education – namely the importance of a liberal education within the confines of a small college dedicated to undergraduate education, combined with a strong emphasis on the residential college as a force for shaping the whole person – may still persist, but this is a declining reality. In its most pristine form it is most likely to be found in the small American liberal arts colleges, but its overall representation within higher education is in steady decline.

In order to survive, the idea of the college has adjusted pragmatically, and in the process has become a more complex and, in some respects, more interesting concept. Indeed, our small foray into the world of the medieval college revealed similar flexibility. There are numerous contemporary examples – colleges for graduate students, undergraduate colleges with affiliated graduate students and colleges that use their resources (status and buildings) to pursue a range of money-making activities. If there is nostalgia then it is put to good use in the regular appeals for donations that are targeted at alumni. Furthermore, as the admission of women to the former all-male colleges at both Oxford and Haverford demonstrates, the colleges did in the last analysis make decisions they felt were in their own best interests. Decision-making in the colleges may be slow but the need to do what is seen as best for the college is invariably of paramount concern.

In some respects colleges have become business enterprises, dependent on their commercial pursuits to augment their incomes and thus enhance their core activities. And at Kent, Lancaster and York we noted the emergence of college annexes,

so creating the possibility for students to establish different kinds of relationships to their college. In a formal sense all undergraduates at these three new (1960s) universities, as well as at Durham, may belong to a college but what that means in practice can vary considerably.

What is true for students is also true for the faculty. The collegiate system (even in the small, high-status American liberal arts colleges) has had to adjust to social and academic change, which has meant accepting the fact that nearly all academics will construct relations to the college that they perceive to be in their own best interests. Thus the weight of undergraduate teaching cannot be allowed to damage seriously the commitment to research; commensality has to be confined more to the 'nine-to-five' working day; and involvement in conducting the affairs of the college becomes more ritualised, and perhaps increasingly delegated to a small number of faculty whose personal circumstances (and interests) make it particularly appropriate. As the example of the University of California at Santa Cruz (UCSC) demonstrates, it is especially difficult to create a collegiate university (as opposed to a university that embraces collegiality) within the boundaries of a university with a deeply entrenched commitment to the research agenda. The unexplored issue with respect to UCSC is whether a compromise could have been formulated that would have allowed the differing factions either to coalesce amicably or to go their separate ways while making different positive contributions to the greater good.

While, to draw again upon Rhoades (1990), reports on American higher education may have had a tendency to invoke the collegial model of higher education and thereby create a nostalgic (and unreal) view of the past, the same charge could not be levelled at the colleges themselves. Moreover, the four English universities with colleges (besides Oxford and Cambridge) that we have researched in this book (Durham, Kent, Lancaster and York) all confirm vociferously the appeal of their colleges to would-be students and the depth they add to the undergraduate experience. These are claims that would be matched in broad terms by the American liberal arts colleges, and even those less than enamoured of Oxbridge would accept that the colleges are still intrinsic to the current identities of the two universities.

'Small is beautiful' retains its appeal, but precisely how small colleges have to be in order to sustain that appeal is difficult to say. The interesting question is what evidence is there to support it? No doubt survey evidence could be produced to show that the overwhelming majority of undergraduates have positive views of their colleges and would affirm that it was the opportunity to reside in a college that proved a decisive factor in determining which university to attend. But this is to solicit the views of the insiders, those who have already come within the orbit of the colleges. We need to know how wide this appeal is or, to put the question the other way round, is it a selective appeal, and, if so, how selective? The question that can be asked, but to which there is no answer, is how attractive these universities would be to applicants and undergraduates if they had no residential colleges? One suspects that the brand of the university, and that of the liberal arts college, is so strong that the presence of colleges has little impact upon applications, although undoubtedly they will impact upon the undergraduate experience. Again it is a matter for speculation, but perhaps an environment with intrinsically more appeal could replace colleges.

The implication of the above argument is that the public pronouncements coming from the universities with residential colleges are more a reaffirmation of their value positions rather than of any solid evidence of their appeal to applicants. This is to be expected especially when it is possible to sustain the argument with an array of anecdotal evidence. The position with respect to Oxford and Cambridge is more interesting. First, these are collegiate universities and the colleges have key academic functions – including, of course, control over the admission of undergraduates. Second, several of the colleges at both universities have international reputations in their own right. Third, over time colleges have established social links with schools and families (note also the delicate issue of how the Ivy League universities respond to pressure from their alumni who seek to secure the entry of their own children) and undoubtedly these will encourage some applicants to apply to a particular college.

Perhaps the most solid Oxbridge evidence of the appeal of the colleges is that, although applicants can make open applications (that is not to apply to a specific college) the overwhelming majority in fact choose not to do so. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that there is a strong belief (if not amongst applicants then amongst their teachers and parents) that the chances of securing a place are enhanced if you target a particular college. Moreover, how detailed a picture of the college the applicant will obtain – especially in terms of the way it will impact upon the teaching she/he is likely to receive – is very problematic. It is likely that for most applicants Cambridge and Oxford seem very desirable places to study and both come with colleges.

As the federal model of institutional governance is open to a range of interpretations, so much the same is true of the idea of the college. We are in a fluid situation with colleges adjusting to the changing environment in a manner that they judge will best ensure their long-term futures. The paths are not necessarily those the colleges would have chosen if they had been free agents. They have to plan their development in the context of their present circumstances (which certainly within Oxford and Cambridge will vary considerably from college to college) as well as the pressures they face from other institutional actors (the university, other colleges, inter-collegiate bodies and even state organisations). Moreover, the key internal elements – college fellows, students and the administrative staff – will each have interests of their own to protect. These ebbs and flows occur within an environment that is increasingly less rule bound. So, students and faculty (less so administrative/support staff) are more in control of their relationship to the college. Once the norms were clear-cut, now they are more amenable to interpretation. Thus the college has less of a sense of its own identity and its members, obviously within broadly defined boundaries, can shape their own relationship to the college. The college will mean different things to different people. To some students it will be at the very centre of their lives for several years, for others little more than an upmarket hall of residence (especially if nearly all their teaching is under the control of the university). To some tutors it may provide little more than lunch or the occasional dinner, for others it may mean an opportunity to construct an alternative (perhaps more interesting) career line. Some employees may see the college as little more than

an employer (and a not particularly generous one at that), while others may find their jobs give them both satisfaction and status within a comfortable, human-scale setting. None of this is particularly surprising and, to a degree, it was always true. The difference is that the idea of the college has rarely been so fluid and relationships to it driven so much by pragmatic considerations. This is perhaps as dramatic a period of change as that of the latter half of the nineteenth century, which saw the emergence of the idea of the college that is contemporarily under so much pressure.

The Academic Enterprise in Action

One of the main reasons for writing this book was the conviction that the collegial tradition was embedded deeply within both contrasting national systems of higher education and institutions of a widely varied character (including, besides universities, law firms and barristers' chambers). It is a tradition not confined to collegiate universities or to universities with colleges alone but rather represents an idea of how all universities should pursue their goals. It is composed of values that underwrite organisational structures and procedures that many would argue are central to the idea of the university.

In much of continental Europe, the United States and Britain there has been a persistent belief that control of academic affairs is best left to those who are responsible for their delivery. This placed academic authority in the hands of the faculty and most power, especially in continental Europe, resided with the professors. But in this respect the contrast with both the United States and Britain should not be too sharply drawn. Invariably senior academics, especially those who were members of decision-making bodies like Senates or held management posts – heads of departments, deans and members of academic boards – had most influence. From 1945 to around 1980 the academic estate was the dominant decision-making force in the university. We have discussed how in the past 20 years its influence has waned to the point that it may no longer control even the development of the university's academic agenda.

In continental Europe the university has come to acquire a much stronger sense of its own identity and institutional decision-making is no longer simply a question of how to navigate and construct compromises out of competing interests. In the United Kingdom the sentiment of the academic literature is that the state has eroded university autonomy by ever more tighter steering of the development of higher education. But there is an alternative interpretation: the state has strengthened its grip of higher education policy by undermining the authority of the academic estate and at the same time has enhanced the ability of the university to resist pressure from this previously dominant interest. The key issue is no longer whether universities are autonomous institutions or not, but rather who has power on campus. But, of course, one should not forget that power over the development of the university may also have seeped out of the campus towards state and quasi-state institutions (the United Kingdom) or to the trustees (the United States).

The decline in the authority of academics is usually seen as the corollary of the managerial revolution in higher education with its emphasis on the importance of institutional leadership, senior management teams, the clear designation of councils as the executive authority of the university (with a majority of lay members and a layperson as chair), the fusing of departments into schools/colleges and the appointment by the centre (rather than election from below) of deans who are absorbed into a hierarchical chain of command. Thus, even the idea of shared governance, let alone collegial governance, is fading rapidly.

However, interpreting developments in higher education is rarely clear-cut. The presence of many institutions within a diverse system of higher education invariably means that universities will change at different speeds and with variations in their practices. As the continental experience informs us it is perhaps more important to examine policy implementation rather than policy prescriptions because the gap between what appears on the statute book and how the universities interpret their legal obligations is often wide. In spite of these equivocations, it is evident that both academic structures, and the mechanisms by which the academy develops, have changed quite markedly in the past 20 years. The issue is not whether there has been a managerial revolution but rather how it impacts upon the structure of governance and administration in higher education. Does it mean the demise of the collegial tradition? Or can this assume forms that will lead to a constructive synergy between managerialism and collegiality?

In both the United Kingdom and the United States the academic estate (excluding the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge) was the most prevalent policy-making interest for only a comparatively brief period of time. Therefore, it could be argued that what we are seeing is not so much the decline of donnish dominion but rather a shrinking of its sphere of influence to boundaries that were once commonplace. By way of contrast, in much of continental Europe the university did not have a strong identity, rather it acted as a body reconciling the competing interests of the guilds, with the professoriate (that gave the university its identity) exercising most authority. In the emerging continental model the university has more autonomy not so much in relation to the state but rather in its dealings with its internal interests. While the state increases the institutional authority of the university, in return it demands more detailed accountability. The university needs to demonstrate that it is indeed delivering efficiency and effectiveness.

The question is what model of governance and administration will be adopted within the varying national systems to enable the university to achieve its goals? The general trend across national boundaries points to more centralised structures of both governance and administration, with a decline in the authority of the academic estate paralleled by an increase in the influence of both the administrative arm of the university and of lay representatives within its governing bodies. So there has been a real shift in the formal balance of power, with the academic faculty more restricted to sustaining academic programmes both in teaching and in research. However, how those general formal shifts actually impact in practice is a matter for research, and there is some evidence (especially from continental Europe) to suggest that change is often more cosmetic than real.

As equally (if not more) important are the possible variations in the functioning of the new model. With regard to this issue, the evidence sends out mixed messages: at one end of the continuum an almost hermetically sealed cadre of decision-makers who determine the policy direction of the university and at the other end (again with particular reference to continental Europe) the perpetuation of weak university governance, thanks to the continuing strength of the guilds. But between these two extremes there are possibilities for an alternative model, probably best exemplified by Burton Clark's entrepreneurial university, which draws upon examples from higher education institutions in the United Kingdom, continental Europe and the United States (all three of which provide the empirical evidence for this book).

It is this possibility that suggests the seeds of a reformulated collegial model for the university. In this model the role of the faculty is to manage and develop the academic mission of the university (its traditional function). The proposition is that academic programmes, whether they are research projects or undergraduate degrees, cannot be successfully delivered unless they are managed collegially. While this may require strong leadership and effective management it also means that the delivery of the end product is dependent upon cooperative action. A broad consensus, constructed through the participation of those who are responsible for delivery, is critical to ensuring success. The entrepreneurial university cannot be imposed from the centre, neither can research excellence or high status undergraduate degrees; the centre is a facilitator of the academic enterprise. In as much as academic development (as opposed to ongoing delivery) is likely to be costly, then it is inevitable that personnel in key administrative positions will be called upon to estimate risks and form judgements. However, it is risk management that has to be arrived at on the basis of evidence provided by those who are in the best position to know (to guess) what is likely to succeed – the academic estate.

Viewed in this way collegiality becomes a form of governance that is dependent upon the bridges constructed between the centre and the periphery as well as between the different interests within the university. It is not so much shared governance but rather joint governance. It is not a question of the charismatic leadership of president/rector/principal/vice-chancellor, the bureaucratic authority of senior management groups, the formal executive authority of councils or even the sovereignty vested in assemblies. Rather it is an interactive process built upon the trust established amongst the various institutional partners. While the centre may have the formal authority to make the key decisions (and must make those decisions) it is the process of decision-making that determines what those decisions will be. It is clear both where authority resides and how that authority should be exercised.

Central to the reformulated ideal of collegiality is the recognition by state and society that universities are most likely to meet the expectations placed upon them, as well as fulfilling those expectations they place upon themselves, if they remain autonomous institutions (the Humboldtian tradition retains its value). Autonomy does not mean that universities are free agents to plot the course of their development as they please. But it does mean that they will determine how they respond to the social and economic pressures within which they have to manoeuvre, including those pressures generated by their own established national traditions of higher

education. For collegiality to thrive it means the state has to trust the universities. In continental Europe the state has permitted a greater measure of institutional autonomy but in return requires greater accountability, but autonomy is hollow if the accountability mechanisms are too oppressive. Inevitably this would encourage bureaucratic rather than collegial response mechanisms, as occurred in the United Kingdom before opposition from within the universities forced the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) to move towards a 'lighter touch' model. The evidence, therefore, would suggest that there is a lot to play for. There is no inevitability about the intensity and direction that either state control or the intrusion of managerialism will take, and collegial resistance – as the battle between the QAA and frontline academics in the United Kingdom demonstrates – can reshape how they impact upon the university.

The Scenarios

The book has examined the development of higher education on a wide front through the prism of the collegial tradition. The first, and most obvious, point to make is that ideas do not survive unless they are already in tune with the unfolding character of a state and a society or unless they can be reformulated in a manner that empathises with that unfolding character. However ideas are not simply dependent variables because change is an interactive process incorporating a dialogue between theory and practice.

Within the United Kingdom there was a powerful idea of the university incorporating values and traditions that shaped the relationship between the universities on the one hand and state and society on the other – autonomy, collegiality, the delivery of demanding programmes of undergraduate education, the independence of the research tradition, and higher education as a public service that transcended its formal academic brief. The emerging model of higher education that is taking root is the product of the interaction of new values and practices introduced side by side in a piecemeal process of change. And what has been true of the United Kingdom is equally true, perhaps even more so, of continental Europe and the United States.

Drawing upon the above overview of the broad developments in the collegial tradition we want to construct three differing perspectives on the ongoing state of play: continuity, reformulation and demise.

Continuity

In spite of all dire warnings of the demise of the collegial tradition that we have analysed in this book, it is important not to forget that it remains a powerful idea in any discussion of the development of higher education. It is perhaps now, however, of greater symbolic, than formative, significance – a little akin to the ritualistic references to both von Humboldt and John Henry Newman. But Oxford and Cambridge

continue as two collegiate universities and by any measure they remain in the top flight of world-class universities. The colleges continue to fulfil important academic functions and retain a significant presence in shaping the intellectual agendas at both universities. Moreover, the number of colleges has expanded in recent decades and the battles to retain traditional structures of university governance have been fierce. We are not looking at a mild collegial lamb that is being led to the slaughter.

Similarly those universities with residential colleges continue to reaffirm their importance both in attracting applicants and in adding to the quality of the undergraduate experience. Collegiality defined as the college experience may be retreating to a heartland (with the liberal arts colleges in the United States and Oxbridge at its very centre) but it remains a very significant force in the lives of many undergraduates. It can be argued that its relative decline is not a consequence of a weakening of its appeal but rather the result of powerful practical constraints – decent colleges are expensive to construct and sustain, and increasingly many students are not in a position to uproot and go to college.

The ‘retreat to the heartland’ proposition is also applicable to developments that are occurring with respect to the academic organisation of universities. The evidence is mixed: on the one hand the emergence of centralised administrative structures that suck in the periphery of the university, but on the other hand there is the entrepreneurial university that attempts to create a dynamic synergy between centre and periphery. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that effective teaching and research can be maintained unless there are collegial relations, no matter how constructed, amongst those responsible for the fulfilment of those tasks. In this model collegiality does not disappear but is confined to the smaller units of the university – departments, laboratories, colleges and research teams. This is not to deny that the smaller units will also have both managers and a leadership cadre, but the argument is that the closer you are to the delivery of the core functions of a university, the more essential it is to sustain a collegial ethos if you wish to be successful.

Rejuvenation

The continuity of the collegial tradition is dependent upon three variables: how deeply embedded it is in the fabric of institutions and the consciousness of those who exercise authority within them, the extent to which it can demonstrate continuing practical payoffs (even if the evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive) and the fact that it is critical to the conduct of teaching and research of a high standard. Continuity, therefore, is built around ingrained and purposeful resistance to change whereas reformulation is dependent upon thoughtful readjustments by both institutions and individuals in order to sustain the values of the collegial tradition, although not necessarily all of its manifestations.

Throughout the book we have provided examples of how the collegial tradition has adjusted to pressures for change. This is true of the three dimensions of collegiality that we have examined: governance and administration, colleges and commensality, and the delivery of the academic agenda. Colleges as institutions

and colleges as people (predominantly students and tutors) have made pragmatic adjustments in their relationships to the collegial tradition. In one sense it places collegial loyalties on a less-secure footing (the relationship is based more on personal and institutional self-interest) but it can also provide a powerful rationale for tutors and students to sustain their loyalty. The institution has to calculate the price it can afford to pay, while individuals have a clearer idea of the benefits (and costs) that accrue to them. Thus collegiality becomes an idea that is maintained more by an implicit bargaining process as opposed to assumed loyalties. While the romance in the relationship may be in decline, the glue may be more adhesive.

The problem, as we have alluded to on a number of occasions, with the reformulation thesis, is that there are no clear-cut boundaries as to how far the concept of collegiality can be stretched before it becomes something very different. However, this has always been an issue (note the radical changes that Rothblatt charted in the nineteenth century identity of Cambridge), and it is not one that is confined to the idea of collegiality alone. However, to say that there is a general problem does not resolve the matter. Without attempting to enter the uncharted waters of precise measurement, it is possible to say that many of the traditional ingredients of the collegial tradition are still to be found: federal systems of government in which responsibility for key functions is shared, residential colleges, a commitment to undergraduate teaching that embraces more than professional training and an acceptance that the academic enterprise needs to be driven as much from the bottom upwards as managed from the top down.

Demise

Continuity and reformulation, however, must be placed within the context of the broad pattern of development within higher education. We may point to both continuity borne of resistance and reformulation as the product of pragmatic compromises but there is plenty of evidence to support the hypothesis that the collegial tradition is in relative decline and its presence in higher education is now marginal.

The founding of new collegiate universities is virtually impossible. Besides the costs of such a venture, there is the problem of drawing up statutes that would ensure a constructive sharing of the key functions between the university and its college(s). Of course, the constitution of the United States provides a dramatic counter-argument but it emerged out of a particular historical context and has evolved over time in response to changing circumstances. The US constitution is not an invention but the product of an evolutionary (if dramatic) process of historical change. The hypothesis is that likewise collegiate universities cannot be created but have to evolve out of established institutional structures and procedures.

The attempts to introduce collegiate universities in the United States did little more than produce residential colleges, which were already embedded in the American tradition of higher education. The University of California, Santa Cruz, undoubtedly represents the boldest contemporary endeavour to establish a collegiate

university but, while it may still be unique amongst the campuses of the University of California, it cannot be described as a collegiate university. It is possible to point to a range of ad hoc reasons to account for this outcome with the implication that if the circumstances had been more propitious the outcome would have been different. However, we would maintain that collegiate universities have to be the product of evolution and cannot be created. Thus from the beginning Santa Cruz would be something else other than a collegiate university.

Moreover, the consortia of American liberal arts colleges appear to be entrapped at the inter-collegiate stage of development with little incentive to move beyond that model. Furthermore, there is no societal dynamic to suggest that they need to do otherwise. Within England the pressures upon the federal models of governance are destabilising university/college patterns of interaction either by increasing the power of the university (Oxford and Cambridge) or by strengthening the move towards independence on the part of the colleges (London and Wales).

Undoubtedly, the collegial tradition, defined as residential colleges and the social interaction that they create, remains popular. But this is essentially a taste for a limited segment of society and, within the mass model of higher education, is somewhat marginalised. It is a classic example of collegiality retreating to its heartland. More significant is the academic organisation of the university because this is a matter that impacts upon all institutions of higher education. While we have pointed to continuity (and resistance) as well as pragmatic reformulation, it cannot be denied that the pervasiveness of the managerial revolution has eroded the collegial governance and administration of the university – including how it conducts it academic affairs. The managerial impulse (for example, in the entrepreneurial university) may operate in a fashion that interacts constructively with collegial values, and within segments of the university the collegial tradition may persist or even experience a revival. But this is rather like clutching at straws in the midst of a hurricane. Nonetheless, there is still sufficient contradictory evidence (built around continuity and reformulation) to suggest not the demise of the collegial tradition but rather its containment within shrinking parameters. Are the barriers sufficiently strong to ensure that the hurricane will not claim a complete triumph?

If we conclude with a somewhat pessimistic scenario for the future of the collegial tradition, it is important to place this within the framework of the wider development of higher education, and more particularly the fact that the governance of higher education at large is in a state of flux. Perhaps what is more remarkable about the idea of collegiality is not that it is under pressure but that it has survived for so long. In a time of considerable flux it remains a reference point for contemporary developments. Can the same be said of the emerging models of the university? Will they prove any more effective responses to the challenges that the university will face in the twenty-first century? Or will the most viable models prove to be those that embrace at their very cores the idea of collegiality with strong respect for and trust in the academic guild?

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